[House Report 117-156]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


117th Congress    }                                    {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                    {      117-156

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                _______
                                

October 28, 2021.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Schiff, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 5412]

    The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 5412) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2022 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence community management account.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 303. Temporary authority for paid leave for a serious health 
condition.
Sec. 304. Harmonization of whistleblower protections.
Sec. 305. Congressional oversight of certain special access programs.
Sec. 306. Clarification of requirement for authorization of funding for 
intelligence activities.
Sec. 307. Authorization of support by Director of National Intelligence 
for certain activities relating to intelligence community workforce.
Sec. 308. Requirements for certain employment activities by former 
intelligence officers and employees.
Sec. 309. Non-reimbursable detail of intelligence community personnel 
to assist with processing and resettlement of refugees, parolees, and 
other aliens from Afghanistan.
Sec. 310. Authority for transport of certain canines associated with 
force protection duties of intelligence community.
Sec. 311. Development of definitions for certain terms relating to 
intelligence.
Sec. 312. Support for and oversight of Unidentified Aerial Phenomena 
Task Force.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
Sec. 402. Clarification of certain responsibilities of Director of 
National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence regarding 
National Intelligence Program budget concerning Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.
Sec. 404. Climate Security Advisory Council.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements

Sec. 411. Protection of certain facilities and assets of Central 
Intelligence Agency from unmanned aircraft.
Sec. 412. Modification of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
personnel management authority to attract experts in science and 
engineering.
Sec. 413. Requirements for termination of dual-hat arrangement for 
Commander of the United States Cyber Command.
Sec. 414. National Space Intelligence Center.
Sec. 415. Procurement by Federal Bureau of Investigation of Chinese 
products and services.
Sec. 416. Counterintelligence units at non-intelligence community 
Federal departments and agencies.
Sec. 417. Detection and monitoring of wildfires.

   TITLE V--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE MATTERS

Sec. 501. Compensation and professional standards for certain medical 
officers of Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 502. Medical advisory board of Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 503. Report on protocols for certain intelligence community 
employees and dependents.
Sec. 504. Inspector General of Central Intelligence Agency review of 
Office of Medical Services.
Sec. 505. Clarification of effect of certain benefits relating to 
injuries to the brain.

            TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Sec. 601. National Intelligence Estimate on security situation in 
Afghanistan and related region.
Sec. 602. Report on likelihood of military action by countries of the 
South Caucasus.
Sec. 603. Report on intelligence collection posture and other matters 
relating to Afghanistan and related region.
Sec. 604. Report on threat posed by emerging Chinese technology 
companies.
Sec. 605. Report on cooperation between China and United Arab Emirates.
Sec. 606. Report on propagation of extremist ideologies from Saudi 
Arabia.
Sec. 607. Report on effects of sanctions by United States.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Sec. 701. Pilot program for security vetting of certain individuals.
Sec. 702. Intelligence assessment and reports on foreign racially 
motivated violent extremists.
Sec. 703. Periodic report on positions in intelligence community that 
can be conducted without access to classified information, networks, or 
facilities.
Sec. 704. Biennial reports on foreign biological threats.
Sec. 705. Annual reports on domestic activities of intelligence 
community.
Sec. 706. Annual reports on certain cyber vulnerabilities procured by 
intelligence community and foreign commercial providers of cyber 
vulnerabilities.
Sec. 707. Improvements to annual report on demographic data of 
employees of intelligence community.
Sec. 708. National Intelligence Estimate on escalation and de-
escalation of gray zone activities in great power competition.
Sec. 709. Report on certain actions taken by intelligence community 
with respect to human rights and international humanitarian law.
Sec. 710. Briefing on trainings relating to blockchain technology.
Sec. 711. Report on prospective ability to administer COVID-19 vaccines 
and other medical interventions to certain intelligence community 
personnel.
Sec. 712. Report on potential inclusion within intelligence community 
of the Office of National Security of the Department of Health and 
Human Services.
Sec. 713. Reports relating to Inspector General of Defense Intelligence 
Agency.
Sec. 714. Report on rare earth elements.
Sec. 715. Report on plan to fully fund the Information Systems Security 
Program and next generation encryption.
Sec. 716. Review of National Security Agency and United States Cyber 
Command.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
        ``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given 
        such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 3003).
          (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2022 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the following elements of the United States Government:
          (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) The Department of Defense.
          (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (5) The National Security Agency.
          (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (7) The Coast Guard.
          (8) The Department of State.
          (9) The Department of the Treasury.
          (10) The Department of Energy.
          (11) The Department of Justice.
          (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
          (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be 
appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence 
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of 
section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
          (1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations 
        referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the 
        President.
          (2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3), 
        the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection 
        (a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the 
        executive branch.
          (3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly 
        disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any 
        portion of such Schedule except--
                  (A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing 
                Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 
                U.S.C. 3306(a));
                  (B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; 
                or
                  (C) as otherwise required by law.

SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2022 the sum of 
$619,000,000.
  (b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to 
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for 
fiscal year 2022 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year 
2022.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed 
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity 
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of 
the United States.

SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 303. TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FOR PAID LEAVE FOR A SERIOUS HEALTH 
                    CONDITION.

  (a) Authorization of Paid Leave for a Serious Health Condition for 
Employees of Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
          (1) In general.--Title III of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
        section 304 the following:

``SEC. 305. TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FOR PAID LEAVE FOR A SERIOUS HEALTH 
                    CONDITION.

  ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Paid serious health condition leave.--The term `paid 
        serious health condition leave' means paid leave taken under 
        subsection (b).
          ``(2) Serious health condition.--The term `serious health 
        condition' has the meaning given the term in section 6381 of 
        title 5, United States Code.
          ``(3) Son or daughter.--The term `son or daughter' has the 
        meaning given the term in section 6381 of title 5, United 
        States Code.
  ``(b) Paid Serious Health Condition Leave.--During the period 
specified in subsection (f), and notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, a civilian employee of an element of the intelligence community 
shall have available a total of 12 administrative workweeks of paid 
leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the following:
          ``(1) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or 
        parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or 
        parent has a serious health condition.
          ``(2) Because of a serious health condition that makes the 
        employee unable to perform the functions of the employee's 
        position.
  ``(c) Treatment of Serious Health Condition Leave Request.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an element of the 
intelligence community shall accommodate an employee's leave schedule 
request under subsection (b), including a request to use such leave 
intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule, to the extent that the 
requested leave schedule does not unduly disrupt agency operations.
  ``(d) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--During the period specified in 
subsection (f), and notwithstanding any other provision of law--
          ``(1) an employee of an element of the intelligence 
        community--
                  ``(A) shall be required to first use all accrued or 
                accumulated paid sick leave before being allowed to use 
                paid serious health condition leave; and
                  ``(B) may not be required to first use all or any 
                portion of any unpaid leave available to the employee 
                before being allowed to use paid serious health 
                condition leave; and
          ``(2) paid serious health condition leave--
                  ``(A) shall be payable from any appropriation or fund 
                available for salaries or expenses for positions within 
                the employing element;
                  ``(B) may not be considered to be annual or vacation 
                leave for purposes of section 5551 or 5552 of title 5, 
                United States Code, or for any other purpose;
                  ``(C) if not used by the employee before the end of 
                the 12-month period described in subsection (b) to 
                which the leave relates, may not be available for any 
                subsequent use and may not be converted into a cash 
                payment;
                  ``(D) may be granted only to the extent that the 
                employee does not receive a total of more than 12 weeks 
                of paid serious health condition leave in any 12-month 
                period;
                  ``(E) shall be used in increments of hours (or 
                fractions thereof), with 12 administrative workweeks 
                equal to 480 hours for employees of elements of the 
                intelligence community with a regular full-time work 
                schedule and converted to a proportional number of 
                hours for employees of such elements with part-time, 
                seasonal, or uncommon tours of duty; and
                  ``(F) may not be used during off-season (nonpay 
                status) periods for employees of such elements with 
                seasonal work schedules.
  ``(e) Implementation.--
          ``(1) Consistency with serious health condition leave under 
        title 5.--The Director of National Intelligence shall carry out 
        this section in a manner consistent, to the extent appropriate, 
        with the administration of leave taken under section 6382 of 
        title 5, United States Code, for a reason described in 
        subparagraph (C) or (D) of subsection (a)(1) of that section, 
        including with respect to the authority to require a 
        certification described in section 6383 of such title.
          ``(2) Implementation plan.--Not later than 1 year after the 
        date of enactment of this section, the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees an implementation plan that includes--
                  ``(A) processes and procedures for implementing the 
                paid serious health condition leave policies under 
                subsections (b) through (d) during the period specified 
                in subsection (f);
                  ``(B) an explanation of how such implementation will 
                be reconciled with policies of other elements of the 
                Federal Government, including the impact on elements 
                funded by the National Intelligence Program that are 
                housed within agencies outside the intelligence 
                community;
                  ``(C) the projected impact of such implementation on 
                the workforce of the intelligence community, including 
                take rates, retention, recruiting, and morale, broken 
                down by each element of the intelligence community; and
                  ``(D) all costs or operational expenses associated 
                with such implementation.
          ``(3) Directive.--Not later than 90 days after the Director 
        of National Intelligence submits the implementation plan under 
        paragraph (2), the Director of National Intelligence shall 
        issue a written directive to implement this section, which 
        directive shall take effect on the date of issuance.
  ``(f) Duration of Authority.--The authority and requirements under 
subsections (b) through (d) shall only apply during the 3-year period 
beginning on the date on which the Director of National Intelligence 
issues the written directive under subsection (e)(3).
  ``(g) Annual Report.--During the period specified in subsection (f), 
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees an annual report that--
          ``(1) details the number of employees of each element of the 
        intelligence community who applied for and took paid serious 
        health condition leave during the year covered by the report;
          ``(2) includes updates on major implementation challenges or 
        costs associated with paid serious health condition leave; and
          ``(3) includes a recommendation of the Director with respect 
        to whether to extend the period specified in subsection (f).''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents at the 
        beginning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item 
        relating to section 304 the following:

``Sec. 305. Temporary authority for paid leave for a serious health 
condition.''.

  (b) Applicability.--Section 305 of the National Security Act of 1947, 
as added by subsection (b), shall apply with respect to leave taken in 
connection with a serious health condition (as defined in subsection 
(a) of such section 305) that occurs or continues to exist during the 
period specified in subsection (f) of such section.

SEC. 304. HARMONIZATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS.

  (a) Prohibited Personnel Practices in the Intelligence Community.--
          (1) Threats relating to personnel actions.--
                  (A) Agency employees.--Section 1104(b) of the 
                National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234(b)) is 
                amended, in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
                          (i) by striking ``Any employee of an agency'' 
                        and inserting ``Any employee of a covered 
                        intelligence community element or an agency''; 
                        and
                          (ii) by inserting ``, or threaten to take or 
                        fail to take,'' after ``take or fail to take''.
                  (B) Contractor employees.--Section 1104(c)(1) of such 
                Act (50 U.S.C. 3234(c)(1)) is amended, in the matter 
                preceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ``, or 
                threaten to take or fail to take,'' after ``take or 
                fail to take''.
          (2) Protection for contractor employees against reprisal from 
        agency employees.--Section 1104(c)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
        3234(c)(1)), as amended by paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, 
        is further amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), 
        by inserting ``of an agency or'' after ``Any employee''.
          (3) Enforcement.--Subsection (d) of section 1104 of such Act 
        (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended to read as follows:
  ``(d) Enforcement.--The President shall provide for the enforcement 
of this section consistent, to the fullest extent possible, with the 
policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged violations of 
section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code.''.
  (b) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access 
Determinations.--
          (1) Enforcement.--Section 3001(j) of the Intelligence Reform 
        and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)) is 
        amended--
                  (A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); 
                and
                  (B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
          ``(8) Enforcement.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
        subsection, the President shall provide for the enforcement of 
        this section consistent, to the fullest extent possible, with 
        the policies and procedures used to adjudicate alleged 
        violations of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States 
        Code.''.
          (2) Tolling of deadline for appeal of prohibited reprisal.--
        Section 3001(j)(4) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)) is 
        amended--
                  (A) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``(except as 
                provided by subparagraph (D))'' after ``within 90 
                days''; and
                  (B) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
                  ``(D) Tolling.--The time requirement established by 
                subparagraph (A) for an employee or former employee to 
                appeal the decision of an agency may be tolled if the 
                employee or former employee presents substantial 
                credible evidence showing why the employee or former 
                employee did not timely initiate the appeal and why the 
                enforcement of the time requirement would be unfair, 
                such as evidence showing that the employee or former 
                employee--
                          ``(i) did not receive notice of the decision; 
                        or
                          ``(ii) could not timely initiate the appeal 
                        because of factors beyond the control of the 
                        employee or former employee.''.
  (c) Correction of Definition of Agency.--Section 3001(a)(1)(B) of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 
3341(a)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``and'' and inserting ``or''.
  (d) Establishing Consistency With Respect to Protections for 
Disclosures of Mismanagement.--
          (1) Security clearance and access determinations.--Section 
        3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
        Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)) is amended--
                  (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``gross 
                mismanagement'' and inserting ``mismanagement''; and
                  (B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``gross 
                mismanagement'' and inserting ``mismanagement''.
          (2) Personnel actions against contractor employees.--Section 
        1104(c)(1)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        3234(c)(1)(B)) is amended by striking ``gross mismanagement'' 
        and inserting ``mismanagement''.
  (e) Protected Disclosures to Supervisors.--
          (1) Personnel actions.--
                  (A) Disclosures by agency employees to supervisors.--
                Section 1104(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 
                (50 U.S.C. 3234(b)), as amended by subsection 
                (a)(1)(A), is further amended, in the matter preceding 
                paragraph (1), by inserting ``a supervisor in the 
                employee's direct chain of command, or a supervisor of 
                the employing agency with responsibility for the 
                subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including'' 
                before ``the head of the employing agency''.
                  (B) Disclosures by contractor employees to 
                supervisors.--Section 1104(c)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
                3234(c)(1)), as amended by subsection (a), is further 
                amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by 
                inserting ``a supervisor in the contractor employee's 
                direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the 
                contracting agency with responsibility for the subject 
                matter of the disclosure, up to and including'' before 
                ``the head of the contracting agency''.
          (2) Security clearance and access determinations.--Section 
        3001(j)(1)(A) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
        Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)(A)) is amended, in 
        the matter preceding clause (i), by inserting ``a supervisor in 
        the employee's direct chain of command, or a supervisor of the 
        employing agency with responsibility for the subject matter of 
        the disclosure, up to and including'' before ``the head of the 
        employing agency''.
  (f) Establishing Parity for Protected Disclosures.--Section 1104 of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (b), as amended by subsections (a)(1)(A) 
        and (e)(1)(A)--
                  (A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
                subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving 
                such subparagraphs, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the 
                right;
                  (B) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as 
                redesignated and moved by subparagraph (A) of this 
                paragraph, by striking ``for a lawful disclosure'' and 
                inserting the following: ``for--
          ``(1) any lawful disclosure''; and
                  (C) by adding at the end the following:
          ``(2) any lawful disclosure that complies with--
                  ``(A) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H 
                of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
                  ``(B) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of section 
                17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
                (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
                  ``(C) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of section 
                103H(k)(5); or
          ``(3) if the actions do not result in the employee unlawfully 
        disclosing information specifically required by Executive order 
        to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or 
        the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in 
        conjunction with--
                  ``(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or 
                grievance right granted by any law, rule, or 
                regulation;
                  ``(B) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting 
                any individual in the exercise of any right referred to 
                in subparagraph (A); or
                  ``(C) cooperation with or disclosing information to 
                the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with 
                applicable provisions of law in connection with an 
                audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the 
                Inspector General.''; and
          (2) in subsection (c)(1), as amended by subsections (a) and 
        (e)(1)(B)--
                  (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as 
                clauses (i) and (ii), respectively, and moving such 
                clauses, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the right;
                  (B) in the matter preceding clause (i), as 
                redesignated and moved by subparagraph (A) of this 
                paragraph, by striking ``for a lawful disclosure'' and 
                inserting the following: ``for--
          ``(A) any lawful disclosure''; and
                  (C) by adding at the end the following:
          ``(B) any lawful disclosure that complies with--
                  ``(i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of section 8H 
                of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.);
                  ``(ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of section 
                17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
                (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
                  ``(iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of section 
                103H(k)(5); or
          ``(C) if the actions do not result in the contractor employee 
        unlawfully disclosing information specifically required by 
        Executive order to be kept classified in the interest of 
        national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs, any lawful 
        disclosure in conjunction with--
                  ``(i) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or 
                grievance right granted by any law, rule, or 
                regulation;
                  ``(ii) testimony for or otherwise lawfully assisting 
                any individual in the exercise of any right referred to 
                in clause (i); or
                  ``(iii) cooperation with or disclosing information to 
                the Inspector General of an agency, in accordance with 
                applicable provisions of law in connection with an 
                audit, inspection, or investigation conducted by the 
                Inspector General.''.
  (g) Clarification Relating to Protected Disclosures.--Section 1104 of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is further amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections 
        (f) and (g), respectively; and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
  ``(d) Rule of Construction.--Consistent with the protection of 
sources and methods, nothing in subsection (b) or (c) shall be 
construed to authorize--
          ``(1) the withholding of information from Congress; or
          ``(2) the taking of any personnel action against an employee 
        who lawfully discloses information to Congress.
  ``(e) Disclosures.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from this 
section because--
          ``(1) the disclosure was made to an individual, including a 
        supervisor, who participated in an activity that the employee 
        reasonably believed to be covered under subsection (b)(1)(B) or 
        the contractor employee reasonably believed to be covered under 
        subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii);
          ``(2) the disclosure revealed information that had been 
        previously disclosed;
          ``(3) the disclosure was not made in writing;
          ``(4) the disclosure was made while the employee was off 
        duty;
          ``(5) of the amount of time which has passed since the 
        occurrence of the events described in the disclosure; or
          ``(6) the disclosure was made during the normal course of 
        duties of an employee or contractor employee.''.
  (h) Correction Relating to Normal Course Disclosures.--Section 
3001(j)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(3)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``Disclosures.--'' and all that follows 
        through ``because--'' and inserting ``Disclosures.--A 
        disclosure shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) because--
        '';
          (2) by striking subparagraph (B);
          (3) by redesignating clauses (i) through (v) as subparagraphs 
        (A) through (E), respectively, and moving such subparagraphs, 
        as so redesignated, 2 ems to the left;
          (4) in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking 
        ``or'' at the end;
          (5) in subparagraph (E), as redesignated by paragraph (3), by 
        striking the period at the end and inserting ``; or''; and
          (6) by adding at the end the following:
                  ``(F) the disclosure was made during the normal 
                course of duties of an employee.''.
  (i) Clarification Relating to Rule of Construction.--Section 
3001(j)(2) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(2)) is amended by inserting ``or clearance 
action'' after ``personnel action''.
  (j) Clarification Relating to Prohibited Practices.--Section 
3001(j)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(1)), as amended by this section, is further 
amended by striking ``over'' and inserting ``to take, direct others to 
take, recommend, or approve''.
  (k) Technical Correction.--Section 3001(j)(1)(C)(i) of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 
3341(j)(1)(C)(i)) is amended by striking ``(h)'' and inserting ``(g)''.
  (l) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
report assessing the extent to which protections provided under 
Presidential Policy Directive 19 (relating to protecting whistleblowers 
with access to classified information) have been codified in statutes.

SEC. 305. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

  (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 501 the 
following new section (and conforming the table of contents at the 
beginning of such Act accordingly):

``SEC. 501A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN SPECIAL ACCESS 
                    PROGRAMS.

  ``(a) Reports and Notifications.--At the same time that the Secretary 
of Defense submits any report or notification under section 119 of 
title 10, United States Code, that relates to a covered special access 
program or a new covered special access program, the Secretary shall 
also submit such report or notification to the congressional 
intelligence committees.
  ``(b) Briefings.--On a periodic basis, but not less frequently than 
semiannually, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the chairmen 
and ranking minority members of the congressional intelligence 
committees, and to any staff of such a committee designated by either 
the chair or ranking member for purposes of this subsection, a briefing 
on covered special access programs. Each such briefing shall include, 
at a minimum--
          ``(1) a description of the activity of the program during the 
        period covered by the briefing; and
          ``(2) documentation with respect to how the program has 
        achieved outcomes consistent with requirements documented by 
        the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
        Defense.
  ``(c) Notifications on Compartments and Subcompartments.--
          ``(1) Requirement.--Except as provided by paragraph (2), a 
        head of an element of the intelligence community may not 
        establish a compartment or a subcompartment under a covered 
        special access program until the head notifies the 
        congressional intelligence committees of such compartment or 
        subcompartment, as the case may be.
          ``(2) Waiver.--
                  ``(A) Determination.--On a case-by-case basis, the 
                Director of National Intelligence may waive the 
                requirement under paragraph (1). Not later than two 
                days after making such a waiver, the Director shall 
                notify the congressional intelligence committees of the 
                waiver, including a justification for the waiver.
                  ``(B) Submission.--Not later than 30 days after the 
                date on which the Director makes a waiver under 
                subparagraph (A), the head of the element of the 
                intelligence community for whom the waiver was made 
                shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
                committees the notification required under paragraph 
                (1) relating to such waiver.
  ``(d) Annual Reports.--
          ``(1) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the head of each 
        element of the intelligence community shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report on covered 
        special access programs administered by the head.
          ``(2) Matters included.--Each report shall include, with 
        respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
                  ``(A) A list of all compartments and subcompartments 
                of covered special access programs active as of the 
                date of the report.
                  ``(B) A list of all compartments and subcompartments 
                of covered special access programs terminated during 
                the period covered by the report.
                  ``(C) With respect to the report submitted by the 
                Director of National Intelligence, in addition to the 
                matters specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B)--
                          ``(i) a certification regarding whether the 
                        creation, validation, or substantial 
                        modification, including termination, for all 
                        existing and proposed covered special access 
                        programs, and the compartments and 
                        subcompartments within each, are substantiated 
                        and justified based on the information required 
                        by clause (ii); and
                          ``(ii) for each certification--
                                  ``(I) the rationale for the 
                                revalidation, validation, or 
                                substantial modification, including 
                                termination, of each covered special 
                                access program, compartment, and 
                                subcompartment;
                                  ``(II) the identification of a 
                                control officer for each covered 
                                special access program; and
                                  ``(III) a statement of protection 
                                requirements for each covered special 
                                access program.
  ``(e) Covered Special Access Program Defined.--In this section, the 
term `covered special access program' means a special access program 
that receives funding under the National Intelligence Program or the 
Military Intelligence Program, relates to an intelligence or 
intelligence-related activity, or both.''.
  (b) First Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence 
community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the 
first report required under section 501A(d)(1) of the National Security 
Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
  (c) Conforming Repeal.--Section 608 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 
833; 50 U.S.C. 3315) is amended by striking subsection (b).

SEC. 306. CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING FOR 
                    INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  Paragraph (1) of section 504(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3094(a)) is amended to read as follows:
          ``(1) those funds were specifically authorized by Congress 
        for use for such intelligence or intelligence-related 
        activities; or''.

SEC. 307. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                    FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY WORKFORCE.

  Title X of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) 
is amended by inserting after section 1024 the following new section 
(and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act 
accordingly):

``SEC. 1025. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE FOR CERTAIN WORKFORCE ACTIVITIES.

  ``(a) Authorization.--The Director may, with or without 
reimbursement, obligate or expend amounts authorized to be appropriated 
or otherwise made available for the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence for covered workforce activities for the purpose of 
supporting a covered workforce activity of an element of the 
intelligence community.
  ``(b) Covered Workforce Activity Defined.--In this section, the term 
`covered workforce activity' means an activity relating to--
          ``(1) recruitment or retention of the intelligence community 
        workforce; or
          ``(2) diversity, equality, inclusion, or accessibility, with 
        respect to such workforce.''.

SEC. 308. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER 
                    INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

  (a) Modifications to Requirement.--
          (1) In general.--Section 304 of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 3073a) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER 
                    INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

  ``(a) Temporary Restriction.--An employee of an element of the 
intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence position may 
not occupy a covered post-service position during the 30-month period 
following the date on which the employee ceases to occupy a covered 
intelligence position.
  ``(b) Covered Post-service Employment Reporting.--
          ``(1) Requirement.--During the 5-year period beginning on the 
        date on which an employee ceases to occupy a covered 
        intelligence position, the employee shall--
                  ``(A) report covered post-service employment to the 
                head of the element of the intelligence community that 
                employed such employee in such covered intelligence 
                position upon accepting such covered post-service 
                employment; and
                  ``(B) annually (or more frequently if the head of 
                such element considers it appropriate) report covered 
                post-service employment to the head of such element.
          ``(2) Regulations.--The head of each element of the 
        intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring, as a 
        condition of employment, each employee of such element 
        occupying a covered intelligence position to sign a written 
        agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered post-
        service employment to the head of such element pursuant to 
        paragraph (1).
  ``(c) Penalties.--
          ``(1) Criminal penalties.--A former employee who knowingly 
        and willfully violates subsection (a) or who knowingly and 
        willfully fails to make a required report under subsection (b) 
        shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or 
        imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Each report 
        under subsection (b) shall be subject to section 1001 of title 
        18, United States Code.
          ``(2) Security clearances.--The head of an element of the 
        intelligence community shall revoke the security clearance of a 
        former employee if the former employee knowingly and willfully 
        fails to make a required report under subsection (b) or 
        knowingly and willfully makes a false report under such 
        subsection.
  ``(d) Provision of Information.--
          ``(1) Training.--The head of each element of the intelligence 
        community shall regularly provide training on the reporting 
        requirements under subsection (b) to employees of that element 
        who occupy a covered intelligence position.
          ``(2) Written notice.--The head of each element of the 
        intelligence community shall provide written notice of the 
        reporting requirements under subsection (b) to an employee when 
        the employee ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
  ``(e) Annual Reports.--
          ``(1) Requirement.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the 
        Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report on covered post-
        service employment occurring during the year covered by the 
        report.
          ``(2) Elements.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  ``(A) The number of former employees who occupy a 
                covered post-service position, broken down by--
                          ``(i) the name of the employer;
                          ``(ii) the foreign government, including by 
                        the specific foreign individual, agency, or 
                        entity, for whom the covered post-service 
                        employment is being performed; and
                          ``(iii) the nature of the services provided 
                        as part of the covered post-service employment.
                  ``(B) A certification by the Director that--
                          ``(i) each element of the intelligence 
                        community maintains adequate systems and 
                        processes for ensuring that former employees 
                        are submitting reports required under 
                        subsection (b);
                          ``(ii) to the knowledge of the heads of the 
                        elements of the intelligence community, all 
                        former employees who occupy a covered post-
                        service position are in compliance with this 
                        section;
                          ``(iii) the services provided by former 
                        employees who occupy a covered post-service 
                        position do not--
                                  ``(I) pose a current or future threat 
                                to the national security of the United 
                                States; or
                                  ``(II) pose a counterintelligence 
                                risk; and
                          ``(iv) the Director and the heads of such 
                        elements are not aware of any credible 
                        information or reporting that any former 
                        employee who occupies a covered post-service 
                        position has engaged in activities that violate 
                        Federal law, infringe upon the privacy rights 
                        of United States persons, or constitute abuses 
                        of human rights.
          ``(3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
  ``(f) Notification.--In addition to the annual reports under 
subsection (e), if a head of an element of the intelligence community 
determines that the services provided by a former employee who occupies 
a covered post-service position pose a threat or risk described in 
clause (iii) of paragraph (2)(B) of such subsection, or include 
activities described in clause (iv) of such paragraph, the head shall 
notify the congressional intelligence committees of such determination 
by not later than 7 days after making such determination. The 
notification shall include the following:
          ``(1) The name of the former employee.
          ``(2) The name of the employer.
          ``(3) The foreign government, including the specific foreign 
        individual, agency, or entity, for whom the covered post-
        service employment is being performed.
          ``(4) As applicable, a description of--
                  ``(A) the risk to national security, the 
                counterintelligence risk, or both; and
                  ``(B) the activities that may violate Federal law, 
                infringe upon the privacy rights of United States 
                persons, or constitute abuses of human rights.
  ``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Covered intelligence position.--The term `covered 
        intelligence position' means a position within an element of 
        the intelligence community that, based on the level of access 
        of a person occupying such position to information regarding 
        sensitive intelligence sources or methods or other 
        exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of such element 
        determines should be subject to the requirements of this 
        section.
          ``(2) Covered post-service employment.--The term `covered 
        post-service employment' means direct or indirect employment 
        by, representation of, or any provision of advice or services 
        relating to national security, intelligence, the military, or 
        internal security to, the government of a foreign country or 
        any company, entity, or other person whose activities are 
        directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, 
        financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any 
        government of a foreign country.
          ``(3) Covered post-service position.--The term `covered post-
        service position' means a position of employment described in 
        paragraph (2).
          ``(4) Employee.--The term `employee', with respect to an 
        employee occupying a covered intelligence position, includes an 
        officer or official of an element of the intelligence 
        community, a contractor of such an element, a detailee to such 
        an element, or a member of the Armed Forces assigned to such an 
        element.
          ``(5) Former employee.--The term `former employee' means an 
        individual--
                  ``(A) who was an employee occupying a covered 
                intelligence position; and
                  ``(B) who is subject to the requirements under 
                subsection (a) or (b).
          ``(6) Government of a foreign country.--The term `government 
        of a foreign country' has the meaning given the term in section 
        1(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 
        611(e)).''.
          (2) Application.--Such section 304, as amended by paragraph 
        (1), shall apply with respect to employees who occupy covered 
        intelligence positions (as defined in such section) on or after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (3) Revised regulations.--
                  (A) Submission.--Not later than 90 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each 
                element of the intelligence community shall submit to 
                the congressional intelligence committees new or 
                updated regulations issued under such section 304, as 
                amended by paragraph (1).
                  (B) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
                National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
                intelligence committees--
                          (i) a written certification for each head of 
                        an element of the intelligence community who 
                        has issued the updated regulations under such 
                        section 304, as amended by paragraph (1); and
                          (ii) for each head of an element of the 
                        intelligence community who has not issued such 
                        updated regulations, an explanation for the 
                        failure to issue such updated regulations.
          (4) Initial report.--In the first report submitted by the 
        Director of National Intelligence under subsection (e) of such 
        section 304, as amended by paragraph (1), the Director shall 
        include an assessment of the licensing requirements under the 
        Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) and 
        recommendations with respect to strengthening the activities 
        regulated under such section 304.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
such Act is amended by striking the item relating to section 304 and 
inserting the following new item:

``Sec. 304. Requirements for certain employment activities by former 
intelligence officers and employees.''.

SEC. 309. NON-REIMBURSABLE DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL 
                    TO ASSIST WITH PROCESSING AND RESETTLEMENT OF 
                    REFUGEES, PAROLEES, AND OTHER ALIENS FROM 
                    AFGHANISTAN.

  Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3049) is 
amended--
          (1) by striking ``An officer'' and inserting ``(a) In 
        General.--An officer'';
          (2) by striking ``section'' both places it appears and 
        inserting ``subsection''; and
          (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(b) Processing and Resettlement of Refugees, Parolees, and Other 
Aliens From Afghanistan.--An officer or employee of an element of the 
intelligence community may be detailed to another element of the United 
States Government on a non-reimbursable basis for the purpose of 
providing assistance with the processing and resettlement of refugees, 
parolees, and other aliens, from Afghanistan, as jointly agreed to by 
the heads of the receiving and detailing elements, for a period not to 
exceed 1 year. This subsection does not limit any other source of 
authority for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details. A non-
reimbursable detail made under this subsection shall not be considered 
an augmentation of the appropriations of the receiving element of the 
United States Government.''.

SEC. 310. AUTHORITY FOR TRANSPORT OF CERTAIN CANINES ASSOCIATED WITH 
                    FORCE PROTECTION DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) 
is amended by inserting after section 116 the following new section 
(and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act 
accordingly):

``SEC. 116A. AUTHORITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CERTAIN CANINES ASSOCIATED 
                    WITH FORCE PROTECTION DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  ``(a) Transportation.--For purposes of section 1344 of title 31, 
United States Code, the transportation of federally owned canines 
associated with force protection duties of an element of the 
intelligence community between the residence of an officer or employee 
of the element and various locations that is essential for the 
performance of the force protection duty shall be deemed essential for 
the safe and efficient performance of intelligence duties.
  ``(b) Officers and Employees Covered.--In the administration of 
section 1344 of title 31, United States Code, an officer or employee of 
an element of the intelligence community shall be treated as being 
listed in subsection (b).''.

SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT OF DEFINITIONS FOR CERTAIN TERMS RELATING TO 
                    INTELLIGENCE.

  (a) Development.--Not later than September 30, 2023, the Director of 
National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security, in consultation with the heads of the 
elements of the intelligence community, shall jointly develop and 
publish definitions for the following terms:
          (1) Acoustic intelligence.
          (2) All-source intelligence.
          (3) Communications intelligence.
          (4) Critical intelligence.
          (5) Cyber-threat intelligence.
          (6) Electronic intelligence.
          (7) Explosive ordnance intelligence.
          (8) General military intelligence.
          (9) Imagery intelligence.
          (10) Instrumentation signals intelligence.
          (11) Intelligence-related activity.
          (12) Joint intelligence.
          (13) Measurement and signature intelligence.
          (14) Medical intelligence.
          (15) Open-source intelligence.
          (16) Operational intelligence.
          (17) Scientific and technical intelligence.
          (18) Signals intelligence.
          (19) Strategic intelligence.
          (20) Tactical intelligence.
          (21) Target intelligence.
          (22) Technical intelligence.
          (23) Such others terms as may be jointly determined necessary 
        by the Director of National Intelligence and the Under 
        Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security.
  (b) Application to Activities of Intelligence Community.--The 
Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the definitions 
developed under subsection (a) are used uniformly across activities of 
the intelligence community with respect to the corresponding terms 
specified in such subsection.
  (c) Notice of Modifications.--The Director of National Intelligence 
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees notification of any modification 
by the Director and Under Secretary to a definition of a term specified 
in subsection (a) following the initial publication of the definition 
under such subsection.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``congressional 
intelligence committees'' and ``intelligence community'' have the 
meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).

SEC. 312. SUPPORT FOR AND OVERSIGHT OF UNIDENTIFIED AERIAL PHENOMENA 
                    TASK FORCE.

  (a) Availability of Data on Unidentified Aerial Phenomena.--The 
Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that each element of the 
intelligence community with data relating to unidentified aerial 
phenomena makes such data available immediately to the Unidentified 
Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity, and to the National 
Air and Space Intelligence Center.
  (b) Quarterly Reports.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than quarterly 
        thereafter, the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force, or 
        successor entity, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on the findings of the Unidentified Aerial 
        Phenomena Task Force, or successor entity.
          (2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
        shall include, at a minimum, the following:
                  (A) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-
                related events that occurred during the period covered 
                by the report.
                  (B) All reported unidentified aerial phenomena-
                related events that occurred during a period other than 
                the period covered by the report but were not included 
                in an earlier report.
          (3) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in classified form, consistent with the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods.
  (c) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
                  (A) The congressional intelligence committees.
                  (B) The Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives and the Senate.
          (2) Unidentified aerial phenomena task force.--The term 
        ``Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force'' means the task 
        force established by the Department of Defense on August 4, 
        2020, to be led by the Department of the Navy, under the Office 
        of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and 
        Security.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND BIOSECURITY CENTER.

  (a) Redesignation of Center.--Section 119A of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3057) is amended by striking ``National Counter 
Proliferation Center'' each place it appears and inserting ``National 
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center''.
  (b) Establishment and Head.--Subsection (a) of such section is 
amended--
          (1) in paragraph (1)--
                  (A) by striking ``government tools to prevent'' and 
                inserting ``government tools to--
                  ``(A) prevent'';
                  (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting 
                ``; and''; and
                  (C) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
          ``(B) lead integration and mission management of all 
        intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign 
        biological threats.''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(4) The Director of the National Counterproliferation and 
Biosecurity Center shall serve as the principal coordinator for the 
intelligence community, and as the principal advisor to the Director of 
National Intelligence, with respect to biosecurity and foreign 
biological threats.''.
  (c) Missions and Objectives.--Subsection (b) of such section is 
amended--
          (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) as 
        subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively, and moving such 
        subparagraphs, as so redesignated, 2 ems to the right;
          (2) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), as so 
        redesignated, by striking ``In establishing'' and inserting the 
        following:
          ``(1) Counterproliferation.--In establishing''; and
          (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(2) Biosecurity.--In establishing the National 
        Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the President 
        shall address the following missions and objectives to ensure 
        that the Center serves as the lead for the intelligence 
        community for the integration, mission management, and 
        coordination of intelligence activities pertaining to 
        biosecurity and foreign biological threats, regardless of 
        origin:
                  ``(A) Ensuring that the elements of the intelligence 
                community provide timely and effective warnings to the 
                President and the Director of National Intelligence 
                regarding emerging foreign biological threats, 
                including diseases with pandemic potential.
                  ``(B) Overseeing and coordinating the collection and 
                analysis of intelligence on biosecurity and foreign 
                biological threats in support of the intelligence needs 
                of the Federal departments and agencies responsible for 
                public health, including by conveying collection 
                priorities to elements of the intelligence community.
                  ``(C) Coordinating intelligence support to the 
                Federal departments and agencies responsible for public 
                health, including by ensuring that intelligence 
                pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological 
                threats is disseminated among appropriately cleared 
                personnel of such departments and agencies.
                  ``(D) Coordinating with the Federal departments and 
                agencies responsible for public health to encourage 
                information sharing with the intelligence community.
                  ``(E) Identifying gaps in the capabilities of the 
                intelligence community regarding biosecurity and 
                countering foreign biological threats and providing to 
                the Director of National Intelligence recommended 
                solutions for such gaps, including by encouraging 
                research and development of new capabilities to counter 
                foreign biological threats.''.
  (d) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further amended--
          (1) by striking ``counter proliferation'' each place it 
        appears and inserting ``counterproliferation''; and
          (2) in the section heading, by striking ``counter 
        proliferation'' and inserting ``counterproliferation and 
        biosecurity'' (and conforming the table of sections at the 
        beginning of such Act accordingly).
  (e) References.--Any reference in any law, regulation, guidance, 
instruction, or other document of the United States Government to the 
National Counter Proliferation Center shall be deemed to refer to the 
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.

SEC. 402. CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF 
                    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  Section 102A(f)(8) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3024(f)(8)) is amended by striking ``such other functions'' and 
inserting ``such other intelligence-related functions''.

SEC. 403. RESPONSIBILITY OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REGARDING 
                    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BUDGET CONCERNING 
                    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3024) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(aa) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence Regarding 
National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.--(1) Consistent with subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director 
of National Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, ensure that the programs and 
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that are part of the 
National Intelligence Program are executed in a manner that conforms 
with the requirements of the national intelligence strategy under 
section 108A and the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (or any successor 
mechanism established for the prioritization of such programs and 
activities).
  ``(2) Consistent with subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director of National 
Intelligence shall ensure that the programs and activities that are 
part of the National Intelligence Program, including those of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, are structured and executed in a 
manner than enables budget traceability.''.

SEC. 404. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

  (a) Reports.--Subsection (d) of section 120 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``Not later'' and inserting the following:
          ``(1) Requirement.--Not later''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(2) Matters included.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
        shall include a description of any obstacles or gaps relating 
        to--
                  ``(A) the Council fulfilling its duties and 
                responsibilities under subsection (c); or
                  ``(B) the responsiveness of the intelligence 
                community to the climate security needs and priorities 
                of the policymaking elements of the Federal 
                Government.''.
  (b) Extension of Sunset; Technical Amendments.--Such section 120 is 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (b)(1)(B)(v), by inserting ``and Security'' 
        after ``for Intelligence'';
          (2) by redesignating the second subsection (e) as subsection 
        (f); and
          (3) in subsection (e), by striking ``the date that is 4 years 
        after the date of the enactment of this section'' and inserting 
        ``December 31, 2025''.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements

SEC. 411. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN FACILITIES AND ASSETS OF CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.

  The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) 
is amended by inserting after section 15 the following new section:

``SEC. 15A. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN FACILITIES AND ASSETS OF CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.

  ``(a) Authority.--In accordance with subsection (b), the Director 
shall have the same authority for the Agency as is available to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security for the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Attorney General for the Department of Justice under section 
210G of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n), and shall be 
subject to the same limitations and requirements under such section.
  ``(b) Administration.--For purposes of subsection (a)--
          ``(1) the reference in subsection (i) of section 210G of the 
        Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n) to `the date that 
        is 4 years after the date of enactment of this section' shall 
        be deemed to be a reference to `October 5, 2026';
          ``(2) the term `appropriate congressional committees' as 
        defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (k) of such section 
        shall be deemed to mean the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
          ``(3) the term `covered facility or asset' as defined in 
        paragraph (3) of such subsection (k) shall be deemed to mean 
        installations, property, and persons--
                  ``(A) that are located in the United States;
                  ``(B) for which the Director may provide protection 
                pursuant to section 5(a)(4) or 15(a)(1) of this Act; 
                and
                  ``(C) that the Director identifies as high-risk and a 
                potential target for unlawful unmanned aircraft 
                activity.''.

SEC. 412. MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                    PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY TO ATTRACT EXPERTS 
                    IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING.

  Section 1599h(b)(2)(A) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) by striking ``paragraph (1)(B)'' and inserting 
        ``subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1)''; and
          (2) by inserting ``or employees appointed pursuant to the 
        first subparagraph (G) of such paragraph to any of 2 positions 
        of administration or management designated by the Director of 
        the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for purposes of 
        this subparagraph'' after ``this subparagraph''.

SEC. 413. REQUIREMENTS FOR TERMINATION OF DUAL-HAT ARRANGEMENT FOR 
                    COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND.

  Section 1642 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2601), as amended by section 
1636 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
(Public Law 116-92; 133 Stat. 1748), is further amended--
          (1) by striking subsections (a), (b), and (c), and inserting 
        the following new subsections:
  ``(a) Limitation on Termination of Dual-hat Arrangement.--The 
Secretary of Defense may not terminate the dual-hat arrangement until 
the date on which the Secretary submits to the appropriate committees 
of Congress the certification under subsection (b)(1). The Secretary 
shall implement such termination by not later than the first day of the 
fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the Secretary submits 
such certification.
  ``(b) Annual Submission of Information.--Together with the defense 
budget materials for fiscal year 2023, and annually thereafter until 
the termination of the dual-hat arrangement, the Secretary of Defense, 
in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing 
either of the following:
          ``(1) A certification that the United States Cyber Command 
        has met each of the following conditions:
                  ``(A) Sufficient operational infrastructure has been 
                deployed to meet the unique cyber mission needs of the 
                United States Cyber Command.
                  ``(B) Sufficient command and control systems and 
                processes have been established for planning, 
                deconflicting, and executing military cyber operations.
                  ``(C) Capabilities have been established to enable 
                intelligence collection and operational preparation of 
                the environment for cyber operations consistent with 
                the United States Cyber Command reaching full 
                operational status.
                  ``(D) Mechanisms have been established to train cyber 
                operations personnel, test cyber capabilities, and 
                rehearse cyber missions.
                  ``(E) The United States Cyber Command has achieved 
                full operational capability.
          ``(2) If the Secretary, in coordination with the Director, is 
        not able to make the certification under paragraph (1)--
                  ``(A) an identification of the items contained in the 
                defense budget materials that are related to meeting 
                the conditions specified in such paragraph; and
                  ``(B) an assessment of the funding required to meet 
                such conditions during the period covered by the 
                future-years defense program under section 221 of title 
                10, United States Code.'';
          (2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c); and
          (3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by adding at the 
        end the following new paragraph:
          ``(3) Defense budget materials.--The term `defense budget 
        materials' has the meaning given that term in section 231(f) of 
        title 10, United States Code.''.

SEC. 414. NATIONAL SPACE INTELLIGENCE CENTER.

  (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
          (1) Section 9081 of title 10, United States Code, establishes 
        the United States Space Force as an Armed Force within the 
        Department of the Air Force to, as stated in subsection (c) of 
        such section--
                  (A) provide freedom of operation for the United 
                States in, from, and to space;
                  (B) conduct space operations; and
                  (C) protect the interests of the United States in 
                space.
          (2) The National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 
        headquartered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the 
        primary source for foreign air and space threat analysis within 
        the intelligence enterprise of the Air Force.
          (3) Section 8041 of the Department of Defense Appropriations 
        Act, 2020 (division A of Public Law 116-93; 133 Stat. 2345) 
        prohibits the establishment of a new field operating agency 
        using funds made available under that Act, although the 
        Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a military department 
        may waive the prohibition in cases where the relevant Secretary 
        determines that the establishment will reduce the personnel or 
        financial requirements of the relevant department.
  (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) space has become increasingly contested, congested, and 
        competitive, mandating an expanded need for space intelligence;
          (2) to support this increasingly complex operational 
        environment, the Space Force should have its own intelligence 
        organization dedicated to providing the Joint Combat forces 
        with the required intelligence and analysis to support 
        operations;
          (3) a prominent factor in the basing decision should consider 
        that co-locating the National Space Intelligence Center with 
        the National Air and Space Intelligence Center at Wright-
        Patterson Air Force Base will provide an operational and 
        geographic synergy, which will greatly benefit combat 
        operations across the air and space operational environments;
          (4) the Air Force has requested authority to establish the 
        National Space Intelligence Center as a field operating agency 
        to ensure the appropriate prioritization of analytic effort for 
        the space domain, enhance responsiveness to national-level 
        customers, and align command relationships with the Director of 
        Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance of the Space 
        Force; and
          (5) establishing the National Space Intelligence Center as a 
        field operating agency would be a resource-neutral 
        administrative realignment of billets, and would facilitate a 
        lean and agile space intelligence enterprise.
  (c) Exception.--Notwithstanding section 8041 of the Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act, 2020 (division A of Public Law 116-93; 133 
Stat. 2345), or any other provision of law prohibiting the 
establishment of a field operating agency, the Secretary of the Air 
Force may establish the National Space Intelligence Center as a field 
operating agency of the Space Force to perform the analysis and 
production of scientific and technical intelligence on foreign space 
and counter-space threat capabilities in the support of the Space 
Force.

SEC. 415. PROCUREMENT BY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF CHINESE 
                    PRODUCTS AND SERVICES.

  (a) Security Assessment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation may not procure a Chinese product or service unless, 
before such procurement, the Counterintelligence Division of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation--
          (1) conducts a security assessment of such product or 
        service, including with respect to any physical or cyber 
        vulnerabilities; and
          (2) makes a recommendation to the Director regarding such 
        proposed procurement.
  (b) Submission.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the 
Counterintelligence Division of the Bureau conducts a security 
assessment under subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a copy of such assessment and the 
recommendation under paragraph (2) of such subsection.
  (c) Chinese Product or Service Defined.--In this section, the term 
``Chinese product or service'' means a product or service provided by 
an entity that is owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, 
the government of China.

SEC. 416. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE UNITS AT NON-INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                    FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.

  (a) Establishment.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation shall establish counterintelligence units in the 
departments and agencies described in subsection (b). Such units shall 
be composed of officers of the Counterintelligence Division of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
  (b) Departments and Agencies Described.--The departments and agencies 
described in this subsection are the following departments and agencies 
of the United States Government:
          (1) The Department of Agriculture.
          (2) Any other department or agency that the Director, in 
        coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, 
        determines appropriate.
  (c) Duties.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
shall ensure that each counterintelligence unit established under 
subsection (a) in a department or agency described in subsection (b) 
carries out the following duties:
          (1) Conducts assessments, in coordination with the leadership 
        of the department or agency, to determine the 
        counterintelligence posture of the department or agency, 
        including any components thereof.
          (2) Informs and consults with the leadership of the 
        department or agency, including any components thereof, and 
        provides recommendations with respect to any 
        counterintelligence threats identified by the intelligence 
        community.
          (3) Provides such administrative and technical support as is 
        necessary to develop, in coordination with the leadership of 
        the department or agency, a plan to eliminate or reduce the 
        threats described in paragraph (2).
          (4) Serves as the primary point of contact for the department 
        or agency with respect to counterintelligence for the 
        intelligence community.
  (d) Intelligence Community Support.--The heads of the elements of the 
intelligence community shall ensure that relevant counterintelligence 
information is provided to counterintelligence units established under 
subsection (a) in a manner that is consistent with the need to protect 
sources and methods.

SEC. 417. DETECTION AND MONITORING OF WILDFIRES.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Director 
of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in accordance with 
relevant provisions of law, should continue to manage the systems of 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency that enable the FireGuard 
program of the Department of Defense.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of 
the departments and agencies of the United States Government and other 
organizations that constitute the National Interagency Fire Center, and 
any other relevant organization the Director determines appropriate, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a coordinated 
interagency report that--
          (1) explains how to leverage existing resources to improve 
        processes and organization alignment;
          (2) identifies future opportunities to improve the ability to 
        detect and track wildfires and support firefighting efforts; 
        and
          (3) includes an explication of the relevant authorities with 
        respect to the matters under paragraphs (1) and (2).
  (c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
          (2) the congressional defense committees (as defined in 
        section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code).

   TITLE V--ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS AND OTHER HEALTH CARE MATTERS

SEC. 501. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL 
                    OFFICERS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) 
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

``SEC. 26. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL 
                    OFFICERS.

  ``(a) Office of Medical Services.--There is in the Agency an Office 
of Medical Services.
  ``(b) Compensation.--Beginning not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2022, each medical officer of the Office of Medical Services who meets 
the qualifications under subsection (c) shall be compensated during a 
pay period pursuant to a pay range that is equal to the pay range 
published in the Federal Register pursuant to section 7431(e)(1)(C) of 
title 38, United States Code (for the corresponding pay period), for a 
physician in the Veterans Health Administration in the District of 
Columbia region with a medical subspecialty that is the equivalent of 
the medical subspecialty of the officer.
  ``(c) Clinical Practice Qualifications.--A medical officer meets the 
qualifications under this subsection if the officer provides direct 
care services to patients in connection with the official duties of the 
officer and--
          ``(1) maintains current, active, full, and unrestricted 
        licensure or registration as a physician from a State, the 
        District of Columbia, or a commonwealth or territory of the 
        United States;
          ``(2) holds active board certification and maintains 
        accreditation in an American Board of Medical Specialties 
        direct care clinical specialty; and
          ``(3) except as provided in subsection (d), maintains a 
        minimum of 160 hours per year of clinical practice in an 
        accredited clinic or hospital facility that is not affiliated 
        with the Central Intelligence Agency.
  ``(d) Exception for Overseas Service.--If a medical officer is a 
medical officer located in a duty station outside of the United States 
pursuant to a permanent change of station and greater than 50 percent 
of the official duties of the officer in such duty station involve 
direct patient care, the officer, in lieu of performing the minimum 
hours under subsection (c)(3) on an annual basis, may perform up to 480 
hours of clinical practice as specified in such subsection prior to 
such change of station, to fulfil in advance the requirement under such 
subsection for up to 3 years.
  ``(e) Clinical Practice Hours.--The head of the Office of Medical 
Services shall make available to medical officers excused absence time 
to allow for the maintenance of clinical practice hours in accordance 
with subsection (c)(3).''.

SEC. 502. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Establishment.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), as amended by section 501, is further amended by 
adding at the end the following new section:

``SEC. 27. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.

  ``(a) Establishment.--The Director shall establish within the Agency 
a medical advisory board (in this section referred to as the `Board').
  ``(b) Duties.--The Board shall--
          ``(1) conduct a study on the Office of Medical Services of 
        the Agency, and submit reports regarding such study, in 
        accordance with subsection (c); and
          ``(2) upon request, provide advice and guidance in connection 
        with any independent review of the Office conducted by an 
        inspector general.
  ``(c) Study.--
          ``(1) Objectives.--In conducting the study under subsection 
        (b)(1), the Board shall seek to--
                  ``(A) contribute to the modernization and reform of 
                the Office of Medical Services;
                  ``(B) ensure that the activities of the Office are of 
                the highest professional quality; and
                  ``(C) ensure that all medical care provided by the 
                Office is provided in accordance with the highest 
                professional medical standards.
          ``(2) Reports.--The Board shall submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees, in writing--
                  ``(A) interim reports on the study; and
                  ``(B) a final report on the study, which shall--
                          ``(i) set forth in detail the findings of the 
                        study and the recommendations of the Board, 
                        based on such findings and taking into 
                        consideration the objectives under paragraph 
                        (1), regarding any changes to the activities of 
                        the Office of Medical Services; and
                          ``(ii) include, as applicable, any additional 
                        or dissenting views submitted by a member of 
                        the Board.
  ``(d) Membership.--
          ``(1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be composed of 
        11 members, appointed as follows:
                  ``(A) 2 members appointed by the Chairman of the 
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
                of Representatives.
                  ``(B) 2 members appointed by the ranking minority 
                member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
                  ``(C) 2 members appointed by the Chairman of the 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
                  ``(D) 2 members appointed by the Vice Chairman of the 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
                  ``(E) 3 members appointed by the Director of National 
                Intelligence.
          ``(2) Chairperson.--During the first meeting under subsection 
        (e)(1), the members of the Board shall elect a Chairperson of 
        the Board. In addition to meeting the criteria under paragraph 
        (3), the Chairperson may not be an employee, or former 
        employee, of the Agency.
          ``(3) Criteria.--The members appointed under paragraph (1) 
        shall meet the following criteria:
                  ``(A) Each member shall be a recognized expert in at 
                least 1 medical field, as demonstrated by appropriate 
                credentials.
                  ``(B) Each member shall possess significant and 
                diverse medical experience, including clinical 
                experience.
                  ``(C) Each member shall hold a security clearance at 
                the top secret level and be able to access sensitive 
                compartmented information.
          ``(4) Terms.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Each member, including the 
                Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as 
                applicable, for the life of the Board.
                  ``(B) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Board occurring 
                prior to the expiration of the term under subparagraph 
                (A) shall be filled in the manner in which the original 
                appointment or election was made.
          ``(5) Compensation and travel expenses.--
                  ``(A) Compensation.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), each member of the Board, including 
                the Chairperson, may be compensated at not to exceed 
                the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in 
                effect for a position at level IV of the Executive 
                Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States 
                Code, for each day during which that member is engaged 
                in the actual performance of the duties under 
                subsection (b).
                  ``(B) Exception for federal employees.--Members of 
                the Board, including the Chairperson, who are officers 
                or employees of the United States shall receive no 
                additional pay by reason of the service of the member 
                on the Board.
                  ``(C) Travel expenses.--Each member of the Board, 
                including the Chairperson, while away from the home or 
                regular places of business of the member in the 
                performance of services for the Board, may be allowed 
                travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
                subsistence, in the same manner as persons employed 
                intermittently in the Government service are allowed 
                expenses under section 5703 of title 5, United States 
                Code.
          ``(6) Detailees.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Upon request of the Board, the 
                Director of National Intelligence may detail to the 
                Board, without reimbursement from the Board, any of the 
                personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence to assist in carrying out the duties under 
                subsection (b). Any such detailed personnel shall 
                retain the rights, status, and privileges of the 
                regular employment of the personnel without 
                interruption.
                  ``(B) Clearance.--Any personnel detailed to the Board 
                under subparagraph (A) shall possess a security 
                clearance in accordance with applicable laws and 
                regulations concerning the handling of classified 
                information.
  ``(e) Meetings.--
          ``(1) Board meetings.--The Board shall meet not less 
        frequently than on a quarterly basis.
          ``(2) Meetings with congress.--The Board shall meet with the 
        congressional intelligence committees on a biannual basis.
  ``(f) Information Access.--
          ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
        Board may secure directly from any department or agency of the 
        United States Government information necessary to enable it to 
        carry out the duties under subsection (b) and, upon request of 
        the Chairperson of the Board, the head of that department or 
        agency shall furnish such information to the Board.
          ``(2) Exception.--The Director (without delegation) may deny 
        a request for information made by the Board pursuant to 
        paragraph (1), regardless of the agency from which such 
        information is requested.
          ``(3) Notification requirement.--If the Director denies a 
        request under paragraph (2), not later than 15 days after the 
        date of such denial, the Director shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a written notification of 
        such denial.
          ``(4) Briefings.--The Director shall ensure that the Board 
        receives comprehensive briefings on all activities of the 
        Office of Medical Services, including by promptly scheduling 
        such briefings at the request of the Board.
  ``(g) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date that is 5 
years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.
  ``(h) Definitions.--In this section, the terms `congressional 
intelligence committees' and `intelligence community' have the meanings 
given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3003).''.
  (b) Deadline for Appointments; First Meetings.--
          (1) Deadline for appointments.--Each member of the medical 
        advisory board established under section 27 of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (as added by subsection (a)), 
        including the Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as 
        applicable, in accordance with subsection (d) of such section 
        by not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of 
        this Act.
          (2) First board meeting.--Not later than 30 days after the 
        first date on which at least 7 members of the Board described 
        in paragraph (1) hold the security clearance and are able to 
        access information in accordance with subsection (d)(3)(C) of 
        such section 27, the Board shall meet. During such meeting, the 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide to 
        the Board a comprehensive briefing on all aspects of the Office 
        of Medical Services of the Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) First meeting with congress.--Not later than 30 days 
        after the date of the briefing under paragraph (2), the Board 
        described in such paragraph shall meet with the staff members 
        of the congressional intelligence committees to discuss topics 
        for the Board to examine in carrying out the duties under 
        subsection (b) of such section 27.

SEC. 503. REPORT ON PROTOCOLS FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                    EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS.

  (a) In General.--Beginning not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop, for uniform 
implementation across the elements of the intelligence community, each 
of the protocols described in subsections (c) through (f). Such 
protocols shall be subject to review and revision on a periodic basis, 
and any implementation of such protocols shall be conducted in 
accordance with applicable laws and current clinical and professional 
practices of the interagency medical community.
  (b) Privacy.--No data collected pursuant to any protocol under this 
section may be used for research or analytical purposes without the 
written consent of the individual from whom such data was collected 
with respect to such use.
  (c) Protocol on Baseline Medical Testing.--The protocol described in 
this subsection is a protocol for conducting baseline medical testing 
of covered employees, covered individuals, and the dependents of 
covered employees who are included on the overseas travel orders of the 
covered employee, with respect to anomalous health incidents. Such 
protocol shall set forth the required elements of such baseline medical 
testing, such as--
          (1) standard lab collection and testing of relevant 
        biofluids;
          (2) the conduct of relevant visual and auditory examinations;
          (3) the conduct of Acquired Brain Injury Tool assessments, or 
        other relevant assessments for balance, eye motion, and 
        cognition;
          (4) the assessment of relevant medical histories; and
          (5) the conduct of any other standard relevant medical or 
        neurological examinations, testing, or assessments.
  (d) Protocols on Post-incident Medical Testing.--The protocols 
described in this subsection are protocols to enable voluntary medical 
testing and the coordination of treatment for covered employees, 
covered individuals, and the dependents of covered employees, following 
a reported anomalous health incident, such as--
          (1) a protocol that sets forth elements, similar to the 
        elements described in subsection (c), of such testing;
          (2) a protocol pertaining to the voluntary testing and 
        treatment for victims of anomalous health incidents who are 
        children;
          (3) a protocol for ensuring that all victims of anomalous 
        health incidents receive access to prompt and consistent 
        medical treatment, including from medical professionals holding 
        appropriate security clearances and medical professionals with 
        expertise in child care;
          (4) a protocol for ensuring that all victims of anomalous 
        health incidents are offered options for psychological 
        treatment for the effects of such incidents; and
          (5) a protocol for ensuring that any testing, evaluation, or 
        collection of biofluids or other samples following a reported 
        anomalous health incident may be compared against the baseline 
        for the victim of the anomalous health incident, to the extent 
        the individual participated in the baseline medical testing, 
        consistent with subsections (b) and (c).
  (e) Protocol on Information Collection, Storage, and Safeguarding.--
The protocol described in this subsection is a protocol for the 
collection, storage, and safeguarding of information acquired as a 
result of the protocols described in subsections (c) and (d).
  (f) Protocol on Reporting Mechanisms.--The protocol described in this 
subsection is a protocol for the reporting of matters relating to 
anomalous health incidents by covered employees, covered individuals, 
and the dependents of covered employees, including the development of a 
system for the adjudication of complaints regarding medical treatment 
received by such covered employees, covered individuals, and dependents 
of covered employees.
  (g) Report and Briefings.--
          (1) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        report on the protocols described in subsections (c) through 
        (f).
          (2) Elements.--Such report shall include the following 
        elements:
                  (A) A copy of each protocol under this section.
                  (B) A description of the following:
                          (i) Any interagency agreements, authorities, 
                        or policies required to effectively implement 
                        the protocols under this section.
                          (ii) Any new facilities, medical equipment, 
                        tools, training, or other resources required to 
                        effectively implement such protocols.
                  (C) A timeline for the implementation of the 
                protocols under this section, including a proposal for 
                the prioritization of implementation with respect to 
                various categories of covered employees and the 
                dependents of covered employees.
          (3) Briefing.--Not later than 60 days following the date of 
        submission of the report under paragraph (1), and biannually 
        thereafter, the Director shall provide to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a briefing regarding the implementation 
        of the protocols under this section.
  (h) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee'' means an 
        individual who is an employee, assignee, or detailee of an 
        element of the intelligence community.
          (2) Covered individual.--The term ``covered individual'' 
        means a contractor to an element of the intelligence community.
          (3) Dependent of a covered employee.--The term ``dependent of 
        a covered employee'' means, with respect to a covered employee, 
        a family member (including a child), as defined by the Director 
        of National Intelligence.
          (4) Victim of an anomalous health incident.--The term 
        ``victim of an anomalous health incident'' means a covered 
        employee, covered individual, or dependent of a covered 
        employee, who is, or is suspected to have been, affected by an 
        anomalous health incident.

SEC. 504. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REVIEW OF 
                    OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES.

  (a) Review.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
in coordination with, and with the support of, the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community, shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report containing a review of the 
responsibilities, authorities, resources, and performance of the Office 
of Medical Services of the Central Intelligence Agency (in this section 
referred to as the ``Office'').
  (b) Matters Included.--The review under subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
          (1) A detailed description of the responsibilities and 
        authorities of the Office, as set forth in Federal law and any 
        applicable regulation, policy, or other document of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency.
          (2) A detailed description of the budgetary, human, and other 
        resources available to the Office, including with respect to 
        employees and any other personnel.
          (3) An assessment of the ability of the Office to 
        consistently discharge the responsibilities of the Office, with 
        an emphasis on the provision of medical treatment and care by 
        personnel of the Office, including with respect to--
                  (A) the roles of personnel of the Office, and of 
                senior officials of the Agency outside of the Office, 
                in determining what medical evaluation, treatment, and 
                care should be provided in a particular case, including 
                the provision of specialty care by medical personnel 
                outside of the Office;
                  (B) whether personnel of the Office consistently 
                provide appropriate and high-quality medical treatment 
                and care in accordance with standards set independently 
                by the professional medical community;
                  (C) whether the Office has sufficient human and other 
                resources, including personnel with specialized 
                background, qualifications, or expertise, to 
                consistently provide high-quality medical treatment and 
                care in accordance with standards set independently by 
                the professional medical community;
                  (D) whether personnel of the Office, including 
                personnel claiming specialized medical backgrounds and 
                expertise, are required by the Agency to maintain 
                current board certifications or other certifications 
                and licenses, and the extent to which the Office 
                verifies such certifications and licenses;
                  (E) the extent to which the Office makes consistent 
                and effective use of the specialized medical 
                background, qualifications, and expertise of the 
                personnel of the Office in providing medical treatment 
                and care;
                  (F) an assessment of whether personnel of the Office 
                who provide medical treatment and care, or who make 
                decisions with respect to such treatment or care, are 
                required to have extensive clinical or other experience 
                in directly treating patients, including in areas 
                requiring specialized background, qualifications, or 
                expertise;
                  (G) any factors that have frustrated or delayed the 
                provision of medical treatment and care by personnel of 
                the Office in significant cases; and
                  (H) any factors that have frustrated or could 
                frustrate prompt detection, effective oversight, and 
                swift remediation of problems within the Office, 
                including such factors that frustrate or delay the 
                provision of medical treatment and care in significant 
                cases.
  (c) Independent Advice.--In conducting the review under subsection 
(a), the Inspector General may obtain the advice of the medical 
advisory board established under section 502.
  (d) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an 
unclassified form to the extent practicable, consistent with the 
protection of intelligence sources and methods, but may include a 
classified annex.

SEC. 505. CLARIFICATION OF EFFECT OF CERTAIN BENEFITS RELATING TO 
                    INJURIES TO THE BRAIN.

  (a) Personnel of Central Intelligence Agency.--Subsection (d) of 
section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
3519b), as added by the HAVANA Act of 2021, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new paragraph:
          ``(5) No effect on other benefits.--Payments made under 
        paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit furnished 
        by the United States Government for which a covered dependent, 
        covered employee, or covered individual is entitled, and the 
        receipt of such payments may not affect the eligibility of such 
        a person to any other benefit furnished by the United States 
        Government.''.
  (b) Personnel of Department of State.--Subsection (i) of section 901 
of title IX of division J of the Further Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b), as added by the HAVANA Act of 2021, is 
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(5) No effect on other benefits.--Payments made under 
        paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit furnished 
        by the United States Government for which a covered dependent, 
        dependent of a former employee, covered employee, former 
        employee, or covered individual is entitled, and the receipt of 
        such payments may not affect the eligibility of such a person 
        to any other benefit furnished by the United States 
        Government.''.

            TITLE VI--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

SEC. 601. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON SECURITY SITUATION IN 
                    AFGHANISTAN AND RELATED REGION.

  (a) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence, acting 
through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National 
Intelligence Estimate on the situation in Afghanistan and the covered 
region.
  (b) Matters.--The National Intelligence Estimate produced under 
subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the 2-year period 
beginning on the date on which the Estimate is produced, an assessment 
of the following:
          (1) The presence in Afghanistan (including financial 
        contributions to the Taliban, political relations with the 
        Taliban, military presence in the covered region, economic 
        presence in the covered region, and diplomatic presence in the 
        covered region) of China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and any other 
        foreign country determined relevant by the Director, 
        respectively, and an assessment of the potential risks, or 
        benefits, of any such presence, contributions, or relations.
          (2) Any change in the threat to the United States homeland or 
        United States entities abroad as a result of the withdrawal of 
        the Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, including 
        an assessment of the risk of al-Qaeda or any affiliates 
        thereof, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any 
        affiliates thereof, or any other similar international 
        terrorist group, using Afghanistan as a safe haven for 
        launching attacks on the United States and its interests 
        abroad.
          (3) The political composition and sustainability of the 
        governing body of Afghanistan, including an assessment of the 
        ability of the United States Government to influence the 
        policies of such governing body on the following:
                  (A) Counterterrorism.
                  (B) Counternarcotics.
                  (C) Human rights (particularly regarding women and 
                girls and traditionally targeted ethnic groups).
                  (D) The treatment and safe transit of Afghans holding 
                special immigrant visa status under section 602 of the 
                Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 
                note) and other Afghans who, during the period 
                beginning in 2001, assisted efforts of the United 
                States in Afghanistan or the covered region.
          (4) The effect on the covered region, and Europe, of refugees 
        leaving Afghanistan.
          (5) The commitments of the Taliban relating to 
        counterterrorism, including an assessment of--
                  (A) whether such commitments required under the 
                agreement entered into between the United States 
                Government and the Taliban in February 2020, have been 
                tested, or will be tested during the 2-year period 
                covered by the Estimate, and what such commitments 
                entail;
                  (B) whether any additional commitments relating to 
                counterterrorism agreed to by the Taliban pursuant to 
                subsequent negotiations with the United States 
                Government following February 2020, have been tested, 
                or will be tested during the 2-year period covered by 
                the Estimate, and, if applicable, what such commitments 
                entail;
                  (C) any benchmarks against which the Taliban are to 
                be evaluated with respect to commitments relating to 
                counterterrorism; and
                  (D) the intentions and capabilities of the Taliban 
                with respect to counterterrorism (as such term is 
                understood by the United States and by the Taliban, 
                respectively), including the relations of the Taliban 
                with al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, the Islamic 
                State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any affiliates 
                thereof, or any other similar international terrorist 
                group.
  (c) Submission to Congress.--
          (1) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence 
        Estimate produced under subsection (a), including all 
        intelligence reporting underlying the Estimate.
          (2) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate shall be 
        submitted under paragraph (1) in classified form.
  (d) Public Version.--Consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, at the same time as the Director submits to the 
congressional intelligence committees the National Intelligence 
Estimate under subsection (c), the Director shall make publicly 
available on the internet website of the Director an unclassified 
version of the key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered region.--The term ``covered region'' includes the 
        following countries:
                  (A) China.
                  (B) The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including 
                Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates.
                  (C) India.
                  (D) Iran.
                  (E) Pakistan.
                  (F) Tajikistan.
                  (G) Turkey.
                  (H) Turkmenistan.
                  (I) Uzbekistan.
          (2) United states entity.--The term ``United States entity'' 
        means a citizen of the United States, an embassy or consulate 
        of the United States, or an installation, facility, or 
        personnel of the United States Government.

SEC. 602. REPORT ON LIKELIHOOD OF MILITARY ACTION BY COUNTRIES OF THE 
                    SOUTH CAUCASUS.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the likelihood 
of a South Caucasus country taking military action against another 
country (including in Nagorno-Karabakh or any other disputed 
territory). Such report shall include an indication of the strategic 
balance in the region, including with respect to the offensive military 
capabilities of each South Caucasus country.
  (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (c) South Caucasus Country Defined.--In this section, the term 
``South Caucasus country'' means any of the following:
          (1) Armenia.
          (2) Azerbaijan.
          (3) Georgia.

SEC. 603. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION POSTURE AND OTHER MATTERS 
                    RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN AND RELATED REGION.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the heads of elements of the intelligence community determined 
relevant by the Director, shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on the collection posture of the 
intelligence community and other matters relating to Afghanistan and 
the covered region.
  (b) Matters.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the 
following:
          (1) A detailed description of the collection posture of the 
        intelligence community with respect to Afghanistan, including 
        with respect to the following:
                  (A) The countering of terrorism threats that are 
                directed at the United States homeland or United States 
                entities abroad.
                  (B) The finances of the Taliban, including financial 
                contributions to the Taliban from foreign countries 
                (particularly from China, Iran, Russia, and any other 
                foreign country in the Arab Gulf region (or elsewhere) 
                determined relevant by the Director, respectively).
                  (C) The detection, and prevention of, any increased 
                threat to the United States homeland or United States 
                entities abroad as a result of the withdrawal of the 
                United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 
                31, 2021, including any such increased threat resulting 
                from al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, the Islamic 
                State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any affiliates 
                thereof, or any other similar international terrorist 
                group, using Afghanistan as a safe harbor.
          (2) A detailed description of any plans, strategies, or 
        efforts to improve the collection posture described in 
        paragraph (1)(A), including by filling any gaps identified 
        pursuant to such paragraph.
          (3) An assessment of the effect of publicly documenting 
        abuses engaged in by the Taliban, and a description of the 
        efforts of the intelligence community to support other 
        departments and agencies in the Federal Government with respect 
        to the collection and documentation of such abuses.
          (4) An assessment of the relationship between the 
        intelligence community and countries in the covered region, 
        including an assessment of the following:
                  (A) Intelligence and information sharing with such 
                countries.
                  (B) Any change in the collection posture of the 
                intelligence community with respect to the nuclear 
                activities of such countries as a result of the 
                withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces from 
                Afghanistan on August 31, 2021.
                  (C) The collection posture of the intelligence 
                community with respect to the presence of such 
                countries in Afghanistan (including financial 
                contributions to the Taliban, political relations with 
                the Taliban, military presence in Afghanistan, economic 
                presence in Afghanistan, and diplomatic presence in 
                Afghanistan) and the understanding of the intelligence 
                community regarding the potential risks, or benefits, 
                of any such presence, contributions, or relations.
                  (D) The ability of the intelligence community to use 
                the airspace of any such countries.
          (5) An assessment of any financial contributions to the 
        Taliban from foreign countries (particularly from China, Iran, 
        Russia, and any other foreign country in the Arab Gulf region 
        (or elsewhere) determined relevant by the Director, 
        respectively) made during the year preceding the withdrawal of 
        the United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 
        2021.
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in 
classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary.
  (d) Biannual Updates.--On a biannual basis during the 5-year period 
following the date of the submission of the report under subsection 
(a), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined relevant 
by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees an update to such report.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered region.--The term ``covered region'' includes the 
        following countries:
                  (A) China.
                  (B) The Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including 
                Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates.
                  (C) India.
                  (D) Iran.
                  (E) Pakistan.
                  (F) Tajikistan.
                  (G) Turkey.
                  (H) Turkmenistan.
                  (I) Uzbekistan.
          (2) United states entity.--The term ``United States entity'' 
        means a citizen of the United States, an embassy or consulate 
        of the United States, or an installation, facility, or 
        personnel of the United States Government.

SEC. 604. REPORT ON THREAT POSED BY EMERGING CHINESE TECHNOLOGY 
                    COMPANIES.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
threat to the national security of the United States posed by emerging 
Chinese technology companies.
  (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
          (1) An assessment of the threat to the national security of 
        the United States posed by emerging Chinese technology 
        companies, including with respect to--
                  (A) the practices of the companies and their 
                relationships to the government of China;
                  (B) the security of the communications, data, and 
                commercial interests of the United States; and
                  (C) the privacy interests of United States persons.
          (2) An assessment of the ability of the United States to 
        counter any such threat, including with respect to different 
        tools that could counter such a threat.
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in 
classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified 
executive summary.
  (d) Emerging Chinese Technology Companies Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``emerging Chinese technology companies'' means a Chinese 
technology company, including a company listed on the Science and 
Technology Innovation Board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, that the 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis 
determines poses a significant threat to the national security of the 
United States.

SEC. 605. REPORT ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

  (a) Requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the heads of elements of the intelligence community 
that the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the 
following:
          (1) Details on the cooperation between China and the United 
        Arab Emirates regarding defense, security, technology, and 
        other strategically sensitive matters that implicate the 
        national security interests of the United States.
          (2) The most recent, as of the date of the report, quarterly 
        assessment by the intelligence community of measures that the 
        United Arab Emirates has implemented to safeguard technology of 
        the United States and the reliability of any assurances by the 
        United Arab Emirates (with respect to both current assurances 
        and assurances being considered as of the date of the report).
          (3) A certification by the Director regarding whether such 
        assurances described in paragraph (2) are viable and sufficient 
        to protect technology of the United States from being 
        transferred to China or other third parties.
  (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in 
classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified 
executive summary.

SEC. 606. REPORT ON PROPAGATION OF EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES FROM SAUDI 
                    ARABIA.

  (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2022, the Director of 
National Intelligence, in consultation with other relevant Federal 
departments and agencies, shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on the threat of extremist ideologies 
propagated from Saudi Arabia and the failure of the Government of Saudi 
Arabia to prevent the propagation of such ideologies. Such report shall 
include a detailed description of--
          (1) the role of governmental and nongovernmental entities and 
        individuals of Saudi Arabia in promoting, funding, and 
        exporting ideologies, including so-called ``Wahhabist 
        ideology'', that inspire extremism or extremist groups in other 
        countries; and
          (2) the practical and strategic consequences for vital 
        national security interests of the United States as a result of 
        such promotion, funding, or export.
  (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 607. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS BY UNITED STATES.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
report on how covered countries respond to sanctions imposed by the 
United States.
  (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
          (1) An assessment of whether sanctions imposed by the United 
        States on entities, individuals, or the governments of covered 
        countries have caused those countries to alter their behavior.
          (2) An assessment of the effectiveness of--
                  (A) continuing such sanctions; and
                  (B) imposing additional sanctions.
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in 
classified form, but if so submitted shall include an unclassified 
executive summary.
  (d) Covered Country Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered 
country'' means--
          (1) China;
          (2) Iran;
          (3) Russia; and
          (4) any other foreign country the Assistant Secretary of the 
        Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis determines appropriate.

                  TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

SEC. 701. PILOT PROGRAM FOR SECURITY VETTING OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.

  (a) Establishment.--The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
and Security may establish a pilot program to identify risks associated 
with individuals who are performing unclassified research funded by the 
Department of Defense who would not otherwise undergo Federal personnel 
vetting.
  (b) Elements.--In carrying out the pilot program under this section, 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security may--
          (1) identify the size of the population to be vetted under 
        the pilot program;
          (2) establish a process to obtain information from 
        individuals to be vetted under the pilot program;
          (3) determine the criteria to evaluate national security 
        risks to research funded by the Department of Defense from 
        individuals who are participating in such research;
          (4) establish a process to conduct vetting, including 
        referrals to appropriate counterintelligence and law 
        enforcement entities, for the population to be screened under 
        the pilot program; and
          (5) carry out the process described in paragraph (4) with 
        respect to the population to be screened under the pilot 
        program.
  (c) Report.--Before commencing the pilot program under this section, 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing 
details of the planned elements of the pilot program under subsection 
(b).
  (d) Briefings.--Not less frequently than annually during the 3-year 
period beginning on the date that is 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
and Security shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 
a briefing on the status of the pilot program under this section.
  (e) Termination.--The authority to conduct the pilot program under 
this section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
  (f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
          (2) the congressional defense committees (as such term is 
        defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code).

SEC. 702. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND REPORTS ON FOREIGN RACIALLY 
                    MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISTS.

  (a) Intelligence Assessment.--
          (1) Requirement.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National 
        Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with the Director of 
        the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of 
        Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and in 
        consultation with other relevant Federal departments and 
        agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees an intelligence assessment on significant threats to 
        the United States associated with foreign racially motivated 
        violent extremist organizations.
          (2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  (A) A list of foreign racially motivated violent 
                extremist organizations that pose a significant threat 
                to the national security of the United States.
                  (B) With respect to each such organization--
                          (i) an overview of the membership, ideology, 
                        and activities;
                          (ii) a description of any transnational links 
                        to the United States or United States persons;
                          (iii) a description of the leadership, plans, 
                        intentions, and capabilities;
                          (iv) whether (and if so, to what extent) 
                        foreign governments or their proxies provide 
                        any manner of support to such organizations, 
                        including a list of each such foreign 
                        government or proxy;
                          (v) a description of the composition and 
                        characteristics of the members and support 
                        networks, including whether (and if so, to what 
                        extent) the members are also a part of a 
                        military, security service, or police;
                          (vi) a description of financing and other 
                        forms of material support;
                          (vii) an assessment of trends and patterns 
                        relative to communications, travel, and 
                        training (including whether and to what extent 
                        the organization is engaged in or facilitating 
                        military or paramilitary training);
                          (viii) an assessment of the radicalization 
                        and recruitment, including an analysis of the 
                        extremist messaging motivating members and 
                        supporters; and
                          (ix) whether (and if so, to what extent) 
                        foreign governments have sufficient laws and 
                        policies to counter threats to the United 
                        States associated with the organization, 
                        including best practices and gaps.
                  (C) An assessment of the status and extent of 
                information sharing, intelligence partnerships, foreign 
                police cooperation, and mutual legal assistance between 
                the United States and foreign governments relative to 
                countering threats to the United States associated with 
                foreign racially motivated violent extremist 
                organizations.
                  (D) An assessment of intelligence gaps and 
                recommendations on how to remedy such gaps.
                  (E) An opportunity analysis regarding countering such 
                threats, including, at a minimum, with respect to 
                mitigating and disrupting the transnational nexus.
          (3) Standards.--The intelligence assessment under paragraph 
        (1) shall be conducted in a manner that meets the analytic 
        integrity and tradecraft standards of the intelligence 
        community.
          (4) Form.--The intelligence assessment under paragraph (1) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex in electronic form that is fully indexed and 
        searchable. In carrying out this paragraph, the officials 
        specified in paragraph (1) shall--
                  (A) ensure that the assessment is unclassified to the 
                extent possible; and
                  (B) ensure that the assessment is drafted in a way to 
                maximize the ability to share the assessment, including 
                the classified annex, with the entities under paragraph 
                (5).
          (5) Sharing.--Consistent with the protection of classified 
        information, the Director of National Intelligence, acting 
        through the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, 
        in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 
        Intelligence and Analysis, shall share the intelligence 
        assessment under paragraph (1) with--
                  (A) appropriate Federal departments and agencies;
                  (B) Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Domestic 
                Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell of the Federal Bureau 
                of Investigation;
                  (C) State, local, and Tribal law enforcement 
                officials, including officials who operate within 
                State, local, and regional fusion centers through the 
                Department of Homeland Security State, Local, and 
                Regional Fusion Center Initiative established in 
                accordance with section 210A of the Homeland Security 
                Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h); and
                  (D) appropriate foreign governments, including 
                foreign intelligence services and foreign police, and 
                international institutions, that partner with the 
                United States on countering significant threats 
                associated with foreign racially motivated violent 
                extremist organizations.
  (b) Report.--
          (1) Requirement.--Not later than 150 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence, acting through the Director of the National 
        Counterterrorism Center, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, and in a manner consistent with 
        the authorities and responsibilities of such Secretary or 
        Director, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on the use of Federal laws, regulations, 
        and policies by the Federal Government to counter significant 
        threats to the United States and United States persons 
        associated with foreign racially motivated violent extremist 
        organizations.
          (2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include 
        the following:
                  (A) An identification, description, and assessment of 
                the use and efficacy of, Federal laws, regulations, and 
                policies used by the Federal Government to address 
                significant threats to the United States and United 
                States persons associated with foreign racially 
                motivated violent extremist organizations, including 
                pursuant to--
                          (i) section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform 
                        and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 
                        485) and section 119 of the National Security 
                        Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3056), particularly with 
                        respect to the coordination and integration of 
                        all instruments of national power;
                          (ii) Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 
                        note), as amended;
                          (iii) the designation of foreign terrorist 
                        organizations under section 219 of the 
                        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
                        1189);
                          (iv) the designation of specially designated 
                        terrorists, specially designated global 
                        terrorists, or specially designated nationals 
                        and blocked persons, pursuant to Executive 
                        Orders 13886, 13372, and 13224 and parts 594, 
                        595, 596, and 597 of title 31, Code of Federal 
                        Regulations;
                          (v) National Security Presidential 
                        Memorandums 7 and 9, particularly with respect 
                        to the sharing of terrorism information and 
                        screening and vetting activities; and
                          (vi) any other applicable Federal laws, 
                        regulations, or policies.
                  (B) An assessment of whether (and if so, to what 
                extent and why) such Federal laws, regulations, and 
                policies are sufficient to counter such threats, 
                including a description of any gaps and specific 
                examples to illustrate such gaps.
                  (C) Recommendations regarding how to remedy the gaps 
                under subparagraph (B).
          (3) Privacy and civil liberties assessment.--Not later than 
        180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
        Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, in consultation 
        with the civil liberties and privacy officers of the Federal 
        departments and agencies the Board determines appropriate, 
        shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        report containing--
                  (A) an assessment of the impacts on the privacy and 
                civil liberties of United States persons concerning the 
                use or recommended use of any Federal laws, 
                regulations, and policies specified in paragraph (2); 
                and
                  (B) recommendations on options to develop protections 
                to mitigate such impacts.
          (4) Form.--The reports under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex in electronic form that is fully indexed and searchable. 
        In carrying out this paragraph, the officials responsible for 
        submitting such reports shall ensure that the reports are 
        unclassified to the extent possible.
  (c) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on 
                Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                  (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
                Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.
          (2) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism 
        information'' has the meaning given that term in section 
        1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
        of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(a)).
          (3) United states person.--The term ``United States person'' 
        has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039).

SEC. 703. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT 
                    CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED 
                    INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES.

  Section 6610 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 
(50 U.S.C. 3352e) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``this Act and not less frequently than once 
        every 5 years thereafter,'' and inserting ``this Act, and 
        biennially thereafter,''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ``Such 
        report shall take into account the potential effect of 
        maintaining continuity of operations during a covered national 
        emergency (as defined by section 303 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (division W of Public 
        Law 116-260)) and the assessed needs of the intelligence 
        community to maintain such continuity of operations.''.

SEC. 704. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS.

  (a) Requirement.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such 
Act accordingly):

``SEC. 1111. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS.

  ``(a) Reports.--On a biennial basis until the date that is 10 years 
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2022, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive 
report on the activities, prioritization, and responsibilities of the 
intelligence community with respect to foreign biological threats 
emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country.
  ``(b) Matters Included.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
include, with respect to foreign biological threats emanating from the 
territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country, the following:
          ``(1) A detailed description of all activities relating to 
        such threats undertaken by each element of the intelligence 
        community, and an assessment of any gaps in such activities.
          ``(2) A detailed description of all duties and 
        responsibilities relating to such threats explicitly authorized 
        or otherwise assigned, exclusively or jointly, to each element 
        of the intelligence community, and an assessment of any 
        identified gaps in such duties or responsibilities.
          ``(3) A description of the coordination among the relevant 
        elements of the intelligence community with respect to the 
        activities specified in paragraph (1) and the duties and 
        responsibilities specified in paragraph (2).
          ``(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, policies, and 
        interagency agreements of the intelligence community relating 
        to the collection, monitoring, analysis, mitigation, and 
        attribution of such threats, and an assessment of any 
        identified gaps therein.
          ``(5) A description of the coordination and interactions 
        among the relevant elements of the intelligence community and 
        non-intelligence community partners.
          ``(6) An assessment of foreign malign influence efforts 
        relating to such threats, and a description of how the 
        intelligence community contributes to efforts by non-
        intelligence community partners to counter such foreign malign 
        influence.
  ``(c) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an 
unclassified executive summary.
  ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Covered country.--The term `covered country' means--
                  ``(A) China;
                  ``(B) Iran;
                  ``(C) North Korea;
                  ``(D) Russia; and
                  ``(E) any other foreign country--
                          ``(i) from which the Director of National 
                        Intelligence determines a biological threat 
                        emanates; or
                          ``(ii) that the Director determines has a 
                        known history of, or has been assessed as 
                        having conditions present for, infectious 
                        disease outbreaks or epidemics.
          ``(2) Foreign biological threat.--The term `foreign 
        biological threat' means biological warfare, bioterrorism, 
        naturally occurring infectious diseases, or accidental 
        exposures to biological materials, without regard to whether 
        the threat originates from a state actor, a non-state actor, 
        natural conditions, or an undetermined source.
          ``(3) Foreign malign influence.--The term `foreign malign 
        influence' has the meaning given such term in section 119C(e).
          ``(4) Non-intelligence community partner.--The term `non-
        intelligence community partner' means a Federal department or 
        agency that is not an element of the intelligence community.''.
  (b) First Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first report 
required under section 1111 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
added by subsection (a).

SEC. 705. ANNUAL REPORTS ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of 
        Homeland Security conduct vital work in enforcing the rule of 
        law and safeguarding the people of the United States from harm;
          (2) the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
        2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) sought to facilitate 
        greater information sharing between law enforcement and 
        intelligence communities for the purpose of thwarting attacks 
        on the homeland from international terrorist organizations;
          (3) National Intelligence Program funds should be expended 
        only in support of intelligence activities with a foreign 
        nexus, consistent with the definition of ``intelligence'' 
        provided by Congress in section 3 of the National Security Act 
        of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003); and
          (4) the intelligence community should not engage in the 
        collection, assessment, or analysis of information that 
        pertains exclusively to United States persons absent a foreign 
        nexus.
  (b) Requirement.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 704, is further amended by 
adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table 
of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

``SEC. 1112. ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  ``(a) Reports.--Not later than January 31 of each year, the Director 
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report--
          ``(1) identifying all domestic activities undertaken by each 
        element of the intelligence community during the prior fiscal 
        year; and
          ``(2) for each activity identified under paragraph (1), a 
        statement of the legal authority authorizing such activity to 
        be undertaken.
  ``(b) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
  (c) First Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first report 
required under section 1112 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
added by subsection (a).

SEC. 706. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES PROCURED BY 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL 
                    PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES.

  (a) Requirement.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 705, is further amended by 
adding at the end the following new section (and conforming the table 
of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly):

``SEC. 1113. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES PROCURED 
                    BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL 
                    PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES.

  ``(a) Annual Reports.--On an annual basis through 2026, the Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National 
Security Agency, in coordination with the Director of National 
Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report containing information on foreign commercial 
providers and the cyber vulnerabilities procured by the intelligence 
community through foreign commercial providers.
  ``(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with 
respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
          ``(1) A description of each cyber vulnerability procured 
        through a foreign commercial provider, including--
                  ``(A) a description of the vulnerability;
                  ``(B) the date of the procurement;
                  ``(C) whether the procurement consisted of only that 
                vulnerability or included other vulnerabilities;
                  ``(D) the cost of the procurement;
                  ``(E) the identity of the commercial provider and, if 
                the commercial provider was not the original supplier 
                of the vulnerability, a description of the original 
                supplier;
                  ``(F) the country of origin of the vulnerability; and
                  ``(G) an assessment of the ability of the 
                intelligence community to use the vulnerability, 
                including whether such use will be operational or for 
                research and development, and the approximate timeline 
                for such use.
          ``(2) An assessment of foreign commercial providers that--
                  ``(A) pose a significant threat to the national 
                security of the United States; or
                  ``(B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to any 
                foreign government that--
                          ``(i) has used the cyber vulnerabilities to 
                        target United States persons, the United States 
                        Government, journalists, or dissidents; or
                          ``(ii) has an established pattern or practice 
                        of violating human rights or suppressing 
                        dissent.
          ``(3) An assessment of whether the intelligence community has 
        conducted business with the foreign commercial providers 
        identified under paragraph (2) during the 5-year period 
        preceding the date of the report.
  ``(c) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) may be submitted in 
classified form.
  ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Commercial provider.--The term `commercial provider' 
        means any person that sells, or acts as a broker, for a cyber 
        vulnerability.
          ``(2) Cyber vulnerability.--The term `cyber vulnerability' 
        means any tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code that is 
        intended to compromise a device, network, or system, including 
        such a tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code procured by the 
        intelligence community for purposes of research and 
        development.''.
  (b) First Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and the Director of the National Security Agency shall jointly submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees the first report required 
under section 1113 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
subsection (a).

SEC. 707. IMPROVEMENTS TO ANNUAL REPORT ON DEMOGRAPHIC DATA OF 
                    EMPLOYEES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Section 5704(c) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 
(50 U.S.C. 3334b(c)) is amended--
          (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
        ``After making available a report under subsection (b), the 
        Director of National Intelligence shall annually provide a 
        report'' and inserting ``Not later than March 31 of each year, 
        the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a report''; 
        and
          (2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new 
        paragraph:
          ``(1) demographic data and information on the status of 
        diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence community, 
        including demographic data relating to--
                  ``(A) the average years of service;
                  ``(B) the average number of years of service for each 
                level in the General Schedule, Senior Executive 
                Service, Senior Intelligence Service, or equivalent; 
                and
                  ``(C) career categories;''.

SEC. 708. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ESCALATION AND DE-
                    ESCALATION OF GRAY ZONE ACTIVITIES IN GREAT POWER 
                    COMPETITION.

  (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
          (1) The conventional power of the United States has driven 
        foreign adversaries to a level of competition that does not 
        always depend on military confrontation with the United States.
          (2) Rather than challenging the United States in a manner 
        that could provoke a kinetic military response, foreign 
        adversaries of the United States have turned to carrying out 
        gray zone activities to advance the interests of such 
        adversaries, weaken the power of the United States, and erode 
        the norms that underpin the United States-led international 
        order.
          (3) Gray zone activity falls on a spectrum of attribution and 
        deniability that ranges from covert adversary operations, to 
        detectible covert adversary operations, to unattributable 
        adversary operations, to deniable adversary operations, to open 
        adversary operations.
          (4) To adequately address such a shift to gray zone activity, 
        the United States must understand what actions tend to either 
        escalate or de-escalate such activity by our adversaries.
          (5) The laws, principles, and values of the United States are 
        strategic advantages in great power competition with 
        authoritarian foreign adversaries that carry out gray zone 
        activities, because such laws, principles, and values increase 
        the appeal of the governance model of the United States, and 
        the United States-led international order, to states and 
        peoples around the world.
          (6) The international security environment has demonstrated 
        numerous examples of gray zone activities carried out by 
        foreign adversaries, including the following activities of 
        foreign adversaries:
                  (A) Information operations, such as efforts by Russia 
                to influence the 2020 United States Federal elections 
                (as described in the March 15, 2021, intelligence 
                community assessment of the Office of the Director of 
                National Intelligence made publicly available on March 
                15, 2021).
                  (B) Adversary political coercion operations, such as 
                the wielding of energy by Russia, particularly in the 
                context of Ukrainian gas pipelines, to coerce its 
                neighbors into compliance with its policies.
                  (C) Cyber operations, such as the use by China of 
                cyber tools to conduct industrial espionage.
                  (D) Provision of support to proxy forces, such as the 
                support provided by Iran to Hezbollah and Shia militia 
                groups.
                  (E) Provocation by armed forces controlled by the 
                government of the foreign adversary through measures 
                that do not rise to the level of an armed attack, such 
                as the use of the China Coast Guard and maritime 
                militia by China to harass the fishing vessels of other 
                countries in the South China Sea.
                  (F) Alleged uses of lethal force on foreign soil, 
                such as the 2018 poisoning of Sergei Skripal in London 
                by Russia.
                  (G) The potential use by an adversary of technology 
                that causes anomalous health incidents among United 
                States Government personnel.
  (b) National Intelligence Estimate.--
          (1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
        acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce 
        a National Intelligence Estimate on how foreign adversaries use 
        gray zone activities to advance interests, what responses by 
        the United States (or the allies or partners of the United 
        States) would tend to result in the escalation or de-escalation 
        of such gray zone activities by foreign adversaries, and any 
        opportunities for the United States to minimize the extent to 
        which foreign adversaries use gray zone activities in 
        furtherance of great power competition.
          (2) Matters included.--To the extent determined appropriate 
        by the National Intelligence Council, the National Intelligence 
        Estimate produced under paragraph (1) may include an assessment 
        of the following topics:
                  (A) Any potential or actual lethal or harmful gray 
                zone activities carried out against the United States 
                by foreign adversaries, including against United States 
                Government employees and United States persons, whether 
                located within or outside of the United States.
                  (B) To the extent such activities have occurred, or 
                are predicted to occur--
                          (i) opportunities to reduce or deter any such 
                        activities; and
                          (ii) any actions of the United States 
                        Government that would tend to result in the 
                        escalation or de-escalation of such activities.
                  (C) Any incidents in which foreign adversaries could 
                have used, but ultimately did not use, gray zone 
                activities to advance the interests of such 
                adversaries, including an assessment as to why the 
                foreign adversary ultimately did not use gray zone 
                activities.
                  (D) The effect of lowering the United States 
                Government threshold for the public attribution of 
                detectible covert adversary operations, unattributable 
                adversary operations, and deniable adversary 
                operations.
                  (E) The effect of lowering the United States 
                Government threshold for responding to detectible 
                covert adversary operations, unattributable adversary 
                operations, and deniable adversary operations.
                  (F) The extent to which the governments of foreign 
                adversaries exercise control over any proxies or 
                parastate actors used by such governments in carrying 
                out gray zone activities.
                  (G) The extent to which gray zone activities carried 
                out by foreign adversaries affect the private sector of 
                the United States.
                  (H) The international norms that provide the greatest 
                deterrence to gray zone activities carried out by 
                foreign adversaries, and opportunities for 
                strengthening those norms.
                  (I) The effect, if any, of the strengthening of 
                democratic governance abroad on the resilience of 
                United States allies and partners to gray zone 
                activities.
                  (J) Opportunities to strengthen the resilience of 
                United States allies and partners to gray zone 
                activities, and associated tactics, carried out by 
                foreign adversaries.
                  (K) Opportunities for the United States to improve 
                the detection of, and early warning for, such 
                activities and tactics.
                  (L) Opportunities for the United States to galvanize 
                international support in responding to such activities 
                and tactics.
          (3) Submission to congress.--
                  (A) Submission.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
                of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit 
                to the congressional intelligence committees the 
                National Intelligence Estimate produced under paragraph 
                (1), including all intelligence reporting underlying 
                the Estimate.
                  (B) Notice regarding submission.--If at any time 
                before the deadline specified in subparagraph (A), the 
                Director determines that the National Intelligence 
                Estimate produced under paragraph (1) cannot be 
                submitted by such deadline, the Director shall (before 
                such deadline) submit to the congressional intelligence 
                committees a report setting forth the reasons why the 
                National Intelligence Estimate cannot be submitted by 
                such deadline and an estimated date for the submission 
                of the National Intelligence Estimate.
                  (C) Form.--Any report under subparagraph (B) shall be 
                submitted in unclassified form.
          (4) Public version.--Consistent with the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the 
        Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees 
        the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1), the 
        Director shall make publicly available on the internet website 
        of the Director an unclassified version of the key findings of 
        the National Intelligence Estimate.
          (5) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                  (A) Gray zone activity.--The term ``gray zone 
                activity'' means an activity to advance the national 
                interests of a State that--
                          (i) falls between ordinary statecraft and 
                        open warfare;
                          (ii) is carried out with an intent to 
                        maximize the advancement of interests of the 
                        state without provoking a kinetic military 
                        response by the United States; and
                          (iii) falls on a spectrum that ranges from 
                        covert adversary operations, to detectible 
                        covert adversary operations, to unattributable 
                        adversary operations, to deniable adversary 
                        operations, to open adversary operations.
                  (B) Covert adversary operation.--The term ``covert 
                adversary operation'' means an operation by an 
                adversary that--
                          (i) the adversary intends to remain below the 
                        threshold at which the United States detects 
                        the operation; and
                          (ii) does stay below such threshold.
                  (C) Detectible covert adversary operation.--The term 
                ``detectible covert adversary operation'' means an 
                operation by an adversary that--
                          (i) the adversary intends to remain below the 
                        threshold at which the United States detects 
                        the operation; but
                          (ii) is ultimately detected by the United 
                        States at a level below the level at which the 
                        United States will publicly attribute the 
                        operation to the adversary.
                  (D) Unattributable adversary operation.--The term 
                ``unattributable adversary operation'' means an 
                operation by an adversary that the adversary intends to 
                be detected by the United States, but remain below the 
                threshold at which the United States will publicly 
                attribute the operation to the adversary.
                  (E) Deniable adversary operation.--The term 
                ``deniable adversary operation'' means an operation by 
                an adversary that--
                          (i) the adversary intends to be detected and 
                        publicly or privately attributed by the United 
                        States; and
                          (ii) the adversary intends to deny, to limit 
                        the response by the United States, and any 
                        allies of the United States.
                  (F) Open adversary operation.--The term ``open 
                adversary operation'' means an operation by an 
                adversary that the adversary openly acknowledges as 
                attributable to the adversary.
  (c) Requirement to Develop Lexicon.--
          (1) Requirement.--The Director of National Intelligence, 
        acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall develop 
        a lexicon of common terms (and corresponding definitions for 
        such terms) for concepts associated with gray zone activities.
          (2) Considerations.--In developing the lexicon under 
        paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Council shall include 
        in the lexicon each term (and the corresponding definition for 
        each term) specified in subsection (b)(5), unless the National 
        Intelligence Council determines that an alternative term (or 
        alternative definition)--
                  (A) more accurately describes a concept associated 
                with gray zone activities; or
                  (B) is preferable for any other reason.
          (3) Report.--
                  (A) Publication.--The Director of National 
                Intelligence shall publish a report containing the 
                lexicon developed under paragraph (1).
                  (B) Form.--The report under subparagraph (A) shall be 
                published in unclassified form.

SEC. 709. REPORT ON CERTAIN ACTIONS TAKEN BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                    WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
                    HUMANITARIAN LAW.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on certain actions taken 
by the intelligence community with respect to human rights and 
international humanitarian law.
  (b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the 
following:
          (1) A detailed explanation of whether, and to what extent, 
        each element of the intelligence community has provided 
        intelligence products relating to the efforts of the Secretary 
        of State and the Secretary of Treasury regarding the 
        categorization, determinations on eligibility for assistance 
        and training, and general understanding, of covered entities 
        that commit, engage, or are otherwise complicit in, violations 
        of human rights or international humanitarian law.
          (2) A detailed explanation of whether, and to what extent, 
        each element of the intelligence community has provided 
        intelligence products relating to any of the following:
                  (A) Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, 
                Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations 
                Act, 2020 (division G of Public Law 116-94; 8 U.S.C. 
                1182 note).
                  (B) The visa restriction policy of the Department of 
                State announced on February 26, 2021, and commonly 
                referred to as the ``Khashoggi Ban''.
                  (C) The annual report requirement of the Department 
                of Defense under section 1057 of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (131 Stat. 
                1572).
                  (D) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability 
                Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 
                U.S.C. 2656 note).
          (3) A detailed explanation of the following processes:
                  (A) The process of each element of the intelligence 
                community for monitoring covered entities for 
                derogatory human rights or international humanitarian 
                law information.
                  (B) The process of each element of the intelligence 
                community for determining the credibility of derogatory 
                human rights or international humanitarian law 
                information.
                  (C) The process of each element of the intelligence 
                community for determining what further action is 
                appropriate if derogatory human rights or international 
                humanitarian law information is determined to be 
                credible.
          (4) An unredacted copy of each policy or similar document 
        that describes a process specified in paragraph (3).
          (5) A detailed explanation of whether, with respect to each 
        element of the intelligence community, the head of the element 
        has changed or restricted any activities of the element in 
        response to derogatory human rights or international 
        humanitarian law information.
          (6) Examples of any changes or restrictions specified in 
        paragraph (5) taken by the head of the element of the 
        intelligence community during the two years preceding the date 
        of the submission of the report.
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity''--
                  (A) means an individual, unit, or foreign government 
                that--
                          (i) has a cooperative relationship with the 
                        United States Government; or
                          (ii) is the target of an intelligence 
                        collection activity carried out by the United 
                        States Government; but
                  (B) does not include an employee of the United States 
                Government.
          (2) Derogatory human rights or international humanitarian law 
        information.--The term ``derogatory human rights or 
        international humanitarian law information'' means information 
        tending to suggest that a covered entity committed, 
        participated, or was otherwise complicit in, a violation of 
        human rights or international humanitarian law, regardless of 
        the credibility of such information, the source of the 
        information, or the level of classification of the information.
          (3) Violation of human rights or international humanitarian 
        law.--The term ``violation of human rights or international 
        humanitarian law'' includes a violation of any authority or 
        obligation of the United States Government related to human 
        rights or international humanitarian law, without regard to 
        whether such authority or obligation is codified in a provision 
        of law, regulation, or policy.

SEC. 710. BRIEFING ON TRAININGS RELATING TO BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY.

  (a) Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the 
congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the feasibility and 
benefits of providing training described in subsection (b).
  (b) Training Described.--Training described in this subsection is 
training that meets the following criteria:
          (1) The training is on cryptocurrency, blockchain technology, 
        or both subjects.
          (2) The training may be provided through partnerships with 
        universities or private sector entities.

SEC. 711. REPORT ON PROSPECTIVE ABILITY TO ADMINISTER COVID-19 VACCINES 
                    AND OTHER MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS TO CERTAIN 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, in consultation 
with the elements of the intelligence community and relevant public 
health agencies of the United States, shall jointly develop and submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
prospective ability of the intelligence community to administer COVID-
19 vaccines, and such other medical interventions as may be relevant in 
the case of a future covered national emergency, to covered personnel 
(particularly with respect to essential covered personnel and covered 
personnel deployed outside of the United States).
  (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include 
an assessment of the following:
          (1) The prospective ability of the elements of the 
        intelligence community to administer COVID-19 vaccines 
        (including subsequent booster shots for COVID-19), to covered 
        personnel, and whether additional authorities or resources are 
        necessary for, or may otherwise facilitate, such 
        administration.
          (2) The potential risks and benefits of granting the 
        additional authorities or resources described in paragraph (1) 
        to the Director, the Under Secretary, or both.
          (3) With respect to potential future covered national 
        emergencies, including future outbreaks of an infectious 
        pandemic disease or similar public health emergencies, the 
        following:
                  (A) The ability of the intelligence community to 
                ensure the timely administration of medical 
                interventions to covered personnel during the covered 
                national emergency.
                  (B) Whether additional authorities or resources are 
                necessary to ensure, or may otherwise facilitate, such 
                timely administration, including with respect to the 
                ability of the Director or Under Secretary to provide 
                an alternative means of access to covered personnel 
                with reduced access to the interventions provided by 
                the respective element.
                  (C) The potential risks and benefits of granting the 
                additional authorities or resources described in 
                subparagraph (B) to the Director, the Under Secretary, 
                or both.
          (4) A summary of the findings of the survey under subsection 
        (c).
  (c) Survey.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and prior to submitting the report under subsection (a), 
the Director and the Under Secretary shall jointly conduct a survey to 
determine the process by which each element of the intelligence 
community has administered COVID-19 vaccines to covered personnel, to 
inform continued medical care relating to COVID-19 and future responses 
to covered national emergencies. Such survey shall address, with 
respect to each element, the following:
          (1) The timeline of the element with respect to the 
        administration of COVID-19 vaccines prior to the date of the 
        enactment of this Act.
          (2) The process by which the element determined when covered 
        personnel would become eligible to receive the COVID-19 vaccine 
        (including if certain categories of such personnel became 
        eligible before others).
          (3) A general approximation of the percentage of covered 
        personnel of the element that received the COVID-19 vaccine 
        from the element versus through an alternative means (such as a 
        private sector entity, foreign government, State, or local 
        government), particularly with respect to covered personnel 
        deployed outside of the United States.
          (4) Any challenges encountered by the element with respect to 
        the administration of COVID-19 vaccines prior to the date of 
        the enactment of this Act.
          (5) Any other feedback determined relevant for purposes of 
        the survey.
  (d) Privacy Considerations.--In carrying out the report and survey 
requirements under this section, the Director, the Under Secretary, and 
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community shall ensure, 
to the extent practicable, the preservation of medical privacy and the 
anonymity of data.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered national emergency.--The term ``covered national 
        emergency'' has the meaning given such term in section 303 of 
        the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 
        U.S.C. 3316b).
          (2) Covered personnel.--The term ``covered personnel'' means 
        personnel who are--
                  (A) employees of, or otherwise detailed or assigned 
                to, an element of the intelligence community; or
                  (B) funded under the National Intelligence Program or 
                the Military Intelligence Program.
          (3) Essential covered personnel.--The term ``essential 
        covered personnel'' means covered personnel deemed essential 
        to--
                  (A) continuity of operations of the intelligence 
                community;
                  (B) continuity of operations of the United States 
                Government; or
                  (C) other purposes related to the national security 
                of the United States.
          (4) National intelligence program.--The term ``National 
        Intelligence Program'' has the meaning given such term in 
        section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
        3003).

SEC. 712. REPORT ON POTENTIAL INCLUSION WITHIN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                    OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE 
                    DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the potential 
advantages and disadvantages of adding the Office of National Security 
of the Department of Health and Human Services as a new element of the 
intelligence community.
  (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
          (1) An assessment of the following:
                  (A) The likelihood that the addition of the Office of 
                National Security as a new element of the intelligence 
                community would increase connectivity between other 
                elements of the intelligence community working on 
                health security topics and the Department of Health and 
                Human Services.
                  (B) The likelihood that such addition would increase 
                the flow of raw intelligence and finished intelligence 
                products to officials of the Department of Health and 
                Human Services.
                  (C) The likelihood that such addition would 
                facilitate the flow of information relating to health 
                security topics to intelligence analysts of various 
                other elements of the intelligence community working on 
                such topics.
                  (D) The extent to which such addition would clearly 
                demonstrate to both the national security community and 
                the public health community that health security is 
                national security.
                  (E) Any anticipated impediments to such addition 
                relating to additional budgetary oversight by the 
                executive branch or Congress.
                  (F) Any other significant advantages or disadvantages 
                of such addition, as identified by either the Director 
                of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Health and 
                Human Services.
          (2) A joint recommendation by the Director of National 
        Intelligence and the Secretary of Health and Human Services as 
        to whether to add the Office of National Security as a new 
        element of the intelligence community.
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the congressional intelligence committees; and
          (2) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
        and Pensions of the Senate.

SEC. 713. REPORTS RELATING TO INSPECTOR GENERAL OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE 
                    AGENCY.

  (a) Report on Responses by Inspector General to Substantiated 
Allegations.--
          (1) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report on allegations of reprisal or abuse of 
        authority determined to be substantiated by the Inspector 
        General of the Defense Intelligence Agency during the 5-year 
        period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
        include, with respect to each allegation determined to be 
        substantiated during the 5-year period specified in such 
        paragraph, a description of the following:
                  (A) Details of each substantiated allegation.
                  (B) The rank or grade of the individuals involved in 
                the allegation.
                  (C) Any disciplinary action recommended by the 
                Inspector General in response to the allegation, or, if 
                the Inspector General recommended no disciplinary 
                action be taken in response, any justification for such 
                recommendation.
                  (D) Any disciplinary action taken by the relevant 
                manager of the Defense Intelligence Agency in response 
                to the allegation.
                  (E) Whether the relevant manager reduced, or declined 
                to take, a disciplinary action recommended by the 
                Inspector General in response to the allegation.
                  (F) Any justification from the relevant manager 
                regarding the decision to take, reduce, or decline to 
                take, a disciplinary action recommended by the 
                Inspector General in response to the allegation.
                  (G) The process by which Defense Intelligence Agency 
                management reviews and makes decisions regarding 
                disciplinary actions in response to substantiated 
                allegations, including--
                          (i) the criteria applied by management in 
                        making the decision to take, reduce, or decline 
                        to take, a disciplinary action;
                          (ii) a description of which managers have the 
                        authority to make such decisions, including the 
                        rank or grade of the managers; and
                          (iii) a description of any formal or informal 
                        appeals processes available with respect to 
                        such decisions.
          (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted 
        in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (b) Report on Processes for Ensuring Independence of Inspector 
General.--
          (1) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees and the Council of the Inspectors General on 
        Integrity and Efficiency established under section 11 of the 
        Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) a report on the 
        processes of the Defense Intelligence Agency for ensuring the 
        independence of the position of the Inspector General of the 
        Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall 
        include a description of the following:
                  (A) The selection criteria used by the Director in 
                the appointment of the Inspector General.
                  (B) The methods used by the Director to ensure the 
                independence of the position of the Inspector General, 
                including--
                          (i) the process for vetting candidates for 
                        such position for independence from leadership 
                        of the Defense Intelligence Agency and from 
                        officials occupying positions in the Defense 
                        Intelligence Senior Executive Service; and
                          (ii) the process for evaluating such 
                        candidates for conflicts of interest.
          (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted 
        in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (c) Assessment by Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency.--
          (1) Assessment.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Council of the Inspectors 
        General on Integrity and Efficiency shall--
                  (A) conduct an assessment of the effectiveness of the 
                selection criteria and methods specified in subsection 
                (b)(2) with respect to the position of the Inspector 
                General of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and
                  (B) submit to the congressional intelligence 
                committees a report containing the results of such 
                assessment.
          (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1)(B) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 714. REPORT ON RARE EARTH ELEMENTS.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of 
Energy, and any other head of an element of the intelligence community 
that the Director of National Intelligence determines relevant, shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on rare 
earth elements.
  (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
          (1) An assessment coordinated by the National Intelligence 
        Council of--
                  (A) long-term trends in the global rare earth element 
                industry;
                  (B) the national security, economic, and industrial 
                risks to the United States, and to the partners and 
                allies of the United States, with respect to relying on 
                foreign countries for rare earth mining and the 
                processing or production of rare earth elements;
                  (C) the intentions of foreign governments with 
                respect to limiting, reducing, or ending access of the 
                United States or the partners and allies of the United 
                States to--
                          (i) rare earth elements; or
                          (ii) any aspect of the rare earth mining, 
                        processing, or production chain; and
                  (D) opportunities for the United States, and for the 
                partners and allies of the United States, to assure 
                continued access to--
                          (i) rare earth elements; and
                          (ii) the rare earth mining, processing, or 
                        production chain.
          (2) A description of--
                  (A) any relevant procurement, use, and supply chain 
                needs of the intelligence community with respect to 
                rare earth elements;
                  (B) any relevant planning or efforts by the 
                intelligence community to assure secured access to rare 
                earth elements;
                  (C) any assessed vulnerabilities or risks to the 
                intelligence community with respect to rare earth 
                elements;
                  (D) any relevant planning or efforts by the 
                intelligence community to coordinate with departments 
                and agencies of the United States Government that are 
                not elements of the intelligence community on securing 
                the rare earth element supply chain; and
                  (E) any previous or anticipated efforts by the Supply 
                Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task 
                Force established under section 6306 of the Damon Paul 
                Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 
                (50 U.S.C. 3370) with respect to rare earth elements.
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (d) Rare Earth Elements Defined.--In this section, the term ``rare 
earth elements'' includes products that contain rare earth elements, 
including rare earth magnets.

SEC. 715. REPORT ON PLAN TO FULLY FUND THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY 
                    PROGRAM AND NEXT GENERATION ENCRYPTION.

  (a) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the resources necessary to fully 
fund the Information Systems Security Program during the period covered 
by the most recent future-years defense program submitted under section 
221 of title 10, United States Code--
          (1) to address the cybersecurity requirements of the 
        Department of Defense; and
          (2) for the adoption of next generation encryption into 
        existing and future systems.
  (b) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
          (1) An assessment by the Chief Information Officer of the 
        Department of Defense, in coordination with the chiefs of the 
        Armed Forces and in consultation with the Director of the 
        National Security Agency, of the additional resources required 
        to fund the Information Systems Security Program at a level 
        that satisfies current and anticipated cybersecurity 
        requirements of the Department.
          (2) An identification of any existing funding not currently 
        aligned to the Program that is more appropriately funded 
        through the Program.
          (3) A strategic plan, developed in coordination with the 
        chiefs of the Armed Forces and in consultation with the 
        Director of the National Security Agency, that provides 
        options, timelines, and required funding by the Armed Forces or 
        a component of the Department, for the adoption of next 
        generation encryption into existing and future systems.
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in 
classified form.
  (d) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the 
Secretary submits the report under subsection (a), the Chief 
Information Officer of the Department and the Director of the National 
Security Agency shall jointly provide to the appropriate congressional 
committees a briefing on the report.
  (e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
          (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate.

SEC. 716. REVIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AND UNITED STATES CYBER 
                    COMMAND.

  (a) Review Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the National Security 
Agency, Intelligence Community, and Department of Defense shall jointly 
complete a review of the National Security Agency and the United States 
Cyber Command.
  (b) Elements.--The review required by subsection (a) shall include 
assessment of the following:
          (1) Whether and what resources, authorities, activities, 
        missions, facilities, and personnel are appropriately being 
        delineated and used to conduct the intelligence and 
        cybersecurity missions at the National Security Agency as well 
        as the cyber offense and defense missions of the United States 
        Cyber Command.
          (2) The extent to which current resource-sharing arrangements 
        between the National Security Agency and the United States 
        Cyber Command lead to conflicts of interest in directing 
        intelligence collection in support of United States Cyber 
        Command missions rather than foreign intelligence collection.
          (3) The intelligence analysis and production conducted by the 
        United States Cyber Command using National Security Agency 
        authorities, with a focus on analytic integrity and 
        intelligence oversight to ensure proper analysis is informing 
        mission operations.
          (4) The number of personnel detailed from the National 
        Security Agency to the United States Cyber Command, including 
        from which offices such personnel have been detailed, and an 
        assessment of the mission impact on the sponsoring office.
  (c) Report and Brief.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Inspectors General of the National Security 
Agency, Intelligence Community, and Department of Defense shall jointly 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 
10, United States Code) a report and provide such committees a briefing 
on the findings of the inspectors general with respect to the review 
completed under subsection (a).

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 5412, the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (the Act), is to authorize the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022.

                 Classified Annex and Committee Intent

    The classified annex to this report includes the classified 
schedule of authorizations and associated explanatory and 
directive language. The classified schedule of authorizations 
is incorporated directly into the legislation by Section 102 of 
the bill. Elements of the Intelligence Community shall strictly 
comply with all Committee direction and other guidance set 
forth in the classified annex.
    The classified annex and classified schedule of 
authorizations have been made available for review by all 
Members of the House of Representatives, on conditions set by 
the Committee at the time of its consideration of H.R. 5412.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    The bill authorizes United States intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities within the jurisdiction of the 
Committee, including the National Intelligence Program (NIP) 
and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the Homeland 
Security Intelligence Program (HSIP), and the Information 
Systems Security Program (ISSP).
    The NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as well as 
intelligence, intelligence-related, and counterintelligence 
activities conducted by: the Central Intelligence Agency; the 
Department of Defense, including the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and 
certain activities of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force; the Department of Energy; the Department of Justice, 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration; the Department of Homeland 
Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard and intelligence 
elements of DHS; the Department of State; and the Department of 
the Treasury.
    The MIP consists of certain activities of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, 
intelligence, intelligence-related, and counterintelligence 
activities of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 
the Marine Corps and Space Force, Special Operations Command, 
other elements of the Department of Defense and Combat Support 
Agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Agency, and 
certain activities of the National Reconnaissance Office.
    The Committee has exclusive or concurrent legislative, 
authorizing, and oversight jurisdiction of these activities--
and exclusive jurisdiction to study the sources and methods of 
the Intelligence Community.

                            Committee Views

    H.R. 5412, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2022 
(the Act) authorizes the activities of, and funding for, the 18 
elements comprising the United States Intelligence Community. 
Because most of the intelligence budget involves classified 
programs, the bulk of the Committee's recommendations each year 
are found in the classified annex accompanying the bill.

        Committee Statement Regarding Anomalous Health Incidents

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 
advances the Committee's continuing, bipartisan efforts with 
respect to anomalous health incidents, or ``AHIs''--which 
Intelligence Community (IC) and other United States personnel 
have suffered for years. From the earliest reports of ``Havana 
Syndrome'' onward, an utmost priority for the Committee has 
been to enable a vigorous and comprehensive response by the 
U.S. Government.
    In exercise of its legislative and oversight jurisdiction, 
and during the 116th and 117th Congresses, the Committee has 
focused on ensuring that:
           Victims of AHIs are strongly encouraged--at 
        all levels, including by senior and supervisory 
        personnel--to come forward with their accounts 
        immediately and to seek treatment, without fear of 
        being disbelieved, or of other negative consequences;
           Throughout the Executive Branch, clear 
        processes and procedures are established and 
        implemented for reporting, analyzing, and disseminating 
        information about AHIs;
           Victims and their families promptly receive 
        medical care and support of the highest quality, and 
        without encountering bureaucratic obstacles or delays, 
        including in pursuit of specialized care for traumatic 
        brain injuries and in planning for potential long-term 
        physiological and psychological effects;
           Every effort is undertaken throughout the 
        Executive Branch in order to determine the cause or 
        causes of AHIs, and thereafter immediately to report 
        any relevant information to Congress and the American 
        people; and that
           Any actor responsible for these injuries is 
        swiftly held to account.
    During the 117th Congress, the Committee's Members and 
staff have been, and continue to be, regularly briefed on all 
facets of AHI matters, including the direct experiences of AHI 
victims and their families. These engagements indicated 
deficiencies, some of them quite serious, in how AHI issues 
were handled by the IC in the past--especially with respect to 
the provision and adequacy of medical care.
    Informed by these oversight activities, the IAA takes 
remedial steps, among other things by:
           Incentivizing doctors in the CIA's Office of 
        Medical Services (OMS) to maintain their medical 
        accreditation, and requiring that such doctors be 
        afforded time to maintain clinical practice;
           Creating an expert advisory board to assist 
        with a top-to-bottom modernization of OMS;
           Mandating a comprehensive review by IC 
        Inspectors General of OMS; and
           Requiring the President to develop uniform 
        protocols for voluntary, pre-deployment testing--or 
        ``baselining''--of individuals, and comprehensive 
        treatment and care of individuals (and their families) 
        following an AHI. The IAA further requires creation of 
        protocols that encourage the reporting of AHIs and for 
        handling complaints or concerns regarding the 
        government's treatment of employees who report an AHI.

                                  ***

    The Committee welcomes the Administration's visible and 
serious efforts related to providing care to those harmed by 
AHIs, and to prioritizing investigation of AHI's cause or 
causes. The Committee notes in particular the significant 
advances within the IC during the past year, regarding the 
reporting of AHIs and the provision of medical treatment to 
affected personnel.
    As important as these steps have been, a great deal remains 
to be done. The Committee remains concerned that, despite the 
Administration's initiatives, and repeated legislative 
interventions by Congress, the Executive Branch's AHI policies 
are not uniform across Departments and agencies. Some victims 
also continue to be frustrated in their attempts to report 
AHIs, and are afforded inconsistent or slow access to important 
treatment and benefits. Going forward, it will be imperative 
for the Executive Branch to make sure that, in every case, the 
highest possible quality care and support is provided, 
expeditiously, to AHI victims and their families. That is a 
central goal of the IAA's AHI-related provisions, and of the 
HAVANA Act and related measures championed by the Committee.
    The Committee underscores, to the public and to all U.S. 
personnel and their families, its enduring commitment to 
providing all necessary resources and authorities--so as to 
guarantee that AHI victims and their families receive care and 
support; to quickly determine the origins of this most serious 
threat to U.S. national security; and to swiftly hold those 
responsible to account.

            Committee Statement Regarding Domestic Terrorism

    During the previous administration, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) assessed that ``white supremacist 
extremists (WSEs)--will remain the most persistent and lethal 
threat in the Homeland.'' Acting Secretary Chad Wolf noted in 
his preface to DHS's Homeland Threat Assessment, issued in 
October 2020, that he was ``particularly concerned about white 
supremacist violent extremists'' who have become 
``exceptionally lethal'' over the past few years.
    The Committee shares this deep concern about the threat of 
WSEs. To better understand and focus on this threat, the 
Committee included in this Act Section 702, which aims to 
improve federal intelligence agencies' ability to prioritize 
the threat of Racially Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs), 
especially WSEs, which are the most concerning such group. In 
particular, Sec. 702 adopts H.R. 4038, an act authored by 
Subcommittee Chairman Andre Carson, ``to direct the Director of 
National Intelligence to submit to Congress an intelligence 
assessment on threats to the United States associated with 
foreign violent White supremacist extremist organizations.'' 
The provision also aims to address intelligence gaps about this 
threat, including regarding white supremacist extremists' 
objectives and operational structure.
    While the Committee is deeply concerned about the domestic 
terrorist threat, the Committee is also mindful of the 
importance of protecting the civil rights and civil liberties 
of United States persons, and notes that the Intelligence 
Community plays a vital role in response to that threat.

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee held multiple 
hearings, briefings, and other engagements on the classified 
budgetary issues raised by H.R. 5412. The bill, as reported by 
the Committee, reflects conclusions reached by the Committee in 
light of this oversight activity.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    Broadly stated, the goals and objectives of H.R. 5412 are 
to authorize the intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 
2022. The classified annex accompanying the legislation 
reflects in detail the Committee's specific performance goals 
and objectives with respect to classified programs.

                  Non-Duplication of Federal Programs

    With respect to clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, no provision of H.R. 5412 
establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government 
that is known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a 
program that was included in any report from the Government 
Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of 
Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a program 
identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic 
Assistance.

                        Committee Consideration

    The Committee marked up H.R. 5412 on September 30, 2021. 
Chairman Schiff offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, which the Committee adopted by unanimous consent. 
No other amendments were offered, and the bill as amended was 
approved and ordered to be reported to the House by voice vote.

                    Unclassified Committee Direction


Expediting Comprehensive Processing and Resettlement of Vulnerable 
        Afghans

    A continuing Committee priority is the safe evacuation and 
resettlement of vulnerable foreign nationals fleeing 
Afghanistan--to include Afghan women and girls, and Afghans and 
others who assisted the United States or its mission before its 
departure from Afghanistan on August 30, 2021. In that regard, 
Section 309 of the Act authorizes non-reimbursable details by 
Intelligence Community (IC) personnel to other Executive Branch 
agencies, for the purpose of assisting with the processing and 
resettlement of refugees, parolees, and other aliens at risk of 
being harmed by the Taliban.
    The Committee urges Departments and agencies of the 
Executive Branch to make full and innovative use of this 
processing and resettlement authority, and of all other related 
authorities and capabilities, in order to ensure that such 
persons are evacuated and resettled safely. The Committee also 
instructs each relevant IC element to continue to provide 
regular, timely updates to the Committee regarding both 
processing and resettlement efforts, and any challenges or 
issues relating to those efforts.

Intelligence Lessons Learned regarding Afghanistan

    The Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with key heads of elements of the 
Intelligence Community (IC) as determined appropriate, to 
create a task force to conduct a review of the intelligence 
analysis provided by IC elements beginning in September 2018, 
and up and until the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan 
on August 31, 2021, and to submit a corresponding report based 
on that review no later than June 30, 2022. The review, and 
corresponding report, shall include:
          1. An objective overview of the intelligence 
        analysis, products, briefings, and any other relevant 
        information provided by key intelligence elements in 
        connection with deliberations relating to Afghanistan 
        policy during the relevant time period, including 
        counterterrorism (CT), the future stability of the 
        Afghanistan government under President Ghani, the 
        ability of that government to withstand the United 
        States' withdrawal, the threat of terrorist 
        organizations, including Al Qaeda and ISIS-K as a 
        result of potential U.S. withdrawal, and any other 
        relevant issues the element reported on during that 
        period;
          2. An assessment of the accuracy of those 
        intelligence materials, including taking into account 
        the extent and quality of information that was 
        available to analysts at the time the assessments were 
        made;
          3. An assessment as to whether the IC provided 
        sufficient intelligence materials relating to, and had 
        a sufficient understanding of, the evolving dynamics 
        within Afghanistan, including the subsequent timing of 
        the fall of the Afghanistan government to the Taliban;
          4. An assessment of what factors, such as 
        intelligence gaps, and/or limitations in analytic 
        tradecraft, information sharing, and/or other issues, 
        limited the accuracy or usability of the intelligence 
        materials;
          5. An assessment of ways to improve the assessment, 
        collection, usability, and information sharing, both 
        internally among the key intelligence elements and 
        between the IC and the Executive Branch, of 
        intelligence materials, based on the limitations 
        identified in (4);
          6. An assessment of how to apply the limitations and 
        issues identified in the report to improve U.S. 
        intelligence collection, monitoring, and deterrence in 
        Afghanistan over the next two years, including in the 
        areas of CT, and the U.S. interaction with the Taliban 
        and/or any intelligence elements in Afghanistan; and
          7. An overview of lessons learned as applied to 
        future, comparable missions.

Afghanistan's Tactical Intelligence Capture

    A significant amount of intelligence was collected by 
tactical military units over the past two decades of conflict 
in Afghanistan. The Committee acknowledges the challenge in 
capturing intelligence data from echelons, units, and groups, 
but believes this information should be appropriately retained 
for further use as necessary or appropriate. Further, this data 
should be standardized and formatted in order to effectively 
share operational intelligence and intelligence mission data 
across the joint force.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security in coordination with the 
Defense Intelligence Agency to provide a briefing to the 
Committee by February 4, 2022, on how the Department will 
properly utilize, standardize, and format this data, as well as 
ensure long-term access to this information across relevant 
echelons, units, branches, and commands within the Department.

DNI Reporting on Saudi Entities Linked to Murder of Jamal Khashoggi

    The Committee welcomes the Director of National 
Intelligence's (DNI) submission of the unclassified report 
required by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021 (P.L. 116-260) confirming the culpability of Saudi 
government officials in the brutal murder of United States 
resident and journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
    To further inform the Committee's and Congress' ongoing 
oversight regarding any possible role of Saudi government-
affiliated entities and individuals in this heinous act, 
especially amid public reports implicating the Saudi Public 
Investment Fund, the Committee directs the DNI to produce an 
unclassified report, if needed with a classified annex, no 
later than March 1, 2022, that lists all of the Saudi entities, 
if any, that the Intelligence Community (IC) assesses as having 
been linked to the killing. The report shall detail the IC's 
confidence in that assessment, as well as a summary of all 
relevant information--unclassified and classified--that 
informed the IC's assessment. The DNI shall make this report 
available to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

Biodefense Steering Committee

    The Committee directs the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), in coordination with the heads of such other elements of 
the Intelligence Community (IC) as the DNI may determine 
relevant, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees by no later than June 30, 2022, a report on the 
efforts of the IC to support the Biodefense Steering Committee 
in the implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy. Such 
report shall at minimum include:
          1. A description of previous, ongoing, and planned IC 
        efforts or activities in support of the Committee's, or 
        any successor's, implementation of the National 
        Biodefense Strategy by the Biodefense Steering 
        Committee;
          2. An inventory and assessment of any existing IC 
        strategy, plan, or policy of the IC, or interagency 
        agreement entered into by the IC, that relates to the 
        provision of support to the Biodefense Steering 
        Committee, including for the implementation of the 
        National Biodefense Strategy; and
          3. A description of assessed opportunities for the IC 
        to further enhance the capabilities and effectiveness 
        of the Biodefense Steering Committee with respect to 
        its implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy.
    Such report may be submitted in classified form but should 
include an unclassified executive summary.

Examining the Use of Other Transaction Authority

    The barrier to entry for commercial entities to work with 
the Intelligence Community (IC) is high. Federal contracting 
and acquisitions processes can be complex, and the IC in 
particular has strict security and background check 
requirements that can be difficult for companies, particularly 
those that are new and small, to meet. It is the belief of the 
Committee that the IC underutilizes versatile models of 
acquisition, like Other Transaction Authority (OTA), for work 
with these nontraditional partners.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees, by no later than May 31, 2022, a written report on 
the use of OTA procurement by IC elements for research and 
prototyping activities. The report shall examine and detail the 
current use of OTA and identify additional areas in which IC 
elements could leverage OTA for more efficient and innovative 
acquisition.

Security and Resiliency of Intelligence Community

    The Committee is concerned that the Intelligence 
Community's (IC) cyber infrastructure and capabilities are at 
risk of supply chain vulnerabilities that could compromise key 
elements of our national security. Recent revelations confirm 
that near-peer competitors have heavily invested in the 
capability to penetrate the IC's communications infrastructure. 
Those reports present substantial questions about our supply 
chain vulnerabilities. To counter this challenge, the Committee 
directs the Director of National Intelligence to develop an 
acquisition strategy that ensures that critical communications 
technologies remain secure and resilient in the face of current 
and future cyber threats.
    When developing a strategy for the construction of, or 
upgrades to, IC communications, the Committee directs IC 
procurement and acquisition officers to consider mission 
effectiveness and operational suitability prioritizing factors 
such as:
          1. Components and devices that are engineered, 
        sourced, and manufactured domestically;
          2. The accessibility-risk of components and devices 
        responsible for routing and disseminating information, 
        and mitigation measures supported by deterministic 
        systems authoritatively certified and deployed to 
        isolate network communications;
          3. The cost of reconfiguring systems in response to 
        dynamic mission requirements and challenges;
          4. Physical, logistical, or operational measures to 
        mitigate insider threats; and
          5. Consistent with the IC's desire to evaluate energy 
        efficiencies and long-term costs, consideration shall 
        also be given to whether the systems will support next 
        generation technologies and readily incorporate 
        upgrades, reduce the size of the data centers, moderate 
        energy consumption, use clean energy alternatives, and 
        decrease the area needed for rack space and other 
        essential hardware.

Intelligence Sharing Frameworks

    The Committee notes the importance of intelligence and 
resource sharing agreements as well as the need to further 
strengthen connections with alliance countries and others as a 
key component of fully implementing the National Intelligence 
and National Defense Strategies.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, 
and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to provide 
a report to the Committee by May 20, 2022, outlining the 
current intelligence and resource sharing agreements between 
the United States and Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom (the Five Eyes); as well as the risks, benefits, 
and feasibility of expanding such intelligence and resource 
sharing agreements to South Korea, Japan, India, Germany, and 
France.
    The report shall include a catalogue of the current 
agreements for Five Eyes intelligence and resource sharing 
agreements, including the date of any relevant or recent 
updates, and changes which may be made to increase efficiency 
and/or enhance security. It shall also include the current 
significant intelligence and resource sharing efforts among 
other partner countries, and the risk/gain factors which may be 
considered for any future intelligence or resource sharing 
opportunities with countries to include South Korea, Japan, 
India, Germany, France, and any other countries deemed 
appropriate.

IC Support to DoD Emerging Technology Steering Committee

    The Committee continues to encourage the Intelligence 
Community (IC) to fully engage and coordinate with appropriate 
science and technology counterparts in the Federal Government 
to address national and military intelligence scientific and 
technological priorities. The Strategic Technologies and 
Advanced Research (STAR) Subcommittee report from 2020 
highlighted the need for stronger leadership within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence to coordinate and 
integrate science and technology efforts across the defense and 
intelligence enterprise.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees by no later than April 29, 2022, a report about the 
IC's interactions with, or activities undertaken in explicit 
support of, the Department of Defense's steering committee on 
emerging technology and national security threats, as 
established by Section 236 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 
116-283).

DNI Reporting on the United Arab Emirates

    The Committee is concerned with multiple, credible public 
reports that the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
has engaged in troubling activities contrary to United States 
interests, including: security and defense cooperation with 
adversaries of the United States, most especially China; 
recruited former U.S. intelligence personnel to engage in 
surveillance and related activities that may have violated the 
privacy of American citizens; and prolonged the Saudi-led war 
in and contributed to a fragmentation of Yemen.
    To further inform the Committee's ongoing oversight and in 
light of ongoing Emirati efforts focused on influencing 
Congress and the U.S. Government, including efforts to secure 
the most advanced U.S. weapons and technology, the Committee 
directs the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to produce 
an unclassified report, if needed with a classified annex, no 
later than March 1, 2022, detailing the Intelligence 
Community's (IC) assessment as to whether the UAE's actions and 
interests are aligned with the United States, including but not 
limited to the following areas:
          1. Stabilizing Libya and supporting the 
        internationally-recognized government;
          2. Ending the war in Yemen;
          3. Reducing Arab-Israeli tensions and sustainably 
        resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
          4. Promoting and respecting human rights, including 
        prohibitions under international law against torture 
        and the repression of journalists;
          5. Containing the spread of Chinese influence as well 
        as the growth of Chinese technological capabilities, 
        including through the theft or unapproved acquisition 
        of U.S. technology;
          6. Sustainably combatting international terrorists 
        that pose a confirmed threat to the United States; and
          7. Preventing the proliferation of unmanned and 
        autonomous weapons systems.
    The DNI shall submit this report to the congressional 
intelligence committees as well as the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate.

DNI Reporting on the Declassification and Public Release of Documents 
        Related to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks

    The Committee supports the President's decision to order a 
declassification review of documents related to the September 
11 terrorist attacks, including previously classified documents 
related to Saudi Arabia's involvement. The Committee has long 
pressed, on a bipartisan basis, for the release of this 
information and the passage of time has mitigated concerns over 
sources and methods. As such, the Committee is strongly 
committed to closely overseeing the declassification process to 
ensure that all Intelligence Community elements adhere to the 
President's guidance to apply the maximum degree of 
transparency allowed by law when conducting the review and 
encourages the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
expeditiously complete the classification process and public 
release of these documents.
    To advance its ongoing oversight, the Committee directs the 
DNI to produce to the congressional intelligence committees, 
within 30 days of the enactment of this Act and no later than 
January 15, 2022, a report containing the following elements: 
(1) a schedule for expeditiously completing the 
declassification process and public release of these documents; 
and (2) a written explanation of the processes and procedures 
that will govern the review and declassification of documents, 
to include the processes that the DNI will utilize to arbitrate 
any disagreements between elements. In addition, if there is 
any instance in which documents cannot be declassified during 
this process, the Committee directs the DNI to provide a 
written justification to the congressional intelligence 
committees as to why it cannot declassify such documents.

Cyber Notification Requirements

    The Intelligence Community (IC) is a high priority target 
for foreign cyber actors. The private companies who contract 
with the IC on technical, analytic, or other types of support 
are similarly at risk, but often lack requirements for 
notifying the U.S. Government, including Congress, of a breach. 
Identifying, assessing, and sharing information related to a 
cyber-attack is critical to stopping a more widespread attack 
and protecting U.S. national security.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), in coordination with relevant elements as 
the DNI deems appropriate, to brief the congressional 
intelligence committees on the IC's process for identifying, 
assessing, and disseminating information related to a cyber-
attack or intrusion affecting IC contract companies or their 
networks, including efforts by the relevant elements to share 
and receive information relating to such attacks with such 
companies. Further, the Committee directs the DNI to notify the 
congressional intelligence committees within 10 days of 
discovering a compromise to any IC contractor's unclassified or 
classified networks.

Required Training for IC Personnel

    The Committee recognizes that the Federal Government's 
ability to maintain safe and respectful workplaces is essential 
to the recruitment and retention of personnel. Anti-harassment 
and anti-discrimination training that is clear and accessible 
can ensure that employees are aware of their rights and 
responsibilities, and can foster more inclusive workplaces.
    Therefore, the Committee encourages elements of the 
Intelligence Community to implement mandatory anti-harassment 
and anti-discrimination training for supervisors and non-
supervisors, as well as bystander intervention training and 
executive leadership training related to harassment, 
discrimination, and related retaliation. Such training should 
follow best practices in the field, as studied by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission's Select Task Force on the 
Study of Harassment in the Workplace. The Committee further 
directs the Director of National Intelligence to provide a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees on these 
efforts by no later than June 30, 2022.

Prevalence of Nondisclosure Clauses Related to Harassment, 
        Discrimination and Related Retaliation

    The Committee recognizes that nondisclosure agreements 
related to experiences of workplace harassment, discrimination, 
and related retaliation may interfere with the Federal 
Government's ability to maintain safe and respectful workplaces 
and attract and retain personnel by deterring victims from 
coming forward to participate in future investigations, 
shielding perpetrators from reputational harm and 
accountability, and leaving victims confused about their legal 
rights and vulnerability to legal action. The William M. (Mac) 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021 (P.L. 116-283) recognized the potential negative impact of 
nondisclosure agreements by barring such agreements if they 
prohibit or restrict federal employees or applicants for 
employment from disclosing to Congress, the Special Counsel, 
the Inspector General of an agency, or any other agency 
component responsible for internal investigation or review, any 
information that relates to any violation of any law, rule, 
regulation, mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 
authority, a substantial and specific danger to public health 
or safety, or any other whistleblower protection.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with other heads of 
elements that the DNI deems appropriate, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees by no later than April 
29, 2022, an unclassified report on the prevalence of 
nondisclosure clauses related to experiences of workplace 
harassment, discrimination, and related retaliation in the 
Intelligence Community. Such report shall include a 
comprehensive review of employment contracts, settlements, and 
other agreements. If such clauses are utilized, the report 
shall detail in what circumstances those clauses are utilized, 
the rationale for usage, and any efforts to move away from the 
use of nondisclosure clauses.

Strategy for Integration of Gender-Based Issues in Intelligence

    The Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (H.R. 2484 and 
S. 1141) became Public Law and demonstrates the sense of 
Congress that the United States must be a global leader in 
promoting women's participation in conflict prevention, 
management, and resolution, as well as post-conflict relief and 
recovery efforts. In addition, studies have found, based on 
empirical data, that the fate of a nation is inextricably tied 
to the status of the women within it and that the subordination 
of women fatally jeopardizes the security and stability of 
global democracies. Further, it is the sense of this Committee 
that women are uniquely posed to provide essential and distinct 
insight, information, and analysis in unstable or potentially 
violent contexts, and to detect early signs of radicalization 
and intervene before individuals begin to act with violence, 
including because women oftentimes are able to access 
populations and sites that men cannot for the purposes of 
gathering key intelligence regarding potential threats to 
stability and security. And, when women are involved in peace 
processes, resulting agreements are more sustainable, partially 
due to unique access to wider community groups and the 
necessity of women to rebuild society within nations. Women's 
participation can also foster stability, and prevent factors 
that challenge the effectiveness and implementation of peace 
agreements, such as corruption.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), in coordination with the heads of other 
elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) as the DNI deems 
appropriate, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committee by no later than April 29, 2022, a strategy for 
integrating gender-based issues and perspectives into 
intelligence collection, analysis, and tradecraft. Such 
strategy shall at minimum address the benefits, drawbacks, and 
feasibility of:
          1. Developing a training curriculum, to be made 
        available across the IC, that addresses gender-related 
        issues in intelligence collection, analysis, and 
        tradecraft; and
          2. Implementing a requirement that introductory 
        analytic trainings offered by elements of the IC 
        include a module addressing gender-related issues in 
        intelligence collection, analysis, and tradecraft.

Accessibility in the IC

    Building an inclusive workforce and ensuring that the 
Intelligence Community (IC) remains a desirable employer for 
individuals of all backgrounds is a national security 
imperative. The Committee strongly encourages nascent and 
ongoing efforts to improve accessibility for persons with 
disabilities who aspire to join or are currently part of the IC 
workforce.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), in consultation with the heads of other 
elements that the DNI deems appropriate, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, by no later than April 
29, 2022, a report that at minimum:
          1. Provides an update on the IC's status and 
        implementation of relevant executive orders, 
        guidelines, and laws, including Executive Order 14035 
        and ICPG 110.1 (``Employment of Individuals with 
        Disabilities'');
          2. Documents the number of instances within the past 
        10 years that an IC element has invoked an exception 
        to:
                  a. Sec. 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
                1973, as amended;
                  b. The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968; or
                  c. Any other law or executive order 
                pertaining to enhancing accessibility for 
                persons with disabilities in the Federal 
                Government;
          3. Describes anticipated or current activities or 
        policies of the IC to increase the availability of 
        reasonable accommodations for information technology 
        and accessible workplace facilities for persons with 
        disabilities, including mechanisms for applicants to 
        initiate and track accommodation requests, such as 
        through formalized platforms; and
          4. Describes anticipated or current opportunities for 
        the IC to recruit and hire more persons with 
        disabilities, including through the Department of 
        Labor's Workforce Recruitment Program, or through other 
        initiatives that address travel, accommodations, and 
        security clearance concerns during the recruiting and 
        onboarding process.

DNI Reporting on the Intelligence Community's Compliance with the 
        Freedom of Information Act

    The Committee applauds the Director of National 
Intelligence's (DNI) commitment to transparency, and believes 
that compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and 
the timely and appropriate processing of FOIA requests is a 
critical part of that commitment. Therefore, the Committee 
directs the DNI, in coordination with heads of elements of the 
Intelligence Community (IC) as the DNI deems appropriate, and 
by no later than June 1, 2022, to submit to the Committee a 
written report on compliance by IC elements with the FOIA. The 
report shall contain a detailed list, sorted by element, of:
          1. The number of outstanding FOIA requests and how 
        long ago they were filed;
          2. The number of instances over the last five years 
        in which the element provided a ``Glomar Response'' and 
        asserted that it could ``neither confirm nor deny'' the 
        existence of the records requested under the FOIA;
          3. The number, for each of the following categories, 
        of FOIA requests in which the requester initiated legal 
        action in United States District Court in the last five 
        years challenging the element's:
                  a. Failure to respond in a timely fashion;
                  b. Decision not to release records in whole 
                or in part; and
                  c. Adequacy of the search used to locate 
                responsive records.
    In addition, the report shall contain specific 
recommendations for how to enhance the FOIA process and ensure 
timely responses by IC entities, including the need for 
additional resources or any other reforms to ensure rigorous 
and appropriate responses to FOIA requests.

Metrics for Modern Best Practices in Software Development

    Modern best practices for software development frequently 
rely on a set of standardized processes known as development, 
security, and operations (DevSecOps). DevSecOps combine 
software development and operations, with security integrated 
throughout every phase of the development lifecycle.
    Standardized DevSecOps metrics such as availability, change 
lead time, and time to Authorization to Operate (ATO), among 
others, are vitally useful in assessing and understanding 
software development programs' adherence or deviation from 
modern best practices. Furthermore, many of these metrics can 
be collected in an automated fashion, allowing for rapid and 
frequent scoring of programs that can help predict future 
success or failure. It is clear to the Committee that different 
Intelligence Community (IC) elements are evolving to a 
DevSecOps approach at different rates.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Intelligence Community 
Chief Information Officer to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, by no later than May 31, 2022, a 
written report exploring adherence to modern best practices of 
software development programs throughout the IC. The report 
shall include, at a minimum:
          1. Identification of the relevant metrics for 
        programs' adherence to modern DevSecOps practices;
          2. Identifications of programs and elements that 
        struggle with best practices, and recommendations to 
        migrate them towards best practices;
          3. A plan to standardize automation of metrics across 
        the IC; and
          4. A discussion of any barriers preventing the 
        adoption of DevSecOps practices throughout the IC.

Intelligence Collection Prioritization on Advanced Technologies of 
        Adversaries

    The Committee recognizes that strategic competitors and 
adversaries of the United States are innovating rapidly to 
develop and exploit technology-enabled tools that may harm the 
United States and allies of the United States. The Committee is 
concerned that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) has 
not adequately prioritized collection of these emerging 
scientific and technical developments. The Committee believes 
the DIE must prioritize collection of emerging technologies of 
strategic competitors and adversaries of the United States to 
better understand those capabilities and intentions.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security to provide a briefing to 
the congressional intelligence committees no later than March 
15, 2022, on steps taken within the DIE to prioritize 
collection of emerging technologies being pursued by strategic 
competitors and adversaries of the United States, including 
developments in biotechnology, artificial intelligence and 
machine learning, lethal autonomous weapons, hypersonic 
weapons, and directed energy weapons.

Department of Defense transformation through Project GAMECHANGER

    The Committee awaits complete implementation of the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees' direction 
contained in Section 1626 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (P.L. 115-91). Core to the 
congressional intent for Section 1626 was first, the creation 
of a framework to more effectively manage elements of the 
Intelligence Community (IC), which are also Combat Support 
Agencies, and second, the reconciliation of variances in the 
definitions used by the Department and/or IC and clear 
codification of those terms.
    The Committee supported the Department's creation of 
project GAMECHANGER as one of the ways to effectively answer 
Section 1626's direction. Further, the Committee supports the 
Department's continued maturation of the GAMECHANGER 
technology. This unique defense innovation effort will 
transform the way the Department sets policy, updates doctrine, 
and manages critical guidance documents. It is imperative that 
the GAMECHANGER technology be managed properly, effectively 
scaled, and transitioned to programs of record.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Director of the 
Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, in consultation with the 
Chief Data Officer and Comptroller, to provide a briefing to 
the Committee no later than February 4, 2022, on the current 
usage inside the Department of GAMECHANGER, as well as an 
approved plan of action and milestones to transition 
GAMECHANGER to a program of record by the Fiscal Year 2024 
budget request.

Office of the Undersecretary for Defense Intelligence and Security 
        Oversight and Structure

    The Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled, 
``Defense Intelligence and Security: DoD Needs to Establish 
Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools that Enhance 
Accountability'' (GAO-21-295), raised certain issues about the 
ways the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence & Security (OUSD(I&S)) provides oversight and 
ensures accountability of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise 
(DIE) and the Defense Security Enterprise (DSE).
    The report contained two recommendations. First, that the 
Secretary of Defense should ensure that the USD(I&S) 
establishes clear expectations for oversight, including 
refining business rules for governance bodies and clarifying 
key oversight terms. Second, that the Secretary of Defense 
should ensure that the USD(I&S) develops tools to enhance 
accountability--such as through strategies or other mechanisms 
with identified goals, desired outcomes, and performance 
metrics--for specific intelligence and security mission areas 
and use these tools to conduct oversight. The Department 
concurred with both recommendations.
    The Committee appreciates USD(I&S)' acknowledgment of and 
work to address these recommendations, including an independent 
review of authorities and responsibilities assigned by statute 
and policy recommendations for organization staffing, optimum 
assignments of existing staffing, and other alignment of Roles 
and Missions--a longstanding interest item for the Committee. 
However, the Committee is concerned that, like certain 
recommendations from the 2018 USDI Roles and Missions study, 
certain actions will stall and fail to be fully implemented.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I&S) to provide 
updates to the implementation of the GAO recommendations to the 
Committee on a quarterly basis. Further, the Committee 
understands that the review conducted by the Institute for 
Defense Analyses (IDA) is due no later than September 1, 2022. 
The Committee directs that USD(I&S) present a plan of action 
and milestones for implementation of accepted recommendations, 
to include those resulting from the IDA analysis, no later than 
December 1, 2022, and that the accepted recommendations be 
fully implemented no later than October 1, 2023.

Hypersonic Aircraft

    The Committee is encouraged by recent efforts to mature the 
technologies necessary to develop high Mach and hypersonic 
aircraft. The Committee is also aware of ongoing investments by 
the Department of Defense (DoD) and private industry to develop 
high Mach flight for both defense and commercial applications. 
The Committee believes the Intelligence Community (IC) must 
ensure it is postured to leverage the development of hypersonic 
flight systems for intelligence related mission requirements.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering, and the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly brief the congressional 
intelligence committees on their efforts to incorporate 
hypersonic flight research and development into the Fiscal Year 
2023 budget request no later than March 31, 2022.
    The Committee further directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering and the DNI, in 
coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security, to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees a report no later than June 1, 2022, on 
the utility of establishing a joint DoD-IC program office to 
coordinate activities related to high Mach and hypersonic 
aircraft development programs. This report will include at a 
minimum:
          1. A recommended timeline for establishing a joint 
        program office;
          2. An overview of how a program office will develop 
        program requirements in consultation with the user 
        community;
          3. An overview of the remaining engineering 
        challenges associated with producing high Mach and 
        hypersonic aircraft; and
          4. An assessment of the personnel, training, and 
        logistical support requirements high Mach and 
        hypersonic aircraft will generate.

DIA Workforce Issues

    The Committee is concerned about the inherent isolation 
required of intelligence professionals and the lack of external 
resources or support due to the sensitive nature of their work. 
An additional challenge is the effects of COVID-19 on the 
workforce, including the added stress of crisis operations and 
shiftwork, which may exacerbate any underlying negative or 
challenging management culture or working environments.
    The Committee applauds the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) for creating the Office of the Surgeon General and for 
internally realigning personnel, programs, and funding to 
consolidate existing medical, behavioral health, and wellness 
professionals under a single organization. The Committee 
strongly supports efforts to streamline workforce support 
mechanisms across DIA's therapeutic and medical services, 
particularly the renewed focus on mental health. However, 
continuing to collect, monitor, and respond to regular data and 
feedback will be critical to ensuring the health of current 
personnel and the creation or sustainment of programs to retain 
a talented, diverse workforce.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DIA to notify the 
Committee within 10 days of the launch of any agency, 
Directorate, or Career Field annual or ad hoc workforce 
engagement or climate surveys, including the topic, rationale, 
accessibility, lead subject office or work unit, and timeframe. 
The Committee also directs the DIA, within 30 days of 
completion of such survey, to provide an initial summary of the 
results of such surveys, for example, participation rates and 
demographics, with full results made available to the Committee 
within 90 days of completion of the survey. Further, the 
Committee directs DIA to provide a briefing, by March 1, 2022, 
on plans to ensure such surveys are available on both 
classified and unclassified systems and that exit surveys or 
exit interviews with the Office of the Ombuds are mandatory for 
all departing or permanently separating employees.
    Additionally, the Committee directs DIA to provide a 
report, by September 30, 2022, on the data from the Office of 
the Ombuds, Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEO), Employee 
Management Relations, and any other employee resource for 
seeking help with a perceived hostile work environment, 
reprisal, harassment, or abuse of authority. This report should 
include the total number of consultations related to a 
supervisor, chain of command, or management culture, the nature 
of the complaint, whether or not the complaint resulted in a 
formal EEO or Inspector General review or report, the 
consulting office's recommendations to the supervisory chain or 
the office in question, and the management actions taken in 
response. DIA should provide a briefing on the initial results 
of this study and any challenges in implementation by March 30, 
2022.
    Finally, the Committee directs DIA to provide a briefing, 
by February 14, 2022, on the mechanism by which supervisors 
receive feedback, including from peers and subordinates, on 
their ability to create and maintain a healthy and supportive 
workplace environment either as part of annual performance 
reviews or through regular training, development, or coaching, 
and the feasibility of conducting 360-degree performance 
reviews.

Congressional Applicant Referrals for the Defense Intelligence Agency

    Members of Congress receive hundreds of applications for 
United States Military Academies every year. However, with only 
two slots allowed per Member, a significant number of highly 
qualified, motivated young Americans must look elsewhere for 
their education, and for the opportunity to serve their 
country. Many of these talented students go on to join the 
military through other avenues, but a large number would be 
ideally suited to careers as civilian intelligence officers and 
may be unaware of the opportunities that exist. Further, the 
geographic diversity represented by these candidates could add 
critical insight into the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
officer corps and further strengthen DIA's representation of 
American communities.
    DIA provides internship and scholarship opportunities for 
undergraduate and graduate students to gain valuable national 
security work experience and an opportunity to serve their 
country. For many, this experience leads to a full-time career 
with DIA or an Intelligence Community partner after graduation.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DIA to provide, by January 
31, 2022, information about DIA student and internship programs 
so that those candidates not selected for a Military Academy 
appointment may receive details about available DIA programs, 
application requirements, and application deadlines. This 
information shall be provided to Members' personal offices to 
be made available to prospective student applicants.

NSA's Cyber Collaboration Center and Cyber Deterrence

    The Committee supports the National Security Agency's (NSA) 
establishment of the Cyber Collaboration Center to provide 
greater information sharing between government and private 
industry. The Committee recognizes that cybersecurity is a 
national problem that benefits uniquely from private sector 
insights.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of NSA, by no 
later than May 2, 2022, to submit to the Committee a written 
description of how the Cyber Collaboration Center works with 
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to 
disseminate cyber threat information and what, if any, overlap 
exists between NSA and CISA with regard to collaboration with 
private industry.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947


                              short title

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

     * * * * * * *

               Title I--Coordination for National Security

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 116A. Authority for transportation of certain canines associated 
          with force protection duties of intelligence community.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 119A. National [Counter Proliferation] Counterproliferation and 
          Biosecurity Center.
     * * * * * * *

                        Title III--Miscellaneous

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 304. Reporting of certain employment activities by former 
          intelligence officers and employees.]
Sec. 304. Requirements for certain employment activities by former 
          intelligence officers and employees.
Sec. 305. Temporary authority for paid leave for a serious health 
          condition.
     * * * * * * *

           Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 501A. Congressional oversight of certain special access programs.
     * * * * * * *

         TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

     * * * * * * *

               Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1025. Authorization of support by Director of National Intelligence 
          for certain workforce activities.
     * * * * * * *

                       TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1111. Biennial reports on foreign biological threats.
Sec. 1112. Annual reports on the domestic activities of the intelligence 
          community.
Sec. 1113. Annual reports on certain cyber vulnerabilities procured by 
          intelligence community and foreign commercial providers of 
          cyber vulnerabilities.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



     responsibilities and authorities of the director of national 
                              intelligence

  Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) The Director 
of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that 
national intelligence is provided--
          (A) to the President;
          (B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the 
        executive branch;
          (C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
        senior military commanders;
          (D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and 
        the committees thereof; and
          (E) to such other persons as the Director of National 
        Intelligence determines to be appropriate.
  (2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, 
independent of political considerations, and based upon all 
sources available to the intelligence community and other 
appropriate entities.
  (b) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the 
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have 
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to 
the national security which is collected by any Federal 
department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise 
provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed 
upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (c) Budget Authorities.--(1) With respect to budget requests 
and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall--
          (A) based on intelligence priorities set by the 
        President, provide to the heads of departments 
        containing agencies or organizations within the 
        intelligence community, and to the heads of such 
        agencies and organizations, guidance for developing the 
        National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such 
        agencies and organizations;
          (B) based on budget proposals provided to the 
        Director of National Intelligence by the heads of 
        agencies and organizations within the intelligence 
        community and the heads of their respective departments 
        and, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the 
        Joint Intelligence Community Council, develop and 
        determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence 
        Program budget; and
          (C) present such consolidated National Intelligence 
        Program budget, together with any comments from the 
        heads of departments containing agencies or 
        organizations within the intelligence community, to the 
        President for approval.
  (2) In addition to the information provided under paragraph 
(1)(B), the heads of agencies and organizations within the 
intelligence community shall provide the Director of National 
Intelligence such other information as the Director shall 
request for the purpose of determining the annual consolidated 
National Intelligence Program budget under that paragraph.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall 
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of 
the annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any 
successor program or programs.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide 
guidance for the development of the annual budget for each 
element of the intelligence community that is not within the 
National Intelligence Program.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the 
effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities.
  (5)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall be 
responsible for managing appropriations for the National 
Intelligence Program by directing the allotment or allocation 
of such appropriations through the heads of the departments 
containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence 
community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
with prior notice (including the provision of appropriate 
supporting information) to the head of the department 
containing an agency or organization receiving any such 
allocation or allotment or the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
  (B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pursuant to 
relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence 
Program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
shall exercise the authority of the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget to apportion funds, at the exclusive 
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, for 
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community 
through the relevant host executive departments and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Department comptrollers or appropriate 
budget execution officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or 
transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence 
Program in an expeditious manner.
  (C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the 
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence 
Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community that manage programs and activities that are part of 
the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and 
evaluations.
  (6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this 
subsection shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of 
title 31, United States Code, and the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
  (7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a 
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April 
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding 
implementation of this section.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall report to the 
President and the Congress not later than 15 days after 
learning of any instance in which a departmental comptroller 
acts in a manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent 
statutes, authorization Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the 
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, in carrying 
out the National Intelligence Program.
  (d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and 
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) No funds made available under 
the National Intelligence Program may be transferred or 
reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director of 
National Intelligence, except in accordance with procedures 
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
  (B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director 
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming 
funds made available under the Military Intelligence Program or 
any successor program or programs.
  (2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, 
the Director of National Intelligence may transfer or reprogram 
funds appropriated for a program within the National 
Intelligence Program--
          (A) to another such program;
          (B) to other departments or agencies of the United 
        States Government for the development and fielding of 
        systems of common concern related to the collection, 
        processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination 
        of intelligence information; or
          (C) to a program funded by appropriations not within 
        the National Intelligence Program to address critical 
        gaps in intelligence information sharing or access 
        capabilities.
  (3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer 
or reprogram funds referred to in paragraph (1)(A)--
          (A) with the approval of the Director of the Office 
        of Management and Budget; and
          (B) after consultation with the heads of departments 
        containing agencies or organizations within the 
        intelligence community to the extent such agencies or 
        organizations are affected, and, in the case of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with 
        the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (4) The amounts available for transfer or reprogramming in 
the National Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and 
the terms and conditions governing such transfers and 
reprogrammings, are subject to the provisions of annual 
appropriations Acts and this subsection.
  (5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds may be made under 
this subsection only if--
          (i) the funds are being transferred to an activity 
        that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
          (ii) the transfer or reprogramming supports an 
        emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or 
        increases efficiency;
          (iii) the transfer or reprogramming does not involve 
        a transfer or reprogramming of funds to a Reserve for 
        Contingencies of the Director of National Intelligence 
        or the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency;
          (iv) the transfer or reprogramming results in a 
        cumulative transfer or reprogramming of funds out of 
        any department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the 
        National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year--
                  (I) that is less than $150,000,000, and
                  (II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts 
                available to a department or agency under the 
                National Intelligence Program; and
          (v) the transfer or reprogramming does not terminate 
        an acquisition program.
  (B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to 
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph 
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the 
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The 
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by 
the head of the department involved or the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central 
Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
  (6) Funds transferred or reprogrammed under this subsection 
shall remain available for the same period as the 
appropriations account to which transferred or reprogrammed.
  (7) Any transfer or reprogramming of funds under this 
subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing 
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the 
appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer or 
reprogramming for which notice is given to the appropriate 
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report 
explaining the nature of the proposed transfer or reprogramming 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In 
addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be 
promptly notified of any transfer or reprogramming of funds 
made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the 
transfer or reprogramming would not have otherwise required 
reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of the 
date of the enactment of this subsection.
  (e) Transfer of Personnel.--(1)(A) In addition to any other 
authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first 
twelve months after establishment of a new national 
intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence, 
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget and in consultation with the congressional 
committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may 
transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of 
the intelligence community to such center.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly 
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to 
this paragraph to--
          (i) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
        and the House of Representatives;
          (iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed 
        Services of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives.
  (C) The Director shall include in any notice under 
subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
  (2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence, with the 
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
and in accordance with procedures to be developed by the 
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of the 
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel 
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to 
another such element for a period of not more than 2 years.
  (B) A transfer of personnel may be made under this paragraph 
only if--
          (i) the personnel are being transferred to an 
        activity that is a higher priority intelligence 
        activity; and
          (ii) the transfer supports an emergent need, improves 
        program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.
  (C) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly 
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to 
this paragraph to--
          (i) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed 
        Services of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives; and
          (iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or 
        from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of 
        Representatives.
  (D) The Director shall include in any notice under 
subparagraph (C) an explanation of the nature of the transfer 
and how it satisfies the requirements of this paragraph.
  (3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent 
positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such 
Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time 
equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes 
described in subparagraph (B).
  (B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of 
National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position 
authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of 
providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance 
with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community 
to enable such element to increase the total number of 
personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis--
          (i) during a period in which a permanent employee of 
        such element is absent to participate in critical 
        language training; or
          (ii) to accept a permanent employee of another 
        element of the intelligence community to provide 
        language-capable services.
  (C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a 
transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B).
  (D) For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the 
use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall 
include a description of--
          (i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the 
        Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by 
        each element of the intelligence community;
          (ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled 
        or partially fulfilled through the use of such 
        transfers; and
          (iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).
  (4) It is the sense of Congress that--
          (A) the nature of the national security threats 
        facing the United States will continue to challenge the 
        intelligence community to respond rapidly and flexibly 
        to bring analytic resources to bear against emerging 
        and unforeseen requirements;
          (B) both the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence and any analytic centers determined to be 
        necessary should be fully and properly supported with 
        appropriate levels of personnel resources and that the 
        President's yearly budget requests adequately support 
        those needs; and
          (C) the President should utilize all legal and 
        administrative discretion to ensure that the Director 
        of National Intelligence and all other elements of the 
        intelligence community have the necessary resources and 
        procedures to respond promptly and effectively to 
        emerging and unforeseen national security challenges.
  (f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall--
          (i) establish objectives, priorities, and guidance 
        for the intelligence community to ensure timely and 
        effective collection, processing, analysis, and 
        dissemination (including access by users to collected 
        data consistent with applicable law and, as 
        appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection 
        (b) and analytic products generated by or within the 
        intelligence community) of national intelligence;
          (ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and 
        manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis, 
        production, and dissemination of national intelligence 
        by elements of the intelligence community, including--
                  (I) approving requirements (including those 
                requirements responding to needs provided by 
                consumers) for collection and analysis; and
                  (II) resolving conflicts in collection 
                requirements and in the tasking of national 
                collection assets of the elements of the 
                intelligence community; and
          (iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence 
        elements of those agencies and departments not within 
        the National Intelligence Program.
  (B) The authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
under subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
          (i) insofar as the President so directs;
          (ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A), 
        insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking 
        authority under plans or arrangements agreed upon by 
        the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
        Intelligence; or
          (iii) to the direct dissemination of information to 
        State government and local government officials and 
        private sector entities pursuant to sections 201 and 
        892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121, 
        482).
  (2) The Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the 
National Counterterrorism Center, the National 
Counterproliferation Center, and the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center and may establish such 
other national intelligence centers as the Director determines 
necessary.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe, 
in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of 
the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective 
departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the 
intelligence community that--
          (i) encourage and facilitate assignments and details 
        of personnel to national intelligence centers, and 
        between elements of the intelligence community;
          (ii) set standards for education, training, and 
        career development of personnel of the intelligence 
        community;
          (iii) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and 
        retention by the intelligence community of highly 
        qualified individuals for the effective conduct of 
        intelligence activities;
          (iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence 
        community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the 
        collection and analysis of intelligence through the 
        recruitment and training of women, minorities, and 
        individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and 
        linguistic backgrounds;
          (v) make service in more than one element of the 
        intelligence community a condition of promotion to such 
        positions within the intelligence community as the 
        Director shall specify; and
          (vi) ensure the effective management of intelligence 
        community personnel who are responsible for 
        intelligence community-wide matters.
  (B) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be 
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable 
to members of the uniformed services.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure 
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States 
by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such 
compliance by other elements of the intelligence community 
through the host executive departments that manage the programs 
and activities that are part of the National Intelligence 
Program.
  (5) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the 
elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the 
intelligence community.
  (6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish 
requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence 
information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide 
assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information 
derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under 
that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and 
effectively for national intelligence purposes, except that the 
Director shall have no authority to direct or undertake 
electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant 
to that Act unless authorized by statute or Executive order.
  (7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the 
Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a 
congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability 
review of an element of the intelligence community or the 
personnel of such element in relation to a failure or 
deficiency within the intelligence community.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and 
procedures for conducting an accountability review under 
subparagraph (A).
  (C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide 
the findings of an accountability review conducted under 
subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for 
corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the 
applicable element of the intelligence community. Such 
recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of 
personnel.
  (ii) If the head of such element does not implement a 
recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head 
of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a notice of the determination not to implement the 
recommendation, including the reasons for the determination.
  (D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed 
to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence 
under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
  (8) The Director of National Intelligence shall perform [such 
other functions] such other intelligence-related functions as 
the President may direct.
  (9) Nothing in this title shall be construed as affecting the 
role of the Department of Justice or the Attorney General under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
  (g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure 
maximum availability of and access to intelligence information 
within the intelligence community consistent with national 
security requirements. The Director of National Intelligence 
shall--
          (A) establish uniform security standards and 
        procedures;
          (B) establish common information technology 
        standards, protocols, and interfaces;
          (C) ensure development of information technology 
        systems that include multi-level security and 
        intelligence integration capabilities;
          (D) establish policies and procedures to resolve 
        conflicts between the need to share intelligence 
        information and the need to protect intelligence 
        sources and methods;
          (E) develop an enterprise architecture for the 
        intelligence community and ensure that elements of the 
        intelligence community comply with such architecture;
          (F) have procurement approval authority over all 
        enterprise architecture-related information technology 
        items funded in the National Intelligence Program; and
          (G) in accordance with Executive Order No. 13526 (75 
        Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security 
        information) (or any subsequent corresponding executive 
        order), and part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal 
        Regulations (or any subsequent corresponding 
        regulation), establish--
                  (i) guidance to standardize, in appropriate 
                cases, the formats for classified and 
                unclassified intelligence products created by 
                elements of the intelligence community for 
                purposes of promoting the sharing of 
                intelligence products; and
                  (ii) policies and procedures requiring the 
                increased use, in appropriate cases, and 
                including portion markings, of the 
                classification of portions of information 
                within one intelligence product.
  (2) The President shall ensure that the Director of National 
Intelligence has all necessary support and authorities to fully 
and effectively implement paragraph (1).
  (3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the 
specific written agreement of the head of the department or 
agency in question, a Federal agency or official shall not be 
considered to have met any obligation to provide any 
information, report, assessment, or other material (including 
unevaluated intelligence information) to that department or 
agency solely by virtue of having provided that information, 
report, assessment, or other material to the Director of 
National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center.
  (4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely 
manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or 
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the 
Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability 
of access to intelligence information within the intelligence 
community consistent with the protection of the national 
security of the United States.
  (h) Analysis.--To ensure the most accurate analysis of 
intelligence is derived from all sources to support national 
security needs, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
          (1) implement policies and procedures--
                  (A) to encourage sound analytic methods and 
                tradecraft throughout the elements of the 
                intelligence community;
                  (B) to ensure that analysis is based upon all 
                sources available; and
                  (C) to ensure that the elements of the 
                intelligence community regularly conduct 
                competitive analysis of analytic products, 
                whether such products are produced by or 
                disseminated to such elements;
          (2) ensure that resource allocation for intelligence 
        analysis is appropriately proportional to resource 
        allocation for intelligence collection systems and 
        operations in order to maximize analysis of all 
        collected data;
          (3) ensure that differences in analytic judgment are 
        fully considered and brought to the attention of 
        policymakers; and
          (4) ensure that sufficient relationships are 
        established between intelligence collectors and 
        analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the 
        needs of analysts.
  (i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) The 
Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence 
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
  (2) Consistent with paragraph (1), in order to maximize the 
dissemination of intelligence, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall establish and implement guidelines for the 
intelligence community for the following purposes:
          (A) Classification of information under applicable 
        law, Executive orders, or other Presidential 
        directives.
          (B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both 
        in final form and in the form when initially gathered.
          (C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a 
        way that source information is removed to allow for 
        dissemination at the lowest level of classification 
        possible or in unclassified form to the extent 
        practicable.
  (3) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given 
the Director under this subsection to the Principal Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence.
  (j) Uniform Procedures for Classified Information.--The 
Director of National Intelligence, subject to the direction of 
the President, shall--
          (1) establish uniform standards and procedures for 
        the grant of access to sensitive compartmented 
        information to any officer or employee of any agency or 
        department of the United States and to employees of 
        contractors of those agencies or departments;
          (2) ensure the consistent implementation of those 
        standards and procedures throughout such agencies and 
        departments;
          (3) ensure that security clearances granted by 
        individual elements of the intelligence community are 
        recognized by all elements of the intelligence 
        community, and under contracts entered into by those 
        agencies;
          (4) ensure that the process for investigation and 
        adjudication of an application for access to sensitive 
        compartmented information is performed in the most 
        expeditious manner possible consistent with applicable 
        standards for national security;
          (5) ensure that the background of each employee or 
        officer of an element of the intelligence community, 
        each contractor to an element of the intelligence 
        community, and each individual employee of such a 
        contractor who has been determined to be eligible for 
        access to classified information is monitored on a 
        continual basis under standards developed by the 
        Director, including with respect to the frequency of 
        evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such 
        employee or officer of an element of the intelligence 
        community, such contractor, or such individual employee 
        to such a contractor to determine whether such employee 
        or officer of an element of the intelligence community, 
        such contractor, and such individual employee of such a 
        contractor continues to meet the requirements for 
        eligibility for access to classified information; and
          (6) develop procedures to require information sharing 
        between elements of the intelligence community 
        concerning potentially derogatory security information 
        regarding an employee or officer of an element of the 
        intelligence community, a contractor to an element of 
        the intelligence community, or an individual employee 
        of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of 
        such employee or officer of an element of the 
        intelligence community, such contractor, or such 
        individual employee of such a contractor for a security 
        clearance.
  (k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the 
direction of the President and in a manner consistent with 
section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 
3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the 
coordination of the relationships between elements of the 
intelligence community and the intelligence or security 
services of foreign governments or international organizations 
on all matters involving intelligence related to the national 
security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine 
means.
  (l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The Director of 
National Intelligence shall, under regulations prescribed by 
the Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of 
the intelligence community to serve--
          (i) on the staff of the Director of National 
        Intelligence;
          (ii) on the staff of the national intelligence 
        centers;
          (iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center; and
          (iv) in other positions in support of the 
        intelligence community management functions of the 
        Director.
  (B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial 
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as 
the Director considers appropriate.
  (2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are 
assigned or detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under 
the Director of National Intelligence shall be promoted at 
rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element 
who are not so assigned or detailed.
  (B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
paragraph.
  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe 
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the 
intelligence community through various elements of the 
intelligence community in the course of their careers in order 
to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such 
personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods, 
users, and capabilities.
  (B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may 
include the following:
          (i) The establishment of special occupational 
        categories involving service, over the course of a 
        career, in more than one element of the intelligence 
        community.
          (ii) The provision of rewards for service in 
        positions undertaking analysis and planning of 
        operations involving two or more elements of the 
        intelligence community.
          (iii) The establishment of requirements for 
        education, training, service, and evaluation for 
        service involving more than one element of the 
        intelligence community.
  (C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms 
prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent 
practical, seek to duplicate for civilian personnel within the 
intelligence community the joint officer management policies 
established by chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, and 
the other amendments made by title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 
99-433).
  (D) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) and any 
other policies of the Director--
          (i) may not require an employee of an office of 
        inspector general for an element of the intelligence 
        community, including the Office of the Inspector 
        General of the Intelligence Community, to rotate to a 
        position in an office or organization of such an 
        element over which such office of inspector general 
        exercises jurisdiction; and
          (ii) shall be implemented in a manner that exempts 
        employees of an office of inspector general from a 
        rotation that may impact the independence of such 
        office.
  (4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and 
subparagraph (D), this subsection shall not apply with respect 
to personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who 
are members of the uniformed services.
  (B) Mechanisms that establish requirements for education and 
training pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(iii) may apply with 
respect to members of the uniformed services who are assigned 
to an element of the intelligence community funded through the 
National Intelligence Program, but such mechanisms shall not be 
inconsistent with personnel policies and education and training 
requirements otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed 
services.
  (C) The personnel policies and programs developed and 
implemented under this subsection with respect to law 
enforcement officers (as that term is defined in section 
5541(3) of title 5, United States Code) shall not affect the 
ability of law enforcement entities to conduct operations or, 
through the applicable chain of command, to control the 
activities of such law enforcement officers.
  (D) Assignment to the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall 
be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint 
officer management policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title 
10, United States Code, and other provisions of that title.
  (m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In 
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the 
Director of National Intelligence may exercise with respect to 
the personnel of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence any authority of the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the 
Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence 
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other 
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment 
of this subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same 
conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to 
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence shall have the same 
rights and protections under the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence as employees of the Central Intelligence 
Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 
and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the 
enactment of this subsection.
  (n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) In carrying out 
the responsibilities and authorities under this section, the 
Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition 
and appropriations authorities referred to in the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) other 
than the authorities referred to in section 8(b) of that Act 
(50 U.S.C. 403j(b)).
  (2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred 
to in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall 
be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National 
Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an 
authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency 
may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts 
or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall 
be final.
  (B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of 
National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of 
National Intelligence may, in such official's discretion, 
delegate to any officer or other official of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence any authority to make a 
determination or decision as the head of the agency under an 
authority referred to in paragraph (1).
  (C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d) 
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
403c(d)) shall apply to the exercise by the Director of 
National Intelligence of an authority referred to in paragraph 
(1).
  (D) Each determination or decision required by an authority 
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon 
written findings made by the official making such determination 
or decision, which findings shall be final and shall be 
available within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence for a period of at least six years following the 
date of such determination or decision.
  (4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph 
(1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the 
head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an 
acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and 
403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than 
50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program.
  (B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may 
not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) 
until--
          (i) the head of such element (without delegation) 
        submits to the Director of National Intelligence a 
        written request that includes--
                  (I) a description of such authority requested 
                to be exercised;
                  (II) an explanation of the need for such 
                authority, including an explanation of the 
                reasons that other authorities are 
                insufficient; and
                  (III) a certification that the mission of 
                such element would be--
                          (aa) impaired if such authority is 
                        not exercised; or
                          (bb) significantly and measurably 
                        enhanced if such authority is 
                        exercised; and
          (ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a 
        written authorization that includes--
                  (I) a description of the authority referred 
                to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be 
                exercised; and
                  (II) a justification to support the exercise 
                of such authority.
  (C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority 
referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an 
individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of 
acquisitions described in the request and authorization 
referred to in subparagraph (B).
  (D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the 
intelligence community located within one of the departments 
described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to 
in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of 
National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures 
established by the head of such department.
  (ii) The departments described in this clause are the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department 
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department 
of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
  (E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community 
may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in 
subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of 
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National 
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such 
an authority for not more than 6 years.
  (ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to 
in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the 
requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not 
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National 
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension 
period of not more than 6 years.
  (F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the 
Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the 
authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E) 
to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a 
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
  (G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit--
          (i) to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        notification of an authorization to exercise an 
        authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an 
        extension of such authorization that includes the 
        written authorization referred to in subparagraph 
        (B)(ii); and
          (ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and 
        Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise 
        an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an 
        acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed 
        $50,000,000 annually.
  (H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority 
referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a 
period of at least 6 years following the date of such request 
or authorization.
  (I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or 
otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence 
Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3 
or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).
  (o) Consideration of Views of Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
take into account the views of a head of a department 
containing an element of the intelligence community and of the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (p) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence 
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning the 
Department of Defense.--Subject to the direction of the 
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall, after 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that the 
National Intelligence Program budgets for the elements of the 
intelligence community that are within the Department of 
Defense are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs 
of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the 
unified and specified commands, and wherever such elements are 
performing Government-wide functions, the needs of other 
Federal departments and agencies.
  (q) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence 
program within the National Intelligence Program for the 
acquisition of a major system, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall--
          (A) require the development and implementation of a 
        program management plan that includes cost, schedule, 
        security risks, and performance goals and program 
        milestone criteria, except that with respect to 
        Department of Defense programs the Director shall 
        consult with the Secretary of Defense;
          (B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority, 
        except that with respect to Department of Defense 
        programs the Director shall serve as milestone decision 
        authority jointly with the Secretary of Defense or the 
        designee of the Secretary; and
          (C) periodically--
                  (i) review and assess the progress made 
                toward the achievement of the goals and 
                milestones established in such plan; and
                  (ii) submit to Congress a report on the 
                results of such review and assessment.
  (2) If the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement on a 
milestone decision under paragraph (1)(B), the President shall 
resolve the conflict.
  (3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the 
authority of the Director of National Intelligence to delegate 
to any other official any authority to perform the 
responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
  (4) In this subsection:
          (A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect 
        to the acquisition of a major system, means a program 
        that--
                  (i) is carried out to acquire such major 
                system for an element of the intelligence 
                community; and
                  (ii) is funded in whole out of amounts 
                available for the National Intelligence 
                Program.
          (B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given 
        such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and 
        Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
  (r) Performance of Common Services.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of 
departments and agencies of the United States Government 
containing elements within the intelligence community and with 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinate the 
performance by the elements of the intelligence community 
within the National Intelligence Program of such services as 
are of common concern to the intelligence community, which 
services the Director of National Intelligence determines can 
be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner.
  (s) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1) 
Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other 
provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the 
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence 
may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a 
department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or 
more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in 
excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions 
of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at 
the discretion of the head of the department or agency 
employing the individual in a position covered by such 
authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any 
conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence 
when granting such authority.
  (2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or 
exercised only--
          (A) with respect to a position that requires an 
        extremely high level of expertise and is critical to 
        successful accomplishment of an important mission; and
          (B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an 
        individual exceptionally well qualified for the 
        position.
  (3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of 
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate 
payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section 
5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written 
approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as 
otherwise authorized by law.
  (4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of 
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate 
payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 
5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written 
approval of the President in response to a request by the 
Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by 
law.
  (5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a 
position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  (6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the 
congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days 
after the date on which the Director grants authority to the 
head of a department or agency under this subsection.
  (B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director 
of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection 
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the 
Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30 
days after the date on which such head exercises such 
authority.
  (t) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National 
Intelligence Service.--(1) The President, based on the 
recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may 
award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence 
Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer 
not already covered by such a rank award program in the same 
manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded 
a rank under section 4507 of title 5, United States Code.
  (2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank 
under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National 
Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the 
intelligence community whose identity as such a member or 
officer is classified information (as defined in section 
606(1)).
  (u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--The Director of 
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the 
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations 
prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the 
intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if 
such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance 
thereof.
  (v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence 
of the head of the covered department concerned and in 
consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel 
Management, may--
          (A) convert competitive service positions, and the 
        incumbents of such positions, within an element of the 
        intelligence community in such department, to excepted 
        service positions as the Director of National 
        Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the 
        intelligence functions of such element; and
          (B) establish new positions in the excepted service 
        within an element of the intelligence community in such 
        department, if the Director of National Intelligence 
        determines such positions are necessary to carry out 
        the intelligence functions of such element.
  (2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the 
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under 
this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion. 
Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the 
position may be converted to the excepted service.
  (3) A covered department may appoint an individual to a 
position converted or established pursuant to this subsection 
without regard to the civil-service laws, including parts II 
and III of title 5, United States Code.
  (4) In this subsection, the term ``covered department'' means 
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, 
the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.
  (w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements Intelligence 
Community Addendum.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the 
intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall 
provide to the President, the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment 
Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation 
agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's 
export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters, 
including interactions with other countries of proliferation 
concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or 
missile-related transfers to such countries.
  (x) Requirements for Intelligence Community Contractors.--The 
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
head of each department of the Federal Government that contains 
an element of the intelligence community and the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, shall--
          (1) ensure that--
                  (A) any contractor to an element of the 
                intelligence community with access to a 
                classified network or classified information 
                develops and operates a security plan that is 
                consistent with standards established by the 
                Director of National Intelligence for 
                intelligence community networks; and
                  (B) each contract awarded by an element of 
                the intelligence community includes provisions 
                requiring the contractor comply with such plan 
                and such standards;
          (2) conduct periodic assessments of each security 
        plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such 
        security plan complies with the requirements of such 
        paragraph; and
          (3) ensure that the insider threat detection 
        capabilities and insider threat policies of the 
        intelligence community apply to facilities of 
        contractors with access to a classified network.
  (y) Fundraising.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence 
may engage in fundraising in an official capacity for the 
benefit of nonprofit organizations that--
          (A) provide support to surviving family members of a 
        deceased employee of an element of the intelligence 
        community; or
          (B) otherwise provide support for the welfare, 
        education, or recreation of employees of an element of 
        the intelligence community, former employees of an 
        element of the intelligence community, or family 
        members of such employees.
  (2) In this subsection, the term ``fundraising'' means the 
raising of funds through the active participation in the 
promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed to 
raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation of 
money by any other means.
  (3) Not later than 7 days after the date the Director engages 
in fundraising authorized by this subsection or at the time the 
decision is made to participate in such fundraising, the 
Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees 
of such fundraising.
  (4) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the 
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry 
out the authority provided in this subsection. Such regulations 
shall ensure that such authority is exercised in a manner that 
is consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and 
principles, including the avoidance of any prohibited conflict 
of interest or appearance of impropriety.
  (z) Analyses and Impact Statements Regarding Proposed 
Investment Into the United States.--(1) Not later than 20 days 
after the completion of a review or an investigation of any 
proposed investment into the United States for which the 
Director has prepared analytic materials, the Director shall 
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representative copies of such analytic materials, including 
any supplements or amendments to such analysis made by the 
Director.
  (2) Not later than 60 days after the completion of 
consideration by the United States Government of any investment 
described in paragraph (1), the Director shall determine 
whether such investment will have an operational impact on the 
intelligence community, and, if so, shall submit a report on 
such impact to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives. Each such report shall--
          (A) describe the operational impact of the investment 
        on the intelligence community; and
          (B) describe any actions that have been or will be 
        taken to mitigate such impact.
  (aa) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence 
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.--(1) Consistent with 
subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director of National Intelligence 
shall, after consultation with the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, ensure that the programs and 
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that are part 
of the National Intelligence Program are executed in a manner 
that conforms with the requirements of the national 
intelligence strategy under section 108A and the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence (or any successor mechanism 
established for the prioritization of such programs and 
activities).
  (2) Consistent with subsection (c)(5)(C), the Director of 
National Intelligence shall ensure that the programs and 
activities that are part of the National Intelligence Program, 
including those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are 
structured and executed in a manner than enables budget 
traceability.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               non-reimbursable detail of other personnel

  Sec. 113A. [An officer] (a) In General._An officer  or 
employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces may 
be detailed to the staff of an element of the intelligence 
community funded through the National Intelligence Program from 
another element of the intelligence community or from another 
element of the United States Government on a non-reimbursable 
basis, as jointly agreed to by the heads of the receiving and 
detailing elements, for a period not to exceed three years. 
This [section] subsection does not limit any other source of 
authority for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details. A non-
reimbursable detail made under this [section] subsection shall 
not be considered an augmentation of the appropriations of the 
receiving element of the intelligence community.
  (b) Processing and Resettlement of Refugees, Parolees, and 
Other Aliens From Afghanistan.--An officer or employee of an 
element of the intelligence community may be detailed to 
another element of the United States Government on a non-
reimbursable basis for the purpose of providing assistance with 
the processing and resettlement of refugees, parolees, and 
other aliens, from Afghanistan, as jointly agreed to by the 
heads of the receiving and detailing elements, for a period not 
to exceed 1 year. This subsection does not limit any other 
source of authority for reimbursable or non-reimbursable 
details. A non-reimbursable detail made under this subsection 
shall not be considered an augmentation of the appropriations 
of the receiving element of the United States Government.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 116A. AUTHORITY FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CERTAIN CANINES ASSOCIATED 
                    WITH FORCE PROTECTION DUTIES OF INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) Transportation.--For purposes of section 1344 of title 
31, United States Code, the transportation of federally owned 
canines associated with force protection duties of an element 
of the intelligence community between the residence of an 
officer or employee of the element and various locations that 
is essential for the performance of the force protection duty 
shall be deemed essential for the safe and efficient 
performance of intelligence duties.
  (b) Officers and employees covered.--In the administration of 
section 1344 of title 31, United States Code, an officer or 
employee of an element of the intelligence community shall be 
treated as being listed in subsection (b).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


national [counter proliferation]  counterproliferation and biosecurity 
                                 center

  Sec. 119A. (a) Establishment.--(1) The President shall 
establish a [National Counter Proliferation Center] National 
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, taking into 
account all appropriate [government tools to prevent] 
government tools to--
                  (A) prevent  and halt the proliferation of 
                weapons of mass destruction, their delivery 
                systems, and related materials and 
                technologies[.]; and
          (B) lead integration and mission management of all 
        intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and 
        foreign biological threats.
  (2) The head of the [National Counter Proliferation Center] 
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall be 
the Director of the [National Counter Proliferation Center] 
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, who shall 
be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
  (3) The [National Counter Proliferation Center] National 
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center shall be located 
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
  (4) The Director of the National Counterproliferation and 
Biosecurity Center shall serve as the principal coordinator for 
the intelligence community, and as the principal advisor to the 
Director of National Intelligence, with respect to biosecurity 
and foreign biological threats.
  (b) Missions and Objectives.--[In establishing]
          (1) Counterproliferation._In establishing  the 
        [National Counter Proliferation Center] National 
        Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the 
        President shall address the following missions and 
        objectives to prevent and halt the proliferation of 
        weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, 
        and related materials and technologies:
                  [(1)] (A) Establishing a primary organization 
                within the United States Government for 
                analyzing and integrating all intelligence 
                possessed or acquired by the United States 
                pertaining to proliferation.
                  [(2)] (B) Ensuring that appropriate agencies 
                have full access to and receive all-source 
                intelligence support needed to execute their 
                [counter proliferation] counterproliferation 
                plans or activities, and perform independent, 
                alternative analyses.
                  [(3)] (C) Establishing a central repository 
                on known and suspected proliferation 
                activities, including the goals, strategies, 
                capabilities, networks, and any individuals, 
                groups, or entities engaged in proliferation.
                  [(4)] (D) Disseminating proliferation 
                information, including proliferation threats 
                and analyses, to the President, to the 
                appropriate departments and agencies, and to 
                the appropriate committees of Congress.
                  [(5)] (E) Conducting net assessments and 
                warnings about the proliferation of weapons of 
                mass destruction, their delivery systems, and 
                related materials and technologies.
                  [(6)] (F) Coordinating [counter 
                proliferation] counterproliferation plans and 
                activities of the various departments and 
                agencies of the United States Government to 
                prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons 
                of mass destruction, their delivery systems, 
                and related materials and technologies.
                  [(7)] (G) Conducting strategic operational 
                [counter proliferation] counterproliferation 
                planning for the United States Government to 
                prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons 
                of mass destruction, their delivery systems, 
                and related materials and technologies.
          (2) Biosecurity.--In establishing the National 
        Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the 
        President shall address the following missions and 
        objectives to ensure that the Center serves as the lead 
        for the intelligence community for the integration, 
        mission management, and coordination of intelligence 
        activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign 
        biological threats, regardless of origin:
                  (A) Ensuring that the elements of the 
                intelligence community provide timely and 
                effective warnings to the President and the 
                Director of National Intelligence regarding 
                emerging foreign biological threats, including 
                diseases with pandemic potential.
                  (B) Overseeing and coordinating the 
                collection and analysis of intelligence on 
                biosecurity and foreign biological threats in 
                support of the intelligence needs of the 
                Federal departments and agencies responsible 
                for public health, including by conveying 
                collection priorities to elements of the 
                intelligence community.
                  (C) Coordinating intelligence support to the 
                Federal departments and agencies responsible 
                for public health, including by ensuring that 
                intelligence pertaining to biosecurity and 
                foreign biological threats is disseminated 
                among appropriately cleared personnel of such 
                departments and agencies.
                  (D) Coordinating with the Federal departments 
                and agencies responsible for public health to 
                encourage information sharing with the 
                intelligence community.
                  (E) Identifying gaps in the capabilities of 
                the intelligence community regarding 
                biosecurity and countering foreign biological 
                threats and providing to the Director of 
                National Intelligence recommended solutions for 
                such gaps, including by encouraging research 
                and development of new capabilities to counter 
                foreign biological threats.
  (c) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the 
requirements of this section, and any parts thereof, if the 
President determines that such requirements do not materially 
improve the ability of the United States Government to prevent 
and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
their delivery systems, and related materials and technologies. 
Such waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and shall 
include a description of how the missions and objectives in 
subsection (b) are being met.
  (d) Report to Congress.--(1) Not later than nine months after 
the implementation of this Act, the President shall submit to 
Congress, in classified form if necessary, the findings and 
recommendations of the President's Commission on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction established by Executive Order in February 
2004, together with the views of the President regarding the 
establishment of a [National Counter Proliferation Center] 
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
  (2) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver 
authority granted by subsection (c), the President shall submit 
to Congress from time to time updates and plans regarding the 
establishment of a [National Counter Proliferation Center] 
National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.
  (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that a 
central feature of [counter proliferation] counterproliferation 
activities, consistent with the President's Proliferation 
Security Initiative, should include the physical interdiction, 
by air, sea, or land, of weapons of mass destruction, their 
delivery systems, and related materials and technologies, and 
enhanced law enforcement activities to identify and disrupt 
proliferation networks, activities, organizations, and persons.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.

  (a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the 
purpose of--
          (1) assisting intelligence analysts of various 
        elements of the intelligence community with respect to 
        analysis of climate security and its impact on the 
        areas of focus of such analysts;
          (2) facilitating coordination between the elements of 
        the intelligence community and elements of the Federal 
        Government that are not elements of the intelligence 
        community in collecting data on, and conducting 
        analysis of, climate change and climate security; and
          (3) ensuring that the intelligence community is 
        adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out 
        its activities.
  (b) Composition of Council.--
          (1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the 
        following individuals appointed by the Director of 
        National Intelligence:
                  (A) An appropriate official from the National 
                Intelligence Council, who shall chair the 
                Council.
                  (B) The lead official with respect to climate 
                and environmental security analysis from--
                          (i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
                          (ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and 
                        Research of the Department of State;
                          (iii) the National Geospatial-
                        Intelligence Agency;
                          (iv) the Office of Intelligence and 
                        Counterintelligence of the Department 
                        of Energy;
                          (v) the Office of the Under Secretary 
                        of Defense for Intelligence and 
                        Security; and
                          (vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
                  (C) Three appropriate officials from elements 
                of the Federal Government that are not elements 
                of the intelligence community that are 
                responsible for--
                          (i) providing decision makers with a 
                        predictive understanding of the 
                        climate;
                          (ii) making observations of our Earth 
                        system that can be used by the public, 
                        policymakers, and to support strategic 
                        decisions; or
                          (iii) coordinating Federal research 
                        and investments in understanding the 
                        forces shaping the global environment, 
                        both human and natural, and their 
                        impacts on society.
                  (D) Any other officials as the Director of 
                National Intelligence or the chair of the 
                Council may determine appropriate.
          (2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the 
        Council shall have responsibility for--
                  (A) identifying agencies to supply 
                individuals from elements of the Federal 
                Government that are not elements of the 
                intelligence community;
                  (B) securing the permission of the relevant 
                agency heads for the participation of such 
                individuals on the Council; and
                  (C) any other duties that the Director of 
                National Intelligence may direct.
  (c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council 
shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
          (1) To meet at least quarterly to--
                  (A) exchange appropriate data between 
                elements of the intelligence community and 
                elements of the Federal Government that are not 
                elements of the intelligence community;
                  (B) discuss processes for the routine 
                exchange of such data and implementation of 
                such processes; and
                  (C) prepare summaries of the business 
                conducted at each meeting.
          (2) To assess and determine best practices with 
        respect to the analysis of climate security, including 
        identifying publicly available information and 
        intelligence acquired through clandestine means that 
        enables such analysis.
          (3) To assess and identify best practices with 
        respect to prior efforts of the intelligence community 
        to analyze climate security.
          (4) To assess and describe best practices for 
        identifying and disseminating climate intelligence 
        indications and warnings.
          (5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of 
        climate security and the best practices identified 
        under paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic 
        training programs.
          (6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements 
        of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of 
        climate change or climate security and elements of the 
        Federal Government that are not elements of the 
        intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate 
        change or climate security, for the purpose of sharing 
        information about ongoing efforts and avoiding 
        duplication of existing efforts.
          (7) To work with elements of the intelligence 
        community that conduct analysis of climate change or 
        climate security and elements of the Federal Government 
        that are not elements of the intelligence community 
        that conduct analysis of climate change or climate 
        security--
                  (A) to exchange appropriate data between such 
                elements, establish processes, procedures and 
                practices for the routine exchange of such 
                data, discuss the implementation of such 
                processes; and
                  (B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of 
                findings and analysis between such elements.
          (8) To assess whether the elements of the 
        intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate 
        change or climate security may inform the research 
        direction of academic work and the sponsored work of 
        the United States Government.
          (9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to 
        convene conferences of analysts and nonintelligence 
        community personnel working on climate change or 
        climate security on subjects that the chair shall 
        direct.
  (d) Annual Report.--[Not later]
          (1) Requirement._Not later  than January 31, 2021, 
        and not less frequently than annually thereafter, the 
        chair of the Council shall submit, on behalf of the 
        Council, to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        report describing the activities of the Council as 
        described in subsection (c) during the year preceding 
        the year during which the report is submitted.
          (2) Matters included.--Each report under paragraph 
        (1) shall include a description of any obstacles or 
        gaps relating to--
                  (A) the Council fulfilling its duties and 
                responsibilities under subsection (c); or
                  (B) the responsiveness of the intelligence 
                community to the climate security needs and 
                priorities of the policymaking elements of the 
                Federal Government.
  (e) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on [the date that is 
4 years after the date of the enactment of this section] 
December 31, 2025.
  [(e)] (f) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Climate security.--The term ``climate security'' 
        means the effects of climate change on the following:
                  (A) The national security of the United 
                States, including national security 
                infrastructure.
                  (B) Subnational, national, and regional 
                political stability.
                  (C) The security of allies and partners of 
                the United States.
                  (D) Ongoing or potential political violence, 
                including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, 
                insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, 
                civil war, and interstate war.
          (2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--
        The term ``climate intelligence indications and 
        warnings'' means developments relating to climate 
        security with the potential to--
                  (A) imminently and substantially alter the 
                political stability or degree of human security 
                in a country or region; or
                  (B) imminently and substantially threaten--
                          (i) the national security of the 
                        United States;
                          (ii) the military, political, or 
                        economic interests of allies and 
                        partners of the United States; or
                          (iii) citizens of the United States 
                        abroad.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



[SEC. 304. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER 
                    INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

  [(a) In General.--The head of each element of the 
intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring each 
employee of such element occupying a covered position to sign a 
written agreement requiring the regular reporting of covered 
employment to the head of such element.
  [(b) Agreement Elements.--The regulations required under 
subsection (a) shall provide that an agreement contain 
provisions requiring each employee occupying a covered position 
to, during the two-year period beginning on the date on which 
such employee ceases to occupy such covered position--
          [(1) report covered employment to the head of the 
        element of the intelligence community that employed 
        such employee in such covered position upon accepting 
        such covered employment; and
          [(2) annually (or more frequently if the head of such 
        element considers it appropriate) report covered 
        employment to the head of such element.
  [(c) Definitions.--In this section:
          [(1) Covered employment.--The term ``covered 
        employment'' means direct employment by, representation 
        of, or the provision of advice relating to national 
        security to the government of a foreign country or any 
        person whose activities are directly or indirectly 
        supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or 
        subsidized, in whole or in major part, by any 
        government of a foreign country.
          [(2) Covered position.--The term ``covered position'' 
        means a position within an element of the intelligence 
        community that, based on the level of access of a 
        person occupying such position to information regarding 
        sensitive intelligence sources or methods or other 
        exceptionally sensitive matters, the head of such 
        element determines should be subject to the 
        requirements of this section.
          [(3) Government of a foreign country.--The term 
        ``government of a foreign country'' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents 
        Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).]

SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY FORMER 
                    INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.

  (a) Temporary Restriction.--An employee of an element of the 
intelligence community who occupies a covered intelligence 
position may not occupy a covered post-service position during 
the 30-month period following the date on which the employee 
ceases to occupy a covered intelligence position.
  (b) Covered Post-service Employment Reporting.--
          (1) Requirement.--During the 5-year period beginning 
        on the date on which an employee ceases to occupy a 
        covered intelligence position, the employee shall--
                  (A) report covered post-service employment to 
                the head of the element of the intelligence 
                community that employed such employee in such 
                covered intelligence position upon accepting 
                such covered post-service employment; and
                  (B) annually (or more frequently if the head 
                of such element considers it appropriate) 
                report covered post-service employment to the 
                head of such element.
          (2) Regulations.--The head of each element of the 
        intelligence community shall issue regulations 
        requiring, as a condition of employment, each employee 
        of such element occupying a covered intelligence 
        position to sign a written agreement requiring the 
        regular reporting of covered post-service employment to 
        the head of such element pursuant to paragraph (1).
  (c) Penalties.--
          (1) Criminal penalties.--A former employee who 
        knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a) or who 
        knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report 
        under subsection (b) shall be fined under title 18, 
        United States Code, or imprisoned for not more than 5 
        years, or both. Each report under subsection (b) shall 
        be subject to section 1001 of title 18, United States 
        Code.
          (2) Security clearances.--The head of an element of 
        the intelligence community shall revoke the security 
        clearance of a former employee if the former employee 
        knowingly and willfully fails to make a required report 
        under subsection (b) or knowingly and willfully makes a 
        false report under such subsection.
  (d) Provision of Information.--
          (1) Training.--The head of each element of the 
        intelligence community shall regularly provide training 
        on the reporting requirements under subsection (b) to 
        employees of that element who occupy a covered 
        intelligence position.
          (2) Written notice.--The head of each element of the 
        intelligence community shall provide written notice of 
        the reporting requirements under subsection (b) to an 
        employee when the employee ceases to occupy a covered 
        intelligence position.
  (e) Annual Reports.--
          (1) Requirement.--Not later than March 31 of each 
        year, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
        submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        report on covered post-service employment occurring 
        during the year covered by the report.
          (2) Elements.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                  (A) The number of former employees who occupy 
                a covered post-service position, broken down 
                by--
                          (i) the name of the employer;
                          (ii) the foreign government, 
                        including by the specific foreign 
                        individual, agency, or entity, for whom 
                        the covered post-service employment is 
                        being performed; and
                          (iii) the nature of the services 
                        provided as part of the covered post-
                        service employment.
                  (B) A certification by the Director that--
                          (i) each element of the intelligence 
                        community maintains adequate systems 
                        and processes for ensuring that former 
                        employees are submitting reports 
                        required under subsection (b);
                          (ii) to the knowledge of the heads of 
                        the elements of the intelligence 
                        community, all former employees who 
                        occupy a covered post-service position 
                        are in compliance with this section;
                          (iii) the services provided by former 
                        employees who occupy a covered post-
                        service position do not--
                                  (I) pose a current or future 
                                threat to the national security 
                                of the United States; or
                                  (II) pose a 
                                counterintelligence risk; and
                          (iv) the Director and the heads of 
                        such elements are not aware of any 
                        credible information or reporting that 
                        any former employee who occupies a 
                        covered post-service position has 
                        engaged in activities that violate 
                        Federal law, infringe upon the privacy 
                        rights of United States persons, or 
                        constitute abuses of human rights.
          (3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.
  (f) Notification.--In addition to the annual reports under 
subsection (e), if a head of an element of the intelligence 
community determines that the services provided by a former 
employee who occupies a covered post-service position pose a 
threat or risk described in clause (iii) of paragraph (2)(B) of 
such subsection, or include activities described in clause (iv) 
of such paragraph, the head shall notify the congressional 
intelligence committees of such determination by not later than 
7 days after making such determination. The notification shall 
include the following:
          (1) The name of the former employee.
          (2) The name of the employer.
          (3) The foreign government, including the specific 
        foreign individual, agency, or entity, for whom the 
        covered post-service employment is being performed.
          (4) As applicable, a description of--
                  (A) the risk to national security, the 
                counterintelligence risk, or both; and
                  (B) the activities that may violate Federal 
                law, infringe upon the privacy rights of United 
                States persons, or constitute abuses of human 
                rights.
  (g) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered intelligence position.--The term 
        ``covered intelligence position'' means a position 
        within an element of the intelligence community that, 
        based on the level of access of a person occupying such 
        position to information regarding sensitive 
        intelligence sources or methods or other exceptionally 
        sensitive matters, the head of such element determines 
        should be subject to the requirements of this section.
          (2) Covered post-service employment.--The term 
        ``covered post-service employment'' means direct or 
        indirect employment by, representation of, or any 
        provision of advice or services relating to national 
        security, intelligence, the military, or internal 
        security to, the government of a foreign country or any 
        company, entity, or other person whose activities are 
        directly or indirectly supervised, directed, 
        controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in 
        major part, by any government of a foreign country.
          (3) Covered post-service position.--The term 
        ``covered post-service position'' means a position of 
        employment described in paragraph (2).
          (4) Employee.--The term ``employee'', with respect to 
        an employee occupying a covered intelligence position, 
        includes an officer or official of an element of the 
        intelligence community, a contractor of such an 
        element, a detailee to such an element, or a member of 
        the Armed Forces assigned to such an element.
          (5) Former employee.--The term ``former employee'' 
        means an individual--
                  (A) who was an employee occupying a covered 
                intelligence position; and
                  (B) who is subject to the requirements under 
                subsection (a) or (b).
          (6) Government of a foreign country.--The term 
        ``government of a foreign country'' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents 
        Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).

SEC. 305. TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FOR PAID LEAVE FOR A SERIOUS HEALTH 
                    CONDITION.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Paid serious health condition leave.--The term 
        ``paid serious health condition leave'' means paid 
        leave taken under subsection (b).
          (2) Serious health condition.--The term ``serious 
        health condition'' has the meaning given the term in 
        section 6381 of title 5, United States Code.
          (3) Son or daughter.--The term ``son or daughter'' 
        has the meaning given the term in section 6381 of title 
        5, United States Code.
  (b) Paid Serious Health Condition Leave.--During the period 
specified in subsection (f), and notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, a civilian employee of an element of the 
intelligence community shall have available a total of 12 
administrative workweeks of paid leave during any 12-month 
period for one or more of the following:
          (1) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, 
        daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, 
        son, daughter, or parent has a serious health 
        condition.
          (2) Because of a serious health condition that makes 
        the employee unable to perform the functions of the 
        employee's position.
  (c) Treatment of Serious Health Condition Leave Request.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an element of the 
intelligence community shall accommodate an employee's leave 
schedule request under subsection (b), including a request to 
use such leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule, 
to the extent that the requested leave schedule does not unduly 
disrupt agency operations.
  (d) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--During the period 
specified in subsection (f), and notwithstanding any other 
provision of law--
          (1) an employee of an element of the intelligence 
        community--
                  (A) shall be required to first use all 
                accrued or accumulated paid sick leave before 
                being allowed to use paid serious health 
                condition leave; and
                  (B) may not be required to first use all or 
                any portion of any unpaid leave available to 
                the employee before being allowed to use paid 
                serious health condition leave; and
          (2) paid serious health condition leave--
                  (A) shall be payable from any appropriation 
                or fund available for salaries or expenses for 
                positions within the employing element;
                  (B) may not be considered to be annual or 
                vacation leave for purposes of section 5551 or 
                5552 of title 5, United States Code, or for any 
                other purpose;
                  (C) if not used by the employee before the 
                end of the 12-month period described in 
                subsection (b) to which the leave relates, may 
                not be available for any subsequent use and may 
                not be converted into a cash payment;
                  (D) may be granted only to the extent that 
                the employee does not receive a total of more 
                than 12 weeks of paid serious health condition 
                leave in any 12-month period;
                  (E) shall be used in increments of hours (or 
                fractions thereof), with 12 administrative 
                workweeks equal to 480 hours for employees of 
                elements of the intelligence community with a 
                regular full-time work schedule and converted 
                to a proportional number of hours for employees 
                of such elements with part-time, seasonal, or 
                uncommon tours of duty; and
                  (F) may not be used during off-season (nonpay 
                status) periods for employees of such elements 
                with seasonal work schedules.
  (e) Implementation.--
          (1) Consistency with serious health condition leave 
        under title 5.--The Director of National Intelligence 
        shall carry out this section in a manner consistent, to 
        the extent appropriate, with the administration of 
        leave taken under section 6382 of title 5, United 
        States Code, for a reason described in subparagraph (C) 
        or (D) of subsection (a)(1) of that section, including 
        with respect to the authority to require a 
        certification described in section 6383 of such title.
          (2) Implementation plan.--Not later than 1 year after 
        the date of enactment of this section, the Director of 
        National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees an implementation plan that 
        includes--
                  (A) processes and procedures for implementing 
                the paid serious health condition leave 
                policies under subsections (b) through (d) 
                during the period specified in subsection (f);
                  (B) an explanation of how such implementation 
                will be reconciled with policies of other 
                elements of the Federal Government, including 
                the impact on elements funded by the National 
                Intelligence Program that are housed within 
                agencies outside the intelligence community;
                  (C) the projected impact of such 
                implementation on the workforce of the 
                intelligence community, including take rates, 
                retention, recruiting, and morale, broken down 
                by each element of the intelligence community; 
                and
                  (D) all costs or operational expenses 
                associated with such implementation.
          (3) Directive.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        Director of National Intelligence submits the 
        implementation plan under paragraph (2), the Director 
        of National Intelligence shall issue a written 
        directive to implement this section, which directive 
        shall take effect on the date of issuance.
  (f) Duration of Authority.--The authority and requirements 
under subsections (b) through (d) shall only apply during the 
3-year period beginning on the date on which the Director of 
National Intelligence issues the written directive under 
subsection (e)(3).
  (g) Annual Report.--During the period specified in subsection 
(f), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees an annual report that--
          (1) details the number of employees of each element 
        of the intelligence community who applied for and took 
        paid serious health condition leave during the year 
        covered by the report;
          (2) includes updates on major implementation 
        challenges or costs associated with paid serious health 
        condition leave; and
          (3) includes a recommendation of the Director with 
        respect to whether to extend the period specified in 
        subsection (f).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 501A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF CERTAIN SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.

  (a) Reports and Notifications.--At the same time that the 
Secretary of Defense submits any report or notification under 
section 119 of title 10, United States Code, that relates to a 
covered special access program or a new covered special access 
program, the Secretary shall also submit such report or 
notification to the congressional intelligence committees.
  (b) Briefings.--On a periodic basis, but not less frequently 
than semiannually, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to 
the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional 
intelligence committees, and to any staff of such a committee 
designated by either the chair or ranking member for purposes 
of this subsection, a briefing on covered special access 
programs. Each such briefing shall include, at a minimum--
          (1) a description of the activity of the program 
        during the period covered by the briefing; and
          (2) documentation with respect to how the program has 
        achieved outcomes consistent with requirements 
        documented by the Director of National Intelligence and 
        the Secretary of Defense.
  (c) Notifications on Compartments and Subcompartments.--
          (1) Requirement.--Except as provided by paragraph 
        (2), a head of an element of the intelligence community 
        may not establish a compartment or a subcompartment 
        under a covered special access program until the head 
        notifies the congressional intelligence committees of 
        such compartment or subcompartment, as the case may be.
          (2) Waiver.--
                  (A) Determination.--On a case-by-case basis, 
                the Director of National Intelligence may waive 
                the requirement under paragraph (1). Not later 
                than two days after making such a waiver, the 
                Director shall notify the congressional 
                intelligence committees of the waiver, 
                including a justification for the waiver.
                  (B) Submission.--Not later than 30 days after 
                the date on which the Director makes a waiver 
                under subparagraph (A), the head of the element 
                of the intelligence community for whom the 
                waiver was made shall submit to the 
                congressional intelligence committees the 
                notification required under paragraph (1) 
                relating to such waiver.
  (d) Annual Reports.--
          (1) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the head of 
        each element of the intelligence community shall submit 
        to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
        on covered special access programs administered by the 
        head.
          (2) Matters included.--Each report shall include, 
        with respect to the period covered by the report, the 
        following:
                  (A) A list of all compartments and 
                subcompartments of covered special access 
                programs active as of the date of the report.
                  (B) A list of all compartments and 
                subcompartments of covered special access 
                programs terminated during the period covered 
                by the report.
                  (C) With respect to the report submitted by 
                the Director of National Intelligence, in 
                addition to the matters specified in 
                subparagraphs (A) and (B)--
                          (i) a certification regarding whether 
                        the creation, validation, or 
                        substantial modification, including 
                        termination, for all existing and 
                        proposed covered special access 
                        programs, and the compartments and 
                        subcompartments within each, are 
                        substantiated and justified based on 
                        the information required by clause 
                        (ii); and
                          (ii) for each certification--
                                  (I) the rationale for the 
                                revalidation, validation, or 
                                substantial modification, 
                                including termination, of each 
                                covered special access program, 
                                compartment, and 
                                subcompartment;
                                  (II) the identification of a 
                                control officer for each 
                                covered special access program; 
                                and
                                  (III) a statement of 
                                protection requirements for 
                                each covered special access 
                                program.
  (e) Covered Special Access Program Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``covered special access program'' means a special 
access program that receives funding under the National 
Intelligence Program or the Military Intelligence Program, 
relates to an intelligence or intelligence-related activity, or 
both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   funding of intelligence activities

  Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence 
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or 
intelligence-related activity only if--
          [(1) those funds were specifically authorized by the 
        Congress for use for such activities; or]
          (1) those funds were specifically authorized by 
        Congress for use for such intelligence or intelligence-
        related activities; or
          (2) in the case of funds from the Reserve for 
        Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
        consistent with the provisions of section 503 of this 
        Act concerning any significant anticipated intelligence 
        activity, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency has notified the appropriate congressional 
        committees of the intent to make such funds available 
        for such activity; or
          (3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by 
        the Congress for a different activity--
                  (A) the activity to be funded is a higher 
                priority intelligence or intelligence-related 
                activity;
                  (B) the use of such funds for such activity 
                supports an emergent need, improves program 
                effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and
                  (C) the Director of National Intelligence, 
                the Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney 
                General, as appropriate, has notified the 
                appropriate congressional committees of the 
                intent to make such funds available for such 
                activity;
          (4) nothing in this subsection prohibits obligation 
        or expenditure of funds available to an intelligence 
        agency in accordance with sections 1535 and 1536 of 
        title 31, United States Code.
  (b) Funds available to an intelligence agency may not be made 
available for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity 
for which funds were denied by the Congress.
  (c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any 
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government 
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any 
covert action, as defined in section 503(e), unless and until a 
Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of section 503 
has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that 
subsection.
  (d)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, 
funds available to an intelligence agency that are not 
appropriated funds may be obligated or expended for an 
intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if those 
funds are used for activities reported to the appropriate 
congressional committees pursuant to procedures which 
identify--
          (A) the types of activities for which nonappropriated 
        funds may be expended; and
          (B) the circumstances under which an activity must be 
        reported as a significant anticipated intelligence 
        activity before such funds can be expended.
  (2) Procedures for purposes of paragraph (1) shall be jointly 
agreed upon by the congressional intelligence committees and, 
as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence or the 
Secretary of Defense.
  (e) As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``intelligence agency'' means any 
        department, agency, or other entity of the United 
        States involved in intelligence or intelligence-related 
        activities;
          (2) the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
        and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
          (3) the term ``specifically authorized by the 
        Congress'' means that--
                  (A) the activity and the amount of funds 
                proposed to be used for that activity were 
                identified in a formal budget request to the 
                Congress, but funds shall be deemed to be 
                specifically authorized for that activity only 
                to the extent that the Congress both authorized 
                the funds to be appropriated for that activity 
                and appropriated the funds for that activity; 
                or
                  (B) although the funds were not formally 
                requested, the Congress both specifically 
                authorized the appropriation of the funds for 
                the activity and appropriated the funds for the 
                activity.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 1025. AUTHORIZATION OF SUPPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE FOR CERTAIN WORKFORCE ACTIVITIES.

  (a) Authorization.--The Director may, with or without 
reimbursement, obligate or expend amounts authorized to be 
appropriated or otherwise made available for the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence for covered workforce 
activities for the purpose of supporting a covered workforce 
activity of an element of the intelligence community.
  (b) Covered Workforce Activity Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``covered workforce activity'' means an activity relating 
to--
          (1) recruitment or retention of the intelligence 
        community workforce; or
          (2) diversity, equality, inclusion, or accessibility, 
        with respect to such workforce.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 1104. PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICES IN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means an executive 
        department or independent establishment, as defined 
        under sections 101 and 104 of title 5, United States 
        Code, that contains an intelligence community element, 
        except the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (2) Covered intelligence community element.--The term 
        ``covered intelligence community element''--
                  (A) means--
                          (i) the Central Intelligence Agency, 
                        the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
                        National Geospatial-Intelligence 
                        Agency, the National Security Agency, 
                        the Office of the Director of National 
                        Intelligence, and the National 
                        Reconnaissance Office; and
                          (ii) any executive agency or unit 
                        thereof determined by the President 
                        under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of 
                        title 5, United States Code, to have as 
                        its principal function the conduct of 
                        foreign intelligence or 
                        counterintelligence activities; and
                  (B) does not include the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation.
          (3) Personnel action.--The term ``personnel action'' 
        means, with respect to an employee in a position in a 
        covered intelligence community element (other than a 
        position excepted from the competitive service due to 
        its confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or 
        policy-advocating character) or a contractor employee--
                  (A) an appointment;
                  (B) a promotion;
                  (C) a disciplinary or corrective action;
                  (D) a detail, transfer, or reassignment;
                  (E) a demotion, suspension, or termination;
                  (F) a reinstatement or restoration;
                  (G) a performance evaluation;
                  (H) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or 
                awards;
                  (I) a decision concerning education or 
                training if such education or training may 
                reasonably be expected to lead to an 
                appointment, promotion, or performance 
                evaluation; or
                  (J) any other significant change in duties, 
                responsibilities, or working conditions.
          (4) Contractor employee.--The term ``contractor 
        employee'' means an employee of a contractor, 
        subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal 
        services contractor, of a covered intelligence 
        community element.
  (b) Agency Employees.--[Any employee of an agency] Any 
employee of a covered intelligence community element or an 
agency who has authority to take, direct others to take, 
recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, with 
respect to such authority, take or fail to take, or threaten to 
take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to any 
employee of a covered intelligence community element as a 
reprisal [for a lawful disclosure] for--
          (1)  any lawful disclosure of information by the 
        employee to the Director of National Intelligence (or 
        an employee designated by the Director of National 
        Intelligence for such purpose), the Inspector General 
        of the Intelligence Community, a supervisor in the 
        employee's direct chain of command, or a supervisor of 
        the employing agency with responsibility for the 
        subject matter of the disclosure, up to and including 
        the head of the employing agency (or an employee 
        designated by the head of that agency for such 
        purpose), the appropriate inspector general of the 
        employing agency, a congressional intelligence 
        committee, or a member of a congressional intelligence 
        committee, which the employee reasonably believes 
        evidences--
                  [(1)] (A) a violation of any Federal law, 
                rule, or regulation; or
                  [(2)] (B) mismanagement, a gross waste of 
                funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial 
                and specific danger to public health or safety.
          (2) any lawful disclosure that complies with--
                  (A) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of 
                section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 
                (5 U.S.C. App.);
                  (B) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of 
                section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence 
                Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
                  (C) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of 
                section 103H(k)(5); or
          (3) if the actions do not result in the employee 
        unlawfully disclosing information specifically required 
        by Executive order to be kept classified in the 
        interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign 
        affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction with--
                  (A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or 
                grievance right granted by any law, rule, or 
                regulation;
                  (B) testimony for or otherwise lawfully 
                assisting any individual in the exercise of any 
                right referred to in subparagraph (A); or
                  (C) cooperation with or disclosing 
                information to the Inspector General of an 
                agency, in accordance with applicable 
                provisions of law in connection with an audit, 
                inspection, or investigation conducted by the 
                Inspector General.
  (c) Contractor Employees.--(1) Any employee of an agency or 
of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or 
personal services contractor, of a covered intelligence 
community element who has authority to take, direct others to 
take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall not, 
with respect to such authority, take or fail to take, or 
threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with 
respect to any contractor employee as a reprisal [for a lawful 
disclosure] for--
          (A) any lawful disclosure of information by the 
        contractor employee to the Director of National 
        Intelligence (or an employee designated by the Director 
        of National Intelligence for such purpose), the 
        Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, a 
        supervisor in the contractor employee's direct chain of 
        command, or a supervisor of the contracting agency with 
        responsibility for the subject matter of the 
        disclosure, up to and including the head of the 
        contracting agency (or an employee designated by the 
        head of that agency for such purpose), the appropriate 
        inspector general of the contracting agency, a 
        congressional intelligence committee, or a member of a 
        congressional intelligence committee, which the 
        contractor employee reasonably believes evidences--
                          [(A)] (i) a violation of any Federal 
                        law, rule, or regulation (including 
                        with respect to evidence of another 
                        employee or contractor employee 
                        accessing or sharing classified 
                        information without authorization); or
                          [(B) gross mismanagement] (ii) 
                        mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, 
                        an abuse of authority, or a substantial 
                        and specific danger to public health or 
                        safety.
          (B) any lawful disclosure that complies with--
                  (i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and (g) of 
                section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 
                (5 U.S.C. App.);
                  (ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) of 
                section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence 
                Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
                  (iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) of 
                section 103H(k)(5); or
          (C) if the actions do not result in the contractor 
        employee unlawfully disclosing information specifically 
        required by Executive order to be kept classified in 
        the interest of national defense or the conduct of 
        foreign affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction 
        with--
                  (i) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or 
                grievance right granted by any law, rule, or 
                regulation;
                  (ii) testimony for or otherwise lawfully 
                assisting any individual in the exercise of any 
                right referred to in clause (i); or
                  (iii) cooperation with or disclosing 
                information to the Inspector General of an 
                agency, in accordance with applicable 
                provisions of law in connection with an audit, 
                inspection, or investigation conducted by the 
                Inspector General.
  (2) A personnel action under paragraph (1) is prohibited even 
if the action is undertaken at the request of an agency 
official, unless the request takes the form of a 
nondiscretionary directive and is within the authority of the 
agency official making the request.
  (d) Rule of Construction.--Consistent with the protection of 
sources and methods, nothing in subsection (b) or (c) shall be 
construed to authorize--
          (1) the withholding of information from Congress; or
          (2) the taking of any personnel action against an 
        employee who lawfully discloses information to 
        Congress.
  (e) Disclosures.--A disclosure shall not be excluded from 
this section because--
          (1) the disclosure was made to an individual, 
        including a supervisor, who participated in an activity 
        that the employee reasonably believed to be covered 
        under subsection (b)(1)(B) or the contractor employee 
        reasonably believed to be covered under subsection 
        (c)(1)(A)(ii);
          (2) the disclosure revealed information that had been 
        previously disclosed;
          (3) the disclosure was not made in writing;
          (4) the disclosure was made while the employee was 
        off duty;
          (5) of the amount of time which has passed since the 
        occurrence of the events described in the disclosure; 
        or
          (6) the disclosure was made during the normal course 
        of duties of an employee or contractor employee.
  [(d) Enforcement.--The President shall provide for the 
enforcement of this section.]
  (f) Enforcement.--The President shall provide for the 
enforcement of this section consistent, to the fullest extent 
possible, with the policies and procedures used to adjudicate 
alleged violations of section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United 
States Code.
  [(e)] (g) Existing Rights Preserved.--Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to--
          (1) preempt or preclude any employee, contractor 
        employee, or applicant for employment, at the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation from exercising rights provided 
        under any other law, rule, or regulation, including 
        section 2303 of title 5, United States Code; or
          (2) repeal section 2303 of title 5, United States 
        Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1111. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS.

  (a) Reports.--On a biennial basis until the date that is 10 
years after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the 
activities, prioritization, and responsibilities of the 
intelligence community with respect to foreign biological 
threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a 
covered country.
  (b) Matters Included.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
include, with respect to foreign biological threats emanating 
from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country, the 
following:
          (1) A detailed description of all activities relating 
        to such threats undertaken by each element of the 
        intelligence community, and an assessment of any gaps 
        in such activities.
          (2) A detailed description of all duties and 
        responsibilities relating to such threats explicitly 
        authorized or otherwise assigned, exclusively or 
        jointly, to each element of the intelligence community, 
        and an assessment of any identified gaps in such duties 
        or responsibilities.
          (3) A description of the coordination among the 
        relevant elements of the intelligence community with 
        respect to the activities specified in paragraph (1) 
        and the duties and responsibilities specified in 
        paragraph (2).
          (4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, policies, 
        and interagency agreements of the intelligence 
        community relating to the collection, monitoring, 
        analysis, mitigation, and attribution of such threats, 
        and an assessment of any identified gaps therein.
          (5) A description of the coordination and 
        interactions among the relevant elements of the 
        intelligence community and non-intelligence community 
        partners.
          (6) An assessment of foreign malign influence efforts 
        relating to such threats, and a description of how the 
        intelligence community contributes to efforts by non-
        intelligence community partners to counter such foreign 
        malign influence.
  (c) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include 
an unclassified executive summary.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered country.--The term ``covered country'' 
        means--
                  (A) China;
                  (B) Iran;
                  (C) North Korea;
                  (D) Russia; and
                  (E) any other foreign country--
                          (i) from which the Director of 
                        National Intelligence determines a 
                        biological threat emanates; or
                          (ii) that the Director determines has 
                        a known history of, or has been 
                        assessed as having conditions present 
                        for, infectious disease outbreaks or 
                        epidemics.
          (2) Foreign biological threat.--The term ``foreign 
        biological threat'' means biological warfare, 
        bioterrorism, naturally occurring infectious diseases, 
        or accidental exposures to biological materials, 
        without regard to whether the threat originates from a 
        state actor, a non-state actor, natural conditions, or 
        an undetermined source.
          (3) Foreign malign influence.--The term ``foreign 
        malign influence'' has the meaning given such term in 
        section 119C(e).
          (4) Non-intelligence community partner.--The term 
        ``non-intelligence community partner'' means a Federal 
        department or agency that is not an element of the 
        intelligence community.

SEC. 1112. ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Reports.--Not later than January 31 of each year, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report--
          (1) identifying all domestic activities undertaken by 
        each element of the intelligence community during the 
        prior fiscal year; and
          (2) for each activity identified under paragraph (1), 
        a statement of the legal authority authorizing such 
        activity to be undertaken.
  (b) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.

SEC. 1113. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES PROCURED BY 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL 
                    PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES.

  (a) Annual Reports.--On an annual basis through 2026, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of 
the National Security Agency, in coordination with the Director 
of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report containing 
information on foreign commercial providers and the cyber 
vulnerabilities procured by the intelligence community through 
foreign commercial providers.
  (b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the 
following:
          (1) A description of each cyber vulnerability 
        procured through a foreign commercial provider, 
        including--
                  (A) a description of the vulnerability;
                  (B) the date of the procurement;
                  (C) whether the procurement consisted of only 
                that vulnerability or included other 
                vulnerabilities;
                  (D) the cost of the procurement;
                  (E) the identity of the commercial provider 
                and, if the commercial provider was not the 
                original supplier of the vulnerability, a 
                description of the original supplier;
                  (F) the country of origin of the 
                vulnerability; and
                  (G) an assessment of the ability of the 
                intelligence community to use the 
                vulnerability, including whether such use will 
                be operational or for research and development, 
                and the approximate timeline for such use.
          (2) An assessment of foreign commercial providers 
        that--
                  (A) pose a significant threat to the national 
                security of the United States; or
                  (B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to 
                any foreign government that--
                          (i) has used the cyber 
                        vulnerabilities to target United States 
                        persons, the United States Government, 
                        journalists, or dissidents; or
                          (ii) has an established pattern or 
                        practice of violating human rights or 
                        suppressing dissent.
          (3) An assessment of whether the intelligence 
        community has conducted business with the foreign 
        commercial providers identified under paragraph (2) 
        during the 5-year period preceding the date of the 
        report.
  (c) Form.--Each report under subsection (a) may be submitted 
in classified form.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Commercial provider.--The term ``commercial 
        provider'' means any person that sells, or acts as a 
        broker, for a cyber vulnerability.
          (2) Cyber vulnerability.--The term ``cyber 
        vulnerability'' means any tool, exploit, vulnerability, 
        or code that is intended to compromise a device, 
        network, or system, including such a tool, exploit, 
        vulnerability, or code procured by the intelligence 
        community for purposes of research and development.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


        INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                     TITLE III--SECURITY CLEARANCES

SEC. 3001. SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) The term ``agency'' means--
                  (A) an executive agency (as that term is 
                defined in section 105 of title 5, United 
                States Code);
                  (B) a military department (as that term is 
                defined in section 102 of title 5, United 
                States Code); [and] or
                  (C) an element of the intelligence community.
          (2) The term ``authorized investigative agency'' 
        means an agency designated by the head of the agency 
        selected pursuant to subsection (b) to conduct a 
        counterintelligence investigation or investigation of 
        persons who are proposed for access to classified 
        information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy 
        the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such 
        information.
          (3) The term ``authorized adjudicative agency'' means 
        an agency authorized by law, regulation, or direction 
        of the Director of National Intelligence to determine 
        eligibility for access to classified information in 
        accordance with Executive Order 12968.
          (4) The term ``highly sensitive program'' means--
                  (A) a government program designated as a 
                Special Access Program (as that term is defined 
                in section 4.1(h) of Executive Order 12958 or 
                any successor Executive order); or
                  (B) a government program that applies 
                restrictions required for--
                          (i) restricted data (as that term is 
                        defined in section 11 y. of the Atomic 
                        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(y)); 
                        or
                          (ii) other information commonly 
                        referred to as ``sensitive 
                        compartmented information''.
          (5) The term ``current investigation file'' means, 
        with respect to a security clearance, a file on an 
        investigation or adjudication that has been conducted 
        during--
                  (A) the 5-year period beginning on the date 
                the security clearance was granted, in the case 
                of a Top Secret Clearance, or the date access 
                was granted to a highly sensitive program;
                  (B) the 10-year period beginning on the date 
                the security clearance was granted in the case 
                of a Secret Clearance; and
                  (C) the 15-year period beginning on the date 
                the security clearance was granted in the case 
                of a Confidential Clearance.
          (6) The term ``personnel security investigation'' 
        means any investigation required for the purpose of 
        determining the eligibility of any military, civilian, 
        or government contractor personnel to access classified 
        information.
          (7) The term ``periodic reinvestigations'' means 
        investigations conducted for the purpose of updating a 
        previously completed background investigation--
                  (A) every 5 years in the case of a top secret 
                clearance or access to a highly sensitive 
                program;
                  (B) every 10 years in the case of a secret 
                clearance; or
                  (C) every 15 years in the case of a 
                Confidential Clearance.
          (8) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
        means--
                  (A) the Permanent Select Committee on 
                Intelligence and the Committees on Armed 
                Services, Homeland Security, Government Reform, 
                and the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                  (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence and 
                the Committees on Armed Services, Homeland 
                Security and Governmental Affairs, and the 
                Judiciary of the Senate.
          (9) Access determination.--The term ``access 
        determination'' means the determination regarding 
        whether an employee--
                  (A) is eligible for access to classified 
                information in accordance with Executive Order 
                12968 (60 Fed. Reg. 40245; relating to access 
                to classified information), or any successor 
                thereto, and Executive Order 10865 (25 Fed. 
                Reg. 1583; relating to safeguarding classified 
                information with industry), or any successor 
                thereto; and
                  (B) possesses a need to know under such an 
                Order.
  (b) Selection of Entity.--Except as otherwise provided, not 
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the President shall select a single department, agency, or 
element of the executive branch to be responsible for--
          (1) directing day-to-day oversight of investigations 
        and adjudications for personnel security clearances, 
        including for highly sensitive programs, throughout the 
        United States Government;
          (2) developing and implementing uniform and 
        consistent policies and procedures to ensure the 
        effective, efficient, and timely completion of security 
        clearances and determinations for access to highly 
        sensitive programs, including the standardization of 
        security questionnaires, financial disclosure 
        requirements for security clearance applicants, and 
        polygraph policies and procedures;
          (3) serving as the final authority to designate an 
        authorized investigative agency or authorized 
        adjudicative agency;
          (4) ensuring reciprocal recognition of access to 
        classified information among the agencies of the United 
        States Government, including acting as the final 
        authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes involving 
        the reciprocity of security clearances and access to 
        highly sensitive programs pursuant to subsection (d);
          (5) ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that 
        sufficient resources are available in each agency to 
        achieve clearance and investigative program goals;
          (6) reviewing and coordinating the development of 
        tools and techniques for enhancing the conduct of 
        investigations and granting of clearances; and
          (7) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2014, and consistent with subsection (j)--
                  (A) developing policies and procedures that 
                permit, to the extent practicable, individuals 
                alleging reprisal for having made a protected 
                disclosure (provided the individual does not 
                disclose classified information or other 
                information contrary to law) to appeal any 
                action affecting an employee's access to 
                classified information and to retain their 
                government employment status while such 
                challenge is pending; and
                  (B) developing and implementing uniform and 
                consistent policies and procedures to ensure 
                proper protections during the process for 
                denying, suspending, or revoking a security 
                clearance or access to classified information 
                following a protected disclosure, including the 
                ability to appeal such a denial, suspension, or 
                revocation, except that there shall be no 
                appeal of an agency's suspension of a security 
                clearance or access determination for purposes 
                of conducting an investigation, if that 
                suspension lasts no longer than 1 year or the 
                head of the agency or a designee of the head of 
                the agency certifies that a longer suspension 
                is needed before a final decision on denial or 
                revocation to prevent imminent harm to the 
                national security.
  (c) Performance of Security Clearance Investigations.--(1) 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall, in consultation with the head of the entity selected 
pursuant to subsection (b), select a single agency of the 
executive branch to conduct, to the maximum extent practicable, 
security clearance investigations of employees and contractor 
personnel of the United States Government who require access to 
classified information and to provide and maintain all security 
clearances of such employees and contractor personnel. The head 
of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) may designate 
other agencies to conduct such investigations if the head of 
the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) considers it 
appropriate for national security and efficiency purposes.
  (2) The agency selected under paragraph (1) shall--
          (A) take all necessary actions to carry out the 
        requirements of this section, including entering into a 
        memorandum of understanding with any agency carrying 
        out responsibilities relating to security clearances or 
        security clearance investigations before the date of 
        the enactment of this Act;
          (B) as soon as practicable, integrate reporting of 
        security clearance applications, security clearance 
        investigations, and determinations of eligibility for 
        security clearances, with the database required by 
        subsection (e); and
          (C) ensure that security clearance investigations are 
        conducted in accordance with uniform standards and 
        requirements established under subsection (b), 
        including uniform security questionnaires and financial 
        disclosure requirements.
  (d) Reciprocity of Security Clearance and Access 
Determinations.--(1) All security clearance background 
investigations and determinations completed by an authorized 
investigative agency or authorized adjudicative agency shall be 
accepted by all agencies.
  (2) All security clearance background investigations 
initiated by an authorized investigative agency shall be 
transferable to any other authorized investigative agency.
  (3)(A) An authorized investigative agency or authorized 
adjudicative agency may not establish additional investigative 
or adjudicative requirements (other than requirements for the 
conduct of a polygraph examination) that exceed requirements 
specified in Executive Orders establishing security 
requirements for access to classified information without the 
approval of the head of the entity selected pursuant to 
subsection (b).
  (B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the head of the entity 
selected pursuant to subsection (b) may establish such 
additional requirements as the head of such entity considers 
necessary for national security purposes.
  (4) An authorized investigative agency or authorized 
adjudicative agency may not conduct an investigation for 
purposes of determining whether to grant a security clearance 
to an individual where a current investigation or clearance of 
equal level already exists or has been granted by another 
authorized adjudicative agency.
  (5) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection 
(b) may disallow the reciprocal recognition of an individual 
security clearance by an agency under this section on a case-
by-case basis if the head of the entity selected pursuant to 
subsection (b) determines that such action is necessary for 
national security purposes.
  (6) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection 
(b) shall establish a review procedure by which agencies can 
seek review of actions required under this section.
  (e) Database on Security Clearances.--(1) Not later than 12 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall, in 
cooperation with the heads of the entities selected pursuant to 
subsections (b) and (c), establish and commence operating and 
maintaining an integrated, secure, database into which 
appropriate data relevant to the granting, denial, or 
revocation of a security clearance or access pertaining to 
military, civilian, or government contractor personnel shall be 
entered from all authorized investigative and adjudicative 
agencies.
  (2) The database under this subsection shall function to 
integrate information from existing Federal clearance tracking 
systems from other authorized investigative and adjudicative 
agencies into a single consolidated database.
  (3) Each authorized investigative or adjudicative agency 
shall check the database under this subsection to determine 
whether an individual the agency has identified as requiring a 
security clearance has already been granted or denied a 
security clearance, or has had a security clearance revoked, by 
any other authorized investigative or adjudicative agency.
  (4) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection 
(b) shall evaluate the extent to which an agency is submitting 
information to, and requesting information from, the database 
under this subsection as part of a determination of whether to 
certify the agency as an authorized investigative agency or 
authorized adjudicative agency.
  (5) The head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection 
(b) may authorize an agency to withhold information about 
certain individuals from the database under this subsection if 
the head of the entity considers it necessary for national 
security purposes.
  (f) Evaluation of Use of Available Technology in Clearance 
Investigations and Adjudications.--(1) The head of the entity 
selected pursuant to subsection (b) shall evaluate the use of 
available information technology and databases to expedite 
investigative and adjudicative processes for all and to verify 
standard information submitted as part of an application for a 
security clearance.
  (2) The evaluation shall assess the application of the 
technologies described in paragraph (1) for--
          (A) granting interim clearances to applicants at the 
        secret, top secret, and special access program levels 
        before the completion of the appropriate full 
        investigation;
          (B) expediting investigations and adjudications of 
        security clearances, including verification of 
        information submitted by the applicant;
          (C) ongoing verification of suitability of personnel 
        with security clearances in effect for continued access 
        to classified information;
          (D) use of such technologies to augment periodic 
        reinvestigations;
          (E) assessing the impact of the use of such 
        technologies on the rights of applicants to verify, 
        correct, or challenge information obtained through such 
        technologies; and
          (F) such other purposes as the head of the entity 
        selected pursuant to subsection (b) considers 
        appropriate.
  (3) An individual subject to verification utilizing the 
technology described in paragraph (1) shall be notified of such 
verification, shall provide consent to such use, and shall have 
access to data being verified in order to correct errors or 
challenge information the individual believes is incorrect.
  (4) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the head of the entity selected pursuant to 
subsection (b) shall submit to the President and the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the results of 
the evaluation, including recommendations on the use of 
technologies described in paragraph (1).
  (g) Reduction in Length of Personnel Security Clearance 
Process.--(1) The head of the entity selected pursuant to 
subsection (b) shall, within 90 days of selection under that 
subsection, develop, in consultation with the appropriate 
committees of Congress and each authorized adjudicative agency, 
a plan to reduce the length of the personnel security clearance 
process.
  (2)(A) To the extent practical the plan under paragraph (1) 
shall require that each authorized adjudicative agency make a 
determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a 
personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days after 
the date of receipt of the completed application for a security 
clearance by an authorized investigative agency. Such 60-day 
average period shall include--
          (i) a period of not longer than 40 days to complete 
        the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
          (ii) a period of not longer than 20 days to complete 
        the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
  (B) Determinations on clearances not made within 60 days 
shall be made without delay.
  (3)(A) The plan under paragraph (1) shall take effect 5 years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (B) During the period beginning on a date not later than 2 
years after the date after the enactment of this Act and ending 
on the date on which the plan under paragraph (1) takes effect, 
each authorized adjudicative agency shall make a determination 
on at least 80 percent of all applications for a personnel 
security clearance pursuant to this section within an average 
of 120 days after the date of receipt of the application for a 
security clearance by an authorized investigative agency. Such 
120-day average period shall include--
          (i) a period of not longer than 90 days to complete 
        the investigative phase of the clearance review; and
          (ii) a period of not longer than 30 days to complete 
        the adjudicative phase of the clearance review.
  (h) Reports.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2006, and 
annually thereafter through 2011, the head of the entity 
selected pursuant to subsection (b) shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the progress 
made during the preceding year toward meeting the requirements 
of this section.
  (2) Each report shall include, for the period covered by such 
report--
          (A) the periods of time required by the authorized 
        investigative agencies and authorized adjudicative 
        agencies for conducting investigations, adjudicating 
        cases, and granting clearances, from date of submission 
        to ultimate disposition and notification to the subject 
        and the subject's employer;
          (B) a discussion of any impediments to the smooth and 
        timely functioning of the requirements of this section; 
        and
          (C) such other information or recommendations as the 
        head of the entity selected pursuant to subsection (b) 
        considers appropriate.
  (i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to 
be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 
2005 and each fiscal year thereafter for the implementation, 
maintenance, and operation of the database required by 
subsection (e).
  (j) Retaliatory Revocation of Security Clearances and Access 
Determinations.--
          (1) In general.--Agency personnel with authority 
        [over] to take, direct others to take, recommend, or 
        approve personnel security clearance or access 
        determinations shall not take or fail to take, or 
        threaten to take or fail to take, any action with 
        respect to any employee's security clearance or access 
        determination in retaliation for--
                  (A) any lawful disclosure of information to 
                the Director of National Intelligence (or an 
                employee designated by the Director of National 
                Intelligence for such purpose) or a supervisor 
                in the employee's direct chain of command, or a 
                supervisor of the employing agency with 
                responsibility for the subject matter of the 
                disclosure, up to and including the head of the 
                employing agency (or employee designated by the 
                head of that agency for such purpose) by an 
                employee that the employee reasonably believes 
                evidences--
                          (i) a violation of any Federal law, 
                        rule, or regulation; or
                          (ii) [gross mismanagement] 
                        mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, 
                        an abuse of authority, or a substantial 
                        and specific danger to public health or 
                        safety;
                  (B) any lawful disclosure to the Inspector 
                General of an agency or another employee 
                designated by the head of the agency to receive 
                such disclosures, of information which the 
                employee reasonably believes evidences--
                          (i) a violation of any Federal law, 
                        rule, or regulation; or
                          (ii) [gross mismanagement] 
                        mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, 
                        an abuse of authority, or a substantial 
                        and specific danger to public health or 
                        safety;
                  (C) any lawful disclosure that complies 
                with--
                          (i) subsections (a)(1), (d), and 
                        [(h)] (g) of section 8H of the 
                        Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 
                        App.);
                          (ii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (H) 
                        of section 17(d)(5) of the Central 
                        Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
                        U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)); or
                          (iii) subparagraphs (A), (D), and (I) 
                        of section 103H(k)(5) of the National 
                        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
                        3033(k)(5)); and
                  (D) if the actions do not result in the 
                employee or applicant unlawfully disclosing 
                information specifically required by Executive 
                order to be kept classified in the interest of 
                national defense or the conduct of foreign 
                affairs, any lawful disclosure in conjunction 
                with--
                          (i) the exercise of any appeal, 
                        complaint, or grievance right granted 
                        by any law, rule, or regulation;
                          (ii) testimony for or otherwise 
                        lawfully assisting any individual in 
                        the exercise of any right referred to 
                        in clause (i); or
                          (iii) cooperation with or disclosing 
                        information to the Inspector General of 
                        an agency, in accordance with 
                        applicable provisions of law in 
                        connection with an audit, inspection, 
                        or investigation conducted by the 
                        Inspector General.
          (2) Rule of construction.--Consistent with the 
        protection of sources and methods, nothing in paragraph 
        (1) shall be construed to authorize the withholding of 
        information from Congress or the taking of any 
        personnel action or clearance action against an 
        employee who lawfully discloses information to 
        Congress.
          (3)  [Disclosures.-- 
                  [(A) In general.--] Disclosures._A disclosure 
                shall not be excluded from paragraph (1) 
                because--  [A disclosure shall not be excluded 
                from paragraph (1) because--]
                  [(i)] (A) the disclosure was made to a 
                person, including a supervisor, who 
                participated in an activity that the employee 
                reasonably believed to be covered by paragraph 
                (1)(A)(ii);
                  [(ii)] (B) the disclosure revealed 
                information that had been previously disclosed;
                  [(iii)] (C) the disclosure was not made in 
                writing;
                  [(iv)] (D) the disclosure was made while the 
                employee was off duty; [or]
                  [(v)] (E) of the amount of time which has 
                passed since the occurrence of the events 
                described in the disclosure[.]; or
                  [(B) Reprisals.--If a disclosure is made 
                during the normal course of duties of an 
                employee, the disclosure shall not be excluded 
                from paragraph (1) if any employee who has 
                authority to take, direct others to take, 
                recommend, or approve any personnel action with 
                respect to the employee making the disclosure, 
                took, failed to take, or threatened to take or 
                fail to take a personnel action with respect to 
                that employee in reprisal for the disclosure.]
                  (F) the disclosure was made during the normal 
                course of duties of an employee.
          (4) Agency adjudication.--
                  (A) Remedial procedure.--An employee or 
                former employee who believes that he or she has 
                been subjected to a reprisal prohibited by 
                paragraph (1) may, within 90 days (except as 
                provided by subparagraph (D)) after the 
                issuance of notice of such decision, appeal 
                that decision within the agency of that 
                employee or former employee through proceedings 
                authorized by subsection (b)(7), except that 
                there shall be no appeal of an agency's 
                suspension of a security clearance or access 
                determination for purposes of conducting an 
                investigation, if that suspension lasts not 
                longer than 1 year (or a longer period in 
                accordance with a certification made under 
                subsection (b)(7)).
                  (B) Corrective action.--If, in the course of 
                proceedings authorized under subparagraph (A), 
                it is determined that the adverse security 
                clearance or access determination violated 
                paragraph (1), the agency shall take specific 
                corrective action to return the employee or 
                former employee, as nearly as practicable and 
                reasonable, to the position such employee or 
                former employee would have held had the 
                violation not occurred. Such corrective action 
                may include back pay and related benefits, 
                travel expenses, and compensatory damages not 
                to exceed $300,000.
                  (C) Contributing factor.--In determining 
                whether the adverse security clearance or 
                access determination violated paragraph (1), 
                the agency shall find that paragraph (1) was 
                violated if a disclosure described in paragraph 
                (1) was a contributing factor in the adverse 
                security clearance or access determination 
                taken against the individual, unless the agency 
                demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence 
                that it would have taken the same action in the 
                absence of such disclosure, giving the utmost 
                deference to the agency's assessment of the 
                particular threat to the national security 
                interests of the United States in the instant 
                matter.
                  (D) Tolling.--The time requirement 
                established by subparagraph (A) for an employee 
                or former employee to appeal the decision of an 
                agency may be tolled if the employee or former 
                employee presents substantial credible evidence 
                showing why the employee or former employee did 
                not timely initiate the appeal and why the 
                enforcement of the time requirement would be 
                unfair, such as evidence showing that the 
                employee or former employee--
                          (i) did not receive notice of the 
                        decision; or
                          (ii) could not timely initiate the 
                        appeal because of factors beyond the 
                        control of the employee or former 
                        employee.
          (5) Appellate review of security clearance access 
        determinations by director of national intelligence.--
                  (A) Appeal.--Within 60 days after receiving 
                notice of an adverse final agency determination 
                under a proceeding under paragraph (4), an 
                employee or former employee may appeal that 
                determination in accordance with the procedures 
                established under subparagraph (B).
                  (B) Policies and procedures.--The Director of 
                National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
                Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, 
                shall develop and implement policies and 
                procedures for adjudicating the appeals 
                authorized by subparagraph (A).
                  (C) Congressional notification.--Consistent 
                with the protection of sources and methods, at 
                the time the Director of National Intelligence 
                issues an order regarding an appeal pursuant to 
                the policies and procedures established by this 
                paragraph, the Director of National 
                Intelligence shall notify the congressional 
                intelligence committees.
          (6) Judicial review.--Nothing in this section shall 
        be construed to permit or require judicial review of 
        any--
                  (A) agency action under this section; or
                  (B) action of the appellate review procedures 
                established under paragraph (5).
          (7) Private cause of action.--Nothing in this section 
        shall be construed to permit, authorize, or require a 
        private cause of action to challenge the merits of a 
        security clearance determination.
          (8) Enforcement.--Except as otherwise provided in 
        this subsection, the President shall provide for the 
        enforcement of this section consistent, to the fullest 
        extent possible, with the policies and procedures used 
        to adjudicate alleged violations of section 2302(b)(8) 
        of title 5, United States Code.
          [(8)] (9) Inclusion of contractor employees.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``employee'' includes an employee 
        of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or 
        personal services contractor, of an agency. With 
        respect to such employees, the term ``employing 
        agency'' shall be deemed to be the contracting agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
DIVISION N--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 608. IMPROVEMENT IN GOVERNMENT CLASSIFICATION AND 
                    DECLASSIFICATION.

  (a) Review of Government Classification and 
Declassification.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall--
          (1) review the system by which the Government 
        classifies and declassifies information;
          (2) develop recommendations--
                  (A) to make such system a more effective tool 
                for the protection of information relating to 
                national security;
                  (B) to improve the sharing of information 
                with partners and allies of the Government; and
                  (C) to support the appropriate 
                declassification of information; and
          (3) submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report with--
                  (A) the findings of the Director with respect 
                to the review conducted under paragraph (1); 
                and
                  (B) the recommendations developed under 
                paragraph (2).
  [(b) Annual Certification of Controlled Access Programs.--
          [(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each 
        year, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
        certify in writing to the congressional intelligence 
        committees whether the creation, validation, or 
        substantial modification, including termination, for 
        all existing and proposed controlled access programs, 
        and the compartments and subcompartments within each, 
        are substantiated and justified based on the 
        information required by paragraph (2).
          [(2) Information required.--Each certification 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include--
                  [(A) the rationale for the revalidation, 
                validation, or substantial modification, 
                including termination, of each controlled 
                access program, compartment and subcompartment;
                  [(B) the identification of a control officer 
                for each controlled access program; and
                  [(C) a statement of protection requirements 
                for each controlled access program.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


                CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
SEC. 15A. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN FACILITIES AND ASSETS OF CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM UNMANNED AIRCRAFT.

  (a) Authority.--In accordance with subsection (b), the 
Director shall have the same authority for the Agency as is 
available to the Secretary of Homeland Security for the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Attorney General for 
the Department of Justice under section 210G of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n), and shall be subject to 
the same limitations and requirements under such section.
  (b) Administration.--For purposes of subsection (a)--
          (1) the reference in subsection (i) of section 210G 
        of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124n) to 
        ``the date that is 4 years after the date of enactment 
        of this section'' shall be deemed to be a reference to 
        ``October 5, 2026'';
          (2) the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (k) of such 
        section shall be deemed to mean the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
        Representatives and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate; and
          (3) the term ``covered facility or asset'' as defined 
        in paragraph (3) of such subsection (k) shall be deemed 
        to mean installations, property, and persons--
                  (A) that are located in the United States;
                  (B) for which the Director may provide 
                protection pursuant to section 5(a)(4) or 
                15(a)(1) of this Act; and
                  (C) that the Director identifies as high-risk 
                and a potential target for unlawful unmanned 
                aircraft activity.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY REASON OF 
                    WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, 
                    OR INCIDENTS DESIGNATED BY THE DIRECTOR.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered 
        dependent'' means a family member (as defined by the 
        Director) of a covered employee who, on or after 
        September 11, 2001--
                  (A) accompanies the covered employee to an 
                assigned duty station in a foreign country; and
                  (B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying 
                injury.
          (2) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee'' 
        means an officer or employee of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency who, on or after September 11, 
        2001, becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
          (3) Covered individual.--The term ``covered 
        individual'' means an individual who--
                  (A)(i) is detailed to the Central 
                Intelligence Agency from other agencies of the 
                United States Government or from the Armed 
                Forces; or
                  (ii) is affiliated with the Central 
                Intelligence Agency, as determined by the 
                Director; and
                  (B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, 
                becomes injured by reason of a qualifying 
                injury.
          (4) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying 
        injury'' means the following:
                  (A) With respect to a covered dependent, an 
                injury incurred--
                          (i) during a period in which the 
                        covered dependent is accompanying the 
                        covered employee to an assigned duty 
                        station in a foreign country;
                          (ii) in connection with war, 
                        insurgency, hostile act, terrorist 
                        activity, or an incident designated for 
                        purposes of this section by the 
                        Director; and
                          (iii) that was not the result of the 
                        willful misconduct of the covered 
                        dependent.
                  (B) With respect to a covered employee or a 
                covered individual--
                          (i) an injury incurred--
                                  (I) during a period of 
                                assignment to a duty station in 
                                a foreign country;
                                  (II) in connection with war, 
                                insurgency, hostile act, or 
                                terrorist activity; and
                                  (III) that was not the result 
                                of the willful misconduct of 
                                the covered employee or the 
                                covered individual; or
                          (ii) an injury incurred--
                                  (I) in connection with an 
                                incident designated for 
                                purposes of this section by the 
                                Director; and
                                  (II) that was not the result 
                                of the willful misconduct of 
                                the covered employee or the 
                                covered individual.
  (b) Adjustment of Compensation for Total Disability Resulting 
From Certain Injuries.--
          (1) Increase.--The Director may increase the amount 
        of monthly compensation paid to a covered employee 
        under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code. 
        Subject to paragraph (2), the Director may determine 
        the amount of each such increase by taking into 
        account--
                  (A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
                  (B) the circumstances by which the covered 
                employee became injured; and
                  (C) the seniority of the covered employee.
          (2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, 
        United States Code, the total amount of monthly 
        compensation increased under paragraph (1) may not 
        exceed the monthly pay of the maximum rate of basic pay 
        for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of 
        such title.
  (c) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director may 
pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered 
employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent, or may 
reimburse a covered employee, a covered individual, or a 
covered dependent for such costs, that are not otherwise 
covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, or other 
provision of Federal law.
  (d) Authority To Make Payments for Qualifying Injuries to the 
Brain.--
          (1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                  (A) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered 
                dependent'' has the meaning given such term in 
                subsection (a), except that the assigned duty 
                station need not be in a foreign country.
                  (B) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying 
                injury'' has the meaning given such term in 
                subsection (a), except that the assigned duty 
                station need not be in a foreign country.
          (2) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
        of law but subject to paragraph (3), the Director may 
        provide payment to a covered dependent, a covered 
        employee, and a covered individual for a qualifying 
        injury to the brain.
          (3) Limitations.--
                  (A) Appropriations required.--Payment under 
                paragraph (2) in a fiscal year may only be made 
                using amounts appropriated in advance 
                specifically for payments under such paragraph 
                in such fiscal year.
                  (B) Matter of payments.--Payments under 
                paragraph (2) using amounts appropriated for 
                such purpose shall be made on a first come, 
                first serve, or pro rata basis.
                  (C) Amounts of payments.--The total amount of 
                funding obligated for payments under paragraph 
                (2) may not exceed the amount specifically 
                appropriated for providing payments under such 
                paragraph during its period of availability.
          (4) Regulations.--
                  (A) In general.--The Director shall prescribe 
                regulations to carry out this subsection.
                  (B) Elements.--The regulations prescribed 
                under subparagraph (A) shall include 
                regulations detailing fair and equitable 
                criteria for payment under paragraph (2).
          (5) No effect on other benefits.--Payments made under 
        paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit 
        furnished by the United States Government for which a 
        covered dependent, covered employee, or covered 
        individual is entitled, and the receipt of such 
        payments may not affect the eligibility of such a 
        person to any other benefit furnished by the United 
        States Government.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 26. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL 
                    OFFICERS.

  (a) Office of Medical Services.--There is in the Agency an 
Office of Medical Services.
  (b) Compensation.--Beginning not later than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2022, each medical officer of the Office of Medical 
Services who meets the qualifications under subsection (c) 
shall be compensated during a pay period pursuant to a pay 
range that is equal to the pay range published in the Federal 
Register pursuant to section 7431(e)(1)(C) of title 38, United 
States Code (for the corresponding pay period), for a physician 
in the Veterans Health Administration in the District of 
Columbia region with a medical subspecialty that is the 
equivalent of the medical subspecialty of the officer.
  (c) Clinical Practice Qualifications.--A medical officer 
meets the qualifications under this subsection if the officer 
provides direct care services to patients in connection with 
the official duties of the officer and--
          (1) maintains current, active, full, and unrestricted 
        licensure or registration as a physician from a State, 
        the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth or 
        territory of the United States;
          (2) holds active board certification and maintains 
        accreditation in an American Board of Medical 
        Specialties direct care clinical specialty; and
          (3) except as provided in subsection (d), maintains a 
        minimum of 160 hours per year of clinical practice in 
        an accredited clinic or hospital facility that is not 
        affiliated with the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (d) Exception for Overseas Service.--If a medical officer is 
a medical officer located in a duty station outside of the 
United States pursuant to a permanent change of station and 
greater than 50 percent of the official duties of the officer 
in such duty station involve direct patient care, the officer, 
in lieu of performing the minimum hours under subsection (c)(3) 
on an annual basis, may perform up to 480 hours of clinical 
practice as specified in such subsection prior to such change 
of station, to fulfil in advance the requirement under such 
subsection for up to 3 years.
  (e) Clinical Practice Hours.--The head of the Office of 
Medical Services shall make available to medical officers 
excused absence time to allow for the maintenance of clinical 
practice hours in accordance with subsection (c)(3).

SEC. 27. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.

  (a) Establishment.--The Director shall establish within the 
Agency a medical advisory board (in this section referred to as 
the ``Board'').
  (b) Duties.--The Board shall--
          (1) conduct a study on the Office of Medical Services 
        of the Agency, and submit reports regarding such study, 
        in accordance with subsection (c); and
          (2) upon request, provide advice and guidance in 
        connection with any independent review of the Office 
        conducted by an inspector general.
  (c) Study.--
          (1) Objectives.--In conducting the study under 
        subsection (b)(1), the Board shall seek to--
                  (A) contribute to the modernization and 
                reform of the Office of Medical Services;
                  (B) ensure that the activities of the Office 
                are of the highest professional quality; and
                  (C) ensure that all medical care provided by 
                the Office is provided in accordance with the 
                highest professional medical standards.
          (2) Reports.--The Board shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees, in writing--
                  (A) interim reports on the study; and
                  (B) a final report on the study, which 
                shall--
                          (i) set forth in detail the findings 
                        of the study and the recommendations of 
                        the Board, based on such findings and 
                        taking into consideration the 
                        objectives under paragraph (1), 
                        regarding any changes to the activities 
                        of the Office of Medical Services; and
                          (ii) include, as applicable, any 
                        additional or dissenting views 
                        submitted by a member of the Board.
  (d) Membership.--
          (1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be 
        composed of 11 members, appointed as follows:
                  (A) 2 members appointed by the Chairman of 
                the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives.
                  (B) 2 members appointed by the ranking 
                minority member of the Permanent Select 
                Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
                Representatives.
                  (C) 2 members appointed by the Chairman of 
                the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate.
                  (D) 2 members appointed by the Vice Chairman 
                of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate.
                  (E) 3 members appointed by the Director of 
                National Intelligence.
          (2) Chairperson.--During the first meeting under 
        subsection (e)(1), the members of the Board shall elect 
        a Chairperson of the Board. In addition to meeting the 
        criteria under paragraph (3), the Chairperson may not 
        be an employee, or former employee, of the Agency.
          (3) Criteria.--The members appointed under paragraph 
        (1) shall meet the following criteria:
                  (A) Each member shall be a recognized expert 
                in at least 1 medical field, as demonstrated by 
                appropriate credentials.
                  (B) Each member shall possess significant and 
                diverse medical experience, including clinical 
                experience.
                  (C) Each member shall hold a security 
                clearance at the top secret level and be able 
                to access sensitive compartmented information.
          (4) Terms.--
                  (A) In general.--Each member, including the 
                Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as 
                applicable, for the life of the Board.
                  (B) Vacancies.--Any vacancy in the Board 
                occurring prior to the expiration of the term 
                under subparagraph (A) shall be filled in the 
                manner in which the original appointment or 
                election was made.
          (5) Compensation and travel expenses.--
                  (A) Compensation.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), each member of the Board, 
                including the Chairperson, may be compensated 
                at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the 
                annual rate of basic pay in effect for a 
                position at level IV of the Executive Schedule 
                under section 5315 of title 5, United States 
                Code, for each day during which that member is 
                engaged in the actual performance of the duties 
                under subsection (b).
                  (B) Exception for federal employees.--Members 
                of the Board, including the Chairperson, who 
                are officers or employees of the United States 
                shall receive no additional pay by reason of 
                the service of the member on the Board.
                  (C) Travel expenses.--Each member of the 
                Board, including the Chairperson, while away 
                from the home or regular places of business of 
                the member in the performance of services for 
                the Board, may be allowed travel expenses, 
                including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in 
                the same manner as persons employed 
                intermittently in the Government service are 
                allowed expenses under section 5703 of title 5, 
                United States Code.
          (6) Detailees.--
                  (A) In general.--Upon request of the Board, 
                the Director of National Intelligence may 
                detail to the Board, without reimbursement from 
                the Board, any of the personnel of the Office 
                of the Director of National Intelligence to 
                assist in carrying out the duties under 
                subsection (b). Any such detailed personnel 
                shall retain the rights, status, and privileges 
                of the regular employment of the personnel 
                without interruption.
                  (B) Clearance.--Any personnel detailed to the 
                Board under subparagraph (A) shall possess a 
                security clearance in accordance with 
                applicable laws and regulations concerning the 
                handling of classified information.
  (e) Meetings.--
          (1) Board meetings.--The Board shall meet not less 
        frequently than on a quarterly basis.
          (2) Meetings with congress.--The Board shall meet 
        with the congressional intelligence committees on a 
        biannual basis.
  (f) Information Access.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
        the Board may secure directly from any department or 
        agency of the United States Government information 
        necessary to enable it to carry out the duties under 
        subsection (b) and, upon request of the Chairperson of 
        the Board, the head of that department or agency shall 
        furnish such information to the Board.
          (2) Exception.--The Director (without delegation) may 
        deny a request for information made by the Board 
        pursuant to paragraph (1), regardless of the agency 
        from which such information is requested.
          (3) Notification requirement.--If the Director denies 
        a request under paragraph (2), not later than 15 days 
        after the date of such denial, the Director shall 
        submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
        written notification of such denial.
          (4) Briefings.--The Director shall ensure that the 
        Board receives comprehensive briefings on all 
        activities of the Office of Medical Services, including 
        by promptly scheduling such briefings at the request of 
        the Board.
  (g) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date that 
is 5 years after the date of the first meeting of the Board.
  (h) Definitions.--In this section, the terms ``congressional 
intelligence committees'' and ``intelligence community'' have 
the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
                              ----------                              


                      TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MILITARY LAW

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART II--PERSONNEL

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 81--CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 1599h. Personnel management authority to attract experts in 
                    science and engineering

  (a) Programs Authorized.--
          (1) Laboratories of the military departments.--The 
        Secretary of Defense may carry out a program of 
        personnel management authority provided in subsection 
        (b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent 
        experts in science or engineering for such laboratories 
        of the military departments as the Secretary shall 
        designate for purposes of the program for research and 
        development projects of such laboratories.
          (2) DARPA.--The Director of the Defense Advanced 
        Research Projects Agency may carry out a program of 
        personnel management authority provided in subsection 
        (b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent 
        experts in science or engineering for research and 
        development projects and to enhance the administration 
        and management of the Agency.
          (3) DOTE.--The Director of the Office of Operational 
        Test and Evaluation may carry out a program of 
        personnel management authority provided in subsection 
        (b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent 
        experts in science or engineering to support 
        operational test and evaluation missions of the Office.
          (4) Strategic capabilities office.--The Director of 
        the Strategic Capabilities Office may carry out a 
        program of personnel management authority provided in 
        subsection (b) in order to facilitate recruitment of 
        eminent experts in science or engineering for the 
        Office.
          (5) DIU.--The Director of the Defense Innovation Unit 
        may carry out a program of personnel management 
        authority provided in subsection (b) in order to 
        facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or 
        engineering for the Unit.
          (6) Joint artificial intelligence center.--The 
        Director of the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center 
        may carry out a program of personnel management 
        authority provided in subsection (b) in order to 
        facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or 
        engineering for the Center. The authority to carry out 
        the program under this paragraph shall terminate on 
        December 31, 2024.
          (7)  NGA.--The Director of the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency may carry out a program of 
        personnel management authority provided in subsection 
        (b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent 
        experts in science or engineering for research and 
        development projects and to enhance the administration 
        and management of the Agency.
          (7)    SDA.--The Director of the Space Development 
        Agency may carry out a program of personnel management 
        authority provided in subsection (b) in order to 
        facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science or 
        engineering for research and development projects and 
        to enhance the administration and management of the 
        Agency. The authority to carry out the program under 
        this paragraph shall terminate on December 31, 2025.
          (8) United states cyber command.--The Commander of 
        United States Cyber Command may carry out a program of 
        personnel management authority provided in subsection 
        (b) in order to facilitate the recruitment of eminent 
        experts in computer science, data science, engineering, 
        mathematics, and computer network exploitation within 
        the headquarters of United States Cyber Command and the 
        Cyber National Mission Force.
  (b) Personnel Management Authority.--Under a program under 
subsection (a), the official responsible for administration of 
the program may--
          (1) without regard to any provision of title 5 
        governing the appointment of employees in the civil 
        service--
                  (A) in the case of the laboratories of the 
                military departments designated pursuant to 
                subsection (a)(1), appoint scientists and 
                engineers to a total of not more than 40 
                scientific and engineering positions in such 
                laboratories;
                  (B) in the case of the Defense Advanced 
                Research Projects Agency, appoint individuals 
                to a total of not more than 140 positions in 
                the Agency, of which not more than 5 such 
                positions may be positions of administration or 
                management of the Agency;
                  (C) in the case of the Office of Operational 
                Test and Evaluation, appoint scientists and 
                engineers to a total of not more than 10 
                scientific and engineering positions in the 
                Office;
                  (D) in the case of the Strategic Capabilities 
                Office, appoint scientists and engineers to a 
                total of not more than 5 scientific and 
                engineering positions in the Office;
                  (E) in the case of the Defense Innovation 
                Unit, appoint scientists and engineers to a 
                total of not more than 5 scientific and 
                engineering positions in the Unit;
                  (F) in the case of the Joint Artificial 
                Intelligence Center, appoint scientists and 
                engineers to a total of not more than 5 
                scientific and engineering positions in the 
                Center;
                  (G) in the case of the National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency, appoint individuals to a 
                total of not more than 7 positions in the 
                Agency, of which not more than 2 such positions 
                may be positions of administration or 
                management in the Agency;
                  (G)   3 in the case of the Space 
                Development Agency, appoint individuals to a 
                total of not more than 10 positions in the 
                Agency, of which not more than 3 such positions 
                may be positions of administration or 
                management of the Agency; and
                  (H) in the case of United States Cyber 
                Command, appoint computer scientists, data 
                scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and 
                computer network exploitation specialists to a 
                total of not more than 10 scientific and 
                engineering positions in the Command;
          (2) notwithstanding any provision of title 5 
        governing the rates of pay or classification of 
        employees in the executive branch, prescribe the rates 
        of basic pay for positions to which employees are 
        appointed under paragraph (1)--
                  (A) in the case of employees appointed 
                pursuant to [paragraph (1)(B)] subparagraph (B) 
                of paragraph (1) to any of 5 positions 
                designated by the Director of the Defense 
                Advanced Research Projects Agency for purposes 
                of this subparagraph or employees appointed 
                pursuant to the first subparagraph (G) of such 
                paragraph to any of 2 positions of 
                administration or management designated by the 
                Director of the National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency for purposes of this 
                subparagraph, at rates not in excess of a rate 
                equal to 150 percent of the maximum rate of 
                basic pay authorized for positions at Level I 
                of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of 
                title 5; and
                  (B) in the case of any other employee 
                appointed pursuant to paragraph (1), at rates 
                not in excess of the maximum rate of basic pay 
                authorized for senior-level positions under 
                section 5376 of title 5; and
          (3) pay any employee appointed under paragraph (1), 
        other than an employee appointed to a position 
        designated as described in paragraph (2)(A), payments 
        in addition to basic pay within the limit applicable to 
        the employee under subsection (d).
  (c) Limitation on Term of Appointment.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
        the service of an employee under an appointment under 
        subsection (b)(1) may not exceed four years.
          (2) Extension.--The official responsible for the 
        administration of a program under subsection (a) may, 
        in the case of a particular employee under the program, 
        extend the period to which service is limited under 
        paragraph (1) by up to two years if the official 
        determines that such action is necessary to promote the 
        efficiency of a laboratory of a military department, 
        the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the 
        Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, the 
        Strategic Capabilities Office, the Defense Innovation 
        Unit, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, or the 
        National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, as applicable.
  (d) Maximum Amount of Additional Payments Payable.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or section 
5307 of title 5, no additional payments may be paid to an 
employee under subsection (b)(3) in any calendar year if, or to 
the extent that, the employee's total annual compensation in 
such calendar year will exceed the maximum amount of total 
annual compensation payable at the salary set in accordance 
with section 104 of title 3.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XVI--STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle C--Cyberspace-Related Matters

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1642. LIMITATION ON TERMINATION OF DUAL-HAT ARRANGEMENT FOR 
                    COMMANDER OF THE UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND.

  [(a) Limitation on Termination of Dual-hat Arrangement.--The 
Secretary of Defense may not terminate the dual-hat arrangement 
until the date on which the Secretary and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff jointly certify to the appropriate 
committees of Congress that--
          [(1) the Secretary and the Chairman carried out the 
        assessment under subsection (b);
          [(2) each of the conditions described in paragraph 
        (2)(C) of such subsection has been met; and
          [(3) termination of the dual-hat arrangement will not 
        pose risks to the military effectiveness of the United 
        States Cyber Command that are unacceptable to the 
        national security interests of the United States.
  [(b) Assessment.--
          [(1) In general.--The Secretary and the Chairman 
        shall jointly assess the military and intelligence 
        necessity and benefit of the dual-hat arrangement.
          [(2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                  [(A) An evaluation of the operational 
                dependence of the United States Cyber Command 
                on the National Security Agency.
                  [(B) An evaluation of the ability of the 
                United States Cyber Command and the National 
                Security Agency to carry out their respective 
                roles and responsibilities independently.
                  [(C) A determination of whether the following 
                conditions have been met:
                          [(i) Robust operational 
                        infrastructure has been deployed that 
                        is sufficient to meet the unique cyber 
                        mission needs of the United States 
                        Cyber Command and the National Security 
                        Agency, respectively.
                          [(ii) Robust command and control 
                        systems and processes have been 
                        established for planning, 
                        deconflicting, and executing military 
                        cyber operations and national 
                        intelligence operations.
                          [(iii) The tools, weapons, and 
                        accesses used in and available for 
                        military cyber operations are 
                        sufficient for achieving required 
                        effects and United States Cyber Command 
                        is capable of acquiring or developing 
                        such tools, weapons, and accesses.
                          [(iv) Capabilities have been 
                        established to enable intelligence 
                        collection and operational preparation 
                        of the environment for cyber 
                        operations.
                          [(v) Capabilities have been 
                        established to train cyber operations 
                        personnel, test cyber capabilities, and 
                        rehearse cyber missions.
                          [(vi) The Cyber Mission Force has 
                        achieved full operational capability 
                        and has demonstrated the capacity to 
                        execute the cyber missions of the 
                        Department, including the following:
                                  [(I) Execution of national-
                                level missions through 
                                cyberspace, including 
                                deterrence and disruption of 
                                adversary cyber activity.
                                  [(II) Defense of the 
                                Department of Defense 
                                Information Network.
                                  [(III) Support for other 
                                combatant commands, including 
                                targeting of adversary military 
                                assets.
  [(c) Biannual Briefing.--
          [(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this subsection and biannually 
        thereafter, the Secretary of Defense and the Director 
        of National Intelligence shall provide to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress briefings on the 
        nature of the National Security Agency and United 
        States Cyber Command's current and future partnership. 
        Briefings under this subsection shall not terminate 
        until the certification specified in subsection (a) is 
        issued.
          [(2) Elements.--Each briefing under this subsection 
        shall include status updates on the current and future 
        National Security Agency-United States Cyber Command 
        partnership efforts, including relating to the 
        following:
                  [(A) Common infrastructure and capability 
                acquisition.
                  [(B) Operational priorities and partnership.
                  [(C) Research and development partnership.
                  [(D) Executed documents, written memoranda of 
                agreements or understandings, and policies 
                issued governing such current and future 
                partnership.
                  [(E) Projected long-term efforts.]
  (a) Limitation on Termination of Dual-hat Arrangement.--The 
Secretary of Defense may not terminate the dual-hat arrangement 
until the date on which the Secretary submits to the 
appropriate committees of Congress the certification under 
subsection (b)(1). The Secretary shall implement such 
termination by not later than the first day of the fiscal year 
following the fiscal year in which the Secretary submits such 
certification.
  (b) Annual Submission of Information.--Together with the 
defense budget materials for fiscal year 2023, and annually 
thereafter until the termination of the dual-hat arrangement, 
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of 
National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report containing either of the 
following:
          (1) A certification that the United States Cyber 
        Command has met each of the following conditions:
                  (A) Sufficient operational infrastructure has 
                been deployed to meet the unique cyber mission 
                needs of the United States Cyber Command.
                  (B) Sufficient command and control systems 
                and processes have been established for 
                planning, deconflicting, and executing military 
                cyber operations.
                  (C) Capabilities have been established to 
                enable intelligence collection and operational 
                preparation of the environment for cyber 
                operations consistent with the United States 
                Cyber Command reaching full operational status.
                  (D) Mechanisms have been established to train 
                cyber operations personnel, test cyber 
                capabilities, and rehearse cyber missions.
                  (E) The United States Cyber Command has 
                achieved full operational capability.
          (2) If the Secretary, in coordination with the 
        Director, is not able to make the certification under 
        paragraph (1)--
                  (A) an identification of the items contained 
                in the defense budget materials that are 
                related to meeting the conditions specified in 
                such paragraph; and
                  (B) an assessment of the funding required to 
                meet such conditions during the period covered 
                by the future-years defense program under 
                section 221 of title 10, United States Code.
  [(d)] (c) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                  (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
                Committee on Appropriations, and the Select 
                Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
                  (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
                Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
                of Representatives.
          (2) Dual-hat arrangement.--The term ``dual-hat 
        arrangement'' means the arrangement under which the 
        Commander of the United States Cyber Command also 
        serves as the Director of the National Security Agency.
          (3) Defense budget materials.--The term ``defense 
        budget materials'' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 231(f) of title 10, United States Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


   SECTION 901 OF TITLE IX OF DIVISION J OF THE FURTHER CONSOLIDATED 
                        APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2020


SEC. 901. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS' COM-PENSATION 
                    PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
                    PERSONNEL UNDER CHIEF OF MISSION AUTHORITY.

  (a) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
          (1) Increase.--The Secretary of State or the head of 
        any other Federal agency may pay an additional monthly 
        monetary benefit, provided that the covered employee is 
        receiving benefits under section 8105 or 8106 of title 
        5, United States Code, and may determine the amount of 
        each monthly monetary benefit amount by taking into 
        account--
                  (A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
                  (B) the circumstances by which the covered 
                employee became injured; and
                  (C) the seniority of the covered employee, 
                particularly for purposes of compensating for 
                lost career growth.
          (2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, 
        United States Code, the total amount of monthly 
        compensation increased under paragraph (1) may not 
        exceed the monthly pay of the maximum rate of basic pay 
        for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of 
        such title.
  (b) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Secretary of 
State may pay the costs of or reimburse for diagnosing and 
treating--
          (1) a qualifying injury of a covered employee for 
        such costs, that are not otherwise covered by chapter 
        81 of title 5, United States Code, or other provision 
        of Federal law; or
          (2) a covered individual, or a covered dependent, for 
        such costs that are not otherwise covered by Federal 
        law.
  (c) Information Exchange.--To avoid duplicate or otherwise 
improper payments under this subsection, the Secretary of 
Labor, the Secretary of State, and, as appropriate, the head of 
any other Federal agency paying benefits under this section 
shall exchange information about the amounts paid for treatment 
of qualifying injuries.
  (d) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall--
          (1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and 
        equitable implementation of this section; and
          (2) submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
        the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
        House of Representatives such regulations.
  (e) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered 
        dependent'' means a family member (as defined by the 
        Secretary of State) of a employee who, on or after 
        January 1, 2016--
                  (A) accompanies the employee to an assigned 
                duty station in a foreign country under chief 
                of mission authority; and
                  (B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying 
                injury.
          (2) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee'' 
        means an employee of the Federal Government who, on or 
        after January 1, 2016, becomes injured by reason of a 
        qualifying injury and was assigned to a duty station in 
        the Republic of Cuba, the People's Republic of China, 
        or another foreign country designated by the Secretary 
        of State pursuant to subsection (f), but does not 
        include an individual receiving compensation under 
        section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
        1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b).
          (3) Covered individual.--The term ``covered 
        individual'' means an individual who, on or after 
        January 1, 2016, becomes injured by reason of a 
        qualifying injury and is--
                  (A) detailed to a duty station in the 
                Republic of Cuba, the People's Republic of 
                China, or another foreign country designated by 
                the Secretary of State pursuant to subsection 
                (f); or
                  (B) affiliated with the Department of State, 
                as determined by the Secretary of State.
          (4) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying 
        injury'' means the following:
                  (A) With respect to a covered dependent, an 
                injury incurred--
                          (i) during a period in which the 
                        covered dependent is accompanying an 
                        employee to an assigned duty station in 
                        the Republic of Cuba, the People's 
                        Republic of China, or another foreign 
                        country designated by the Secretary of 
                        State pursuant to subsection (f);
                          (ii) in connection with war, 
                        insurgency, hostile act, terrorist 
                        activity, or other incident designated 
                        by the Secretary of State; and
                          (iii) that was not the result of the 
                        willful misconduct of the covered 
                        dependent.
                  (B) With respect to a covered employee or a 
                covered individual, an injury incurred--
                          (i) during a period of assignment to 
                        a duty station in the Republic of Cuba, 
                        the People's Republic of China, or 
                        another country designated by the 
                        Secretary of State pursuant to 
                        subsection (f);
                          (ii) in connection with war, 
                        insurgency, hostile act, terrorist 
                        activity, or other incident designated 
                        by the Secretary of State; and
                          (iii) that was not the result of the 
                        willful misconduct of the covered 
                        employee or the covered individual.
  (f) Designation by the Secretary of State of Another Foreign 
Country or Duty Station.--The Secretary of State may designate 
another foreign country for the purposes of this section, 
provided that the Secretary reports such designation to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and 
includes in such report a rationale for each such designation. 
The Secretary of State may not designate an added foreign 
country or duty station for purposes of providing additional 
monetary benefit pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (i) for a 
qualifying injury to covered employees, covered dependents, or 
covered individuals under this section unless the Secretary of 
State--
          (1) provides to the Committees on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
        the House of Representatives 30 days' notice of the 
        designation of a particular additional country or duty 
        station and the rationale for such addition; and
          (2) provides no such additional monetary benefit 
        pursuant to subsection (a), (b), or (i) to covered 
        employees, covered dependents, or covered individuals 
        for a qualifying injury until the 30-day notice period 
        expires, unless there is written agreement by both the 
        Chair and Ranking Members of both the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that 
        there is no objection to proceeding with provision of 
        such monetary benefit compensation in less than 30 
        days.
  (g) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to this 
section shall be treated as amounts described in subsection 
(a)(5) of such section.
  (h) Application.--
          (1) Adjustment of compensation provision.--
        Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply with respect to--
                  (A) payments made to covered employees (as 
                defined in such section) under section 8105 or 
                8106 of title 5, United States Code, beginning 
                on or after January 1, 2016; and
                  (B) diagnosis or treatment described in 
                subsection (b) occurring on or after January 1, 
                2016.
          (2) Other payment provision.--Payment under 
        subsection (i) may be made available for a qualifying 
        injury (as defined in such subsection) that occurs 
        before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the 
        Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological 
        Attacks Act of 2021.
          (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this section 
        shall limit, modify, or otherwise supersede chapter 81 
        of title 5, United States Code, the Defense Base Act 
        (42 U.S.C. 1651 et seq.), or section 19A of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b). 
        Monetary benefits and treatment expenses paid under 
        this section shall not be considered payments under any 
        workers' compensation law.
  (i) Other Injuries.--
          (1) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                  (A) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered 
                dependent'' has the meaning given such term in 
                subsection (e), except that the assigned duty 
                station need not be in the Republic of Cuba, 
                the People's Republic of China, or another 
                foreign country.
                  (B) Covered employee.--The term ``covered 
                employee'' has the meaning given such term in 
                subsection (e), except that the assigned duty 
                station need not be in the Republic of Cuba, 
                the People's Republic of China, or another 
                foreign country.
                  (C) Covered individual.--The term ``covered 
                individual'' has the meaning given such term in 
                subsection (e), except that the assigned duty 
                station need not be in the Republic of Cuba, 
                the People's Republic of China, or another 
                foreign country.
                  (D) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying 
                injury'' has the meaning given such term in 
                subsection (e), except that the assigned duty 
                station need not be in the Republic of Cuba, 
                the People's Republic of China, or another 
                foreign country.
          (2) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
        of law but subject to paragraph (3), the Secretary of 
        State or other agency head with an employee may provide 
        payment to a covered dependent, a dependent of a former 
        employee, a covered employee, a former employee, and a 
        covered individual for a qualifying injury to the 
        brain.
          (3) Limitations.--
                  (A) Appropriations required.--Payment under 
                paragraph (2) in a fiscal year may only be made 
                using amounts appropriated in advance 
                specifically for payments under such paragraph 
                in such fiscal year.
                  (B) Matter of payments.--Payments under 
                paragraph (2) using amounts appropriated for 
                such purpose shall be made on a first come, 
                first serve, or pro rata basis.
                  (C) Amounts of payments.--The total amount of 
                funding obligated for payments under paragraph 
                (2) may not exceed the amount specifically 
                appropriated for providing payments under such 
                paragraph during its period of availability.
          (4) Regulations.--
                  (A) In general.--The Secretary or other 
                agency head described in paragraph (2) that 
                provides payment under such paragraph shall 
                prescribe regulations to carry out this 
                subsection.
                  (B) Elements.--The regulations prescribed 
                under subparagraph (A) shall include 
                regulations detailing fair and equitable 
                criteria for payment under paragraph (2).
          (5) No effect on other benefits.--Payments made under 
        paragraph (2) are supplemental to any other benefit 
        furnished by the United States Government for which a 
        covered dependent, dependent of a former employee, 
        covered employee, former employee, or covered 
        individual is entitled, and the receipt of such 
        payments may not affect the eligibility of such a 
        person to any other benefit furnished by the United 
        States Government.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION 
               ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
 DIVISION E--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, 
AND 2020

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBDIVISION 1

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                 TITLE LVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Subtitle A--Reports and Briefings

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 5704. COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION OF WORKFORCE DATA.

  (a) Modification of Requirement for Annual Report on Hiring 
and Retention of Minority Employees.--
          (1) Expansion of period of report.--Subsection (a) of 
        section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 3050) is amended by inserting ``and the 
        preceding 5 fiscal years'' after ``fiscal year''.
          (2) Clarification on disaggregation of data.--
        Subsection (b) of such section is amended, in the 
        matter before paragraph (1), by striking 
        ``disaggregated data by category of covered person from 
        each element of the intelligence community'' and 
        inserting ``data, disaggregated by category of covered 
        person and by element of the intelligence community,''.
  (b) Initial Reporting.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and subject to 
        paragraph (3), the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall make available to the public, the appropriate 
        congressional committees, and the workforce of the 
        intelligence community a report which includes 
        aggregate demographic data and other information 
        regarding the diversity and inclusion efforts of the 
        workforce of the intelligence community.
          (2) Contents.--A report made available under 
        paragraph (1)--
                  (A) shall include unclassified reports and 
                barrier analyses relating to diversity and 
                inclusion efforts;
                  (B) shall include aggregate demographic 
                data--
                          (i) by segment of the workforce of 
                        the intelligence community and grade or 
                        rank;
                          (ii) relating to attrition and 
                        promotion rates;
                          (iii) that addresses the compliance 
                        of the intelligence community with 
                        validated inclusion metrics, such as 
                        the New Inclusion Quotient index score; 
                        and
                          (iv) that provides demographic 
                        comparisons to the relevant 
                        nongovernmental labor force and the 
                        relevant civilian labor force;
                  (C) shall include an analysis of applicant 
                flow data, including the percentage and level 
                of positions for which data are collected, and 
                a discussion of any resulting policy changes or 
                recommendations;
                  (D) shall include demographic data relating 
                to participants in professional development 
                programs of the intelligence community and the 
                rate of placement into senior positions for 
                participants in such programs;
                  (E) shall include any voluntarily collected 
                demographic data relating to the membership of 
                any external advisory committee or board to 
                which individuals in senior positions in the 
                intelligence community appoint members; and
                  (F) may include data in proportions or 
                percentages to account for concerns relating to 
                the protection of classified information.
  (c) Updates.--[After making available a report under 
subsection (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall 
annually provide a report] Not later than March 31 of each 
year, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide a 
report (which may be provided as part of an annual report 
required under another provision of law) to the workforce of 
the intelligence community (including senior leadership), the 
public, and the appropriate congressional committees that 
includes--
          [(1) demographic data and information on the status 
        of diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence 
        community;]
          (1) demographic data and information on the status of 
        diversity and inclusion efforts of the intelligence 
        community, including demographic data relating to--
                  (A) the average years of service;
                  (B) the average number of years of service 
                for each level in the General Schedule, Senior 
                Executive Service, Senior Intelligence Service, 
                or equivalent; and
                  (C) career categories;
          (2) an analysis of applicant flow data, including the 
        percentage and level of positions for which data are 
        collected, and a discussion of any resulting policy 
        changes or recommendations; and
          (3) demographic data relating to participants in 
        professional development programs of the intelligence 
        community and the rate of placement into senior 
        positions for participants in such programs.
  (d) Expand the Collection and Analysis of Voluntary Applicant 
Flow Data.--
          (1) In general.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall develop a system to collect and 
        analyze applicant flow data for as many positions 
        within the intelligence community as practicable, in 
        order to identify areas for improvement in attracting 
        diverse talent, with particular attention to senior and 
        management positions.
          (2) Phased implementation.--The collection of 
        applicant flow data may be implemented by the Director 
        of National Intelligence in a phased approach 
        commensurate with the resources available to the 
        intelligence community.
  (e) Identify Additional Categories for Voluntary Data 
Collection of Current Employees.--
          (1) In general.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence may submit to the Office of Management and 
        Budget and to the appropriate congressional committees 
        a recommendation regarding whether the intelligence 
        community should voluntarily collect more detailed data 
        on demographic categories in addition to the race and 
        ethnicity categories specified in the statistical 
        policy directive issued by the Office of Management and 
        Budget entitled ``Standards for Maintaining, 
        Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and 
        Ethnicity''.
          (2) Process.--In making a recommendation under 
        paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence 
        shall--
                  (A) engage in close consultation with 
                internal stakeholders, such as employee 
                resource or affinity groups;
                  (B) ensure that there is clear communication 
                with the workforce of the intelligence 
                community--
                          (i) to explain the purpose of the 
                        potential collection of such data; and
                          (ii) regarding legal protections 
                        relating to any anticipated use of such 
                        data; and
                  (C) ensure adherence to relevant standards 
                and guidance issued by the Federal Government.
  (f) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Applicant flow data.--The term ``applicant flow 
        data'' means data that tracks the rate of applications 
        for job positions among demographic categories.
          (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                  (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
                Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the 
                Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
                  (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
                Homeland Security, the Permanent Select 
                Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
          (3) Diversity.--The term ``diversity'' means 
        diversity of persons based on gender, race, ethnicity, 
        disability status, veteran status, sexual orientation, 
        gender identity, national origin, and other demographic 
        categories.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBDIVISION 2

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE LXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 6610. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                    THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED 
                    INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES.

  Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
[this Act and not less frequently than once every 5 years 
thereafter,] this Act, and biennially thereafter, the Director 
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report that reviews the intelligence 
community for which positions can be conducted without access 
to classified information, networks, or facilities, or may only 
require a security clearance at the secret level. Such report 
shall take into account the potential effect of maintaining 
continuity of operations during a covered national emergency 
(as defined by section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (division W of Public Law 116-260)) 
and the assessed needs of the intelligence community to 
maintain such continuity of operations.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             MINORITY VIEWS

    The Republican Members of the Committee are increasingly 
concerned about the Administration's use of the Intelligence 
Community (IC) for purposes outside of the collection, 
exploitation, and dissemination of foreign intelligence as 
defined in the National Security Act. Longstanding bipartisan 
support for the IC's mission is jeopardized by the blurring of 
lines between U.S. Government entities responsible for domestic 
activities, including law enforcement, and those responsible 
for the collection of intelligence against foreign adversaries.
    Congress authorizes and funds the development of powerful 
tools for use by America's spy agencies. We do so with the 
understanding, reflected in both law and policy, that the 
purpose of the IC is to acquire information on foreign threats. 
This singular focus enhances our confidence that we'll avoid a 
reoccurrence of the dark days in which the Central Intelligence 
Agency and National Security Agency were used by the Executive 
Branch to target Americans based on their political views. This 
focus is also necessitated by the complexity and magnitude of 
the threats faced by the United States from our foreign 
adversaries.
    As Members of the Committee, we recognize that limitations 
on domestic activities can make the mission of the IC more 
challenging. We also understand that the tools and capabilities 
of the IC could potentially enhance the domestic missions of 
the U.S. Government, such as the prosecution of domestic 
violent extremists. However, unlike our authoritarian 
adversaries--such as the People's Republic of China--the 
efficiency of domestic surveillance is not the objective of the 
U.S. Government. First and foremost, we must ensure the rights 
of the American people are not infringed.
    While we support the vigorous prosecution of all criminal 
acts carried out by domestic violent extremists, the IC cannot 
be involved in tracking, investigating, or analyzing such 
threats other than when law enforcement identifies a potential 
foreign nexus to those criminal acts. If federal law 
enforcement agencies lack the resources to prevent and 
prosecute persistent and lethal domestic threats, the Executive 
Branch should request those resources from the appropriate 
Congressional committees of jurisdiction rather than improperly 
utilizing National Intelligence Program funds for this purpose.
    In order for Congress to conduct rigorous oversight and to 
ensure that the IC's resources are not being improperly used, 
we must obtain the information we need from the Executive 
Branch. That is why Section 705 of this Act creates a 
permanent, annual requirement for every IC element to report to 
this Committee about every domestic activity it engaged in 
during the prior fiscal year. Such reports will likely include 
many mundane and unobjectionable activities, such as conducting 
security clearance investigations, running insider threat 
programs, or other administrative functions. But the annual 
reports may also shed light on activities that are improper for 
elements of the IC. This will allow the Committee to make 
yearly decisions, as part of our annual Intelligence 
Authorization Act process, about which domestic Intelligence 
Community activities should be authorized and to identify those 
that should be prohibited.
            Sincerely,
                                   Devin Nunes.
                                   Michael Turner.
                                   Brad Wenstrup.
                                   Chris Stewart.
                                   Rick Crawford.
                                   Elise Stefanik.
                                   Markwayne Mullin.
                                   Trent Kelly.
                                   Darin LaHood.
                                   Brian Fitzpatrick.

                                  [all]