[Senate Report 116-233]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      Calendar No. 477
116th Congress      }                                   {       Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session         }                                   {      116-233

======================================================================



 
                  INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2021

                                _______
                                

                 June 17, 2020.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. Rubio, from the Select Committee on Intelligence,
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 3905]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 3905) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
year 2021 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

               Classified Annexes to the Committee Report

    Pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259), the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed on February 11, 
2020, that the request for the National Intelligence Program 
(NIP) for Fiscal Year 2021 was $61.9 billion. Other than for 
limited unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, the classified nature of United 
States intelligence activities precludes any further 
disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its 
budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has 
prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule 
of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act and has the legal status of 
public law. The classified annex is made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for 
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2021 (the ``Act'') that was reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2021.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2021 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Intelligence community management account

    Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year 
2021.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations for the CIA 
Retirement and Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2021.

               TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

           SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 303. Clarification of authorities and responsibilities of 
        National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and 
        Information Systems Security

    Section 303 permits the National Manager for National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security, 
as designated by National Security Directive 42 (NSD-42), to 
delegate NSD-42 authorities to a Deputy National Manager, 
without further delegation. Section 303 further reinforces the 
National Security Agency's (NSA's) mission regarding 
authorities and funding programs by ensuring that the National 
Manager--when carrying out NSD-42 authorities--may supervise, 
oversee, or execute (directly or indirectly) the Information 
Systems Security Program (ISSP), but shall not supervise, 
oversee, or execute any aspect of the National Intelligence 
Program (NIP) or Military Intelligence Program (MIP), except as 
necessary to supervise, oversee, or execute the ISSP. Section 
303 also provides that, upon such delegation of authority, the 
Deputy National Manager may supervise, oversee, or execute 
(directly or indirectly) the ISSP, but shall not supervise, 
oversee, or execute any aspect of the NIP or MIP, except as 
necessary to supervise, oversee, or execute the ISSP.

Section 304. Continuity of operations plans for certain elements of the 
        intelligence community in the case of a national emergency

    Section 304 requires the Directors of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), NSA, and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) to establish continuity of operations 
plans for use in the case of certain national emergencies as 
defined in statute, and share those with the congressional 
intelligence committees within 7 days of a national emergency 
being declared. Furthermore, Section 304 requires these 
agencies to provide the committees with any updates to those 
plans as the conditions of the national emergency require.

Section 305. Application of Executive Schedule level III to positions 
        of Director of National Security Agency and Director of 
        National Reconnaissance Office

    Section 305 provides that the Director of the NRO and the 
Director of the NSA shall be designated as Level III on the 
Executive Schedule, the equivalent of an Under Secretary. The 
Committee recognizes that this provision does not affect the 
current Director of the NSA's military rank or pay. Section 305 
is intended to provide the Committee's view as to the 
Director's stature in the interagency; it is not intended to 
signal support for a civilian nominee. The Committee further 
clarifies that this provision shall apply to a successor 
civilian occupying the position of Director of the NRO.

Section 306. National Intelligence University

    Section 306 provides the National Intelligence University 
(NIU) with the authorities that the Department of Defense War 
Colleges have regarding faculty member hiring and compensation, 
and the acceptance of faculty research grants. Section 306 also 
sustains an independent, external board of visitors to provide 
oversight of the NIU.

Section 307. Requiring facilitation of establishment of Social Media 
        Data and Threat Analysis Center

    Section 307 provides a requirement regarding Section 5323 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
by requiring that the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis 
Center be established not later than 180 days after enhancement 
of this Act.

Section 308. Data collection on attrition in intelligence community

    Section 308 requires the DNI to set standards and issue an 
annual report on the reasons why different categories of 
Intelligence Community (IC) employees separate from service or 
applicants to IC positions withdraw from the hiring process 
after they have been issued a conditional offer of employment. 
Data on workforce attrition should include demographics, 
specialties, and length of service. Such reasons may include an 
alternative job opportunity, a loss of interest in joining the 
IC, or the length of time to complete the clearance process.

Section 309. Limitation on delegation of responsibility for program 
        management of information-sharing environment

    Section 309 stipulates that the President must delegate 
responsibilities under Section 1016(b) of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to an official 
other than the ODNI on or after October 1, 2020.

Section 310. Improvements to provisions relating to intelligence 
        community information technology environment

    Section 310 streamlines current reporting requirements by 
requiring the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
develop and maintain a long-term roadmap for the Intelligence 
Community Information Technology Environment (IC ITE). Section 
310 further requires the DNI to develop and maintain a business 
plan to implement the long-term IC ITE roadmap.

Section 311. Requirements and authorities for Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency to improve education in science, 
        technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics

    Section 311 ensures that the Director of the CIA has the 
legal authorities required to improve the skills in science, 
technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics (known as STEAM) 
necessary to meet long-term national security needs.

      SUBTITLE B--INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Section 321. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity 
        as reprisal against whistleblower disclosure by employees and 
        contractors in the intelligence community

    Section 321 adds to prohibited personnel practices a 
knowing, willful or negligent disclosure that reveals an IC 
Whistleblower's identifying information without consent. 
Section 321 further provides an IC Whistleblower with a private 
right of action if such disclosure is taken as a reprisal 
against the IC Whistleblower for bringing a complaint.

Section 322. Clarification of standards regarding whistleblower 
        complaints and information of urgent concern received by 
        Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 322 clarifies the definition of ``urgent concern'' 
regarding whistleblower complaints and ensures that the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) has 
authority over determining whether a matter falls within the 
``urgent concern'' definition.

Section 323. Clarification regarding submittal of complaints and 
        information by whistleblowers in the intelligence community to 
        Congress

    Section 323 clarifies that IC Whistleblowers can give their 
complaints to the intelligence committees--as long as the 
complaint is provided to both Chairman and Vice Chairman or 
Ranking Member or designated nonpartisan staff--regardless of 
whether they are determined to be urgent concerns. Section 323 
further provides new security protocols in the instances where 
complaints include classified information.

Section 324. Limitation on sharing of intelligence community 
        whistleblower complaints with persons named in such complaints

    Section 324 prohibits Federal government agents and 
employees from sharing an IC Whistleblower complaint that has 
been submitted to an IC element's IG with a named subject of 
the complaint, unless the IC Whistleblower provides written 
consent or information sharing is required as part of the 
investigation. Section 324 further provides that any violation 
is subject to criminal fines and/or two-year imprisonment and 
requires notification to the congressional intelligence 
committees.

  SUBTITLE C--REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS PERTAINING TO THE INTELLIGENCE 
                               COMMUNITY

Section 331. Assessment by the Comptroller General of the United States 
        on efforts of the Intelligence Community and the Department of 
        Defense to identify and mitigate risks posed to the 
        Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense by the use 
        of direct-to-consumer genetic testing by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China

    Section 331 directs the Comptroller General to assess 
efforts in the IC and Department of Defense (DoD) to identify 
and mitigate the risks posed to the IC and DoD by direct-to-
consumer genetic testing by the Government of the People's 
Republic of China. Section 331 further requires the report to 
include key national security risks and vulnerabilities, an 
assessment of the IC's and DoD's identification and mitigation 
of such risks and vulnerabilities, and recommendations for the 
IC and DoD to improve identification and mitigation of such 
risks and vulnerabilities.

Section 332. Report on use by intelligence community of hiring 
        flexibilities and expedited human resources practices to assure 
        quality and diversity in the workforce of the intelligence 
        community

    Section 332 requires the DNI to submit a report describing 
how IC elements are exercising hiring flexibilities and 
expedited human resources practices afforded under 5 U.S.C. 
Sec. 3326 and related regulations, including the identification 
of any obstacles encountered by the IC in exercising such 
authorities.

Section 333. Report on signals intelligence priorities and requirements

    Section 333 requires the DNI to submit a report detailing 
signals intelligence priorities and requirements subject to 
Presidential Policy Directive-28 that stipulates ``why, 
whether, when, and how the United States conducts signals 
intelligence activities.'' This report shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

Section 334. Assessment of demand for student loan repayment program 
        benefit

    Section 334 requires the head of each IC element to 
calculate the number of personnel who qualify for a student 
loan repayment program benefit, and compare it to the number of 
personnel who apply for such a benefit. The information 
provided will include recommendations for how to optimize 
participation and enhance the effectiveness of the benefit as a 
retention tool, to identify any shortfall in funds or 
authorities needed to provide such benefit, and to include such 
materials with the budget request for Fiscal Year 2022.

Section 335. Assessment of intelligence community demand for child care

    Section 335 requires the DNI in coordination with the heads 
of other IC elements to provide a report that includes: a 
calculation of the total annual demand for child care by 
employees at NSA, NGA, DIA, NRO, CIA, and ODNI; an 
identification of any shortfalls between demand and the child 
care support by these IC elements; an assessment of options for 
addressing any such shortfall; an identification of the 
advantages, disadvantages, security requirements, and costs 
associated with each option; a plan to meet, within five years 
after the date of the report, the demand for childcare, and an 
assessment of specific considerations that impact the 
alternatives available to these IC elements.

Section 336. Open source intelligence strategies and plans for the 
        intelligence community

    Section 336 requires the DNI in coordination with the heads 
of each IC element, to conduct a survey of the open source 
intelligence requirements, goals, investments, and capabilities 
for each element of the IC and to evaluate the usability of the 
Open Source Enterprise (OSE). Based on such findings, it 
further mandates the DNI shall develop, in coordination with 
the heads of each IC element, a strategy for open source 
intelligence collection, analysis, and production across the 
IC; create a plan for improving usability of the OSE; and 
conduct a risk and benefit analysis of creating an independent 
open source center.
    Using the findings above, Section 336 further requires the 
DNI to develop a plan for a centralized data repository of open 
source intelligence. Finally, it mandates the DNI develop a 
cost-sharing model that leverages the open source intelligence 
investments of each IC element for the beneficial use of the 
entire IC. It also requires the heads of ODNI, CIA, DIA, NGA, 
and NSA to jointly brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on the progress developing the aforementioned plans.

Section 337. Plan for establishing an element of the intelligence 
        community within the United States Space Force

    Section 337 requires the DNI and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the 
Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations, 
to submit a plan for establishing an element of the IC within 
the United States Space Force.

          TITLE IV--SECURITY CLEARANCES AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE

Section 401. Exclusivity, consistency, and transparency in security 
        clearance procedures, and right to appeal

    Section 401 requires the Executive Branch to publish 
adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility to access 
classified information and makes these guidelines the exclusive 
basis for granting, denying, and revoking clearances in order 
to increase transparency and accountability, and ensure due 
process. Section 401 further codifies the right of government 
employees to appeal unfavorable eligibility determinations to 
an agency-level panel. Section 401 also creates a higher level 
review by a government-wide appeals panel, chaired by the DNI 
as the government's Security Executive Agent, to review certain 
agency-level panel determinations involving allegations of 
constitutional violations or discrimination. This DNI-led panel 
can remand decisions to the employing agency for reevaluation 
if the panel finds valid cause.

Section 402. Establishing process parity for security clearance 
        revocations

    Section 402 requires an agency, in justifying an adverse 
security clearance or access determination against a 
whistleblower, to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence 
that the agency would have made the same security clearance or 
access determination in the absence of the whistleblower's 
disclosure. Section 402 establishes parity in the legal 
standards applied to IC Whistleblower matters.

Section 403. Federal policy on sharing of derogatory information 
        pertaining to contractor employees in the trusted workforce

    Section 403 requires the DNI to issue a policy within 180 
days of enactment that facilitates sharing of derogatory 
information the government obtains on cleared contractors 
(along with any mitigation measures put in place) with Federal 
contractor employers' chief security officers, to help 
companies maintain robust insider threat programs. The policy 
must comport with privacy rights, allow individuals to verify 
the information, and stipulate that such sharing is only for 
purposes of security risk mitigation.

                   TITLE V--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Section 501. Secure and trusted technology

    Section 501 establishes a Communications Technology 
Security and Innovation Fund to support the development and 
deployment of open standards-based compatible, interoperable 
equipment for fifth-generation wireless networks to create a 
more secure and diverse telecommunications vendor market. It 
also establishes a Multilateral Telecommunications Security 
Fund to support the adoption of secure and trusted 
communications technologies in key markets globally. Section 
501 authorizes up to $750,000,000 for each fund and requires 
the administrators of each fund to provide annual reports to 
Congress detailing the use of proceeds.
    Section 501 further requires the DNI to submit a report on 
political influence by adversarial nations within international 
forums that set standards for fifth-generation and future 
generations of wireless networks, including International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), Inter-American Telecommunication 
Commission (CITEL), and 3rd Generation Partnership Project 
(3GPP). Section 501 also requires the DNI and Secretary of 
Defense to jointly submit a report on developing federal 
wireless network testbeds for development of fifth-generation 
technologies for U.S. military and dual-use applications using 
open interface standards-based compatible, interoperable 
equipment. This report should include an assessment of efforts 
by foreign governments to build wireless network testbeds for 
virtualized telecommunication technologies. Both reports shall 
be in unclassified form with a classified annex, if required.

Section 502. Report on attempts by foreign adversaries to build 
        telecommunications and cybersecurity equipment and services 
        for, or to provide such equipment and services to, certain 
        allies of the United States

    Section 502 requires the CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit to the 
congressional intelligence and armed services committees a 
joint report that describes the United States intelligence 
sharing and military posture in Five Eyes countries that 
currently have or intend to use adversary telecommunications or 
cybersecurity equipment, especially as provided by China or 
Russia, with a description of potential vulnerabilities of that 
information and assessment of mitigation options.

Section 503. Report on threats posed by use by foreign governments and 
        entities of commercially available cyber intrusion and 
        surveillance technology

    Section 503 requires the DNI to submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees on the threats posed by 
foreign governments and foreign entities using and 
appropriating commercially available cyber intrusion and other 
surveillance technology.

Section 504. Reports on recommendation of the Cyberspace Solarium 
        Commission

    Section 504 requires the ODNI, Department of Homeland 
Security (acting through the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis), Department of Energy 
(acting through the Director of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy), Department of 
Commerce, and DoD to report to Congress their assessment of the 
recommendations submitted by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission 
pursuant to Section 1652(j) of the John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019, and to 
describe actions that each agency expects to take to implement 
these recommendations.

Section 505. Assessment of critical technology trends relating to 
        artificial intelligence, microchips, and semiconductors and 
        related supply chains

    Section 505 requires the DNI to complete an assessment of 
export controls related to artificial intelligence (AI), 
microchips, advanced manufacturing equipment, and other AI-
enabled technologies, including the identification of 
opportunities for further cooperation with international 
partners.

Section 506. Duty to report counterintelligence threats to campaigns

    Section 506 requires that Federal presidential campaigns 
must report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within 
one week any offers to contribute, donate, expend, disburse, or 
solicit as prohibited under 50 U.S.C. Sec. 30121 by the 
following individuals: a foreign principal as defined in the 
Foreign Agent Registration Act; a person acting at the 
direction of a foreign principal; or a person included in the 
list of specially designated nationals or blocked person by the 
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control. Section 
506 further requires Federal campaigns to establish a policy to 
retain and preserve records related to reportable foreign 
contacts for not less than three years, and enacts criminal 
penalties for willful violations of this section.

Section 507. Combating Chinese influence operations in the United 
        States and strengthening civil liberties protections

    Section 507 provides additional requirements to annual 
reports in 50 U.S.C. Sec.  3237(B) on Influence Operations and 
Campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) by mandating an identification of influence operations by 
the CCP against the science and technology sector in the United 
States. Section 507 also requires the FBI to create a plan, in 
consultation with stakeholders outside the Intelligence 
Community to increase public awareness and detection of 
influence activities by the CCP. Finally, Section 507 requires 
the FBI, in consultation with the Assistant Attorney General 
for the Civil Rights and the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Officer of the Department of Justice, to develop 
recommendations to strengthen relationships with communities 
targeted by the CCP and to build trust with such communities 
through local and regional grassroots outreach.

Section 508. Annual report on corrupt activities of senior officials of 
        the Chinese Communist Party

    Section 508 requires the CIA, in coordination with the 
Department of Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
and the FBI, to submit to designated congressional committees 
annually through 2025 a report that describes and assesses the 
wealth and corruption of senior officials of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), as well as targeted financial measures, 
including potential targets for sanctions designation. Section 
508 further expresses the Sense of Congress that the United 
States should undertake every effort and pursue every 
opportunity to expose the corruption and illicit practices of 
senior officials of the CCP, including President Xi Jinping.

Section 509. Report on corrupt activities of Russian and other Eastern 
        European oligarchs

    Section 509 requires the CIA, in coordination with the 
Department of the Treasury's Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis and the FBI, to submit to designated congressional 
committees and the Under Secretary of State for Public 
Diplomacy, a report that describes the corruption and corrupt 
or illegal activities among Russian and other Eastern European 
oligarchs who support the Russian government and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, and the impact of those activities on 
the economy and citizens of Russia. Section 509 further 
requires the CIA, in coordination with the Department of 
Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, to describe 
potential sanctions that could be imposed for such activities.

Section 510. Report on biosecurity risk and disinformation by the 
        Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China

    Section 510 requires the DNI to submit to the designated 
congressional committees a report identifying whether and how 
CCP officials and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China may have sought to suppress or exploit for national 
advantage information regarding the novel coronavirus pandemic, 
including specific related assessments. Section 510 further 
provides that the report shall be submitted in unclassified 
form, but may have a classified annex.

Section 511. Report on effect of lifting of United Nations arms embargo 
        on Islamic Republic of Iran

    Section 511 requires the DIA to submit to designated 
congressional committees a report on the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran's plans to acquire military arms if 
the United Nations Security Council's resolutions' ban on arms 
transfers to or from the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran is lifted, as well as the effects such arms acquisitions 
may have on regional security and stability.

Section 512. Report on Iranian activities relating to nuclear 
        nonproliferation

    Section 512 directs the DNI to submit a report on any 
relevant activities relating to nuclear weapons research and 
development by the Islamic Republic of Iran and any relevant 
efforts to afford or deny international access to related 
facilities in accordance with international non-proliferation 
agreements.

Section 513. Sense of Congress on Third Option Foundation

    Section 513 expresses the sense of Congress that the Third 
Option Foundation's work on behalf of the CIA's special 
operations community and their families is invaluable, such 
that the Director of the CIA should work with the Foundation to 
implement section 6412 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew 
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
2018, 2019, and 2020, which provided special rules for certain 
monthly workers' compensation payments and other payments to 
CIA personnel.

                           Committee Comments


Equitable Treatment of Relocation Costs for Intelligence Community 
        Civilians

    As demonstrated in The Intelligence Community Workforce 
Agility Protection Act of 2020, S. 3675, introduced by Senators 
Burr and Warner, the Committee strongly supports IC personnel 
who must make a permanent change of station to accept an IC 
position. The Committee recognizes such relocations pose 
significant financial hardships for the IC civilians who move 
their families to serve their country. Current law provides 
military members with exemptions from effective tax penalties 
for such relocations, but IC civilians have no similar 
exemptions, thus undermining the IC's ability to recruit and 
maintain a highly qualified and motivated workforce. The 
Intelligence Community Workforce Agility Protection Act of 2020 
would provide equitable tax treatment for IC civilians who are 
subject to similar permanent change of station orders. The 
Committee looks forward to expeditious congressional action on 
this matter.

Advanced Aerial Threats

    The Committee supports the efforts of the Unidentified 
Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval 
Intelligence to standardize collection and reporting on 
unidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to 
adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to 
U.S. military assets and installations. However, the Committee 
remains concerned that there is no unified, comprehensive 
process within the Federal Government for collecting and 
analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena, 
despite the potential threat. The Committee understands that 
the relevant intelligence may be sensitive; nevertheless, the 
Committee finds that the information sharing and coordination 
across the Intelligence Community has been inconsistent, and 
this issue has lacked attention from senior leaders.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other 
agencies as the Director and Secretary jointly consider 
relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of 
enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and 
armed services committees on unidentified aerial phenomena 
(also known as ``anomalous aerial vehicles''), including 
observed airborne objects that have not been identified.
    The Committee further directs the report to include:
          1. A detailed analysis of unidentified aerial 
        phenomena data and intelligence reporting collected or 
        held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including 
        data and intelligence reporting held by the 
        Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;
          2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data 
        collected by:
            a. geospatial intelligence;
            b. signals intelligence;
            c. human intelligence; and
            d. measurement and signals intelligence;
          3. A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was 
        derived from investigations of intrusions of 
        unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted 
        United States airspace;
          4. A detailed description of an interagency process 
        for ensuring timely data collection and centralized 
        analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting 
        for the Federal Government, regardless of which service 
        or agency acquired the information;
          5. Identification of an official accountable for the 
        process described in paragraph 4;
          6. Identification of potential aerospace or other 
        threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to 
        national security, and an assessment of whether this 
        unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be 
        attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;
          7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that 
        indicate a potential adversary may have achieved 
        breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put 
        United States strategic or conventional forces at risk; 
        and
          8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of 
        data, enhanced research and development, and additional 
        funding and other resources.
    The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex.

Coordination of Security for Domestic Military Installations and Other 
        Facilities

    The Committee is concerned that, as a result of several 
recent incidents of attempted unauthorized access to Naval Air 
Station Key West and Fort Story, Virginia by Chinese nationals, 
several security vulnerabilities have been discovered. Foreign 
adversaries may be systematically probing military 
installations and facilities, and it is important that the 
Department of Defense take responsibility for ensuring security 
measures are adequate, unauthorized accesses are tracked, and 
uniform reporting requirements for attempted unauthorized 
accesses are established.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), in 
coordination with the DNI and the Director of the FBI, to 
establish within the Office of the USD(I&S) a designee 
responsible for coordination of security for domestic military 
installations and other domestic military facilities. 
Specifically, the designee's responsibilities shall include 
tracking unauthorized incursions into domestic military 
installations and facilities and attempts at such incursions.
    The Committee further directs that, within 180 days of 
enactment of this Act, such individual shall develop a strategy 
for security and counterintelligence collection that defines 
the capability requirements, responsibilities, and processes 
for security and counterintelligence for domestic military 
installations and other domestic military facilities. In 
addition, not less frequently than once each year, the Under 
Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of other 
appropriate elements of the DoD and the IC, brief the 
intelligence and armed services committees on the:
          1. Activities of the designee; and
          2. Current and anticipated trends and developments in 
        connection with security for domestic military 
        installations and other domestic military facilities.

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Modernization and 
        Integration Efforts of the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-functional 
        Team of the Department of Defense

    The Committee is concerned with the intelligence silos that 
have resulted from isolated procurement programs that store 
data in individual repositories, each with its own set of 
cataloging procedures and proprietary technologies. This, in 
turn, potentially limits advantageous communications among 
databases, causes vital intelligence to go undetected, and 
causes duplication of separately-located analysts' efforts in 
reviewing other, less vital, intelligence information.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the head of the 
Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, as established in 
the Department of Defense by memorandum dated April 26, 2017, 
to submit to the congressional intelligence and armed services 
committees within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report 
that includes:
          1. Recommendations for the delineation of efforts 
        between the Team and the Joint Artificial Intelligence 
        Center, especially with respect to data labeling, 
        testing and evaluation;
          2. Recommendations for resource sharing across the 
        intelligence community for test and evaluation as 
        Project Maven transitions its independent lines of 
        effort;
          3. The plan of the Team to integrate unsupervised 
        artificial intelligence algorithms (e.g., algorithms 
        that learn from data without being trained, allowing 
        the artificial intelligence to self-improve) into 
        Project Maven;
          4. The plan of the Team to incorporate independent 
        data repositories located across the intelligence 
        community, irrespective of the element providing the 
        data or the domain they are resident to, into Project 
        Maven; and
          5. The plan of the Team to ensure that development of 
        Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination technology 
        that will facilitate and enhance the capability of 
        analysts to rapidly search across near real-time 
        sensors, leverage historical data, and identify 
        valuable intelligence is incorporated into the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-
        repository System.

Plan for Assessing Government Agency Counterintelligence Programs

    Adversary intelligence and security service efforts to 
monitor, access, penetrate, and/or manipulate government 
facilities, personnel, networks, and supply chains have become 
increasingly more sophisticated, as described in the National 
Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States. Many 
national security agencies, to include those in the DoD and IC, 
have mature and robust counterintelligence programs to preserve 
the integrity of their systems. However, many agencies' 
programs lag behind, either because they do not believe they 
are at risk or because of internal funding challenges. 
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center to develop a plan 
within 90 days of enactment of this Act for assessing the 
effectiveness of all government agency counterintelligence 
programs. This plan should address the standards and methods of 
assessment that may apply for different categories of executive 
agencies; phasing of implementation over a five-year timeframe 
to cover all government counterintelligence; the periodicity 
for updated assessments; and annual costs to conduct these 
assessment and any recommendation for a cost recovery 
mechanism.

Security Clearance Procedures and Rights to Appeal

    Section 401 of the Act provides appeal rights and 
procedures for security clearance eligibility determinations. 
This provision is not intended to impede agency decisions 
regarding access to classified information for a limited 
purpose or duration (e.g., regarding an election or one-time 
read-ins for a specific event or threat). The Committee does, 
however, expect agencies to keep Congress fully and currently 
informed of any limited purpose or duration grants of access. 
Finally, the Committee expects the DNI-level appeals panel to 
exercise judgment and review only those appeals that the panel 
concludes have evidentiary and jurisdictional merit.

Supporting Industry during Coronavirus

    Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 
Security Act (CARES Act) in March 2020 to provide necessary 
assistance to the American economy during the coronavirus 
pandemic. An important element of that Act was Section 3610, 
which provided agencies authorities to modify contracts for 
companies supporting the government. This provision was 
critical to the defense industrial base. The Committee believes 
that consistent interpretation of Section 3610, particularly as 
it relates to work conducted at contractor facilities, cost 
reimbursement methodology, adjustments in payment plans, and 
adjustments in contract periods of performance, is essential to 
reducing uncertainty and sustaining a vibrant national security 
sector. The Committee looks forward to working with the IC 
elements in identifying if any additional authorities or 
resources are necessary and identifying lessons learned for any 
future national emergency.

Efficient Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities

    The Committee is concerned that there are unnecessary 
challenges to the utilization of Sensitive Compartmented 
Information Facility (SCIF) spaces by multiple programs among 
IC and Department of Defense components and their appropriately 
cleared government contractors. These challenges result in 
inefficient use of SCIFs and classified networks. The Committee 
finds that it is important to support collaboration and related 
efficiencies by sharing SCIF spaces.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, to issue, within 180 days after 
enactment of this Act, revised guidance authorizing and 
directing government agencies and their appropriately cleared 
contractors to process, store, use, and discuss sensitive 
compartmented information (SCI) at facilities previously 
approved to handle SCI, without need for further approval by 
agency or by site. This guidance shall apply to both IC-
controlled access programs and DoD special access programs.

                            Committee Action

    On June 3, 2020, a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Votes on amendments to the committee bill and the classified annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Acting 
Chairman and Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified 
annex for Fiscal Year 2021, the base text for purposes of 
amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc three 
amendments to the classified annex, as follows: (1) a second-
degree amendment by Acting Chairman Rubio; (2) an amendment by 
Acting Chairman Rubio; and (3) a second-degree amendment by 
Senator Sasse.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc five 
amendments to the bill, as follows: (1) an amendment by Senator 
Burr and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, to improve 
provisions relating to the IC Information Technology 
Environment; (2) an amendment by Senator Risch and cosponsored 
by Senator King, to require reporting on Cyberspace Solarium 
Commission recommendations; (3) a second-degree amendment by 
Acting Chairman Rubio and cosponsored by Senators Risch, Blunt, 
Cotton, Cornyn, and Sasse, to improve Section 322; (4) an 
amendment by Senator Bennet and cosponsored by Vice Chairman 
Warner and Senators Cotton and Cornyn, to require an assessment 
of critical technology trends related to artificial 
intelligence; and (5) an amendment by Senator Cotton to require 
a report on Iranian activities relating to nuclear 
nonproliferation.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment by 
Senator Burr and cosponsored by Vice Chairman Warner, which 
provides the legal authorities required for the Director of the 
CIA to improve recruitment in the areas of science, technology, 
engineering, arts, and mathematics (known as STEAM) necessary 
to meet long-term national security needs.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a second-degree 
amendment by Vice Chairman Warner and cosponsored by Senators 
Collins and Bennet, to an amendment by Vice Chairman Warner, 
and cosponsored by Senators Collins and Bennet, that requires 
Federal presidential campaigns to report to the FBI illegal 
offers of assistance by known foreign agents. The second-degree 
amendment exempted unpaid volunteers from such reporting 
requirements and reduced the criminal penalties. By a vote of 8 
ayes and 7 noes, the Committee adopted the amendment by Vice 
Chairman Warner, and cosponsored by Senators Collins and 
Bennet, as modified by the second-degree amendment. The votes 
in person were as follows: Acting Chairman Rubio--no; Senator 
Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Collins--aye; Senator 
Blunt--no; Senator Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator 
Sasse--no; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; 
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; 
Senator Harris--aye; and Senator Bennet--aye.
    By a vote of 7 ayes and 8 noes, the Committee did not adopt 
an amendment by Senator Wyden to establish the DNI as the 
Executive Agent for Federal government-wide declassification 
processes and requirements. The votes in person were as 
follows: Acting Chairman Rubio--no; Senator Burr--no; Senator 
Risch--no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Blunt--no; Senator 
Cotton--no; Senator Cornyn--no; Senator Sasse--no; Vice 
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Harris--
aye; and Senator Bennet--aye.

Votes to report the committee bill

    On June 3, 2020, the Committee voted to report the bill, as 
amended, by a vote of 14 ayes and one no. The votes in person 
or by proxy were as follows: Acting Chairman Rubio--aye; 
Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Collins--aye; 
Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; 
Senator Sasse--aye; Vice Chairman Warner--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Heinrich--aye; 
Senator King--aye; Senator Harris--aye; and Senator Bennet--
aye.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes to the bill and 
classified annex.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule of 
authorizations also contain no limited tax benefits or limited 
tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On June 8, 
2020, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        Changes to Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that it is 
necessary to dispense with the requirement of paragraph 12 to 
expedite the business of the Senate.

                    MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    Despite its strong provisions, I voted against the Fiscal 
Year 2021 Intelligence Authorization Act because the 
legislation failed to reform a broken, costly declassification 
system. Years of reports, from the Information Security 
Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Public Interest 
Declassification Board (PIDB), have documented how a flood of 
digital classification has overwhelmed the federal government's 
obsolete declassification system. There is a consensus, inside 
and outside government, that the system is unsustainable.
    The ISOO has determined that the cost of classification 
continues to increase and now exceeds $18 billion annually. A 
dysfunctional system that lets more and more classified records 
pile up wastes a significant portion of that amount, while 
undermining transparency and doing nothing to protect national 
security.
    There is no dispute about the severity of the problem, nor 
about the solution--modernization of the declassification 
system. Senator Jerry Moran and I have introduced bipartisan 
legislation (S. 3733) to charge the Director of National 
Intelligence with modernizing declassification, a 
recommendation also made by the PIDB. I am disappointed that 
the Committee rejected efforts to adopt this commonsense 
bipartisan reform and address this ever-growing crisis.
    The bill includes a number of important Intelligence 
Community whistleblower protection provisions, four of which 
were included at the behest of Vice Chairman Warner and myself. 
Those provisions protect from outside interference the 
Inspector General's determinations about what whistleblower 
complaints to submit to Congress, prohibit the public 
disclosure of whistleblowers' identities, prohibit 
whistleblower complaints from being shared with the subjects of 
those complaints, and provide a channel for whistleblowers to 
come directly to Congress without interference from the DNI.
    Unnecessarily restrictive language was added to the 
provision facilitating direct whistleblower communications with 
Congress. The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection 
Act created a process for whistleblowers to communicate with 
the ``intelligence committees,'' whereas the bill appears to 
limit such communication to the Chairman and Vice Chairman, or 
certain nonpartisan staff. To the extent the bill creates new 
limitations on efforts by whistleblowers to convey concerns to 
members of Congress, the language in the bill should be 
modified or clarified.
    The bill includes a fifth whistleblower provision I 
proposed that protects whistleblowers whose security clearances 
are revoked or who face an adverse access determination by 
requiring that the government demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the agency would have made the same 
security clearance or access determination in the absence of 
the whistleblower's disclosure.
    It also includes my provision requiring a report on the 
threat posed by the proliferation of commercial spyware as well 
as U.S. government efforts to counter that threat.
    Finally, I am pleased that the Classified Annex requires a 
report with information that Senator Heinrich and I have been 
seeking related to collection conducted pursuant to Executive 
Order 12333.

                                                         Ron Wyden.

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