[Senate Report 116-222]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      Calendar No. 437
116th Congress      }                                   {       Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session         }                                   {      116-222
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

  

         CBRN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2019

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                              to accompany

                               H.R. 1589

   TO AMEND THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO ESTABLISH CHEMICAL, 
  BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION 
  SHARING FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE 
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND TO REQUIRE DISSEMINATION OF 
        INFORMATION ANALYZED BY THE DEPARTMENT TO ENTITIES WITH 
 RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO HOMELAND SECURITY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES






              [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]






                 March 2, 2020.--Ordered to be printed 
                 
                               __________

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                      
99-010                     WASHINGTON : 2020 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah                    KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
RICK SCOTT, Florida                  KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Staff Director
                   Joseph C. Folio III, Chief Counsel
               Charles Carroll, Professional Staff Member
               David M. Weinberg, Minority Staff Director
               Zachary I. Schram, Minority Chief Counsel
   Christopher J. Mulkins, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk








                                                      Calendar No. 437
116th Congress      }                                   {       Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session         }                                   {      116-222

======================================================================



 
         CBRN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2019

                                _______
                                

                 March 2, 2020.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 1589]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, to which was referred the Act (H.R. 1589), to amend 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence and 
information sharing functions of the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security and to require 
dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to 
entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security, 
and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon with an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................4
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................4
  V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................5
 VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................5
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Act, as Reported.............6

                         I. Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 1589, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing 
Act of 2019, requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to coordinate 
analysis of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
(CBRN) threats against the United States homeland and integrate 
the analysis with CBRN and global infectious disease threat 
vulnerability assessments. The Act directs I&A to leverage 
existing structures and offices within DHS to prevent, detect, 
and deter the unauthorized hostile use of CBRN devices and 
agents against the United States homeland.
    The Act also requires I&A to properly coordinate with other 
DHS intelligence components, agencies, and offices involved in 
homeland security related CBRN defense activity in the analysis 
of the threat. In addition, I&A is required to disseminate this 
analysis and information to state and local governments and 
authorities. Finally, DHS is required to prepare a report on 
the activities carried out to accomplish the requirements of 
this Act, the activities taken to counter the threat from CBRN 
and global infectious disease, and the implementation status of 
the Act. The report is to be provided to Congress within one 
year of the enactment of this Act, and annually for five years.

              II. Background and the Need for Legislation

    The threat posed by individuals, nation-states, and 
terrorists groups seeking to utilize illicit CBRN devices or 
agents against the United States homeland is increasing. Our 
nation's adversaries, including the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), are using CBRN weapons on the battlefield and 
aspire to use these weapons in more attacks.\1\ According to 
Department of Defense (DOD) officials, Russia, China, North 
Korea, and Iran are at the forefront of the proliferation of 
CBRN attacks, especially as these nation-states move away from 
conventional warfare.\2\ In July 2019, Andrew Kilianski, Chief 
Intelligence Officer with the Joint Program Executive Office 
for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense, 
DOD, highlighted the increased threat that nation-states posed, 
stating that, ``What we've seen over the past few years is the 
norms around chemical and biological weapon use have been 
eroded almost completely.''\3\ For instance, the 2018 chemical 
attack on former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal and his 
daughter using a nerve agent known as Novichok in the United 
Kingdom, provides an example of the increased proliferation of 
such attacks and the need to obtain the intelligence and 
information to mitigate these threats.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Exec. Office of the President, National Strategy for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, at 1 (Dec. 2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/20181210_National-
Strategy-for-Countering-WMD-Terrorism.pdf.
    \2\Yasmin Tadjdeh, CBRN Conference News: Defense Officials See 
Increased Threat from Chinese, Russian Chem-Bio Weapons, National 
Defense (Jul. 23, 2019), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
articles/2019/7/23/defense-officials-see-increased-threat-from-chinese-
russian-chembio-weapon.
    \3\Id.
    \4\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In recognition of the increasing nature and severity of 
these threats, in 2018, the Administration released its 
National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Terrorism and the National Biodefense Strategy, which highlight 
the risks and challenges posed by CBRN weapons and the Federal 
Government's efforts to mitigate these threats.\5\ Moreover, 
recent incidents perpetrated by ISIS and near-peer adversaries 
are the reason why, according to one expert, it is a matter of 
if, not when, a CBRN attack will be used against the United 
States.\6\ The barrier to entry to obtain CBRN materials is low 
as materials become increasingly easier to move and serve a 
legitimate role in a number of industries.\7\ Naturally 
occurring biological threats, such as global infectious 
diseases, as well as agricultural and veterinarian borne 
threats also pose a significant risk to the United States.\8\ 
Addressing these threats requires coordinated analysis and 
communication of the risk posed by CBRN to the United States 
and its global interests abroad.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\Exec. Office of the President, National Strategy for Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (Dec. 2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/20181210_National-
Strategy-for-Countering-WMD-Terrorism.pdf.; Exec. Office of the 
President, National Biodefense Strategy (2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-
Strategy.pdf.
    \6\Tadjdeh, supra note 2.
    \7\U.S. Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, at 7 (Feb. 13, 2018) 
(Statement for the record of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National 
Intelligence), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/
Testimonies/2018-
ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.
    \8\Exec. Office of the President, National Biodefense Strategy at i 
(2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-
Biodefense-Strategy.pdf.; Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov'l Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(statement of David J. Glawe, Under Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Homeland 
Sec.), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Glawe-2019-
11-05-REVISED1.pdf.
    \9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DHS recognized the risk posed by the evolving nature of 
these threats and created the Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office (CWMD) to coordinate DHS strategy and policy 
to plan, detect, and protect against the importation, 
possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of 
unauthorized CBRN materials, devices, or agents.\10\ 
Recognizing the importance of the office, Congress codified it 
in 2018.\11\ H.R. 1589 builds on Congress' initial legislation 
and the Department's efforts to protect the United States 
against CBRN threats.\12\ This legislation strengthens I&A's 
ability to carry out its mission to drive intelligence and 
information sharing at national, foreign, and local level 
provide critical avenues for CWMD information sharing.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\Notice of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office 
Reorganization Pursuant to Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 from Elaine Duke, Acting Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 
to Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov'l Affairs 
(Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov'l 
Affairs).
    \11\Pub. L. 115-387 (2018).
    \12\U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Counter Terrorism and Homeland 
Security Threats (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/counter-terrorism-
and-homeland-security-threats.
    \13\U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-
analysis (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 1589 requires the I&A to place appropriate focus on 
and strengthen the information sharing architecture to better 
understand and communicate the CBRN threat within the 
Department of Homeland Security and with State, local, and 
Tribal partners. The Act also requires I&A to work with the 
Intelligence Community and DHS components when analyzing CBRN 
threats, as well as other agencies and offices within DHS and 
the federal government to coordinate analysis of CBRN threats 
while using existing resources to plan for, detect, and protect 
against the unauthorized hostile use and transport of CBRN 
material. Full cooperation and coordination between DHS 
components and other federal agencies is imperative, and as 
such, the Committee directs I&A to ensure meaningful 
involvement in the coordination of analysis of CBRN threats and 
vulnerabilities.

                        III. Legislative History

    Representative Mark Walker (R-NC) introduced H.R. 1589 on 
March 7, 2019. The House of Representatives passed the Act 
under suspension of the rules by voice vote on April 1, 2019. 
The Act was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs.
    The Committee considered H.R. 1589 at a business meeting on 
November 6, 2019. Chairman Ron Johnson offered a substitute 
amendment requiring I&A to cooperate and coordinate all CBRN 
related analysis with the proper intelligence components as 
well as other department entities related to countering weapons 
of mass destruction such as the Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office, the Science and Technology Directorate, and 
the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency. The amendment 
also requires I&A to consider and analyze the full spectrum of 
CBRN threats and threat actors to the U.S. homeland.
    The Committee adopted the Johnson Amendment by voice vote 
and the Act, as amended, was reported favorably by voice en 
bloc. Senators present were Johnson, Portman, Paul, Lankford, 
Romney, Scott, Enzi, Hawley, Peters, Carper, Hassan, Sinema, 
and Rosen.

        IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported


Section 1. Short title

    This section establishes the short title of the bill as 
``CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019.''

Section 2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear intelligence 
        and information sharing

    This section requires the Secretary, acting through the 
Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, to coordinate 
analysis of CBRN threats to national security as well as 
threats from global infectious disease, and food, agriculture, 
and veterinarian derived threats to public health. I&A is also 
required to ensure that the analysis required under this Act is 
integrated with assessments of the vulnerability of and risks 
to the people, territory, key resources, and critical 
infrastructure posed by CBRN material, devices, or agents.
    I&A is required to coordinate these efforts with DHS 
intelligence components and with the CWMD Office, the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Science 
and Technology Directorate as well as state and local 
governments and authorities, including public health 
authorities. These components and entities are to provide 
information on optimal information and intelligence sharing 
practices.
    The Act requires that DHS provide a report one year after 
enactment and of this Act and annually for five years outlining 
CBRN intelligence and information sharing under this Act. The 
report should include, among other things, information on 
activities carried out to counter CBRN threats, as well as 
threats from global infectious disease.

                   V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has 
considered the regulatory impact of this Act and determined 
that the Act will have no regulatory impact within the meaning 
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional 
Budget Office's statement that the Act contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs 
on state, local, or tribal governments.

             VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                 Washington, DC, December 11, 2019.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
        Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for Department of Homeland 
Security Legislation.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Kim Cawley.
            Sincerely,
                                         Phillip L. Swagel,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

              [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    On November 6, 2019, the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs ordered reported the 
following pieces of legislation:
           H.R. 495, the Federal Information Resource 
        to Strengthen Ties with State and Local Law Enforcement 
        Act of 2019, which would require the Department of 
        Homeland Security (DHS) to submit an annual report to 
        the Congress on the department's efforts to coordinate 
        activities and share information with state, local, and 
        tribal law enforcement agencies;
           H.R. 1589, the CBRN Intelligence and 
        Information Sharing Act of 2019, which would direct DHS 
        to gather and analyze intelligence on terrorist threats 
        involving chemical, biological, radiological, and 
        nuclear (CBRN) materials and to share that information 
        with federal, state, and local authorities; and
           H.R. 2066, the DHS Intelligence Rotational 
        Assignment Program Act of 2019, which would authorize 
        DHS to permit its intelligence analysts to participate 
        in the department's in-house employee rotation program.
    DHS is currently carrying out activities similar to those 
required by the acts listed above, and any new activities 
required under the legislation would not require substantial 
action by the department. Thus, CBO estimates that implementing 
each act would not have a significant cost; any spending would 
be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    On April 23, 2019, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 
1589, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 
2019, as passed by the House of Representatives on April 1, 
2019. The two versions of the legislation are similar and CBO's 
estimate of the budgetary effects for each version are the 
same.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Kim Cawley. The 
estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

       VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows: (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is 
printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) * * *
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
is as follows:
    Sec. 1. * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Title II--Information Analysis

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 210F. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE 
                    AND INFORMATION SHARING.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBTITLE A--INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS; ACCESS TO INFORMATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 210F. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE 
                    AND INFORMATION SHARING.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the 
Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and working with 
the intelligence components of the Department, shall--
          (1) coordinate the analysis of the intentions, 
        capabilities, and plans of individuals or organizations 
        threatening or preparing to conduct attacks against the 
        homeland (including key resources and critical 
        infrastructure of the United States) involving the use 
        of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
        materials, devices, or agents;
          (2) coordinate the analysis of threats to homeland 
        security from global infectious disease and other food, 
        agricultural, or veterinary threats to public health;
          (3) ensure the integration of the analysis described 
        in paragraphs (1) and (2) with assessments of the 
        vulnerability of and risks to the people, territory, 
        key resources, and critical infrastructure of the 
        United States from chemical, biological, nuclear, and 
        radiological materials, devices, or agents;
          (4) leverage existing and emerging homeland security 
        intelligence capabilities and structures to--
                  (A) plan for, detect, and protect against the 
                importation, possession, storage, 
                transportation, development, or use of 
                unauthorized chemical, biological, 
                radiological, or nuclear materials, devices, or 
                agents in the United States; and
                  (B) protect against an attack using such 
                materials, devices, or agents against the 
                people, territory, or interests of the United 
                States;
          (5) share information and provide tailored analytical 
        support on these threats to State, local, Tribal 
        authorities and other Federal agencies, as appropriate; 
        and
          (6) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by 
        the Secretary.
    (b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Undersecretary 
for Intelligence and Analysis shall--
          (1) coordinate with--
                  (A) other Departmental components, including 
                the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 
                Office, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
                Security Agency, the Science and Technology 
                Directorate; and
                  (B) other Federal, State, local, and Tribal 
                entities, including officials from high-threat 
                urban areas, State and major urban area fusion 
                centers, and local public health departments; 
                and
          (2) enable such components and entities to provide 
        recommendations on--
                  (A) optimal information sharing mechanisms, 
                including expeditious sharing of classified 
                information; and
                  (B) how such components and entities can 
                provide information to the Undersecretary and 
                other components of the Department.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term `fusion center' 
has the meaning given the term in section 210A.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


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