[Senate Report 116-222]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 437
116th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 116-222
_______________________________________________________________________
CBRN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2019
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
to accompany
H.R. 1589
TO AMEND THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO ESTABLISH CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
SHARING FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND TO REQUIRE DISSEMINATION OF
INFORMATION ANALYZED BY THE DEPARTMENT TO ENTITIES WITH
RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO HOMELAND SECURITY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
March 2, 2020.--Ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
99-010 WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
RAND PAUL, Kentucky THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
MITT ROMNEY, Utah KAMALA D. HARRIS, California
RICK SCOTT, Florida KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Staff Director
Joseph C. Folio III, Chief Counsel
Charles Carroll, Professional Staff Member
David M. Weinberg, Minority Staff Director
Zachary I. Schram, Minority Chief Counsel
Christopher J. Mulkins, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Calendar No. 437
116th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 116-222
======================================================================
CBRN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2019
_______
March 2, 2020.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 1589]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the Act (H.R. 1589), to amend
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to establish chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear intelligence and
information sharing functions of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security and to require
dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to
entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security,
and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment in the nature of a
substitute and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................4
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................4
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................5
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................5
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Act, as Reported.............6
I. Purpose and Summary
H.R. 1589, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing
Act of 2019, requires the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to coordinate
analysis of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) threats against the United States homeland and integrate
the analysis with CBRN and global infectious disease threat
vulnerability assessments. The Act directs I&A to leverage
existing structures and offices within DHS to prevent, detect,
and deter the unauthorized hostile use of CBRN devices and
agents against the United States homeland.
The Act also requires I&A to properly coordinate with other
DHS intelligence components, agencies, and offices involved in
homeland security related CBRN defense activity in the analysis
of the threat. In addition, I&A is required to disseminate this
analysis and information to state and local governments and
authorities. Finally, DHS is required to prepare a report on
the activities carried out to accomplish the requirements of
this Act, the activities taken to counter the threat from CBRN
and global infectious disease, and the implementation status of
the Act. The report is to be provided to Congress within one
year of the enactment of this Act, and annually for five years.
II. Background and the Need for Legislation
The threat posed by individuals, nation-states, and
terrorists groups seeking to utilize illicit CBRN devices or
agents against the United States homeland is increasing. Our
nation's adversaries, including the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), are using CBRN weapons on the battlefield and
aspire to use these weapons in more attacks.\1\ According to
Department of Defense (DOD) officials, Russia, China, North
Korea, and Iran are at the forefront of the proliferation of
CBRN attacks, especially as these nation-states move away from
conventional warfare.\2\ In July 2019, Andrew Kilianski, Chief
Intelligence Officer with the Joint Program Executive Office
for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense,
DOD, highlighted the increased threat that nation-states posed,
stating that, ``What we've seen over the past few years is the
norms around chemical and biological weapon use have been
eroded almost completely.''\3\ For instance, the 2018 chemical
attack on former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal and his
daughter using a nerve agent known as Novichok in the United
Kingdom, provides an example of the increased proliferation of
such attacks and the need to obtain the intelligence and
information to mitigate these threats.\4\
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\1\Exec. Office of the President, National Strategy for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, at 1 (Dec. 2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/20181210_National-
Strategy-for-Countering-WMD-Terrorism.pdf.
\2\Yasmin Tadjdeh, CBRN Conference News: Defense Officials See
Increased Threat from Chinese, Russian Chem-Bio Weapons, National
Defense (Jul. 23, 2019), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
articles/2019/7/23/defense-officials-see-increased-threat-from-chinese-
russian-chembio-weapon.
\3\Id.
\4\Id.
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In recognition of the increasing nature and severity of
these threats, in 2018, the Administration released its
National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Terrorism and the National Biodefense Strategy, which highlight
the risks and challenges posed by CBRN weapons and the Federal
Government's efforts to mitigate these threats.\5\ Moreover,
recent incidents perpetrated by ISIS and near-peer adversaries
are the reason why, according to one expert, it is a matter of
if, not when, a CBRN attack will be used against the United
States.\6\ The barrier to entry to obtain CBRN materials is low
as materials become increasingly easier to move and serve a
legitimate role in a number of industries.\7\ Naturally
occurring biological threats, such as global infectious
diseases, as well as agricultural and veterinarian borne
threats also pose a significant risk to the United States.\8\
Addressing these threats requires coordinated analysis and
communication of the risk posed by CBRN to the United States
and its global interests abroad.\9\
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\5\Exec. Office of the President, National Strategy for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (Dec. 2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/20181210_National-
Strategy-for-Countering-WMD-Terrorism.pdf.; Exec. Office of the
President, National Biodefense Strategy (2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-
Strategy.pdf.
\6\Tadjdeh, supra note 2.
\7\U.S. Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, at 7 (Feb. 13, 2018)
(Statement for the record of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National
Intelligence), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/
Testimonies/2018-
ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.
\8\Exec. Office of the President, National Biodefense Strategy at i
(2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-
Biodefense-Strategy.pdf.; Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov'l Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019)
(statement of David J. Glawe, Under Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec.), https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Glawe-2019-
11-05-REVISED1.pdf.
\9\Id.
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DHS recognized the risk posed by the evolving nature of
these threats and created the Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office (CWMD) to coordinate DHS strategy and policy
to plan, detect, and protect against the importation,
possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of
unauthorized CBRN materials, devices, or agents.\10\
Recognizing the importance of the office, Congress codified it
in 2018.\11\ H.R. 1589 builds on Congress' initial legislation
and the Department's efforts to protect the United States
against CBRN threats.\12\ This legislation strengthens I&A's
ability to carry out its mission to drive intelligence and
information sharing at national, foreign, and local level
provide critical avenues for CWMD information sharing.\13\
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\10\Notice of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Reorganization Pursuant to Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 from Elaine Duke, Acting Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
to Ron Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov'l Affairs
(Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov'l
Affairs).
\11\Pub. L. 115-387 (2018).
\12\U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Counter Terrorism and Homeland
Security Threats (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/counter-terrorism-
and-homeland-security-threats.
\13\U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-
analysis (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
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H.R. 1589 requires the I&A to place appropriate focus on
and strengthen the information sharing architecture to better
understand and communicate the CBRN threat within the
Department of Homeland Security and with State, local, and
Tribal partners. The Act also requires I&A to work with the
Intelligence Community and DHS components when analyzing CBRN
threats, as well as other agencies and offices within DHS and
the federal government to coordinate analysis of CBRN threats
while using existing resources to plan for, detect, and protect
against the unauthorized hostile use and transport of CBRN
material. Full cooperation and coordination between DHS
components and other federal agencies is imperative, and as
such, the Committee directs I&A to ensure meaningful
involvement in the coordination of analysis of CBRN threats and
vulnerabilities.
III. Legislative History
Representative Mark Walker (R-NC) introduced H.R. 1589 on
March 7, 2019. The House of Representatives passed the Act
under suspension of the rules by voice vote on April 1, 2019.
The Act was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.
The Committee considered H.R. 1589 at a business meeting on
November 6, 2019. Chairman Ron Johnson offered a substitute
amendment requiring I&A to cooperate and coordinate all CBRN
related analysis with the proper intelligence components as
well as other department entities related to countering weapons
of mass destruction such as the Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction Office, the Science and Technology Directorate, and
the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency. The amendment
also requires I&A to consider and analyze the full spectrum of
CBRN threats and threat actors to the U.S. homeland.
The Committee adopted the Johnson Amendment by voice vote
and the Act, as amended, was reported favorably by voice en
bloc. Senators present were Johnson, Portman, Paul, Lankford,
Romney, Scott, Enzi, Hawley, Peters, Carper, Hassan, Sinema,
and Rosen.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported
Section 1. Short title
This section establishes the short title of the bill as
``CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of 2019.''
Section 2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear intelligence
and information sharing
This section requires the Secretary, acting through the
Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, to coordinate
analysis of CBRN threats to national security as well as
threats from global infectious disease, and food, agriculture,
and veterinarian derived threats to public health. I&A is also
required to ensure that the analysis required under this Act is
integrated with assessments of the vulnerability of and risks
to the people, territory, key resources, and critical
infrastructure posed by CBRN material, devices, or agents.
I&A is required to coordinate these efforts with DHS
intelligence components and with the CWMD Office, the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Science
and Technology Directorate as well as state and local
governments and authorities, including public health
authorities. These components and entities are to provide
information on optimal information and intelligence sharing
practices.
The Act requires that DHS provide a report one year after
enactment and of this Act and annually for five years outlining
CBRN intelligence and information sharing under this Act. The
report should include, among other things, information on
activities carried out to counter CBRN threats, as well as
threats from global infectious disease.
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this Act and determined
that the Act will have no regulatory impact within the meaning
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional
Budget Office's statement that the Act contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, December 11, 2019.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for Department of Homeland
Security Legislation.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Kim Cawley.
Sincerely,
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director.
Enclosure.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
On November 6, 2019, the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs ordered reported the
following pieces of legislation:
H.R. 495, the Federal Information Resource
to Strengthen Ties with State and Local Law Enforcement
Act of 2019, which would require the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to submit an annual report to
the Congress on the department's efforts to coordinate
activities and share information with state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies;
H.R. 1589, the CBRN Intelligence and
Information Sharing Act of 2019, which would direct DHS
to gather and analyze intelligence on terrorist threats
involving chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) materials and to share that information
with federal, state, and local authorities; and
H.R. 2066, the DHS Intelligence Rotational
Assignment Program Act of 2019, which would authorize
DHS to permit its intelligence analysts to participate
in the department's in-house employee rotation program.
DHS is currently carrying out activities similar to those
required by the acts listed above, and any new activities
required under the legislation would not require substantial
action by the department. Thus, CBO estimates that implementing
each act would not have a significant cost; any spending would
be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
On April 23, 2019, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R.
1589, the CBRN Intelligence and Information Sharing Act of
2019, as passed by the House of Representatives on April 1,
2019. The two versions of the legislation are similar and CBO's
estimate of the budgetary effects for each version are the
same.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Kim Cawley. The
estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows: (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is
printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) * * *
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. * * *
* * * * * * *
Title II--Information Analysis
* * * * * * *
SEC. 210F. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE
AND INFORMATION SHARING.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE A--INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS; ACCESS TO INFORMATION
* * * * * * *
SEC. 210F. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR INTELLIGENCE
AND INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) In General.--The Secretary, acting through the
Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, and working with
the intelligence components of the Department, shall--
(1) coordinate the analysis of the intentions,
capabilities, and plans of individuals or organizations
threatening or preparing to conduct attacks against the
homeland (including key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States) involving the use
of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
materials, devices, or agents;
(2) coordinate the analysis of threats to homeland
security from global infectious disease and other food,
agricultural, or veterinary threats to public health;
(3) ensure the integration of the analysis described
in paragraphs (1) and (2) with assessments of the
vulnerability of and risks to the people, territory,
key resources, and critical infrastructure of the
United States from chemical, biological, nuclear, and
radiological materials, devices, or agents;
(4) leverage existing and emerging homeland security
intelligence capabilities and structures to--
(A) plan for, detect, and protect against the
importation, possession, storage,
transportation, development, or use of
unauthorized chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear materials, devices, or
agents in the United States; and
(B) protect against an attack using such
materials, devices, or agents against the
people, territory, or interests of the United
States;
(5) share information and provide tailored analytical
support on these threats to State, local, Tribal
authorities and other Federal agencies, as appropriate;
and
(6) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by
the Secretary.
(b) Coordination.--Where appropriate, the Undersecretary
for Intelligence and Analysis shall--
(1) coordinate with--
(A) other Departmental components, including
the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Office, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency, the Science and Technology
Directorate; and
(B) other Federal, State, local, and Tribal
entities, including officials from high-threat
urban areas, State and major urban area fusion
centers, and local public health departments;
and
(2) enable such components and entities to provide
recommendations on--
(A) optimal information sharing mechanisms,
including expeditious sharing of classified
information; and
(B) how such components and entities can
provide information to the Undersecretary and
other components of the Department.
(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `fusion center'
has the meaning given the term in section 210A.
* * * * * * *
[all]