[Senate Report 116-184]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 395
116th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 16-184
_______________________________________________________________________
SECURE 5G AND BEYOND ACT OF 2019
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
on
S. 893
December 19, 2019.--Ordered to be printed
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
99-010 WASHINGTON : 2019
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
one hundred sixteenth congress
first session
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ROY BLUNT, Missouri AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
TED CRUZ, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TOM UDALL, New Mexico
CORY GARDNER, Colorado GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE LEE, Utah JON TESTER, Montana
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
TODD C. YOUNG, Indiana JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
RICK SCOTT, Florida
John Keast, Staff Director
David Strickland, Minority Staff Director
Calendar No. 395
116th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 116-184
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SECURE 5G AND BEYOND ACT OF 2019
_______
December 19, 2019.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Wicker, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 893]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to
which was referred the bill (S. 893) to require the President
to develop a strategy to ensure the security of next generation
mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure in the
United States and to assist allies and strategic partners in
maximizing the security of next generation mobile
telecommunications systems, infrastructure, and software, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports
favorably thereon with an amendment (in the nature of a
substitute) and recommends that the bill (as amended) do pass.
Purpose of the Bill
The purpose of S. 893, the Secure 5G and Beyond Act of
2019, is to require the President to develop a strategy to
ensure the security of 5th generation (5G) and other future
generations of wireless communications systems and
infrastructure in the United States, and to assist allies in
maximizing the security of their 5G and other future
generations of wireless communications systems and
infrastructure, and software.
Background and Needs
The United States and some other countries have concluded
that Chinese communications equipment vendors Huawei and ZTE
pose a national security risk,\1\ because Chinese law requires
organizations and citizens to ``support, cooperate with, and
collaborate in national intelligence work.''\2\ U.S.
communications providers have been urged to remove Huawei and
ZTE equipment from their networks to prevent cyberattacks and
other threats to the stability and reliability of the Nation's
communications systems.\3\ As early as 2012, a report issued by
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives warned of the national security threat posed by
Huawei and ZTE.\4\
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\1\See, e.g., Executive Order on Securing the Information and
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, May 15, 2019,
Executive order (https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-information-
communications-technology-services-supply-chain/); see also, Michael
Kahn and Jan Lopatka, ``Western Allies Agree 5G Security Guidelines
Warn of Outside Influence,'' Reuters, May 3, 2019 (https://
www.reuters.com/
article/us-telecoms-5g-security/western-allies-agree-5g-security-
guidelines-warn-of-outside-
influence-idUSKCN1S91D2).
\2\Michael Kahn and Jan Lopatka, ``Western Allies Agree 5G Security
Guidelines Warn of Outside Influence,'' Reuters, May 3, 2019 (https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-telecoms-5g-
security/western-allies-agree-5g-security-guidelines-warn-of-outside-
influence-idUSKCN1S91D2).
\3\Tom Cotton and John Cornyn, ``Keep the Chinese Government Away
From 5G Technology,'' Washington Post, April 1, 2019 (https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/keep-the-chinese-government-away-from-
5g-technology/2019/04/01/ba7a30ac-54b3-11e9-9136-
f8e636f1f6df_story.html?utm_term=.055accd882e0).
\4\U.S. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ``Investigative
Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese
Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE,'' October 8, 2012 (https:/
/intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=96).
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In 2018, Congress barred Federal agencies from procuring
communications services from providers that have purchased
equipment from Huawei and ZTE, and also limited the ability of
the Federal Government to provide grants, loans, and loan
guarantees to providers who intend to use that money to
purchase equipment from those same providers.\5\ On May 15,
2019, President Trump issued an Executive order prohibiting the
``acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in,
or use of any information and communications technology or
service . . . where the transaction involves any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest. . . .''\6\ On November 22, 2019, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) approved a
prohibition on the use of universal service funds to purchase
equipment or services from any communications equipment or
service providers identified as posing a national security risk
to communications networks or the communications supply
chain.\7\ The Commission also recently denied an application by
China Mobile to provide international telecommunications
services between the United States and foreign destinations,
citing ``China Mobile USA's ownership and control by the
Chinese Government.''\8\
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\5\John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, sec. 889.
\6\Executive Order 13873 (https://www.Federalregister.gov/
documents/2019/05/17/2019-10538/securing-the-information-and-
communications-technology-and-services-supply chain).
\7\Federal Communications Commission, press release, FCC Bars Use
of Universal Service Funding for Equipment & Services Posing National
Security Risks, November 22, 2019 (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DOC-360976A1.pdf).
\8\In the Matter of China Mobile International (USA) Inc.,
Application for Global Facilities-Based and Global Resale International
Telecommunications Authority Pursuant to Section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, ITC-210-20110901-00289,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 19-38, released May 10, 2019, China
Mobile Order (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-38A1.pdf).
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The U.S. Government and allies are taking steps to help
protect their communications networks from potential risks
posed by Huawei and ZTE equipment and services.\9\ Australia
and New Zealand have blocked the use of Huawei to provide the
technology for their 5G networks.\10\ Japan has effectively
banned Huawei and ZTE from official contracts, with its top
three telecom operators following suit.\11\ Canada is reviewing
its relationship with Huawei.\12\ The United Kingdom's National
Cyber Security Centre has warned of the potential threats,\13\
and British Telecom is removing Huawei equipment from key areas
of its 4G network and will not use Huawei in central parts of
its 5G network.\14\
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\9\Lenka Ponikelska, ``Countries Seek United 5G Security Approach
Amid Huawei Concerns,'' Bloomberg, May 3, 2019 (https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-03/countries-seek-united-5g-
security-approach-amid-huawei-concerns).
\10\``Huawei: Should We Be Worried About the Chinese Tech Giant?,''
BBC, March 7, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46465438).
\11\Simon Denyer, ``Japan Effectively Bans China's Huawei and ZTE
From Government Contracts, Joining U.S.,'' Washington Post, December
10, 2018 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-
effectively-bans-chinas-huawei-zte-from-government-contracts-joining-
us/2018/12/10/748fe98a-fc69-11e8-ba87-
8c7facdf6739_story.html?utm_term=.b9e4d0a33b28).
\12\``Huawei: Should We Be Worried About the Chinese Tech Giant?,''
BBC, March 7, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46465438).
\13\Alistair Bunkall, ``Huawei: Chinese Telecoms Giant `Still A
Security Threat to UK'--GCHQ,'' SkyNews, March 28, 2019 (https://
news.sky.com/story/huawei-chinese-telecoms-giant-still-a-security-
threat-to-uk-gchq-11677162).
\14\``Huawei: Should We Be Worried About the Chinese Tech Giant?,''
BBC, March 7, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46465438); see
also Alex Hern, ``BT Removing Huawei Equipment From Parts of 4G
Network,'' The Guardian, December 5, 2018 (https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/dec/05/bt-removing-huawei-equipment-from-parts-of-4g-
network).
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Yet although there is significant international concern
about the national security implications of the use of Huawei
and ZTE equipment, not all countries have limited the use of
those companies' equipment in their domestic communications
networks.\15\ Furthermore, there is concern about the
availability of alternative secure communications
infrastructure and software for use in U.S. and international
wireless networks.\16\ Many have argued it would be helpful for
the Federal Government to develop a single unified strategy for
how to deal with the national security implications related to
Huawei and ZTE, both within domestic communications networks
and in the Nation's international diplomatic relationships.\17\
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\15\See Alexander Cornwell, ``Bahrain to Use Huawei in 5G Rollout
Despite U.S. Warnings,'' Reuters, March 26, 2019 (https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-security-bahrain/bahrain-to-use-
huawei-in-5g-rollout-despite-us-warnings-idUSKCN1R71B3); see Philip
Blenkinsop, ``Belgian Cybersecurity Agency Finds No Threat From
Huawei,'' Reuters, April 15, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
huawei-tech-security-belgium/belgian-cybersecurity-agency-finds-no-
threat-from-huawei-idUSKCN1RR1GP); see Mathieu Rosemain, Gwenaelle
Barzic and Elizabeth Pineau, ``French Senate Rejects Tougher Telecoms
Controls Despite U.S. Huawei Warning,'' Reuters, February 6, 2019
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-europe-france/french-senate-
rejects-tougher-telecoms-controls-despite-u-s-huawei-warning-
idUSKCN1PV2B8); see Stephen Jewkes and Giselda Vagnoni, ``Italy Denies
It Will Ban Huawei, ZTE From Its 5G Plans,'' Reuters, February 7, 2019
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-europe-italy/italy-
denies-it-will-ban-huawei-zte-from-its-5g-plans-idUSKCN1PW0LV); see
Victoria Klesty, ``Norway Will Not Ban Huawei From 5G Mobile Network:
Minister,'' Reuters, September 26, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-norway-huawei-tech/norway-will-not-ban-huawei-from-5g-
mobile-network-minister-idUSKBN1WB15G); see Patpicha Tanakasempipat,
``Thailand Launches Huawei 5G Test Bed, Even as U.S. Urges Allies To
Bar Chinese Gear,'' Reuters, February 8, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-huawei-thailand/thailand-launches-huawei-5g-test-bed-even-
as-u-s-urges-allies-to-bar-chinese-gear-idUSKCN1PX0DY); see Alexander
Cornwell, ``U.S. Flags Huawei 5G Network Security Concerns to Gulf
Allies,'' Reuters, September 12, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-huawei-security-usa-gulf/u-s-flags-huawei-5g-network-
security-concerns-to-gulf-allies-idUSKCN1VX241); see Alexander
Cornwell, ``UAE's Du Says U.S. Ban on Huawei Not an Issue for 5G
Network,'' Reuters, July 24, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
huawei-security-du/uaes-du-says-u-s-ban-on-huawei-not-an-issue-for-5g-
network-idUSKCN1UJ13I).
\16\See Brian Fung, ``How China's Huawei Took the Lead Over U.S.
Companies in 5G Technology,'' The Washington Post, April 10, 2019
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/us-spat-with-
huawei-explained/); see Eric Jhonsa, ``Huawei's Work on Alternatives to
U.S. Tech--And the Challenges They Face,'' Real Money, August 30, 2019
(https://realmoney.thestreet.com/investing/technology/huawei-s-work-on-
alternatives-to-u-s-tech-and-the-challenges-they-face-15072796).
\17\See Jacqueline Thomsen, ``Key Senators Say Administration
Should Ban Huawei Tech in US Electric Grid,'' The Hill, February 25,
2019 (https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/431427-senators-request-
trump-admin-consider-ban-on-huawei-tech-in-us-electric); see Adam
Segal, ``The Right Way to Deal With Huawei: The United States Needs to
Compete With Chinese Firms, Not Just Ban Them,'' Foreign Affairs, July
11, 2019 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-07-11/
right-way-deal-huawei).
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Summary of Provisions
S. 893 would do the following:
Require the President of the United States to
develop a Federal Government-wide strategy to ensure
the security of the Nation's next-generation--and
future generations--wireless telecommunications systems
and infrastructure.
Direct the U.S. Government to assist allies and
strategic partners in maximizing the security of next-
generation wireless telecommunications systems,
infrastructure, and software.
Legislative History
S. 893 was introduced on March 27, 2019, by Senator Cornyn
(for himself and Senators Burr, Warner, Collins, Rubio, Bennet,
Cotton, and Feinstein) and was referred to the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
Senators Blackburn, Murphy, and Sullivan are additional
cosponsors. On July 24, 2019, the Committee met in open
Executive Session and, by voice vote, ordered S. 893 reported
favorably with an amendment (in the nature of a substitute)
offered by Senator Wicker. The Committee also adopted two
additional amendments related to the bill. The first, offered
by Senator Lee, would provide that the strategy developed
pursuant to the bill shall include the provision of technical
assistance to other countries to maximize the security of 5th
and future generations wireless communications systems and
infrastructure. The second, offered by Senator Cruz, would
require that the strategy include identification and assessment
of the global competitiveness and vulnerabilities of United
States manufacturers and suppliers of 5th and future
generations wireless communications equipment, and identify
incentives and policy options to ensure the economic viability
of the U.S. domestic industrial base.
Similar legislation, H.R. 2881, is pending in the House of
Representatives. On May 21, 2019, H.R. 2881 was introduced by
Representative Spanberger (D-VA) (for herself and
Representatives Stefanik (R-NY), Slotkin (D-MI), Rooney (R-FL),
O'Halleran (D-AZ), and Brooks (R-IN)) and was referred to the
Committees on Energy and Commerce, and Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives.
Estimated Costs
In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office:
S. 893 would require the President, acting through the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) and other federal agencies, to develop and submit to the
Congress a strategy to ensure the security of 5G and future
generations wireless communications systems and infrastructure
owned by the United States and its allies. Among various other
requirements, the NTIA would have to assess potential security
threats to American 5G systems and infrastructure and analyze
how competitive American 5G manufacturers and suppliers are
globally.
Using information from the NTIA, CBO estimates that
implementing S. 893 would cost $1 million for the interagency
group to formulate the strategy. Such spending would be subject
to the availability of appropriated funds. CBO expects that
NTIA would coordinate the interagency group and complete the
strategy in 2020. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
would incur insignificant costs to help formulate the strategy.
However, because the FCC is authorized under current law to
collect fees sufficient to offset the appropriated costs of its
regulatory activities each year, CBO estimates that the net
cost to the FCC would be negligible, assuming appropriation
actions consistent with that authority.
If the FCC increases annual fee collections to offset the
costs of implementing provisions in the bill, S. 893 would
increase the cost of an existing private-sector mandate on
entities required to pay those fees. Using information from the
FCC, CBO estimates that the incremental cost of the mandate
would be small and would fall well below the annual threshold
established in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) for
private-sector mandates ($164 million in 2019, adjusted
annually for inflation).
The bill contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined
in UMRA.
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are David Hughes
(for federal costs) and Rachel Austin (for mandates). The
estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Regulatory Impact Statement
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the
legislation, as reported:
number of persons covered
The number of persons covered by S. 893 would be consistent
with current levels. S. 893 would have no effect on the number
or types of individuals and businesses regulated.
economic impact
S. 893 would have no economic impact. By promoting more
secure deployment of next-generation communications throughout
the United States and the world, the bill would allow the
Nation to extend its technology leadership in the next
generation of communications technology and promote investment
and innovation.
privacy
S. 893 would not have any adverse impact on the personal
privacy of affected individuals.
paperwork
The Committee does not anticipate a major increase in
paperwork burdens resulting from the passage of this
legislation. The bill, as reported, would direct a broad group
of Federal stakeholders to prepare a whole-of-government
strategy concerning the security of 5th and future generations
wireless communications systems and infrastructure and various
other issues. The bill would direct the stakeholders to prepare
and submit a report to Congress outlining the strategy within
180 days of the enactment of the bill.
Congressionally Directed Spending
In compliance with paragraph 4(b) of rule XLIV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides that no
provisions contained in the bill, as reported, meet the
definition of congressionally directed spending items under the
rule.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title
This section would provide that the bill may be cited as
the ``Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2019''.
Section 2. Strategy to ensure security of next generation wireless
communications systems and infrastructure
Subsection (a) of this section would define the term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' for purposes of the
bill.
Subsections (b) and (c) of this section would require the
President, in consultation with various other Federal
officials, to develop and submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress within 180 days of enactment a ``Secure Next
Generation Wireless Communications Strategy'' to do the
following:
Ensure the security of 5th generation (5G) and
future generations of U.S. wireless communications
systems and infrastructure.
Provide technical assistance to U.S. mutual defense
treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries,
when in the security interests of the United States, to
maximize the security of 5G and future generations of
wireless communications systems and infrastructure
inside their countries.
Protect the competitiveness of U.S. companies, the
privacy of U.S. consumers, and the integrity and
impartiality of standards-setting bodies related to 5G
and future generations of wireless communications
systems and infrastructure.
Subsection (d) of this section would require that the
strategy represent a whole-of-government approach to the issues
set forth in section 2(b). The subsection then outlines 19
elements that would need to be included in the strategy as
follows:
(1) A description of U.S. national and economic security
interests pertaining to the deployment of 5G and future
generations of wireless communications systems and
infrastructure.
(2) An identification and assessment of potential security
threats and vulnerabilities to the infrastructure, equipment,
systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support
5G and future generations of wireless communications systems
and infrastructure. This assessment would also include a
comprehensive evaluation of the full range of threats to, and
unique security challenges posed by such systems and
infrastructure, as well as steps that public and private sector
entities can take to mitigate such threats. The Committee
intends for this evaluation to include a detailed discussion of
the cybersecurity issues posed by the deployment and use of
such systems and infrastructure.
(3) An identification and assessment of the global
competitiveness and vulnerabilities of U.S. manufacturers and
suppliers of 5G and future generations of wireless
communications equipment.
(4) A list of domestic suppliers of 5G and future
generations of wireless communications equipment and other
suppliers in countries that are mutual defense allies or
strategic partners as well as a strategy to assess their
ability to produce and supply such systems and infrastructure.
(5) Identification of trusted supplier entities from both
inside and outside of the United States that are capable of
producing and supplying to private industry infrastructure and
systems equipment supporting 5G and future generations of
wireless communications systems and infrastructure.
(6) Identification of where security gaps exist in the
domestic or mutual defense treaty allies and strategic partner
communications equipment supply chain for 5G and future
generations wireless communications systems and infrastructure.
(7) Identification of incentives and policy options to help
close or narrow any security gaps in, and ensure the economic
viability of, the U.S. domestic industrial base, including
research and development in critical technologies and workforce
development in 5G and future generations wireless
communications systems and infrastructure.
(8) Identification of incentives and policy options for
leveraging the communications equipment suppliers from mutual
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, or other countries
to ensure that U.S. private industry has adequate sources for
secure, effective, and reliable 5G and future generations of
wireless communications systems and infrastructure equipment.
(9) A strategy for diplomatic engagement with mutual
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries
to share security risk information and findings pertaining to
5G and future generations wireless communications systems and
infrastructure equipment and cooperation on mitigating those
risks.
(10) A strategy for engagement with private sector
communications infrastructure and systems equipment developers
to share information and findings on 5G and future generations
wireless communications systems and infrastructure equipment
standards to secure platforms.
(11) A strategy for engagement with private sector
communications infrastructure and systems equipment developers
to encourage the maximum participation possible on standards-
setting bodies related to such systems and infrastructure
equipment standards by U.S. public and private sector entities.
(12) A strategy for diplomatic engagement with mutual
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries
to share information and findings on 5G and future generations
wireless communications systems and infrastructure equipment
standards to promote maximum interoperability, competitiveness,
openness, and secure platforms.
(13) A strategy for diplomatic engagement with mutual
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries
to share information and findings on 5G and future generations
wireless communications infrastructure and systems equipment
concerning the standards-setting bodies related to such systems
and infrastructure to promote maximum transparency, openness,
impartiality, integrity, and neutrality.
(14) A strategy for joint testing environments with mutual
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries
to ensure a trusted marketplace for 5G and future generations
wireless communications systems and infrastructure equipment.
(15) A strategy for research and development by the Federal
Government, in close partnership with trusted supplier
entities, mutual defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and
other countries to reach and maintain U.S. leadership in 5G and
future generations wireless communications systems and
infrastructure security, including the development of an
ongoing monitoring capability for such systems to identify
security vulnerabilities.
(16) Options for identifying and helping to mitigate the
security risks of 5G and future generations wireless
communications systems and infrastructure that have security
flaws or vulnerabilities, or are utilizing equipment sourced
from countries of concern, and that have already been put in
place within the systems and infrastructure of mutual defense
treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries, when in
U.S. security interests.
(17) Development of a plan that includes a description of
the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the appropriate
executive branch agencies and interagency mechanisms for the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration to
act as the executive agent to coordinate implementation of the
strategy consistent with section 2(g).
(18) An identification of the key diplomatic, development,
intelligence, military, and economic resources necessary to
implement the strategy, including specific budgetary requests.
(19) A description of such legislative or administrative
action as may be necessary to carry out the strategy.
Subsection (e) of this section would prohibit the strategy
from including a recommendation or proposal to federalize 5G or
future generations of wireless telecommunications systems or
infrastructure. This subsection would further make clear that
nothing in the subsection shall be construed to limit the
authority or ability of a Federal agency to do the following:
Conduct cybersecurity incident, threat, or
asset response and recovery activities;
Obtain or execute warrants or other
investigative or intelligence tools; or
Provide assistance to a private entity upon
the request of such entity.
Subsection (f) of this section would require the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, and
other Federal officials as designated by the President, to
provide the appropriate committees of Congress with a briefing
on the implementation of the strategy within 14 days of its
completion. The briefing would need to be held in an
unclassified setting to the maximum extent possible.
Subsection (g) of this section would designate the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration as the
executive agent to coordinate implementation of the strategy
and keep Congress apprised of progress on implementation. The
Committee intends for such coordination activity to be
performed in due regard of the fact that the FCC (one of the
participants in the development of the strategy) is an
independent agency subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, not
the executive branch.
Subsection (h) of this section would specify that the
strategy must be submitted to Congress in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the
bill as reported would make no change to existing law.