[Senate Report 116-184]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       Calendar No. 395
                                                       
                                                       
116th Congress  }                                           {   Report
                                 SENATE                          
1st Session    }                                            {    16-184
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                                       



                   SECURE 5G AND BEYOND ACT OF 2019

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

           COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                                   on

                                 S. 893




               December 19, 2019.--Ordered to be printed
               
                             ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 99-010                WASHINGTON : 2019
              
               
               
               
       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                     one hundred sixteenth congress
                           first session

                 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, Chairman
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota             MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
TED CRUZ, Texas                      RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 TOM UDALL, New Mexico
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE LEE, Utah                       JON TESTER, Montana
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona
TODD C. YOUNG, Indiana               JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
RICK SCOTT, Florida
                       John Keast, Staff Director
               David Strickland, Minority Staff Director


                                                       Calendar No. 395
                                                       
                                                       
116th Congress   }                                            {    Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session     }                                            {   116-184

======================================================================



 
                    SECURE 5G AND BEYOND ACT OF 2019

                                _______
                                

               December 19, 2019.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

       Mr. Wicker, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                Transportation, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 893]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to 
which was referred the bill (S. 893) to require the President 
to develop a strategy to ensure the security of next generation 
mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure in the 
United States and to assist allies and strategic partners in 
maximizing the security of next generation mobile 
telecommunications systems, infrastructure, and software, and 
for other purposes, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon with an amendment (in the nature of a 
substitute) and recommends that the bill (as amended) do pass.

                          Purpose of the Bill

    The purpose of S. 893, the Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 
2019, is to require the President to develop a strategy to 
ensure the security of 5th generation (5G) and other future 
generations of wireless communications systems and 
infrastructure in the United States, and to assist allies in 
maximizing the security of their 5G and other future 
generations of wireless communications systems and 
infrastructure, and software.

                          Background and Needs

    The United States and some other countries have concluded 
that Chinese communications equipment vendors Huawei and ZTE 
pose a national security risk,\1\ because Chinese law requires 
organizations and citizens to ``support, cooperate with, and 
collaborate in national intelligence work.''\2\ U.S. 
communications providers have been urged to remove Huawei and 
ZTE equipment from their networks to prevent cyberattacks and 
other threats to the stability and reliability of the Nation's 
communications systems.\3\ As early as 2012, a report issued by 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives warned of the national security threat posed by 
Huawei and ZTE.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\See, e.g., Executive Order on Securing the Information and 
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, May 15, 2019, 
Executive order (https://www.whitehouse.gov/
presidential-actions/executive-order-securing-information-
communications-technology-services-supply-chain/); see also, Michael 
Kahn and Jan Lopatka, ``Western Allies Agree 5G Security Guidelines 
Warn of Outside Influence,'' Reuters, May 3, 2019 (https://
www.reuters.com/
article/us-telecoms-5g-security/western-allies-agree-5g-security-
guidelines-warn-of-outside-
influence-idUSKCN1S91D2).
    \2\Michael Kahn and Jan Lopatka, ``Western Allies Agree 5G Security 
Guidelines Warn of Outside Influence,'' Reuters, May 3, 2019 (https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-telecoms-5g-
security/western-allies-agree-5g-security-guidelines-warn-of-outside-
influence-idUSKCN1S91D2).
    \3\Tom Cotton and John Cornyn, ``Keep the Chinese Government Away 
From 5G Technology,'' Washington Post, April 1, 2019 (https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/keep-the-chinese-government-away-from-
5g-technology/2019/04/01/ba7a30ac-54b3-11e9-9136-
f8e636f1f6df_story.html?utm_term=.055accd882e0).
    \4\U.S. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ``Investigative 
Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese 
Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE,'' October 8, 2012 (https:/
/intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=96).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2018, Congress barred Federal agencies from procuring 
communications services from providers that have purchased 
equipment from Huawei and ZTE, and also limited the ability of 
the Federal Government to provide grants, loans, and loan 
guarantees to providers who intend to use that money to 
purchase equipment from those same providers.\5\ On May 15, 
2019, President Trump issued an Executive order prohibiting the 
``acquisition, importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, 
or use of any information and communications technology or 
service . . . where the transaction involves any property in 
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any 
interest. . . .''\6\ On November 22, 2019, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) approved a 
prohibition on the use of universal service funds to purchase 
equipment or services from any communications equipment or 
service providers identified as posing a national security risk 
to communications networks or the communications supply 
chain.\7\ The Commission also recently denied an application by 
China Mobile to provide international telecommunications 
services between the United States and foreign destinations, 
citing ``China Mobile USA's ownership and control by the 
Chinese Government.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, sec. 889.
    \6\Executive Order 13873 (https://www.Federalregister.gov/
documents/2019/05/17/2019-10538/securing-the-information-and-
communications-technology-and-services-supply chain).
    \7\Federal Communications Commission, press release, FCC Bars Use 
of Universal Service Funding for Equipment & Services Posing National 
Security Risks, November 22, 2019 (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/
attachments/DOC-360976A1.pdf).
    \8\In the Matter of China Mobile International (USA) Inc., 
Application for Global Facilities-Based and Global Resale International 
Telecommunications Authority Pursuant to Section 214 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, ITC-210-20110901-00289, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 19-38, released May 10, 2019, China 
Mobile Order (https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-38A1.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Government and allies are taking steps to help 
protect their communications networks from potential risks 
posed by Huawei and ZTE equipment and services.\9\ Australia 
and New Zealand have blocked the use of Huawei to provide the 
technology for their 5G networks.\10\ Japan has effectively 
banned Huawei and ZTE from official contracts, with its top 
three telecom operators following suit.\11\ Canada is reviewing 
its relationship with Huawei.\12\ The United Kingdom's National 
Cyber Security Centre has warned of the potential threats,\13\ 
and British Telecom is removing Huawei equipment from key areas 
of its 4G network and will not use Huawei in central parts of 
its 5G network.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\Lenka Ponikelska, ``Countries Seek United 5G Security Approach 
Amid Huawei Concerns,'' Bloomberg, May 3, 2019 (https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-03/countries-seek-united-5g-
security-approach-amid-huawei-concerns).
    \10\``Huawei: Should We Be Worried About the Chinese Tech Giant?,'' 
BBC, March 7, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46465438).
    \11\Simon Denyer, ``Japan Effectively Bans China's Huawei and ZTE 
From Government Contracts, Joining U.S.,'' Washington Post, December 
10, 2018 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-
effectively-bans-chinas-huawei-zte-from-government-contracts-joining-
us/2018/12/10/748fe98a-fc69-11e8-ba87-
8c7facdf6739_story.html?utm_term=.b9e4d0a33b28).
    \12\``Huawei: Should We Be Worried About the Chinese Tech Giant?,'' 
BBC, March 7, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46465438).
    \13\Alistair Bunkall, ``Huawei: Chinese Telecoms Giant `Still A 
Security Threat to UK'--GCHQ,'' SkyNews, March 28, 2019 (https://
news.sky.com/story/huawei-chinese-telecoms-giant-still-a-security-
threat-to-uk-gchq-11677162).
    \14\``Huawei: Should We Be Worried About the Chinese Tech Giant?,'' 
BBC, March 7, 2019 (https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46465438); see 
also Alex Hern, ``BT Removing Huawei Equipment From Parts of 4G 
Network,'' The Guardian, December 5, 2018 (https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/dec/05/bt-removing-huawei-equipment-from-parts-of-4g-
network).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet although there is significant international concern 
about the national security implications of the use of Huawei 
and ZTE equipment, not all countries have limited the use of 
those companies' equipment in their domestic communications 
networks.\15\ Furthermore, there is concern about the 
availability of alternative secure communications 
infrastructure and software for use in U.S. and international 
wireless networks.\16\ Many have argued it would be helpful for 
the Federal Government to develop a single unified strategy for 
how to deal with the national security implications related to 
Huawei and ZTE, both within domestic communications networks 
and in the Nation's international diplomatic relationships.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\See Alexander Cornwell, ``Bahrain to Use Huawei in 5G Rollout 
Despite U.S. Warnings,'' Reuters, March 26, 2019 (https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-security-bahrain/bahrain-to-use-
huawei-in-5g-rollout-despite-us-warnings-idUSKCN1R71B3); see Philip 
Blenkinsop, ``Belgian Cybersecurity Agency Finds No Threat From 
Huawei,'' Reuters, April 15, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
huawei-tech-security-belgium/belgian-cybersecurity-agency-finds-no-
threat-from-huawei-idUSKCN1RR1GP); see Mathieu Rosemain, Gwenaelle 
Barzic and Elizabeth Pineau, ``French Senate Rejects Tougher Telecoms 
Controls Despite U.S. Huawei Warning,'' Reuters, February 6, 2019 
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-europe-france/french-senate-
rejects-tougher-telecoms-controls-despite-u-s-huawei-warning-
idUSKCN1PV2B8); see Stephen Jewkes and Giselda Vagnoni, ``Italy Denies 
It Will Ban Huawei, ZTE From Its 5G Plans,'' Reuters, February 7, 2019 
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-europe-italy/italy-
denies-it-will-ban-huawei-zte-from-its-5g-plans-idUSKCN1PW0LV); see 
Victoria Klesty, ``Norway Will Not Ban Huawei From 5G Mobile Network: 
Minister,'' Reuters, September 26, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-norway-huawei-tech/norway-will-not-ban-huawei-from-5g-
mobile-network-minister-idUSKBN1WB15G); see Patpicha Tanakasempipat, 
``Thailand Launches Huawei 5G Test Bed, Even as U.S. Urges Allies To 
Bar Chinese Gear,'' Reuters, February 8, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-huawei-thailand/thailand-launches-huawei-5g-test-bed-even-
as-u-s-urges-allies-to-bar-chinese-gear-idUSKCN1PX0DY); see Alexander 
Cornwell, ``U.S. Flags Huawei 5G Network Security Concerns to Gulf 
Allies,'' Reuters, September 12, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-huawei-security-usa-gulf/u-s-flags-huawei-5g-network-
security-concerns-to-gulf-allies-idUSKCN1VX241); see Alexander 
Cornwell, ``UAE's Du Says U.S. Ban on Huawei Not an Issue for 5G 
Network,'' Reuters, July 24, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
huawei-security-du/uaes-du-says-u-s-ban-on-huawei-not-an-issue-for-5g-
network-idUSKCN1UJ13I).
    \16\See Brian Fung, ``How China's Huawei Took the Lead Over U.S. 
Companies in 5G Technology,'' The Washington Post, April 10, 2019 
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/04/10/us-spat-with-
huawei-explained/); see Eric Jhonsa, ``Huawei's Work on Alternatives to 
U.S. Tech--And the Challenges They Face,'' Real Money, August 30, 2019 
(https://realmoney.thestreet.com/investing/technology/huawei-s-work-on-
alternatives-to-u-s-tech-and-the-challenges-they-face-15072796).
    \17\See Jacqueline Thomsen, ``Key Senators Say Administration 
Should Ban Huawei Tech in US Electric Grid,'' The Hill, February 25, 
2019 (https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/431427-senators-request-
trump-admin-consider-ban-on-huawei-tech-in-us-electric); see Adam 
Segal, ``The Right Way to Deal With Huawei: The United States Needs to 
Compete With Chinese Firms, Not Just Ban Them,'' Foreign Affairs, July 
11, 2019 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-07-11/
right-way-deal-huawei).
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                         Summary of Provisions

    S. 893 would do the following:
   Require the President of the United States to 
        develop a Federal Government-wide strategy to ensure 
        the security of the Nation's next-generation--and 
        future generations--wireless telecommunications systems 
        and infrastructure.
   Direct the U.S. Government to assist allies and 
        strategic partners in maximizing the security of next-
        generation wireless telecommunications systems, 
        infrastructure, and software.

                          Legislative History

    S. 893 was introduced on March 27, 2019, by Senator Cornyn 
(for himself and Senators Burr, Warner, Collins, Rubio, Bennet, 
Cotton, and Feinstein) and was referred to the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate. 
Senators Blackburn, Murphy, and Sullivan are additional 
cosponsors. On July 24, 2019, the Committee met in open 
Executive Session and, by voice vote, ordered S. 893 reported 
favorably with an amendment (in the nature of a substitute) 
offered by Senator Wicker. The Committee also adopted two 
additional amendments related to the bill. The first, offered 
by Senator Lee, would provide that the strategy developed 
pursuant to the bill shall include the provision of technical 
assistance to other countries to maximize the security of 5th 
and future generations wireless communications systems and 
infrastructure. The second, offered by Senator Cruz, would 
require that the strategy include identification and assessment 
of the global competitiveness and vulnerabilities of United 
States manufacturers and suppliers of 5th and future 
generations wireless communications equipment, and identify 
incentives and policy options to ensure the economic viability 
of the U.S. domestic industrial base.
    Similar legislation, H.R. 2881, is pending in the House of 
Representatives. On May 21, 2019, H.R. 2881 was introduced by 
Representative Spanberger (D-VA) (for herself and 
Representatives Stefanik (R-NY), Slotkin (D-MI), Rooney (R-FL), 
O'Halleran (D-AZ), and Brooks (R-IN)) and was referred to the 
Committees on Energy and Commerce, and Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives.

                            Estimated Costs

    In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the 
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget 
Office:




    S. 893 would require the President, acting through the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) and other federal agencies, to develop and submit to the 
Congress a strategy to ensure the security of 5G and future 
generations wireless communications systems and infrastructure 
owned by the United States and its allies. Among various other 
requirements, the NTIA would have to assess potential security 
threats to American 5G systems and infrastructure and analyze 
how competitive American 5G manufacturers and suppliers are 
globally.
    Using information from the NTIA, CBO estimates that 
implementing S. 893 would cost $1 million for the interagency 
group to formulate the strategy. Such spending would be subject 
to the availability of appropriated funds. CBO expects that 
NTIA would coordinate the interagency group and complete the 
strategy in 2020. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
would incur insignificant costs to help formulate the strategy. 
However, because the FCC is authorized under current law to 
collect fees sufficient to offset the appropriated costs of its 
regulatory activities each year, CBO estimates that the net 
cost to the FCC would be negligible, assuming appropriation 
actions consistent with that authority.
    If the FCC increases annual fee collections to offset the 
costs of implementing provisions in the bill, S. 893 would 
increase the cost of an existing private-sector mandate on 
entities required to pay those fees. Using information from the 
FCC, CBO estimates that the incremental cost of the mandate 
would be small and would fall well below the annual threshold 
established in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) for 
private-sector mandates ($164 million in 2019, adjusted 
annually for inflation).
    The bill contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined 
in UMRA.
    The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are David Hughes 
(for federal costs) and Rachel Austin (for mandates). The 
estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                      Regulatory Impact Statement

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the 
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the 
legislation, as reported:

                       number of persons covered

    The number of persons covered by S. 893 would be consistent 
with current levels. S. 893 would have no effect on the number 
or types of individuals and businesses regulated.

                            economic impact

    S. 893 would have no economic impact. By promoting more 
secure deployment of next-generation communications throughout 
the United States and the world, the bill would allow the 
Nation to extend its technology leadership in the next 
generation of communications technology and promote investment 
and innovation.

                                privacy

    S. 893 would not have any adverse impact on the personal 
privacy of affected individuals.

                               paperwork

    The Committee does not anticipate a major increase in 
paperwork burdens resulting from the passage of this 
legislation. The bill, as reported, would direct a broad group 
of Federal stakeholders to prepare a whole-of-government 
strategy concerning the security of 5th and future generations 
wireless communications systems and infrastructure and various 
other issues. The bill would direct the stakeholders to prepare 
and submit a report to Congress outlining the strategy within 
180 days of the enactment of the bill.

                   Congressionally Directed Spending

    In compliance with paragraph 4(b) of rule XLIV of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides that no 
provisions contained in the bill, as reported, meet the 
definition of congressionally directed spending items under the 
rule.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis


Section 1. Short title

    This section would provide that the bill may be cited as 
the ``Secure 5G and Beyond Act of 2019''.

Section 2. Strategy to ensure security of next generation wireless 
        communications systems and infrastructure

    Subsection (a) of this section would define the term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' for purposes of the 
bill.
    Subsections (b) and (c) of this section would require the 
President, in consultation with various other Federal 
officials, to develop and submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress within 180 days of enactment a ``Secure Next 
Generation Wireless Communications Strategy'' to do the 
following:
   Ensure the security of 5th generation (5G) and 
        future generations of U.S. wireless communications 
        systems and infrastructure.
   Provide technical assistance to U.S. mutual defense 
        treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries, 
        when in the security interests of the United States, to 
        maximize the security of 5G and future generations of 
        wireless communications systems and infrastructure 
        inside their countries.
   Protect the competitiveness of U.S. companies, the 
        privacy of U.S. consumers, and the integrity and 
        impartiality of standards-setting bodies related to 5G 
        and future generations of wireless communications 
        systems and infrastructure.
    Subsection (d) of this section would require that the 
strategy represent a whole-of-government approach to the issues 
set forth in section 2(b). The subsection then outlines 19 
elements that would need to be included in the strategy as 
follows:
    (1) A description of U.S. national and economic security 
interests pertaining to the deployment of 5G and future 
generations of wireless communications systems and 
infrastructure.
    (2) An identification and assessment of potential security 
threats and vulnerabilities to the infrastructure, equipment, 
systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 
5G and future generations of wireless communications systems 
and infrastructure. This assessment would also include a 
comprehensive evaluation of the full range of threats to, and 
unique security challenges posed by such systems and 
infrastructure, as well as steps that public and private sector 
entities can take to mitigate such threats. The Committee 
intends for this evaluation to include a detailed discussion of 
the cybersecurity issues posed by the deployment and use of 
such systems and infrastructure.
    (3) An identification and assessment of the global 
competitiveness and vulnerabilities of U.S. manufacturers and 
suppliers of 5G and future generations of wireless 
communications equipment.
    (4) A list of domestic suppliers of 5G and future 
generations of wireless communications equipment and other 
suppliers in countries that are mutual defense allies or 
strategic partners as well as a strategy to assess their 
ability to produce and supply such systems and infrastructure.
    (5) Identification of trusted supplier entities from both 
inside and outside of the United States that are capable of 
producing and supplying to private industry infrastructure and 
systems equipment supporting 5G and future generations of 
wireless communications systems and infrastructure.
    (6) Identification of where security gaps exist in the 
domestic or mutual defense treaty allies and strategic partner 
communications equipment supply chain for 5G and future 
generations wireless communications systems and infrastructure.
    (7) Identification of incentives and policy options to help 
close or narrow any security gaps in, and ensure the economic 
viability of, the U.S. domestic industrial base, including 
research and development in critical technologies and workforce 
development in 5G and future generations wireless 
communications systems and infrastructure.
    (8) Identification of incentives and policy options for 
leveraging the communications equipment suppliers from mutual 
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, or other countries 
to ensure that U.S. private industry has adequate sources for 
secure, effective, and reliable 5G and future generations of 
wireless communications systems and infrastructure equipment.
    (9) A strategy for diplomatic engagement with mutual 
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries 
to share security risk information and findings pertaining to 
5G and future generations wireless communications systems and 
infrastructure equipment and cooperation on mitigating those 
risks.
    (10) A strategy for engagement with private sector 
communications infrastructure and systems equipment developers 
to share information and findings on 5G and future generations 
wireless communications systems and infrastructure equipment 
standards to secure platforms.
    (11) A strategy for engagement with private sector 
communications infrastructure and systems equipment developers 
to encourage the maximum participation possible on standards-
setting bodies related to such systems and infrastructure 
equipment standards by U.S. public and private sector entities.
    (12) A strategy for diplomatic engagement with mutual 
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries 
to share information and findings on 5G and future generations 
wireless communications systems and infrastructure equipment 
standards to promote maximum interoperability, competitiveness, 
openness, and secure platforms.
    (13) A strategy for diplomatic engagement with mutual 
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries 
to share information and findings on 5G and future generations 
wireless communications infrastructure and systems equipment 
concerning the standards-setting bodies related to such systems 
and infrastructure to promote maximum transparency, openness, 
impartiality, integrity, and neutrality.
    (14) A strategy for joint testing environments with mutual 
defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries 
to ensure a trusted marketplace for 5G and future generations 
wireless communications systems and infrastructure equipment.
    (15) A strategy for research and development by the Federal 
Government, in close partnership with trusted supplier 
entities, mutual defense treaty allies, strategic partners, and 
other countries to reach and maintain U.S. leadership in 5G and 
future generations wireless communications systems and 
infrastructure security, including the development of an 
ongoing monitoring capability for such systems to identify 
security vulnerabilities.
    (16) Options for identifying and helping to mitigate the 
security risks of 5G and future generations wireless 
communications systems and infrastructure that have security 
flaws or vulnerabilities, or are utilizing equipment sourced 
from countries of concern, and that have already been put in 
place within the systems and infrastructure of mutual defense 
treaty allies, strategic partners, and other countries, when in 
U.S. security interests.
    (17) Development of a plan that includes a description of 
the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the appropriate 
executive branch agencies and interagency mechanisms for the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration to 
act as the executive agent to coordinate implementation of the 
strategy consistent with section 2(g).
    (18) An identification of the key diplomatic, development, 
intelligence, military, and economic resources necessary to 
implement the strategy, including specific budgetary requests.
    (19) A description of such legislative or administrative 
action as may be necessary to carry out the strategy.
    Subsection (e) of this section would prohibit the strategy 
from including a recommendation or proposal to federalize 5G or 
future generations of wireless telecommunications systems or 
infrastructure. This subsection would further make clear that 
nothing in the subsection shall be construed to limit the 
authority or ability of a Federal agency to do the following:
           Conduct cybersecurity incident, threat, or 
        asset response and recovery activities;
           Obtain or execute warrants or other 
        investigative or intelligence tools; or
           Provide assistance to a private entity upon 
        the request of such entity.
    Subsection (f) of this section would require the Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, and 
other Federal officials as designated by the President, to 
provide the appropriate committees of Congress with a briefing 
on the implementation of the strategy within 14 days of its 
completion. The briefing would need to be held in an 
unclassified setting to the maximum extent possible.
    Subsection (g) of this section would designate the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration as the 
executive agent to coordinate implementation of the strategy 
and keep Congress apprised of progress on implementation. The 
Committee intends for such coordination activity to be 
performed in due regard of the fact that the FCC (one of the 
participants in the development of the strategy) is an 
independent agency subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, not 
the executive branch.
    Subsection (h) of this section would specify that the 
strategy must be submitted to Congress in unclassified form, 
but may include a classified annex.

                        Changes in Existing Law

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the 
bill as reported would make no change to existing law.