[House Report 116-705]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
116th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 116-705
========================================================================
NO PRESIDENT IS ABOVE THE LAW ACT OF 2020
_______
December 31, 2020.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Nadler, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2678]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 2678) to amend title 18, United States Code, to
provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations with
regard to certain offenses committed by the President of the
United States during or prior to tenure in office, and for
other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as
amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 2
Hearings......................................................... 6
Committee Consideration.......................................... 6
Committee Votes.................................................. 6
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 7
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures and Congressional
Budget Office Cost Estimate.................................... 7
Duplication of Federal Programs.................................. 7
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 7
Advisory on Earmarks............................................. 7
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 7
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 8
Minority Views................................................... 9
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and insert
the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``No President is Above the Law Act of
2020''.
SEC. 2. TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
(a) Offenses Committed by the President or Vice President During or
Prior to Tenure in Office.--Section 3282 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Offenses Committed by the President or Vice President During or
Prior to Tenure in Office.--In the case of any person serving as
President or Vice President of the United States, the duration of that
person's tenure in office shall not be considered for purposes of any
statute of limitations applicable to any Federal criminal offense
committed by that person (including any offenses committed during any
period of time preceding such tenure in office).''.
(b) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply
to any offense committed before the date of the enactment of this
section, if the statute of limitations applicable to that offense had
not run as of such date.
Purpose and Summary
H.R. 2678 would suspend the statute of limitations for any
federal offense committed by a sitting president, whether it
was committed before or during the president's term in office.
This legislation would ensure that presidents can be held
accountable for criminal conduct just like every other American
and not use the presidency to avoid legal consequences.
Background and Need for the Legislation
A. Department of Justice Policy
On September 24, 1973, in the midst of the Watergate
scandal, Robert G. Dixon, Jr., the head of the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice (DOJ), issued a
memorandum (``the 1973 OLC Memo'') regarding the propriety of
indicting a sitting President of the United States.\1\ Dixon
noted that there was no express provision of the Constitution
conferring any immunity upon the President.\2\ The ``proper
approach,'' he wrote, ``is to find the proper balance between
the normal functions of the courts and the special
responsibilities . . . of the Presidency.''\3\ He concluded
that criminal proceedings against a sitting President should
not result in so serious an interference with the President's
exercise of his official powers and duties that it would amount
to an incapacitation.\4\ Indeed, according to the 1973 OLC
Memo, ``a necessity to defend a criminal trial and to attend
court . . . would interfere with the President's unique
official duties.''\5\
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\1\See Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Amenability of the President,
Vice President and other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution
while in Office (Sep. 24, 1973), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/
092473.pdf.
\2\Id. at 4.
\3\Id. at 24.
\4\Id. at 28.
\5\Id. Significantly, the 1973 OLC Memo also concluded that ``the
case for granting the Vice President immunity from criminal prosecution
has not been made.'' Id. at 40.
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Dixon also addressed ``a possibility not yet mentioned:''
that a sitting president could be indicted but further
proceedings could be deferred until they were no longer in
office.\6\ Unlike placing a president on trial, this would not
result in a ``physical interference'' with the president's
duties. Nevertheless, Dixon concluded that this step should not
be taken because of the reputational damage to the president:
``The spectacle of an indicted President still trying to serve
as Chief Executive boggles the imagination.''\7\
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\6\See id. at 29.
\7\Id. at 30.
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On October 16, 2000, Assistant Attorney General Randolph
Moss issued a formal OLC opinion (``the 2000 OLC Opinion'')
addressing whether a president can be indicted and prosecuted
while serving in office.\8\ The opinion found that ``the
indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would
impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to
perform its constitutionally assigned functions'' in violation
of ``the constitutional separation of powers.''\9\ Like the
1973 OLC Memo, the 2000 OLC Opinion set out several obstacles
to trying a president and reaffirmed OLC's position that a
sitting president could not be indicted: ``In 1973, the
Department concluded that the indictment or criminal
prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly
undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its
constitutionally assigned functions . . . We believe that the
conclusion reached by the Department in 1973 still represents
the best interpretation of the Constitution.''\10\
Significantly, a number of constitutional scholars and federal
practitioners have disagreed with this interpretation by the
Department of Justice, arguing instead that a sitting President
can be federally indicted while in office.\11\
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\8\See A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (2000) (``2000 OLC Op.''), https://
www.justice.gov/file/19351/download.
\9\Id. at 222 & 260.
\10\Id. at 222.
\11\See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Constitution Rules Out Immunity
for Sitting Presidents, Boston Globe (Dec. 10, 2018; updated Dec. 12,
2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/12/10/constitution-
rules-out-sitting-president-immunity-from-criminal-prosecution/
6Byq7Qw6TeJlPVUhlgABPM/story.html; Laurence H. Tribe, Yes, the
Constitution Allows Indictment of the President, Lawfare (Dec. 20,
2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/yes-constitution-allows-indictment-
president; Mark Medish, President Donald Trump Can Be Indicted--And
Here is the Constitutional Proof (Mar. 21, 2019), https://
www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/president-donald-trump-can-be-indicted-
here-s-constitutional-proof-ncna985586.
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Most recently, however, in the Report On The Investigation
Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election
(the ``Mueller Report''), Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller,
III, determined that he was bound by the 2000 OLC Opinion for
the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction.\12\ The
Mueller Report determined that ``a federal criminal accusation
against a sitting President would place burdens on the
President's capacity to govern and potentially preempt
constitutional processes for addressing presidential
misconduct.''\13\ Relying on the 2000 OLC Opinion, Mueller also
observed that a President does not have immunity once he leaves
office.\14\
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\12\Robert S. Mueller, III, Report On The Investigation Into
Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election (Vol. II) (Mar.
2019), at 1.
\13\Id.
\14\Id. (citing 4 OLC Op. at 255 (``Recognizing an immunity from
prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution
once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from
office by resignation or impeachment'')).
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But, significantly, while making clear that investigations
into presidential criminal conduct could move forward, the
Mueller Report failed to address what would happen if the
statute of limitations on such criminal conduct were to expire
during the period of time when the sitting President could
not--and would not--be indicted by the Department of Justice.
Depending on the timing of the criminal conduct and the length
of the President's term in office, this could mean that a
president could ``get away'' with having committed a crime, as
he or she could not be indicted before the expiration (or
``running'') of the statute of limitations. The OLC opinion
would thus operate to confer immunity upon a president for
criminal conduct that occurred before taking office (if the
statute of limitations would run during his or her period in
office) and during office (if the president were to serve a
second term). Regardless of whether one believes the OLC
opinion to be correct, by tolling, or suspending, the statute
of limitations during the duration of a president's term in
office, H.R. 2678 would ensure that the office of the
presidency cannot be used as a shield for criminal conduct and
would underscore that no one, not even the President of the
United States, is above the law.
B. Statute of Limitations
Most criminal offenses in the U.S. Code have a statute of
limitations. Some offenses--such as murder or rape--do not have
an applicable statute of limitations and can be brought at any
point after their commission, during the lifetime of the
defendant. The typical statute of limitations for federal
criminal offenses is five years, meaning that an indictment
must ordinarily issue within five years of the last act that
constitutes the particular crime.\15\ The statute of
limitations begins running at the time a crime is completed and
each element of the criminal case has been satisfied. An
indictment stops the running of the statute of limitations.
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\15\See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3282 (``(e)xcept as otherwise expressly
provided by law,'' a prosecution for a non-capital offense shall be
instituted within five years after the offense was committed).
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In Tousie v. United States,\16\ the U.S. Supreme Court
explained that the statute of limitations is needed to balance
the rights of a defendant against criminal charges where the
underlying facts may have eroded over time with the interest of
the government in swiftly investigating the alleged criminal
activity. The statute of limitations is necessary to provide
repose and finality to the defendant. It ensures that the
possibility of a criminal prosecution does not hang over a
defendant's head forever and encourages prosecutors to bring
charges while evidence is fresh. In United States v.
Marion,\17\ the Supreme Court noted that statutes of
limitations work in tandem with the Constitution's Speedy Trial
Clause\18\ to prevent pretrial delay. But while the purpose of
the Speedy Trial Clause is to protect criminal defendants,
statutes of limitations reflect a balance between protecting
defendants from delay and allowing prosecutors adequate time to
investigate and charge cases.
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\16\397 U.S. 112 (1970).
\17\404 U.S. 307 (1971).
\18\The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that ``[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.'' U.S. Const.
amend. VI.
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Congress has seen it appropriate to toll, or suspend, the
statute of limitations in certain circumstances. The running of
statutes of limitation is tolled during periods of
fugitivity,\19\ during the pendency of an official request to a
foreign court or authority to obtain evidence located in a
foreign country,\20\ and, for certain offenses (fraud,
disposition of real property, procurement fraud, among others)
for five years after the cessation of hostilities in a foreign
war.\21\
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\19\18 U.S.C. 3290.
\20\18 U.S.C. 3292.
\21\18 U.S.C. 3287.
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Even when a statute of limitations has run, a court could
preserve charges that have otherwise expired through equitable
tolling. In Young v. United States,\22\ Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote that all statutes of limitations periods are
``customarily subject to equitable tolling.''\23\ Equitable
tolling is essentially a resort to the plenary power of the
courts to ensure that justice is done. But equitable tolling is
typically applied by courts only sparingly, and, even so,
mostly in civil cases.\24\ At least one federal court of
appeals--the Third Circuit in United States v. Midgley\25\--has
explicitly said that equitable tolling can apply in criminal
cases. Even in that case, however, the court decided not to
toll the statute of limitations for prosecutors who sought to
charge the defendant with crimes they had originally dropped in
a plea bargain after the defendant violated the plea
agreement.\26\
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\22\535 U.S. 43 (2002).
\23\Id. at 49 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
\24\Irwin v. Dep't of Vet. Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
\25\142 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1998).
\26\Id. at 179.
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When courts address equitable tolling in criminal cases,
they typically stress that it applies only in extraordinary
circumstances and when demanded by the ``interests of
justice.'' For example, the Second Circuit in United States v.
Grady\27\ held that the statute of limitations tolled when ``a
superseding indictment [is] brought at any time while the first
indictment is still validly pending, if and only if it does not
broaden the charges made in the first indictment.''\28\ Courts
have also allowed criminal statutes of limitations to be
equitably tolled when indictments are timely filed under seal
and then made public after the limitations period has expired,
unless the defendant proves that this had a prejudicial
effect.\29\ In the case of the indictment of a sitting
president, this exception would be unhelpful because the 2000
OLC Memo, under the view of some, precludes such indictments in
the first place.
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\27\544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1976).
\28\Id. at 601-02.
\29\Amanda Lineberry & Chuck Rosenberg, Equitable Tolling and the
Prosecution of a President, Lawfare (Apr. 17, 2019), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/equitable-tolling-and-prosecution-president.
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Most cases in which criminal statutes of limitations are
tolled involve situations in which the commission of the crime
has been concealed or the defendant has fled or is
unavailable--but tolling in these circumstances is authorized
by statute.\30\ Such cases, therefore, do not require equitable
tolling. But because equitable tolling is a limited remedy,
there is no guarantee that a president who commits a federal
offense (but cannot be charged because of DOJ policy) can be
indicted once they leave office if the statute of limitations
on those offenses has otherwise run. In fact, the 2000 OLC
Opinion points out that ``[t]he interest in avoiding the
statute of limitations bar by securing an indictment while the
President remains sitting is a legitimate one.''\31\ The
opinion then makes the argument that impeachment and removal
would be one way to cure the problem. Another way to cure the
problem, the 2000 OLC Opinion also argues, would be to toll the
statute of limitations. This could be applied by courts under
constitutional or equitable principles, but, to be on the safe
side, ``Congress could overcome [any reluctance by courts to
apply such principles] by imposing its own tolling rule.''\32\
Therefore,''[a]t most, . . . prosecution would be delayed
rather than denied.''\33\
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\30\Id.
\31\2000 OLC Op. at 256.
\32\Id.; see also note 34 (``We believe Congress derives such
authority from its general power to `make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.' U S Const, art I, Sec. 8, cl.
18. Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. [681,] 709 [(1997)] (`If Congress
deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it
may respond with appropriate legislation.')'').
\33\2000 OLC Op. at 256. The 2000 OLC Opinion also acknowledges
DOJ's view that ``Congress may have power to enact a tolling provision
governing the statute of limitations for conduct that has already
occurred, at least so long as the original statutory period has not
already expired.'' Id. at note 34 (citations omitted).
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Whether or not one believes that a president may not be
indicted while in office, H.R. 2678 simply ensures that, once a
president leaves office, indictments can be sought by DOJ, if
appropriate, against a president who commits federal crimes
that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations
when they leave office. Again, this ensures that no president
of the United States is above the law.
Hearings
The Committee held a series of hearings examining the
conduct of President Donald Trump, which helped develop this
legislation, including a hearing on July 24, 2019 entitled
``Oversight of the Report on the Investigation into Russian
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Former Special
Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III,'' a hearing on June 24, 2020
entitled ``Oversight of the Department of Justice: Political
Interference and Threats to Prosecutorial Independence,'' and a
hearing on July 28, 2020 entitled ``Oversight of the Department
of Justice.''
Committee Consideration
On July 23, 2020, the Committee met in open session and
ordered the bill, H.R. 2678, favorably reported as an amendment
in the nature of a substitute, by a vote of 22 to 14.
Committee Votes
In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the
following votes occurred during the Committee's consideration
of H.R. 2678.
1. An amendment in the nature of a substitute by Mr.
Nadler, which, by a voice vote, added ``of 2020'' to the title
of the bill.
2. An amendment by Representative Greg Steube, which, by a
voice vote, made the bill applicable also to a person in the
office of Vice President.
3. An amendment by Representative Andy Biggs, which would
have added to the bill a 10-year statute of limitations for
``spying against a political opponent,'' was defeated by a vote
of 21 to 14.
4. An amendment by Representative Ben Cline, which would
have added a number of findings pertaining to the Trump
campaign and Russian interference with the 2016 election, was
defeated by a vote of 21 to 14.
5. An amendment by Representative Ken Buck, which would
have made the effective date of the bill January 20, 2021,
failed by a voice vote.
6. Final passage of the bill, as amended, which passed by a
vote of 22 to 14.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures and Congressional Budget
Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect
to requirements of clause (3)(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested
but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the
Director of Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Committee
has requested but not received from the Director of the CBO a
statement as to whether this bill contains any new budget
authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an increase
or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures.
Duplication of Federal Programs
No provision of H.R. 2678 establishes or reauthorizes a
program of the Federal government known to be duplicative of
another federal program, a program that was included in any
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R.
2678, as amended, would put in place a measure that ensures the
tolling of the statute of limitations for federal criminal
offenses committed by a person in the office of President or
Vice President, for a period of time before and during their
tenure in office.
Advisory on Earmarks
In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, H.R. 2678 does not contain any
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff
benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI.
Section-by-Section Analysis
The following discussion describes the bill as reported by
the Committee.
Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 provides the short title of
the bill as the ``No President is Above the Law Act.''
Sec. 2. Tolling of Statute of Limitations. Section 2 would
amend Section 3282 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which
sets forth the typical statute of limitations for federal non-
capital offenses (i.e., 5 years). Section 2 would add a
subsection--subsection 3282(c)--to the current statute in the
case of ``Offenses Committed by the President or Vice President
During or Prior to Tenure in Office.'' New subsection 3282(c)
would exempt the duration of a president or vice president's
term in office from consideration for purposes of any statute
of limitations applicable to any Federal criminal offense
committed by that person. Offenses committed during any period
of time preceding such tenure in office would also be exempted.
Section 2 also makes clear that the tolling provision would
apply to offenses committed prior to enactment of the bill, so
long as the statute of limitations had not already run as of
the date of enactment.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is
printed in italics and existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART II--CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 213--LIMITATIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3282. Offenses not capital
(a) In General.--Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any
offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the
information is instituted within five years next after such
offense shall have been committed.
(b) DNA Profile Indictment.--
(1) In general.--In any indictment for an offense
under chapter 109A for which the identity of the
accused is unknown, it shall be sufficient to describe
the accused as an individual whose name is unknown, but
who has a particular DNA profile.
(2) Exception.--Any indictment described under
paragraph (1), which is found not later than 5 years
after the offense under chapter 109A is committed,
shall not be subject to--
(A) the limitations period described under
subsection (a); and
(B) the provisions of chapter 208 until the
individual is arrested or served with a summons
in connection with the charges contained in the
indictment.
(3) Defined term.--For purposes of this subsection,
the term ``DNA profile'' means a set of DNA
identification characteristics.
(c) Offenses Committed by the President or Vice President
During or Prior to Tenure in Office.--In the case of any person
serving as President or Vice President of the United States,
the duration of that person's tenure in office shall not be
considered for purposes of any statute of limitations
applicable to any Federal criminal offense committed by that
person (including any offenses committed during any period of
time preceding such tenure in office).
* * * * * * *
Minority Views
H.R. 2678, the so-called ``No President is Above the Law
Act,'' would amend title 18 of the United States Code to allow
for the tolling of the statute of limitations with regard to
certain offenses committed by the President of the United
States during or prior to the President's time in office.\1\
This bill is not a serious attempt to address any real
shortcoming in federal criminal law. It is instead an overtly
political messaging vehicle designed to further the Democrat
majority's fictional narrative that President Trump has engaged
in some amorphous and undefined criminal conduct.
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\1\H.R. 2678, 116th Cong. (2019).
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The Speedy Trial Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution protects the criminally accused against
unreasonable delays between his or her indictment and trial.\2\
Prior to indictment, a statute of limitation serves to
effectuate this Constitutional protection, requiring
prosecutors to bring formal criminal charges within a
prescribed time after a crime has been committed.\3\ This
limitation is designed to protect the criminal accused from
having to defend himself or herself against charges where the
passage of time has obscured the memory of facts. It also
serves as a motivator for law enforcement to expeditiously
investigate criminal wrongdoing. Therefore, prosecutions are
barred if there was no indictment or other formal charge filed
within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations.\4\
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\2\U.S. Const. amend. IV.
\3\BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990).
\4\See generally Doyle, Charles (2017). Statute of Limitation in
Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch (CRS Rept. No. RS21121).
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The majority of federal crimes are governed by a general
five-year statute of limitations.\5\ In 2003, in Stogner v.
California, the Supreme Court held that a law extending a
criminal statute of limitations after the existing limitations
period had expired violates the U.S. Constitution's ex post
facto clause when applied to revive a previously time-barred
prosecution.\6\
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\5\18 U.S.C. 3282.
\6\539 U.S. 607 (2003).
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H.R. 2678, however, does not fix any actual deficiencies
with the current application of statutes of limitation in
federal criminal law. Rather, this bill is an unneeded solution
for an imaginary problem contrived by Chairman Nadler, who
continues to assert without evidence that President Trump has
engaged in some unidentified criminal conduct. House Democrats'
biggest theory of wrongdoing--allegations of collusion with
Russia during the 2016 election--was disproven following
Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. The Special Counsel's
findings, unfortunately, have not deterred House Democrats from
continuing to make baseless allegations about criminal conduct.
H.R. 2678 appears to be entirely politically motivated and
targeted specifically at President Trump. Chairman Nadler did
not introduce similar legislation during the term of President
Bill Clinton, who the House impeached for perjury and
obstruction of justice. Chairman Nadler did not introduce
similar legislation during the term of President George W.
Bush, who the Chairman accused of warrantless electronic
eavesdropping. And Chairman Nadler did not introduce similar
legislation during the term of President Barack Obama. H.R.
2678 is merely a reflection of Chairman Nadler's obsession with
President Trump, with whom the Chairman has feuded since at
least the 1980s.\7\
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\7\Caitlin Oprysko, Trump rehashes 1980s real estate feud with
Nadler, Politico (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/
04/09/trump-nadler-real-estate-feud-1263345.
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Since the day President Trump took office, House Democrats
have obsessively sought to investigate and impeach President
Trump. In 2017 and 2018 alone, House Democrats introduced four
resolutions to impeach President Trump.\8\ On the very first
day of the 116th Congress, House Democrats again introduced
articles of impeachment.\9\ Early in his chairmanship, Chairman
Nadler sent wide-ranging demands for documents and information
to 81 individuals and entities associated with President Trump,
his family, his campaign, and close aides. Chairman Nadler held
hearings on Russian collusion and played a supporting role in
the House Democrats' partisan impeachment inquiry against
President Trump. Chairman Nadler also led investigations into
alleged conspiracies to violate federal campaign and finance
reporting laws, alleged violations of the Emoluments Clause of
the Constitution, and alleged attacks on the press. Despite all
these inquiries, Chairman Nadler and House Democrats have found
no actual evidence of criminality.
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\8\H. Res. 705, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 646, 115th Cong.
(2017); H. Res. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); H. Res. 438, 115th Cong.
(2017).
\9\H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019).
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Chairman Nadler's decision to prioritize his personal
vendetta against the President has real consequences for the
American people. Instead of working with Republicans to pass
important legislation to address lawlessness in American cities
or address the Obama-Biden Administration's weaponization of
the Justice Department, Chairman Nadler has squandered critical
committee business days to take political jabs at the
President. H.R. 2678 is just an election year messaging bill to
perpetuate the Democrats' fictional narrative about President
Trump.
House Democrats will take every chance they get to attack
the President, regardless of the truth and veracity of their
claims. H.R. 2678 is just the legislative manifestation of
their obsessive attacks. No matter how many changes House
Democrats make to federal statutes of limitation, it does not
change the fact that President Trump has broken no laws. After
nearly four years and countless wasted taxpayer dollars on
partisan investigations, Chairman Nadler and House Democrats
refuse to accept the truth.
Jim Jordan,
Ranking Member.