[House Report 116-705]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


116th Congress }                                              { Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session    }                                              { 116-705

========================================================================



 
               NO PRESIDENT IS ABOVE THE LAW ACT OF 2020

                                _______
                                

 December 31, 2020.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
            the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Nadler, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 2678]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 2678) to amend title 18, United States Code, to 
provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations with 
regard to certain offenses committed by the President of the 
United States during or prior to tenure in office, and for 
other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably 
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as 
amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     6
Committee Consideration..........................................     6
Committee Votes..................................................     6
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     7
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures and Congressional 
  Budget Office Cost Estimate....................................     7
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................     7
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     7
Advisory on Earmarks.............................................     7
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     7
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............     8
Minority Views...................................................     9

    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all that follows after the enacting clause and insert 
the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``No President is Above the Law Act of 
2020''.

SEC. 2. TOLLING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

  (a) Offenses Committed by the President or Vice President During or 
Prior to Tenure in Office.--Section 3282 of title 18, United States 
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
  ``(c) Offenses Committed by the President or Vice President During or 
Prior to Tenure in Office.--In the case of any person serving as 
President or Vice President of the United States, the duration of that 
person's tenure in office shall not be considered for purposes of any 
statute of limitations applicable to any Federal criminal offense 
committed by that person (including any offenses committed during any 
period of time preceding such tenure in office).''.
  (b) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply 
to any offense committed before the date of the enactment of this 
section, if the statute of limitations applicable to that offense had 
not run as of such date.

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 2678 would suspend the statute of limitations for any 
federal offense committed by a sitting president, whether it 
was committed before or during the president's term in office. 
This legislation would ensure that presidents can be held 
accountable for criminal conduct just like every other American 
and not use the presidency to avoid legal consequences.

                Background and Need for the Legislation


A. Department of Justice Policy

    On September 24, 1973, in the midst of the Watergate 
scandal, Robert G. Dixon, Jr., the head of the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice (DOJ), issued a 
memorandum (``the 1973 OLC Memo'') regarding the propriety of 
indicting a sitting President of the United States.\1\ Dixon 
noted that there was no express provision of the Constitution 
conferring any immunity upon the President.\2\ The ``proper 
approach,'' he wrote, ``is to find the proper balance between 
the normal functions of the courts and the special 
responsibilities . . . of the Presidency.''\3\ He concluded 
that criminal proceedings against a sitting President should 
not result in so serious an interference with the President's 
exercise of his official powers and duties that it would amount 
to an incapacitation.\4\ Indeed, according to the 1973 OLC 
Memo, ``a necessity to defend a criminal trial and to attend 
court . . . would interfere with the President's unique 
official duties.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\See Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Amenability of the President, 
Vice President and other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution 
while in Office (Sep. 24, 1973), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/
092473.pdf.
    \2\Id. at 4.
    \3\Id. at 24.
    \4\Id. at 28.
    \5\Id. Significantly, the 1973 OLC Memo also concluded that ``the 
case for granting the Vice President immunity from criminal prosecution 
has not been made.'' Id. at 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dixon also addressed ``a possibility not yet mentioned:'' 
that a sitting president could be indicted but further 
proceedings could be deferred until they were no longer in 
office.\6\ Unlike placing a president on trial, this would not 
result in a ``physical interference'' with the president's 
duties. Nevertheless, Dixon concluded that this step should not 
be taken because of the reputational damage to the president: 
``The spectacle of an indicted President still trying to serve 
as Chief Executive boggles the imagination.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\See id. at 29.
    \7\Id. at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On October 16, 2000, Assistant Attorney General Randolph 
Moss issued a formal OLC opinion (``the 2000 OLC Opinion'') 
addressing whether a president can be indicted and prosecuted 
while serving in office.\8\ The opinion found that ``the 
indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would 
impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to 
perform its constitutionally assigned functions'' in violation 
of ``the constitutional separation of powers.''\9\ Like the 
1973 OLC Memo, the 2000 OLC Opinion set out several obstacles 
to trying a president and reaffirmed OLC's position that a 
sitting president could not be indicted: ``In 1973, the 
Department concluded that the indictment or criminal 
prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly 
undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its 
constitutionally assigned functions . . . We believe that the 
conclusion reached by the Department in 1973 still represents 
the best interpretation of the Constitution.''\10\ 
Significantly, a number of constitutional scholars and federal 
practitioners have disagreed with this interpretation by the 
Department of Justice, arguing instead that a sitting President 
can be federally indicted while in office.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\See A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal 
Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (2000) (``2000 OLC Op.''), https://
www.justice.gov/file/19351/download.
    \9\Id. at 222 & 260.
    \10\Id. at 222.
    \11\See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Constitution Rules Out Immunity 
for Sitting Presidents, Boston Globe (Dec. 10, 2018; updated Dec. 12, 
2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/12/10/constitution-
rules-out-sitting-president-immunity-from-criminal-prosecution/
6Byq7Qw6TeJlPVUhlgABPM/story.html; Laurence H. Tribe, Yes, the 
Constitution Allows Indictment of the President, Lawfare (Dec. 20, 
2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/yes-constitution-allows-indictment-
president; Mark Medish, President Donald Trump Can Be Indicted--And 
Here is the Constitutional Proof (Mar. 21, 2019), https://
www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/president-donald-trump-can-be-indicted-
here-s-constitutional-proof-ncna985586.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most recently, however, in the Report On The Investigation 
Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election 
(the ``Mueller Report''), Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, 
III, determined that he was bound by the 2000 OLC Opinion for 
the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction.\12\ The 
Mueller Report determined that ``a federal criminal accusation 
against a sitting President would place burdens on the 
President's capacity to govern and potentially preempt 
constitutional processes for addressing presidential 
misconduct.''\13\ Relying on the 2000 OLC Opinion, Mueller also 
observed that a President does not have immunity once he leaves 
office.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\Robert S. Mueller, III, Report On The Investigation Into 
Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election (Vol. II) (Mar. 
2019), at 1.
    \13\Id.
    \14\Id. (citing 4 OLC Op. at 255 (``Recognizing an immunity from 
prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution 
once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from 
office by resignation or impeachment'')).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But, significantly, while making clear that investigations 
into presidential criminal conduct could move forward, the 
Mueller Report failed to address what would happen if the 
statute of limitations on such criminal conduct were to expire 
during the period of time when the sitting President could 
not--and would not--be indicted by the Department of Justice. 
Depending on the timing of the criminal conduct and the length 
of the President's term in office, this could mean that a 
president could ``get away'' with having committed a crime, as 
he or she could not be indicted before the expiration (or 
``running'') of the statute of limitations. The OLC opinion 
would thus operate to confer immunity upon a president for 
criminal conduct that occurred before taking office (if the 
statute of limitations would run during his or her period in 
office) and during office (if the president were to serve a 
second term). Regardless of whether one believes the OLC 
opinion to be correct, by tolling, or suspending, the statute 
of limitations during the duration of a president's term in 
office, H.R. 2678 would ensure that the office of the 
presidency cannot be used as a shield for criminal conduct and 
would underscore that no one, not even the President of the 
United States, is above the law.

B. Statute of Limitations

    Most criminal offenses in the U.S. Code have a statute of 
limitations. Some offenses--such as murder or rape--do not have 
an applicable statute of limitations and can be brought at any 
point after their commission, during the lifetime of the 
defendant. The typical statute of limitations for federal 
criminal offenses is five years, meaning that an indictment 
must ordinarily issue within five years of the last act that 
constitutes the particular crime.\15\ The statute of 
limitations begins running at the time a crime is completed and 
each element of the criminal case has been satisfied. An 
indictment stops the running of the statute of limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3282 (``(e)xcept as otherwise expressly 
provided by law,'' a prosecution for a non-capital offense shall be 
instituted within five years after the offense was committed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Tousie v. United States,\16\ the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained that the statute of limitations is needed to balance 
the rights of a defendant against criminal charges where the 
underlying facts may have eroded over time with the interest of 
the government in swiftly investigating the alleged criminal 
activity. The statute of limitations is necessary to provide 
repose and finality to the defendant. It ensures that the 
possibility of a criminal prosecution does not hang over a 
defendant's head forever and encourages prosecutors to bring 
charges while evidence is fresh. In United States v. 
Marion,\17\ the Supreme Court noted that statutes of 
limitations work in tandem with the Constitution's Speedy Trial 
Clause\18\ to prevent pretrial delay. But while the purpose of 
the Speedy Trial Clause is to protect criminal defendants, 
statutes of limitations reflect a balance between protecting 
defendants from delay and allowing prosecutors adequate time to 
investigate and charge cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\397 U.S. 112 (1970).
    \17\404 U.S. 307 (1971).
    \18\The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that ``[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.'' U.S. Const. 
amend. VI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress has seen it appropriate to toll, or suspend, the 
statute of limitations in certain circumstances. The running of 
statutes of limitation is tolled during periods of 
fugitivity,\19\ during the pendency of an official request to a 
foreign court or authority to obtain evidence located in a 
foreign country,\20\ and, for certain offenses (fraud, 
disposition of real property, procurement fraud, among others) 
for five years after the cessation of hostilities in a foreign 
war.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\18 U.S.C. 3290.
    \20\18 U.S.C. 3292.
    \21\18 U.S.C. 3287.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even when a statute of limitations has run, a court could 
preserve charges that have otherwise expired through equitable 
tolling. In Young v. United States,\22\ Justice Antonin Scalia 
wrote that all statutes of limitations periods are 
``customarily subject to equitable tolling.''\23\ Equitable 
tolling is essentially a resort to the plenary power of the 
courts to ensure that justice is done. But equitable tolling is 
typically applied by courts only sparingly, and, even so, 
mostly in civil cases.\24\ At least one federal court of 
appeals--the Third Circuit in United States v. Midgley\25\--has 
explicitly said that equitable tolling can apply in criminal 
cases. Even in that case, however, the court decided not to 
toll the statute of limitations for prosecutors who sought to 
charge the defendant with crimes they had originally dropped in 
a plea bargain after the defendant violated the plea 
agreement.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\535 U.S. 43 (2002).
    \23\Id. at 49 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    \24\Irwin v. Dep't of Vet. Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
    \25\142 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1998).
    \26\Id. at 179.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When courts address equitable tolling in criminal cases, 
they typically stress that it applies only in extraordinary 
circumstances and when demanded by the ``interests of 
justice.'' For example, the Second Circuit in United States v. 
Grady\27\ held that the statute of limitations tolled when ``a 
superseding indictment [is] brought at any time while the first 
indictment is still validly pending, if and only if it does not 
broaden the charges made in the first indictment.''\28\ Courts 
have also allowed criminal statutes of limitations to be 
equitably tolled when indictments are timely filed under seal 
and then made public after the limitations period has expired, 
unless the defendant proves that this had a prejudicial 
effect.\29\ In the case of the indictment of a sitting 
president, this exception would be unhelpful because the 2000 
OLC Memo, under the view of some, precludes such indictments in 
the first place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1976).
    \28\Id. at 601-02.
    \29\Amanda Lineberry & Chuck Rosenberg, Equitable Tolling and the 
Prosecution of a President, Lawfare (Apr. 17, 2019), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/equitable-tolling-and-prosecution-president.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most cases in which criminal statutes of limitations are 
tolled involve situations in which the commission of the crime 
has been concealed or the defendant has fled or is 
unavailable--but tolling in these circumstances is authorized 
by statute.\30\ Such cases, therefore, do not require equitable 
tolling. But because equitable tolling is a limited remedy, 
there is no guarantee that a president who commits a federal 
offense (but cannot be charged because of DOJ policy) can be 
indicted once they leave office if the statute of limitations 
on those offenses has otherwise run. In fact, the 2000 OLC 
Opinion points out that ``[t]he interest in avoiding the 
statute of limitations bar by securing an indictment while the 
President remains sitting is a legitimate one.''\31\ The 
opinion then makes the argument that impeachment and removal 
would be one way to cure the problem. Another way to cure the 
problem, the 2000 OLC Opinion also argues, would be to toll the 
statute of limitations. This could be applied by courts under 
constitutional or equitable principles, but, to be on the safe 
side, ``Congress could overcome [any reluctance by courts to 
apply such principles] by imposing its own tolling rule.''\32\ 
Therefore,''[a]t most, . . . prosecution would be delayed 
rather than denied.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\Id.
    \31\2000 OLC Op. at 256.
    \32\Id.; see also note 34 (``We believe Congress derives such 
authority from its general power to `make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or 
in any Department or Officer thereof.' U S Const, art I, Sec. 8, cl. 
18. Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. [681,] 709 [(1997)] (`If Congress 
deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it 
may respond with appropriate legislation.')'').
    \33\2000 OLC Op. at 256. The 2000 OLC Opinion also acknowledges 
DOJ's view that ``Congress may have power to enact a tolling provision 
governing the statute of limitations for conduct that has already 
occurred, at least so long as the original statutory period has not 
already expired.'' Id. at note 34 (citations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Whether or not one believes that a president may not be 
indicted while in office, H.R. 2678 simply ensures that, once a 
president leaves office, indictments can be sought by DOJ, if 
appropriate, against a president who commits federal crimes 
that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations 
when they leave office. Again, this ensures that no president 
of the United States is above the law.

                                Hearings

    The Committee held a series of hearings examining the 
conduct of President Donald Trump, which helped develop this 
legislation, including a hearing on July 24, 2019 entitled 
``Oversight of the Report on the Investigation into Russian 
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Former Special 
Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III,'' a hearing on June 24, 2020 
entitled ``Oversight of the Department of Justice: Political 
Interference and Threats to Prosecutorial Independence,'' and a 
hearing on July 28, 2020 entitled ``Oversight of the Department 
of Justice.''

                        Committee Consideration

    On July 23, 2020, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill, H.R. 2678, favorably reported as an amendment 
in the nature of a substitute, by a vote of 22 to 14.

                            Committee Votes

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
following votes occurred during the Committee's consideration 
of H.R. 2678.
    1. An amendment in the nature of a substitute by Mr. 
Nadler, which, by a voice vote, added ``of 2020'' to the title 
of the bill.
    2. An amendment by Representative Greg Steube, which, by a 
voice vote, made the bill applicable also to a person in the 
office of Vice President.
    3. An amendment by Representative Andy Biggs, which would 
have added to the bill a 10-year statute of limitations for 
``spying against a political opponent,'' was defeated by a vote 
of 21 to 14.
    4. An amendment by Representative Ben Cline, which would 
have added a number of findings pertaining to the Trump 
campaign and Russian interference with the 2016 election, was 
defeated by a vote of 21 to 14.
    5. An amendment by Representative Ken Buck, which would 
have made the effective date of the bill January 20, 2021, 
failed by a voice vote.
    6. Final passage of the bill, as amended, which passed by a 
vote of 22 to 14.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

  New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures and Congressional Budget 
                          Office Cost Estimate

    With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule 
XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 
308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect 
to requirements of clause (3)(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives and section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has requested 
but not received a cost estimate for this bill from the 
Director of Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Committee 
has requested but not received from the Director of the CBO a 
statement as to whether this bill contains any new budget 
authority, spending authority, credit authority, or an increase 
or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    No provision of H.R. 2678 establishes or reauthorizes a 
program of the Federal government known to be duplicative of 
another federal program, a program that was included in any 
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress 
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program 
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of 
Federal Domestic Assistance.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 
2678, as amended, would put in place a measure that ensures the 
tolling of the statute of limitations for federal criminal 
offenses committed by a person in the office of President or 
Vice President, for a period of time before and during their 
tenure in office.

                          Advisory on Earmarks

    In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 2678 does not contain any 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

    The following discussion describes the bill as reported by 
the Committee.
    Sec. 1. Short Title. Section 1 provides the short title of 
the bill as the ``No President is Above the Law Act.''
    Sec. 2. Tolling of Statute of Limitations. Section 2 would 
amend Section 3282 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which 
sets forth the typical statute of limitations for federal non-
capital offenses (i.e., 5 years). Section 2 would add a 
subsection--subsection 3282(c)--to the current statute in the 
case of ``Offenses Committed by the President or Vice President 
During or Prior to Tenure in Office.'' New subsection 3282(c) 
would exempt the duration of a president or vice president's 
term in office from consideration for purposes of any statute 
of limitations applicable to any Federal criminal offense 
committed by that person. Offenses committed during any period 
of time preceding such tenure in office would also be exempted. 
Section 2 also makes clear that the tolling provision would 
apply to offenses committed prior to enactment of the bill, so 
long as the statute of limitations had not already run as of 
the date of enactment.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is 
printed in italics and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                      TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART II--CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 213--LIMITATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 3282. Offenses not capital

  (a) In General.--Except as otherwise expressly provided by 
law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any 
offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the 
information is instituted within five years next after such 
offense shall have been committed.
  (b) DNA Profile Indictment.--
          (1) In general.--In any indictment for an offense 
        under chapter 109A for which the identity of the 
        accused is unknown, it shall be sufficient to describe 
        the accused as an individual whose name is unknown, but 
        who has a particular DNA profile.
          (2) Exception.--Any indictment described under 
        paragraph (1), which is found not later than 5 years 
        after the offense under chapter 109A is committed, 
        shall not be subject to--
                  (A) the limitations period described under 
                subsection (a); and
                  (B) the provisions of chapter 208 until the 
                individual is arrested or served with a summons 
                in connection with the charges contained in the 
                indictment.
          (3) Defined term.--For purposes of this subsection, 
        the term ``DNA profile'' means a set of DNA 
        identification characteristics.
  (c) Offenses Committed by the President or Vice President 
During or Prior to Tenure in Office.--In the case of any person 
serving as President or Vice President of the United States, 
the duration of that person's tenure in office shall not be 
considered for purposes of any statute of limitations 
applicable to any Federal criminal offense committed by that 
person (including any offenses committed during any period of 
time preceding such tenure in office).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             Minority Views

    H.R. 2678, the so-called ``No President is Above the Law 
Act,'' would amend title 18 of the United States Code to allow 
for the tolling of the statute of limitations with regard to 
certain offenses committed by the President of the United 
States during or prior to the President's time in office.\1\ 
This bill is not a serious attempt to address any real 
shortcoming in federal criminal law. It is instead an overtly 
political messaging vehicle designed to further the Democrat 
majority's fictional narrative that President Trump has engaged 
in some amorphous and undefined criminal conduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\H.R. 2678, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Speedy Trial Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution protects the criminally accused against 
unreasonable delays between his or her indictment and trial.\2\ 
Prior to indictment, a statute of limitation serves to 
effectuate this Constitutional protection, requiring 
prosecutors to bring formal criminal charges within a 
prescribed time after a crime has been committed.\3\ This 
limitation is designed to protect the criminal accused from 
having to defend himself or herself against charges where the 
passage of time has obscured the memory of facts. It also 
serves as a motivator for law enforcement to expeditiously 
investigate criminal wrongdoing. Therefore, prosecutions are 
barred if there was no indictment or other formal charge filed 
within the period prescribed by the statute of limitations.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\U.S. Const. amend. IV.
    \3\BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990).
    \4\See generally Doyle, Charles (2017). Statute of Limitation in 
Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch (CRS Rept. No. RS21121).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority of federal crimes are governed by a general 
five-year statute of limitations.\5\ In 2003, in Stogner v. 
California, the Supreme Court held that a law extending a 
criminal statute of limitations after the existing limitations 
period had expired violates the U.S. Constitution's ex post 
facto clause when applied to revive a previously time-barred 
prosecution.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\18 U.S.C. 3282.
    \6\539 U.S. 607 (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 2678, however, does not fix any actual deficiencies 
with the current application of statutes of limitation in 
federal criminal law. Rather, this bill is an unneeded solution 
for an imaginary problem contrived by Chairman Nadler, who 
continues to assert without evidence that President Trump has 
engaged in some unidentified criminal conduct. House Democrats' 
biggest theory of wrongdoing--allegations of collusion with 
Russia during the 2016 election--was disproven following 
Special Counsel Mueller's investigation. The Special Counsel's 
findings, unfortunately, have not deterred House Democrats from 
continuing to make baseless allegations about criminal conduct.
    H.R. 2678 appears to be entirely politically motivated and 
targeted specifically at President Trump. Chairman Nadler did 
not introduce similar legislation during the term of President 
Bill Clinton, who the House impeached for perjury and 
obstruction of justice. Chairman Nadler did not introduce 
similar legislation during the term of President George W. 
Bush, who the Chairman accused of warrantless electronic 
eavesdropping. And Chairman Nadler did not introduce similar 
legislation during the term of President Barack Obama. H.R. 
2678 is merely a reflection of Chairman Nadler's obsession with 
President Trump, with whom the Chairman has feuded since at 
least the 1980s.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\Caitlin Oprysko, Trump rehashes 1980s real estate feud with 
Nadler, Politico (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/
04/09/trump-nadler-real-estate-feud-1263345.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since the day President Trump took office, House Democrats 
have obsessively sought to investigate and impeach President 
Trump. In 2017 and 2018 alone, House Democrats introduced four 
resolutions to impeach President Trump.\8\ On the very first 
day of the 116th Congress, House Democrats again introduced 
articles of impeachment.\9\ Early in his chairmanship, Chairman 
Nadler sent wide-ranging demands for documents and information 
to 81 individuals and entities associated with President Trump, 
his family, his campaign, and close aides. Chairman Nadler held 
hearings on Russian collusion and played a supporting role in 
the House Democrats' partisan impeachment inquiry against 
President Trump. Chairman Nadler also led investigations into 
alleged conspiracies to violate federal campaign and finance 
reporting laws, alleged violations of the Emoluments Clause of 
the Constitution, and alleged attacks on the press. Despite all 
these inquiries, Chairman Nadler and House Democrats have found 
no actual evidence of criminality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\H. Res. 705, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 646, 115th Cong. 
(2017); H. Res. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); H. Res. 438, 115th Cong. 
(2017).
    \9\H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Nadler's decision to prioritize his personal 
vendetta against the President has real consequences for the 
American people. Instead of working with Republicans to pass 
important legislation to address lawlessness in American cities 
or address the Obama-Biden Administration's weaponization of 
the Justice Department, Chairman Nadler has squandered critical 
committee business days to take political jabs at the 
President. H.R. 2678 is just an election year messaging bill to 
perpetuate the Democrats' fictional narrative about President 
Trump.
    House Democrats will take every chance they get to attack 
the President, regardless of the truth and veracity of their 
claims. H.R. 2678 is just the legislative manifestation of 
their obsessive attacks. No matter how many changes House 
Democrats make to federal statutes of limitation, it does not 
change the fact that President Trump has broken no laws. After 
nearly four years and countless wasted taxpayer dollars on 
partisan investigations, Chairman Nadler and House Democrats 
refuse to accept the truth.

                                   Jim Jordan,
                                           Ranking Member.