[House Report 116-594]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
116th Congress } { Rept. 116-594
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { Part 1
======================================================================
H.R. 4644, THE LIBYA STABILIZATION ACT
_______
November 17, 2020.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Engel, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 4644]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 4644) having considered the same, reports favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as
amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
The Amendment.................................................... 2
Purpose and Legislation.......................................... 11
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 12
Summary of the Legislation....................................... 13
Hearings/Briefings............................................... 14
Committee Consideration.......................................... 14
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 14
New Budget Authority, Tax Expenditures, and Federal Mandates..... 14
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 14
Basis of Estimate................................................ 15
Mandates......................................................... 16
Directed Rule Making............................................. 16
Non-Duplication of Federal Programs.............................. 16
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 16
Congressional Accountability Act................................. 17
New Advisory Committees.......................................... 17
Earmark Identification........................................... 17
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 17
Committee Correspondence......................................... 21
Additional Views................................................. 25
THE AMENDMENT
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Libya
Stabilization Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings; statement of policy.
TITLE I--IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO STABILITY IN LIBYA
Sec. 101. Report on activities of certain foreign governments and
actors in Libya.
Sec. 102. Report of Russian activities and objectives in Libya.
Sec. 103. Determination of sanctionable activities of the Libyan
National Army with respect to Syria.
TITLE II--ACTIONS TO ADDRESS FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
Sec. 201. Sanctions with respect to foreign persons leading, directing,
or supporting certain foreign government involvement in Libya.
Sec. 202. Sanctions with respect to foreign persons threatening the
peace or stability of Libya.
Sec. 203. Sanctions with respect to foreign persons who are responsible
for or complicit in gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights committed in Libya.
Sec. 204. Sanctions described.
Sec. 205. Waiver.
Sec. 206. Implementation and regulatory authority.
Sec. 207. Exception relating to importation of goods.
Sec. 208. Definitions.
Sec. 209. Suspension of sanctions.
Sec. 210. Sunset.
TITLE III--ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYA
Sec. 301. Humanitarian relief for the people of Libya and international
refugees and migrants in Libya.
Sec. 302. Support for democratic governance, elections, and civil
society.
Sec. 303. Engaging international financial institutions to advance
Libyan economic recovery and improve public sector financial
management.
Sec. 304. Recovering assets stolen from the Libyan people.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The stability and territorial unity of Libya is critical
to the security of the United States, Europe, North Africa, and
the Sahel, as well as maritime routes in the southern
Mediterranean Sea.
(2) United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) identifies
containing instability in Libya as one of its six main lines of
effort in Africa and works to support diplomatic efforts to
reconstitute the Libyan State and to disrupt terrorist
organizations that impede that process or threaten United
States interests.
(3) According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Islamic
State in Libya (ISIS Libya) is ``degraded''. However, Secretary
of Defense Mark Esper said in November 2019 that there is a
continued need for lethal operations to keep ISIS Libya in a
degraded state.
(4) On April 4, 2019, Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the
Libyan National Army (LNA) ordered forces loyal to him to begin
a unilateral military operation to take control of Tripoli, the
capital of Libya and seat of the Government of National Accord
(GNA), an interim body that emerged from previous United
Nations-backed negotiations which the United States Government
and the United Nations Security Council have recognized since
2015.
(5) Both the LNA, the GNA, and their associated forces have
failed to observe their obligations under international
humanitarian law, increased the geographic scope of the
conflict, ignored calls for de-escalation and a ceasefire,
recruited foreign mercenaries, and intensified ground and air
campaigns using heavy weapons, aircraft, and reportedly using
armed drones provided by foreign powers.
(6) According to then-United Nations Special Representative
and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya
(UNSMIL), Ghassan Salame, weapons provided by foreign powers to
the warring parties in violation of the United Nations arms
embargo are being sold to or captured by terrorist groups
active in Libya.
(7) According to the United Nations, since the LNA offensive
began in April 2019, the conflict in Libya has led to the
deaths of more than 2,200 people and the displacement of more
than 150,000 people.
(8) All sides of the conflict have requisitioned the houses
of civilians, targeted medical facilities, and inhibited
humanitarian access to food, health, and other life-saving
services, worsening humanitarian conditions.
(9) More than 2,200 refugees and migrants are detained in
detention facilities in Libya with serious risks of torture,
starvation, sexual abuse, and death. On July 2, 2019, an
airstrike against the Tajura Detention Center killed 53 and
wounded 130 people trapped in the center. The United Nations
has called for the immediate release, evacuation, and
protection of refugees and migrants detained in conflict zones.
(10) The Department of State's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report states with regard to Libya, ``Trafficking victims--
including men, women, and children--are highly vulnerable to
extreme violence and other human rights violations in Libya by
governmental and non-state armed groups, including: physical,
sexual, and verbal assault; abduction for ransom; extortion;
arbitrary killings; inhumane detention; and child soldiering .
. . Migrants in Libya are extremely vulnerable to sex and labor
trafficking [and . . .] are vulnerable to exploitation by state
and non-state actors, including employers who refuse to pay
laborers' wages.''.
(11) In November 2019, the GNA and the Government of Turkey
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on maritime boundaries in
the Mediterranean Sea.
(12) According to a July 2020 Department of Defense Inspector
General report, the Wagner Group, a Russian private military
company, has deployed as many as 2,500 mercenary forces,
including some Syrian fighters, advanced equipment, and
advanced capabilities to support the LNA and Russian objectives
in North Africa.
(13) According to a July 2020 Department of Defense Inspector
General report, ``Turkey's president acknowledged that his
country sent many Syrian militants to Libya to support the
Government of National Accord (GNA). . . . USAFRICOM estimated
that 3,500 Syrian mercenaries were in Libya supporting the GNA
as of the end of March. Citing press reports, USAFRICOM stated
that an additional 300 Turkish-supported `Syrian opposition'
fighters arrived in Libya in early April.''.
(14) In January 2020, LNA-aligned forces shut down oil
production in eastern Libya, which according to the United
Nations threatens devastating consequences for the Libyan
people and for the country's economic and financial situation.
(15) On January 19, 2020, at a peace conference in Berlin,
representatives of the Governments of Algeria, China, Egypt,
France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, the Republic of Congo,
the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, as well as regional and multilateral organizations,
agreed to refrain from interference in Libya's internal
affairs, abide by the United Nations arms embargo, and advance
a 55-point communique to resolve the conflict in Libya.
(16) On January 30, 2020, then-United Nations Special
Representative Salame asserted, ``the warring parties have
continued to receive advanced equipment, fighters, and advisors
from foreign states, in violation of the UN arms embargo and
pledges made by representatives of these countries in Berlin''.
(17) On February 12, 2020, the United States Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs testified before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ``The task of bringing
the Libyans back to the negotiating table has been complicated
by the involvement of external actors. Libya is not the place
for Russian mercenaries, or fighters from Syria, Chad, and
Sudan. It is not the place for the Emiratis, Russians, or Turks
to be fighting battles on the ground through intermediaries
they sponsor or support with sophisticated and deadly equipment
in pursuit of their own agendas.''.
(18) On February 13, 2020, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 2510, which endorses the Conclusions
of the International Conference on Libya held in Berlin,
affirms the need for a lasting ceasefire, demands full
compliance by all member states with the United Nations arms
embargo, and expresses unequivocal support for the United
Nations Special Representative and the ongoing UNSMIL-
facilitated intra-Libyan dialogue.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to advance a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Libya
through a political process as the best way to secure United
States interests, ensure a stable and unified Libya, reduce the
threat of terrorism, and provide peace and opportunity to the
Libyan people;
(2) to support the implementation of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011), which
established an arms embargo on Libya, and subsequent
resolutions modifying and extending the embargo;
(3) to enforce Executive Order 13726 (81 Fed. Reg. 23559;
relating to blocking property and suspending entry into the
United States of persons contributing to the situation in Libya
(April 19, 2016)), designed to target individuals or entities
who ``threaten the peace, security, and stability of Libya'';
(4) to oppose attacks on civilians, medical workers, and
critical infrastructure, including water supplies, in Libya,
and to support accountability for those engaged in such heinous
actions;
(5) to support Libya's sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity, and national unity consistent with United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2510 (2020) and all predecessor
resolutions with respect to Libya, including by--
(A) taking action to end the violence and flow of
arms;
(B) rejecting attempts by any party to illicitly
export Libya's oil; and
(C) urging Libyan parties to eject foreign military
and mercenary forces;
(6) to leverage diplomatic relations to convince the parties
to the conflict in Libya to immediately de-escalate and halt
their current fighting and persuade foreign powers to stop
providing personnel, including mercenaries, weapons, and
financing that exacerbate the conflict;
(7) to support building on the Libyan Political Agreement as
a viable framework for the political solution in Libya and to
urge all Libyan parties to resume the inclusive Libyan-led and
Libyan-owned political process under the auspices of UNSMIL;
(8) to support a negotiated and peaceful political solution
that includes a single, unified, inclusive, and effective
Libyan Government approved by the Libyan House of
Representatives, the end of a transitional period achieved
through free, fair, inclusive, and credible elections, a fair
and transparent allocation of resources, interim security
arrangements, and a process for the reunification of Libyan
government ministries and Libyan sovereign institutions,
including the Central Bank of Libya, the National Oil
Corporation, and the Libyan Investment Authority;
(9) to support constant, unimpeded, and reliable humanitarian
access to those in need and to hold accountable those who
impede or threaten the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
(10) to seek to bring an end to trafficking in persons such
as slavery, forced labor, and sexual exploitation, including
with respect to migrants;
(11) to advocate for the immediate release and safe
evacuations of detained refugees and migrants trapped by the
fighting in Libya;
(12) to encourage implementation of UNSMIL's plan for the
organized and gradual closure of migrant detention centers in
Libya;
(13) to support current and future democratic and economic
development; and
(14) to discourage all parties from heightening tensions in
the region, through unhelpful and provocative actions.
TITLE I--IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES TO
STABILITY IN LIBYA
SEC. 101. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND
ACTORS IN LIBYA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report that includes--
(1) a description of the full extent of involvement in Libya
by foreign governments, including the Governments of Russia,
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, China,
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, including--
(A) a description of which governments are linked to
drone and aircraft strikes;
(B) a list of the types and estimated amounts of
equipment transferred by each government described in
this paragraph to the parties to the conflict,
including foreign military contractors, mercenaries, or
paramilitary forces operating in Libya; and
(C) an estimate of the financial support provided by
each government described in this paragraph to the
parties to the conflict, including foreign military
contractors, mercenaries, or paramilitary forces
operating in Libya;
(2) an analysis and determination of whether the actions by
the governments described in paragraph (1) violate the arms
embargo with respect to Libya under United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2473 (2019) and other relevant Security
Council resolutions;
(3) a list of the specific offending materiel or financial
support transfers provided by a government described in
paragraph (1) that violate the arms embar go with respect to
Libya under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2473
(2019) and other relevant Security Council resolutions;
(4) a description of the activities of each foreign armed
group, including the Russian Wagner Group, Turkish military
contractors and mercenaries, affiliates of ISIS, al-Qaida in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Ansar al-Sharia, in Libya;
(5) a description of European Union and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) efforts to enforce the United Nations arms
embargo and facilitate a ceasefire;
(6) a description of any violations of the arms embargo by
European Union member states; and
(7) a description of United States diplomatic engagement with
the European Union and NATO regarding enforcement of the United
Nations arms embargo.
(b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 102. REPORT OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES IN LIBYA.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) General Stephen Townsend, Commander of United States
Africa Command (AFRICOM), warned in January 2020 that in Libya,
Russia seeks to ``demonstrate itself as an alternative partner
to the West'' and seeks to position itself alongside the
southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
(2) AFRICOM has also stated that the Russian military
presence in Libya threatens future United States military
partnerships and counterterrorism cooperation by impeding
United States access to Libya.
(3) In May 2020, AFRICOM reported that the Government of
Russia deployed 14 MiG-29 and Su-24 aircraft to Libya to
support Russian state-sponsored private military contractors,
including the Wagner Group.
(b) Report.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains
an assessment of Russian activities and objectives in Libya,
including--
(A) the potential threat such activities pose to the
United States, southern Europe, NATO, and partners in
the Mediterranean Sea and North African region;
(B) the direct role of Russia in Libyan financial
affairs, to include issuing and printing currency; and
(C) Russia's use of mercenaries, military
contractors, equipment, and paramilitary forces in
Libya.
(2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
(3) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
SEC. 103. DETERMINATION OF SANCTIONABLE ACTIVITIES OF THE LIBYAN
NATIONAL ARMY WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate a list of members of the Libyan National Army (LNA), and
details of their activities, that the President determines are
knowingly responsible for sanctionable offenses pursuant to--
(1) section 7412 of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 8791 note; 133 Stat. 2292); or
(2) Executive Order 13582 (76 Fed. Reg. 52209; relating to
blocking property of the Government of Syria and prohibiting
certain transactions with respect to Syria (August 17, 2011)).
TITLE II--ACTIONS TO ADDRESS FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
SEC. 201. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS LEADING, DIRECTING,
OR SUPPORTING CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall impose each of the sanctions
described in section 204 with respect to each foreign person that the
President determines knowingly engages in an activity described in
subsection (b).
(b) Activities Described.--A foreign person engages in an activity
described in this subsection if the person leads, directs, or provides
significant financial, material, or technological support to, or
knowingly engages in a significant transaction with, a non-Libyan
foreign person that is--
(1) in Libya in a military or commercial capacity as a
military contractor, mercenary, or part of a paramilitary
force; and
(2) engaged in significant actions that threaten the peace,
security, or stability of Libya.
SEC. 202. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS THREATENING THE
PEACE OR STABILITY OF LIBYA.
(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--The President shall impose each of
the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign
person on the list required by subsection (b).
(b) List.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a list of--
(1) foreign persons, including senior government officials,
militia leaders, paramilitary leaders, and other persons who
provide significant support to militia or paramilitary groups
in Libya, that the President determines are knowingly--
(A) engaged in significant actions or policies that
threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya,
including any supply of arms or related materiel in
violation of a United Nations Security Council
resolution with respect to Libya;
(B) engaged in significant actions or policies that
obstruct, undermine, delay, or impede, or pose a
significant risk of obstructing, undermining, delaying,
or impeding the United Nations-mediated political
process that seeks a negotiated and peaceful solution
to the Libyan crisis;
(C) engaged in significant actions that may lead to
or result in the misappropriation of significant state
assets of Libya;
(D) involved in, or has been involved in, the
significant illicit exploitation of crude oil or any
other natural resources in Libya, including the
significant illicit production, refining, brokering,
sale, purchase, or export of Libyan oil;
(E) significantly threatening or coercing Libyan
state financial institutions or the Libyan National Oil
Company; or
(F) significantly responsible for actions or policies
that are intended to undermine efforts to promote
stabilization and economic recovery in Libya;
(2) foreign persons that the President determines are
successor entities to persons referred to in subparagraphs (A)
through (F) of paragraph (1); and
(3) foreign persons that the President determines--
(A) own or control, or are owned or controlled by, a
person referred to in any of subparagraphs (A) through
(F) of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2); and
(B) have provided, or attempted to provide,
significant financial, material, technological, or
other support for, or goods or services in support of,
a person referred to in any of subparagraphs (A)
through (F) of paragraph (1) or paragraph (2) for
purposes of engaging in any activity listed in such
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (1).
(c) Updates of List.--The President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees an updated list under subsection (b)--
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years; or
(2) as new information becomes available.
(d) Form.--The list required by subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 203. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERSONS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR OR COMPLICIT IN GROSS VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTED
IN LIBYA.
(a) Imposition of Sanctions.--The President shall impose each of
the sanctions described in section 204 with respect to each foreign
person on the list required by subsection (b).
(b) List of Persons.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a list of foreign persons,
including senior government officials, militia leaders,
paramilitary leaders, and other persons who provide significant
support to militia or paramilitary groups in Libya, that the
President determines are knowingly responsible for or complicit
in, or have directly or indirectly engaged in, gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights committed in Libya.
(2) Updates of list.--The President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees an updated list under
paragraph (1)--
(A) not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for a
period of 5 years; or
(B) as new information becomes available.
(3) Form.--The list required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 204. SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.
(a) Sanctions Described.--The sanctions to be imposed with respect
to a foreign person under section 201, 202, or 203 are the following:
(1) Blocking of property.--The President shall exercise all
of the powers granted to the President by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (except
that the requirements of section 202 of such Act (50 U.S.C.
1701) shall not apply) to the extent necessary to block and
prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property
of the person if such property and interests in property are in
the United States, come within the United States, or are or
come within the possession or control of a United States
person.
(2) Inadmissibility of certain individuals.--
(A) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole.--A
foreign person who meets any of the criteria described
section 201, 202, or 203 is--
(i) inadmissible to the United States;
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or
paroled into the United States or to receive
any other benefit under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked.--A foreign person subject
to section 201, 202, or 203 is subject to the
following:
(i) Revocation of any visa or other entry
documentation regardless of when the visa or
other entry documentation is or was issued.
(ii) A revocation under clause (i) shall--
(I) take effect immediately; and
(II) automatically cancel any other
valid visa or entry documentation that
is in the foreign person's possession.
(b) Penalties.--The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and
(c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations
promulgated under section 306(2) to carry out subsection (a)(1) to the
same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an
unlawful act described in section 206(a) of that Act.
(c) Exception.--Sanctions under subsection (a)(2) shall not apply
to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States
is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement
regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake
Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947,
between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable
international obligations of the United States.
(d) Exception to Comply With National Security.--The following
activities shall be exempt from sanctions under this section:
(1) Activities subject to the reporting requirements under
title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et
seq.).
(2) Any authorized intelligence or law enforcement activities
of the United States.
SEC. 205. WAIVER.
The President may waive the application of sanctions imposed on a
foreign person under this title if the President--
(1) determines that such a waiver is in the national interest
of the United States; and
(2) not later than the date on which such waiver will take
effect, submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
notice of and justification for such waiver.
SEC. 206. IMPLEMENTATION AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY.
The President--
(1) is authorized to exercise all authorities provided to the
President under sections 203 and 205 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to
carry out this title; and
(2) shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are
necessary to carry out this title.
SEC. 207. EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.
(a) In General.--The authorities and requirements to impose
sanctions under this title shall not include the authority or
requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(b) Good Defined.--In this section, the term ``good'' means any
article, natural or man-made substance, material, supply or
manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment and
excluding technical data.
SEC. 208. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate.
(2) Admitted; alien.--The terms ``admitted'' and ``alien''
have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means an
individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(4) Foreign government.--The term ``foreign government''
means any government of a country other than the United States.
(5) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' with respect to
conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has
actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the
circumstance, or the result.
(6) United states person.--The term ``United States person''
means--
(A) an individual who is a United States citizen or
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
the United States; or
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any jurisdiction within the United States,
including a foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C) any person in the United States.
(7) Gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.--The term ``gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights'' has the meaning given such term in
section 502B(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2304(d)(1)).
SEC. 209. SUSPENSION OF SANCTIONS.
(a) In General.--The President may suspend in whole or in part the
imposition of sanctions otherwise required under this title for periods
not to exceed 90 days if the President determines that the parties to
the conflict in Libya have agreed to and are upholding a sustainable,
good-faith ceasefire in support of a lasting political solution in
Libya.
(b) Notification Required.--Not later than 30 days after the date
on which the President makes a determination to suspend the imposition
of sanctions as described in subsection (a), the President shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a notification of the
determination.
(c) Reimposition of Sanctions.--Any sanctions suspended under
subsection (a) shall be reimposed if the President determines that the
criteria described in that subsection are no longer being met.
SEC. 210. SUNSET.
The requirement to impose sanctions under this title shall cease to
be effective on December 31, 2024.
TITLE III--ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYA
SEC. 301. HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR THE PEOPLE OF LIBYA AND INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN LIBYA.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States Government should--
(A) continue efforts to address Libya's humanitarian
crisis;
(B) leverage diplomatic relations with the warring
parties to guarantee constant, reliable humanitarian
access by frontline providers in Libya;
(C) leverage diplomatic relations with the warring
parties, the United Nations, and the European Union to
encourage the voluntary safe passage of detained
vulnerable migrants and refugees from the conflict
zones in Libya; and
(D) support efforts to document and publicize gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights
and international humanitarian law, including efforts
related to trafficking in persons such as slavery,
forced labor, and sexual exploitation, and hold
perpetrators accountable; and
(2) humanitarian assistance to address the crisis in Libya
should be targeted toward those most in need and delivered
through partners that uphold internationally recognized
humanitarian principles, with robust monitoring to ensure
assistance is reaching intended beneficiaries.
(b) Assistance Authorized.--The Administrator of the United States
Agency for International Development, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, should continue to support humanitarian assistance
to individuals and communities in Libya, including--
(1) health assistance, including logistical and technical
assistance to hospitals, ambulances, and health clinics in
affected communities, including migrant communities, and
provision of basic public health commodities;
(2) services, such as medicines and medical supplies and
equipment;
(3) assistance to provide--
(A) protection, food, and shelter, including to
migrant communities; and
(B) water, sanitation, and hygiene (commonly referred
to as ``WASH''); and
(4) technical assistance to ensure health, food, and
commodities are appropriately selected, procured, targeted,
monitored, and distributed.
(c) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
strategy on the following:
(1) How the United States, working with relevant foreign
governments and multilateral organizations, plans to address
the humanitarian situation in Libya.
(2) Diplomatic efforts by the United States to encourage
strategic burdensharing with international donors, including
foreign governments and multilateral organizations on efforts
to improve the humanitarian situation in Libya.
(3) How to address humanitarian access challenges and ensure
protection for vulnerable refugees and migrants, including
protection from trafficking in persons such as slavery, forced
labor, and sexual exploitation.
(4) How the United States is mitigating risk, utilizing third
party monitors, and ensuring effective delivery of assistance.
(d) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, should work with relevant foreign governments and
multilateral organizations to coordinate a high-level summit with
respect to Libya in order to--
(1) advance a ceasefire;
(2) facilitate a political process to achieve such a
ceasefire; and
(3) coordinate donations to advance the provision of
humanitarian assistance to the people of Libya and
international migrants and refugees in Libya in order to carry
out the strategy required by subsection (c).
(e) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
SEC. 302. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, ELECTIONS, AND CIVIL
SOCIETY.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of State shall coordinate United
States Government efforts to--
(1) support efforts to resolve the current civil conflict in
Libya;
(2) work to help the people of Libya and a future Libyan
government develop functioning, unified Libyan economic,
security, and governing institutions;
(3) work to ensure free, fair, inclusive, and credible
elections organized by an independent and effective High
National Elections Commission in Libya, including through
supporting electoral security and international election
observation and by providing training and technical assistance
to institutions with election-related responsibilities, as
appropriate;
(4) work with the people of Libya, nongovernmental
organizations, and Libyan institutions to strengthen democratic
governance, reinforce civilian institutions and support
decentralization in order to address community grievances,
promote social cohesion, mitigate drivers of violent extremism,
and help communities recover from Islamic State occupation;
(5) defend against gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights in Libya, including by supporting
efforts to document such violations;
(6) to combat corruption and improve the transparency and
accountability of Libyan government institutions; and
(7) to support the efforts of independent media outlets to
broadcast, distribute, and share information with the Libyan
people.
(b) Risk Mitigation and Assistance Monitoring.--The Secretary of
State and Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development shall ensure that appropriate steps are taken to mitigate
risk of diversion of assistance for Libya and ensure reliable third-
party monitoring is utilized for projects in Libya that United States
Government personnel are unable to access and monitor.
(c) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the activities carried out under
subsection (a).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated
$23,000,000 for fiscal year 2021 to carry out subsection (a).
(2) Notification requirements.--Any expenditure of amounts
made avail able to carry out subsection (a) shall be subject to
the notification requirements applicable to--
(A) expenditures from the Economic Support Fund under
section 531(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2346(c)); and
(B) expenditures from the Development Assistance Fund
under section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2413(a)).
SEC. 303. ENGAGING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO ADVANCE
LIBYAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SECTOR
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the
United States Executive Director at each international financial
institution to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
to support, in a way that is consistent with broader United States
national interests, a Libyan-led process to develop a framework for the
economic recovery of Libya and improved public sector financial
management, complementary to United Nations-led peace efforts and in
support of the future establishment of a sovereign state with
democratic institutions and the rule of law in Libya.
(b) Additional Elements.--To the extent consistent with broader
United States national interests, the framework described in subsection
(a) shall include the following policy proposals:
(1) To restore, respect, and safeguard the integrity, unity,
and lawful governance of Libya's key economic ministries and
institutions, in particular the Central Bank of Libya, the
Libya Investment Authority, the National Oil Corporation, and
the Audit Bureau (AB).
(2) To improve the accountability and effectiveness of Libyan
authorities, including sovereign economic institutions, in
providing services and opportunity to the Libyan people.
(3) To assist in improving public financial management and
reconciling the public accounts of national financial
institutions and letters of credit issued by private Libyan
financial institutions as needed pursuant to a political
process.
(4) To restore the production, efficient management, and
development of Libya's oil and gas industries so such
industries are resilient against malign foreign influence and
can generate prosperity on behalf of the Libyan people.
(5) To promote the development of private sector enterprise.
(6) To improve the transparency and accountability of public
sector employment and wage distribution.
(7) To strengthen supervision of and reform of Libyan
financial institutions.
(8) To eliminate exploitation of price controls and market
distorting subsidies in the Libyan economy.
(9) To support opportunities for United States businesses.
(c) Consultation.--In supporting the framework described in
subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United
States Executive Director at each international financial institution
to encourage the institution to consult with relevant stakeholders in
the financial, governance, and energy sectors.
(d) Definition of International Financial Institution.--In this
section, the term ``international financial institution'' means the
International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
International Development Association, International Finance
Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, African
Development Bank, African Development Fund, Asian Development Bank,
Inter-American Development Bank, Bank for Economic Cooperation and
Development in the Middle East and North Africa, and Inter-American
Investment Corporation.
(e) Termination.--The requirements of this section shall cease to
be effective on December 31, 2024.
SEC. 304. RECOVERING ASSETS STOLEN FROM THE LIBYAN PEOPLE.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney
General should, to the extent practicable, advance a coordinated
international effort--
(1) to carry out special financial investigations to identify
and track assets taken from the people and institutions of
Libya through theft, corruption, money laundering, or other
illicit means; and
(2) to work with foreign governments--
(A) to share financial investigations intelligence,
as appropriate;
(B) to oversee the assets identified pursuant to
paragraph (1); and
(C) to provide technical assistance to help
governments establish the necessary legal framework to
carry out asset forfeitures.
(b) Additional Elements.--The coordinated international effort
described in subsection (a) should include input from--
(1) the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes of
the Department of the Treasury;
(2) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the
Department of the Treasury; and
(3) the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section of the
Department of Justice.
PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION
H.R. 4644, the ``Libya Stabilization Act of 2020'', is a
response to years of instability and violence created by the
conflict in Libya, and exacerbated by external actors seeking
to exploit the vacuum left by weakened Libyan state
institutions. This legislation seeks to raise the price of
perpetuating conflict for internal and external actors in order
to support a political process to end the conflict and urge the
parties to the conflict to comply with agreed-upon ceasefire
arrangements. The legislation also authorizes humanitarian
assistance to the people of Libya and assistance to help them
strengthen democratic governance and build a better future in
Libya.
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
Libya's political transition from Muammar al-Qaddafi's
authoritarian rule has been disrupted by violence between armed
nonstate groups and threatened by the indecision and squabbles
of interim leaders for years. After an armed uprising by
Libyans and NATO's military intervention ended Qaddafi's four-
decade rule in 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form
a stable government, address security issues, reshape the
country's finances, or create a viable pathway for post-
conflict reconciliation. Insecurity spread as local armed
groups competed for influence and resources.
Qaddafi's rule left Libya ill-prepared for self-government,
with crippled institutions and little to no civil society.
Between 2012 and 2014, insecurity and violence between armed
groups increased as did terrorist attacks against the U.S.
(such as the attack on the U.S. compound in Benghazi in
September 2012 that killed four Americans, including U.S.
Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens) and other
international targets, further destabilizing Libya.
In December 2015, some Libyan leaders endorsed a U.N.-
brokered political agreement to create a Government of National
Accord (GNA) to oversee the completion of the transition. GNA
Prime Minister-designate Fayez al-Sarraj and members of a GNA
Presidency Council tried to implement a negotiated political
agreement but faced resistance from rival political leaders and
defiant militias, including rivals and armed groups in eastern
Libya, most prominently Khalifa Haftar Libyan National Army
(LNA).
These tensions erupted into major conflict in 2019 when
Haftar's LNA launched an armed assault on western Libyan
population centers and sought to seize Libya's capital,
Tripoli, from the internationally-recognized GNA. Fighting
intensified until GNA forces repelled Haftar's advance and
forced the LNA's withdrawal from Tripoli's environs in June
2020. The U.S. and EU, as of the time of the writing of this
report, are supporting a national ceasefire and have resumed
negotiations aimed at ensuring the viability of a long-term
Libyan civilian government.
In 2019 and 2020 various foreign states, each seeking to
gain a foothold and expand their regional influence through
Libyan proxies, fueled the civil war by providing lethal
weaponry, fighters, and financial resources to their respective
allies. Arms flows from outside states violate multiple UN
Security Council resolutions including Resolution 2174 (adopted
in August 2014) which authorizes the placement of UN financial
and travel sanctions on individuals and entities found to be
``engaging in or providing support for other acts that threaten
the peace, stability or security of Libya, or obstruct or
undermine the successful completion of its political
transition.'' UNSCR 2174 also strengthened the arms embargo
provisions and UNSCR 2213 expanded the scope of sanctionable
activities related to the arms embargo.
Russian state-supported private military contractor Wagner
Group intervened on behalf of Haftar's LNA via mercenary
personnel in-country as well as providing small arms and
equipment. In response, the European Union in October 2020
imposed sanctions on the head of the Wagner Group for
``multiple and repeated breaches of the United Nations arms
embargo in Libya.'' The U.S. also has sanctions on Wagner,
Yevgeniy Prigozhin (manager and financier of the Wagner Group),
and numerous affiliated entities. Egypt and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) also supplied funding and weaponry to the LNA
including small arms, drones and other equipment. Turkey,
acting through a bilateral agreement reached with the GNA, has
provided training, mercenaries, weapons, and equipment to GNA
forces, and positioned naval vessels off Libya's coast to
support GNA forces and harass and intimidate those seeking to
support GNA adversaries through maritime shipments.
The U.S. and EU have repeatedly underscored the need for
such actions to cease, including at the January 2020 Berlin
Conference on Libya where the five permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council and other key foreign actors made joint
commitments with a goal of ending the conflict. These
commitments included a cessation of hostilities, a pledge of
mutual respect for the U.N. arms embargo, and a set of shared
post-conflict governance, economic, and security goals.
In June 2020, U.S. Ambassador Richard Norland and AFRICOM
Commander Gen. Stephen Townsend visited western Libya and met
with GNA Prime Ministerdesignate Sarraj, Minister of Interior
Fathi Bashaga, and other GNA officials. Upon the conclusion of
this visit, Ambassador Norland stated, ``External actors should
stop fueling the conflict, respect the UN arms embargo, and
uphold commitments made at the Berlin Summit.''
On October 23, 2020 GNA and LNA officials, representing
Libya's main warring parties, agreed to a cease-fire,
facilitated by the United Nations. The agreement seeks to end
the fighting and calls on forces to return to their bases and
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries within
three months. Initial military steps are to be followed by
dialogue between parties and continued efforts towards a
lasting political solution to the conflict. On November 9, the
United Nations convened the first in-person meeting of the
Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, which aims to define a new
consensus on holding national elections, beginning
reconciliation, and ending the political transition. Though the
United Nations will continue to facilitate and monitor the
security and political processes, many details remain to be
defined such as enforcement mechanisms, terms and objectives of
the forthcoming political process, as well as timelines and
details of national elections.
This legislation supports such goals by placing additional
U.S. sanctions on actors engaged in violations of the U.N. arms
embargo and establishing additional reporting requirements in
furtherance of U.S. policy goals.
SUMMARY OF THE LEGISLATION
The Committee believes that one way to advance a diplomatic
solution in Libya is to raise the costs for those parties
continuing to engage in and support violence in Libya. This
legislation imposes sanctions on foreign persons, both inside
and outside of Libya, who are unhelpfully fueling the conflict
thereby putting peaceful resolution further out of reach. The
legislation also authorizes humanitarian relief and support for
democratic governance, elections and civil society to help the
people of Libya rebuild their country and prevent a power
vacuum that violent extremists and adversarial powers like
Russia could exploit.
HEARINGS/BRIEFINGS
For the purposes of section 103(i) of H. Res. 6 of the
116th Congress the following hearing was used to develop or
consider H.R. 4644. May 15, 2019, Subcommittee on the Middle
East, North Africa, and International Terrorism hearing on
``The Conflict in Libya'' (Ben Fishman, Senior Fellow, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Megan Doherty,
Senior Director for Policy and Advocacy, Mercy Corps; Frederic
Wehrey, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace; Thomas Hill, Senior Program
Officer, North Africa, United States Institute of Peace).
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION
The Committee on Foreign Affairs marked up H.R. 4644 in
open session on July 29, 2020, pursuant to notice. An amendment
in the nature of a substitute (offered by Subcommittee on the
Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism Chairman
Theodore Deutch) and one amendment to that amendment in the
nature of a substitute (offered by Rep. Steve Chabot and Rep.
Ilhan Omar) were considered en bloc with the underlying bill,
and were agreed to by voice vote.
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee reports that
findings and recommendations of the committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of House Rule X, are
incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report,
particularly in the ``Purpose of Legislation,'' ``Background
and Need for Legislation,'' and `` Section-by-Section
Analysis'' sections.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, TAX EXPENDITURES,
AND FEDERAL MANDATES
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII and
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 104-4), the committee
adopts as its own the estimate of new budget authority,
entitlement authority, tax expenditure or revenues, and Federal
mandates contained in the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, September 29, 2020.
Hon. Eliot Engel,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4644, the Libya
Stabilization Act.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sunita
D'Monte.
Sincerely,
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director.
Enclosure.
BASIS OF ESTIMATE
H.R. 4644 would authorize the appropriation of $23 million
in 2021 to promote stability, free elections, civil society,
and democratic governance in Libya. Assuming appropriation of
the specified amount, CBO estimates that providing such
assistance would cost $17 million over the 2021-2025 period.
The remainder would be spent after 2025.
The bill also would require the Administration to provide
several reports to the Congress on sanctions, the conflict in
Libya, and related matters. On the basis of information about
similar requirements, CBO estimates that providing the required
reports would cost the department $1 million. In total, CBO
estimates that implementing the bill would cost $18 million
over the 2020-2025 period. Such spending would be subject to
the availability of appropriated funds.
Finally, the bill would require the President to impose
sanctions on foreign persons who threaten the peace and
stability of Libya or who commit gross violations of human
rights in that country. That authority would expire on December
31, 2024. Those sanctions would deny affected people entry into
the United States. CBO estimates that the provision would
increase the number of people who would be denied visas by the
Department of State. Most visa fees are retained by the
department and spent without further appropriation, but some
fees are deposited in the Treasury as revenues. Denying foreign
nationals entry into the United States also would reduce direct
spending on certain federal benefits for which they are
eligible, such as emergency Medicaid or federal subsidies for
health insurance.
In addition, the sanctions would block transactions in
assets and property that are in the United States or come under
the control of U.S. persons.
Enacting the bill also would increase the number of people
who would be subject to civil or criminal penalties for
violating the sanctions. Penalties are recorded as revenues,
and a portion of those penalties can be spent without further
appropriation.
Using data from similar sanctions, CBO estimates that few
people would be affected; thus, enacting the bill would have
insignificant effects on revenues and direct spending, and
would, on net, reduce the deficit by insignificant amounts.
MANDATES
H.R. 4644 would impose a private-sector mandate as defined
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). It would prohibit
individuals or entities in the United States from engaging in
transactions involving assets and property that have been
frozen by sanctions authorized in the bill. Those transactions
are otherwise permitted under current law. The cost of the
mandate would be any income lost as a consequence. CBO expects
that because a small number of people or entities would be
affected, the loss of income from any incremental increase in
restrictions imposed by the bill would be small as well. CBO
estimates that the cost of the mandate would fall well below
the annual threshold established in UMRA for private-sector
mandates ($168 million in 2020, adjusted annually for
inflation).
H.R. 4644 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined
in UMRA.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Sunita D'Monte;
Mandates: Brandon Lever.
Estimate reviewed by: David Newman, Chief, Defense,
International Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs Cost Estimates
Unit; Kathleen FitzGerald, Chief, Public and Private Mandates
Unit; Leo Lex, Deputy Director of Budget Analysis.
DIRECTED RULE MAKING
[Pursuant to clause 3(c) of House Rule XIII, as modified by
section 3(i) of H. Res. 5 during the 116th Congress, the
committee notes that H.R. 4664 contains no directed rule-
makingprovisions.]
NON-DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS
[Pursuant to clause 3(c)(5) of House Rule XIII, the
committee states that no provision of this bill establishes or
reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be
duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was
included in any report from the Government Accountability
Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-
139, or a program related to a program identified in the most
recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance.]
PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The Act is intended to compel internal and external actors
to cease activity in Libya that fuels conflict and undermines a
political process. The key performance goal associated with
this objective is a determination that the parties to the
conflict in Libya have agreed to and are upholding a
sustainable, good faith ceasefire in support of a lasting
political solution in Libya.
CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
H.R. 4644 does not apply to terms and conditions of
employment or to access to public services or accommodations
within the legislative branch.
NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES
H.R. 4644 does not establish or authorize any new advisory
committees.
EARMARK IDENTIFICATION
H.R. 4644 contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits as described in clauses
9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House Rule XXI.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Sec. 1: Short title; Table of Contents
Sec. 2: Findings; Statement of Policy
Includes a statement that it is the policy of the United
States to advance a peaceful resolution to the conflict in
Libya through a political process as the best way to secure
United States interests, ensure a stable and unified Libya,
reduce the threat of terrorism, and provide peace and
opportunity to the Libyan people.
Sec. 101: Report on activities of certain Foreign Governments and
actors in Libya
This provision requires an executive branch report on the
extent and type of foreign actor involvement in Libya,
including numbers and types of military equipment transferred,
extent of financial support, and numbers and capabilities of
military contractors, mercenaries or other types of
paramilitary forces provided and the extent to which such
actions violate the UN arms embargo.
Sec. 102: Report of Russian activities and objectives in Libya
This provision requires a report from the executive branch
on the extent and implications of Russian involvement in Libya
and the impact of such activities on the U.S. and Europe.
Sec. 103: Determination of sanctionable activities of the Libyan
National Army with respect to Syria
This provision requires a determination as to whether
Libyan National Army (LNA) activities connected to Syria and
the Assad regime are sanctionable under the Caesar Syrian
Civilian Protection Act or Executive Order 13582.
Sec. 201: Sanctions with respect to foreign persons leading, directing
or supporting certain Foreign Government involvement in Libya
This section mandates U.S. sanctions on any foreign person
that knowingly leads, directs, or provides significant
financial, material, or technological support to, or knowingly
engages in a significant transaction with a non-Libyan foreign
person that is in Libya in a military or commercial capacity as
a military contractor, mercenary, or paramilitary force and
engaged in significant actions that threaten the peace,
security, or stability of Libya.
Sec. 202: Sanctions with respect to foreign persons threatening the
peace or stability of Libya
This section mandates U.S. sanctions on any foreign
persons, including senior government officials, militia
leaders, paramilitary leaders or any other persons who are
knowingly engaging in significant actions that threaten the
peace, security, or stability of Libya including any supply of
arms or related materiel in violation of a UN Security Council
Resolution with respect to Libya; who engage in any activities
or efforts that delay or obstruct the UN-mediated political
negotiations process; who engage in significant illicit
exploitation or misappropriation of Libyan state assets or
natural resources including oil; who significantly threaten or
coerce Libyan state financial institution or the Libyan
National Oil Company; or who are significantly responsible for
actions or policies intended to undermine efforts to promote
stabilization or recovery in Libya. Those who have provided or
attempted to provide significant financial, material,
technological or other support for a person engaged in such
actions are also subject to sanctions.
Sec. 203: Sanctions with respect to foreign persons who are responsible
for or complicit in gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights committed in Libya
This provision mandates sanctions on any foreign persons,
including senior government officials, militia leaders,
paramilitary leaders and other persons who provide significant
support to militia or paramilitary groups in Libya, that the
President determines are knowingly responsible for, complicit,
or engaged in gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights committed in Libya.
Sec. 204: Sanctions described
Sec. 205: Waiver
Sec. 206: Implementation and regulatory authority
Authorizes the President to issue regulations in order to
implement this legislation.
Sec. 207: Exception relating to importation of goods
Clarifies that the Authority to Impose of Sanctions does
not Include the Authority or Requirement to Impose Sanctions on
the Importation of Goods.
Sec. 208: Definitions
Sec. 209: Suspension of sanctions
This provision allows for the President to suspend
sanctions if parties to the conflict in Libya are determined to
have agreed to and are upholding a sustainable, good-faith
ceasefire in support of a lasting political solution to the
conflict. Sanctions would be reimposed if the President
determines that the parties are no longer upholding a ceasefire
in support of a lasting political solution to the conflict.
Sec. 210: Sunset
The requirement to impose sanctions ceases to be effective
on December 31, 2024.
Sec. 301: Humanitarian relief for the people of Libya and international
refugees and migrants in Libya
This provision states that the U.S. Agency for
International Development, in coordination with the Secretary
of State should continue humanitarian assistance to individuals
and communities in Libya including via health assistance;
services such as medicine and medical supplies; food; shelter;
water, sanitation, and hygiene; and related technical
assistance. Also requires an accompanying strategy for
addressing the humanitarian situation in Libya including
coordinating with other states and burden-sharing.
Sec. 302: Support for democratic governance, elections, and civil
society
This provision directs the Secretary of State to coordinate
U.S. efforts to: support efforts to resolve the civil conflict
in Libya; help the people of Libya develop functioning, unified
institutions; work to ensure the holding of free, fair and
inclusive elections; strengthen democratic governance and
reinforce civilian institutions; defend against and document
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights;
combat corruption; and support efforts to independent media to
broadcast to the Libyan people. The provision authorizes
$23,000,000 for fiscal year 2021 to carry out such activities
and requires a report to Congress on such work.
Sec. 303: Engaging international financial institutions to advance
Libyan economic recovery and improve public sector financial
management
This provision requires the Secretary of the Treasury to
direct U.S. representatives at each international financial
institution to support a Libyan-led process to develop a
framework for the economic recovery of Libya and improved
public sector financial management, complementary to UN-led
peace efforts and in support of the future establishment of a
sovereign state with democratic institutions and the rule of
law in Libya. Elements of such efforts must also include
initiatives to: restore institutions such as the Central Bank
of Libya, the Libyan Investment Authority, the Libyan National
Oil Company and the Audit Bureau; improve the accountability
and effectiveness of Libyan authorities and institutions;
assist in restoring the functioning and management of Libya's
oil and gas industries to benefit the Libyan people; promote
the development of private sector enterprise; improve the
transparency and accountability of public sector employment and
wage distribution; strengthen reform of Libyan financial
institutions; eliminate exploitation of price controls and
market distorting subsidies in Libya; and support opportunities
for U.S. businesses.
Sec. 304: Recovering assets stolen from the Libyan people
Expresses the sense of Congress that the United States
should advance a coordinated international effort to carry out
special financial investigations to identify and track assets
taken from the people and institutions of Libya through theft,
corruption, money laundering or other illicit means.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
We concur with the views expressed in the full Committee
report accompanying H.R. 4644, the Libya Stabilization Act and
recommend that the bill do pass. I offer supplemental views for
the report on the following two points:
1. Violence in Libya: Subsequent to the fall of Qadhafi,
violence between rival revolutionary militias and terrorist
groups remained at relatively low-level rates prior to the
surge of external military support. I visited Benghazi in 2011
in the joyous aftermath of Qadhafi's fall and witnessed the
significant security challenges facing Libyans, but also their
commitment to working with one another to build a new country
across regional and tribal divides. This was ultimately trumped
by external military support, which sought to tip the scales in
the internal Libyan political transition. In particular,
following the start of the civil war in the summer of 2014,
Libya saw flagrant violations of the UN arms embargo by the UAE
and Egypt.
The revolution was fought by hastily assembled militias,
operating independently and with minimal connection to pre-
revolutionary military structures. As a result, following the
revolution, low-level violence erupted sporadically as these
militias struggled to work through significant ideological and
political differences, while simultaneously fending off ISIS
and AQ-inspired groups. However, following an offensive
launched in early 2014 by former Qadhafiera general Khalifa
Haftar, a surge of support from the UAE and Egypt expanded the
scale of conflict and shifted the nature of violence.
In the aftermath of this support, the nature of violence in
Libya shifted away from low-level skirmishes. By 2014, Haftar's
militias unleashed largescale military and political campaigns
seeking to dominate the post-revolutionary landscape, eliminate
rival militias, and purge ideological and political diversity
from Libya.
This provision of external financing, weapons, military
construction, and air support cemented the political division
of the country in 2014 and empowered Haftar to stand against
the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) negotiated in 2015 with US
support. Emirati and Egyptian support to Haftar was crucial to
the failure of the LPA in reunifying the country.
2. External involvement: Concern about external actors
providing weapons in violation of the UN arms embargo is not
new. As a former Assistant Secretary of State, I can attest
that the US government has been aware of and publicly
condemnatory of external involvement in Libya since at least
2014. However, a clear understanding of the sequencing of
external involvement is essential to unwinding these tragic
missteps.
Of note, the United Arab Emirates launched a program of
major military and financial support to Haftar's militias as
early as 2014, providing small arms, financing, and military
air strikes. This escalated with the provision in 2016-2017 of
drones and attack aircraft following the completion of the
Khadim airbase. These flagrant violations of the UN arms
embargo were frequently facilitated by the Egyptian government,
whose acquiescence was necessary for crossborder movement of
weapons and personnel into eastern Libya. The UN Panel of
Experts on Libya has documented that the most significant
violations since at least 2014 have been undertaken by the
Emirates and systematically benefited Haftar's forces.
Violations include provision of attack helicopters, armed
drones, fighter planes and parts, armored vehicles, small arms,
and ammunition. Some weapons shipments may have even violated
USG end-use conditions, such as US-provided attack aircraft
sold to the UAE but illegally diverted to eastern Libya. During
the same timeframe, Qatar was suspected of bankrolling
relatively limited shipments of ammunition and small arms from
Turkey and Sudan.
2019-2020 saw a renewed interest by external parties
following Haftar's UAE-backed offensive on the US and UN-
recognized government in Tripoli. Of note, Turkey-a late
entrant in hard support to this conflict-has surged armored
vehicles, small arms, and Syrian mercenaries to support the
Tripoli government. While Ankara points to formal agreements
with the UN-recognized government, such weapons shipments and
other military support would still violate the still-in-force
arms embargo. During this latter period, the Emirates has
escalated its own materiel support through the provision of
Pantsir air defense systems and is alleged to have funded
Russian mercenaries fighting for Haftar. These systematic
violations have killed and endangered civilians and prolonged a
conflict that has displaced more than 400,000.
De-escalation and a return to democratic transition for
Libya will unavoidably require an enforceable and verifiable
cessation of external support to the various armed groups.
However, the United States government must provide transparent
and thorough reporting on the relative scale and nature of this
illegal materiel support in violation of the UN arms embargo,
including by US allies and partners. As a prerequisite to
serious conflict resolution, I am confident that the
transparent accounting required under this bill will serve to
restore US credibility as a neutral and honest broker in the
conflict.
Tom Malinowski.
Joe Wilson.