[House Report 116-335]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 116-335
_______________________________________________________________________
R E P O R T
of the
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
on
THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 116-335
_______________________________________________________________________
R E P O R T
of the
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
on
THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
38-600 WASHINGTON : 2019
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Rep. ADAM B. SCHIFF (CA), Chairman
Rep. JIM HIMES (CT) Rep. DEVIN NUNES (CA), Ranking
Rep. TERRI SEWELL (AL) Member
Rep. ANDRE CARSON (IN) Rep. MIKE CONAWAY (TX)
Rep. JACKIE SPEIER (CA) Rep. MICHAEL TURNER (OH)
Rep. MIKE QUIGLEY (IL) Rep. BRAD WENSTRUP (OH)
Rep. ERIC SWALWELL (CA) Rep. CHRIS STEWART (UT)
Rep. JOAQUIN CASTRO (TX) Rep. ELISE STEFANIK (NY)
Rep. DENNY HECK (WA) Rep. WILL HURD (TX)
Rep. PETER WELCH (VT) Rep. JOHN RATCLIFFE (TX)
Rep. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY (NY) Rep. JIM JORDAN (OH)
Rep. VAL DEMINGS (FL)
Rep. RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI (IL)
------
Majority Staff
Timothy S. Bergreen, Staff Director
Daniel S. Goldman, Director of Investigations
Maher Bitar, General Counsel
Rheanne Wirkkala, Deputy Director of Investigations
Patrick M. Boland, Communications Director
------
Impeachment Inquiry Investigative Staff
William M. Evans Daniel S. Noble
Patrick Fallon Diana Y. Pilipenko
Sean A. Misko Ariana N. Rowberry
Nicolas A. Mitchell
Carly A. Blake, Deputy Staff Director
William Wu, Budget and Policy Director
Wells C. Bennett, Deputy General Counsel
------
Oversight Staff
Linda D. Cohen Lucian D. Sikorskyj
Thomas Eager Conrad Stosz
Abigail C. Grace Kathy L. Suber
Kelsey M. Lax Aaron A. Thurman
Amanda A. Rogers Thorpe Raffaela L. Wakeman
Non-Partisan Security and Information Technology Staff
Kristin Jepson Claudio Grajeda
Kimberlee Kerr
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
Rep. CAROLYN B. MALONEY (NY), Chairwoman
Rep. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS (MD), Chairman
Rep. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON (DC) Rep. JIM JORDAN (OH),
Rep. WM. LACY CLAY (MO) Ranking Member
Rep. STEPHEN LYNCH (MA) Rep. PAUL GOSAR (AZ)
Rep. JIM COOPER (TN) Rep. THOMAS MASSIE (KY)
Rep. GERALD E. CONNOLLY (VA) Rep. VIRGINIA FOXX (NC)
Rep. RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI (IL) Rep. MARK MEADOWS (NC)
Rep. JAMIE RASKIN (MD) Rep. JODY HICE (GA)
Rep. HARLEY ROUDA (CA) Rep. GLENN GROTHMAN (WI)
Rep. DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ (FL) Rep. JAMES COMER (KY)
Rep. JOHN SARBANES (MD) Rep. MICHAEL CLOUD (TX)
Rep. PETER WELCH (VT) Rep. BOB GIBBS (OH)
Rep. JACKIE SPEIER (CA) Rep. CLAY HIGGINS (LA)
Rep. ROBIN KELLY (IL) Rep. RALPH NORMAN (SC)
Rep. MARK DESAULNIER (CA) Rep. CHIP ROY (TX)
Rep. BRENDA LAWRENCE (MI) Rep. CAROL MILLER (WV)
Rep. STACEY PLASKETT (VI) Rep. MARK GREEN (TN)
Rep. RO KHANNA (CA) Rep. KELLY ARMSTRONG (ND)
Rep. JIMMY GOMEZ (CA) Rep. GREG STEUBE (FL)
Rep. ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ (NY) Rep. FRED KELLER (PA)
Rep. AYANNA PRESSLEY (MA)
Rep. RASHIDA TLAIB (MI)
Majority Staff
Dave Rapallo, Staff Director
Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Deputy Staff Director & Chief Counsel
Peter Kenny, Chief Investigative Counsel
Krista A. Boyd, General Counsel
Janet H. Kim, Chief Counsel for Investigations
Russell Anello, Chief Oversight Counsel
Aryele Bradford, Communications Director
Investigative Staff
S. Tori Anderson Gina Kim
Aaron D. Blacksberg Jason Powell
Chioma Chukwu Dan Rebnord
Cassie Fields Ricardo Brandon Rios
Greta Gao Erinn L. Sauer, Detailee
Michael Gordon Amish A. Shah
Jessica L. Heller Laura Waters
Operations and Press Team
Zachary Barger, Intern Elisa LaNier
Jamitress Bowden Kellie Larkin
Kristen Charley, Intern Olivia Letts, Intern
Kenyatta Collins Anna Rose Marx, Inter
James Darlson, Intern Courtney Miller
Emma Dulaney Noah Steimel, Intern
Evan Elizabeth Freeman, Intern Travis Stoller, Intern
Christopher Godshall, Intern Amy Stratton
Trinity Goss Laura Trevisani, Intern
Brandon Jacobs Joshua Zucker
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Rep. ELIOT L. ENGEL (NY), Chairman
Rep. BRAD SHERMAN (CA) Rep. MICHAEL MCCAUL (TX),
Rep. GREGORY MEEKS (NY) Ranking Member
Rep. ALBIO SIRES (NJ) Rep. CHRISTOPHER SMITH (NJ)
Rep. GERALD E. CONNOLLY (VA) Rep. STEVE CHABOT (OH)
Rep. THEODORE DEUTCH (FL) Rep. JOE WILSON (SC)
Rep. KAREN BASS (CA) Rep. SCOTT PERRY (PA)
Rep. WILLIAM KEATING (MA) Rep. TED YOHO (FL)
Rep. DAVID CICILLINE (RI) Rep. ADAM KINZINGER (IL)
Rep. AMI BERA (CA) Rep. LEE ZELDIN (NY)
Rep. JOAQUIN CASTRO (TX) Rep. JAMES SENSENBRENNER (WI)
Rep. DINA TITUS (NV) Rep. ANN WAGNER (MO)
Rep. ADRIANO ESPAILLAT (NY) Rep. BRIAN MAST (FL)
Rep. TED LIEU (CA) Rep. FRANCIS ROONEY (FL)
Rep. SUSAN WILD (PA) Rep. BRIAN FITZPATRICK (PA)
Rep. DEAN PHILLIPS (MN) Rep. JOHN CURTIS (UT)
Rep. ILHAN OMAR (MN) Rep. KEN BUCK (CO)
Rep. COLIN ALLRED (TX) Rep. RON WRIGHT (TX)
Rep. ANDY LEVIN (MI) Rep. GUY RESCHENTHALER (PA)
Rep. ABIGAIL SPANBERGER (VA) Rep. TIM BURCHETT (TN)
Rep. CHRISSY HOULAHAN (PA) Rep. GREG PENCE (IN)
Rep. TOM MALINOWSKI (NJ) Rep. STEVE WATKINS (KS)
Rep. DAVID TRONE (MD) Rep. MICHAEL GUEST (MS)
Rep. JIM COSTA (CA)
Rep. JUAN VARGAS (CA)
Rep. VICENTE GONZALEZ (CA)
Majority Staff
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Doug Campbell, Deputy Staff Director
Janice Kaguyutan, Chief Counsel
Laura Carey, Senior Professional Staff Member, State Department
Oversight
Tim Mulvey, Communications Director
Jacqueline Ramos, Senior Professional Staff Member, Europe and Russia
Operations and Press Staff
Evan Bursey Rachel Levitan
Jacqueline Colvett
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, December 11, 2019.
Hon. Cheryl L. Johnson,
Clerk, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mrs. Johnson: I present herewith an unclassified
report entitled, ``The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry
Report''.
Sincerely,
Adam B. Schiff,
Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
PREFACE.......................................................... IX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................ 1
KEY FINDINGS OF FACT............................................. 22
SECTION I. THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT............................ 25
1. The President Forced Out the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine... 25
2. The President Put Giuliani and the Three Amigos in Charge
of Ukraine Issues.......................................... 38
3. The President Froze Military Assistance to Ukraine........ 54
4. The President's Meeting with the Ukrainian President Was
Conditioned on an Announcement of Investigations........... 70
5. The President Asked the Ukrainian President to Interfere
in the 2020 U.S. Election by Investigating the Bidens and
2016 Election Interference................................. 85
6. The President Wanted Ukraine to Announce the
Investigations Publicly.................................... 101
7. The President's Conditioning of Military Assistance and a
White House Meeting on Announcement of Investigations
Raised Alarm............................................... 111
8. The President's Scheme Was Exposed........................ 125
SECTION II. THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES' IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY........................... 167
1. Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and
Impeachment................................................ 167
2. The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply............. 172
3. The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed
Documents.................................................. 180
4. The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify..... 193
5. The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Key
Witnesses.................................................. 206
6. The President's Intimidation of Witnesses................. 217
APPENDIX A: KEY PEOPLE AND ENTITIES.............................. 245
APPENDIX B: ABBREVIATIONS AND COMMON TERMS....................... 248
PREFACE
This report reflects the evidence gathered thus far by the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in
coordination with the Committee on Oversight and Reform and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, as part of the House of
Representatives' impeachment inquiry into Donald J. Trump, the
45th President of the United States.
The report is the culmination of an investigation that
began in September 2019 and intensified over the past three
months as new revelations and evidence of the President's
misconduct towards Ukraine emerged. The Committees pursued the
truth vigorously, but fairly, ensuring the full participation
of both parties throughout the probe.
Sustained by the tireless work of more than three dozen
dedicated staff across the three Committees, we issued dozens
of subpoenas for documents and testimony and took more than 100
hours of deposition testimony from 17 witnesses. To provide the
American people the opportunity to learn and evaluate the facts
themselves, the Intelligence Committee held seven public
hearings with 12--witnesses including three requested by the
Republican Minority--that totaled more than 30 hours.
At the outset, I want to recognize my late friend and
colleague Elijah E. Cummings, whose grace and commitment to
justice served as our North Star throughout this investigation.
I would also like to thank my colleagues Eliot L. Engel and
Carolyn B. Maloney, chairs respectively of the Foreign Affairs
and Oversight and Reform Committees, as well as the Members of
those Committees, many of whom provided invaluable
contributions. Members of the Intelligence Committee, as well,
worked selflessly and collaboratively throughout this
investigation. Finally, I am grateful to Speaker Nancy Pelosi
for the trust she placed in our Committees to conduct this work
and for her wise counsel throughout.
I also want to thank the dedicated professional staff of
the Intelligence Committee, who worked ceaselessly and with
remarkable poise and ability. My deepest gratitude goes to
Daniel Goldman, Rheanne Wirkkala, Maher Bitar, Timothy
Bergreen, Patrick Boland, Daniel Noble, Nicolas Mitchell, Sean
Misko, Patrick Fallon, Diana Pilipenko, William Evans, Ariana
Rowberry, Wells Bennett, and William Wu. Additional
Intelligence Committee staff members also assured that the
important oversight work of the Committee continued, even as we
were required to take on the additional responsibility of
conducting a key part of the House impeachment inquiry.
Finally, I would like to thank the devoted and outstanding
staff of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, including but
not limited to Dave Rapallo, Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Peter
Kenny, Krista Boyd, and Janet Kim, as well as Laura Carey from
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
* * *
In his farewell address, President George Washington warned
of a moment when ``cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men
will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp
for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards
the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.''
The Framers of the Constitution well understood that an
individual could one day occupy the Office of the President who
would place his personal or political interests above those of
the nation. Having just won hard-fought independence from a
King with unbridled authority, they were attuned to the dangers
of an executive who lacked fealty to the law and the
Constitution.
In response, the Framers adopted a tool used by the British
Parliament for several hundred years to constrain the Crown--
the power of impeachment. Unlike in Britain, where impeachment
was typically reserved for inferior officers but not the King
himself, impeachment in our untested democracy was specifically
intended to serve as the ultimate form of accountability for a
duly-elected President. Rather than a mechanism to overturn an
election, impeachment was explicitly contemplated as a remedy
of last resort for a president who fails to faithfully execute
his oath of office ``to preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.''
Accordingly, the Constitution confers the power to impeach
the president on Congress, stating that the president shall be
removed from office upon conviction for ``Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' While the Constitutional
standard for removal from office is justly a high one, it is
nonetheless an essential check and balance on the authority of
the occupant of the Office of the President, particularly when
that occupant represents a continuing threat to our fundamental
democratic norms, values, and laws.
Alexander Hamilton explained that impeachment was not
designed to cover only criminal violations, but also crimes
against the American people. ``The subjects of its
jurisdiction,'' Hamilton wrote, ``are those offenses which
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words,
from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately
to the society itself.''
Similarly, future Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania at the
Constitutional Convention, distinguished impeachable offenses
from those that reside ``within the sphere of ordinary
jurisprudence.'' As he noted, ``impeachments are confined to
political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and
to political punishments.''
* * *
As this report details, the impeachment inquiry has found
that President Trump, personally and acting through agents
within and outside of the U.S. government, solicited the
interference of a foreign government, Ukraine, to benefit his
reelection. In furtherance of this scheme, President Trump
conditioned official acts on a public announcement by the new
Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, of politically-
motivated investigations, including one into President Trump's
domestic political opponent. In pressuring President Zelensky
to carry out his demand, President Trump withheld a White House
meeting desperately sought by the Ukrainian President and
critical U.S. military assistance to fight Russian aggression
in eastern Ukraine.
The President engaged in this course of conduct for the
benefit of his own presidential reelection, to harm the
election prospects of a political rival, and to influence our
nation's upcoming presidential election to his advantage. In
doing so, the President placed his own personal and political
interests above the national interests of the United States,
sought to undermine the integrity of the U.S. presidential
election process, and endangered U.S. national security.
At the center of this investigation is the memorandum
prepared following President Trump's July 25, 2019, phone call
with Ukraine's President, which the White House declassified
and released under significant public pressure. The call record
alone is stark evidence of misconduct; a demonstration of the
President's prioritization of his personal political benefit
over the national interest. In response to President Zelensky's
appreciation for vital U.S. military assistance, which
President Trump froze without explanation, President Trump
asked for ``a favor though'': two specific investigations
designed to assist his reelection efforts.
Our investigation determined that this telephone call was
neither the start nor the end of President Trump's efforts to
bend U.S. foreign policy for his personal gain. Rather, it was
a dramatic crescendo within a months-long campaign driven by
President Trump in which senior U.S. officials, including the
Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Acting Chief of
Staff, the Secretary of Energy, and others were either
knowledgeable of or active participants in an effort to extract
from a foreign nation the personal political benefits sought by
the President.
The investigation revealed the nature and extent of the
President's misconduct, notwithstanding an unprecedented
campaign of obstruction by the President and his Administration
to prevent the Committees from obtaining documentary evidence
and testimony. A dozen witnesses followed President Trump's
orders, defying voluntary requests and lawful subpoenas, and
refusing to testify. The White House, Department of State,
Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and
Department of Energy refused to produce a single document in
response to our subpoenas.
Ultimately, this sweeping effort to stonewall the House of
Representatives' ``sole Power of Impeachment'' under the
Constitution failed because witnesses courageously came forward
and testified in response to lawful process. The report that
follows was only possible because of their sense of duty and
devotion to their country and its Constitution.
Nevertheless, there remain unanswered questions, and our
investigation must continue, even as we transmit our report to
the Judiciary Committee. Given the proximate threat of further
presidential attempts to solicit foreign interference in our
next election, we cannot wait to make a referral until our
efforts to obtain additional testimony and documents wind their
way through the courts. The evidence of the President's
misconduct is overwhelming, and so too is the evidence of his
obstruction of Congress. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine a
stronger or more complete case of obstruction than that
demonstrated by the President since the inquiry began.
The damage the President has done to our relationship with
a key strategic partner will be remedied over time, and Ukraine
continues to enjoy strong bipartisan support in Congress. But
the damage to our system of checks and balances, and to the
balance of power within our three branches of government, will
be long-lasting and potentially irrevocable if the President's
ability to stonewall Congress goes unchecked. Any future
President will feel empowered to resist an investigation into
their own wrongdoing, malfeasance, or corruption, and the
result will be a nation at far greater risk of all three.
* * *
The decision to move forward with an impeachment inquiry is
not one we took lightly. Under the best of circumstances,
impeachment is a wrenching process for the nation. I resisted
calls to undertake an impeachment investigation for many months
on that basis, notwithstanding the existence of presidential
misconduct that I believed to be deeply unethical and damaging
to our democracy. The alarming events and actions detailed in
this report, however, left us with no choice but to proceed.
In making the decision to move forward, we were struck by
the fact that the President's misconduct was not an isolated
occurrence, nor was it the product of a naive president.
Instead, the efforts to involve Ukraine in our 2020
presidential election were undertaken by a President who
himself was elected in 2016 with the benefit of an
unprecedented and sweeping campaign of election interference
undertaken by Russia in his favor, which the President welcomed
and utilized.
Having witnessed the degree to which interference by a
foreign power in 2016 harmed our democracy, President Trump
cannot credibly claim ignorance to its pernicious effects. Even
more pointedly, the President's July call with Ukrainian
President Zelensky, in which he solicited an investigation to
damage his most feared 2020 opponent, came the day after
Special Counsel Robert Mueller testified to Congress about
Russia's efforts to damage his 2016 opponent and his urgent
warning of the dangers of further foreign interference in the
next election. With this backdrop, the solicitation of new
foreign intervention was the act of a president unbound, not
one chastened by experience. It was the act of a president who
viewed himself as unaccountable and determined to use his vast
official powers to secure his reelection.
This repeated and pervasive threat to our democratic
electoral process added urgency to our work. On October 3,
2019, even as our Committee was engaged in this inquiry,
President Trump publicly declared anew that other countries
should open investigations into his chief political rival,
saying, ``China should start an investigation into the
Bidens,'' and ``President Zelensky, if it were me, I would
recommend that they start an investigation into the Bidens.''
When a reporter asked the President what he hoped Ukraine's
President would do following the July 25 call, President Trump,
seeking to dispel any doubt as to his continuing intention,
responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were honest
about it, they'd start a major investigation into the Bidens.
It's a very simple answer.''
By doubling down on his misconduct and declaring that his
July 25 call with President Zelensky was ``perfect,'' President
Trump has shown a continued willingness to use the power of his
office to seek foreign intervention in our next election. His
Acting Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney, in the course of
admitting that the President had linked security assistance to
Ukraine to the announcement of one of his desired
investigations, told the American people to ``get over it.'' In
these statements and actions, the President became the author
of his own impeachment inquiry. The question presented by the
set of facts enumerated in this report may be as simple as that
posed by the President and his chief of staff's brazenness: is
the remedy of impeachment warranted for a president who would
use the power of his office to coerce foreign interference in a
U.S. election, or is that now a mere perk of the office that
Americans must simply ``get over''?
* * *
Those watching the impeachment hearings might have been
struck by how little discrepancy there was between the
witnesses called by the Majority and Minority. Indeed, most of
the facts presented in the pages that follow are uncontested.
The broad outlines, as well as many of the details of the
President's scheme, have been presented by the witnesses with
remarkable consistency. There will always be some variation in
the testimony of multiple people witnessing the same events,
but few of the differences here go to the heart of the matter.
And so, it may have been all the more surprising to the public
to see very disparate reactions to the testimony by the Members
of Congress from each party.
If there was one ill the Founders feared as much as that of
an unfit president, it may have been that of excessive
factionalism. Although the Framers viewed parties as necessary,
they also endeavored to structure the new government in such a
way as to minimize the ``violence of faction.'' As George
Washington warned in his farewell address, ``the common and
continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to
make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage
and restrain it.''
Today, we may be witnessing a collision between the power
of a remedy meant to curb presidential misconduct and the power
of faction determined to defend against the use of that remedy
on a president of the same party. But perhaps even more
corrosive to our democratic system of governance, the President
and his allies are making a comprehensive attack on the very
idea of fact and truth. How can a democracy survive without
acceptance of a common set of experiences?
America remains the beacon of democracy and opportunity for
freedom-loving people around the world. From their homes and
their jail cells, from their public squares and their refugee
camps, from their waking hours until their last breath,
individuals fighting human rights abuses, journalists
uncovering and exposing corruption, persecuted minorities
struggling to survive and preserve their faith, and countless
others around the globe just hoping for a better life look to
America. What we do will determine what they see, and whether
America remains a nation committed to the rule of law.
As Benjamin Franklin departed the Constitutional
Convention, he was asked, ``what have we got? A Republic or a
Monarchy?'' He responded simply: ``A Republic, if you can keep
it.''
Adam B. Schiff,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { 116-335
======================================================================
THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT
_______
December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
_______
Mr. Schiff, from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
THE TRUMP-UKRAINE
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT
Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Pursuant to H. Res. 660 in Consultation with the
House Committee on Oversight and Reform and the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The impeachment inquiry into Donald J. Trump, the 45th
President of the United States, uncovered a months-long effort
by President Trump to use the powers of his office to solicit
foreign interference on his behalf in the 2020 election. As
described in this executive summary and the report that
follows, President Trump's scheme subverted U.S. foreign policy
toward Ukraine and undermined our national security in favor of
two politically motivated investigations that would help his
presidential reelection campaign. The President demanded that
the newly-elected Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky,
publicly announce investigations into a political rival that he
apparently feared the most, former Vice President Joe Biden,
and into a discredited theory that it was Ukraine, not Russia,
that interfered in the 2016 presidential election. To compel
the Ukrainian President to do his political bidding, President
Trump conditioned two official acts on the public announcement
of the investigations: a coveted White House visit and critical
U.S. military assistance Ukraine needed to fight its Russian
adversary.
During a July 25, 2019, call between President Trump and
President Zelensky, President Zelensky expressed gratitude for
U.S. military assistance. President Trump immediately responded
by asking President Zelensky to ``do us a favor though'' and
openly pressed for Ukraine to investigate former Vice President
Biden and the 2016 conspiracy theory. In turn, President
Zelensky assured President Trump that he would pursue the
investigation and reiterated his interest in the White House
meeting. Although President Trump's scheme intentionally
bypassed many career personnel, it was undertaken with the
knowledge and approval of senior Administration officials,
including the President's Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney,
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Secretary of Energy Rick
Perry. In fact, at a press conference weeks after public
revelations about the scheme, Mr. Mulvaney publicly
acknowledged that the President directly tied the hold on
military aid to his desire to get Ukraine to conduct a
political investigation, telling Americans to ``get over it.''
President Trump and his senior officials may see nothing
wrong with using the power of the Office of the President to
pressure a foreign country to help the President's reelection
campaign. Indeed, President Trump continues to encourage
Ukraine and other foreign countries to engage in the same kind
of election interference today. However, the Founding Fathers
prescribed a remedy for a chief executive who places his
personal interests above those of the country: impeachment.
Accordingly, as part of the House of Representatives'
impeachment inquiry, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, in coordination with the Committees on Oversight
and Reform and Foreign Affairs, was compelled to undertake a
serious, sober, and expeditious investigation into whether the
President's misconduct warrants that remedy.
In response, President Trump engaged in an unprecedented
campaign of obstruction of this impeachment inquiry.
Nevertheless, due in large measure to patriotic and courageous
public servants who provided the Committees with direct
evidence of the President's actions, the Committees uncovered
significant misconduct on the part of the President of the
United States. As required under House Resolution 660, the
Intelligence Committee, in consultation with the Committees on
Oversight and Reform and Foreign Affairs, has prepared this
report to detail the evidence uncovered to date, which will now
be transmitted to the Judiciary Committee for its
consideration.
SECTION I--THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT
The President Conditioned a White House Meeting and Military Aid to
Ukraine on a Public Announcement of Investigations Beneficial to his
Reelection Campaign
The President's Request for a Political Favor
On the morning of July 25, 2019, President Donald Trump
settled in to the White House Executive Residence to join a
telephone call with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine. It
had been more than three months since President Zelensky, a
political neophyte, had been swept into office in a landslide
victory on a platform of rooting out corruption and ending the
war between his country and Russia. The day of his election,
April 21, President Zelensky spoke briefly with President
Trump, who had called to congratulate him and invite him to a
visit at the White House. As of July 25, no White House meeting
had materialized.
As is typical for telephone calls with other heads of
state, staff members from the National Security Council (NSC)
convened in the White House Situation Room to listen to the
call and take notes, which would later be compiled into a
memorandum that would constitute the U.S. government's official
record of the call. NSC staff had prepared a standard package
of talking points for the President based on official U.S.
policy. The talking points included recommendations to
encourage President Zelensky to continue to promote anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine, a pillar of American foreign
policy in the country as far back as its independence in the
1990s when Ukraine first rid itself of Kremlin control.
This call would deviate significantly from that script.
Shortly before he was patched through to President Zelensky,
President Trump spoke with Gordon Sondland, who had donated $1
million to President Trump's 2016 presidential inauguration and
whom the President had appointed as the United States
Ambassador to the European Union. Ambassador Sondland had
helped lay the groundwork for a very different kind of call
between the two Presidents.
Ambassador Sondland had relayed a message to President
Zelensky six days earlier that ``assurances to run a fully
transparent investigation'' and ``turn over every stone'' were
necessary in his call with President Trump. Ambassador Sondland
understood these phrases to refer to two investigations
politically beneficial to the President's reelection campaign:
one into former Vice President Joe Biden and a Ukrainian gas
company called Burisma, of which his son sat on the board, and
the other into a discredited conspiracy theory alleging that
Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. The
allegations about Vice President Biden were without evidence,
and the U.S. Intelligence Community had unanimously determined
that Russia, not Ukraine, interfered in the 2016 election to
help the candidacy of Donald Trump. Despite the falsehoods,
Ambassador Sondland would make it clear to Ukrainian officials
that the public announcement of these investigations was a
prerequisite for the coveted White House meeting with President
Trump, an effort that would help the President's reelection
campaign.
The White House meeting was not the only official act that
President Trump conditioned on the announcement of these
investigations. Several weeks before his phone call with
President Zelensky, President Trump ordered a hold on nearly
$400 million of congressionally-appropriated security
assistance to Ukraine that provided Kyiv essential support as
it sought to repel Russian forces that were occupying Crimea
and inflicting casualties in the eastern region of the country.
The President's decision to freeze the aid, made without
explanation, sent shock waves through the Department of Defense
(DOD), the Department of State, and the NSC, which uniformly
supported providing this assistance to our strategic partner.
Although the suspension of aid had not been made public by the
day of the call between the two Presidents, officials at the
Ukrainian embassy in Washington had already asked American
officials about the status of the vital military assistance.
At the outset of the conversation on July 25, President
Zelensky thanked President Trump for the ``great support in the
area of defense'' provided by the United States to date. He
then indicated that Ukraine would soon be prepared to purchase
additional Javelin anti-tank missiles from the United States as
part of this defense cooperation. President Trump immediately
responded with his own request: ``I would like you to do us a
favor though,'' which was ``to find out what happened'' with
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election.
President Trump then asked President Zelensky ``to look
into'' former Vice President Biden's role in encouraging
Ukraine to remove a prosecutor widely viewed by the United
States and numerous European partners to be corrupt. In so
doing, President Trump gave currency to a baseless allegation
that Vice President Biden wanted to remove the corrupt
prosecutor because he was investigating Burisma, a company on
whose board the Vice President's son sat at the time.
Over the course of the roughly thirty-minute call,
President Trump repeated these false allegations and pressed
the Ukrainian President to consult with his personal attorney,
Rudy Giuliani, who had been publicly advocating for months for
Ukraine to initiate these specific investigations. President
Zelensky promised that he would ``work on the investigation of
the case.'' Later in the call, he thanked President Trump for
his invitation to join him at the White House, following up
immediately with a comment that, ``[o]n the other hand,'' he
would ``ensure'' that Ukraine pursued ``the investigation''
that President Trump had requested.
During the call, President Trump also disparaged Marie
Yovanovitch, the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, who
championed anti-corruption reforms in the country, and whom
President Trump had unceremoniously removed months earlier
following a smear campaign waged against her by Mr. Giuliani
and others. President Trump claimed that she was ``bad news''
and was ``going to go through some things.'' He praised the
current prosecutor at the time, who was widely viewed as
corrupt and who helped initiate the smear campaign against her,
calling him ``very good'' and ``very fair.''
Hearing the call as it transpired, several White House
staff members became alarmed. Far from giving the ``full-
throated endorsement of the Ukraine reform agenda'' that had
been hoped for, the President instead demanded a political
investigation into an American--the presidential candidate he
evidently feared most, Joe Biden.
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, an NSC staff member
responsible for Ukraine policy who listened to the call,
immediately reported his concerns to NSC lawyers. His
supervisor, NSC Senior Director for Europe and Russia Timothy
Morrison, also reported the call to the lawyers, worrying that
the call would be ``damaging'' if leaked publicly. In response,
the lawyers placed the memorandum summarizing the call onto a
highly classified server, significantly limiting access to the
materials.
The call record would not remain hidden forever. On
September 25, 2019, facing immense public pressure to reveal
the contents of the call and following the announcement the
previous day of a formal impeachment inquiry in the House of
Representatives into President Trump's actions toward Ukraine,
the White House publicly released the memorandum of the July 25
call.
The record of the call would help explain for those
involved in Ukraine policy in the U.S. government, the
Congress, and the public why President Trump, his personal
attorney, Mr. Giuliani, his hand-picked appointees in charge of
Ukraine issues, and various senior Administration officials
would go to great lengths to withhold a coveted White House
meeting and critical military aid from Ukraine at a time when
it served as a bulwark against Russian aggression in Europe.
The answer was as simple as it was inimical to our national
security and election integrity: the President was withholding
officials acts while soliciting something of value to his
reelection campaign--an investigation into his political rival.
The story of that scheme follows.
* * *
The President Removed Anti-Corruption Champion Ambassador Yovanovitch
On April 24, 2019, President Trump abruptly called back to
Washington the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie
``Masha'' Yovanovitch, after a ruthless smear campaign was
waged against her. She was known throughout Ukraine and among
her peers for aggressively advocating for anti-corruption
reforms consistent with U.S. foreign policy and only recently
had been asked to extend her stay in Ukraine. Her effectiveness
in anti-corruption efforts earned her enemies in Kyiv and in
Washington. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent
testified in praising Ambassador Yovanovitch: ``You can't
promote principled anticorruption action without pissing off
corrupt people.''
Beginning on March 20, The Hill newspaper published several
op-eds attacking Ambassador Yovanovitch and former Vice
President Joe Biden, relying on information from a Ukrainian
prosecutor, Yuriy Lutsenko, who was widely viewed to be
corrupt. Mr. Lutsenko had served as the chief prosecutor in
Ukraine under the then-incumbent president who lost to
Volodymyr Zelensky in April 2019. Although he would later
recant many of his allegations, Mr. Lutsenko falsely accused
Ambassador Yovanovitch of speaking negatively about President
Trump and giving Mr. Lutsenko a ``do-not-prosecute list.''
The attacks against Ambassador Yovanovitch were amplified
by prominent, close allies of President Trump, including Mr.
Giuliani and his associates, Sean Hannity, and Donald Trump Jr.
President Trump tweeted the smears himself just a month before
he recalled the Ambassador from Ukraine. In the face of attacks
driven by Mr. Lutsenko and the President's allies, Ambassador
Yovanovitch and other senior State Department officials asked
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to issue a statement of support
for her and for the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. The Secretary
declined, fearing that President Trump might publicly undermine
those efforts, possibly through a tweet.
Following a ceremony in which she presented an award of
courage to the family of a young female anti-corruption
activist killed in Ukraine for her work, Ambassador Yovanovitch
received an urgent call from the State Department regarding her
``security,'' and imploring her to take the first plane back to
Washington. When she arrived, she was informed that she had
done nothing wrong, but that the President had lost confidence
in her. She was told to leave her post as soon as possible.
In her place, the President would designate three new
agents to spearhead Ukraine policy, political appointees far
more willing to engage in an improper ``domestic political
errand'' than an ambassador known for her efforts to fight
corruption.
The President's Hand-Picked Agents Began the Scheme
Just three days before Ambassador Yovanovitch's abrupt
recall to Washington, President Trump had his first telephone
call with President-elect Zelensky. During that conversation,
President Trump congratulated the Ukrainian leader on his
victory, complimented him on his country's Miss Universe
Pageant contestants, and invited him to visit the White House.
A White House meeting would help demonstrate the United States'
strong support for Ukraine as it fought a hot war with Russia
and attempted to negotiate an end to the conflict with Russian
President Vladimir Putin, as well as to bolster President-elect
Zelensky's standing with his own people as he sought to deliver
on his promised anti-corruption agenda. Although the White
House's public summary of the call included some discussion of
a commitment to ``root out corruption,'' President Trump did
not mention corruption at all.
Shortly after the conversation, President Trump asked Vice
President Mike Pence to attend President Zelensky's
inauguration. Vice President Pence confirmed directly to
President Zelensky his intention to attend during a phone
conversation on April 23, and Vice President Pence's staff and
the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv began preparations for the trip.
At the same time, President Trump's personal attorney, Mr.
Giuliani, intensified his campaign to pressure Ukraine's newly-
elected President to initiate investigations into Joe Biden,
who had officially entered the race for the Democratic
nomination on April 25, and the baseless conspiracy theory
about Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election. On May 9,
the New York Times published an article in which Mr. Giuliani
declared that he intended to travel to Ukraine on behalf of his
client, President Trump, in order to meddle in an
investigation. After public backlash, Mr. Giuliani canceled the
trip, blaming ``some bad people'' around President Zelensky.
Days later, President Trump rescinded the plans for Vice
President Pence to attend President Zelensky's inauguration,
which had not yet been scheduled. The staff member planning the
trip was not provided an explanation for the about-face, but
staff in the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv were disappointed that
President Zelensky would not receive a ``high level'' show of
support from the United States.
In Vice President Pence's stead, Secretary of Energy Rick
Perry led the American delegation to the Ukrainian President's
inauguration. Ambassador Sondland, Special Representative for
Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Kurt Volker, and Lt. Col.
Vindman also attended. In comments that would foreshadow
troubling events to come, Lt. Col. Vindman warned President
Zelensky to stay out of U.S. domestic politics to avoid
jeopardizing the bipartisan support Ukraine enjoyed in
Congress.
The delegation returned to the United States impressed with
President Zelensky, especially his focus on anti-corruption
reforms. Ambassador Sondland quickly organized a meeting with
President Trump in the Oval Office on May 23, attended by most
of the other members of the delegation. The three political
appointees, who would describe themselves as the ``Three
Amigos,'' relayed their positive impression of President
Zelensky to President Trump and encouraged him to schedule the
Oval Office meeting he promised in his April 21 phone call with
the new leader.
President Trump reacted poorly to the suggestion, claiming
that Ukraine ``tried to take me down'' in 2016. In order to
schedule a White House visit for President Zelensky, President
Trump told the delegation that they would have to ``talk to
Rudy.'' Ambassador Sondland testified that he understood the
President's instruction to be a directive to work with Mr.
Giuliani if they hoped to advance relations with Ukraine.
President Trump directed the three senior U.S. government
officials to assist Mr. Giuliani's efforts, which, it would
soon become clear, were exclusively for the benefit of the
President's reelection campaign.
As the Three Amigos were given responsibility over the U.S.
government's Ukraine portfolio, Bill Taylor, a former
Ambassador to Ukraine, was considering whether to come out of
retirement to accept a request to succeed Ambassador
Yovanovitch in Kyiv. As of May 26, Ambassador Taylor was
``still struggling with the decision,'' and, in particular,
whether anyone can ``hope to succeed with the Giuliani-Biden
issue swirling.'' After receiving assurances from Secretary
Pompeo that U.S. policy toward Ukraine would not change,
Ambassador Taylor accepted the position and arrived in Kyiv on
June 17. Ambassador Taylor would quickly come to observe an
``irregular channel'' led by Mr. Giuliani that, over time,
began to undermine the official channel of diplomatic relations
with Ukraine. Mr. Giuliani would prove to be, as the
President's National Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton
would tell a colleague, a ``hand grenade that was going to blow
everyone up.''
The President Froze Vital Military Assistance
For fiscal year 2019, Congress appropriated and authorized
$391 million in security assistance to Ukraine: $250 million in
funds administered by DOD and $141 million in funds
administered by the State Department. On June 18, DOD issued a
press release announcing its intention to provide $250 million
in taxpayer-funded security assistance to Ukraine following the
certification that all legitimate conditions on the aid,
including anti-corruption reforms, had been met. Shortly after
this announcement, however, both the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and DOD received inquiries from the President
related to the funds. At that time, and throughout the next few
months, support for Ukraine security assistance was
overwhelming and unanimous among all of the relevant agencies
and within Congress.
By July 3, OMB blocked a Congressional notification which
would have cleared the way for the release of $141 million in
State Department security assistance funds. By July 12,
President Trump had placed a hold on all military support
funding for Ukraine. On July 18, OMB announced the hold to all
of the relevant agencies and indicated that it was directed by
the President. No other reason was provided.
During a series of policy meetings involving increasingly
senior officials, the uniform and consistent position of all
policymaking agencies supported the release of funding. Ukraine
experts at DOD, the State Department, and the NSC argued that
it was in the national security interest of the United States
to continue to support Ukraine. As Mr. Morrison testified,
``The United States aids Ukraine and her people so that they
can fight Russia over there, and we don't have to fight Russia
here.''
Agency officials also expressed concerns about the legality
of President Trump's direction to withhold assistance to
Ukraine that Congress had already appropriated for this express
purpose. Two OMB career officials, including one of its legal
counsels, would resign, in part, over concerns regarding the
hold.
By July 25, the date of President Trump's call with
President Zelensky, DOD was also receiving inquiries from
Ukrainian officials about the status of the security
assistance. Nevertheless, President Trump continued to withhold
the funding to Ukraine without explanation, against the
interests of U.S. national security, and over the objections of
these career experts.
The President Conditioned a White House Meeting on Investigations
By the time Ukrainian officials were first learning about
an issue with the anticipated military assistance, the
President's hand-picked representatives to Ukraine had already
informed their Ukrainian counterparts that President Zelensky's
coveted White House meeting would only happen after Ukraine
committed to pursuing the two political investigations that
President Trump and Mr. Giuliani demanded.
Ambassador Sondland was unequivocal in describing this
conditionality, testifying, ``I know that members of this
committee frequently frame these complicated issues in the form
of a simple question: Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified
previously with regard to the requested White House call and
the White House meeting, the answer is yes.'' Ambassadors
Sondland and Volker worked to obtain the necessary assurance
from President Zelensky that he would personally commit to
initiate the investigations in order to secure both.
On July 2, in Toronto, Canada, Ambassador Volker conveyed
the message directly to President Zelensky, specifically
referencing the ``Giuliani factor'' in President Zelensky's
engagement with the United States. For his part, Mr. Giuliani
made clear to Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, who were
directly communicating with the Ukrainians, that a White House
meeting would not occur until Ukraine announced its pursuit of
the two political investigations. After observing Mr.
Giuliani's role in the ouster of a U.S. Ambassador and learning
of his influence with the President, Ukrainian officials soon
understood that ``the key for many things is Rudi [sic].''
On July 10, Ambassador Bolton hosted a meeting in the White
House with two senior Ukrainian officials, several American
officials, including Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, Secretary
Perry, Dr. Fiona Hill, Senior Director for Europe and Russia at
the NSC, and Lt. Col. Vindman. As had become customary each
time Ukrainian officials met with their American counterparts,
the Ukrainians asked about the long-delayed White House
meeting. Ambassador Bolton demurred, but Ambassador Sondland
spoke up, revealing that he had worked out an arrangement with
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney to schedule the White House
visit after Ukraine initiated the ``investigations.''
Ambassador Bolton ``stiffened'' and quickly ended the meeting.
Undaunted, Ambassador Sondland ushered many of the
attendees to the Ward Room downstairs to continue their
discussion. In the second meeting, Ambassador Sondland
explained that he had an agreement with Mr. Mulvaney that the
White House visit would come only after Ukraine announced the
Burisma/Biden and 2016 Ukraine election interference
investigations. At this second meeting, both Lt. Col. Vindman
and Dr. Hill objected to intertwining a ``domestic political
errand'' with official foreign policy, and they indicated that
a White House meeting would have to go through proper channels.
Following these discussions, Dr. Hill reported back to
Ambassador Bolton, who told her to ``go and tell [the NSC Legal
Advisor] that I am not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and
Mulvaney are cooking up on this.'' Both Dr. Hill and Lt. Col.
Vindman separately reported the incident to the NSC Legal
Advisor.
The President's Agents Pursued a ``Drug Deal''
Over the next two weeks, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker
worked closely with Mr. Giuliani and senior Ukrainian and
American officials to arrange a telephone call between
President Trump and President Zelensky and to ensure that the
Ukrainian President explicitly promised to undertake the
political investigations required by President Trump to
schedule the White House meeting. As Ambassador Sondland would
later testify: ``Mr. Giuliani was expressing the desires of the
President of the United States, and we knew these
investigations were important to the President.''
On July 19, Ambassador Volker had breakfast with Mr.
Giuliani and his associate, Lev Parnas, at the Trump Hotel in
Washington, D.C. Mr. Parnas would subsequently be indicted for
campaign finance violations as part of an investigation that
remains ongoing. During the conversation, Ambassador Volker
stressed his belief that the attacks being leveled publicly
against Vice President Biden related to Ukraine were false and
that the former Vice President was ``a person of integrity.''
He counseled Mr. Giuliani that the Ukrainian prosecutor pushing
the false narrative, Mr. Lutsenko, was promoting ``a self-
serving narrative to preserve himself in power.'' Mr. Giuliani
agreed, but his promotion of Mr. Lutsenko's false accusations
for the benefit of President Trump did not cease. Ambassador
Volker also offered to help arrange an in-person meeting
between Mr. Giuliani and Andriy Yermak, one of President
Zelensky's most trusted advisors, which would later take place
in Madrid, Spain in early August.
After the breakfast meeting at the Trump Hotel, Ambassador
Volker reported back to Ambassadors Sondland and Taylor about
his conversation with Mr. Giuliani, writing in a text message
that, ``Most impt [sic] is for Zelensky to say that he will
help investigation and address any specific personnel issues if
there are any,'' likely referencing President Zelensky's
decision to remove Mr. Lutsenko as prosecutor general, a
decision with which Mr. Giuliani disagreed. The same day,
Ambassador Sondland spoke with President Zelensky and
recommended that the Ukrainian leader tell President Trump that
he ``will leave no stone unturned'' regarding the political
investigations during the upcoming presidential phone call.
Ambassador Sondland emailed several top Administration
officials, including Secretary of State Pompeo, Acting Chief of
Staff Mulvaney, and Secretary Perry, stating that President
Zelensky confirmed that he would ``assure'' President Trump
that ``he intends to run a fully transparent investigation and
will `turn over every stone.''' According to Ambassador
Sondland, he was referring in the email to the Burisma/Biden
and 2016 election interference investigations. Secretary Perry
and Mr. Mulvaney responded affirmatively that the call would
soon take place, and Ambassador Sondland testified later that
``everyone was in the loop'' on plans to condition the White
House meeting on the announcement of political investigations
beneficial to President Trump. The arrangement troubled the
Ukrainian President, who ``did not want to be used as a pawn in
a U.S. reelection campaign.''
The President Pressed President Zelensky to Do a Political Favor
On the morning of July 25, Ambassador Volker sent a text
message to President Zelensky's top aide, Mr. Yermak, less than
30 minutes before the presidential call. He stated: ``Heard
from White House--assuming President Z convinces trump he will
investigate`get to the bottom of what happened' in 2016, we
will nail down date for visit to Washington. Good luck!''
Shortly before the call, Ambassador Sondland spoke directly
with President Trump.
President Zelensky followed this advice during his
conversation with President Trump. President Zelensky assured
that he would pursue the investigations that President Trump
had discussed--into the Bidens and 2016 election interference--
and, in turn, pressed for the White House meeting that remained
outstanding.
The following day, Ambassadors Volker, Sondland, and Taylor
met with President Zelensky in Kyiv. The Ukrainian President
told them that President Trump had mentioned ``sensitive
issues'' three times during the previous day's phone call.
Following the meeting with the Ukrainian leader, Ambassador
Sondland had a private, one-on-one conversation with Mr. Yermak
in which they discussed ``the issue of investigations.'' He
then retired to lunch at an outdoor restaurant terrace with
State Department aides where he called President Trump directly
from his cellphone. The White House confirmed that the
conversation lasted five minutes.
At the outset of the call, President Trump asked Ambassador
Sondland whether President Zelensky ``was going to do the
investigation'' that President Trump had raised with President
Zelensky the day before. Ambassador Sondland stated that
President Zelensky was ``going to do it'' and ``would do
anything you ask him to.'' According to David Holmes, the State
Department aide sitting closest to Ambassador Sondland and who
overheard the President's voice on the phone, Ambassador
Sondland and President Trump spoke only about the investigation
in their discussion about Ukraine. The President made no
mention of other major issues of importance in Ukraine,
including President Zelensky's aggressive anti-corruption
reforms and the ongoing war it was fighting against Russian-led
forces in eastern Ukraine.
After hanging up the phone, Ambassador Sondland explained
to Mr. Holmes that President Trump ``did not give a shit about
Ukraine.'' Rather, the President cared only about ``big stuff''
that benefited him personally, like ``the Biden investigation
that Mr. Giuliani was pitching,'' and that President Trump had
pushed for in his July 25 call with the Ukrainian leader.
Ambassador Sondland did not recall referencing Biden
specifically, but he did not dispute Mr. Holmes' recollection
of the call with the President or Ambassador Sondland's
subsequent discussion with Mr. Holmes.
The President's Representatives Ratcheted up Pressure on the Ukrainian
President
In the weeks following the July 25 call, the President's
hand-picked representatives increased the President's pressure
campaign on Ukrainian government officials--in person, over the
phone, and by text message--to secure a public announcement of
the investigations beneficial to President Trump's reelection
campaign.
In discussions with Ukrainian officials, Ambassador
Sondland understood that President Trump did not require that
Ukraine conduct investigations as a prerequisite for the White
House meeting so much as publicly announce the investigations--
making clear that the goal was not the investigations, but the
political benefit Trump would derive from their announcement
and the cloud they might put over a political opponent.
On August 2, President Zelensky's advisor, Mr. Yermak,
traveled to Madrid to meet Mr. Giuliani in person. There, they
agreed that Ukraine would issue a public statement, and they
discussed potential dates for a White House meeting. A few days
later, Ambassador Volker told Mr. Giuliani that it ``would be
good'' if Mr. Giuliani would report to ``the boss,'' President
Trump, about ``the results'' of his Madrid discussion so that
President Trump would finally agree to a White House visit by
President Zelensky.
On August 9, Ambassador Volker and Mr. Giuliani spoke twice
by phone, and Ambassador Sondland spoke twice to the White
House for a total of about 20 minutes. In a text message to
Ambassador Volker later that day, Ambassador Sondland wrote,
``I think potus [sic] really wants the deliverable,'' which
Ambassador Sondland acknowledged was the public statement
announcing the two political investigations sought by President
Trump and Mr. Giuliani.
The following day, Ambassador Sondland briefed State
Department Counselor Ulrich Brechbuhl, a top advisor to
Secretary Pompeo, on these discussions about President Zelensky
issuing a statement that would include an announcement of the
two political investigations. Ambassador Sondland also emailed
Secretary Pompeo directly, copying the State Department's
executive secretary and Mr. Brechbuhl, to inform them about the
agreement for President Zelensky to give the press conference.
He expected to see a draft of the statement, which would be
``delivered for our review in a day or two.'' Ambassador
Sondland noted his hope that the draft statement would ``make
the boss happy enough to authorize an invitation.''
On August 12, Mr. Yermak sent the proposed statement to
Ambassador Volker, but it lacked specific references to the two
investigations politically beneficial to President Trump's
reelection campaign. The following morning, Ambassadors
Sondland and Volker spoke with Mr. Giuliani, who made clear
that if the statement ``doesn't say Burisma and 2016, it's not
credible.'' Ambassador Volker revised the statement following
this direction to include those references and returned it to
the Ukrainian President's aide.
Mr. Yermak balked at getting drawn into U.S. politics and
asked Ambassador Volker whether the United States had inquired
about investigations through any appropriate Department of
Justice channels. The answer was no, and several witnesses
testified that a request to a foreign country to investigate a
U.S. citizen ``for political reasons'' goes ``against
everything'' the United States sought to promote in eastern
Europe, specifically the rule of law. Ambassador Volker
eventually agreed with Mr. Yermak that the announcement of the
Biden/Burisma and 2016 elections investigations would ``look
like it would play into our domestic politics,'' so the
statement was temporarily ``shelved.''
Nevertheless, Ambassador Sondland, in accordance with
President Trump's wishes, continued to pursue the statement
into early September 2019.
Ukrainians Inquired about the President's Hold on Security Assistance
Once President Trump placed security assistance on hold in
July, ``it was inevitable that it was eventually going to come
out.'' On July 25, DOD officials learned that diplomats at the
Ukrainian Embassy in Washington had made multiple overtures to
DOD and the State Department ``asking about security
assistance.'' Separately, two different contacts at the
Ukrainian Embassy approached Ambassador Volker's special
advisor, Catherine Croft, to ask her in confidence about the
hold. Ms. Croft was surprised at the effectiveness of their
``diplomatic tradecraft,'' noting that they ``found out very
early on'' that the United States was withholding critical
military aid to Ukraine. By mid-August, before the freeze on
aid became public, Lt. Col. Vindman had also received inquiries
from an official at the Ukrainian Embassy.
The hold remained in place throughout August against the
unanimous judgment of American officials focused on Ukraine
policy. Without an explanation for the hold, which ran contrary
to the recommendation of all relevant agencies, and with
President Trump already conditioning a White House visit on the
announcement of the political investigations, it became
increasingly apparent to multiple witnesses that the military
aid was also being withheld in exchange for the announcement of
them. As both Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Holmes would later
testify, it became as clear as ``two plus two equals four.''
On August 22, Ambassador Sondland emailed Secretary Pompeo
again, recommending a plan for a potential meeting between
President Trump and President Zelensky in Warsaw, Poland on
September 1. Ambassador Sondland noted that President Zelensky
should ``look him in the eye'' and tell President Trump that
once new prosecutorial officials were in place in Ukraine,
``Zelensky should be able to move forward publicly and with
confidence on those issues of importance to Potus and the
U.S.'' Ambassador Sondland testified that this was a reference
to the political investigations that President Trump discussed
on the July 25 call, which Secretary Pompeo had listened to.
Ambassador Sondland hoped this would ``break the logjam''--the
hold on critical security assistance to Ukraine. Secretary
Pompeo replied three minutes later: ``Yes.''
The President's Security Assistance Hold Became Public
On August 28, Politico published a story revealing
President Trump's weeks-long hold on U.S. military assistance
to Ukraine. Senior Ukrainian officials expressed grave concern,
deeply worried about the practical impact on their efforts to
fight Russian aggression, but also about the public message it
sent to the Russian government, which would almost certainly
seek to exploit any real or perceived crack in U.S. resolve
toward Ukraine.
On August 29, at the urging of National Security Advisor
Bolton, Ambassador Taylor wrote a first-person cable to
Secretary Pompeo. This was the only first-person cable the
Ambassador had ever sent in his decades of government service.
He explained the ``folly'' of withholding security assistance
to Ukraine as it fought a hot war against Russia on its
borders. He wrote that he ``could not and would not defend such
a policy.'' Ambassador Taylor stated that Secretary Pompeo may
have carried the cable with him to a meeting at the White
House.
The same day that Ambassador Taylor sent his cable,
President Trump cancelled his planned trip to Warsaw for a
World War II commemoration event, where he was scheduled to
meet with President Zelensky. Vice President Pence traveled in
his place. Ambassador Sondland also traveled to Warsaw and, at
a pre-briefing discussion with the Vice President before he met
President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland raised the issue of the
hold on security assistance. He told Vice President Pence that
he was concerned that the security assistance ``had become tied
to the issue of investigations'' and that ``everything is being
held up until these statements get made.'' Vice President Pence
nodded in response, apparently expressing neither surprise nor
dismay at the linkage between the two.
At the meeting, President Zelensky expressed concern that
even an appearance of wavering support from the United States
for Ukraine could embolden Russia. Vice President Pence
reiterated U.S. support for Ukraine, but could not promise that
the hold would be lifted. Vice President Pence said he would
relay his support for lifting the hold to President Trump so a
decision could be made on security assistance as soon as
possible. Vice President Pence spoke with President Trump that
evening, but the hold was not lifted.
Following this meeting, Ambassador Sondland pulled aside
President Zelensky's advisor, Mr. Yermak, to explain that the
hold on security assistance was conditioned on the public
announcement of the Burisma/Biden and the 2016 election
interference investigations. After learning of the
conversation, Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassador Sondland:
``Are we now saying that security assistance and WH meeting are
conditioned on investigations?''
The two then spoke by phone. Ambassador Sondland explained
that he had previously made a ``mistake'' in telling Ukrainian
officials that only the White House meeting was conditioned on
a public announcement of the political investigations
beneficial to President Trump. He clarified that
``everything''--the White House meeting and hundreds of
millions of dollars of security assistance to Ukraine--was now
conditioned on the announcement. President Trump wanted
President Zelensky in a ``public box,'' which Ambassador Taylor
understood to mean that President Trump required that President
Zelensky make a public announcement about the investigations
and that a private commitment would not do.
On September 7, President Trump and Ambassador Sondland
spoke. Ambassador Sondland stated to his colleagues that the
President said, ``there was no quid pro quo,'' but that
President Zelensky would be required to announce the
investigations in order for the hold on security assistance to
be lifted, ``and he should want to do it.'' Ambassador Sondland
passed on a similar message directly to President Zelensky and
Mr. Yermak that, ``although this was not a quid pro quo, if
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would
be at a stalemate,'' referring to the hold on security
assistance. Arrangements were made for the Ukrainian President
to make a public statement during an interview on CNN.
After speaking with Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Taylor
texted Ambassadors Sondland and Volker: ``As I said on the
phone, I think it's crazy to withhold security assistance for
help with a political campaign.'' Notwithstanding his long-held
understanding that the White House meeting was conditioned on
the public announcement of two political investigations desired
by President Trump--and not broader anti-corruption concerns--
Ambassador Sondland responded hours later:
Bill, I believe you are incorrect about President
Trump's intentions. The President has been crystal
clear: no quid pro quo's of any kind. The President is
trying to evaluate whether Ukraine is truly going to
adopt the transparency and reforms that President
Zelensky promised during his campaign. I suggest we
stop the back and forth by text. If you still have
concerns, I recommend you give Lisa Kenna or [Secretary
Pompeo] a call to discuss with them directly. Thanks.
Ambassador Sondland's subsequent testimony revealed this
text to be a false exculpatory--an untruthful statement that
can later be used to conceal incriminating information. In his
public testimony, Ambassador Sondland testified that the
President's direction to withhold a presidential telephone call
and a White House meeting for President Zelensky were both quid
pro quos designed to pressure Ukraine to announce the
investigations. He also testified that he developed a clear
understanding that the military aid was also conditioned on the
investigations, that it was as simple as 2+2=4. Sondland
confirmed that his clear understanding was unchanged after
speaking with President Trump, which he then communicated to
the Ukrainians--President Zelensky had to publicly announce the
two investigations if he wanted to get the meeting or the
military aid.
In Ambassador Sondland's testimony, he was not clear on
whether he had one conversation with the President in which the
subject of a quid pro quo came up, or two, or on precisely
which date the conversation took place during the period of
September 6 through 9. In one version of the conversation,
which Ambassador Sondland suggested may have taken place on
September 9, he claimed that the President answered an open
question about what he wanted from Ukraine with an immediate
denial--``no quid pro quo.'' In another, he admitted that the
President told him that President Zelensky should go to a
microphone and announce the investigations, and that he should
want to do so--effectively confirming a quid pro quo.
Both Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Morrison, relying on their
contemporaneous notes, testified that the call between
Ambassador Sondland and President Trump occurred on September
7, which is further confirmed by Ambassador Sondland's own text
message on September 8, in which he wrote that he had
``multiple convos'' with President Zelensky and President
Trump. A call on September 9, which would have occurred in the
middle of the night, is at odds with the weight of the evidence
and not backed up by any records the White House was willing to
provide Ambassador Sondland. Regardless of the date, Ambassador
Sondland did not contest telling both Mr. Morrison and
Ambassador Taylor of a conversation he had with the President
in which the President reaffirmed Ambassador Sondland's
understanding of the quid pro quo for the military aid.
As Ambassador Sondland acknowledged bluntly in his
conversation with Mr. Holmes, President Trump's sole interest
with respect to Ukraine was the ``big stuff'' that benefited
him personally, such as the investigations into former Vice
President Biden, and not President Zelensky's promises of
transparency and reform.
The President's Scheme Unraveled
By early September, President Zelensky was ready to make a
public announcement of the two investigations to secure a White
House meeting and the military assistance his country
desperately needed. He proceeded to book an interview on CNN,
during which he could make such an announcement, but other
events soon intervened.
On September 9, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, the Committees on Oversight and Reform, and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs announced an investigation into
the scheme by President Trump and his personal attorney, Mr.
Giuliani, ``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to
assist the President's bid for reelection.'' The Committees
sent document production and preservation requests to the White
House and the State Department related to the investigation.
NSC staff members believed this investigation might have had
``the effect of releasing the hold'' on Ukraine military
assistance because it would have been ``potentially politically
challenging'' to ``justify that hold.''
Later that day, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (ICIG) sent a letter to Chairman Schiff and Ranking
Member Nunes notifying the Committee that a whistleblower had
filed a complaint on August 12 that the ICIG had determined to
be both an ``urgent concern'' and ``credible.'' Nevertheless,
the Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) took the
unprecedented step of withholding the complaint from the
Congressional Intelligence Committees, in coordination with the
White House and the Department of Justice.
The White House had been aware of the whistleblower
complaint for several weeks, and press reports indicate that
the President was briefed on it in late August. The ICIG's
notification to Congress of the complaint's existence, and the
announcement of a separate investigation into the same subject
matter, telegraphed to the White House that attempts to
condition the security assistance on the announcement of the
political investigations beneficial to President Trump--and
efforts to cover up that misconduct--would not last.
On September 11, in the face of growing public and
Congressional scrutiny, President Trump lifted the hold on
security assistance to Ukraine. As with the implementation of
the hold, no clear reason was given. By the time the President
ordered the release of security assistance to Ukraine, DOD was
unable to spend approximately 14 percent of the funds
appropriated by Congress for Fiscal Year 2019. Congress had to
pass a new law to extend the funding in order to ensure the
full amount could be used by Ukraine to defend itself.
Even after the hold was lifted, President Zelensky still
intended to sit for an interview with CNN in order to announce
the investigations--indeed, he still wanted the White House
meeting. At the urging of Ambassador Taylor, President Zelensky
cancelled the CNN interview on September 18 or 19. The White
House meeting, however, still has not occurred.
The President's Chief of Staff Confirmed Aid was Conditioned on
Investigations
The conditioning of military aid to Ukraine on the
investigations sought by the President was as clear to
Ambassador Sondland as ``two plus two equals four.'' In fact,
the President's own Acting Chief of Staff, someone who meets
with him daily, admitted that he had discussed security
assistance with the President and that his decision to withhold
it was directly tied to his desire to get Ukraine to conduct a
political investigation.
On October 17, at a press briefing in the White House,
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney confirmed that President
Trump withheld the essential military aid for Ukraine as
leverage to pressure Ukraine to investigate the conspiracy
theory that Ukraine had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.
As Dr. Hill made clear in her testimony, this false narrative
has been promoted by President Putin to deflect away from
Russia's systemic interference in our election and to drive a
wedge between the United States and a key partner.
According to Mr. Mulvaney, President Trump ``[a]bsolutely''
mentioned ``corruption related to the DNC server'' in
connection with the security assistance during his July 25
call. Mr. Mulvaney also stated that the server was part of
``why we held up the money.'' After a reporter attempted to
clarify this explicit acknowledgement of a quid pro quo, Mr.
Mulvaney replied: ``We do that all the time with foreign
policy.'' He added, ``I have news for everybody: get over it.
There is going to be political influence in foreign policy.''
Ambassador Taylor testified that in his decades of military
and diplomatic service, he had never seen another example of
foreign aid conditioned on the personal or political interests
of the President. Rather, ``we condition assistance on issues
that will improve our foreign policy, serve our foreign policy,
ensure that taxpayers'' money is well-spent,'' not specific
investigations designed to benefit the political interests of
the President of the United States.
In contrast, President Trump does not appear to believe
there is any such limitation on his power to use White House
meetings, military aid or other official acts to procure
foreign help in his reelection. When asked by a reporter on
October 3 what he had hoped President Zelensky would do
following their July 25 call, President Trump responded:
``Well, I would think that, if they were honest about it,
they'd start a major investigation into the Bidens. It's a very
simple answer.''
SECTION II--THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES' IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY
The President Obstructed the Impeachment Inquiry by Instructing
Witnesses and Agencies to Ignore Subpoenas for Documents and Testimony
An Unprecedented Effort to Obstruct an Impeachment Inquiry
Donald Trump is the first President in the history of the
United States to seek to completely obstruct an impeachment
inquiry undertaken by the House of Representatives under
Article I of the Constitution, which vests the House with the
``sole Power of Impeachment.'' He has publicly and repeatedly
rejected the authority of Congress to conduct oversight of his
actions and has directly challenged the authority of the House
to conduct an impeachment inquiry into his actions regarding
Ukraine.
President Trump ordered federal agencies and officials to
disregard all voluntary requests for documents and defy all
duly authorized subpoenas for records. He also directed all
federal officials in the Executive Branch not to testify--even
when compelled.
No other President has flouted the Constitution and power
of Congress to conduct oversight to this extent. No President
has claimed for himself the right to deny the House's authority
to conduct an impeachment proceeding, control the scope of a
power exclusively vested in the House, and forbid any and all
cooperation from the Executive Branch. Even President Richard
Nixon--who obstructed Congress by refusing to turn over key
evidence--accepted the authority of Congress to conduct an
impeachment inquiry and permitted his aides and advisors to
produce documents and testify to Congressional committees.
Despite President Trump's unprecedented and categorical
commands, the House gathered overwhelming evidence of his
misconduct from courageous individuals who were willing to
follow the law, comply with duly authorized subpoenas, and tell
the truth. In response, the President engaged in a brazen
effort to publicly attack and intimidate these witnesses.
If left unanswered, President Trump's ongoing effort to
thwart Congress' impeachment power risks doing grave harm to
the institution of Congress, the balance of power between our
branches of government, and the Constitutional order that the
President and every Member of Congress have sworn to protect
and defend.
Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and Impeachment
The House's Constitutional and legal authority to conduct
an impeachment inquiry is clear, as is the duty of the
President to cooperate with the House's exercise of this
authority.
Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives the House of
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment.'' The Framers
intended the impeachment power to be an essential check on a
President who might engage in corruption or abuse of power.
Congress is empowered to conduct oversight and investigations
to carry out its authorities under Article I. Because the
impeachment power is a core component of the nation's
Constitutional system of checks and balances, Congress'
investigative authority is at its zenith during an impeachment
inquiry.
The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress' authority
to investigate includes the authority to compel the production
of information by issuing subpoenas, a power the House has
delegated to its committees pursuant to its Constitutional
authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings.''
Congress has also enacted statutes to support its power to
investigate and oversee the Executive Branch. These laws impose
criminal and other penalties on those who fail to comply with
inquiries from Congress or block others from doing so, and they
reflect the broader Constitutional requirement to cooperate
with Congressional investigations.
Unlike President Trump, past Presidents who were the
subject of impeachment inquiries--including Presidents Andrew
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton--recognized and, to
varying degrees, complied with information requests and
subpoenas.
President Nixon, for example, agreed to let his staff
testify voluntarily in the Senate Watergate investigation,
stating: ``All members of the White House Staff will appear
voluntarily when requested by the committee. They will testify
under oath, and they will answer fully all proper questions.''
President Nixon also produced documents in response to the
House's subpoenas as part of its impeachment inquiry, including
more than 30 transcripts of White House recordings and notes
from meetings with the President. When President Nixon withheld
tape recordings and produced heavily edited and inaccurate
records, the House Judiciary Committee approved an article of
impeachment for obstruction.
The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply
Even before the House of Representatives launched its
investigation regarding Ukraine, President Trump rejected the
authority of Congress to investigate his actions, proclaiming,
``We're fighting all the subpoenas,'' and ``I have an Article
II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as
president.''
When the Intelligence, Oversight and Reform, and Foreign
Affairs Committees began reviewing the President's actions as
part of the House's impeachment inquiry, the President
repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of the investigation in
word and deed. His rhetorical attacks appeared intended not
only to dispute reports of his misconduct, but to persuade the
American people that the House lacks authority to investigate
the President.
On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the Constitution
and that there ``should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally,
through the courts.'' A common theme of his defiance has been
his claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been
following the same investigative rules that Republicans
championed when they were in control.
On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone sent a
letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the Chairmen of the
investigating Committees confirming that President Trump
directed his entire Administration not to cooperate with the
House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Cipollone wrote: ``President
Trump cannot permit his Administration to participate in this
partisan inquiry under these circumstances.''
Mr. Cipollone's letter advanced remarkably politicized
arguments and legal theories unsupported by the Constitution,
judicial precedent, and more than 200 years of history. If
allowed to stand, the President's defiance, as justified by Mr.
Cipollone, would represent an existential threat to the
nation's Constitutional system of checks and balances,
separation of powers, and rule of law.
The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed Documents
Following President Trump's categorical order, not a single
document has been produced by the White House, the Office of
the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the
Department of Energy in response to 71 specific, individualized
requests or demands for records in their possession, custody,
or control. These subpoenas remain in full force and effect.
These agencies and offices also blocked many current and former
officials from producing records directly to the Committees.
Certain witnesses defied the President's sweeping,
categorical, and baseless order and identified the substance of
key documents. For example, Ambassador Gordon Sondland attached
ten exhibits to his written hearing testimony reflecting
reproductions of certain communications with high-level
Administration officials, including Acting White House Chief of
Staff Mick Mulvaney, former National Security Advisor John
Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Secretary of Energy
Rick Perry. Other witnesses identified numerous additional
documents that the President and various agencies are
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment
inquiry.
Like the White House, the Department of State refused to
produce a single document in response to its subpoena, even
though there is no legal basis for the Department's actions. In
fact, on November 22, the Department was forced to produce 99
pages of emails, letters, notes, timelines, and news articles
to a non-partisan, nonprofit ethics watchdog organization
pursuant to a court order in a lawsuit filed under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). Although limited in scope, this
production affirms that the Department is withholding
responsive documents from Congress without any valid legal
basis.
The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify
No other President in history has issued an order
categorically directing the entire Executive Branch not to
testify before Congress, including in the context of an
impeachment inquiry. President Trump issued just such an order.
As reflected in Mr. Cipollone's letter, President Trump
directed government witnesses to violate their legal
obligations and defy House subpoenas--regardless of their
offices or positions. President Trump even extended his order
to former officials no longer employed by the federal
government. This Administration-wide effort to prevent all
witnesses from providing testimony was coordinated and
comprehensive.
At President Trump's direction, twelve current or former
Administration officials refused to testify as part of the
House's impeachment inquiry, ten of whom did so in defiance of
duly authorized subpoenas:
Mick Mulvaney, Acting White House Chief of Staff
Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the President and
Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff
Ambassador John Bolton, Former National Security
Advisor
John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the President
for National Security Affairs and Legal Advisor, National
Security Council
Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the
President and Deputy Legal Advisor, National Security Council
Preston Wells Griffith, Senior Director for
International Energy and Environment, National Security Council
Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, National
Security Council
Russell T. Vought, Acting Director, Office of
Management and Budget
Michael Duffey, Associate Director for National
Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget
Brian McCormack, Associate Director for Natural
Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of Management and Budget
T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of
State
Secretary Rick Perry, Department of Energy
These witnesses were warned that their refusal to testify
``shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a
contempt proceeding'' and ``may be used as an adverse inference
against you and the President.''
The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Other Key Witnesses
Despite President Trump's orders that no Executive Branch
employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment
inquiry, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized
subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and
public hearings. These officials not only served their nation
honorably, but they fulfilled their oath to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States.
In addition to the President's broad orders seeking to
prohibit all Executive Branch employees from testifying, many
of these witnesses were personally directed by senior political
appointees not to cooperate with the House's impeachment
inquiry. These directives frequently cited or enclosed copies
of Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter conveying the President's
order not to comply.
For example, the State Department, relying on President
Trump's order, attempted to block Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch
from testifying, but she fulfilled her legal obligations by
appearing at a deposition on October 11 and a hearing on
November 15. More than a dozen current and former officials
followed her courageous example by testifying at depositions
and public hearings over the course of the last two months. The
testimony from these witnesses produced overwhelming and clear
evidence of President Trump's misconduct, which is described in
detail in the first section of this report.
The President's Intimidation of Witnesses
President Trump publicly attacked and intimidated witnesses
who came forward to comply with duly authorized subpoenas and
testify about his misconduct, raising grave concerns about
potential violations of criminal laws intended to protect
witnesses appearing before Congressional proceedings. For
example, the President attacked:
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, who served the
United States honorably for decades as a U.S. diplomat and
anti-corruption advocate in posts around the world under six
different Presidents;
Ambassador Bill Taylor, who graduated at the top
of his class at West Point, served as an infantry commander in
Vietnam, and earned a Bronze Star and an Air Medal with a V
device for valor;
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, an active-
duty Army officer for more than 20 years who earned a Purple
Heart for wounds he sustained in an improvised explosive device
attack in Iraq, as well as the Combat Infantryman Badge; and
Jennifer Williams, who is Vice President Mike
Pence's top advisor on Europe and Russia and has a
distinguished record of public service under the Bush, Obama,
and Trump Administrations.
The President engaged in this effort to intimidate these
public servants to prevent them from cooperating with Congress'
impeachment inquiry. He issued threats, openly discussed
possible retaliation, made insinuations about their character
and patriotism, and subjected them to mockery and derision--
when they deserved the opposite. The President's attacks were
broadcast to millions of Americans--including witnesses'
families, friends, and coworkers.
It is a federal crime to intimidate or seek to intimidate
any witness appearing before Congress. This prohibition applies
to anyone who knowingly ``uses intimidation, threatens, or
corruptly persuades'' another person in order to ``influence,
delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official
proceeding.'' Violations of this law can carry a criminal
sentence of up to 20 years in prison.
In addition to his relentless attacks on witnesses who
testified in connection with the House's impeachment inquiry,
the President also repeatedly threatened and attacked a member
of the Intelligence Community who filed an anonymous
whistleblower complaint raising an ``urgent concern'' that
``appeared credible'' regarding the President's conduct. The
whistleblower filed the complaint confidentially with the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, as authorized
by the relevant whistleblower law. Federal law prohibits the
Inspector General from revealing the whistleblower's identity.
Federal law also protects the whistleblower from retaliation.
In more than 100 public statements about the whistleblower
over a period of just two months, the President publicly
questioned the whistleblower's motives, disputed the accuracy
of the whistleblower's account, and encouraged others to reveal
the whistleblower's identity. Most chillingly, the President
issued a threat against the whistleblower and those who
provided information to the whistleblower regarding the
President's misconduct, suggesting that they could face the
death penalty for treason.
The President's campaign of intimidation risks discouraging
witnesses from coming forward voluntarily, complying with
mandatory subpoenas for documents and testimony, and disclosing
potentially incriminating evidence in this inquiry and future
Congressional investigations.
KEY FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on witness testimony and evidence collected during
the impeachment inquiry, the Intelligence Committee has found
that:
I. Donald J. Trump, the 45th President of the United
States--acting personally and through his agents within and
outside of the U.S. government--solicited the interference of a
foreign government, Ukraine, in the 2020 U.S. presidential
election. The President engaged in this course of conduct for
the benefit of his reelection, to harm the election prospects
of a political opponent, and to influence our nation's upcoming
presidential election to his advantage. In so doing, the
President placed his personal political interests above the
national interests of the United States, sought to undermine
the integrity of the U.S. presidential election process, and
endangered U.S. national security.
II. In furtherance of this scheme, President Trump--
directly and acting through his agents within and outside the
U.S. government--sought to pressure and induce Ukraine's newly-
elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to publicly announce
unfounded investigations that would benefit President Trump's
personal political interests and reelection effort. To advance
his personal political objectives, President Trump encouraged
the President of Ukraine to work with his personal attorney,
Rudy Giuliani.
III. As part of this scheme, President Trump, acting in his
official capacity and using his position of public trust,
personally and directly requested from the President of Ukraine
that the government of Ukraine publicly announce investigations
into (1) the President's political opponent, former Vice
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and his son, Hunter Biden, and
(2) a baseless theory promoted by Russia alleging that
Ukraine--rather than Russia--interfered in the 2016 U.S.
election. These investigations were intended to harm a
potential political opponent of President Trump and benefit the
President's domestic political standing.
IV. President Trump ordered the suspension of $391 million
in vital military assistance urgently needed by Ukraine, a
strategic partner, to resist Russian aggression. Because the
aid was appropriated by Congress, on a bipartisan basis, and
signed into law by the President, its expenditure was required
by law. Acting directly and through his subordinates within the
U.S. government, the President withheld from Ukraine this
military assistance without any legitimate foreign policy,
national security, or anti-corruption justification. The
President did so despite the longstanding bipartisan support of
Congress, uniform support across federal departments and
agencies for the provision to Ukraine of the military
assistance, and his obligations under the Impoundment Control
Act.
V. President Trump used the power of the Office of the
President and exercised his authority over the Executive
Branch, including his control of the instruments of the federal
government, to apply increasing pressure on the President of
Ukraine and the Ukrainian government to announce the
politically-motivated investigations desired by President
Trump. Specifically, to advance and promote his scheme, the
President withheld official acts of value to Ukraine and
conditioned their fulfillment on actions by Ukraine that would
benefit his personal political interests:
A. President Trump--acting through agents within and
outside the U.S. government--conditioned a head of
state meeting at the White House, which the President
of Ukraine desperately sought to demonstrate continued
United States support for Ukraine in the face of
Russian aggression, on Ukraine publicly announcing the
investigations that President Trump believed would aid
his reelection campaign.
B. To increase leverage over the President of
Ukraine, President Trump, acting through his agents and
subordinates, conditioned release of the vital military
assistance he had suspended to Ukraine on the President
of Ukraine's public announcement of the investigations
that President Trump sought.
C. President Trump's closest subordinates and
advisors within the Executive Branch, including Acting
Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo, Secretary of Energy J. Richard Perry, and other
senior White House and Executive Branch officials had
knowledge of, in some cases facilitated and furthered
the President's scheme, and withheld information about
the scheme from the Congress and the American public.
VI. In directing and orchestrating this scheme to advance
his personal political interests, President Trump did not
implement, promote, or advance U.S. anti-corruption policies.
In fact, the President sought to pressure and induce the
government of Ukraine to announce politically-motivated
investigations lacking legitimate predication that the U.S.
government otherwise discourages and opposes as a matter of
policy in that country and around the world. In so doing, the
President undermined U.S. policy supporting anti-corruption
reform and the rule of law in Ukraine, and undermined U.S.
national security.
VII. By withholding vital military assistance and
diplomatic support from a strategic foreign partner government
engaged in an ongoing military conflict illegally instigated by
Russia, President Trump compromised national security to
advance his personal political interests.
VIII. Faced with the revelation of his actions, President
Trump publicly and repeatedly persisted in urging foreign
governments, including Ukraine and China, to investigate his
political opponent. This continued solicitation of foreign
interference in a U.S. election presents a clear and present
danger that the President will continue to use the power of his
office for his personal political gain.
IX. Using the power of the Office of the President, and
exercising his authority over the Executive Branch, President
Trump ordered and implemented a campaign to conceal his conduct
from the public and frustrate and obstruct the House of
Representatives' impeachment inquiry by:
A. refusing to produce to the impeachment inquiry's
investigating Committees information and records in the
possession of the White House, in defiance of a lawful
subpoena;
B. directing Executive Branch agencies to defy lawful
subpoenas and withhold the production of all documents
and records from the investigating Committees;
C. directing current and former Executive Branch
officials not to cooperate with the Committees,
including in defiance of lawful subpoenas for
testimony; and
D. intimidating, threatening, and tampering with
prospective and actual witnesses in the impeachment
inquiry in an effort to prevent, delay, or influence
the testimony of those witnesses.
In so doing, and despite the fact that the Constitution
vests in the House of Representatives the ``sole Power of
Impeachment,'' the President sought to arrogate to himself the
right to determine the propriety, scope, and nature of an
impeachment inquiry into his own misconduct, and the right to
deny any and all information to the Congress in the conduct of
its constitutional responsibilities.
SECTION I.
THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT
1. The President Forced Out the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
The President forced out the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie
Yovanovitch, following a baseless smear campaign promoted by
President Trump's personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, and others.
The campaign publicized conspiracy theories that benefited the
President's personal political interests and undermined
official U.S. policy, some of which the President raised during
his July 25 call with the President of Ukraine.
Overview
On April 24, 2019, President Donald J. Trump abruptly
recalled the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch.
Ambassador Yovanovitch, an award-winning 33-year veteran
Foreign Service officer, aggressively advocated for anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine consistent with U.S. foreign
policy. President Trump forced her out following a baseless
smear campaign promoted by his personal attorney, Rudy
Giuliani, associates of Mr. Giuliani, and corrupt Ukrainians.
Ambassador Yovanovitch was told by the State Department
that President Trump had lost confidence in her, but she was
never provided a substantive justification for her removal. Her
ouster set the stage for other U.S. officials appointed by
President Trump to work in cooperation with Mr. Giuliani to
advance a scheme in support of the President's reelection.
Mr. Giuliani and his associates promoted false conspiracy
theories about Ukraine colluding with Democrats to interfere in
the 2016 U.S. election. This false claim was promoted by
Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2017--less than a
month after the unanimous U.S. Intelligence Community
assessment that Russia alone was responsible for a covert
influence campaign aimed at helping President Trump during the
2016 election. Mr. Giuliani also made discredited public
allegations about former Vice President Joe Biden and his son,
Hunter, in an apparent effort to hurt President Trump's
political rival in the 2020 presidential election. Mr.
Giuliani's associates, with their own ties to President Trump,
also worked to enter into arrangements with current and former
corrupt Ukrainian officials to promote these false
allegations--the same unfounded allegations President Trump
requested that Ukraine investigate on his July 25 call with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
President Trump amplified these baseless allegations by
tweeting them just a month before he recalled Ambassador
Yovanovitch. Despite requests from Ambassador Yovanovitch and
other senior State Department officials, Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo refused to issue a statement of support for the
Ambassador or the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine for fear of being
undermined by a tweet by President Trump.
The removal of Ambassador Yovanovitch left a vacuum in the
leadership of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine at an important time.
A new president had just been elected on an anti-corruption
platform, and the country was in a period of transition as it
continued to defend itself against Russia-led military
aggression in the east.
Anti-Corruption Ceremony Interrupted to Recall Anti-Corruption
Ambassador
Ambassador Yovanovitch represented the United States of
America as the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 2016 to 2019.
She is a non-partisan career public servant, first selected for
the American Foreign Service in 1986. President George W. Bush
named her as an Ambassador twice, to the Kyrgyz Republic and
Armenia, and President Barack Obama nominated her for the
posting in Kyiv.\1\
On the evening of April 24, Ambassador Yovanovitch
approached a podium in front of gold drapes at the U.S.
Ambassador's residence in Ukraine's capital city. She was
hosting an event to present an award of courage to the father
of Kateryna Handziuk, who was brutally murdered by people who
opposed her efforts to expose and root out public corruption in
Ukraine. In 2018, attackers threw sulfuric acid at Ms.
Handziuk, burning more than 30 percent of her body. After
months of suffering and nearly a dozen surgeries, she died at
the age of 33.\2\ Her attackers have still not been held to
account.\3\
Ambassador Yovanovitch began her speech by noting that Ms.
Handziuk ``was a woman of courage who committed herself to
speaking out against wrongdoing.'' She lamented how Ms.
Handziuk had ``paid the ultimate price for her fearlessness in
fighting against corruption and for her determined efforts to
build a democratic Ukraine.'' She pledged that the United
States would ``continue to stand with those engaged in the
fight for a democratic Ukraine free of corruption, where people
are held accountable'' and commended Ukrainians who ``have
demonstrated to the world that they are willing to fight for a
better system.''\4\
Ambassador Yovanovitch concluded her remarks by holding Ms.
Handziuk's story up as an inspiration to the many Ukrainians
striving to chart a new course for their country in the face of
Russian interference and aggression:
I think we can all see what a remarkable woman
Kateryna Handziuk was, but she continues to inspire all
of us to fight for justice. She was a courageous woman,
who wanted to make Ukraine a better place. And she is
continuing to do so. And I'll just leave you with one
thought that was expressed in Washington at the
ceremony--that courage is contagious. I think we saw
that on the Maidan in 2014, we see that on the front
lines every day in the Donbas, we see it in the work
that Kateryna Handziuk did here in Ukraine. And we see
it in the work of all of you--day in, day out--fighting
for Ukraine and the future of Ukraine.\5\
Ambassador Yovanovitch's evening was interrupted around
10:00 p.m. by a telephone call from the State Department's
headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of
Human Resources Ambassador Carol Perez warned that the
Department's leaders had ``great concern'' and ``were worried''
about her. Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that it is ``hard
to know how to react to something like that.'' Ambassador Perez
said she did not know what the concerns were but pledged she
would ``try to find out more'' and would try to call back ``by
midnight.''\6\
Finally, at 1:00 a.m. in Kyiv, Ambassador Perez called
again: The ``concerns'' were from ``up the street'' at the
White House. Ambassador Perez said that Ambassador Yovanovitch
needed to ``come home immediately, get on the next plane to the
U.S.'' She warned that there were concerns about Ambassador
Yovanovitch's ``security.'' When Ambassador Yovanovitch asked
if Ambassador Perez was referring to her physical safety,
Ambassador Perez relayed that she ``hadn't gotten that
impression that it was a physical security issue,'' but that
Ambassador Yovanovitch ``needed to come home right away.''\7\
Ambassador Yovanovitch asked Ambassador Perez specifically
whether this order had anything to do with President Trump's
personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, who had been making unfounded
allegations against her in the media. Ambassador Perez said she
``didn't know.''\8\ Ambassador Yovanovitch argued that this
order to return to Washington, D.C. was ``extremely irregular''
and that no one had provided her a reason.\9\ In the end,
however, Ambassador Yovanovitch swiftly returned to
Washington.\10\
Rudy Giuliani, on Behalf of President Trump, Led a Smear Campaign to
Oust Ambassador Yovanovitch
Ambassador Yovanovitch's recall followed a concerted smear
campaign by Mr. Giuliani and his associates, promoted by
President Trump. The campaign was largely directed by Mr.
Giuliani, President Trump's personal attorney since early
2018.\11\ A cast of supporting characters, which included
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutors, now-indicted middlemen,
conservative media pundits, and attorneys close to President
Trump, assisted Mr. Giuliani. Among those associates were two
U.S. citizens, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman. Mr. Parnas and Mr.
Fruman were Florida-based businessmen who were represented by
Mr. Giuliani ``in connection with their personal and business
affairs'' and who also ``assisted Mr. Giuliani in connection
with his representation of President Trump.''\12\ Both Mr.
Parnas and Mr. Fruman were criminally indicted in the Southern
District of New York in October and face charges of conspiring
to violate the federal ban on foreign donations and
contributions in connection with federal and state
elections.\13\ Dr. Fiona Hill, former Deputy Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National
Security Council (NSC), learned from her colleagues that
``these guys were notorious in Florida and that they were bad
news.''\14\
The campaign was also propelled by individuals in Ukraine,
including two prosecutors general. Yuriy Lutsenko served as the
Prosecutor General of Ukraine under former Ukrainian President
Petro Poroshenko--the incumbent who lost to President Zelensky
in April 2019--and previously was the head of President
Poroshenko's faction in the Ukrainian parliament.\15\ Viktor
Shokin was Mr. Lutsenko's predecessor and was removed from
office in 2016.\16\ Mr. Shokin has been described as ``a
typical Ukraine prosecutor who lived a lifestyle far in excess
of his government salary, who never prosecuted anybody known
for having committed a crime,'' and ``covered up crimes that
were known to have been committed.''\17\
In late 2018, Ukrainian officials informed Ambassador
Yovanovitch about Mr. Giuliani's and Mr. Lutsenko's plans to
target her. They told her that Mr. Lutsenko ``was in
communication with Mayor Giuliani'' and that ``they were going
to, you know, do things, including to me.''\18\ Soon
thereafter, Ambassador Yovanovitch learned that ``there had
been a number of meetings'' between Mr. Giuliani and Mr.
Lutsenko, who was looking to ``hurt'' her ``in the U.S.''\19\
The allegations against Ambassador Yovanovitch, which later
surfaced publicly, concerned false claims that she had provided
a ``do-not-prosecute list'' to Mr. Lutsenko and made
disparaging comments about President Trump.\20\
Ambassador Yovanovitch inferred that Mr. Lutsenko was
spreading ``falsehoods'' about her because she was ``effective
at helping Ukrainians who wanted reform, Ukrainians who wanted
to fight against corruption, and . . . that was not in his
interest.''\21\ Anti-corruption reform was not in Mr.
Lutsenko's interest because he himself was known to be
corrupt.\22\ David Holmes, Counselor for Political Affairs at
the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, explained that:
In mid-March 2019, an Embassy colleague learned from
a Ukrainian contact that Mr. Lutsenko had complained
that Ambassador Yovanovitch had, quote, unquote,
destroyed him, with her refusal to support him until he
followed through with his reform commitments and ceased
using his position for personal gain.\23\
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent similarly
summarized Mr. Lutsenko's smear campaign against Ambassador
Yovanovitch, which was facilitated by Mr. Giuliani and his
associates, as motivated by revenge:
Over the course of 2018 and 2019, I became
increasingly aware of an effort by Rudy Giuliani and
others, including his associates Lev Parnas and Igor
Fruman, to run a campaign to smear Ambassador
Yovanovitch and other officials at the U.S. Embassy in
Kyiv. The chief agitators on the Ukrainian side of this
effort were some of those same corrupt former
prosecutors I had encountered, particularly Yuriy
Lutsenko and Viktor Shokin. They were now peddling
false information in order to extract revenge against
those who had exposed their misconduct, including U.S.
diplomats, Ukrainian anticorruption officials, and
reform-minded civil society groups in Ukraine.\24\
Mr. Kent succinctly summarized, ``[y]ou can't promote
principled anti-corruption efforts without pissing off corrupt
people.''\25\ By doing her job, Ambassador Yovanovitch drew Mr.
Lutsenko's ire.
In late 2018 and early 2019, Mr. Lutsenko also risked
losing his job as Prosecutor General, and risked possible
criminal investigation, if then-candidate Volodymyr Zelensky
won the presidency. Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations, Ambassador Kurt Volker, explained:
As is often the case in Ukraine, a change in power
would mean change in prosecutorial powers as well, and
there have been efforts in the past at prosecuting the
previous government. I think Mr. Lutsenko, in my
estimation, and I said this to Mayor Giuliani when I
met with him, was interested in preserving his own
position. He wanted to avoid being fired by a new
government in order to prevent prosecution of himself,
possible prosecution of himself.\26\
Officials in Ukraine have also speculated that Mr. Lutsenko
cultivated his relationship with Mr. Giuliani in an effort to
hold on to his position.\27\ Ambassador Yovanovitch described
Mr. Lutsenko as an ``opportunist'' who ``will ally himself,
sometimes simultaneously . . . with whatever political or
economic forces he believes will suit his interests best at the
time.''\28\
Mr. Lutsenko promoted debunked conspiracy theories that had
gained traction with President Trump and Mr. Giuliani. Those
debunked conspiracy theories alleged that the Ukrainian
government--not Russia--was behind the hack of the Democratic
National Committee (DNC) server in 2016, and that former Vice
President Biden had petitioned for the removal of Mr. Shokin to
prevent an investigation into Burisma Holdings, a Ukrainian
energy company for which Vice President Biden's son, Hunter,
served as a board member.
Both conspiracy theories served the personal political
interests of President Trump because they would help him in his
campaign for reelection in 2020. The first would serve to
undercut Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation, which
was still underway when Mr. Giuliani began his activities in
Ukraine and was denounced as a ``witch hunt'' by the President
and his supporters.\29\ The second would serve to damage
Democratic presidential candidate Vice President Biden.
These conspiracies lacked any basis in fact. The
Intelligence Community, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, both the Majority and Minority of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
investigation undertaken by Special Counsel Robert Mueller
concluded that Russia was responsible for interfering in the
2016 election.\30\ President Trump's former Homeland Security
Advisor, Tom Bossert, said that the idea of Ukraine hacking the
DNC server was ``not only a conspiracy theory, it is completely
debunked.''\31\
Russia has pushed the false theory that Ukraine was
involved in the 2016 election to distract from its own
involvement.\32\ Mr. Holmes testified that it was to President
Putin's advantage to promote the theory of Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 U.S. elections for several reasons:
First of all, to deflect from the allegations of
Russian interference. Second of all, to drive a wedge
between the United States and Ukraine which Russia
wants to essentially get back into its sphere of
influence. Thirdly, to besmirch Ukraine and its
political leadership, [and] to degrade and erode
support for Ukraine from other key partners in Europe
and elsewhere.\33\
The allegations that Vice President Biden inappropriately
pressured the Ukrainians to remove Mr. Shokin also are without
merit. Mr. Shokin was widely considered to be ineffective and
corrupt.\34\ When he urged the Ukrainian government to remove
Mr. Shokin, Vice President Biden was advocating for anti-
corruption reform and pursuing official U.S. policy.\35\
Moreover, Mr. Shokin's removal was supported by other
countries, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank,
and was ``widely understood internationally to be the right
policy.''\36\ In May 2019, even Mr. Lutsenko himself admitted
that there was no credible evidence of wrongdoing by Hunter
Biden or Vice President Biden.\37\
Nevertheless, Mr. Giuliani engaged with both Mr. Lutsenko
and Mr. Shokin regarding these baseless allegations. According
to documents provided to the State Department Office of
Inspector General, in January 23, 2019, Mr. Giuliani, Mr.
Parnas, and Mr. Fruman participated in a conference call with
Mr. Shokin. According to notes of the call, Mr. Shokin made
allegations about Vice President Biden and Burisma. Mr. Shokin
also claimed that Ambassador Yovanovitch had improperly denied
him a U.S. visa and that she was close to Vice President
Biden.\38\
Mr. Giuliani separately met with Mr. Lutsenko in New
York.\39\ Over the course of two days, on January 25 and 26,
Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Lutsenko, Mr. Parnas, and Mr. Fruman,
reportedly discussed whether Ambassador Yovanovitch was ``loyal
to President Trump,'' as well as investigations into Burisma
and the Bidens.\40\ For his part, Mr. Lutsenko later said he
``understood very well'' that Mr. Giuliani wanted Mr. Lutsenko
to investigate former Vice President Biden and his son, Hunter.
``I have 23 years in politics,'' Mr. Lutsenko said. ``I knew .
. . . I'm a political animal.''\41\
Mr. Giuliani later publicly acknowledged that he was
seeking information from Ukrainians on behalf of his client,
President Trump. On October 23, Mr. Giuliani tweeted
``everything I did was to discover evidence to defend my client
against false charges.''\42\ Then, in a series of tweets on
October 30, Mr. Giuliani stated:
All of the information I obtained came from
interviews conducted as . . . private defense counsel
to POTUS, to defend him against false allegations. I
began obtaining this information while Mueller was
still investigating his witch hunt and a full 5 months
before Biden even announced his run for Pres.\43\
President Trump and Mr. Giuliani's efforts to investigate
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and
Vice President Biden negatively impacted the U.S. Embassy in
Kyiv. Mr. Holmes testified:
Beginning in March 2019, the situation at the Embassy
and in Ukraine changed dramatically. Specifically, the
three priorities of security, economy, and justice and
our support for Ukrainian democratic resistance to
Russian aggression became overshadowed by a political
agenda promoted by former New York City Mayor Rudy
Giuliani and a cadre of officials operating with a
direct channel to the White House.\44\
U.S. national interests in Ukraine were undermined and
subordinated to the personal, political interests of President
Trump.
The Smear Campaign Accelerated in Late March 2019
The smear campaign entered a more public phase in the
United States in late March 2019 with the publication of a
series of opinion pieces in The Hill.
On March 20, 2019, John Solomon penned an opinion piece
quoting a false claim by Mr. Lutsenko that Ambassador
Yovanovitch had given him a do-not-prosecute list.\45\ Mr.
Lutsenko later retracted the claim.\46\ Mr. Solomon's work also
included false allegations that Ambassador Yovanovitch had
``made disparaging statements about President Trump.''\47\
Ambassador Yovanovitch called this allegation ``fictitious,''
and the State Department issued a statement describing the
allegations as a ``fabrication.''\48\
The Committees uncovered evidence of close ties and
frequent contacts between Mr. Solomon and Mr. Parnas, who was
assisting Mr. Giuliani in connection with his representation of
the President. Phone records show that in the 48 hours before
publication of The Hill opinion piece, Mr. Parnas spoke with
Mr. Solomon.\49\ In addition, The Hill piece cited a letter
dated May 9, 2018, from Representative Pete Sessions (R-Texas)
to Secretary Pompeo, in which Rep. Sessions accused Ambassador
Yovanovitch of speaking ``privately and repeatedly about her
disdain for the current administration.''\50\ A federal
criminal indictment alleges that in or about May 2018, Mr.
Parnas sought a congressman's assistance to remove Ambassador
Yovanovitch, at the request of one or more Ukrainian government
officials.\51\
On March 20, 2019, the day The Hill opinion piece was
published, Mr. Parnas again spoke with Mr. Solomon for 11
minutes.\52\ Shortly after that phone call, President Trump
promoted Mr. Solomon's article in a tweet.\53\
Following President Trump's tweet, the public attacks
against Ambassador Yovanovitch were further amplified on social
media and were merged with the conspiracy theories regarding
both Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and the
Bidens. On March 22, 2019, Mr. Giuliani tweeted: ``Hillary,
Kerry, and Biden people colluding with Ukrainian operatives to
make money and affect 2016 election.'' He also gave an
interview to Fox News in which he raised Hunter Biden and
called for an investigation.\54\ Then, on March 24, Donald
Trump, Jr. called Ambassador Yovanovitch a ``joker'' on Twitter
and called for her removal.\55\
This campaign reverberated in Ukraine. Mr. Kent testified
that ``starting in mid-March'' Mr. Giuliani was ``almost
unmissable'' during this ``campaign of slander'' against
Ambassador Yovanovitch.\56\ According to Mr. Kent, Mr.
Lutsenko's press spokeswoman retweeted Donald Trump, Jr.'s
tweet attacking the Ambassador.\57\
Concerns About President Trump Kept State Department From Issuing
Statement of Support
At the end of March, as this smear campaign intensified,
Ambassador Yovanovitch sent Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs David Hale an email identifying her concerns
with the false allegations about her and asking for a strong
statement of support from the State Department. She explained
that, otherwise, ``it makes it hard to be a credible ambassador
in a country.''\58\ Ambassador Hale had been briefed on the
smears in a series of emails from Mr. Kent.\59\ Ambassador Hale
agreed that the allegations were without merit.\60\
Ambassador Yovanovitch was told that State Department
officials were concerned that if they issued a public statement
supporting her, ``it could be undermined'' by ``[t]he
President.''\61\ Ambassador Hale explained that a statement of
support ``would only fuel further negative reaction'' and that
``it might even provoke a public reaction from the President
himself about the Ambassador.''\62\ In short, State Department
officials were concerned ``that the rug would be pulled out
from underneath the State Department.''\63\
Ambassador Yovanovitch turned to the U.S. Ambassador to the
European Union, Gordon Sondland, for advice. According to
Ambassador Yovanovitch, Ambassador Sondland suggested that, in
response to the smear campaign, she make a public statement in
support of President Trump. She said Ambassador Sondland told
her, ``you need to go big or go home'' and ``tweet out there
that you support the President, and that all these are lies and
everything else.''\64\ Ambassador Yovanovitch said she felt
that this ``was advice that I did not see how I could implement
in my role as an Ambassador, and as a Foreign Service
officer.''\65\
Ultimately, Secretary Pompeo refused to issue a public
statement of support for Ambassador Yovanovitch. At the same
time Secretary Pompeo was refusing to issue a statement, he was
communicating with one of the individuals involved in the smear
campaign against her. Records and witness testimony indicate
that Secretary Pompeo spoke to Mr. Giuliani on March 26, 28,
and 29, not long after Mr. Solomon's first article in The
Hill.\66\
The Smear Campaign was a Coordinated Effort by Mr. Giuliani, His
Associates, and One or More Individuals at the White House
In April, Mr. Solomon continued to publish opinion pieces
about Ambassador Yovanovitch and other conspiracy theories
being pursued by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of President Trump. Mr.
Solomon was not working alone. As further described below,
there was a coordinated effort by associates of President Trump
to push these false narratives publicly, as evidenced by public
statements, phone records, and contractual agreements.
On April 1, Mr. Solomon published an opinion piece in The
Hill alleging that Vice President Biden had inappropriately
petitioned for the removal of Mr. Shokin to protect his son,
Hunter.\67\ The opinion piece was entitled, ``Joe Biden's 2020
Ukrainian Nightmare: A Closed Probe is Revived.'' Many of the
allegations in the piece were based on information provided by
Mr. Lutsenko. The following day, Donald Trump, Jr. retweeted
the article.\68\
Phone records obtained by the Committees show frequent
communication between key players during this phase of the
scheme. Between April 1 and April 7, Mr. Parnas exchanged
approximately 16 calls with Mr. Giuliani (longest duration
approximately seven minutes) and approximately 10 calls with
Mr. Solomon (longest duration approximately nine minutes).\69\
On April 7, Mr. Solomon followed up with another opinion
piece. The piece accused Ambassador Yovanovitch of preventing
the issuance of U.S. visas for Ukrainian officials who wished
to travel to the United States to provide purported evidence of
wrongdoing by ``American Democrats and their allies in
Kiev.''\70\ One of those Ukrainian officials allegedly denied a
visa was Kostiantyn Kulyk, a deputy to Mr. Lutsenko. Mr. Kulyk
participated in a ``wide-ranging interview'' with Mr. Solomon
and was extensively quoted.\71\
These Ukrainian officials claimed to have evidence of
wrongdoing about Vice President Biden's efforts in 2015 to
remove Mr. Shokin, Hunter Biden's role as a Burisma board
member, Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election in
favor of Hillary Clinton, and the misappropriation and transfer
of Ukrainian funds abroad.\72\ The opinion piece also made
clear that Mr. Giuliani was pursuing these very same theories
on behalf of the President:
More recently, President Trump's private attorney
Rudy Giuliani--former mayor and former U.S. attorney in
New York City--learned about some of the allegations
while, on behalf of the Trump legal team, he looked
into Ukrainian involvement in the 2016 election.
According to Mr. Solomon's piece, Mr. Lutsenko was reported
to have sufficient evidence, ``particularly involving Biden,
his family and money spirited out of Ukraine--to warrant a
meeting with U.S. Attorney General William Barr.''\73\
On the same day that Mr. Solomon published these
allegations, Mr. Giuliani appeared on Fox News. Mr. Giuliani
discussed how he learned about alleged Ukrainian interference
in the 2016 U.S. elections and the Bidens' purported misconduct
in Ukraine:
Let me tell you my interest in that. I got
information about three or four months ago that a lot
of the explanations for how this whole phony
investigation started will be in the Ukraine, that
there were a group of people in the Ukraine that were
working to help Hillary Clinton and were colluding
really--[LAUGHTER]--with the Clinton campaign. And it
stems around the ambassador and the embassy, being used
for political purposes. So I began getting some people
that were coming forward and telling me about that. And
then all of a sudden, they revealed the story about
Burisma and Biden's son . . . [Vice President Biden]
bragged about pressuring Ukraine's president to firing
[sic] a top prosecutor who was being criticized on a
whole bunch of areas but was conducting investigation
of this gas company which Hunter Biden served as a
director.\74\
The next day, April 8, Mr. Giuliani tweeted about Mr.
Solomon's opinion piece.\75\
Over the course of the four days following the April 7
article, phone records show contacts between Mr. Giuliani, Mr.
Parnas, Ranking Member Nunes, and Mr. Solomon. Specifically,
Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas were in contact with one another,
as well as with Mr. Solomon.\76\ Phone records also show
contacts on April 10 between Mr. Giuliani and Ranking Member
Nunes, consisting of three short calls in rapid succession,
followed by a nearly three-minute call.\77\ Later that same
day, Mr. Parnas and Mr. Solomon had a four minute, 39 second
call.\78\
Victoria Toensing, a lawyer who, along with her partner
Joseph diGenova, once briefly represented President Trump in
connection with Special Counsel Robert Mueller's
investigation,\79\ also was in phone contact with Mr. Giuliani
and Mr. Parnas at the beginning of April.\80\
Beginning in mid-April, Ms. Toensing signed retainer
agreements between diGenova & Toensing LLP and Mr. Lutsenko,
Mr. Kulyk, and Mr. Shokin--all of whom feature in Mr. Solomon's
opinion pieces.\81\ In these retainer agreements, the firm
agreed to represent Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk in meetings with
U.S. officials regarding alleged ``evidence'' of Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, and to represent Mr.
Shokin ``for the purpose of collecting evidence regarding his
March 2016 firing as Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the role
of Vice President Biden in such firing, and presenting such
evidence to U.S. and foreign authorities.''\82\ On July 25,
President Trump would personally press President Zelensky to
investigate these very same matters.
On April 23, Mr. Parnas had a call with Mr. Solomon, and
multiple phone contacts with Mr. Giuliani.\83\ On that same
day, Mr. Giuliani had a series of short phone calls (ranging
from 11 to 18 seconds) with a phone number associated with the
White House, followed shortly thereafter by an eight minute,
28-second call with an unidentified number that called him.\84\
Approximately half an hour later, Mr. Giuliani had a 48-second
call with a phone number associated with Ambassador John
Bolton, National Security Advisor to the President.\85\
That same day, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:
Hillary is correct the report is the end of the
beginning for the second time . . . NO COLLUSION. Now
Ukraine is investigating Hillary campaign and DNC
conspiracy with foreign operatives including Ukrainian
and others to affect 2016 election. And there's no
Comey to fix the result.\86\
The next day, on the morning of April 24, Mr. Giuliani
appeared on Fox and Friends, lambasting the Mueller
investigation. Mr. Giuliani also promoted the false conspiracy
theories about Ukraine and Vice President Biden:
And I ask you to keep your eye on Ukraine, because in
Ukraine, a lot of the dirty work was done in digging up
the information. American officials were used,
Ukrainian officials were used. That's like collusion
with the Ukrainians. And, or actually in this case,
conspiracy with the Ukrainians. I think you'd get some
interesting information about Joe Biden from Ukraine.
About his son, Hunter Biden. About a company he was on
the board of for years, which may be one of the most
crooked companies in Ukraine. . . . And Biden bragged
about the fact that he got the prosecutor general
fired. The prosecutor general was investigating his son
and then the investigation went south.\87\
Later that day, Mr. Giuliani had three phone calls with a
number associated with OMB, and eight calls with a White House
phone number.\88\ One of the calls with the White House was
four minutes, 53 seconds, and another was three minutes, 15
seconds.
Later that evening, the State Department phoned Ambassador
Yovanovitch and abruptly called her home because of
``concerns'' from ``up the street'' at the White House.\89\
Ambassador Yovanovitch Was Informed That the President ``Lost
Confidence'' in Her
When Ambassador Yovanovitch returned to the United States
at the end of April, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan
informed her that she had ``done nothing wrong,'' but ``there
had been a concerted campaign'' against her and that President
Trump had ``lost confidence'' in her leadership.\90\ He also
told her that ``the President no longer wished me to serve as
Ambassador to Ukraine, and that, in fact, the President had
been pushing for my removal since the prior summer.''\91\
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, offered
a similar assessment. He explained to Ambassador Yovanovitch
that Secretary Pompeo had tried to ``protect'' her, but ``was
no longer able to do that.''\92\
Counselor of the Department of State T. Ulrich Brechbuhl,
who had been handling Ambassador Yovanovitch's recall, refused
to meet with her.\93\
Ambassador Yovanovitch's final day as U.S. Ambassador to
Ukraine was May 20, 2019. This was the same day as President
Zelensky's inauguration, which was attended by Secretary of
Energy Rick Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador
Volker.\94\ Rather than joining the official delegation at the
inaugural festivities, she finished packing her personal
belongings and boarded an airplane for her final flight home.
Three days later, President Trump met in the Oval Office with
his hand-picked delegation and gave them the ``directive'' to
``talk with Rudy [Giuliani]'' about Ukraine.\95\
The President Provided No Rationale for the Recall of Ambassador
Yovanovitch
Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that she was never
provided a justification for why President Trump recalled
her.\96\ Only two months earlier, in early March 2019,
Ambassador Yovanovitch had been asked by Ambassador Hale to
extend her assignment as Ambassador to Ukraine until 2020.\97\
Ambassador Hale testified that Ambassador Yovanovitch was
``an exceptional officer doing exceptional work at a very
critical embassy in Kyiv.''\98\ He added, ``I believe that she
should've been able to stay at post and continue to do the
outstanding work that she was doing.''\99\
During her more than three-decade career, Ambassador
Yovanovitch received a number of awards, including: the
Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the Secretary's
Diplomacy in Human Rights Award, the Senior Foreign Service
Performance Award six times, and the State Department's
Superior Honor Award five times.\100\
Career foreign service officer Ambassador P. Michael
McKinley, former Senior Advisor to Secretary Pompeo, testified
that Ambassador Yovanovitch's reputation was ``excellent,
serious, committed.''\101\ Ambassador Reeker described her as
an ``[o]utstanding diplomat,'' ``very precise, very--very
professional,'' ``an excellent mentor,'' and ``a good
leader.''\102\
Ambassador Yovanovitch Strongly Advocated for the U.S. Policy to Combat
Corruption
Throughout the course of her career, and while posted to
Kyiv, Ambassador Yovanovitch was a champion of the United
States' longstanding priority of combatting corruption.
Mr. Kent described U.S. foreign policy in Ukraine as
encompassing the priorities of ``promoting the rule of law,
energy independence, defense sector reform, and the ability to
stand up to Russia.''\103\ Ambassador Yovanovitch testified
that it ``was and remains a top U.S. priority to help Ukraine
fight corruption'' because corruption makes Ukraine more
``vulnerable to Russia.''\104\ Additionally, she testified that
an honest and accountable Ukrainian leadership makes a U.S.-
Ukrainian partnership more reliable and more valuable to the
United States.\105\
Mr. Holmes testified that Ambassador Yovanovitch was
successful in implementing anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine
by achieving, for example, ``the hard-fought passage of a law
establishing an independent court to try corruption
cases.''\106\ Mr. Holmes said Ambassador Yovanovitch was ``[a]s
good as anyone known for'' combatting corruption.\107\ The
reforms achieved by Ambassador Yovanovitch helped reduce the
problem faced by many post-Soviet countries of selective
corruption prosecutions to target political opponents.\108\
There was a broad consensus that Ambassador Yovanovitch was
successful in helping Ukraine combat pervasive and endemic
corruption.
The President's Authority Does Not Explain Removal of Ambassador
Yovanovitch
While ambassadors serve at the pleasure of the president,
the manner and circumstances of Ambassador Yovanovitch's
removal were unusual and raise questions of motive.\109\
Ambassador Yovanovitch queried ``why it was necessary to
smear my reputation falsely.''\110\ She found it difficult to
comprehend how individuals ``who apparently felt stymied by our
efforts to promote stated U.S. policy against corruption'' were
``able to successfully conduct a campaign of disinformation
against a sitting ambassador using unofficial back
channels.''\111\
Dr. Hill similarly testified that while the President has
the authority to remove an ambassador, she was concerned
``about the circumstances in which [Ambassador Yovanovitch's]
reputation had been maligned, repeatedly, on television and in
all kinds of exchanges.'' Dr. Hill ``felt that that was
completely unnecessary.''\112\
The Recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch Threatened U.S.-Ukraine Policy
The smear campaign questioning Ambassador Yovanovitch's
loyalty undermined U.S. diplomatic efforts in Ukraine, a key
U.S. partner and a bulwark against Russia's expansion into
Europe. As Ambassador Yovanovitch explained:
Ukrainians were wondering whether I was going to be
leaving, whether we really represented the President,
U.S. policy, et cetera. And so I think it was--you
know, it really kind of cut the ground out from
underneath us.\113\
Summarizing the cumulative impact of the attacks, she
emphasized: ``If our chief representative is kneecapped it
limits our effectiveness to safeguard the vital national
security interests of the United States.''\114\
President Trump's recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch left the
U.S. Embassy in Ukraine without an ambassador at a time of
electoral change in Ukraine and when the Embassy was also
without a deputy chief of mission. Mr. Kent explained:
During the late spring and summer of 2019, I became
alarmed as those efforts bore fruit. They led to the
outer [ouster] of Ambassador Yovanovitch and hampered
U.S. efforts to establish rapport with the new Zelensky
administration in Ukraine.\115\
. . .
One of the unfortunate elements of the timing was
that we were also undergoing a transition in my old job
as deputy chief of mission. The person who replaced me
had already been moved early to be our DCM and Charge
in Sweden, and so we had a temporary acting deputy
chief of mission. So that left the embassy not only
without--the early withdrawal of Ambassador Yovanovitch
left us not only without an Ambassador but without
somebody who had been selected to be deputy chief of
mission.\116\
It was not until late May that Secretary Pompeo asked
Ambassador Bill Taylor, who had previously served as Ambassador
to Ukraine, to return to Kyiv as Charge d'Affaires to lead the
embassy while it awaited a confirmed Ambassador. Ambassador
Taylor did not arrive in Kyiv until June 17, more than a month
after Ambassador Yovanovitch officially left Kyiv.\117\ His
mission to carry out U.S. objectives there would prove
challenging in the face of ongoing efforts by Mr. Giuliani and
others--at the direction of the President--to secure
investigations demanded by the President to help his
reelection.
2. The President Put Giuliani and the Three Amigos in Charge of Ukraine
Issues
After President Trump recalled Ambassador Yovanovitch, his personal
agent, Rudy Giuliani, intensified the President's campaign to
pressure Ukraine's newly-elected president to interfere in the
2020 U.S. election. President Trump directed his own political
appointees to coordinate with Mr. Giuliani on Ukraine, while
National Security Council officials expressed alarm over the
efforts to pursue a ``domestic political errand'' for the
political benefit of the President. Officials at the highest
levels of the White House and Trump Administration were aware
of the President's scheme.
Overview
On April 21, 2019, the day that Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky was elected as president of Ukraine,
President Trump called to congratulate him. After a positive
call--in which Mr. Zelensky complimented President Trump and
requested that President Trump attend his inauguration--
President Trump instructed Vice President Mike Pence to lead
the U.S. delegation to the inauguration. However, on May 13--
before the inauguration date was even set--President Trump
instructed Vice President Pence not to attend.
Rudy Giuliani also announced a plan to visit Ukraine in
mid-May 2019--not on official U.S. government business, but
instead to pursue on behalf of his client, President Trump, the
debunked conspiracy theories about alleged Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 election and discredited claims about
the Bidens. After public scrutiny in response to his announced
visit, Mr. Giuliani cancelled his trip and alleged that
President-elect Zelensky was surrounded by ``enemies of the
President.''
Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, Ambassador to the European
Union Gordon Sondland, and Ambassador Kurt Volker, Special
Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, ultimately led the
U.S. delegation to President Zelensky's inauguration. Upon
returning to Washington, D.C., the three U.S. officials--who
dubbed themselves the ``Three Amigos''--debriefed the President
in the Oval Office and encouraged him to engage with President
Zelensky. Instead of accepting their advice, President Trump
complained that Ukraine is ``a terrible place, all corrupt,
terrible people,'' and asserted that Ukraine ``tried to take me
down in 2016.'' The President instructed the ``Three Amigos''
to ``talk to Rudy'' and coordinate with him on Ukraine matters.
They followed the President's orders.
Dr. Fiona Hill, Deputy Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National Security
Council, would later observe that Ambassador Sondland ``was
being involved in a domestic political errand, and we [the NSC
staff] were being involved in national security foreign policy,
and those two things had just diverged.''
A Political Newcomer Won Ukraine's Presidential Election on an Anti-
Corruption Platform
On April 21, popular comedian and television actor,
Volodymyr Zelensky, won a landslide victory in Ukraine's
presidential election, earning the support of 73 percent of
voters and unseating the incumbent Petro Poroshenko. Mr.
Zelensky, who had no prior political experience, told voters a
week before his victory: ``I'm not a politician. I'm just a
simple person who came to break the system.''\118\ Five years
earlier, in late 2013, Ukrainians had gathered in Kyiv and
rallied against the corrupt government of former President
Viktor Yanukovych, eventually forcing him to flee to the safety
of Vladimir Putin's Russia. Mr. Zelensky's victory in April
2019 reaffirmed the Ukrainian people's strong desire to
overcome an entrenched system of corruption and pursue closer
partnership with the West.\119\
Following the election results, at 4:29 p.m. Eastern Time,
President Trump was connected by telephone to President-elect
Zelensky and congratulated him ``on a job well done . . . a
fantastic election.'' He declared, ``I have no doubt you will
be a fantastic president.''\120\
According to a call record released publicly by the White
House, President Trump did not openly express doubts about the
newly-elected leader.\121\ And contrary to a public readout of
the call originally issued by the White House, President Trump
did not mention corruption in Ukraine, despite the NSC staff
preparing talking points on that topic.\122\ Indeed,
``corruption'' was not mentioned once during the April 21
conversation, according to the official call record.\123\
In the call, President-elect Zelensky lauded President
Trump as ``a great example'' and invited him to visit Ukraine
for his upcoming inauguration--a gesture that President Trump
called ``very nice.''\124\ President Trump told Mr. Zelensky:
I'll look into that, and well--give us the date and,
at a very minimum, we'll have a great representative.
Or more than one from the United States will be with
you on that great day. So, we will have somebody, at a
minimum, at a very, very high level, and they will be
with you.\125\
Mr. Zelensky persisted. ``Words cannot describe our
country,'' he went on, ``so it would be best for you to see it
yourself. So, if you can come, that would be great. So again, I
invite you to come.''\126\ President Trump responded, ``Well, I
agree with you about your country and I look forward to
it.''\127\ In a nod to his past experience working with Ukraine
as a businessman, President Trump added, ``When I owned Miss
Universe . . . Ukraine was always very well represented.''\128\
President Trump then invited Mr. Zelensky to the White
House to meet, saying: ``When you're settled in and ready, I'd
like to invite you to the White House. We'll have a lot of
things to talk about, but we're with you all the way.'' Mr.
Zelensky promptly accepted the President's invitation, adding
that the ``whole team and I are looking forward to that
visit.''\129\
Mr. Zelensky then reiterated his interest in President
Trump attending his inauguration, saying, ``it will be
absolutely fantastic if you could come and be with us.''
President Trump promised to let the Ukrainian leader know
``very soon'' and added that he would see Mr. Zelensky ``very
soon, regardless.''\130\
Shortly after the April 21 call, Jennifer Williams, Special
Advisor to the Vice President for Europe and Russia, learned
that President Trump asked Vice President Pence to attend Mr.
Zelensky's inauguration.\131\ Ms. Williams testified that in a
separate phone call between Vice President Pence and President-
elect Zelensky two days later, ``the Vice President accepted
that invitation from President Zelensky, and looked forward to
being able to attend . . . if the dates worked out.''\132\ Ms.
Williams and her colleagues began planning for the Vice
President's trip to Kyiv.\133\
Rudy Giuliani and his Associates Coordinated Efforts to Secure and
Promote the Investigations With Ukrainian President Zelensky
As previously explained in Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani, acting
on behalf of President Trump, had for months engaged corrupt
current and former Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian
Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko. The April election of Mr.
Zelensky, however, raised the possibility that Mr. Lutsenko
might lose his job as Prosecutor General once Mr. Zelensky took
power.
In the immediate aftermath of President-elect Zelensky's
election, Mr. Giuliani continued publicly to project confidence
that Ukraine would deliver on investigations related to the
Bidens. On April 24--before Ambassador Yovanovitch received
calls abruptly summoning her back to Washington--Mr. Giuliani
stated in an interview on Fox and Friends that viewers should,
[K]eep your eye on Ukraine . . . I think you'd get
some interesting information about Joe Biden from
Ukraine. About his son, Hunter Biden. About a company
he was on the board of for years, which may be one of
the most crooked companies in Ukraine.\134\
Behind the scenes, however, Mr. Giuliani was taking steps
to engage the new Ukrainian leader and his aides.
The day before, on April 23, the same day that Vice
President Pence confirmed his plans to attend President-elect
Zelensky's inauguration, Mr. Giuliani dispatched his own
delegation--consisting of Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman--to meet
with Ihor Kolomoisky, a wealthy Ukrainian with ties to
President-elect Zelensky. Instead of going to Kyiv, they booked
tickets to Israel, where they met with Mr. Kolomoisky.\135\ Mr.
Kolomoisky owned Ukraine's largest bank until 2016, when
Ukrainian authorities nationalized the failing financial
institution. Although he denied allegations of committing any
crimes, Mr. Kolomoisky subsequently left Ukraine for Israel,
where he remained until President Zelensky assumed power.\136\
Mr. Kolomoisky confirmed to the New York Times that he met
with Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman in late April 2019. He claimed
they sought his assistance in facilitating a meeting between
Mr. Giuliani and President-elect Zelensky, and he told them,
``you've ended up in the wrong place,'' and declined to arrange
the requested meeting.\137\
Mr. Giuliani was not deterred.
During the time surrounding Ambassador Yovanovitch's
recall, Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas connected over a flurry of
calls around a planned trip to Ukraine by Mr. Giuliani, which
he would eventually cancel after growing public scrutiny. As
previously described in Chapter 1, call records obtained by the
Committees show a series of contacts on April 23 and 24 between
Mr. Giuliani, the White House, Mr. Parnas, and John Solomon,
among others.\138\
On April 25, 2019, former Vice President Biden publicly
announced his campaign for the Democratic nomination for
President of the United States and launched his effort to
unseat President Trump in the 2020 election.\139\
That evening, Mr. Solomon published a new opinion piece in
The Hill entitled, ``How the Obama White House Engaged Ukraine
to Give Russia Collusion Narrative an Early Boost.'' Like Mr.
Solomon's previous work, this April 25 piece repeated
unsubstantiated conspiracy theories about alleged Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.\140\
Meanwhile, in Kyiv, David Holmes, Counselor for Political
Affairs at the U.S. Embassy, learned on April 25 that Mr.
Giuliani had reached out to Mr. Zelensky's campaign chair, Ivan
Bakanov, seeking a channel to the newly-elected leader. Mr.
Bakanov told Mr. Holmes ``that he had been contacted by, quote,
someone named Giuliani, who said he was an advisor to the Vice
President, unquote.''\141\ Mr. Holmes clarified that Mr.
Bakanov was ``speaking in Russian'' and that he did not ``know
what he [Bakanov] meant'' by his reference to the Vice
President, ``but that's what he [Bakanov] said.''\142\
Regardless of Mr. Bakanov's apparent confusion as to who Mr.
Giuliani represented, Mr. Holmes explained that by this point
in time, Ukrainian officials seemed to think that Mr. Giuliani
``was a significant person in terms of managing their
relationship with the United States.''\143\
At 7:14 p.m. Eastern Time on April 25, Mr. Giuliani once
again received a call from an unknown ``-1'' number, which
lasted four minutes and 40 seconds.\144\ Minutes later, Mr.
Giuliani held a brief 36 second call with Sean Hannity, a Fox
News opinion host.\145\
On the night of April 25, President Trump called into Mr.
Hannity's prime time Fox News show. In response to a question
about Mr. Solomon's recent publication, President Trump said:
It sounds like big stuff. It sounds very interesting
with Ukraine. I just spoke to the new president a
little while ago, two days ago, and congratulated him
on an incredible race. Incredible run. A big surprise
victory. That's 75 percent of the vote. But that sounds
like big, big stuff. I'm not surprised.\146\
As Mr. Holmes later learned on July 26 from Ambassador
Sondland, President Trump did not care about Ukraine, he cared
about this ``big stuff''--such as the investigation into Vice
President Biden.\147\
In the same Fox News interview, Mr. Hannity asked President
Trump whether America needed to see the purported evidence
possessed by the unnamed Ukrainians noted in Mr. Solomon's
piece. The President replied, invoking Attorney General William
P. Barr:
Well, I think we do. And, frankly, we have a great
new attorney general who has done an unbelievable job
in a very short period of time. And he is very smart
and tough and I would certainly defer to him. I would
imagine he would want to see this. People have been
saying this whole--the concept of Ukraine, they have
been talking about it actually for a long time. You
know that, and I would certainly defer to the attorney
general. And we'll see what he says about it. He calls
them straight. That's one thing I can tell you.\148\
Ukraine's current Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka,
who assumed his new position in late August 2019, told the
Financial Times in late November 2019 that Attorney General
Barr had made no contact regarding a potential investigation
into allegations of wrongdoing by former Vice President
Biden.\149\ In an apparent reference to President Trump's
demand for Ukrainian interference in U.S. elections, Mr.
Ryaboshapka stated: ``It's critically important for the west
not to pull us into some conflicts between their ruling elites,
but to continue to support so that we can cross the point of no
return.''\150\
President Trump Promoted False Information About Former Vice President
Joe Biden
In early May, Mr. Giuliani continued his outreach to
President-elect Zelensky and promoted the need for Ukrainian
investigations into former Vice President Biden that served
President Trump's political needs.
On May 2, at 6:21 a.m. Eastern Time, President Trump
retweeted a link to an article in the New York Times, which
assessed that Mr. Giuliani's efforts underscored ``the Trump
campaign's concern about the electoral threat from the former
vice president's presidential campaign'' and noted that ``Mr.
Giuliani's involvement raises questions about whether Mr. Trump
is endorsing an effort to push a foreign government to proceed
with a case that could hurt a political opponent at
home.''\151\
Later that evening, in an interview with Fox News at the
White House, President Trump referenced the false allegations
about the firing of a corrupt former Ukrainian prosecutor,
Viktor Shokin, that Mr. Giuliani had been promoting. He was
asked, ``Should the former vice president explain himself on
his feeling in Ukraine and whether there was a conflict . . .
with his son's business interests?''\152\ President Trump
replied:
I'm hearing it's a major scandal, major problem. Very
bad things happened, and we'll see what that is. They
even have him on tape, talking about it. They have Joe
Biden on tape talking about the prosecutor. And I've
seen that tape. A lot of people are talking about that
tape, but that's up to them. They have to solve that
problem.\153\
``The tape'' President Trump referenced in his interview
was a publicly available video of former Vice President Biden
speaking in January 2018 at an event hosted by the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR), a nonpartisan think-tank focused on
foreign policy matters. During an interview with the CFR
president, Vice President Biden detailed how the United
States--consistent with the policy of its European allies and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)--withheld $1 billion in
loan guarantees until the Ukrainian government acceded to
uniform American and international demands to fire the corrupt
prosecutor.\154\
By late 2015, Ukrainians were agitating for Mr. Shokin's
removal, and in March 2016, Ukraine's parliament voted to
dismiss the prosecutor general.\155\ Multiple witnesses
testified that Mr. Shokin's dismissal in 2016 made it more--not
less--likely that Ukrainian authorities might investigate any
allegations or wrongdoing at Burisma or other allegedly corrupt
companies.\156\ Nonetheless, President Trump and his supporters
sought to perpetuate the false narrative that Mr. Shokin should
not have been removed from office and that Vice President Biden
had acted corruptly in carrying out U.S. policy.
Rudy Giuliani Was ``Meddling in an Investigation'' on Behalf of
President Trump
On May 7, 2019, Christopher Wray, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified before the U.S.
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science, and Related Agencies regarding foreign interference in
U.S. elections:
My view is that, if any public official or member of
any campaign is contacted by any nation-state or
anybody acting on behalf of a nation-state about
influencing or interfering with our election, then that
is something that the FBI would want to know
about.\157\
Mr. Giuliani nonetheless pressed forward with his plan to
personally convey to President-elect Zelensky, on behalf of his
client President Trump, the importance of opening
investigations that would assist President Trump's reelection
campaign.
On the morning of May 8, Mr. Giuliani called the White
House Switchboard and connected for six minutes and 26 seconds
with someone at the White House.\158\ That same day, Mr.
Giuliani also connected with Mr. Solomon for almost six minutes
and separately with Mr. Parnas. Mr. Parnas connected for one
minute 13 seconds and with Derek Harvey, a member of Ranking
Member Nunes' staff on the Intelligence Committee, on the same
day.\159\
During a meeting that same day, Ukraine Minister of
Interior Arsen Avakov disclosed to Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State George Kent that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman would soon
visit Kyiv ``and that they were coming with their associate,
the Mayor Giuliani.''\160\ Minister Avakov confided to Mr. Kent
that ``Mayor Giuliani had reached out to him and invited him to
come and meet the group of them in Florida'' in February
2019.\161\ Although he declined that offer, Minister Avakov
indicated that he intended to accept their new invitation to
meet in Kyiv.\162\
The next day, on May 9, the New York Times publicized Mr.
Giuliani's plan to visit Ukraine.\163\ Mr. Giuliani confirmed
that he planned to meet with President Zelensky and press the
Ukrainians to pursue investigations that President Trump
promoted only days earlier on Fox News.\164\ The New York Times
described Mr. Giuliani's planned trip as:
[P]art of a monthslong effort by the former New York
mayor and a small group of Trump allies working to
build interest in the Ukrainian inquiries. Their
motivation is to . . . undermine the case against Paul
Manafort, Mr. Trump's imprisoned former campaign
chairman; and potentially to damage Mr. Biden, the
early front-runner for the 2020 Democratic presidential
nomination.\165\
Mr. Giuliani claimed, ``We're not meddling in an election,
we're meddling in an investigation, which we have a right to
do.''\166\
Only a few days after Director Wray's public comments about
foreign interference in U.S. elections, Mr. Giuliani
acknowledged that ``[s]omebody could say it's improper'' to
pressure Ukraine to open investigations that would benefit
President Trump. But, Mr. Giuliani argued:
[T]his isn't foreign policy--I'm asking them to do an
investigation that they're doing already, and that
other people are telling them to stop. And I'm going to
give them reasons why they shouldn't stop it because
that information will be very, very helpful to my
client, and may turn out to be helpful to my
government.\167\
Mr. Giuliani's ``client'' was President Trump, as Mr.
Giuliani repeatedly stated publicly. According to Mr. Giuliani,
the President fully supported putting pressure on Ukraine to
open investigations that would benefit his 2020 reelection
campaign.\168\ Mr. Giuliani emphasized that President Trump
``basically knows what I'm doing, sure, as his lawyer.''\169\
Underscoring his commitment to pressuring Ukraine until it
opened the investigations President Trump promoted on Fox News,
Mr. Giuliani told the Washington Post that he would ``make sure
that nothing scuttles the investigation that I want.''\170\
On May 9, following public revelation of his trip by the
New York Times, Mr. Giuliani connected in quick succession with
Mr. Solomon and then Mr. Parnas for several minutes at a
time.\171\ Mr. Giuliani then made brief connections with the
White House Switchboard and Situation Room several times,
before connecting at 1:43 p.m. Eastern Time with someone at the
White House for over four minutes.\172\ He connected,
separately, thereafter with Mr. Parnas several times in the
afternoon and into the evening.\173\
That evening, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:
If you doubt there is media bias and corruption then
when Democrats conspiring with Ukrainian officials
comes out remember much of the press, except for Fox,
the Hill, and NYT, has suppressed it. If it involved
@realDonaldTrump or his son it would have been front
page news for weeks.\174\
Shortly thereafter, on the night of May 9, he made an
appearance on Fox News and reiterated that his trip to Ukraine
was intended to further the President's personal and political
interests by pressuring the Ukrainian government to investigate
the Bidens:
It's a big story. It's a dramatic story. And I
guarantee you, Joe Biden will not get to election day
without this being investigated, not because I want to
see him investigated. This is collateral to what I was
doing.\175\
The next morning, on May 10, amidst the press coverage of
his trip, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:
Explain to me why Biden shouldn't be investigated if
his son got millions from a Russian loving crooked
Ukrainian oligarch while He was VP and point man for
Ukraine. Ukrainians are investigating and your fellow
Dems are interfering. Election is 17 months away. Let's
answer it now\176\
He then had another flurry of calls with Mr. Parnas.
Shortly after 2:00 p.m., Eastern Time, Mr. Giuliani also spoke
with Ambassador Volker on the phone.\177\ Ambassador Volker had
learned that Mr. Giuliani intended to travel to Ukraine ``to
pursue these allegations that Lutsenko had made, and he was
going to investigate these things''--specifically, the debunked
story that Vice President Biden had improperly pressured
Ukraine to fire a corrupt prosecutor general, as well as the
Russian-backed conspiracy that the Ukrainians interfered in the
2016 U.S. election.\178\ Ambassador Volker testified that he
had a simple warning for Mr. Giuliani: Prosecutor General
Lutsenko ``is not credible. Don't listen to what he is
saying.''\179\ Call records obtained by the Committees reveal
that their call lasted more than 30 minutes.\180\
Call records also show that around midday on May 10, Mr.
Giuliani began trading aborted calls with Kashyap ``Kash''
Patel, an official at the National Security Council who
previously served on Ranking Member Nunes' staff on the
Intelligence Committee. Mr. Patel successfully connected with
Mr. Giuliani less than an hour after Mr. Giuliani's call with
Ambassador Volker. Beginning at 3:23 p.m., Eastern Time, Mr.
Patel and Mr. Giuliani spoke for over 25 minutes.\181\ Five
minutes after Mr. Patel and Mr. Giuliani disconnected, an
unidentified ``-1'' number connected with Mr. Giuliani for over
17 minutes.\182\ Shortly thereafter, Mr. Giuliani spoke with
Mr. Parnas for approximately 12 minutes.\183\
That same afternoon, President Trump conducted a 15-minute
long phone interview with Politico. In response to a question
about Mr. Giuliani's upcoming visit to Kyiv, the President
replied, ``I have not spoken to him at any great length, but I
will . . . I will speak to him about it before he
leaves.''\184\
Recently, when asked what Mr. Giuliani was doing in Ukraine
on his behalf, the President responded: ``Well, you have to ask
that to Rudy, but Rudy, I don't, I don't even know. I know he
was going to go to Ukraine, and I think he canceled a
trip.''\185\ Prior to that, on October 2, the President
publicly stated; ``And just so you know, we've been
investigating, on a personal basis--through Rudy and others,
lawyers--corruption in the 2016 election.''\186\ On October 4,
the President publicly stated: ``If we feel there's corruption,
like I feel there was in the 2016 campaign there was tremendous
corruption against me--if we feel there's corruption, we have a
right to go to a foreign country.''\187\
By the evening of May 10, Mr. Giuliani appeared to have
concerns about the incoming Ukrainian President. He appeared on
Fox News and announced, ``I'm not going to go'' to Ukraine
``because I think I'm walking into a group of people that are
enemies of the President.''\188\ In a text message to Politico,
Mr. Giuliani alleged the original offer for a meeting with
President-elect Zelensky was a ``set up'' orchestrated by
``several vocal critics'' of President Trump who were advising
President-elect Zelensky.\189\ Mr. Giuliani declared that
President-elect Zelensky ``is in [the] hands of avowed enemies
of Pres[ident] Trump.''\190\
Like Mr. Giuliani, President Trump would express hostility
toward Ukraine in the days and weeks to come.
Russian President Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban Counseled
President Trump on Ukraine
In early May, Mr. Giuliani was not the only person who
conveyed his skepticism of Ukraine to President Trump. The
President reportedly discussed Ukraine with Russian President
Vladimir Putin when they spoke by phone on May 3. President
Trump posted on Twitter that he ``[h]ad a long and very good
conversation with President Putin of Russia'' and discussed
``even the ``Russian Hoax''--an apparent reference to the
unanimous finding by the U.S. Intelligence Community that
Russia interfered in the 2016 election with the aim of
assisting President Trump's candidacy.\191\ Mr. Kent
subsequently heard from Dr. Hill, the NSC's Senior Director for
Europe and Russia, that President Putin also expressed negative
views about Ukraine to President Trump. He testified that
President Putin's motivation in undercutting President-elect
Zelensky was ``very clear'':
He denies the existence of Ukraine as a nation and a
country, as he told President Bush in Bucharest in
2008. He invaded and occupied 7 percent of Ukraine's
territory and he's led to the death of 13,000
Ukrainians on Ukrainian territory since 2014 as a
result of aggression. So that's his agenda, the agenda
of creating a greater Russia and ensuring that Ukraine
does not survive independently.\192\
On May 13, President Trump met one-on-one for an hour with
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. President Trump offered
the leader a warm reception in the Oval Office and claimed
Prime Minister Orban had ``done a tremendous job in so many
different ways. Highly respected. Respected all over
Europe.''\193\ The European Union and many European leaders,
however, have widely condemned Prime Minister Orban for
undermining Hungary's democratic institutions and promoting
anti-Semitism and xenophobia.\194\
Mr. Kent explained to the Committees that Prime Minister
Orban's ``animus towards Ukraine is well-known, documented, and
has lasted now two years.'' Due to a dispute over the rights of
130,000 ethnic Hungarians who live in Ukraine, Mr. Kent noted
that Prime Minister Orban ``blocked all meetings in NATO with
Ukraine at the ministerial level or above,'' undercutting U.S.
and European efforts to support Ukraine in its war against
Russia.\195\ Nonetheless, President Trump told reporters prior
to his meeting with Prime Minister Orban to not ``forget
they're a member of NATO, and a very good member of
NATO.''\196\
Commenting on what Dr. Hill shared with him following the
May 3 call and May 13 meeting, Mr. Kent said he understood
President Trump's discussions about Ukraine with President
Putin and Prime Minister Orban ``as being similar in tone and
approach.'' He explained that ``both leaders'' had
``extensively talked Ukraine down, said it was corrupt, said
Zelensky was in the thrall of oligarchs'' the effect of which
was ``negatively shaping a picture of Ukraine, and even
President Zelensky personally.''\197\ The veteran State
Department diplomat concluded, ``[T]hose two world leaders
[Putin and Orban], along with former Mayor Giuliani, their
communications with President Trump shaped the President's view
of Ukraine and Zelensky, and would account for the change from
a very positive first call on April 21 to his negative
assessment of Ukraine.''\198\
President Trump Instructs Vice President Pence Not to Attend President
Zelensky's Inauguration
On Monday, May 13, at approximately 11:00 a.m. Eastern
Time, Ms. Williams received a call from an assistant to the
Vice President's Chief of Staff.\199\ President Trump, the
assistant relayed, had ``decided that the Vice President would
not attend the inauguration in Ukraine,'' despite the fact that
Vice President Pence previously had accepted the
invitation.\200\ Ms. Williams was never given a reason for the
change in President Trump's decision.\201\
Mr. Holmes later testified that:
[The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv had] gone back and forth
with NSC staff about proposing a list of potential
members of the delegation. It was initially quite a
long list. We had asked who would be the senior [U.S.]
member of that delegation. We were told that Vice
President Pence was likely to be that senior member, it
was not yet fully agreed to. And so we were
anticipating that to be the case. And then the Giuliani
event happened, and then we heard that he was not going
to play that role.\202\
Asked to clarify what he meant by ``the Giuliani event,''
Mr. Holmes replied, ``the interview basically saying that he
had planned to travel to Ukraine, but he canceled his trip
because there were, quote, unquote, enemies of the U.S.
President in Zelensky's orbit.''\203\
One of the individuals around President-elect Zelensky whom
Mr. Giuliani publicly criticized was the oligarch Mr.
Kolomoisky, who had refused to set up a meeting between Mr.
Giuliani and President Zelensky. On May 18, Mr. Giuliani
complained on Twitter that the oligarch ``returned from a long
exile and immediately threatened and defamed two Americans, Lev
Parnas and Igor Fruman. They are my clients and I have advised
them to press charges.''\204\
Mr. Kolomoisky responded to Mr. Giuliani in a televised
interview and declared, ``Look, there is Giuliani, and two
clowns, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, who were engaging in
nonsense. They are Giuliani's clients.'' He added: ``They came
here and told us that they would organize a meeting with
Zelensky. They allegedly struck a deal with [Prosecutor-General
Yuriy] Lutsenko about the fate of this criminal case--Burisma,
[former Vice President] Biden, meddling in the U.S. election
and so on.''\205\ He warned that a ``big scandal may break out,
and not only in Ukraine, but in the United States. That is, it
may turn out to be a clear conspiracy against Biden.''\206\
Despite Ukraine's significance to U.S. national security as
a bulwark against Russian aggression and the renewed
opportunity that President Zelensky's administration offered
for bringing Ukraine closer to the United States and Europe,
President Trump did not ask Secretary of State Michael Pompeo,
Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, or National
Security Advisor John Bolton to lead the delegation to
President Zelensky's inauguration. Instead, according to Mr.
Holmes, the White House ``ultimately whittled back an initial
proposed list for the official delegation to the inauguration
from over a dozen individuals to just five.''\207\
Topping that list was Secretary Perry. Accompanying him
were Ambassador Sondland, U.S. Special Representative for
Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Volker, and NSC Director for
Ukraine Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman.\208\ Acting Deputy Chief of
Mission (Charged'Affaires) of U.S. Embassy Kyiv Joseph
Pennington joined the delegation, in place of outgoing U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch. U.S. Senator Ron
Johnson also attended the inauguration and joined several
meetings with the presidential delegation. When asked if this
delegation was ``a good group,'' Mr. Holmes replied that it
``was not as senior a delegation as we [the U.S. embassy] might
have expected.''\209\
Secretary Perry, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland
subsequently began to refer to themselves as the ``Three
Amigos.'' During the delegation's meeting with President
Zelensky, Mr. Holmes recounted that ``Secretary Perry passed
President Zelensky a list of, quote, ``people he trusts'' from
whom Zelensky could seek advice on energy sector reform, which
was the topic of subsequent meetings between Secretary Perry
and key Ukrainian energy sector contacts, from which Embassy
personnel were excluded by Secretary Perry's staff.''\210\
Mr. Holmes assessed that the delegation's visit proceeded
smoothly, although ``at one point during a preliminary meeting
of the inaugural delegation, someone in the group wondered
aloud about why Mr. Giuliani was so active in the media with
respect to Ukraine.''\211\ Ambassador Sondland responded:
``Dammit, Rudy. Every time Rudy gets involved he goes and effs
everything up.''\212\ Mr. Holmes added: ``He used the `F'
word.''\213\
By the time of the inauguration, Mr. Holmes assessed that
President Zelensky and the Ukrainians were already starting to
feel pressure to conduct political investigations related to
former Vice President Biden.\214\ Lt. Col. Vindman also was
concerned about the potentially negative consequences of Mr.
Giuliani's political efforts on behalf of President Trump--both
for U.S. national security and also Ukraine's longstanding
history of bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress.\215\
During the U.S. delegation's meeting with President
Zelensky on the margins of the inauguration, Lt. Col. Vindman
was the last person to speak.\216\ He ``offered two pieces of
advice'' to President Zelensky. First, he advised the new
leader, ``be particularly cautious with regards to Russia, and
its desire to provoke Ukraine.''\217\ And second, Lt. Col.
Vindman warned, ``stay out of U.S. domestic . . .
politics.''\218\ Referencing the activities of Mr. Giuliani,
Lt. Col Vindman explained:
[I]n the March and April timeframe, it became clear
that there were--there were actors in the U.S., public
actors, nongovernmental actors that were promoting the
idea of investigations and 2016 Ukrainian interference.
And it was consistent with U.S. policy to advise any
country, all the countries in my portfolio, any country
in the world, to not participate in U.S. domestic
politics. So I was passing the same advice consistent
with U.S. policy.\219\
U.S. Officials Briefed President Trump About Their Positive Impressions
of Ukraine
Ambassadors Volker and Sondland left Kyiv with ``a very
favorable impression'' of the new Ukrainian leader.\220\ They
believed it was important that President Trump ``personally
engage with the President of Ukraine in order to demonstrate
full U.S. support for him,'' including by inviting him to
Washington for a meeting in the Oval Office.\221\ It was agreed
that the delegation would request a meeting with President
Trump and personally convey their advice. They were granted
time with President Trump on May 23.
According to Mr. Kent, the delegation was able to secure
the Oval Office meeting shortly after the return from Kyiv
because of Ambassador Sondland's ``connections'' to Acting
White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney and President
Trump.\222\ Christopher Anderson, Special Advisor to Ambassador
Kurt Volker, also attributed the delegation's ability to
quickly confirm a meeting with President Trump to Ambassador
Sondland's ``connections to the White House.''\223\
At the May 23 meeting, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker were
joined by Secretary Perry, Senator Johnson, and Dr. Charles M.
Kupperman, the Deputy National Security Advisor. Mr. Mulvaney
may have also participated.\224\
Lt. Col. Vindman, who had represented the White House at
President Zelensky's inauguration, did not participate in the
meeting. Dr. Hill directed him not to join, because she had
learned that ``there was some confusion'' from the President
``over who the director for Ukraine is.''\225\ Specifically,
Dr. Hill testified that around the time of the May 23
debriefing in the Oval Office, she ``became aware by chance and
accident'' that President Trump had requested to speak with the
NSC's Ukraine director about unspecified ``materials.''\226\ A
member of the NSC executive secretary's staff stated that in
response to the President's request, ``we might be reaching out
to Kash.''\227\
Dr. Hill testified that she understood the staff to be
referring to Mr. Patel, who then served as a director in the
NSC's directorate of International Organizations and Alliances,
not the directorate of Europe and Russia.\228\ She subsequently
consulted with Dr. Kupperman and sought to clarify if Mr. Patel
``had some special . . . Ambassador Sondland-like
representational role on Ukraine'' that she had not been
informed about, but ``couldn't elicit any information about
that.''\229\ All Dr. Kupperman said was that he would look into
the matter.\230\ Dr. Hill also testified that she never saw or
learned more about the Ukraine-related ``materials'' that the
President believed he had received from Mr. Patel, who
maintained a close relationship with Ranking Member Nunes after
leaving his staff to join the NSC.\231\
President Trump Put the Three Amigos in Charge of the United States'
Ukraine Relationship and Directed Them to ``Talk to Rudy'' About
Ukraine
According to witness testimony, the May 23 debriefing with
the President in the Oval Office proved consequential for two
reasons. President Trump authorized Ambassador Sondland,
Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Volker to lead engagement with
President Zelensky's new administration in Ukraine. He
instructed them, however, to talk to and coordinate with his
personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani.
Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry,
and Senator Johnson ``took turns'' making their case ``that
this is a new crowd, it's a new President'' in Ukraine who was
``committed to doing the right things,'' including fighting
corruption.\232\ According to Ambassador Sondland, the group
``emphasized the strategic importance of Ukraine'' and the
value to the United States of strengthening the relationship
with President Zelensky.\233\ They recommended that President
Trump once again call President Zelensky and follow through on
his April 21 invitation for President Zelensky to meet with him
in the Oval Office.\234\
President Trump reacted negatively to the positive
assessment of Ukraine. Ambassador Volker recalled that
President Trump said Ukraine is ``a terrible place, all
corrupt, terrible people'' and was ``just dumping on
Ukraine.''\235\ This echoed Mr. Giuliani's public statements
about Ukraine during early May.
According to both Ambassadors Volker and Sondland,
President Trump also alleged, without offering any evidence,
that Ukraine ``tried to take me down'' in the 2016
election.\236\ The President emphasized that he ``didn't
believe'' the delegation's positive assessment of the new
Ukrainian President, and added ``that's not what I hear'' from
Mr. Giuliani.\237\ President Trump said that Mr. Giuliani
``knows all of these things'' and knows that President Zelensky
has ``some bad people around him.''\238\ Rather than committing
to an Oval Office meeting with the Ukrainian leader, President
Trump directed the delegation to ``[t]alk to Rudy, talk to
Rudy.''\239\
Ambassador Sondland testified that the ``Three Amigos'' saw
the writing on the wall and concluded ``that if we did not talk
to Rudy, nothing would move forward on Ukraine.''\240\ He
continued:
[B]ased on the President's direction we were faced
with a choice. We could abandon the goal of a White
House meeting for President Zelensky, which we all
believed was crucial to strengthening U.S.-Ukrainian
ties . . . or we could do as President Trump directed
and talk to Mr. Giuliani to address the President's
concerns. We chose the latter path.\241\
Ambassador Volker reached a similar conclusion. He believed
``that the messages being conveyed by Mr. Giuliani were a
problem, because they were at variance with what our official
message to the President was, and not conveying that positive
assessment that we all had. And so, I thought it was important
to try to step in and fix the problem.''\242\ Ultimately,
however, the ``problem'' posed by the President's instruction
to coordinate regarding Ukraine with his personal attorney
persisted and would become more acute.
After the May 23 meeting, Ambassador Sondland stayed behind
with President Trump and personally confirmed that the Three
Amigos ``would be working on the Ukraine file.''\243\
Multiple witnesses testified about this shift in personnel
in charge of the Ukraine relationship.\244\ Mr. Kent recalled
that, after the Oval Office meeting, Secretary Perry,
Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Volker began ``asserting
that, going forward, they would be the drivers of the
relationship with Ukraine.''\245\ Catherine Croft, Special
Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker, recalled that ``Sondland,
Volker, and sort of Perry, as a troika, or as the Three Amigos,
had been sort of tasked with Ukraine policy'' by President
Trump.\246\ Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
David Hale testified about his understanding of the meeting,
``[I]t was clear that the President, from the readout I had
received, the President had tasked that group, members of that
delegation to pursue these objectives: the meeting, and the
policy goals that I outlined earlier. So I was, you know,
knowing I was aware that Ambassador Volker and Ambassador
Sondland would be doing that.''\247\
On a June 10 conference call with the Three Amigos,
``Secretary Perry laid out for Ambassador Bolton the notion
that'' they ``would assist Ambassador Taylor on Ukraine and be
there to support'' him as the U.S.-Ukraine relationship
``move[ed] forward.''\248\
This de facto change in authority was never officially
communicated to other officials, including Dr. Hill, who had
responsibility for Ukraine at the National Security
Council.\249\
U.S. Officials Collaborated with Rudy Giuliani to Advance the
President's Political Agenda
Ambassador Sondland testified that in the weeks and months
after the May 23 Oval Office meeting, ``everyone was in the
loop'' regarding Mr. Giuliani's role in advancing the
President's scheme regarding Ukraine.\250\ The ``Three Amigos''
did as the President ordered and began communicating with Mr.
Giuliani. E-mail messages described to the Committees by
Ambassador Sondland showed that he informed Mr. Mulvaney,
Ambassador Bolton, and Secretaries Pompeo and Perry, as well as
their immediate staffs, of his Ukraine-related efforts on
behalf of the President.\251\
According to Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry agreed to
reach out to Mr. Giuliani first ``given their prior
relationship.''\252\ Secretary Perry discussed with Mr.
Giuliani the political concerns that President Trump
articulated in the May 23 meeting.\253\
Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Volker, Ambassador
Sondland, and Secretary Perry ``gave us every impression that
they were meeting with Rudy Giuliani at this point, and Rudy
Giuliani was also saying on the television, and indeed has said
subsequently, that he was closely coordinating with the State
Department.''\254\ These meetings ran counter to Ambassador
Bolton's repeated declarations that ``nobody should be meeting
with Giuliani.''\255\
Like Dr. Hill, Ambassador Bolton also closely tracked Mr.
Giuliani's activities on behalf of the President. According to
Dr. Hill, Ambassador Bolton closely monitored Mr. Giuliani's
public statements and repeatedly referred to Mr. Giuliani as a
``hand grenade that was going to blow everyone up.''\256\
During a meeting on June 13, Ambassador Bolton made clear that
he supported more engagement with Ukraine by senior White House
officials but warned that ``Mr. Giuliani was a key voice with
the President on Ukraine.''\257\ According to Ambassador
Bolton, Mr. Giuliani's influence ``could be an obstacle to
increased White House engagement.''\258\ Ambassador Bolton
joked that ``every time Ukraine is mentioned, Giuliani pops
up.''\259\
Ambassador Bolton also reportedly joined Dr. Hill in
warning Ambassador Volker against contacting Mr. Giuliani.\260\
Dr. Hill was particularly concerned about engagement with Mr.
Giuliani because ``the more you engage with someone who is
spreading untruths, the more validity you give to those
untruths.''\261\ She further testified that she also discussed
Mr. Giuliani's activities with Dr. Kupperman, specifically her
concern that ``Ukraine was going to be played by Giuliani in
some way as part of the campaign.''\262\
On June 18, Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary
of State Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Secretary Perry,
Ambassador Sondland, and State Department Counselor T. Ulrich
Brechbuhl participated in a meeting at the Department of Energy
to follow up to the May 23 Oval Office meeting.\263\ Ambassador
William Taylor, Charge d'Affaires for U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, who
had arrived in Ukraine just the day before, participated by
phone from Kyiv.\264\ The group agreed that a meeting between
President Trump and President Zelensky would be valuable.\265\
However, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland subsequently relayed
to Ambassador Taylor that President Trump ``wanted to hear from
Zelensky before scheduling the meeting in the Oval
Office.''\266\ Ambassador Taylor testified that he did not
understand, at that time, what the President wanted to hear
from his Ukrainian counterpart.\267\ However, Ambassador
Volker's assistant, Mr. Anderson, recalled ``vague
discussions'' about addressing ``Mr. Giuliani's continued calls
for a corruption investigation.''\268\
The quid pro quo--conditioning the Oval Office meeting that
President Trump first offered the Ukrainian leader during their
April 21 call on the Ukrainians' pursuit of investigations that
would benefit President Trump politically--was beginning to
take shape. As Ambassador Sondland testified, the conditions
put on the White House meeting and on Ukraine's continued
engagement with the White House would get ``more insidious''
with the passage of time.\269\
President Trump Invited Foreign Interference in the 2020 Election
As U.S. officials debated how to meet the President's
demands as articulated by Mr. Giuliani, President Trump
publicly disclosed on June 12 in an Oval Office interview with
ABC News anchor George Stephanopoulos that there was ``nothing
wrong with listening'' to a foreign power who offered political
dirt on an opponent. The President added, ``I think I'd want to
hear it.''
Mr. Stephanopoulos then pressed the President directly,
``You want that kind of interference in our elections?'' to
which President Trump replied, ``It's not an interference, they
have information. I think I'd take it.''\270\ President Trump
also made clear that he did not think a foreign power offering
damaging information on an opponent was necessarily wrong, and
said only that he would ``maybe'' contact the FBI ``if I
thought there was something wrong.''\271\
President Trump's willingness to accept foreign
interference in a U.S. election during his interview with Mr.
Stephanopoulos was consistent with tweets and interviews by Mr.
Giuliani at this time. For example, on June 21, Mr. Giuliani
tweeted:
New Pres of Ukraine still silent on investigation of
Ukrainian interference in 2016 election and alleged
Biden bribery of Pres Poroshenko. Time for leadership
and investigate both if you want to purge how Ukraine
was abused by Hillary and Obama people.\272\
On June 18, Dr. Hill met with Ambassador Sondland at the
White House. She ``asked him quite bluntly'' what his role was
in Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland replied that ``he was in charge
of Ukraine.''\273\ Dr. Hill was taken aback and a bit
irritated. She prodded Ambassador Sondland again and asked,
``Who put you in charge of Ukraine?'' Dr. Hill testified:
``And, you know, I'll admit, I was a bit rude. And that's when
he told me the President, which shut me up.''\274\
Dr. Hill tried to impress upon Ambassador Sondland the
``importance of coordinating'' with other national security
officials in the conduct of Ukraine policy, including the NSC
staff and the State Department. Ambassador Sondland
``retorted'' that he was ``coordinating with the President''
and Mr. Mulvaney, ``filling in'' Ambassador Bolton, and talking
to State Department Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl. Ambassador
Sondland asked: ``Who else did he have to inform?''\275\
Dr. Hill stated that, in hindsight, with the benefit of the
sworn testimony by others during the impeachment inquiry and
seeing documents displayed by witnesses, she realized that she
and Ambassador Sondland were working on two fundamentally
different tasks. Dr. Hill testified:
But it struck me when yesterday, when you put up on
the screen Ambassador Sondland's emails and who was on
these emails, and he said, These are the people who
need to know, that he was absolutely right. Because he
was being involved in a domestic political errand, and
we were being involved in national security foreign
policy, and those two things had just diverged. So he
was correct. And I had not put my finger on that at the
moment, but I was irritated with him and angry with him
that he wasn't fully coordinating. And I did say to
him, Ambassador Sondland, Gordon, I think this is all
going to blow up. And here we are.\276\
Reflecting on her June 18 conversation with Ambassador
Sondland, Dr. Hill concluded:
Ambassador Sondland is not wrong that he had been
given a different remit than we had been. And it was at
that moment that I started to realize how those things
had diverged. And I realized, in fact, that I wasn't
really being fair to Ambassador Sondland, because he
was carrying out what he thought he had been instructed
to carry out, and we were doing something that we
thought was just as--or perhaps even more important,
but it wasn't in the same channel.\277\
3. The President Froze Military Assistance to Ukraine
The President froze military assistance to Ukraine against U.S.
national security interests and over the objections of career
experts.
Overview
Since 2014, the United States has maintained a bipartisan
policy of delivering hundreds of millions of dollars in
security assistance to Ukraine each year. These funds benefit
the security of the United States and Europe by ensuring that
Ukraine is equipped to defend itself against Russian
aggression. In 2019, that bipartisan policy was undermined when
President Trump ordered, without justification, a freeze on
military assistance to Ukraine.
For fiscal year 2019, Congress authorized and appropriated
$391 million in security assistance: $250 million through the
Department of Defense's (DOD) Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative and $141 million through the State Department's
Foreign Military Financing program. In July 2019, however,
President Trump ordered the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to put a hold on all $391 million in security assistance
to Ukraine.
The hold surprised experts from DOD and the State
Department. DOD had already announced its intent to deliver
security assistance to Ukraine after certifying that the
country had implemented sufficient anti-corruption reforms, and
the State Department was in the process of notifying Congress
of its intent to deliver foreign military financing to Ukraine.
In a series of interagency meetings, every represented agency
other than OMB (which is headed by Mick Mulvaney, who is also
the President's Acting Chief of Staff) supported the provision
of assistance to Ukraine and objected to President Trump's
hold. Ukraine experts at DOD, the State Department, and the
National Security Council (NSC) argued that it was in the
national security interest of the United States to continue to
support Ukraine. Agency experts also expressed concerns about
the legality of President Trump withholding assistance to
Ukraine that Congress had already appropriated for this express
purpose.
Despite these concerns, OMB devised a plan to implement
President Trump's hold on the assistance. On July 25, 2019, OMB
began using a series of footnotes in funding documents to
notify DOD that the assistance funds were temporarily on hold
to allow for interagency review. Throughout August and
September, OMB continued to use this method and rationale to
maintain the hold, long after the final interagency meeting on
Ukraine assistance occurred on July 31. The hold continued
despite concerns from DOD that the hold would threaten its
ability to fully spend the money before the end of the fiscal
year, as legally required.
On July 25--the same day as President Trump's call with
President Zelensky--officials at Ukraine's embassy emailed DOD
to ask about the status of the hold. By mid-August, officials
at DOD, the State Department, and the NSC received numerous
questions from Ukrainian officials about the hold. President
Trump's hold on the Ukraine assistance was publicly reported on
August 28, 2019.
Security Assistance to Ukraine is Important to U.S. National Security
Interests
The United States has an interest in providing security
assistance to Ukraine to support the country in its
longstanding battle against Russian aggression and to shore it
up as an independent and democratic country that can deter
Kremlin influence in both Ukraine and other European countries.
In early 2014, in what became known as the Revolution of
Dignity, Ukrainian citizens demanded democratic reforms and an
end to corruption, thereby forcing the ouster of pro-Kremlin
Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine's President. Shortly thereafter,
Russian military forces and their proxies began an incursion
into Ukraine that led to Russia's illegal annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, as well as the ongoing, Russian-
led armed conflict in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine.
Approximately 13,000 people have been killed as a result of the
conflict and over 1.4 million people have been displaced.\278\
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley,
noted that ``militants in eastern Ukraine report directly to
the Russian military, which arms them, trains them, leads them,
and fights alongside them.''\279\ Similarly, then-Secretary of
Defense James Mattis, during a visit to Ukraine in 2017, chided
Russia, stating that ``despite Russia's denials, we know they
are seeking to redraw international borders by force,
undermining the sovereign and free nations of Europe.''\280\
In response to Russia's aggression, the international
community imposed financial and visa sanctions on Russian
individuals and entities, and committed to providing billions
of dollars in economic, humanitarian, and security assistance
to Ukraine to continue to support its sovereignty and
democratic development.
The European Union is the single largest contributor of
total foreign assistance to Ukraine, having provided =15
billion in grants and loans since 2014.\281\ In addition to
economic and humanitarian assistance, the United States has
contributed a substantial amount of security assistance, mostly
lethal and non-lethal military equipment and training, to
Ukraine. In fact, the United States is the largest contributor
of security assistance to Ukraine. Since 2014, the United
States has delivered approximately $1.5 billion in security
assistance to Ukraine.\282\
Multiple witnesses--including Ambassador William Taylor,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent, Lt. Col.
Alexander Vindman, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Laura Cooper--testified that this security assistance to
Ukraine is vital to the national security of the United States
and Europe.\283\ As Ambassador Taylor noted:
[R]adar and weapons and sniper rifles, communication,
that saves lives. It makes the Ukrainians more
effective. It might even shorten the war. That's what
our hope is, to show that the Ukrainians can defend
themselves and the Russians, in the end, will say
``Okay, we're going to stop.''\284\
State Department Special Advisor for Ukraine, Catherine
Croft, further emphasized that Ukrainians currently ``face
casualties nearly every day in defense of their own territory
against Russian aggression.''\285\ Ambassador Taylor testified
that American aid is a concrete demonstration of the United
States' ``commitment to resist aggression and defend
freedom.''\286\
Witnesses also testified that it is in the interest of the
United States for Russian aggression to be halted in Ukraine.
In the 20th century, the United States fought two bloody wars
to resist the aggression of a hostile power that tried to
change the borders of Europe by force. As Ambassador Taylor put
it, Russian aggression in Ukraine ``dismissed all the
principles that have kept the peace and contributed to
prosperity in Europe since World War II.''\287\
Timothy Morrison, former Senior Director for Europe and
Russia at the NSC, put the importance of U.S. assistance in
stark terms:
Russia is a failing power, but it is still a
dangerous one. The United States aids Ukraine and her
people so that they can fight Russia over there, and we
don't have to fight Russia here.\288\
Bipartisan Support for Security Assistance to Ukraine
Congressional support for security assistance to Ukraine
has been overwhelming and bipartisan. Congress provided $391
million in security assistance to Ukraine for fiscal year 2019:
$250 million through the DOD-administered Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative (USAI) and $141 million through the State
Department-administered Foreign Military Financing program.
On September 26, 2018, Congress appropriated $250 million
for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which is funded
through DOD. The funding law made clear that the funding was
only ``available until September 30, 2019.'' President Trump
signed the bill into law on September 28, 2018.\289\
The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative--a
Congressionally-mandated program codifying portions of the
European Reassurance Initiative, which was originally launched
by the Obama Administration in 2015--authorizes DOD to provide
``security assistance and intelligence support, including
training, equipment, and logistics support, supplies and
services, to military and other security forces of the
Government of Ukraine.''\290\ Recognizing that strengthening
Ukraine's institutions, in addition to its military, is vital
to helping it break free of Russia's influence, Congress
imposed conditions upon DOD before it could spend a portion of
the security assistance funds. Half of the money was held in
reserve until the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with
the Secretary of State, certified to Congress that Ukraine had
undertaken sufficient anti-corruption reforms, such as in
civilian control of the military and increased transparency and
accountability.\291\
On February 28, 2019, John C. Rood, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, notified Congress that DOD intended to
deliver the first half ($125 million) of assistance
appropriated in September 2018 to Ukraine, including ``more
than $50 million of assistance to deliver counter-artillery
radars and defensive lethal assistance.''\292\ Congress cleared
the Congressional notification, which enabled DOD to begin
obligating (spending) funds.\293\
For Ukraine to qualify to receive the remaining $125
million of assistance, Congress required that the Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, certify
that the Government of Ukraine had taken substantial
anticorruption reform actions.\294\ Ms. Cooper and others at
DOD conducted a review to evaluate whether Ukraine had met the
required benchmarks.\295\ Ms. Cooper explained that the review
involved ``pulling in all the views of the key experts on
Ukraine defense, and coming up with a consensus view,'' which
was then run ``up the chain in the Defense Department, to
ensure we have approval.''\296\
On May 23, 2019, Under Secretary Rood certified to Congress
that Ukraine had completed the requisite defense institutional
reforms to qualify for the remaining $125 million in funds. He
wrote:
On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and in
coordination with the Secretary of State, I have
certified that the Government of Ukraine has taken
substantial actions to make defense institutional
reforms for the purposes of decreasing corruption,
increasing accountability, and sustaining improvements
of combat capability enabled by U.S. assistance.\297\
Congress then cleared the related Congressional
notification, which enabled DOD to begin obligating the
remaining $125 million in funds.\298\
On June 18, 2019, DOD issued a press release announcing its
intention to provide $250 million in security assistance funds
to Ukraine ``for additional training, equipment, and advisory
efforts to build the capacity of Ukraine's armed forces.'' DOD
announced that the security assistance would provide Ukraine
with sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and
counter-artillery radars, command and control, electronic
warfare detection and secure communications, military mobility,
night vision, and military medical treatment.\299\
On February 15, 2019, Congress also appropriated $115
million for Ukraine through the State Department-administered
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF).\300\ The Foreign
Military Financing Program is administered by the State
Department and provides grants or loans to foreign countries to
help them purchase military services or equipment manufactured
by U.S. companies in the United States. In addition to the $115
million appropriated for fiscal year 2019, approximately $26
million carried over from fiscal year 2018.\301\ Thus, the
total amount of foreign military financing available for
Ukraine was approximately $141 million.
Before a country receives foreign military financing, the
State Department must first seek Congressional approval through
a notification to Congress.\302\ The State Department never
sent the required Congressional notification to Congress in the
spring or summer of 2019. As described below, OMB blocked the
notification.\303\
President Trump had Questions About Ukraine Security Assistance
The day after DOD issued its June 18 press release
announcing $250 million in security assistance funds for
Ukraine, President Trump started asking OMB questions about the
funding for Ukraine. On June 19, Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate
Director for National Security Programs at OMB, was copied on
an email from his boss, Michael Duffey, Associate Director for
National Security Programs at OMB, to Elaine McCusker, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) that said that ``the
President had questions about the press report and that he was
seeking additional information.''\304\ Notably, the same day,
President Trump gave an interview on Fox News where he raised
the so-called ``Crowdstrike'' conspiracy theory that Ukraine,
rather than Russia, had interfered in the 2016 election, a line
he would repeat during his July 25 call with the Ukrainian
president.\305\
On June 20, in response to the President's inquiry, Ms.
McCusker responded to President Trump's inquiry by providing
Mr. Sandy information on the security assistance program.\306\
Mr. Sandy shared the document with Mr. Duffey, who had follow-
up questions about the ``financial resources associated with
the program, in particular,'' the ``history of the
appropriations, [and] any more details about the intent of the
program.''\307\ Mr. Sandy said that his staff provided the
relevant information to Mr. Duffey, but he did not know whether
Mr. Duffey shared the information with the White House.\308\
Ms. Cooper also recalled receiving an email inquiring about
DOD-administered Ukraine security assistance a ``few days''
after DOD's June 18, 2019, press release.\309\ The email was
from the Secretary of Defense's Chief of Staff, ``asking for
follow-up on a meeting with the President.'' The email
contained three questions:
And the one question was related to U.S. industry.
Did U.S.--is U.S. industry providing any of this
equipment? The second question that I recall was
related to international contributions. It asked, what
are other countries doing, something to that effect.
And then the third question, I don't recall--I mean,
with any of these I don't recall the exact wording, but
it was something to the effect of, you know, who gave
this money, or who gave this funding?\310\
Like Mr. Sandy, Ms. Cooper believed that the President's
inquiries were spurred by DOD's June 18 press release. She
testified, ``we did get that series of questions just within a
few days after the press release and after that one article
that had the headline.''\311\ Ms. Cooper noted that it was
``relatively unusual'' to receive questions from the President,
and that she and her staff at the DOD responded ``as quickly''
as they could.\312\ According to Ms. Cooper, DOD officials
included in their answers that security assistance funding
``has strong bipartisan support,'' but never received a
response.\313\
President Trump Froze Military Assistance
Despite the fact that DOD experts demonstrated that the
security assistance was crucial for both Ukraine and U.S.
national security and had strong bipartisan support in
Congress, President Trump ordered OMB to freeze the funds in
July.
On July 3, the State Department notified DOD and NSC staff
that OMB was blocking the State Department from transmitting a
Congressional notification for the provision of State
Department-administered security assistance to Ukraine (the
$141 million in foreign military financing).\314\ Because the
State Department is legally required to transmit such a
notification to Congress before spending funds, blocking the
Congressional notification effectively barred the State
Department from spending the funding.\315\ Ms. Williams
testified that she saw the news in a draft email that was being
prepared as part of the nightly update for the National
Security Advisor.\316\ She agreed that the hold came ``out of
the blue'' because it had not been discussed previously by OMB
or the NSC.\317\
On or about July 12, 2019, President Trump directed that a
hold be placed on security assistance funding for Ukraine. That
day, Robert Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior
Advisor to the Chief of Staff, sent an email to Mr. Duffey at
OMB about Ukraine security assistance.\318\ Mr. Sandy, who was
on personal leave at the time but later received a copy of the
email from Mr. Duffey, testified that in the July 12 email, Mr.
Blair communicated ``that the President is directing a hold on
military support funding for Ukraine.''\319\ The email
mentioned no concerns about any other country, security
assistance package, or aid of any sort.\320\
On or about July 15, Mr. Morrison learned from Deputy
National Security Advisor Charles Kupperman ``that it was the
President's direction to hold the assistance.''\321\ On or
about July 17 or 18, 2019, Mr. Duffey and Mr. Blair again
exchanged emails about Ukraine security assistance.\322\ Mr.
Sandy later received a copy of the emails, which showed that
when Mr. Duffey asked Mr. Blair about the reason for the hold,
Mr. Blair provided no explanation and instead said, ``we need
to let the hold take place'' and then ``revisit'' the issue
with the President.\323\
On July 18 or 19, when he returned from two weeks of
personal leave, Mr. Sandy learned for the first time that the
President had placed a hold on Ukraine security assistance from
Mr. Duffey.\324\ According to Mr. Sandy, Mr. Duffey was not
aware of the reason but ``there was certainly a desire to learn
more about the rationale'' for the hold.\325\
Agency Experts Repeatedly Objected to the Hold on Security Assistance
Between July 18 and July 31, 2019, the NSC staff convened a
series of interagency meetings, at which the hold on security
assistance was discussed in varying degrees of detail. Over the
course of these meetings, it became evident that:
the President directed the hold through OMB;
no justification was provided for the hold;
with the exception of OMB, all represented
agencies supported Ukraine security assistance because it was
in the national security interests of the United States; and
there were concerns about the legality of the
hold.
The first interagency meeting was held on July 18 at the
Deputy Assistant Secretary level (i.e., a ``sub-Policy
Coordination Committee''). It was supposed to be a ``routine
Ukraine policy meeting.''\326\ Ambassador Taylor, Lt. Col.
Vindman, Ms. Croft, and Mr. Kent were among the attendees.
Witnesses testified that OMB announced at the meeting that
President Trump had directed a hold on Ukraine security
assistance. Mr. Kent testified that at the meeting, an OMB
staff person announced that Acting White House Chief of Staff
Mick Mulvaney ``at the direction of the President had put a
hold on all security assistance to the Ukraine.''\327\
Ambassador Taylor testified that the ``directive had come from
the President to the Chief of Staff to OMB'' and that when he
learned of the hold on military assistance, he ``realized that
one of the key pillars of our strong support for Ukraine was
threatened.''\328\
According to Ms. Croft, when Mr. Kent raised the issue of
security assistance, it ``blew up the meeting.''\329\
Ambassador Taylor testified that he and others on the call
``sat in astonishment'' when they learned about the hold.\330\
David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv,
was also on the call. He testified he was ``shocked'' and
thought the hold was ``extremely significant.''\331\ He thought
the hold undermined what he had understood to be longstanding
U.S. policy in Ukraine.\332\
Ms. Croft testified that ``the only reason given was that
the order came at the direction of the President.''\333\ Ms.
Cooper, who did not participate but received a readout of the
meeting, testified that the fact that the hold was announced
without explanation was ``unusual.''\334\ Mr. Kent testified
that ``[t]here was great confusion among the rest of us because
we didn't understand why that had happened.''\335\ He explained
that ``[s]ince there was unanimity that this [security
assistance to Ukraine] was in our national interest, it just
surprised all of us.''\336\
With the exception of OMB, all agencies present at the July
18 meeting advocated for the lifting of the hold.\337\
There was also a lack of clarity as to whether the hold
applied only to the State Department-administered Foreign
Military Financing to Ukraine or whether it also applied to the
DOD-administered Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
funding.\338\ Ms. Cooper and her colleagues at the DOD were
``concerned'' about the hold.\339\ After the meeting, DOD
sought further clarification from the NSC and State Department
about its impact on the DOD-administered funding.\340\ However,
there was no ``specific guidance for DOD at the time.''\341\
The second interagency meeting to discuss the hold on
Ukraine security assistance was held at the Assistant Secretary
level (i.e., a ``Policy Coordination Committee'') on July 23,
2019.\342\ The meeting was chaired by Mr. Morrison.\343\ Ms.
Cooper, who participated via secure video teleconference,
testified that ``the White House chief of staff ha[d] conveyed
that the President has concerns about Ukraine and Ukraine
security assistance.''\344\ Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor
to Vice President Pence for Europe and Eurasia, who also
attended the meeting on behalf of the Vice President, testified
that the ``OMB representative conveyed that they had been
directed by the Chief of Staff, the White House Chief of Staff,
to continue holding it [the Ukraine security assistance] until
further notice.''\345\ Similar to the July 18 meeting, the July
23 meeting did not provide clarity about whether the
President's hold applied to the DOD-administered funding or
only to the funds administered by the State Department.\346\
Again, no reason was provided for the hold.\347\ Mr. Sandy
did not attend the July 23 meeting as the representative for
OMB, but he received a readout that other agencies expressed
concerns about the hold. Specifically, the concerns related to
the lack of rationale for the hold, the hold's implications on
U.S. assistance and ``overall policy toward Ukraine,'' and
``similar legal questions.''\348\
Mr. Morrison also testified that there was a discussion at
the July 23 meeting about the legality of the hold, and
specifically whether it is ``actually legally permissible for
the President to not allow for the disbursement of the
funding.''\349\ Mr. Morrison recalled that DOD raised concerns
about possible violations of the Impoundment Control Act.\350\
The Impoundment Control Act gives the President the authority
to delay spending, or not spend, funds only if Congress is
notified of those intentions and approves the proposed action
(see below for further discussion of the act).\351\
With the exception of OMB, all agencies present at the July
23rd meeting advocated for the lifting of the hold.\352\
Ambassador Taylor explained that the State Department ``made a
strong statement about the importance of this assistance'' and
that Ms. Cooper, on behalf of DOD, ``made a very strong case
and continued to make a very strong case for the
effectiveness'' of the security assistance.\353\ Lt. Col.
Vindman, who also attended the meeting, testified that there
was agreement that the issue should be elevated to the Agency
deputies ``as quickly as possible to recommend a release of
security assistance.''\354\
The third interagency meeting, a Deputies Small Group
meeting at the Cabinet Deputies level, was held on July 26,
2019. Mr. Duffey was the OMB representative, and Mr. Sandy
prepared Mr. Duffey for the meeting.\355\ Mr. Sandy explained
that he prepared Mr. Duffey to get policy guidance on six
critical issues: (1) the reason for the hold; (2) the extent of
the hold; (3) the duration of the hold; (4) the Congressional
affairs approach; (5) the public affairs approach; and (6) and
the diplomatic approach.\356\ Mr. Sandy testified that on July
26, OMB still did not have an understanding of the reason for
the hold.\357\ According to Mr. Sandy, at that time, there was
no discussion within OMB about the amount of money that was
being contributed to Ukraine by other countries, or whether
that topic was the reason for the President's hold.\358\
Mr. Morrison, Lt. Col. Vindman, Ms. Cooper, Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs David Hale, and Mr. Duffey
attended the July 26 meeting. At the meeting, OMB stated that
``they had guidance from the President and from Acting Chief of
Staff Mulvaney to freeze the assistance.''\359\ It also was
``stated very clearly'' that the hold applied to both the State
Department and Defense Department security assistance
funds.\360\ Ambassador Hale, as the representative for the
Department of State, ``advocated strongly for resuming the
assistance,'' as did representatives from all agencies other
than OMB.\361\
Mr. Morrison testified that, at the meeting, ``OMB
represented that--and the Chief of Staff's Office was present--
that the President was concerned about corruption in Ukraine,
and he wanted to make sure that Ukraine was doing enough to
manage that corruption.''\362\ Ms. Cooper had a similar
recollection but received no further understanding of what OMB
meant by ``corruption.''\363\ Ms. Cooper recalled that the
deputies did not consider corruption to be a legitimate reason
for the hold because they unanimously agreed that Ukraine was
making sufficient progress on anti-corruption reforms, as had
been certified by DOD on May 23.\364\
President Trump Continued the Hold Despite Agency Concerns About
Legality
Prior to the passage of the Impoundment Control Act,
presidents had frequently impounded--i.e., refused to spend--
Congressionally-appropriated funds to enforce their policy
priorities when they diverged from Congress'. However, most of
these impoundments were small (i.e., no more than a few percent
of the total program budget) or temporary (i.e., funds were
released in time for them to be spent before the end of the
fiscal year) and rooted in policy, rather than political
interests of the President. It was not until President Richard
Nixon that presidential impoundment of funds would prompt
Congress to take action citing constitutional concerns.\365\
Unlike his predecessors, President Nixon undertook
impoundments that were both substantial and, in some cases,
permanent, which raised concerns for Congress over its Article
I powers. In fact, between 1969 and 1972, President Nixon
impounded between 15% and 20% of Congressionally-appropriated
funds in various accounts.\366\
To reassert Congressional authority over the budget, in
1973, Congress established the Joint Study Committee on Budget
Control, which held a series of hearings and produced more than
4,600 pages of testimony and reports. The Joint Study
Committee's findings ultimately led to the overwhelmingly
bipartisan passage--over President Nixon's veto--of the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, one of a series of reform
bills designed to reign in presidential power. Looking back at
that moment in history, Rep. Bill Archer (R-TX), a fiscal
conservative who served 30 years in the House of
Representatives, including as the Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee, remarked, ``the culture then was that the
president had too much power . . . the president is abusing his
power.''\367\
In addition to establishing the Congressional Budget
Committees and the independent Congressional Budget Office, the
Impoundment Control Act also limits the circumstances under
which a president can legally impound Congressionally-
appropriated funds. According to the Act, although the
President may request authority from Congress to withhold or
permanently cancel the availability of budget authority, such
an action is not allowed without Congressional approval. Any
amount of budget authority proposed to be deferred (i.e.,
temporarily withheld) or rescinded (i.e., permanently withheld)
must be made available for obligation unless Congress, within
45 legislative days, completes action on a bill rescinding all
or part of the amount proposed for rescission.\368\ The
Impoundment Control Act does not permit the withholding of
funds through their date of expiration, which would be a de
facto rescission without Congressional approval.\369\
At the July 26 interagency meeting, senior agency officials
raised serious concerns about the legality of the hold under
the Impoundment Control Act. Ms. Cooper testified:
A: Well, I'm not an expert on the law, but in that
meeting immediately deputies began to raise concerns
about how this could be done in a legal fashion because
there was broad understanding in the meeting that the
funding--the State Department funding related to an
earmark for Ukraine and that the DOD funding was
specific to Ukraine security assistance. So the
comments in the room at the deputies' level reflected a
sense that there was not an understanding of how this
could legally play out. And at that meeting the
deputies agreed to look into the legalities and to look
at what was possible.
Q: Okay. So is it fair to say the deputies thought
the President was not authorized to place a hold on
these funds?
A: They did not use that term, but the expression in
the room that I recall was a sense that there was not
an available mechanism to simply not spend money that
has been in the case of USAI [DOD security assistance]
already notified to Congress.\370\
Lt. Col. Vindman testified that the issue needed to be
``elevated to a PC [Principals Committee] as quickly as
possible to release the hold on security assistance'' so that
the funds could be obligated before the end of the fiscal
year.\371\
A Principals Committee meeting was never convened.\372\
According to Mr. Morrison, National Security Advisor John
Bolton ``believed that it was unnecessary, that he already had
a reasonable idea of where the principals were, and he wanted
to get directly to the President as early as possible in the
most effective way.''\373\ Ambassador Bolton understood that
the principals ``were all supportive of the continued
disbursement of the aid.''\374\ As had been clear since the
very first interagency meeting on July 18, the lifting of the
hold was ``the unanimous position of the entire
interagency.''\375\ At this point, it remained unclear to many
officials why the President continued to hold the funds.
On July 31, 2019, a fourth and final interagency meeting
was held at the Policy Coordination Committee level. Ms. Cooper
attended the meeting on behalf of DOD. According to Ms. Cooper,
the agenda ``was largely focused on just routine Ukraine
business, postelection follow up,'' and ``security assistance
was not actually an explicit agenda item.''\376\ Ms. Cooper
nevertheless raised security assistance and expressed her
understanding, after consulting with DOD counsel, that there
were only two legally available options to implement the hold:
a Presidential rescission notice to Congress (i.e., requesting
that Congress ``take back'' funds it had already appropriated)
or for the Defense Department to do a reprogramming action
(i.e., use Congressionally-appropriated funds for a different
purpose).\377\ In either case, the law requires that the
Executive Branch notify, and seek approval from, Congress
before taking any action.\378\
At the July 31 meeting, Ms. Cooper emphasized to the
participants that because ``there are only two legally
available options and we do not have direction to pursue
either,'' DOD would have to start obligating the funds on or
about August 6.\379\ She explained at her deposition that DOD
would have had to begin obligating the funds by that date or
risk violation of the Impoundment Control Act.\380\
The Administration, however, never proposed a rescission or
reprogramming of funds for Ukraine security assistance and
never notified Congress of its intent to withhold funds.\381\
OMB Used Unusual Process to Implement President's Hold, Skirting Legal
Concerns
OMB plays a critical role in the release of security
assistance funding. The Antideficiency Act requires that,
before any department or agency may spend Congressionally-
appropriated funding, the Director of OMB or his delegates must
``apportion'' (i.e., make available to spend) the funds in
writing.\382\ Through this mechanism, OMB has the ability to
directly impact security assistance funding or funding of any
kind that is appropriated by Congress.
In parallel with the interagency meetings that occurred
during the latter half of July 2019, OMB devised a way to
implement the President's hold on security assistance to
Ukraine, notwithstanding DOD's Congressional notifications of
February 28 and May 23. Over the course of his twelve-year
career at OMB, Mr. Sandy could not recall any other time when a
hold had been placed on security assistance after a
Congressional notification had been sent.\383\
When speaking with Mr. Duffey on or about July 18 or 19,
Mr. Sandy immediately raised concerns about how to implement
the hold without violating the Impoundment Control Act, which
required that the funds be obligated (i.e., spent) before they
expired at the end of the fiscal year, on September 30.\384\ In
light of that legal requirement, the hold would have to be
temporary.\385\ An additional hurdle was the fact that OMB had
already authorized DOD to spend the security assistance funds
DOD administered for fiscal year 2019.\386\ Therefore, when
President Trump directed the hold in July, OMB scrambled to
reverse that prior authorization.
From July 19 through July 24, Mr. Sandy consulted with the
OMB Office of General Counsel as well as Ms. McCusker at DOD on
how to legally implement a hold on the funds.\387\ Mr. Sandy's
staff at OMB also conferred with OMB's Budget Review
Division.\388\ Based on these consultations, OMB decided to
implement the hold through a series of nine funding documents,
known legally as ``apportionments.''\389\ Apportionments
typically are used to convey authority to an agency to spend
funds, not to withhold funds; thus, in order to bar DOD from
spending money, these particular apportionments included
footnotes that would impose the holds while using creative
language to skirt legal concerns. Mr. Sandy testified that
``the purpose of the footnote was to preclude obligation for a
limited period of time but enable planning and casework to
continue.''\390\ He also testified that this use of footnotes
was unusual and that in his 12 years of OMB experience, he
could ``not recall another event like it.''\391\
On July 25, OMB issued the first funding document
implementing the hold. In this document, the relevant footnote
notified DOD that the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
funds ``are not available for obligation until August 5, 2019,
to allow for an interagency process to determine the best use
of such funds.'' The footnote also stated that:
Based on OMB's communication with DOD on July 25,
2019, OMB understands from the Department that this
brief pause in obligations will not preclude DOD's
timely execution of the final policy direction. DOD may
continue its planning and casework for the Initiative
during this period.\392\
Mr. Sandy explained that the ``interagency process''
referenced in the footnote referred to the NSC-led interagency
meetings convened during the latter half of July, and that the
August 5 date provided a ``reasonable timeframe for an
interagency process'' to produce ``clear guidance'' on the
hold.\393\ The August 5 date was determined in consultation
with Mr. Duffey at OMB and Ms. McCusker at DOD.\394\
Mr. Sandy further testified that the second sentence in the
footnote--which states, in relevant part, that ``OMB
understands from the Department that this brief pause in
obligations will not preclude DOD's timely execution of the
final policy direction''--was critical to the implementation of
the hold:
Well, that gets to the heart of that issue about
ensuring that we don't run afoul of the Impoundment
Control Act, which means that you have to allow for the
timely execution. And this reflects my conversation
with--conversations plural with Elaine McCusker that
they can confirm that, during this brief period, they
would not foresee any problem fully executing the
program by the end of the fiscal year.\395\
The sentence, in effect, affirmed that if the hold remained
in place only until August 5, DOD would still have sufficient
time to spend all security assistance funds by September 30,
2019. President Trump, however, would continue the hold long
past August 5.
Trump Appointee Took Over Signing Authority from Career Budget Expert
Since becoming Deputy Associate Director for National
Security in 2013, Mr. Sandy was responsible for approving
release of the funding for programs within his portfolio,
including the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.\396\ Mr.
Sandy approved and signed the July 25 funding document.\397\ On
July 29, however, Mr. Duffey--a political appointee of
President Trump whose prior position had been as Executive
Director of the Republican Party of Wisconsin--told Mr. Sandy--
a career civil servant with decades of experience in this
area--that he would no longer be responsible for approving the
release of funding for Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative.\398\ Mr. Duffey also revoked the authority for
approving the release of funding for Foreign Military Financing
from Mr. Sandy's colleague at OMB.\399\ Instead, Mr. Duffey
would himself assume authority for the $250 million in DOD-
administered Ukraine security assistance and authority for
approving the release of funding for the $141 million in State
Department-administered Foreign Military Financing to
Ukraine.\400\
Mr. Duffey did not tell Mr. Sandy whether he requested this
change in authority but did say that ``it was in essence a
joint decision reflecting both guidance from the Acting
Director and also his support.''\401\ Over the course of
several days, Mr. Duffey explained to Mr. Sandy and others in
the National Security Division that ``there was interest among
the leadership in tracking the uses of moneys [sic]
closely.''\402\ Mr. Duffey expressed an ``interest in being
more involved in daily operations'' and ``regarded this
responsibility as a way for him to learn more about specific
accounts within his area.''\403\
Mr. Sandy testified that prior to July 29, he had never
heard Mr. Duffey state any interest in approving the release of
funding.\404\ Furthermore, when they learned that Mr. Duffey
was taking on this new responsibility, Mr. Sandy and other
staff relayed their concerns to Mr. Duffey that it was a
substantial workload.\405\ Mr. Sandy also testified that
``people were curious what he thought he would learn from
apportionments about the accounts as opposed to the other, you
know, sources of information.''\406\ Mr. Sandy agreed that
there are more efficient ways of learning about accounts and
programs, and that ``I can think of other ways--other materials
that I personally would find more informative.''\407\
Mr. Sandy was not aware of any prior instance when a
political appointee assumed this kind of funding approval
authority.\408\
After the July 31 interagency meeting at which Ms. Cooper
announced that DOD would have to start obligating the funds on
or about August 6, Mr. Duffey sought clarification.\409\ Ms.
Cooper explained to Mr. Duffey that at a certain point DOD
would not have sufficient time to fully obligate the funds
before they expired at the end of the fiscal year. In response,
Mr. Duffey ``wanted more information on the precise nature of
how long does it take to obligate, and how many cases, and that
sort of thing.''\410\ Ms. Cooper referred Mr. Duffey to the DOD
comptroller and to the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency.\411\ During the month of August, Mr. Duffey and Ms.
McCusker communicated about the implementation of the hold on
the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds.\412\
On August 6 and August 15, Mr. Duffey approved two more
funding documents that contained footnotes with language nearly
identical to the footnote in the July 25 funding document that
initiated the hold; the only difference was that the date funds
would become available for spending was changed from August 5
to August 12.\413\
The August 6 and 15 footnotes, and all subsequent footnotes
through September 10, continued to state that the hold was in
place ``to allow for an interagency process to determine the
best use of such funds,'' even though the final interagency
meeting regarding Ukraine security assistance occurred on July
31.\414\ Not only was there no active interagency process after
July, but Ms. Cooper also was not aware of any review of the
funding conducted by DOD in July, August, or September.\415\ In
fact, Ms. Cooper noted that months before, DOD had completed
its review of whether Ukraine ``had made sufficient progress in
meeting defense reform and anticorruption goals consistent with
the NDAA,'' and certified to Congress in May 2019 that Ukraine
had met the requirements to receive funding.\416\ Similarly,
Mr. Kent testified that the State Department did not conduct,
and was never asked to conduct, a review of the security
assistance funding administered by the State Department.\417\
At the same time that OMB was implementing the President's
hold through the funding footnotes, officials inside OMB were
advocating for release of the funds. On August 7, the National
Security Division, International Affairs Division, and Office
of Legal Counsel of OMB drafted and transmitted a memo on
Ukraine security assistance to OMB Acting Director Vought ``in
anticipation of a principals-level discussion to address the
topic.''\418\ The National Security Division's portion of the
memorandum recommended to remove the hold because (1) the
assistance was consistent with the national security strategy
in terms of supporting a stable, peaceful Europe; (2) the aid
countered Russian aggression; and (3) there was bipartisan
support for the program.\419\ Mr. Duffey approved the
memorandum and agreed with the policy recommendation.\420\
Sometime in mid-August, DOD raised concerns that it might
not be able to fully obligate the Defense Department-
administered funds before the end of the fiscal year.\421\ Ms.
Cooper testified that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
estimated that $100 million of aid might not be obligated in
time and was at risk.\422\
Because of this, DOD concluded that it could no longer
support OMB's claim in the footnote that ``this brief pause in
obligations will not preclude DOD's timely execution of the
final policy direction.''\423\ As mentioned above, Mr. Sandy
testified that this sentence was at ``the heart of that issue
about ensuring that we don't run afoul of the Impoundment
Control Act.''\424\
As a result of DOD's concerns, all of the subsequent
footnotes issued by OMB during the pendency of the hold
approved by Mr. Duffey on August 20, 27, and 31, and September
5, 6, and 10--removed the sentence regarding DOD's ability to
fully obligate by the end of the fiscal year.\425\ Each
footnote extended the hold for a period of two to six
days.\426\
Mr. Sandy and his staff ``continued to express concerns [to
Mr. Duffey] about the potential implications vis-a-vis the
Impoundment Control Act,''\427\ and advised Mr. Duffey to
consult with OMB's Office of General Counsel ``on every single
footnote.''\428\ Mr. Sandy was copied on emails with the Office
of General Counsel on these topics.\429\ Although Mr. Sandy
understood that the Office of General Counsel supported the
footnotes, he noted that there were dissenting opinions within
the Office of General Counsel.\430\ Concerns about whether the
Administration was bending, if not breaking, the law by holding
back this vital assistance contributed to at least two OMB
officials resigning, including one attorney in the Office of
General Counsel.\431\ Mr. Sandy testified that the resignation
was motivated in part by concerns about the way OMB was
handling the hold on Ukraine security assistance.\432\
According to Mr. Sandy, the colleague disagreed with the Office
of General Counsel about the application of the Impoundment
Control Act to the hold on Ukraine security assistance.\433\
Nevertheless, at the direction of the President, OMB
continued to implement the hold through September 11.
Senior Officials Failed to Convince President Trump to Release the Aid
in August
Sometime prior to August 16, Ambassador Bolton had a one-
on-one meeting with President Trump about the aid.\434\
According to Mr. Morrison, at that meeting the President ``was
not yet ready to approve the release of the assistance.''\435\
Following the meeting, Ambassador Bolton instructed Mr.
Morrison to look for opportunities to get the principals
together ``to have the direct, in-person conversation with the
President about this topic.''\436\
On or about August 13 or 14, Lt. Col. Vindman was directed
to draft a Presidential Decision Memorandum for Ambassador
Bolton and the other principals to present to President Trump
for a decision on Ukraine security assistance.\437\ The
memorandum, finalized on August 15, recommended that the hold
should be lifted, explained why, and included the consensus
views from the July 26 meeting that the funds should be
released.\438\ Lt. Col. Vindman received conflicting accounts
about whether the memorandum was presented to the
President.\439\
Mr. Morrison, who was Lt. Col. Vindman's supervisor at the
NSC and agreed with the recommendation to lift the hold,
testified that the memorandum was never provided to the
President.\440\ Mr. Morrison explained that Ambassador Bolton
intended to present the memorandum to the President during an
unrelated meeting in Bedminster, New Jersey, on August 15, but
the ``other subject matter of that meeting consumed all the
time.''\441\ However, while at Bedminster, the principals ``all
represented to Ambassador Bolton that they were prepared to
tell the President they endorsed the swift release and
disbursement of the funding.''\442\
Mr. Morrison testified that he attempted to gather the
``the right group of principals'' to meet with the President
but was unable to do so because of scheduling issues.\443\
According to Mr. Morrison, the next possible opportunity was
during a trip to Warsaw, Poland at the beginning of September,
but President Trump did not end up making that trip.\444\
Ms. Cooper recalled receiving an email at the end of August
from Secretary of Defense Esper referencing a meeting or
discussion with the President, and that there was ``no decision
on Ukraine.''\445\
Ukrainian Officials Learned About the Hold in July 2019
Witnesses testified that officials in the Ukraine
government knew of President Trump's hold on security
assistance before it was publicly reported in the press on
August 28, 2019. Ms. Croft testified that after July 18--when
the hold was announced by OMB at the interagency meeting--it
was ``inevitable that it was eventually going to come
out.''\446\
Two individuals from the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington,
D.C., approached Ms. Croft approximately a week apart ``quietly
and in confidence to ask me about an OMB hold on Ukraine
security assistance.''\447\ Ms. Croft could not precisely
recall the dates of these conversations, but testified that she
was ``very surprised at the effectiveness of my Ukrainian
counterparts'' diplomatic tradecraft, as in to say they found
out very early on or much earlier than I expected them
to.''\448\
Ms. Croft explained that the Ukrainian officials came to
her quietly because they would not want the hold to become
public:
I think that if this were public in Ukraine it would
be seen as a reversal of our policy and would, just to
say sort of candidly and colloquially, this would be a
really big deal, it would be a really big deal in
Ukraine, and an expression of declining U.S. support
for Ukraine.\449\
DOD also received questions from the Ukraine Embassy about
the status of the military assistance. Ms. Cooper testified
that those occurred on July 25, 2019--the same day as President
Trump's call with President Zelensky:
On July 25th, a member of my staff got a question
from a Ukraine Embassy contact asking what was going on
with Ukraine security assistance, because at that time,
we did not know what the guidance was on USAI [DOD-
administered funds]. The OMB notice of apportionment
arrived that day, but this staff member did not find
out about it until later. I was informed that the staff
member told the Ukrainian official that we were moving
forward on USAI, but recommended that the Ukraine
Embassy check in with State regarding the FMF [State
Department-administered funds].\450\
On July 25, Ms. Cooper's staff received two emails from the
State Department revealing that the Ukrainian Embassy was
``asking about security assistance'' and that ``the Hill knows
about the FMF situation to an extent, and so does the Ukrainian
Embassy.''\451\
One of Ms. Cooper's staff members reported that sometime
during the week of August 6, a Ukrainian Embassy officer stated
that ``a Ukrainian official might raise concerns about security
assistance in an upcoming meeting,'' but that the issue was
``not, in fact, raised.''\452\ Ms. Cooper's staff further
reported that Ukrainian officials were aware of the hold on
security assistance in August.\453\
Lt. Col. Vindman testified that, by mid-August, he too was
getting questions from Ukrainians about the status of the hold
on security assistance:
So to the best of my knowledge, the Ukrainians, first
of all, are in general pretty sophisticated, they have
their network of, you know, Ukrainian interest groups
and so forth. They have bipartisan support in Congress.
And certainly there are--it was no secret, at least
within government and official channels, that security
assistance was on hold. And to the best of my
recollection, I believe there were some of these light
inquires in the mid-August timeframe.\454\
While numerous individuals, including Ukrainians, were
aware of the hold, it did not become publicly known until a
Politico report on August 28, 2019.\455\
4. The President's Meeting With the Ukrainian President Was Conditioned
on an Announcement of Investigations
President Trump demanded the public announcement by President Zelensky
of investigations into President Trump's political rival and
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election in
exchange for an Oval Office meeting. The President's
representatives made that quid pro quo clear to Ukrainian
officials.
Overview
After ordering the hold on security assistance to Ukraine
against the unanimous advice of the relevant U.S. government
agencies, President Trump used his hand-picked representatives
to demand that Ukrainian leaders publicly announce
investigations into his political rival, former Vice President
Joe Biden, and into the debunked conspiracy theory that
Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.
President Trump, through his agents, made clear that his demand
needed to be met before a coveted White House meeting with
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would be scheduled. A
face-to-face meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office
would have conferred on the new Ukrainian leader much-sought
prestige and would have signaled to Russia that Ukraine could
continue to count on the support of the President of the United
States, which was particularly important as Russia continued to
wage war in eastern Ukraine.
To date, the White House meeting for President Zelensky has
not occurred. Following the May 23 meeting in the Oval Office,
President Trump's hand-picked representatives--the so-called
``Three Amigos''--worked with the President's personal
attorney, Rudy Giuliani, to pressure Ukrainian leaders to
announce publicly investigations that would benefit the
President's reelection campaign. Testimony of multiple
witnesses and contemporaneous text messages exchanged between
and among President Trump's representatives confirm that the
White House meeting--and later the release of security
assistance for Ukraine--was conditioned on Ukraine acquiescing
to the President's demands.
In the weeks leading up to the July 25 call between
President Trump and President Zelensky, President Trump's
representatives repeatedly relayed the message of
conditionality to Ukrainian government officials--including to
President Zelensky himself--in meetings in Kyiv, Toronto, and
Washington, D.C. President Zelensky and his advisors struggled
to navigate these demands, recognizing that President Trump's
desire that Ukraine announce these political investigations
threatened to render Ukraine a ``pawn'' in U.S. domestic
reelection politics.
An Oval Office Meeting for President Zelensky Was Important to Ukraine
and U.S. National Security
A face-to-face meeting with the President of the United
States in the Oval Office was critical to President Zelensky as
the newly-elected Ukrainian leader sought U.S. support for his
ambitious anti-corruption agenda and to repel Russian
aggression. A White House meeting was also important for U.S.
national security because it would have served to bolster
Ukraine's negotiating position in peace talks with Russia. It
also would have supported Ukraine as a bulwark against further
Russian advances in Europe.
Multiple witnesses unanimously attested to the importance
of a White House meeting for Ukraine and the United States. For
example, David Holmes, the Political Counselor at the U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv, testified that a White House meeting was
``critical'' to President Zelensky's ability to ``encourage
Russian President Putin to take seriously President Zelensky's
peace efforts.''\456\ Likewise, Deputy Assistant Secretary
George Kent explained that a White House meeting was ``very
important'' for Ukrainians to demonstrate the strength of their
relationship with ``Ukraine's strongest supporter.'' He also
said that it ``makes sense'' for the United States to meet with
the Ukrainians as they were on ``the front lines of Russian
malign influence and aggression.''\457\
Dr. Fiona Hill, Deputy Assistant to the President and
Senior Director of Europe and Russia at the NSC, explained that
a White House meeting would supply the new Ukrainian Government
with ``the legitimacy that it needed, especially vis-a-vis the
Russians,''--and that the Ukrainians viewed a White House
meeting as ``a recognition of their legitimacy as a sovereign
state.''\458\ Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, the NSC Director for
Ukraine, testified that a White House meeting would provide a
``show of support'' from ``the most powerful country in the
world and Ukraine's most significant benefactor,'' which would
help the Ukrainian President ``establish his bona fides'' and
``implement his agenda.''\459\
Ambassador Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations, also recognized that it was ``a tremendous symbol
of support'' to have President Zelensky visit the White
House.\460\ He explained that a meeting ``enhances [President
Zelensky's] stature, that he is accepted, that he is seen at
the highest level. The imagery you get from being at the White
House is the best in the world, in terms of how it enhances
someone's image.''\461\
President Trump ``Wanted to Hear from Zelensky'' Before Scheduling Oval
Office Meeting
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr. arrived in Ukraine as the
new Charge d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv on June 17,
2019. After arriving, Ambassador Taylor worked to secure an
Oval Office meeting between President Trump and President
Zelensky. This was ``an agreed-upon goal'' of policymakers in
both Ukraine and the United States.\462\
Ambassador Taylor worked with Ambassador Volker and
Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland--two of the
Three Amigos--to try to schedule this meeting. Just days after
beginning his new position, Ambassador Taylor learned that
President Trump ``wanted to hear from Zelensky'' before
scheduling the Oval Office meeting, but Ambassador Taylor did
not understand what that meant at the time.\463\ On June 27,
Ambassador Sondland informed Ambassador Taylor that President
Zelensky needed to ``make clear'' to President Trump that he,
President Zelensky, was not ``standing in the way of
`investigations.'''\464\ Ambassador Taylor relayed this
conversation to Mr. Holmes, who testified that he understood
``investigations'' in that context to mean the ``Burisma-Biden
investigations that Mr. Giuliani and his associates had been
speaking about'' publicly.\465\
On June 28, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry the--third of
the Three Amigos--and Ambassadors Sondland, Volker, and Taylor
participated in a conference call to prepare for a discussion
later that day with President Zelensky. During this preparatory
call, Ambassador Volker explained that he planned to be
``explicit'' with President Zelensky in an upcoming one-on-one
meeting in Toronto, Canada. Specifically, Ambassador Volker
intended to inform President Zelensky that President Trump
would require Ukraine to address ``rule of law, transparency,
but also, specifically, cooperation on investigations to get to
the bottom of things'' in order to ``get the meeting in the
White House.''\466\
For the subsequent call with President Zelensky on June 28,
Ambassador Sondland sought to limit the number of U.S.
government personnel listening in. According to Ambassador
Taylor, Ambassador Sondland stated that he did not want to
include ``most of the regular interagency participants'' and
that ``he wanted to make sure no one was transcribing or
monitoring'' the call when President Zelensky was patched in.
Ambassador Taylor testified that he considered Ambassador
Sondland's requests to be ``odd.''\467\ During that call,
President Zelensky and the U.S. officials discussed energy
policy and the conflict with Russia in eastern Ukraine. The
Ukrainian president also noted that he looked forward to the
White House visit that President Trump had offered in a letter
dated May 29.\468\
The exclusion of State Department staff and notetakers from
the June 28 call was an early indication to Ambassador Taylor
that separate channels of diplomacy related to Ukraine policy--
an official channel and an irregular channel--were
``diverging.'' Ambassador Taylor testified:
This suggested to me that there were the two
channels. This suggested to me that the normal channel,
where you would have staff on the phone call, was being
cut out, and the other channel, of people who were
working, again, toward a goal which I supported, which
was having a meeting to further U.S.-Ukrainian
relations, I supported, but that irregular channel
didn't have a respect for or an interest in having the
normal staff participate in this call with the head of
state.\469\
Given Ambassador Sondland's efforts to exclude staff on the
June 28 call with President Zelensky, Ambassador Taylor asked
Ambassadors Sondland and Volker by text message how they
planned to handle informing other U.S. officials about the
contents of the call. Ambassador Volker responded: ``I think we
just keep it among ourselves to try to build working
relationship and just get the d*** date for the meeting!''\470\
Ambassador Sondland then texted: ``Agree with KV. Very close
hold.''\471\ Nevertheless, Ambassador Taylor informed Mr. Kent
about the call and wrote a memo for the record dated June 30
that summarized the conversation with President Zelensky.\472\
Ambassador Volker Pressed ``Investigations'' With President Zelensky in
Toronto
On July 2, Ambassador Volker met with President Zelensky
and his chief of staff on the sidelines of the Ukraine Reform
Conference in Toronto. As he later texted to Ambassador Taylor,
Ambassador Volker ``pulled the two of them aside at the end and
explained the Giuliani factor.''\473\ Ambassador Volker
clarified that by ``the Giuliani factor,'' he meant ``a
negative narrative about Ukraine'' that was ``being amplified
by Rudy Giuliani'' and was unfavorably impacting ``Ukraine's
image in the United States and our ability to advance the
bilateral relationship.''\474\ Ambassador Volker later informed
Ukraine's incoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vadym
Prystaiko, about his pull-aside with President Zelensky in
Toronto via text message: ``I talked to him privately about
Giuliani and impact on president T[rump].''\475\
On July 3, the day after his pull-aside with President
Zelensky in Toronto, Ambassador Volker sent a message to
Ambassador Taylor emphasizing that ``The key thing is to tee up
a phone call w potus and then get visit nailed down.''\476\
Ambassador Volker told Ambassador Taylor that during the
Toronto conference, he counseled the Ukrainian president about
how he could ``prepare for the phone call with President
Trump.'' Specifically, Ambassador Volker told the Ukrainian
leader that President Trump ``would like to hear about the
investigations.''\477\ In his public testimony, Ambassador
Volker confirmed that he mentioned ``investigations'' to
President Zelensky in Toronto, explaining that he was
``thinking of Burisma and 2016'' in raising the subject, and
that his ``assumption'' was that Ukrainian officials also
understood his reference to ``investigations'' to be ``Burisma/
2016.''\478\
Ambassador Volker's efforts to prepare President Zelensky
for his phone call with President Trump appear to have borne
fruit. As discussed further in Chapter 5, during the July 25
call, President Zelensky expressed his openness to pursuing
investigations into President Trump's political rival, former
Vice President Biden, and the conspiracy theory that Ukraine,
rather than Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election.
President Zelensky also specifically referenced ``Burisma''
during the call.
Ambassadors Volker and Sondland Worked to get Mr. Giuliani What he
Needed
According to Ambassador Sondland, President Zelensky's
commitment to make a public announcement about investigations
into Burisma and the 2016 election was a ``prerequisite[]'' for
the White House meeting.\479\ In fact, Ambassador Sondland
testified that the announcement of the investigations--and not
the investigations themselves--was the price President Trump
sought in exchange for a White House meeting with Ukrainian
President Zelensky:
Q: But he had to get those two investigations if that
official act was going to take place, correct?
A: He had to announce the investigations. He didn't
actually have to do them, as I understood it.
Q: Okay. President Zelensky had to announce the two
investigations the President wanted, make a public
announcement, correct?
A: Correct.\480\
Ambassadors Sondland and Volker understood that they needed
to work with Mr. Giuliani, who was publicly pressing for the
announcement of investigations that would benefit President
Trump politically. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ambassador
Sondland testified that the key to overcoming President Trump's
skepticism about Ukraine was satisfying the President's
personal attorney. Sondland said, ``Nonetheless, based on the
President's direction, we were faced with a choice: We could
abandon the efforts to schedule the White House phone call and
a White House visit'' or ``do as President Trump had directed
and `talk with Rudy''' because ``it was the only constructive
path open to us.''\481\
Ambassador Volker discussed his intention to contact Mr.
Giuliani with Mr. Kent. Ambassador Volker explained that he
intended to reach out to Mr. Giuliani because it was clear that
the former mayor ``had influence'' with President Trump ``in
terms of the way the President thought of Ukraine.''\482\
Ukrainian officials also understood the importance of working
through Mr. Giuliani, something that was underscored by his
successful effort to smear and remove Ambassador Marie
Yovanovitch from Kyiv in late April.\483\
In response to Ambassador Volker's stated intention to
reach out to Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Kent raised concerns about Mr.
Giuliani's ``track record,'' including ``asking for a visa for
a corrupt former prosecutor,'' attacking Ambassador
Yovanovitch, and ``tweeting that the new President needs to
investigate Biden and the 2016 campaign.'' Mr. Kent also warned
Ambassador Volker that ``asking another country to investigate
a prosecution for political reasons undermines our advocacy of
the rule of law.''\484\
On July 10, Ambassador Taylor met with Ukrainian officials
in Kyiv, before their Ukrainian colleagues were scheduled to
meet with National Security Advisor John Bolton at the White
House later that day. At the meeting in Kyiv, the Ukrainian
officials expressed that they were ``very concerned'' because
they had heard from former Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko,
who had learned from Mr. Giuliani, that President Trump had
decided not to meet with President Zelensky.\485\
Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassador Volker to explain the
situation and advised that he had also informed T. Ulrich
Brechbuhl, Counselor of the Department of State:
Volker: Good grief. Please tell Vadym to let the
official USG representatives speak for the U.S.
lutsenko has his own self-Interest here . . .
Taylor: Exactly what I told them.
Taylor: And I said that RG is a private citizen.
Taylor: I briefed Ulrich this afternoon on this.\486\
Despite his text message to Ambassador Taylor that official
U.S. government representatives should be allowed to ``speak
for the U.S.,'' and notwithstanding Mr. Kent's warnings about
engaging with Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador Volker almost
immediately reached out to Mr. Giuliani. Four minutes after
sending the text message above, Ambassador Volker texted Mr.
Giuliani to request a meeting to ``update you on my
conversations about Ukraine.'' He told Mr. Giuliani that he
believed he had ``an opportunity to get you what you
need.''\487\
One hour later, around 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador
Volker met Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy Yermak for coffee
at the Trump Hotel before they traveled down Pennsylvania
Avenue to their afternoon meetings at the White House.\488\
Over coffee, Mr. Yermak asked Ambassador Volker to connect him
to Mr. Giuliani, thus further demonstrating the Ukrainians'
understanding that satisfying Mr. Giuliani's demands was a key
to getting what they wanted from President Trump, namely the
Oval Office meeting.\489\
July 10 White House Meetings: Ambassador Sondland Explicitly
Communicated the ``Prerequisite of Investigations'' to Ukrainians
On July 10, during two separate meetings at the White
House, Ambassador Sondland informed senior Ukrainian officials
that there was a ``prerequisite of investigations'' before an
Oval Office meeting between President Trump and President
Zelensky would be scheduled.\490\
The first meeting took place in Ambassador Bolton's office.
NSC officials, including Ambassador Bolton's staff responsible
for Ukraine--Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman--attended, as did
the Three Amigos: Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and
Ambassador Volker. The Ukrainian delegation included Mr.
Yermak, a senior aide to President Zelensky, and Oleksandr
``Sasha'' Danyliuk, the incoming Ukrainian National Security
Advisor.\491\ The purpose of the meeting was twofold. The
Ukrainians were seeking advice and assistance from Ambassador
Bolton about how to ``revamp'' the Ukrainian National Security
Council, and they were also ``very anxious to set up a meeting,
a first meeting between President Zelensky and our
President.''\492\
Near the end of the meeting, the Ukrainian officials raised
the scheduling of the Oval Office meeting for President
Zelensky. According to Dr. Hill, Ambassador Sondland, who is
``a fairly big guy, kind of leaned over'' and then ``blurted
out: Well, we have an agreement with the [White House] Chief of
Staff for a meeting if these investigations in the energy
sector start.'' Dr. Hill described that others in the room
looked up from their notes, thinking the comment was ``somewhat
odd.'' Ambassador Bolton ``immediately stiffened'' and ended
the meeting. Dr. Hill recounted that Ambassador Bolton was
polite but was ``very abrupt. I mean, he looked at the clock as
if he had, you know, suddenly another meeting and his time was
up, but it was obvious he ended the meeting,'' she added.\493\
Lt. Col. Vindman similarly testified that the meeting in
Ambassador Bolton's office ``proceeded well'' until Ukrainian
officials raised the meeting between President Trump and
President Zelensky. The Ukrainians stated that they considered
the Oval Office meeting to be ``critically important in order
to solidify the support for their most important international
partner.'' When Ambassador Sondland mentioned Ukraine
``delivering specific investigations in order to secure the
meeting with the President,'' Ambassador Bolton cut the meeting
short.\494\
Although Ambassador Volker did not recall any mention of
``investigations'' during the July 10 meeting at his
deposition,\495\ he later testified at his public hearing, ``As
I remember, the meeting [in Ambassador Bolton's office] was
essentially over when Ambassador Sondland made a general
comment about investigations. I think all of us thought it was
inappropriate'' and ``not what we should be talking
about.''\496\
After Ambassador Bolton ended the meeting in his office,
Ambassador Sondland ``went out into the office in front of
Ambassador Bolton'' and made ``unusual'' arrangements for the
Ukrainians, Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry, and others to
go to a second meeting in the Ward Room of the White House,
located near the secure spaces of the White House Situation
Room. As Dr. Hill described it, the purpose of the Ward Room
meeting was ``to talk to the Ukrainians about next steps''
regarding the Oval Office meeting for President Zelensky.\497\
As Dr. Hill was leaving Ambassador Bolton's office, he pulled
her aside and directed her to attend the Ward Room meeting to
``find out what they're talking about and come back'' and
report to him. Dr. Hill followed his instruction.\498\
During the Ward Room meeting, which occurred after a brief
photo opportunity outside the West Wing, Ambassador Sondland
was more explicit in pressing the Ukrainians to undertake the
investigations in order to secure an Oval Office meeting for
President Zelensky. Lt. Col. Vindman testified that when the
group entered the Ward Room, Ambassador Sondland began to
``review what the deliverable would be in order to get the
meeting,'' and that ``to the best of my recollection, he did
specifically say `investigation of the Bidens.''' Lt. Col.
Vindman said the request ``was explicit. There was no
ambiguity'' and that Ambassador Sondland also mentioned
``Burisma.''\499\
Dr. Hill entered the Ward Room as the discussion was
underway. She testified that ``Ambassador Sondland, in front of
the Ukrainians, as I came in, was talking about how he had an
agreement with Chief of Staff Mulvaney for a meeting with the
Ukrainians if they were going to go forward with
investigations. And my director for Ukraine [Lt. Col. Vindman]
was looking completely alarmed.''\500\ Dr. Hill recalled that
Ambassador Sondland mentioned ``Burisma'' in the presence of
the Ukrainians, in response to which Mr. Danyliuk also appeared
``very alarmed'' and as if he did not know what was
happening.\501\
Dr. Hill confronted Ambassador Sondland, informing him that
Ambassador Bolton had sent her there to ensure that the U.S.
officials did not commit ``at this particular juncture'' to a
meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky.
Ambassador Sondland responded that he and the Ukrainians
already had an agreement that the meeting would go
forward.\502\ At Dr. Hill's urging, however, Ambassador
Sondland excused the Ukrainian officials, who moved into the
corridor near the White House Situation Room.
Dr. Hill then told Ambassador Sondland: ``Look, I don't
know what's going on here, but Ambassador Bolton wants to make
it very clear that we have to talk about, you know, how are we
going to set up this meeting. It has to go through proper
procedures.'' Lt. Col. Vindman relayed his own concerns to
Ambassador Sondland in the Ward Room.\503\ He explained that
``the request to investigate the Bidens and his son had nothing
to do with national security, and that such investigations were
not something that the NSC was going to get involved in or
push.''\504\
Ambassador Sondland responded that he had had conversations
with Mr. Mulvaney and he also mentioned Mr. Giuliani. Lt. Col.
Vindman confirmed that Ambassador Sondland described an
agreement he had with Mr. Mulvaney about the Oval Office
meeting: ``I heard him say that this had been coordinated with
White House Chief of Staff Mr. Mick Mulvaney . . . He just said
that he had had a conversation with Mr. Mulvaney, and this is
what was required in order to get a meeting.''\505\ Dr. Hill
then cut the conversation short because she ``didn't want to
get further into this discussion at all.'' She testified that
Ambassador Sondland ``was clearly annoyed with this, but then,
you know, he moved off. He said he had other meetings.''\506\
Later on July 10, when Ambassador Taylor asked Ambassador
Volker how the meetings went with the Ukrainian officials and
whether they had resulted in a decision on a presidential call,
Ambassador Volker replied: ``Not good lets talk.''\507\
Following the July 10 White House meetings, Mr. Yermak
followed up with Ambassador Volker by text message: ``Thank you
for meeting and your clear and very logical position. Will be
great meet with you before my departure and discuss. I feel
that the key for many things is Rudi and I ready to talk with
him at any time.''\508\
Concerned Officials Reported Details of This ``Drug Deal'' to White
House Lawyers
After the Ward Room meeting, Dr. Hill returned to
Ambassador Bolton's office and relayed what she had just
witnessed. Ambassador Bolton was ``very angry'' and instructed
her to report the conversation to John Eisenberg, Deputy
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and the
Legal Advisor to the National Security Council:
And he told me, and this is a direct quote from
Ambassador Bolton: You go and tell Eisenberg that I am
not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and Mulvaney
are cooking up on this, and you go and tell him what
you've heard and what I've said.\509\
Dr. Hill explained that ``drug deal'' referred to
Ambassador Sondland's and Mr. Mulvaney's conditioning of a
White House meeting on investigations.\510\ By this point, Dr.
Hill explained, it was clear that investigations were ``code,
at least, for Burisma. Because that had been mentioned, you
know, in the course of Mr. Giuliani's appearances on
television.''\511\ Numerous U.S. officials, including
Ambassadors Sondland, Volker, and Bolton, as well as Lt. Col.
Vindman and others, were well aware of Mr. Giuliani's efforts
to push Ukraine to pursue these political investigations.
Following the meeting with Ambassador Bolton, Dr. Hill
reported what had occurred to Mr. Eisenberg. She conveyed to
Mr. Eisenberg the details of the two meetings, including
Ambassador Sondland's agreement with Mr. Mulvaney to provide
the White House meeting if Ukraine agreed to pursue the
investigations.\512\ The initial conversation between Dr. Hill
and Mr. Eisenberg was brief, and they scheduled a longer
discussion for the next day.\513\
On July 11, Dr. Hill enlisted another NSC official who
attended the July 10 meetings, Senior Director for
International Energy and Environment P. Wells Griffith, to
attend the longer discussion with Mr. Eisenberg.\514\ Dr. Hill
and Mr. Griffith went over the events of July 10 and further
explained that Ambassador Sondland said that he had been
communicating with Mr. Giuliani. Mr. Eisenberg was ``very
concerned'' and stated that he would follow up. Dr. Hill
understood that Mr. Eisenberg later discussed the issue with
his ``reporting authority,'' specifically, White House Counsel
Pat Cipollone.\515\
Lt. Col. Vindman separately reported his concerns about the
July 10 meetings to Mr. Eisenberg. He told Mr. Eisenberg that
Ambassador Sondland had asked for investigations into ``Bidens
and Burisma,'' which he thought was ``inappropriate.''\516\ Lt.
Col. Vindman also reported that the investigation ``Mr.
Giuliani was pushing was now being pulled into a, you know,
national security dialogue.''\517\ Mr. Eisenberg said that he
would look into it and invited Lt. Col. Vindman to return if
any further concerns arose. No one from the of the White House
Counsel's Office, however, followed up with Lt. Col. Vindman on
this issue.\518\
Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman discussed their reactions and
alarm about the July 10 discussions with each other. They both
believed that Ambassador Sondland's statements were
inappropriate and ``had nothing to do with national security,''
and that they would not get involved with the scheme.\519\ On
July 19, they also shared their concerns about Ambassador
Sondland's comments during the July 10 meetings with Ambassador
Taylor.\520\
Ambassador Sondland Coached President Zelensky on Investigations and
Kept Senior White House and State Department Officials ``In the Loop''
In mid-July, Dr. Hill was preparing to depart the NSC and
transitioning her role to Timothy Morrison, who had been
serving in another role at the NSC.\521\ On July 13, Ambassador
Sondland emailed Mr. Morrison, explaining that the ``[s]ole
purpose'' of a presidential call was for President Zelensky to
assure President Trump that, ``Corruption ending, unbundling
moving forward and any hampered investigations will be allowed
to move forward transparently.'' In exchange, Ambassador
Sondland wrote, the ``Goal is for Potus to invite him to Oval.
Volker, Perry, Bolton and I strongly recommend.''\522\ Later
that evening, Mr. Morrison responded, ``Thank you.
Tracking.''\523\
On July 19, a little over a week after the July 10 meetings
at the White House, Ambassador Sondland spoke directly to
President Zelensky about the upcoming call between the two
presidents: ``It was a short call. I think I said: It looks
like your call is finally on, and I think it's important that
you, you know, give President Trump--he wanted this--some kind
of a statement about corruption.''\524\
Following his call with President Zelensky, Ambassador
Sondland emailed several senior Trump Administration officials,
including Mr. Mulvaney, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo,
Secretary Perry, and their staffs. The subject line of the July
19 email read: ``I Talked to Zelensky just now.'' Ambassador
Sondland wrote:
He is prepared to receive Potus' call. Will assure
him that he intends to run a fully transparent
investigation and will ``turn over every stone''. He
would greatly appreciate a call prior to Sunday so that
he can put out some media about a ``friendly and
productive call'' (no details) prior to Ukraine
election on Sunday.\525\
Secretary Perry responded that Mr. Mulvaney had confirmed a
call would be set up ``for tomorrow by NSC,''\526\ and Mr.
Mulvaney also responded to confirm that he had asked the NSC to
set up the call between the presidents for the following day,
July 20.\527\
Ambassador Sondland explained that this email chain showed
that ``[e]veryone was in the loop'' regarding his discussions
with Ukrainian officials about the need for the Ukrainian
leader to confirm to President Trump that he would announce the
investigations. As Ambassador Sondland further testified:
It was no secret. Everyone was informed via email on
July 19th, days before the Presidential call. As I
communicated to the team, I told President Zelensky in
advance that assurances to run a fully transparent
investigation and turn over every stone were necessary
in his call with President Trump.\528\
Call records reviewed by the Committees show repeated
contact between Ambassador Sondland and the White House around
this time. For example, on July 19, at 10:43 a.m. Eastern Time,
a number associated with the White House dialed Ambassador
Sondland. Four minutes later, at 10:47 a.m., Ambassador
Sondland called a White House phone number and connected for
approximately seven minutes.\529\
Later in the afternoon of July 19, Ambassador Sondland
texted Ambassadors Volker and Taylor: ``Looks like Potus call
tomorrow. I spike [sic] directly to Zelensky and gave him a
full briefing. He's got it.''\530\ Ambassador Volker replied:
``Good. Had breakfast with Rudy this morning--teeing up call w
Yermak Monday. Must have helped. Most impt is for Zelensky to
say that he will help investigation--and address any specific
personnel issues--if there are any.''\531\
Mr. Giuliani Met with State Department Officials and Ukrainian
Government Officials
As Ambassador Volker informed Ambassador Sondland in the
above text message, on July 19, Ambassador Volker met Mr.
Giuliani and his now-indicted associate Lev Parnas for
breakfast at the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C.\532\
Ambassador Volker also texted Mr. Yermak to inform him that he
and Mr. Giuliani were meeting that day: ``Having our long
anticipated breakfast today--will let you know and try to
connect you directly.''\533\
During the breakfast, Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador Volker
discussed the discredited allegations against former Vice
President Biden relating to Ukraine. Ambassador Volker
testified that he pushed back against the allegations during
his breakfast with Mr. Giuliani:
One of the things that I said in that breakfast that
I had with Mr. Giuliani, the only time Vice President
Biden was ever discussed with me, and he was
repeating--he wasn't making an accusation and he wasn't
seeking an investigation--but he was repeating all of
the things that were in the media that we talked about
earlier about, you know, firing the prosecutor general
and his son being on the company and all that.
And I said to Rudy in that breakfast the first time
we sat down to talk that it is simply not credible to
me that Joe Biden would be influenced in his duties as
Vice President by money or things for his son or
anything like that. I've known him a long time, he's a
person of integrity, and that's not credible.\534\
Ambassador Volker further advised Mr. Giuliani during the
breakfast that the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor General, Yuriy
Lutsenko, was promoting a ``self-serving narrative to preserve
himself in power.'' Mr. Giuliani agreed with Ambassador Volker
and stated that he had come to that conclusion as well.\535\
Following the breakfast, Ambassador Volker connected Mr.
Giuliani with Mr. Yermak by text message:
Volker: Mr Mayor--really enjoyed breakfast this
morning. As discussed, connecting you here with Andrey
Yermak, who is very close to President Zelensky. I
suggest we schedule a call together on Monday--maybe
10am or 11am Washington time? Kurt
Giuliani: Monday 10 to 11
Yermak: Ok, thank you
Volker: I will set up call--10 am--thanks--Kurt
Yermak: T\536\
On the morning of July 22, Mr. Yermak texted Ambassador
Volker about the upcoming call with Mr. Giuliani, writing that
it was ``very good'' that their discussion would take place
before the call between President Trump and President
Zelensky.\537\ Later that day, the three men spoke by phone.
Ambassador Volker described the July 22 discussion as merely an
``introductory phone call,''\538\ although phone records
indicate that the call lasted for approximately 38
minutes.\539\
Ambassador Volker testified that during the call, Mr.
Giuliani and Mr. Yermak discussed plans for an in-person
meeting in Madrid in early August.\540\ Afterward, Ambassador
Volker texted Mr. Yermak that he thought the call had been
``very useful'' and recommended that Mr. Yermak send Mr.
Giuliani a text message to schedule a date for the Madrid
meeting.\541\ Mr. Yermak texted Mr. Giuliani later that day
about a plan to ``take this relationship to a new level'' and
to meet in person as soon as possible.\542\
Later on July 22, Ambassador Volker updated Ambassador
Sondland on the ``great call'' he ``[o]rchestrated'' between
Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Yermak, noting that ``Rudy is now
advocating for phone call,'' an apparent reference to the call
between President Trump and President Zelensky that would occur
on July 25. Ambassador Volker also recommended that Ambassador
Sondland inform Mr. Mulvaney that ``Rudy agrees,'' and that he
planned to convey the same information to Ambassador Bolton.
Ambassador Sondland replied that Mr. Morrison of the White
House NSC was also in support of the call.\543\ Ambassador
Volker also told Ambassador Sondland that Mr. Giuliani and Mr.
Yermak would meet in person in Madrid within a couple of
weeks.\544\
President Zelensky Feared Becoming ``A Pawn'' in U.S. Reelection
Campaign
Around this time, senior Ukrainian officials informed U.S.
officials that the new Ukrainian president did not want Ukraine
to become enmeshed in U.S. domestic reelection politics.
On July 20, Ambassador Taylor spoke with Mr. Danyliuk, the
Ukrainian national security advisor, who conveyed that
President Zelensky ``did not want to be used as a pawn in a
U.S. reelection campaign.''\545\ Ambassador Taylor discussed
President Zelensky's concern with Ambassador Volker and, the
next day, texted Ambassador Sondland:
Taylor: Gordon, one thing Kurt and I talked about
yesterday was Sasha Danyliuk's point that President
Zelenskyy is sensitive about Ukraine being taken
seriously, not merely as an instrument in Washington
domestic, reelection politics.
Sondland: Absolutely, but we need to get the
conversation started and the relationship built,
irrespective of the pretext. I am worried about the
alternative.\546\
Ambassador Taylor explained that his reference to
``Washington domestic reelection politics'' was ``a reference
to the investigations that Mr. Giuliani wanted to
pursue.''\547\ According to Ambassador Taylor, President
Zelensky understood what President Trump and Mr. Giuliani meant
by ``investigations,'' and ``he did not want to get involved.''
Specifically, the Ukrainians understood that the
``investigations were pursuant to Mr. Giuliani's request to
develop information, to find information about Burisma and the
Bidens. This was very well known in public. Mr. Giuliani had
made this point clear in several instances in the beginning--in
the springtime.''\548\ Ambassador Taylor also testified that
the ``whole thrust'' of the activities undertaken by Mr.
Giuliani and Ambassador Sondland ``was to get these
investigations, which Danyliuk and presumably Zelensky were
resisting because they didn't want to be seen to be interfering
but also to be a pawn.''\549\
Despite the Ukrainian resistance, Ambassador Sondland said
he believed that the public announcement of investigations
would ``fix'' an impasse between the Ukrainian government and
President Trump. When asked what he meant by ``irrespective of
the pretext'' in his July 21 text message to Ambassador Taylor,
Ambassador Sondland explained, ``Well, the pretext being the
agreed-upon interview or the agreed-upon press statement. We
just need to get by it so that the two can meet, because,
again, it was back to once they meet, all of this will be
fixed.''\550\
Witnesses Confirmed the President Conditioned an Oval Office Meeting on
Investigations
Multiple witnesses testified that the conditioning of an
Oval Office meeting on President Zelensky's announcement of
investigations to benefit the President's reelection campaign
came from the very top: President Trump.
Ambassador Sondland testified that he, Secretary Perry, and
Ambassador Volker worked with Mr. Giuliani ``at the express
direction of the President of the United States.''\551\
Ambassador Sondland stated that ``Mr. Giuliani was expressing
the desires of the President of the United States, and we knew
these investigations were important to the President.''\552\
Ambassador Sondland explained that he ``followed the directions
of the President'' and that ``we followed the President's
orders.''\553\
Ambassador Sondland further testified that President Trump
expressed--both directly and through Mr. Giuliani--that he
wanted ``a public statement from President Zelensky committing
to the investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election'' as
``prerequisites for the White House call and the White House
meeting.''\554\ Ambassador Sondland explained:
I know that members of this committee frequently
frame these complicated issues in the form of a simple
question: Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified
previously with regard to the requested White House
call and the White House meeting, the answer is
yes.\555\
Ambassador Sondland also testified that knowledge of this
quid pro quo was widespread among the President's advisers:
``Everyone was in the loop'' about the President's expectation
that President Zelensky had to announce these specific
investigations to secure an Oval Office meeting. As an example,
Ambassador Sondland cited an email--copying Senior Advisor to
the White House Chief of Staff Robert Blair, State Department
Executive Secretary Lisa Kenna, Chief of Staff to the Secretary
of Energy Brian McCormack, Mr. Mulvaney, Secretary Perry, and
Secretary Pompeo--where ``[e]veryone was informed.''\556\
Other U.S. government officials also understood this scheme
as a quid pro quo. Ambassador Taylor testified that as early as
mid-July, it was ``becoming clear'' to him that ``the meeting
President Zelensky wanted was conditioned on investigations of
Burisma and alleged Ukrainian influence in the 2016 elections''
and that ``this condition was driven by the irregular policy
channel I had come to understand was guided by Mr.
Giuliani.''\557\ Mr. Holmes similarly understood that by July,
``it was made clear that some action on a Burisma/Biden
investigation was a precondition for an Oval Office
visit.''\558\ Dr. Hill testified that this quid pro quo was
readily apparent after reading the July 25 call summary,
explaining that it revealed that the White House meeting was
used as ``some kind of asset'' that was ``dangled out to the
Ukrainian Government'' to secure a political benefit.\559\
Final Preparation for Trump-Zelensky Call: Ambassador Volker Counseled
Ukrainians and Ambassador Sondland Prepped President Trump
Ambassador Taylor testified that the call between President
Trump and President Zelensky that ultimately occurred on July
25 was not confirmed until the last minute: ``We were trying to
schedule it for about a week in advance, that whole week. As I
say, back and forth, yes, no, this time, that time. . . . it
may have been about the day before that it was actually locked
down, so about the 24th.''\560\ According to Ambassador Taylor,
at least one person had prescient concerns about the call
before it occurred: ``Ambassador Bolton was not interested in
having--did not want to have the call because he thought it was
going to be a disaster. He thought that there could be some
talk of investigations or worse on the call.''\561\
Before the call took place on July 25, Ambassador Volker
had lunch with Mr. Yermak in Kyiv. Ambassador Volker followed
up with a text message to Mr. Yermak approximately 30 minutes
before the call, noting that a White House visit was still on
the table if, during the call, President Zelensky convinced
President Trump that Ukraine would ``investigate'' and ``get to
the bottom of what happened'' in 2016:
Volker: Good lunch--thanks. Heard from White House--
assuming President Z convinces trump he will
investigate / ``get to the bottom of what happened'' in
2016, we will nail down date for visit to Washington.
Good luck! See you tomorrow--kurt
Ambassador Volker later informed Ambassador Sondland that
he had relayed this ``message'' to Mr. Yermak, which Ambassador
Sondland had conveyed to Ambassador Volker earlier that day:
Volker: Hi Gordon--got your message. Had a great
lunch w Yermak and then passed your message to him. He
will see you tomorrow. Think everything in place\562\
Ambassador Sondland testified that the ``message'' that
Ambassador Volker conveyed to Mr. Yermak in advance of the July
25 call likely originated from an earlier conversation that
Ambassador Sondland had with President Trump:
Q: So is it fair to say that this message is what you
received from President--Trump on that phone call that
morning?
A: Again, if he testified to that, to refresh my own
memory, then, yes, likely I would have received that
from President Trump.
Q: But the sequence certainly makes sense, right?
A: Yeah, it does.
Q: You talked to President Trump.
A: Yeah.
Q: You told Kurt Volker to call you. You left a
message for Kurt Volker. Kurt Volker sent this text
message to Andriy Yermak to prepare President Zelensky
and then President Trump had a phone call where
President Zelensky spoke very similar to what was in
this text message, right?
A: Right.
Q: And you would agree that the message in this--that
is expressed here is that President Zelensky needs to
convince Trump that he will do the investigations in
order to nail down the date for a visit to Washington,
D.C. Is that correct?
A: That's correct.\563\
Ambassador Sondland testified that he spoke with President
Trump before the call with President Zelensky.\564\ Mr.
Morrison also confirmed that President Trump and Ambassador
Sondland spoke before President Trump's call with President
Zelensky.\565\ Mr. Morrison stated that Ambassador Sondland
emailed him on the morning of the call and listed ``three
topics that he was working on, the first of which was `I spoke
to the President this morning to brief him on the call.'''\566\
According to Mr. Morrison, Ambassador Sondland ``believed''
that he helped to facilitate the July 25 call between President
Trump and President Zelensky.\567\
On July 26, the day after the call between President Trump
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Volker acknowledged his role
in prepping President Zelensky for the call with President
Trump in a text to Mr. Giuliani: ``Hi Mr Mayor--you may have
heard--the President has [sic] a great phone call with the
Ukrainian President yesterday. Exactly the right messages as we
discussed.''\568\
5. The President Asked the Ukrainian President to Interfere in the
2020 U.S. Election by Investigating the Bidens and 2016 Election
Interference
During a call on July 25, President Trump asked President Zelensky of
Ukraine to ``do us a favor though'' and investigate his
political opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden, and a
debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered in the 2016
U.S. election. The next day, Ambassador Gordon Sondland
informed President Trump that President Zelensky ``was gonna do
the investigation'' and ``anything'' President Trump asked of
him.
Overview
During a telephone call on July 25, 2019, President Donald
J. Trump asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to
investigate his political rival, former Vice President Joseph
Biden, and a debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered
in the 2016 U.S. election. President Trump also discussed the
removal of Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, former U.S. Ambassador
to Ukraine, said that she was ``bad news,'' and warned that she
would ``go through some things.'' Two witnesses who listened to
the call testified that they immediately reported the details
of the call to senior White House lawyers.
When asked by a reporter on October 3, 2019, what he had
hoped President Zelensky would do following the call, President
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.''
Witnesses unanimously testified that President Trump's
claims about former Vice President Biden and alleged Ukrainian
interference in the 2016 U.S. election have been discredited.
The witnesses reaffirmed that in late 2015 and early 2016, when
former Vice President Biden advocated for the removal of a
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor, he acted in accordance with a
``broad-based consensus'' and the official policy of the United
States, the European Union, and major international financial
institutions. Witnesses also unanimously testified that the
removal of that prosecutor made it more likely that Ukraine
would investigate corruption, not less likely.
Dr. Fiona Hill, former Deputy Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National
Security Council, testified that the conspiracy theories about
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election touted by
President Trump are a ``fictional narrative that is being
perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services.''
She noted that President Trump's former Homeland Security
Advisor Tom Bossert and former National Security Advisor H.R.
McMaster repeatedly advised the President that the so-called
``CrowdStrike'' conspiracy theory that President Trump raised
in the July 25 call is completely ``debunked,'' and that
allegations Ukraine interfered in the 2016 U.S. election are
false.
Nonetheless, on July 26, 2019, U.S. Ambassador to the
European Union Gordon Sondland met with senior Ukrainian
officials in Kyiv and then informed President Trump that
President Zelensky ``was gonna do the investigation'' into
former Vice President Biden and alleged Ukrainian interference
in the 2016 U.S. election. Ambassador Sondland added that
President Zelensky would ``do anything'' President Trump asked
of him. After the call, Ambassador Sondland told David Holmes,
Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv,
that President Trump ``did not give a shit about Ukraine'' and
that he only cared about the ``big stuff'' that benefited his
personal interests, like the ``Biden investigation.''
President Trump's Call With President Zelensky on July 25, 2019
On July 25, 2019, President Zelensky finally had a long-
awaited phone call with Ukraine's most important international
partner: The President of the United States.
It had been over three months since the two leaders first
spoke. Despite a warm but largely non-substantive call on April
21, President Trump had since declined President Zelensky's
invitation to attend his inauguration and directed Vice
President Mike Pence not to attend either.\569\ Ukrainian
efforts to set a date for a promised Oval Office meeting with
President Trump were stalled. As Mr. Holmes explained,
following the April 21 call:
President Zelensky's team immediately began pressing
to set a date for that visit. President Zelensky and
senior members of his team made clear that they wanted
President Zelensky's first overseas trip to be to
Washington, to send a strong signal of American
support, and requested a call with President Trump as
soon as possible.\570\
Before scheduling the July 25 call or a White House visit,
President Trump met on June 28 with Russian President Vladimir
Putin--whose armed forces were engaged in a war of attrition
against U.S.-backed Ukrainian forces--on the sidelines of the
G20 summit in Osaka, Japan.\571\ During their meeting,
President Trump and President Putin shared a joke about
Russia's meddling in the 2016 U.S. election.\572\
On July 25, President Trump joined the call with President
Zelensky from the Executive Residence at the White House, away
from a small group of senior national security aides who would
normally join him in the Oval Office for a conversation with a
foreign head of state. President Trump and President Zelensky
began to speak at 9:03 a.m. Washington time--4:03 p.m. in Kyiv.
According to Tim Morrison, the newly-installed Senior Director
for Europe and Russia on the NSC, President Zelensky spoke in
Ukrainian and occasionally in ``chopped English.''\573\
Translators interpreted the call on both sides.\574\ American
aides listening to the call from the White House Situation Room
hoped that what was said over the next 30 minutes would provide
President Zelensky with the strong U.S. endorsement he needed
in order to successfully negotiate an end to the five-year-old
war with Russia that had killed over 13,000 Ukrainian soldiers
and to advance President Zelensky's ambitious anti-corruption
initiatives in Ukraine.\575\
The Trump Administration's subject-matter experts, NSC
Director for Ukraine Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman and Mr.
Morrison, were both on the call.\576\ They had prepared talking
points for President Trump and were taking detailed notes of
what both leaders said, so that they could promptly implement
any agreed-upon actions.\577\ They were joined by Lt. Gen.
Keith Kellogg, National Security Advisor to the Vice President,
and Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President
for Europe and Russia. Assistant to the President Robert Blair,
a senior aide to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, was also
present, along with an NSC press officer.\578\ Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo listened from a different location, as did
Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, the Deputy National Security
Advisor.\579\
Notably, Secretary Pompeo did not reveal that he listened
to the July 25 call when asked directly about it on This Week
on September 22.\580\ Neither Secretary Pompeo nor the State
Department corrected the record until September 30, when ``a
senior State Department official'' disclosed the Secretary of
State's participation in the July 25 call.\581\
The two presidents first exchanged pleasantries. President
Trump congratulated the Ukrainian leader on his party's
parliamentary victory. In a nod to their shared experience as
political outsiders, President Zelensky called President Trump
``a great teacher'' who informed his own efforts to involve
``many many new people'' in Ukraine's politics and ``drain the
swamp here in our country.''\582\
The discussion turned to U.S. support for Ukraine.
President Trump contrasted U.S. assistance to that of America's
closest European allies, stating: ``We spend a lot of effort
and a lot of time. Much more than the European countries are
doing and they should be helping you more than they are.'' The
call then took a more ominous turn. President Trump stated that
with respect to U.S. support for Ukraine, ``I wouldn't say that
it's reciprocal necessarily because things are happening that
are not good but the United States has been very very good to
Ukraine.''\583\
President Zelensky, whose government receives billions of
dollars in financial support from the European Union and its
member states, responded that European nations were ``not
working as much as they should work for Ukraine,'' including in
the area of enforcing sanctions against Russia.\584\ He noted
that ``the United States is a much bigger partner than the
European Union'' and stated that he was ``very grateful''
because ``the United States is doing quite a lot for
Ukraine.''\585\
President Zelensky then raised the issue of U.S. military
assistance for Ukraine with President Trump: ``I also would
like to thank you for your great support in the area of
defense''--an area where U.S. support is vital.\586\ President
Zelensky continued: ``We are ready to continue to cooperate for
the next steps specifically we are almost ready to buy more
Javelins from the United States for defense purposes.''\587\
The Javelin anti-tank missiles, first transferred to Ukraine by
the United States in 2018, were widely viewed by U.S. officials
as a deterrent against further Russian encroachment into
Ukrainian territory.\588\
Immediately after the Ukrainian leader raised the issue of
U.S. military assistance to Ukraine, President Trump replied:
``I would like you to do us a favor though because our country
has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it.''\589\
Request to Investigate 2016 Election
President Trump then explained the ``favor'' he wanted
President Zelensky to do. He first requested that Ukraine
investigate a discredited conspiracy theory aimed at
undercutting the U.S. Intelligence Community's unanimous
conclusion that the Russian government interfered in the 2016
U.S. election.\590\ Specifically, President Trump stated:
I would like you to find out what happened with this
whole situation with Ukraine, they say Crowdstrike . .
. I guess you have one of your wealthy people . . . The
server, they say Ukraine has it. There are a lot of
things that went on, the whole situation. I think
you're surrounding yourself with some of the same
people. I would like to have the Attorney General call
you or your people and I would like you to get to the
bottom of it. As you saw yesterday, that whole nonsense
ended with a very poor performance by a man named
Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance, but they
say a lot of it started with Ukraine. Whatever you can
do, it's very important that you do it if that's
possible.\591\
President Trump was referencing the widely debunked
conspiracy theory that the Ukrainian government--and not
Russia--was behind the hack of Democratic National Committee
(DNC) servers in 2016, and that the American cybersecurity firm
CrowdStrike moved the DNC's servers to Ukraine to prevent U.S.
law enforcement from examining them. This theory is often
referred to in shorthand as ``CrowdStrike'' and has been
promoted by the Russian government.\592\
For example, during a press conference in February 2017,
just weeks after the U.S. Intelligence Community unanimously
assessed in a public report that Russia interfered in the 2016
U.S. election to benefit the candidacy of Donald J. Trump,
President Putin falsely asserted that ``the Ukrainian
government adopted a unilateral position in favour of one
candidate. More than that, certain oligarchs, certainly with
the approval of the political leadership, funded this
candidate, or female candidate, to be more precise.''\593\
President Trump's reference in his July 25 telephone call to
``one of your wealthy people'' tracked closely with President
Putin's accusations that ``certain oligarchs'' in Ukraine
meddled in the 2016 U.S. election to support Democratic
candidate Hillary Clinton.
Dr. Hill, an expert on Russia and President Putin,
testified that the claim that ``Russia and its security
services did not conduct a campaign against our country and
that perhaps, somehow for some reason, Ukraine did'' is ``a
fictional narrative that is being perpetrated and propagated by
the Russian security services themselves.'' Dr. Hill reaffirmed
that the U.S. Intelligence Community's January 2017 conclusion
that Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. election is ``beyond
dispute, even if some of the underlying details must remain
classified.''\594\
Tom Bossert, President Trump's former Homeland Security
Advisor, stated publicly that the CrowdStrike theory is ``not
only a conspiracy theory, it is completely debunked.''\595\ Dr.
Hill testified that White House officials--including Mr.
Bossert and former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster--
``spent a lot of time'' refuting the CrowdStrike conspiracy
theory to President Trump. Dr. Hill explained that Mr. Bossert
and others ``who were working on cybersecurity laid out to the
President the facts about the interference.'' She affirmed that
President Trump was advised that ``the alternative theory that
Ukraine had interfered in the election was false.''\596\
President Zelensky did not directly address President
Trump's reference to CrowdStrike during the July 25 call, but
he tried to assure President Trump that ``it is very important
for me and everything that you just mentioned earlier.''\597\
President Zelensky committed to proceed with an investigation,
telling President Trump that he had ``nobody but friends'' in
the new Ukrainian presidential administration, possibly
attempting to rebut Rudy Giuliani's earlier claims that
President Zelensky was surrounded by ``enemies'' of President
Trump. President Zelensky then specifically noted that one of
his assistants ``spoke with Mr. Giuliani just recently and we
are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani will be able to travel
to Ukraine and we will meet once he comes to Ukraine.''\598\
Significantly, President Zelensky referenced Mr. Giuliani
even before President Trump had mentioned him, demonstrating
the Ukrainian leader's understanding that Mr. Giuliani
represented President Trump's interests in Ukraine. The
Ukrainian leader then reassured President Trump, ``I also plan
to surround myself with great people and in addition to that
investigation'' into the CrowdStrike conspiracy theory. He
said, ``I guarantee as the President of Ukraine that all the
investigations will be done openly and candidly. That I can
assure you.''\599\ President Trump replied, ``Rudy very much
knows what's happening and he is a very capable guy. If you
could speak to him that would be great.''\600\
Request to Investigate Bidens
President Trump then returned to his requested ``favor,''
asking President Zelensky about the ``[t]he other thing'': that
Ukraine investigate President Trump's U.S. political rival,
former Vice President Biden, for allegedly ending an
investigation into the Ukrainian energy company Burisma
Holdings. Vice President Biden's son, Hunter Biden, served as a
member of Burisma's board of directors. President Trump told
President Zelensky:
The other thing, There's a lot of talk about Biden's
son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of
people want to find out about that so whatever you can
do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden went
around bragging that he stopped the prosecution so if
you can look into it . . . It sounds horrible to
me.\601\
President Trump later continued, ``I will have Mr. Giuliani
give you a call and I am also going to have Attorney General
Barr call and we will get to the bottom of it. I'm sure you
will figure it out.''\602\
In public remarks on October 3, 2019, a reporter asked
President Trump, ``what exactly did you hope Zelensky would do
about the Bidens after your phone call? Exactly.'' President
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.''\603\
When President Trump asserted to President Zelensky during
the July 25 call that former Vice President ``Biden went around
bragging that he stopped the prosecution,'' President Trump was
apparently referring to Vice President Biden's involvement in
the removal of the corrupt former Ukrainian prosecutor general,
Viktor Shokin.
Multiple witnesses--including Dr. Hill, former U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, Mr. Holmes, and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State George Kent--testified that they
were not aware of any credible evidence to support the claim
that former Vice President Biden acted inappropriately when he
advocated for the removal of Mr. Shokin.\604\ To the contrary,
those witnesses confirmed that it was the official policy of
the United States, the European Union, and major international
financial institutions, to demand Mr. Shokin's dismissal. As
Mr. Kent testified, there was ``a broad-based consensus'' that
Mr. Shokin was ``a typical Ukraine prosecutor who lived a
lifestyle far in excess of his government salary, who never
prosecuted anybody known for having committed a crime'' and who
``covered up crimes that were known to have been
committed.''\605\ Mr. Kent further explained:
What former Vice President Biden requested of former
President of Ukraine Poroshenko was the removal of a
corrupt prosecutor general, Viktor Shokin, who had
undermined a program of assistance that we had spent,
again, U.S. taxpayer money to try to build an
independent investigator unit to go after corrupt
prosecutors.\606\
As Ambassador Yovanovitch testified, the removal of a
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor general, who was not prosecuting
enough corruption, increased the chance that alleged corruption
in companies in Ukraine could be investigated.\607\
Mr. Shokin was a known associate of Mr. Giuliani. As
described in Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani had been communicating
with Mr. Shokin since at least 2018.\608\ Mr. Giuliani also
lobbied the White House on behalf of Mr. Shokin to intervene
earlier in 2019 when the State Department rejected a visa
application for Mr. Shokin to visit the United States based
upon Mr. Shokin's notorious corrupt conduct.\609\ Ambassador
Kurt Volker, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations, testified that he explicitly warned Mr.
Giuliani--to no avail--against pursuing ``the conspiracy theory
that Vice President Biden would have been influenced in his
duties as Vice President by money paid to his son.''\610\
Ambassador Volker affirmed that former Vice President Biden is
``an honorable man, and I hold him in the highest
regard.''\611\
Attacks Against Ambassador Yovanovitch
During the July 25 call, President Trump also attacked
Ambassador Yovanovitch, whom he had ousted as the U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine three months earlier after a concerted
smear campaign perpetuated by Mr. Giuliani. As described in
Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani viewed Ambassador Yovanovitch--a
decorated diplomat who had championed Ukrainian anti-corruption
officials and activists--as an impediment to his activities in
Ukraine.\612\ President Trump told President Zelensky: ``The
former ambassador from the United States, the woman, was bad
news and the people she was dealing with in the Ukraine were
bad news so I just want to let you know that.'' He later added:
``Well, she's going to go through some things.''\613\
Ambassador Yovanovitch described her visceral reaction when
she first read the call record, after the White House released
it publicly on September 25, 2019. She testified, ``I was
shocked. I mean, I was very surprised that President Trump
would--first of all, that I would feature repeatedly in a
Presidential phone call, but secondly, that the President would
speak about me or any ambassador in that way to a foreign
counterpart.''\614\ When asked whether she felt ``threatened''
by President Trump's statement that ``she's going to go through
some things,'' Ambassador Yovanovitch answered that she
did.\615\
Praise of Corrupt Former Ukrainian Prosecutor
After disparaging Ambassador Yovanovitch, who had an
extensive record of combatting corruption, President Trump
praised an unnamed former Ukrainian prosecutor general--
referring to Yuriy Lutsenko--who was widely considered to be
corrupt and had promoted false allegations against Ambassador
Yovanovitch.\616\ President Trump told President Zelensky:
``Good because I heard you had a prosecutor who was very good
and he was shut down and that's really unfair. A lot of people
are talking about that, the way they shut your very good
prosecutor down and you had some very bad people
involved.''\617\ He later added, ``I heard the prosecutor was
treated very badly and he was a very fair prosecutor so good
luck with everything.''\618\
At the time of the July 25 call, Mr. Lutsenko--who was
collaborating with Mr. Giuliani to smear Ambassador Yovanovitch
and the Bidens--was still the Ukrainian prosecutor general. Mr.
Holmes testified that Mr. Lutsenko ``was not a good partner. He
had failed to deliver on the promised reforms that he had
committed to when he took office, and he was using his office
to insulate and protect political allies while presumably
enriching himself.''\619\ By July 2019, Mr. Holmes assessed
that Mr. Lutsenko was ``trying to angle to keep his job'' under
the new Zelensky Administration and that part of his strategy
was ``appealing to Rudy Giuliani and Donald Trump by pushing
out these false theories about the Bidens and the 2016
election.''\620\
Multiple witnesses testified that another former Ukrainian
prosecutor, Mr. Shokin, was also considered to be corrupt. For
example, Mr. Kent testified during his deposition that Mr.
Lutsenko and Mr. Shokin were ``corrupt former prosecutors'' who
were ``peddling false information in order to extract revenge
against those who had exposed their misconduct, including U.S.
diplomats, Ukrainian anticorruption officials, and reform-
minded civil society groups in Ukraine.''\621\ Ambassador
Volker testified at his public hearing that Mr. Lutsenko was
``not credible, and was acting in a self-serving
capacity.''\622\ Mr. Holmes further noted that Mr. Lutsenko
``resisted fully empowering truly independent anticorruption
institutions that would help ensure that no Ukrainians, however
powerful, were above the law.''\623\
After the call, the White House press office issued a short
and incomplete summary of the call, omitting major elements of
the conversation. The press statement read:
Today, President Donald J. Trump spoke by telephone with
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine to congratulate him on
his recent election. President Trump and President Zelenskyy
discussed ways to strengthen the relationship between the
United States and Ukraine, including energy and economic
cooperation. Both leaders also expressed that they look forward
to the opportunity to meet.\624\
Concerns Raised by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman
Prior to President Trump's July 25 call with President
Zelensky, Lt. Col. Vindman had prepared--with Mr. Morrison's
review and approval--a call briefing package, including talking
points for President Trump's use. This was consistent with the
NSC's regular process of preparing for the President's phone
calls with foreign leaders.\625\ The NSC-drafted talking points
did not include any reference to Biden, Burisma, CrowdStrike,
or alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S.
election.\626\
Lt. Col. Vindman testified during his deposition that,
prior to the July 25 call, he was aware of concerns from former
National Security Advisor John Bolton and other U.S. officials
that President Trump might raise these discredited issues with
President Zelensky.\627\ Indeed, Ambassador Bolton had resisted
scheduling the call because he believed it might be a
``disaster.''\628\
As he sat in the White House Situation Room listening to
the leaders, Lt. Col. Vindman quickly recognized that the
President's conversation was diverging from the talking points
he helped prepare based on the interagency policy process, and
``straying'' into an ``unproductive narrative'' promoted by Mr.
Giuliani and other ``external and nongovernmental
influencers''\629\--topics that Lt. Col. Vindman dubbed ``stray
voltage.''\630\
Lt. Col. Vindman knew immediately that he had a duty to
report the contents of the call to the White House lawyers. He
explained, ``I had concerns, and it was my duty to report my
concerns to the proper--proper people in the chain of
command.''\631\ Lt. Col. Vindman testified that President
Trump's request that a foreign leader dependent on the United
States open an investigation into his U.S. political opponent
constituted a ``demand'' that President Zelensky had to meet in
order to secure a White House meeting:
So, Congressman, the power disparity between the
President of the United States and the President of
Ukraine is vast, and, you know, in the President asking
for something, it became--there was--in return for a
White House meeting, because that's what this was
about. This was about getting a White House meeting. It
was a demand for him to fulfill his--fulfill this
particular prerequisite in order to get the
meeting.\632\
Lt. Col. Vindman further testified that President Trump's
demand of the Ukrainian leader was ``inappropriate'' and
``improper,'' and that it would undermine U.S. national
security:
Chairman, as I said in my statement, it was
inappropriate. It was improper for the President to
request--to demand an investigation into a political
opponent, especially a foreign power where there's, at
best, dubious belief that this would be a completely
impartial investigation, and that this would have
significant implications if it became public knowledge,
and it would be perceived as a partisan play. It would
undermine our Ukraine policy, and it would undermine
our national security.\633\
Within an hour of the call ending, Lt. Col. Vindman
reported his concerns to John A. Eisenberg, the Deputy Counsel
to the President for National Security Affairs and the Legal
Advisor to the NSC, and Michael Ellis, a Senior Associate
Counsel to the President and the Deputy Legal Advisor to the
NSC.\634\ Lt. Col. Vindman recounted the content of the call
based on his handwritten notes and told the lawyers that he
believed it was ``wrong'' for President Trump to ask President
Zelensky to investigate Vice President Biden.\635\
Concerns Raised by Timothy Morrison
After 17 years as a Republican Congressional staffer and
approximately a year serving elsewhere on the NSC staff, Mr.
Morrison assumed his position as the NSC's Senior Director for
Europe and Russia on July 15, 2019, only 10 days before
President Trump's call with President Zelensky.\636\
Before he transitioned into his new role, Mr. Morrison met
with his predecessor, Dr. Hill. She advised him to stay away
from efforts orchestrated by Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador
Sondland to pressure Ukraine into investigating a ``bucket of
issues'' that included ``Burisma the company,'' and ``Hunter
Biden on the board.''\637\ Dr. Hill also warned Mr. Morrison
before the July 25 call about the President's interest in
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election
related to the DNC server.\638\
Mr. Morrison testified that he had no knowledge of any
investigations at the time, but after performing a Google
search of ``what is Burisma?'' and seeing the name Hunter
Biden, Mr. Morrison decided to ``stay away.''\639\ Even though
he was new to the portfolio, Mr. Morrison promptly concluded
that because ``Burisma'' involved Hunter Biden, and because
former Vice President Biden was running for President, such
investigations could be a ``problematic'' area.\640\ Mr.
Morrison further explained that he tried to stay away from
requests related to Burisma and the 2016 U.S. election because
these investigations were not related to ``the proper policy
process that I was involved in on Ukraine,'' and ``had nothing
to do with the issues that the interagency was working
on.''\641\
With that background in mind, Mr. Morrison admitted he was
``concerned'' when, while listening to the call on July 25, he
heard President Trump raise ``issues related to the [DNC]
server.'' Ultimately, Mr. Morrison said, ``the call was not the
full-throated endorsement of the Ukraine reform agenda that I
was hoping to hear.''\642\
In ``fairly short order,'' Mr. Morrison reported the
contents of the call to Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Ellis, the NSC
lawyers. He asked them to review the call, which he feared
would be ``damaging'' if leaked.\643\ Mr. Morrison stated that
at the time of the call, he ``did not have a view'' on whether
the call was ``appropriate and proper.''\644\ He also stated
that he ``was not concerned that anything illegal was
discussed.''\645\ During his deposition, however, Mr. Morrison
clarified, ``I did not then and I do not now opine . . . as to
the legality'' of what happened on the call.\646\
In a second meeting with Mr. Eisenberg, Mr. Morrison
requested that access to the electronic files of the call
record be restricted. This was an unusual request. Mr. Morrison
confirmed to the Committee that he had never before asked the
NSC Legal Advisor to restrict access to a presidential call
record.\647\ It was also unusual because Mr. Morrison raised
restricting access with Mr. Eisenberg despite the fact that Mr.
Morrison himself had the authority, as an NSC senior director,
to recommend restrictions on the relevant files to the NSC's
Executive Secretariat.
Lt. Col. Vindman also discussed restricting access to the
July 25 call summary with Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Ellis. At some
point after the call, Lt. Col. Vindman discussed with the NSC
lawyers the ``sensitivity'' of the matters raised on the call
and ``the fact that . . . there are constant leaks.''\648\ Lt.
Col. Vindman explained that ``[f]rom a foreign policy
professional perspective, all of these types of calls would
inherently be sensitive.''\649\ But the July 25 call was
particularly sensitive because it could ``undermine our
relationship with the Ukrainians'' given that it ``would
implicate a partisan play.''\650\ The NSC lawyers, therefore,
believed that it was ``appropriate to restrict access for the
purpose of the leaks'' and ``to preserv[e] the integrity'' of
the transcript.\651\ Lt. Col. Vindman recalled that Mr. Ellis
raised the idea of placing the call summary on the NSC's server
for highly classified information and Mr. Eisenberg ``gave the
go-ahead.''\652\
Some weeks after his discussions with the NSC attorneys,
Mr. Morrison could not locate the call record. He contacted the
staff of the NSC's Executive Secretariat in search of an
explanation and was informed that ``John Eisenberg had directed
it to be moved to a different server'' utilized by the NSC
staff for highly classified information.\653\ This transfer
occurred despite Mr. Morrison's view that the call record did
not meet the requirements to be placed on the highly classified
system.\654\
Mr. Eisenberg later told Mr. Morrison that the call record
had been placed on the highly classified system by
``mistake.''\655\ Even after Mr. Eisenberg stated that the call
record was moved to the highly classified system by
``mistake,'' it nevertheless remained on that system until at
least the third week of September 2019, shortly before its
declassification and public release by the White House.\656\
Concerns Raised by Jennifer Williams
Vice President Pence's advisor, Ms. Williams, had listened
to nearly a dozen phone calls between President Trump and other
heads of state prior to July 25, 2019, as well as Vice
President Pence's April 23 call with President Zelensky.\657\
As she sat listening to President Trump's July 25 call, she was
struck by his requests relating to Vice President Biden. She
stated that she believed that President Trump's comments were
``unusual and inappropriate.''\658\
Ms. Williams testified that she thought that ``references
to specific individuals and investigations, such as former Vice
President Biden and his son'' were ``political in nature, given
that the former Vice President is a political opponent of the
President.''\659\ The comments struck her as ``more specific to
the President in nature, to his personal political agenda,'' as
opposed to ``a broader foreign policy objective of the United
States.''\660\ She added, ``it was the first time I had heard
internally the President reference particular investigations
that previously I had only heard about through Mr. Giuliani's
press interviews and press reporting.''\661\
Significantly, Ms. Williams, who had learned about the hold
on security assistance for Ukraine on July 3, also said that
the Trump-Zelensky call ``shed some light on possible other
motivations behind a security assistance hold.''\662\
``Burisma'' Omitted from Call Record
Mr. Morrison, Lt. Col. Vindman, and Ms. Williams all agreed
that the publicly released record of the call was substantially
accurate, but Lt. Col. Vindman and Ms. Williams both testified
that President Zelensky made an explicit reference to
``Burisma'' that was not included in the call record.
Specifically, Lt. Col. Vindman testified that his notes
indicated President Zelensky used the word ``Burisma''--instead
of generically referring to ``the company''--when discussing
President Trump's request to investigate the Bidens.\663\ Ms.
Williams' notes also reflected that President Zelensky had said
``Burisma'' later in the call when referring to a
``case.''\664\
Lt. Col. Vindman indicated that President Zelensky's
mention of ``Burisma'' was notable because it suggested that
the Ukrainian leader was ``prepped for this call.'' He
explained that ``frankly, the President of Ukraine would not
necessarily know anything about this company Burisma.'' Lt.
Col. Vindman continued, ``he would certainly understand some of
this--some of these elements because the story had been
developing for some time, but the fact that he mentioned
specifically Burisma seemed to suggest to me that he was
prepped for this call.''\665\
The Substance of the Call Remained Tightly Controlled
Ms. Williams testified that staff in the Office of the Vice
President placed the draft call record in the Vice President's
nightly briefing book on July 25.\666\
Separately, and following established protocols for
coordinating U.S. government activities toward Ukraine, Lt.
Col. Vindman provided Mr. Kent at the State Department with a
readout. Because Mr. Kent had worked on Ukraine policy for many
years, Lt. Col. Vindman sought Mr. Kent's ``expert view'' on
the investigations requested by the President. Mr. Kent
informed him that ``there was no substance'' behind the
CrowdStrike conspiracy theory and ``took note of the fact that
there was a call to investigate the Bidens.''\667\ Recalling
this conversation, Mr. Kent testified that Lt. Col. Vindman
said ``he could not share the majority of what was discussed
[on the July 25 call] because of the very sensitive nature of
what was discussed,'' but that Lt. Col. Vindman noted that the
call ``went into the direction of some of the most extreme
narratives that have been discussed publicly.''\668\
Ambassador Sondland Followed Up on President Trump's Request for
Investigations
Soon after arriving in Kyiv from Brussels on July 25,
Ambassador Sondland asked the U.S. Embassy to arrange a meeting
the next day with Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy
Yermak.\669\
On the morning of July 26, Ambassadors Sondland, Volker and
Taylor--accompanied by Mr. Holmes, who acted as their official
notetaker--went to the Presidential Administration Building in
central Kyiv for meetings with Ukrainian officials.\670\
Contrary to standard procedure, Mr. Holmes and Ambassador
Taylor did not receive readouts of the July 25 call, so they
were unaware of what President Trump and President Zelensky had
discussed.\671\ Ambassador Volker also did not receive an
official readout of the July 25 call from the NSC staff. He
testified that Andriy Yermak, a senior aide to President
Zelensky, simply characterized it as a ``good call'' in which
``President Zelensky did reiterate his commitment to reform and
fighting corruption in Ukraine.''\672\
The first meeting on July 26 was with Chief of Staff to
President Zelensky Andriy Bohdan.\673\ Regarding the July 25
call, Mr. Holmes recalled Mr. Bohdan sharing that ``President
Trump had expressed interest . . . in President Zelensky's
personnel decisions related to the Prosecutor General's office
[PGO].''\674\ Mr. Holmes further testified that Mr. Bohdan then
``started asking . . . about individuals I've since come to
understand they were considering appointing to different roles
in the PGO.''\675\ Mr. Holmes explained that he ``didn't
understand it,'' and that ``[i]t wasn't until I read the July
25th phone call transcript that I realized that the President
[Trump] had mentioned Mr. Lutsenko in the call.''\676\
Subsequently, Ambassadors Sondland, Taylor, and Volker met
with President Zelensky and other senior officials. Mr. Holmes
once again took notes.\677\ He testified ``During the meeting,
President Zelensky stated that, during the July 25th call,
President Trump had, quote, `three times raised some very
sensitive issues' and that he would have to follow up--he,
Zelensky--would have to follow up on those issues when he and
President Trump met in person.''\678\ After he read the
transcript of the July 25 call, Mr. Holmes determined that
President Zelensky's mention of ``sensitive issues'' was a
reference to President Trump's demands for a ``Burisma Biden
investigation.''\679\
Catherine Croft, Special Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker,
was also in Kyiv on July 26. Although she did not attend the
meeting with President Zelensky, she received a readout from
Ambassadors Volker and Taylor later that day, as they were
traveling in an embassy vehicle. Ms. Croft testified that her
handwritten notes from that readout indicate ``the President
[Trump] had raised investigations multiple times'' in his July
25 call with President Zelensky.\680\ Ambassadors Sondland and
Taylor told the Committee that they did not recall President
Zelensky's comments about investigations.\681\ Ambassador
Volker similarly did not recall that the issue of
investigations was discussed, but testified that he did not
dispute the validity of ``notes taken contemporaneously at the
meeting.''\682\
Ambassador Sondland Met One-on-One With Ukrainian Presidential Aide
The meeting with President Zelensky ended around noon.\683\
After the meeting, Ambassadors Taylor and Volker departed the
Presidential Administration building for a visit to the front
lines of the war with Russia in eastern Ukraine.\684\
Ambassador Sondland separately headed for Mr. Yermak's office.
Mr. Holmes testified that, at the last minute, he received
instruction from his leadership at the U.S. Embassy to join
Ambassador Sondland.\685\ By that point, Mr. Holmes recalled,
he ``was a flight of stairs behind Ambassador Sondland as he
headed to meet with Mr. Yermak.''\686\ Mr. Holmes continued,
``When I reached Mr. Yermak's office, Ambassador Sondland had
already gone in to the meeting.''\687\ Mr. Holmes then
``explained to Mr. Yermak's assistant that I was supposed to
join the meeting as the Embassy's representative and strongly
urged her to let me in, but she told me that Ambassador
Sondland and Mr. Yermak had insisted that the meeting be one on
one with no note taker.''\688\ Mr. Holmes ``then waited in the
anteroom until the meeting ended, along with a member of
Ambassador Sondland's staff and a member of the U.S. Embassy
Kyiv staff.''\689\
Ambassador Sondland's meeting with Mr. Yermak lasted
approximately 30 minutes.\690\ When it ended, Ambassador
Sondland did not provide Mr. Holmes an explanation of what they
discussed.\691\ Ambassador Sondland later testified that he did
not ``recall the specifics'' of his conversation with Mr.
Yermak, but he believed ``the issue of investigations was
probably a part of that agenda or meeting.''\692\
Call Between President Trump and Ambassador Sondland on July 26, 2019
After a busy morning of meetings with Ukrainian officials
on July 26, Ambassador Sondland indicated that he wanted to get
lunch. Mr. Holmes interjected that he would ``be happy to
join'' Ambassador Sondland and two other State Department
colleagues accompanying him ``if he wanted to brief me out on
his meeting with Mr. Yermak or discuss other issues.''\693\
Ambassador Sondland accepted the offer. The diplomats proceeded
``to a nearby restaurant and sat on an outdoor terrace.''\694\
Mr. Holmes ``sat directly across from Ambassador Sondland,''
close enough that they could ``share an appetizer.''\695\
Mr. Holmes recounted that ``at first, the lunch was largely
social. Ambassador Sondland selected a bottle of wine that he
shared among the four of us, and we discussed topics such as
marketing strategies for his hotel business.''\696\ Later
during the meal, Ambassador Sondland ``said that he was going
to call President Trump to give him an update.''\697\
Ambassador Sondland then placed a call on his unsecure mobile
phone. Mr. Holmes was taken aback. He told the Committee, ``it
was, like, a really extraordinary thing, it doesn't happen very
often''--a U.S. Ambassador picking up his mobile phone at an
outdoor cafe and dialing the President of the United
States.\698\
Mr. Holmes, who was sitting directly opposite from
Ambassador Sondland, said he ``heard him announce himself
several times, along the lines of, `Gordon Sondland, holding
for the President.' It appeared that he was being transferred
through several layers of switchboards and assistants, and I
then noticed Ambassador Sondland's demeanor changed and
understood that he had been connected to President
Trump.''\699\
Mr. Holmes stated he was able to hear the first part of
Ambassador Sondland's conversation with President Trump because
it was ``quite loud'' and ``quite distinctive'' when the
President began speaking. When President Trump started
speaking, Ambassador Sondland ``sort of winced and held the
phone away from his ear,'' and ``did that for the first couple
exchanges.''\700\
Recounting the conversation that followed, Mr. Holmes
testified:
I heard Ambassador Sondland greet the President and
explain he was calling from Kyiv. I heard President
Trump then clarify that Ambassador Sondland was in
Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland replied, yes, he was in
Ukraine, and went on to state that President Zelensky,
quote, ``loves your ass.'' I then heard President Trump
ask, ``So he's going to do the investigation?''
Ambassador Sondland replied that he is going to do it,
adding that President Zelensky will do ``anything you
ask him to do.''\701\
President Trump has denied that he spoke to Ambassador
Sondland on July 26 and told reporters, ``I know nothing about
that.''\702\ But in his public testimony before the Committee,
Ambassador Sondland noted that White House call records made
available to his legal counsel confirmed that the July 26 call
in fact occurred.\703\ Ambassador Sondland further explained
that Mr. Holmes's testimony--specifically, a ``reference to
A$AP Rocky''--refreshed his recollection about the July 26
call, which Ambassador Sondland had not originally disclosed to
the Committee.\704\
Although Ambassador Sondland did not believe he mentioned
the Bidens by name, he testified that with regard to the
substance of his July 26 conversation with President Trump: ``I
have no reason to doubt that this conversation included the
subject of investigations.''\705\ He added that he had ``no
reason'' to doubt Mr. Holmes' testimony about the contents of
the call, and that he would ``have been more surprised if
President Trump had not mentioned investigations, particularly
given what we were hearing from Mr. Giuliani about the
President's concerns.''\706\ Asked about his statement to
President Trump that President Zelensky ``loves your ass,''
Ambassador Sondland replied: ``That sounds like something I
would say. That's how President Trump and I communicate, a lot
of four-letter words, in this case three letter.''\707\
After the call between Ambassador Sondland and President
Trump ended, Ambassador Sondland remarked to Mr. Holmes that
``the President was in a bad mood,'' as ``was often the case
early in the morning.''\708\ Mr. Holmes, who had learned about
the freeze on U.S. security assistance days earlier, was
attempting to clarify the President's thinking, and said he
``took the opportunity to ask Ambassador Sondland for his
candid impression of the President's views on Ukraine'':
In particular, I asked Ambassador Sondland if it was
true that the President did not give a shit about
Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland agreed that the President
did not give a shit about Ukraine. I asked, why not,
and Ambassador Sondland stated, the President only
cares about, quote, unquote, ``big stuff.'' I noted
there was, quote, unquote, big stuff going on in
Ukraine, like a war with Russia. And Ambassador
Sondland replied that he meant, quote, unquote, ``big
stuff'' that benefits the President, like the, quote,
unquote, ``Biden investigation'' that Mr. Giuliani was
pushing. The conversation then moved on to other
topics.\709\
Ambassador Sondland did not dispute the substance of Mr.
Holmes' recollection of this discussion. He stated, ``I don't
recall my exact words, but clearly the President, beginning on
May 23, when we met with him in the Oval Office, was not a big
fan'' of Ukraine. Asked whether President Trump ``was a big fan
of the investigations,'' Ambassador Sondland replied:
``Apparently so.''\710\ Asked to clarify if, during his July 26
conversation with Mr. Holmes, he recalled ``at least referring
to an investigation that Rudy Giuliani was pushing,''
Ambassador Sondland replied, ``I would have, yes.''\711\
Mr. Holmes Informed U.S. Embassy Leadership about President Trump's
Call with Ambassador Sondland
After the lunch, Mr. Holmes dropped off Ambassador Sondland
at his hotel, the Hyatt Regency Kyiv. Mr. Holmes then returned
to the U.S. Embassy.\712\ Ambassador Taylor, the acting
Ambassador in Kyiv, was still visiting the front line. So when
he arrived at the Embassy, Mr. Holmes briefed his immediate
supervisor, Kristina Kvien, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S.
Embassy Kyiv, about the President's call with Ambassador
Sondland and Ambassador Sondland's subsequent description of
President Trump's priorities for Ukraine.\713\
After taking a long-planned vacation from July 27 to August
5, Mr. Holmes told Ambassador Taylor about his lunch with
Ambassador Sondland on the first day he returned to work,
August 6.\714\ Mr. Holmes told the Committee that he did not
brief the call in detail to Ambassador Taylor because ``it was
obvious what the President was pressing for'':
Of course that's what's going on. Of course the
President is pressing for a Biden investigation before
he'll do these things the Ukrainians want. There was
nodding agreement. So did I go through every single
word in the call? No, because everyone by that point
agreed, it was obvious what the President was pressing
for.\715\
In October 2019, following the public release of testimony
by several witnesses pursuant to the Committee's impeachment
inquiry, Mr. Holmes reminded Ambassador Taylor about Ambassador
Sondland's July 26 conversation with President Trump.
Ambassador Taylor was preparing to return to Washington and
testify publicly before the Committee. Mr. Holmes had been
following news coverage of the inquiry and realized he had
unique, firsthand evidence that ``potentially bore on the
question of whether the President did, in fact, have
knowledge'' of efforts to press the Ukrainian President to
publicly announce investigations:
I came to realize that I had firsthand knowledge
regarding certain events on July 26 that had not
otherwise been reported and that those events
potentially bore on the question of whether the
President did, in fact, have knowledge that those
senior officials were using the levers of diplomatic
power to influence the new Ukrainian President to
announce the opening of a criminal investigation
against President Trump's political opponent. It is at
that point that I made the observation to Ambassador
Taylor that the incident I had witnessed on July 26th
had acquired greater significance, which is what he
reported in his testimony last week and is what led to
the subpoena for me to appear here today.\716\
Mr. Holmes testified that the July 26 call became ``sort of
a touchstone piece of information'' for diplomats at the U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv who ``were trying to understand why we weren't
able to get the meeting'' between President Trump and President
Zelensky and ``what was going on with the security hold.''\717\
He elaborated:
I would refer back to it repeatedly in our, you know,
morning staff meetings. We'd talk about what we're
trying to do. We're trying to achieve this, that. Maybe
it will convince the President to have the meeting. And
I would say, `Well, as we know, he doesn't really care
about Ukraine. He cares about some other things. And
we're trying to keep Ukraine out of our politics and
so, you know, that's what we're up against.' And I
would refer--use that repeatedly as a refrain.\718\
6. The President Wanted Ukraine to Announce the Investigations
Publicly
In the weeks following the July 25 call, President Trump's hand-picked
representatives carried out his wishes to condition a coveted
White House meeting for the Ukrainian President on the public
announcement of investigations beneficial to President Trump.
Top U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Energy, were ``in the loop.''
Overview
In the weeks following the July 25 call, during which
President Trump had pressed Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky to ``do us a favor though,'' the President's
representatives worked to secure from the Ukrainian President a
public announcement about the requested investigations as a
condition for the White House meeting.
That meeting would have conferred vital support on a new
president who relied on the United States to help defend his
nation militarily, diplomatically, and politically against
Russian aggression. U.S. Ambassador to the European Union
Gordon Sondland provided testimony and quoted from documents
demonstrating that he kept everyone ``in the loop'' about the
plan, including the Secretaries of State and Energy.
Ambassadors Sondland and Volker worked closely with Mr.
Giuliani, the President's personal lawyer, to help draft
Ukraine's public statement. They sought to ensure that
President Zelensky explicitly used the words ``Burisma''--a
reference to allegations about former Vice President Biden and
his son--and ``2016 elections.''
Ukrainian officials were ``very uncomfortable'' with the
provision of this statement, which they understood to be a
requirement and a ``deliverable'' demanded by President Trump.
The Ukrainian President was elected on a platform of rooting
out public corruption, and so he resisted issuing the
statement. Instead, President Zelensky's aides asked whether an
official request for legal assistance with investigations had
been made through appropriate channels at the U.S. Department
of Justice. No such formal request was ever made. Consequently,
Ukrainian officials made clear to Ambassador Volker that they
did not support issuing a public statement because it could
``play into'' U.S. domestic politics. Nevertheless, U.S.
efforts to secure a public statement continued.
Giuliani Met with Ukrainian Presidential Aide Andriy Yermak in Madrid
and Discussed a White House Meeting
On July 26, the day after the call between President Trump
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Volker wrote to Mr. Giuliani
to confirm that he would soon be meeting with Andriy Yermak, a
Ukrainian presidential aide, to ``help'' efforts.\719\
Ambassador Volker texted: ``Please send dates when you will
be in Madrid. I am seeing Yermak tomorrow morning. He will come
to you in Madrid. Thanks for your help! Kurt.''\720\ Mr.
Giuliani replied that he would travel to Spain from August 1 to
5, and Ambassador Volker affirmed that he would tell the
Ukrainian presidential aide to ``visit with you there.''\721\
Ambassador Volker kept himself apprised of plans, texting Mr.
Yermak on August 1 to ensure that everything was ``on track''
for the meeting in Spain's capital. He also asked whether Mr.
Yermak planned to visit Washington.\722\
On August 2, Mr. Yermak and Mr. Giuliani met in
Madrid.\723\ Ambassador Volker received a meeting summary from
Mr. Yermak the same day: ``My meeting with Mr. Mayor was very
good.'' Mr. Yermak added: ``We asked for White House meeting
during week start [sic] 16 Sept. Waiting for confirmation.
Maybe you know the date?''\724\
The Madrid meeting set off a ``series of discussions''
among Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland
about the need for President Zelensky to issue a public
statement about the investigations into Burisma and the 2016
election conspiracy theory in order to secure a White House
meeting with President Trump.\725\ Ambassador Volker first
spoke to Mr. Giuliani, who said that he thought Ukraine
``should issue a statement.''\726\ Ambassador Volker then spoke
to Mr. Yermak, who affirmed that the Ukrainian leader was
``prepared to make a statement'' that ``would reference Burisma
and 2016 in a wider context of bilateral relations and rooting
out corruption anyway.''\727\
Mr. Giuliani, acting as President Trump's personal
attorney, exerted significant influence in the process. On
August 4, Mr. Yermak inquired again about the presidential
meeting. Ambassador Volker replied that he would speak with Mr.
Giuliani later that day and would call the Ukrainian aide
afterward.\728\ Ambassador Volker texted the former mayor about
the Madrid meeting and asked for a phone call. Mr. Giuliani
replied: ``It was excellent I can call a little later.''\729\
Phone records obtained by the Committees show a 16 minute
call on August 5 between Ambassador Volker and Mr.
Giuliani.\730\ Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Yermak: ``Hi
Andrey--had a good long talk w Rudy--call anytime--Kurt.''\731\
During the same period, Ambassador Volker informed Ambassador
Sondland that ``Giuliani was happy with that meeting,'' and
``it looks like things are turning around.''\732\
``Potus Really Wants the Deliverable'' Before Scheduling a White House
Visit for President Zelensky
Things had not turned around by August 7. Ambassador Volker
texted Mr. Giuliani to recommend that he report to ``the
boss''--President Trump--about his meeting with Mr. Yermak in
Madrid. He wrote:
Hi Rudy--hope you made it back safely. Let's meet if
you are coming to DC. And would be good if you could
convey results of your meeting in Madrid to the boss so
we can get a firm date for a visit.\733\
The Committees did not find evidence that Mr. Giuliani
responded to Ambassador Volker's text message.
However, call records show that the next day, on August 8,
Mr. Giuliani connected with the White House Situation Room
switchboard in the early afternoon, Eastern Time, for 42
seconds, and then again for one minute, 25 seconds.\734\
The same day, Mr. Giuliani texted several times with a
number associated with the White House. The Committees were
unable to identify the official associated with the phone
number. In the mid-afternoon, someone using a telephone number
associated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
called Mr. Giuliani, and the call lasted for nearly 13 minutes.
Mr. Giuliani called the OMB number and the White House
Situation Room several more times that evening, but each time
connected for only a few seconds or not at all.
RUDY GIULIANI CALL HISTORY, AUGUST 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting Duration
Date Time (EDT) of Call Caller Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/08/19 12:44:56 0:42 Giuliani, White House Switchboard
Rudy (Situation Room)\735\
08/08/19 12:45:38 1:25 Giuliani, White House Switchboard
Rudy (Situation Room)\736\
08/08/19 13:02:37 TEXT Giuliani, White House Number\737\
Rudy
08/08/19 13:02:37 TEXT Giuliani, White House Number\738\
Rudy
08/08/19 13:02:57 TEXT Giuliani, White House Number\739\
Rudy
08/08/19 14:14:53 TEXT White Giuliani, Rudy\740\
House
Number
08/08/19 14:15:17 TEXT Giuliani, White House Number\741\
Rudy
08/08/19 14:21:13 TEXT Giuliani, White House Number\742\
Rudy
08/08/19 15:13:05 12:56 OMB Giuliani, Rudy\743\
Number
08/08/19 15:56:44 0:00 Giuliani, OMB-Associated Number\744\
Rudy
08/08/19 15:56:51 0:00 Giuliani, OMB-Associated Number\745\
Rudy
08/08/19 15:57:05 0:00 Giuliani, OMB-Associated Number\746\
Rudy
08/08/19 15:57:21 0:22 Giuliani, White House Switchboard
Rudy (Situation Room)\747\
08/08/19 17:20:33 0:17 Giuliani, White House Switchboard
Rudy (Situation Room)\748\
08/08/19 19:14:48 0:00 Giuliani, White House Switchboard
Rudy (Situation Room)\749\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approximately 30 minutes after his text to Mr. Giuliani on
August 7, Ambassador Volker received a text message from Mr.
Yermak: ``Do you have some news about White House meeting
date?''\750\ Ambassador Volker responded that he had asked Mr.
Giuliani to ``weigh in,'' presumably with the President,
``following your meeting,'' and that Ambassador Sondland would
be speaking with President Trump on Friday, August 9.
Ambassador Volker added: ``We are pressing this.''\751\ The
next day, on August 8, Mr. Yermak texted Ambassador Volker to
report that he had ``some news.''\752\ Ambassador Volker
replied that he was available to speak at that time.\753\
Later on the evening of August 8, Eastern Time, Mr.
Giuliani sent a text message to a phone number associated with
the White House. Approximately one hour 15 minutes later,
someone using an unidentified number (``-1'') dialed Mr.
Giuliani three times in rapid succession. Less than three
minutes later, Mr. Giuliani dialed the White House switchboard
for the White House Situation Room. When the call did not
connect, Mr. Giuliani immediately dialed another general number
for the White House switchboard and connected for 47 seconds.
Approximately 16 minutes later, someone using the ``-1'' number
called Mr. Giuliani and connected for just over four
minutes.\754\
RUDY GIULIANI CALL HISTORY, AUGUST 8 (CONTINUED)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting Duration
Date Time (EDT) of Call Caller Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/08/19 20:53:13 TEXT Giuliani, White House Number\755\
Rudy
08/08/19 22:09:31 0:00 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy\756\
08/08/19 22:09:32 0:05 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy\757\
08/08/19 22:09:46 0:00 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy (Cell
2)\758\
08/08/19 22:09:47 0:02 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy (Cell
2)\759\
08/08/19 22:10:08 0:05 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy\760\
08/08/19 22:11:52 0:00 Giuliani, OMB-Associated Number\761\
Rudy
08/08/19 22:12:16 0:00 Giuliani, White House Switchboard
Rudy (Situation Room)\762\
08/08/19 22:12:25 0:47 Giuliani, White House
Rudy Switchboard\763\
08/08/19 22:28:51 4:06 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy\764\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Late the next morning Washington time, on August 9,
Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador Sondland:
Hi Mr. Mayor! Had a good chat with Yermak last night.
He was pleased with your phone call. Mentioned Z
[President Zelensky] making a statement. Can we all get
on the phone to make sure I advise Z [President
Zelensky] correctly as to what he should be saying?
Want to make sure we get this done right. Thanks!\765\
It is unclear which ``phone call'' Ambassador Volker was
referencing.
Text messages and call records obtained by the Committees
show that Ambassador Volker and Mr. Giuliani connected by phone
twice around noon Eastern Time on August 9 for several minutes
each.\766\ Following the calls with Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador
Volker created a three-way group chat using WhatsApp that
included Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Mr.
Yermak.\767\
At 2:24 p.m. Eastern Time on August 9, Ambassador Volker
texted the group: ``Hi Andrey--we have all consulted here,
including with Rudy. Can you do a call later today or tomorrow
your afternoon time?''\768\ Ambassador Sondland texted that he
had a call scheduled for 3 p.m. Eastern Time ``for the three of
us. [State Department] Ops will call.''\769\
Call records obtained by the Committees show that on August
9, Ambassador Sondland twice called numbers associated with the
White House, once in early afternoon for approximately 18
minutes, and once in late afternoon for two minutes, 25 seconds
with a number associated with OMB.\770\
By early evening, minutes after his second call with the
OMB-associated number, Ambassador Volker and Ambassador
Sondland discussed a breakthrough they had reached in obtaining
a date for a White House visit, noting that President Trump
really wanted ``the deliverable'':
Sondland: [Tim] Morrison ready to get dates as soon
as Yermak confirms.
Volker: Excellent!! How did you sway him? :)
Sondland: Not sure i did. I think potus really wants
the deliverable
Volker: But does he know that?
Sondland: Yep
Sondland: Clearly lots of convos going on
Volker: Ok--then that's good it's coming from two
separate sources\771\
Ambassador Sondland told the Committees that the
``deliverable'' required by President Trump was a press
statement from President Zelensky committing to ``do the
investigations'' pushed by President Trump and Mr.
Giuliani.\772\
To ensure progress, immediately after their text exchange,
Ambassador Sondland recommended to Ambassador Volker that Mr.
Yermak share a draft of the press statement to ``avoid
misunderstandings'' and so they would know ``exactly what they
propose to cover.'' Ambassador Sondland explained: ``Even
though Ze [President Zelensky] does a live presser [press
event] they can still summarize in a brief statement.''
Ambassador Volker agreed.\773\
As they were negotiating the language that would appear in
a press statement, ``there was talk about having a live
interview or a live broadcast'' during which President Zelensky
would make the agreed-upon statement.\774\ Ambassador Sondland
suggested reviewing a written summary of the statement because
he was ``concerned'' that President Zelensky would ``say
whatever he would say on live television and it still wouldn't
be good enough for Rudy, slash, the President [Trump].''\775\
``Everyone Was in the Loop'' About Plan for Ukrainians to Deliver a
Public Statement about Investigations in Exchange for a White House
Visit
As negotiations continued, on August 10, Mr. Yermak texted
Ambassador Volker in an attempt to schedule a White House
meeting before the Ukrainian president made a public statement
in support of investigations into Burisma and the 2016
election. He wrote:
I think it's possible to make this declaration and
mention all these things. Which we discussed yesterday.
But it will be logic [sic] to do after we receive a
confirmation of date. We inform about date of visit
about our expectations and our guarantees for future
visit. Let [sic] discuss it\776\
Ambassador Volker responded that he agreed, but that first
they would have to ``iron out [a] statement and use that to get
[a] date,'' after which point President Zelensky would go
forward with making the statement.\777\ They agreed to have a
call the next day, and to include Ambassador Sondland. Mr.
Yermak texted:
Excellent. Once we have a date, will call for a press
briefing, announcing upcoming visit and outlining
vision for the reboot of the US-UKRAINE relationship,
including, among other things, Burisma and election
meddling in investigations.\778\
Ambassador Volker forwarded the message to Ambassador
Sondland, and they agreed to speak with Mr. Yermak the next
day.\779\
Ambassador Sondland testified that ``everyone was in the
loop'' regarding this plan.\780\ Also on August 10, Ambassador
Sondland informed Ambassador Volker that he briefed T. Ulrich
Brechbuhl, Counselor of the Department of State, noting: ``I
briefed Ulrich. All good.''\781\ Ambassador Sondland testified
that he ``may have walked [Mr. Brechbuhl] through where we
were.''\782\ When asked if Mr. Brechbuhl briefed Secretary
Pompeo, Ambassador Sondland noted that it was Mr. Brechbuhl's
``habit'' to ``consult with Secretary Pompeo frequently.''\783\
Secretary of Energy Rick Perry was also made aware of
efforts to pressure Ukraine to issue a public statement about
political investigations in exchange for a White House meeting.
Ambassador Sondland testified:
Mr. Giuliani conveyed to Secretary Perry, Ambassador
Volker, and others that President Trump wanted a public
statement from President Zelensky committing to
investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election. Mr.
Giuliani expressed those requests directly to the
Ukrainians. Mr. Giuliani also expressed those requests
directly to us. We all understood that these
prerequisites for the White House call and the White
House meeting reflected President Trump's desires and
requirements.\784\
On August 11, Ambassador Volker requested a phone call with
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Giuliani, noting that he had heard
from Mr. Yermak that the Ukrainians were ``writing the
statement now and will send to us.''\785\ According to call
records obtained by the Committees, Ambassador Volker and Mr.
Giuliani connected for 34 seconds.\786\
The same day, Ambassador Sondland updated Mr. Brechbuhl and
Lisa Kenna, Executive Secretary of the State Department, about
efforts to secure a public statement and a ``big presser'' from
President Zelensky, which he hoped might ``make the boss happy
enough to authorize an invitation.'' He addressed the email to
Secretary Pompeo:
Mike, Kurt [Volker] and I negotiated a statement from
Zelensky to be delivered for our review in a day or
two. The contents will hopefully make the boss happy
enough to authorize an invitation. Zelensky plans to
have a big presser on the openness subject (including
specifics) next week.\787\
Ambassador Sondland made clear in his hearing testimony
that by ``specifics,'' he meant the ``2016 and the Burisma''
investigations; ``the boss'' referred to ``President Trump;''
and ``the invitation'' referred to ``the White House
meeting.''\788\ Ms. Kenna replied to Ambassador Sondland that
she would ``pass to S [Secretary Pompeo]. Thank you.''\789\
Ambassador Sondland cited the email as evidence that ``everyone
was in the loop'' on plans to condition a White House meeting
on a public statement about political investigations.\790\
President Trump's Agents Negotiated a Draft Statement about the
Investigations
In the evening of the next day, August 12, Mr. Yermak
texted Ambassador Volker an initial version of the draft
statement, which read:
Special attention should be paid to the problem of
interference in the political processes of the United
States, especially with the alleged involvement of some
Ukrainian politicians. I want to declare that this is
unacceptable. We intend to initiate and complete a
transparent and unbiased investigation of all available
facts and episodes, which in turn will prevent the
recurrence of this problem in the future.\791\
The draft statement did not explicitly mention Burisma or
2016 election interference, as expected.
On August 13, around 10 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador
Volker texted Mr. Giuliani: ``Mr mayor--trying to set up call
in 5 min via state Dept. If now is not convenient, is there a
time later today?''\792\ Phone records show that, shortly
thereafter, someone using a State Department number called Mr.
Giuliani and connected for more than nine minutes.\793\
Ambassador Volker told the Committees that, during the call,
Mr. Giuliani stated: ``If [the statement] doesn't say Burisma
and 2016, it's not credible, because what are they
hiding?''\794\ Ambassador Volker asked whether inserting
references to ``Burisma and 2016'' at the end of the statement
would make it ``more credible.'' Mr. Giuliani confirmed that it
would.\795\
Two minutes after the call ended, Ambassador Volker sent a
WhatsApp message to Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak: ``Hi
Andrey--we spoke with Rudy. When is good to call you?''\796\
Ambassador Sondland replied that it was, ``Important. Do you
have 5 mins.''\797\ They agreed to a call approximately 10
minutes later.\798\ When Ambassador Sondland suggested having
his ``operator'' in Brussels dial in the group, Ambassador
Volker asked if they could ``do this one on what's App?''\799\
Text messages and calls in the WhatsApp cell phone application
are encrypted from end-to-end, ensuring that WhatsApp employees
and third parties cannot listen in or retrieve deleted
communications.\800\
Shortly before the call, Ambassador Volker sent a revised
draft of the proposed statement to Ambassador Sondland. It had
been edited to include reference to Burisma and the 2016
elections:
Special attention should be paid to the problem of
interference in the political processes of the United
States, especially with the alleged involvement of some
Ukrainian politicians. I want to declare that this is
unacceptable. We intend to initiate and complete a
transparent and unbiased investigation of all available
facts and episodes including those involving Burisma
and the 2016 US elections, which in turn will prevent
the recurrence of this problem in the future.\801\
Ambassador Sondland replied: ``Perfect. Lets send to Andrey
after our call.''\802\
Following the call, Ambassador Volker texted Ambassador
Sondland and Mr. Yermak: ``Andrey--good talking--following is
text with insert at the end for the 2 key items.''\803\
Ambassador Volker then sent to them the revised statement that
included the explicit references to ``Burisma and 2016
elections.''\804\
COMPARISON OF DRAFT STATEMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Giuliani-Volker-Sondland Draft
Yermak Draft August 12 August 13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special attention should be paid to Special attention should be paid to
the problem of interference in the the problem of interference in the
political processes of the United political processes of the United
States, especially with the States, especially with the
alleged involvement of some alleged involvement of some
Ukrainian politicians. I want to Ukrainian politicians. I want to
declare that this is unacceptable. declare that this is unacceptable.
We intend to initiate and complete We intend to initiate and complete
a transparent and unbiased a transparent and unbiased
investigation of all available investigation of all available
facts and episodes, which in turn facts and episodes, including
will prevent the recurrence of those involving Burisma and the
this problem in the future. 2016 US elections, which in turn
will prevent the recurrence of
this problem in the future.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A ``Quid Pro Quo'' from ``The President of the United States''
Ambassador Volker testified that the language reflected
what Mr. Giuliani deemed necessary for the statement to be
``credible.''\805\ Ambassador Sondland noted the language was
``proposed by Giuliani.''\806\ Ambassador Sondland explained
that the language was a clear quid pro quo that expressed ``the
desire of the President of the United States'':
Mr. Giuliani's requests were a quid pro quo for
arranging a White House visit for President Zelensky.
Mr. Giuliani demanded that Ukraine make a public
statement announcing investigations of the 2016
election/DNC server and Burisma. Mr. Giuliani was
expressing the desires of the President of the United
States, and we knew that these investigations were
important to the President.\807\
Shortly after Ambassador Volker sent the revised statement
to Mr. Yermak on August 13, Ambassador Sondland called Mr.
Giuliani and connected for nearly four minutes.
Ukrainian Officials and Career State Department Became Increasingly
Concerned
On August 13--while Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland,
and Mr. Yermak were negotiating the draft statement about
investigations--Mr. Yermak asked Ambassador Volker ``whether
any request had ever been made by the U.S. to investigate
election interference in 2016.'' He appeared interested in
knowing whether the U.S. Department of Justice had made an
official request to Ukraine's law enforcement agency for legal
assistance in such a matter.\808\ When Ambassador Volker sent
Mr. Giuliani's approved draft statement to Mr. Yermak, he
stated that he would ``work on official request.''\809\
Ambassador Volker testified: ``When I say official request,
I mean law enforcement channels, Department of Justice to law
enforcement in Ukraine, please investigate was there any effort
to interfere in the U.S. elections.''\810\ Ambassador Volker
explained:
He [Yermak] said, and I think quite appropriately,
that if they [Ukraine] are responding to an official
request, that's one thing. If there's no official
request, that's different. And I agree with that.\811\
According to Ambassador Volker, he was merely trying to
``find out'' if there was ever an official request made by the
Department of Justice: ``As I found out the answer that we had
not, I said, well, let's just not go there.''\812\
On September 25, within hours of the White House's public
release of the record of the July 25 call between President
Trump and President Zelensky, a Justice Department spokesperson
issued a statement, apparently confirming that no such formal
request had been made:
The President has not spoken with the Attorney
General about having Ukraine investigate anything
relating to former Vice President Biden or his son. The
President has not asked the Attorney General to contact
Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The Attorney
General has not communicated with Ukraine--on this or
any other subject.\813\
Ukraine's current Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka,
who assumed his new position in late August 2019, confirmed the
Justice Department's account. He told the Financial Times in
late November 2019 that Attorney General Barr had made no
formal request regarding a potential investigation into
allegations of wrongdoing by former Vice President Biden.\814\
In an apparent reference to President Trump's demand that
Ukraine interfere in U.S. elections, Mr. Ryaboshapka added:
``It's critically important for the west not to pull us into
some conflicts between their ruling elites, but to continue to
support so that we can cross the point of no return.''\815\
Neither Ambassador Taylor in Ukraine nor Deputy Assistant
Secretary George Kent in Washington were aware of the efforts
by Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, in coordination with Mr.
Giuliani, to convince Ukrainian officials to issue a statement
in real time. Ambassador Taylor told the Committees that, on
August 16, in a text message exchange with Ambassador Volker,
he ``learned that Mr. Yermak had asked that the United States
submit an official request for an investigation into Burisma's
alleged violations of Ukrainian law, if that is what the United
States desired.''\816\ Ambassador Taylor noted that ``a formal
U.S. request to the Ukrainians to conduct an investigation
based on violations of their own law'' was ``improper'' and
advised Ambassador Volker to ``stay clear.''\817\
Nevertheless, Ambassador Volker requested Ambassador
Taylor's help with the matter.\818\ ``To find out the legal
aspects of the question,'' Ambassador Taylor gave Ambassador
Volker the name of an official at the Department of Justice
``whom I thought would be the proper point of contact for
seeking a U.S. referral for a foreign investigation.''\819\
On August 15, Ambassador Volker texted Ambassador Sondland
that Mr. Yermak wanted to ``know our status on asking them to
investigate.''\820\ Two days later, Ambassador Volker wrote:
``Bill [Taylor] had no info on requesting an investigation--
calling a friend at DOJ.'' Ambassador Volker testified that he
was not able to connect with his contact at the Department of
Justice.\821\
Mr. Kent testified that on August 15, Catherine Croft,
Ambassador Volker's special assistant, approached him to ask
whether there was any precedent for the United States asking
Ukraine to conduct investigations on its behalf. Mr. Kent
advised Ms. Croft:
[I]f you're asking me have we ever gone to the
Ukrainians and asked them to investigate or prosecute
individuals for political reasons, the answer is, I
hope we haven't, and we shouldn't because that goes
against everything that we are trying to promote in
post-Soviet states for the last 28 years, which is the
promotion of the rule of law.\822\
Mr. Kent testified that the day after his conversation with
Ms. Croft, he spoke with Ambassador Taylor, who ``amplified the
same theme'' and told Mr. Kent that ``Yermak was very
uncomfortable'' with the idea of investigations and suggested
that ``it should be done officially and put in writing.'' As a
result, it became clear to Mr. Kent in mid-August that Ukraine
was being pressured to conduct politically-motivated
investigations. Mr. Kent told Ambassador Taylor ``that's wrong,
and we shouldn't be doing that as a matter of U.S.
policy.''\823\
After speaking to Ms. Croft and Ambassador Taylor, Mr. Kent
wrote a memo to file on August 16 documenting his ``concerns
that there was an effort to initiate politically motivated
prosecutions that were injurious to the rule of law, both in
Ukraine and U.S.''\824\ Mr. Kent testified:
At the time, I had no knowledge of the specifics of
the [July 25] call record, but based on Bill Taylor's
account of the engagements with Andriy Yermak that were
engagements of Yermak with Kurt Volker, at that point
it was clear that the investigations that were being
suggested were the ones that Rudy Giuliani had been
tweeting about, meaning Biden, Burisma, and 2016.\825\
On August 17, Mr. Yermak reached out to both Ambassador
Sondland and Ambassador Volker.\826\ Ambassador Sondland texted
Ambassador Volker that ``Yermak just tapped on me about dates.
Havent responded. Any updates?''\827\ Ambassador Volker
responded that ``I've got nothing'' and stated that he was
contacting the Department of Justice to find out about
requesting an investigation.\828\
Ambassador Sondland then asked: ``Do we still want Ze
[Zelensky] to give us an unequivocal draft with 2016 and
Boresma [sic]?'' Ambassador Volker replied: ``That's the clear
message so far. . . .'' Ambassador Sondland said that he would
ask that Mr. Yermak ``send us a clean draft,'' to which
Ambassador Volker replied that he had spoken to Mr. Yermak and
suggested that he and Ambassador Sondland speak the following
day, August 18, to discuss ``all the latest.''\829\
Ambassador Volker claimed that he ``stopped pursuing'' the
statement from the Ukrainians around this time because of
concerns raised by Mr. Yermak that Yuriy Lutsenko was still the
Prosecutor General. Mr. Lutsenko was likely to be replaced by
President Zelensky, and because Mr. Lutsenko was alleging the
same false claims that President Trump and Mr. Giuliani were
demanding of President Zelensky, Ukrainian officials ``did not
want to mention Burisma or 2016.''\830\ Ambassador Volker
testified that he ``agreed'' and advised Mr. Yermak that
``making those specific refences was not a good idea'' because
making those statements might ``look like it would play into
our domestic politics.''\831\
Mr. Yermak agreed and, according to Ambassador Volker,
plans to put out a statement were ``shelved.''\832\ Ambassador
Volker reasoned that the plan for a public statement did not
materialize partly because of ``the sense that Rudy was not
going to be convinced that it meant anything, and, therefore,
convey a positive message to the President if it didn't say
Burisma and 2016.''\833\ He added:
I agreed with the Ukrainians they shouldn't do it,
and in fact told them just drop it, wait till you have
your own prosecutor general in place. Let's work on
substantive issues like this, security assistance and
all. Let's just do that. So we dropped it.\834\
Ambassador Volker testified that, ``From that point on, I
didn't have any further conversations about this
statement.''\835\ Nevertheless, efforts to secure a
presidential statement announcing the two investigations into
the Bidens and the 2016 U.S. election interference continued
well into September.
On August 19, Ambassador Sondland told Ambassador Volker
that he ``drove the `larger issue' home'' with Mr. Yermak: that
this was bigger than just a White House meeting and was about
``the relationship per se.''\836\ Ambassador Volker told the
Committees that he understood this referred to ``the level of
trust that the President has with President Zelensky. He has
this general negative assumption about everything Ukraine, and
that's the larger issue.''\837\ That negative assumption would
prove difficult to overcome as Ukrainian and U.S. officials
sought to finally obtain a White House meeting and shake free
from the White House hundreds of millions of dollars in
Congressionally-approved security assistance for Ukraine.
7. The President's Conditioning of Military Assistance and a White
House Meeting on Announcement of Investigations Raised Alarm
Following the public disclosure in late August 2019 of a hold on U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine, President Trump made clear that
``everything''--an Oval Office meeting and the release of
taxpayer-funded U.S. security assistance--was contingent on the
Ukrainian president announcing investigations into former Vice
President Joe Biden and a debunked conspiracy theory about
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. President
Trump wanted the Ukrainian leader ``in a public box,'' even as
Ambassador Bill Taylor warned that it was ``crazy to withhold
security assistance for help with a political campaign.''
Overview
On August 28, 2019, Politico first reported that President
Trump was withholding hundreds of millions of dollars of
Congressionally-appropriated U.S. security assistance from
Ukraine, a fact that had been previously suspected by Ukrainian
officials in July. Public revelations about the freeze raised
questions--about the U.S. commitment to Ukraine and harming
efforts to deter Russian influence and aggression in Europe.
Around this time, American officials made clear to
Ukrainians that a public announcement about investigations into
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election and former Vice
President Joe Biden was a pre-condition--not only to obtain a
White House meeting for President Zelensky, but also to end the
freeze on military and other security assistance for Ukraine.
In early September, Ambassador Gordon Sondland conveyed
President Trump's demands to both U.S. and Ukrainian officials.
On September 1, he informed a senior Ukrainian official that
the military aid would be released if the ``prosecutor general
would to go the mike [sic]'' and announce the investigations.
Later, on September 7, President Trump informed Ambassador
Sondland that he wanted President Zelensky--not the Prosecutor
General--in a ``public box'' and demanded that the Ukrainian
president personally announce the investigations to ``clear
things up.'' Only then would Ukraine end the ``stalemate'' with
the White House related to security assistance. President
Zelensky proceeded to schedule an interview on CNN in order to
announce the investigations and satisfy President Trump.
The President's efforts to withhold vital military and
security assistance in exchange for political investigations
troubled U.S. officials. NSC Senior Director for Europe and
Russia Timothy Morrison twice reported what he understood to be
the President's requirement of a quid pro quo to National
Security Advisor John Bolton, who advised him to ``make sure
the lawyers are tracking.'' Ambassador Bill Taylor expressed
his concerns to Ambassador Sondland, stating plainly that it
was ``crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a
political campaign.''
Secretary Pompeo and Ambassador Sondland Worked to ``Break the Logjam''
President Trump's hold on security assistance persisted
throughout August, without explanation to U.S. officials and
contrary to the consensus recommendation of the President's
national security team. At the same time, President Trump
refused to schedule a coveted White House visit for President
Zelensky until he announced two investigations that could
benefit President Trump's reelection prospects. The confluence
of those two circumstances led some American officials,
including Ambassador Sondland and David Holmes, Counselor for
Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, to conclude that
the military assistance was conditioned on Ukraine's public
announcement of the investigations.\838\
On August 20, Ambassador Kurt Volker met with Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper. Ms. Cooper and
Ambassador Volker agreed that if the hold on security
assistance was not lifted, ``it would be very damaging to the
relationship'' between the U.S. and Ukraine.\839\ During this
meeting, Ambassador Volker mentioned that he was talking to an
advisor to President Zelensky about making a statement ``that
would somehow disavow any interference in U.S. elections and
would commit to the prosecution of any individuals involved in
election interference.''\840\ Ambassador Volker indicated that
if his efforts to get a statement were successful, the hold on
security assistance might be lifted.\841\
Although he did not mention that conversation during his
deposition, Ambassador Volker had a similar recollection,
during his public testimony, of the meeting with Ms. Cooper.
Ambassador Volker recalled discussing with Ms. Cooper the draft
statement that had been coordinated with Ukrainian presidential
aide Andriy Yermak--which included reference to the two
investigations that President Trump demanded in the July 25
call--and that such a statement ``could be helpful in getting a
reset of the thinking of the President, the negative view of
Ukraine that he had'' which might, in turn, ``unblock[]
whatever hold there was on security assistance.''\842\
Around this time, Ambassador Sondland sought to ``break the
logjam'' on the security assistance and the White House meeting
by coordinating a meeting between the two Presidents through
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. On August 22, Ambassador
Sondland emailed Secretary Pompeo, copying the State
Department's Executive Secretary, Lisa Kenna:
Should we block time in Warsaw for a short pull-aside
for POTUS to meet Zelensky? I would ask Zelensky to
look him in the eye and tell him that once Ukraine's
new justice folks are in place (mid-Sept) Ze should be
able to move forward publicly and with confidence on
those issues of importance to Potus and to the US.
Hopefully, that will break the logjam.\843\
Secretary Pompeo replied, ``Yes.''\844\
Ambassador Sondland testified that when he referenced
``issues of importance to Potus,'' he meant the investigation
into the false allegations about Ukrainian interference in the
2016 election and the investigation into the Bidens.\845\ He
told the Committee that his goal was to ``do what was necessary
to get the aid released, to break the logjam.''\846\ Ambassador
Sondland believed that President Trump would not release the
aid until Ukraine announced the two investigations the
President wanted.\847\
Ambassador Sondland testified: ``Secretary Pompeo
essentially gave me the green light to brief President Zelensky
about making those announcements.''\848\ He explained:
This was a proposed briefing that I was going to give
President Zelensky, and I was going to call President
Zelensky and ask him to say what is in this email. And
I was asking essentially . . . [Secretary] Pompeo's
permission to do that, which he said yes.\849\
He then forwarded the email to Ms. Kenna, seeking
confirmation of ``10-15 min on the Warsaw sched[ule]'' for the
pull-aside meeting. The Ambassador stated that he was seeking
confirmation in order to brief President Zelensky. Ms. Kenna
replied, ``I will try for sure.''\850\
On August 24, Ukraine celebrated its Independence Day.
According to Mr. Holmes, Ukrainian Independence Day presented
``another good opportunity to show support for Ukraine.''\851\
However, nobody senior to Ambassador Volker attended the
festivities, even though Secretary of Defense James Mattis
attended in 2017 and Ambassador Bolton attended in 2018.\852\
Two days later, on August 26, Ambassador Bolton's office
requested Mr. Giuliani's contact information from Ambassador
Sondland. Ambassador Sondland sent Ambassador Bolton the
information directly.\853\ Ambassador Sondland testified that
he had ``no idea'' why Ambassador Bolton requested the contact
information.\854\
Ambassador Bolton Visited Kyiv
On August 27, Ambassador Bolton arrived in Kyiv for an
official visit. Ambassador Bolton emphasized to Andriy Bohdan,
President Zelensky's chief of staff, that an upcoming meeting
between Presidents Trump and Zelensky, scheduled for September
1 in Warsaw, Poland, would be ``crucial to cementing their
relationship.''\855\ Mr. Holmes, who accompanied Ambassador
Bolton in Kyiv, testified that he also heard ``Ambassador
Bolton express to Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Morrison his
frustration about Mr. Giuliani's influence with the President,
making clear there was nothing he could do about it.''\856\
Prior to Ambassador Bolton's departure from Kyiv,
Ambassador Taylor asked to meet with him privately. Ambassador
Taylor expressed his ``serious concern about the withholding of
military assistance to Ukraine while the Ukrainians were
defending their country from Russian aggression.''\857\ During
the conversation, Ambassador Bolton ``indicated that he was
very sympathetic'' to Ambassador's Taylor's concerns.\858\ He
advised that Ambassador Taylor ``send a first-person cable to
Secretary Pompeo directly relaying my concerns'' about the
withholding of military assistance.\859\
Mr. Holmes testified that Ambassador Bolton advised during
his trip that ``the hold on security assistance would not be
lifted prior to the upcoming meeting between President Trump
and President Zelensky in Warsaw, where it would hang on
whether Zelensky was able to favorably impress President
Trump.''\860\
Ukrainian Concern Over Military Aid Intensified After First Public
Report of Hold
On August 28, 2019, Politico first reported that President
Trump had implemented a hold on nearly $400 million of U.S.
military assistance to Ukraine that had been appropriated by
Congress.
Almost immediately after the news became public, Ukrainian
officials expressed alarm to their American counterparts. Mr.
Yermak sent Ambassador Volker a link to the Politico story and
then texted: ``Need to talk with you.''\861\ Other Ukrainian
officials also expressed concerns to Ambassador Volker that the
Ukrainian government was being ``singled out and penalized for
some reason.''\862\
On August 29, Mr. Yermak also contacted Ambassador Taylor
to express that he was ``very concerned'' about the hold on
military assistance.\863\ Mr. Yermak and other Ukrainian
officials told Ambassador Taylor that they were ``just
desperate'' and would be willing to travel to Washington to
raise with U.S. officials the importance of the assistance.
Ambassador Taylor described confusion among Ukrainian officials
over the hold on military aid:
I mean, the obvious question was, ``Why?'' So Mr.
Yermak and others were trying to figure out why this
was . . . They thought that there must be some rational
reason for this being held up, and they just didn't--
and maybe in Washington they didn't understand how
important this assistance was to their fight and to
their armed forces. And so maybe they could figure--so
they were just desperate.\864\
Without any official explanation for the hold, American
officials could provide little reassurance to their Ukrainian
counterparts. Ambassador Taylor continued, ``And I couldn't
tell them. I didn't know and I didn't tell them, because we
hadn't--we hadn't--there'd been no guidance that I could give
them.''\865\
Ambassador Taylor's First-Person Cable Described the ``Folly'' in
Withholding Military Aid
The same day that Ambassador Taylor heard from Mr. Yermak
about his concerns about the hold on military aid, Ambassador
Taylor transmitted his classified, first-person cable to
Washington. It was the first and only time in Ambassador
Taylor's career that he sent such a cable to the Secretary of
State.\866\ The cable described ``the folly I saw in
withholding military aid to Ukraine at a time when hostilities
were still active in the east and when Russia was watching
closely to gauge the level of American support for the
Ukrainian Government.''\867\
Ambassador Taylor worried about the public message that
such a hold on vital military assistance would send in the
midst of Ukraine's hot war with Russia: ``The Russians, as I
said at my deposition, would love to see the humiliation of
President Zelensky at the hands of the Americans. I told the
Secretary that I could not and would not defend such a
policy.''\868\
The cable also sought to explain clearly ``the importance
of Ukraine and the security assistance to U.S. national
security,'' according to Mr. Holmes.\869\ However, Mr. Holmes
worried that the national security argument might not achieve
its purpose given the reasons he suspected for the hold on
military aid. His ``clear impression'' at the time was that
``the security assistance hold was likely intended by the
President either as an expression of dissatisfaction with the
Ukrainians, who had not yet agreed to the Burisma/Biden
investigation, or as an effort to increase the pressure on them
to do so.''\870\ Mr. Holmes viewed this as ``the only logical
conclusion.''\871\ He had ``no other explanation for why there
was disinterest in this [White House] meeting that the
President had already offered'' and there was a ``hold of the
security assistance with no explanation whatsoever.''\872\
Ambassador Taylor never received a response to his cable,
but was told that Secretary Pompeo carried it with him to a
White House meeting about security assistance to Ukraine.\873\
Ambassador Sondland Told Senator Johnson That Ukraine Aid Was
Conditioned on Investigations
The next day, on August 30, Republican Senator Ron Johnson
spoke with Ambassador Sondland to express his concern about
President Trump's decision to withhold military assistance to
Ukraine. According to Senator Johnson, Ambassador Sondland told
him that if Ukraine would commit to ``get to the bottom of what
happened in 2016--if President Trump has that confidence, then
he'll release the military spending.''\874\
On August 31, Senator Johnson spoke by phone with President
Trump regarding the decision to withhold aid to Ukraine.\875\
President Trump denied the quid pro quo that Senator Johnson
had learned of from Ambassador Sondland.\876\ At the same time,
however, President Trump refused to authorize Senator Johnson
to tell Ukrainian officials that the aid would be
forthcoming.\877\
The message that Ambassador Sondland communicated to
Senator Johnson mirrored that used by President Trump during
his July 25 call with President Zelensky, in which President
Trump twice asked that the Ukrainian leader ``get to the bottom
of it,'' including in connection to an investigation into the
debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered in the 2016
election to help Hillary Clinton.\878\ To the contrary, the
U.S. Intelligence Community unanimously assessed that Russia
interfered in the 2016 election to help Donald Trump, as did
Special Counsel Robert Mueller.\879\
In a November 18 letter to House Republicans, Senator
Johnson confirmed the accuracy of the Wall Street Journal's
account of his August 30 call with Ambassador Sondland.\880\
Ambassador Sondland testified that he had ``no reason to
dispute'' Senator Johnson's recollection of the August 30 call
and testified that by late August 2019, he had concluded that
``if Ukraine did something to demonstrate a serious intention
to fight corruption, and specifically addressing Burisma and
the 2016, then the hold on military aid would be lifted.''\881\
Ambassador Sondland Raised the Link Between Investigations and Security
Assistance to Vice President Pence Before Meeting with President
Zelensky
On September 1, President Trump was scheduled to meet
President Zelensky in Warsaw, Poland during an event
commemorating World War II. Citing the approach of Hurricane
Dorian towards American soil, the President canceled his trip
just days beforehand. Vice President Mike Pence traveled to
Warsaw instead.\882\
Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President
for Europe and Russia, learned of the change in the President's
travel plans on August 29 and ``relied heavily on the NSC
briefing papers'' originally prepared for President Trump. Ms.
Williams recalled that ``prior to leaving, [National Security
Advisor to the Vice President] General Kellogg had asked, at
the request of the Vice President, for an update on the status
of the security assistance that was at that time still on
hold.'' Given the public reporting about the hold on August 29,
White House officials expected that President Zelensky would
seek further information on the status of the funds.\883\
The delegation arrived in Warsaw and gathered in a hotel
room to brief the Vice President shortly before his engagement
with President Zelensky. Ambassador Bolton, who had just
arrived from Kyiv, led the Ukraine briefing. He updated Vice
President Pence on President Zelensky's efforts to combat
corruption and explained ``what the security assistance was
for.'' Advisors in the room ``agreed on the need to get a final
decision on that security assistance as soon as possible so
that it could be implemented before the end of the fiscal
year.''\884\
Before the bilateral meeting between Vice President Pence
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland attended a
``general briefing'' for the Vice President.\885\ Ambassador
Sondland testified that he raised concerns that the delay in
security assistance had ``become tied to the issue of
investigations.''\886\ The Vice President ``nodded like, you
know, he heard what I said.''\887\
During Ambassador Sondland's public testimony, Vice
President Pence's office issued a carefully worded statement
claiming that the Vice President ``never had a conversation
with Gordon Sondland about investigating the Bidens, Burisma,
or the conditional release of financial aid to Ukraine based
upon potential investigations,'' and that ``Ambassador Gordon
Sondland was never alone with the Vice President on the
September 1 trip to Poland.''\888\ Ambassador Sondland did not
testify that he specifically mentioned the Bidens, Burisma, or
the conditional release of financial aid to Ukraine during his
discussion with Vice President Pence, nor did he testify that
he was alone with the Vice President.
Before Vice President Pence's meeting with President
Zelensky, Ukrainian National Security Advisor Oleksandr
``Sasha'' Danyliuk wrote Ambassador Taylor, incorrectly
describing the failure to provide security assistance as a
``gradually increasing problem.''\889\ In the hours before Vice
President Pence's meeting with President Zelensky, Ambassador
Taylor replied, clarifying that ``the delay of U.S. security
assistance was an all-or-nothing proposition, in the sense that
if the White House did not lift the hold prior to the end of
the fiscal year, September 30th, the funds would expire and
Ukraine would receive nothing.''\890\ Ambassador Taylor wanted
to make sure Mr. Danyliuk understood that if the assistance was
not provided ``by the end of the fiscal year, then it goes
away.''\891\
President Zelensky Immediately Asked Vice President Pence About
Security Assistance
As expected, at the outset of the bilateral meeting,
President Zelensky immediately asked Vice President Pence about
the status of U.S. security assistance. It was ``the very first
question'' that he raised.\892\ President Zelensky emphasized
the multifold importance of American assistance, stating that
``the symbolic value of U.S. support in terms of security
assistance . . . was just as valuable to the Ukrainians as the
actual dollars.''\893\ President Zelensky also expressed
concern that ``any hold or appearance of reconsideration of
such assistance might embolden Russia to think that the United
States was no longer committed to Ukraine.''\894\
According to Ms. Williams, the Vice President ``assured
President Zelensky that there was no change in U.S. policy in
terms of our . . . full-throated support for Ukraine and its
sovereignty and territorial integrity.''\895\ Vice President
Pence also assured the Ukrainian delegation that he would
convey to President Trump the details of President Zelensky's
``good progress on reforms, so that hopefully we could get a
decision on the security assistance as soon as possible.''\896\
The reassurance proved to be ineffective. The Washington
Post later reported that one of President Zelensky's aides told
Vice President Pence: ``You're the only country providing us
military assistance. You're punishing us.''\897\
Mr. Holmes testified that President Trump's decision to
cancel his Warsaw trip effectively meant that ``the hold [on
security assistance] remained in place, with no clear means to
get it lifted.''\898\
Ambassador Sondland Informed President Zelensky's Advisor that Military
Aid Was Contingent on Ukraine Publicly Announcing the Investigations
After the bilateral meeting between Vice President Pence
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland briefly spoke to
President Zelensky's aide, Mr. Yermak. Ambassador Sondland
conveyed his belief that ``the resumption of U.S. aid would
likely not occur until Ukraine took some kind of action on the
public statement that we had been discussing for many weeks''
regarding the investigations that President Trump discussed
during the July 25 call.\899\
Immediately following the conversation, Ambassador Sondland
told Mr. Morrison what had transpired during his aside with Mr.
Yermak. Mr. Morrison recounted to the Committees that
Ambassador Sondland told Mr. Yermak ``what could help them move
the aid was if the prosecutor general would go to the mike
[sic] and announce that he was opening the Burisma
investigation.''\900\
Mr. Morrison Reported Ambassador Sondland's Proposal to Get Ukrainians
``Pulled Into Our Politics'' to White House Officials and Ambassador
Taylor
Mr. Morrison felt uncomfortable with ``any idea that
President Zelensky should allow himself to be involved in our
politics.''\901\ He promptly reported the conversation between
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak to Ambassador Bolton. Mr.
Morrison had concerns with ``what Gordon was proposing about
getting the Ukrainians pulled into our politics.''\902\
Ambassador Bolton told Mr. Morrison--consistent with his own
``instinct''--to ``make sure the lawyers are tracking.''\903\
Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Morrison reported his
concerns to NSC lawyers John Eisenberg and Michael Ellis.\904\
Mr. Morrison testified that, in speaking to the NSC legal
advisors, he wanted to ensure ``that there was a record of what
Ambassador Sondland was doing, to protect the President.''\905\
At this point, Mr. Morrison was not certain that the President
had authorized Ambassador Sondland's activities, but Mr.
Morrison agreed that if the President had been aware of
Ambassador Sondland's activities, the effect could be to create
a paper trail that incriminated President Trump.\906\
Mr. Morrison also reported the conversation to Ambassador
Taylor ``because I wanted him to be in a position to advise the
Ukrainians not to do it.''\907\ Ambassador Taylor said that he
was ``alarmed'' to hear about the remarks to Mr. Yermak.\908\
He explained that ``this was the first time that I had heard
that the security assistance, not just the White House meeting,
was conditioned on the investigations.''\909\ To Ambassador
Taylor, ``It's one thing to try to leverage a meeting in the
White House. It's another thing, I thought, to leverage
security assistance . . . to a country at war, dependent on
both the security assistance and the demonstration of
support.''\910\
President Trump Wanted President Zelensky in a ``Public Box,'' and Said
``Everything'' Depended on Announcing the Investigations
Upon hearing from Mr. Morrison about the conditionality of
the military aid on Ukraine publicly announcing the two
investigations, Ambassador Taylor sent a text message to
Ambassador Sondland: ``Are we now saying that security
assistance and WH meeting are conditioned on investigations?''
Ambassador Sondland responded, ``Call me.''\911\
Ambassador Sondland confirmed over the phone to Ambassador
Taylor that ``everything''--the Oval Office meeting and the
security assistance--was dependent on the Ukrainian government
publicly announcing the political investigations President
Trump requested on July 25. Informed by a review of
contemporaneous notes that he took during his phone call,
Ambassador Taylor testified:
During that phone call, Ambassador Sondland told me
that President Trump had told him that he wants
President Zelensky to state publicly that Ukraine will
investigate Burisma and alleged Ukrainian interference
in the 2016 election. Ambassador Sondland also told me
that he now recognized that he had made a mistake by
earlier telling Ukrainian officials that only a White
House meeting with President Zelensky was dependent on
a public announcement of the investigations. In fact,
Ambassador Sondland said, everything was dependent on
such an announcement, including security assistance. He
said that President Trump wanted President Zelensky in
a public box, by making a public statement about
ordering such investigations.\912\
By this point, Ambassador Taylor's ``clear understanding''
was that President Trump would withhold security assistance
until President Zelensky ``committed to pursue the
investigation.''\913\ He agreed that the U.S. position was ``if
they don't do this,'' referring to the investigations, ``they
are not going to get that,'' referring to the security
assistance.\914\ Ambassador Taylor also concurred with the
statement that ``if they don't do this, they are not going to
get that'' was the literal definition of a quid pro quo.\915\
Ambassador Taylor testified that his contemporaneous notes
of the phone call with Ambassador Sondland reflect that
Ambassador Sondland used the phrase ``public box'' to describe
President Trump's desire to ensure that the initiation of his
desired investigations was announced publicly.\916\ Ambassador
Sondland, who did not take contemporaneous notes of any of his
conversations, did not dispute that he used those words.\917\
He also testified that, when he spoke to Mr. Yermak, he
believed that it would be sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of President Trump and Mr. Giuliani if the new
Ukrainian prosecutor general issued a statement about
investigations, but his understanding soon changed.\918\
President Trump Informed Ambassador Sondland that President Zelensky
Personally ``Must Announce the Opening of the Investigations''
On September 7, Ambassador Sondland called Mr. Morrison to
report that he had just concluded a call with President Trump.
Mr. Morrison testified that Ambassador Sondland told him ``that
there was no quid pro quo, but President Zelensky must announce
the opening of the investigations and he should want to do
it.''\919\ This led Mr. Morrison to believe that a public
announcement of investigations by the Ukrainian president--and
not the prosecutor general--was a prerequisite for the release
of the security assistance.\920\ He reported the conversation
to Ambassador Bolton, who once again instructed him to ``tell
the lawyers,'' which Mr. Morrison did.\921\
Later on September 7, Mr. Morrison relayed the substance of
Ambassador Sondland's conversation with President Trump to
Ambassador Taylor. Ambassador Taylor explained:
I had a conversation with Mr. Morrison in which he
described a phone conversation earlier that day between
Ambassador Sondland and President Trump. Mr. Morrison
said that he had a sinking feeling after learning about
this conversation from Ambassador Sondland. According
to Mr. Morrison, President Trump told Ambassador
Sondland he was not asking for a quid pro quo, but
President Trump did insist that President Zelensky go
to a microphone and say he is opening investigations of
Biden and 2016 election interference and that President
Zelensky should want to do this himself. Mr. Morrison
said that he told Ambassador Bolton and the NSC lawyers
of this phone call between President Trump and
Ambassador Sondland.\922\
The following day, on September 8, Ambassador Sondland
texted Ambassadors Volker and Taylor: ``Guys multiple convos
with Ze, Potus. Lets talk.'' Ambassador Taylor responded one
minute later, ``Now is fine with me.''\923\ On the phone,
Ambassador Sondland ``confirmed that he had talked to President
Trump'' and that ``President Trump was adamant that President
Zelensky himself had to clear things up and do it in public.
President Trump said it was not a quid pro quo.''\924\
Ambassador Sondland also shared that he told President Zelensky
and Mr. Yermak that, ``although this was not a quid pro quo, if
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would
be at a stalemate.''\925\
Ambassador Taylor testified that he understood
``stalemate'' to mean that ``Ukraine would not receive the
much-needed military assistance.''\926\ During his public
testimony, Ambassador Sondland did not dispute Ambassador
Taylor's recollection of events and agreed that the term
``stalemate'' referred to the hold on U.S. security assistance
to Ukraine.\927\
Although Ambassador Sondland otherwise could not
independently recall any details about his September 7
conversation with President Trump, he testified that he had no
reason to dispute the testimony from Ambassador Taylor or Mr.
Morrison--which was based on their contemporaneous notes--
regarding this conversation.\928\ Ambassador Sondland, however,
did recall that President Zelensky agreed to make a public
announcement about the investigations into Burisma and the
Bidens and the 2016 election in an interview on CNN.''\929\
According to Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Sondland
explained that President Trump was a ``businessman,'' and that
when ``a businessman is about to sign a check to someone who
owes him something, the businessman asks that person to pay up
before signing the check.''\930\ Ambassador Taylor was
concerned that President Trump believed Ukraine ``owed him
something'' in exchange for the hundreds of millions of dollars
in taxpayer-funded U.S. security assistance.\931\ He argued to
Ambassador Sondland that ``the explanation made no sense. The
Ukrainians did not owe President Trump anything. And holding up
security assistance for domestic political gain was
crazy.''\932\ Ambassador Sondland did not recall this exchange
specifically, but did not dispute Ambassador Taylor's
testimony.\933\
Ambassador Taylor Texted Ambassador Sondland that ``It's Crazy to
Withhold Security Assistance for Help with a Political Campaign''
Ambassador Taylor remained concerned by the President's
directive that ``everything'' was conditioned on President
Zelensky publicly announcing the investigations. He also
worried that, even if the Ukrainian leader did as President
Trump required, the President might continue to withhold the
vital U.S. security assistance in any event. Ambassador Taylor
texted his concerns to Ambassadors Volker and Sondland stating:
``The nightmare is they give the interview and don't get the
security assistance. The Russians love it. (And I quit.)''\934\
Ambassador Taylor testified:
``The nightmare'' is the scenario where President
Zelensky goes out in public, makes an announcement that
he's going to investigate the Burisma and the . . .
interference in 2016 election, maybe among other
things. He might put that in some series of
investigations. But . . . the nightmare was he would
mention those two, take all the heat from that, get
himself in big trouble in this country and probably in
his country as well, and the security assistance would
not be released. That was the nightmare.\935\
Early in the morning in Europe on September 9, Ambassador
Taylor reiterated his concerns about the President's ``quid pro
quo'' in another series of text messages with Ambassadors
Volker and Sondland:
Taylor: The message to the Ukrainians (and Russians)
we send with the decision on security assistance is
key. With the hold, we have already shaken their faith
in us. Thus my nightmare scenario.
Taylor: Counting on you to be right about this
interview, Gordon.
Sondland: Bill, I never said I was ``right''. I said
we are where we are and believe we have identified the
best pathway forward. Lets hope it works.
Taylor: As I said on the phone, I think it's crazy to
withhold security assistance for help with a political
campaign.\936\
By ``help with a political campaign,'' Ambassador Taylor
was referring to President Trump's 2020 reelection effort.\937\
Ambassador Taylor testified: ``The investigation of Burisma and
the Bidens was clearly identified by Mr. Giuliani in public for
months as a way to get information on the two Bidens.''\938\
Ambassador Taylor framed the broader national security
implications of President Trump's decision to withhold vital
security assistance from Ukraine. He said:
[T]he United States was trying to support Ukraine as
a frontline state against Russian attack. And, again,
the whole notion of a rules-based order was being
threatened by the Russians in Ukraine. So our security
assistance was designed to support Ukraine. And it was
not just the United States; it was all of our
allies.\939\
Ambassador Taylor explained:
[S]ecurity assistance was so important for Ukraine as
well as our own national interests, to withhold that
assistance for no good reason other than help with a
political campaign made no sense. It was
counterproductive to all of what we had been trying to
do. It was illogical. It could not be explained. It was
crazy.\940\
Ambassador Sondland Repeated the President's Denial of a ``Quid Pro
Quo'' to Ambassador Taylor, While He and President Trump Continued to
Demand Public Investigations
In response to Ambassador Taylor's text message that it was
``crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a
political campaign,'' Ambassador Sondland denied that the
President had demanded a ``quid pro quo.''
At approximately 5:17 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador
Sondland responded to Ambassador Taylor:
Bill, I believe you are incorrect about President
Trump's intentions. The President has been crystal
clear: no quid pro quo's of any kind. The President is
trying to evaluate whether Ukraine is truly going to
adopt the transparency and reforms that President
Zelensky promised during his campaign. I suggest we
stop the back and forth by text. If you still have
concerns, I recommend you give Lisa Kenna or S
[Secretary Pompeo] a call to discuss them directly.
Thanks.\941\
Notably, Ambassador Sondland recalled that President Trump
raised the possible existence of a quid pro quo entirely on his
own, without any prompting. Ambassador Sondland asked President
Trump what he affirmatively wanted from Ukraine, yet President
Trump reportedly responded by asserting what was not the case:
Q: Okay. During that telephone conversation with
President Trump, you didn't ask the President directly
if there was a quid pro quo, correct?
A: No. As I testified, I asked the question open
ended, what do you want from Ukraine?
Q: President Trump was the first person to use the
word ``quid pro quo,'' correct?
A: That is correct.\942\
In contrast, Ambassador Sondland testified unequivocally
there was a quid pro quo in connection to a telephone call
between President Trump and President Zelensky, as well as a
White House meeting for President Zelensky.\943\ He
acknowledged that the reference to ``transparency and reforms''
in his text message to Ambassador Taylor ``was my clumsy way of
saying he wanted these announcement to be made.''\944\
Ambassador Sondland also testified that President Trump
immediately followed his stated denial of a quid pro quo by
demanding that President Zelensky still make a public
announcement, while the military assistance remained on an
unexplained hold. Ambassador Sondland agreed that President
Trump said that he wanted President Zelensky to ``clear things
up and do it in public,'' as Ambassador Taylor had
testified.\945\ Ambassador Sondland testified that nothing on
his call with President Trump changed his understanding of a
quid pro quo and, at least as of September 8, he was
``absolutely convinced'' the White House meeting and President
Trump's release of the military assistance were conditioned on
the public announcement of the investigations President Trump
sought.\946\
After hearing from President Trump, Ambassador Sondland
promptly told the Ukrainian leader and Mr. Yermak that ``if
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would
be at a stalemate.''\947\ President Zelensky responded to the
demand relayed by Ambassador Sondland, by agreeing to make an
announcement of investigations on CNN.\948\
Regardless of when the call between President Trump and
Ambassador Sondland occurred, both that phone call and
Ambassador's Sondland text message denying any quid pro quo
occurred after the White House had been informed of the
whistleblower complaint discussing the hold on security
assistance. The White House first received notice of the
whistleblower complaint alleging wrongdoing concerning the
President's July 25 call with President Zelensky on August 26--
over a week before the ``no quid pro quo'' denial.\949\ In
addition, Ambassador Sondland wrote his text message on
September 9, the same day that the ICIG informed the Committee
of the existence of a ``credible'' and ``urgent'' whistleblower
complaint that was later revealed to be related to
Ukraine.\950\ The Administration received prior notice of the
ICIG's intent to inform the Committee.\951\
Ambassador Sondland's Testimony is the Only Evidence the Committees
Received Indicating That President Trump Denied Any ``Quid Pro Quo'' on
the Phone on September 9
Ambassador Sondland testified in his deposition that he
sent a text message to Ambassador Taylor after speaking
directly with President Trump on September 9. However,
testimony from other witnesses and documents available to the
Committees do not confirm that Ambassador Sondland and
President Trump spoke on that day.
Ambassador Sondland's own testimony indicated some
ambiguity in his recollection of the timing of the call. At a
public hearing on November 20, Ambassador Sondland testified
that he ``still cannot find a record of that call [on September
9] because the State Department and the White House cannot
locate it.''\952\ While Ambassador Sondland testified that
``I'm pretty sure I had the call on that day,''\953\ he
acknowledged that he might have misremembered the date of the
September 9 call--``I may have even spoken to him on September
6th''--and that without his call records, he could not be
certain about when he spoke to President Trump.\954\
After the deposition transcripts of Ambassador Taylor and
Mr. Morrison were made public, including their detailed
accounts of the September 7 conversation that Ambassador
Sondland had with President Trump, Ambassador Sondland
submitted a written addendum to his deposition based on his
``refreshed'' recollection.\955\ In that addendum, Ambassador
Sondland amended his testimony and stated, ``I cannot
specifically recall if I had one or two phone calls with
President Trump in the September 6-9 time frame.''\956\
Furthermore, the conversation recalled by Ambassador
Sondland as having taken place on September 9 is consistent
with a conversation that Ambassador Sondland relayed to Mr.
Morrison and Ambassador Taylor during the previous two days.
Both Mr. Morrison and Ambassador Taylor, after reviewing their
contemporaneous written notes, provided detailed testimony
about Ambassador Sondland's description of his call with
President Trump. For example, Ambassador Sondland shared with
Ambassador Taylor that even though President Trump asserted
that ``there is no quid pro quo,'' President Trump ``did insist
that President Zelensky go to a microphone and say he is
opening investigations of Biden and 2016 election
interference.''\957\ Mr. Morrison and Ambassador Taylor both
testified that this conversation occurred on September 7.\958\
Ambassador Sondland acknowledged that he had no basis to
dispute the recollections of Mr. Morrison and Ambassador
Taylor.\959\ Ambassador Sondland, who testified that he does
not take notes, stated: ``If they have notes and they recall
that, I don't have any reason to dispute it.''\960\
Text messages produced to the Committees also indicate that
Ambassador Sondland spoke to President Trump prior to September
8. On September 4, Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Yermak that
Ambassador Sondland planned to speak to President Trump on
September 6 or 7. Ambassador Volker wrote: ``Hi Andrey. Reports
are that pence liked meeting and will press trump on scheduling
Ze visit. Gordon will follow up with pence and, if nothing
moving, will have a chance to talk with President on Saturday
[September 7].''\961\ Ambassador Volker then corrected himself:
``Sorry--on Friday [September 6].''\962\
On Sunday, September 8, at 11:20 a.m. Eastern Time,
Ambassador Sondland texted Ambassadors Taylor and Volker:
``Guys multiple convos with Ze, Potus. Lets talk.''\963\
Shortly after this text, Ambassador Taylor testified that he
spoke to Ambassador Sondland, who recounted his conversation
with President Trump on September 7, as well as a separate
conversation that Ambassador Sondland had with President
Zelensky.
The timing of the text messages also raises questions about
Ambassador Sondland's recollection. If Ambassador Sondland
spoke to President Trump after receiving Ambassador Taylor's
text message on September 9, and before he responded, then the
timing of the text messages would mean that President Trump
took Ambassador Sondland's call in the middle of the night in
Washington, D.C. Ambassador Taylor sent his message on
September 9 at 12:47 a.m. Eastern Time, and Ambassador Sondland
responded less than five hours later at 5:19 a.m. Eastern
Time.\964\
In any event, President Trump's purported denial of the
``quid pro quo'' was also contradicted when Acting Chief of
Staff Mick Mulvaney publicly admitted that security assistance
was withheld in order to pressure Ukraine to conduct an
investigation into the 2016 election.
On October 17, at a press briefing in the White House, Mr.
Mulvaney confirmed that President Trump withheld the essential
military aid for Ukraine as leverage to pressure Ukraine to
investigate the conspiracy theory that Ukraine had interfered
in the 2016 U.S. election, which was also promoted by Vladimir
Putin.\965\ Mr. Mulvaney confirmed that President Trump
``absolutely'' mentioned ``corruption related to the DNC
server. . . . No question about that.''\966\ When the White
House press corps attempted to clarify this acknowledgement of
a quid pro quo related to security assistance, Mr. Mulvaney
replied: ``We do that all the time with foreign policy.'' He
continued. ``I have news for everybody: get over it.''\967\
8. The President's Scheme Was Exposed
President Trump lifted the hold on U.S. military assistance to Ukraine
on September 11 after it became clear to the White House and
President Trump that his scheme was exposed.
Overview
As news of the President's hold on military assistance to
Ukraine became public on August 28, Congress, the press, and
the public increased their scrutiny of President Trump's
actions regarding Ukraine, which risked exposing President
Trump's scheme. By this date, the White House had learned that
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG),
Michael Atkinson, had determined that a whistleblower complaint
related to the same Ukraine matters was ``credible'' and an
``urgent concern,'' and, pursuant to the applicable statute,
recommended to the Acting Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), Joseph Maguire, that the complaint should be transmitted
to Congress.
In early September, bipartisan Members of both houses of
Congress--publicly, and privately--expressed concerns to the
White House about the hold on military assistance. On September
9, after months of internal discussion due to growing concern
about the activity of President Trump's personal attorney, Rudy
Giuliani, regarding Ukraine, the Chairs of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
and the Committee on Oversight and Reform announced a joint
investigation into efforts by President Trump and Mr. Giuliani,
``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to assist the
President's bid for reelection,'' including by withholding
Congressionally-appropriated military assistance.
Later that same day, the ICIG notified Chairman Schiff and
Ranking Member Nunes that, despite uniform past practice and a
statutory requirement that credible, ``urgent concern''
complaints be provided to the intelligence committees, the
Acting DNI was nevertheless withholding the whistleblower
complaint from Congress. The Acting DNI later testified that
his office initially withheld the complaint on the advice of
the White House, with guidance from the Department of Justice.
Two days later, on September 11, the President lifted the
hold on the military assistance to Ukraine. Numerous witnesses
testified that they were never aware of any official reason for
why the hold was either implemented or lifted.
Notwithstanding this ongoing inquiry, President Trump has
continued to urge Ukraine to investigate his political rival,
former Vice President Biden. For example, when asked by a
journalist on October 3 what he hoped Ukraine's President would
do about the Bidens in response to the July 25 call, President
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.'' President Trump reiterated
his affinity for the former Prosecutor General of Ukraine,
Yuriy Lutsenko, whom numerous witnesses described as inept and
corrupt: ``And they got rid of a prosecutor who was a very
tough prosecutor. They got rid of him. Now they're trying to
make it the opposite way.''
Public Scrutiny of President Trump's Hold on Military Assistance for
Ukraine
After news of the President's freeze on U.S. military
assistance to Ukraine became public on August 28, both houses
of Congress increased their ongoing scrutiny of President
Trump's decision.\968\ On September 3, a bipartisan group of
Senators, including Senator Rob Portman and Senator Ron
Johnson, sent a letter to Acting White House Chief of Staff
Mick Mulvaney expressing ``deep concerns'' that the
``Administration is considering not obligating the Ukraine
Security Initiative funds for 2019.''\969\ The Senators' letter
urged that the ``vital'' funds be obligated
``immediately.''\970\ On September 5, the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee sent a letter to
Mr. Mulvaney and Acting Director of the OMB Russell Vought
expressing ``deep concern'' about the continuing hold on
security assistance funding for Ukraine.\971\
On September 5, the Washington Post editorial board
reported concerns that President Trump was withholding military
assistance for Ukraine and a White House meeting in order to
force President Zelensky to announce investigations of Mr.
Biden and purported Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S.
election. The Post editorial board wrote:
[W]e're reliably told that the president has a second
and more venal agenda: He is attempting to force Mr.
Zelensky to intervene in the 2020 U.S. presidential
election by launching an investigation of the leading
Democratic candidate, Joe Biden. Mr. Trump is not just
soliciting Ukraine's help with his presidential
campaign; he is using U.S. military aid the country
desperately needs in an attempt to extort it.
It added:
4 The White House claims Mr. Trump suspended Ukraine's
military aid in order for it [sic] be reviewed. But, as
CNN reported, the Pentagon has already completed the
study and recommended that the hold be lifted. Yet Mr.
Trump has not yet acted. If his recalcitrance has a
rationale, other than seeking to compel a foreign
government to aid his reelection, the president has yet
to reveal it.\972\
On the same day that the Washington Post published its
editorial, Senators Christopher Murphy and Ron Johnson visited
Kyiv, and met with President Zelensky. They were accompanied by
Ambassador Bill Taylor and Counselor for Political Affairs
David Holmes of U.S. Embassy Kyiv. President Zelensky's ``first
question to the Senators was about the withheld security
assistance.''\973\ Ambassador Taylor testified that both
Senators ``stressed that bipartisan support for Ukraine in
Washington was Ukraine's most important strategic asset and
that President Zelensky should not jeopardize that bipartisan
support by getting drawn into U.S. domestic politics.''\974\
As Senator Johnson and Senator Murphy later recounted, the
Senators sought to reassure President Zelensky that there was
bipartisan support in Congress for providing Ukraine with
military assistance for Ukraine and that they would continue to
urge President Trump to lift the hold--as Senator Johnson had
already tried, unsuccessfully, before traveling to
Ukraine.\975\
Three Committees Announced Joint Investigation of President's Scheme
On September 9, the Chairs of the House Intelligence
Committee, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee
on Oversight and Reform publicly announced a joint
investigation of the scheme by President Trump and Mr. Giuliani
``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to assist the
President's bid for reelection.''\976\ The Committees had been
planning and coordinating this investigation since early
summer, after growing public scrutiny of Mr. Giuliani's
activities in Ukraine and questions about Ambassador
Yovanovitch's abrupt removal following a public smear campaign
targeting her.
In a letter sent to White House Counsel Pat Cipollone the
same day, the three Chairs stated that President Trump and Mr.
Giuliani ``appear to have acted outside legitimate law
enforcement and diplomatic channels to coerce the Ukrainian
government into pursuing two politically-motivated
investigations under the guise of anti-corruption activity''--
investigations into purported Ukrainian interference in the
2016 election and Vice President Biden and his son.\977\
With respect to the hold on Ukraine military assistance,
the Chairs observed that ``[i]f the President is trying to
pressure Ukraine into choosing between defending itself from
Russian aggression without U.S. assistance or leveraging its
judicial system to serve the ends of the Trump campaign, this
would represent a staggering abuse of power, a boon to Moscow,
and a betrayal of the public trust.''\978\ The Chairs requested
that the White House preserve all relevant records and produce
them by September 16, including the transcript of the July 25
call between President Trump and President Zelensky.\979\
On the same day, the Chairs of the three Committees sent a
similar letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo seeking the
preservation and production of all relevant records at the
Department of State by September 16.\980\ To date, and as
explained more fully in Section II, Secretary Pompeo has not
produced a single document sought by the Committees pursuant to
a lawful subpoena.
NSC Senior Director for Russia and Europe Timothy Morrison
recalled seeing a copy of the letter that was sent by the three
Chairs to the White House.\981\ He also recalled that the three
Committees' Ukraine investigation was discussed at meeting of
senior-level NSC staff soon after it was publicly
announced.\982\ The NSC's legislative affairs staff issued a
notice of the investigation to NSC staff members, although it
is unclear exactly when.\983\ NSC Director for Ukraine
Alexander Vindman recalled discussions among NSC staff members,
including Mr. Morrison's deputy, John Erath, that the
investigation ``might have the effect of releasing the hold''
on Ukraine military assistance because it would be
``potentially politically challenging'' for the Administration
to ``justify that hold'' to the Congress.\984\
Inspector General Notified Intelligence Committee that the
Administration Was Withholding Whistleblower Complaint
Later that same day, September 9, Inspector General
Atkinson sent a letter to Chairman Schiff and Ranking Member
Nunes notifying them that an Intelligence Community
whistleblower had filed a complaint with the ICIG on August
12.\985\ Pursuant to a statute governing whistleblower
disclosures, the Inspector General--after a condensed,
preliminary review--had determined that the complaint
constituted an ``urgent concern'' and that its allegations
appeared to be ``credible.''\986\ The Inspector General's
September 9 letter did not disclose the substance or topic of
the whistleblower complaint.
Contrary to uniform past practice and the clear
requirements of the whistleblower statute, Acting DNI Maguire
withheld the whistleblower complaint based on advice from the
White House.\987\ Acting DNI Maguire also relied upon an
unprecedented intervention by the Department of Justice into
Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to overturn the
ICIG's determination based on a preliminary investigation.\988\
The White House had been aware of the whistleblower
complaint weeks prior to the ICIG's letter of September 9.\989\
Acting DNI Maguire testified that, after receiving the
whistleblower complaint from the Inspector General on August
26, his office contacted the White House Counsel's Office for
guidance.\990\
Consistent with Acting DNI Maguire's testimony, the New
York Times reported that in late August, Mr. Cipollone and
National Security Council Legal Advisor John Eisenberg
personally briefed President Trump about the complaint's
existence--and explained to the President that they believed
the complaint could be withheld on executive privilege
grounds.\991\ The report alleged that Mr. Cipollone and Mr.
Eisenberg ``told Mr. Trump they planned to ask the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel to determine whether they
had to disclose the complaint to lawmakers.''\992\
On September 10, Chairman Schiff wrote to Acting DNI
Maguire to express his concern about the Acting DNI's
``unprecedented departure from past practice'' in withholding
the whistleblower complaint from the Congressional intelligence
committees notwithstanding his ``express obligations under the
law'' and the Inspector General's determination.\993\ Chairman
Schiff observed that the ``failure to transmit to the Committee
an urgent and credible whistleblower complaint, as required by
law, raises the prospect that an urgent matter of a serious
nature is being purposefully concealed from the
Committee.''\994\
Also on September 10, Ambassador John Bolton resigned from
his position as National Security Advisor. Ambassador Bolton's
deputy, Dr. Charles Kupperman, became the Acting National
Security Advisor. The Committee was unable to determine if
Ambassador Bolton's departure related to the matters under
investigation because neither he nor Dr. Kupperman agreed to
appear for testimony as part of this inquiry.
On September 13, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) General Counsel informed the Committee that
DOJ had overruled the ICIG's determination, and that the ODNI
could not transmit the complaint to the Committee at its
discretion because it involved ``potentially privileged
communications by persons outside the Intelligence
Community''--presumably presidential communications.\995\ In
response, Chairman Schiff issued a subpoena to the Acting DNI
on September 13 and announced to the public that ODNI was
withholding a ``credible'' whistleblower complaint of ``urgent
concern.''\996\ Following intense pressure from the public and
Congress, on September 25, the White House released the
complaint to the intelligence committees and the July 25 call
record to the public.\997\
President Trump Lifted the Hold on Military Assistance for Ukraine
On September 11--two days after the three Committees
launched their investigation into President Trump's scheme, and
one day after Chairman Schiff requested that Acting DNI Maguire
produce a copy of the whistleblower complaint--President Trump
lifted the hold on military assistance for Ukraine.
On the evening of September 11, prior to lifting the hold,
President Trump met with Vice President Mike Pence, Mr.
Mulvaney, and Senator Portman to discuss the hold.\998\ Around
8:00 p.m. on September 11, the Chief of Staff's office informed
Dr. Kupperman that the hold had been lifted.\999\
Just like there was no official explanation for why the
hold on Ukraine security assistance was implemented, numerous
witnesses testified that they were not provided with a reason
for why the hold was lifted on September 11.\1000\ For example,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper testified
that President Trump's lifting of the hold ``really came quite
out of the blue . . . It was quite abrupt.''\1001\ Jennifer
Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President for Europe and
Russia, testified that from the time when she first learned
about the hold on July 3 until it was lifted on September 11,
she never came to understand why President Trump ordered the
hold.\1002\
OMB Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs
Mark Sandy, who was the senior career official overseeing the
administration of some of the Ukraine military assistance, only
learned of a possible rationale for the hold in early
September--after the Acting DNI had informed the White House
about the whistleblower complaint.\1003\ Mr. Sandy testified
that he could not recall another instance ``where a significant
amount of assistance was being held up'' and he ``didn't have a
rationale for as long as I didn't have a rationale in this
case.''\1004\ However, in ``early September,'' approximately
two months after President Trump had implemented the hold, and
several weeks after the White House learned of the
whistleblower complaint, Mr. Sandy received an email from OMB
Associate Director of National Security Programs Michael
Duffey. For the first time, it ``attributed the hold to the
President's concern about other countries not contributing more
to Ukraine'' and requested ``information on what additional
countries were contributing to Ukraine.''\1005\
Mr. Sandy testified that he was not aware of any other
countries committing to provide more financial assistance to
Ukraine prior to the lifting of the hold on September 11.\1006\
According to Lt. Col. Vindman, none of the ``facts on the
ground'' changed before the President lifted the hold.\1007\
After the Hold was Lifted, Congress was Forced to Pass a Law to Ensure
All of the Military Aid Could Be Distributed to Ukraine
The lengthy delay created by the hold on Ukraine military
assistance prevented the Department of Defense from spending
all of the Congressionally-appropriated funds by the end of the
fiscal year, which meant that the funds would expire on
September 30 because unused funds do not roll over to the next
fiscal year.\1008\ This confirmed the fears expressed by Ms.
Cooper, Mr. Sandy, and others related to the illegal
impoundment of Congressionally-mandated funding--concerns that
were discussed in some depth within the relevant agencies in
late July and throughout August.\1009\
Prior to the release of the funds, DOD's internal analysis
raised concerns that up to $100 million of military assistance
could go unspent as a result of the hold imposed by the
President.\1010\ Ultimately, approximately $35 million of
Ukraine military assistance--14% of the total funds--remained
unspent by the end of fiscal year 2019.\1011\ Typically, DOD
averages between 2 and 5 percent unspent funds for similar
programs, substantially less than the 14 percent left unspent
in this case.\1012\
In order to ensure that Ukraine did not permanently lose
$35 million of the critical military assistance frozen by the
White House,\1013\ Congress passed a provision on September
27--three days before funds were set to expire--to ensure that
the remaining $35 million in 2019 military assistance to
Ukraine could be spent.\1014\ Ms. Cooper testified that such an
act of Congress was unusual--indeed, she had never heard of
funding being extended in this manner.\1015\
As of November 2019, Pentagon officials confirmed that the
$35 million in security assistance originally held by the
President and extended by Congress had still yet to be
disbursed. When asked for an explanation, the Pentagon only
confirmed that the funds had not yet been spent but declined to
say why.\1016\
Pressure to Announce Investigations Continued After the Hold was Lifted
Before President Trump lifted the hold on security
assistance, Ukrainian officials had relented to the American
pressure campaign to announce the investigations and had
scheduled President Zelensky to appear on CNN.\1017\ Even after
President Trump lifted the hold on September 11, President
Zelensky did not immediately cancel his planned CNN
interview.\1018\
On September 12, Ambassador Taylor personally informed
President Zelensky and the Ukrainian foreign minister that
President Trump's hold on military assistance had been
lifted.\1019\ Ambassador Taylor remained concerned, however,
that ``there was some indication that there might still be a
plan for the CNN interview in New York'' during which President
Zelensky would announce the investigations that President Trump
wanted Ukraine to pursue.\1020\ Ambassador Taylor testified
that he ``wanted to be sure that that didn't happen, so I
addressed it with Zelensky's staff.''\1021\
On September 13, a staff member at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv
texted Mr. Holmes to relay a message that ``Sondland said the
Zelensky interview is supposed to be today or Monday, and they
plan to announce that a certain investigation that was `on
hold' will progress.''\1022\ The Embassy Kyiv staffer stated
that he ``did not know if this was decided or if Sondland was
advocating for it. Apparently he's been discussing this with
Yermak.''\1023\
On September 13, during a meeting in President Zelensky's
office, Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy Yermak ``looked
uncomfortable'' when Ambassador Taylor sought to confirm that
there were no plans for President Zelensky to announce the
investigations during a CNN interview.\1024\ Although President
Zelensky's National Security Advisor Oleksandr Danyliuk
indicated that there were no plans for President Zelensky to do
the CNN interview, Ambassador Taylor was still concerned after
he and Mr. Holmes saw Mr. Yermak following the meeting.\1025\
According to Ambassador Taylor, Mr. Yermak's ``body language
was such that it looked to me like he was still thinking they
were going to make that statement.''\1026\ Mr. Holmes also
recalled that when he and Ambassador Taylor ran into Mr. Yermak
following the meeting, Ambassador Taylor ``stressed the
importance of staying out of U.S. politics and said he hoped no
interview was planned,'' but ``Mr. Yermak shrugged in
resignation and did not answer, as if to indicate he had no
choice.''\1027\
That same day, September 13, President Zelensky reportedly
met with CNN's Fareed Zakaria, who was in Kyiv to moderate the
Yalta European Strategy Conference.\1028\ During the meeting
with Mr. Zakaria, President Zelensky did not cancel his planned
CNN interview.\1029\
Conflicting advice prompted the Ukrainian foreign minister
to observe in a meeting with Ambassador Volker, Ambassador
Taylor, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent,
``You guys are sending us different messages in different
channels.''\1030\
For example, at a September 14 meeting in Kyiv attended by
Ambassador Volker, Mr. Yermak, and the Ukrainian foreign
minister, Ambassador Volker stated that when the two Presidents
finally meet, ``it's important that President Zelensky give the
messages that we discussed before,'' apparently referring to
President Zelensky's ``willingness to open investigations in
the two areas of interest to the President and that had been
pushed previously by Rudy Giuliani.''\1031\ Ambassador Taylor,
however, replied: ``Don't do that.''\1032\
On September 18 or 19, President Zelensky cancelled his
scheduled interview with CNN.\1033\ Although President Zelensky
did not publicly announce the investigations that President
Trump wanted, he remains under pressure from President Trump,
particularly because he requires diplomatic, financial, and
military backing from the United States, the most powerful
supporter of Ukraine. That pressure continues to this day. As
Mr. Holmes testified:
[A]lthough the hold on the security assistance may
have been lifted, there were still things they wanted
that [the Ukrainians] weren't getting, including a
meeting with the President in the Oval Office. Whether
the hold--the security assistance hold continued or
not, Ukrainians understood that that's something the
President wanted, and they still wanted important
things from the President.
And I think that continues to this day. I think
they're being very careful. They still need us now
going forward. In fact, right now, President Zelensky
is trying to arrange a summit meeting with President
Putin in the coming weeks, his first face to face
meeting with him to try to advance the peace process.
He needs our support. He needs President Putin to
understand that America supports Zelensky at the
highest levels. So this doesn't end with the lifting of
the security assistance hold. Ukraine still needs us,
and as I said, still fighting this war this very
day.\1034\
Vice President Pence Spoke to President Zelensky
On September 18, approximately one week before President
Trump was scheduled to meet with President Zelensky at the
United Nations General Assembly in New York, Vice President
Pence spoke with President Zelensky by telephone.\1035\
According to Ms. Williams, during the call, Vice President
Pence ``reiterat[ed] the release of the funds'' and ``ask[ed] a
bit more about . . . how Zelensky's efforts were going.''\1036\
On November 26, Ms. Williams submitted a classified
addendum to her hearing testimony on November 19 related to
this telephone call. According to Ms. Williams' counsel, the
Office of the Vice President informed Ms. Williams' counsel
that certain portions of the September 18 call, including the
additional information in Ms. Williams' addendum, are
classified. The Committee has requested that the Office of the
Vice President conduct a declassification review so that the
Committee may share this additional information regarding the
substance of the September 18 call publicly. On October 9, Vice
President Pence told reporters, ``I'd have no objection'' to
the White House releasing the transcript of his calls with
President Zelensky and said that ``we're discussing that with
White House counsel as we speak.''\1037\ In a November 7
interview with Fox Business, Vice President Pence reiterated,
``I have no objection at all'' to releasing records of his
calls.\1038\
President Trump and Rudy Giuliani, Undeterred, Continued to Solicit
Foreign Interference in Our Elections
On September 19, Rudy Giuliani was interviewed by Chris
Cuomo on CNN. During the interview, Mr. Giuliani confirmed that
he had urged Ukraine to investigate ``the allegations that
there was interference in the election of 2016, by the
Ukrainians, for the benefit of Hillary Clinton[.]'' When asked
specifically if he had asked Ukraine to look into Vice
President Biden, Mr. Giuliani replied immediately, ``of course
I did.''
Seconds later, Mr. Giuliani attempted to clarify his
admission, insisting that he had not asked Ukraine to
investigate Vice President Biden but instead ``to look into the
allegations that related to my client [President Trump], which
tangentially involved Joe Biden in a massive bribery scheme.''
Mr. Giuliani insisted that his conduct was appropriate, telling
Mr. Cuomo later in the interview that ``it is perfectly
appropriate for a President to say to a leader of a foreign
country, investigate this massive bribe . . . that was paid by
a former Vice President.''\1039\
President Trump also has continued to publicly urge
President Zelensky to launch an investigation of Vice President
Biden and alleged 2016 election interference by Ukraine. On
September 23, in a public press availability, President Trump
stated:
I put no pressure on them whatsoever. I could have. I
think it would probably, possibly, have been okay if I
did. But I didn't. I didn't put any pressure on them
whatsoever. You know why? Because they want to do the
right thing.\1040\
On September 24, in public remarks upon arriving at the
opening session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Trump
stated: ``What Joe Biden did for his son, that's something they
should be looking at.''\1041\
On September 25--in a joint public press availability with
President Zelensky--President Trump stated that ``I want him to
do whatever he can'' in reference to the investigation of the
Biden family. He added, ``Now, when Biden's son walks away with
millions of dollars from Ukraine, and he knows nothing, and
they're paying him millions of dollars, that's corruption.''
President Trump added, ``He [President Zelensky] was elected--I
think, number one--on the basis of stopping corruption, which
unfortunately has plagued Ukraine. And if he could do that,
he's doing, really, the whole world a big favor. I know--and I
think he's going to be successful.''\1042\
On September 30, during his remarks at the swearing-in
ceremony of Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia, President Trump
stated:
Now, the new President of Ukraine ran on the basis of
no corruption. That's how he got elected. And I believe
that he really means it. But there was a lot of
corruption having to do with the 2016 election against
us. And we want to get to the bottom of it, and it's
very important that we do.\1043\
On October 2, in a public press availability, President
Trump discussed the July 25 call with President Zelensky and
stated that ``the conversation was perfect; it couldn't have
been nicer.'' He added:
The only thing that matters is the transcript of the
actual conversation that I had with the President of
Ukraine. It was perfect. We're looking at
congratulations. We're looking at doing things
together. And what are we looking at? We're looking at
corruption. And, in, I believe, 1999, there was a
corruption act or a corruption bill passed between
both--and signed--between both countries, where I have
a duty to report corruption. And let me tell you
something: Biden's son is corrupt, and Biden is
corrupt.\1044\
On October 3, in remarks before he departed on Marine One,
President Trump expressed his ``hope'' that Ukraine would
investigate Mr. Biden and his son. Specifically, President
Trump stated that he had hoped--after his July 25
conversation--that Ukraine would ``start a major investigation
into the Bidens.'' The President also stated that ``by the way,
likewise, China should start an investigation into the Bidens,
because what happened in China is just about as bad as what
happened with--with Ukraine.'' He addressed the corrupt
prosecutor general, Yuriy Lutsenko, who had recently been
removed by Parliament: ``And they got rid of a prosecutor who
was a very tough prosecutor. They got rid of him. Now they're
trying to make it the opposite way.\1045\
The next day, on October 4, in remarks before he departed
on Marine One, the President again said:
When you look at what Biden and his son did, and when
you look at other people--what they've done. And I
believe there was tremendous corruption with Biden, but
I think there was beyond--I mean, beyond corruption--
having to do with the 2016 campaign, and what these
lowlifes did to so many people, to hurt so many people
in the Trump campaign--which was successful, despite
all of the fighting us. I mean, despite all of the
unfairness.\1046\
President Trump reiterated his willingness to solicit
foreign assistance related to his personal interests: ``Here's
what's okay: If we feel there's corruption, like I feel there
was in the 2016 campaign--there was tremendous corruption
against me--if we feel there's corruption, we have a right to
go to a foreign country.''\1047\ President Trump added that
asking President Xi of China to investigate the Bidens ``is
certainly something we can start thinking about.''\1048\
Consistent with the President's remarks after this inquiry
began, Ambassador Volker understood that references to fighting
``corruption'' in Ukraine, when used by President Trump and Mr.
Giuliani, in fact referred to the two investigations into
``Burisma''--and former Vice President Biden--and the 2016
election interference that President Trump sought to benefit
his reelection efforts.\1049\
The President's Scheme Undermined U.S. Anti-Corruption Efforts in
Ukraine
Rather than combatting corruption in Ukraine, President
Trump's ongoing efforts to urge Ukraine to pursue an
investigation into former Vice President Biden undermine
longstanding U.S. anti-corruption policy, which encourages
countries to refrain from using the criminal justice system to
investigate political opponents. When it became clear that
President Trump was pressuring Ukraine to investigate his
political rival, career public servants charged with
implementing U.S. foreign policy in a non-partisan manner, such
as Lt. Col. Vindman and Ambassador Taylor, communicated to
President Zelensky and his advisors that Ukraine should avoid
getting embroiled in U.S. domestic politics.\1050\
Mr. Kent, an anti-corruption and rule of law expert,
explained that U.S. anti-corruption efforts prioritize
``building institutional capacity so that the Ukrainian
Government has the ability to go after corruption and
effectively investigate, prosecute, and judge alleged criminal
activities using appropriate institutional mechanisms, that is,
to create and follow the rule of law.\1051\
Mr. Holmes concurred:
[O]ur longstanding policy is to encourage them
[Ukraine] to establish and build rule of law
institutions, that are capable and that are independent
and that can actually pursue credible allegations.
That's our policy. We've been doing that for quite some
time with some success. So focusing on [particular]
cases, including [] cases where there is an interest of
the President, it's just not part of what we've done.
It's hard to explain why we would do that.\1052\
Mr. Kent emphasized that when foreign government officials
``hear diplomats on the ground saying one thing, and they hear
other U.S. leaders saying something else,'' it raises concerns
about the United States' credibility on anti-corruption
efforts.\1053\ Ambassador Taylor agreed, stating that ``[o]ur
credibility is based on a respect for the United States'' and
``if we damage that respect, then it hurts our credibility and
makes it more difficult for us to do our jobs.''\1054\
Mr. Kent, like many other witnesses, explained that urging
Ukraine to engage in ``selective politically associated
investigations or prosecutions'' undermined the rule of law
more generally:
As a general principle, I do not believe the United
States should ask other countries to engage in
selective politically associated investigations or
prosecutions against opponents of those in power
because such selective actions undermine the rule of
law, regardless of the country.\1055\
Mr. Kent agreed that pressuring Ukraine to conduct
political investigations is not a part of U.S. foreign policy
to promote the rule of law in Ukraine and around the
world.\1056\ Mr. Kent concluded that the President's request
for investigations ``went against U.S. policy'' and ``would've
undermined the rule of law and our longstanding policy goals in
Ukraine, as in other countries, in the post-Soviet
space.''\1057\
These conflicting messages came to a head at a September 14
meeting between American and Ukrainian officials in Kyiv.
During that meeting, Ambassador Volker advised Mr. Yermak about
the ``potential problems'' with investigations that the
Zelensky administration was contemplating into former Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko.\1058\ Mr. Yermak retorted, ``what,
you mean like asking us to investigate Clinton and
Biden?''\1059\ Ambassador Volker did not respond.\1060\
SECTION I ENDNOTES
\1\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 16-17.
\2\Kateryna Handziuk, Ukrainian Activist, Dies From Acid Attack,
New York Times (Nov. 5, 2018) (online at www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/
world/europe/kateryna-handziuk-dies-ukraine.html).
\3\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 30-31.
\4\U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Department of State, Ambassador
Yovanovitch's Remarks at a Women of Courage Reception in Honor of
Kateryna Handziuk (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at https://ua.usembassy.gov/
ambassador-yovanovitchs-remarks-at-a-women-of-courage-reception-in-
honor-of-kateryna-handziuk/).
\5\U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Department of State, Ambassador
Yovanovitch's Remarks at a Women of Courage Reception in Honor of
Kateryna Handziuk (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at https://ua.usembassy.gov/
ambassador-yovanovitchs-remarks-at-a-women-of-courage-reception-in-
honor-of-kateryna-handziuk/).
\6\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 31.
\7\Id. at 31-32.
\8\Id. at 32.
\9\Id. at 31.
\10\Id. at 31-32.
\11\Giuliani to Join Trump's Legal Team, New York Times (April 19,
2018) (online at www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/us/politics/giuliani-
trump.html).
\12\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 3, 2019).
\13\Department of Justice, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman Charged with
Conspiring to Violate Straw and Foreign Donor Bans (Oct. 10, 2019)
(online at www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lev-parnas-and-igor-fruman-
charged-conspiring-violate-straw-and-foreign-donor-bans).
\14\Hill Dep. Tr. at 59.
\15\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 28-29.
\16\Ukraine Ousts Victor Shokin, Top Prosecutor, and Political
Stability Hangs in the Balance, New York Times (Mar. 29, 2016) (online
at www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/europe/political-stability-in-the-
balance-as-ukraine-ousts-top-prosecutor.html).
\17\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
\18\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
\19\Id. at 31-32.
\20\Id. at 21.
\21\Id. at 32-33, 38 (``I think that he felt that I and the embassy
were effective at helping Ukrainians who wanted reform, Ukrainians who
wanted to fight against corruption, and he did not you know, that was
not in his interest.'').
\22\Id. at 30.
\23\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 14.
\24\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
\25\Id. at 132.
\26\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 27.
\27\Nickolay Kapitonenko, an advisor to the Ukrainian Parliament's
Foreign Policy Committee, described Giuliani as a ``mythical link to
the U.S.'' who is viewed as ``an extension of Trump.'' Giuliani Sits at
the Center of the Ukraine Controversy, Wall Street Journal (Sept. 26,
2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/giuliani-sits-at-the-center-of-
the-ukraine-controversy-11569546774); David Sakvarelidze, a former
Ukrainian deputy prosecutor general, stated, ``Lutsenko was trying to
save his political skin by pretending to be Trumpist at the end of his
career.'' Meet the Ukrainian Ex-Prosecutor Behind the Impeachment
Furor, New York Times (Oct. 5, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/05/world/europe/ukraine-prosecutor-trump.html).
\28\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 30.
\29\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Jan. 17, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1086096691613323265) (``Gregg
Jarrett: `Mueller's prosecutors knew the `Dossier' was the product of
bias and deception.' It was a Fake, just like so much news coverage in
our Country. Nothing but a Witch Hunt, from beginning to end!'').
\30\Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to
``Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections'':
The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017)
(online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf); Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election (May 8, 2018) (online at
www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-
intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures); House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active
Measures (Mar. 22, 2018) (online at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/
IG00/20180322/108023/HRPT-115-1_1-p1-U3.pdf); House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Minority Views (Mar. 26, 2018) (online at
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20180411_-_final_-
_hpsci_minority_views_on_majority_report.pdf).
\31\President Trump's Former National Security Advisor `Deeply
Disturbed' by Ukraine Scandal: `Whole World Is Watching,' ABC News
(Sept. 29, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-
trumps-national-security-advisor-deeply-disturbed-ukraine/
story?id=65925477).
\32\Charges of Ukrainian Meddling? A Russian Operation, U.S.
Intelligence Says, New York Times (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/us/politics/ukraine-russia-
interference.html).
\33\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 56-57.
\34\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
\35\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 330.
\36\Id. at 330; Explainer: Biden, Allies, Pushed Out Ukrainian
Prosecutor Because He Didn't Pursue Corruption Cases, USA Today (Oct.
3, 2019) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/10/03/
what-really-happened-when-biden-forced-out-ukraines-top-prosecutor/
3785620002/).
\37\See, e.g., Ukraine Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by
Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-
by-bidens) (``Hunter Biden did not violate any Ukrainian laws--at least
as of now, we do not see any wrongdoing. A company can pay however much
it wants to its board . . . Biden was definitely not involved . . . We
do not have any grounds to think that there was any wrongdoing starting
from 2014.'').
\38\Notes of Call with Viktor Shokin (Jan. 23, 2019); Ukraine
Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16,
2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-
prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-by-bidens).
\39\Giuliani Pursued Business in Ukraine While Pushing for
Inquiries for Trump, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/nyregion/giuliani-ukraine-business-
trump.html); Ukraine Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by
Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-
by-bidens).
\40\Notes of Meeting with Yuriy Lutsenko (Jan. 25, 2019); Ukraine
Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16,
2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-
prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-by-bidens).
\41\Giuliani Pursued Business in Ukraine While Pushing for
Inquiries for Trump, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/nyregion/giuliani-ukraine-business-
trump.html).
\42\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1187168034835894272).
\43\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Oct. 30, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1189667101079932928).
\44\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 19.
\45\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
\46\Ukraine Prosecutor General Lutsenko Admits U.S. Ambassador
Didn't Give Him a Do Not Prosecute List, The Ukrainian (Apr. 18, 2019)
(online at www.unian.info/politics/10520715-ukraine-prosecutor-general-
lutsenko-admits-u-s-ambassador-didn-t-give-him-a-do-not-prosecute-
list.html).
\47\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
\48\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 21, 37.
\49\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00768-
ATTHPSCI_
20190930_00772, ATTHPSCI_20190930_00775. The Committee did not subpoena
the call detail records of any member of Congress or staff, including
Ranking Member Devin Nunes, nor of any journalist, including John
Solomon. To the extent that congressional members or staff, or
journalists, appear in the report, call records indicate that they were
in contact with individuals of interest to the investigation. A
subpoena served to the White House requesting certain call records was
obstructed in full by President Trump. Nevertheless, the Committee's
investigation into these and other call records remains ongoing.
\50\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
\51\Department of Justice, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman Charged with
Conspiring to Violate Straw and Foreign Donor Bans (Oct. 10, 2019)
(online at www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lev-parnas-and-igor-fruman-
charged-conspiring-violate-straw-and-foreign-donor-bans) (alleging that
in May and June 2018, Mr. Parnas sought the assistance of an unnamed
congressman in causing the removal or recall of the then-U.S.
ambassador to Ukraine).
\52\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00775.
\53\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1108559080204001280).
\54\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Mar. 22, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1109117167176466432); Giuliani Slams
Mueller Leak, Fox News (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at https://
www.foxnews.com/transcript/giuliani-slams-mueller-leak).
\55\Donald Trump, Jr., Twitter (Mar. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/donaldjtrumpjr/status/1109850575926108161).
\56\Kent Dep. Tr. at 57-58.
\57\Id. at 178.
\58\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 62.
\59\Hale Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
\60\Id. at 99-100.
\61\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 63-64.
\62\Hale Dep. Tr. at 27.
\63\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 124.
\64\Id. at 267-268.
\65\Id. at 268.
\66\Email from [Redacted] to S_All (Mar. 26, 2019) (online at
www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Email from Operations Center to
[Redacted] (Mar. 29, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf). (The same
State Department records show that Secretary Pompeo was scheduled to
have a secure call with Rep. Nunes on April 1, 2019.); Email from
Operations Center to [Redacted] (Mar. 29, 2019) (online at
www.americanoversight.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Email from
[Redacted] to S_Scheduling (Mar. 28, 2019) (online at
www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Hale Dep. Tr. at 34 (stating
that Secretary Pompeo
spoke with Mr. Giuliani on March 28 and March 29); AT&T Document
Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02034-ATTHPSCI _20190930_02053,
ATTHPSCI_20190930_03538-ATTHPSCI_20190930_03539.
\67\Joe Biden's 2020 Ukrainian Nightmare: A Closed Probe is
Revived, The Hill (Apr. 1, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/white-house/436816-joe-bidens-2020-ukrainian-nightmare-a-
closed-probe-is-revived).
\68\Donald Trump, Jr., Twitter (Apr. 2, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/donaldjtrumpjr/status/1113046659456528385).
\69\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00848-
ATTHPSCI_
20190930_00884. Mr. Parnas also had an aborted call that lasted 5
seconds on April 5, 2019 with an aide to Rep. Devin Nunes on the
Intelligence Committee, Derek Harvey. Id. at Bates
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00876. Call records obtained by the Committees show
that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Harvey had connected previously, including a
four minute 42 second call on January 31, 2019, a one minute 7 second
call on February 4, and a one minute 37 second call on February 7,
2019. Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00617, ATTHPSCI_20190930_00630,
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00641. As explained later in this Chapter, Rep. Nunes
would connect separately by phone on April 10 and 11 with Mr. Giuliani,
and on April 12 with Mr. Parnas. Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00913-
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00914; ATTHPSCI_20190930-02125, ATTHPSCI_20190930-
02129.
\70\Ukrainian to US Prosecutors: Why Don't You Want Our Evidence on
Democrats?, The Hill (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/white-house/437719-ukrainian-to-us-prosecutors-why-dont-you-
want-our-evidence-on-democrats).
\71\Id.
\72\Id.
\73\Id.
\74\Giuliani Slams Mueller Leak, Fox News (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at
www.foxnews.com/transcript/giuliani-slams-mueller-leak).
\75\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Apr. 8, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1115171828618731520).
\76\Specifically, between April 8 and April 11, phone records show
the following phone contacts:
at least six calls between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas
(longest duration approximately five minutes), AT&T Document
Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02115-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02131.
at least four calls between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Solomon
(all on April 8, longest duration approximately one minute, 30 seconds)
AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02114-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-02115;
at least nine calls between Mr. Parnas and Mr. Solomon
(longest duration four minutes, 39 seconds) AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00885-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00906; and
at least three calls between Mr. Parnas and Ms. Toensing
(longest duration approximately six minutes), AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00885-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00905.
The Committee did not subpoena the call detail records of any
member of Congress or staff, including Ranking Member Devin Nunes, nor
of any journalist, including John Solomon. To the extent that
congressional members or staff, or journalists, appear in the report,
records indicate that they were in contact with individuals of interest
to the investigation. A subpoena served to the White House requesting
certain call records was obstructed in full by President Trump.
Nevertheless, the Committee's investigation into these and other call
records remains ongoing.
\77\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02125, ATTHPSCI_20190930-03236.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting Duration
Date Time (ET) of Call Caller Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/10/19 12:00:36 0:35 Giuliani, Rudy Nunes, Devin
04/10/19 12:10:35 0:00 Nunes, Devin Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19 12:10:37 0:31 Nunes, Devin Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19 12:11:10 SMS UNKNOWN Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19 12:12:35 2:50 Giuliani, Rudy Nunes, Devin
04/10/19 12:15:38 0:00 Giuliani, Rudy Nunes, Devin
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\Id. Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00902.
\79\Jay Sekulow, personal counsel to President Trump, stated that
the President was disappointed that Mr. diGenova and Ms. Toensing had
to withdraw due to a conflict of interest, but noted that ``those
conflicts do not prevent them from assisting the President in other
legal matters. The President looks forward to working with them.''
Trump's Legal Team Remains in Disarray as New Lawyer Will No Longer
Represent Him in Russia Probe, Washington Post (Mar. 25, 2018) (online
at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-another-blow-to-trumps-efforts-
to-combat-russia-probe-digenova-will-no-longer-join-legal-team/2018/03/
25/8ac8c8d2-3038-11e8-94fa-32d48460b955_story.html).
\80\For example, between April 1 and April 7, Ms. Toensing
exchanged at least five calls with Mr. Parnas and two calls with Mr.
Giuliani. ATTHPSCI_20190930-02089-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02110;
ATTHPSCI_20190930-00871-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00884. In addition, on April
10, Ms. Toensing and Mr. Giuliani spoke for approximately six minutes,
19 seconds. AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02126.
Mr. diGenova and Ms. Toensing were also very active on social media in
promoting these conspiracy theories as well as the false accusations
against Ambassador Yovanovitch. See, e.g., Ryan Saavedra, Twitter (Mar.
23, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/RealSaavedra/status/
1109546629672009728); Victoria Toensing, Twitter (Mar. 21, 2019)
(online at https://twitter.com/VicToensing/status/1108751525239762944);
Victoria Toensing, Twitter (Mar. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/VicToensing/status/1109882728101625856).
\81\Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and
Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019); Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing,
LLP, Viktor Shokin (Apr. 15, 2019).
\82\On April 12, less than a week after the latest piece in The
Hill, Ms. Toensing signed a retainer agreement between diGenova &
Toensing, LLP, Mr. Lutsenko, and his former deputy Kostiantyn Kulyk,
two of the primary sources for Mr. Solomon's articles. The Committees
obtained a copy of this document which is not signed by the Ukrainians,
but a spokesman for Ms. Toensing and Mr. diGenova confirmed that the
firm represented Mr. Lutsenko. See Giuliani Weighed Doing Business with
Ukrainian Government, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at
www.wsj.com/articles/giuliani-weighed-doing-business-with-ukrainian-
government-11574890951).
The first paragraph of the retainer agreement sets forth the
services to be provided by diGenova & Toensing, LLP to their Ukrainian
clients:
Yurii Lutsenko and Kostiantyn Kulyk (``Clients'') hereby engage the
firm of diGenova & Toensing, LLP (``Firm'' or ``Attorneys'') to
represent them in connection with recovery and return to the Ukraine
government of funds illegally embezzeled from that country and
providing assistance to meet and discuss with United States government
officials the evidence of illegal conduct in Ukraine regarding the
United States, for example, interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.
See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and
Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019).
The scope of representation--which includes representing Mr.
Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk in meetings with U.S. officials regarding
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections--mirrors the
allegations reported in The Hill, pursued by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of
President Trump, and pushed by the President on his July 25 call with
President Zelensky. According to the retainer agreement, Mr. Lutsenko
was to pay diGenova & Toensing, LLP $25,000 per month, plus costs, for
four months for this work. See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing,
LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019).
On April 12, the same day Ms. Toensing signed the retainer
agreement with Mr. Lutsenko, phone records show contacts between Ms.
Toensing, Mr. Giuliani, and Mr. Parnas, as well as contacts between Mr.
Parnas and Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Parnas and Rep. Nunes. In addition,
among these calls are contacts between Mr. Giuliani and a phone number
associated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an
unidentified number (``-1''), and a phone number associated with the
White House:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting Time Duration of
Date (ET) Call Caller Recipient Source
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/12/19 9:48:57 0:24 Toensing, Parnas, Lev AT&T Document Production,
Victoria Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00908
04/12/19 10:40:19 3:25 Parnas, Lev Toensing, AT&T Document Production,
Victoria Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00909
04/12/19 11:05:25 0:03 OMB-Associated Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Phone Number Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02134
04/12/19 11:05:39 12:10 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02134
04/12/19 13:13:49 0:12 Giuliani, Rudy White House AT&T Document Production,
Phone Number Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02135
04/12/19 13:18:46 0:07 Toensing, Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Victoria Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02135
04/12/19 13:26:54 0:24 Giuliani Parnas, Lev AT&T Document Production,
Partners Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00911
04/12/19 14:11:22 0:03 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02136
04/12/19 14:11:27 0:03 OMB-Associated Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Phone Number Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02136
04/12/19 14:17:46 0:07 Toensing, Parnas, Lev AT&T Document Production,
Victoria Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19 15:09:22 0:02 Parnas, Lev Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19 15:09:32 0:01 Parnas, Lev Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19 15:16:09 1:38 Parnas, Lev Solomon, John AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19 15:48:09 0:03 OMB-Associated Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Phone Number Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02137
04/12/19 16:10:49 0:00 Parnas, Lev Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19 16:10:51 0:02 Parnas, Lev Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
4/12/19 16:12:53 1:00 Parnas, Lev Nunes, Devin AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19 16:54:11 0:00 Nunes, Devin Parnas, Lev AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19 16:54:13 0:02 Nunes, Devin Parnas, Lev AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19 17:07:20 1:27 Parnas, Lev Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19 17:17:36 7:52 Sekulow, Jay Giuliani, Rudy AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-03565
04/12/19 17:24:05 1:49 Parnas, Lev Solomon, John AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19 17:26:48 0:28 Parnas, Lev Solomon, John AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19 17:30:19 8:34 Parnas, Lev Nunes, Devin AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19 17:39:25 0:53 Parnas, Lev Solomon, John AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19 19:56:43 5:03 Giuliani, Rudy White House AT&T Document Production,
Phone Number Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02139
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of the investigation, the Committees uncovered contact
between Mr. Giuliani and a landline number with a prefix associated
with the Office of Management and Budget within the Executive Office of
the President, according to public directories. This number appears to
obscure the identity of outgoing calls, but does not itself accept
incoming calls. The Committees continue to investigate the
originator(s) of these calls, including to determine whether other
offices or landlines within the White House may also show up with the
same landline number when outgoing calls are made and to clarify who at
the White House spoke to Mr. Giuliani at these key points in time under
investigation. A subpoena served to the White House requesting certain
call records was obstructed in full by President Trump. Nevertheless,
the Committee's investigation into these and other call records remains
ongoing.
Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk were not the only Ukrainians who appear
to have engaged with diGenova & Toensing, LLP. On April 15, Ms.
Toensing signed another retainer agreement between diGenova & Toensing,
LLP and former Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin. Again, the Committees'
copy is not signed by Mr. Shokin. A spokesman for Ms. Toensing and Mr.
diGenova acknowledged that the firm represented ``Ukrainian
whistleblowers,'' but claimed that the identities of those clients
(other that Mr. Lutsenko) are protected by attorney-client privilege.
See Giuliani Weighed Doing Business with Ukrainian Government, Wall
Street Journal (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/
giuliani-weighed-doing-business-with-ukrainian-government-11574890951).
The first paragraph of the retainer agreement outlined the services
to be rendered:
Viktor Shokin (``Client'') hereby engaged the firm diGenova &
Toensing, LLP (``Firm'' or ``Attorneys'') to represent him for the
purpose of collecting evidence regarding his March 2016 firing as
Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the role of then-Vice President Joe
Biden in such firing, and presenting such evidence to U.S. and foreign
authorities.
See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Viktor Shokin (Apr.
15, 2019).
The subject matter of the agreement--the activities of Vice
President Biden--again echo Mr. Solomon's pieces in The Hill,
conspiracy theories spread by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of President
Trump, and the President's statements about Vice President Biden on his
July 25 call with President Zelensky.
\83\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00947-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-00950.
\84\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02222-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02223.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting Duration
Date Time (ET) of Call Caller Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/23/19 14:00:56 1:50 Giuliani, Rudy Parnas, Lev
04/23/19 14:15:18 0:18 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/23/19 14:15:43 0:11 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/23/19 15:20:17 0:11 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/23/19 15:50:23 8:28 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02224.
\86\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Apr. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1120798794692612097).
\87\Giuliani Fires Back at Hillary Clinton's Remarks on Mueller
Probe, Fox News (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at www.youtube.com/
watch?v=FDtg8z12Q7s&feature=youtu.be).
\88\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02229-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-02237.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecting Duration
Date Time (ET) of Call Caller Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/24/19 7:17:48 0:42 OMB-Associated Giuliani, Rudy
Phone Number
04/24/19 7:47:57 0:37 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/24/19 7:48:39 0:21 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/24/19 7:49:00 0:31 OMB-Associated Giuliani, Rudy
Phone Number
04/24/19 7:49:00 0:20 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/24/19 7:49:35 4:53 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/24/19 7:54:52 0:24 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/24/19 13:03:50 13:44 OMB-Associated Giuliani, Rudy
Phone Number
04/24/19 16:42:52 8:00 Parnas, Lev Giuliani, Rudy
04/24/19 18:38:57 0:44 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/24/19 18:42:43 8:42 ``-1'' Giuliani, Rudy
04/24/19 20:09:14 0:06 Giuliani, Rudy White House Phone
Number
04/24/19 20:12:08 3:15 White House Phone Giuliani, Rudy
Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
\90\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 22.
\91\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 21-22.
\92\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 129.
\93\Id. at 139.
\94\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 28.
\95\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 21.
\96\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 131-132.
\97\Hale Dep. Tr. at 16-17, 112-113; Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 21.
\98\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 63 (``I only met her when I took
this job, but immediately I understood that we had an exceptional
officer doing exceptional work at a very critical embassy in Kyiv. And
during my visits to Kyiv, I was very impressed by what she was doing
there, to the extent that I asked her if she'd be willing to stay, if
that was a possibility, because we had a gap coming up.'').
\99\Id. at 64.
\100\Biography of Marie L. Yovanovitch, Department of State (online
at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/261588.htm).
\101\McKinley Transcribed Interview Tr. at 37.
\102\Reeker Dep. Tr. at 26.
\103\Kent Dep. Tr. at 188-189.
\104\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 18-19.
\105\Id.
\106\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 18-19, 45-46.
\107\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 142.
\108\What ``Corruption'' Means in the Impeachment Hearings, New
Yorker (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/the-corruption-of-the-word-corruption-and-so-much-else-amid-
the-impeachment-hearings).
\109\22 U.S.C. Sec. 3941.
\110\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 110-111.
\111\Ambassador Yovanovitch said: ``Although then and now I have
always understood that I served at the pleasure of the President, I
still find it difficult to comprehend that foreign and private
interests were able to undermine U.S. interests in this way.
Individuals who apparently felt stymied by our efforts to promote
stated U.S. policy against corruption, that is, to do our mission, were
able to successfully conduct a campaign of disinformation against a
sitting ambassador using unofficial back channels. As various witnesses
have recounted, they shared baseless allegations with the President and
convinced him to remove his ambassador despite the fact that the State
Department fully understood that the allegations were false and the
sources highly suspect.'' Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 22.
\112\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 78-79.
\113\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 313-314.
\114\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 22.
\115\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
\116\Kent. Dep. Tr. at 131-132.
\117\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
\118\Comedian Volodymyr Zelensky Unseats Incumbent in Ukraine's
Presidential Election, Exit Polls Show, Washington Post (Apr. 21, 2019)
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-ukraine-votes-in-
presidential-runoff-a-comedian-looks-to-unseat-the-incumbent/2019/04/
21/b7d69a38-603f-11e9-bf24-db4b9fb62aa2_story.html).
\119\Id.
\120\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr.
21, 2019) (online at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
6550349/First-Trump-Ukraine-Call.pdf).
\121\Id.
\122\Conflicting White House accounts of 1st Trump-Zelenskiy call,
Associated Press (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at https://apnews.com/
2f3c9910e0a14ec08d6d76ed93148059).
\123\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr.
21, 2019) (online at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
6550349/First-Trump-Ukraine-Call.pdf).
\124\Id.
\125\Id.
\126\Id.
\127\Id.
\128\Id.
\129\Id.
\130\Id.
\131\Williams Dep. Tr. at 36.
\132\Id. at 37.
\133\Id. at 36.
\134\Fox & Friends, Fox News (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDtg8z12Q7s#action=share).
\135\Why Giuliani Singled Out 2 Ukrainian Oligarchs to Help Look
for Dirt, New York Times (Nov. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/25/us/giuliani-ukraine-oligarchs.html).
\136\Ukraine's Unlikely President, Promising a New Style of
Politics, Gets a Taste of Trump's Swamp, New Yorker (Oct. 25, 2019)
(online at www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/04/how-trumps-emissaries-
put-pressure-on-ukraines-new-president).
\137\Why Giuliani Singled Out 2 Ukrainian Oligarchs to Help Look
for Dirt, New York Times (Nov. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/25/us/giuliani-ukraine-oligarchs.html).
\138\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00947;
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00949; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02222;
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02223.
\139\Joe Biden Announces 2020 Run for President, After Months of
Hesitation, New York Times (Apr. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/25/us/politics/joe-biden-2020-announcement.html).
\140\How the Obama White House Engaged Ukraine to Give Russia
Collusion Narrative an Early Boost, The Hill (Apr. 25, 2019) (online at
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/440730-how-the-obama-white-
house-engaged-ukraine-to-give-russia-collusion).
\141\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 17.
\142\Id. at 116.
\143\Id.
\144\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02245.
\145\Id.
\146\Sean Hannity Interviews Trump on Biden, Russia Probe, FISA
Abuse, Comey, Fox News (Apr. 26, 2019) (online at
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/26/
full_video_sean_hannity_interviews_trump_on_biden_russia_probe_fisa_abus
e_comey.html).
\147\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 55-56.
\148\Sean Hannity Interviews Trump on Biden, Russia Probe, FISA
Abuse, Comey, Fox News (Apr. 26, 2019) (online at
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/26/
full_video_sean_hannity_interviews_trump_on_biden_russia_probe_fisa_abus
e_comey.html). As discussed later in this report, on the morning of
September 25, 2019, the Department of Justice would quickly issue a
statement after President Trump released the record of his July 25 call
with President Zelensky. The statement asserted that that Attorney
General Barr had not engaged on Ukraine matters at the President's
request:
The President has not spoken with the Attorney General about having
Ukraine investigate anything relating to former Vice President Biden or
his son. The President has not asked the Attorney General to contact
Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The Attorney General has not
communicated with Ukraine--on this or any other subject.
\149\Cleaning Up Ukraine in the Shadow of Trump, Financial Times
(Nov. 28, 2019) (online at www.ft.com/content/eb8e4004-1059-11ea-a7e6-
62bf4f9e548a).
\150\Id.
\151\Biden Faces Conflict of Interest Questions That Are Being
Promoted by Trump and Allies, New York Times (May 1, 2019) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/us/politics/biden-son-ukraine.html).
\152\Transcript: Fox News Interview with President Trump, Fox News
(May 7, 2019) (online at www.foxnews.com/politics/transcript-fox-news-
interview-with-president-trump).
\153\Id.
\154\Foreign Affairs Issue Launch with Former Vice President Joe
Biden, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 23, 2018) (online at:
www.cfr.org/event/foreign-affairs-issue-launch-former-vice-president-
joe-biden).
\155\Ukraine Ousts Viktor Shokin, Top Prosecutor, and Political
Stability Hangs in the Balance, New York Times (Mar. 29, 2016) (online
at www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/europe/political-stability-in-the-
balance-as-ukraine-ousts-top-prosecutor.html).
\156\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 50; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 115.
\157\Trump Says He'd Consider Accepting Information from Foreign
Governments on His Opponents, Washington Post (June 12, 2019) (online
at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-hed-consider-accepting-
dirt-from-foreign-governments-on-his-opponents/2019/06/12/b84ba860-
8d5c-11e9-8f69-a2795fca3343_story.html).
\158\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02313.
\159\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02314; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02316;
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02318; ATTHPSCI_20190930_01000.
\160\Kent Dep. Tr. at 137.
\161\Id.
\162\Id.
\163\Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries That
Could Help Trump, New York Times (May 9, 2019) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/giuliani-ukraine-trump.html).
\164\Id.
\165\Id.
\166\Id.
\167\Id.
\168\Id.
\169\Id.
\170\Trump's Interest in Stirring Ukraine Investigations Sows
Confusion in Kiev, Washington Post (May 11, 2019) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/trumps-interest-stirring-ukraine-
investigations-sows-confusion-in-kiev/2019/05/11/cb94f7f4-73ea-11e9-
9331-30bc5836f48e_story.html).
\171\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02321;
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02322.
\172\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02320,
02321, 02322, 02323, 03612.
\173\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03614;
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02326; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02327;
ATTHPSCI_20190930_03614.
\174\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1126701386224156673).
\175\Giuliani: Massive Collusion Between DNC, Obama Admin, Clinton
People & Ukraine To Create False Info About Trump, Real Clear Politics
(May 10, 2019) (online at www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/05/10/
giuliani_massive_collusion_between_dnc_obama_admin_clinton_people_ukrain
e_to_create_false_info_about_trump.html).
\176\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 10, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/rudygiuliani/status/1126858889209831424?lang=en).
\177\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02334.
\178\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 227; see also id. at 32-
33, 36 (describing the allegations).
\179\Id. at 227.
\180\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02334.
\181\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02335.
\182\Id.
\183\Id.
\184\Trump: Discussing a Biden Probe with Barr Would Be
`Appropriate,' Politico (May 10, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/
story/2019/05/10/trump-biden-ukraine-barr-1317601).
\185\Trump Denies Sending Rudy Giuliani to Ukraine to Push Biden,
Election Probes, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at www.cnbc.com/2019/11/
27/trump-denies-sending-rudy-giuliani-to-ukraine-to-push-biden-
election-probes.html).
\186\Remarks by President Trump and President Niinisto of the
Republic of Finland in Joint Press Conference, The White House (Oct. 2,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-president-niinisto-republic-finland-joint-press-
conference/).
\187\Remarks by President Trump before Marine One Departure, The
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-68/).
\188\Giuliani: I Didn't Go to Ukraine to Start an Investigation,
There Already Was One, Fox News (May 11, 2019) (online at https://
video.foxnews.com/v/6035385372001/#sp=show-clips).
\189\Trump: Discussing a Biden Probe with Barr Would Be
`Appropriate', Politico (May 10, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/
story/2019/05/10/trump-biden-ukraine-barr-1317601) (documenting
Giuliani text message).
\190\Id.
\191\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (May 3, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1124359594418032640).
\192\Kent Dep. Tr. at 338-339.
\193\Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Orban of Hungary
Before Bilateral Meeting, The White House (May 13, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-
minister-orban-hungary-bilateral-meeting/).
\194\In Hungary, a Freewheeling Trump Ambassador Undermines U.S.
Diplomats, New York Times (Oct. 22, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/22/world/europe/david-cornstein-hungary-trump-orban.html);
Hungarian Prime Minister Earns Rare Rebuke from European Bloc that Has
Long Backed Him, Washington Post (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/hungarys-orban-earns-rare-rebuke-
from-european-bloc-that-has-long-backed-him/2019/03/20/83be110a-4b17-
11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html).
\195\Kent Dep. Tr. at 339.
\196\Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Orban of Hungary
Before Bilateral Meeting, The White House (May 13, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-
minister-orban-hungary-bilateral-meeting/).
\197\Kent Dep. Tr. at 253.
\198\Id. at 254.
\199\Williams Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
\200\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 14. Other witnesses testified
that Vice President Pence may not have been able to attend on account
of scheduling issues. See Hill Dep. Tr. at 316 (``there was a lot of
scheduling issues'' regarding the attempts to schedule the Vice
President's participation in the delegation); Kent Dep. Tr. at 189-191
(Vice President Pence was not available); Volker Transcribed Interview
Tr. at 288-290, 293 (Volker ``wasn't surprised'' Pence could not make
it and assumed it was a matter of scheduling). However, Ms. Williams
was the only staff member in the Office of the Vice President to
testify before the Committees, and the only witness to testify to
having heard an explanation from Vice President Pence's staff about why
Vice President Pence did not attend the inauguration.
\201\Williams Dep. Tr. at 39.
\202\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 37.
\203\Id.
\204\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 18, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1129761193755910144).
\205\Kolomoisky: We Called Varkuch and Asked: `Do You Support
Zelensky or No?', Pravda (May 27, 2019) (online at www.pravda.com.ua/
rus/articles/2019/05/27/7216183/).
\206\Id.
\207\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 16.
\208\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 288-290; Vindman Dep. Tr.
at 125.
\209\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 101.
\210\Id. at 18.
\211\Id. 17-18.
\212\Id. at 18.
\213\Id.
\214\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 61.
\215\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 26.
\216\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 61.
\217\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 26.
\218\Id.
\219\Id.; David Holmes separately testified that Lt. Col. Vindman
``made a general point about the importance of Ukraine to our national
security, and he said it's very important that the Zelensky
administration stay out of U.S. domestic politics.'' Hill-Holmes
Hearing Tr. at 61.
\220\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 30.
\221\Id. at 29-30.
\222\Kent Dep. Tr. at 193.
\223\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 15, 54. Ambassador Sondland testified
that he did not specifically recall who arranged the May 23 meeting and
conjectured that ``either Rick Perry or I reached out to someone at the
NSC saying: Doesn't the President want a briefing about the
inauguration. And I think--I think it was Perry, if I recall correctly,
that got it nailed down.'' Sondland Dep. Tr. at 87.
\224\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 29, 303; Vindman Dep. Tr.
at 168.
\225\Hill Dep. Tr. at 311.
\226\Id. at 308.
\227\Id.
\228\Id. at 309-310.
\229\Id.
\230\Id.
\231\Nunes Ally Kash Patel Who Fought Russia Probe Gets Senior
White House National Security Job, The Daily Beast (July 31, 2019)
(online at www.thedailybeast.com/kash-patel-devin-nunes-ally-who-
fought-russia-probe-gets-senior-white-house-national-security-job).
\232\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 304.
\233\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 25.
\234\Id.
\235\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 304.
\236\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 337; Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at
304; Hill Dep. Tr. at 320-321 (describing Volker's readout); Croft Dep.
Tr. at 90 (describing Volker's readout); Anderson Dep. Tr. at 57
(describing Volker's readout).
\237\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 305.
\238\Id.
\239\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 62; Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. 305;
Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 40.
\240\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 71.
\241\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 26. See also id. at 87-90.
\242\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 131.
\243\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 167.
\244\In addition to the testimony cited in this paragraph, see also
Hill Dep. Tr. at 113; Hale Dep. Tr. at 90; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 58, 285;
and Reeker Dep. Tr. at 148.
\245\Kent Dep. Tr. at 195.
\246\Croft Dep. Tr. at 91.
\247\Hale Dep. Tr. at 73.
\248\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 151-152.
\249\Hill Dep. Tr. at 59-60.
\250\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 24, 27, 123-124, 125-126.
\251\Id. at 27-30.
\252\Id. at 22.
\253\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 77-78.
\254\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 94.
\255\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127. According to call records obtained by
the Committees, Mr. Giuliani connected with Ambassador Bolton's office
three times for brief calls of under a minute between April 23 and May
10, 2019--a time period that corresponds with the recall of Ambassador
Yovanovitch and the acceleration of Mr. Giuliani's efforts, on behalf
of President Trump, to pressure Ukraine into opening investigations
that would benefit his reelection campaign. AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02224, 02322, 02330.
\256\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127.
\257\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 15.
\258\Id.
\259\Id. at 101.
\260\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127-128.
\261\Id. at 116-117.
\262\Id. at 130.
\263\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 16.
\264\Id.; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 24-25, 167.
\265\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 25.
\266\Id.
\267\Id.
\268\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 16-17.
\269\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 240.
\270\ABC News' Oval Office Interview with President Trump, ABC News
(June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-
oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/story?id=63688943).
\271\ABC News' Oval Office Interview with President Trump, ABC News
(June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-
oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/story?id=63688943)
(emphasis added).
\272\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (June 21, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1142085975230898176).
\273\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 77.
\274\Id. at 91.
\275\Hill Dep. Tr. at 222-223.
\276\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 92.
\277\Id. at 93.
\278\Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November
2018 to 15 February 2019 (online at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/
UA/ReportUkraine16Nov2018-15Feb2019.pdf); Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights
Situation in Ukraine: 16 August to 15 November 2017 (online at
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport20th_EN.pdf); Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Conflict in
Ukraine Enters its Fourth Year with No End in Sight (June 13, 2017)
(online at www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21730&LangID=E). These figures do not include
the 298 civilians of 13 different nationalities killed aboard Malaysia
Airlines Flight 17, which a Dutch-led joint investigation found was
shot down by a Russian missile system from a Russian military unit, a
conclusion supported by U.S. intelligence. See Dutch Safety Board,
Report on the Crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 (Oct. 13, 2015)
(online at www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014);
U.S. Discloses Intelligence on Downing of Malaysian Jet, Washington
Post (July 22, 2014) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-discloses-intelligence-on-downing-of-malaysian-jet/2014/07/
22/b178fe58-11e1-11e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html).
\279\Ambassador Nikki Haley, United States Mission to the United
Nations, Remarks at a U.N. Security Council Briefing on Ukraine (May
29, 2018) (online at https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-
security-council-briefing-on-ukraine-2/).
\280\Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense James Mattis
Remarks with President Petro Poroshenko (Aug. 24, 2017) (online at
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/1291430/secretary-of-
defense-james-mattis-remarks-with-president-petro-poroshenko/).
\281\European Union External Action, EU-Ukraine Relations Factsheet
(Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headQuarters-homepage/4081/eu-ukraine-relations-factsheet_en); NATO,
Fact Sheet: NATO's Support to Ukraine (Nov. 2018) (www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181106_1811-factsheet-nato-
ukraine-support-eng.pdf).
\282\DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, U.S. Department of Defense
(June 18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/
Article/1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-ukraine/).
\283\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 21, 28-29, 50; Vindman Dep. Tr. at
40-41, 113; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 15-16.
\284\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 153.
\285\Croft Dep. Tr. at 16.
\286\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 30.
\287\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 20.
\288\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 11.
\289\Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, Sec. 9013 (2018).
\290\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub.
L. 114-92, Sec. 1250 (2015), amended by the National Defense Act
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234
(2017), and most recently amended by the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
Sec. 1246 (2018).
\291\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub.
L. No. 114-328, Sec. 1237 (2016); National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234 (2018); John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L.
No. 115-232, Sec. 1246 (2018).
\292\Letter from John C. Rood, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Department of Defense, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Feb. 28, 2019).
\293\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
\294\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub.
L. No. 114-92, Sec. 1250 (2015), as amended by the National Defense Act
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234
(2017), and most recently amended by the John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232,
Sec. 1246 (2018).
\295\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 24.
\296\Id.
\297\Letter from John C. Rood, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Department of Defense, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs (May 23, 2019).
\298\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 31-32.
\299\DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, Department of Defense (June
18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/
1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-ukraine/).
\300\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6,
Sec. 7046(a)(2) (2019); Conference Report to Accompany Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2019, H.R. Rep. No. 116-9, p. 869 (2019).
\301\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141,
Title VIII (2017).
\302\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6,
Sec. 7015(c) (2019); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No.
115-141, Sec. 7015(c) (2017).
\303\OMB Circular No. A-11, Sec. 22.3 (2019) (requiring that the
State Department receive clearance from OMB before notifying Congress).
\304\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 25; DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine,
Department of Defense (June 18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-
ukraine/).
\305\Sean Hannity Interviews Donald Trump via Telephone, Fox News
(June 19, 2019) (transcript at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-
trump-interview-sean-hannity-fox-telephone-june-19-2019).
\306\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 26-27.
\307\Id. at 27-28.
\308\Id. at 29-30.
\309\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 33-34.
\310\Id. at 33.
\311\Id. at 34.
\312\Id. at 38.
\313\Id. at 37-38.
\314\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 14; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 178-179.
See also Stalled Ukraine Military Aid Concerned Members of Congress for
Months, CNN (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/09/30/
politics/ukraine-military-aid-congress/index.html) (suggesting that the
State Department sought OMB's approval for $141 million in FMF funds on
June 21, 2019).
\315\OMB Circular No. A-11, Sec. 22.3 (2019) (requiring that the
State Department receive clearance from OMB before notifying Congress).
\316\Williams Dep. Tr. at 54-55.
\317\Id. at 55.
\318\Blair previously served as Associate Director of National
Security Programs at OMB (Blair was Duffey's predecessor), and left OMB
for the White House Office of Chief of Staff with Mick Mulvaney. Sandy
Dep. Tr. at 36-38.
\319\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 38-39.
\320\Id. at 39.
\321\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 161.
\322\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 141-142.
\323\Id. at 142.
\324\Id. at 31-32.
\325\Id. at 41-42.
\326\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40; see also Croft Dep. Tr. at 83 (``very
routine low-level business'').
\327\Kent Dep. Tr. at 303-305.
\328\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
\329\Croft Dep. Tr. at 83.
\330\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 27.
\331\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 154.
\332\Id.
\333\Croft Dep. Tr. at 15.
\334\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 45.
\335\Kent Dep. Tr. at 304.
\336\Id. at 305.
\337\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 99; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182.
\338\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40. Morrison, who did not attend the sub-
PCC meeting but received a readout, testified that he thought OMB
announced at the July 18th meeting that the hold ``covered all dollars,
DOD and Department of State, and it was--it was beyond funds not yet
obligated to include funds that had, in fact, been obligated but not
yet expended.'' Morrison Dep. Tr. at 161.
\339\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40.
\340\Id. at 44-45.
\341\Id. at 40.
\342\Kent Dep. Tr. at 307-308.
\343\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162.
\344\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 46.
\345\Williams Dep. Tr. at 91-92; see also Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162
(testifying that representatives from OMB stated that the hold ``had
been imposed by the chief of staff's office'' and that the hold ``was
at the direction of the President'').
\346\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 46.
\347\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162-163; Kent Dep. Tr. at 310; Sandy Dep.
Tr. at 91.
\348\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 91.
\349\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 163.
\350\Id.
\351\2 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq.
\352\Williams Dep. Tr. at 91-92; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182; Morrison
Dep. Tr. at 162; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 99.
\353\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 195.
\354\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182.
\355\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 54.
\356\Id. at 54, 96-98.
\357\Id. at 97.
\358\Id. at 97.
\359\Hale Dep. Tr. at 81.
\360\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 47.
\361\Hale Dep. Tr. at 81; see also Vindman Dep. Tr. at 184 (``It
was unanimous consensus on the approach that we had laid out in
expanding engagement, the areas of cooperation that we wanted to focus
on, and that this should be elevated to a PC as quickly as possible to
release the hold on security assistance because we're talking about the
end of July, and time these funds were set to expire September 30th, so
there was some urgency to it.''); Cooper Dep. Tr. at 49 (``Although
each member went around to talk about how important it [security
assistance] was and how they assessed the future in Ukraine based on
the recent election results.'').
\362\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 165.
\363\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 93.
\364\Id. at 49, 93.
\365\Nixon's Presidency: Crisis for Congress, New York Times (Mar.
5, 1973) (online at www.nytimes.com/1973/03/05/archives/nixons-
presidency-crisis-for-congress-this-is-the-second-of-a.html).
\366\Congressional Research Service, The Congressional Budget Act
of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) Legislative History and Analysis (Feb. 26, 1975)
(online at https://budgetcounsel.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/added-crs-
the-congressional-budget-act-of-1974-p-l-93-344-legislative-history-
and-analysis-order-code-75-94-s-february-26-1975.pdf).
\367\Calvin Coolidge Presidential Foundation, The History of the
1921 and 1974 Budget Acts (Nov. 26, 2014); So . . . this is Nixon's
Fault?, Politico (Oct. 21, 2015) (online at www.politico.com/agenda/
story/2015/10/richard-nixon-congressional-budget-control-act-history-
000282).
\368\2 U.S.C. Sec. 683.
\369\U.S. Government Accountability Office, Impoundment Control
Act--Withholding of Funds through Their Date of Expiration (Dec. 10,
2018) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/700/695889.pdf).
\370\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 47-48. With regard to interagency
discussions about the legality of the hold, Vindman testified ``[s]o
I'm not a legal expert, but there was a sufficient amount of--a
significant amount of work done to determine whether it was legal for
OMB to be able to place the hold. . . . I think at the--so my
recollection in the [July 18th] sub-PCC was that the matter was raised;
at the [July 23rd] PCC, it was tasked for further development; and I
think by the time it got to our [July 26th] DSG it was determined that,
you know, there was a legal basis to hold.'' Vindman Dep. Tr. at 185.
\371\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 184.
\372\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 165.
\373\Id. at 264.
\374\Id.
\375\Id.
\376\ Cooper Dep. Tr. at 51.
\377\Id.; see also id. at 113 (explaining that she relied on a
conversation with DOD legal to form her understanding of the two proper
legal mechanisms).
\378\2 U.S.C. Sec. 683.
\379\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 58-59.
\380\Id. at 114.
\381\Id. at 51, 57; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 147-148.
\382\31 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1511-1516.
\383\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 87, 163.
\384\Id. at 34-35.
\385\Id. at 51.
\386\Id. at 23.
\387\Id. at 33-35, 51-52.
\388\Id. at 86.
\389\Id. at 86-87.
\390\Id. at 86.
\391\Id. at 87-88.
\392\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (July
25, 2019).
\393\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 94.
\394\Id.
\395\Id. at 94-95; SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB
Footnote A4 (July 25, 2019).
\396\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 87.
\397\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (July
25, 2019); Sandy Dep. Tr. at 92.
\398\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 101.
\399\Id. at 102.
\400\Id. at 96-97, 102.
\401\Id. at 101-102.
\402\Id. at 63.
\403\Id.
\404\Id. at 102.
\405\Id. at 64-65.
\406\Id. at 65.
\407\Id. at 108-109.
\408\Id. at 104, 119-120.
\409\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 58-59.
\410\Id.
\411\Id. at 59.
\412\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 74-75, 127-128.
\413\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (August
6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4
(August 15, 2019). Because of a drafting error in which OMB forgot to
extend the date, the footnotes technically did not restrict DOD from
spending funds between August 12 and August 20 (the date of the
subsequent funding document reinstating the hold). However, Sandy
testified that the hold was still in place and that the direction from
the President remained unchanged. Sandy Dep. Tr. at 124-126.
\414\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (August
6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4
(August 15, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote
A4 (August 20, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB
Footnote A4 (August 27, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019,
OMB Footnote A4 (August 31, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY
2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 5, 2019); SF-13; SF-132 Apportionment
Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 6, 2019); Apportionment
Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 10, 2019).
\415\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 91-92.
\416\Id. at 92.
\417\Kent Dep. Tr. at 318-319.
\418\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 56-61.
\419\Id. at 59-60.
\420\Id. at 60-61.
\421\Id. at 75, 127-128; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 57-58; see also id. at
59 (``And along the way, [the] Defense Security Cooperation Agency was
expressing doubt that they could do it.'').
\422\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 80-81. Ultimately, as described below, DOD
was able to obligate all but approximately $35 million in USAI funds by
September 30th. Sandy Dep. Tr. at 146-147.
\423\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 127-128.
\424\Id. at 95.
\425\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 20, 2019); SF-
132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 27, 2019); SF-132
Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 31, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment
Schedule FY 2019 (September 5, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY
2019 (September 6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019
(September 10, 2019).
\426\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 20, 2019) (funds
not available for obligation until August 26); SF-132 Apportionment
Schedule FY 2019 (August 27, 2019) (funds not available for obligation
until August 31); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 31,
2019) (funds not available for obligation until September 5); SF-132
Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (September 5, 2019) (funds not available
for obligation until September 7); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY
2019 (September 6, 2019) (funds not available for obligation until
September 11); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (September 10,
2019) (funds not available for obligation until September 12).
\427\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 131.
\428\Id. at 136-137.
\429\Id. at 136.
\430\Id. at 135-137, 150-155.
\431\Id. at 149-152.
\432\Id. at 152.
\433\Id. at 150-156.
\434\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 266-267.
\435\Id. at 268.
\436\Id. at 267.
\437\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 186.
\438\Id.
\439\Id. at 187-188.
\440\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 167-168.
\441\Id. at 170-171.
\442\Id. at 265-266.
\443\Id. at 172, 266.
\444\Id. at 266.
\445\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 68.
\446\Croft Dep. Tr. at 86.
\447\Id. at 86-87.
\448\Id. at 86-87, 101.
\449\Id. at 97-98.
\450\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 14.
\451\Id. at 13-14.
\452\Id. at 14.
\453\Id. at 15.
\454\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 221-222.
\455\Trump Holds Up Ukraine Military Aid Meant to Confront Russia,
Politico (Aug. 28, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/story/2019/08/28/
trump-ukraine-military-aid-russia-1689531).
\456\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 18 (``It is important to understand that a
White House visit was critical to President Zelensky. He needed to
demonstrate U.S. support at the highest levels, both to advance his
ambitious anti-corruption agenda at home and to encourage Russian
President Putin to take seriously President Zelensky's peace
efforts.'').
\457\Kent Dep. Tr. at 202 (``The President of the United States is
a longtime acknowledged leader of the free world, and the U.S. is
Ukraine's strongest supporter. And so in the Ukraine context, it's very
important to show that they can establish a strong relationship with
the leader of the United States. That's the Ukrainian argument and
desire to have a meeting. The foreign policy argument is it's a very
important country in the front lines of Russian malign influence and
aggression. And the U.S. spends a considerable amount of our resources
supporting Ukraine and therefore it makes sense.'').
\458\Hill Dep. Tr. at 158 (``He was just generally concerned about
actually not having a meeting because he felt that this would deprive
Ukraine, the new Ukrainian Government of the legitimacy that it needed,
especially vis--vis the Russians. So this gets to, you know, the heart
of our national security dilemma. You know, the Ukrainians at this
point, you know, are looking at a White House meeting or looking at a
meeting with the President of the United States as a recognition of
their legitimacy as a sovereign state.'').
\459\Vindman Hearing Tr. at 38-39 (``The show of support for
President Zelensky, still a brand-new President, frankly, a new
politician on the Ukrainian political scene, looking to establish his
bona fides as a regional and maybe even a world leader, would want to
have a meeting with the United States, the most powerful country in the
world and Ukraine's most significant benefactor, in order to be able to
implement his agenda.'').
\460\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 59.
\461\Id. at 328.
\462\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 5 (``In late June, one of the
goals of both channels was to facilitate a visit by President Zelensky
to the White House for a meeting with President Trump, which President
Trump had promised in his congratulatory letter of May 29. The
Ukrainians were clearly eager for the meeting to happen. During a
conference call with Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs Phil Reeker, Secretary Perry,
Ambassador Sondland, and Counsel of the U.S. Department of State Ulrich
Brechbuhl on June 18, it was clear that a meeting between the two
presidents was an agreed-upon goal.'').
\463\Id. at 25 (``[D]uring my subsequent communications with
Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, they relayed to me that the President
wanted to hear from Zelensky' before scheduling the meeting in the Oval
Office. It was not clear to me what this meant.'').
\464\Id.
\465\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 20.
\466\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 25-26.
\467\Id. at 25. See also id. at 128.
Q: But Ambassador Sondland made it clear not only that he didn't
wish to include most of the regular interagency participants but also
that no one was transcribing or monitoring the call as they added
President Zelensky. What struck you as odd about that?
A: Same concern. That is, in the normal, regular channel, the State
Department operations center that was putting the call together would
stay on the line, in particular when you were having a conversation
with the head of state, they would stay on the line, transcribe, take
notes so that there could be a record of the discussion with this head
of state. It is an official discussion. When he wanted to be sure that
there was not, the State Department operations center agreed.
\468\Id. at 26.
\469\Id. at 127.
\470\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\471\Id.
\472\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 26.
\473\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000027 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\474\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 242-243.
\475\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000055 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\476\Id at. Bates KV00000027.
Taylor: Are you OK with me briefing Ulrich on these conversations?
Maybe you have already?
Volker: I have not--please feel free.
Volker: The key thing is to tee up a phone call w potus and then
get visit nailed down.
Taylor: I agree. Is Ze on board with a phone call?
Volker: Yes--bogdan was a little skeptical, but Zelensky was ok
with it. Now we need to get it on potus schedule . . .
Taylor: The three amigos are on a roll. Let me know when I can
help.
\477\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 65-66 (``Kurt told me that he had discussed
how President Zelensky could prepare for the phone call with President
Trump. And without going into--without providing me any details about
the specific words, did talk about investigations in that conversation
. . . Kurt suggested that President Trump would like to hear about the
investigations.'').
\478\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 94.
Q: In the July 2nd or 3rd meeting in Toronto that you had with
President Zelensky, you also mentioned investigations to him, right?
A: Yes.
Q: And again, you were referring to the Burisma and the 2016
election.
A: I was thinking of Burisma and 2016.
Q: And you understood that that what the Ukrainians interpreted
references to investigations to be, related to Burisma and the 2016
election?
A: I don't know specifically at that time if we had talked that
specifically, Burisma/2016. That was my assumption, though, that they
would've been thinking that too.
\479\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 27.
\480\Id. at 43.
\481\Id. at 21-22.
\482\Kent Dep. Tr. at 246.
\483\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 59.
\484\Kent Dep. Tr. at 246-247 (``I do not recall whether the
follow-on conversation I had with Kurt about this was in Toronto, or
whether it was subsequently at the State Department. But he did tell me
that he planned to start reaching out to former Mayor of New York, Rudy
Giuliani. And when I asked him why, he said that it was clear that the
former mayor had influence on the President in terms of the way the
President though of Ukraine. And I think by that moment in time, that
was self-evidence to anyone who was working on the issues, and
therefore, it made sense to try to engage the mayor. When I raised with
Kurt, I said, about what? Because former Mayor Giuliani has a track
record of, you know, asking for a visa for a corrupt former prosecutor.
He attacked Masha, and he's tweeting that the new President needs to
investigate Biden and the 2016 campaign. And Kurt's reaction or
response to me at that was, well, if there's nothing there, what does
it matter? And if there is something there, it should be investigated.
My response to him was asking another country to investigate a
prosecution for political reasons undermines our advocacy of the rule
of law.'').
\485\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\486\Id.
\487\Id. at Bates KV00000006.
\488\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 308; Kurt Volker Document
Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2, 2019).
\489\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 138.
\490\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23.
\491\Hill Dep. Tr. at 63.
\492\Id. at 63-67, 155.
\493\Id.
Q: Did anything happen in that meeting that was out of the
ordinary?
A: Yes. At one point during that meeting, Ambassador Bolton was,
you know, basically trying very hard not to commit to a meeting,
because, you know--and, again, these meetings have to be well-prepared.
They're not just something that you say, yes, we're going to have a
meeting without there being a clear understanding of what the content
of that meeting is going to be. . . . And Ambassador Bolton is always
was always very cautious and always very much, you know, by the book
and was not going to certainly commit to a meeting right there and
then, certainly not one where it wasn't--it was unclear what the
content of the meeting would be about, what kind of issues that we
would discuss that would be pertaining to Ukrainian-U.S. relations. . .
. Then Ambassador Sondland blurted out: Well, we have an agreement with
the chief of staff for a meeting if these investigations in the energy
sector start. And Ambassador Bolton immediately stiffened. He said
words to the effect--I can't say word for word what he said because I
was behind them sitting on the sofa with our Senior Director of Energy,
and we all kind of looked up and thought that was somewhat odd. And
Ambassador Bolton immediately stiffened and ended the meeting.
Q: Right then, he just ended the meeting?
A: Yeah. He said: Well, it was very nice to see you. You know, I
can't discuss a meeting at this time. We'll clearly work on this. And,
you know, kind of it was really nice to see you. So it was very abrupt.
I mean, he looked at the clock as if he had, you know, suddenly another
meeting and his time was up, but it was obvious he ended the meeting.
\494\ Vindman Dep. Tr. at 17 (``The meeting proceeded well until
the Ukrainians broached the subject of a meeting between the two
Presidents. The Ukrainians saw this meeting as critically important in
order to solidify the support for their most important international
partner. Ambassador Sondland started--when Ambassador Sondland started
to speak about Ukraine delivering specific investigations in order to
secure the meeting with the President, Ambassador Bolton cut the
meeting short.'')
\495\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 310.
\496\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23, 73, 103.
\497\Hill Dep. Tr. at 68 (``And Ambassador Sondland said to
Ambassador Volker and also Secretary Perry and the other people who
were with him, including the Ukrainians, to come down to--there's a
room in the White House, the Ward Room, to basically talk about next
steps. And that's also unusual. I mean, he meant to talk to the
Ukrainians about next steps about the meeting.'')
\498\Id. (``And Ambassador Bolton pulled me back as I was walking
out afterwards and said: Go down to the Ward Room right now and find
out what they're talking about and come back and talk to me. So I did
go down.'').
\499\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 64-65.
Q: And what do you recall specifically of what Sondland said to the
Ukrainians--
A: Right.
Q: --in the Ward Room?
A: So that is right, the conversation unfolded with Sondland
proceeding to kind of, you know, review what the deliverable would be
in order to get the meeting, and he talked about the investigation into
the Bidens, and, frankly, I can't 100 percent recall because I didn't
take notes of it, but Burisma, that it seemed--I mean, there was no
ambiguity, I guess, in my mind. He was calling for something, calling
for an investigation that didn't exist into the Bidens and Burisma.
Q: Okay. Ambiguity in your mind is different from what you--
A: Sure.
Q: --actually heard?
A: Right. Correct.
Q: What did you hear Sondland say?
A: That the Ukrainians would have to deliver an investigation into
the Bidens.
Q: Into the Bidens. So in the Ward Room he mentioned the word
``Bidens''?
A: To the best of my recollection, yes.
Q: Okay. Did he mention 2016?
A: I don't recall.
Q: Did he mention Burisma?
A: My visceral reaction to what was being called for suggested that
it was explicit. There was no ambiguity.
. . .
A: Again, based on my visceral reaction, it was explicit what he
was calling for. And to the best of my recollection, he did
specifically say ``investigation of the Bidens.''
. . .
A: So the meeting that occurred in the Ward Room referenced
investigations into the Bidens, to the best of my recollection, Burisma
and 2016.
\500\Hill Dep. Tr. at 69.
\501\Id. at 151-152.
\502\Id. at 69-70.
\503\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 31.
Q: Did Ambassador Sondland--were the Ukrainian officials in the
room when he was describing the need for these investigations in order
to get the White House meeting?
A: So they were in the room initially. I think, once it became
clear that there was some sort of discord amongst the government
officials in the room, Ambassador Sondland asked them to step out of
the room.
Q: What was the discord?
A: The fact that it was clear that I, as the representative--I, as
the representative of the NSC, thought it was inappropriate and that we
were not going to get involved in investigations.
Q: Did you say that to Ambassador Sondland?
A: Yes, I did.
\504\Id. at 18. While not specifically disagreeing with any of the
content of the discussion in the Ward Room, Ambassador Sondland
generally disputed Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman's accounts, saying
that he did not recall ``any yelling or screaming . . . as others have
said.'' Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23. Neither Dr. Hill nor Lt. Col.
Vindman described yelling or screaming in the meetings.
Ambassador Sondland also testified that ``those recollections of
protest do not square with the documentary record of our interactions
with the NSC in the days and weeks that followed.'' Sondland Hearing
Tr. at 23. As an example, Sondland provided text from a July 13 email
that he sent--not to Dr. Hill, but to her successor Tim Morrison--which
said that the ``sole purpose'' of the call between President Trump and
President Zelensky was to give the former ``assurances of new sheriff'
in town.'' Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23. The email that Ambassador
Sondland provided does not undermine Dr. Hill's or Lt. Col. Vindman's
testimony that they objected to Ambassador Sondland's conduct in the
Ward Room meeting. The email provided by Ambassador Sondland, however,
was sent to Mr. Morrison, not Dr. Hill. Mr. Morrison had not yet
started working as NSC Senior Director for Europe and was not at the
July 10 meeting.
\505\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 29.
A: So I heard him say that this had been coordinated with White
House Chief of Staff Mr. Mick Mulvaney.
Q: What did he say about that?
A: He just said that he had had a conversation with Mr. Mulvaney,
and this is what was required in order to get a meeting.
\506\ Hill Dep. Tr. at 69-70.
\507\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2,
2019).
Taylor: Eager to hear if your meeting with Danyliuk and Bolton
resulted in a decision on a call.
Taylor: How did the meeting go?
Volker: Not good--lets talk--kv
\508\Id. at Bates KV00000018.
\509\Hill Dep. Tr. at 70-72.
\510\Id. at 126-27.
Q: Okay. But what did you understand him to mean by that?
A: Well, based on what had happened in the July 10th meeting and
Ambassador Sondland blurting out that he'd already gotten agreement to
have a meeting at the White House for Zelensky if these investigations
were started up again, clearly Ambassador Bolton was referring directly
to those.
\511\Id. at 129.
\512\Id. at 139. (``I told him exactly, you know, what had
transpired and that Ambassador Sondland had basically indicated that
there was an agreement with the Chief of Staff that they would have a
White House meeting or, you know, a Presidential meeting if the
Ukrainians started up these investigations again.'').
\513\Id.
\514\Id. at 146-147.
\515\Id. at 158-159, 161.
Q: What was Mr. Eisenberg's reaction to what you explained to him
had and Mr. Griffith had explained to him had occurred the day before?
A: Yeah. He was also concerned. I mean, he wasn't aware that
Sondland, Ambassador Sondland was, you know, kind of running around
doing a lot of these, you know, meetings and independently. We talked
about the fact that, you know, Ambassador Sondland said he'd been
meeting with Giuliani and he was very concerned about that. And he said
that he would follow up on this.
\516\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 37. (``Sir, I think I--I mean, the top
line I just offered, I'll restate it, which is that Mr. Sondland asked
for investigations, for these investigations into Bidens and Burisma. I
actually recall having that particular conversation. Mr. Eisenberg
doesn't really work on this issue, so I had to go a little bit into the
back story of what these investigations were, and that I expressed
concerns and thought it was inappropriate.'').
\517\Id. at 36.
\518\Id. at 38.
Q: Did he say anything to you, that, all right, I'm going to do
anything with it?
A: I vaguely recall something about: I'll take a look into it. You
know, there might not be anything here. We'll take a look into it,
something of that nature. But--and then he offered to, you know, if I
have any concerns in the future, you know, that I should be open--I
should be--feel free to come back and, you know, share those concerns.
Q: Did either he or anyone from the legal staff circle back to you
on this issue?
A: No.
\519\Id. at 39-40.
\520\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 29. (``In the same July 19th phone call,
they gave me an account of the July 10th meeting with the Ukrainian
officials at the White House. Specifically, they told me that
Ambassador Sondland had connected investigations with an Oval Office
meeting for President Zelensky, which so irritated Ambassador Bolton
that he abruptly ended the meeting, telling Dr. Hill and Mr. Vindman
that they should have nothing to do with domestic politics.'').
\521\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 12.
\522\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019) (``2. The call between
Zelensky and Potus should happen before 7/21. (Parliamentary Elections)
Sole purpose is for Zelensky to give Potus assurances of `new sheriff'
in town. Corruption ending, unbundling moving forward and any hampered
investigations will be allowed to move forward transparently. Goal is
for Potus to invite him to Oval. Volker, Perry, Bolton and I strongly
recommend.'').
\523\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 21 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\524\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 227.
\525\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 21 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\526\Id.
\527\Id.
\528\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 27.
\529\Verizon Document Production. It is unclear whether this call
occurred before or after Ambassador Sondland spoke with President
Zelensky, and it is also unclear whether the White House caller was an
Administration official or the President himself.
\530\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\531\Id.
\532\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 229-230.
\533\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\534\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 202-203.
\535\Id. at 232.
\536\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000002 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\537\Id. at Bates KV00000018.
\538\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 138-139.
\539\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02705.
\540\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 139.
\541\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\542\Id. at Bates KV00000002-KV00000003.
\543\Id. at Bates KV00000042.
Volker: Orchestrated a great call w Rudy and Yermak. They are going
to get together when Rudy goes to Madrid in a couple of weeks.
Volker: In the meantime, Rudy is now advocating for phone call
Volker: I have call into Fiona's replacement and will call Bolton
if needed.
Volker: But I can tell Bolton and you can tell Mick that Rudy
agrees on a call, if that helps
Sondland: I talked to Tim Morrison. (Fiona's replacement). He is
pushing but feel free as well.
\544\Id.
\545\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 30.
\546\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\547\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 74.
\548\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 68.
\549\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 177.
\550\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 183.
\551\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 17.
\552\Id. at 18.
\553\Id. at 19, 17.
\554\Id. at 27.
\555\Id. at 26.
\556\Id. at 27.
\557\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 26.
\558\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 25.
\559\Hill Dep. Tr. at 420-421.
Q: You've mentioned repeatedly concerns that you had about, in
particular, Mr. Giuliani and his efforts. When you read the call
transcript of July 25th, the call record, which you must have done just
a couple weeks ago, did it crystalize in your head in any way a better
understanding of what was transpiring while you were there?
A: In terms of providing, you know, more information with
hindsight, unfortunately, yes.
Q: And in what way?
A: The specific references, also juxtaposed with the release of the
text messages by Ambassador Volker--you know, what I said before--
really was kind of my worst fears and nightmares, in terms of, you
know, there being some kind of effort not just to subvert the national
security process but to try to subvert what really should be, you know,
kind of, a diplomatic effort to, you know, kind of, set up a
Presidential meeting.
Q: This may--
A: There seems to be an awful lot of people involved in, you know,
basically turning a White House meeting into some kind of asset.
Q: What do you mean by ``asset''?
A: Well, something that was being, you know, dangled out to the
Ukrainian Government. They wanted the White House meeting very much.
And this was kind of laying out that it wasn't just a question of
scheduling or having, you know, the national security issues worked
out, that there were all of these alternative discussions going on
behind.
\560\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 174.
\561\Id.
\562\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\563\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 53-55.
\564\Id. at 52-53.
\565\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 30-31, 101, 247, 256.
\566\Id. at 31.
\567\Id. at 111.
\568\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 102-103; Kurt Volker
Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 2019). In his testimony,
Ambassador Volker did not explain to the Committees what he had heard
about the July 25 call put him in a position to tell Mr. Giuliani that
the ``right messages'' were, in fact, discussed.
Ambassador Volker testified twice about the readouts that he
received of the July 25 call. In his deposition, he told the Committees
that he received ``the same'' readout from both the State Department
and Mr. Yermak: that there was a message of congratulations to
President Zelensky, that President Zelensky promised to fight
corruption and that President Trump repeated the invitation to visit
the White House. Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 102-103.
Ambassador Volker described it as a ``superficial'' readout. Volker
Transcribed Interview Tr. at 19.
In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker repeated that claim: the
readouts from Mr. Yermak and Ambassador Volker's U.S. sources ``were
largely the same, that it was a good call, that it was a congratulatory
phone call for the President winning the parliamentary election.''
Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 74. Ambassador Volker did testify that
he ``expected'' the call to cover the material in his July 25 text
message--that the Ukrainians would ``investigate/`get to the bottom of
what happened' in 2016''--but did not receive anything more than a
``barebones'' description of what was said Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr.
at 87-88, 75.
If Ambassador Volker is correctly describing the readouts he
received, it is not clear what he heard that gave him the basis to tell
Mr. Giuliani that ``exactly the right messages'' were discussed.
\569\Williams Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
\570\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 23.
\571\Id. at 25.
\572\Trump and Putin Share Joke About Election Meddling, Sparking
New Furor, New York Times (June 28, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/28/us/politics/trump-putin-election.html) (``As he sat down on
Friday with Mr. Putin on the sidelines of an international summit in
Japan, Mr. Trump was asked by a reporter if he would tell Russia not to
meddle in American elections. `Yes, of course I will,' Mr. Trump said
Turning to Mr. Putin, he said, with a half-grin on his face and mock
seriousness in his voice, `Don't meddle in the election,
President.''').
\573\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 41.
\574\Williams Dep. Tr. at 131.
\575\See Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42, 109; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 41.
\576\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 18; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 15.
\577\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42-43; Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 32.
\578\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 39; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 45.
\579\U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Italy, Secretary Michael R.
Pompeo and Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio at a Press
Availability (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at https://it.usembassy.gov/
secretary-michael-r-pompeo-and-italian-foreign-minister-luigi-di-maio-
at-a-press-availability/). Mr. Morrison testified that Dr. Kupperman
was not in the Situation Room, but Mr. Morrison was informed after the
fact that Dr. Kupperman was listening. Morrison Dep. Tr. at 39-40. Ms.
Williams and Lt. Col. Vindman testified that they both believed Dr.
Kupperman was present, but neither had a clear recollection. Williams
Dep. Tr. at 64; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 45.
\580\See Transcript, This Week with George Stephanopoulos, ABC News
(Sept. 22, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-
transcript-22-19-secretary-mike-pompeo-gen/story?id=65778332) (Q: And I
want to turn to this whistleblower complaint, Mr. Secretary. The
complaint involving the president and a phone call with a foreign
leader to the director of national intelligence inspector general.
That's where the complaint was launched by the whistle-blower. `The
Wall Street Journal' is reporting that President Trump pressed the
president of Ukraine eight times to work with Rudy Giuliani to
investigate Joe Biden's son. What do you know about those
conversations? A: So, you just gave me a report about a I.C. whistle-
blower complaint, none of which I've seen.. . .'').
\581\Pompeo Took Part in Ukraine Call, Official Says, Wall Street
Journal (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/pompeo-took-
part-in-ukraine-call-official-says-11569865002).
\582\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\583\Id.
\584\Id. See European Union External Action Service, EU-Ukraine
Relations Factsheet (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/4081/eu-ukraine-relations-
factsheet_en).
\585\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\586\Id.; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 29.
\587\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\588\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 114.
\589\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\590\See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing
Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections (Jan. 6,
2017) (online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).
\591\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\592\Charges of Ukrainian Meddling? A Russian Operation, U.S.
Intelligence Says, New York Times (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/us/politics/ukraine-russia-
interference.html).
\593\The President of Russia, Joint News Conference with Hungarian
Prime Minister Viktor Orban (Feb. 2, 2017) (online at http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53806).
\594\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 39-40.
\595\President Trump's Former National Security Advisor `Deeply
Disturbed' by Ukraine Scandal: `Whole World Is Watching,' ABC News
(Sept. 29, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-
trumps-national-security-advisor-deeply-disturbed-ukraine/
story?id=65925477).
\596\Hill Dep. Tr. at 234-235.
\597\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\598\Id.
\599\Id.
\600\Id.
\601\Id.
\602\Id.
\603\The White House, Remarks by President Trump before Marine One
(Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-
67/).
\604\Hill Dep. Tr. at 400; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 73; Hill-
Holmes Hearing Tr. at 63-64; Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 49-50;
Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23.
\605\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
\606\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 116.
\607\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 50.
\608\See Section I, Chapter 1.
\609\Kent Dep. Tr. at 44-50.
\610\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23.
\611\Id.
\612\See Section I, Chapter 1.
\613\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\614\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 192-193.
\615\Id.
\616\Ambassador Volker was the only witness to testify that
President Trump's reference to the ``prosecutor'' during the July 25
call was to Mr. Shokin, not Mr. Lutsenko. See Volker Transcribed
Interview Tr. at 355. However, Mr. Holmes testified that, on July 26--
the day after the call--he spoke with President Zelensky's Chief of
Staff Andriy Bohdan who told Holmes that ``President Trump had
expressed interest during the previous day's phone call in President
Zelensky's personnel decisions related to the Prosecutor General's
office,'' which Mr. Holmes understood to refer to Mr. Lutsenko once he
saw the July 25 call transcript. Holmes Dep. Tr. at 22, 49. In
addition, in a text message to Taylor and Sondland after his July 19
breakfast with Giuliani, Volker emphasized that ``Most impt [important]
is for Zelensky to say'' on the July 25 call ``that he will help
investigation--and address any specific personnel issues--if there are
any.'' Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\617\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\618\Id.
\619\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 55.
\620\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 49-50.
\621\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
\622\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 19.
\623\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 18.
\624\In-Town Pool Report #6--Ukraine Call, White House Pool Report
(July 25, 2019) (online at https://publicpool.kinja.com/subject-in-
town-pool-report-6-ukraine-call-1836700221).
\625\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
\626\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 31-33; Morrison-Volker Hearing
Tr. at 34.
\627\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 46-47.
\628\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 29.
\629\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 94.
\630\Id. at 46-47.
\631\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 28.
\632\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 147.
\633\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 28-29.
\634\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 96-97.
\635\Id. at 97-98.
\636\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 29.
\637\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 23-24.
\638\Id. at 41-42, 191-192.
\639\Id. at 97.
\640\Id.
\641\Id. at 101.
\642\Id. at 41.
\643\Id. at 43.
\644\Id. at 44.
\645\Id. at 16.
\646\Id. at 101.
\647\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 38.
\648\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 121.
\649\Id. at 122.
\650\Id. at 122-123.
\651\Id. at 121.
\652\Id. at 123-124.
\653\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 121.
\654\Id. at 55-56.
\655\Id. at 55-56, 121-123.
\656\Id. at 270.
\657\Williams Dep. Tr. at 16, 63.
\658\Id. at 149.
\659\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 34.
\660\Williams Dep. Tr. at 148.
\661\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 29.
\662\Williams Dep. Tr. at 54, 149.
\663\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 54-55 (``There's one other substantive
item in the next paragraph from Zelensky, where it says `He or she will
look into the situation specifically to the company' it shouldn't be
`the company. It should be `to Burisma that you mentioned.' Because I
think, you know, frankly these are not necessarily folks that are
familiar with the substance. So President Zelensky specifically
mentioned the company Burisma.'').
\664\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 61.
\665\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 89.
\666\Williams Dep. Tr. at 68-69.
Q: Okay. When the transcript was made available to the VP's office,
do you remember when that occurred?
A: My colleagues--I can't remember the precise time, but before the
end of the day that day my colleagues who help prepare the Vice
President's briefing book received a hard copy of the transcript from
the White House Situation Room to include in that book. I didn't
personally see it, but I understood that they had received it because
we wanted to make sure the Vice President got it.
Q: On the 25th or 26th?
A: It was on the 25th.
\667\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 139-141.
\668\Kent Dep. Tr. at 163-165.
\669\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 107.
\670\Id. at 21-22.
\671\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38; Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 26.
\672\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 74 (``Yes. So I was not on the
phone call. I had arrived in Ukraine, and I had had that lunch with Mr.
Yermak that we saw on the day of the phone call. I had been pushing for
the phone call because I thought it was important to renew the personal
connection between the two leaders and to congratulate President
Zelensky on the parliamentary election. The readout I received from Mr.
Yermak and also from the U.S. side--although I'm not exactly sure who
it was on the U.S. side, but there was U.S. and a Ukrainian readout--
were largely the same, that it was a good call, that it was a
congratulatory phone call for the President winning the parliamentary
election. President Zelensky did reiterate his commitment to reform and
fighting corruption in Ukraine, and President Trump did reiterate his
invitation to President Zelensky to come visit him in the White House.
That's exactly what I thought the phone call would be, so I was not
surprised at getting that as the readout.'').
\673\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 22.
\674\Id. at 22, 48-49.
\675\Id. at 49.
\676\Id. at 49.
\677\Id. at 22.
\678\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 27.
\679\Id. at 48-49.
\680\Croft Dep. Tr. at 118-119.
\681\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 25; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38.
\682\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 89-90.
\683\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 64.
\684\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38.
\685\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 27.
\686\Id.
\687\Id. at 27-28.
\688\Id.
\689\Id.
\690\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 108.
\691\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 49.
\692\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 25-26.
\693\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
\694\Id.
\695\Id. at 49 (``The restaurant has sort of glass doors that open
onto a terrace, and we were at the first tables on the terrace, so
immediately outside of the interior of the restaurant. The doors were
all wide open. There were--there was tables, a table for four, while I
recall it being two tables for two pushed together. In any case, it was
quite a wide table, and the table was set. There was sort of a table
runner down the middle. I was directly across from Ambassador Sondland.
We were close enough that we could, you know, share an appetizer
between us, and then the two staffers were off to our right at this
next table.'').
\696\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
\697\Id.
\698\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 160.
\699\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
\700\Id. at 50.
Q: Now, you said that you were able to hear President Trump's voice
through the receiver. How were you able to hear if it was not on
speaker phone?
A: It was several things. It was quite loud when the President came
on, quite distinctive. I believe Ambassador Sondland also said that he
often speaks very loudly over the phone, and I certainly experienced
that. When the President came on, he sort of winced and held the phone
away from his ear like this, and he did that for the first couple
exchanges. I don't know if he then turned the volume down, if he got
used to it, if the President moderated his volume. I don't know. But
that's how I was able to hear.
\701\Id. at 28-29.
\702\Trump Denies Discussing Ukraine Investigations with Sondland
in July Phone Call, Axios (Nov. 13, 2019) (online at: www.axios.com/
trump-denies-ukraine-investigation-sondland-6063f555-2629-4f99-b2f9-
fd38739c0548.html).
\703\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26.
\704\Id. at 46.
\705\Id. at 26.
\706\Id.
\707\Id. at 48.
\708\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 25.
\709\Id. at 25-26.
\710\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 49-50. Ambassador Sondland opined
that, while he may have referred to an investigation that Mr. Giuliani
was pushing as an example of an investigation that President Trump
cared about, he believed that he would have said ``Burisma, not
Biden.'' He testified, however:
Q: But do you recall saying at least referring to an investigation
that Rudy Giuliani was pushing? Is that something that you likely would
have said?
A: I would have, yes.
Id. at 50.
\711\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 50.
\712\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 67.
\713\Id. at 68-69.
\714\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 30.
\715\Id. at 107.
\716\Id. at 34.
\717\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 80.
\718\Id. at 80-81.
\719\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\720\Id.
\721\Id.
\722\Id. at Bates KV00000019.
\723\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 112.
\724\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\725\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 42.
\726\Id.
\727\Id. at 20-21.
\728\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\729\Id. at Bates KV00000007.
\730\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02786.
\731\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\732\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 192-193.
\733\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\734\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02797.
\735\Id.
\736\Id.
\737\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03326.
\738\Id.
\739\Id.
\740\Id.
\741\Id.
\742\Id.
\743\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02798.
\744\Id.
\745\Id.
\746\Id.
\747\Id.
\748\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02799.
\749\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02801.
\750\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\751\Id.
\752\Id.
\753\Id.
\754\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02802-03,
02813, 03326, 03719.
\755\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03326.
\756\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02802.
\757\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02803.
\758\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03719.
\759\Id.
\760\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02803.
\761\Id.
\762\Id.
\763\Id.
\764\Id.
\765\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000004-KV00000005
(Oct. 2, 2019).
\766\Id. at Bates KV00000004-KV00000005; AT&T Document Production,
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02805-06.
\767\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000023 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\768\Id.
\769\Id.
\770\Verizon Document Production.
\771\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\772\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 290; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 100-101.
\773\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\774\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 291.
\775\Id.
\776\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\777\Id.
\778\Id.
\779\Id. at Bates KV00000042.
\780\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 15 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\781\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\782\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 291-292.
\783\Id.
\784\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 14 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\785\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000005 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\786\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02816.
\787\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 22 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\788\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 102.
\789\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 22 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\790\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 28.
\791\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\792\Id. at Bates KV00000007.
\793\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02828.
\794\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 113.
\795\Id. at 71-72.
\796\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000023 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\797\Id.
\798\Id.
\799\Id.
\800\WhatsApp Security (online at www.whatsapp.com/security/)
(accessed Nov. 29, 2019).
\801\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\802\Id.
\803\Id. at Bates KV00000023.
\804\Id.
\805\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 43-44, 113-114.
\806\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 5 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\807\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 18.
\808\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 191, 197-198.
\809\Id. at 191-192.
\810\Id. at 201.
\811\Id. at 198.
\812\Id. at 197.
\813\Trump Hasn't Talked to Attorney General About Having Ukraine
Investigate Biden, DOJ Says, CNN (Sept. 25, 2019) (online at
www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-impeachment-inquiry-09-25-2019/
h_619f3c67775916f27e22898fbed210f2).
\814\Cleaning Up Ukraine in the Shadow of Trump, The Financial
Times (Nov. 28, 2019) (online at www.ft.com/content/eb8e4004-1059-11ea-
a7e6-62bf4f9e548a).
\815\Id.
\816\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 9.
\817\Id.
\818\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 196-197.
\819\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 9.
\820\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\821\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 196-197.
\822\Kent Dep. Tr. at 261
\823\Id. at 262-263.
\824\Id. at 264.
\825\Id. at 264-265.
\826\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\827\Id. at Bates KV00000043.
\828\Id.
\829\Id.
\830\Volker Transcribed Interview Opening Statement at 8.
\831\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 44.
\832\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 21.
\833\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 259-260.
\834\Id. at 260.
\835\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 128.
\836\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\837\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 199-200.
\838\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32, 68; Sondland Hearing Tr. at
55-57.
\839\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 71.
\840\Id. at 62, 66.
\841\Id. at 62.
\842\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 90-91.
\843\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 23, Impeachment, 116th
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
\844\Id.
\845\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 104.
\846\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 18, Impeachment, 116th
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
\847\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 44.
\848\Id. at 75.
\849\Id. at 76.
\850\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 23, Impeachment, 116th
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
\851\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 30.
\852\Id.
\853\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 28.
\854\Id. at 106.
\855\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
\856\Id. at 31.
\857\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
\858\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 230.
\859\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
\860\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 8.
\861\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\862\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 80-81.
A: By the time it hit Politico publicly, I believe it was the end
of August. And I got a text message from, it was either the Foreign
Minister or--I think it was the future Foreign Minister. And, you know,
basically, you're just--you're--I have to verbalize this. You're just
trying to explain that we are trying this. We have a complicated
system. We have a lot of players in this. We are working this. Give us
time to fix it.
Q: So anybody on the Ukrainian side of things ever express like
grave concern that this would not get worked out?
A: Not that it wouldn't get worked out, no, they did not. They
expressed concern that, since this has now come out publicly in this
Politico article, it looks like that they're being, you know, singled
out and penalized for some reason. That's the image that that would
create in Ukraine.
\863\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 34.
\864\Id. at 137-138.
\865\Id.
\866\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 174.
\867\Id. at 40.
\868\Id.
\869\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
\870\Id.
\871\Id. at 68.
\872\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 58.
\873\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
\874\Trump, in August Call with GOP Senator, Denied Official's
Claim on Ukraine Aid, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at
www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-used-potential-meeting-to-
pressure-ukraine-on-biden-texts-indicate-11570205661).
\875\Id.
\876\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin
Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019)
(online at www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-
42e6-88b1-b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf).
\877\Id.
\878\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\879\Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to
``Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections'':
The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017)
(online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).
\880\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan,
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin Nunes,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019) (online at
www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-42e6-88b1-
b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf).
\881\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 30.
\882\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 251-252; Kent-Taylor
Hearing Tr. at 41.
\883\Williams Dep. Tr. at 74-77.
\884\Id. at 76.
\885\Id. at 78-79.
\886\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 30.
\887\Id. at 38. See also Sondland Hearing Tr. at 57:
A: I don't know exactly what I said to him. This was a briefing
attended by many people, and I was invited at the very last minute. I
wasn't scheduled to be there. But I think I spoke up at some point late
in the meeting and said, it looks like everything is being held up
until these statements get made, and that's my, you know, personal
belief.
Q: And Vice President Pence just nodded his head?
A: Again, I don't recall any exchange or where he asked me any
questions. I think he--it was sort of a duly noted response.
Q: Well, he didn't say, Gordon, what are you talking about?
A: No, he did not.
Q: He didn't say, what investigations?
A: He did not.
\888\Pence Disputes that Sondland Raised Concerns to Him About
Ukraine Aid-Investigations Link, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 20, 2019)
(online at www.wsj.com/livecoverage/gordon-sondland-testifies-
impeachment/card/1574268547).
\889\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 190.
\890\Id. at 35.
\891\Id. at 190-191.
\892\Williams Dep. Tr. at 81.
\893\Id. at 82.
\894\Id. at 82-83.
\895\Id. at 83.
\896\Id.
\897\How a CIA Analyst, Alarmed by Trump's Shadow Foreign Policy,
Triggered an Impeachment Inquiry, Washington Post (Nov. 16, 2019)
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/how-a-cia-analyst-
alarmed-by-trumps-shadow-foreign-policy-triggered-an-impeachment-
inquiry/2019/11/15/042684a8-03c3-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
\898\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31.
\899\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 31.
\900\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 134.
\901\Id. at 155.
\902\Id.
\903\Id. at 137.
\904\Id. at 182.
\905\Id. at 184.
\906\Id. at 228.
\907\Id. at 154.
\908\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 42.
\909\Id.
\910\Id. at 57.
\911\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000039 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\912\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 42.
\913\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 190.
\914\Id.
\915\Id.
\916\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 60.
\917\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 59.
\918\Id. at 59-60.
\919\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-191.
\920\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 52.
\921\Id. at 53-54; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 238.
\922\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-44.
\923\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\924\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 44.
\925\Id.
\926\Id.
\927\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 109-110.
\928\Id.
\929\Id. at 110-111.
\930\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 45.
\931\Id. at 45, 63.
\932\Id. at 45.
\933\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 110. Ambassador Volker also testified
that Ambassador Sondland used the same analogy to him when discussing
the release of the hold on security assistance. Morrison-Volker Hearing
Tr. at 96-97.
\934\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\935\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 209.
\936\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\937\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 54.
\938\Id.
\939\Id.
\940\Id.
\941\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\942\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 217.
\943\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26 (``Was there a quid pro quo? As I
testified previously with regard to the requested White House call and
the White House meeting, the answer is yes.'').
\944\Id. at 41.
\945\Id. at 112
\946\Id. at 61-62.
\947\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 39.
\948\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 39.
\949\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 110; Whistleblower Compl. Appendix 2.
Public reporting indicates that ``[l]awyers from the White House
counsel's office told Mr. Trump in late August about the complaint,
explaining that they were trying to determine whether they were legally
required to give it to Congress.'' Trump Knew of Whistle-Blower
Complaint When He Released Aid to Ukraine, New York Times (Nov. 26,
2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/us/politics/trump-whistle-
blower-complaint-ukraine.html).
\950\Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff and Ranking Member
Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 9,
2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
20190909_-_ic_ig_letter_to_hpsci_on_whistleblower.pdf).
\951\Id.
\952\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 118. See also Witness Testimony and
Records Raise Questions About Account of Trump's `No Quid Pro Quo'
Call, Washington Post (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/witness-testimony-and-records-raise-
questions-about-account-of-trumps-no-quid-pro-quo-call/2019/11/27/
425545c2-0d49-11ea-8397-a955cd542d00_story.html).
\953\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 118.
\954\Id. at 73.
\955\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of
State, at 1 (Nov. 4, 2019). This addendum did not address the July 26
telephone conversation that Sondland had with President Trump, which he
only recalled following the testimony of David Holmes on November 15,
2019. Sondland Hearing Tr. at 46.
\956\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of
State, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2019).
\957\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-44; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-
191.
\958\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-191; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-
44.
\959\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 109.
\960\Id. at 45, 109.
\961\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2,
2019).
\962\Id.
\963\Id. at Bates KV00000053.
\964\Id.
\965\The White House, Press Briefing by Acting Chief of Staff Mick
Mulvaney (Oct. 17, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/press-briefing-acting-chief-staff-mick-mulvaney/).
\966\Id.
\967\Id. Ambassador Taylor's testimony contradicted Mr. Mulvaney's
statement about the ubiquity of such quid pro quos in American foreign
policy. Ambassador Taylor testified that in his decades of military and
diplomatic service, he had never seen another example of foreign aid
conditioned on the personal or political interests of the President.
Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 55. Rather, ``[w]e condition assistance on
issues that will improve our foreign policy, serve our foreign policy,
ensure that taxpayers' money is well-spent.'' Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr.
at 150.
\968\There were early concerns raised in the House and Senate about
the frozen aid, even before the news became public. On August 9, the
Democratic leadership of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
wrote to OMB and the White House warning that the August 3 letter
apportionment might constitute an illegal impoundment of funds. They
urged the Trump Administration to adhere to the law and obligate the
withheld funding. Letter from Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy, Senate
Committee on Appropriations, and Chairwoman Nita M. Lowey, House
Committee on Appropriations, to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney,
The White House, and Acting Director Russell Vought, Office of
Management and Budget (Aug. 9, 2019) (online at https://
appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/
files/documents/SFOPS%20Apportionment%20Letter%20Lowey-
Leahy%20Signed%202019.8.9.pdf). On August 19, the Democratic leadership
of the House and Senate Budget Committees wrote to OMB and the White
House urging the Administration to comply with appropriations law and
the Impoundment Control Act. Letter from Chairman John Yarmuth, House
Committee on the Budget, and Ranking Member Bernard Sanders, Senate
Committee on the Budget, to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, The
White House (Aug. 19, 2019) (online at https://budget.house.gov/sites/
democrats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/OMB%20Letter_081919.pdf).
\969\Letter from Senators Jeanne Shaheen, Rob Portman, Richard
Durbin, Ron Johnson, and Richard Blumenthal to Acting White House Chief
of Staff Mick Mulvaney (Sept. 3, 2019) (online at
www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Ukraine%20Security%20Letter%209.3.2019.pdf).
\970\Id.
\971\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel and Ranking Member Michael
T. McCaul, House Foreign Affairs Committee to Mick Mulvaney, Director,
and Russell Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget,
The White House (Sept. 5, 2019) (online at https://
foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/c/4/c49328c2-941b-4c41-8c00-
8c1515f0972f/
D1968A9&fxsp0;C42455BB3&fxsp0;AFC38F&fxsp0;97D966&fxsp0;857B.ele-
mccaul-letter-to-mulvaney-vought-on-ukraine-assistance.pdf).
\972\Trump Tries to Force Ukraine to Meddle in the 2020 Election,
Washington Post (Sept. 5, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/global-opinions/is-trump-strong-arming-ukraines-new-president-
for-political-gain/2019/09/05/4eb239b0-cffa-11e9-8c1c-
7c8ee785b855_story.html).
\973\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
\974\Id. at 38.
\975\See Letter from Senator Christopher Murphy to Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Acting
Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, House Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Nov. 19, 2019) (online at www.murphy.senate.gov/download/111919-sen-
murphy-letter-to-house-impeachment-investigators-on-ukraine) (``Senator
Johnson and I assured Zelensky that Congress wanted to continue this
funding, and would press Trump to release it immediately.''); Letter
from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan, Committee on
Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin Nunes, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019) (online at
www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-42e6-88b1-
b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf) (``I explained that I had
tried to persuade the president to authorize me to announce the hold
was released but that I was unsuccessful.'').
\976\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Three House
Committees Launch Probe Into Trump and Giuliani Pressure Campaign
(Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=685).
\977\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat Cipollone, Counsel to the
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
\978\Id.
\979\Id.
\980\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of
State (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf).
\981\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 245.
\982\Id.
\983\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 303.
\984\Id. at 304.
\985\Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff and Ranking Member
Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 9,
2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
20190909_-_ic_ig_letter_to_hpsci_on_whistleblower.pdf).
\986\Id. see also 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3033(k)(5) (setting forth
procedures for reporting of complaints or information with respect to
an ``urgent concern'' to Congressional intelligence committees).
\987\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 14 (``As a result, we consulted with
the White House Counsel's Office, and we were advised that much of the
information in the complaint was, in fact, subject to executive
privilege, a privilege that I do not have the authority to waive.
Because of that, we were unable to immediately share the details of the
complaint with this committee but continued to consult with the White
House counsels in an effort to do so.'').
\988\Id. at 15-16 (``Because the allegation on its face did not
appear to fall in the statutory framework, my office consulted with the
United States Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. . . .
After reviewing the complaint and the Inspector General's transmission
letter, the Office of Legal Counsel determined that the complaint's
allegations do not meet the statutory definition concerning legal
urgent concern, and found that I was not legally required to transmit
the material to our oversight committee under the Whistleblower
Protection Act.'').
\989\Id. at 22-23. See also CIA's Top Lawyer Made `Criminal
Referral' on Complaint about Trump Ukraine Call, NBC News (Oct. 4,
2019) (online at www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-impeachment-inquiry/
cia-s-top-lawyer-made-criminal-referral-whistleblower-s-complaint-
n1062481) (reporting that the CIA's General Counsel, Courtney Simmons
Elwood, informed NSC chief lawyer John Eisenberg about an anonymous
whistleblower complaint on August 14, 2019).
\990\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 14, 21-22. On September 26, Acting DNI
Maguire testified that he and the ODNI General Counsel first consulted
with the White House counsel's office before discussing the
whistleblower complaint with the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel:
The Chairman.I'm just trying to understand the chronology. You
first went to the Office of Legal Counsel, and then you went to the
White House Counsel?
Acting Director Maguire. No, no, no, sir. No, sir. No. We went to
the White House first to determine_to ask the question_
The Chairman. That's all I want to know is the chronology. So you
went to the White House first. So you went to the subject of the
complaint for advice first about whether you should provide the
complaint to Congress?
Acting Director Maguire. There were issues within this, a couple of
things: One, it did appear that it has executive privilege. If it does
have executive privilege, it is the White House that determines that. I
cannot determine that, as the Director of National Intelligence.
Id. at 21-22.
\991\Trump Knew of Whistle-Blower Complaint When He Released Aid to
Ukraine, New York Times (Nov. 26, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/26/us/politics/trump-whistle-blower-complaint-ukraine.html).
\992\Id. The Administration repeatedly referenced privilege
concerns in connection with the whistleblower complaint. See, e.g.,
Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019) (noting that ``the
complaint involves confidential and potentially privileged
communications by persons outside the Intelligence Community'')
(emphasis added); Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 17, 2019)
(characterizing subpoena to the Acting DNI for documents as demanding
``sensitive and potentially privileged'' materials and whistleblower
complaint as involving ``potentially privileged matters relating to the
interests of other stakeholders within the Executive Branch'')
(emphasis added).
However, the White House never formally invoked executive privilege
as to the whistleblower complaint. See Maguire Hearing Tr. at 20
(``Chairman Schiff: So they never asserted executive privilege, is that
the answer? Acting Director Maguire: Mr. Chairman, if they did, we
would not have released the letters yesterday and all the information
that has been forthcoming.'').
\993\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of
National Intelligence (Sept. 10, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190910_-
_chm_schiff_letter_to_acting_dni_maguire.pdf).
\994\Id.
\995\See Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019).
\996\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of
National Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190913_-
_chm_schiff_letter_to_acting_dni_re_whistleblower_-_subpoena.pdf).
\997\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\998\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 305-06; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 242.
\999\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 242.
\1000\See, e.g., Id. at 244; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306; Williams Dep.
Tr. at 147.
\1001\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 68-69.
\1002\Williams Dep. Tr. at 147. Ms. Williams did testify that
President Trump's pressure on President Zelensky to open investigations
into the Bidens on the July 25 call ``shed some light on possible other
motivations behind a security assistance hold.'' Williams Dep. Tr. at
149.
\1003\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 42, 139-140. According to a press report,
after Congress began investigating President Trump's scheme, the White
House Counsel's Office reportedly opened an internal investigation
relating to the July 25 call. As part of that internal investigation,
White House lawyers gathered and reviewed ``hundreds of documents''
that ``reveal extensive efforts to generate an after-the-fact
justification'' for the hold on military assistance for Ukraine ordered
by President Trump. These documents reportedly include ``early August
email exchanges between acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and White
House budget officials seeking to provide an explanation for
withholding the funds after the president had already ordered a hold in
mid-July on the nearly $400 million in security assistance.'' White
House Review Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify
Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov.
24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-
review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-
decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-
bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html). The White House has withheld these
documents from the Committee, so the Committee cannot verify the
accuracy of the reporting as of the publication of this report.
\1004\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 49.
\1005\Id. at 42, 44.
\1006\Id. at 180.
\1007\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306.
\1008\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 83.
\1009\Id. at 47-48, 58, 112-114; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 34-35, 85-86,
95, 128, 129-131, 133; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 163; Kent Dep. Tr. at 308-
309; Reeker Dep. Tr. at 133. News reports indicate that a confidential
White House review of President Trump's hold on military assistance to
Ukraine has identified hundreds of documents revealing ``extensive
efforts to generate an after-the-fact justification for the decision
and a debate over whether the delay was legal.'' White House Review
Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify Trump's Decision to
Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-review-turns-up-emails-
showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-decision-to-block-ukraine-
military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-bd9d-
c628fd48b3a0_story.html). According to ``two people briefed on an
internal White House review,'' in August, Acting Chief of Staff
Mulvaney ``asked . . . whether there was a legal justification for
withholding hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to
Ukraine.'' Mulvaney Asked About Legal Justification for Withholding
Ukraine Aid, New York Times (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/24/us/politics/mulvaney-ukraine-aid.html). Reports indicate
that, ``[e]mails show [OMB Director] Vought and OMB staffers arguing
that withholding aid was legal, while officials at the National
Security Council and State Department protested. OMB lawyers said that
it was legal to withhold the aid, as long as they deemed it a
`temporary' hold.'' White House Review Turns Up Emails Showing
Extensive Effort to Justify Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military
Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/white-house-review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-
to-justify-trumps-decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/
2121cf98-0d57-11ea-bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html). The White House and
State Department's obstruction of Congress has prevented the Committee
from obtaining any documents on this matter and, therefore, the
Committee cannot verify the accuracy of this reporting as of the
publication of this report.
\1010\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 80.
\1011\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 146-147.
\1012\See Department of Defense, DOD Budget Materials (FY2011-
FY2018) (online at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/).
In 1974, President Nixon impounded 15-20 percent of a number of
specific programs, which prompted the passage of the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974. Congressional Research Service, The Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) Legislative History and Analysis (Feb.
26, 1975).
\1013\Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, Sec. 9013 (2018); Sandy Dep. Tr. at
147.
\1014\Continuing Appropriations Act 2020, and Health Extenders Act
of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-59, Sec. 124 (2019).
\1015\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 98.
\1016\$35 Million in Pentagon Aid Hasn't Reached Ukraine Despite
White House Assurances, L.A. Times (Nov. 19, 2019) (online at
www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-11-19/documents-show-nearly-40-
million-in-ukraine-aid-delayed-despite-white-house-assurances).
\1017\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
\1018\Id.
\1019\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 40.
\1020\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 106.
\1021\Id.
\1022\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 33.
\1023\Id.
\1024\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 41.
\1025\Id. at 217-18.
\1026\Id.
\1027\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 30.
\1028\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
\1029\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 33; see also Zelensky Planned to
Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's What Happened, Washington
Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-
what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-072a-11ea-8292-
c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
\1030\Kent. Dep. Tr. at 333.
\1031\Id. at 329-31.
\1032\Id. at 330.
\1033\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
\1034\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46-47.
\1035\Williams Dep. Tr. at 156.
\1036\Id.
\1037\Pence Says He's Working to Release Transcripts of His Calls
with Ukraine Leader, Politico (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at
www.politico.com/news/2019/10/09/pence-ukraine-zelensky-biden-043684).
\1038\Pence: I Don't Object To Releasing My Call Transcripts With
Zelensky, Fox Business (Nov. 7, 2019) (online at
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/11/07/
pence_i_dont_object_to_releasing_my_call_transcripts_with_zelensky.html)
\1039\Rudy Giuliani's Remarkable Ukraine Interview, Annotated,
Washington Post (Sept. 20, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2019/09/20/rudy-giulianis-remarkable-ukraine-interview-
annotated/).
\1040\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President
Duda of Poland Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 23, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-duda-poland-bilateral-meeting/).
\1041\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon Arriving at
the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-
arriving-u-n-general-assembly-new-york-ny/).
\1042\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President
Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept 25, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-zelensky-ukraine-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/).
\1043\The White House, Remarks by President Trump at the Swearing-
in Ceremony of Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia (Sept 30, 2019) (online
at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
swearing-ceremony-secretary-labor-eugene-scalia/).
\1044\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President
Niinisto of the Republic of Finland Before Bilateral Meeting (Oct. 2,
2019) (www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-niinisto-republic-finland-bilateral-meeting/).
\1045\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-67/).
\1046\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-68).
\1047\Id.
\1048\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-67/). These
recent statements by President inviting foreign assistance for his
personal political interests are consistent with his statements to
George Stephanopoulos of ABC News on June 12, when President Trump
indicated a desire to receive dirt on a political opponent provided by
a foreign country. ABC News' Oval Office interview with President
Trump, ABC News (June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/abc-news-oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/
story?id=63688943).
\1049\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 46-47, 91-92.
\1050\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 158-19; Holmes Dep. Tr. at 100; Kent-
Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43.
\1051\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 24.
\1052\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46.
\1053\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 165.
\1054\Id.
\1055\Id. at 24.
\1056\Id. at 55-56.
\1057\Id. at 164.
\1058\Kent Dep. Tr. at 329; Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 138-139.
\1059\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 139.
\1060\Id.
SECTION II.
THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES'
IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY
1. Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and
Impeachment
Article I of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the
``sole Power of Impeachment.'' Congress is authorized to
conduct oversight and investigations in support of its Article
I powers. The Supreme Court--and previous Presidents--have
acknowledged these authorities.
Overview
The House's Constitutional and legal authority to conduct
an impeachment inquiry is clear, as is the duty of the
President to cooperate with the House's exercise of this
authority. The Constitution vests in the House of
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment'' as well as
robust oversight powers. As the Founders intended, the courts
have agreed, and prior Presidents have acknowledged, the
House's sweeping powers to investigate are at their peak during
an impeachment inquiry of a President. Congress has also
enacted statutes to support its power to investigate and
oversee the Executive Branch.
Unlike President Donald J. Trump, past Presidents who were
the subject of impeachment inquiries acknowledged Congress'
authority to investigate and--to varying degrees--complied with
information requests and subpoenas. Even so, the House has
previously determined that partial noncooperation can serve as
a ground for an article of impeachment against a President as
it would upend the separation of powers to allow the President
to dictate the scope of an impeachment inquiry. When President
Richard Nixon withheld tape recordings and produced heavily
edited and inaccurate records, the House Judiciary Committee
approved an article of impeachment for obstruction.
Constitutional Power of Congress to Investigate_and to Impeach
Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives the House of
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment.''\1\ The
Framers intended the impeachment power to be an essential check
on a President who might engage in corruption or abuse power.
For example, during the Constitutional Convention, George Mason
stated:
No point is of more importance than that the right of
impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above
Justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can
commit the most extensive injustice? . . . Shall the
man who has practised corruption & by that means
procured his appointment in the first instance, be
suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his
guilt?\2\
Congress is empowered to conduct oversight and
investigations to carry out its authorities under Article I.\3\
In light of the core nature of the impeachment power to the
nation's Constitutional system of checks and balances,
Congress' investigative authority is at its zenith during an
impeachment inquiry.\4\
As the House Judiciary Committee explained during the
impeachment of President Nixon:
Whatever the limits of legislative power in other
contexts--and whatever need may otherwise exist for
preserving the confidentiality of Presidential
conversations--in the context of an impeachment
proceeding the balance was struck in favor of the power
of inquiry when the impeachment provision was written
into the Constitution.\5\
This conclusion echoed an early observation on the floor of
the House of Representatives that the ``House possessed the
power of impeachment solely, and that this authority certainly
implied the right to inspect every paper and transaction in any
department, otherwise the power of impeachment could never be
exercised with any effect.''\6\
The House's ``sole Power of Impeachment'' is the mechanism
provided by the Constitution to hold sitting Presidents
accountable for serious misconduct. The Department of Justice
has highlighted the importance of the impeachment power in
justifying the Department's view that a sitting President
cannot be indicted or face criminal prosecution while in
office.\7\ The Department's position that the President is
immune from prosecution has not been endorsed by Congress or
the courts, but as long as the Department continues to refuse
to prosecute a sitting President, Congress has a heightened
responsibility to exercise its impeachment power, if necessary,
to ensure that no President is ``above the law.''\8\
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad
oversight authority under the Constitution to inquire about a
wide array of topics, even outside the context of impeachment:
The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress
throughout our history, over the whole range of the
national interests concerning which Congress might
legislate or decide upon due investigation not to
legislate; it has similarly been utilized in
determining what to appropriate from the national
purse, or whether to appropriate. The scope of the
power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and
farreaching as the potential power to enact and
appropriate under the Constitution.\9\
The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress' authority
to investigate includes the authority to compel the production
of information by issuing subpoenas,\10\ a power the House has
delegated to its committees pursuant to its Constitutional
authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings.''\11\
The Supreme Court has affirmed that compliance with
Congressional subpoenas is mandatory:
It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to
cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain
the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It
is their unremitting obligation to respond to
subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and
its committees and to testify fully with respect to
matters within the province of proper
investigation.\12\
Federal courts have held that the ``legal duty'' to respond
to Congressional subpoenas extends to the President's ``senior-
level aides'' and that the failure to comply violates the
separation of powers principles in the Constitution.\13\ As one
court recently explained:
[W]hen a committee of Congress seeks testimony and
records by issuing a valid subpoena in the context of a
duly authorized investigation, it has the
Constitution's blessing, and ultimately, it is acting
not in its own interest, but for the benefit of the
People of the United States. If there is fraud or abuse
or waste or corruption in the federal government, it is
the constitutional duty of Congress to find the facts
and, as necessary, take corrective action. Conducting
investigations is the means that Congress uses to carry
out that constitutional obligation. Thus, blatant
defiance of Congress' centuries-old power to compel the
performance of witnesses is not an abstract injury, nor
is it a mere banal insult to our democracy. It is an
affront to the mechanism for curbing abuses of power
that the Framers carefully crafted for our protection,
and, thereby, recalcitrant witnesses actually undermine
the broader interests of the People of the United
States.\14\
Laws Passed by Congress
Congress has enacted statutes to support its power to
investigate and oversee the Executive Branch. These laws impose
criminal and other penalties on those who fail to comply with
inquiries from Congress or block others from doing so, and they
reflect the broader Constitutional requirement to cooperate
with Congressional investigations. For example:
Obstructing Congress: Obstructing a Congressional
investigation is a crime punishable by up to five years in
prison. An individual is guilty of obstruction if he or she
``corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening
letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede'' the ``due and
proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry
or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee
of either House.''\15\
Concealing Material Facts: Concealing information
from Congress is also punishable by up to five years in prison.
This prohibition applies to anyone who ``falsifies, conceals,
or covers up'' a ``material fact'' in connection with ``any
investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of
any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the
Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or
Senate.''\16\
Intimidating and Harassing Witnesses: Intimidating
witnesses in a Congressional investigation is a crime
punishable by up to twenty years in prison. This statute
applies to anyone who ``knowingly uses intimidation, threatens,
or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or
engages in misleading conduct toward another person,'' with the
intent to ``influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any
person in an official proceeding.''\17\ An individual who
``intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders,
delays, prevents, or dissuades'' a person from ``attending or
testifying in an official proceeding'' is also guilty of a
crime punishable by fines and up to three years in prison.\18\
Retaliating Against Employees Who Provide
Information to Congress: Employees who speak to Congress have
the right not to have adverse personnel actions taken against
them. Retaliatory actions taken against Executive Branch
employees who cooperate with Congress may constitute violations
of this law.\19\ Any Executive Branch official who ``prohibits
or prevents'' or ``attempts or threatens to prohibit or
prevent'' any officer or employee of the federal government
from speaking with Congress could have his or her salary
withheld.\20\
Precedent of Previous Impeachments and Other Investigations
Unlike President Trump, past Presidents who were the
subject of impeachment inquiries--including Presidents Andrew
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton--acknowledged
Congress' authority to investigate and, to varying degrees,
complied with information requests and subpoenas.
For example, President Johnson complied with the House's
requests for information. According to a report subsequently
adopted by the House Judiciary Committee, ``There is no
evidence that Johnson ever asserted any privilege to prevent
disclosure of presidential conversations to the Committee, or
failed to comply with any of the Committee's requests.''\21\
Similarly, President Clinton provided written responses to
81 interrogatories from the House Judiciary Committee during
the House's impeachment inquiry.\22\
Even President Nixon agreed to let his staff testify
voluntarily in the Senate Watergate investigation, stating:
``All members of the White House Staff will appear voluntarily
when requested by the committee. They will testify under oath,
and they will answer fully all proper questions.''\23\ As a
result, numerous senior White House officials testified,
including White House Counsel John Dean III, White House Chief
of Staff H.R. Haldeman, Deputy Assistant to the President
Alexander Butterfield, and Chief Advisor to the President for
Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman.\24\ President Nixon also
produced numerous documents and records in response to the
House's subpoenas as part of its impeachment inquiry, including
more than 30 transcripts of White House recordings and notes
from meetings with the President.\25\
However, President Nixon's production of documents was
incomplete. For example, he did not produce tape recordings,
and transcripts he produced were heavily edited or inaccurate.
President Nixon claimed that his noncompliance with House
subpoenas was necessary to protect the confidentiality of
Presidential conversations, but the House Judiciary Committee
rejected these arguments and approved an article of impeachment
for obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry.\26\
In a letter to President Nixon, Judiciary Committee
Chairman Peter Rodino explained that it would upend the
separation of powers to allow the President to dictate the
scope of an impeachment inquiry:
Under the Constitution it is not within the power of
the President to conduct an inquiry into his own
impeachment, to determine which evidence, and what
version or portion of that evidence, is relevant and
necessary to such an inquiry. These are matters which,
under the Constitution, the House has the sole power to
determine.\27\
Consistent with that long-settled understanding, other
Presidents have recognized that they must comply with
information requests issued in a House impeachment inquiry. In
1846, for example, President James Polk stated in a message to
the House:
It may be alleged that the power of impeachment
belongs to the House of Representatives, and that with
a view to the exercise of this power, that House has
the right to investigate the conduct of all public
officers under the government. This is cheerfully
admitted. In such a case, the safety of the Republic
would be the supreme law; and the power of the House in
the pursuit of this object would penetrate into the
most secret recesses of the executive departments. It
could command the attendance of any and every agent of
the government, and compel them to produce all papers,
public or private, official or unofficial, and to
testify on oath to all facts within their
knowledge.\28\
Past Presidents have also produced documents and permitted
senior officials to testify in connection with other
Congressional investigations, including inquiries into
Presidential actions.
For example, in the Iran-Contra inquiry, President Ronald
Reagan's former National Security Advisor, Oliver North, and
the former Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, John Poindexter, testified before Congress.\29\
President Reagan also produced ``relevant excerpts of his
personal diaries to Congress.''\30\
During the Clinton Administration, Congress obtained
testimony from top advisors to President Clinton, including
Chief of Staff Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles,
White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum, and White House Counsel
Jack Quinn.\31\
Similarly, in the Benghazi investigation, led by Chairman
Trey Gowdy, President Barack Obama made many of his top aides
available for transcribed interviews, including National
Security Advisor Susan Rice and Deputy National Security
Advisor for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes.\32\ The
Obama Administration also produced more than 75,000 pages of
documents in that investigation, including 1,450 pages of White
House emails containing communications of senior officials on
the National Security Council.\33\
2. The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply
President Trump categorically directed the White House, federal
departments and agencies, and federal officials not to
cooperate with the House's inquiry and not to comply with duly
authorized subpoenas for documents or testimony.
Overview
Donald Trump is the first and only President in American
history to openly and indiscriminately defy all aspects of the
Constitutional impeachment process, ordering all federal
agencies and officials categorically not to comply with
voluntary requests or compulsory demands for documents or
testimony.
On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the Constitution
and that there ``should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally,
through the courts.'' A common theme of his defiance has been
his claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been
following the same investigative rules that Republicans
championed when they were in control.
On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone--acting on
behalf of President Trump--sent a letter to House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi and the three investigating Committees confirming that
President Trump directed his entire Administration not to
cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Cipollone
wrote: ``President Trump cannot permit his Administration to
participate in this partisan inquiry under these
circumstances.''
Mr. Cipollone's letter elicited immediate criticism from
legal experts across the political spectrum. He advanced
remarkably politicized arguments and legal theories unsupported
by the Constitution, judicial precedent, and more than 200
years of history. If allowed to stand, the President's
defiance, as justified by Mr. Cipollone, would represent an
existential threat to the nation's Constitutional system of
checks and balances, separation of powers, and rule of law.
The House's Impeachment Inquiry of President Trump
In January, the House of Representatives voted to adopt its
rules for the 116th Congress. These rules authorized House
Committees to conduct investigations, hold hearings, issue
subpoenas for documents and testimony, and depose
witnesses.\34\ Significantly, these authorities are similar to
those adopted when Republicans controlled the House during
previous Congresses.\35\
In April, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, who was
appointed by then-Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein to
investigate Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election and potential obstruction of justice by President
Trump, issued a two-volume report.\36\ In connection with that
report, the Committee on the Judiciary began an inquiry into
``whether to approve articles of impeachment with respect to
the President.''\37\ The Judiciary Committee detailed its
authority and intent to conduct this investigation in a series
of reports, memoranda, and legal filings.\38\
On August 22, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, the Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary, sent a letter requesting that the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Oversight and Reform, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
Committee on Financial Services provide ``information,
including documents and testimony, depositions, and/or
interview transcripts'' relevant to the ``ongoing impeachment
investigation relating to President Trump.''\39\
In September, the Intelligence Committee, the Oversight
Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee sent letters
requesting documents and interviews from the White House and
the Department of State regarding the actions of President
Trump, the President's personal agent, Rudy Giuliani, and
others to pressure Ukraine to launch investigations into former
Vice President Joe Biden and a debunked conspiracy theory
alleging Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election.\40\
On September 22, President Trump admitted to discussing
former Vice President Biden and his son with the President of
Ukraine during a telephone call on July 25.\41\
On September 24, Speaker Pelosi stated publicly that the
House Committees were ``moving forward'' to ``proceed with
their investigations under that umbrella of impeachment
inquiry.'' She explained that, for the past several months, the
House had been ``investigating in our Committees and litigating
in the courts, so the House can gather `all the relevant facts
and consider whether to exercise its full Article I powers,
including a constitutional power of the utmost gravity--
approval of articles of impeachment.'''\42\
On September 25, the White House made public a Memorandum
of Telephone Conversation of President Trump's call with
President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 25. As discussed in detail
in Section I, this call record documented how President Trump
directly and explicitly asked President Zelensky to launch
investigations of former Vice President Biden and the 2016
election.\43\
Following the Speaker's announcement and the release of the
call record, the Intelligence Committee, the Oversight
Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee continued their
investigation, requesting documents and information, issuing
subpoenas, and conducting interviews and depositions. The
Committees made clear that this information would be
``collected as part of the House's impeachment inquiry and
shared among the Committees, as well as with the Committee on
the Judiciary as appropriate.''\44\
On October 31, the House voted to approve House Resolution
660, directing the Committees ``to continue their ongoing
investigations as part of the existing House of Representatives
inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of
Representatives to exercise its Constitutional power to impeach
Donald John Trump, President of the United States of America.''
The resolution set forth the process for holding public
hearings, releasing deposition transcripts, presenting a report
to the Judiciary Committee, holding proceedings within the
Judiciary Committee, and submitting to the House of
Representatives ``such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or
other recommendations as it deems proper.''\45\
President Trump's Unprecedented Order Not to Comply
President Trump's categorical and indiscriminate order and
efforts to block witness testimony and conceal documentary
evidence from the Committees investigating his conduct as part
of the House's impeachment inquiry stand in contrast to his
predecessors and challenge the basic tenets of the
Constitutional system of checks and balances.
Even before the House of Representatives launched its
investigation regarding Ukraine, President Trump made numerous
statements rejecting the fundamental authority of Congress to
investigate his actions as well as those of his Administration.
For example, on April 24, he stated, in response to
Congressional investigations: ``We're fighting all the
subpoenas.''\46\ Similarly, during a speech on July 23, he
stated: ``I have an Article II, where I have to the right to do
whatever I want as president.''\47\
When the three investigating Committees began reviewing the
President's actions as part of the House's impeachment inquiry,
President Trump repeatedly challenged the investigation's
legitimacy in word and deed. President Trump's rhetorical
attacks appeared intended not just to dispute public reports of
his misconduct, but to persuade the public that the House lacks
authority to investigate the President and the inquiry is
therefore invalid and fraudulent. For example, the President
described the impeachment inquiry as:
``a COUP''\48\
``illegal, invalid, and unconstitutional''\49\
``an unconstitutional power grab''\50\
``Ukraine Witch Hunt''\51\
``a continuation of the Greatest and most
Destructive Witch Hunt of all time''\52\
``a total Witch Hunt Scam by the Democrats''\53\
``bad for the country''\54\
``all a hoax''\55\
``the single greatest witch hunt in American
history''\56\
``Democrat Scam''\57\
``just another Democrat Hoax''\58\
``a fraud against the American people''\59\
``A Witch Hunt Scam''\60\
``a con being perpetrated on the United States
public and even the world''\61\
``ridiculous''\62\
``a continuation of the greatest Scam and Witch
Hunt in the history of our Country''\63\
``Ukraine Hoax''\64\
``No Due Process Scam''\65\
``the phony Impeachment Scam''\66\
``the phony Impeachment Hoax''\67\
On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the
Constitution: ``What these guys are doing--Democrats--are doing
to this country is a disgrace and it shouldn't be allowed.
There should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally, through
the courts.''\68\
A common theme of President Trump's defiance has been his
claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been
following the same investigative rules that Republicans
championed when they were in control and conducted aggressive
oversight of previous Administrations.\69\
White House Counsel's Letters Implementing the President's Order
On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone sent a
letter to Speaker Pelosi and the three Committees explaining
that President Trump had directed his entire Administration not
to cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry. He wrote:
Consistent with the duties of the President of the
United States, and in particular his obligation to
preserve the rights of future occupants of his office,
President Trump cannot permit his Administration to
participate in this partisan inquiry under these
circumstances.\70\
On October 10, President Trump confirmed that Mr. Cipollone
was indeed conveying his orders, stating:
As our brilliant White House Counsel wrote to the
Democrats yesterday, he said their highly partisan and
unconstitutional effort threatens grave and lasting
damage to our democratic institutions, to our system of
free elections, and to the American people. That's what
it is. To the American people. It's so terrible.
Democrats are on a crusade to destroy our democracy.
That's what's happening. We will never let it happen.
We will defeat them.\71\
Mr. Cipollone's letter elicited immediate criticism from
legal experts from across the political spectrum.\72\
Mr. Cipollone wrote a second letter to the Committees on
October 18, declaring that the White House would refuse to
comply with the subpoena issued to it for documents.\73\
On November 1--after the House had already issued several
subpoenas to the White House and other Executive Branch
officials for testimony--the Trump Administration issued a new
``Letter Opinion'' from Assistant Attorney General Steven A.
Engel to Mr. Cipollone. The Office of Legal Counsel opinion
sought to extend the reach of the President's earlier direction
to defy Congressional subpoenas and to justify noncompliance by
officials who could not plausibly be considered among the
President's closest advisors.
Mr. Engel's opinion asserted that the House's impeachment
inquiry seeks information that is ``potentially protected by
executive privilege'' and claimed the Committees' deposition
subpoenas are ``invalid'' and ``not subject to civil or
criminal enforcement'' because the House's long-standing
deposition rules do not allow the participation of attorneys
from the White House or other government agencies.\74\ These
claims are without basis and unsupported by precedent.
The Letter Opinion cited statements from previous
Presidents and Attorneys General that directly undercut the
Administration's position. For example, President James K.
Polk, stated that in an impeachment inquiry the House had power
to ``penetrate into the most secret recesses of the Executive
Departments.''\75\ In addition, Attorney General Robert H.
Jackson, who later served on the Supreme Court, stated that
``pertinent information would be supplied in impeachment
proceedings, usually instituted at the suggestion of the
Department and for the good of the administration of
justice.''\76\
In his letters conveying the President's direction, Mr.
Cipollone advanced remarkably politicized arguments and legal
theories unsupported by the Constitution, judicial precedent,
and more than 200 years of history. These letters effectuated
the President's order and campaign to obstruct and thwart the
House's exercise of its sole power of impeachment under the
Constitution. They are rebutted as follows:
The Impeachment Inquiry is Constitutional:
According to Mr. Cipollone, ``the President did nothing
wrong,'' and ``there is no basis for an impeachment
inquiry.''\77\ President Trump has repeatedly described his
call with President Zelensky as ``perfect.''\78\ Speaking for
President Trump, Mr. Cipollone also asserted that the
impeachment inquiry is ``partisan and unconstitutional,'' ``a
naked political strategy that began the day he was inaugurated,
and perhaps even before,'' and that it ``plainly seeks to
reverse the election of 2016 and to influence the election of
2020.''\79\
However, as this report details in Section I, Congress
found abundant evidence of a scheme directed by the President
to solicit foreign election interference by pressing the newly-
elected President of Ukraine to announce publicly politically-
motivated investigations to benefit President Trump's own
reelection campaign. Fundamentally, the Constitutional validity
of an impeachment inquiry cannot depend on a President's view
that he did nothing wrong or on the political composition of
the House. Such an extreme reimagining of the Constitution
would render the Article I impeachment power meaningless and
provide the President with power the Constitution does not
grant him to thwart, manipulate, and stonewall an impeachment
inquiry conducted by the House, including by concealing
information of his own misconduct.\80\ Taken to its logical
conclusion, the President's position would eliminate the
impeachment power in every year during which a political party
other than the President's is in power. Under this approach,
the impeachments of President Clinton, President Nixon, and
President Andrew Johnson would not have been permitted.\81\
The purpose of an impeachment inquiry is for the House to
collect evidence to determine for itself whether the President
may have committed an impeachable offense warranting articles
of impeachment. Because the Constitution vests the House alone
with ``the sole Power of Impeachment,'' it is not for the
President to decide whether the House is exercising that power
properly or prudently. The President is not free to arrogate
the House's power to himself--or to order across-the-board
defiance of House subpoenas--based solely on his unilateral
characterization of legislative motives or because he opposes
the House's decision to investigate his actions.
The Impeachment Inquiry is Properly Authorized:
According to Mr. Cipollone, the ``House has not expressly
adopted any resolution authorizing an impeachment
investigation'' nor has it ``delegated such authority to any of
your Committees by rule.''\82\ However, nothing in either the
Constitution or the House Rules requires the full House to vote
to authorize an impeachment inquiry.\83\ The impeachment
inquiries into Presidents Andrew Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton
all began prior to the House's consideration and approval of a
resolution authorizing the investigations.\84\ The same is true
of many judicial impeachments;\85\ indeed, numerous judges have
been impeached without any prior vote of the full House
authorizing a formal inquiry.\86\ Even though Mr. Cipollone's
argument is inherently invalid, the House has taken two floor
votes that render it obsolete the first on January 9 to adopt
rules authorizing committees to conduct investigations, and the
second on October 31 to set forth procedures for open hearings
in the Intelligence Committee and for additional proceedings in
the Judiciary Committee.\87\ Even following passage of House
Resolution 660, whereby the House confirmed the preexisting and
ongoing impeachment inquiry, the President and the White House
Counsel, acting on the President's behalf, have persisted in
their obstructive conduct.
President Has No Valid Due Process Claims:
According to Mr. Cipollone, ``the Committees have not
established any procedures affording the President even the
most basic protections demanded by due process under the
Constitution and by fundamental fairness,'' and the Committees
``have denied the President the right to cross-examine
witnesses, to call witnesses, to receive transcripts of
testimony, to have access to evidence,'' and ``to have counsel
present.''\88\ Yet, there is no requirement that the House
provide these procedures during an impeachment inquiry. The
Constitution vests the House with ``the sole Power of
Impeachment,'' and provides no constraints on how the House
chooses to conduct its impeachment process.\89\ Nevertheless,
Mr. Cipollone's complaints are unfounded as the House has
implemented procedural protections for the President in its
exercise of its Constitutional power. House Resolution 660
authorizes procedures to ``allow for the participation of the
President and his counsel.''\90\ The Committee Report
accompanying House Resolution 660 explains that these
protections for the President are part of the Judiciary
Committee hearing process and are ``based on those provided
during the Nixon and Clinton inquiries.'' These procedures
include ``that the president and his counsel are invited to
attend all hearings; the ability for the president's counsel to
cross-examine witnesses and object to the admissibility of
testimony; and the ability of the president's counsel to make
presentations of evidence before the Judiciary Committee,
including the ability to call witnesses.''\91\
Fact-Finding Was Appropriately Transparent:
According to Mr. Cipollone, the Committees conducted their
proceedings ``in secret.''\92\ This argument fundamentally
misconstrues and misapprehends the fact-gathering process
required at this initial stage of the House's impeachment
inquiry. Unlike in the cases of Presidents Nixon and Clinton,
the House conducted a significant portion of the factual
investigation itself because no independent prosecutor was
appointed to investigate President Trump's conduct regarding
Ukraine. Attorney General William P. Barr refused to authorize
a criminal investigation into the serious allegations of
misconduct, and even this decision was limited to possible
violations of federal campaign finance laws.\93\ The
investigative Committees proceeded consistent with the House's
rules of procedure and in keeping with investigative best
practices, including the need to reduce the risk that witnesses
may try to coordinate or align testimony. As the House
explained in its report accompanying House Resolution 660:
The initial stages of an impeachment inquiry in the
House are akin to those preceding a prosecutorial
charging decision. Under this process, the House is
responsible for collecting the evidence and, rather
than weighing the question of returning an indictment,
the Members of the House have the obligation to decide
whether to approve articles of impeachment.\94\
The Committees have released transcripts of all interviews
and depositions conducted during the investigation. As these
transcripts make clear, all Members of all three Committees--
including 47 Republican Members of Congress--had the
opportunity to ask questions, and these transcripts are now
available to the President and his counsel. These same
procedures were supported by Acting White House Chief of Staff
Mick Mulvaney when he served as a Member of the Oversight
Committee and by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo when he served
as a Member of the Benghazi Select Committee. In fact, some of
the same Members and staff currently conducting depositions as
part of the present impeachment inquiry participated directly
in depositions during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama
Administrations.\95\ The Intelligence Committee also held
public hearings with 12 of these witnesses.
Agency Attorneys Can Be (And Should Be) Excluded
from Depositions: According to Mr. Cipollone, ``it is
unconstitutional to exclude agency counsel from participating
in congressional depositions.''\96\ Mr. Cipollone cites no case
law to support his position because there is none. Instead, he
relies on a single opinion from the Trump Administration's
Office of Legal Counsel and ignores the ample legal authority
and historical precedent that clearly support the Committees'
actions. For example, the Constitution expressly delegates to
Congress the authority to ``determine the Rules of its
Proceedings,''\97\ which includes the power to determine the
procedures used for gathering information from witnesses
whether via interview, staff deposition, or in a public
hearing.\98\ The basis for the rule excluding agency counsel is
straightforward: it prevents agency officials who are directly
implicated in the abuses Congress is investigating from trying
to prevent their own employees from coming forward to tell the
truth to Congress. The rule protects the rights of witnesses by
allowing them to be accompanied in depositions by personal
counsel. Agency attorneys have been excluded from Congressional
depositions of Executive Branch officials for decades, under
both Republicans and Democrats, including Chairmen Dan Burton,
Henry Waxman, Darrell Issa, Jason Chaffetz, Trey Gowdy, Kevin
Brady, and Jeb Hensarling, among others.\99\
Congress Can Exercise Its Broad Oversight
Authority: According to Mr. Cipollone, ``you simply cannot
expect to rely on oversight authority to gather information for
an unauthorized impeachment inquiry that conflicts with all
historical precedent and rides roughshod over due process and
the separation of powers.''\100\ But, of course, the present
impeachment inquiry does neither. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has made clear that Congress' ``power of inquiry'' is ``as
penetrating and farreaching as the potential power to enact and
appropriate under the Constitution.''\101\ The subject matter
of the impeachment inquiry implicates the House's impeachment-
specific as well as legislative and oversight authorities and
interests. The activity under investigation, for instance,
relates to a broad array of issues in which Congress has
legislated and may legislate in the future, including
government ethics and transparency, election integrity,
appropriations, foreign affairs, abuse of power, bribery,
extortion, and obstruction of justice. In fact, Members of
Congress have already introduced legislation on issues related
to the impeachment inquiry.\102\ The House does not forfeit its
Constitutional authority to investigate and legislate when it
initiates an impeachment inquiry.\103\ Congress passed sweeping
legislative reforms following the scandal over the Watergate
break-in and President Nixon's resignation.\104\
``Confidentiality Interests'' Do Not Eliminate
Congress' Authority: According to Mr. Cipollone, the
Administration would also not comply with the Committees'
demands for documents and testimony because of unspecified
Executive Branch ``confidentiality interests.''\105\ There is
no basis in the law of executive privilege for declaring a
categorical refusal to respond to any House subpoena. In an
impeachment inquiry, the House's need for information and its
Constitutional authority are at their greatest, and the
Executive's interest in confidentiality must yield. Only the
President can assert executive privilege, yet he has not done
so in the House's impeachment inquiry. Prior to asserting
executive privilege, the Executive Branch is obligated to seek
to accommodate the legitimate informational needs of Congress,
which, as discussed below, it has not done.\106\ In any event,
much of the information sought by the Committees would not be
covered by executive privilege under any theory,\107\ and the
privilege--where validly asserted on a particularized basis and
not outweighed by the legitimate needs of the impeachment
inquiry--would protect any legitimate Executive Branch interest
in confidentiality.\108\
President's Top Aides Are Not ``Absolutely
Immune'': According to Mr. Cipollone, the President's top aides
are ``absolutely immune'' from being compelled to testify
before Congress.\109\ This extreme position has been explicitly
and repeatedly rejected by Congress--which has received
testimony from senior aides to many previous Presidents--and by
federal courts. In 2008, a federal court rejected an assertion
by President George W. Bush that White House Counsel Harriet
Miers was immune from being compelled to testify, noting that
the President had failed to identify even a single judicial
opinion to justify his claim.\110\ On November 25, 2019,
another federal judge rejected President Trump's claim of
absolute immunity for former White House Counsel Don McGahn,
concluding: ``Stated simply, the primary takeaway from the past
250 years of recorded American history is that Presidents are
not kings,'' and that ``Executive branch officials are not
absolutely immune from compulsory congressional process--no
matter how many times the Executive branch has asserted as much
over the years--even if the President expressly directs such
officials'' non-compliance.''\111\ Mr. Cipollone's position,
adopted by President Trump, has thus been repudiated by
Congress and the courts, and is not salvaged by Executive
Branch legal opinions insisting upon a wholly fictional ground
for non-compliance. In ordering categorical defiance of House
subpoenas, President Trump has confirmed the unlimited breadth
of his position and his unprecedented view that no branch of
government--even the House--is empowered to investigate whether
he may have committed constitutional offenses.
In addition to advancing specious legal arguments,
President Trump has made no effort to accommodate the House's
interests in conducting the impeachment inquiry. For example,
the Committees first requested documents from the White House
on September 9, but the White House disregarded the
request.\112\ The Committees made a second request on September
24, but the White House again ignored the request.\113\
Finally, on October 4, the Committees transmitted a subpoena
for the documents.\114\ However, on October 18, the White House
Counsel sent a letter stating that ``the White House cannot
comply with the October 4 subpoena.''\115\
Since then, there has been no evidence of a willingness by
the President to produce any of the documents covered by the
subpoena to the White House. The State Department made passing
references to potentially engaging in an ``accommodations''
process in response to its September 27 subpoena.\116\ However,
there has been no effort to do so, and departments and agencies
have not produced any documents in response to subpoenas issued
as part of the House impeachment inquiry. The President also
made no apparent effort to accommodate the House's need for
witness testimony and instead continued to flatly refuse to
allow Executive Branch officials to testify.
3. The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed Documents
Pursuant to the President's orders, the White House, federal
departments and agencies, and key witnesses refused to produce
any documents in response to duly authorized subpoenas issued
pursuant to the House's impeachment inquiry.
Overview
Following President Trump's categorical order, not a single
document has been produced by the White House, the Office of
the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the
Department of Energy in response to 71 specific, individualized
requests or demands for records in their possession, custody,
or control. The subpoenas to federal departments and agencies
remain in full force and effect. These agencies and offices
also blocked many current and former officials from producing
records directly to the Committees.
Certain witnesses defied the President's sweeping,
categorical, and baseless order and identified the substance of
key documents. Other witnesses identified numerous additional
documents that the President and various agencies are
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment
inquiry.
The President's personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani, although a
private citizen, also sought to rely on the President's order,
as communicated in Mr. Cipollone's letter on October 8, to
justify his decision to disobey a lawful subpoena for
documents.
The White House
On September 9, the Committees sent a letter to White House
Counsel Pat Cipollone seeking six categories of documents in
response to reports indicating that, ``for nearly two years,
the President and his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, appear
to have acted outside legitimate law enforcement and diplomatic
channels to coerce the Ukrainian government into pursuing two
politically-motivated investigations under the guise of anti-
corruption activity.''\117\ The Committees asked the White
House to voluntarily produce responsive documents by September
16.\118\ The White House did not provide any response by that
date.
On September 24, the Committees sent a follow-up letter
requesting that the White House produce the documents by
September 26.\119\ Again, the White House did not provide any
documents or respond by that date.
Having received no response from the White House, then-
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings sent a memorandum to Members of the
Committee on Oversight and Reform, which has jurisdiction over
the Executive Office of the President, explaining that he was
preparing to issue a subpoena in light of the White House's
non-compliance and non-responsiveness. He wrote:
Over the past several weeks, the Committees tried
several times to obtain voluntary compliance with our
requests for documents, but the White House has refused
to engage with--or even respond to--the
Committees.\120\
On October 4, the Committees sent a letter to Acting White
House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney transmitting a subpoena
issued by Chairman Cummings compelling the White House to
produce documents by October 18.\121\
As discussed above, on October 8, the White House Counsel
sent a letter to Speaker Pelosi and the Committees stating that
``President Trump cannot permit his Administration to
participate in this partisan inquiry under these
circumstances.''\122\ The White House Counsel also sent a
letter on October 18, confirming that ``the White House cannot
comply with the October 4 subpoena to Acting Chief of Staff
Mulvaney.''\123\
To date, the White House has not produced a single document
in response to the subpoena.\124\ Instead, the White House has
released to the public only two documents--call records from
the President's phone calls with President Zelensky on April 21
and July 25.\125\
Witnesses who testified before the Committees have
identified multiple additional documents that the President is
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment
inquiry, including but not limited to:
briefing materials for President Trump's call with
President Zelensky on July 25 prepared by Lt. Col. Alexander S.
Vindman, Director for Ukraine at the National Security
Council;\126\
notes relating to the July 25 call taken by Lt.
Col. Vindman and Tim Morrison, the former Senior Director for
Europe and Russia on the National Security Council;\127\
an August 15 ``Presidential decision memo''
prepared by Lt. Col. Vindman and approved by Mr. Morrison
conveying ``the consensus views from the entire deputies small
group'' that ``the security assistance be released'';\128\
National Security Council staff summaries of
conclusions from meetings at the principal, deputy, or sub-
deputy level relating to Ukraine, including military
assistance;\129\
call records between President Trump and
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, United States Ambassador to the
European Union;\130\
National Security Council Legal Advisor John
Eisenberg's notes and correspondence relating to discussions
with Lt. Col. Vindman regarding the July 10 meetings in which
Ambassador Sondland requested investigations in exchange for a
White House meeting;\131\
the memorandum of conversation from President
Trump's meeting in New York with President Zelensky on
September 25;\132\ and
as explained below, emails and other messages
between Ambassador Sondland and senior White House officials,
including Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, Senior Advisor
to the Chief of Staff Rob Blair, and then-National Security
Advisor John Bolton, among other high-level Trump
Administration officials.\133\
The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that
the White House is in possession of and continues to withhold
significantly more documents and records responsive to the
subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment inquiry.
The Committees have closely tracked public reports that the
White House is in possession of other correspondence and
records of direct relevance to the impeachment inquiry. On
November 24, for instance, a news report revealed that the
White House had conducted a confidential, internal records
review of the hold on military assistance in response to the
Committees' inquiry. The review reportedly ``turned up hundreds
of documents that reveal extensive efforts to generate an
after-the-fact justification for the decision and a debate over
whether the delay was legal.''\134\
Office of the Vice President
On October 4, the Committees sent a letter to Vice
President Mike Pence seeking 13 categories of documents in
response to reports that he and his staff were directly
involved in the matters under investigation. The Committees
wrote:
Recently, public reports have raised questions about
any role you may have played in conveying or
reinforcing the President's stark message to the
Ukrainian President. The reports include specific
references to a member of your staff who may have
participated directly in the July 25, 2019, call,
documents you may have obtained or reviewed, including
the record of the call, and your September 1, 2019,
meeting with the Ukrainian President in Warsaw, during
which you reportedly discussed the Administration's
hold on U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\135\
The Committees asked the Vice President to produce
responsive documents by October 15.\136\ On that date, Matthew
E. Morgan, Counsel to the Vice President, responded to the
Committees by refusing to cooperate and reciting many of the
same baseless arguments as the White House Counsel. He wrote:
[T]he purported ``impeachment inquiry'' has been
designed and implemented in a manner that calls into
question your commitment to fundamental fairness and
due process rights. Never before in history has the
Speaker of the House attempted to launch an
``impeachment inquiry'' against a President without a
majority of the House of Representatives voting to
authorize a constitutionally acceptable process.\137\
To date, the Vice President has not produced a single
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any
intent to do so going forward.
Witnesses who testified before the Committees have
identified multiple additional documents that the Vice
President is withholding that are directly relevant to the
impeachment inquiry, including but not limited to:
notes taken by Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor
to the Vice President for Europe and Russia, during the call
between President Trump and President Zelensky on July 25;\138\
notes taken by Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, National
Security Advisor to the Vice President, during the call between
President Trump and President Zelensky on July 25;\139\
materials regarding the July 25 call that were
placed in the Vice President's briefing book that same
day;\140\
the memorandum of conversation from Vice President
Pence's call with President Zelensky on September 18;\141\ and
briefing materials prepared for Vice President
Pence's meeting with President Zelensky September 1 in Warsaw,
Poland.\142\
The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that
the Office of the Vice President is in possession of and
continues to withhold significantly more documents and records
responsive to their request and of direct relevance to the
impeachment inquiry.
Office of Management and Budget
On October 7, the Committees sent a letter to Russell
Vought, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), conveying a subpoena issued by the Intelligence
Committee for nine categories of documents in response to
public reports that the President directed OMB to freeze
hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance
appropriated by Congress to help Ukraine counter Russian
aggression. The Committees wrote:
According to multiple press reports, at some point in
July 2019, President Trump ordered Acting Chief of
Staff and Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Director Mick Mulvaney to freeze the military aid to
Ukraine, and Mr. Mulvaney reportedly conveyed the
President's order ``through the budget office to the
Pentagon and the State Department, which were told only
that the administration was looking at whether the
spending was necessary.''\143\
The subpoena compelled Acting Director Vought to produce
responsive documents by October 15.\144\ On that day, OMB
Associate Director for Legislative Affairs Jason Yaworske
responded by refusing to produce any documents and reciting
many of the same baseless arguments as the White House Counsel:
[T]he President has advised that ``[g]iven that your
inquiry lacks any legitimate constitutional foundation,
any pretense of fairness, or even the most elementary
due process protections, the Executive Branch cannot be
expected to participate in it.'' . . . President Trump
cannot permit his Administration to participate in this
partisan inquiry under these circumstances.\145\
To date, Acting Director Vought has not produced a single
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any
intent to do so going forward.
Witnesses who testified before the Committees have
identified multiple additional documents that Acting Director
Vought is withholding that are directly relevant to the
impeachment inquiry, including but not limited to:
a June 19 email from OMB Associate Director of
National Security Programs Michael Duffey to Department of
Defense (DOD) Deputy Comptroller Elaine McCusker regarding the
fact that ``the President had seen a media report and he had
questions about the assistance'' and expressing ``interest in
getting more information from the Department of Defense,''
specifically a ``description of the program'';\146\
a July 12 email from White House Assistant to the
President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff Robert Blair
to Associate Director Duffey explaining that the ``President is
directing a hold on military support for Ukraine'' and not
mentioning any other country or security assistance
package;\147\ and
an August 7 memorandum drafted in preparation for
Acting Director Vought's attendance at a Principals Committee
meeting on Ukrainian security assistance, which included a
recommendation to lift the military assistance hold.\148\
The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that
the Office of Management and Budget is in possession of and
continues to withhold significantly more documents and records
responsive to the subpoena and of direct relevance to the
impeachment inquiry.
Department of State
On September 9, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo requesting six categories of documents in
response to reports that ``President Trump and his personal
attorney appear to have increased pressure on the Ukrainian
government and its justice system in service of President
Trump's reelection campaign'' and ``the State Department may be
abetting this scheme.''\149\ The Committees requested that
Secretary Pompeo produce responsive documents by September 16.
The Secretary did not provide any documents or response by that
date.
On September 23, the Committees sent a follow-up letter
asking Secretary Pompeo to ``inform the Committees by close of
business on Thursday, September 26, 2019, whether you intend to
fully comply with these requests or whether subpoenas will be
necessary.''\150\ The Secretary did not provide any documents
or respond by that date.
On September 27, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary
Pompeo conveying a subpoena for documents issued by Rep. Eliot
Engel, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
compelling the production of documents by October 4.\151\
Since Secretary Pompeo had failed to respond, the
Committees also sent separate letters to six individual State
Department employees seeking documents in their possession and
requesting that they participate in depositions with the
Committees.\152\
On October 1, Secretary Pompeo responded to the Committees
for the first time. He objected to the Committees seeking
documents directly from State Department employees after he
failed to produce them, claiming inaccurately that such a
request was ``an act of intimidation and an invitation to
violate federal records laws.''\153\ He also claimed that the
Committees' inquiry was ``an attempt to intimidate, bully, and
treat improperly the distinguished professionals of the
Department of State.''\154\
To the contrary, Deputy Assistant Secretary George Kent,
one of the State Department professionals from whom the
Committees sought documents and testimony, testified that he
``had not felt bullied, threatened, and intimidated.''\155\
Rather, Mr. Kent said that the language in Secretary Pompeo's
letter, which had been drafted by a State Department attorney
without consulting Mr. Kent, ``was inaccurate.''\156\ Mr. Kent
explained that, when he raised this concern, the State
Department attorney ``spent the next 5 minutes glaring at me''
and then ``got very angry.'' According to Mr. Kent, the
official ``started pointing at me with a clenched jaw and
saying, What you did in there, if Congress knew what you were
doing, they could say that you were trying to sort of control,
or change the process of collecting documents.''\157\
With respect to his own compliance with the subpoena for
documents, Secretary Pompeo wrote that he ``intends to respond
to that subpoena by the noticed return date of October 4,
2019.''\158\
Later on October 1, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy
Secretary of State John J. Sullivan in light of new evidence
that Secretary Pompeo participated on President Trump's call
with President Zelensky on July 25. The Committees wrote:
We are writing to you because Secretary Pompeo now
appears to have an obvious conflict of interest. He
reportedly participated personally in the July 25, 2019
call, in which President Donald Trump pressed President
Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine to investigate the son of
former Vice President Joseph Biden immediately after
the Ukrainian President raised his desire for United
States military assistance to counter Russian
aggression.
If true, Secretary Pompeo is now a fact witness in
the impeachment inquiry. He should not be making any
decisions regarding witness testimony or document
production in order to protect himself or the
President. Any effort by the Secretary or the
Department to intimidate or prevent witnesses from
testifying or withhold documents from the Committees
shall constitute evidence of obstruction of the
impeachment inquiry.\159\
The following day, at a press conference in Italy,
Secretary Pompeo publicly acknowledged that he had been on the
July 25 call between Presidents Trump and Zelensky.\160\
On October 7, Committee staff met with State Department
officials who acknowledged that they had taken no steps to
collect documents in response to the September 9 letter, but
instead had waited for the September 27 subpoena before
beginning to search for responsive records. During that
conversation, the Committees made a good-faith attempt to
engage the Department in the constitutionally-mandated
accommodations process. The Committees requested, on a priority
basis, ``any and all documents that it received directly from
Ambassador Sondland,'' as well as ``documents--especially those
documents identified by the witnesses as responsive--related to
Ambassador Yovanovitch and DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary]
Kent.'' The depositions of these witnesses--Ambassador
Sondland, Ambassador Yovanovitch, and Mr. Kent--were scheduled
for the days shortly after that October 7 meeting. The
Department's representatives stated that they would take the
request back to senior State Department officials, but never
provided any further response.\161\
To date, Secretary Pompeo has not produced a single
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any
intent to do so going forward. In addition, the Department has
ordered its employees not to produce documents in their
personal possession. For example, on October 14, the Department
sent a letter to Mr. Kent's personal attorney warning that
``your client is not authorized to disclose to Congress any
records relating to official duties.''\162\
Moreover, the Department appears to have actively
discouraged its employees from identifying documents responsive
to the Committees' subpoena. Mr. Kent testified in his
deposition that he informed a Department attorney about
additional responsive records that the Department had not
collected, including an email from Assistant Secretary of State
for Consular Affairs David Risch, who ``had spoken to Rudy
Giuliani several times in January about trying to get a visa
for the corrupt former prosecutor general of Ukraine, Viktor
Shokin.''\163\ The Department attorney ``objected to [Mr. Kent]
raising of the additional information'' and ``made clear that
he did not think it was appropriate for [Mr. Kent] to make the
suggestion.''\164\ Mr. Kent responded that what he was ``trying
to do was make sure that the Department was being fully
responsive.''\165\
Certain witnesses defied the President's directive and
produced the substance of key documents. For example,
Ambassador Sondland attached ten exhibits to his written
hearing statement.\166\ These exhibits contained replicas of
emails and WhatsApp messages between Ambassador Sondland and
high-level Trump Administration officials, including Secretary
Pompeo, Secretary Perry, Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney,
and former National Security Advisor John Bolton.\167\ The
exhibits also contained a replica of a WhatsApp message between
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak.\168\
Earlier in the investigation, Ambassador Kurt Volker had
produced key text messages with Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador
Sondland, President Zelensky's senior aide, Andriy Yermak, Mr.
Giuliani, and others very soon after the Committees requested
them and prior to Mr. Cipollone's letter on October 8 conveying
the President's directive not to comply.\169\
The Department also prevented Ambassador Sondland--a
current State Department employee--from accessing records to
prepare for his testimony. As described above, federal law
imposes fines and up to five years in prison for anyone who
corruptly or by threats ``impedes or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede'' the ``due and proper exercise of the
power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is
being had by either House, or any committee of either
House.''\170\ Ambassador Sondland explained that the
Department's actions directly impeded his testimony:
I have not had access to all of my phone records,
State Department emails, and other State Department
documents. And I was told I could not work with my EU
Staff to pull together the relevant files. Having
access to the State Department materials would have
been very helpful to me in trying to reconstruct with
whom I spoke and met, when, and what was said. . . .
My lawyers and I have made multiple requests to the
State Department and the White House for these
materials. Yet, these materials were not provided to
me. They have also refused to share these materials
with this Committee. These documents are not classified
and, in fairness, should have been made available.\171\
He testified, ``I have been hampered to provide completely
accurate testimony without the benefit of those
documents.''\172\ Ambassador Sondland also stated:
Despite repeated requests to the White House and the
State Department, I have not been granted access to all
of the phone records, and I would like to review those
phone records, along with any notes and other documents
that may exist, to determine if I can provide more
complete testimony to assist Congress.\173\
On November 22, the Department produced 99 pages of emails,
letters, notes, timelines, and news articles to a non-partisan,
nonprofit ethics watchdog organization pursuant to a court
order in a lawsuit filed under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA).\174\ This handful of documents was limited to a narrow
window of time and specific people, but it clearly indicates
that the Department is withholding documents that are
responsive to the Committees' requests.
For example, the Department's FOIA production contains an
email from the Office Manager to the Secretary of State to
``S--All'' sent on March 26 which states that ``S is speaking
with Rudy Giuliani.''\175\ It also contains a March 27 email in
which Madeleine Westerhout, the Personal Secretary to President
Trump, facilitates another phone call between Rudy Giuliani and
Secretary Pompeo.\176\ These documents are directly responsive
to the September 27 subpoena for ``all documents and
communications, from January 20, 2017 to the present, relating
or referring to: Communications between any current or former
State Department officials or employees and Rudolph W.
Giuliani, including any text messages using personal or work-
related devices.''\177\
Witnesses who testified before the Committees have
identified multiple additional documents that Secretary Pompeo
is withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment
inquiry, including but not limited to:
a cable on August 29 from Ambassador Bill Taylor,
at the recommendation of then-National Security Advisor John
Bolton, sent directly to Secretary Pompeo ``describing the
folly I saw in withholding military aid to Ukraine at a time
when hostilities were still active in the east and when Russia
was watching closely to gauge the level of American support for
the Ukrainian Government'' and telling Secretary Pompeo ``that
I could not and would not defend such a policy'';\178\
WhatsApp messages and emails that Ambassador
Sondland replicated and provided as exhibits to the
Intelligence Committee showing key communications between
Ambassador Sondland and high-level Trump Administration
officials, including Secretary Pompeo, Secretary Perry, Acting
Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, and Ambassador Bolton, as well as
President Zelensky's senior aide, Andriy Yermak;\179\
notes and memoranda to file from Mr. Kent,
Ambassador Taylor, and others, including Ambassador Taylor's
``little notebook'' in which he would ``take notes on
conversations, in particular when I'm not in the office,'' such
as meetings with Ukrainians or when out and receiving a phone
call,'' as well as his ``small, little spiral notebook'' of
calls that took place in the office;\180\
emails among Philip Reeker, Acting Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs;
David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Mr.
Kent; and others regarding the unsuccessful effort to issue a
public statement in support of Ambassador Yovanovitch,
including the ``large number of emails related to the press
guidance and the allegations about the Ambassador'' from the
``late March timeframe.''\181\
The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that
the Department of State is in possession of and continues to
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment
inquiry.
Department of Defense
On October 7, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of
Defense Mark Esper conveying a subpoena issued by the
Intelligence Committee for 14 categories of documents in
response to reports that the President directed a freeze of
hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid appropriated by
Congress to help Ukraine counter Russian aggression. The
Committees wrote:
Officials at the Departments of State and Defense
reportedly were ``puzzled and alarmed'' after learning
about the White House's directive. Defense Department
officials reportedly ``tried to make a case to the
White House that the Ukraine aid was effective and
should not be looked at in the same manner as other
aid,'' but ``those arguments were ignored.''\182\
The subpoena required Secretary Esper to produce responsive
documents by October 15. On October 13, Secretary Esper stated
in a public interview that the Department would comply with the
Intelligence Committee's subpoena:
Q: Very quickly, are you going to comply with the
subpoena that the House provided you and provide
documents to them regarding to the halt to military aid
to Ukraine?
A: Yeah we will do everything we can to cooperate
with the Congress. Just in the last week or two, my
general counsel sent out a note as we typically do in
these situations to ensure documents are retained.
Q: Is that a yes?
A: That's a yes.
Q: You will comply with the subpoena?
A: We will do everything we can to comply.\183\
On October 15, however, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs Robert R. Hood responded by refusing to
produce any documents and reciting many of the same legally
unsupportable arguments as the White House Counsel:
In light of these concerns, and in view of the
President's position as expressed in the White House
Counsel's October 8 letter, and without waiving any
other objections to the subpoena that the Department
may have, the Department is unable to comply with your
request for documents at this time.\184\
To date, Secretary Esper has not produced a single document
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do
so going forward, notwithstanding his public promise to ``do
everything we can to comply.''\185\
Witnesses who testified before the Committees have
identified multiple additional documents that Secretary Esper
is withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment
inquiry, including but not limited to:
DOD staff readouts from National Security Council
meetings at the principal, deputy, or sub-deputy level relating
to Ukraine, including military assistance;\186\
an email from Secretary Esper's Chief of Staff, to
Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, in late July ``asking for follow-
up on a meeting with the President,'' including information on
whether ``U.S. industry [is] providing any of this equipment,''
``international contributions'' to Ukraine, and ``who gave this
funding'';\187\
fact sheets and other information provided by Ms.
Cooper in response to the email request;\188\
an email sent to Ms. Cooper's staff on July 25 at
2:31 p.m.--the same day as President's Trump's call with
Ukrainian President Zelensky--stating that the Ukrainian
Embassy was inquiring about the status of military aid,
suggesting that Ukrainian officials were concerned about the
status of the military aid much earlier than ever previously
acknowledged by the Executive Branch;\189\
an email sent to Ms. Cooper's staff on July 25 at
4:25 p.m. stating that the Ukrainian Embassy and The Hill
newspaper had become aware of the situation with the military
assistance funding;\190\ and
an email received by Ms. Cooper's staff on July 3
at 4:23 p.m.--from the Department of State explaining that the
Department of State ``had heard the CN [Congressional
Notification] is currently being blocked by OMB.''\191\
The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that
the Department of Defense is in possession of and continues to
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment
inquiry.
Department of Energy
On October 10, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of
Energy Rick Perry conveying a subpoena issued by the
Intelligence Committee for ten categories of documents in
response to reports about his involvement with matters under
investigation. The Committees wrote:
Recently, public reports have raised questions about
any role you may have played in conveying or
reinforcing the President's stark message to the
Ukrainian President. These reports have also raised
significant questions about your efforts to press
Ukrainian officials to change the management structure
at a Ukrainian state-owned energy company to benefit
individuals involved with Rudy Giuliani's push to get
Ukrainian officials to interfere in our 2020
election.\192\
The subpoena required Secretary Perry to produce responsive
documents by October 18. On that day, Melissa F. Burnison, the
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs, responded by refusing to produce any
documents and reciting many of the same flawed arguments as the
White House Counsel:
Pursuant to these concerns, the Department restates
the President's position: ``Given that your inquiry
lacks any legitimate constitutional foundation, any
pretense of fairness, or even the most elementary due
process protections, the Executive Branch cannot be
expected to participate in it.''\193\
To date, Secretary Perry has not produced a single document
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do
so going forward.
Witnesses who testified before the Committees have
identified multiple documents that Secretary Perry is
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment
inquiry, including but not limited to:
a document passed directly from Secretary Perry to
President Zelensky in a May 2019 meeting with a list of
``people he trusts'' that President Zelensky could seek advice
from on issues of relating to ``key Ukrainian energy-sector
contacts,'' according to David Holmes, the Political Counselor
at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv;\194\
a June 5 email from Philip Reeker, Acting
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs, to Secretary Perry and others, regarding ``Zelenskyy's
visit to Brussels, and the critical perhaps historic role of
the dinner and engagement Gordon [Ambassador Sondland]
coordinated'';\195\ and
a July 19 email from Secretary Perry in which he
states ``Mick [Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney] just
confirmed the call being set up for tomorrow by NSC'' in
reference to a call between President Trump and President
Zelensky.\196\
The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that
the Department of Energy is in possession of and continues to
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment
inquiry.
Rudy Giuliani and His Associates
On September 30, the Committees sent a letter conveying a
subpoena issued by the Intelligence Committee to the
President's personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, compelling the
production of 23 categories of documents relating to his
actions in Ukraine.\197\
On October 15, Mr. Giuliani's counsel responded to the
Committees by stating that Mr. Giuliani ``will not participate
because this appears to be an unconstitutional, baseless, and
illegitimate `impeachment inquiry.'''\198\ He also stated:
``Mr. Giuliani adopts all the positions set forth in Mr.
Cipollone's October 8, 2019 letter on behalf of President
Donald J. Trump.''\199\
To date, Mr. Giuliani has not produced a single document
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do
so going forward.
On September 30, the Committees sent letters to two of Mr.
Giuliani's business associates--Igor Fruman and Lev Parnas--
requesting testimony and eleven categories of documents from
each.\200\ The Committees sought documents from Mr. Fruman and
Mr. Parnas related to their efforts to influence U.S.
elections.
According to press reports, Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman
reportedly were ``assisting with Giuliani's push to get
Ukrainian officials to investigate former vice president Joe
Biden and his son as well as Giuliani's claim that Democrats
conspired with Ukrainians in the 2016 campaign.'' Press reports
also indicate that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman were involved with
efforts to press Ukrainian officials to change the management
structure at a Ukrainian state-owned energy company, Naftogaz,
to benefit individuals involved with Mr. Giuliani's push to get
Ukrainian officials to interfere in the 2020 election.\201\
On October 3, counsel to Mr. Fruman and Mr. Parnas
responded to Committee staff, explaining his clients'
relationship with Mr. Giuliani and President Trump:
Be advised that Messrs. Parnas and Fruman assisted
Mr. Giuliani in connection with his representation of
President Trump. Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman have also
been represented by Mr. Giuliani in connection with
their personal and business affairs. They also assisted
Joseph DiGenova and Victoria Toensing in their law
practice.\202\
With respect to preparing Mr. Fruman's and Mr. Parnas'
response, their counsel wrote: ``The amount of time required is
difficult to determine. [sic] but we are happy to keep you
advised of our progress and engage in a rolling production of
non-privileged documents.''
On October 8, their counsel wrote again to Committee staff,
stating:
This is an update. We continue to meet with Mr.
Parnas and Mr. Fruman to gather the facts and documents
related to the many subjects and persons detailed in
your September 30 letter and to evaluate all of that
information in light of the privileges we raised in our
last letter.\203\
On October 9, their counsel wrote to Committee staff,
stating, ``Please be advised that Messrs. Parnas and Fruman
agree with and adopt the position of White House Counsel
pertaining to Democrat inquiry.''\204\
On October 10, the Committees transmitted subpoenas
compelling Mr. Fruman and Mr. Parnas to produce eleven
categories of documents.\205\ That same day, their counsel
responded:
As I did in my recent letter of October 8, 2019,
please be advised we were in the formative stages of
recovering and reviewing records on October 9 when
Messrs. Parnas and Fruman were arrested by the FBI and
locked up in Virginia pursuant to Four Count Indictment
by a Federal Grand Jury in the Southern District of New
York unsealed on October 10, 2019.
Further, their records and other belongings,
including materials sought by your subpoenas, were
seized pursuant warrants [sic] by the FBI in several
locations on the 9th and 10th of October.\206\
To date, Mr. Fruman has not produced a single document in
response to his subpoena and has not indicated any intent to do
so going forward.
With respect to Mr. Parnas, he obtained new counsel during
the course of the impeachment inquiry. His new attorney has
asserted that Mr. Parnas will cooperate with the House's
inquiry, stating: ``We will honor and not avoid the committee's
requests to the extent they are legally proper, while
scrupulously protecting Mr. Parnas' privileges including that
of the Fifth Amendment.''\207\
In contrast to Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Fruman, Mr. Parnas has
begun rolling production of certain records in his possession,
custody, or control in response to the subpoena, which the
Committees are evaluating. The Committees expect Mr. Parnas'
full compliance with the subpoena.
4. The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify
At President Trump's direction, twelve current or former Administration
officials refused to testify as part of the House's impeachment
inquiry, ten of whom did so in defiance of duly authorized
subpoenas. The President's orders were coordinated and executed
by the White House Counsel and others, and they prevented
testimony from officials from the White House, National
Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, Department
of State, and Department of Energy.
Overview
No other President in history has issued an order
categorically directing the entire Executive Branch not to
testify before Congress, including in the context of an
impeachment inquiry. President Trump issued just such an order.
As reflected in White House Counsel Pat Cipollone's October
8 letter, President Trump directed all government witnesses to
violate their legal obligations by defying House subpoenas
regardless of their office or position.\208\ President Trump
even extended his order to former officials no longer employed
by the federal government. This Administration-wide effort to
prevent all witnesses from providing testimony was coordinated
and comprehensive.
These witnesses were warned that their refusal to testify
``shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a
contempt proceeding'' and ``may be used as an adverse inference
against you and the President.''
Despite the President's unprecedented commands, the House
gathered a wealth of evidence of his conduct from courageous
individuals who were willing to follow the law, comply with
duly authorized subpoenas, and tell the truth. Nevertheless,
the President's efforts to obstruct witness testimony deprived
Congress and the public of additional evidence.
In following President Trump's orders to defy duly
authorized Congressional subpoenas, several Administration
officials who, to date, remain under subpoena may have placed
themselves at risk of being held in criminal contempt of
Congress.\209\ These witnesses were warned explicitly that
their refusal to obey lawful orders to testify ``shall
constitute evidence that may be used against you in a contempt
proceeding'' and could also result in adverse inferences being
drawn against both them and the President.\210\
Mick Mulvaney, Acting White House Chief of Staff
On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Acting White
House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney seeking his appearance at a
deposition on November 8.\211\ The Committees received no
response to this letter.
On November 7, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena
compelling Mr. Mulvaney's appearance at a deposition on
November 8.\212\ On November 8, Mr. Mulvaney's personal
attorney sent an email to Committee staff stating that ``Mr.
Mulvaney will not be attending the deposition today, and he is
considering the full range of his legal options.''\213\
Mr. Mulvaney's personal attorney provided a letter that was
sent on November 8 from Mr. Cipollone, stating that ``the
President directs Mr. Mulvaney not to appear at the Committee's
scheduled deposition on November 8, 2019.''\214\ Mr. Mulvaney's
personal attorney also provided a letter sent on November 7
from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General at the Office
of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, to Mr.
Cipollone, stating, ``Mr. Mulvaney is absolutely immune from
compelled congressional testimony in his capacity as a senior
advisor to the President.''\215\
Mr. Mulvaney did not appear at the deposition on November
8, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The Committees met,
and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Mulvaney's absence,
stating:
Neither Congress nor the courts recognize a blanket
absolute immunity as a basis to defy a congressional
subpoena. Mr. Mulvaney and the White House, therefore,
have no legitimate legal basis to evade a duly
authorized subpoena. The President's direction to Mr.
Mulvaney to defy our subpoena can, therefore, only be
construed as an effort to delay testimony and obstruct
the inquiry, consistent with the White House Counsel's
letter dated October 8, 2019.\216\
Chairman Schiff also explained Mr. Mulvaney's knowledge of
and role in facilitating the President's conduct:
Mr. Mulvaney's role in facilitating the White House's
obstruction of the impeachment inquiry does not occur
in a vacuum. Over the past several weeks, we have
gathered extensive evidence of the President's abuse of
power related to pressuring Ukraine to pursue
investigations that would benefit the President
personally and politically and jeopardize national
security in doing so. Some of that evidence has
revealed that Mr. Mulvaney was a percipient witness to
misconduct by the President and may have had a role in
certain actions under investigation. The evidence shows
that Mr. Mulvaney may have coordinated with U.S.
Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland, Rudy
Giuliani, and others to carry out President Trump's
scheme to condition a White House meeting with
President Zelensky on the Ukrainians' pursuit of
investigations of the Bidens, Burisma holdings, and
purported Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election. In addition, evidence suggests
that Mr. Mulvaney may have played a central role in
President Trump's attempt to coerce Ukraine into
launching his desired political investigations by
withholding nearly $400 million in vital security
assistance from Ukraine that had been appropriated by
Congress. At a White House press briefing on October
17, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney admitted publicly that President
Trump ordered the hold on Ukraine security assistance
to further the President's own personal political
interests rather than the national interest. . . .
Based on the record evidence gathered to date, we can
only infer that Mr. Mulvaney's refusal to testify is
intended to prevent the Committees from learning
additional evidence of President Trump's misconduct and
that Mr. Mulvaney's testimony would corroborate and
confirm other witnesses' accounts of such misconduct.
If the White House had evidence to contest those facts,
they would allow Mr. Mulvaney to be deposed. Instead,
the President and the White House are hiding and trying
to conceal the truth from the American people. Given
the extensive evidence the Committees have already
uncovered, the only result of this stonewalling is to
buttress the case for obstruction of this inquiry.\217\
To date, Mr. Mulvaney has not changed his position about
compliance with the subpoena.\218\
Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the
Chief of Staff
On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Robert B.
Blair, an Assistant to the President and the Senior Advisor to
Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney, seeking Mr. Blair's appearance
at a deposition on November 1.\219\ On November 2, Mr. Blair's
personal attorney sent a letter to the Committees stating:
Mr. Blair has been directed by the White House not to
appear and testify at the Committees' proposed
deposition, based on the Department of Justice's advice
that the Committees may not validly require an
executive branch witness to appear at such a deposition
without the assistance of agency counsel. In light of
the clear direction he has been given by the Executive
Branch, Mr. Blair must respectfully decline to testify,
as you propose, on Monday, November 4, 2019.\220\
On November 3, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Blair's
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling Mr. Blair
to appear at a deposition on November 4.\221\
On November 4, Mr. Blair did not appear for the scheduled
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Blair's
absence, stating:
Although the committees requested a copy of the
correspondence from the White House and Department of
Justice, Mr. Blair's Counsel did not provide it to the
Committees. This new and shifting rationale from the
White House, like the others it has used to attempt to
block witnesses from appearing to provide testimony
about the President's misconduct, has no basis in law
or the Constitution and is a serious affront to decades
of precedent in which Republicans and Democrats have
used exactly the same procedures to depose executive
branch officials without agency counsel present,
including some of the most senior aides to multiple
previous Presidents.\222\
Unlike President Trump's directive to Acting Chief of Staff
Mulvaney, neither Mr. Blair nor the White House have asserted
that Mr. Blair is ``absolutely immune'' from providing
testimony to Congress. To date, Mr. Blair has not changed his
position or contacted the Committees about compliance with the
subpoena.
Ambassador John Bolton, Former National Security Advisor
On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to the personal
attorney of Ambassador John Bolton, the former National
Security Advisor to President Trump, seeking his appearance at
a deposition on November 7.\223\ Later that day, Ambassador
Bolton's personal attorney sent an email to Committee staff
stating, ``As you no doubt have anticipated, Ambassador Bolton
is not willing to appear voluntarily.''\224\
On November 7, Ambassador Bolton did not appear for the
scheduled deposition. On November 8, Ambassador Bolton's
personal attorney sent a letter to Douglas Letter, the General
Counsel of the House of Representatives, suggesting that, if
Ambassador Bolton were subpoenaed, he would file a lawsuit and
would comply with the subpoena only if ordered to do so by the
court. He referenced a lawsuit filed by another former
official, Dr. Charles Kupperman, represented by the same
attorney, and stated:
As I emphasized in my previous responses to letters
from the House Chairs, Dr. Kupperman stands ready, as
does Ambassador Bolton, to testify if the Judiciary
resolves the conflict in favor of the Legislative
Branch's position respecting such testimony.\225\
To date, Ambassador Bolton has not changed his
position or come forward to testify.\226\
John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the President for National
Security Affairs and Legal Advisor, National Security Council
On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to John A.
Eisenberg, the Deputy Counsel to the President for National
Security Affairs and the Legal Advisor at the National Security
Council, seeking his appearance at a deposition on November
4.\227\ The Committees received no response to this
letter.\228\
On November 1, the Committees sent a letter to Mr.
Eisenberg transmitting a subpoena compelling his appearance at
a deposition on November 4.\229\ On November 4, Mr. Eisenberg's
personal attorney sent a letter to the Committees, stating:
Even if Mr. Eisenberg had been afforded a reasonable
amount of time to prepare, the President has instructed
Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the deposition. Enclosed
with this letter is the President's instruction as
relayed by Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President,
in a letter dated November 3, 2019. We also enclose a
letter, also dated November 3, 2019, from Steven A.
Engel, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, to Mr.
Cipollone advising that Mr. Eisenberg is ``absolutely
immune from compelled congressional testimony in his
capacity as a senior advisor to the President.'' Under
these circumstances, Mr. Eisenberg has no other option
that is consistent with his legal and ethical
obligations except to follow the direction of his
client and employer, the President of the United
States. Accordingly, Mr. Eisenberg will not be
appearing for a deposition at this time.\230\
Enclosed was a letter sent on November 3 from Mr. Cipollone
to Mr. Eisenberg's personal attorney stating that ``the
President directs Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the
Committee's deposition on Monday, November 4, 2019.''\231\ Also
enclosed was a letter sent on November 3 from the Office of
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice to Mr. Cipollone
stating:
You have asked whether the Committee may compel Mr.
Eisenberg to testify. We conclude that he is absolutely
immune from compelled congressional testimony in his
capacity as a senior advisor to the President.\232\
Mr. Eisenberg did not appear for the scheduled deposition,
in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The Committees met and
Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Eisenberg's absence, stating:
Despite his legal obligations to comply, Mr.
Eisenberg is not present here today and has therefore
defied a duly authorized congressional subpoena. This
morning, in an email received at 9:00 a.m., when the
deposition was supposed to commence, Mr. Eisenberg's
personal attorney sent a letter to the committee
stating that President Trump had, quote, ``instructed
Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the deposition,''
unquote. The attorney attached correspondence from
White House counsel Pat Cipollone and a letter from the
Office of Legal Counsel at Department of Justice. The
OLC letter informs the White House that Mr. Eisenberg
is purportedly, quote, ``absolutely immune from
compelled congressional testimony in his capacity as a
senior advisor to the President,'' unquote. . . .
Moreover, neither Congress nor the courts recognize a
blanket, quote, ``absolute immunity,'' unquote, as a
basis to defy a congressional subpoena. Mr. Eisenberg
and the White House, therefore, have no basis for
evading a lawful subpoena. As such, the President's
direction to Mr. Eisenberg to defy a lawful compulsory
process can only be construed as an effort to delay
testimony and obstruct the inquiry, consistent with the
White House counsel's letter dated October 8, 2019. As
Mr. Eisenberg was informed, the Committees may consider
his noncompliance with the subpoena as evidence in a
future contempt proceeding. His failure or refusal to
appear, moreover, shall constitute evidence of
obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may
be used as an adverse inference against the President.
The subpoena remains in full force. The committees
reserve all of their rights, including the right to
raise this matter at a future Intelligence Committee
proceeding, at the discretion of the chair of the
committee.
Mr. Eisenberg's nonappearance today adds to a growing
body of evidence of the White House seeking to obstruct
the White House's impeachment inquiry. To the extent
the White House believes that an issue could be raised
at the deposition that may implicate a valid claim of
privilege, the White House may seek to assert that
privilege with the Committee in advance of the
deposition. To date, as has been the case in every
other deposition as part of the inquiry, the White
House has not done so. Mr. Eisenberg's failure to
appear today also flies in the face of historical
precedent. Even absent impeachment proceedings,
congressional committees have deposed senior White
House officials, including White House counsels and
senior White House lawyers.\233\
Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy
Legal Advisor, National Security Council
On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to Michael
Ellis, a Senior Associate Counsel to the President and the
Deputy Legal Advisor at the National Security Council, seeking
his appearance at a deposition on November 4.\234\ On November
2, Mr. Ellis' personal attorney sent an email to Committee
staff stating:
[W]e are in receipt of an opinion from the Office of
Legal Counsel providing guidance on the validity of a
subpoena under the current terms and conditions and
based on that guidance we are not in a position to
appear for a deposition at this time.\235\
This email followed the November 1 Office of Legal Counsel
opinion, discussed above, which sought to extend the reach of
the President's earlier direction to defy Congressional
subpoenas and provided justification for noncompliance by
officials who could not plausibly be considered among the
President's closest advisors.
On November 3, Mr. Ellis' personal attorney sent another
email to Committee staff stating:
[O]ur guidance is that the failure to permit agency
counsel to attend a deposition of Mr. Ellis would not
allow sufficient protection of relevant privileges and
therefore render any subpoena constitutionally invalid.
As an Executive branch employee Mr. Ellis is required
to follow this guidance.\236\
On November 3, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Ellis'
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling his
appearance at a deposition on November 4, stating:
Mr. Ellis' failure or refusal to comply with the
subpoena, including at the direction or behest of the
President or the White House, shall constitute further
evidence of obstruction of the House's impeachment
inquiry and may be used as an adverse inference against
Mr. Ellis and the President.\237\
On November 4, Mr. Ellis did not appear for the scheduled
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Ellis'
absence, stating:
Other than the White House's objections to
longstanding congressional practice, the committees are
aware of no other valid constitutional privilege
asserted by the White House to direct Mr. Ellis to defy
this subpoena.\238\
To date, Mr. Ellis has not changed his position or
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.
Preston Wells Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and
Environment, National Security Council
On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Preston
Wells Griffith, the Senior Director for International Energy
and Environment at the National Security Council, seeking his
appearance at a deposition on November 5.\239\ On November 4,
Mr. Griffith's personal attorney sent a letter to the
Committees stating:
As discussed with Committee counsel, Mr. Griffith
respectfully declines to appear for a deposition before
the joint Committees conducting the impeachment
inquiry, based upon the direction of White House
Counsel that he not appear due to agency counsel not
being permitted.\240\
Later that day, the Committees sent a letter to Mr.
Griffith's personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling
his appearance at a deposition on November 5, stating:
Mr. Griffith's failure or refusal to comply with the
subpoena, including at the direction or behest of the
President or the White House, shall constitute further
evidence of obstruction of the House's impeachment
inquiry and may be used as an adverse inference against
Mr. Griffith and the President.\241\
On November 5, Mr. Griffith did not appear for the
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena.
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr.
Griffith's absence, stating:
Although the committees requested a copy of any
written direction from the White House, Mr. Griffith's
counsel has not provided any such documentation to the
committees. The White House's newly invented rationale
for obstructing the impeachment inquiry appears based
on a legal opinion that was issued by the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel just last Friday,
November 1. It is noteworthy and telling that OLC
issued this opinion after multiple current and former
White House, State Department, and Department of
Defense officials testified before the committees, both
voluntarily and pursuant to subpoena, all without
agency counsel present. The White House's invocation of
this self-serving OLC opinion should therefore be seen
for what it is: a desperate attempt to staunch the flow
of incriminating testimony from the executive branch
officials about the President's abuse of power.\242\
To date, Mr. Griffith has not changed his position or
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.
Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, National Security Council
On October 16, the Committees sent a letter to Dr. Charles
M. Kupperman, a former Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, seeking his appearance at a
deposition on October 23.\243\
On October 25, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena
compelling Dr. Kupperman to appear at a deposition on October
28.\244\
Later that day, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent an
email to Committee staff attaching a 17-page complaint in
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether he
should comply with the subpoena.\245\ His counsel wrote:
Pending the courts' determination as to which Branch
should prevail, Dr. Kupperman will not effectively
adjudicate the conflict by appearing and testifying
before the Committees.\246\
Enclosed as part of the complaint was a letter sent on
October 25 from Mr. Cipollone to Dr. Kupperman's personal
attorney stating that ``the President directs Mr. Kupperman not
to appear at the Committee's scheduled hearing on Monday,
October 28, 2019.''\247\ Also enclosed was a letter sent on
October 25 from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department
of Justice, to Mr. Cipollone stating that Dr. Kupperman ``is
absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony in his
capacity as a former senior advisor to the President.''\248\
On October 26, the Committees sent a letter to Dr.
Kupperman's personal attorneys, stating:
In light of the direction from the White House, which
lacks any valid legal basis, the Committees shall
consider your client's defiance of a congressional
subpoena as additional evidence of the President's
obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry.\249\
Later that day, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent a
letter to Committee staff, stating: ``The proper course for Dr.
Kupperman, we respectfully submit, is to lay the conflicting
positions before the Court and abide by the Court's judgment as
to which is correct.''\250\ On October 27, Dr. Kupperman's
personal attorney sent a letter to Committee staff, writing:
``If your clients'' position on the merits of this issue is
correct, it will prevail in court, and Dr. Kupperman, I assure
you again, will comply with the Court's judgment.''\251\
On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Dr.
Kupperman's personal attorneys withdrawing the subpoena,
stating:
The question whether the Executive Branch's
``absolute immunity'' theory has any basis in law is
currently before the court in Committee on the
Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-cv-2379 (D.D.C. filed Aug.
7, 2019). In addition to not suffering from the
jurisdictional flaws in Dr. Kupperman's suit, McGahn is
procedurally much further along.\252\
On November 8, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent a
letter to Douglas Letter, the General Counsel of the House of
Representatives, stating that Dr. Kupperman stands ready to
testify ``if the Judiciary resolves the conflict in favor of
the Legislative Branch's position respecting such
testimony.''\253\
On November 25, the district court in McGahn held that
``with respect to senior-level presidential aides, absolute
immunity from compelled congressional process simply does not
exist.'' The court explained there is ``no basis in the law''
for a claim of absolute immunity regardless of the position of
the aides in question or whether they ``are privy to national
security matters, or work solely on domestic issues.''\254\ To
date and notwithstanding the ruling in McGahn as it relates to
Presidential aides who ``are privy to national security
matters,'' Dr. Kupperman continues to refuse to testify, and
his case remains pending in federal court.\255\
Russell T. Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget
On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Russell T.
Vought, the Acting Director of OMB, seeking his appearance at a
deposition on October 25.\256\ On October 21, an attorney at
OMB sent an email to Committee staff stating:
Per the White House Counsel's October 8, 2019 letter,
the President has directed that ``[c]onsistent with the
duties of the President of the United States, and in
particular his obligation to preserve the rights of
future occupants of his office, [he] cannot permit his
Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry
under these circumstances.'' Therefore, Acting Director
Vought will not be participating in Friday's
deposition.\257\
That same day, Mr. Vought publicly stated:
I saw some Fake News over the weekend to correct. As
the WH letter made clear two weeks ago, OMB officials--
myself and Mike Duffey--will not be complying with
deposition requests this week. #shamprocess.\258\
On October 25, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a
subpoena compelling Mr. Vought's appearance at a deposition on
November 6.\259\
On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman
Schiff stating:
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reasserts
its position that, as directed by the White House
Counsel's October 8, 2019, letter, OMB will not
participate in this partisan and unfair impeachment
inquiry. . . . Therefore, Mr. Vought, Mr. Duffey, and
Mr. McCormack will not appear at their respective
depositions without being permitted to bring agency
counsel.\260\
On November 5, Mr. Vought did not appear for the scheduled
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Vought's
absence, stating:
On Monday of this week, OMB reasserted its position
that, quote, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's
October 8, 2019, letter, OMB will not participate in
this partisan and unfair impeachment inquiry,''
unquote. OMB argues that the impeachment inquiry lacks
basic due process protections and relies on OLC opinion
that the committee cannot lawfully bar agency counsel
from depositions. This new and shifting rationale from
the White House, like the others it has used to attempt
to block witnesses from appearing to provide testimony
about the President's misconduct, has no basis in law
or the Constitution and is a serious affront to decades
of precedent in which Republicans and Democrats have
used exactly the same procedures to depose executive
branch officials without agency counsel present,
including some of the most senior aides to multiple
previous Presidents.\261\
To date, Mr. Vought has not changed his position or
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.
Michael Duffey, Associate Director for National Security Programs,
Office of Management and Budget
On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Michael
Duffey, the Associate Director for National Security Programs
at OMB, seeking his appearance at a deposition on October
23.\262\
On October 21, an attorney at OMB sent an email to
Committee staff stating:
Per the White House Counsel's October 8, 2019 letter,
the President has directed that ``[c]onsistent with the
duties of the President of the United States, and in
particular his obligation to preserve the rights of
future occupants of his office, [he] cannot permit his
Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry
under these circumstances.'' Therefore, Mike Duffey
will not be participating in Wednesday's
deposition.\263\
On October 25, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a
subpoena compelling Mr. Duffey to appear at a deposition on
November 5, stating:
Your failure or refusal to appear at the deposition,
including at the direction or behest of the President
or the White House, shall constitute evidence of
obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may
be used as an adverse inference against the
President.\264\
On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman
Schiff stating that, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's
October 8, 2019, letter,'' Mr. Duffey will not appear at his
deposition.\265\
On November 5, Mr. Duffey did not appear for the scheduled
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Duffey's
absence, stating:
This effort by the President to attempt to block Mr.
Duffey from appearing can only be interpreted as a
further effort by the President and the White House to
obstruct the impeachment inquiry and Congress's lawful
and constitutional functions.\266\
To date, Mr. Duffey has not changed his position or
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.
Brian McCormack, Associate Director for Natural Resources, Energy, and
Science, Office of Management and Budget
On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Brian
McCormack, the Associate Director for Natural Resources,
Energy, and Science at OMB, seeking his appearance at a
deposition on November 4.\267\
On November 1, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a
subpoena compelling Mr. McCormack's appearance at a deposition
on November 4.\268\
On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman
Schiff stating that, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's
October 8, 2019, letter,'' Mr. McCormack will not appear at his
deposition.\269\
On November 4, Mr. McCormack did not appear for the
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena.
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr.
McCormack's absence, stating:
At approximately 11:30 a.m. today, committee staff
received via email a letter from the Associate Director
for Legislative Affairs at OMB. The letter states that,
quote, ``As directed by the White House counsel's
October 8, 2019, letter,'' unquote, OMB will not
participate in the House's impeachment inquiry. The
letter further states that, based on the advice of the
Office of Legal Counsel that, quote, ``the committee
cannot lawfully bar agency counsel from these
depositions,'' unquote, Mr. McCormack will not appear
at his deposition today without agency counsel present.
As Mr. McCormack was informed, the committees may
consider his noncompliance with a subpoena as evidence
in a future contempt proceeding. His failure or refusal
to appear, moreover, shall constitute evidence of
obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may
be used as an adverse inference against the
President.\270\
To date, Mr. McCormack has not changed his position or
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.
T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State
On September 13, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo seeking transcribed interviews with
Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl and other officials.\271\ The
Committees received no direct, substantive response to this
letter.
On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing
Secretary Pompeo that Mr. Brechbuhl's deposition was being
scheduled on October 8, stating:
On September 13, the Committees wrote to request that
you make State Department employees available for
transcribed interviews. We asked you to provide, by
September 20, dates by which the employees would be
made available for transcribed interviews. You failed
to comply with the Committees' request.\272\
That same day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Mr.
Brechbuhl seeking his appearance at a deposition on October
8.\273\
On October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the
Committees stating, ``Based on the profound procedural and
legal deficiencies noted above, the Committee's requested dates
for depositions are not feasible.''\274\
Later that day, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy
Secretary of State John J. Sullivan stating that the State
Department ``must immediately halt all efforts to interfere
with the testimony of State Department witnesses before
Congress.''\275\
On October 2, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney sent an
email to Committee staff stating:
My law firm is in the process of being formally
retained to assist Mr. Brechbuhl in connection with
this matter. It will take us some time to complete
those logistics, review the request and associated
request for documents, and to meet with our client to
insure he is appropriately prepared for any deposition.
It will not be possible to accomplish those tasks
before October 8, 2019. Thus, as I am sure that you can
understand, Mr. Brechbuhl will not be able to appear on
that date as he requires a sufficient opportunity to
consult with counsel. Moreover, given the concerns
expressed in Secretary Pompeo's letter of October 1,
2019, to Chairman Engel, any participation in a
deposition would need to be coordinated with our
stakeholders.\276\
On October 8, Committee staff sent an email to Mr.
Brechbuhl's personal attorney stating: ``The Committees have
agreed to reschedule Mr. Brechbuhl's deposition to Thursday,
October 17. Please confirm that Mr. Brechbuhl intends to appear
voluntarily.''\277\ On October 9, Committee staff sent an email
to Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney asking him to ``confirm by
COB today whether Mr. Brechbuhl intends to appear
voluntarily.''\278\ Later that day, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal
attorney sent an email to Committee staff stating, ``I am still
seeking clarification from the State Department regarding this
deposition.''\279\
On October 25, the Committees sent a letter to Mr.
Brechbuhl's personal attorney transmitting a subpoena
compelling Mr. Brechbuhl's appearance at a deposition on
November 6.\280\
On November 5, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney sent a
letter to the Committees stating:
Mr. Brechbuhl respects the important Constitutional
powers vested in the United States Congress. And,
indeed, he would welcome the opportunity to address
through testimony an existing inaccuracy in the public
record--the false claim that Mr. Brechbuhl in any way
personally participated in the telephone call between
President Trump and President Zelensky that occurred on
July 25, 2019. However, Mr. Brechbuhl has received a
letter of instruction from the State Department,
directing that he not appear. The State Department
letter of instruction asserts significant Executive
Branch interests as the basis for direction not to
appear and also asserts that the subpoena Mr. Brechbuhl
received is invalid. The letter is supported by
analysis from the United States Department of Justice.
We are also aware that litigation has recently been
initiated in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia that may bear on resolving the
significant issues now arising between the Committees
and the President. Given these circumstances, Mr.
Brechbuhl is not able to appear on November 6,
2019.\281\
On November 6, Mr. Brechbuhl did not appear for the
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena.
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr.
Brechbuhl's absence, stating:
The committees requested a copy of the State
Department's letter and the Department of Justice
analysis, but Mr. Brechbuhl's attorney has not
responded. While the letter from Mr. Brechbuhl's
attorney provides only vague references to unidentified
executive branch interests and a DOJ analysis as the
basis for the State Department's blocking of Mr.
Brechbuhl's testimony, the Department's latest
obstruction of this inquiry appears to be predicated on
the opinion issued by the Department of Justice Office
of Legal Counsel just last Friday, November 1, well
after the subpoena was issued to Mr. Brechbuhl. It is
noteworthy and telling that the OLC issued this opinion
only after multiple State Department officials
testified in this inquiry, both voluntarily and
pursuant to subpoena, all without agency counsel
present. Indeed, this morning, the third-highest-
ranking official at the State Department, Under
Secretary David Hale, appeared and has begun testifying
in accordance with his legal obligations pursuant to a
subpoena.\282\
The Committees sent Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney two
separate inquiries asking him to provide a copy of the ``letter
of instruction'' that Mr. Brechbuhl claimed to have received
from the State Department directing him to defy a congressional
subpoena.\283\ Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney furnished the
Committees with a copy of the letter on December 2. The State
Department's letter to Mr. Brechbuhl is dated November 4,
2019.\284\
To date, Mr. Brechbuhl has not changed his position or
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.
Secretary Rick Perry, Department of Energy
On November 1, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of
Energy Rick Perry seeking his appearance at a deposition on
November 6, stating:
Your failure or refusal to appear at the deposition,
including at the direction or behest of the President
or the White House, shall constitute evidence of
obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may
be used as an adverse inference against the
President.\285\
On November 5, an attorney at the Department of Energy sent
a letter to the Committees stating:
Please be advised that the Secretary will not appear
on Wednesday, November 6, 2019, at 2:00 pm for a
deposition to be conducted jointly by the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Oversight and
Reform.\286\
To date, Secretary Perry has not changed his position or
come forward to testify.
5. The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Key Witnesses
Despite President Trump's explicit orders that no Executive Branch
employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry
and efforts by federal agencies to limit the testimony of those
who did, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized
subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and
public hearings. These officials adhered to the rule of law and
obeyed lawful subpoenas.
Overview
Despite President Trump's orders that no Executive Branch
employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment
inquiry, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized
subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and
public hearings. These officials not only served their nation
honorably, but they fulfilled their oath to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States.
In addition to the President's broad orders seeking to
prohibit all Executive Branch employees from testifying, many
of these witnesses were personally directed by senior political
appointees not to cooperate with the House's impeachment
inquiry. These directives frequently cited or enclosed copies
of Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter conveying the President's
order not to comply.
For example, the State Department, relying on President
Trump's order, attempted to block Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch
from testifying, but she fulfilled her legal obligations by
appearing at a deposition on October 11 and a hearing on
November 15. More than a dozen current and former officials
followed her courageous example by testifying at depositions
and public hearings over the course of the last two months. The
testimony from these witnesses produced overwhelming and clear
evidence of President Trump's misconduct, which is described in
detail in Section I of this report.
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine,
Department of State
On September 13, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo seeking a transcribed interview with
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch and other State Department
officials.\287\ The Committees received no direct, substantive
response to this letter.
On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing
Secretary Pompeo that Ambassador Yovanovitch's deposition was
being scheduled on October 2, stating:
On September 13, the Committees wrote to request that
you make State Department employees available for
transcribed interviews. We asked you to provide, by
September 20, dates by which the employees would be
made available for transcribed interviews. You failed
to comply with the Committees' request.\288\
Also on September 27, the Committees sent a letter directly
to Ambassador Yovanovitch seeking her appearance at a
deposition on October 2.\289\
On October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the
Committees stating:
Therefore, the five officials subject to your letter
may not attend any interview or deposition without
counsel from the Executive Branch present to ensure
that the Executive Branch's constitutional authority to
control the disclosure of confidential information,
including deliberative matters and diplomatic
communications, is not impaired.\290\
After further discussions with Ambassador Yovanovitch's
counsel, her deposition was rescheduled for October 11. On
October 10, Brian Bulatao, the Under Secretary of State for
Management, sent a letter to Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal
attorney directing Ambassador Yovanovitch not to appear for her
deposition and enclosing Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter
stating that President Trump and his Administration would not
participate in the House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Bulatao's
letter stated:
Accordingly, in accordance with applicable law, I
write on behalf of the Department of State, pursuant to
the President's instruction reflected in Mr.
Cipollone's letter, to instruct your client (as a
current employee of the Department of State),
consistent with Mr. Cipollone's letter, not to appear
before the Committees under the present
circumstances.\291\
That same day, October 10, when asked whether he intended
to block Ambassador Yovanovitch from testifying the next day,
President Trump stated: ``You know, I don't think people should
be allowed. You have to run a country, I don't think you should
be allowed to do that.''\292\
On the morning of Ambassador Yovanovitch's deposition on
October 11, the Committees sent a letter to her personal
attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling her appearance,
stating:
In light of recent attempts by the Administration to
direct your client not to appear voluntarily for the
deposition, the enclosed subpoena now compels your
client's mandatory appearance at today's deposition on
October 11, 2019.\293\
Later on October 11, Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal
attorney sent a letter to Mr. Bulatao, stating:
In my capacity as counsel for Ambassador Marie
Yovanovitch, I have received your letter of October 10,
2019, directing the Ambassador not to appear
voluntarily for her scheduled deposition testimony on
October 11, 2019 before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform
in connection with the House of Representatives's
impeachment inquiry. Just this morning, the Ambassador
received a subpoena issued by the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, requiring her to
appear for the deposition as scheduled. Although the
Ambassador has faithfully and consistently honored her
professional duties as a State Department employee--
including at all times following her abrupt termination
as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine--she is unable to obey
your most recent directive. As the recipient of a duly
issued congressional subpoena, Ambassador Yovanovitch
is, in my judgment, legally obligated to attend the
depositions as scheduled.\294\
Ambassador Yovanovitch participated in the deposition on
October 11, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\295\
During her deposition, Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal
attorney confirmed that ``she received a direction by the Under
Secretary to decline to appear voluntarily.''\296\
On November 15, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to
Ambassador Yovanovitch compelling her to testify at a public
hearing of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\297\
Ambassador Yovanovitch complied with the Committees' subpoena
and testified at the public hearing. During the hearing,
Chairman Schiff acknowledged Ambassador Yovanovitch's
compliance, stating:
Ambassador, I want to thank you for your decades of
service. I want to thank you, as Mr. Maloney said, for
being the first one through the gap. What you did in
coming forward and answering a lawful subpoena was to
give courage to others that also witnessed wrongdoing,
that they, too, could show the same courage that you
have, that they could stand up, speak out, answer
questions, they could endure whatever threats, insults
may come their way. And so in your long and
distinguished career you have done another great public
service in answering the call of our subpoena and
testifying before us today.\298\
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union,
Department of State
On September 27, 2019, the Committees sent a letter
informing Secretary Pompeo that Ambassador Gordon Sondland's
deposition was being scheduled on October 10.\299\ That same
day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Ambassador
Sondland seeking his appearance at the deposition.\300\ On
October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the Committees
stating that Ambassador Sondland ``may not attend'' the
deposition.\301\
After further discussions with Ambassador Sondland's
personal attorney, his deposition was rescheduled for October
8. On October 7, Mr. Bulatao sent a letter to Ambassador
Sondland's personal attorney, stating:
Based on consultations with the White House, the
State Department hereby instructs your client,
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, not to appear tomorrow for
his voluntary deposition based on the Executive Branch
confidentiality interests remaining to be addressed,
including, in particular, the Committee's refusal to
permit agency counsel to appear.\302\
On October 8, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney sent
an email to the Committees stating:
I am incredibly disappointed to report that,
overnight, the State Department advised that it will
direct Ambassador Sondland not to appear before the
Committee this morning. While we have not yet gotten
written confirmation of that direction, we wanted to
advise you of this development at the earliest
opportunity. As the sitting US Ambassador to the EU and
employee of the State Department, Ambassador Sondland
is required to follow this direction. I hope that
whatever concerns the Department has can be resolved
promptly and that Ambassador Sondland's testimony can
be scheduled at the earliest opportunity. I am very
sorry for the inexcusably late notice, but we are
sharing this with you as soon as it was confirmed to
us. Ambassador Sondland is personally disappointed that
he will not be able to answer the Committee's questions
this morning.\303\
On October 8, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador
Sondland transmitting a subpoena compelling his appearance at a
deposition on October 16, stating:
The Committees have not received any communication
directly from the White House or the State Department
about this matter. In light of Secretary Pompeo's
direct intervention to block your appearance before our
Committees, we are left with no choice but to compel
your appearance at a deposition pursuant to the
enclosed subpoena.\304\
On October 14, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador
Sondland stating:
We hereby write to memorialize our agreement with
your counsel, Mr. Robert Luskin, Esq., to adjourn the
date and time of your document production and
deposition to October 17, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. at the
Capitol, HVC-304.\305\
Ambassador Sondland participated in the deposition on
October 17, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\306\
During the deposition, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney
stated:
But we also wish to emphasize that it's his belief,
and ours, that the Committee should have access to all
relevant documents, and he regrets that they have not
been provided in advance of his testimony. Having those
documents would lead to a more fulsome and accurate
inquiry into the matters at hand. Indeed, Ambassador
Sondland has not had access to all of the State
Department records that would help him refresh his
recollection in anticipation of this testimony.\307\
During the deposition, Ambassador Sondland stated:
I was truly disappointed that the State Department
prevented me at the last minute from testifying earlier
on October 8, 2019. But your issuance of a subpoena has
supported my appearance here today, and I'm pleased to
provide the following testimony.\308\
On November 4, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney
transmitted to the Committees a sworn declaration from
Ambassador Sondland, which supplemented his deposition
testimony and noted that despite ``repeated requests to the
White House and the State Department,'' he still had not been
granted access to records he sought to review to determine if
he could ``provide more complete testimony to assist
Congress.''\309\
On November 20, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to
Ambassador Sondland compelling him to testify at a public
hearing of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\310\
Ambassador Sondland complied with the Committees' subpoena and
testified at the public hearing. During the hearing, Ambassador
Sondland described the direction he received from the White
House:
Q: Ambassador Sondland, in your deposition, you
lamented, quote: I was truly disappointed that the
State Department prevented me at the last minute from
testifying earlier on October 8, 2019, but your
issuance of a subpoena has supported my appearance here
today, and I am pleased to provide the following
testimony. So it is clear that the White House, the
State Department did not want you to testify at that
deposition. Is that correct?
A: That is correct.
Q: And since then, you have on numerous occasions
during your opening statement today indicated that you
have not been able to access documents in the State
Department. Is that correct?
A: Correct.
Q: So you have been hampered in your ability to
provide testimony to this committee. Is that correct?
A: I have been hampered to provide completely
accurate testimony without the benefit of those
documents.\311\
George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State
On September 13, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to
Secretary of State Pompeo seeking a transcribed interview with
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent and other State
Department officials.\312\ The Committees received no direct,
substantive response to this letter.
On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing
Secretary Pompeo that Mr. Kent's deposition was being scheduled
on October 7.\313\ That same day, the Committees sent a letter
directly to Mr. Kent seeking his appearance at the deposition
on that date.\314\ Later that day, Mr. Kent sent an email to
Committee staff acknowledging receipt of the Committees'
request and copying an official from the Office of Legislative
Affairs at the Department of State.\315\ On October 1,
Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the Committees stating that
Mr. Kent ``may not attend'' the deposition.\316\
After consulting with Mr. Kent's personal attorney, the
Committees rescheduled his deposition for October 15.\317\ On
October 10, Under Secretary Bulatao sent a letter to Mr. Kent's
personal attorney enclosing the White House Counsel's letter of
October 8, and stating:
I write on behalf of the Department of State,
pursuant to the President's instruction reflected in
Mr. Cipollone's letter, to instruct your client (as a
current employee of the Department of State),
consistent with Mr. Cipollone's letter, not to appear
before the Committees under the present
circumstances.\318\
On October 15, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Kent's
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling him to
appear at a deposition on that date.\319\
Mr. Kent participated in the deposition on October 15, in
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\320\ During the
deposition, he stated:
As you all know, I am appearing here in response to
your congressional subpoena. If I did not appear I
would have been exposed to being held in contempt. At
the same time, I have been instructed by my employer,
the U.S. Department of State, not to appear. I do not
know the Department of State's views on disregarding
that order.\321\
On November 13, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to
Mr. Kent compelling him to testify at a public hearing before
the Intelligence Committee on that day.\322\ Mr. Kent complied
with the Committees' subpoena and testified at the public
hearing. During the hearing, Mr. Kent described the direction
he received from the White House, stating that he ``received,
initially, a letter directing me not to appear. And once the
committees issued a subpoena, I was under legal obligation to
appear, and I am here today under subpoena.''\323\
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge D affaires for U.S. Embassy
in Kyiv, Department of State
On October 4, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy
Secretary of State John Sullivan seeking a deposition with
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr. on October 15.\324\ That same
day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Ambassador Taylor
seeking his appearance at the deposition.\325\
On October 14, after consulting with Ambassador Taylor's
counsel, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador Taylor
stating: ``We hereby write to adjourn the date and time of your
deposition to Tuesday, October 22, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. at the
Capitol, HVC-304.''\326\
On October 22, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to
Ambassador Taylor's personal attorneys compelling Ambassador
Taylor to appear at a deposition on that date, stating:
In light of recent attempts by the Administration to
direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for
depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your
client's mandatory appearance at today's
deposition.\327\
Ambassador Taylor participated in the deposition on October
22, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena. During the
deposition, Ambassador Taylor's personal attorney stated, in
regard to communications with the Department of State:
They sent us the directive that said he should not
appear under I think the quote is under the present
circumstances. We told the majority that we could not
appear; he'd been instructed not to. We saw the
pattern.\328\
On November 13, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to
Ambassador Taylor compelling him to testify at a public hearing
of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\329\ Ambassador
Taylor complied with the Committees' subpoena and testified at
the public hearing. During the hearing, Ambassador Taylor
described the direction he received from the State Department:
Q: Ambassador, were you also asked not to be part of
the deposition?
A: Mr. Quigley, I was told by the State Department:
Don't appear under these circumstances. That was in the
letter to me. And when I got the subpoena, exactly as
Mr. Kent said, that was different circumstances and
obeyed a legal subpoena. So, yes, sir, I'm here for
that reason.\330\
Catherine Croft and Christopher Anderson, Department of State
On October 24, 2019, the Committees sent letters to the
personal attorney representing two State Department officials,
Catherine Croft and Christopher Anderson, seeking their
attendance at depositions on October 30 and November 1,
respectively.\331\
On October 25, their attorney sent a letter to the
Committees acknowledging receipt of the Committees' requests
and stating that ``we are in the process of contacting the
Office of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State in an
effort to learn the disposition of that Office with regard to
the Committee's request.''\332\
On October 28, Under Secretary Bulatao sent letters to the
personal attorney for Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson. Both letters
enclosed the White House Counsel's October 8 letter and stated:
Pursuant to Mr. Cipollone's letter and in light of
these defects, we are writing to inform you and Ms.
Croft of the Administration-wide direction that
Executive Branch personnel ``cannot participate in [the
impeachment] inquiry under these circumstances.''\333\
On October 30, the Committees transmitted subpoenas to the
personal attorney for Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson compelling
their appearance at depositions on October 30, stating:
In light of recent attempts by the Administration to
direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for
depositions, the enclosed subpoenas compel your
clients' mandatory appearance.\334\
Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson participated in their
depositions on October 30, in compliance with the Committees'
subpoenas.\335\ During Ms. Croft's deposition, her personal
attorney stated:
On October 28th, 2019, Ms. Croft received a letter
through her lawyers from Under Secretary of State Brian
Bulatao, in which we were instructed that Ms. Croft
cannot participate in the impeachment inquiry being
conducted by the House of Representatives and these
committees. Under Secretary Bulatao's letter stated
that these instructions were issued pursuant to a
directive from the Office of White House Counsel.
Nonetheless, Ms. Croft has been served with a valid
subpoena, and so she is obliged to be here today.\336\
During Mr. Anderson's deposition, his personal attorney
stated:
On October 28th, 2019, Mr. Anderson received a
letter, through his lawyers, from Under Secretary of
State Brian Bulatao in which we were instructed that
Mr. Anderson cannot participate in the impeachment
inquiry being conducted by the House of Representatives
and these committees. Under Secretary Bulatao's letter
stated that these instructions were issued pursuant to
a directive from the Office of White House Counsel.
Nonetheless, Mr. Anderson has been served with a valid
subpoena, and so he is obliged to be here today.\337\
Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia,
Ukraine, and Eurasia, Department of Defense
On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura K. Cooper seeking her
attendance at a deposition on October 18.\338\
After consulting with Ms. Cooper's personal attorney, the
Committees rescheduled her deposition for October 23.
On October 22, Deputy Secretary of Defense David L.
Norquist sent a letter to Ms. Cooper's personal attorney,
stating:
This letter informs you and Ms. Cooper of the
Administration-wide direction that Executive Branch
personnel ``cannot participate in [the impeachment]
inquiry under these circumstances''' [Tab C]. In the
event that the Committees issue a subpoena to compel
Ms. Cooper's appearance, you should be aware that the
Supreme Court has held, in United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41 (1953), that a person cannot be sanctioned for
refusing to comply with a congressional subpoena
unauthorized by House Rule or Resolution.\339\
On October 23, the Committees sent an email transmitting a
subpoena compelling Ms. Cooper to appear at a deposition on
that date, stating:
In light of recent attempts by the Administration to
direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for
depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your
client's mandatory appearance at today's
deposition.\340\
Ms. Cooper participated in the deposition on October 23, in
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\341\
During her deposition, Ms. Cooper stated with regard to the
Department of Defense, ``They instructed me yesterday not to
participate.''\342\
On November 20, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to
Ms. Cooper compelling her to testify at a public hearing before
the Intelligence Committee on that day.\343\ Ms. Cooper
complied with the Committees' subpoena and testified at the
public hearing.\344\
Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs,
Office of Management and Budget
On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Mark Sandy,
the Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs at
OMB, seeking his appearance at a deposition on November 8.\345\
On November 6, Mr. Sandy responded to confirm receipt of the
Committees' letter.\346\
On November 7, an attorney at OMB sent an email to
Committee staff stating:
In light of the Committee's rules that prohibit
agency counsel from being present in a deposition of an
executive branch witness and consistent with the
November 1, 2019 OLC letter opinion addressing this
issue, OMB has directed Mr. Sandy not to appear at
tomorrow's deposition.\347\
After consulting with Mr. Sandy's personal attorney, the
Committees rescheduled his deposition for November 16.
On November 16, the Committees sent an email transmitting a
subpoena compelling Mr. Sandy to appear at a deposition on that
date, stating:
In light of recent attempts by the Administration to
direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for
depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your
client's mandatory appearance.\348\
Mr. Sandy participated in the deposition on November 16, in
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\349\ During his
deposition, Mr. Sandy also testified that the Administration
sent his personal attorney an official communication with
further direction, stating: ``It did direct me to have my
personal counsel ask for a postponement until agency counsel
could accompany me.''\350\
Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council
On October 9, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking
Dr. Hill's testimony at a deposition on October 14.\351\ On
October 13, Dr. Hill's personal attorney informed the White
House that she intended to appear at the scheduled
deposition.\352\ On October 14, the White House sent a letter
to Dr. Hill's personal attorney stating that ``Dr. Hill is not
authorized to reveal or release any classified information or
any information subject to executive privilege.''\353\ Also on
October 14, the Committees sent Dr. Hill a subpoena seeking her
testimony the same day.\354\ Dr. Hill complied and participated
in the deposition.\355\
On November 18, Dr. Hill's personal attorney sent a letter
to the White House stating that Dr. Hill had been invited to
provide testimony at a public hearing on November 21, and
stating: ``We continue to disagree with regard to the
parameters of executive privilege as you articulated it on
October 14 and our prior telephone calls.''\356\ On November
20, the White House sent a letter to Dr. Hill's personal
attorney stating that Dr. Hill ``continues to be bound by
important obligations to refrain from disclosing classified
information or information subject to executive privilege in
her upcoming testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.''\357\ On November 21, the
Committees sent Dr. Hill a subpoena seeking her testimony the
same day.\358\ Dr. Hill also complied with this subpoena and
testified at the public hearing.\359\
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National
Security Council
On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking
Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman's testimony at a deposition on
October 24.\360\ After discussions with Lt. Col. Vindman's
personal attorneys, the deposition was rescheduled to October
29. On October 29, the Committees sent Lt. Col. Vindman a
subpoena seeking his testimony the same day.\361\ Lt. Col.
Vindman complied.\362\ In addition, on November 19, the
Committees conveyed a subpoena seeking Lt. Col. Vindman's
testimony at a public hearing that same day.\363\ Lt. Col.
Vindman also complied with this subpoena and testified at the
public hearing.\364\
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council
On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to
Timothy Morrison seeking his testimony at a deposition on
October 25.\365\ After discussions with Mr. Morrison's personal
attorney, the deposition was rescheduled to October 31. On
October 31, the Committees sent Mr. Morrison a subpoena seeking
his testimony the same day.\366\ Mr. Morrison complied.\367\ In
addition, on November 19, the Committees conveyed a subpoena
seeking Mr. Morrison's testimony at a public hearing that same
day.\368\ Mr. Morrison also complied with this subpoena and
testified at the public hearing.\369\
David Hale, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State
On November 1, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking
Under Secretary David Hale's testimony at a deposition on
November 6.\370\ On November 5, Mr. Hale's counsel wrote to the
Committees, stating that Mr. Hale would be willing to testify
pursuant to a subpoena.\371\
On November 6, the Committees sent Mr. Hale a subpoena
seeking his testimony the same day.\372\ Mr. Hale
complied.\373\ In addition, on November 20, the Committees
conveyed a subpoena seeking Mr. Hale's testimony at a public
hearing that same day.\374\ Mr. Hale also complied with this
subpoena and testified at the public hearing.\375\
David Holmes, Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in
Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State
On November 12, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to
Political Counselor David Holmes' personal attorney seeking his
testimony at a deposition on November 15.\376\ On November 15,
the Committees conveyed a subpoena to Mr. Holmes' personal
attorney seeking his testimony the same day.\377\ Mr. Holmes
complied.\378\ In addition, on November 21, the Committees
conveyed a subpoena seeking Mr. Holmes' testimony at a public
hearing that same day.\379\ Mr. Holmes also complied with this
subpoena and testified at the public hearing.\380\
Ambassador P. Michael McKinley, Former Senior Advisor to the Secretary
of State, Department of State
On October 12, 2019, Committee staff emailed Ambassador P.
Michael McKinley requesting his voluntary participation in a
transcribed interview on October 16.\381\ On October 14, the
Committees sent a letter formalizing this request.\382\ On
October 16, Ambassador McKinley participated in the scheduled
transcribed interview.\383\
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State
On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker's testimony at a deposition on
October 23.\384\ On October 25, the Committees sent Ambassador
Reeker a subpoena seeking his testimony on October 26.\385\
Ambassador Reeker complied and testified at the scheduled
deposition.\386\
Ambassador Kurt Volker, Former U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations, Department of State
On September 13, 2019, the Committees wrote a letter to
Secretary Pompeo requesting the testimony of four witnesses,
including Ambassador Kurt Volker.\387\ On September 27, the
Committees sent a follow up letter to Secretary Pompeo, noting
that Ambassador Volker's deposition had been scheduled for
October 3.\388\ On that same day, the Committees sent a letter
directly to Ambassador Volker, seeking his testimony at the
deposition scheduled for October 3.\389\
On October 1, Secretary Pompeo responded to the Committees,
refusing to make Ambassador Volker available on the requested
date.\390\ On October 2, the Department of State wrote a letter
to Ambassador Volker's counsel instructing Ambassador Volker
not to reveal classified or privileged information and
prohibiting Ambassador Volker from producing any government
documents.\391\
On October 2, Ambassador Volker produced copies of text
messages in response to the Committees' request.\392\ On
October 3, Ambassador Volker voluntarily participated in a
transcribed interview.\393\ In addition, on November 19,
Ambassador Volker testified voluntarily at a public
hearing.\394\
Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the
Vice President
On November 4, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to
Jennifer Williams seeking her testimony at a deposition on
November 7.\395\ On November 7, the Committees sent Ms.
Williams a subpoena seeking her testimony the same day.\396\
Ms. Williams complied.\397\ On November 11, Ms. Williams sent a
letter to Chairman Schiff to make one amendment to her
deposition testimony.\398\ In addition, on November 19, the
Committees conveyed a subpoena seeking Ms. William's testimony
at a public hearing on November 19.\399\ Ms. Williams also
complied with this subpoena and testified at the public
hearing.\400\
6. The President's Intimidation of Witnesses
President Trump publicly attacked and intimidated witnesses who came
forward to comply with duly authorized subpoenas and testify
about his conduct. The President also threatened and attacked
an Intelligence Community whistleblower.
Overview
President Trump engaged in a brazen effort to publicly
attack and intimidate witnesses who came forward to comply with
duly authorized subpoenas and testify about his conduct,
raising grave concerns about potential violations of the
federal obstruction statute and other criminal laws intended to
protect witnesses appearing before Congressional proceedings.
President Trump issued threats, openly discussed possible
retaliation, made insinuations about witnesses' character and
patriotism, and subjected them to mockery and derision. The
President's attacks were broadcast to millions of Americans
including witnesses' families, friends, and coworkers and his
actions drew criticism from across the political spectrum,
including from his own Republican supporters.
It is a federal crime to intimidate or seek to intimidate
any witness appearing before Congress. This statute applies to
all citizens, including federal officials. Violations of this
law can carry a criminal sentence of up to 20 years in prison.
This campaign of intimidation risks discouraging witnesses
from coming forward voluntarily, complying with mandatory
subpoenas for documents and testimony, and disclosing evidence
that may support consideration of articles of impeachment.
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine,
Department of State
As discussed above, President Trump removed Marie
Yovanovitch as the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine in May 2019
following a concerted effort by Rudy Giuliani, his associates
Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, and others to spread false
conspiracy theories about her. The smearing of the Ambassador
was part of the larger campaign undertaken by Mr. Giuliani at
President Trump's direction and in his capacity as President
Trump's representative. During her deposition on October 11,
Ambassador Yovanovitch explained that she felt threatened and
``very concerned'' after she read President Trump's statements
about her during his July 25 call with President Zelensky,
including President Trump's claim that ``she's going to go
through some things.''\401\
On November 15, Ambassador Yovanovitch testified at a
public hearing that she was ``shocked'' and ``devastated'' by
the President's statements about her:
I was shocked and devastated that I would feature in
a phone call between two heads of state in such a
manner, where President Trump said that I was bad news
to another world leader and that I would be ``going
through some things.'' So I was it was it was a
terrible moment. A person who saw me actually reading
the transcript said that the color drained from my
face. I think I even had a physical reaction. I think,
you know, even now, words kind of fail me.\402\
Ambassador Yovanovitch was also asked about her reaction to
the President's comment that she would ``go through some
things.'' She acknowledged feeling threatened, stating: ``It
didn't sound good. It sounded like a threat.''\403\
As Ambassador Yovanovitch was in the process of testifying
before the Committee, President Trump tweeted an attack against
her. He wrote:
Everywhere Marie Yovanovitch went turned bad. She
started off in Somalia, how did that go? Then fast
forward to Ukraine, where the new Ukrainian President
spoke unfavorably about her in my second phone call
with him. It is a U.S. President's absolute right to
appoint ambassadors.\404\
During the hearing, Chairman Schiff asked Ambassador
Yovanovitch for her reaction to the President's attacks:
Q: Ambassador, you've shown the courage to come
forward today and testify, notwithstanding the fact you
were urged by the White House or State Department not
to; notwithstanding the fact that, as you testified
earlier, the President implicitly threatened you in
that call record. And now, the President in real-time
is attacking you. What effect do you think that has on
other witnesses' willingness to come forward and expose
wrongdoing?
A: Well, it's very intimidating.
Q: It's designed to intimidate, is it not?
A: I--I--I mean, I can't speak to what the President
is trying to do, but I think the effect is to be
intimidating.
Q: Well, I want to let you know, Ambassador, that
some of us here take witness intimidation very, very
seriously.\405\
In response to the President's attacks, Rep. Liz Cheney,
Chair of the House Republican Caucus, stated that the President
``was wrong'' and that Ambassador Yovanovitch ``clearly is
somebody who's been a public servant to the United States for
decades and I don't think the President should have done
that.''\406\ Rep. Francis Rooney, also a Republican, stated:
``I don't necessarily think it's right to be harassing or
beating up on our professional diplomatic service.''\407\
Even after these rebukes, the President continued to attack
and threaten Ambassador Yovanovitch. For example, in an
interview on November 22, President Trump stated: ``This was
not an angel, this woman, okay? And there are a lot of things
that she did that I didn't like. And we will talk about that at
some time.''\408\
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National
Security Council
On October 29, President Trump tweeted that Lt. Col.
Alexander Vindman is a ``Never Trumper.''\409\ When asked by a
reporter what evidence he had for his claim, the President
responded: ``We'll be showing that to you real soon.
Okay?''\410\ President Trump continued attacking Lt. Col.
Vindman during his testimony on November 19, seeking to
question his loyalty to the United States. The President
retweeted: ``Lt. Col. Vindman was offered the position of
Defense Minister for the Ukrainian Government THREE
times!''\411\ Allies of the President also questioned Lt. Col.
Vindman's loyalty to the country and amplified the smear.\412\
For his part, Lt. Col. Vindman stated during his testimony:
I want to take a moment to recognize the courage of
my colleagues who have appeared and are scheduled to
appear before this Committee. I want to state that the
vile character attacks on these distinguished and
honorable public servants is reprehensible.\413\
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge d'Affaires for U.S. Embassy
in Kyiv, Department of State
On October 23, one day after Ambassador William Taylor's
deposition, the President sent a tweet comparing ``Never
Trumper Republicans'' to ``human scum.''\414\ An hour later, he
described Ambassador Taylor in a tweet as a ``Never
Trumper.''\415\
On October 25, the President discussed Ambassador Taylor's
testimony with reporters, and again dismissed the Ambassador as
a ``Never Trumper.'' After a reporter noted that Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo had hired Ambassador Taylor, the President
responded: ``Hey, everybody makes mistakes.'' He then had the
following exchange about Ambassador Taylor:
Q: Do you want him out now as the top diplomat?
A: He's a Never Trumper. His lawyer is the head of
the Never Trumpers. They're a dying breed, but they're
still there.\416\
On the morning of November 13, just before Ambassador
Taylor and George Kent testified at a public hearing, the
President tweeted: ``NEVER TRUMPERS!''\417\
Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the
Vice President
On November 17, two days before Jennifer Williams testified
at a public hearing, President Trump sent a tweet attacking her
and stating that ``she should meet with the other Never
Trumpers, who I don't know & mostly never even heard of, & work
out a better presidential attack!''\418\ During the hearing,
Rep. Jim Himes asked Ms. Williams what impression the
President's tweet had made on her. She responded: ``It
certainly surprised me. I was not expecting to be called out by
name.'' Rep. Himes noted that the tweet ``surprised me, too,
and it looks an awful lot like witness intimidation and
tampering, and an effort to try to get you to perhaps shape
your testimony today.''\419\
Threats of Retaliation
The President suggested that witnesses who testified as
part of the impeachment inquiry could face retaliation. For
example, on November 16, the President sent a pair of tweets
indicating that three witnesses appearing before the
impeachment inquiry could face dismissals as a result of their
testimony. The President tweeted language he attributed to
radio host Rush Limbaugh:
``My support for Donald Trump has never been greater
than it is right now. It is paramountly obvious
watching this, these people have to go. You elected
Donald Trump to drain the Swamp, well, dismissing
people like Yovanovitch is what that looks like.
Dismissing people like Kent . . . and Taylor,
dismissing everybody involved from the Obama holdover
days trying to undermine Trump, getting rid of those
people, dismissing them, this is what it looks like. It
was never going to be clean, they were never going to
sit by idly and just let Trump do this!'' Rush L\420\
Intelligence Community Whistleblower
In addition to his relentless attacks on witnesses who
testified in connection with the House's impeachment inquiry,
the President also repeatedly threatened and attacked a member
of the Intelligence Community who filed an anonymous
whistleblower complaint raising an ``urgent concern'' regarding
the President's conduct. The whistleblower filed the complaint
confidentially with the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, as authorized by the relevant whistleblower law.
Federal law prohibits the Inspector General from revealing the
whistleblower's identity.\421\ Federal law also protects the
whistleblower from retaliation.\422\
On September 9, the Inspector General notified Congress
that this individual had filed a credible complaint regarding
an ``urgent concern,'' but that the Acting Director of National
Intelligence was withholding the complaint from Congress
contrary to his statutory obligation to have submitted the
complaint to the congressional intelligence committees by no
later than September 2.\423\ On September 13, 2019, the
Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena to the Acting Director
of National Intelligence for the whistleblower's complaint and
other records.\424\
On September 26, the Intelligence Committee received the
declassified whistleblower complaint and made it available to
the public.\425\
That day, the President issued a chilling threat against
the whistleblower and those who provided information to the
whistleblower regarding the President's misconduct, suggesting
that they could face the death penalty for treason. President
Trump stated:
I want to know who's the person who gave the whistle-
blower the information because that's close to a spy.
You know what we used to do in the old days when we
were smart with spies and treason, right? We used to
handle it a little differently than we do now.\426\
In response, the Committees warned President Trump to stop
attacking the whistleblower, stating:
The President's comments today constitute--
reprehensible--witness intimidation and an attempt to
obstruct Congress' impeachment inquiry. We condemn the
President's attacks, and we invite our Republican
counterparts to do the same because Congress must do
all it can to protect this whistleblower, and all
whistleblowers. Threats of violence from the leader of
our country have a chilling effect on the entire
whistleblower process, with grave consequences for our
democracy and national security.\427\
Yet the President's attacks did not stop. Instead, he
continued to threaten the whistleblower, publicly questioned
the whistleblower's motives, disputed the accuracy of the
whistleblower's account, and encouraged others to reveal the
whistleblower's identity. The President's focus on the
whistleblower has been obsessive, with the President making
more than 100 public statements about the whistleblower over a
period of just two months. For example, the President stated:
``I want to meet not only my accuser, who
presented SECOND & THIRD HAND INFORMATION, but also the person
who illegally gave this information, which was largely
incorrect, to the Whistleblower.' Was this person SPYING on the
U.S. President? Big Consequences!''\428\
``I think it's outrageous that a Whistleblower is
a CIA agent.''\429\
``But what they said is he's an Obama person. It
was involved with Brennan; Susan Rice, which means Obama. But
he was like a big--a big anti-Trump person. Hated Trump.''\430\
``The Whistleblower got it sooo wrong that HE must
come forward. The Fake News Media knows who he is but, being an
arm of the Democrat Party, don't want to reveal him because
there would be hell to pay. Reveal the Whistleblower and end
the Impeachment Hoax!''\431\
``But the whistleblower should be revealed because
the whistleblower gave false stories. Some people would call it
a fraud; I won't go that far. But when I read it closely, I
probably would. But the whistleblower should be
revealed.''\432\
``I think that the whistleblower gave a lot of
false information.''\433\
``The whistleblower is not a whistleblower. He's a
fake. . . . Everybody knows who the whistleblower is. And the
whistleblower is a political operative.''\434\
In response to a request from Intelligence Committee
Ranking Member Nunes to call the whistleblower to testify at an
open hearing, Chairman Schiff underscored the danger posed by
the President's threats against the whistleblower and why the
whistleblower's testimony was now unnecessary:
The Committee also will not facilitate efforts by
President Trump and his allies in Congress to threaten,
intimidate, and retaliate against the whistleblower who
courageously raised the initial alarm. It remains the
duty of the Intelligence Committee to protect
whistleblowers, and until recently, this was a
bipartisan priority. The whistleblower has a right
under laws championed by this Committee to remain
anonymous and to be protected from harm.
The impeachment inquiry, moreover, has gathered an
ever-growing body of evidence--from witnesses and
documents, including the President's own words in his
July 25 call record--that not only confirms, but far
exceeds, the initial information in the whistleblower's
complaint. The whistleblower's testimony is therefore
redundant and unnecessary. In light of the President's
threats, the individual's appearance before us would
only place their personal safety at grave risk.\435\
Until President Trump's attacks on the whistleblower,
Republicans and Democrats were united in protecting
whistleblowers' right to report abuses of power and be free
from retaliation.\436\ For example, Ranking Member Nunes,
serving in 2017 as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
spoke in defense of whistleblowers, stating: ``We want people
to come forward and we will protect the identity of those
people at all cost.''\437\ He also stated:
As you know, and I've said this several times, we
don't talk about sources at this committee. . . . The
good thing is, is that we have continued to have people
come forward, voluntarily, to this committee and we
want to continue that and I will tell you that that
will not happen if we tell you who our sources are and
people that come come to the committee.\438\
Other Republican Members of Congress have opposed efforts
to expose the whistleblower. For example, Senator Charles
Grassley stated:
This person appears to have followed the
whistleblower protection laws and ought to be heard out
and protected. We should always work to respect
whistleblowers' requests for confidentiality. Any
further media reports on the whistleblower's identity
don't serve the public interest--even if the conflict
sells more papers or attracts clicks.\439\
Senator Richard Burr, the Chair of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, affirmed that he would ``never''
want the identity of the whistleblower revealed and stated,
``We protect whistleblowers. We protect witnesses in our
committee.''\440\
Senator Mitt Romney also called for support of the
whistleblower's rights, stating: ``[W]histleblowers should be
entitled to confidentiality and privacy, because they play a
vital function in our democracy.''\441\
SECTION II ENDNOTES
\1\U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5.
\2\Statement of George Mason, Madison Debates (July 20, 1787).
\3\McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (``We are of [the]
opinion that the power of inquiry--with process to enforce--it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.'');
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (``the
power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws'');
Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379,
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019) (``[T]he House
of Representatives has the constitutionally vested responsibility to
conduct investigations of suspected abuses of power within the
government, and to act to curb those improprieties, if required.''). As
of this report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331
(D.C. Cir.).
\4\Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (``Vigilant
oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of
office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment.'');
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing in dicta the ``inquiry into
presidential impeachment'' opened by the House Judiciary Committee
regarding President Nixon and explaining, ``The investigative authority
of the Judiciary Committee with respect to presidential conduct has an
express constitutional source.''); In re Report & Recommendation of
June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to House of
Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) (``[I]t should not be
forgotten that we deal in a matter of the most critical moment to the
Nation, an impeachment investigation involving the President of the
United States. It would be difficult to conceive of a more compelling
need than that of this country for an unswervingly fair inquiry based
on all the pertinent information.''). In 1833, Justice Joseph Story
reasoned--while explaining why pardons cannot confer immunity from
impeachment--that, ``The power of impeachment will generally be applied
to persons holding high office under the government; and it is of great
consequence that the President should not have the power of preventing
a thorough investigation of their conduct, or of securing them against
the disgrace of a public conviction by impeachment, should they deserve
it. The constitution has, therefore, wisely interposed this check upon
his power.'' Joseph L. Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States Sec. 1501 (1873 ed., T.M. Cooley (ed.)).
\5\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M.
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
\6\Statement of Rep. William Lyman, Annals of Congress, 4th Cong.
601 (1796).
\7\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, A Sitting
President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution (Oct.
16, 2000) (explaining that a President ``who engages in criminal
behavior falling into the category of `high Crimes and Misdemeanors'''
is ``always subject to removal from office upon impeachment by the
House and conviction by the Senate'') (online at www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olc-v024-p0222_0.pdf).
\8\Id. (``Moreover, the constitutionally specified impeachment
process ensures that the immunity [of a sitting President from
prosecution] would not place the President `above the law.''').
President Trump's personal lawyers have staked out the more extreme
position that the President may not be investigated by law enforcement
agencies while in office. For example, President Trump's personal
attorney asserted in court that the President could not be investigated
by local authorities if he committed murder while in office. If Trump
Shoots Someone on 5th Ave., Does He Have Immunity? His Lawyer Says Yes,
New York Times (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/
nyregion/trump-taxes-vance.html). A federal district court and appeals
court rejected this argument. Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631 (2nd Cir.
2019) (``presidential immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state
grand jury subpoena directing a third party to produce non-privileged
material, even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to
the President''); Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(calling the President's claims of ``unqualified and boundless''
immunity from judicial process ``repugnant to the nation's governmental
structure and constitutional values''). The case is currently being
appealed.
\9\Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
\10\McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (``A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information--which not infrequently is true--recourse must be
had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere
requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.'');
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (``the
subpoena power may be exercised by a committee acting, as here, on
behalf of one of the Houses''); Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers,
558 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2008) (``In short, there can be no question
that Congress has a right--derived from its Article I legislative
function--to issue and enforce subpoenas, and a corresponding right to
the information that is the subject of such subpoenas. . . .
Congress''s power of inquiry is as broad as its power to legislate and
lies at the very heart of Congress's constitutional role. Indeed, the
former is necessary to the proper exercise of the latter: according to
the Supreme Court, the ability to compel testimony is necessary to the
effective functioning of courts and legislatures.''') (citation
omitted).
\11\U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2.
\12\Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
\13\See Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 84
(D.D.C. 2008) (``Thus, federal precedent dating back as far as 1807
contemplates that even the Executive is bound to comply with duly
issued subpoenas.'').
\14\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379,
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this
report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C.
Cir.).
\15\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505.
\16\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 (also prohibiting making ``any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation'' or
making or using ``any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
entry'' in connection with a Congressional investigation).
\17\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b); See also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1515(a)
(defining ``official proceeding'' to include ``a proceeding before the
Congress'').
\18\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(d).
\19\See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302; 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1034; P.L. 113-
126.
\20\P.L. 116-6, Sec. 713 (``No part of any appropriation contained
in this or any other Act shall be available for the payment of the
salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Government, who . . .
prohibits or prevents, or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent,
any other officer or employee of the Federal Government from having any
direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member,
committee, or subcommittee of the Congress in connection with any
matter pertaining to the employment of such other officer or employee
or pertaining to the department or agency of such other officer or
employee in any way, irrespective of whether such communication or
contact is at the initiative of such other officer or employee or in
response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee, or
subcommittee.'').
\21\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M.
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
\22\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of William
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 105th Cong. (1998)
(H. Rep. 105-830).
\23\The White House, The President's Remarks Announcing
Developments and Procedures to be Followed in Connection with the
Investigation (Apr. 17, 1973). President Nixon initially stated that
members of his ``personal staff'' would ``decline a request for a
formal appearance before a committee of the Congress,'' but reversed
course approximately one month later. The White House, Statement by the
President, Executive Privilege (Mar. 12, 1973).
\24\See, e.g., Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities, Testimony of John Dean, Watergate and Related Activities,
Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 93rd Cong. (June 25, 1973); Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of H.R.
Haldeman, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate
Investigation, 93rd Cong. (July 30, 1973); Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of Alexander Butterfield,
Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation,
93rd Cong. (July 16, 1973); Senate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities, Testimony of John Ehrlichman, Watergate and
Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 93rd Cong. (July
24, 1973).
\25\See House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M.
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
\26\Id.
\27\Id. (quoting letter from Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., House
Committee on the Judiciary, to President Richard M. Nixon (May 30,
1974)).
\28\H.R. Jour., 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 693 (Apr. 20, 1846).
\29\Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition and House Select Committee to Investigate
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Testimony of Oliver North, Iran-
Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee
to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
Oppositions, 100th Cong. (July 7, 1987); Senate Select Committee on
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and
House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with
Iran, Testimony of John Poindexter, Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint
Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms
Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Secret
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Oppositions, 100th Cong.
(July 15, 1987).
\30\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Civ. No. 1:19-cv-02379,
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this
report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C.
Cir.).
\31\Committee on Government Reform, Democratic Staff, Congressional
Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 2006) (online at
https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/http://oversight-
archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-91336.pdf) (noting
that Republican Dan Burton, Chairman of the Committee on Government
Reform, deposed 141 Clinton Administration officials during his
tenure).
\32\Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist
Attack in Benghazi, Final Report of the Select Committee on the Events
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, 114th Cong. (2016)
(H. Rep. 114-848) (noting that the Select Committee interviewed or
received testimony from 107 people none of whom was instructed not to
appear including 57 current and former State Department officials such
as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Chief of Staff and Counselor to
the Secretary of State Cheryl Mills, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director
of Policy Planning Jacob Sullivan, and Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations Huma Abedin; 24 Defense Department officials such as
Secretary Leon Panetta and General Carter Ham; and 19 Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials such as Director David Petraeus and
former Deputy Director Michael Morell).
\33\Id. (including productions of 71,640 pages of State Department
documents, 300 pages of CIA intelligence analyses, 200 pages of Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) documents, 900 pages of Defense
Department documents, and 750 pages of National Security Agency
documents).
\34\See, e.g., House rule X, clause 2(a) (assigning ``general
oversight responsibilities'' to committees); House Rule XI, clause 2(m)
(authorizing Committees to ``hold such hearings as it considers
necessary'' and to ``require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance
and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books,
records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it
considers necessary''); H. Res. 6 (2019) (granting deposition authority
to committees); 116th Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition
Authority, Congressional Record (Jan. 25, 2019) (establishing
procedures for committee depositions).
\35\See, e.g., House Rules (2017); H. Res. 5 (2017); 115th Congress
Staff Deposition Authority Procedures, Congressional Record (Jan. 13,
2017).
\36\Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, Department of Justice,
Report on The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016
Presidential Election, Vol. I (March 2019) (online at www.justice.gov/
storage/report.pdf); Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Department
of Justice, Report on The Investigation Into Russian Interference In
The 2016 Presidential Election, Vol. II (March 2019) (online at
www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume2.pdf).
\37\See H. Res. 430; see also H. Rep. 116-105 (2019) (the purposes
of the Judiciary Committee's investigation include ``considering
whether any of the conduct described in the Special Counsel's Report
warrants the Committee in taking any further steps under Congress'
Article I powers,'' including ``whether to approve articles of
impeachment with respect to the President or any other Administration
official'').
\38\See Letter from Chairman Jerrold Nadler, House Committee on the
Judiciary, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Chairwoman Maxine Waters, House Committee on Financial
Services, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and
Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
(Aug. 22, 2019) (online at https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/
democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/
FiveChairsLetter8.22.pdf).
\39\Id.
\40\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President,
The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf); Letter from
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman
Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform,
to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State (Sept. 9, 2019)
(online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf); Letter from
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah
E. Cummings, Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R.
Pompeo, Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov;/sites;/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/;2019-
09-13.EEC%20EL;E%20Schiff;%20re%20Ukraine.pdf).
\41\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Sept. 22, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-66/) (``We had
a great conversation. The conversation I had was largely
congratulatory. It was largely corruption all of the corruption taking
place. It was largely the fact that we don't want our people, like Vice
President Biden and his son, creating to the corruption already in the
Ukraine.'').
\42\Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Remarks Announcing
Impeachment Inquiry (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at www.speaker.gov/
newsroom/92419-0).
\43\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 25,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\44\See, e.g., Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Mick Mulvaney, Acting
Chief of Staff, The White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-10-04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-
WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
\45\H. Res. 660 (2019).
\46\Trump Vows Stonewall of `All' House Subpoenas, Setting Up Fight
Over Powers, New York Times (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/24/us/politics/donald-trump-subpoenas.html).
\47\While Bemoaning Mueller Probe, Trump Falsely Says the
Constitution Gives Him `The Right to do Whatever I Want', Washington
Post (July 23, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/
07/23/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-
right-do-whatever-i-want/).
\48\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1179179573541511176).
\49\At Louisiana Rally, Trump Lashes Out at Impeachment Inquiry and
Pelosi, New York Times (Oct. 11, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/11/us/trump-rally-louisiana-lake-charles.html).
\50\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 18, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1185374394350215169) (purporting to
quote former Rep. Jason Chaffetz).
\51\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 21, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1175409914384125952).
\52\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1176559970390806530).
\53\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1176623010230525953).
\54\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President Salih
of Iraq Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-salih-iraq-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny-2/).
\55\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President
Bukele of El Salvador Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 25, 2019) (online
at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-bukele-el-salvador-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/).
\56\The White House, Remarks by President Trump in a Multilateral
Meeting on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Sept. 25, 2019)
(online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-multilateral-meeting-bolivarian-republic-venezuela-new-york-ny/).
\57\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 26, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1177285017636093953).
\58\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1179023004241727489).
\59\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 5, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1180482408522629120).
\60\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181761045486080002).
\61\The White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of
Executive Orders on Transparency in Federal Guidance and Enforcement
(Oct. 9, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-orders-transparency-federal-
guidance-enforcement/).
\62\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181913137483829250).
\63\ Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1181969511697788928).
\64\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 20, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1186035686396321793).
\65\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 12, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1194214569591394304).
\66\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1198733640722718725).
\67\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 26, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1199352977934487553).
\68\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon Air Force One
Arrival (Sept. 26, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-air-force-one-arrival-prince-
georges-county-md/).
\69\See, e.g., Co-Equal, Investigative Rules and Practices Followed
by House Republicans (online at www.co-equal.org/guide-to-
congressional-oversight/investigative-rules-and-practices-followed-by-
house-republicans). See also Committee on Government Reform, Democratic
Staff, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17,
2006) (online at https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/
http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-
91336.pdf) (noting that House Republicans conducted hundreds of
confidential depositions of both political appointees and career
officials without agency counsel present, with one Committee alone
conducting over 140 depositions of Clinton Administration officials).
\70\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
\71\Speech: Donald Trump Holds a Political Rally in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, Factbase Videos (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at www.youtube.com/
watch?time_continue=742&v=_y8Al_mGwmc&feature=emb_logo).
\72\Gregg Nunziata, a former legal counsel and senior policy
advisor to Senator Marco Rubio, stated: ``This letter is bananas. A
barely-lawyered temper tantrum.'' Gregg Nunziata, Twitter (Oct. 8,
2019) (online at https://twitter.com/greggnunziata/status/
1181685021926662144). Jonathan Turley, a law professor who has
represented House Republicans, stated: ``A President cannot simply pick
up his marbles and leave the game because he does not like the other
players. A refusal to cooperate with a constitutionally mandated
process can itself be an abuse of power.'' White House Issues Defiant
Letter Refusing to Cooperate in Impeachment Proceedings, Res Ipsa
Loquitur (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://jonathanturley.org/2019/10/
09/white-house-issues-defiant-letter-refusing-to-cooperate-in-
impeachment-proceedings/). Preet Bharara, the former U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, stated, ``It's one of the worst
letters I've seen from the White House counsel's office.'' George
Conway, a prominent conservative attorney, called Mr. Cipollone's
letter ``a disgrace to the country, a disgrace to the presidency, and a
disgrace to the legal profession.'' He accused the White House of
``clearly engaging in obstructionist tactics.'' Diagnosing Trump (with
George Conway), Stay Tuned with Preet Bharara (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at
https://cafe.com/stay-tuned-transcript-diagnosing-trump-with-george-
conway/). Mr. Conway also stated: ``I cannot fathom how any self-
respecting member of the bar could affix his name to this letter. It's
pure hackery, and it disgraces the profession.'' George T. Conway, III,
Twitter (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/gtconway3d/
status/1181685229687394307).
\73\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Chairman,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
\74\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Exclusion of
Agency Counsel from Congressional Depositions in the Impeachment
Context (Nov. 1, 2019) (online at www.justice.gov/olc/file/1214996/
download).
\75\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Legal Aspects
of Impeachment: An Overview (1974) (quoting President James K. Polk)
(online at www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/980036/download).
\76\Position of the Executive Department Regarding Investigative
Reports, 40 Op. Atty Gen. 45 (1941).
\77\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
\78\See, e.g., The White House, Remarks by President Trump and
President Salih of Iraq Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 24, 2019)
(online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-president-salih-iraq-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/) (``The phone
call was perfect.''); The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon
Arriving at the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-
arriving-u-n-general-assembly-new-york-ny/) (``That call was
perfect.''); Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 11, 2019) (online at
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1193615188311912449) (``The
call to the Ukrainian President was PERFECT.'').
\79\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
\80\See House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M.
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305) (Impeachment Article III: ``In refusing to produce these papers
and things, Richard M. Nixon, substituting his judgment as to what
materials were necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the
presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of
Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions and judgments
necessary to the exercise of the sole power of impeachment vested by
the Constitution in the House of Representatives.'').
\81\In this case, one Republican Member of the House of
Representatives supported impeaching President Trump--Rep. Justin Amash
from Michigan. In explaining his support, Rep. Amash noted the
importance of upholding Congress' ``duties under our Constitution''
rather than ``loyalty to a political party.'' After Rep. Amash
announced his support for impeachment, President Trump denounced him as
a ``total lightweight'' and a ``loser.'' Rep. Amash subsequently
declared that he was leaving the Republican party. See Justin Amash,
Twitter (May 18, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/justinamash/
status/1129831626844921862); Trump Calls Representative Justin Amash a
`Loser' Over Impeachment Talk, New York Times (May 19, 2019) (online at
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/trump-justin-amash-
impeachment.html); Justin Amash: Our politics is in a partisan death
spiral. That's why I'm leaving the GOP, Washington Post (July 4, 2019)
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justin-amash-our-politics-
is-in-a-partisan-death-spiral-thats-why-im-leaving-the-gop/2019/07/04/
afbe0480-9e3d-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html).
\82\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Chairman,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
\83\Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice Sec. 603 (stating
that ``various events have been credited with setting an impeachment in
motion,'' including ``facts developed and reported by an investigating
committee of the House''). On October 25, 2019, a federal district
court affirmed that ``no governing law requires'' the House to hold a
such a vote. In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857
(D.D.C. 2019). More than 300 legal scholars agreed, concluding that
``the Constitution does not mandate the process for impeachment and
there is no constitutional requirement that the House of
Representatives authorize an impeachment inquiry before one begins.''
An Open Letter from Legal Scholars on Trump Impeachment Inquiry (Oct.
17, 2019) (online at www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
Open-Letter-from-Legal-Scholars-re-Impeachment.pdf).
\84\In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857 (D.D.C.
2019).
\85\See, e.g., 3 Deschler Ch. 14 Sec. 5 (discussing impeachment of
Justice William O. Douglas).
\86\See, e.g., H. Res. 87, 101st Cong. (1989) (impeachment of Judge
Walter L. Nixon, Jr.); H. Res. 461, 99th Cong. (1986) (impeachment of
Judge Harry E. Claiborne).
\87\H. Res. 6 (2019); H. Res. 660 (2019). In addition, on June 11,
2019, the House approved House Resolution 430, which, in part,
authorized the House Committee on the Judiciary to seek judicial
enforcement of subpoenas in the ongoing investigation related to
Special Counsel Mueller's report. The resolution granted the Committee
``any and all necessary authority under Article I of the Constitution''
to seek judicial enforcement. The accompanying report by the House
Committee on Rules explained that this authority is intended to further
the Judiciary Committee's ongoing investigation, the purpose of which
includes assessing whether to recommend ``articles of impeachment with
respect to the President.'' H. Rep. 116-108, quoting H. Rep. 116-105.
\88\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf). President Trump has also made these claims
directly, stating: ``we had a great two weeks watching these crooked
politicians, not giving us due process, not giving us lawyers, not
giving us the right to speak, and destroying their witnesses,'' and
``we weren't allowed any rights.'' Speech: Donald Trump Holds a
Political Rally in Sunrise, Florida, Factbase Videos (Nov. 26, 2019)
(online atwww.youtube.com/watch?v=zoRcCRULQl8&feature=youtu.be).
\89\Indeed, Mr. Cipollone articulated no basis under the
Constitution for his various ``due process'' demands and there is no
such basis, especially when the House is engaged in a fact-finding
investigation as part of its efforts to ascertain whether to consider
articles of impeachment. See H. Rept. 116-266 (2019).
\90\H. Res. 660 (2019).
\91\H. Rept. 116-266 (2019) (``The purpose of providing these
protections is to ensure that the president has a fair opportunity to
present evidence to the Judiciary Committee if it must weigh whether to
recommend articles of impeachment against him to the full House.'').
\92\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings,
Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf).
\93\In a September 25, 2019, statement, a Department of Justice
spokesperson stated: ``The Attorney General was first notified of the
President's conversation with Ukrainian President Zelensky several
weeks after the call took place, when the Department of Justice learned
of a potential referral. The President has not spoken with the Attorney
General about having Ukraine investigate anything relating to former
Vice President Biden or his son. The President has not asked the
Attorney General to contact Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The
Attorney General has not communicated with Ukraine--on this or any
other subject. Nor has the Attorney General discussed this matter, or
anything relating to Ukraine, with Rudy Giuliani.'' As to the
President's conduct with regard to Ukraine, the Department stated: ``In
August, the Department of Justice was referred a matter relating to a
letter the Director of National Intelligence had received from the
Inspector General for the Intelligence Community regarding a purported
whistleblower complaint. The Inspector General's letter cited a
conversation between the President and Ukrainian President Zelensky as
a potential violation of federal campaign finance law, while
acknowledging that neither the Inspector General nor the complainant
had firsthand knowledge of the conversation. Relying on established
procedures set forth in the Justice Manual, the Department's Criminal
Division reviewed the official record of the call and determined, based
on the facts and applicable law, that there was no campaign finance
violation and that no further action was warranted. All relevant
components of the Department agreed with this legal conclusion, and the
Department has concluded the matter.'' Department of Justice (Sept. 25,
2019) (as emailed by the Department of Justice to the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence).
\94\H. Rept. 116-266 (2019) (The report continued: ``As previously
described, an impeachment inquiry is not a criminal trial and should
not be confused with one. The president's liberty is not at stake and
the constitutional protections afforded a criminal defendant do not as
a matter of course apply. The constitutionally permitted consequences
of impeachment are limited to immediate removal from office and
potentially being barred from holding future federal office. Moreover,
it is the Senate that conducts the trial to determine whether the
conduct outlined in the articles warrant the president's removal from
office, which requires a 2/3 majority vote. Indeed, given the nature of
the ongoing investigation into the Ukraine matter, President Trump has
received additional procedural protections. During closed door
depositions held by HPSCI and others related to the Ukraine matter,
minority members have been present and granted equal time to question
witnesses brought before the committees. This is unlike the process in
the preceding two presidential impeachment inquiries, which relied
significantly upon information gathered by third-party
investigators.'').
\95\See Committee on Government Reform, Democratic Staff,
Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 2006)
(online at https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/http://
oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-91336.pdf)
(explaining that when Rep. Dan Burton served as Chairman of the
Committee on Government Reform, the Committee deposed 141 Clinton
Administration officials without agency counsel present--including
White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty; White House Chief of Staff
Erskine Bowles; White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum; White House
Counsel Jack Quinn; Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey; Deputy
White House Counsel Cheryl Mills; Deputy White House Chief of Staff
Harold Ickes; Chief of Staff to the Vice President Roy Neel; and Chief
of Staff to the First Lady Margaret Williams).
\96\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E.
Cummings, Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf). On November 1, 2019, after the House approved H. Res.
660, the Administration continued to press this spurious claim, with
the Office of Legal Counsel issuing an opinion asserting that
``Congressional committees participating in an impeachment inquiry may
not validly compel executive branch witnesses to testify about matters
that potentially involve information protected by executive privilege
without the assistance of agency counsel.'' Department of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel, Exclusion of Agency Counsel from Congressional
Depositions in the Impeachment Context (Nov. 1, 2019) (online at
www.justice.gov/olc/file/1214996/download). As discussed in this
section, this position is entirely unsupported by judicial precedent
and erroneous.
\97\U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2.
\98\The regulations that govern House depositions state: ``Only
members, Committee staff designated by the chair or ranking minority
member, an official reporter, the witness, and the witness's counsel
are permitted to attend. Observers or counsel for other persons,
including counsel for government agencies, may not attend.'' 116th
Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition Authority, Congressional
Record, H1216 (Jan. 25, 2019) (online at www.congress.gov/116/crec/
2019/01/25/CREC-2019-01-25-pt1-PgH1216-2.pdf).
\99\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Committee Depositions in the
House of Representatives: Longstanding Republican and Democratic
Practice of Excluding Agency Counsel (Nov. 5, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
Committee%20Depositions%20in%20the%20House%20of%20Representatives_Longst
anding% 20Republican%20and%20Democratic%20Practice%20of
%20Excluding%20Agency%20 CounselCounsel.pdf).
\100\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
\101\Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
\102\See, e.g., S. 2537 (requiring an investigation by the State
Department Inspector General into the withholding of aid to Ukraine,
directing the President to immediately obligate previously appropriated
funds, and authorizing funds to counter Russian influence); H.R. 3047
(providing support to Ukraine to defend its independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity).
\103\In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857 (D.D.C.
2019), quoting Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30475
(D.D.C. 2019) (``Nothing in the Constitution or case law . . . compels
Congress to abandon its legislative role at the first scent of
potential illegality and confine itself exclusively to the impeachment
process.''').
\104\See, e.g., the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information
Act, P.L. 93-502; Ethics in Government Act of 1978, P.L. 95-52;
Presidential Records Act of 1978, P.L. 95-591; Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, P.L. 93-443.
\105\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf); Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the
President, The White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Eliot L. Engel,
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
\106\United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (``Rather, each branch should take cognizance of an implicit
constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a
realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the
particular fact situation.'').
\107\For example, on November 22, 2019, the Department of State
produced to a private party 99 pages of emails, letters, notes,
timelines, and news articles under a court order pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act. State Department Releases Ukraine Documents
to American Oversight, American Oversight (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at
www.americanoversight.org/state-department-releases-ukraine-documents-
to-american-oversight).
\108\Even if the President were to make a colorable assertion of
executive privilege, which he has not, the Supreme Court has held that
the privilege is not absolute. In the context of a grand jury subpoena,
the Supreme Court found that the President's ``generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in
a pending criminal trial.'' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held that executive privilege
is a ``qualified'' privilege and that ``courts must balance the public
interests at stake in determining whether the privilege should yield in
a particular case, and must specifically consider the need of the party
seeking privileged evidence.'' In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C.
Cir. 1997). As described above, Congress' need for information during
an impeachment inquiry is particularly ``compelling.'' In re Report &
Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of
Evidence to House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974)
(``[I]t should not be forgotten that we deal in a matter of the most
critical moment to the Nation, an impeachment investigation involving
the President of the United States. It would be difficult to conceive
of a more compelling need than that of this country for an unswervingly
fair inquiry based on all the pertinent information.'').
\109\See, e.g., Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the
President, The White House, to William Pittard, Counsel to Mick
Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 8, 2019)
(asserting that Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney ``is absolutely
immune from compelled congressional testimony with respect to matters
related to his service as a senior advisor to the President'' and that
``[s]ubjecting a senior presidential advisor to the congressional
subpoena power would be akin to requiring the President himself to
appear before Congress on matters relating to the performance of his
constitutionally assigned executive functions'').
\110\Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53
(D.D.C. 2008) (``The Executive cannot identify a single judicial
opinion that recognizes absolute immunity for senior presidential
advisors in this or any other context. That simple yet critical fact
bears repeating: the asserted absolute immunity claim here is entirely
unsupported by existing case law. In fact, there is Supreme Court
authority that is all but conclusive on this question and that
powerfully suggests that such advisors do not enjoy absolute immunity.
The Court therefore rejects the Executive's claim of absolute immunity
for senior presidential aides.'').
\111\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379,
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this
report, an appeal is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir.).
\112\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
\113\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the
President, The White House (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2019-09-
24.eec_engel_schiff_to_cipollone-wh_re_potus_ukraine.pdf).
\114\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/
sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
\115\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Oct. 18, 2019).
\116\Email from Bureau of Legislative Affairs, Department of State,
to Committee Staff (Oct. 2, 2019).
\117\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
\118\Id.
\119\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the
President, The White House (Sept. 24, 2019).
\120\Memorandum from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings to Members of the
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Notice of Intent to Issue
Subpoenas (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
02.COR%20WH%20Subpoena%20Memo%20and%20Schedule.pdf).
\121\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/
sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
\122\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf).
\123\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
\124\On September 13, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena
pursuant to its oversight authority to the Acting Director of National
Intelligence to compel the production of a complaint submitted by an
Intelligence Community whistleblower, as well as other records. The
Intelligence Committee issued this subpoena before Speaker Pelosi
announced on September 24 that the Intelligence Committee and other
committees would be continuing their work under the umbrella of the
impeachment inquiry being conducted by the Judiciary Committee. As a
result, this subpoena should not be conflated with subpoenas issued as
part of the impeachment inquiry. See Letter from Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph
Maguire, Acting Director of National Intelligence, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019).
\125\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr.
21, 2019) (online at http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2019/images/11/15/4-21-
19.trump-zelensky.call.pdf); The White House, Memorandum of Telephone
Conversation (July 25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/09/Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
\126\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
\127\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 53; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 19-20.
\128\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 186-187; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 166-167.
\129\See, e.g., Cooper Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
\130\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 78-79.
\131\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 36-37.
\132\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 31.
\133\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
\134\The review reportedly uncovered ``early August email exchanges
between acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and White House budget
officials seeking to provide an explanation for withholding the funds
after the president had already ordered a hold in mid-July on the
nearly $400 million in security assistance.'' The review also
reportedly included interviews with ``some key White House officials
involved in handling Ukraine aid and dealing with complaints and
concerns in the aftermath of the call between Trump and Zelensky.''
White House Review Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify
Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov.
24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-
review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-
decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-
bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html).
\135\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Vice President Michael R. Pence
(Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20re%20Request%20to%20VP%2010-04-
19%20Letter%20and%20Schedule.pdf).
\136\Id.
\137\Letter from Matthew E. Morgan, Counsel to the Vice President,
Office of the Vice President, to Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 15, 2019).
\138\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 61.
\139\Williams Dep. Tr. at 129.
\140\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 15.
\141\Id. at 23-24.
\142\Williams Dep. Tr. at 74-75.
\143\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Acting Director Russell T. Vought, Office of
Management and Budget (Oct. 7, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2019-10-
07.eec_engel_schiff_to_vought-_omb_breb_subpoena.pdf).
\144\Id.
\145\Letter from Jason Yaworske, Associate Director for Legislative
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 15, 2019).
\146\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 23-26.
\147\Id. at 36-41.
\148\Id. at 57-60, 62-63.
\149\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf).
\150\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 23, 2019).
\151\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Document%20Subpoena.pdf).
\152\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State
(Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
08.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Sondland%20re%20Subpoena.pdf); Letter
from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador William Taylor, Department of State
(Oct. 4, 2019); Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190927_-
_eec_engel_schiff_to_brechbuhl_re_individual_deposition_request.pdf);
Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Deputy Assistant Secretary George P. Kent,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019); Letter from Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah
E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador
Kurt Volker, Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019); Letter from Chairman
Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
\153\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State,
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1,
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E.
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same
day).
\154\Id.
\155\Kent Dep. Tr. at 27.
\156\Id. at 33-34.
\157\Id. at 34-35.
\158\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State,
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1,
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E.
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same
day).
\159\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Deputy Secretary John J.
Sullivan, Department of State (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/4/6/4683bc86-be2a-49fc-9e76-
7cdbf669592f/98BEBD8006DE62BA36BEBD175775F744.2019-10-1-ele-abs-eec-to-
depsec-sullivan.pdf).
\160\Pompeo: `I Was on the Phone Call' with Trump and Ukrainian
President, CNN (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/10/02/
politics/mike-pompeo-ukraine-call/index.html).
\161\Email from Committee Staff to Bureau of Legislative Affairs,
Department of State (Oct. 7, 2019).
\162\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for
Management, Department of State, to Andrew Wright, Counsel to Deputy
Assistant Secretary George P. Kent, Department of State (Oct. 14,
2019).
\163\Kent Dep. Tr. at 30-31, 46.
\164\Id. at 32.
\165\Id. at 35.
\166\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
\167\Id.
\168\Id. In addition, Dr. Fiona Hill, the former Senior Director
for Europe and Russia at the National Security Council, produced
calendar entries relating to relevant meetings. Fiona Hill Document
Production, Bates Hill0001-Hill0049 (Oct. 13, 2019).
\169\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000001-KV00000065
(Oct. 2, 2019).
\170\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505.
\171\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 3-4 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\172\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 160.
\173\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of
State, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2019).
\174\State Department Releases Ukraine Documents to American
Oversight, American Oversight (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at
www.americanoversight.org/state-department-releases-ukraine-documents-
to-american-oversight); American Oversight v. Dep't of State, Case No.
19-cv-2934, Doc. No. 15 (D.D.C. November 25, 2019).
\175\Email from Office Manager to the Secretary of State to S_All
(Mar. 26, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_1Docs_11-22.pdf).
\176\Email from Madeleine Westerhout to State Department Official,
(Mar. 27, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf).
\177\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Document%20Subpoena.pdf).
\178\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 33-34.
\179\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 20-23 (Nov. 20, 2019).
\180\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 45-46.
\181\Hale Dep. Tr. at 147-148.
\182\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Mark Esper, Department of Defense
(Oct. 7, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2019-10-07.eec_engel_schiff_to_esper-dod_re_subpoena.pdf).
\183\Transcript: Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on ``Face the
Nation,'' October 13, 2019, CBS News (Oct. 13, 2019) (online at
www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper-on-
face-the-nation-october-13-2019/).
\184\Letter from Robert R. Hood, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E.
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 15, 2019).
\185\Transcript: Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on ``Face the
Nation,'' October 13, 2019, CBS News (Oct. 13, 2019) (online at
www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper-on-
face-the-nation-october-13-2019/).
\186\See, e.g., Cooper Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
\187\Id. at 33.
\188\Id. at 33-38.
\189\Cooper Hearing Tr. at 13-14.
\190\Id. at 14.
\191\Id.
\192\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Rick Perry, Department
of Energy (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
10.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Perry-
DOE%20Joint%20Cover%20Letter%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
\193\Letter from Melissa F. Burnison, Assistant Secretary for
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Energy, to
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman
Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform
(Oct. 18, 2019).
\194\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 160.
\195\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
\196\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State,
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
\197\Letter from Chairman Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Rudy Giuliani (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-%20Giuliani%20HPSCI%20Subpoena%20Letter.pdf).
\198\Letter from Jon A. Sale, Counsel to Rudy Giuliani, to
Committee Staff (Oct. 15, 2019).
\199\Id.
\200\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Igor Fruman (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-
%20Fruman%20Letter%20and%20Doc%20Request%20Schedule.pdf); Letter from
Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight
and Reform, to Lev Parnas (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-
%20Parnas%20Letter%20and%20Doc%20Request%20Schedule.pdf).
\201\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev
Parnas (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/2019-10-
09.eec_engel_schiff_to_parnas_fruman_re_subpoena.pdf).
\202\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 3, 2019).
\203\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 8, 2019).
\204\Email from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 9, 2019).
\205\Email from Committee Staff to John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor
Fruman and Lev Parnas (Oct. 10, 2019).
\206\Email from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 10, 2019).
\207\Exclusive: Giuliani Associate Parnas Will Comply with Trump
Impeachment Inquiry--Lawyer, Reuters (Nov. 4, 2019) (online at
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-impeachment-parnas-exclusiv/
exclusive-giuliani-associate-now-willing-to-comply-with-trump-
impeachment-inquiry-lawyer-idUSKBN1XE297). On November 23, 2019, Mr.
Parnas' attorney informed the press that ``Mr. Parnas learned from
former Ukrainian Prosecutor General Victor Shokin that [Ranking Member
Devin] Nunes had met with Shokin in Vienna last December.'' According
to the report, ``Parnas says he worked to put Nunes in touch with
Ukrainians who could help Nunes dig up dirt on Biden and Democrats in
Ukraine, according to Bondy.'' Exclusive: Giuliani Associate Willing to
Tell Congress Nunes Met with Ex-Ukrainian Official to Get Dirt on
Biden, CNN (Nov. 23, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/11/22/politics/
nunes-vienna-trip-ukrainian-prosecutor-biden/index.html). On November
24, 2019, Mr. Parnas' attorney told press that his client had arranged
skype and phone calls earlier this year between Ranking Member Nunes'
staff and Ukraine's chief anti-corruption prosecutor, Nazar
Kholodnytsky, as well as a deputy in Ukraine's Prosecutor General's
office, Kostantyn Kulyk. According to Mr. Parnas' attorney, Ranking
Member Nunes had actually planned a trip to Ukraine instead of the
calls, but cancelled the trip when his staff realized it would require
alerting Chairman Schiff about the travel. Giuliani Associate Parnas
Wants to Testify that Nunes Aides Hid Ukraine Meetings on Biden Dirt
from Schiff, CNBC (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.cnbc.com/2019/11/24/
giuliani-ally-would-testify-that-nunes-staffers-hid-ukraine-meetings-
from-schiff.html).
\208\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff,
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L.
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8,
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
\209\See 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 192, 194. Witnesses who received
subpoenas that were subsequently withdrawn would not face a similar
risk of being held in contempt of Congress.
\210\See, e.g., Email from Committee Staff to Mick Mulvaney, Acting
Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019) (``Your failure or
refusal to comply with the subpoena, including at the direction or
behest of the President, shall constitute further evidence of
obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may be used as an
adverse inference against you and the President. Moreover, your failure
to appear shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a
contempt proceeding.'').
\211\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of
Staff, The White House (Nov. 5, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2019-11-
05.CBM%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Depo%20Notice.pdf).
\212\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to
Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019).
\213\Email from William Pittard, Counsel to Mick Mulvaney, Acting
Chief of Staff, The White House, to Committee Staff (Nov. 8, 2019).
\214\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to William Pittard, Counsel to Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief
of Staff, The White House (Nov. 8, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
\215\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone,
Counsel to the President, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019).
\216\Mulvaney Dep. Tr. at 5.
\217\Id. at 7-9.
\218\On November 8, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney filed a motion in federal
court seeking to join a lawsuit, discussed below, filed by Dr. Charles
Kupperman seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether he should comply
with the Committees' subpoena. On November 11, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney
withdrew his request to join the case. White House Chief of Staff
Mulvaney Drops Bid to Join Kupperman Impeachment Lawsuit, Washington
Post (Nov. 11, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-
issues/bolton-and-kupperman-reject-white-house-chief-of-staff-
mulvaneys-bid-to-join-impeachment-lawsuit/2019/11/11/cdf40226-04ac-
11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
\219\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Robert B. Blair, Assistant
to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, The White
House (Oct. 24, 2019).
\220\Letter from Whitney C. Ellerman, Counsel to Robert B. Blair,
Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff,
The White House, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 2, 2019).
\221\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Whitney C. Ellerman, Counsel to Robert
B. Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of
Staff, The White House (Nov. 3, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the
President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, The White House
(Nov. 3, 2019).
\222\Blair Dep. Tr. at 6-7.
\223\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Charles J. Cooper and
Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Ambassador John Bolton, Former National
Security Advisor, The White House (Oct. 30, 2019).
\224\Email from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Ambassador John
Bolton, Former National Security Advisor, The White House, to Committee
Staff (Oct. 30, 2019).
\225\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Ambassador John
Bolton, Former National Security Advisor, The White House, to Douglas
N. Letter, General Counsel, House of Representatives (Nov. 8, 2019).
\226\In early November 2019, Ambassador Bolton's personal attorney
also informed Committee staff that if the Committees were to issue a
subpoena to compel his testimony, he would seek to join the lawsuit
filed by Dr. Kupperman. On November 24, 2019, Chairman Schiff stated,
``We've certainly been in touch with his lawyer and what we've been
informed by his lawyer because we invited him and he did not choose to
come in and testify, notwithstanding the fact that his deputy Fiona
Hill and his other deputy Colonel Vindman and Tim Morrison and others
on the National Security Council have shown the courage to come in is
if we subpoena him, they will sue us in court.'' Schiff Pushes Bolton
to Testify But Will Not Go to Court to Force Him, CNN (Nov. 24, 2019)
(online at www.cnn.com/2019/11/24/politics/adam-schiff-house-democrats-
impeachment-state-of-the-union-cnntv/index.html).
\227\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council,
The White House (Oct. 30, 2019).
\228\Eisenberg Dep. Tr. at 6 (``Mr. Eisenberg never acknowledged
receipt or otherwise responded to the committees' deposition request,
nor did any official at the White House.'').
\229\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council,
The White House (Nov. 1, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Subpoena to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the
President for National Security Affairs and Legal Advisor to the
National Security Council, The White House (Nov. 1, 2019).
\230\Letter from William A. Burck, Counsel to John A. Eisenberg,
Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council,
The White House, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 4, 2019).
\231\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to William A. Burck, Counsel to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council,
The White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
\232\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone,
Counsel to the President, the White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
\233\Eisenberg Dep. Tr. at 6-8.
\234\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Michael Ellis, Senior
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House
(Oct. 30, 2019).
\235\Email from Paul Butler, Counsel to Michael Ellis, Senior
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House,
to Committee Staff (Nov. 2, 2019).
\236\Email from Paul Butler, Counsel to Michael Ellis, Senior
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House,
to Committee Staff (Nov. 3, 2019).
\237\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Paul W. Butler, Counsel to Michael
Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council,
The White House (Nov. 3, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Subpoena to Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to
the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security
Council, National Security Council, The White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
\238\Ellis Dep. Tr. at 7.
\239\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Preston Wells Griffith,
Senior Director for International Energy and Environment, National
Security Council (Oct. 24, 2019).
\240\Letter from Karen D. Williams, Counsel to Preston Wells
Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and Environment,
National Security Council, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 4, 2019).
\241\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Karen D. Williams, Counsel to Preston
Wells Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and
Environment, National Security Council (Nov. 4, 2019); House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Preston Wells Griffith,
Senior Director for International Energy and Environment, National
Security Council (Nov. 4, 2019).
\242\Griffith Dep. Tr. at 5-6.
\243\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
National Security Council (Oct. 16, 2019).
\244\Email from Committee Staff to Charles J. Cooper and Michael W.
Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council
(Oct. 25, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Subpoena to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council
(Oct. 25, 2019).
\245\Compl., Kupperman v. U.S. House of Representatives et al., No.
19 Civ. 3224 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 25, 2019).
\246\Email from Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M.
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct.
25, 2019).
\247\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The
White House, to Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman,
Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
National Security Council (Oct. 25, 2019).
\248\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone,
Counsel to the President, The White House (Oct. 25, 2019).
\249\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Charles J. Cooper and Michael W.
Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council
(Oct. 26, 2019).
\250\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M.
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct.
26, 2019).
\251\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M.
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct.
27, 2019).
\252\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform to Charles J. Cooper and
Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National
Security Council, (Nov. 5, 2019).
\253\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M.
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Douglas N. Letter,
General Counsel, House of Representatives (Nov. 8, 2019).
\254\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Memorandum Opinion
(D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019) (``To make the point as plain as possible, it is
clear to this Court for the reasons explained above that, with respect
to senior-level presidential aides, absolute immunity from compelled
congressional process simply does not exist. Indeed, absolute
testimonial immunity for senior-level White House aides appears to be a
fiction that has been fastidiously maintained over time through the
force of sheer repetition in OLC opinions, and through accommodations
that have permitted its proponents to avoid having the proposition
tested in the crucible of litigation. And because the contention that a
President's top advisors cannot be subjected to compulsory
congressional process simply has no basis in the law, it does not
matter whether such immunity would theoretically be available to only a
handful of presidential aides due to the sensitivity of their
positions, or to the entire Executive branch. Nor does it make any
difference whether the aides in question are privy to national security
matters, or work solely on domestic issues.''). As of this report, an
appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir.).
\255\See Kupperman v. U.S. House of Representatives, et al., No. 19
Civ. 3224 (D.D.C.). As of this report, the House Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (Nov. 14, 2019), ECF No. 41, remains pending. Although the
Committee will not reissue the subpoena to Dr. Kupperman and the court
case is moot, he could choose to appear on a voluntary basis to assist
Congress in the discharge of its Constitutional responsibilities.
\256\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Acting Director Russell T.
Vought, Office of Management and Budget (Oct. 11, 2019).
\257\Email from Jessica L. Donlon, Deputy General Counsel for
Oversight, Office of Management and Budget, to Committee Staff (Oct.
21, 2019).
\258\Russell T. Vought, Twitter (Oct. 21, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RussVought45/status/1186276793172578306?s=20).
\259\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Acting Director Russell T.
Vought, Office of Management and Budget (Oct. 25, 2019).
\260\Letter from Jason A. Yaworske, Associate Director for
Legislative Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam
B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 4,
2019).
\261\Vought Dep. Tr. at 10-11.
\262\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Associate Director Michael
Duffey, Office of Management and Budget (Oct. 11, 2019).
\263\Email from Jessica L. Donlon, Deputy General Counsel for
Oversight, Office of Management and Budget, to Committee Staff (Oct.
21, 2019).
\264\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Michael Duffey, Associate
Director of National Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget
(Oct. 25, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/20191025_-_letter_duffey_re_subpoena.pdf); House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Michael Duffey,
Associate Director of National Security Programs, Office of Management
and Budget (Oct. 25, 2019).
\265\Letter from Jason A. Yaworske, Associate Director for
Legislative Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam
B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 4,
2019).
\266\Duffey Dep. Tr. at 7.
\267\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Brian McCormack, Associate
Director for Natural Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of
Management and Budget (Oct. 24, 2019).
\268\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Brian McCormack, Associate
Director for Natural Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of
Management and Budget (Nov. 1, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Brian McCormack, Associate Director for
Natural Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of Management and Budget
(Nov. 1, 2019).
\269\Letter from Jason A. Yaworske, Associate Director for
Legislative Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam
B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 4,
2019).
\270\McCormack Dep. Tr. at 6.
\271\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019).
\272\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (internal citations omitted)
(online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-09-
27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Depositions.pdf).
\273\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
\274\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State,
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1,
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E.
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same
day).
\275\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Deputy Secretary of State John J.
Sullivan, Department of State (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-10-01%20ELE%20ABS%20EEC%20TO%20DEPSEC%20SULLIVAN.pdf).
\276\Email from Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl,
Counselor, Department of State, to Committee Staff (Oct. 2, 2019).
\277\Email from Committee Staff, to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T.
Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State (Oct. 8, 2019).
\278\Email from Committee Staff, to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T.
Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State (Oct. 9, 2019).
\279\Email from Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl,
Counselor, Department of State, to Committee Staff (Oct. 9, 2019).
\280\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl,
Counselor, Department of State (Oct. 25, 2019); House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor,
Department of State (Oct. 25, 2019).
\281\Letter from Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl,
Counselor, Department of State to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B.
Maloney, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 5, 2019).
\282\Brechbuhl Dep. Tr. at 4-5.
\283\Email from Committee staff to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T.
Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State (Nov. 5, 2019); Email
from Committee Staff to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich
Brechbuhl, Counselor (Nov. 22, 2019).
\284\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for
Management, to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl,
Counselor, Department of State (Nov. 4, 2019.)
\285\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Rick Perry,
Department of Energy (Nov. 1, 2019).
\286\Letter from General Counsel Bill Cooper, Department of Energy,
to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform (Nov. 5, 2019).
\287\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019).
\288\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (internal citations omitted).
\289\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch,
Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of State (Sept. 27,
2019).
\290\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State,
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1,
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E.
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same
day).
\291\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for
Management, Department of State, to Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine,
Department of State (Oct. 10, 2019).
\292\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-69/).
\293\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to Ambassador
Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of
State (Oct. 11, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Subpoena to Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of State (Oct. 11, 2019).
\294\Letter from Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to Ambassador Marie
Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of State, to
Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for Management, Department of
State (Oct. 11, 2019) (citations omitted).
\295\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr.
\296\Id. at 70.
\297\Email from Committee Staff to Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine,
Department of State (Nov. 15, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of State (Nov. 15, 2019).
\298\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 157-158.
\299\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department
of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (internal citations omitted) (online at
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff&commat%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Depositions.pdf).
\300\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S.
Ambassador to the European Union, Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
\301\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State,
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1,
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E.
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same
day).
\302\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for
Management, Department of State, to Robert Luskin, Counsel to
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union,
Department of State (Oct.7, 2019).
\303\Email from Robert Luskin, Counsel to Ambassador Gordon
Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, Department of State,
to Committee Staff (Oct. 8, 2019).
\304\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to
the European Union, Department of State (Oct. 8, 2019); House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Ambassador Gordon
Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, Department of State
(Oct. 11, 2019).
\305\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to
the European Union, Department of State (Oct. 14, 2019).
\306\Sondland Dep. Tr.
\307\Id. at 16.
\308\Id. at 17.
\309\Letter from Robert Luskin, Counsel to Ambassador Gordon
Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, Department of State,
to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence (Nov. 4, 2019); Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland,
Department of State (Nov. 4, 2019).
\310\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union,
Department of State (Nov. 20, 2019).
\311\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 160.
\312\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019).
\313\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Depositions.pdf) (internal citations omitted).
\314\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department
of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
\315\Email from George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State, to
Committee Staff (Sept. 27, 2019).
\316\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State,
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1,
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E.
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same
day).
\317\Email from Committee Staff to Andrew M. Wright, Counsel to
George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 8, 2019).
\318\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for
Management, Department of State, to Andrew M. Wright, Counsel to George
P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 10, 2019).
\319\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, to Andrew M. Wright, Counsel to George P. Kent,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 15, 2019); House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department
of State (Oct. 15, 2019).
\320\Kent Dep. Tr.
\321\Id. at 17.
\322\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to
George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European
and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Nov. 20, 2019).
\323\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 142-143.
\324\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John J. Sullivan, Deputy
Secretary of State, Department of State (Oct. 4, 2019).
\325\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador William B. Taylor,
Jr., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Kyiv, Department of State (Oct.
4, 2019).
\326\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge
d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Kyiv, Department of State (Oct. 14, 2019).
\327\Email from Committee Staff to John B. Bellinger, III, and
Jeffrey H. Smith, Counsel to Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge
d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Kyiv, Department of State (Oct. 22, 2019);
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Kyiv, Department of State (Oct. 22, 2019).
\328\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 83.
\329\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy,
Kyiv, Department of State (Nov. 13, 2019).
\330\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 143.
\331\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Mark J. MacDougall, Counsel
to Catherine Croft, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State (Oct.
24, 2019); Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Mark J. MacDougall, Counsel
to Christopher Anderson, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State
(Oct. 24, 2019).
\332\Letter from Mark J. MacDougall, Counsel to Catherine Croft,
Foreign Service Officer, Department of State, and Christopher Anderson,
Foreign Service Officer, Department of State, to Committee Staff (Oct.
25, 2019).
\333\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for
Management, Department of State, to Mark J. MacDougall, Counsel to
Catherine Croft, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State (Oct. 28,
2019) (bracketed text in original); Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under
Secretary of State for Management, Department of State, to Mark J.
MacDougall, Counsel to Christopher Anderson, Foreign Service Officer,
Department of State (Oct. 28, 2019) (bracketed text in original); see
Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The White
House, to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf).
\334\Email from Committee Staff to Mark J. MacDougall and Abbey
McNaughton, Counsel to Catherine Croft, Foreign Service Officer,
Department of State and Christopher Anderson, Foreign Service Officer,
Department of State (Oct. 30, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Catherine Croft, Foreign Service Officer,
Department of State (Oct. 30, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Christopher Anderson, Foreign Service
Officer, Department of State (Oct. 30, 2019).
\335\Croft Dep. Tr.; Anderson Dep. Tr.
\336\Croft Dep. Tr. at 12.
\337\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 11-12.
\338\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Department of
Defense (Oct. 11, 2019).
\339\Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist to
Daniel Levin, Counsel to Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Department of Defense (Oct. 22,
2019).
\340\Email from Committee Staff to Dan Levin, Counsel to Laura K.
Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine,
Eurasia, Department of Defense (Oct. 23, 2019); House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Laura K. Cooper, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Department
of Defense (Oct. 23, 2019).
\341\Cooper Dep. Tr.
\342\Id. at 108.
\343\Email from Committee Staff to Dan Levin, Counsel to Laura K.
Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine,
Eurasia, Department of Defense (Nov. 20, 2019); House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Laura K. Cooper, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Department
of Defense (Nov. 20, 2019).
\344\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr.
\345\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director
of National Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget (Nov. 5,
2019).
\346\Email from Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director of National
Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget, to Committee Staff
(Nov. 6, 2019).
\347\Email from Jessica L. Donlon, Deputy General Counsel for
Oversight, Office of Management and Budget, to Committee Staff (Nov. 7,
2019).
\348\Email from Committee Staff to Barbara Van Gelder, Counsel to
Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs,
Office of Management and Budget (Nov. 16, 2019); House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate
Director of National Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget
(Nov. 16, 2019).
\349\Sandy Dep. Tr.
\350\Id. at 161.
\351\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia,
National Security Council (Oct. 9, 2019).
\352\Letter from Lee S. Wolosky, Counsel to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former
Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and
Russia, National Security Council, to Michael M. Purpura, Deputy
Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President, The White House, and
Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the
President, The White House (Oct. 13, 2019).
\353\Letter from Michael M. Purpura, Deputy Counsel and Deputy
Assistant to the President, The White House, to Lee S. Wolosky, Counsel
to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Oct. 14,
2019).
\354\Email from Committee Staff to Lee S. Wolosky and Samuel S.
Ungar, Counsel to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National Security
Council (Oct. 14, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Subpoena to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to
the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National
Security Council (Oct. 14, 2019).
\355\Hill Dep. Tr.
\356\Letter from Lee S. Wolosky, Counsel to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former
Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and
Russia, National Security Council, to Michael M. Purpura, Deputy
Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President, The White House (Nov.
18, 2019).
\357\Letter from Michael M. Purpura, Deputy Counsel and Deputy
Assistant to the President, The White House, to Lee S. Wolosky, Counsel
to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Nov. 20,
2019).
\358\Email from Committee Staff to Lee S. Wolosky and Samuel S.
Ungar, Counsel to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National Security
Council (Nov. 21, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Subpoena to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to
the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National
Security Council (Nov. 21, 2019).
\359\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr.
\360\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S.
Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National Security Council (Oct. 16,
2019).
\361\Email from Committee Staff to Michael Volkov and Matt
Stankiewicz, Counsel to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman,
Director for Ukraine, National Security Council (Oct. 29, 2019); House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Lieutenant
Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National Security
Council (Oct. 29, 2019).
\362\Vindman Dep. Tr. (During the deposition, Lieutenant Colonel
Vindman stated: ``I was subpoenaed to appear here. You know, absent a
subpoena, I would believe I was operating under the President's
guidance to not appear, but I was subpoenaed and I presented myself.''
Vindman Dep. Tr. at 232).
\363\Email from Committee Staff, to Michael Volkov and Matt
Stankiewicz, Counsel to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman,
Director for Ukraine, National Security Council (Nov. 19, 2019); House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Lieutenant
Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National Security
Council (Nov. 19, 2019).
\364\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr.
\365\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia,
National Security Council (Oct. 16, 2019).
\366\Email from Committee Staff to Barbara Van Gelder, Counsel to
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Oct. 31,
2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Oct. 31,
2019).
\367\Morrison Dep. Tr.
\368\Email from Committee Staff to Barbara Van Gelder, Counsel to
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Nov. 19,
2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Nov. 19,
2019).
\369\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr.
\370\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to David Hale, Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs, Department of State (Nov. 1, 2019).
\371\Letter from Brian A. Glasser, Counsel to David Hale, Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State, to
Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee on
Oversight and Reform (Nov. 5, 2019).
\372\Email from Committee Staff to Brian Glasser and Cary Joshi,
Counsel for David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
Department of State (Nov. 6, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Subpoena to David Hale, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Department of State (Nov. 6, 2019).
\373\Hale Dep. Tr.
\374\Email from Committee Staff to Brian A. Glasser, Counsel to
David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department
of State (Nov. 20, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Subpoena to David Hale, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Department of State (Nov. 20, 2019).
\375\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr.
\376\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and from Chairman Eliot L. Engel,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Kenneth L. Wainstein, Counsel to
David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine,
Department of State (Nov. 12, 2019).
\377\Email from Committee Staff to Kenneth L. Wainstein, Paul J.
Nathanson, and Katherine Swan, Counsel to David Holmes, Political
Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State
(Nov. 15, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Subpoena to David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in
Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State (Nov. 15, 2019).
\378\Holmes Dep. Tr.
\379\Email from Committee Staff to Kenneth L. Wainstein, Paul J.
Nathanson, and Katherine Swan, Counsel to David Holmes, Political
Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State
(Nov. 21, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Subpoena to David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in
Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State (Nov. 21, 2019).
\380\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr.
\381\Email from Committee Staff to Ambassador P. Michael McKinley,
Former Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State, Department of State
(Oct. 12, 2019).
\382\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John B. Bellinger, III, Counsel
to Ambassador P. Michael McKinley, Former Senior Advisor to the
Secretary of State, Department of State (Oct. 14, 2019).
\383\McKinley Transcribed Interview Tr.
\384\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador Philip T. Reeker,
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs,
Department of State (Oct. 16, 2019).
\385\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Margaret E. Daum, Counsel to
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 25, 2019);
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 25, 2019).
\386\Reeker Dep. Tr.
\387\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019).
\388\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo,
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
\389\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador Kurt Volker, U.S.
Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, Department of State
(Sept. 27, 2019).
\390\Letter from Secretary Michael F. Pompeo, Department of State,
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1,
2019) (Identical letters transmitted to Chairman Schiff and Chairman
Cummings).
\391\Letter from Marik A. String, Acting Legal Advisor, Department
of State, to Margaret E. Daum, Counsel to Ambassador Kurt Volker, U.S.
Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, Department of State
(Oct. 2, 2019).
\392\Letter from Margaret E. Daum, Counsel to Ambassador Kurt
Volker, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations,
Department of State, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House
Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 2, 2019); Kurt Volker Document
Production, Bates KV0000000-KV00000065 (Oct. 2, 2019).
\393\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr.
\394\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr.
\395\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney,
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Justin Shur, Counsel to Jennifer
Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice
President (Nov. 4, 2019).
\396\Email from Committee Staff to Justin Shur, Counsel to Jennifer
Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice
President (Nov. 7, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Subpoena to Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe
and Russia, Office of the Vice President (Nov. 7, 2019).
\397\Williams Dep. Tr.
\398\Letter from Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and
Russia, Office of the Vice President, Justin Shur, Emily K. Damrau, and
Caleb Hayes-Deats, Counsel to Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for
Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice President, to Chairman Adam B.
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 11,
2019).
\399\Email from Committee Staff to Justin Shur and Caleb Hayes-
Deats, Counsel to Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and
Russia, Office of the Vice President (Nov. 19, 2019); House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Jennifer Williams,
Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice President
(Nov. 19, 2019).
\400\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr.
\401\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 193.
\402\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 37-38.
\403\Id. at 38.
\404\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1195356198347956224).
\405\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 46.
\406\The Latest: Ousted Ukraine Ambassador Has Her Say in Hearing,
Associated Press (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at https://apnews.com/
2f420045618b4106b6fa7419a3d75b8e).
\407\Impeachment Inquiry Hearing with Former US Ambassador to
Ukraine, CNN (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/
impeachment-hearing-11-15-19/h_fb32b149181437e02e5d937c6fc64f35).
During a recess in the hearing at which Ambassador Yovanovitch was
testifying, a federal jury returned a verdict of guilty against
President Trump's longest-serving political advisor, Roger Stone, on
seven criminal counts, including witness tampering and obstruction of
Congress' investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election
and possible links to President Trump's campaign. Mr. Stone used
threats and intimidation to attempt to persuade a witness to withhold
information and lie to Congress. He has yet to be sentenced. See Roger
Stone Guilty on All Counts of Lying to Congress, Witness Tampering,
Washington Post (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/roger-stone-jury-weighs-evidence-and-a-defense-
move-to-make-case-about-mueller/2019/11/15/554fff5a-06ff-11ea-8292-
c46ee8cb3dce_story.html). Mr. Stone was convicted of giving false and
misleading statements to the Intelligence Committee, failing to produce
and lying about the existence of records responsive to Committee
requests, and attempting to persuade a witness to give false testimony
to the Committee. Among other acts of witness tampering, Mr. Stone told
the witness to ``Stonewall it. Plead the Fifth'' and to ``be honest w
fbi'' that ``there was no back channel.'' He also called the witness a
``rat'' and ``stoolie'' and threatened retaliation. United States v.
Roger Stone, Indictment, No. 1:19-cr-00018-ABJ (Jan. 24, 2019). Mr.
Stone was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505 (obstruction), 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1001 (false statements), and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b)
(witness tampering).
\408\Fox and Friends, Fox News (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNqKhRcpktU).
\409\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1189167309455331328).
\410\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Nov. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-74/).
\411\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 19, 2019) (retweeting Dan
Scavino Jr., Twitter (Nov. 19, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/
Scavino45/status/1196860213233684480)).
\412\See, e.g., Berman Shocked by Republican's Attacks on US War
Vet, CNN (Oct. 29, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2019/
10/29/duffy-berman-spar-over-vindman-loyalty newday-vpx.cnn) (former
Rep. Sean Duffy claiming that Lt. Col Vindman ``has an affinity, I
think for the Ukraine,'' that ``it seems very clear that he is
incredibly concerned about Ukrainian defense,'' and that ``I don't know
that he's concerned about American policy''); see also Rudy Giuliani,
Twitter (Oct. 30, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/
status/1189732605383630850) (claiming that Lt. Col. Vindman was
``giving advice to two countries'' and stating that ``I thought he
worked for US'').
\413\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Written
Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Impeachment,
116th Cong. (Nov. 19, 2019).
\414\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1187063301731209220).
\415\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1187080923961012228).
\416\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Oct. 25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-72/).
\417\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 13, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1194608482793795584).
\418\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 17, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1196155347117002752).
\419\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 97.
\420\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1195727871765073921); Donald J.
Trump, Twitter (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1195727879780360193).
\421\50 U.S.C. Sec. 3033(g)(3) (when a complaint is received from a
member of the Intelligence Community, ``the Inspector General shall not
disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure
is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure
is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken'').
\422\50 U.S.C. Sec. 3234(b).
\423\Letter from Michael K. Atkinson, Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, and Ranking Member Devin Nunes, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 9, 2019); see also 50
U.S.C. Sec. 3033(k)(5)(C) (``Upon receipt of the transmittal from the
ICIG, the Director shall within 7 calendar days of such receipt,
forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence committees,
together with any comments the Director considers appropriate.'')
\424\Letter from Chairman, Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of
National Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(Sept. 13, 2019).
\425\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House
Intelligence Committee Releases Whistleblower Complaint (Sept. 26,
2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=708).
\426\Listen: Audio of Trump Discussing Whistleblower at Private
Event: `That's Close to a Spy,' Los Angeles Times (Sept. 26, 2019)
(online at www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-09-26/trump-at-private-
breakfast-who-gave-the-whistle-blower-the-information-because-thats-
almost-a-spy).
\427\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairmen
Warn President to Stop Attacking Whistleblower and Witnesses to His
Misconduct and to Halt Efforts to Obstruct Impeachment Inquiry (Sept.
26, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=709).
\428\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 29, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1178442765736333313?s=20).
\429\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1180123504924151809).
\430\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Nov. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-74/).
\431\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 3, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1191000516580519937).
\432\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Nov. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-74/).
\433\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One
Departure (Nov. 4, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-75/).
\434\The White House, Remarks by President Trump After Tour of
Apple Manufacturing Plant (Nov. 20, 2019) (online www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-tour-apple-manufacturing-
plant-austin-tx/).
\435\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff to Ranking Member Devin
Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 9, 2019).
\436\In 2017, every Republican Member of Congress joined a
unanimous vote in the House of Representatives to increase penalties
for retaliation against whistleblowers. U.S. House of Representatives,
Roll Call Vote Approving S. 585, The Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (Oct. 12, 2017) (420 yeas, 0 nays)
(online at www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/115-2017/h568).
\437\House Intelligence Chair News Conference, C-SPAN (Mar. 24,
2017) (online at www.c-span.org/video/?425953-1/paul-manafort-
volunteered-intelligence-committee-chairman-nunes).
\438\Id.
\439\Office of Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Statement Regarding
Intel Community Whistleblower (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at
www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-statement-
regarding-intel-community-whistleblower).
\440\Senate Intel Chair Doesn't Want Whistleblower's Identity
Disclosed, The Hill (Nov. 7, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
homenews/senate/469455-senate-intel-chair-doesnt-want-whistleblowers-
identity-disclosed).
\441\Republicans Break with Trump and Rand Paul on Whistleblower
Unmasking, Politico (Nov. 5, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/news/
2019/11/05/rand-paul-trump-whistleblower-065917).
APPENDIX A: KEY PEOPLE AND ENTITIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anderson, Christopher J................ Special Advisor for Ukraine
Negotiations, Department of
State, August 2017-July 2019
Atkinson, Michael K.................... Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, May
2018-present
Avakov, Arsen.......................... Ukrainian Minister of Internal
Affairs, February 2014-present
Bakanov, Ivan.......................... Head of Security Service of
Ukraine, August 2019-present;
First Deputy Chief of the
Security Service of Ukraine,
May 2019-August 2019
Barr, William P........................ Attorney General, Department of
Justice, February 2019-present
Biden, Hunter.......................... Son of former Vice President
Joe Biden
Biden, Joseph R., Jr................... U.S. Vice President, January
2009-January 2017
Blair, Robert B........................ Assistant to the President and
Senior Advisor to the Chief of
Staff, February 2019-present
Bohdan (Bogdan), Andriy................ Head of Ukrainian Presidential
Administration, May 2019-
present
Bolton, John........................... National Security Advisor,
March 2018-September 2019
Brechbuhl, T. Ulrich................... Counselor, Department of State,
May 2018-present
Bulatao, Brian......................... Under Secretary of State for
Management, Department of
State, May 2019-present
Burisma Holdings....................... Ukrainian energy company
Cipollone, Pat......................... White House Counsel, December
2018-present
Clinton, Hillary Rodham................ Democratic Presidential
candidate, November 2016
Cooper, Laura K........................ Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Russia, Ukraine,
Eurasia, Department of
Defense, 2016-present
Croft, Catherine M..................... Special Advisor for Ukraine
Negotiations, Department of
State, July 2019-present;
Ukraine director, National
Security Council, July 2017-
July 2018
CrowdStrike............................ Cybersecurity company; object
of conspiracy theories
claiming that CrowdStrike
framed Russia in hack of the
DNC server in the 2016 U.S.
election
Danyliuk (Danylyuk), Oleksandr Secretary, Ukrainian National
``Sasha''. Security and Defense Council,
May 2019-September 2019
diGenova, Joseph....................... Attorney allegedly working for
President Trump to obtain
information from Ukrainian
officials on the Bidens
Duffey, Michael........................ Associate Director, National
Security Programs, Office of
Management and Budget, May
2019-present
Eisenberg, John........................ Legal Advisor to the National
Security Council and Deputy
Counsel to the President for
National Security Affairs,
February 2017-present
Ellis, Michael......................... Senior Associate Counsel to the
President and Deputy Legal
Advisor to the National
Security Council, March 2017-
present
Elwood, Courtney Simmons............... General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency, June 2017-
present
Engel, Steven A........................ Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel,
Department of Justice,
November 2017-present
Esper, Mark............................ Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense, July
2019-present; Acting Secretary
of Defense, June 2019-July
2019
Fruman, Igor........................... Giuliani associate named in
indictment unsealed on October
10, 2019
Giuliani, Rudolph ``Rudy''............. President Trump's agent and
personal attorney
Griffith, P. Wells..................... Senior Director for
International Energy and
Environment, National Security
Council, April 2018-present
Hale, David M.......................... Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Department
of State, August 2018-present
Hannity, Sean.......................... Host of Hannity, Fox News,
January 2009-present
Hill, Fiona............................ Deputy Assistant to the
President and Senior Director
for Europe and Russia,
National Security Council,
April 2017-July 2019
Hochstein, Amos J...................... Supervisory Board Member,
Naftogaz, November 2017-
present
Holmes, David A........................ Political Counselor, U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine,
August 2017-present
Johnson, Ron........................... Senator from Wisconsin,
Chairman, Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, January
2015-present
Kellogg, Keith......................... National Security Advisor to
the Vice President, April 2018-
present
Kenna, Lisa D.......................... Executive Secretary in the
Office of the Secretary,
Department of State, June 2017-
present
Kent, George P......................... Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, September
2018-present; Deputy Chief of
Mission in Kyiv, Ukraine, 2015-
2018
Kholodnitsky, Nazar.................... Head, Ukrainian Specialized
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's
Office, November 2015-present
Klitenic, Jason........................ General Counsel, Office of the
Director of National
Intelligence
Kulyk, Kostiantyn...................... Deputy Head of the Ukrainian
Department of International
Legal Cooperation of the
Prosecutor General's Office,
November 2018-November 2019
Kupperman, Charles M................... Deputy National Security
Advisor, January 2019-
September 2019
Kushner, Jared......................... Assistant to the President and
Senior Advisor, 2017-present
Kvien, Kristina........................ Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv, May 2019-
present
Lutsenko, Yuriy........................ Ukrainian Prosecutor General,
May 2016-August 2019
McCormack, Brian....................... Associate Director for Natural
Resources, Office of
Management and Budget,
September 2019-present; Chief
of Staff, Department of
Energy, March 2017-September
2019
McKinley, P. Michael................... Senior Advisor to the
Secretary, Department of
State, May 2018-October 2019
McKusker, Elaine A..................... Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller),
Department of Defense, August
2017-present
Maguire, Joseph........................ Acting Director of National
Intelligence, August 2019-
present
Manafort, Paul......................... Chairman, Donald J. Trump
presidential campaign, May
2016-August 2016; convicted in
August 2018 on two counts of
bank fraud, five counts of tax
fraud, and one count of
failure to disclose a foreign
bank account
Morrison, Tim.......................... Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security, National Security
Council, July 2019-October
2019
Mueller, Robert S., III................ Special Counsel, Department of
Justice, May 2017-May 2019
Mulvaney, John Michael ``Mick''........ Acting Chief of Staff, White
House, January 2019-present
Murphy, Chris.......................... Senator from Connecticut,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Near East, South Asia,
Central Asia, and
Counterterrorism, Senate
Committee on Foreign
Relations, formerly Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Europe
and Regional Security
Cooperation, Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, January
2017-January 2019
Naftogaz............................... Ukrainian state-owned national
gas company
Parnas, Lev............................ Giuliani associate named in
indictment unsealed on October
10, 2019
Patel, Kashyap ``Kash''................ Senior Director for
Counterterrorism, National
Security Council, July 2019-
present; former Staff,
Directorate of International
Organizations and Alliances,
National Security Council,
February 2019-July 2019;
former National Security
Advisor, House Permanent
Select Committee on
Intelligence, March 2018-
January 2019; former Senior
Counsel for Counterterrorism,
House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence,
April 2017-March 2018
Pence, Michael R....................... Vice President, January 2017-
present
Pennington, Joseph..................... Charge d'Affaires, of the U.S.
Embassy in Ukraine, May 2019
Perez, Carol Z......................... Director General of the Foreign
Service and Director of Human
Services, January 2019-present
Perry, James Richard ``Rick''.......... Secretary of Energy, March 2017-
December 2019
Pompeo, Michael........................ Secretary of State, April 2018-
present
Poroshenko, Petro...................... President of Ukraine, June 2014-
May 2019
Portman, Robert........................ U.S. Senator from Ohio, January
2011-present; Chairman,
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Senate
Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs
Committee, January 2015-
present
Purpura, Michael....................... Deputy Counsel to the
President, December 2018-
present
Putin, Vladimir........................ Russian President, May 2012-
present
Reeker, Philip T....................... Acting Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, Department
of State, March 2019-present
Rood, John C........................... Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Department of Defense,
January 2018-present
Sandy, Mark............................ Deputy Associate Director for
National Security at the
Office of Management and
Budget, December 2013-present;
Acting Director of the Office
of Management and Budget,
January 2017-February 2017
Sekulow, Jay........................... Personal attorney for President
Trump
Shokin, Viktor......................... Ukrainian Prosecutor General of
Ukraine, February 2015-March
2016
Short, Marc............................ Chief of Staff to Vice
President Mike Pence, February
2019-present
Solomon, John.......................... Author of articles promoting
debunked conspiracy theories
about the Bidens, Crowdstrike,
and the 2016 U.S. election
Sondland, Gordon....................... U.S. Ambassador to the European
Union, July 2018-present
String, Marik.......................... Acting Legal Advisor, Office of
the Legal Advisor, Department
of State, June 2019-present
Sullivan, John J....................... Deputy Secretary of State,
Department of State, June 2017-
present
Taylor, William B., Jr................. Charge d'Affaires for the U.S.
Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, June
2019-present
``Three Amigos''....................... Secretary of Energy Rick Perry,
Ambassador Gordon Sondland,
and Ambassador Kurt Volker
Toensing, Victoria..................... Attorney allegedly working
``off the books'' for
President Trump to obtain
information from Ukrainian
officials on the Bidens
Trump, Donald J........................ U.S. President, January 2017-
present
Trump, Donald J., Jr................... Son of President Trump
Vindman, Alexander S................... Director for Ukraine, National
Security Council, July 2018-
present; Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Army
Volker, Kurt........................... U.S. Special Representative for
Ukraine Negotiations,
Department of State, July 2017-
September 2019
Vought, Russell T...................... Acting Director, Office of
Management and Budget, January
2019-present
Whistleblower.......................... Author of complaint
declassified by the Office of
the Director of National
Intelligence on September 25,
2019
Williams, Jennifer..................... Special Advisor for Europe and
Russia, Office of the Vice
President, April 2019-present
Yermak, Andriy......................... Assistant to the President of
Ukraine, May 2019-present
Yovanovitch, Marie L................... U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine,
August 2016-May 2019
Zakaria, Fareed........................ Host, Fareed Zakaria GPS, June
2008-present
Zelensky, Volodymyr.................... President of Ukraine, May 2019-
present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX B: ABBREVIATIONS AND COMMON TERMS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AntAC..................................... Anti-Corruption Action
Center
CDA....................................... Charge d'Affaires / Acting
Ambassador
CIA....................................... Central Intelligence Agency
Charge d'Affaires......................... Acting Ambassador
CN........................................ Congressional Notification
COM....................................... Chief of Mission
DAS....................................... Deputy Assistant Secretary
DC........................................ Deputies Committee
DCM....................................... Deputy Chief of Mission
DNI....................................... Director of National
Intelligence
DNC....................................... Democratic National
Committee
DOD....................................... Department of Defense
DOE....................................... Department of Energy
DOJ....................................... Department of Justice
DOS....................................... Department of State
DSCA...................................... Defense Security Cooperation
Agency
EDI....................................... European Deterrence
Initiative
ERI....................................... European Reassurance
Initiative
FBI....................................... Federal Bureau of
Investigation
FMF....................................... Foreign Military Financing
FMS....................................... Foreign Military Sales
FSB....................................... Russian Federal Security
Service
IC........................................ Intelligence Community
ICIG...................................... Inspector General for the
Intelligence Community
IO........................................ Bureau of International
Organizations
IG........................................ Inspector General
Legatt.................................... Legal Attache
LNG....................................... Liquefied Natural Gas
MEMCON.................................... Memorandum of Conversation
MLAT...................................... Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty
NABU...................................... National Anti-Corruption
Bureau of Ukraine
NBU....................................... National Bank of Ukraine
NDAA...................................... National Defense
Authorization Act
NSC....................................... National Security Council
ODNI...................................... Office of the Director of
National Intelligence
OFAC...................................... Office of Foreign Assets
Control
OMB....................................... Office of Management and
Budget
OSCE...................................... Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe
OVP....................................... Office of the Vice President
PAC....................................... Political Action Committee
PC........................................ Principals Committee
PCC....................................... Policy Coordination
Committee
PDB....................................... President's Daily Briefing
PDM....................................... Presidential Decision
Memorandum
PGO....................................... Prosecutor General's Office
SAPO...................................... Specialized Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor's Office
SBU....................................... Security Service of Ukraine
SDN....................................... Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked
Persons
SMM....................................... Special Monitoring Mission
SOC....................................... Summary of Conclusions
SVTC...................................... Secure Video Teleconference
TCG....................................... Trilateral Contact Group
UNSCR..................................... United Nations Security
Council Resolution
USAI...................................... Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative
USAID..................................... United States Agency for
International Development
WHSR...................................... White House Situation Room
YES....................................... Yalta European Strategy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MINORITY VIEWS
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2019.
Hon. Adam B. Schiff,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2(l),
we hereby transit minority views to The Trump-Ukraine
Impeachment Inquiriy Report issued by the Committee on December
3, 2019.
Sincerely,
Devin Nunes,
Ranking Member.
Michael R. Turner.
Chris Stewart.
Will Hurd.
Jim Jordon.
K. Michael Conaway.
Brad Wenstrup.
Elise Stefanik.
John Ratcliffe.
Enclosure.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On November 8, 2016, nearly 63 million Americans from
around the country chose Donald J. Trump to be the 45th
President of the United States. Now, less than a year before
the next presidential election, 231 House Democrats in
Washington, D.C., are trying to undo the will of the American
people.* As one Democrat admitted, the pursuit of this extreme
course of action is because they want to stop President Trump's
re-election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019) (Roll call vote 604).
Weekends with Alex Witt (MSNBC television broadcast May 5
2019) (interview with Rep. Al Green).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Democrats in the House of Representatives have been working
to impeach President Trump since his election. Democrats
introduced four separate resolutions in 2017 and 2018 seeking
to impeach President Trump.= In January 2019, on their first
day in power, House Democrats again introduced articles of
impeachment.Sec. That same day, a newly elected Congresswoman
promised to an audience of her supporters, ``we're going to go
in there and we're going to impeach the [expletive
deleted].''** Her comments are not isolated. Speaker Nancy
Pelosi called President Trump ``an impostor'' and said it is
``dangerous'' to allow American voters to evaluate his
performance in 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
=H., Res. 705, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 646, 115th Cong. (2017);
H. Res. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); H. Res. 438, 115th Cong. (2017).
Sec. H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019).
**Amy B. Wong, Rep. Rashida Tlaib profanely promised to impeach
Trump. She's not sorry., Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2019.
Emily Tillett, Nancy Pelosi says Trump's attacks on
witnesses ``very significant'' to impeachment probe CBS News, No. 15,
2019; Dear Colleague Letter from Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Nov. 18, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Democrats' impeachment inquiry is not the organic
outgrowth of serious misconduct; it is an orchestrated campaign
to upend our political system. The Democrats are trying to
impeach a duly elected President based on the accusations and
assumptions of unelected bureaucrats who disagreed with
President Trump's policy initiatives and processes. They are
trying to impeach President Trump because some unelected
bureaucrats were discomforted by an elected President's
telephone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
They are trying to impeach President Trump because some
unelected bureaucrats chafed at an elected President's
``outside the beltway'' approach to diplomacy.
The sum and substance of the Democrats' case for
impeachment is that President Trump abused his authority to
pressure Ukraine to investigate former Vice President Joe
Biden, President Trump's potential political rival, for
President Trump's benefit in the 2020 election. Democrats say
this pressure campaign encompassed leveraging a White House
meeting and the release of U.S. security assistance to force
the Ukrainian President to succumb to President Trump's
political wishes. Democrats say that Mayor Rudy Giuliani, the
President's personal attorney, and a ``shadow'' group of U.S.
officials conspired to benefit the President politically.
The evidence presented does not prove any of these Democrat
allegations, and none of the Democrats' witnesses testified to
having evidence of bribery, extortion, or any high crime or
misdemeanor.
The evidence does not support the accusation that President
Trump pressured President Zelensky to initiate investigations
for the purpose of benefiting the President in the 2020
election. The evidence does not support the accusation that
President Trump covered up the summary of his phone
conversation with President Zelensky. The evidence does not
support the accusation that President Trump obstructed the
Democrats' impeachment inquiry.
At the heart of the matter, the impeachment inquiry
involves the actions of only two people: President Trump and
President Zelensky. The summary of their July 25, 2019,
telephone conversation shows no quid pro quo or indication of
conditionality, threats, or pressure--much less evidence of
bribery or extortion. The summary reflects laughter,
pleasantries, and cordiality. President Zelensky has said
publicly and repeatedly that he felt no pressure. President
Trump has said publicly and repeatedly that he exerted no
pressure.
Even examining evidence beyond the presidential phone call
shows no quid pro quo, bribery, extortion, or abuse of power.
The evidence shows that President Trump holds a deep-seated,
genuine, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its
history of pervasive corruption. The President has also been
vocal about his skepticism of U.S. foreign aid and the need for
European allies to shoulder more of the financial burden for
regional defense. Senior Ukrainian officials under former
President Petro Poroshenko publicly attacked then-candidate
Trump during the 2016 campaign--including some senior Ukrainian
officials who remained in their positions after President
Zelensky's term began. All of these factors bear on the
President's state of mind and help to explain the President's
actions toward Ukraine and President Zelensky.
Understood in this proper context, the President's initial
hesitation to meet with President Zelensky or to provide U.S.
taxpayer-funded security assistance to Ukraine without
thoughtful review is entirely prudent. Ultimately, President
Zelensky took decisive action demonstrating his commitment to
promoting reform, combatting corruption, and replacing
Poroshenko-era holdovers with new leadership in his
Administration. President Trump then released security
assistance to Ukraine and met with President Zelensky in
September 2019--all without Ukraine taking any action to
investigate President Trump's political rival.
House Democrats allege that Ukraine felt pressure to bend
to the President's political will, but the evidence shows a
different reality. Ukraine felt good about its relationship
with the United States in the early months of the Zelensky
Administration, having had several high-level meetings with
senior U.S. officials between July and September. Although U.S.
security assistance was temporarily paused, the U.S. government
did not convey the pause to the Ukrainians because U.S.
officials believed the pause would get worked out and, if
publicized, may be mischaracterized as a shift in U.S. policy
towards Ukraine. U.S. officials said that the Ukrainian
government in Kyiv never knew the aid was delayed until reading
about it in the U.S. media. Ambassador Kurt Volker, the key
American interlocutor trusted by the Ukrainian government, said
the Ukrainians never raised concerns to him until after the
pause became public in late August.
The Democrats' impeachment narrative ignores Ukraine's
dramatic transformation in its fight against endemic
corruption. President Trump was skeptical of Ukrainian
corruption and his Administration sought proof that newly-
elected President Zelensky was a true reformer. And after
winning a parliamentary majority, the new Zelensky
administration took rapid strides to crack down on corruption.
Several high-level U.S. officials observed firsthand these
anti-corruption achievements in Kyiv, and the security
assistance was released soon afterward.
The Democrats' impeachment narrative also ignores President
Trump's steadfast support for Ukraine in its war against
Russian occupation. Several of the Democrats' witnesses
described how President Trump's policies toward Ukraine to
combat Russian aggression have been substantially stronger than
those of President--Obama then under the stewardship of Vice
President Biden. Where President Obama and Vice President Biden
gave the Ukrainians night-vision goggles and blankets, the
Trump Administration provided the Ukrainians with lethal
defensive assistance, including Javelin anti-tank missiles.
The Democrats nonetheless tell a story of an illicit
pressure campaign run by President Trump through his personal
attorney, Mayor Giuliani, to coerce Ukraine to investigate the
President's political rival by withholding a meeting and
security assistance. There is, however, no direct, firsthand
evidence of any such scheme. The Democrats are alleging guilt
on the basis of hearsay, presumptions, and speculation--all of
which are reflected in the anonymous whistleblower complaint
that sparked this inquiry. The Democrats' narrative is so
dependent on speculation that one Democrat publicly justified
hearsay as ``better'' than direct evidence.== Where there are
ambiguous facts, the Democrats interpret them in a light most
unfavorable to the President. In the absence of real evidence,
the Democrats appeal to emotion--evaluating how unelected
bureaucrats felt about the events in question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
== ``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr.
George Kent'': Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence,
116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rep. Mike Quigley).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fundamental disagreement apparent in the Democrats'
impeachment inquiry is a difference of world views and a
discomfort with President Trump's policy decisions. To the
extent that some unelected bureaucrats believed President Trump
had established an ``irregular'' foreign policy apparatus, it
was because they were not a part of that apparatus. There is
nothing illicit about three senior U.S. officials--each with
official interests relating to Ukraine shepherding the U.S.-
Ukraine relationship and reporting their actions to State
Department and NSC leadership. There is nothing inherently
improper with Mayor Giuliani's involvement as well because the
Ukrainians knew that he was a conduit to convince President
Trump that President Zelensky was serious about reform.
There is also nothing wrong with asking serious questions
about the presence of Vice President Biden's son, Hunter Biden,
on the board of directors of Burisma, a corrupt Ukrainian
company, or about Ukraine's attempts to influence the 2016
presidential election. Biden's Burisma has an international
reputation as a corrupt company. As far back as 2015, the Obama
State Department had concerns about Hunter Biden's role on
Burisma's board. Ukrainian anti-corruption activists noted
concerns as well. Publicly available--and irrefutable--evidence
shows how senior Ukrainian government officials sought to
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election in opposition to
President Trump's candidacy, and that some in the Ukrainian
embassy in Washington worked with a Democrat operative to
achieve that goal. While Democrats reflexively dismiss these
truths as conspiracy theories, the facts are indisputable and
bear heavily on the Democrats' impeachment inquiry.
* * *
In our system of government, power resides with the
American people, who delegate executive power to the President
through an election once every four years. Unelected officials
and career bureaucrats assist in the execution of the laws. The
unelected bureaucracy exists to serve the elected
representatives of the American people. The Democrats'
impeachment narrative flips our system on its head in service
of their political ambitions.
The Democrats' impeachment inquiry, led by House
Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff, is merely the
outgrowth of their obsession with re-litigating the results of
the 2016 presidential election. Despite their best efforts, the
evidence gathered during the Democrats' partisan and one-sided
impeachment inquiry does not support that President Trump
pressured Ukraine to investigate his political rival to benefit
the President in the 2020 presidential election. The evidence
does not establish any impeachable offense.
But that is not for Democrats' want of trying.
For the first phase of the Democrats' impeachment inquiry,
Chairman Schiff led the inquiry from his Capitol basement
bunker, preventing transparency on the process and
accountability for his actions. Because the fact-finding was
unclassified, the closed-door process was purely for
information control. This arrangement allowed Chairman Schiff--
who had already publicly fabricated evidence and misled
Americans about his interaction with the anonymous
whistleblower--to selectively leak information to paint
misleading public narratives, while simultaneously imposing a
gag rule on Republican members. From his basement bunker,
Chairman Schiff provided no due process protections for the
President and he directed witnesses called by the Democrats not
to answer Republican questions. Chairman Schiff also ignored
Republican requests to secure the testimony of the anonymous
whistleblower, despite promising earlier that the whistleblower
would provide ``unfiltered testimony.''
When the Democrats emerged from the bunker for the public
phase of their impeachment inquiry, Chairman Schiff continued
to deny fundamental fairness and minority rights. Chairman
Schiff interrupted Republican Members and directed witnesses
not to answer Republican questions. Chairman Schiff refused to
allow Republicans to exercise the limited procedural rights
afforded to them. Chairman Schiff rejected witnesses identified
by Republicans who would inject some semblance of fairness and
objectivity. Chairman Schiff denied Republican subpoenas for
testimony and documents, violating the Democrats' own rules to
vote down these subpoenas with no notice to Republicans.
Speaker Pelosi, Chairman Schiff, and House Democrats seek
to impeach President Trump--not because they have proof of a
high crime or misdemeanor, but because they disagreed with the
President's actions and his policies. But in our system of
government, the President is accountable to the American
people. The accountability to the American people comes at the
ballot box, not in House Democrats' star chamber.
FINDINGS
Democrats allege that President Trump pressured Ukraine to
initiate investigations into his political rival, former Vice
President Biden, for the purpose of benefiting the President in
the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The evidence does not
support the Democrats' allegations. Instead, the findings
outlined below are based on the evidence presented and
information available in the public realm.
President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and
reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of
pervasive corruption.
President Trump has a long-held skepticism of U.S.
foreign assistance and believes that Europe should pay its fair
share for mutual defense.
President Trump's concerns about Hunter Biden's
role on Burisma's board are valid. The Obama State Department
noted concerns about Hunter Biden's relationship with Burisma
in 2015 and 2016.
There is indisputable evidence that senior
Ukrainian government officials opposed President Trump's
candidacy in the 2016 election and did so publicly. It has been
publicly reported that a Democratic National Committee
operative worked with Ukrainian officials, including the
Ukrainian Embassy, to dig up dirt on then-candidate Trump.
The evidence does not establish that President
Trump pressured Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice
President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in
the 2016 election for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020
election.
The evidence does not establish that President
Trump withheld a meeting with President Zelensky for the
purpose of pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings,
Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence
in the 2016 election.
The evidence does not support that President Trump
withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine for the purpose of
pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice
President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in
the 2016 election.
The evidence does not support that President Trump
orchestrated a shadow foreign policy apparatus for the purpose
of pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice
President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in
the 2016 election.
The evidence does not support that President Trump
covered up the substance of his telephone conversation with
President Zelensky by restricting access to the call summary.
President Trump's assertion of longstanding claims
of executive privilege is a legitimate response to an unfair,
abusive, and partisan process, and does not constitute
obstruction of a legitimate impeachment inquiry.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................ 251
FINDINGS......................................................... 255
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................ 257
TABLE OF NAMES................................................... 260
I. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured
the Ukrainian government to investigate his political rival for
the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 U.S. presidential
election....................................................... 262
A. The evidence does not establish that President Trump
pressured President Zelensky during the July 25 phone call
to investigate the President's political rival for the
purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election............. 264
1. The call summary does not reflect any improper
pressure or conditionality to pressure Ukraine to
investigate President Trump's political rival.......... 264
2. President Zelensky has publicly and repeatedly said he
felt no pressure to investigate President Trump's
political rival........................................ 267
3. President Trump has publicly and repeatedly said he
did not pressure President Zelensky to investigate his
political rival........................................ 269
4. Read-outs of the phone call from both the State
Department and the Ukrainian government did not reflect
that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to
investigate his political rival........................ 270
5. The National Security Council leadership did not see
the call as illegal or improper........................ 272
6. The anonymous, secondhand whistleblower complaint
misstated details about the July 25 call, which has
falsely colored the call's public characterization..... 273
B. The evidence does not establish that President Trump
withheld a meeting with President Zelensky to pressure
Ukraine to investigate the President's political rival for
the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election......... 274
1. Ukraine has a long history of pervasive corruption.... 275
2. President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and
reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of
pervasive corruption................................... 276
3. Senior Ukrainian government officials publicly
attacked President Trump during the 2016 campaign...... 277
4. U.S. foreign policy officials were split on President
Zelensky, a political novice with untested views on
anti-corruption and a close relationship with a
controversial oligarch................................. 279
5. President Trump extended an invitation to the White
House to President Zelensky on three occasions without
conditions............................................. 281
6. Despite difficulty scheduling a face-to-face
presidential meeting, senior Ukrainian officials
interacted often with senior American officials between
May and September 2019................................. 283
7. The evidence does not establish a linkage between a
White House meeting and Ukrainian investigations into
President Trump's political rival...................... 284
8. The evidence does not establish that President Trump
directed Vice President Pence not to attend President
Zelensky's inauguration to pressure Ukraine to
investigate the President's political rival............ 289
9. President Trump and President Zelensky met during the
United Nations General Assembly in September 2019
without any Ukrainian action to investigate President
Trump's political rival................................ 291
C. The evidence does not establish that President Trump
withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine to pressure
Ukraine to investigate the President's political rival for
the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election......... 292
1. President Trump has been skeptical about U.S.
taxpayer-funded foreign assistance..................... 292
2. President Trump has been clear and consistent in his
view that Europe should pay its fair share for regional
defense................................................ 294
3. U.S. foreign aid is often conditioned or paused, and
U.S. security assistance to Ukraine has been paused
before................................................. 296
4. Despite President Trump's skepticism, the Trump
Administration's policies have shown greater commitment
and support to Ukraine than those of the Obama
Administration......................................... 298
5. Although security assistance to Ukraine was paused in
July 2019, several witnesses testified that U.S.
security assistance was not linked to any Ukrainian
action on investigations............................... 300
6. President Trump rejected any linkage between U.S.
security assistance and Ukrainian action on
investigations......................................... 305
7. Senior U.S. officials never substantively discussed
the delay in security assistance with Ukrainian
officials before the July 25 call...................... 307
8. The Ukrainian government denied any awareness of a
linkage between U.S. security assistance and
investigations......................................... 310
9. The Ukrainian government considered issuing a public
anti-corruption statement to convey that President
Zelensky was ``serious and different'' from previous
Ukrainian regimes...................................... 311
10. President Zelensky never raised a linkage between
security assistance and investigations in his meetings
with senior U.S. government officials.................. 316
11. In early September 2019, President Zelensky's
government implemented several anti-corruption reform
measures............................................... 318
12. The security assistance was ultimately disbursed to
Ukraine in September 2019 without any Ukrainian action
to investigate President Trump's political rival....... 320
D. The evidence does not establish that President Trump set
up a shadow foreign policy apparatus to pressure Ukraine to
investigate the President's political rival for the purpose
of benefiting him in the 2020 election..................... 321
1. The President has broad Constitutional authority to
conduct the foreign policy of the United States........ 322
2. President Trump was likely skeptical of the
established national security apparatus as a result of
continual leaks and resistance from the federal
bureaucracy............................................ 322
3. The President has the constitutional authority to
remove Ambassador Yovanovitch.......................... 324
4. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary
Perry were all senior U.S. government officers with
official interests in Ukraine policy................... 325
5. Referencing Ukrainian corruption, President Trump told
Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary
Perry to talk to Mayor Giuliani........................ 326
6. At the Ukrainian government's request, Ambassador
Volker connected them with Mayor Giuliani to change his
impression about the Zelensky regime................... 328
7. The Ukrainian government understood that Mayor
Giuliani was not speaking on behalf of President Trump. 329
8. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary
Perry kept the National Security Council and the State
Department informed about their actions................ 331
9. Although some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment
bristled, the roles of Ambassador Volker, Ambassador
Sondland, and Secretary Perry and their interactions
with Mayor Giuliani did not violate the law or harm
national security...................................... 331
E. President Trump is not wrong to raise questions about
Hunter Biden's role with Burisma or Ukrainian government
officials' efforts to influence the 2016 campaign.......... 333
1. It is appropriate for Ukraine to investigate
allegations of corruption in its country............... 334
2. There are legitimate concerns surrounding Hunter
Biden's position on the board of Ukrainian energy
company Burisma during his father's term as Vice
President of the United States......................... 335
3. There are legitimate questions about the extent to
which Ukrainian government officials worked to oppose
President Trump's candidacy in the 2016 election....... 340
F. The anonymous whistleblower who served as the basis for
the impeachment inquiry has no firsthand knowledge of
events and a bias against President Trump.................. 343
1. The anonymous whistleblower acknowledged having no
firsthand knowledge of the events in question.......... 344
2. Press reports suggest that the anonymous whistleblower
acknowledged having a professional relationship with
former Vice President Biden............................ 345
3. The anonymous whistleblower secretly communicated with
Chairman Schiff or his staff........................... 346
II. The evidence does not establish that President Trump engaged
in a cover-up of his interactions with Ukrainian President
Zelensky....................................................... 349
A. President Trump declassified and released publicly the
summary of his July 25 phone call with President Zelensky.. 349
B. President Trump released a redacted version of the
classified anonymous whistleblower complaint............... 350
C. President Trump released publicly the summary of his April
21 phone call with President Zelensky...................... 350
D. The Trump Administration has experienced a surge in
sensitive leaks, including details of the President's
communications with foreign leaders........................ 350
E. The evidence does not establish that access to the July 25
call summary was restricted for inappropriate reasons...... 351
III. The evidence does not establish that President Trump
obstructed Congress in the Democrats' impeachment inquiry...... 353
A. Democrats have abandoned long-standing precedent by
failing to guarantee due process and fundamental fairness
in their impeachment inquiry............................... 355
B. Democrats have engaged in an abusive process toward a pre-
determined outcome......................................... 356
C. President Trump may raise privileges and defenses in
response to unfair, abusive proceedings.................... 358
D. Although declining to submit to the Democrats' abusive and
unfair process, President Trump has released information to
help the American public understand the issues............. 359
IV. Conclusion................................................... 361
TABLE OF NAMES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Anderson................... Foreign Service Officer, U.S.
Department of State
Michael Atkinson....................... Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community (May
2018-present)
Arsen Avakov........................... Ukrainian Minister of Internal
Affairs (February 2014-
present)
Hunter Biden........................... Board Member, Burisma Holdings
(April 2014-October 2019)
Joseph R. Biden........................ Vice President of the United
States (January 2009-January
2017)
Robert Blair........................... Senior Advisor to the White
House Chief of Staff (January
2019-present)
Andriy Bohdan.......................... Head of Ukrainian Office of
Presidential Administration
(May 2019-present)
John Bolton............................ U.S. National Security Advisor
(April 2018-September 2019)
T. Ulrich Brechbuhl.................... Counselor to the U.S. Secretary
of State, U.S. Department of
State (May 2018-present)
Alexandra Chalupa...................... Former contractor, Democratic
National Committee
Valeriy Chaly.......................... Ukrainian Ambassador to the
United States (July 2015-July
2019)
Laura Cooper........................... Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Russia, Ukraine,
and Eurasia, U.S. Department
of Defense
Catherine Croft........................ Foreign Service Officer, U.S.
Department of State Director
for European Affairs, National
Security Council (July 2017-
July 2018)
Oleksandr Danylyuk..................... Secretary of the Ukrainian
National Security and Defense
Council (May 2019-September
2019)
Michael Duffey......................... Associate Director for National
Security Programs, U.S. Office
of Management and Budget (May
2019-present)
John Eisenberg......................... Legal Advisor, National
Security Council (2017-
present)
Michael Ellis.......................... Deputy Legal Advisor, National
Security Council (March 2017-
present)
Rudy Giuliani.......................... Mayor of New York City (1994-
2001), Personal Attorney to
President Trump (April 2018-
present)
Preston Wells Griffith................. Associate Director for Natural
Resources, Energy & Science,
U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (April 2018-present)
David Hale............................. Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, U.S.
Department of State (August
2018-present)
Fiona Hill............................. Senior Director for European
and Russian Affairs, National
Security Council (April 2017-
July 2019)
David Holmes........................... Political Counselor, U.S.
Embassy KyivSec. Sec. (August
2017-present)
Keith Kellogg.......................... National Security Advisor to
the Vice President (April 2018-
present)
George Kent............................ Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State (September
2018-present)
Igor Kolomoisky........................ Co-owner, PrivatBank Co-owner,
1+1 Media Group
Charles Kupperman...................... U.S. Deputy National Security
Advisor (January 2019-
September 2019)
Serhiy Leshchenko...................... Ukrainian Member of Parliament
(November 2014-July 2019)
Yuriy Lutsenko......................... Prosecutor General of Ukraine
(May 2016-August 2019)
Joseph Maguire......................... Acting U.S. Director of
National Intelligence (August
2019-present)
Brian McCormack........................ Associate Director for Natural
Resources, Energy & Science,
U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (September 2018-
present)
Michael McKinley....................... Senior Advisor to the U.S.
Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State (November
2018-October 2019)
Tim Morrison........................... Senior Director for European
and Russian Affairs, National
Security Council (July 2019-
November 2019)
Mick Mulvaney.......................... Director of the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget
(February 2017-present),
Acting Chief of Staff to the
President (January 2019-
present)
Nellie Ohr............................. Contractor, Fusion GPS
Mike Pence............................. Vice President of the United
States (January 2017-present)
Rick Perry............................. U.S. Secretary of Energy (March
2017-present)
Mike Pompeo............................ U.S. Secretary of State (April
2018-present)
Petro Poroshenko....................... President of Ukraine (June 2014-
May 2019)
Vadym Prystaiko........................ Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine (August 2019-present)
Philip Reeker.......................... Acting Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
Department of State (March
2019-present)
Mark Sandy............................. Deputy Associate Director for
National Security, U.S. Office
of Management and Budget
(December 2013-present)
Viktor Shokin.......................... Prosecutor General of Ukraine
(February 2015-March 2016)
Oksana Shulyar......................... Deputy Chief of Mission,
Embassy of Ukraine to the U.S.
Gordon Sondland........................ U.S. Ambassador to the European
Union (July 2018-present)
William Taylor......................... U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
(June 2006-May 2009), U.S.
Charge d'Affaires, a.i. U.S.
Embassy Kyiv (June 2019-
present)
Andrii Telizhenko...................... Political officer, Embassy of
Ukraine to the U.S.
Donald J. Trump........................ President of the United States
(January 2017-present)
Alexander Vindman...................... Director for European Affairs,
National Security Council
(July 2018-present)
Kurt Volker............................ U.S. Special Representative for
Ukraine Negotiations, U.S.
Department of State (July 2017-
September 2019)
Russell Vought......................... Acting Director, U.S. Office of
Management and Budget
Kathryn Wheelbarger.................... Acting Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International
Affairs, U.S. Department of
Defense (November 2018-
present)
Jennifer Williams...................... Special Adviser for Europe and
Russia, Office of the Vice
President
Viktor Yanukovych...................... President of Ukraine (February
2010-February 2014)
Arseniy Yatsenyuk...................... Prime Minister of Ukraine
(February 2014-April 2016)
Andrey Yermak.......................... Adviser to President of Ukraine
Volodymyr Zelensky
Marie Yovanovitch...................... U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
(August 2016-May 2019)
Volodymyr Zelensky***.................. President of Ukraine (May 2019-
present)
Mykola Zlochevsky...................... Co-founder, Burisma Holdings
(2002-present), Ukrainian
Minister of Ecology and
Natural Resources (July 2010-
April 2012)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. Sec. Consistent with the U.S. Board on Geographic Names, this
report spells the Ukrainian capital as ``Kyiv'' throughout.
*** Although some sources use alternate spellings of the Ukrainian
President's surname, this report uses the spelling ``Zelensky'' for
consistency throughout.
I. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured the
Ukrainian government to investigate his political rival for the purpose
of benefiting him in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.
Democrats have alleged that President Trump exerted
pressure on Ukrainian President Zelensky to force the Ukrainian
government to manufacture ``dirt'' or otherwise investigate a
potential Democrat candidate in the 2020 U.S. presidential
election for President Trump's political benefit.\1\ Democrats
allege that President Trump sought to use the possibility of a
White House meeting with President Zelensky and release of U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine as leverage to force Ukraine to
help the President politically. Democrats allege that President
Trump orchestrated a ``shadow'' foreign policy apparatus that
worked to accomplish the President's political goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\``Whistleblower Disclosure'': Hearing of the H. Perm. Sel. Comm.
on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff,
Chairman); Rep. Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter (Oct. 12, 2019,
2:53 p.m.), https://twitter.com/repadamschiff/status/11831386
29130035200; Lieu accuses Trump of asking Ukraine to ``manufacture
dirt'' on Biden, The Hill, Sept. 25, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The evidence obtained in the Democrats' impeachment
inquiry, however, does not support these Democrat allegations.
In fact, witnesses called by the Democrats denied having any
awareness of criminal activity or an impeachable offense. Rep.
John Ratcliffe asked Ambassador Bill Taylor and Deputy
Assistant Secretary George Kent whether they were ``assert[ing]
there was an impeachable offense in [the July 25] call.''\2\
Neither said there was.\3\ Rep. Chris Stewart asked Ambassador
Marie Yovanovitch if she had any information about President
Trump's involvement in criminal activity.\4\ Ambassador
Yovanovitch said no.\5\ Rep. Ratcliffe asked National Security
Council (NSC) staff member LTC Alexander Vindman and Office of
the Vice President special adviser Jennifer Williams if they
have labeled the President's conduct as ``bribery.''\6\ Both
said no.\7\ Rep. Elise Stefanik asked Ambassador Kurt Volker,
the U.S. special envoy for Ukraine negotiations, and Tim
Morrison, the NSC senior director for Europe, whether they saw
any bribery, extortion, or quid pro quo.\8\ Both said no.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr.
George Kent'': Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence,
116th Cong. (2019).
\3\Id.
\4\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch'': Hearing
before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019).
\5\Id.
\6\``Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer
Williams'': Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence,
116th Cong. (2019). This report abbreviates military titles consistent
with the U.S. Government Printing Office style manual. See U.S. Gov't
Printing Off., Style Manual 227 (2016).
\7\Id.
\8\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison'': Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence,
116th Cong. (2019).
\9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contrary to Democrat assertions, the evidence does not show
that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to
investigate his political rival during the July 25 phone call.
The best evidence of the conversation--the call summary--shows
no evidence of conditionality, threats, or pressure. President
Zelensky and President Trump have both said there was no
pressure, the initial read-out from the State Department and
the Ukrainian government reflected no concerns, and the NSC
leadership saw no illegality or impropriety with the call.
The evidence does not show that President Trump withheld a
meeting with President Zelensky to pressure Ukraine to
investigate his political rival. The evidence shows that
President Trump has a long-standing, deep-seated skepticism of
Ukraine due to its history of pervasive corruption. President
Zelensky was a political newcomer with untested views on anti-
corruption and a close association with a Ukrainian oligarch.
Even so, President Trump agreed to invite President Zelensky to
the White House, and in the interim, Ukrainian officials had
several high-level meetings with U.S. officials. President
Trump and President Zelensky met in September 2019 without
Ukraine ever taking any action on investigating President
Trump's political rival.
In addition, the evidence does not show that President
Trump withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine to pressure
Ukraine to investigate his political rival. The evidence shows
that President Trump has a skepticism of U.S. taxpayer-funded
foreign aid and believes Europe should carry more financial
burden for its regional defense. Although U.S. security
assistance was paused temporarily, Democrats' witnesses denied
there being any direct link to investigations of the
President's political rival. Both the Ukrainian government and
President Trump separately denied any linkage. U.S. officials
did not tell the Ukrainian officials about the delay because
they thought it would get worked out. Ambassador Volker, a
senior U.S. diplomat and primary interlocutor with senior
Ukrainian government officials, testified that the Ukrainians
did not raise concerns to him about a delay in aid until after
the pause was made public in late August 2019. The U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine was ultimately disbursed without
Ukraine taking any action to investigate President Trump's
political rival.
The evidence does not show that President Trump established
a ``shadow'' foreign policy apparatus to pressure Ukraine to
investigate his political rival. The President has broad
Constitutional authority over U.S. foreign policy, and
President Trump is likely suspicious of the national security
apparatus due to continual leaks of sensitive information and
the resistance within the federal bureaucracy. The three U.S.
officials who Democrats accuse of conducting an ``irregular''
foreign policy channel had legitimate responsibilities for
Ukraine policy. They kept the State Department and NSC aware of
their actions. To the extent Mayor Giuliani was involved, he
was in communication with these officials and the Ukrainians
did not see him as speaking on behalf of the President.
Although Democrats reflexively criticize President Trump
for promoting ``conspiracy theories'' about Hunter Biden's role
on Burisma's board or Ukrainian attempts to influence the 2016
election, evidence suggests there are legitimate questions
about both issues. The Democrats' witnesses testified that it
would be appropriate for Ukraine to investigate allegations of
corruption in Ukraine.
Finally, there are fundamental flaws with the anonymous
whistleblower complaint that initiated the Democrats'
impeachment inquiry. The complaint contained inaccurate and
misleading information that prejudiced the public understanding
of President Trump's conversation with President Zelensky. The
whistleblower had no firsthand knowledge of the events in
question and a bias against President Trump. The whistleblower
communicated with Chairman Schiff or his staff prior to
submitting the whistleblower complaint to the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community. Several witnesses contradicted
assertions made by the anonymous whistleblower. The
whistleblower's complaint did not accurately reflect the tone
and substance of the phone call, which is unsurprising given
the whistleblower's reliance on secondhand information that had
likely already been colored by biases of the original sources.
A. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured
President Zelensky during the July 25 phone call to investigate
the President's political rival for the purpose of benefiting
him in the 2020 election.
On July 25, 2019, President Trump and President Zelensky
spoke by telephone.\10\ This conversation would later serve as
the basis for the anonymous whistleblower complaint and the
spark for the Democrats' impeachment inquiry. Contrary to
allegations that President Trump pressured Ukraine to
investigate a domestic political rival during this call,\11\
the evidence shows that President Trump did not pressure
President Zelensky to investigate his political rival.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\President Trump had spoken with then-President-elect Zelensky
on April 21, 2019, to congratulate him on his election. See The White
House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 21, 2019). This
conversation too contained no indication of pressure, intimidation or
threats. See id.
\11\See, e.g., Josh Dawsey et al., How Trump and Giuliani pressured
Ukraine to investigate the President's rivals, Wash. Post, (Sept. 20,
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The call summary and initial read-outs of the conversation
reflect no indication of conditionality, coercion, or
intimidation--elements that would have been present if
President Trump had used his authority to pressure President
Zelensky to investigate his political rival. Importantly, both
President Zelensky and President Trump have said publicly there
was no pressure or anything inappropriate about their
conversation. The anonymous whistleblower complaint--which
sparked the impeachment inquiry--contains sensational rhetoric
about the July 25 phone conservation that has prejudged
subsequent views of the call.
1. The call summary does not reflect any improper pressure or
conditionality to pressure Ukraine to investigate President
Trump's political rival.
The best evidence of the telephone conversation between
President Trump and President Zelensky is the contemporaneous
summary prepared by the White House Situation Room. The
Democrats' witnesses described how National Security Council
(NSC) policy staffers and White House Situation Room duty
officers typically listen in on presidential conversations with
foreign leaders to transcribe the contents of the
conversation.\12\ This process occurred for President Trump's
July 25 phone call with President Zelensky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\See, e.g., Deposition of Dr. Fiona Hill, in Wash., D.C., at
297-300 (Oct. 14, 2019) [hereinafter ``Hill deposition'']. Although
some have alleged that the presence of ellipses in the call summary
connotes missing text, witnesses testified that call summaries often
use ellipses to denote unfinished thoughts and not to ``read too much''
into the use of ellipses. See, e.g., id. at 307. LTC Vindman testified
in his closed-door deposition that any editing decisions or missing
words were not done maliciously. See Deposition of LTC Alexander
Vindman, in Wash., D.C., at 253 (Oct. 29, 2019) [hereinafter ``Vindman
deposition'']. In his public testimony, LTC Vindman explained that
although the summary did not mention the word ``Burisma,'' it was ``not
a significant omission.'' Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman
and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6. Morrison testified in his
deposition that he believed the call memorandum was an ``accurate and
complete'' reflection of the substance of the call. Deposition of
Timothy Morrison, in Wash., D.C., at 60 (Oct. 31, 2019) [hereinafter
``Morrison deposition''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As transcribed, the call summary denotes laughter,
pleasantries, and compliments exchanged between President Trump
and President Zelensky. The summary does not evince any
threats, coercion, intimidation, or indication of
conditionality. Democrats even acknowledged that the call
summary reflected no quid pro quo.\13\ The summary bears
absolutely no resemblance to House Intelligence Committee
Chairman Adam Schiff's self-described ``parody'' interpretation
of the call, which the Chairman performed at a public hearing
on September 26.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\See, e.g., MSNBC Live with Craig Melvin (MSNBC television
broadcast Sept. 25, 2019) (interview with Rep. Ro Khanna) (saying
evidence of a quid pro quo on the call summary is ``irrelevant'').
\14\Whistleblower Disclosure, supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The summary of the July 25 phone call begins by President
Trump congratulating President Zelensky on a ``great victory,''
a ``terrific job,'' and a ``fantastic achievement.''\15\
President Zelensky reciprocated by complimenting President
Trump, saying:
Well, yes, to tell you the truth, we are trying to
work hard because we wanted to drain the swamp here in
our country. We brought in many, many new people. Not
the old politicians, not the typical politicians,
because we want to have a new format and a new type of
government. You are a great teacher for us and in
that.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 (July
25, 2019).
\16\Id. at 2.
President Trump expressed his concern that European
countries were not providing their fair share in terms of
assistance to Ukraine\17\--a topic about which President Trump
has been vocal.\18\ President Zelensky responded that President
Trump was ``absolutely right'' and that he had expressed
concerns to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French
President Emmanuel Macron.\19\ President Zelensky thanked
President Trump for U.S. military support and said Ukraine was
``almost ready to buy more Javelins from the United States for
defense purposes.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\Id.
\18\See infra section I.C.2.
\19\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 2.
\20\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Trump then transitioned to discuss the allegation
that some Ukrainian officials sought to influence the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. Although Democrats have seized on the
President's phrasing--``I would like you to do us a favor
though''\21\--to accuse the President of pressuring President
Zelensky to target his 2020 political rival for his political
benefit,\22\ they omit the remainder of his sentence. The full
sentence shows that President Trump was not asking President
Zelensky to investigate his political rival, but rather asking
him to assist in ``get[ting] to the bottom'' of potential
Ukrainian involvement in the 2016 election.\23\ This reading is
supported by President Trump's subsequent reference to Special
Counsel Robert Mueller, who had testified the day before about
his findings,\24\ and to Attorney General William Barr, who had
initiated an official inquiry into the origins of the U.S.
government's 2016 Russia investigation.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\Id. at 3.
\22\See, e.g., Whistleblower Disclosure, supra note 1 (statement of
Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman).
\23\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3. The
President's reference to ``Crowdstrike'' during the conversation refers
to a cybersecurity firm that examined the Democratic National Committee
server following intrusion by the Russian government in 2016.
\24\``Oversight of the Report on the Investigation into Russian
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Former Special Counsel
Robert S. Mueller, III'': Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong. (2019).
\25\See, e.g., Adam Goldman et al., Barr assigns U.S. Attorney in
Connecticut to review origins of Russia inquiry, N.Y. Times, May 13,
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Zelensky did not express any concern that
President Trump had raised the allegations about Ukrainian
influence in the 2016 election. In fact, President Zelensky
responded by reiterating his commitment to cooperation between
Ukraine and the United States and mentioning that he had
recalled the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, Valeriy
Chaly.\26\ Ambassador Chaly had authored an op-ed in The Hill
during the height of the presidential campaign in 2016
criticizing a statement that President Trump had made by
Crimea.\27\ President Zelensky said he planned to surround
himself with ``the best and most experienced people'' and
pledged that ``as the President of Ukraine that all the
investigations will be done openly and candidly.''\28\
President Zelensky also raised former New York Mayor Rudy
Giuliani, saying ``we are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani
will be able to travel to Ukraine and we will meet once he
comes to Ukraine.''\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3.
\27\Valeriy Chaly, Ukraine's ambassador: Trump's comments send
wrong message to world, The Hill, Aug. 4, 2016.
\28\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3.
\29\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The call summary shows that the discussion then intertwined
several different topics. In response to President Zelensky's
statement about new personnel, President Trump and President
Zelensky discussed the position of prosecutor general.\30\
President Zelensky did not express any discomfort discussing
the prosecutor general position. He said the new prosecutor
general would be ``100% my person, my candidate'' and said the
prosecutor would look into the matters raised by President
Trump to ``mak[e] sure to restore the honesty'' of the
investigation.\31\ President Zelensky later said ``we will be
very serious about the case and will work on the
investigation.''\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\Id. at 3-4.
\31\Id. at 4.
\32\Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to President Zelensky's reference to Mayor
Giuliani, President Trump said Mayor Giuliani is ``a highly
respected man'' who ``very much knows what's happening and he
is a very capable guy.''\33\ President Trump said that he would
ask Mayor Giuliani to call President Zelensky, along with
Attorney General Barr, to ``get to the bottom of it.''\34\
President Zelensky did not express any concern about Mayor
Giuliani's engagement--in fact, President Zelensky, not
President Trump, first referenced Mayor Giuliani in the
conversation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\Id. at 3-4.
\34\Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Trump then raised former U.S. Ambassador to
Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, saying that she was ``bad news''
and ``the people she was dealing with in the Ukraine were bad
news.''\35\ President Zelensky did not express any hesitancy in
discussing the ambassador. Contrary to Democrats' assertion
that he felt obligated to agree with President Trump's
assessment, President Zelensky stated his independent negative
assessment of Ambassador Yovanovitch:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\Id.
Her attitude toward me was far from the best as she
admired the previous President and she was on his side.
She would not accept me as a new President well
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
enough.\36\
President Trump also raised in passing--using the
transition phrase ``the other thing''--the topic of Vice
President Joe Biden's son, Hunter Biden, referring to his
position on the board of a Ukrainian energy company, Burisma,
known for its corruption.\37\ President Trump said ``a lot of
people want to find out about that so whatever you can do with
the Attorney General would be great.''\38\ President Zelensky
did not reply to President Trump's reference to the Bidens, and
the two did not discuss the topic substantively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\Id.
\37\Id.
\38\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The call concluded with President Zelensky raising energy
cooperation between Ukraine and the United States and with
President Trump reiterating his invitation for President
Zelensky to visit the White House.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although some later expressed concern about the call, the
call summary--the best evidence of the conversation--shows no
indication of conflict, intimidation, or pressure. President
Trump never conditioned a White House meeting on any action by
President Zelensky. President Trump never mentioned U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine. President Zelensky never
verbalized any disagreement, hostility, or concern about any
facet of the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship.
2. President Zelensky has publicly and repeatedly said he felt no
pressure to investigate President Trump's political rival.
Since President Trump declassified and publicly released
the content of his July 25 phone conversation with President
Zelensky, President Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian
officials have publicly and repeatedly asserted that President
Zelensky felt no pressure to investigate President Trump's
political rival. President Zelensky has variously asserted,
``nobody pushed . . . me,'' ``I was never pressured,'' and
there was no ``blackmail.''
On September 25, President Zelensky and President Trump met
face-to-face for a bilateral meeting on the margins of the 74th
United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly in New York. The
presidents jointly participated in a media availability, during
which President Zelensky asserted that he felt no pressure.\40\
President Zelensky said then:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\Press Release, The White House, Remarks by President Trump and
President Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 25,
2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-president-zelensky-ukraine-bilateral-meeting-
new-york-ny/.
Q. President Zelensky, have you felt any pressure
from President Trump to investigate Joe Biden and
Hunter Biden?
A. I think you read everything. So I think you read
text. I'm sorry, but I don't want to be involved to
democratic, open elections--elections of USA. No, you
heard that we had, I think, good phone call. It was
normal. We spoke about many things. And I--so I think,
and you read it, that nobody pushed--pushed me.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\Id. (emphasis added).
President Zelensky again reiterated that he was not
pressured to investigate President Trump's political rival
during an interview with a Kyodo News, a Japanese media outlet,
published on October 6. Kyodo News quoted President Zelensky as
saying, ``I was never pressured and there were no conditions
being imposed'' on a White House meeting or U.S. security
assistance to Ukraine.\42\ President Zelensky denied ``reports
by U.S. media that [President] Trump's requests were
conditions'' for a White House meeting or U.S. security
assistance.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\Ukraine president denies being pushed by Trump to investigate
Biden, Kyodo News, Oct. 6, 2019.
\43\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On October 10, during an all-day media availability in
Kyiv, President Zelensky again emphasized that he felt no
pressure to investigate President Trump's political rival.
President Zelensky said there was ``no blackmail'' during the
conversation, explaining: ``This is not corruption. It was just
a call.''\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\Ukraine's president says no blackmail' in Trump call, BBC, Oct.
10, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, on September 21--before President Trump had
even declassified and released the call summary--Ukrainian
Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko denied that President Trump
had pressured President Zelensky to investigate President
Trump's political rival\45\ Foreign Minister Prystaiko said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\``Trump did not pressure Zelenskyy, Ukraine is independent
state''--Foreign Minister Prystaiko, Hromadske, Sept. 21, 2019.
I know what the conversation was about and I think
there was no pressure. There was talk, conversations
are different, leaders have the right to discuss any
problems that exist. This conversation was long,
friendly, and it touched on a lot of questions,
including those requiring serious answers.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, Ambassador Bill Taylor explained that he had
dinner with Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-Secretary of the National
Security and Defense Council, the night of the phone
conversation between President Trump and President
Zelensky.\47\ He explained that Danylyuk said that the
Ukrainian government ``seemed to think that the call went fine,
the call went well. He wasn't disturbed by anything. He wasn't
disturbed that he told us about the phone call.''\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\Deposition of Ambassador William B. Taylor, in Wash., D.C., at
80 (Oct. 22, 2019).
\48\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Zelensky's repeated denials that President Trump
pressured him to investigate domestic political rival--
corroborated by Foreign Minister Prystaiko's similar denial--
carry significant weight.
3. President Trump has publicly and repeatedly said he did not pressure
President Zelensky to investigate his political rival.
Like President Zelensky, President Trump has repeatedly and
publicly stated that he did not pressure President Zelensky to
investigate his political rival. During the September 25
bilateral meeting with President Zelensky, President Trump said
to the assembled members of the media: ``There was no pressure.
And you know there was--and, by the way, you know there was no
pressure. All you have to do it see it, what went on the
call.''\49\ When asked whether he wanted President Zelensky to
``do more'' to investigate Vice President Biden, President
Trump responded: ``No. I want him to do whatever he can. This
was not his fault; he wasn't there. He's just been here
recently. But whatever he can do in terms of corruption,
because the corruption is massive.''\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\Remarks by President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine
Before Bilateral Meeting, supra note 40.
\50\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the President's statements, some allege that an
overheard conversation the day after President Trump's
conversation with President Zelensky shows that the President
sought to pressure President Zelensky. On July 26, following a
meeting with President Zelensky, Ambassador Gordon Sondland,
the U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, telephoned President
Trump from Kyiv.\51\According to a subsequent account of David
Holmes, a Political Counselor at U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ambassador
Sondland told the President that he was in Ukraine and stated
President Zelensky ``loves your ass.''\52\ Holmes recounted
that President Trump asked Ambassador Sondland, ``So he's going
to do the investigation?''\53\ Ambassador Sondland allegedly
replied, ``He's going to do it.''\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\Deposition of David Holmes, in Wash., D.C., at 23-25 (Nov. 15,
2019) [hereinafter ``Holmes deposition'']. Ambassador Sondland did not
mention this phone call in his deposition. See generally Deposition of
Ambassador Gordon D. Sondland, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 17, 2019)
[hereinafter ``Sondland deposition''].
\52\Holmes deposition, supra note 51, at 24
\53\Id.
\54\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This conversation is not definitive evidence that President
Trump pressured President Zelensky to investigate his political
rival. First, according to Ambassador Sondland, it was not
clear that President Trump meant an investigation into the
Bidens. In his closed-door deposition, Ambassador Sondland
testified that he only had ``five or six'' conversations with
the President and did not mention this particular
conversation.\55\ In his public testimony, however, Ambassador
Sondland suddenly recalled the conversation, saying that it
``did not strike me as significant at the time'' and that the
primary purpose of the call was to discuss rapper A$AP Rocky,
who was imprisoned in Sweden.\56\ Ambassador Sondland testified
that he has no recollection of discussing Vice President Biden
or his son, Hunter Biden, with President Trump.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 56.
\56\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland'': Hearing
before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019).
\57\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, Holmes testified that although he disclosed
Ambassador Sondland's conversation with the President to
multiple friends on multiple occasions, he did not feel
compelled to disclose it to the State Department or Congress
until weeks into the impeachment inquiry.\58\ Although Holmes
testified that he told his boss, Ambassador Taylor, about the
call on August 6 and received a ``knowing'' response, and that
he referred to the call often in staff meetings, Ambassador
Taylor testified publicly that he was ``not aware of this
information'' at the time of his October 22 deposition, and
that he only became aware of the Holmes account on November 8,
2019, two days after his hearing was publicly announced, at
which point he referred it (for the first time) to the Legal
Adviser for the Department of State.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\Holmes deposition, supra note 51, at 31, 158-62.
\59\Id. at 81-82, 121-22, 167; see generally Taylor deposition,
supra note 47; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and
Mr. George Kent, supra note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Read-outs of the phone call from both the State Department and the
Ukrainian government did not reflect that President Trump
pressured President Zelensky to investigate his political
rival.
Immediately following the telephone conversation between
President Trump and President Zelensky, senior U.S. and
Ukrainian government officials provided read-outs of the
conversation. According to witness testimony, none of these
read-outs indicated that the conversation between the
presidents was substantively concerning.
Ambassador Volker testified that he received informal read-
outs of the call from both his State Department assistant and
his high-level Ukrainian contacts.\60\ These read-outs did not
indicate any concern with the phone call. Ambassador Volker
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\Transcribed interview of Ambassador Kurt Volker, in Wash.,
D.C., at 102-03 (Oct. 3, 2019) [hereinafter ``Volker transcribed
interview'']. Ambassador Volker's assistant at the time, Catherine
Croft, testified that she only received a read-out of the phone call
was based on what President Zelensky told Ambassador Volker, Ambassador
Taylor, and Ambassador Sondland on July 26. Deposition of Catherine
Croft, in Wash., D.C., at 16 (Oct. 30, 2019) [hereinafter ``Croft
deposition''].
A. I got an oral readout from the staffer who works
for me in the State Department and our charge, as well
as from Andrey Yermak, who had been on the call in
Ukraine himself.
Q. So you got two readouts?
A. Yeah.
Q. One from each side?
A. Correct.
Q. What was the top line message you got from the
State Department?
A. Well, they were the same, actually, which is
interesting. But the message was congratulations from
the President to President Zelensky; President Zelensky
reiterating that he is committed to fighting corruption
and reform in the Ukraine; and President Trump
reiterating an invitation for President Zelensky to
visit him at the White House. That was it.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 102-03.
In fact, in his public testimony, Ambassador Volker
testified that President Zelensky was ``very upbeat about the
fact of the call.''\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Sondland received a summary of the phone call
from his staff.\63\ Ambassador Sondland testified that he was
pleased to learn that it was a ``good call.''\64\ George Kent,
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State covering Ukraine,
testified that he received a read-out of the call from NSC
staffer LTC Alexander Vindman.\65\ According to Kent, although
LTC Vindman said the ``atmospherics'' of the conversation was
cooler and reserved, LTC Vindman did not mention Vice President
Biden's name or anything relating to 2016.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 116.
\64\Id.
\65\Deposition of George Kent, in Wash., D.C., at 163 (Oct. 15,
2019) [hereinafter ``Kent deposition''].
\66\Id. at 163-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Office of the President of Ukraine issued
an official statement following the phone call.\67\ The
official statement also signaled no concern about the call or
any indication of coercion, intimidation, or pressure from
President Trump. The statement read in full:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\Press Release, Office of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr
Zelenskyy had a phone conversation with President of the United States
(July 25, 2019), available at https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/
volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-s-56617.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky had a phone
conversation with President of the United States Donald
Trump. President of the United States congratulated
Ukraine on successful holding free and democratic
parliamentary elections as well as Volodymyr Zelensky
with victory the Servant of the People Party.
Donald Trump is convinced that the new Ukrainian
government will be able to quickly improve image of
Ukraine, complete investigation of corruption cases,
which inhibited the interaction between Ukraine and the
USA.
He also confirmed continued support of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine by the
United States and the readiness of the American side to
fully contribute to the implementation of a Large-Scale
Reform Program in our country.
Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Donald Trump for US
leadership in preserving and strengthening the
sanctions pressure on Russia.
The Presidents agreed to discuss practical issues of
Ukrainian-American cooperation during the visit of
Volodymyr Zelensky to the United States.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\Id.
The initial read-outs of the July 25 telephone conversation
between President Trump and President Zelensky provide
compelling evidence that the key message conveyed during the
conversation was about fighting corruption in Ukraine--and not
about digging up dirt on President Trump's political rival for
the President's political benefit.
5. The National Security Council leadership did not see the call as
illegal or improper.
The evidence shows that the NSC leadership did not see the
telephone conversation between President Trump and President
Zelensky as improper. Timothy Morrison, who served as the
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security,
listened in on the conversation.\69\ He testified that he was
concerned information from the call could leak, but he was not
concerned that anything discussed on the call was illegal or
improper.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 15.
\70\Id. at 16, 60-61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LTG Keith Kellogg, Vice President Pence's National Security
Advisor, also listened in on the July 25 telephone
conversation.\71\ LTG Kellogg stated that like Morrison: ``I
heard nothing wrong or improper on the call. I had and have no
concerns.''\72\ LTG Kellogg's subordinate, Jennifer Williams,
testified that although she found the call to be ``unusual,''
she did not raise concerns to LTG Kellogg.\73\ LTG Kellogg
similarly noted that Williams never raised concerns to him.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\The White House, Statement from Lieutenant General Keith
Kellogg, National Security Advisor to Vice President Mike Pence (Nov.
19, 2019) [hereinafter ``Statement from Lieutenant General Kellogg''].
\72\Id.
\73\Deposition of Jennifer Williams, in Wash., D.C., at 129 (Nov.
7, 2019) [hereinafter ``Williams deposition'']; Impeachment Inquiry:
LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6.
\74\Statement from Lieutenant General Kellogg, supra note 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morrison's subordinate, LTC Vindman, listened in on the
conversation.\75\ At the time of the call, LTC Vindman handled
Ukraine policy for the NSC.\76\ He testified that he was
concerned by the conversation and raised his concerns to the
NSC's Legal Advisor, John Eisenberg.\77\ Eisenberg, according
to LTC Vindman, did not share the concern.\78\ LTC Vindman did
not raise any concerns to Morrison, his immediate
supervisor.\79\ In his public testimony, Morrison explained
that he had concerns with LTC Vindman's judgment and deviation
from the chain of command.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 18.
\76\Id. at 16.
\77\Id. at 96.
\78\Id. at 97, 258.
\79\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 59.
\80\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The evidence suggests that any wider concerns about the
July 25 phone call originated from LTC Vindman. Williams
testified that she discussed the call with no one outside the
NSC.\81\ LTC Vindman, on the other hand, testified that he
discussed the phone call with two people outside of the NSC,
Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent and an unidentified
intelligence community employee.\82\ Deputy Assistant Secretary
Kent explained that LTC Vindman felt ``uncomfortable'' and
would not share the majority of the substance of the
conversation.\83\ According to Kent's recollection, LTC Vindman
did not mention that the conversation included any reference to
Vice President Biden.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer
Williams, supra note 6.
\82\Id.
\83\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 163-64.
\84\Id. at 165-66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The anonymous, secondhand whistleblower complaint misstated details
about the July 25 call, which has falsely colored the call's
public characterization.
The anonymous whistleblower did not listen in on the July
25 call between President Trump and President Zelensky. The
whistleblower's subsequent complaint about the conversation,
compiled with secondhand information, misstated key details
about the conversation.
The whistleblower sensationally alleged that President
Trump ``sought to pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions
to help the President's 2020 reelection bid.''\85\ The call
summary, however, contains no reference to 2020 or President
Trump's reelection bid.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\Letter to Richard Burr, Chairman, S. Sel. Comm. on
Intelligence, & Adam Schiff, Chairman, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on
Intelligence 2 (Aug. 12, 2019) [hereinafter ``Whistleblower letter''].
\86\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The whistleblower alleged that President Trump
``pressured'' President Zelensky to ``initiate or continue an
investigation into the activities of former Vice President
Joseph Biden and his son, Hunter Biden.''\87\ The call summary,
however, shows that President Trump referenced the Bidens only
in passing and that the presidents did not discuss the topic
substantively.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 2.
\88\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The whistleblower alleged that President Trump
``pressured'' President Zelensky to ``locate and turn over
servers used by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and
examined by the U.S. cyber security firm Crowdstrike.''\89\ The
call summary, however, demonstrates that while President Trump
mentioned Crowdstrike and ``the server,'' President Trump never
made any request that President Zelensky locate or turn over
any material.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 2.
\90\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The whistleblower alleged that President Trump ``praised
Ukraine's Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuriy Lutsenko, and suggested
that Mr. Zelensky might want to keep him in his position.''\91\
The call summary is not clear about which prosecutor general
President Trump is referring to--Ambassador Volker testified he
believed President Trump was referring to Lutsenko's
predecessor, Viktor Shokin\92\--and President Trump never
specifically referenced Lutsenko.\93\ President Trump also
never suggested or intimated that President Zelensky should
``keep [Lutsenko] in his position.''\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 3.
\92\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 355.
\93\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
\94\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The whistleblower also alleged that T. Ulrich Brechbuhl,
Counselor to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, listened in on the
July 25 phone call.\95\ Subsequent reporting, confirmed by a
letter sent by Brechbuhl's attorney, indicated that Brechbuhl
was not on the call.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 3.
\96\Christina Ruffini (@EenaRuffini), Twitter (Sept. 26, 2019,
12:41 p.m.), https://twitter.com/EenaRuffini/status/
1177307225024544768; Letter from Ronald Tenpas to Adam Schiff,
Chairman, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence (Nov. 5, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Setting aside the whistleblower's mischaracterization of
President Trump's phone call with President Zelensky, the best
available evidence shows no coercion, threats, or pressure for
Ukraine to investigate the President's political rival for the
President's political benefit. The call summary shows no quid
pro quo, the initial read-outs relayed no substantive concerns,
and both President Zelensky and President Trump have repeatedly
said publicly there was no pressure. These facts refute the
Democrats' allegations.
B. The evidence does not establish that President Trump withheld a
meeting with President Zelensky to pressure Ukraine to
investigate the President's political rival for the purpose of
benefiting him in the 2020 election.
Democrats allege that President Trump withheld a meeting
with President Zelensky as a way of pressuring Ukraine to
investigate President Trump's political rival.\97\ Here, too,
the evidence obtained during the impeachment inquiry does not
support this allegation. President Trump and President Zelensky
met without Ukraine ever investigating Vice Present Biden or
his son, Hunter Biden.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\See, e.g., Karoun Demirjian et al., Officials' texts reveals
belief that Trump wanted probes as condition of Ukraine meeting, Wash.
Post, Oct. 4, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The evidence strongly suggests, instead, that President
Trump was reluctant to meet with President Zelensky for a
different reason--Ukraine's long history of pervasive
corruption and uncertainty about whether President Zelensky
would break from this history and live up to his anti-
corruption campaign platform. The Democrats' witnesses
described how President Trump has a deep-seated and genuine
skepticism of Ukraine due to its corruption and that the
President's view was reasonable. Because of President Trump's
skepticism and because President Zelensky was a first-time
candidate with relatively untested views, Ukraine and U.S.
officials sought to convince President Trump that President
Zelensky was the ``real deal'' on reform. President Trump
ultimately signed a letter to President Zelensky on May 29
inviting him to the White House.
Although there were several months between President
Trump's invitation on May 29 and the bilateral meeting on
September 25, the evidence does not show the delay was
intentional or aimed at pressuring President Zelensky. The
Democrats' witnesses described the difficulty in scheduling
high-level meetings and how an anticipated presidential meeting
in Poland in early September was cancelled due to Hurricane
Dorian. Nonetheless, U.S. foreign policy officials believed
that the Ukrainian government felt good about its relationship
with the Trump Administration because of several high-level
bilateral meetings held between May and September 2019,
including President Zelensky's meeting with Vice President
Pence on September 1. Ultimately, of course, President Trump
and President Zelensky met during the U.N. General Assembly in
New York on September 25, without Ukraine taking steps to
investigate President Trump's political rival.
1. Ukraine has a long history of pervasive corruption.
Since it became an independent nation following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been plagued by
systemic corruption. The Guardian has called Ukraine ``the most
corrupt nation in Europe''\98\ and Ernst & Young cites Ukraine
among the three most-corrupt nations of the world.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\Oliver Bullough, Welcome to Ukraine, the Most Corrupt Nation in
Europe, Guardian, (Feb. 6, 2015).
\99\See, e.g., 14th Global Fraud Survey, Ernst & Young, (2016),
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-corporate-misconduct-
individual-consequences/$FILE/EY-corporate-misconduct-individual-
consequences.pdf (noting that 88% of Ukrainian's agree that ``bribery/
corrupt practices happen widely in business in [Ukraine]''). See also
Viktor Tkachuk, People First: The Latest in the Watch on Ukrainian
Democracy, Kyiv Post, (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.kyivpost.com/
article/opinion/op-ed/people-first-the-latest-in-the-watch-on-
ukrainian-democracy-5-312797.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) explained Ukraine's history of corruption in a 2006
report:
From the early 1990s, powerful officials in [the
Ukrainian] government and politics acquired and
privatized key economic resources of the state. As
well, shadowy businesses, allegedly close to organized
crime, became powerful economic forces in several
regions of the country. Over the course of the past
decade, these business groupings--or clans--as they
became called, grew into major financial-industrial
structures that used their very close links with and
influence over government, political parties, the mass
media and the state bureaucracy to enlarge and fortify
their control over the economy and sources of wealth.
They used ownership ties, special privileges, relations
with government and direct influence over the courts
and law enforcement and regulatory organizations to
circumvent weaknesses in governmental
institutions.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\U.S. Agency for International Development, Final Report,
Corruption Assessment: Ukraine (2006), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf _docs/
PNADK247.pdf.
Corruption is so pervasive in Ukraine that in 2011, 68.8%
of Ukrainian citizens reported that they had bribed a public
official within the preceding twelve months.\101\ Bribery and
facilitation payments\102\ are common schemes by which
Ukrainian officials demand payment in exchange for ensuring
public services are delivered either on time or at all.\103\
Corruption also presents an obstacle to private and public
business in Ukraine.\104\ In 2011, then-President Petro
Poroshenko estimated that 15%, or $7.4 billion, of the state
budget ``ends up in the pockets of officials'' through corrupt
public procurement practices.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Fighting Corruption in Ukraine: Ukrainian Style, Gorshenin
Inst., (Mar. 7, 2011), http://gpf-europe.com/upload/iblock/333/round
_table _eng.pdf.
\102\See Facilitation Payments, Corruption Dictionary,
Ganintegrity.com, (last visited Oct. 23, 2019), https://
www.ganintegrity.com/portal/corruption-dictionary/. Facilitation
payments, also known as ``grease payments,'' are a form of bribery made
with the purpose of expediting or securing the performance of a routine
action to which the payer is legally entitled. Id.
\103\People & Corruption: Citizens' Voices from Around the World,
Transparency Int'l, (2017), https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/
publication/people and corruption_citizens_voices _from _around _the
_world.
\104\Id.
\105\Mark Rachkevych, Under Yanukovych, Ukraine Slides Deeper in
Ranks of Corrupt Nations, Kyiv Post, (Dec. 1, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pervasive corruption in Ukraine has been one of the primary
impediments to Ukraine joining the European Union.\106\
Corruption-related concerns also figure prominently in the
E.U.-Ukrainian Association Agreement, the document establishing
a political and economic association between the E.U. and
Ukraine.\107\ The Agreement was entered into with the intent of
Ukraine committing to gradually conform to E.U. technical and
consumer standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\See, e.g., Vladimir Isachenkov, Ukraine's integration into
West dashed by war and corruption, Assoc. Press, Mar. 26, 2019.
\107\E.U.-Ukraine Ass'n Agreement, art. 14, Mar. 21, 2014, 57 Off.
J. of the E.U. L161/3 (``In their cooperation on justice, freedom and
security, the Parties shall attach particular importance to the
consolidation of the rule of law and the reinforcement of institutions
at all levels in the areas of administration in general and law
enforcement and the administration of justice in particular.
Cooperation will, in particular, aim at strengthening the judiciary,
improving its efficiency, safeguarding its independence and
impartiality, and combating corruption. Respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms will guide all cooperation on justice, freedom and
security.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Department witnesses called by the Democrats during
the impeachment inquiry confirmed Ukraine's reputation for
corruption. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent
described Ukraine's corruption problem as ``serious'' and said
corruption has long been ``part of the high-level dialogue''
between the United States and Ukraine.\108\ Ambassador Bill
Taylor said corruption in Ukraine is a ``big issue.''\109\
Ambassador Kurt Volker testified that ``Ukraine has a long
history of pervasive corruption throughout the economy[,]
throughout the country, and it has been incredibly difficult
for Ukraine as a country to deal with this, to investigate it,
to prosecute it.''\110\ He later elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\Kent deposition, supra note 65 at 105, 151.
\109\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 86.
\110\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 76.
Ukraine had for decades a reputation of being just a
corrupt place. There are a handful of people who own a
disproportionate amount of the economy. Oligarchs, they
use corruption as kind of the coin of the realm to get
what they want, including influencing the Parliament,
the judiciary, the government, state-owned industries.
And so businessmen generally don't want to invest in
Ukraine, even to this day, because they just fear that
it's a horrible environment to be working in, and they
don't want to put--expose themselves to that risk. I
would have to believe that President Trump would be
aware of that general climate.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\Id. at 148-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and reasonable
skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of pervasive
corruption.
Multiple Democrat witnesses offered firsthand testimony of
President Trump's skeptical view of Ukraine, as far back as
September 2017. Ambassador Volker explained: ``President Trump
demonstrated that he had a very deeply rooted negative view of
Ukraine based on past corruption. And that's a reasonable
position. Most people who would know anything about Ukraine
would think that.''\112\ He elaborated that the President's
concern about Ukraine was genuine,\113\ and that this concern
contributed to a delay in the meeting with President Zelensky.
He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\Id. at 30.
\113\Id. at 295.
So the issue as I understood it was this deep-rooted,
skeptical view of Ukraine, a negative view of Ukraine,
preexisting 2019, you know, going back. When I started
this, I had one other meeting with President Trump and
[then-Ukrainian] President Poroshenko. It was in
September of 2017. And at that time he had a very
skeptical view of Ukraine. So I know he had a very
deep-rooted skeptical view. And my understanding at the
time was that even though he agreed in the [May23]
meeting that we had with him, say, okay, I'll invite
him, he didn't really want to do it. And that's why the
meeting kept being delayed and delayed.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\Id. at 41.
Other testimony confirms Ambassador Volker's statements.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch confirmed
the President's skepticism, saying that she observed it during
President Trump's meeting with President Poroshenko in
September 2017.\115\ She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Deposition of Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, in Wash., D.C., at
142 (Oct. 11, 2019).
Q. Were you aware of the President's deep-rooted
skepticism about Ukraine's business environment?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did you know about that?
A. That he--I mean, he shared that concern directly
with President Poroshenko in their first meeting in the
Oval Office.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\Id.
Dr. Fiona Hill, NSC Senior Director for Europe, also
testified that President Trump was ``quite publicly'' skeptical
of Ukraine and that ``everyone has expressed great concerns
about corruption in Ukraine.''\117\ Catherine Croft, a former
NSC director, similarly attested to President's Trump
skepticism when she staffed President Trump for two Ukraine
matters in 2017, explaining: ``Throughout both, I heard,
directly and indirectly, President Trump described Ukraine as a
corrupt country.''\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 118.
\118\Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Senior Ukrainian government officials publicly attacked President
Trump during the 2016 campaign.
President Trump's skepticism about Ukraine was compounded
by statements made by senior Ukrainian government officials in
2016 that were critical of then-candidate Trump and supportive
of his opponent, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Although Democrats have attempted to discredit these assertions
as ``debunked,'' the statements by Ukrainian leaders speak for
themselves and shed light on President Trump's mindset when
interacting with President Zelensky in 2019.
In August 2016, less than three months before the election,
Valeriy Chaly, then-Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States,
authored an op-ed in the Washington-based publication The Hill
criticizing candidate Trump for comments he made about Russia's
occupation of Crimea.\119\ Ambassador Chaly wrote that
candidate Trump's comments ``have raised serious concerns in
[Kyiv] and beyond Ukraine.''\120\ Although President Zelensky
dismissed Ambassador Chaly on July 19, 2019,\121\ the
ambassador's op-ed remains on the website of the Ukrainian
Embassy in the U.S. as of the date of this report.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\See Chaly, supra note 27.
\120\Id.
\121\Zelensky dismisses Valeriy Chaly from post of Ukraine's envoy
to US, Kyiv Post (July 19, 2019).
\122\Embassy of Ukraine in the United States of America, Op-ed by
Ambassador of Ukraine to the USA Valeriy Chaly for the Hill: ``Trump's
comments send wrong message to world,'' https://usa.mfa.gov.ua/en/
press-center/publications/4744-posol-ukrajini-vislovlyuvannya-trampa-
nadsilajuty-nevirnij-signal-svitu.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Later that month, the Financial Times published an article
asserting that Trump's candidacy led ``Kyiv's wider political
leadership to do something they would never have attempted
before: intervene, however indirectly, in a US election.''\123\
The article quoted Serhiy Leshchenko, a Ukrainian Member of
Parliament, to detail how the Ukrainian government was
supporting Secretary Clinton's candidacy.\124\ The article
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\Roman Olearchyk, Ukraine's leaders campaign against `pro-
Putin' Trump, Financial Times, Aug. 28, 2016.
\124\Id.
Though most Ukrainians are disillusioned with the
country's current leadership for stalled reforms and
lackluster anti-corruption efforts, Mr. Leshchenko said
events of the past two years had locked Ukraine on to a
pro-western course. The majority of Ukraine's
politicians, he added, are ``on Hillary Clinton's
side.''\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\Id. (emphasis added).
The Financial Times reported that during the U.S.
presidential campaign, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy
Yatsenyuk had warned on Facebook that candidate Trump
``challenged the very values of the free world.''\126\ On
Twitter, Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Arsen Avakov
called Trump a ``clown'' who is ``an even bigger danger to the
US than terrorism.''\127\ In a Facebook post, Avakov called
Trump ``dangerous for Ukraine and the US'' and said that
Trump's Crimea comments were the ``diagnosis of a dangerous
misfit.''\128\ Avakov continues to serve in President
Zelensky's government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\Id.
\127\Kenneth P. Vogel & David Stern, Ukrainian efforts to sabotage
Trump backfire, Politico, Jan. 11, 2017.
\128\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple Democrat witnesses testified that these Ukrainian
actions during the 2016 election campaign likely also colored
President Trump's views of President Zelensky. Ambassador
Volker said:
Q. And you mentioned that the President was
skeptical, had a deep-rooted view of the Ukraine. Is
that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And that, whether fair or unfair, he believed
there were officials in Ukraine that were out to get
him in the run-up to his election?
A. That is correct.
Q. So, to the extent there are allegations lodged,
credible or uncredible, if the president was made aware
of those allegations, whether it was via The Hill or,
you know, via Mr. Giuliani or via cable news, if the
President was made aware of these allegations, isn't it
fair to say that he may, in fact, have believed they
were credible?
A. Yes, I believe so.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 70-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Sondland similarly testified:
Q. Did [President Trump] mention anything about
Ukraine's involvement in the 2016 election?
A. I think he said: They tried to take me down. He
kept saying that over and over.
Q. In connection with the 2016 election?
A. Probably, yeah.
Q. That was what your understanding was?
A. That was my understanding, yeah.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. U.S. foreign policy officials were split on President Zelensky, a
political novice with untested views on anti-corruption and a
close relationship with a controversial oligarch.
Evidence obtained during the Democrats' impeachment inquiry
shows that the U.S. foreign policy apparatus was divided on the
question of whether President Trump should meet with President
Zelensky. President Zelensky was a first-time candidate and a
newcomer to the Ukrainian political scene. Although President
Zelensky ran on an anti-corruption and reform platform, the
Democrats' witnesses explained that the State Department was
unsure how he would govern as president. In addition, others in
the U.S. government worried about President Zelensky's
association with Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoisky.
President Zelensky won a landslide victory on April 21,
2019, defeating incumbent President Petro Poroshenko by a 73-24
percent margin.\131\ The win came as a surprise to many.\132\
At the time of his election, Mr. Zelensky was a comedic
television personality. Ambassador Volker testified that
``Zelensky kind of came up out of nowhere. . . . When he arose
kind of meteorically, as an outside figure and a popular
candidate, I think it did take everybody by surprise.''\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\Ukraine election: Comedian Zelensky wins presidency by
landside, BBC News (Apr. 22, 2019).
\132\Id.
\133\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60 at 152-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Yovanovitch also testified that Zelensky's
election came as a surprise. She explained:
And I think that there was, you know, as is true, I
think, probably in any country during Presidential
elections, a lot of--a lot of concerns among people.
This was I think a big surprise for the political elite
of Ukraine, which is relatively small. And so, I don't
think they saw it coming really until the very end.
And, so, there was surprise and, you know, all the
stages of grief, anger, disbelief, how is this
happening?\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 73-74.
Ambassador Yovanovitch agreed that President Zelensky was
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
an ``untried'' politician:
Q. And how did you feel about [Zelensky winning the
election]? What were your views of Zelensky? Did you
think he was going to be a good advocate for the
anticorruption initiatives, as he was campaigning on?
A. We didn't know. I mean, he was an untried
politician. Obviously, he has a background as a
comedian, as an actor, as a businessperson, but we
didn't know what he would be like as a President.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\Id. at 74.
Ambassador Sondland testified that there was a difference
in opinion regarding whether to schedule a call between
Presidents Trump and Zelensky. Ambassador Sondland recalled
that he, Ambassador Volker, and Secretary Perry advocated for a
call between the presidents, while NSC officials
disagreed.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\Sondland note 51, at 27-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence suggests that U.S. officials had concerns about
some people surrounding President Zelensky. Ambassador Volker
testified that President Zelensky's chief of presidential
administration, Andriy Bohdan, had earlier been an attorney for
``a very famous oligarch in Ukraine.''\137\ Senator Ron
Johnson, who attended President Zelensky's inauguration in May
2019, recalled ``concern over rumors that [President] Zelensky
was going to appoint Andriy Bohdan, the lawyer for oligarch
Igor Kolomoisky, as his chief of staff. The delegation [to the
inauguration] viewed Bohdan's rumored appointment to be
contrary to the goal of fighting corruption and maintaining
U.S. support.''\138\ President Zelensky appointed Bohdan to be
head of presidential administration in May 2019.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 137.
\138\Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson to Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Reform, & Devin Nunes, Ranking Member, H. Perm.
Sel. Comm. on Intelligence 3 (Nov. 18, 2019).
\139\Roman Olearchyk, Volodymyr Zelensky hires oligarch's lawyer as
chief of staff, Financial Times, May 22, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, Dr. Hill explained that the NSC had a concern
about President Zelensky's relationship with Kolomoisky, an
oligarch who had owned the television station on which
Zelensky's comedy show aired.\140\ Under the Poroshenko regime,
the Ukrainian government had accused Kolomoisky of embezzling
from PrivatBank, which he co-owned, causing Kolomoisky to flee
Ukraine.\141\ According to Ambassador Volker, ``the Ukrainian
taxpayer officially is bailing out the bank for the money that
Kolomoisky stole. Because the IMF provides budgetary support to
Ukraine, we [the U.S. taxpayers] actually ended up bailing out
this bank.''\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 76-77.
\141\Andrew E. Kramer, Oligarch's return raises alarm in Ukraine,
N.Y. Times, May 16, 2019.
\142\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Taylor testified that he discussed these
concerns about Kolomoisky directly with President Zelensky:
[T]he influence of one particular oligarch over Mr.
Zelensky is of particular concern, and that's this
fellow Kolomoisky, so--and Kolomoisky has growing
influence. And this is one of the concerns that I have
expressed to President Zelensky and his team on several
occasions very explicitly, saying that, you know, Mr.
President, Kolomoisky was not elected. You were elected
and he, Mr. Kolomoisky, is increasing his influence in
your government, which could cause you to fail. So I've
had that conversation with him a couple of times.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 86.
Kolomoisky returned to Ukraine following President
Zelensky's victory.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\Kramer, supra note 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. President Trump extended an invitation to the White House to
President Zelensky on three occasions without conditions.
The evidence demonstrates that President Trump had a deep
skepticism of Ukraine based on its history of pervasive
corruption. This inherent skepticism, coupled with certain
Ukrainian government officials' criticism of candidate Trump
during the 2016 campaign and President Zelensky's untested
views, contributed to President Trump's reticence to meet with
President Zelensky. In spring and summer 2019, however, the
President extended an invitation to the White House to
President Zelensky on three occasions without any conditions.
On April 21, 2019, President Trump placed a brief
congratulatory call to President-elect Zelensky.\145\ President
Trump said: ``When you're settled in and ready, I'd like to
invite you to the White House.''\146\ The presidents did not
discuss any investigations, and President Trump placed no
conditions on his invitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 10.
\146\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 23, President Trump met with Ambassador Volker,
Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, and Senator Johnson--the
senior U.S. officials who had comprised the official U.S.
delegation to President Zelensky's inauguration days before.
The delegation sought to convey to President Trump a positive
impression of President Zelensky.\147\ According to Ambassador
Volker:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 320.
President Trump demonstrated that he had a very
deeply rooted negative view of Ukraine based on past
corruption. And that's a reasonable position. Most
people who would know anything about Ukraine would
think that. That's why it was important that we wanted
to brief him, because we were saying, it's different,
this guy is different. But the President had a very
deeply rooted negative view. We urged that he invite
President Zelensky to meet with him at the White House.
He was skeptical of that. We persisted. And he finally
agreed, okay, I'll do it.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 30-31.
Later in his transcribed interview, Ambassador Volker
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provided more context for the May 23 discussion:
What I heard from President Trump in the meeting in
the oval office was blanket, like, ``this--these are
terrible people, this is a corrupt country,'' you know,
``I don't believe it.'' I made the argument that
President Zelensky is the real deal, he is going to try
to fix things, and, you know, he just did not believe
it. He waved it off. So there's a general issue there.
He did not mention investigations to me in that
meeting, or call for investigations. I was not aware
that he did so in the July 25th call later. His
attitude towards Ukraine was just general and
negative.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\Id. at 280.
Ambassador Sondland similarly testified that President
Trump expressed negative views about Ukraine in this meeting
and mentioned how ``they tried to take me down'' in 2016.\150\
Although Ambassador Sondland said he was discouraged by the
President's viewpoint, he was pleased and surprised that the
President later agreed to invite President Zelensky to the
White House.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 74-75.
\151\Id. at 74, 81, 85-87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Johnson recalled that in this meeting, President
Trump ``expressed strong reservations about support for
Ukraine. He made it crystal clear that he viewed Ukraine as a
thoroughly corrupt country both generally and, specifically,
regarding rumored meddling in the 2016 election.''\152\ Senator
Johnson further explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson, supra note 138, at 4.
It was obvious that [the President's] viewpoint and
reservations were strongly held, and that we would have
a significant sales job ahead of us in getting him to
change his mind. I specifically asked him to keep his
viewpoint and reservations private and not to express
them publicly until he had a chance to meet [President]
Zelensky. He agreed to do so, but he added that he
wanted [President] Zelensky to know exactly how he felt
about the corruption in Ukraine prior to any future
meeting.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\Id.
Senator Johnson recounted that he did not recall President
Trump mentioning Burisma or the Bidens, but it was ``obvious''
that President Trump was aware of ``rumors that corrupt actors
in Ukraine might have played a part in helping create the false
Russia collusion narrative.''\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 29, President Trump wrote to President Zelensky to
invite him to Washington, D.C. ``as soon as we can find a
mutually convenient time.''\155\ President Trump's letter did
not mention any investigations and placed no conditions on
President Zelensky's invitation to the White House. On July 25,
during their phone conversation, President Trump reiterated his
invitation to President Zelensky, again without
conditions.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\Letter from President Donald J. Trump to His Excellency
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine (May 29, 2019). Dr. Hill
testified that Ambassador Sondland claimed he had dictated the
paragraph inviting President Zelensky to the White House, see Hill
deposition, supra note 12, at 74; however, Ambassador Sondland
testified that he had no role in drafting the letter. Sondland
deposition, supra note 51, at 81.
\156\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Despite difficulty scheduling a face-to-face presidential meeting,
senior Ukrainian officials interacted often with senior
American officials between May and September 2019.
By late May 2019, President Trump had formally extended an
invitation for President Zelensky to visit the White House.
Although the two presidents did not meet face-to-face until
September 25, the Democrats' witnesses testified that
presidential meetings can often take time to schedule and that
senior Ukrainian officials met frequently with American
counterparts in the interim.\157\ Ambassador Volker explained
that the new Zelensky regime was ``actually feeling pretty good
by then'' about its relationship with the Trump
Administration.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 231; Volker transcribed
interview, supra note 60, at 127.
\158\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 4, President Zelensky attended an Independence Day
dinner at the U.S. mission to the E.U. hosted by Ambassador
Sondland and also attended by White House Senior Advisor Jared
Kushner.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 26-27, 148-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 3, while in Toronto, Canada, for the Ukraine Reform
Conference, President Zelensky met with Ambassador Volker and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 241; Volker transcribed
interview, supra note 60, at 137.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 9, Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-Secretary of the
National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Andrey
Yermak, a senior adviser to President Zelensky, met with LTG
Keith Kellogg, Vice President Pence's National Security
Advisor; Jennifer Williams, a special advisor covering European
issues for Vice President Pence; and NSC staff member LTC
Alexander Vindman.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 51-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 10, Danylyuk and Yermak met at the White House with
National Security Advisor John Bolton, Secretary Perry,
Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Dr. Hill, and LTC
Vindman.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 66-67; Hill
deposition, supra note 12, at 62-63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 25, President Trump and President Zelensky spoke by
telephone.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 26, President Zelensky met with Ambassador Volker,
Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Taylor in Kyiv.\164\
Ambassador Volker testified that the meeting was scheduled
before the presidents' phone call.\165\ He said President
Zelensky was ``pleased that the call had taken place. . . .
They thought it went well. And they were encouraged again
because the President had asked them to pick dates for coming
to the White House.''\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 312-33;
Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 29.
\165\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 102.
\166\Id. at 313.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 27, President Zelensky met with National Security
Advisor Bolton in Kyiv.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 229-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 1, President Zelensky met with Vice President
Pence in Warsaw, Poland, after an event commemorating the 80th
anniversary of the beginning of World War II.\168\ President
Trump had been scheduled to attend but was forced to cancel due
to Hurricane Dorian.\169\ According to Ambassador Taylor's
testimony, Vice President Pence reiterated President Trump's
views for ``Europeans to do more to support Ukraine and that he
wanted the Ukrainians to do more to fight corruption.''\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\The White House, Readout of Vice President Mike Pence's
Meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Sept. 1, 2019);
Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 34-35.
\169\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 130; Taylor
deposition, supra note 47, at 35.
\170\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 17, Secretary of State Pompeo had a telephone
conversation with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym
Prystaiko.\171\ According to a readout from the U.S. Embassy in
Kyiv, Secretary Pompeo ``affirmed U.S. support for Ukraine as
it advances critical reforms to tackle corruption, strengthen
the rule of law, and foster an economic environment that
promotes competition and investment. The Secretary expressed
unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial integrity.''\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo's Call
with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym Prystayko (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://ua.usembassy.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeos-call-with-
ukrainian-foreign-minister-vadym-prystayko/.
\172\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 18, President Zelensky and Vice President
Pence spoke by telephone.\173\ The two discussed President
Zelensky's upcoming meeting with President Trump on the margins
of the U.N. General Assembly and Ukraine's effort to address
its corruption challenges.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\The White House, Readout of Vice President Mike Pence's Phone
Call with President of Ukraine (Sept. 18, 2019).
\174\Id.; see also Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at
317-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. The evidence does not establish a linkage between a White House
meeting and Ukrainian investigations into President Trump's
political rival.
The evidence in the Democrats' impeachment inquiry does not
show that a White House meeting was conditioned on Ukraine's
willingness to investigate President Trump's political rival.
Although the anonymous whistleblower, citing ``multiple''
secondhand sources, alleged that President Trump sought to
withhold a meeting to pressure President Zelensky to ``play
ball,''\175\ publicly available information contradicts the
whistleblower's claim. For example, Andrey Yermak, a senior
adviser to President Zelensky, admitted in an August 2019 New
York Times article that he discussed with Mayor Giuliani both
meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky and
investigations.\176\ The Times reported, however, that Yermak
and Mayor Giuliani ``did not discuss a link between the
two.''\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 7.
\176\Kenneth P. Vogel & Andrew E. Kramer, Giuliani renews push for
Ukraine to investigate Trump's political opponents, N.Y. Times, Aug.
21, 2019.
\177\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other firsthand testimony obtained during the impeachment
inquiry supports this finding. For example, Ambassador Volker,
the key interlocutor with the Ukrainian government, clearly
testified that there was no ``linkage'' between a White House
meeting and Ukrainian actions to investigate President Trump's
political rival. He explained:
Q. Did the President ever withhold a meeting with
President Zelensky until the Ukrainians committed to
investigating those allegations?
A.We had a difficult time scheduling a bilateral
meeting between President Zelensky and President Trump.
Q. Ambassador Volker, that was a yes-or-no question.
A.Well, if I--can you repeat the question then?
Q. Sure. Did President Trump ever withhold a meeting
with President Zelensky or delay a meeting with
President Zelensky until the Ukrainians committed to
investigate the allegations that you just described
concerning the 2016 Presidential election?
A. The answer to the question is no, if you want a
yes-or-no answer. But the reason the answer is no is we
did have difficulty scheduling a meeting, but there was
no linkage like that.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 35-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Q. So before we move to the text messages, I want to
ask you a clarifying question. You said that you were
not aware of any linkage between the delay in the Oval
Office meeting between President Trump and President
Zelensky and the Ukrainian commitment to investigate
the two allegations as you described them, correct?
A. Correct.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\Id. at 40.
Ambassador Sondland was the only witness to allege a quid
pro quo with respect to a White House meeting. However, to the
extent that Ambassador Sondland testified that he believed a
White House meeting was conditioned on Ukrainian actions, his
belief was that a meeting was conditioned on a public statement
about anti-corruption--not on investigations into President
Trump's political rival.\180\ Ambassador Sondland testified in
his closed-door deposition that ``nothing about the request
raised any red flags for me, Ambassador Volker, or Ambassador
Taylor.''\181\ In his public testimony, Ambassador Sondland
clarified that he believed there was linkage, but that
President Trump had never discussed with him any preconditions
for a White House visit by President Zelensky.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 30, 331.
\181\Id. at 30.
\182\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note
56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, there is conflicting testimony about what
occurred during a July 10 meeting between two senior Ukrainian
officials and senior U.S. officials in National Security
Advisor John Bolton's office. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador
Sondland, Secretary Perry joined Ambassador Bolton to meet with
Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-Secretary of Ukraine's National
Security and Defense Council, and Andrey Yermak, an adviser to
President Zelensky.\183\ Dr. Hill and LTC Vindman from the NSC
staff attended as well.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 27; Volker transcribed
interview, supra note 60, at 50-51.
\184\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 63; Vindman deposition,
supra note 12, at 17-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Hill and LTC Vindman alleged that during the meeting,
Ambassador Sondland raised potential Ukrainian actions on
investigations, leading Ambassador Bolton to abruptly end the
meeting.\185\ Dr. Hill recounted that Ambassador Bolton told
her to brief the NSC Legal Advisor, John Eisenberg, and said he
would not be a part of what he termed a ``drug deal.''\186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 67; Vindman deposition,
supra note 12, at 17.
\186\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 70-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Dr. Hill testified that she confronted Ambassador
Sondland over his discussion of investigations,\187\ Ambassador
Sondland testified in his closed-door deposition that ``neither
Ambassador Bolton, Dr. Hill, or anyone else on the NSC staff
ever expressed any concerns to me about our efforts . . . or,
most importantly, any concerns that we were acting
improperly.''\188\ Ambassador Sondland testified in his
deposition that he recalled no ``unpleasant conversation'' with
Dr. Hill.\189\ Likewise, although Ambassador Volker assessed
that the meeting was ``not good,'' he said it was because
Danylyuk poorly conveyed the appropriate top-level message to
Ambassador Bolton during the meeting.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\Id. at 68-71. Dr. Hill testified that she also had a ``blow
up'' with Ambassador Sondland in June about Ukraine, saying that
Ambassador Sondland got ``testy.'' Id. at 113.
\188\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 28.
\189\Id. at 114.
\190\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker acknowledged
that Ambassador Sondland made a ``general comment about
investigations,'' but he disputed that the July 10 meeting
ended abruptly.\191\ He also testified that preconditions were
not discussed during the meeting.\192\ Although Ambassador
Sondland denied in his closed-door depositions that he raised
investigations during July 10 meeting,\193\ he acknowledged
that he did in his public testimony.\194\ Even still,
Ambassador Sondland denied that the July 10 meeting ended
abruptly: ``I don't recall any abrupt ending of the meeting or
people storming out or anything like that. That would have been
very memorable if someone had stormed out of a meeting, based
on something I said.''\195\ He explained that Dr. Hill never
raised concerns to him, and that any discussion of
investigations did not mention specific investigations.\196\ He
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
\192\Id.
\193\Id. at 109-10.
\194\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note
56.
\195\Id.
\196\Id.
Q. And, in fact, after the meeting, you went out and
you took a picture, right?
A. Yeah. We--Ambassador Bolton--or his assistant
indicated that he was out of time, that he needed--he
had another meeting to attend. And we all walked out of
the White House. Everyone was smiling, everyone was
happy, and we took a picture on the lawn on a nice
sunny day.
Q. Okay. Then did you retire to the Ward Room?
A. I think Secretary Perry asked to use the Ward Room
to continue the conversation. And the real subject that
was under debate--and it wasn't an angry debate, it was
a debate--should the call from President Trump to
President Zelensky be made prior to the parliamentary
elections in Ukraine or after the parliamentary
elections? And there was good reason for both. We
felt--Ambassador Perry, Ambassador Volker, and I
thought it would help President Zelensky to have
President Trump speak to him prior to the parliamentary
elections, because it would give President Zelensky
more credibility, and ultimately he would do better
with his people in the parliamentary elections. Others,
I believe, pushed back and said, no, it's not
appropriate to do it before. It should be done after.
And ultimately, it was done after.
Q. Okay. There was no mention of Vice President Biden
in the Ward Room?
A. Not that I remember, no.
Q. Or any specific investigation?
A. Just the generic investigations.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\Id.
Contemporaneous evidence contradicts the idea that there
was serious discord during the meeting. Following the meeting,
Ambassador Bolton retweeted a statement from Secretary Perry
about the July 10 meeting, writing it was a ``great discussion
. . . on U.S. support for Ukrainian reforms and the peaceful
restoration of Ukrainian territory.''\198\ The picture in the
tweet of the U.S. and Ukrainian officials--taken immediately
after the meeting in Ambassador Bolton's office\199\--shows
smiling faces and no indication of hostility or discord between
Ambassador Bolton and Ambassador Sondland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\John Bolton (@AmbJohnBolton), Twitter (July 10, 2019, 4:39
p.m.), https://twitter.com/AmbJohnBolton/status/1149100798632026112.
\199\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1: Ambassador Bolton tweet following July 10 meeting
Figure 2: Picture of smiling U.S. and Ukrainian officials following
July 10 meeting
8. The evidence does not establish that President Trump directed Vice
President Pence not to attend President Zelensky's inauguration
to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President's political
rival.
The evidence also does not establish that President Trump
directed Vice President Pence not to attend President
Zelensky's inauguration as a means of pressuring Ukraine to
investigate the President's political rival. During their
initial April 21 phone call, President Trump told President
Zelensky that a ``great'' representative of the U.S. would
attend the Zelensky inauguration.\200\ The anonymous
whistleblower alleged that President Trump later ``instructed
Vice President Pence to cancel his planned travel to Ukraine to
attend President Zelensky's inauguration. . . . [I]t was also
`made clear' to them that the President did not want to meet
with Mr. Zelensky until he saw how Zelensky `chose to act' in
office.''\201\ The evidence in the Democrats' impeachment
inquiry does not support this assertion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 10.
\201\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at app. 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Jennifer Williams, a special adviser in the Office
of the Vice President, testified in her closed-door deposition
that a colleague told her that President Trump directed Vice
President Pence not to attend the inauguration,\202\ she had no
firsthand knowledge of any such direction or the reasons given
for any such direction.\203\ Williams explained that the Office
of the Vice President provided three dates--May 30, May 31 and
June 1--during which Vice President Pence would be available to
attend the inauguration.\204\ Williams explained that ``if it
wasn't one of those dates it would be very difficult or
impossible'' for Vice President Pence to attend.\205\ Neither
the Secret Service nor advance teams deployed to Ukraine to
prepare for Vice President Pence's travel.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 37.
\203\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer
Williams, supra note 6.
\204\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 58; Impeachment
Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6.
\205\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 58.
\206\Id. at 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During this same period, Vice Present Pence was planning
travel to Ottawa, Canada, on May 30 to promote the U.S.-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA).\207\ Williams acknowledged in her
public testimony that the Office of the Vice President had
``competing trips . . . for the same window.''\208\ Williams
elaborated that due to international travel by President Trump
and Vice President Pence, there was a ``narrow window'' within
which Vice President Pence was able to attend President
Zelensky's inauguration.\209\ Dr. Hill explained that the
President and Vice President cannot travel internationally at
the same time, testifying that Vice President Pence's
attendance at President Zelensky's inauguration was just
dependent on scheduling and she had no knowledge that the Vice
President was directed not to attend the inauguration.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\See The White House, Joint Statement by Vice President Mike
Pence and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (May 30, 2019).
\208\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer
Williams, supra note 6.
\209\Id.
\210\``Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes'':
Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong.
(2019); Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 185 (``It depended on the
date. I mean, we were hoping, you know, if others couldn't attend that
[Vice President Pence] could. I mean, I myself couldn't attend because
of the date, that the way that it--again, there were several different
dates, and then the date that was announced in May was very quickly
announced.''); id. at 316 (``And it was going to be very tight for the
Vice President to make it for the inauguration. So I, you know, have no
knowledge that he was actually ordered not to go, but it was going to
be very difficult for him to go.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultimately, on May 16, the Ukrainian Parliament scheduled
President Zelensky's inauguration for only four days later, May
20, which was a date not offered by the Vice President's
Office.\211\ Williams testified that this scheduling posed a
problem: ``To be honest, we hadn't looked that closely at the
Vice President's schedule before the President's trip [to
Japan] at the end of May just because we weren't expecting the
Ukrainians to look at that timeframe.''\212\ Kent explained
that this short notice sent the State Department
``scrambl[ing]'' to find a U.S. official to lead the
delegation.\213\ Secretary Pompeo was traveling, so the
decision was made to ask Secretary Perry to lead the
delegation.\214\ On May 20, the day of President Zelensky's
inauguration, Vice President Pence attended an event in
Jacksonville, Florida, to promote the USMCA.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 189.
\212\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 60.
\213\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 190.
\214\Id. at 190-91.
\215\The White House, Remarks by Vice President Pence at America
First Policies Event USMCA: A Better Deal for American Worker (May 20,
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. President Trump and President Zelensky met during the United Nations
General Assembly in September 2019 without any Ukrainian action
to investigate President Trump's political rival.
On September 25, President Trump and President Zelensky met
during the U.N. General Assembly in New York.\216\ Ambassador
Volker said that President Trump and President Zelensky had a
``positive'' meeting. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\Remarks by President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine
Before Bilateral Meeting, supra note 40.
Q. Turning back to President Trump's skepticism of
Ukraine and the corruption there, do you think you made
any inroads in convincing him that Zelensky was a good
partner?
A. I do. I do. I attended the President's meeting
with President Zelensky in New York on, I guess it was
the 25th of September. And I could see the body
language and the chemistry between them was positive,
and I felt that this is what we needed all along.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 87-88.
Ambassador Taylor testified that the meeting was ``good''
and President Trump ``left pleased that they had finally met
face to face.''\218\ Ambassador Taylor said there was no
discussion about investigations during the September 25
meeting.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 288.
\219\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notably, President Trump and President Zelensky met in New
York without Ukraine ever investigating President Trump's
political rival.
* * *
The evidence presented in the impeachment inquiry does not
support the Democrats' assertion that President Trump sought to
withhold a White House meeting to pressure the Ukrainian
government to investigate the President's political rival.
President Trump and President Zelensky met in September 2019
without Ukraine ever investigating Vice President Biden or
Hunter Biden.
Contrary to the assertions in the anonymous whistleblower
complaint, the evidence shows that President Trump has a
genuine, deep-seated, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine
given its history of pervasive corruption. In addition, U.S.
foreign policy officials were divided on whether President
Trump should meet with President Zelensky, in part due to
President Zelensky's close association with an oligarch accused
of embezzlement. In May 2019, President Trump formally invited
President Zelensky to the White House. For several months,
there were attempts to arrange a meeting between President
Trump and President Zelensky. Although President Trump
indicated during their July 25 call that they may meet in
Warsaw in September, Hurricane Dorian forced President Trump to
cancel. Vice President Pence met with President Zelensky
instead. President Trump and President Zelensky ultimately met
without Ukraine ever investigating any of President Trump's
political rival.
C. The evidence does not establish that President Trump withheld U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine to pressure Ukraine to
investigate the President's political rival for the purpose of
benefiting him in the 2020 election.
Democrats allege that President Trump conspired to withhold
U.S. security assistance to Ukraine as a way of pressuring
Ukraine to investigate President Trump's political rival.\220\
Here, too, the evidence obtained during the impeachment inquiry
does not support this allegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\See, e.g., Rishika Dugyala, Democratic Senator: `No doubt'
Ukraine `felt pressure', Politico (Oct. 27, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The evidence suggests a far less nefarious reality. Just as
President Trump holds a deep-seated skepticism about Ukraine,
the President is highly skeptical of foreign assistance. Any
examination of the President's actions must consider this
factor. President Trump has been vocal about his view that U.S.
allies in Europe should contribute a fair share for regional
security. As Ukrainian government officials worked with U.S.
officials to convince President Trump that President Zelensky
was serious about reform and worthy of U.S. assistance, they
discussed a public statement conveying that commitment.
Although the security assistance was paused in July, it is not
unusual for U.S. foreign assistance to become delayed.
Assistance to Ukraine has been delayed before. Most telling,
the Trump Administration has been stronger than the Obama
Administration in providing Ukraine with lethal defensive arms
to deter Russian aggression.
The Democrats' witnesses testified that U.S. security
assistance to Ukraine was not conditioned on Ukrainian action
on investigations. U.S. officials did not raise the issue of
the delay in security assistance with Ukrainian officials
because they viewed it as a bureaucratic issue that would be
resolved. The Ukrainian government in Kyiv was not even aware
that the aid was paused until it was reported publicly, only
two weeks before the aid was released, as senior U.S. officials
confidently predicted it would be. Ultimately, the U.S.
disbursed security assistance to Ukraine without Ukraine ever
investigating Vice Present Biden or his son, Hunter Biden.
1. President Trump has been skeptical about U.S. taxpayer-funded
foreign assistance.
Evidence suggests that President Trump is generally
skeptical of U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. President
Trump's skepticism of U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign assistance
is long-standing. On June 16, 2015, when President Trump
announced his candidacy for president, he said:
It is time to stop sending jobs overseas through bad
foreign trade deals. We will renegotiate our trade
deals with the toughest negotiators our country has . .
. the ones who have actually read ``The Art of the
Deal'' and know how to make great deals for our
country.
It is time to close loopholes for Wall Street and
create far more opportunities for small businesses.
It is necessary that we invest in our infrastructure,
stop sending foreign aid to countries that hate us and
use that money to rebuild our tunnels, roads, bridges
and schools and nobody can do that better than me.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\Donald Trump, Announcement of Candidacy for President of the
United States, in New York, N.Y. (June 16, 2015) (emphasis added).
During the 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Trump
continued to express his skepticism of U.S. taxpayer-funded
foreign aid. In March 2016, he told the Washington Post, ``I do
think it's a different world today and I don't think we should
be nation building anymore. I think it's proven not to work.
And we have a different country than we did then. You know we
have 19 trillion dollars in debt. . . . And I just think we
have to rebuild our country.''\222\ That same month, then-
candidate Trump told the New York Times, ``We're going to be
friendly with everybody, but we're not going to be taken
advantage of by anybody. . . . I think we'll be very worldview
[sic], but we're not going to be ripped off anymore by all of
these countries.''\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\A transcript of Donald Trump's meeting with the Washington
Post editorial board, Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 2016.
\223\Maggie Haberman & David Sanger, Transcript: Donald Trump
Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As president, President Trump has sought to reduce U.S.
taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. In his fiscal year 2018
budget proposal, the President proposed ``to reduce or end
direct funding for international programs and organizations
whose missions do not substantially advance U.S. foreign policy
interests. The Budget also renews attention on the appropriate
U.S. share of international spending . . . for many other
global issues where the United States currently pays more than
its fair share.''\224\ The President's 2020 budget proposal
submitted in March 2019 likewise ``supports America's reliable
allies, but reflects a new approach toward countries that have
taken unfair advantage of the United States' generosity.''\225\
The President's Budget specifically sought ``greater
accountability by international partners along with donor
burden sharing that is more balanced.''\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\224\Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2018 at 13 (May 23,
2017).
\225\Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2020 at 71 (Mar. 11,
2019).
\226\Id. at 73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testimony from the Democrats' witnesses reinforces the
President's skepticism of foreign assistance. Ambassador
Taylor, U.S. charge a.i. in Kyiv, testified that on August 22,
2019, he had a phone conversation with NSC Senior Director for
Europe Tim Morrison in which Morrison said that the ``President
doesn't want to provide any assistance at all.''\227\ Morrison
testified that President Trump generally does not like giving
foreign aid to other countries and believes U.S. ``ought not''
to be the only country providing security assistance.\228\ LTC
Vindman, the NSC director handling Ukraine policy, similarly
testified that President Trump is skeptical of foreign
aid.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\227\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 33.
\228\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 78-79, 132.
\229\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer
Williams, supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, evidence suggests that President Trump sought to
review U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign assistance across the
board. Ambassador David Hale, the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, testified that the Trump Administration was
undertaking a ``review'' of foreign assistance globally.\230\
He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\Deposition of Ambassador David Hale, in Wash., D.C., at 80
(Nov. 6, 2019) [hereinafter ``Hale deposition''].
Q. You mentioned that there was a foreign assistance
review undergoing--
A. Yes.
Q. --at that time. What can you tell us about that?
A. Well, it had been going on for quite a while, and
the concept, you know, the administration did not want
to take a, sort of, business-as-usual approach to
foreign assistance, a feeling that once a country has
received a certain assistance package, it's a--it's
something that continues forever. It's very difficult
to end those programs and to make sure that we have a
very rigorous measure of why we are providing the
assistance.
We didn't go to zero base, but almost a zero-based concept
that each assistance program and each country that receives the
program had to be evaluated that they were actually worthy
beneficiaries of our assistance; that the program made sense;
that we have embarked on, you know, calling everything that we
do around the world countering violent extremism, but, rather,
that's actually focused on tangible and proven means to deal
with extremist problems; that we avoid nation-building
strategies; and that we not provide assistance to countries
that are lost to us in terms of policy, to our adversaries.
Q. And do you know if the President also had concerns
about whether the allies of Ukraine, in this example,
were contributing their fair share?
A. That's another factor in the foreign affairs
review is appropriate burden sharing. But it was not,
in the deputies committee meeting, OMB [the U.S. Office
of Management and Budget] did not really explain why
they were taking the position other than they had been
directed to do so.
Q. Okay. You are aware of the President's skeptical
views on foreign assistance? Right?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And that's a genuinely held belief, correct?
A. It is what guided the foreign affairs review.
Q. Okay. It's not just related to Ukraine?
A. Absolutely not. It's global in nature.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\Id. at 81-83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. President Trump has been clear and consistent in his view that
Europe should pay its fair share for regional defense.
Since his 2016 presidential campaign, President Trump has
emphasized his view that U.S. foreign assistance should be
spent wisely and cautiously. As President, he has continued to
be critical of sending U.S. taxpayer dollars to foreign
countries and asked our allies to share the financial burden
for international stewardship.
In a March 2016 interview with the New York Times, then-
candidate Trump said: ``Now, I'm a person that you notice I
talk about economics quite a bit [in foreign policy] because it
is about economics, because we don't have money anymore because
we've been taking care of so many people in so many different
forms that we don't have money.''\232\ Then-candidate Trump
elaborated about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
a collective defense alliance between the U.S., Canada, and
European countries:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\Haberman & Sanger, supra note 223.
I mean, we defend everybody. (Laughs.) We defend
everybody. No matter who it is, we defend everybody.
We're defending the world. But we owe, soon, it's soon
to be $21 trillion. You know, it's 19 now but it's soon
to be $21 trillion. But we defend everybody. When in
doubt, come to the United States. We'll defend you. In
some cases free of charge. And in all cases for a
substantially, you know, greater amount. We spend a
substantially greater amount than what the people are
paying.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\Id.
That same month, candidate Trump spoke to CBS News about
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. spending to NATO. He said then:
NATO was set up when we were a richer country. We're
not a rich country anymore. We're borrowing, we're
borrowing all of this money . . . NATO is costing us a
fortune and yes, we're protecting Europe with NATO but
we're spending a lot of money. Number one, I think the
distribution of costs has to be changed.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\Shayna Freisleben, A Guide to Trump's Past Comments about
NATO, CBS News, (Apr. 12, 2017).
As president, President Trump has continued to press
European allies to contribute more NATO defense. For example,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in a tweet on July 9, 2018, President Trump wrote:
The United States is spending far more on NATO than
any other Country. This is not fair, nor is it
acceptable. While these countries have been increasing
their contributions since I took office, they must do
much more. Germany is at 1%, the U.S. is at 4%, and
NATO benefits. . . .\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jul. 9, 2018,
7:55 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1016289620596789248.
Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary-General, acknowledged
in an interview that President Trump's message has ``helped''
NATO member countries to increase defense spending, commending
the President on ``his strong message on burden sharing.''\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\David Greene, After Trump's NATO Criticism, Countries Spend
More on Defense, NPR.org, (May 18, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSC Senior Director Tim Morrison explained the President's
specific views about burden sharing regarding Ukraine during
his public testimony. He testified:
Q. And the President was also interested, was he not,
in better understanding opportunities for increased
burden sharing among the Europeans?
A. Yes.
Q. And what can you tell us about that?
A. The President was concerned that the United States
seemed to--to bear the exclusive brunt of security
assistance to Ukraine. He wanted to see the Europeans
step up and contribute more security assistance.
Q. And was there any interagency activity, whether it
be with the State Department for or the Defense
Department, in coordination by the National Security
Council, to look into that a little bit for the
President?
A. We were surveying the data to understand who was
contributing what and sort of in what categories.
Q. And so the President's evinced concerns, the
interagency tried to address them?
A. Yes.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
In his public testimony, LTC Vindman confirmed the
President's concerns about U.S. allies sharing the burden for
mutual defense.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer
Williams, supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. U.S. foreign aid is often conditioned or paused, and U.S. security
assistance to Ukraine has been paused before.
U.S. taxpayer-funded assistance to foreign governments is
not an entitlement. The United States often conditions foreign
aid on actions by recipient nations. In addition, foreign aid
can, and often does, get delayed for various reasons. The pause
of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine in this case is
therefore not presumptive evidence of misconduct.
The United States conditions foreign assistance to a number
of nations as a result of concerns about corruption, human
rights abuses, or other issues. On October 31, 2019, the Trump
Administration announced that it would withhold $105 million in
security assistance for Lebanon shortly after the resignation
of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri.\239\ In September
2019, the State Department announced that it was withholding
$160 million in aid from Afghanistan, citing corruption.\240\
In June 2019, the Administration told Congress that it would
reallocate $370 million in aid to Central American nations and
suspend an additional $180 million in an effort to incentivize
those countries to reduce the number of migrants reaching the
U.S. border.\241\ In 2017, President Trump froze $195 million
in security assistance to Egypt one of the largest recipients
of U.S. aid due to frustration with the country's poor track
record on human rights and a recently enacted law regarding
nongovernmental organizations.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\239\Patricia Zengerle & Mike Stone, Exclusive: U.S. withholding
$105 million in security aid for Lebanon- sources, Reuters, Oct. 31,
2019.
\240\Tal Axelrod, US withholds $160M in Afghan aid citing
corruption, The Hill, Sept. 9, 2019.
\241\Lesley Wroughton & Patricia Zengerle, As promised, Trump
slashes aid to Central America over migrants, Reuters, Jun. 17, 2019.
\242\Gardiner Harris & Declan Walsh, U.S. Slaps Egypt on Human
Rights Record and Ties to North Korea, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Democrats' witnesses explained that it is not unusual
for foreign aid to be paused or even withheld. Ambassador
Taylor testified that U.S. aid to foreign countries can be
paused in various instances, such as a Congressional hold.\243\
Ambassador Volker testified that foreign assistance can be
delayed for a multitude of reasons and that ``this hold on
security assistance [to Ukraine] was not significant.''\244\
Ambassador Volker elaborated during his public testimony:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 170-71.
\244\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 78-80.
Q. Ambassador Volker, you testified during your
deposition that aid, in fact, does get held up from
time-to-time for a whole assortment of reasons. Is that
your understanding?
A. That is true.
Q. And sometimes the holdups are rooted in something
at OMB, sometimes it's at the Defense Department,
sometimes it's at the State Department, sometimes it's
on the Hill. Is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And so, when the aid was held up for 55 days for
Ukraine, that didn't in and of itself strike you as
uncommon?
A. No. It's something that had happened in my career
in the past. I had seen holdups of assistance. I just
assumed it was part of the decision-making process.
Somebody had an objection, and we had to overcome
it.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
Ambassador David Hale, the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, agreed that U.S. taxpayer-funded aid has
been paused from several countries around the world for various
reasons and, in some cases, for unknown reasons.\246\
Ambassador Hale elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale'':
Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong.
(2019).
We've often heard at the State Department that the
President of the United States wants to make sure that
foreign assistance is reviewed scrupulously to make
sure that it's truly in U.S. national interests, and
that we evaluate it continuously, so that it meets
certain criteria that the President has
established.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\Id.
Ambassador Hale explained that the NSC launched a review of
U.S. foreign assistance to ensure U.S. taxpayer money was spent
efficiently and to advance ``[t]he principle of burden sharing
by allies and other like-minded states.''\248\ Dr. Hill, the
NSC's Senior Director for Europe, testified that as she was
leaving NSC in July 2019, ``there had been more scrutiny'' to
assistance:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\Id.
As I understood them, there had been a directive for
whole-scale review of our foreign policy, foreign
policy assistance, and the ties between our foreign
policy objectives and the assistance. This had been
going on actually for many months. And in the period
when I was wrapping up my time there, there had been
more scrutiny than specific assistance to specific sets
of countries as a result of that overall view--
review.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\249\Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes,
supra note 210.
The Democrats' witnesses also described how U.S. foreign
assistance to Ukraine has been delayed in the past. Dr. Hill
testified that security assistance to Ukraine has been paused
before ``at multiple junctures'' during her time at NSC, even
with bipartisan support for the assistance.\250\ Dr. Hill
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\250\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 304.
Q. On the issue of the security assistance freeze,
had assistance for Ukraine ever been held up before
during your time at NSC?
A. Yes.
Q. For what--and when was that?
A. At multiple junctures. You know, it gets back to
the question that [Republican staff] asked before.
There's often a question raised about assistance, you
know, a range of assistance--
Q. But for Ukraine specifically?
A. Yeah, that's correct.
Q. Okay. Even though there's been bipartisan support
for the assistance?
A. Correct.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\Id. at 303-04.
Catherine Croft, a former NSC director, offered an example
in her deposition, explaining that OMB paused the sale of
Javelin missiles to Ukraine in November or December 2017.\252\
This pause, too, was eventually lifted and Ukraine received the
missiles.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 67.
\253\Id. at 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Despite President Trump's skepticism, the Trump Administration's
policies have shown greater commitment and support to Ukraine
than those of the Obama Administration.
Several of the Democrats' witnesses testified that
President Trump has taken a stronger stance in supporting
Ukraine. Dr. Hill testified that President Trump's decision to
support Ukraine with lethal defensive weapons was a more robust
policy than under the Obama Administration.\254\ Ambassador
Taylor characterized President Trump's policy as a
``substantial improvement.''\255\ Ambassador Yovanovitch
agreed, testifying:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 196.
\255\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 155.
And I actually felt that in the 3 years that I was
there, partly because of my efforts, but also the
interagency team, and President Trump's decision to
provide lethal weapons to Ukraine, that our policy
actually got stronger over the three last 3 years
[sic].\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 140-41 (emphasis
added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
She added:
Q. Can you testify to the difference [to] the changes
in aid to Ukraine with the new administration starting
in 2017? The different initiatives, you know, as far as
providing lethal weapons and--
A. Yeah. Well, I think that most of the assistance
programs that we had, you know, continued, and due to
the generosity of the Congress actually were increased.
And so that was a really positive thing, I think, for
Ukraine and for us. In terms of lethal assistance, we
all felt it was very significant that this
administration made the decision to provide lethal
weapons to Ukraine.\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\Id. at 144.
Ambassador Volker also explained how President Trump's
policies of providing lethal defensive assistance to Ukraine
have been ``extremely helpful'' in deterring Russian aggression
in Ukraine.\258\ He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 87.
So there has been U.S. assistance provided to Ukraine
for some time, under the Bush administration, Obama
administration, and now under the Trump administration.
I was particularly interested in the security
assistance and lethal defensive weapons. The reason for
this is this was something that the Obama
administration did not approve. They did not want to
send lethal defensive arms to Ukraine.
I fundamentally disagreed with that decision. It is
not my--you know, I was just a private citizen, but
that's my opinion. I thought that this is a country
that is defending itself against Russian aggression.
They had their military largely destroyed by Russia in
2014 and '15 and needed the help. And humanitarian
assistance is great, and nonlethal assistance, you
know, MREs and blankets and all, that's fine, but if
you're being attacked with mortars and artilleries and
tanks, you need to be able to fight back.
The argument against this assistance being provided,
the lethal defensive assistance, was that it would be
provocative and could escalate the fighting with
Russia. I had a fundamentally different view that if we
did not provide it, it's an inducement to Russia to
keep up the aggression, and there's no deterrence of
Russia from trying to go further into Ukraine. So I
believed it was important to help them rebuild their
defensive capabilities and to deter Russia. It's also a
symbol of U.S. support.
So I argued very strongly from the time I was
appointed by Secretary Tillerson that the rationale for
why we were not providing lethal defensive assistance
to me doesn't hold water and that is a much stronger
rationale that we should be doing it.
That eventually became administration policy. It took
a while, but Secretary Tillerson, you know, he wanted
to think it through, see how that would play out. How
would the allies react to this? How would Russia react
to this? How would the Ukrainians handle it? And we
managed those issues. Secretary Mattis was very much in
favor. And they met. I did not meet with the President
about this, but they met with the President and the
President approved it.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\Id. at 84-86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Although security assistance to Ukraine was paused in July 2019,
several witnesses testified that U.S. security assistance was
not linked to any Ukrainian action on investigations.
Several witnesses testified that U.S. security assistance
was not linked to or conditioned on any Ukrainian action to
investigate President Trump's political rival. Even after U.S.
officials learned in early-to mid-July that the security
assistance had been paused for unknown reasons, evidence
suggests that there was not a link between U.S. security
assistance and Ukrainian action to investigate President
Trump's political rival.
LTC Vindman testified that he learned about a pause on
security assistance on July 3.\260\ Morrison said he learned of
the pause around July 15.\261\ According to Ambassador Taylor,
he learned via conference call on July 18 that OMB had paused
the security assistance to Ukraine.\262\ Ambassador Taylor
relayed that according to the OMB representative on the call,
the pause was done at the direction of the President and the
chief of staff.\263\ Although a reason was not provided for the
pause at the time, OMB official Mark Sandy testified that he
learned in early September 2019 that the pause was related ``to
the President's concern about other countries contributing more
to Ukraine.''\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 178.
\261\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 16.
\262\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 27.
\263\Id. at 28.
\264\Deposition of Mark Sandy, in Wash., D.C., at 42 (Nov. 16,
2019). Sandy testified that in early September, OMB received ``requests
for information on what additional countries were contributing to
Ukraine.'' Id. at 44. OMB provided that information sometime in the
first week of September. Id. at 82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the pause, testimony from the Democrats' witnesses
suggests the assistance was not linked to Ukraine investigating
President Trump's political rival. Ambassador Volker, the key
intermediary between the Ukrainian government and U.S.
officials, testified that he was aware of no quid pro quo and
that the Ukrainian government never raised concerns to him
about a quid pro quo.\265\ He said that when Ambassador Taylor
raised questions about the appearance of a quid pro quo, ``I
discussed with him that there is no linkage here. I view this
as an internal thing, and we are going to get it fixed.''\266\
Ambassador Volker further explained that even if Ukrainians
perceived the aid was linked to investigations, they ``never
raised'' that possibility with him.\267\ Ambassador Volker
believed that given the trust he had developed with the
Ukrainian government, the Ukrainians would have come to him
with concerns about the security assistance.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 170, 300-01.
\266\Id. at 130.
\267\Id. at 284.
\268\Id. at 300-01.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff attempted
to get Ambassador Volker to testify in his closed-door
deposition that the Ukrainian government would have felt
pressure to investigate President Trump's political rival once
they learned that the security assistance was delayed.\269\
Ambassador Volker refused to accept Chairman Schiff's
conclusion. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\Id. at 124-28.
Q. The request is made. And even though the
suspension may have occurred earlier, the request is
made to investigate the Bidens, and then Ukraine
learns, for mysterious reasons, hundreds of millions in
military support is being withheld. Do I have the
chronology correct?
A. Yes.
Q. At the point they learned that, wouldn't that give
them added urgency to meet the President's request on
the Bidens?
A. I don't know the answer to that. The--
Q. Ambassador--
A. When that--no--
Q. --as a career diplomat, you can't venture--
A. But, Congressman, this is why I'm trying to the
say the context is different, because at the time they
learned that, if we assume it's August 29th, they had
just had a visit from the National Security Advisor,
John Bolton. That's a high level meeting already. He
was recommending and working on scheduling the visit of
President Zelensky to Washington. We were also working
on a bilateral meeting to take place in Warsaw on the
margins of a commemoration on the beginning of World
War II. And in that context, I think the Ukrainians
felt like things are going the right direction, and
they had not done anything on--they had not done
anything on an investigation, they had not done
anything on a statement, and things were ramping up in
terms of their engagement with the administration. So I
think they were actually feeling pretty good by then.
Q. Ambassador, I find it remarkable as a career
diplomat that you have difficulty acknowledging that
when Ukraine learned that their aid had been suspended
for unknown reasons, that this wouldn't add additional
urgency to a request by the President of the United
States. I find that remarkable.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\Id. at 126-28 (question and answer with Chairman Adam Schiff).
During his public testimony, in an exchange with Rep. Mike
Turner, Ambassador Volker reiterated that there was no linkage
between U.S. security assistance and investigations. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q. Did the President of the United States ever say to
you that he was not going to allow aid from the United
States to go to the Ukraine unless there were
investigations into Burisma, the Bidens, or the 2016
elections?
A. No, he did not.
Q. Did the Ukrainians ever tell you that they
understood that they would not get a meeting with the
President of the United States, a phone call with the
President of the United States, military aid or foreign
aid from the United States unless they undertook
investigations of Burisma, the Bidens, or the 2016
elections?
A. No, they did not.
Q. So I would assume, then, that the Ukrainians never
told you that [Mayor] Giuliani had told them that, in
order to get a meeting with the President, a phone call
with the President, military aid or foreign aid from
the United States, that they would have to do these
investigations.
A. No.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent testified in his
closed-door deposition that he also did not ``associate'' the
security assistance to investigations.''\272\ Kent relayed how
Ambassador Taylor had told him that Ambassador Sondland was
``pushing'' President Zelensky to give an interview during the
Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference in Kyiv in mid-
September.\273\ Ambassador Taylor told Kent that the ``hope''
was if President Zelensky gave a public signal on
investigations, the security assistance pause would lift;
however, Ambassador Taylor asserted that ``both Tim Morrison
and Gordon Sondland said that they did not believe the two
issues were linked.''\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 323.
\273\Id. at 269.
\274\Id.; see also id. at 323.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During his sworn deposition, Ambassador Sondland testified
that he could not recall ``any discussions with the White House
about withholding U.S. security assistance from Ukraine in
exchange for assistance with President Trump's 2020 election
campaign.''\275\ Ambassador Sondland testified that he was
``never'' aware of any preconditions on the delay of security
assistance to Ukraine, or that the aid was tied to Ukraine
undertaking any investigations.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 35.
\276\Id. at 197.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although media reports allege that Ambassador Sondland
later recanted this testimony to ``confirm'' a quid pro
quo,\277\ those reports exaggerate the supplemental information
that Ambassador Sondland later provided. In a written
supplement to his deposition testimony, Ambassador Sondland
asserted that by the beginning of September 2019, ``in the
absence of any credible explanation for the suspension of aid,
[he] presumed that the aid suspension had become linked to the
proposed anti-corruption statement.''\278\ Ambassador Sondland
asserted that he spoke to Yermak in Warsaw on September 1 and
conveyed that U.S. aid would not ``likely'' flow until Ukraine
provided an anti-corruption statement.\279\ Yermak, however, in
an interview with Bloomberg, disputed Ambassador Sondland's
account, saying that he ``bumped into'' Ambassador Sondland and
``doesn't remember any reference to military aid.''\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\See, e.g., Andrew Desiderio & Kyle Cheney, Sondland reverses
himself on Ukraine, confirming quid pro quo, Politico, Nov. 5, 2019.
\278\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon D. Sondland at para.4 (Nov.
4, 2019) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ``Sondland declaration''].
\279\Id. at para.5.
\280\Stephanie Baker & Daryna Krasnolutska, Ukraine's fraught
summer included a rogue embassy in Washington, Bloomberg, Nov. 22,
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Sondland's addendum does not prove a nefarious
quid pro quo. At most, and even discounting Yermak's subsequent
denial, the addendum shows that as of September 1, Ambassador
Sondland assumed there was a connection and relayed this
assumption to Yermak--an assumption that the President would
later tell Ambassador Sondland was inaccurate.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During his deposition, Ambassador Taylor testified that he
spoke by phone with Ambassador Sondland on September 8.\282\
Ambassador Taylor recounted how Ambassador Sondland told him
that President Trump wanted President Zelensky to ``clear
things up and do it in public'' but there was no ``quid pro
quo.''\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\282\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 39.
\283\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 9, Ambassador Sondland texted Ambassador
Volker and Ambassador Taylor: ``The President has been crystal
clear: no quid pro quo's [sic] of any kind. The President is
trying to evaluate whether Ukraine is truly going to adopt the
transparency and reforms that President Zelensky promised
during his campaign.''\284\ When asked about this text message
during his transcribed interview, Ambassador Volker testified
that ``Gordon was repeating here what we all understood.''\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\Text message from Gordon Sondland to William Taylor and Kurt
Volker (Sept. 9, 2019, 5:19 a.m.) [KV00000053].
\285\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 170.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his public testimony, Ambassador Taylor clarified his
statement from his closed-door deposition that he had ``clear
understanding'' that Ukraine would not receive security
assistance until President Zelensky committed to
investigations.\286\ He explained his ``clear understanding''
came from Ambassador Sondland, who acknowledged that he had
presumed there to be a linkage. In an exchange with Rep. Jim
Jordan, Ambassador Taylor testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr.
George Kent, supra note 2.
Q. So what I'm wondering is, where did you get this
clear understanding?
A. As I testified, Mr. Jordan, this came from
Ambassador Sondland.
* * *
Q. You said you got this from Ambassador Sondland.
A. That is correct. Ambassador Sondland also said he
had talked to President Zelensky and Mr. Yermak and had
told them that, although this was not a quid pro quo,
if President Zelensky did not clear things up in
public, we would be at a stalemate. That was the--that
was one point.
* * *
Q. All right. So, again, just to recap, you had three
meetings with President Zelensky; no linkage in those
three meetings came up. Ambassador Zelensky didn't
announce that he was going [to] do any investigation of
the Bidens or Burisma before the aid was released. He
didn't--
A. That was President--
Q. --do a tweet, didn't do anything on CNN, didn't do
any of that. President Zelensky. Excuse me.
A. Yeah. Right.
Q. And then what you have in front of you is an
addendum that Mr. Sondland made to his testimony that
we got a couple weeks ago. It says, ``Declaration of
Ambassador Gordon Sondland. I, Gordon Sondland, do
hereby swear and affirm as follows.'' I want to you
look at point number two, bullet point number two,
second sentence. ``Ambassador Taylor recalls that Mr.
Morrison told Ambassador Taylor that I told Mr.
Morrison that I conveyed this message to Mr. Yermak on
September 1st, 2019, in connection with Vice President
Pence's visit to Warsaw and a meeting with President
Zelensky.'' Now, this is his clarification. Let me read
it one more time. ``Ambassador Taylor recalls that Mr.
Morrison told Ambassador Taylor that I told Mr.
Morrison that I had conveyed this message to Mr. Yermak
on September 1st, 2019, in connection with Vice
President Pence's visit to Warsaw and a meeting with
President Zelensky.'' We've got six people having four
conversations in one sentence, and you just told me
this is where you got your clear understanding, which--
I mean, even though you had three opportunities with
President Zelensky for him to tell you, ``You know
what? We're going to do these investigations to get the
aid,'' he didn't tell you, three different times. Never
makes an announcement, never tweets about it, never
does the CNN interview. Ambassador, you weren't on the
call, were you? The President--you didn't listen in on
President Trump's call and President Zelensky's call?
A. I did not.
Q. You never talked with Chief of Staff Mulvaney.
A. I never did.
Q. You never met the President.
A. That's correct.
Q. You had three meetings again with Zelensky and it
didn't come up.
A. And two of those, they had never heard about it,
as far as I know, so there was no reason for it to come
up.
Q. And President Zelensky never made an announcement.
This is what I can't believe. And you're their star
witness. You're their first witness.
A. Mr. Jordan--
Q. You're the guy. You're the guy based on this,
based on--I mean, I've seen church prayer chains that
are easier to understand than this.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr.
George Kent, supra note 2.
During his public testimony, Ambassador Sondland made clear
that no one had ever told him that the security assistance was
tied to Ukraine investigating the President's political rival.
In particular, Ambassador Sondland explained that ``President
Trump never told me directly that the aid was conditioned on
the meetings.''\288\ In an exchange with Rep. Turner,
Ambassador Sondland elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\Impeachment inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note
56.
Q. What about the aid? [Ambassador Volker] says that
they weren't tied, that the aid was not tied
A. And I didn't say they were conclusively tied
either. I said I was presuming it.
Q. Okay. And so the President never told you they
were tied.
A. That is correct.
Q. So your testimony and [Ambassador Volker's]
testimony is consistent, and the President did not tie
aid to investigations.
A. That is correct.
* * *
Q. So no one told you, not just the President.
[Mayor] Giuliani didn't tell you. [Acting Chief of
Staff] Mulvaney didn't tell you. Nobody--[Secretary]
Pompeo didn't tell you. Nobody else on this planet told
you that Donald Trump was tying aid to these
investigations. Is that correct?
A. I think I already testified to that.
Q. No. Answer the question. Is it correct? No one on
this planet told you that Donald Trump was tying aid to
the investigations? Because if your answer is yes, then
the chairman is wrong and the headline on CNN is wrong.
No one on this planet told you that President Trump was
tying aid to investigations, yes or no?
A. Yes.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. President Trump rejected any linkage between U.S. security
assistance and Ukrainian action on investigations.
The evidence also shows that when President Trump was asked
about a potential linkage between U.S. security assistance and
Ukrainian investigations into the President's political rival,
the President vehemently denied any connection. This evidence
is persuasive because the President made the same denial twice
to two separate senior U.S. officials in private, where there
is no reason for the President to be anything less than
completely candid.
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal and a detailed
written submission to the impeachment inquiry, Senator Ron
Johnson, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Europe, disclosed that he spoke to President
Trump on August 31, after learning from Ambassador Sondland
that U.S. security assistance may be linked to Ukraine's
willingness to demonstrate its commitment to fight
corruption.\290\ Senator Johnson explained that his purpose for
calling President Trump was ``to inform President Trump of my
upcoming trip to Ukraine and to try to persuade him to
authorize me to tell [President] Zelensky that the hold would
be lifted on military aid.''\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\Letter from Sen. Johnson, supra note 138, at 5; Siobhan Hughes
& Rebecca Ballhaus, Trump, in August call with GOP Senator, denied
official's claim on Ukraine aid, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 2019.
\291\Letter from Sen. Johnson, supra note 138, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Johnson recounted that President Trump was ``not
prepared'' to lift the pause on security assistance to Ukraine,
citing Ukrainian corruption and frustration that Europe did not
share more of the burden.\292\ Echoing his continual statements
about U.S. allies sharing the financial burden for mutual
defense, President Trump told Senator Johnson: ``Ron, I talk to
Angela [Merkel, German chancellor] and ask her, `why don't you
fund these things,' and she tells me, `because we know you
will.' We're schmucks, Ron. We're schmucks.''\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\Id.
\293\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Senator Johnson raised the potential of a linkage
between U.S. security assistance and investigations, President
Trump vehemently denied it.\294\ According to Senator Johnson,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without hesitation, President Trump immediately denied such
an arrangement existed. As reported in the Wall Street Journal,
I quoted the President as saying, ``[Expletive deleted]--No
way. I would never do that. Who told you that?'' I have
accurately characterized his reaction as adamant, vehement and
angry--there was more than one expletive that I have
deleted.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the end of the phone call, President Trump circled back
to Senator Johnson's request to release the pause on security
assistance. President Trump said: ``Ron, I understand your
position. We're reviewing it now, and you'll probably like my
final decision.''\296\ This conversation occurred on August 31,
well before the Democrats initiated their impeachment inquiry,
and undermines the assertion that the President fabricated
legitimate reasons for the pause in security assistance in
response to the Democrats' impeachment inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During his deposition, Ambassador Sondland testified that
he called President Trump on September 9 and asked him ``What
do you want from Ukraine?'' The President's response was
``Nothing. There is no quid pro quo.''\297\ During his
deposition, Ambassador Sondland testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 106.
Q. So when you telephoned the President, tell us what
happened.
A. Well, from the time that the aid was held up until
I telephoned the President there were a lot of rumors
swirling around as to why the aid had been held up,
including they wanted a review, they wanted Europe to
do more. There were all kinds of rumors. And I know in
my few previous conversations with the President he's
not big on small talk to I would have one shot to ask
him. And rather than asking him, ``Are you doing X
because of X or because of Y or because of Z?'' I asked
him one open-ended question: What do you want from
Ukraine? And as I recall, he was in a very bad mood. It
was a very quick conversation. He said: I wanted
nothing. I want no quid pro quo. I want Zelensky to do
the right thing. And I said: What does that mean? And
he said: I want him to do what he ran on.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added).
When asked about his conversation with Senator Johnson--
which prompted Senator Johnson to call President Trump--
Ambassador Sondland testified that he was ``speculating'' about
the linkage between security assistance and
investigations.\299\ He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\Id. at 196.
I noticed in the media [Senator Johnson] had come out
and said that he and I had a conversation on the phone
about it. And he had said that I told him--this is in
the media report, and I haven't discussed this with him
since that media report--that I had said there was a
quid pro quo. And I don't remember telling him that
because I'm not sure I knew that at that point. I think
what I might have done is I might have been
speculating--I hope there's no, I hope this isn't being
held up for nefarious reasons.\300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\Id.
Although Democrats and some in the media believe that
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney confirmed the existence of
a quid pro quo during an October 2019 press briefing,\301\ a
careful reading of his statements shows otherwise. Chief of
Staff Mulvaney cited President Trump's concerns about Ukrainian
corruption and foreign aid in general as the ``driving
factors'' in the temporary pause on security assistance.\302\
He explained that Ukraine's actions in the 2016 election ``was
part of the thing that [the President] was worried about in
corruption with that nation.''\303\ Chief of Staff Mulvaney
specified, however, that ``the money held up had absolutely
nothing to do with [Vice President] Biden.''\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\301\Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes,
supra note 210 (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman); Aaron Blake,
Trump's acting chief of staff admits it: There was a Ukraine quid pro
quo, Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 2019.
\302\The White House, Press Briefing by Acting Chief of Staff Mick
Mulvaney (Oct. 17, 2019).
\303\Id.
\304\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Senior U.S. officials never substantively discussed the delay in
security assistance with Ukrainian officials before the July 25
call.
Evidence also suggests that the senior levels of the
Ukrainian government did not know that U.S. security assistance
was delayed until some point after the July 25 phone call
between President Trump and President Zelensky. Although the
assistance was delayed at the time of the July 25 call,
President Trump never raised the assistance with President
Zelensky or implied that the aid was in danger. As Ambassador
Volker testified, because Ukrainian officials were unaware of
the pause on security assistance, ``there was no leverage
implied.''\305\ This evidence undercuts the allegation that the
President withheld U.S. security assistance to pressure
President Zelensky to investigate his political rival.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 124-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most of the Democrats' witnesses, including Ambassador
Taylor, traced their knowledge of the pause to a July 18
interagency conference call, during which OMB announced a pause
on security assistance to Ukraine.\306\ However, the two U.S.
diplomats closest the Ukrainian government--Ambassador Volker
and Ambassador Taylor--testified that Ukraine did not know
about the delay ``until the end of August,'' six weeks later,
after it was reported publicly by Politico on August 28.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\See, e.g., Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 27.
\307\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 125, 266-67;
Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 119-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Volker, the chief interlocutor with the
Ukrainian government, testified that he never informed the
Ukrainians about the delay.\308\ The Ukrainian government only
raised the issue with Ambassador Volker after reading about the
delay in Politico in late August.\309\ Explaining why the delay
was not ``significant,'' Ambassador Volker testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 80.
\309\Id. at 80-81; Text message from Andrey Yermak to Kurt Volker,
(Aug. 29, 2019, 03:06:14 AM), [KV00000020]; see Caitlin Emma & Connor
O'Brien, Trump holds up Ukraine military aid meant to confront Russia,
Politico, Aug. 28, 2019.
Q. Looking back on it now, is [the delayed security
assistance] something, in the grand scheme of things,
that's very significant? I mean, is this worthy of
investigating, or is this just another chapter in the
rough and tumble world of diplomacy and foreign
assistance?
A. In my view, this hold on security assistance was
not significant. I don't believe--in fact, I am quite
sure that at least I, Secretary Pompeo, the official
representatives of the U.S., never communicated to
Ukrainians that it is being held for a reason. We never
had a reason. And I tried to avoid talking to
Ukrainians about it for as long as I could until it
came out in Politico a month later because I was
confident we were going to get it fixed
internally.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 80.
During his public testimony, Ambassador Volker confirmed
that he did not have any communication with the Ukrainian
government about the pause on U.S. security assistance until
they raised the topic with him.\311\ Morrison likewise
testified that he avoided discussing the pause on security
assistance with the Ukrainian government.\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
\312\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Taylor similarly testified that the Ukrainian
government was not aware of the pause on U.S. security
assistance until late August 2019. In an exchange with Rep.
Ratcliffe, he explained:
Q. So, based on your knowledge, nobody in the
Ukrainian government became aware of a hold on military
aid until 2 days later, on August 29th.
A. That's my understanding.
Q. That's your understanding. And that would have
been well over a month after the July 25th call between
President Trump and President Zelensky.
A. Correct.
Q. So you're not a lawyer, are you, Ambassador
Taylor?
A. I am not.
Q. Okay. So the idea of a quid pro quo is it's a
concept where there is a demand for an action or an
attempt to influence action in exchange for something
else. And in this case, when people are talking about a
quid pro quo, that something else is military aid. So,
if nobody in the Ukrainian government is aware of a
military hold at the time of the Trump-Zelensky call,
then, as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, there
can be no quid pro quo based on military aid. I just
want to be real clear that, again, as of July 25th, you
have no knowledge of a quid pro quo involving military
aid.
A. July 25th is a week after the hold was put on the
security assistance. And July 25th, they had a
conversation between the two presidents where it was
not discussed.
Q. And to your knowledge, nobody in the Ukrainian
government was aware of the hold?
A. That is correct.\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\313\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 119-20.
Likewise, Philip Reeker, the Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Europeans Affairs, testified that he was unaware of
any U.S. official conveying to a Ukrainian official that
President Trump sought political investigations.\314\ Acting
Assistant Secretary Reeker testified that he was not aware of
whether Ambassador Volker or Ambassador Sondland had such
conversations with the Ukrainians.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\Deposition of Philip Reeker in Wash., D.C., at 149 (Oct. 26,
2019).
\315\Id. at 150.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some witnesses testified that the Ukrainian embassy made
informal inquiries about the status of the security assistance.
LTC Vindman recalled receiving ``light queries'' from his
Ukrainian embassy counterparts about the aid in either early-
or mid-August, but he was unable to pinpoint specific dates, or
even the week, that he had such conversations.\316\ LTC Vindman
testified that Ukrainian questions about the delay were not
``substantive'' or ``definitive'' until around the time of the
Warsaw summit, on September 1.\317\ State Department official
Catherine Croft testified that two individuals from the
Ukrainian embassy approached her about a pause on security
assistance at some point before August 28, but Croft told them
she ``was confident that any issues in process would get
resolved.''\318\ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura
Cooper testified publicly that her staff received inquiries
from the Ukrainian embassy in July that ``there was some kind
of issue'' with the security assistance; however, she did not
know what the Ukrainian government knew at the time.\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 135-37, 189-90.
\317\Id. at 189-90.
\318\Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 86-87.
\319\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale,
supra note 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although this evidence suggests that Ukrainian officials in
Washington were vaguely aware of an issue with the security
assistance before August 28, the evidence does not show that
the senior leadership of Ukrainian government in Kyiv was aware
of the pause until late August. A New York Times story claimed
that unidentified Ukrainian officials were aware of a delay in
``early August'' 2019 but said there was no stated link between
that delay and any investigative demands.\320\ However, a
subsequent Bloomberg story reported that President Zelensky
``and his key advisers learned of [the pause on U.S. security
assistance] only in a Politico report in late August.''\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\Andrew E. Kramer & Kenneth P. Vogel, Ukraine knew of aid
freeze by early August, undermining Trump defense, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
2019.
\321\Baker & Krasnolutska, supra note 280.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bloomberg story detailed how Ukraine's embassy in
Washington--led by then-Ambassador Chaly, who had been
appointed by President Zelensky's predecessor--went ``rogue''
in the early months of the Zelensky administration.\322\
According to Andrey Yermak, a close adviser to President
Zelensky, the Ukrainian embassy officials, who were loyal to
former President Poroshenko, did not inform President Zelensky
that there was any issue with the U.S. security
assistance.\323\ This information explains the conflicting
testimony between witnesses like LTC Vindman and Deputy
Assistant Secretary Cooper, who testified that the Ukrainian
embassy raised questions about the security assistance, and
Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Taylor, who testified that the
Zelensky government did not know about any pause in security
assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\Id.
\323\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Ukrainian government, President Zelensky
and his senior advisers only learned of the pause on security
assistance from Politico--severely undercutting the idea that
President Trump was seeking to pressure Ukraine to investigate
his political rival.
8. The Ukrainian government denied any awareness of a linkage between
U.S. security assistance and investigations.
Publicly available information also shows clearly that the
Ukrainian government leadership denied any awareness of a
linkage between U.S. security assistance and investigations
into the President's political rival. The Ukrainian government
leaders made this assertion following public reports that
Ambassador Sondland had raised the potential connection in
early September. This understanding is supported by information
provided by Senator Johnson.
In Ambassador Sondland's addendum to his closed-door
testimony, dated November 5, 2019, he wrote how he came to
perceive a connection between security assistance and the
investigations. He wrote:
[B]y the beginning of September 2019, and in the
absence of any credible explanation for the suspension
of aid, I presumed that the aid suspension had become
linked to the proposed anti-corruption statement. . . .
And it would have been natural for me to have voiced
what I had presumed to Ambassador Taylor, Senator
Johnson, the Ukrainians, and Mr. Morrison.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\Sondland declaration, supra note 278, at 4.
Following media reports of Ambassador Sondland's addendum,
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Prystaiko told the media that
Ambassador Sondland had not linked the security assistance to
Ukrainian action on investigations.\325\ He said: ``Ambassador
Sondland did not tell us, and certainly did not tell me, about
a connection between the assistance and the
investigations.''\326\ Minister Prystaiko went further to say
that he was never aware of any connection between security
assistance and investigations: ``I have never seen a direct
relationship between investigations and security assistance.
Yes, the investigations were mentioned, you know, in the
conversation of the presidents. But there was no clear
connection between these events.''\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\U.S. envoy Sondland did not link Biden probe to aid: Ukraine
minister, Reuters, Nov. 14, 2019.
\326\Id.
\327\Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Johnson explained that he had three meetings with
senior Ukrainian government officials in June and July
2019.\328\ Two of meetings were with Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-
secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council,
and Valeriy Chaly, then-Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S.\329\
Senator Johnson said that none of the these Ukrainian officials
raised any concerns with him about security assistance or
investigations: ``At no time during those meetings did anyone
from Ukraine raise the issue of the withholding of military aid
or express concerns regarding pressure being applied by the
president or his administration.''\330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson, supra note 138, at 4.
\329\Id.
\330\Id. at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. The Ukrainian government considered issuing a public anti-corruption
statement to convey that President Zelensky was ``serious and
different'' from previous Ukrainian regimes.
Evidence shows that in light of President Trump's deep-
rooted skepticism about Ukraine, and working in tandem with
senior U.S. officials, the Ukrainian government sought to
convince President Trump that the new regime took corruption
seriously. This commitment took two potential forms: a public
statement that Ukraine would investigate corruption or a media
interview about investigations. Although the parties later
discussed the inclusion of specific investigations proposed by
Mayor Giuliani, U.S. officials explained that the intent of the
statement was to convey a public commitment to anti-corruption
reform and that they did not associate the statement with an
investigation of the President's political rival.
Ambassador Volker explained the goal of having Ukraine
convey President Zelensky's commitment to reform and fighting
corruption in a public message. He testified:
A. So the issue as I understood it was this deep-
rooted, skeptical view of Ukraine, a negative view of
Ukraine, preexisting 2019, you know, going back. When I
started this I had one other meeting with President
Trump and President Poroshenko. It was in September of
2017. And at that time he had a very skeptical view of
Ukraine. So I know he had a very deep-rooted skeptical
view. And my understanding at the time was that even
though he agreed in the [May 23] meeting that we had
with him, say, okay, I'll invite him, he didn't really
want to do it. And that's why the meeting kept being
delayed and delayed. And we ended up at a point in
talking with the Ukrainians--who we'll come to this,
but, you know, who had asked to communicate with
Giuliani--that they wanted to convey that they really
are different. And we ended up talking about, well,
then, make a statement about investigating corruption
and your commitment to reform and so forth.
Q. Is that the statement that you discussed in your
text messages--
A. Yes.
Q. --around August of 2019?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. To say make a statement along those lines.
And the thought behind that was just trying to be
convincing that they are serious and different from the
Ukraine of the past.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 41-42
(emphasis added).
Ambassador Volker elaborated during his public testimony
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that a public statement is not unusual. He explained:
I didn't find it that unusual. I think when you're
dealing with a situation where I believe the President
was highly skeptical about President Zelensky being
committed to really changing Ukraine after his entirely
negative view of the country, that he would want to
hear something more from President Zelensky to be
convinced that, ``Okay, I'll give this guy a
chance.''\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
The Democrats' witnesses explained how the idea of a public
statement arose. Ambassador Volker testified that Andrey
Yermak, a senior adviser to President Zelensky, sent him a
draft statement following Yermak's meeting with Mayor Giuliani
on August 2.\333\ Ambassador Volker said that he believed the
statement was ``valuable for getting the Ukrainian Government
on the record about their commitment to reform and change and
fighting corruption because I believed that would be helpful in
overcoming this deep skepticism that the President had about
Ukraine.''\334\ Ambassador Volker, however, did not see the
statement as a ``necessary condition'' for President Zelensky
securing a White House meeting.\335\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 71.
\334\Id.
\335\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Volker explained that although the statement
evolved to include specific references to ``Burisma'' and
``2016,'' the goal was still to show that President Zelensky
was ``different.'' He testified:
Q. And the draft statement went through some
iterations. Is that correct?
A. Yeah. It was pretty quick, though. I don't know
the timeline exactly. We have it. But, basically,
Andrey [Yermak] sends me a text. I share it with Gordon
Sondland. We have a conversation with Rudy to say: The
Ukrainians are looking at this text. Rudy says: Well,
if it doesn't say Burisma and if it doesn't say 2016,
what does it mean? You know, it's not credible. You
know, they're hiding something. And so we talked and I
said: So what you're saying is just at the end of the--
same statement, just insert Burisma and 2016, you think
that would be more credible? And he said: Yes. So I
sent that back to Andrey, conveyed the conversation
with him--because he had spoken with Rudy prior to
that, not me--conveyed the conversation, and Andrey
said that he was not--he did not think this was a good
idea, and I shared his view.
Q. You had testified from the beginning you didn't
think it was a good idea to mention Burisma or 2016.
A. Correct.
Q. But then, as I understand it, you came to believe
that if we're going to do the statement, maybe it's
necessary to have that reference in there, correct?
A. I'd say I was in the middle. I wouldn't say I
thought it was necessary to have it in there because I
thought the target here is not the specific
investigations. The target is getting Ukraine to be
seen as credible in changing the country, fighting
corruption, introducing reform, that Zelensky is the
real deal. You may remember that there was a statement
that Rudy Giuliani made when he canceled his visit to
Ukraine in May of 2019 that President Zelensky is
surrounded by enemies of the United States. And I just
knew that to be fundamentally not true. And so I think,
when you talk about overcoming skepticism, that's kind
of what I'm talking about, getting these guys out there
publicly saying: We are different.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\336\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 71-73.
Although subsequent reporting has connoted a connection
between ``Burisma'' and the Bidens,\337\ the Democrats'
witnesses testified that they did not have that understanding
while working with the Ukrainian government about a potential
statement. Ambassador Volker explained that ``there is an
important distinction about Burisma'' and that Vice President
Biden or Hunter Biden were ``never part of the conversation''
with the Ukrainians.\338\ He also testified that the Ukrainians
did not link Burisma to the Bidens: ``They never mentioned
Biden to me.''\339\ Ambassador Volker also made clear that
following his initial conversation with Mayor Giuliani in May
2019, Mayor Giuliani ``never brought up Biden or Bidens with me
again. And so when we talked or heard Burisma, I literally
meant Burisma and that, not the conflation of that with the
Bidens.''\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\See, e.g., Paul Sonne, Michael Kranish, & Matt Viser, The gas
tycoon and the vice president's son: The story of Hunter Biden's foray
into Ukraine, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 2019.
\338\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 73.
\339\Id. at 193.
\340\Id. at 213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Sondland testified that he was unaware that
``Burisma'' may have meant ``Biden'' until the White House
released the July 25th call transcript on September 25.\341\ In
fact, Ambassador Sondland testified that he recalled no
discussions with any State Department or White House official
about former Vice President Joe Biden or Hunter Biden.\342\
Ambassador Sondland testified that he did not recall Mayor
Giuliani ever discussing the Bidens with him.\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 70.
\342\Id. at 33. Ambassador Sondland testified that Burisma was
``one of many examples'' of Ukrainian corruption. Id. Ambassador
Sondland mentioned Naftogaz as another example of Ukrainian corruption
and lack of transparency that ``[came] up at every conversation.'' Id.
at 71, 99.
\343\Id. at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testimony and text messages reflect that Ambassador Volker,
Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Taylor communicated about
Ukraine's commitment to fight corruption throughout the summer.
Ambassador Taylor testified that in a phone conversation on
June 27, Ambassador Sondland told him that President Zelensky
``needed to make clear to President Trump that he, President
Zelensky, was not standing in the way of
`investigations.''\344\ Ambassador Taylor said he did not know
to what ``investigations'' Ambassador Sondland was referring,
but that Ambassador Volker ``intended to pass that message [to
President Zelensky] in Toronto several days later.''\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 25.
\345\Id. at 62-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In early July, Ambassador Volker explained the dynamic
directly to President Zelensky in Toronto, emphasizing the need
to demonstrate a commitment to reform. Ambassador Volker
testified:
I believe [Mayor Giuliani] was getting bad
information, and I believe that his negative messaging
about Ukraine would be reinforcing the President's
already negative position about Ukraine. So I discussed
this with President Zelensky when I saw him in Toronto
on July 3rd, and I said I think this is a problem that
we have Mayor Giuliani--so I didn't discuss his meeting
with Lutsenko then. That came later. I only learned
about that later. But I discussed even on July 3rd with
President Zelensky that you have a problem with your
message of being, you know, clean, reform, that we need
to support you, is not getting--or is getting
countermanded or contradicted by a negative narrative
about Ukraine, that it is still corrupt, there's still
terrible people around you. At this time, there was
concern about his chief of presidential administration,
Andriy Bohdan, who had been a lawyer for a very famous
oligarch in Ukraine. And so I discussed this negative
narrative about Ukraine that Mr. Giuliani seemed to be
furthering with the President.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 137.
On July 21, Ambassador Sondland sent a text message to
Ambassador Taylor that read: ``[W]e need to get the
conversation started and the relationship built, irrespective
of the pretext. I am worried about the alternative.''\347\
Ambassador Sondland testified that the word ``pretext''
concerned agreement on an interview or press statement and that
the ``alternative'' was no engagement at all between President
Trump and President Zelensky.\348\ Ambassador Sondland
testified that he viewed giving a press interview or making a
press statement as different from pressuring Ukraine to
investigate political rival.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\347\Text message from Gordon Sondland to Kurt Volker & William
Taylor (July 21, 2019, 4:45 a.m.) [KV00000037].
\348\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 183-84.
\349\Id. at 170-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 9, Ambassador Sondland sent a text message to
Ambassador Volker, writing in part: ``I think potus [sic]
really wants the deliverable.''\350\ Ambassador Sondland
testified that ``deliverable'' referred to the Ukrainian press
statement.\351\ Ambassador Volker testified that President
Trump wanted a public commitment to reform as a
``deliverable'':
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\350\Text message from Gordon Sondland to Kurt Volker (Aug. 9,
2019, 5:47 p.m.) [KV00000042].
\351\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 290.
Q. And what--yeah, what did you understand what the
President wanted by deliverable?
A. That statement that had been under conversation.
Q. That was the deliverable from Zelensky that the
President wanted before he would commit to--
A. He wanted to see that they're going to come out
publicly and commit to reform, investigate the past, et
cetera.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 184 (emphasis
added).
According to Ambassador Taylor, on September 8, Ambassador
Sondland relayed to Ambassador Taylor that he had told
President Zelensky and Yermak that if President Zelensky ``did
not clear things up in public, we would be at a
stalemate.''\353\ Ambassador Taylor interpreted Ambassador
Sondland's use of ``stalemate'' to mean that there would be no
security assistance to Ukraine.\354\ Ambassador Taylor
recounted that Ambassador Sondland said that President Trump is
a businessman and businessmen ask for something before
``signing a check.''\355\ Ambassador Taylor testified that he
understood that ``signing a check'' related to security
assistance.\356\ Ambassador Sondland did not recall the
conversation with Ambassador Taylor and denied making a
statement about President Trump seeking something for signing a
check to Ukraine.\357\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 39.
\354\Id.
\355\Id. at 40.
\356\Id.
\357\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 198-99, 351.
Q. So you hadn't--did you ever, in the course of
this, ever make a statement to the effect of, you know,
we're cutting a big check to the Ukraine, you know,
what should we get for his?
A. That's not something I would have said. I don't
remember that at all.
Q. Okay. So you've never made a statement relating
the aid to conditions that the Ukrainians ought to
comply with?
A. I don't remember that, no.
Q. But if someone suggested that you made that
statement, that would be out of your own character,
you're saying?
A. Yes.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\Id. at 198-99.
Although Ambassador Sondland's statements imply that the
President personally sought a conditionality on the security
assistance, other witnesses testified that Ambassador Sondland
had a habit of exaggerating his interactions with President
Trump.\359\ Ambassador Sondland himself acknowledged that he
only spoke with the President five or six times, one of which
was a Christmas greeting.\360\ It is not readily apparent that
Ambassador Sondland was speaking on behalf of President Trump
in this context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 240-41; Kent deposition,
supra note 65, at 257.
\360\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. President Zelensky never raised a linkage between security
assistance and investigations in his meetings with senior U.S.
government officials.
Between July 18--the date on which OMB announced the pause
on security assistance to Ukraine during an interagency
conference--call and September 11--when the pause was lifted
President Zelensky had five separate meetings with high-ranking
U.S. government officials. The evidence shows that President
Zelensky never raised any concerns in those meeting that he
felt pressure to investigate President Trump's political rival
or that U.S. security assistance to Ukraine was conditioned on
any such investigations.
On July 25, President Zelensky spoke by telephone with
President Trump. Although President Zelensky noted a desire to
purchase additional Javelin missiles from the United States--an
expenditure separate from security assistance--the call summary
otherwise does not show that the President discussed a pause on
U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 26, President Zelensky met in Kyiv with Ambassador
Volker, Ambassador Taylor, and Ambassador Sondland.\362\
According to Ambassador Sondland's closed-door deposition,
President Zelensky did not raise any concern about a pause on
security assistance or a linkage between the aid and
investigations into President Trump's political rival.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\362\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 31; Sondland deposition,
supra note 51, at 29.
\363\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 252.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 27, President Zelensky met in Kyiv with President
Trump's then-National Security Advisor John Bolton.\364\
According to Ambassador Taylor, President Zelensky and
Ambassador Bolton did not discuss U.S. security
assistance.\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 33.
\365\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 1, President Zelensky met in Warsaw with Vice
President Pence, after the existence of the security assistance
pause became public. Tim Morrison, Senior Director at the NSC,
testified that President Zelensky raised the security
assistance directly with Vice President Pence during their
meeting.\366\ According to Morrison, Vice President Pence
relayed President Trump's concern about corruption, the need
for reform in Ukraine, and his desire for other countries to
contribute more to Ukrainian defense.\367\ As Jennifer
Williams, senior adviser for Europe in the Office of the Vice
President, testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 131-34.
\367\Id.
Once the cameras left the room, the very first
question that President Zelensky had was about the
status of security assistance. And the VP responded by
really expressing our ongoing support for Ukraine, but
wanting to hear from President Zelensky, you know, what
the status of his reform efforts were that he could
then convey back to the President, and also wanting to
hear if there was more that European countries could do
to support Ukraine.\368\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\368\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 81.
Vice President Pence did not discuss any investigations
with President Zelensky.\369\ Morrison said that Vice President
Pence spoke to President Trump that evening, who was ``still
skeptical'' due to the fact that U.S. allies were not
adequately contributing to Ukraine.\370\ Although Ambassador
Sondland claimed in his public hearing that he informed Vice
President Pence of his assumption of a link between security
assistance and investigations in advance of the Vice
President's meeting with President Zelensky,\371\ the Vice
President's office said Ambassador Sondland never raised
investigations or conditionality on the security
assistance.\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\369\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8; Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and
Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6. In fact, Williams testified that
Vice President Pence has ``never brought up'' these investigations.
Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams,
supra note 6.
\370\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 133-34.
\371\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note
56.
\372\Office of the Vice President, Statement from VP Chief of Staff
Marc Short (Nov. 20, 2019). In addition, the summary of President
Trump's July 25 call with President Zelensky was not included in Vice
President Pence's briefing book for his meeting with President
Zelensky. Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 5, President Zelensky met in Kyiv with Senator
Ron Johnson, Senator Chris Murphy, and Ambassador Taylor.\373\
President Zelensky raised the issue of the security assistance,
and Senator Johnson relayed to him what President Trump had
told Senator Johnson during their August 31 conversation.\374\
Senator Murphy then warned President Zelensky ``not to respond
to requests from American political actors or he would risk
losing Ukraine's bipartisan support.''\375\ Senator Johnson
recalled that he did not comment on Senator Murphy's statement
but began discussing a potential presidential meeting.\376\ To
help President Zelensky understand President Trump's mindset,
Senator Johnson ``tried to portray [President Trump's] strongly
held attitude and reiterated the reasons President Trump
consistently gave [Senator Johnson] for his reservations
regarding Ukraine: endemic corruption and inadequate European
support.''\377\ Senator Johnson recounted how President
Zelensky raised no concerns about pressure:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\373\Sen. Johnson letter, supra note 138, at 6.
\374\Id.
\375\Id. at 7.
\376\Id.
\377\Id.
This was a very open, frank, and supportive
discussion. There was no reason for anyone on either
side not to be completely honest or to withhold any
concerns. At no time during this meeting or any other
meeting on this trip was there any mention by
[President] Zelensky or any Ukrainian that they were
feeling pressure to do anything in return for military
aid, not even after [Senator] Murphy warned them about
getting involved in the 2020 election which would have
been the perfect time to discuss any pressure.\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
After Senator Johnson offered his perspective, Senator
Murphy similarly provided an account of the September 5
meeting.\379\ Senator Murphy did not dispute the facts as
recounted by Senator Johnson, including that President Zelensky
raised no concerns about feeling pressure to investigate the
President's political rival.\380\ Senator Murphy, however,
interpreted President Zelensky's silence to mean that he felt
pressure.\381\ This ``interpretation''--based on what President
Zelensky did not say--is unpersuasive in light of President
Zelensky's repeated and consistent statements that he felt no
pressure.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\Letter from Sen. Chris Murphy to Adam Schiff, Chairman, H.
Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, & Carolyn Maloney, Acting Chairwoman,
H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (Nov. 19, 2019).
\380\Id. at 5.
\381\Id.
\382\See supra Section I.A.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. In early September 2019, President Zelensky's government
implemented several anti-corruption reform measures.
Publicly available information shows that following the
seating of Ukraine's new parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Rada),
on August 29, 2019, the Zelensky government initiated
aggressive anti-corruption reforms. Almost immediately,
President Zelensky appointed a new prosecutor general and
opened Ukraine's Supreme Anti-Corruption Court.\383\ On
September 3, the Rada passed a bill that removed parliamentary
immunity.\384\ President Zelensky signed the bill on September
11.\385\ On September 18, the Rada approved a bill streamlining
corruption prosecutions and allowing the Supreme Anti-
Corruption Court to focus on high-level corruption cases.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\Stefan Wolff & Tatyana Malyarenko, In Ukraine, Volodymyr
Zelenskiy must tread carefully or may end up facing another Maidan
uprising, The Conversation, Nov. 11, 2019.
\384\Bill on lifting parliamentary immunity submitted to Zelensky
for signature, Unian, Sept. 4, 2019.
\385\Zelensky signs law on stripping parliamentary immunity,
Interfax-Ukraine, Sept. 11, 2019.
\386\Anti-corruption Court to receive cases from NABU, SAPO, 112
UA, Sept. 18, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Witnesses described how these legislative initiatives
instilled confidence that Ukraine was delivering on anti-
corruption reform. NSC staffer LTC Vindman testified that the
Rada's efforts were significant.\387\ In his deposition,
Ambassador Taylor lauded President Zelensky for this
demonstrable commitment to reform. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\387\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer
Williams, supra note 6.
President Zelensky was taking over Ukraine in a
hurry. He had appointed reformist ministers and
supported long-stalled anticorruption legislation. He
took quick executive action, including opening
Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court, which was
established under previous Presidential administration
but was never allowed to operate. . . . With his new
parliamentary majority, President Zelensky changed the
Ukrainian constitution to remove absolute immunity from
Rada deputies, which had been the source of raw
corruption for decades.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 22-23.
Likewise, NSC Senior Director Tim Morrison recalled that
President Zelensky's team had literally been working through
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the night on anti-corruption reforms. He testified:
Q: And after the Rada was seated, do you know if
President Zelensky made an effort to implement those
[anti-corruption] reforms?
A: I do.
Q: And what reforms generally can you speak to?
A: Well, he named a new prosecutor general. That was
something that we were specifically interested in. He
had his party introduce a spate of legislative reforms,
one of which was particularly significant was stripping
Rada members of their parliamentary immunity. That
passed fairly quickly, as I recall. Those kinds of
things.
Q: And within what time period were some of those
initial reforms passed?
A: Very, very quickly.
Q: Okay. So in the month of August?
A: When we were--when Ambassador Bolton was in
Ukraine and he met with President Zelensky, we observed
that everybody on the Ukrainian side of the table was
exhausted, because they had been up for days working
on, you know, reform legislation, working on the new
Cabinet, to get through as much as possible on the
first day.
Q: Remind me again of Ambassador Bolton's visit. Was
that August, at the end of August?
A: It was at the end of August. It was between the G7
and the Warsaw commemoration
Q: So by Labor Day, for example?
A: I seem to recall we were--we--we were there on the
opening day of the Rada. President--President Zelensky
met with Ambassador Bolton on the opening day of the
Rada, and they were in an all-night session. Yeah. So,
I mean, things were happening that day.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 128-29.
These actions by the Ukrainian government in early
September 2019 are significant in demonstrating President
Zelensky's commitment to fighting corruption. Although the
Department of Defense had certified Ukraine met its anti-
corruption benchmarks in Spring 2019, that certification
occurred before President Zelensky's inauguration.\390\ Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper testified during
her public hearing that the anti-corruption review examined the
efforts of the Poroshenko administration and that President
Zelensky had appointed a new Minister of Defense.\391\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\Deposition of Laura Cooper, in Wash., D.C., at 19, 99 (Oct.
23, 2019).
\391\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale,
supra note 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As President Trump told Ambassador Sondland on September 9,
he sought ``nothing'' from the Ukrainian government; he only
wanted President Zelensky to ``do what he ran on.''\392\
President Zelensky had run on an anti-corruption platform, and
these early aggressive actions provided confirmation that he
was the ``real deal,'' as U.S. officials advised President
Trump.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\392\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. The security assistance was ultimately disbursed to Ukraine in
September 2019 without any Ukrainian action to investigate
President Trump's political rival.
On September 11, President Trump met with Vice President
Pence, Senator Rob Portman, and Acting Chief of Staff Mick
Mulvaney to discuss U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\393\
As recounted by NSC Senior Director Tim Morrison, the group
discussed whether President Zelensky's progress on anti-
corruption reform--which Vice President Pence discussed during
his bilateral meeting with President Zelensky on September 1--
was significant enough to justify releasing the aid.\394\ He
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 242-43.
\394\Id. at 243.
I believe Senator Portman was relating, and I believe
the Vice President as well, related their view of the
importance of the assistance. The Vice President was
obviously armed with his conversation with President
Zelensky, and they were--they convinced the President
that the aid should be disbursed immediately.\395\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\Id.
Following this meeting, the President decided to lift the
pause on U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\396\ The release
was conveyed to the interagency the following morning.\397\ The
U.S. disbursed this assistance without Ukraine ever acting to
investigate President Trump's political rival.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\Id. at 211.
\397\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Democrats cannot show conclusively that the Trump
Administration lifted the pause on security assistance only as
a result of their impeachment inquiry. In a private
conversation with Senator Johnson on August 31, President Trump
signaled that the aid would be released, saying then: ``We're
reviewing it now, and you'll probably like my final
decision.''\398\ A number of other events occurred within the
same period. President Zelensky implemented serious anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine and OMB conducted a review of
foreign assistance globally and provided data on what other
countries contribute to Ukraine. Bipartisan senators contacted
the White House, telling the Administration that the Senate
would act legislatively to undo the pause on security
assistance.\399\ In fact, Senator Dick Durbin credited the
release of the security assistance to the Senate's potential
action.\400\ Senator Durbin said, ``It's beyond a coincidence
that they released it the night before our vote in the
committee.''\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\Letter from Sen. Johnson, supra note 138, at 5.
\399\See Byron York, Why did Trump release Ukraine aid? The answer
is simple, Wash. Exam., Nov. 24, 2019.
\400\Caitlin Emma et al., Trump administration backs off hold on
Ukraine military aid, Politico, Sept. 12, 2019.
\401\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
The evidence does not support the Democrats' allegation
that President Trump sought to withhold U.S. security
assistance to Ukraine to pressure President Zelensky to
investigate his political rival for the President's political
benefit. The Democrats' witnesses denied the two were linked.
The U.S. officials never informed the Ukrainian government that
the security assistance was delayed, and senior Ukrainian
officials did not raise concerns to U.S. officials until after
the delay was publicly reported. President Trump never raised
the security assistance during his phone call with President
Zelensky. President Zelensky never voiced concerns about
pressure or conditionality on security assistance in any
meetings he had with senior U.S. government officials. U.S.
security assistance ultimately flowed to Ukraine without the
Ukrainian government taking any action to investigate President
Trump's political rival.
D. The evidence does not establish that President Trump set up a shadow
foreign policy apparatus to pressure Ukraine to investigate the
President's political rival for the purpose of benefiting him
in the 2020 election.
Democrats allege that President Trump established an
unauthorized, so-called ``shadow'' foreign policy apparatus to
pressure Ukraine to investigate his political rival to benefit
the President in the 2020 election.\402\ Democrats also alleged
that President Trump's recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch was a
``politically motivated'' decision to appease ``allies of
President Trump.''\403\ Although the Constitution gives the
President broad authority to conduct the foreign policy of the
United States, the Democrats say that President Trump abused
his power by disregarding the traditional State Department
bureaucratic channels for his personal political benefit. These
allegations fall flat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\402\Press Release, H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, Engel Floor
Remarks on Resolution for Open Hearings on Trump's Abuse of Power (Oct.
31, 2019); Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff) (Nov. 6, 2019, 10:58 AM),
https://twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1192154367199260672.
\403\Press Release, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Engel & Hoyer
Statement on U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Masha Yovanovitch (May 7,
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is impossible to fairly assess the facts without
appreciating the circumstances in which they occurred. From the
very first days of the Trump Administration--indeed even before
it began--the unelected bureaucracy rejected President Trump
and his policies. The self-proclaimed ``resistance'' organized
protests and parody social media accounts, while high-level
bureaucrats received praise from colleagues for openly defying
the Administration's policies. Leaks of secret information
became almost daily occurrence, including details about the
President's sensitive conversations with foreign leaders.
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice and FBI spent 22 months
thoroughly investigating false allegations that the Trump
campaign had colluded with the Russian government in the 2016
election.
The evidence shows that following President Zelensky's
inauguration, the three senior U.S. officials who attended his
inauguration--Ambassador Kurt Volker, Ambassador Gordon
Sondland, and Secretary Rick Perry--assumed responsibility for
shepherding the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. Contrary to
assertions of an ``irregular'' foreign policy channel, all
three men were senior U.S. leaders who had important official
interests in Ukraine. The three men maintained regular
communication with the NSC and the State Department about their
work in Ukraine.
Following President Zelensky's inauguration, Ambassador
Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry sought to
convince President Trump of Ukraine's commitment to reform. In
that meeting, President Trump referenced Mayor Rudy Giuliani,
who had experience in Ukraine. When President Zelensky's
adviser Andrey Yermak asked Ambassador Volker to connect him
with Mayor Giuliani, Ambassador Volker did so because he
believed it would advance U.S.-Ukrainian interests. Mayor
Giuliani informed Ambassador Volker about his communications
with Yermak. Volker and Yermak both have said that Mayor
Giuliani did not speak on behalf of the President in these
discussions.
Some pockets of the State Department and NSC grumbled that
Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry had
become so active in U.S.-Ukraine policy. Others criticized
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch's recall or fretted about Mayor
Giuliani's involvement. Yet, despite these bureaucratic
misgivings, there is no evidence that the involvement of
Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, or
Mayor Giuliani was illegal or hurt U.S. strategic interests.
There is also no evidence that President Trump made this
arrangement or recalled Ambassador Yovanovitch for the purpose
of pressuring Ukraine to investigate the President's political
rival for his benefit in the 2020 presidential election.
1. The President has broad Constitutional authority to conduct the
foreign policy of the United States.
The Constitution vests the President of the United States
with considerable authority over foreign policy.\404\ The
President is the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces. The
President has the power to make treaties with foreign nations,
and he appoints and receives ``Ambassadors and other public
ministers.''\405\ The Supreme Court has explained that the
Constitution gives the President ``plenary and exclusive
authority'' over the conduct of foreign affairs.\406\ The
President is the ``sole organ of the federal government'' with
respect to foreign affairs.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\U.S. Const. Art. II.
\405\Id.
\406\United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
320 (1936).
\407\Id. Although the President makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; the President alone negotiates. Cf. H. Jefferson
Powell, The President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 546-47 (1999). Dealings
with foreign nations require ``caution and unity of design,'' which
depend on the President's authority to speak with ``one voice'' on
behalf of U.S. interests. Id. at 546.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. President Trump was likely skeptical of the established national
security apparatus as a result of continual leaks and
resistance from the federal bureaucracy.
In the wake of President Trump's electoral victory in 2016,
he faced almost immediate intransigence from unelected--and
often anonymous--federal employees. Since then, the
``Resistance'' has protested President Trump and leaked
sensitive national security information about the Trump
Administration's policies and objectives. In this context, one
can see how President Trump would be justifiably skeptical of
the national security apparatus.
Since the beginning of the Trump Administration, leaks of
sensitive national security information have occurred at
unprecedented rate. As the Washington Post noted, ``[e]very
presidential administration leaks. So far, the Trump White
House has gushed.''\408\ According to an analysis from the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in
May 2017, the Trump Administration faced about one national
security leak per day--flowing seven times faster in the Trump
Administration than during the Obama or Bush
Administrations.\409\ Unelected bureaucrats leaked details
about President Trump's private conversations with world
leaders and the investigation into Russian interference in the
2016 election.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\Paul Farhi, The Trump administration has sprung a leak. Many
of them, in fact, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2017.
\409\Maj. Staff on S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 115th
Cong., State Secrets: How An Avalanche Of Media Leaks Is Harming
National Security (2017) [hereinafter ``HSGAC report''].
\410\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Kimberley Strassel's book Resistance (At All Costs), she
described the Resistance as ``the legions of Americans who were
resolutely opposed to the election of Trump, and who remain
angrily determined to remove him from office.''\411\ This
resistance included anonymous federal employees who criticized
President Trump and his policies on parody U.S. government
social media accounts.\412\ This resistance included high-level
bureaucrats--including then-Acting Attorney General Sally
Yates--who openly defied implementing Administration
policies.\413\ The resistance included an anonymous employee
who published an op-ed in the New York Times in September 2018
titled, ``I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump
Administration,'' detailing how he or she and other unelected
bureaucrats were actively working at odds with the
President.\414\ The op-ed earned the anonymous employee a book
deal.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\Kimberley Strassel, Resistance (At All Costs): How Trump
Haters Are Breaking America (2019).
\412\Kimberley A. Strassel, Whistleblowers and the Real Deep State,
Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 2019.
\413\Id.
\414\I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration,
N.Y. Times, Sep. 5, 2018.
\415\Alexa Diaz, Anonymous Trump official who wrote resistance' op-
ed to publish tell-all book, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``Resistance'' extended to the U.S. national security
apparatus as well, including FBI agents investigating unproven
allegations of collusion between the Trump campaign and the
Russian government.\416\ An FBI lawyer working the
investigation, and later assigned to Special Counsel Robert
Mueller's office, texted another FBI employee, ``Vive le
resistance,'' in the month that President Trump was
elected.\417\ In the week after election night, FBI Agent Peter
Strzok and FBI lawyer Lisa Page--who were both involved in the
Russia collusion investigation--wrote to each other: ``OMG THIS
IS F*CKING TERRIFYING'' and ``I bought all the president's men.
Figure I needed to brush up on watergate [sic].''\418\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Report On The
Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential
Election, 1-2. Vol. 1 (2019) [hereinafter ``Mueller report''].
\417\Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice, A Review of Various Actions
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in
Advance of the 2016 Election, 396, 419 (2018).
\418\Id. at 397, 400.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBI surveilled Trump campaign associates using evidence
delivered by Christopher Steele--a confidential human source
funded by then-candidate Trump's political opponents and who
admitted he was ``desperate'' that Donald Trump lose the
election.\419\ During her deposition, Dr. Hill testified that
Steele's reporting was likely a bogus Russia misinformation
campaign against Steele.\420\ Yet, the FBI accepted Steele's
information and used it to obtain surveillance warrants on
Trump campaign associate Carter Page.\421\ Ultimately, Special
Counsel Mueller's report concluded that the Trump campaign did
not conspire or coordinate with Russian election interference
actions.\422\ In considering the President's mindset, this
context cannot be ignored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\419\F.B.I., Dep't of Just., 302 Interview with Bruce Ohr on Dec.
19, 2016 at 3.
\420\See Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 177-180 (``I think it
was a rabbit hole. . . . The way that the Russians operate is that they
will use whatever conduit they can to put out information that is both
real and credible but that also masks a great deal of disinformation .
. . .'').
\421\Transcribed Interview of Sally Moyer, in Wash., D.C., at 162
(Oct. 23, 2018).
\422\Mueller report, supra note 416.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. The President has the constitutional authority to remove Ambassador
Yovanovitch.
U.S. ambassadors are the President's representatives
abroad, serving at the pleasure of the President. Every
ambassador interviewed during this impeachment inquiry
recognized and appreciated this fact.\423\ Even Ambassador
Yovanovitch understood that the President could remove any
ambassador at any time for any reason, although she
unsurprisingly disagreed with the reason for her removal.\424\
The removal of Ambassador Yovanovitch, therefore, is not per se
evidence of wrongdoing for the President's political benefit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 19; Volker transcribed
interview, supra note 60, at 88-89; Transcribed interview of Ambassador
Michael McKinley, in Wash., D.C., at 37 (Oct. 16, 2019) [hereinafter
``McKinley transcribed interview'']; Yovanovitch deposition, supra note
115, at 23; Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 297; Hale deposition,
supra note 230, at 38.
\424\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 23. Evidence
suggests that Ambassador Yovanovitch took steps to gain the President's
trust. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent testified that
Ambassador Yovanovitch taped videos in which she proclaimed support for
the Trump Administration's foreign policies. Kent deposition, supra
note 65, at 118-19. Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that she sought
Ambassador Sondland's guidance on how to address negative news reports
critical of her work as Ambassador to Ukraine. She said that Ambassador
Sondland told her to ``go big or go home'' in publicly supporting the
President. Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 267-28, 306-07.
Ambassador Sondland, however, testified that he did not recall advising
Ambassador Yovanovitch to make a public statement. Sondland deposition,
supra note 51, at 58-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence suggests that President Trump likely had concerns
about Ambassador Yovanovitch's ability to represent him in
Ukraine,\425\ and that then-Ukrainian President Poroshenko had
authorized an effort to criticize Ambassador Yovanovitch.\426\
Ambassador Volker testified that he had no firsthand knowledge
of Ambassador Yovanovitch criticizing the President; however,
he said that ``President Trump would understandably be
concerned if that was true because you want to have trust and
confidence in your Ambassadors.''\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
\426\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 232.
\427\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite recognizing the President's prerogative to dismiss
ambassadors, some in the U.S. foreign policy apparatus voiced
concerns about Ambassador Yovanovitch's removal. Ambassador
McKinley testified that he resigned from the State Department
because he believed that it failed to protect its
diplomats.\428\ However, Ambassador McKinley did not resign
when he first learned that Ambassador Yovanovitch had been
called home, despite knowing that she had been recalled.\429\
He only resigned months later, after the whistleblower's
account and the President's comments to President Zelensky
about Ambassador Yovanovitch during the July 25 call transcript
became public.\430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\McKinley transcribed interview, supra note 423, at 20, 24-25.
\429\Id. at 33-34.
\430\Id. at 35-36. See also Karen DeYoung, Senior adviser to Pompeo
resigns, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that her removal from Kyiv
had little effect on her career with the State Department. Her
post was scheduled to end only a matter of weeks after her
recall.\431\ Although she had considered extending her tour, a
decision had not been officially made.\432\ Ambassador
Yovanovitch explained that she had been planning to retire
following her tour in Ukraine and ``[s]o I don't think from a
State Department point of view [the recall] has had any
effect.''\433\ The recall also did not affect her
compensation.\434\ Ambassador Yovanovitch explained that the
State Department was helpful in securing her a position with
Georgetown University.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\431\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 114-16, 140.
\432\Id. at 22, 114-16, 122.
\433\Id. at 139-40.
\434\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, supra note
4.
\435\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 139.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry were all
senior U.S. government officers with official interests in
Ukraine policy.
Contrary to allegations that President Trump orchestrated a
``shadow'' foreign policy channel to pressure Ukraine to
investigate his political rival, evidence shows that the U.S.
interactions with Ukraine were led by senior U.S. officials.
These officials, Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and
Secretary Perry, had attended President Zelensky's inauguration
in May 2019 and all had official interests in U.S. policy
toward Ukraine.
Ambassador Volker explained that ``we viewed ourselves as
having been empowered as a Presidential delegation to go there,
meet, make an assessment [of whether President Zelensky was a
legitimate anti-corruption reformer], and report'' to President
Trump.\436\ He said that they assumed responsibility to
``shepherd this [U.S.-Ukrainian] relationship together as best
we could.''\437\ The delegation assumed this responsibility at
a time when the U.S. government lacked an experienced chief of
mission in Kyiv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 206.
\437\Id. at 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Importantly, cutting against the idea of a ``shadow''
channel, each of these three men had an official role with
respect to U.S. policy toward Ukraine.\438\ Ambassador Volker
described his role as the Special Representative for Ukraine
Negotiations as ``supporting democracy and reform in Ukraine,
helping Ukraine better defend itself and deter Russian
aggression, and leading U.S. negotiating efforts to end the war
and restore Ukraine's territorial integrity.''\439\ As
Ambassador to the European Union, Ambassador Sondland said that
Ukraine issues were ``central'' to his responsibilities.\440\
In addition, the Department of Energy, led by Secretary Perry,
has significant equities in energy policies in Ukraine.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\See Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes,
supra note 210.
\439\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 13.
\440\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 20. During her
deposition, Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Sondland told her that
President Trump had ``given him broad authority on all things related
to Europe, that he was the President's point man on Europe.'' Hill
deposition, supra note 12, at 60. Dr. Hill later acknowledged it that
Ambassador Sondland could have been exaggerating, explaining that she
often saw Ambassador Sondland coming out of West Wing saying he was
seeing the President but she learned later that he was really seeing
other staff. Id. at 204.
\441\James Osborne, What Rick Perry was doing in Ukraine, Houston
Chronicle, Oct. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the absence of a seasoned chief of mission in Kyiv--
before Ambassador Taylor's arrival--these three individuals
assumed responsibility following President Zelensky's
inauguration for shepherding U.S. engagement with President
Zelensky's government. That each individual had an official
interest in U.S. policy toward Ukraine undercuts the notion
that they engaged in ``shadow'' diplomacy for illegitimate
purposes.
5. Referencing Ukrainian corruption, President Trump told Ambassador
Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry to talk to
Mayor Giuliani.
Evidence suggests that Mayor Giuliani's negative assessment
of President Zelensky may have reinforced President Trump's
existing skepticism about Ukraine and its history of
corruption. In May 2019, Mayor Giuliani said that President-
elect Zelensky was ``surrounded by enemies'' of President
Trump.\442\ When the U.S. delegation to President Zelensky's
inauguration later tried to assure President Trump that
President Zelensky was different, the President referenced
Mayor Giuliani as someone knowledgeable about Ukrainian
corruption and told the men to talk to Mayor Giuliani.\443\
Testimony differs, however, on whether the President's
reference to Mayor Giuliani was a direction or an aside. Either
way, because President Trump--constitutionally, the nation's
``sole organ of foreign affairs''\444\--raised Mayor Giuliani
as someone knowledgeable about Ukraine, this arrangement is not
evidence of an unsanctioned and nefarious ``shadow'' foreign
policy apparatus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\See Charles Creitz, Giuliani cancels Ukraine trip, says he'd
be walking into a group of people that are enemies of the US,' Fox
News, May 11, 2019.
\443\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 25. According to public
reports, Mayor Giuliani has over a decade of experience working in
Ukraine. See, e.g., Rosalind S. Helderman et al., Impeachment Inquiry
Puts New Focus on Giuliani's Work for Prominent Figures in Ukraine,
Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 2019.
\444\Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 23, the U.S. delegation to President Zelensky's
inauguration briefed President Trump about their impressions of
President Zelensky. Ambassador Sondland testified that the
President relayed concerns about Ukrainian corruption, saying
``Ukraine is a problem,'' ``tried to take me down,'' and ``talk
to Rudy.''\445\ During his transcribed interview, Ambassador
Volker elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\445\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 61-62, 75.
Q. And can you describe the discussion--
A. Yes.
Q. --that occurred?
A Yes. The President started the meeting and started
with kind of a negative assessment of the Ukraine. As
I've said earlier--
Q. Yep.
A. --it's a terrible place, all corrupt, terrible
people, just dumping on Ukraine.
Q. And they were out to get me in 2016.
A. And they were out to get--and they tried to take
me down.
Q. In 2016?
A. Yes. And each of us took turns from this
delegation giving our point of view, which was that
this is a new crowd, it's a new President, he is
committed to doing the right things. I believe I said,
he agrees with you. That's why he got elected. It is a
terrible place, and he campaigned on cleaning it up,
and that's why the Ukrainian people supported him.
So, you know, we strongly encouraged him to engage
with this new President because he's committed to
fighting all of those things that President Trump was
complaining about.
Q. And how did the President react?
A. He just didn't believe it. He was skeptical. And
he also said, that's not what I hear. I hear, you know,
he's got some terrible people around him. And he
referenced that he hears from Mr. Giuliani as part of
that.
Q. Can you explain a little bit more about what the
President said about Rudy Giuliani in that meeting?
A. He said that's not what I hear. I hear a whole
bunch of other things. And I don't know how he phrased
it with Rudy, but it was--I think he said, not as an
instruction but just as a comment, talk to Rudy, you
know. He knows all of these things, and they've got
some bad people around him. And that was the nature of
it. It was clear that he also had other sources. It
wasn't only Rudy Giuliani. I don't know who those might
be, but he--or at least he said, I hear from
people.\446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 304-05. Deputy
Assistant Secretary Kent testified that Dr. Hill relayed to him that
President Trump had conversations with Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister
of Hungary, and Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, which he said
may have also colored President Trump's view of Ukraine. Kent
deposition, supra note 65, at 253-54.
In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker reiterated that
he did not understand the President's comment, ``talk to
Rudy,'' to be a direction.\447\ He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
I didn't take it as an instruction. I want to be
clear about that. He said: That's not what I hear. You
know, when we were giving him our assessment about
President Zelensky and where Ukraine is headed: That's
not what I hear. I hear terrible things. He's got
terrible people around him. Talk to Rudy. And I
understood, in that context, him just saying that's
where he hears it from. I didn't take it as an
instruction.''\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\448\Id.
Ambassador Sondland, however, in both his closed-door
deposition and his public testimony, characterized the
President's comment as a ``direction.''\449\ In an interview
with the Wall Street Journal, Energy Secretary Rick Perry
stated that he called Mayor Giuliani following the May 23
meeting, and that Mayor Giuliani told him ``to be careful with
regards'' to President Zelensky.\450\ Secretary Perry said ``he
never heard the president, any of his appointees, Mr. Giuliani,
or the Ukrainian regime discuss the possibility of specifically
investigating former Vice President Joe Biden, a Democratic
presidential contender, and his son Hunter Biden.''\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note
56; Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 25-26.
\450\Timothy Puko & Rebecca Ballhaus, Rick Perry called Rudy
Giuliani at Trump's direction on Ukraine concerns, Wall St. J., Oct.
16, 2019.
\451\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. At the Ukrainian government's request, Ambassador Volker connected
them with Mayor Giuliani to change his impression about the
Zelensky regime.
Evidence shows that the Ukrainian government, and
specifically Zelensky adviser Andrey Yermak, initiated contact
with Mayor Giuliani--and not the other way around--to attempt
to refute Mayor Giuliani's views about President Zelensky.
Yermak later told Bloomberg that he had informed both
Republicans and Democrats in Congress in July 2019 that he
planned to engage with Mayor Giuliani and heard no
objections.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\Baker & Krasnolutska, supra note 280.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Ambassador Volker, in May 2019, he ``became
concerned that a negative narrative about Ukraine fueled by
assertions made by Ukraine's departing prosecutor general'' was
reaching President Trump via Mayor Giuliani.\453\ In July,
Ambassador Volker shared his concerns with Yermak, who asked
Ambassador Volker to connect him with Mayor Giuliani
directly.\454\ Ambassador Volker explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 18.
\454\Id.; see also id. at 137-38.
After sharing my concerns with the Ukrainian
leadership, an adviser to President Zelensky asked me
to connect him to the President's personal lawyer,
Mayor Rudy Giuliani. I did so. I did so solely because
I understood that the new Ukrainian leadership wanted
to convince those, like Mayor Giuliani, who believed
such a negative narrative about Ukraine, that times
have changed and that, under President Zelensky,
Ukraine is worthy of U.S. support. I also made clear to
the Ukrainians on a number of occasions that Mayor
Giuliani is a private citizen and the President's
personal lawyer and that he does not represent the
United States Government.\455\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\Id. at 18.
Ambassador Volker was clear during his transcribed
interview that his action connecting Yermak with Mayor Giuliani
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
was in the best interests of the United States. He testified:
Q. And so any of the facts here, you connecting Mr.
Giuliani with Mr. Yermak and to the extent you were
facilitating Mr. Giuliani's communication with anybody
in the Ukraine, you were operating under the best
interests of the United States?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And to the extent Mr. Giuliani is tight with the
President, has a good relationship with him, has the
ability to influence him, is it fair to say that, at
times, it was in the U.S.'s interest to have Mr.
Giuliani connecting with these Ukrainian officials?
A. Yes. I would say it this way: It was I think in
the U.S. interest for the information that was reaching
the President to be accurate and fresh and coming from
the right people. And if some of what Mr. Giuliani
believed or heard from, for instance, the former
[Ukrainian] Prosecutor General Lutsenko was self-
serving, inaccurate, wrong, et cetera, I think
correcting that perception that he has is important,
because to the extent that the President does hear from
him, as he would, you don't want this dissonant
information reaching the President.\456\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\Id. at 69-70.
In an interview with Bloomberg, Yermak explained that he
sought to engage with Mayor Giuliani to ``dispel the notion
that the new Ukraine government was corrupt.''\457\ Yermak said
the Zelensky regime was ``surprised'' that Mayor Giuliani
believed them to be ``enemies of the U.S.'' and they sought to
ask Mayor Giuliani directly why he believed that.\458\ Yermak
recounted how, before his engaged with Mayor Giuliani, he
sought bipartisan feedback from Congress about this
approach.\459\ He said that he spoke with ``the top national
security advisers to the minority and majority leaders in both
the U.S. House and Senate'' and told them that ``he planned to
talk to [Mayor] Giuliani to explain the nation's reform agenda
and to urge him not to communicate with Ukraine through the
media.''\460\ Yermak recalled, ``Everyone said: `good
idea.'''\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\457\Baker & Krasnolutska, supra note 280.
\458\Id.
\459\Id.
\460\Id.
\461\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. The Ukrainian government understood that Mayor Giuliani was not
speaking on behalf of President Trump.
Ambassador Volker was the chief interlocutor with the
Ukrainian government. He described himself as someone who had
the Ukrainian government's trust and who offered them counsel
on how to address the negative narrative about Ukrainian
corruption.\462\ Ambassador Volker testified that the Ukrainian
government did not view Mayor Giuliani as President Trump's
``agent'' on whose behalf he spoke.\463\ Instead, the
Ukrainians saw Mayor Giuliani as a one-way method for conveying
information to President Trump about President Zelensky's
commitment to reform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 168-69.
\463\Id. at 116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under examination by House Intelligence Committee Chairman
Adam Schiff in his closed-door deposition, Ambassador Volker
was resolute that the Ukrainian government saw Mayor Giuliani
as someone who ``had the President's ear,'' not someone who
spoke for the President. He explained:
Q. You understood that the Ukrainians recognized that
Rudy Giuliani represented the President, that he was an
agent of the President, that he was a direct channel to
the President. Ukrainian officials you were dealing
with would have understood that, would they not?
A. I would not say that they thought of him as an
agent, but that he was a way of communicating, that you
could get something to Giuliani and he would be someone
who would be talking to the President anyway, so it
would flow information that way.
Q. So this was someone who had the President's ear?
A. Yes. That's fair.\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\464\Id. (emphasis added).
In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker reiterated that
Mayor Giuliani was not speaking on the President's behalf. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained:
I made clear to the Ukrainians that Mayor Giuliani
was a private citizen, the President's personal lawyer,
and not representing the U.S. Government. Likewise, in
my conversations with Mayor Giuliani, I never
considered him to be speaking on the President's
behalf, or giving instructions. Rather, the information
flow was the other way, from Ukraine to Mayor Giuliani,
in the hopes that this would clear up the information
reaching President Trump.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\465\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
During her closed-door deposition, Dr. Hill confirmed this
assessment, explaining that she could not say that Mayor
Giuliani was acting on President Trump's behalf.\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\466\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 424-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andrey Yermak, in an August 2019 New York Times article,
said it was also not clear to him whether Mayor Giuliani was
speaking on behalf of President Trump.\467\ According to the
Times, Mayor Giuliani ``explicitly stated that he was not''
speaking on behalf of the President.\468\ President Trump
confirmed this fact in a November 2019 interview, explaining
that he did not direct Mayor Giuliani's Ukraine
activities.\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\Kramer & Vogel, supra note 176.
\468\Id.
\469\Daniel Chaitin, `I didn't direct him': Trump denies sending
Giuliani to Ukraine, Wash. Exam., Nov. 26, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry kept the
National Security Council and the State Department informed
about their actions.
As Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary
Perry engaged with Ukrainian government officials, they
maintained communications with the State Department and NSC.
This coordination undercuts any notion that President Trump
orchestrated a ``shadow'' foreign policy apparatus to work
outside of the State Department or NSC.
Ambassador Volker testified that ``while executing my
duties, I kept my colleagues at the State Department and
National Security Council informed and also briefed Congress
about my actions.''\470\ Ambassador Volker and Ambassador
Sondland also communicated regularly with Ambassador Bill
Taylor once he became the charge d'affaires, a.i., in
Kyiv.\471\ These briefings went as high as the Counselor to the
Secretary of State, Ulrich Brechbuhl.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 19.
\471\See generally text messages exchanged between Kurt Volker and
Gordon Sondland [KV00000036-39].
\472\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his public testimony, Ambassador Sondland explained that
it was ``no secret'' what he, Ambassador Volker, and Secretary
Perry were doing. As he stated, ``[w]e kept the NSC apprised of
our efforts, including specifically our efforts to secure a
public statement from the Ukrainians that would satisfy
President Trump's concerns.''\473\ Ambassador Sondland
testified that ``everyone was in the loop,'' although he
conceded that he ``presumed'' a connection between
investigations and security assistance without speaking to
President Trump, Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney, or Mayor
Giuliani.\474\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\473\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note
56.
\474\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Although some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment bristled, the
roles of Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary
Perry and their interactions with Mayor Giuliani did not
violate the law or harm national security.
Evidence suggests that some in the U.S. foreign policy
establishment disliked the involvement of Ambassador Volker,
Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry in the U.S.-Ukrainian
relationship. Some also expressed discomfort with Mayor
Giuliani's interactions with Ukrainian officials. However, the
use of private citizens, such as Mayor Giuliani, to assist
effectuating U.S. foreign policy goals on specific issues is
not per se inappropriate and the Democrats' witnesses testified
that the use of private citizens can sometimes beneficial.
There is no evidence that the arrangement here violated any
laws or harmed national security.
Some of the Democrats' witnesses criticized the non-
traditional diplomacy. Ambassador Taylor testified about his
concern for what he characterized as ``two channels'' of U.S.
policy-making in Ukraine: a regular, State Department channel
and an ``irregular, informal'' channel featuring Ambassador
Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, and Mayor
Giuliani.\475\ Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent testified that
he was concerned that discussions were occurring outside the
``formal policy process.''\476\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\475\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 23-24.
\476\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 266-67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Hill, too, disapproved of a non-traditional channel of
communication, testifying that she disagreed with Ambassador
Volker's decision to engage with Mayor Giuliani.\477\ Dr. Hill
characterized Ambassador Sondland's conduct as a ``domestic
political errand.''\478\ However, by the time that Dr. Hill
left the NSC on July 19, Ambassador Volker had only met with
Mayor Giuliani once and Ambassador Sondland had never
communicated with him.\479\ Mayor Giuliani did not meet with
the Ukrainian government until early August.\480\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 113-14. Ambassador Sondland
recounted that when he met with Dr. Hill prior to her departure from
the White House in mid-July, she was ``pretty upset about her role'' in
the Administration and so mad that Ambassador Sondland said he had
``never seen anyone so upset.'' Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at
266-67, 307. In her public testimony, Dr. Hill explained that she was
angry with Ambassador Sondland for not coordinating with her
sufficiently. Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes,
supra note 210.
\478\Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes,
supra note 210.
\479\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon
Sondland, supra note 56.
\480\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite this criticism, Ambassador Volker said that
Ambassador Taylor never raised concerns to him about an
``irregular'' foreign policy channel.\481\ The Democrats'
witnesses also explained that unorthodox foreign policy
channels are not unusual and can actually be helpful to advance
U.S. interests. Ambassador Taylor testified that non-
traditional channels of diplomacy ``can be helpful.''\482\
Ambassador Volker testified that he always operated with the
best interests of the U.S. in mind and to advance ``U.S.
foreign policy goals with respect to Ukraine.''\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\481\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
\482\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 177.
\483\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 15, 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The impeachment inquiry has uncovered no clear evidence
that President Trump directed Ambassador Volker, Ambassador
Sondland, and Secretary Perry to work with Mayor Giuliani for
the purpose of pressuring Ukraine to investigate his political
rival. In fact, the evidence suggests that the White House
actively worked to stop potential impropriety. When Mayor
Giuliani attempted to obtain a visa for former Ukrainian
Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin to travel to the U.S. in
January 2019, the White House shut down the effort.\484\ The
State Department had denied Shokin's visa and Mayor Giuliani
apparently appealed to the White House.\485\ According to
Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent, in settling the matter, White
House senior advisor Rob Blair said: ``I heard what I need to
know to protect the interest of the President.''\486\ Shokin
did not receive a visa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 48-49.
\485\Id. at 48-49.
\486\Id. at 143.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
The evidence does not support the Democrats' allegation
that President Trump set up a shadow foreign policy apparatus
to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President's political
rival for his political benefit in the 2020 election. The
Constitution vests the President with broad authority over U.S.
foreign relations. The U.S. officials accused of conducting
``shadow'' foreign policy--Ambassador Volker, Ambassador
Sondland, and Secretary Perry--were all senior leaders with
official interests in Ukraine who informed the State Department
and NSC of their actions. Mayor Giuliani, whom President Trump
referenced in the May 23 meeting with these three U.S.
officials, also had experience in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian government asked Ambassador Volker to connect
them with Mayor Giuliani to help change Mayor Giuliani's
skeptical view of President Zelensky and ``clear up''
information flowing to the President. The Ukrainian government
saw Mayor Giuliani as someone who had the President's ear but
they did not see him as speaking on behalf of the President.
While some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment disagreed
with these actions, there is no indication it harmed national
security or violated any laws. Notably, Ambassador Volker said
he operated at all times with the U.S. national interest in
mind. Ultimately, Ukraine took no actions to investigate
President Trump's political rival.
E. President Trump is not wrong to raise questions about Hunter Biden's
role with Burisma or Ukrainian government officials' efforts to
influence the 2016 campaign.
Democrats allege that President Trump and Mayor Giuliani
are spreading ``conspiracy theories'' by raising questions
about Hunter Biden's role on the board of Burisma and certain
Ukrainian government officials' efforts to influence the 2016
election.\487\ The evidence available, however, shows that
there are legitimate, unanswered questions about both issues.
As Ukraine implements anti-corruption reforms, it is
appropriate for the country to examine these allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\487\See, e.g., Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland,
supra note 56; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and
Mr. George Kent, supra note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Democrats' witnesses described how Burisma has long
been a subject of controversy in Ukraine. The company's
founder, Mykola Zlochevsky, was Ukraine's Minister of Ecology
and Natural Resources from 2010 to 2012. In that role, he
allegedly granted Burisma licenses for certain mineral
deposits. Hunter Biden and other well-connected Democrats
joined Burisma's board at a time when the company faced
criticism. Hunter Biden's role on Burisma was concerning enough
to the Obama State Department that it raised the issue with
Vice President Biden's office and even prepared Ambassador
Yovanovitch for a potential question on the topic at her
confirmation hearing in 2016.
The extent of Ukraine's involvement in the 2016 election
draws a much more visceral denial from Democrats, despite harsh
rhetoric from prominent Democrats condemning foreign
interference in U.S. election. It is undisputed that the then-
Ukraine Ambassador to the U.S. authored an op-ed criticizing
candidate Trump in U.S. media at the height of the presidential
campaign. It is undisputed that senior Ukrainian officials made
negative and critical comments about candidate Trump. In
addition, a well-researched January 2017 article in Politico
chronicles attempts by some Ukrainian government officials to
harm candidate Trump. The article quotes a former DNC
contractor and Ukrainian embassy staffer to show how the
Ukrainian embassy worked with Democrat operatives and the media
to hurt President Trump's candidacy.
1. It is appropriate for Ukraine to investigate allegations of
corruption in its country.
As Ukraine adopts anti-corruption reforms, the United
States has encouraged the country's leaders to investigate and
prosecute corruption. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs George Kent described Ukraine's
corruption problem as ``serious'' and said corruption has long
been ``part of the high-level dialogue'' between the United
States and Ukraine.\488\ Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, the
former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, testified that in Ukraine
``corruption is not just prevalent, but frankly is the
system.''\489\ Although Ukraine has established various anti-
corruption prosecutors, courts, and investigative agencies to
address the pervasive problem, corruption remains a
problem.\490\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\488\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 105, 151.
\489\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 18.
\490\Id. at 79-80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Democrats' witnesses testified that it is appropriate
for Ukraine to investigate allegations of corruption, including
allegations about Burisma and 2016 election influence. Dr.
Fiona Hill, Senior Director for Europe at the NSC, explained
that it is ``not actually . . . completely ridiculous'' for
President Zelensky's administration to investigate allegations
of corruption arising from prior Ukrainian
administrations.\491\ Ambassador Volker testified that he
``always thought [it] was fine'' for Ukraine to investigate
allegations about 2016 election influence.\492\ Ambassador
Yovanovitch testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\491\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 394.
\492\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 146.
Q. Ambassador Volker mentioned the fact that to the
extent there are corrupt Ukrainians and the United
States is advocating for the Ukraine to investigate
themselves, that certainly would be an appropriate
initiative for U.S. officials to advocate for. Is that
right?
A. If that's what took place.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 294.
With President Trump's deep-seated and genuine concern
about corruption in Ukraine, it is not unreasonable that he
would raise two examples of concern in a conversation with
President Zelensky. Democrats are fundamentally wrong to argue
that President Trump urged President Zelensky to
``manufacture'' or ``dig up'' ``dirt'' by raising these issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Ambassador Volker testified:
Q. Would you say that President Trump in the phone
call--and you've read the transcript and you're
familiar with all the parties--was asking President
Zelensky to manufacture dirt on the Bidens?
A. No. And I've seen that phrase thrown around a lot.
And I think there's a difference between the
manufacture or dig up dirt versus finding out did
anything happen in the 2016 campaign or did anything
happen with Burisma. I think--or even if he's asking
them to investigate the Bidens, it is to find out what
facts there may be rather than to manufacture
something.
Q. It is not an accurate statement of what the
President was asking Ukraine to sum it up as saying
that President Trump was asking Ukraine to manufacture
dirt?
A. Yeah, I agree with that.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 212-213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. There are legitimate concerns surrounding Hunter Biden's position on
the board of Ukrainian energy company Burisma during his
father's term as Vice President of the United States.
Burisma Holdings had a reputation in Ukraine as a corrupt
company.\495\ The company was founded by Mykola Zlochevsky, who
served as Ukraine's Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources
from 2010 to 2012.\496\ During Zlochevsky's tenure in the
Ukrainian government, Burisma received oil exploration licenses
without public auctions.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\495\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 83.
\496\Paul Sonne & Laura Mills, Ukrainians see conflict in Biden's
anticorruption message, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 2015.
\497\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the New York Times, Hunter Biden and two other
well-connected Democrats--Christopher Heinz, then-Secretary of
State John Kerry's stepson, and Devon Archer--``were part of a
broad effort by Burisma to bring in well-connected Democrats
during a period when the company was facing investigations
backed not just by domestic Ukrainian forces but by officials
in the Obama administration.''\498\ Hunter Biden joined
Burisma's board when his father, Vice President Joe Biden,
acted as the Obama Administration's point person on
Ukraine.\499\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\498\Kenneth P. Vogel & Iuliia Mendel, Biden faces conflicts of
interest questions that are being promoted by Trump and allies, N.Y.
Times, May 1, 2019.
\499\Adam Taylor, Hunter Biden's new job at a Ukrainian gas company
is a problem for U.S. soft power, Wash. Post, May 14, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The appearance of a conflict of interest raised concerns
during the Obama Administration. In May 2014, the Washington
Post reported ``[t]he appointment of the vice president's son
to a Ukrainian oil board looks nepotistic at best, nefarious at
worst. No matter how qualified Biden is, it ties into the idea
that U.S. foreign policy is self-interested, and that's a
narrative Vladimir Putin has pushed during Ukraine's
crisis.''\500\ The Post likened Hunter Biden's position with
Burisma to ``children of Russian politicians'' who take
``executive positions in companies at the top of the Forbes 500
list, and China's `princelings' [who] have a similar
habit.''\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\500\Id.
\501\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent testified
that while he served as acting Deputy Chief of Mission in Kyiv
in early 2015, he raised concerns directly to Vice President
Biden's office about Hunter Biden's service on Burisma's
board.\502\ Kent said that the ``message'' he received back was
that because Vice President Biden's elder son, Beau, was dying
of brain cancer at the time, there was no ``bandwidth'' to deal
with any other family issues.\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 226-27.
\503\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported that
Ukrainian anti-corruption activists complained that Vice
President Biden's anti-corruption message ``is being undermined
as his son receives money'' from Zlochevsky.\504\ According to
the Journal, ``some anticorruption campaigners here [in Kyiv]
worry the link with Mr. Biden may protect Mr. Zlochevsky from
being prosecuted in Ukraine.''\505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\504\Sonne & Mills, supra, note 496.
\505\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that the Obama State
Department actually prepared her to address Hunter Biden's role
on Burisma if she received a question about it during her
Senate confirmation hearing to be ambassador to Ukraine in June
2016. She explained:
Q. And you may have mentioned this when we were
speaking before lunch, but when did the issues related
to Burisma first get to your attention? Was that as
soon as you arrived in country?
A. Not really. I first became aware of it when I was
being prepared for my Senate confirmation hearing. So
I'm sure you're familiar with the concept of questions
and answer and various other things. And so there was
one there about Burisma, and so, you know, that's when
I first heard that word.
Q. Were there any other companies that were mentioned
in connection with Burisma?
A. I don't recall.
Q. And was it in the general sense of corruption,
there was a company bereft with corruption?
A. The way the question was phrased in this model Q&A
was, what can you tell us about Hunter Biden's, you
know, being named to the board of Burisma?
* * *
Q. Did anyone at the State Department--when you were
coming on board as the new ambassador, did anyone at
the State Department brief you about this tricky issue,
that Hunter Biden was on the board of this company and
the company suffered from allegations of corruption,
and provide you guidance?
A. Well, there was that Q&A that I mentioned.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 150-53.
According to testimony, the Obama State Department actually
took steps to prevent the U.S. government from associating with
Burisma. In his closed-door deposition, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Kent recounted a story about how he stopped a
taxpayer-funded partnership with Burisma in mid-2016.\507\ He
said he learned that Burisma sought to cosponsor a U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) program to encourage
Ukrainian school children to develop ideas for clean
energy.\508\ Kent said he advised USAID not to work with
Burisma due to its reputation for corruption.\509\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\507\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 88, 102-03.
\508\Id. at 103
\509\Id. at 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. law enforcement in the past has examined employment
arrangements in which a company hires a seemingly unqualified
individual to influence government action. In 2016, the Obama
Justice Department fined a Hong Kong subsidiary of a
multinational bank for a scheme similar to Burisma's use of
Hunter Biden and other well-connected Democrats.\510\ There,
the company hired otherwise unqualified candidates to
``influence'' officials toward favorable business
outcomes.\511\ At the time, then-Assistant Attorney General
Leslie Caldwell explained that ``[a]warding prestigious
employment opportunities to unqualified individuals in order to
influence government officials is corruption, plain and
simple.''\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\510\Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, JPMorgan's Investment
Bank in Hong Kong Agrees to Pay $72 Million Penalty for Corrupt Hiring
Scheme in China (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
jpmorgan-s-investment-bank-hong-kong-agrees-pay-72-million-penalty-
corrupt-hiring-scheme.
\511\Id.
\512\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During their public testimony, Democrat witnesses testified
that Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board of directors
created the potential for the appearance of a conflict of
interest. LTC Vindman testified that Hunter Biden did not
appear qualified to serve on Burisma's board.\513\ Deputy
Assistant Secretary Kent explained that the issues surrounding
Burisma were worthy of investigation by Ukrainian
authorities.\514\ Kent testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer
Williams, supra note 6.
\514\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr.
George Kent, supra note 2.
Q. But given Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board
of directors, at some point, you testified in your
deposition that you expressed some concern to the Vice
President's office. Is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And what did they do about that concern that you
expressed?
A. I have no idea. I reported my concern to the
Office of the Vice President.
Q. Okay. That was the end of it? Nobody--
A. Sir, you would have to ask people who worked in
the Office of the Vice President during 2015.
Q. But after you expressed a concern of a perceived
conflict of interest, at the least, the Vice
President's engagement in the Ukraine didn't decrease,
did it?
A. Correct, because the Vice President was promoting
U.S. policy objectives in Ukraine.
Q. And Hunter Biden's role on the board of Burisma
didn't cease, did it?
A. To the best of my knowledge, it didn't. And my
concern was that there was the possibility of a
perception of a conflict of interest.\515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\515\Id.
Similarly, in her public testimony, Ambassador Yovanovitch
agreed that concerns about Hunter Biden's presence on Burisma's
board were legitimate. In an exchange with Rep. Ratcliffe, she
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q. You understood from Deputy Assistant Secretary
George Kent's testimony, as it's been related to you
that he testified a few days ago, do you understand
that that arrangement, Hunter Biden's role on the
Burisma board, caused him enough concern that, as he
testified in his statement, that ``in February of 2015,
I raised my concern that Hunter Biden's status as a
board member could create the perception of a conflict
of interest.'' Then he went on to talk about the Vice
President's responsibilities over the Ukraine--or over
Ukraine--Ukrainian policy as one of those factors. Do
you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever--do you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. That it was a legitimate concern to raise?
A. I think that it could raise the appearance of a
conflict of interest.
* * *
Q. But the legitimate concern about Hunter Biden's
role was legitimate, correct?
A. I think it creates a concern that there could be
an appearance of conflict of interest.\516\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\516\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, supra note
4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During her public testimony, Dr. Hill testified:
Q. Dr. Hill, you told us during your deposition that,
indeed, that there are perceived conflict of interest
troubles when the child of a government official is
involved with something that government official has an
official policy role in, correct?
A. I think any family member of any member of the
U.S. Government, Congress or the Senate, is open to all
kinds of questions about optics and of perhaps undue
outside influence, if they take part in any kind of
activity that could be misconstrued as being related to
their parent or the family member's work. So as a
matter of course, yes, I do think that's the case.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\517\Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes,
supra note 210.
Despite this evidence, House Intelligence Committee
Chairman Adam Schiff has prevented Republican Members from
fully assessing the role of Hunter Biden on Burisma's board of
directors. Chairman Schiff refused to invite Hunter Biden and
Devon Archer to testify during public hearings.\518\ Chairman
Schiff declined to concur with a Republican subpoena for Hunter
Biden to testify in a closed-door deposition.\519\ Chairman
Schiff declined to concur with a Republican subpoena for
documents relating to Hunter Biden's role on Burisma.\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\518\See, e.g., Allan Smith, Democrats push back on GOP effort to
have whistleblower, Hunter Biden testify, NBC News, Nov. 10, 2019.
\519\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale,
supra note 246.
\520\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to Burisma, there are questions about why the
Ukrainian government fired then-Prosecutor General Shokin--
according to Vice President Biden, at his insistence\521\--when
it did not fire his successor, Prosecutor General Yuriy
Lutsenko. Although Shokin and Lutsenko were both seen by State
Department officials as corrupt and ineffective prosecutors,
there was no effort to remove Lutsenko to the same degree or in
the same way as there was with Shokin.\522\ Ambassador
Yovanovitch testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\521\Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs Issue Launch
with Former Vice President Joe Biden (Jan. 23, 2018).
\522\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 90-98, 144-49.
Q. And was he, in your experience--because you're
very knowledgeable about the region, so when I ask you
in your opinion, you have a very informed opinion--was
Lutsenko better or worse than Shokin?
A. I mean, honestly, I don't know. I mean, I think
they're cut from the same cloth.
* * *
Q. There was never as much of a clamor to remove
Lutsenko as there was Shokin. Is that fair to say?
A. Yeah, I think that's fair.
Q. And what do you account for that?
A. I would say that there was, I think, still a hope
that one could work with Mr. Lutsenko. There was also
that prospect of Presidential elections coming up, and
as seemed likely by, you know, December, January,
February, whatever the time was, that there would be a
change of government. And I think we certainly hoped
that Mr. Lutsenko would be replaced in the natural
order of things, which is, in fact, what happened. We
also had more leverage before. I mean, this was not
easy. President Poroshenko and Mr. Shokin go way back.
In fact, I think that they are godfathers to each
other's children. So this was, you know, this was a big
deal. But we had assistance, as did the IMF, that we
could condition.\523\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\523\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 102-03.
Evidence suggests that Lutsenko's misconduct was not
trivial. Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent explained that the
U.S. government became disillusioned with Lutsenko in 2017 when
he exposed an undercover investigator working to catch
Ukrainian government officials selling fraudulent biometric
passports.\524\ Kent said that Lutsenko's actions could have
resulted in terrorists obtaining fraudulent biometric
passports.\525\ Whereas Shokin only served for little over a
year, Lutsenko served for years until President Zelensky
removed him.\526\ Although both prosecutors were regarded as
ineffective and corrupt, the U.S. government only took an
official position with respect to Shokin's removal and never as
to Lutsenko's.\527\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\524\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 145-47.
\525\Id. at 147-48.
\526\Id. at 95-103.
\527\Id. at 95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. There are legitimate questions about the extent to which Ukrainian
government officials worked to oppose President Trump's
candidacy in the 2016 election.
Democrats reflexively oppose any discussion about whether
senior Ukrainian government officials worked to oppose
President Trump's candidacy and support former Secretary
Clinton during the 2016 election. Calling these allegations
``debunked'' and ``conspiracy theories,'' Democrats ignore
irrefutable evidence that is inconvenient for their political
narrative. The facts, however, show outstanding questions about
Ukrainian influence in the 2016 presidential election--
questions that the Democrats' witnesses said would be
appropriate for Ukraine to examine.
Prominent Democrats expressed concern about foreign
interference in U.S. elections when they believed that the
Russian government colluded with the Trump campaign in 2016.
For example, in a 2017 hearing about Russian election
interference, then-Ranking Member Schiff said that the ``stakes
are nothing less than the future of liberal democracy.''\528\
But where evidence suggests that Ukraine also sought to
influence the election to the benefit of the Clinton campaign,
now-Chairman Schiff and fellow Democrats have held their
outrage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\528\Open hearing on Russian Active Measures Campaign: Hearing
before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Democrats have posited a false choice: that influence in
the 2016 election is binary--it could have been conducted by
Russia or by Ukraine, but not both. This is nonsense. Under
then-Chairman Devin Nunes, Republicans on the House
Intelligence Committee issued a report in March 2018 detailing
Russia's active measures campaign against the United
States.\529\ But Russian interference in U.S. elections does
not preclude Ukrainian officials from also attempting to
influence the election. As Ambassador Volker testified during
his public hearing, it is possible for more than one country to
influence U.S. elections.\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\529\H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active
Measures (Mar. 2018).
\530\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indisputable evidence shows that senior Ukrainian
government officials sought to influence the 2016 election in
favor of Secretary Clinton and against then-candidate Trump. In
August 2016, then-Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States,
Valeriy Chaly, wrote an op-ed in The Hill criticizing Trump's
policies toward Ukraine.\531\ The same month, the Financial
Times reported that Trump's candidacy led ``Kyiv's wider
political leadership to do something they would never have
attempted before: intervene, however indirectly, in a US
election.''\532\ Ukrainian parliamentarian Serhiy Leshchenko
explained that Ukraine was ``on Hillary Clinton's side.\533\
Other senior Ukrainian officials called candidate Trump a
``clown,'' a ``dangerous misfit,'' and ``dangerous,'' and
alleged that candidate Trump ``challenged the very values of
the free world.''\534\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\531\See Chaly, supra note 27.
\532\Olearchyk, supra note 123.
\533\Id.
\534\Id.; Vogel & Stern, supra note 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other publicly available information reinforces the
conclusion that senior Ukrainian government officials worked in
2016 to support Secretary Clinton. A January 2017 Politico
article by current-New York Times reporter Ken Vogel detailed
the Ukrainian effort to ``sabotage'' the Trump campaign.\535\
Although Democrats reflexively dismiss the information
presented in this article, neither Politico nor Vogel have
retracted the story.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\535\Vogel & Stern, supra note 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Vogel's reporting, the Ukrainian government
worked with a Democrat operative and the media in 2016 to boost
Secretary Clinton's candidacy and hurt President Trump's. Vogel
wrote:
Ukrainian government officials tried to help Hillary
Clinton and undermine Trump by publicly questioning his
fitness for office. They also disseminated documents
implicating a top Trump aide in corruption and
suggested they were investigating the matter, only to
back away after the election. And they helped Clinton's
allies research damaging information on Trump and his
advisers, a Politico investigation found.\536\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\536\Id.
Vogel reported how Alexandra Chalupa, a Ukrainian-American
contractor paid by the DNC and working with the DNC and the
Clinton campaign, ``traded information and leads'' about Paul
Manafort, Trump's campaign manager, with staff at the Ukrainian
embassy.\537\ Chalupa also told Vogel that the Ukrainian
embassy ``worked directly with reporters researching Trump,
Manafort, and Russia to point them in the right
directions.''\538\ With the DNC's encouragement, Chalupa asked
Ukrainian embassy staff ``to try to arrange an interview in
which [Ukrainian President] Poroshenko might discuss Manafort's
ties to [Russia-aligned former Ukrainian President Viktor]
Yanukovych.''\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\537\Id. In April 2019, then-Ambassador Chaly issued a statement to
The Hill denying that the Ukrainian embassy sought to influence the
election. See Official April 25, 2019 statement of the Ukrainian
embassy in Washington to The Hill concerning the activities of
Democratic National Committee Alexandra Chalupa during the 2016 U.S.
election, https://www.scribd.com/document/432699412/Ukraine-Chaly-
Statement-on-Chalupa-042519.
\538\Vogel & Stern, supra note 127.
\539\Id. Interestingly, in August 2019, when Chairman Schiff
tweeted an allegation that U.S. security assistance to Ukraine was tied
up with Ukrainian investigations, Alexandra Chalupa replied that she
had ``a lot of information on this topic.'' See Adam Schiff
(@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter (Aug. 28, 2019, 5:17 p.m.), https://
twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1166867471862829056. It is unknown
whether Chalupa ever provided information to Chairman Schiff or his
staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vogel also spoke on the record to Andrii Telizhenko, a
political officer in the Ukrainian Embassy under Ambassador
Chaly, who corroborated Chalupa's account.\540\ Telizhenko said
that he was instructed by Ambassador Chaly's top aide, Oksana
Shulyar, to ``help Chalupa research connections between Trump,
Manafort, and Russia'' with the goal of generating a hearing in
Congress.\541\ Telizhenko also told Vogel that he was
instructed not to speak to the Trump campaign:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\540\Vogel & Stern, supra note 127.
\541\Id.
We had an order not to talk to the Trump team,
because he was critical of Ukraine and the government
and his critical position on Crimea and the conflict. I
was yelled at when I proposed to talk to Trump. The
ambassador said not to get involved--Hillary is going
to win.\542\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\542\Id.
Vogel also reported on the actions of Ukrainian
parliamentarian Leshchenko, who spoke out against Manafort, in
part, to show that candidate Trump was a ``pro-Russia
candidate.''\543\ A separate congressional investigation in
2018 learned that Leshchenko was a source for Fusion GPS, the
opposition research firm hired by the DNC's law firm, Perkins
Coie, to gather information about candidate Trump.\544\ Fusion
GPS received information about Manafort that may have
originated from Leshchenko.\545\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\543\Id.; Olearchyk, supra note 123.
\544\Transcribed Interview of Nellie Ohr, in Wash., D.C., at 113-15
(Oct. 19, 2018).
\545\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Democrats' witnesses in the impeachment inquiry
testified that the allegations of Ukrainian influence in the
2016 election were appropriate to examine.\546\ Asked about the
Politico reporting, Ambassador Taylor said that, if true, it is
``disappointing'' that some Ukrainian officials worked against
President Trump. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\546\See, e.g., Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at
146.
Q. So isn't it possible that Trump administration
officials might have a good-founded belief, whether
true or untrue, that there were forces in the Ukraine
that were operating against them?
A. [B]ased on this [January 2017] Politico article,
which, again, surprises me, disappoints me because I
think it's a mistake for any diplomat or any government
official in one country to interfere in the political
life of another country. That's disappointing.\547\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\547\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 101.
Ambassador Taylor testified that he was ``surprise[ed]
[and] disappoint[ed]'' that Avakov, an influential member of
the Ukrainian government--who still serves in President
Zelensky's government--had criticized President Trump during
the 2016 campaign.\548\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\548\Id. at 98-99.
Q. What do you know about Avakov?
A. So he is the Minister of Internal Affairs and was
the Minister of Internal Affairs under President
Poroshenko as one of only two carryovers from the
Poroshenko Cabinet to the Zelensky Cabinet. He, as I
think I mentioned earlier when we were talking about
Lutsenko, the Minister of Interior, which Avakov is
now, controls the police, which gives him significant
influence in the government.
Q. Avakov, he's a relatively influential Minister. Is
that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Does it concern you that at one time he was being
highly critical of candidate Trump?
A. It does.
Q. And did you ever have any awareness of that before
I called your attention to this?
A. I haven't. This is surprising. Disappointing,
but--\549\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\549\Id.
Despite this testimony, Chairman Schiff has prevented
Republican Members from fully assessing the nature and extent
of Ukraine's influence in the 2016 election. Chairman Schiff
refused to invite Alexandra Chalupa or Fusion GPS contractor
Nellie Ohr to testify during public hearings.\550\ Chairman
Schiff declined to concur with a Republican subpoena for
documents relating to the DNC's communications with the
Ukrainian government.\551\ Chairman Schiff declined to concur
with a Republican subpoena for documents relating to the DNC's
work with Alexandra Chalupa.\552\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\550\See, e.g., Riley Beggin, House Democrats deny Republicans'
request for whistleblower testimony. Vox, Nov. 10, 2019.
\551\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale,
supra note 246.
\552\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
There are legitimate concerns about Burisma's corruption
and Hunter Biden's role on the company's board, and Ukrainian
government officials' actions to support Secretary Clinton over
President Trump in the 2016 election. Democrats reflexively
dismiss these concerns because acknowledging them would require
an admission that past U.S. assistance to Ukraine may have been
misspent. As Ambassador Yovanovitch testified:
I think most Americans believe that there shouldn't
be meddling in our elections. And if Ukraine is the one
that had been meddling in our elections, I think the
support that all of you [in Congress] have provided to
Ukraine over the last almost 30 years, I don't know
that--I think people would ask themselves questions
about that.\553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\553\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 137.
Similarly, other career foreign service employees spoke
about their emotional investment in U.S. foreign assistance to
Ukraine. Speaking about his reaction to the recent events in
Ukraine, Ambassador Taylor testified that he feels a strong
``emotional attachment, bond, connection to this country and
these people.''\554\ Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent, according
to current State Department employee and former NSC staffer
Catherine Croft, likewise ``has a lot of emotion tied into''
U.S. policy toward Ukraine, saying he ``feels very strongly in
all aspects of our policy with regard to Ukraine.''\555\
President Trump's world view threatens these personal,
subjective interests, which may explain why some are so eager
to discount these allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\554\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 273.
\555\Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 105-06.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. The anonymous whistleblower who served as the basis for the
impeachment inquiry has no firsthand knowledge of events and a
bias against President Trump.
Democrats built their impeachment inquiry on the foundation
of the anonymous whistleblower complaint submitted to the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community on August 12.
This foundation is fundamentally flawed.
The anonymous whistleblower acknowledged having no
firsthand knowledge about the events he or she described. As a
result, his or her complaint mischaracterized important facts
and portrayed events in an inaccurate light. The anonymous
whistleblower reportedly had a professional relationship with
Vice President Joe Biden, which, if true, biases the
whistleblower's impressions of the events as they relate to
Vice President Biden. The anonymous whistleblower also
reportedly communicated initially with House Intelligence
Committee Chairman Adam Schiff, who has been an ardent and
outspoken critic of President Trump, or his staff. Chairman
Schiff's early secret awareness of the issue tainted the
objectivity of the Democrats' impeachment inquiry.
To this day, only one Member of Congress--Chairman Schiff--
knows the identity of the individual whose words sparked the
impeachment of the President. Chairman Schiff has prevented any
objective assessment of the whistleblower's credibility or
knowledge. Chairman Schiff declined to invite the whistleblower
to testify as part of the Democrats' impeachment inquiry, but
only after Chairman Schiff's or his staff's communications with
the whistleblower came to light.\556\ Chairman Schiff rejected
a Republican subpoena for documents relating to the drafting of
the whistleblower complaint and the whistleblower's personal
memorandum written shortly after the July 25 telephone
conversation.\557\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\556\See, e.g., Beggin, supra note 550.
\557\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale,
supra note 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The public reporting about the existence of a whistleblower
and his or her sensational allegations about President Trump
generated tremendous public interest. But Americans cannot
assess the credibility, motivations, or biases of the
whistleblower. This analysis is necessary because the
whistleblower's inaccurate assertions, coupled with Chairman
Schiff's selective leaks of cherry-picked information, have
prejudiced the public narrative surrounding President Trump's
telephone call with President Zelensky.
1. The anonymous whistleblower acknowledged having no firsthand
knowledge of the events in question.
The anonymous whistleblower has no direct, firsthand
knowledge of the events described in his or her complaint. In
the complaint, the whistleblower acknowledged, ``I was not a
direct witness to most of the events described,'' and admitted
that he or she was not on the July 25 call between President
Trump and President Zelensky.\558\ Instead, the anonymous
whistleblower relied upon indirect, secondhand information
provided by others--individuals who are also still
unidentified. The whistleblower's lack of firsthand knowledge
undermines the credibility of his or her accusations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\558\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 1; see also Letter
from Hon. Michael Atkinson, Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty.,
to Hon. Joseph Maguire, Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence (Aug. 26,
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testimony provided by officials with firsthand knowledge of
the events rebuts the whistleblower's allegations. Ambassador
Sondland testified that some of the concerns in the August 12
whistleblower complaint may be inaccurate or hyperbole.\559\
For example, both Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Sondland
testified that the whistleblower incorrectly alleged ``that
State Department officials, including Ambassadors Volker and
Sondland, had spoken with Mr. Giuliani to contain the damage'
to U.S. national security.''\560\ The ambassadors also
disagreed with the whistleblower's statement that they helped
Ukrainian leadership ```navigate' the demands'' from President
Trump.\561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\559\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 259-64, 311-14.
\560\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 100-01;
Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 261-62, 313.
\561\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 101; Sondland
deposition, supra note 51, at 259-61, 311-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, Ambassador Sondland took issue with the
whistleblower's characterization of efforts to arrange a
meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky. The
whistleblower complaint stated:
During this same timeframe, multiple U.S. officials
told me [the anonymous whistleblower] that the
Ukrainian leadership was led to believe that a meeting
or phone call between the President and President
Zelensky would depend on whether Zelensky showed
willingness to ``play ball'' on the issues that had
been publicly aired by Mr. Lutsenko and Mr.
Giuliani.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\562\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 7.
Ambassador Sondland testified that he never heard U.S.
officials use the expression ``play ball'' in this
context.\563\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\563\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 264.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Press reports suggest that the anonymous whistleblower acknowledged
having a professional relationship with former Vice President
Biden.
The anonymous whistleblower reportedly acknowledged having
a professional relationship with Vice President Biden. This
admission is important because Vice President Biden was
referenced in passing on the July 25 call and is a potential
opponent of President Trump in the 2020 presidential election.
It stands to reason that a mention of Vice President Biden--no
matter how brief or innocuous--could stir the passion of
someone who had a professional relationship with him.
On August 26, 2019, Inspector General Atkinson wrote to
Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Joseph Maguire
stating that he found ``some indicia of an arguable political
bias on the part of the [anonymous whistleblower] in favor of a
rival political candidate. . . .''\564\ News reports later
reported that the ``rival political candidate'' referenced in
Atkinson's letter was a 2020 Democrat presidential candidate
with whom that the whistleblower acknowledged having a
``professional relationship.''\565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\564\Letter from Hon. Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, to Hon. Joseph Maguire, Dir. Of Nat'l
Intelligence, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (Aug. 26, 2019).
\565\Byron York, Whistleblower Had `Professional' Tie to 2020
Democratic Candidate, Wash. Exam., Oct. 8, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequent news reports explained that the whistleblower is
a CIA analyst who had been detailed to the NSC and would have
worked closely with Vice President Biden's office.\566\ This
relationship is significant because President Obama relied upon
Vice President Biden to be the Obama Administration's point
person for Ukrainian policy.\567\ This relationship suggests
that aside from any partisan bias in support of Vice President
Biden's 2020 presidential campaign, the whistleblower may also
have had a bias in favor of Vice President Biden's Ukrainian
policies instead of those of President Trump.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\566\See generally Rob Crilly, Steven Nelson, & David Drucker, Joe
Biden Worked with Whistleblower When he was Vice President, Officials
Reveal, Wash. Exam., Oct. 10, 2019; Ben Feuerherd, Whistleblower May
Have Worked with Joe Biden in White House: Report, N.Y. Post, Oct. 10,
2019; Julian Barnes, Michael Schmidt, Adam Goldman, & Katie Benner,
White House Knew of Whistleblower's Allegations Soon After Trump's Call
with Ukraine Leader, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2019.
\567\Greg Myre, What Were the Bidens Doing in Ukraine? 5 Questions
Answered, Nat'l Pub. Radio, Sept. 24, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. The anonymous whistleblower secretly communicated with Chairman
Schiff or his staff.
According to an admission from Chairman Schiff, the
anonymous whistleblower communicated with Chairman Schiff's
staff prior to submitting his or her complaint. This early,
secret involvement of Chairman Schiff severely prejudices the
objectivity of the whistleblower's allegations, given Chairman
Schiff's obsession with attacking President Trump for partisan
gain.
Since 2016, Chairman Schiff has been a chief ringleader in
Congress for asserting that President Trump colluded with
Russia, going so far as to allege that he had secret evidence
of collusion.\568\ Now Chairman Schiff is the investigator-in-
chief of President Trump's July 25 phone call with Ukrainian
President Zelensky. Chairman Schiff led the investigation's
first phase from behind the closed doors of his Capitol
basement bunker, even though the depositions were all
unclassified. Chairman Schiff did so purely for information
control--allowing him to leak selected pieces of information to
paint a misleading public narrative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\568\See, e.g., Kelsey Tamborrino, Warner: `Enormous amounts of
evidence' of possible Russia collusion, Politico, Mar. 3, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Schiff has publicly fabricated evidence about
President Trump's July 25 phone call and misled the American
public about his awareness of the whistleblower allegations. On
September 26, at a public hearing of the House Intelligence
Committee, Chairman Schiff opened the proceedings by
fabricating the contents of President Trump's call with
President Zelensky to make the conversation seem sinister.\569\
Pretending to be President Trump, Chairman Schiff said in part:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\569\Whistleblower disclosure, supra note 1.
I hear what you want. I have a favor I want from you
though. And I'm going to say this only seven times so
you better listen good. I want you to make up dirt on
my political opponent, understand. Lots of it.\570\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\570\Id.
These words were never uttered by President Trump. When
Chairman Schiff rightly faced criticism for his actions, he
blamed others for not understanding that he was joking.\571\
Republicans sought to hold Chairman Schiff accountable for his
fabrication of evidence; however, Democrats prevented the House
from voting on a censure resolution.\572\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\571\Id.
\572\Katherine Tully-McManus, Republican effort to censure Adam
Schiff halted, Roll Call, Oct. 21, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2019, the New York Times reported that the
whistleblower contacted a staff member on the House
Intelligence Committee--chaired by Chairman Schiff--after
asking a colleague to convey his or her concerns about the July
25 call to the CIA's top lawyer.\573\ Chairman Schiff, however,
had denied ever communicating directly with the
whistleblower,\574\ and the whistleblower failed to disclose
that he or she had contacted Chairman Schiff's staff when asked
by the Intelligence Community Inspector General.\575\ Chairman
Schiff acknowledged his early awareness of the whistleblower's
allegations only after he was caught.\576\ The Washington Post
gave Chairman Schiff ``Four Pinocchios''--its worst rating--for
``clearly ma[king] a statement that was false.''\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\573\Julian Barnes, Michael Schmidt, & Matthew Rosenberg, Schiff
Got Early Account of Accusations as Whistleblower's Concerns Grew, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 2019.
\574\See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, Schiff's false claim his committee
had not spoken to the whistleblower, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 2019.
\575\Andrew O'Reilly, Schiff Admits He Should Have Been `Much More
Clear' About Contact with Whistleblower, Fox News, Oct. 13, 2019.
\576\Schiff Got Early Account of Accusations as Whistleblower's
Concerns Grew, supra note 573.
\577\Schiff's false claim his committee had not spoken to the
whistleblower, supra note 574.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Schiff's early awareness of the whistleblower
complaint explains why he publicly posited a connection between
paused U.S. security assistance and Ukrainian investigations
well before the whistleblower complaint became public. On
August 28, 2019, before the public became aware of the
whistleblower complaint or any allegations that U.S. security
assistance to Ukraine was linked to Ukraine investigating
President Trump's political rival, Chairman Schiff made such a
connection in a tweet.\578\ According to the New York Times,
Chairman Schiff knew ``the outlines'' of the anonymous
whistleblower complaint at the time that he issued this
tweet.\579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\578\Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter, (Aug. 28, 2019, 8:17
PM), https://twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1166867471862829056.
\579\Barnes, Schmidt, & Rosenberg, supra note 573.
Chairman Schiff's early awareness also explains why he
pressured Inspector General Atkinson to produce the
whistleblower's complaint to Congress, despite Acting DNI
Maguire's determination that transmittal was not required
because the complaint did not meet the legal definition of
``urgent concern.''\580\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\580\U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, ``Urgent
Concern'' Determination by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community 2 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
The allegations of the anonymous whistleblower--the
foundation for the Democrats' impeachment inquiry--are
fundamentally flawed. The whistleblower acknowledged having no
direct, firsthand knowledge of the events he or she described.
The whistleblower reportedly acknowledged a professional
relationship with Vice President Joe Biden, which, if true,
suggests a bias toward Vice President Biden and against
President Trump. Finally, the whistleblower secretly
communicated with staff of Chairman Schiff, who subsequently
misled the public about this communication.
If Democrats are serious about impeaching the President--
about undoing the will of the American people--they cannot
limit the evidence and information available to the House of
Representatives. The motivations, biases, and credibility of
the anonymous whistleblower are necessary aspects of any
serious examination of the facts in question.
II. The Evidence does not establish that President Trump engaged in a
cover-up of his interactions with Ukrainian President Zelensky.
Democrats also argue that President Trump is engaged in a
cover-up of his July 25 telephone conversation by hiding
evidence of his alleged wrongdoing.\581\ There is no basis for
this allegation. The President has been transparent about the
issues surrounding the anonymous whistleblower complaint and
the telephone call with President Zelensky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\581\See, e.g., Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Transcript of Pelosi Weekly
Press Conference (Sept. 26, 2019) (``The [whistleblower] complaint
reports `repeated abuse of an electronics record system designed to
store classified, sensitive national security information, which the
White House used to hide information of a political nature.' This is a
cover-up. This is a cover-up.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 24, Speaker Pelosi launched the impeachment
inquiry based solely on reports of the telephone call between
President Trump and President Zelensky. She had not listened to
the conversation; she had not read the call summary or the
whistleblower complaint. The following day, to offer
unprecedented transparency and prove there was no quid pro quo,
President Trump declassified the July 25 call summary for the
American people to read for themselves. President Trump also
released a redacted version of the anonymous whistleblower
complaint and he released the summary of his April 21 telephone
conversation with President Zelensky. Even the Democrats' best
evidence of a ``cover-up''--the restricted access to the call
summary--is unpersuasive. Evidence suggests that the call
summary was restricted not for a malicious intention but as a
result of the proliferation of leaks by unelected bureaucrats,
including leaks of President Trump's conversations with foreign
leaders.
A. President Trump declassified and released publicly the summary of
his July 25 phone call with President Zelensky.
On July 25, President Trump and President Zelensky spoke by
telephone.\582\ Normally, presidential conversations with
foreign leaders are presumptively classified because ``[t]he
unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is
presumed to cause damage to the national security.''\583\ In
fact, the call summary of President Trump's call with President
Zelensky was initially marked as classified.\584\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\582\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
\583\Exec. Order 13,526 (2009).
\584\See Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 25, after questions arose about the contents
of the phone call, President Trump chose to declassify and
release the transcript in the interest of full transparency. He
wrote on Twitter: ``I am currently at the United Nations
representing our Country, but have authorized the release
tomorrow of the complete, fully declassified and unredacted
transcript of my phone conversation with President Zelensky of
Ukraine.''\585\ The President stressed his goal that Americans
could read for themselves the contents of the call: ``You will
see it was a very friendly and totally appropriate call. No
pressure unlike Joe Biden and his son, NO quid pro quo! This is
nothing more than a continuation of the Greatest and most
Destructive Witch Hunt of all time.''\586\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\585\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019,
11:12 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1176559966024556544.
\586\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019,
11:12 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1176559970390806530.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. President Trump released a redacted version of the classified
anonymous whistleblower complaint.
Like the call summary, the anonymous whistleblower
complaint was initially classified. The complaint was
reportedly ``hand delivered . . . to Capitol Hill'' hours after
President Trump released the call summary.\587\ Although a
limited number of Members of Congress--like Chairman Schiff--
could access the classified complaint, the American public
could not. The President released a redacted version of the
anonymous whistleblower complaint so that every American could
read it for themselves.\588\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\587\Dana Bash, et al, Whistleblower complaint about Trump
declassified and may be released Thursday, CNN, Sept. 26, 2019.
\588\Whistleblower complaint says White House tried to ``lock
down'' Ukraine call records, CBS News, Sept. 26, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. President Trump released publicly the summary of his April 21 phone
call with President Zelensky.
President Trump first spoke by telephone with President
Zelensky on April 21, 2019, the date on which President
Zelensky won the Ukrainian presidential election.\589\ On
November 15, the President publicly released the summary of
this April conversation.\590\ President Trump explained that he
chose to release the summary of this call to ``continue being
the most transparent President in history.''\591\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\589\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 10.
\590\Mark Mazzetti & Eileen Sullivan, Rough transcript of Trump's
first phone call with Ukrainian leader released, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
2019.
\591\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 11, 2019,
3:35 p.m.), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1194035922066714625.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. The Trump Administration has experienced a surge in sensitive leaks,
including details of the President's communications with
foreign leaders.
The Trump Administration has experienced an unprecedented
number of potentially damaging leaks from the U.S. national
security apparatus.\592\ According to a report from the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in May
2017, these leaks have flowed seven times faster under
President Trump than during former Presidents Obama and Bush's
administrations averaging--almost one per day.\593\ The report
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\592\HSGAC report, supra note 409.
\593\Id.
From the morning of President Trump's inauguration,
when major newspapers published information about
highly sensitive intelligence intercepts, news
organizations have reported on an avalanche of leaks
from officials across the U.S. government. Many
disclosures have concerned the investigations of
alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election, with
the world learning details of whose communications U.S.
intelligence agencies are monitoring, what channels are
being monitored, and the results of those intercepts.
All such revelations are potential violations of
federal law, punishable by jail time.
But the leak frenzy has gone far beyond the Kremlin
and has extended to other sensitive information that
could harm national security. President Trump's private
conversations with other foreign leaders have shown up
in the press, while secret operations targeting
America's most deadly adversaries were exposed in
detail.
As The New York Times wrote in a candid self-
assessment: ``Journalism in the Trump era has featured
a staggering number of leaks from sources across the
federal government.'' No less an authority than
President Obama's CIA director called the deluge of
state secrets ``appalling.'' These leaks do not occur
in a vacuum. They can, and do, have real world
consequences for national security.\594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\594\Id.
As the Washington Post explained, ``Every presidential
administration leaks. So far, the Trump White House has
gushed.''\595\ Sensitive national security information--for
which public disclosure could harm U.S. interests--found its
way into mainstream news outlets such as the New York Times,
the Washington Post, NBC, and Associated Press.\596\ This
unfortunate reality helps to explain the circumstances by which
the NSC handled the summary of President Trump's July 25
telephone conversation with President Zelensky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\595\Paul Farhi, The Trump administration has sprung a leak. Many
of them, in fact, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2017.
\596\HSGAC report, supra note 409.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. The evidence does not establish that access to the July 25 call
summary was restricted for inappropriate reasons.
The anonymous whistleblower complaint alleged that NSC
staffers deliberately placed the call summary of the July 25
call on a highly secure server to hide its contents.\597\ This
allegation has not been proven. In fact, the Democrats'
witnesses testified that it was mistakenly place on a highly
classified server. Evidence suggests that call summaries of the
President's conversations with other foreign leaders have been
subject to restricted access due to a pattern of leaks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\597\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Trump Administration dealt with an unprecedented
number of national security leaks, it sought to take
appropriate precautions. Public reporting indicates that the
NSC began restricting access to summaries of the President's
communications with foreign leaders following the leak of
President Trump's conversation in May 2017 with senior Russian
officials.\598\ Dr. Fiona Hill, the former NSC Senior Director
for Europe, testified that a summary of this meeting was not
initially restricted and that details of the conversation
``seemed to immediately end up in the press.''\599\ Following
this leak, the White House began a practice of restricting
access to summaries of calls and meetings with foreign
leaders.\600\ Current and former White House officials said
that it made sense to restrict access to calls given the number
of leaks.\601\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\598\See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes et al., White House Classified
Computer System is Used to Hold Transcripts of Sensitive Calls, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 29, 2019.
\599\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 294.
\600\Barnes, et al., supra note 598.
\601\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the summary of President Trump's
conversation with President Zelensky on July 25, NSC Senior
Director Tim Morrison testified in his closed-door deposition
that although he ``was not concerned that anything illegal was
discussed,'' he was concerned about a leak of the summary of
President Trump's call with President Zelensky.\602\ He
explained that he was ``concerned about how the contents [of
the call summary] would be used in Washington's political
process.''\603\ In his public testimony, Morrison elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\602\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 16.
\603\Id. at 44.
Q. And you were concerned about it leaking because
you were worried about how it would play out in
Washington's polarized political environment, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were also worried how that would lead to
the bipartisan support here in Congress towards
Ukraine, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were also concerned that it might affect
the Ukrainians' perception negatively.
A. Yes.
Q. And, in fact, all three of those things have
played out, haven't they?
A. Yes.\604\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\604\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
LTC Vindman--the NSC staffer who raised concerns about the
contents of call--testified there was no ``malicious intent''
in restricting access to the summary.\605\ Morrison also
testified that call summary was mistakenly placed on a secure
server with restricted access.\606\ He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\605\Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 124.
\606\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 54-57.
Q. And were you ever provided with an explanation for
why [the call summary] was placed in the highly
classified system?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the explanation you were given?
A. It was a mistake.
Q. It was a mistake?
A. Yes.\607\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\607\Id. at 54.
In his public testimony, Morrison reiterated that the
placement of the call summary on a secure server was an
administrative error.\608\ He explained that NSC Legal Advisor
John Eisenberg sought to restrict access to the summary, but
that his direction was mistakenly interpreted to mean placing
the summary on a secure server.\609\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\608\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Timothy
Morrison, supra note 8.
\609\Id.
I spoke with the NSC Executive Secretariat staff,
asked them why [the summary had been removed from the
normal server]. And they did their research, and they
informed me it had been moved to the higher
classification system at the direction of John
Eisenberg, whom I then asked why. I mean, that's--if
that was the judgment he made, that's not necessarily
mine to question, but I didn't understand it. And he
essentially told me, ``I gave no such direction.'' He
did his own inquiry, and he represented back to me that
it was--his understanding was that it was a kind of
administrative error, that when he also gave direction
to restrict access, the Executive Secretariat staff
understood that as an apprehension that there was
something in the content of the [call summary] that
could not exist on the lower classification
system.\610\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\610\Id.
Morrison also explained that there was no malicious intent
in moving the transcript to the secure server.\611\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\611\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To the extent Democrats allege that President Trump sought
to cover up his July 25 telephone conversation with President
Zelensky, the facts do not support such a charge. Indeed,
President Trump has declassified and publicly released the July
25 call summary. He has also released a redacted version of the
classified anonymous whistleblower complaint and released the
call summary of his first phone call with President Zelensky,
on April 21. Although the July 25 call summary was located on a
secure White House server prior to its public release,
testimony shows that its placement on the server was an
``administrative error.'' In light of substantial leaks of
sensitive national security information--including the
President's conversations with foreign leaders--testimony shows
that the NSC Legal Advisor sought to restrict access to the
summary. In attempting to carry out this direction, the NSC
executive secretariat staff incorrectly placed the summary on a
secure server. Taken, together, these facts do not establish
that President Trump sought to cover up his interactions with
President Zelensky.
III. The evidence does not establish that President Trump obstructed
Congress in the Democrats' impeachment inquiry.
Democrats allege that President Trump has obstructed
Congress by declining to participate in Speaker Pelosi's
impeachment inquiry.\612\ Under any fair assessment of the
facts, however, President Trump has not obstructed Congress. In
fact, the President personally urged at least one witness to
cooperate with the Democrats' impeachment inquiry and to
testify truthfully.\613\ But Democrats cannot and should not
impeach President Trump for declining to submit himself to an
abusive and unfair process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\612\See, e.g., Amber Phillips, How the House Could Impeach Trump
for Obstructing its Probe, Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 2019.
\613\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Democrats' impeachment inquiry, fairness is not an
asset guaranteed or even recognized. Democrats have told
witnesses in the inquiry that a failure to adhere strictly to
their demands ``shall constitute evidence of obstruction of the
House's impeachment inquiry and may be used as an adverse
inference against the President.''\614\ Democrats have
threatened to withhold the salaries for agency employees as
punishment for not meeting Democrat demands.\615\ As Chairman
Schiff explained the Democrat logic, any disagreement with
Democrats amounts to obstruction: ``The failure to produce this
witness, the failure to produce these documents, we consider
yet additionally strong evidence of obstruction of the
constitutional functions of Congress, a coequal branch of
government.''\616\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\614\See, e.g., letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, et al. to John Eisenberg, Nat'l Sec. Council (Oct. 30,
2019).
\615\See letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, et al. to John J. Sullivan, Dep. Sec'y, Dep't of State (Oct.
1, 2019).
\616\Phillips, supra note 612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Democrats' actions are fundamentally abusive. In any
just proceeding, the President ought to be afforded an
opportunity to raise defenses without Democrats considering it
to be de facto evidence of obstruction. In any just proceeding,
investigators would not impute the conduct of a witness to the
President or use a witness's refusal to cooperate with an
unfair process as an ``adverse inference'' against the
President.
The Democrats' obstruction arguments are also divorced from
historical precedent for House impeachment proceedings and
basic legal concepts of due process and the presumption of
innocence. Past bipartisan precedent for presidential
impeachment inquiries guaranteed fundamental fairness by
authorizing bipartisan subpoena authority; providing the
President unrestricted access to information presented; and
allowing the President's counsel to identify relevant witnesses
and evidence, cross examine witnesses, and respond to evidence
collected. These guarantees of due process and fundamental
fairness are not present in the Democrats' impeachment
resolution against President Trump.
Congressional oversight of the Executive Branch is an
important and serious undertaking designed to improve the
efficiency and accountability of the federal government. The
White House has said that it is willing to work with Democrats
on legitimate congressional oversight requests.\617\ However,
public statements from prominent Democrats suggest they are
pursuing impeachment purely for partisan reasons--that they are
seeking to prevent President Trump's reelection in 2020.\618\
The Democrats' unfair and abusive impeachment process confirms
that they are not interested in pursuing a full understanding
of the facts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\617\See letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President to
Speaker Nancy Pelosi et al. 8 (Oct. 8, 2019).
\618\See, e.g., Weekends with Alex Witt (MSNBC television broadcast
May 5, 2019) (interview with Rep. Al Green).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even despite the Democrats' partisan rhetoric and unfair
process, President Trump has been transparent about his
interactions with Ukrainian President Zelensky. President Trump
has released to the public documents directly relevant the
subject matter and he has spoken publicly about the issues.
Democrats cannot justly condemn President Trump for declining
to submit to their abusive and fundamentally unfair process.
A. Democrats have abandoned long-standing precedent by failing to
guarantee due process and fundamental fairness in their
impeachment inquiry.
The two recent impeachment investigations into presidents
by the House of Representatives were largely identical to each
other despite the passage of two decades. In 1974, the House
authorized an impeachment inquiry into President Nixon by
debating and passing House Resolution 803.\619\ This resolution
authorized the Committee on the Judiciary to issue subpoenas,
including those offered by the minority; to sit and act without
regard to whether the House stood in recess; and to expend
funds in the pursuit of the investigation.\620\ In 1998, the
House passed House Resolution 581, a nearly identical
resolution authorizing an impeachment inquiry into President
Clinton.\621\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\619\H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong. (1974).
\620\See Id.
\621\H. Res. 581, 105th Cong. (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1974, the House undertook this action because ``the rule
of the House defining the jurisdiction of committees does not
place jurisdiction over impeachment matters in the Judiciary
Committee. In fact, it does not place such jurisdiction
anywhere.''\622\ Passing a resolution authorizing the inquiry
was ``a necessary step if we are to meet our obligations [under
the Constitution].''\623\ By passing the resolution, the House
sought to make ``[t]he committee's investigative authority . .
. fully coextensive with the power of the House in an
impeachment investigation. . . .''\624\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\622\130 Cong. Rec. 2351 (Feb. 6, 1974) (statement of Rep.
Hutchinson).
\623\Id. at 2350 (statement of Rep. Rodino).
\624\H.R. Rep. No. 93-774, at 3 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notably, in empowering the Judiciary Committee to conduct
the Nixon impeachment inquiry, the House granted subpoena power
to the minority, an action that was ``against all precedents''
at the time.\625\ During debate, Members made it ``crystal
clear that the authority given to the minority [ranking] member
and to the chairman, the right to exercise authority [to issue
a subpoena], is essentially the same. It is the same. Both are
subject to a veto by a majority of the membership of that
committee.''\626\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\625\130 Cong. Rec. at 2352 (statement of Rep. Brooks).
\626\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1998, the House similarly passed a resolution
authorizing an impeachment inquiry because the ``[Judiciary]
Committee decided that it must receive authorization from the
full House before proceeding. . . .''\627\ The Judiciary
Committee reached this conclusion ``[b]ecause impeachment is
delegated solely to the House of Representatives by the
Constitution, [and therefore] the full House of Representatives
should be involved in critical decision making regarding
various stages of impeachment.''\628\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\627\H.R. Rep. No. 105-795, at 24 (1998).
\628\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In putting forth this resolution for consideration by the
House, the Judiciary Committee made several commitments with
respect to ensuring ``procedural fairness'' of the impeachment
inquiry. For instance, the Judiciary Committee voted to allow
the President or his counsel to be present at all executive
sessions and open hearings and to allow the President's counsel
to cross examine witnesses, make objections regarding
relevancy, suggest additional evidence or witnesses that the
committee should receive, and to respond to the evidence
collected.\629\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\629\Id. at 25-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fundamental fairness and due process protections
guaranteed in the Nixon and Clinton impeachment proceedings are
missing from Speaker Pelosi's impeachment inquiry. The
Democrats' impeachment inquiry offers a veneer of legitimacy
that hides a deeply partisan and one-sided process. The
impeachment resolution passed by Democrats in the House--
against bipartisan opposition--allows Democrats to maintain
complete control of the proceedings.\630\ The resolution denies
Republicans co-equal subpoena authority and requires the
Democrat chairmen to concur with Republican subpoenas--unlike
Democrat subpoenas, which the chairmen may issue with no
Republican input.\631\ The Democrat impeachment resolution
requires Republicans to specifically identify and explain the
need for witnesses 72 hours before the first impeachment
hearing without a similar requirement for Democrats.\632\ Most
importantly, the Democrats' resolution excludes the President's
counsel from House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam
Schiff's proceedings and provides House Judiciary Committee
Chairman Jerry Nadler with discretion to do the same.\633\ In
short, these partisan procedures dramatically contradict the
bipartisan Nixon and Clinton precedents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\630\H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019).
\631\Id.
\632\Id.
\633\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Democrats have engaged in an abusive process toward a pre-determined
outcome.
Since the beginning of the 116 Congress, Democrats have
sought to impeach President Trump. Just hours after her
swearing in, Rep. Rashida Tlaib told a crowd at a public event
that ``[Democrats are] going to go in there, and we're going to
impeach the [expletive deleted].''\634\ Rep. Brad Sherman
introduced articles of impeachment against President Trump on
the very first day of the Democrat majority.\635\ Rep. Al Green
separately introduced articles of impeachment in July 2019, and
even forced the House to consider the measure.\636\ The House
tabled Rep. Green's impeachment resolution by an overwhelming
bipartisan majority--332 ayes to 95 nays.\637\
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\634\Nicholas Fandos, Rashida Tlaib's Expletive-Laden Cry to
Impeach Trump Upends Democrats' Talking Points, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4,
2019.
\635\H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019).
\636\H. Res. 498, 116th Cong. (2019).
\637\Id. (Roll call vote 483).
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Such a fervor to impeach a political opponent for purely
partisan reasons was what Alexander Hamilton warned of as the
``greatest danger'' in Federalist No. 65: that ``the decision
[to impeach] will be regulated more by the comparative strength
of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt.''\638\ Indicative of this partisan fervor, Democrats
have already forced the House to consider three resolutions of
impeachment--offered by Democrats after no investigation,
report, or process of any kind--since President Trump took
office.\639\
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\638\Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
\639\See H. Res. 646, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 705, 115th Cong.
(2018); H. Res. 498, 116th Cong. (2019).
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During the consideration of articles of impeachment against
President Clinton, Democrats argued that ``[i]f we are to
impeach the President, it should be at the end of a fair
process. . . . [and not through decisions] made on a strictly
partisan basis.''\640\ Rep. Zoe Lofgren, now a senior member of
the Judiciary Committee, testified then before the Rules
Committee on the resolution authorizing the Clinton impeachment
inquiry. She said:
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\640\Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of
the United States, 105th Cong., Consideration of Articles of
Impeachment 82 (Comm. Print 1998) (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).
Under our Constitution, the House of Representatives
has the sole power of impeachment. This is perhaps our
single most serious responsibility short of a
declaration of war. Given the gravity and magnitude of
this undertaking, only a fair and bipartisan approach
to this question will ensure that truth is discovered,
honest judgments rendered, and the constitutional
requirement observed. Our best yardstick is our
historical experience. We must compare the procedures
used today with what Congress did a generation ago when
a Republican President was investigated by a Democratic
House.\641\
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\641\Hearing before the Committee on Rules on H. Res. 525, 105th
Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1998).
However, Speaker Pelosi's impeachment inquiry has been
divorced from historical experience and has borne no markings
of a fair process. During the first several weeks, the Speaker
asserted that a vote authorizing the inquiry was
unnecessary.\642\ This process allowed Chairman Schiff to
conduct his partisan inquiry behind closed doors with only a
limited group of Members present. It also allowed Chairman
Schiff to selectively leak cherry-picked information to paint a
misleading public narrative. Chairman Schiff failed to respond
to Republican requests for witnesses,\643\ and directed
witnesses not to answer questions from Republicans.\644\
Chairman Schiff even declined to share closed-door deposition
transcripts with Republican Members.\645\
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\642\See, e.g., Haley Byrd, Kevin McCarthy Calls on Nancy Pelosi to
Suspend Impeachment Inquiry, CNN, Oct. 3, 2019.
\643\Letter from Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight
& Reform, et al., to Adam Schiff, Chairman, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on
Intelligence (Oct. 23, 2019).
\644\See, e.g., Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 78-80, 103-
05.
\645\See, e.g., Deirdre Shesgreen & Bart Jansen, House Republicans
complain about limited access to closed-door House impeachment
investigation sessions, USA Today, Oct. 16, 2019.
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During the public hearings, despite the modicum of minority
rights outlined in the Democrats' impeachment resolution,
Chairman Schiff has continued to trample long-held minority
rights. Chairman Schiff interrupted Republican Members during
questioning and directed witnesses not to answer Republican
questions.\646\ Chairman Schiff declined to invite all the
witnesses identified by Republicans as relevant to the
inquiry.\647\ Chairman Schiff declined to honor Republican
subpoenas for documents and witnesses, and then violated House
rules and the Democrats' impeachment resolution to vote down
the subpoenas without sufficient notice or even any
debate.\648\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\646\See, e.g., Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor
and Mr. George Kent, supra note 2; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador
Marie Yovanovitch, supra note 4.
\647\See, e.g., Beggin, supra note 550.
\648\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale,
supra note 246.
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This is the very sort of process that Democrats had
previously decried as ``what happens when a legislative chamber
is obsessively preoccupied with investigating the opposition
rather than legislating for the people who elected them to
office.''\649\ Rep. Jerrold Nadler, now chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, once argued that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\649\Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of
the United States, supra note 640, at 94 (statement of Rep. Zoe
Lofgren).
The effect of impeachment is to overturn the popular
will of voters as expressed in a national election. . .
. There must never be a narrowly voted impeachment or
an impeachment substantially supported by one of our
major political parties and largely opposed by the
other. Such an impeachment would lack legitimacy and
produce the divisiveness and bitterness in our politics
for years to come and will call into question the very
legitimacy of our political institutions.\650\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\650\Id. at 77 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) (emphasis added).
During the impeachment proceedings for President Clinton,
Democrats warned against ``dump[ing] mountains of salacious,
uncross-examined and otherwise untested materials onto the
Internet, and then . . . sorting through boxes of documents to
selectively find support for a foregone conclusion.''\651\ But
now, in Speaker Pelosi's impeachment inquiry, as conducted by
Chairman Schiff, the Democrats' old warnings have become the
very process by which their current impeachment inquiry has
proceeded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\651\Id. at 82 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. President Trump may raise privileges and defenses in response to
unfair, abusive proceedings.
Speaker Pelosi's impeachment inquiry, as conducted by
Chairman Schiff, has abandoned due process and the presumption
of innocence that lies at the heart of western legal
systems.\652\ Due to this abusive conduct and the Democrats'
relentless attacks on the Trump Administration, President Trump
may be rightly concerned about receiving fair treatment from
House Democrats during this impeachment inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\652\See, e.g., Id. at 102 (statement of Rep. Maxine Waters) (``As
Members of Congress have sworn to uphold the Constitution, we must
always insist on equal and just treatment under the law. The
presumption of innocence until proven guilty is central and basic to
our system of justice.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the Clinton impeachment proceedings, Rep. Bobby
Scott, now a senior member of the Democrat caucus, argued that
the impeachment process should ``determine[], with a
presumption of innocence, whether those allegations [against
President Clinton] were true by using cross-examination of
witnesses and other traditionally reliable evidentiary
procedures.''\653\ Similarly, Rep. Jerrold Nadler argued then
that ``[w]e have been entrusted with the grave and awesome duty
by the American people, by the Constitution and by history. We
must exercise that duty responsibly. At a bare minimum, that
means the President's accusers must go beyond hearsay and
innuendo and beyond demands that the President prove his
innocence of vague and changing charges.''\654\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\653\Id. at 82 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).
\654\Id. at 78 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, Democrats had previously argued that the
assertion of privileges by a president does not constitute an
impeachable offense. During the Clinton impeachment
proceedings, Rep. Scott stated:
At the hearing when I posed the question of whether
any of the witnesses on the hearing's second panel
believed that the count involving invoking executive
privilege should be considered an impeachable offense,
the clear consensus on the panel was that the charge
was not an impeachable offense. In fact, one Republican
witness said, I do not think invoking executive
privilege even if frivolously, and I believe it was
frivolous in these circumstances, that that does not
constitute an impeachable offense.\655\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\655\Id. at 83 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).
Despite this prior commitment to due process and a
presumption of innocence, the Democrats now favor a presumption
of guilt. Chairman Schiff has said publicly that the Trump
Administration and witnesses asserting their constitutional
rights and seeking to test the soundness of subpoenas have
formed ``a very powerful case against the president for
obstruction, an article of impeachment based on
obstruction.''\656\ Similarly, Chairman Schiff has made
clearthat he will simply assume that a witness's testimony is adverse
to the President when that witness or the President asserts a right or
privilege.\657\ These are not the hallmarks of a fair and transparent
process; these are the tell-tale signs of a star chamber.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\656\Kyle Cheney, Trump Makes `Very Powerful Case' for Impeachment
Based on Obstruction, Schiff Warns, Politico, Oct. 28, 2019.
\657\See Id. (``Schiff also argued that the president is seeking to
block Kupperman because he is concerned about a high-level source
corroborating damning testimony that Trump pressured Ukraine to open
investigations of his political rivals--and condition military aid and
a White House visit on bending the European ally to his will.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Although declining to submit to the Democrats' abusive and unfair
process, President Trump has released information to help the
American public understand the issues.
Just twenty-seven minutes after President Trump's
inauguration on January 20, 2017, the Washington Post reported
that the ``campaign to impeach President Trump has
begun.''\658\ As the Post reported:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\658\Matea Gold, The campaign to impeach President Trump has begun,
Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 2017.
The effort to impeach President Donald John Trump is
already underway. At the moment the new commander in
chief was sworn in, a campaign to build public support
for his impeachment went live at
ImpeachDonaldTrumpNow.org, spearheaded by two liberal
advocacy groups aiming to lay the groundwork for his
eventual ejection from the White House. . . . The
impeachment drive comes as Democrats and liberal
activists are mounting broad opposition to stymie
Trump's agenda.\659\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\659\Id.
In 2017 and 2018, Democrats introduced four separation
resolution in the House with the goal of impeaching President
Trump.\660\ On January 3, 2019, on the Democrats' first day in
power, Rep. Al Green again introduced articles of
impeachment.\661\ That same day, Rep. Rashida Tlaib promised,
``we're going to go in there and we're going to impeach the
[expletive deleted].''\662\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\660\H., Res. 705, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 646, 115th Cong.
(2017); H. Res. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); H. Res. 438, 115th Cong.
(2017).
\661\H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019).
\662\Amy B. Wong, Rep. Rashida Tlaib profanely promised to impeach
Trump. She's not sorry., Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this context, it is difficult to see the Democrats'
impeachment inquiry as anything other than a partisan effort to
undo the results of the 2016 election. Rep. Green said on MSNBC
in May 2019, ``If we don't impeach this President, he will get
re-elected.''\663\ Even as Democrats have conducted their
impeachment inquiry, Speaker Pelosi has called President Trump
``an impostor'' and said it is ``dangerous'' to allow American
voters to evaluate his performance in 2020.\664\ The Democrats'
impeachment process has mirrored this rhetoric, stacking the
deck against the President.\665\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\663\Weekends with Alex Witt, supra note 618.
\664\Emily Tillett, Nancy Pelosi says Trump's attacks on witnesses
``very significant'' to impeachment probe, CBS News, Nov. 15, 2019;
Dear Colleague Letter from Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Nov. 18, 2019).
\665\See H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even so, the President is not entirely unwilling to
cooperate with the Democrats' demands. In October 2019, Pat A.
Cipollone, the Counsel to the President, wrote to Speaker
Pelosi and the chairmen of the three ``impeachment''
committees:
If the Committees wish to return to the regular order
of oversight requests, we stand ready to engage in that
process as we have in the past, in a manner consistent
with well-established bipartisan constitutional
protections and a respect for the separation of powers
enshrined in our Constitution.\666\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\666\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, supra note 617.
Speaker Pelosi did not respond to Mr. Cipollone's letter.
President Trump explained that he would ``like people to
testify'' but he is resisting the Democrats' unfair and abusive
process ``for future Presidents and the Office of the
President.''\667\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\667\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 26, 2019,
7:43 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1199352946187800578.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Democrats' abusive and unfair process has
prevented his cooperation with the Democrats' impeachment
inquiry, President Trump has nonetheless been transparent about
his conduct. On September 25, President Trump declassified and
released to the public the summary of his July 25 phone
conversation with President Zelensky, stressing his goal that
Americans could read for themselves the contents of the call:
``You will see it was a very friendly and totally appropriate
call.''\668\ On November 15, President Trump released to the
public the summary of this April 21 phone conversation with
President Zelensky in the interest of transparency.\669\ In
addition, President Trump has spoken publicly about his
actions, as has Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney.\670\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\668\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019,
11:12 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1176559970390806530.
\669\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 11, 2019,
3:35 p.m.), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1194035922066714625.
\670\See, e.g., The White House, Remarks by President Trump before
Marine One Departure (Nov. 20, 2019); Press Briefing by Acting Chief of
Staff Mick Mulvaney, supra note 302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress has a serious and important role to play in
overseeing the Executive Branch. When the House of
Representatives considers impeachment of a president,
bipartisan precedent dictates fundamental fairness and due
process. In pursuing impeachment of President Trump, however,
Democrats have abandoned those principles, choosing instead to
use impeachment as a tool to pursue their partisan objectives.
While the President has declined to submit himself to the
Democrats' unfair and abusive process, he has still made an
effort to be transparent with the Americans to whom he is
accountable. Under these abusive and unfair circumstances, the
Democrats cannot establish a charge of obstruction.
IV. Conclusion
The impeachment of a president is one of the gravest and
most solemn duties of the House of Representatives. For
Democrats, impeachment is a tool for settling political scores
and re-litigating election results with which they disagreed.
This impeachment inquiry and the manner in which the Democrats
are pursuing it sets a dangerous precedent.
The Democrats have not established an impeachable offense.
The evidence presented in this report does not support a
finding that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to
investigate his political rival for the President's benefit in
the 2020 election. The evidence does not establish that
President Trump withheld a White House meeting to pressure
President Zelensky to investigate his political rival to
benefit him in the 2020 election. The evidence does not support
that President Trump withheld U.S. security assistance to
pressure President Zelensky to investigate his political rival
for the President's benefit in the 2020 election. The evidence
does not establish that President Trump orchestrated a shadow
foreign policy apparatus to pressure President Zelensky to
investigate his political rival to benefit him in the 2020
election.
The best evidence of President Trump's interaction with
President Zelensky is the ``complete and accurate'' call
summary prepared by the White House Situation Room staff. The
summary shows no indication of conditionality, pressure, or
coercion. Both President Trump and President Zelensky have
denied the existence of any pressure. President Zelensky and
his senior advisers in Kyiv did not even know that U.S.
security assistance to Ukraine was paused until it was publicly
reported in U.S. media. Ultimately, Ukraine received the
security assistance and President Zelensky met with President
Trump, all without Ukraine ever investigating President Trump's
political rival. These facts alone severely undercut the
Democrat allegations.
The evidence in the Democrats' impeachment inquiry shows
that President Trump is skeptical about U.S. taxpayer-funded
foreign assistance and strongly believes that European allies
should shoulder more of the financial burden for regional
defense. The President also has deeply-rooted, reasonable, and
genuine concerns about corruption in Ukraine, including the
placement of Vice President Biden's son on the board of a
Ukrainian energy company notorious for corruption at a time
when Vice President Biden was the Obama Administration's point
person for Ukraine policy. There is also compelling and
indisputable evidence that Ukrainian government officials--some
working with a Democrat operative--sought to influence the U.S.
presidential election in 2016 in favor of Secretary Clinton and
in opposition to President Trump.
The Democrats' impeachment narrative ignores the
President's state of mind and it ignores the specific and
concrete actions that the new Zelensky government took to
address pervasive Ukrainian corruption. The Democrats' case
rests almost entirely on hearsay, presumption, and emotion.
Where there are ambiguous facts, the Democrats interpret them
in a light most unfavorable to the President. The Democrats
also flatly disregard any perception of potential wrongdoing
with respect to Hunter Biden's presence on the board of Burisma
Holdings or Ukrainian influence in the 2016 election.
The evidence presented also does not support allegations
that President Trump covered-up his conversation with President
Zelensky by restricting access to it. In light of leaks of
other presidential conversations with world leaders, the White
House took reasonably steps to restrict access to the July 25
call summary. The summary was mistakenly placed on a secure
server; however, the Democrats' witnesses explained that there
was no nefarious conduct or malicious intent associated with
this action.
Likewise, the evidence presented does not support
allegations that President Trump obstructed the Democrats'
impeachment inquiry by raising concerns about an unfair and
abusive process. The Democrats deviated from prior bipartisan
precedent for presidential impeachment and denied Republican
attempts to inject basic fairness and objectivity into their
partisan and one-sided inquiry. The White House has signaled
that it is willing to work with Democrats but President Trump
cannot be faulted for declining to submit himself to the
Democrats' star chamber. Even so, President Trump has been
transparent with the American people about his actions,
releasing documents and speaking publicly about the subject
matter.
The Democrats' impeachment inquiry paints a picture of
unelected bureaucrats within the foreign policy and national
security apparatus who fundamentally disagreed with President
Trump's style, world view, and decisions. Their disagreements
with President Trump's policies and their discomfort with
President Trump's actions set in motion the anonymous,
secondhand whistleblower complaint. Democrats seized on the
whistleblower complaint to fulfill their years-old obsession
with removing President Trump from office.
The unfortunate collateral damage of the Democrats'
impeachment inquiry is the harm done to bilateral U.S.-Ukraine
relations, the fulfillment of Russian President Vladimir
Putin's desire to sow discord within the United States, and the
opportunity costs to the American people. In the time that
Democrats spent investigating the President, Democrats could
have passed legislation to implement the U.S.-Mexico-Canada
Agreement, lower the costs of prescription drugs, or secure our
southern border. Instead, the Democrats' obsession with
impeaching President Trump has paralyzed their already-thin
legislative agenda. Less than a year before the 2020 election
and Democrats in the House still cannot move on from the
results of the last election.
[all]