[House Report 116-335]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                 House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                      {     116-335
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     
                                     


 
                                     

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                         HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT
                       COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                   on

              THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]









 December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed






















                                                 House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                      {     116-335
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                                     

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                         HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT

                       COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                   on

              THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS










              [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]










 December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed
                                _______

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                      
38-600                     WASHINGTON : 2019 
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
                                
            HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                   Rep. ADAM B. SCHIFF (CA), Chairman
Rep. JIM HIMES (CT)                  Rep. DEVIN NUNES (CA), Ranking 
Rep. TERRI SEWELL (AL)                   Member
Rep. ANDRE CARSON (IN)               Rep. MIKE CONAWAY (TX)
Rep. JACKIE SPEIER (CA)              Rep. MICHAEL TURNER (OH)
Rep. MIKE QUIGLEY (IL)               Rep. BRAD WENSTRUP (OH)
Rep. ERIC SWALWELL (CA)              Rep. CHRIS STEWART (UT)
Rep. JOAQUIN CASTRO (TX)             Rep. ELISE STEFANIK (NY)
Rep. DENNY HECK (WA)                 Rep. WILL HURD (TX)
Rep. PETER WELCH (VT)                Rep. JOHN RATCLIFFE (TX)
Rep. SEAN PATRICK MALONEY (NY)       Rep. JIM JORDAN (OH)
Rep. VAL DEMINGS (FL)
Rep. RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI (IL)

                                 ------                                

                             Majority Staff

                  Timothy S. Bergreen, Staff Director
             Daniel S. Goldman, Director of Investigations
                      Maher Bitar, General Counsel
          Rheanne Wirkkala, Deputy Director of Investigations
               Patrick M. Boland, Communications Director
               
                                 ------                                

                Impeachment Inquiry Investigative Staff

William M. Evans                     Daniel S. Noble
Patrick Fallon                       Diana Y. Pilipenko
Sean A. Misko                        Ariana N. Rowberry
Nicolas A. Mitchell
                 Carly A. Blake, Deputy Staff Director
                 William Wu, Budget and Policy Director
                Wells C. Bennett, Deputy General Counsel
                
                                 ------                                

                            Oversight Staff

Linda D. Cohen                       Lucian D. Sikorskyj
Thomas Eager                         Conrad Stosz
Abigail C. Grace                     Kathy L. Suber
Kelsey M. Lax                        Aaron A. Thurman
Amanda A. Rogers Thorpe              Raffaela L. Wakeman

         Non-Partisan Security and Information Technology Staff

Kristin Jepson                       Claudio Grajeda 
Kimberlee Kerr                         
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                                       
                HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

                Rep. CAROLYN B. MALONEY (NY), Chairwoman
                 Rep. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS (MD), Chairman
Rep. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON (DC)      Rep. JIM JORDAN (OH),
Rep. WM. LACY CLAY (MO)                Ranking Member
Rep. STEPHEN LYNCH (MA)              Rep. PAUL GOSAR (AZ)
Rep. JIM COOPER (TN)                 Rep. THOMAS MASSIE (KY)
Rep. GERALD E. CONNOLLY (VA)         Rep. VIRGINIA FOXX (NC)
Rep. RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI (IL)        Rep. MARK MEADOWS (NC)
Rep. JAMIE RASKIN (MD)               Rep. JODY HICE (GA)
Rep. HARLEY ROUDA (CA)               Rep. GLENN GROTHMAN (WI)
Rep. DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ (FL)   Rep. JAMES COMER (KY)
Rep. JOHN SARBANES (MD)              Rep. MICHAEL CLOUD (TX)
Rep. PETER WELCH (VT)                Rep. BOB GIBBS (OH)
Rep. JACKIE SPEIER (CA)              Rep. CLAY HIGGINS (LA)
Rep. ROBIN KELLY (IL)                Rep. RALPH NORMAN (SC)
Rep. MARK DESAULNIER (CA)            Rep. CHIP ROY (TX)
Rep. BRENDA LAWRENCE (MI)            Rep. CAROL MILLER (WV)
Rep. STACEY PLASKETT (VI)            Rep. MARK GREEN (TN)
Rep. RO KHANNA (CA)                  Rep. KELLY ARMSTRONG (ND)
Rep. JIMMY GOMEZ (CA)                Rep. GREG STEUBE (FL)
Rep. ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ (NY)   Rep. FRED KELLER (PA)
Rep. AYANNA PRESSLEY (MA)
Rep. RASHIDA TLAIB (MI)

                             Majority Staff

                      Dave Rapallo, Staff Director
     Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Deputy Staff Director & Chief Counsel
                Peter Kenny, Chief Investigative Counsel
                    Krista A. Boyd, General Counsel
             Janet H. Kim, Chief Counsel for Investigations
                Russell Anello, Chief Oversight Counsel
                Aryele Bradford, Communications Director

                          Investigative Staff

S. Tori Anderson                     Gina Kim
Aaron D. Blacksberg                  Jason Powell
Chioma Chukwu                        Dan Rebnord
Cassie Fields                        Ricardo Brandon Rios
Greta Gao                            Erinn L. Sauer, Detailee
Michael Gordon                       Amish A. Shah
Jessica L. Heller                    Laura Waters

                       Operations and Press Team

Zachary Barger, Intern               Elisa LaNier
Jamitress Bowden                     Kellie Larkin
Kristen Charley, Intern              Olivia Letts, Intern
Kenyatta Collins                     Anna Rose Marx, Inter
James Darlson, Intern                Courtney Miller
Emma Dulaney                         Noah Steimel, Intern
Evan Elizabeth Freeman, Intern       Travis Stoller, Intern
Christopher Godshall, Intern         Amy Stratton
Trinity Goss                         Laura Trevisani, Intern
Brandon Jacobs                       Joshua Zucker 









                   HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   Rep. ELIOT L. ENGEL (NY), Chairman
Rep. BRAD SHERMAN (CA)               Rep. MICHAEL MCCAUL (TX),
Rep. GREGORY MEEKS (NY)                Ranking Member
Rep. ALBIO SIRES (NJ)                Rep. CHRISTOPHER SMITH (NJ)
Rep. GERALD E. CONNOLLY (VA)         Rep. STEVE CHABOT (OH)
Rep. THEODORE DEUTCH (FL)            Rep. JOE WILSON (SC)
Rep. KAREN BASS (CA)                 Rep. SCOTT PERRY (PA)
Rep. WILLIAM KEATING (MA)            Rep. TED YOHO (FL)
Rep. DAVID CICILLINE (RI)            Rep. ADAM KINZINGER (IL)
Rep. AMI BERA (CA)                   Rep. LEE ZELDIN (NY)
Rep. JOAQUIN CASTRO (TX)             Rep. JAMES SENSENBRENNER (WI)
Rep. DINA TITUS (NV)                 Rep. ANN WAGNER (MO)
Rep. ADRIANO ESPAILLAT (NY)          Rep. BRIAN MAST (FL)
Rep. TED LIEU (CA)                   Rep. FRANCIS ROONEY (FL)
Rep. SUSAN WILD (PA)                 Rep. BRIAN FITZPATRICK (PA)
Rep. DEAN PHILLIPS (MN)              Rep. JOHN CURTIS (UT)
Rep. ILHAN OMAR (MN)                 Rep. KEN BUCK (CO)
Rep. COLIN ALLRED (TX)               Rep. RON WRIGHT (TX)
Rep. ANDY LEVIN (MI)                 Rep. GUY RESCHENTHALER (PA)
Rep. ABIGAIL SPANBERGER (VA)         Rep. TIM BURCHETT (TN)
Rep. CHRISSY HOULAHAN (PA)           Rep. GREG PENCE (IN)
Rep. TOM MALINOWSKI (NJ)             Rep. STEVE WATKINS (KS)
Rep. DAVID TRONE (MD)                Rep. MICHAEL GUEST (MS)
Rep. JIM COSTA (CA)
Rep. JUAN VARGAS (CA)
Rep. VICENTE GONZALEZ (CA)

                             Majority Staff

                    Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
                  Doug Campbell, Deputy Staff Director
                    Janice Kaguyutan, Chief Counsel
    Laura Carey, Senior Professional Staff Member, State Department 
                               Oversight
                  Tim Mulvey, Communications Director
 Jacqueline Ramos, Senior Professional Staff Member, Europe and Russia

                       Operations and Press Staff

Evan Bursey                          Rachel Levitan
Jacqueline Colvett














                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                 Washington, DC, December 11, 2019.
Hon. Cheryl L. Johnson,
Clerk, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mrs. Johnson: I present herewith an unclassified 
report entitled, ``The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry 
Report''.
            Sincerely,
                                            Adam B. Schiff,
                                                          Chairman. 
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                                                          
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
PREFACE..........................................................    IX
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................     1
KEY FINDINGS OF FACT.............................................    22
SECTION I. THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT............................    25
    1. The President Forced Out the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine...    25
    2. The President Put Giuliani and the Three Amigos in Charge 
      of Ukraine Issues..........................................    38
    3. The President Froze Military Assistance to Ukraine........    54
    4. The President's Meeting with the Ukrainian President Was 
      Conditioned on an Announcement of Investigations...........    70
    5. The President Asked the Ukrainian President to Interfere 
      in the 2020 U.S. Election by Investigating the Bidens and 
      2016 Election Interference.................................    85
    6. The President Wanted Ukraine to Announce the 
      Investigations Publicly....................................   101
    7. The President's Conditioning of Military Assistance and a 
      White House Meeting on Announcement of Investigations 
      Raised Alarm...............................................   111
    8. The President's Scheme Was Exposed........................   125
SECTION II. THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF 
  REPRESENTATIVES' IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY...........................   167
    1. Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and 
      Impeachment................................................   167
    2. The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply.............   172
    3. The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed 
      Documents..................................................   180
    4. The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify.....   193
    5. The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Key 
      Witnesses..................................................   206
    6. The President's Intimidation of Witnesses.................   217
APPENDIX A: KEY PEOPLE AND ENTITIES..............................   245
APPENDIX B: ABBREVIATIONS AND COMMON TERMS.......................   248

                                PREFACE

    This report reflects the evidence gathered thus far by the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Committee on Oversight and Reform and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, as part of the House of 
Representatives' impeachment inquiry into Donald J. Trump, the 
45th President of the United States.
    The report is the culmination of an investigation that 
began in September 2019 and intensified over the past three 
months as new revelations and evidence of the President's 
misconduct towards Ukraine emerged. The Committees pursued the 
truth vigorously, but fairly, ensuring the full participation 
of both parties throughout the probe.
    Sustained by the tireless work of more than three dozen 
dedicated staff across the three Committees, we issued dozens 
of subpoenas for documents and testimony and took more than 100 
hours of deposition testimony from 17 witnesses. To provide the 
American people the opportunity to learn and evaluate the facts 
themselves, the Intelligence Committee held seven public 
hearings with 12--witnesses including three requested by the 
Republican Minority--that totaled more than 30 hours.
    At the outset, I want to recognize my late friend and 
colleague Elijah E. Cummings, whose grace and commitment to 
justice served as our North Star throughout this investigation. 
I would also like to thank my colleagues Eliot L. Engel and 
Carolyn B. Maloney, chairs respectively of the Foreign Affairs 
and Oversight and Reform Committees, as well as the Members of 
those Committees, many of whom provided invaluable 
contributions. Members of the Intelligence Committee, as well, 
worked selflessly and collaboratively throughout this 
investigation. Finally, I am grateful to Speaker Nancy Pelosi 
for the trust she placed in our Committees to conduct this work 
and for her wise counsel throughout.
    I also want to thank the dedicated professional staff of 
the Intelligence Committee, who worked ceaselessly and with 
remarkable poise and ability. My deepest gratitude goes to 
Daniel Goldman, Rheanne Wirkkala, Maher Bitar, Timothy 
Bergreen, Patrick Boland, Daniel Noble, Nicolas Mitchell, Sean 
Misko, Patrick Fallon, Diana Pilipenko, William Evans, Ariana 
Rowberry, Wells Bennett, and William Wu. Additional 
Intelligence Committee staff members also assured that the 
important oversight work of the Committee continued, even as we 
were required to take on the additional responsibility of 
conducting a key part of the House impeachment inquiry. 
Finally, I would like to thank the devoted and outstanding 
staff of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, including but 
not limited to Dave Rapallo, Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Peter 
Kenny, Krista Boyd, and Janet Kim, as well as Laura Carey from 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

                                 * * *

    In his farewell address, President George Washington warned 
of a moment when ``cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men 
will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp 
for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards 
the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.''
    The Framers of the Constitution well understood that an 
individual could one day occupy the Office of the President who 
would place his personal or political interests above those of 
the nation. Having just won hard-fought independence from a 
King with unbridled authority, they were attuned to the dangers 
of an executive who lacked fealty to the law and the 
Constitution.
    In response, the Framers adopted a tool used by the British 
Parliament for several hundred years to constrain the Crown--
the power of impeachment. Unlike in Britain, where impeachment 
was typically reserved for inferior officers but not the King 
himself, impeachment in our untested democracy was specifically 
intended to serve as the ultimate form of accountability for a 
duly-elected President. Rather than a mechanism to overturn an 
election, impeachment was explicitly contemplated as a remedy 
of last resort for a president who fails to faithfully execute 
his oath of office ``to preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.''
    Accordingly, the Constitution confers the power to impeach 
the president on Congress, stating that the president shall be 
removed from office upon conviction for ``Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' While the Constitutional 
standard for removal from office is justly a high one, it is 
nonetheless an essential check and balance on the authority of 
the occupant of the Office of the President, particularly when 
that occupant represents a continuing threat to our fundamental 
democratic norms, values, and laws.
    Alexander Hamilton explained that impeachment was not 
designed to cover only criminal violations, but also crimes 
against the American people. ``The subjects of its 
jurisdiction,'' Hamilton wrote, ``are those offenses which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately 
to the society itself.''
    Similarly, future Associate Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania at the 
Constitutional Convention, distinguished impeachable offenses 
from those that reside ``within the sphere of ordinary 
jurisprudence.'' As he noted, ``impeachments are confined to 
political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and 
to political punishments.''

                                 * * *

    As this report details, the impeachment inquiry has found 
that President Trump, personally and acting through agents 
within and outside of the U.S. government, solicited the 
interference of a foreign government, Ukraine, to benefit his 
reelection. In furtherance of this scheme, President Trump 
conditioned official acts on a public announcement by the new 
Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, of politically-
motivated investigations, including one into President Trump's 
domestic political opponent. In pressuring President Zelensky 
to carry out his demand, President Trump withheld a White House 
meeting desperately sought by the Ukrainian President and 
critical U.S. military assistance to fight Russian aggression 
in eastern Ukraine.
    The President engaged in this course of conduct for the 
benefit of his own presidential reelection, to harm the 
election prospects of a political rival, and to influence our 
nation's upcoming presidential election to his advantage. In 
doing so, the President placed his own personal and political 
interests above the national interests of the United States, 
sought to undermine the integrity of the U.S. presidential 
election process, and endangered U.S. national security.
    At the center of this investigation is the memorandum 
prepared following President Trump's July 25, 2019, phone call 
with Ukraine's President, which the White House declassified 
and released under significant public pressure. The call record 
alone is stark evidence of misconduct; a demonstration of the 
President's prioritization of his personal political benefit 
over the national interest. In response to President Zelensky's 
appreciation for vital U.S. military assistance, which 
President Trump froze without explanation, President Trump 
asked for ``a favor though'': two specific investigations 
designed to assist his reelection efforts.
    Our investigation determined that this telephone call was 
neither the start nor the end of President Trump's efforts to 
bend U.S. foreign policy for his personal gain. Rather, it was 
a dramatic crescendo within a months-long campaign driven by 
President Trump in which senior U.S. officials, including the 
Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Acting Chief of 
Staff, the Secretary of Energy, and others were either 
knowledgeable of or active participants in an effort to extract 
from a foreign nation the personal political benefits sought by 
the President.
    The investigation revealed the nature and extent of the 
President's misconduct, notwithstanding an unprecedented 
campaign of obstruction by the President and his Administration 
to prevent the Committees from obtaining documentary evidence 
and testimony. A dozen witnesses followed President Trump's 
orders, defying voluntary requests and lawful subpoenas, and 
refusing to testify. The White House, Department of State, 
Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and 
Department of Energy refused to produce a single document in 
response to our subpoenas.
    Ultimately, this sweeping effort to stonewall the House of 
Representatives' ``sole Power of Impeachment'' under the 
Constitution failed because witnesses courageously came forward 
and testified in response to lawful process. The report that 
follows was only possible because of their sense of duty and 
devotion to their country and its Constitution.
    Nevertheless, there remain unanswered questions, and our 
investigation must continue, even as we transmit our report to 
the Judiciary Committee. Given the proximate threat of further 
presidential attempts to solicit foreign interference in our 
next election, we cannot wait to make a referral until our 
efforts to obtain additional testimony and documents wind their 
way through the courts. The evidence of the President's 
misconduct is overwhelming, and so too is the evidence of his 
obstruction of Congress. Indeed, it would be hard to imagine a 
stronger or more complete case of obstruction than that 
demonstrated by the President since the inquiry began.
    The damage the President has done to our relationship with 
a key strategic partner will be remedied over time, and Ukraine 
continues to enjoy strong bipartisan support in Congress. But 
the damage to our system of checks and balances, and to the 
balance of power within our three branches of government, will 
be long-lasting and potentially irrevocable if the President's 
ability to stonewall Congress goes unchecked. Any future 
President will feel empowered to resist an investigation into 
their own wrongdoing, malfeasance, or corruption, and the 
result will be a nation at far greater risk of all three.

                                 * * *

    The decision to move forward with an impeachment inquiry is 
not one we took lightly. Under the best of circumstances, 
impeachment is a wrenching process for the nation. I resisted 
calls to undertake an impeachment investigation for many months 
on that basis, notwithstanding the existence of presidential 
misconduct that I believed to be deeply unethical and damaging 
to our democracy. The alarming events and actions detailed in 
this report, however, left us with no choice but to proceed.
    In making the decision to move forward, we were struck by 
the fact that the President's misconduct was not an isolated 
occurrence, nor was it the product of a naive president. 
Instead, the efforts to involve Ukraine in our 2020 
presidential election were undertaken by a President who 
himself was elected in 2016 with the benefit of an 
unprecedented and sweeping campaign of election interference 
undertaken by Russia in his favor, which the President welcomed 
and utilized.
    Having witnessed the degree to which interference by a 
foreign power in 2016 harmed our democracy, President Trump 
cannot credibly claim ignorance to its pernicious effects. Even 
more pointedly, the President's July call with Ukrainian 
President Zelensky, in which he solicited an investigation to 
damage his most feared 2020 opponent, came the day after 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller testified to Congress about 
Russia's efforts to damage his 2016 opponent and his urgent 
warning of the dangers of further foreign interference in the 
next election. With this backdrop, the solicitation of new 
foreign intervention was the act of a president unbound, not 
one chastened by experience. It was the act of a president who 
viewed himself as unaccountable and determined to use his vast 
official powers to secure his reelection.
    This repeated and pervasive threat to our democratic 
electoral process added urgency to our work. On October 3, 
2019, even as our Committee was engaged in this inquiry, 
President Trump publicly declared anew that other countries 
should open investigations into his chief political rival, 
saying, ``China should start an investigation into the 
Bidens,'' and ``President Zelensky, if it were me, I would 
recommend that they start an investigation into the Bidens.'' 
When a reporter asked the President what he hoped Ukraine's 
President would do following the July 25 call, President Trump, 
seeking to dispel any doubt as to his continuing intention, 
responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were honest 
about it, they'd start a major investigation into the Bidens. 
It's a very simple answer.''
    By doubling down on his misconduct and declaring that his 
July 25 call with President Zelensky was ``perfect,'' President 
Trump has shown a continued willingness to use the power of his 
office to seek foreign intervention in our next election. His 
Acting Chief of Staff, Mick Mulvaney, in the course of 
admitting that the President had linked security assistance to 
Ukraine to the announcement of one of his desired 
investigations, told the American people to ``get over it.'' In 
these statements and actions, the President became the author 
of his own impeachment inquiry. The question presented by the 
set of facts enumerated in this report may be as simple as that 
posed by the President and his chief of staff's brazenness: is 
the remedy of impeachment warranted for a president who would 
use the power of his office to coerce foreign interference in a 
U.S. election, or is that now a mere perk of the office that 
Americans must simply ``get over''?

                                 * * *

    Those watching the impeachment hearings might have been 
struck by how little discrepancy there was between the 
witnesses called by the Majority and Minority. Indeed, most of 
the facts presented in the pages that follow are uncontested. 
The broad outlines, as well as many of the details of the 
President's scheme, have been presented by the witnesses with 
remarkable consistency. There will always be some variation in 
the testimony of multiple people witnessing the same events, 
but few of the differences here go to the heart of the matter. 
And so, it may have been all the more surprising to the public 
to see very disparate reactions to the testimony by the Members 
of Congress from each party.
    If there was one ill the Founders feared as much as that of 
an unfit president, it may have been that of excessive 
factionalism. Although the Framers viewed parties as necessary, 
they also endeavored to structure the new government in such a 
way as to minimize the ``violence of faction.'' As George 
Washington warned in his farewell address, ``the common and 
continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to 
make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage 
and restrain it.''
    Today, we may be witnessing a collision between the power 
of a remedy meant to curb presidential misconduct and the power 
of faction determined to defend against the use of that remedy 
on a president of the same party. But perhaps even more 
corrosive to our democratic system of governance, the President 
and his allies are making a comprehensive attack on the very 
idea of fact and truth. How can a democracy survive without 
acceptance of a common set of experiences?
    America remains the beacon of democracy and opportunity for 
freedom-loving people around the world. From their homes and 
their jail cells, from their public squares and their refugee 
camps, from their waking hours until their last breath, 
individuals fighting human rights abuses, journalists 
uncovering and exposing corruption, persecuted minorities 
struggling to survive and preserve their faith, and countless 
others around the globe just hoping for a better life look to 
America. What we do will determine what they see, and whether 
America remains a nation committed to the rule of law.
    As Benjamin Franklin departed the Constitutional 
Convention, he was asked, ``what have we got? A Republic or a 
Monarchy?'' He responded simply: ``A Republic, if you can keep 
it.''
                                            Adam B. Schiff,
        Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.















                                                 House Calendar No. 60
116th Congress    }                                      {      Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                      {     116-335
======================================================================



 
              THE TRUMP-UKRAINE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT

                                _______
                                

 December 11, 2019.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Schiff, from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                           THE TRUMP-UKRAINE 
                       IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY REPORT

    Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Pursuant to H. Res. 660 in Consultation with the 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform and the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs

                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    The impeachment inquiry into Donald J. Trump, the 45th 
President of the United States, uncovered a months-long effort 
by President Trump to use the powers of his office to solicit 
foreign interference on his behalf in the 2020 election. As 
described in this executive summary and the report that 
follows, President Trump's scheme subverted U.S. foreign policy 
toward Ukraine and undermined our national security in favor of 
two politically motivated investigations that would help his 
presidential reelection campaign. The President demanded that 
the newly-elected Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, 
publicly announce investigations into a political rival that he 
apparently feared the most, former Vice President Joe Biden, 
and into a discredited theory that it was Ukraine, not Russia, 
that interfered in the 2016 presidential election. To compel 
the Ukrainian President to do his political bidding, President 
Trump conditioned two official acts on the public announcement 
of the investigations: a coveted White House visit and critical 
U.S. military assistance Ukraine needed to fight its Russian 
adversary.
    During a July 25, 2019, call between President Trump and 
President Zelensky, President Zelensky expressed gratitude for 
U.S. military assistance. President Trump immediately responded 
by asking President Zelensky to ``do us a favor though'' and 
openly pressed for Ukraine to investigate former Vice President 
Biden and the 2016 conspiracy theory. In turn, President 
Zelensky assured President Trump that he would pursue the 
investigation and reiterated his interest in the White House 
meeting. Although President Trump's scheme intentionally 
bypassed many career personnel, it was undertaken with the 
knowledge and approval of senior Administration officials, 
including the President's Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Secretary of Energy Rick 
Perry. In fact, at a press conference weeks after public 
revelations about the scheme, Mr. Mulvaney publicly 
acknowledged that the President directly tied the hold on 
military aid to his desire to get Ukraine to conduct a 
political investigation, telling Americans to ``get over it.''
    President Trump and his senior officials may see nothing 
wrong with using the power of the Office of the President to 
pressure a foreign country to help the President's reelection 
campaign. Indeed, President Trump continues to encourage 
Ukraine and other foreign countries to engage in the same kind 
of election interference today. However, the Founding Fathers 
prescribed a remedy for a chief executive who places his 
personal interests above those of the country: impeachment. 
Accordingly, as part of the House of Representatives' 
impeachment inquiry, the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Committees on Oversight 
and Reform and Foreign Affairs, was compelled to undertake a 
serious, sober, and expeditious investigation into whether the 
President's misconduct warrants that remedy.
    In response, President Trump engaged in an unprecedented 
campaign of obstruction of this impeachment inquiry. 
Nevertheless, due in large measure to patriotic and courageous 
public servants who provided the Committees with direct 
evidence of the President's actions, the Committees uncovered 
significant misconduct on the part of the President of the 
United States. As required under House Resolution 660, the 
Intelligence Committee, in consultation with the Committees on 
Oversight and Reform and Foreign Affairs, has prepared this 
report to detail the evidence uncovered to date, which will now 
be transmitted to the Judiciary Committee for its 
consideration.

                 SECTION I--THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT

  The President Conditioned a White House Meeting and Military Aid to 
 Ukraine on a Public Announcement of Investigations Beneficial to his 
                          Reelection Campaign

             The President's Request for a Political Favor

    On the morning of July 25, 2019, President Donald Trump 
settled in to the White House Executive Residence to join a 
telephone call with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine. It 
had been more than three months since President Zelensky, a 
political neophyte, had been swept into office in a landslide 
victory on a platform of rooting out corruption and ending the 
war between his country and Russia. The day of his election, 
April 21, President Zelensky spoke briefly with President 
Trump, who had called to congratulate him and invite him to a 
visit at the White House. As of July 25, no White House meeting 
had materialized.
    As is typical for telephone calls with other heads of 
state, staff members from the National Security Council (NSC) 
convened in the White House Situation Room to listen to the 
call and take notes, which would later be compiled into a 
memorandum that would constitute the U.S. government's official 
record of the call. NSC staff had prepared a standard package 
of talking points for the President based on official U.S. 
policy. The talking points included recommendations to 
encourage President Zelensky to continue to promote anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine, a pillar of American foreign 
policy in the country as far back as its independence in the 
1990s when Ukraine first rid itself of Kremlin control.
    This call would deviate significantly from that script. 
Shortly before he was patched through to President Zelensky, 
President Trump spoke with Gordon Sondland, who had donated $1 
million to President Trump's 2016 presidential inauguration and 
whom the President had appointed as the United States 
Ambassador to the European Union. Ambassador Sondland had 
helped lay the groundwork for a very different kind of call 
between the two Presidents.
    Ambassador Sondland had relayed a message to President 
Zelensky six days earlier that ``assurances to run a fully 
transparent investigation'' and ``turn over every stone'' were 
necessary in his call with President Trump. Ambassador Sondland 
understood these phrases to refer to two investigations 
politically beneficial to the President's reelection campaign: 
one into former Vice President Joe Biden and a Ukrainian gas 
company called Burisma, of which his son sat on the board, and 
the other into a discredited conspiracy theory alleging that 
Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. The 
allegations about Vice President Biden were without evidence, 
and the U.S. Intelligence Community had unanimously determined 
that Russia, not Ukraine, interfered in the 2016 election to 
help the candidacy of Donald Trump. Despite the falsehoods, 
Ambassador Sondland would make it clear to Ukrainian officials 
that the public announcement of these investigations was a 
prerequisite for the coveted White House meeting with President 
Trump, an effort that would help the President's reelection 
campaign.
    The White House meeting was not the only official act that 
President Trump conditioned on the announcement of these 
investigations. Several weeks before his phone call with 
President Zelensky, President Trump ordered a hold on nearly 
$400 million of congressionally-appropriated security 
assistance to Ukraine that provided Kyiv essential support as 
it sought to repel Russian forces that were occupying Crimea 
and inflicting casualties in the eastern region of the country. 
The President's decision to freeze the aid, made without 
explanation, sent shock waves through the Department of Defense 
(DOD), the Department of State, and the NSC, which uniformly 
supported providing this assistance to our strategic partner. 
Although the suspension of aid had not been made public by the 
day of the call between the two Presidents, officials at the 
Ukrainian embassy in Washington had already asked American 
officials about the status of the vital military assistance.
    At the outset of the conversation on July 25, President 
Zelensky thanked President Trump for the ``great support in the 
area of defense'' provided by the United States to date. He 
then indicated that Ukraine would soon be prepared to purchase 
additional Javelin anti-tank missiles from the United States as 
part of this defense cooperation. President Trump immediately 
responded with his own request: ``I would like you to do us a 
favor though,'' which was ``to find out what happened'' with 
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election.
    President Trump then asked President Zelensky ``to look 
into'' former Vice President Biden's role in encouraging 
Ukraine to remove a prosecutor widely viewed by the United 
States and numerous European partners to be corrupt. In so 
doing, President Trump gave currency to a baseless allegation 
that Vice President Biden wanted to remove the corrupt 
prosecutor because he was investigating Burisma, a company on 
whose board the Vice President's son sat at the time.
    Over the course of the roughly thirty-minute call, 
President Trump repeated these false allegations and pressed 
the Ukrainian President to consult with his personal attorney, 
Rudy Giuliani, who had been publicly advocating for months for 
Ukraine to initiate these specific investigations. President 
Zelensky promised that he would ``work on the investigation of 
the case.'' Later in the call, he thanked President Trump for 
his invitation to join him at the White House, following up 
immediately with a comment that, ``[o]n the other hand,'' he 
would ``ensure'' that Ukraine pursued ``the investigation'' 
that President Trump had requested.
    During the call, President Trump also disparaged Marie 
Yovanovitch, the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, who 
championed anti-corruption reforms in the country, and whom 
President Trump had unceremoniously removed months earlier 
following a smear campaign waged against her by Mr. Giuliani 
and others. President Trump claimed that she was ``bad news'' 
and was ``going to go through some things.'' He praised the 
current prosecutor at the time, who was widely viewed as 
corrupt and who helped initiate the smear campaign against her, 
calling him ``very good'' and ``very fair.''
    Hearing the call as it transpired, several White House 
staff members became alarmed. Far from giving the ``full-
throated endorsement of the Ukraine reform agenda'' that had 
been hoped for, the President instead demanded a political 
investigation into an American--the presidential candidate he 
evidently feared most, Joe Biden.
    Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, an NSC staff member 
responsible for Ukraine policy who listened to the call, 
immediately reported his concerns to NSC lawyers. His 
supervisor, NSC Senior Director for Europe and Russia Timothy 
Morrison, also reported the call to the lawyers, worrying that 
the call would be ``damaging'' if leaked publicly. In response, 
the lawyers placed the memorandum summarizing the call onto a 
highly classified server, significantly limiting access to the 
materials.
    The call record would not remain hidden forever. On 
September 25, 2019, facing immense public pressure to reveal 
the contents of the call and following the announcement the 
previous day of a formal impeachment inquiry in the House of 
Representatives into President Trump's actions toward Ukraine, 
the White House publicly released the memorandum of the July 25 
call.
    The record of the call would help explain for those 
involved in Ukraine policy in the U.S. government, the 
Congress, and the public why President Trump, his personal 
attorney, Mr. Giuliani, his hand-picked appointees in charge of 
Ukraine issues, and various senior Administration officials 
would go to great lengths to withhold a coveted White House 
meeting and critical military aid from Ukraine at a time when 
it served as a bulwark against Russian aggression in Europe.
    The answer was as simple as it was inimical to our national 
security and election integrity: the President was withholding 
officials acts while soliciting something of value to his 
reelection campaign--an investigation into his political rival.
    The story of that scheme follows.

                                 * * *

 The President Removed Anti-Corruption Champion Ambassador Yovanovitch

    On April 24, 2019, President Trump abruptly called back to 
Washington the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie 
``Masha'' Yovanovitch, after a ruthless smear campaign was 
waged against her. She was known throughout Ukraine and among 
her peers for aggressively advocating for anti-corruption 
reforms consistent with U.S. foreign policy and only recently 
had been asked to extend her stay in Ukraine. Her effectiveness 
in anti-corruption efforts earned her enemies in Kyiv and in 
Washington. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent 
testified in praising Ambassador Yovanovitch: ``You can't 
promote principled anticorruption action without pissing off 
corrupt people.''
    Beginning on March 20, The Hill newspaper published several 
op-eds attacking Ambassador Yovanovitch and former Vice 
President Joe Biden, relying on information from a Ukrainian 
prosecutor, Yuriy Lutsenko, who was widely viewed to be 
corrupt. Mr. Lutsenko had served as the chief prosecutor in 
Ukraine under the then-incumbent president who lost to 
Volodymyr Zelensky in April 2019. Although he would later 
recant many of his allegations, Mr. Lutsenko falsely accused 
Ambassador Yovanovitch of speaking negatively about President 
Trump and giving Mr. Lutsenko a ``do-not-prosecute list.''
    The attacks against Ambassador Yovanovitch were amplified 
by prominent, close allies of President Trump, including Mr. 
Giuliani and his associates, Sean Hannity, and Donald Trump Jr. 
President Trump tweeted the smears himself just a month before 
he recalled the Ambassador from Ukraine. In the face of attacks 
driven by Mr. Lutsenko and the President's allies, Ambassador 
Yovanovitch and other senior State Department officials asked 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to issue a statement of support 
for her and for the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. The Secretary 
declined, fearing that President Trump might publicly undermine 
those efforts, possibly through a tweet.
    Following a ceremony in which she presented an award of 
courage to the family of a young female anti-corruption 
activist killed in Ukraine for her work, Ambassador Yovanovitch 
received an urgent call from the State Department regarding her 
``security,'' and imploring her to take the first plane back to 
Washington. When she arrived, she was informed that she had 
done nothing wrong, but that the President had lost confidence 
in her. She was told to leave her post as soon as possible.
    In her place, the President would designate three new 
agents to spearhead Ukraine policy, political appointees far 
more willing to engage in an improper ``domestic political 
errand'' than an ambassador known for her efforts to fight 
corruption.

          The President's Hand-Picked Agents Began the Scheme

    Just three days before Ambassador Yovanovitch's abrupt 
recall to Washington, President Trump had his first telephone 
call with President-elect Zelensky. During that conversation, 
President Trump congratulated the Ukrainian leader on his 
victory, complimented him on his country's Miss Universe 
Pageant contestants, and invited him to visit the White House. 
A White House meeting would help demonstrate the United States' 
strong support for Ukraine as it fought a hot war with Russia 
and attempted to negotiate an end to the conflict with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, as well as to bolster President-elect 
Zelensky's standing with his own people as he sought to deliver 
on his promised anti-corruption agenda. Although the White 
House's public summary of the call included some discussion of 
a commitment to ``root out corruption,'' President Trump did 
not mention corruption at all.
    Shortly after the conversation, President Trump asked Vice 
President Mike Pence to attend President Zelensky's 
inauguration. Vice President Pence confirmed directly to 
President Zelensky his intention to attend during a phone 
conversation on April 23, and Vice President Pence's staff and 
the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv began preparations for the trip.
    At the same time, President Trump's personal attorney, Mr. 
Giuliani, intensified his campaign to pressure Ukraine's newly-
elected President to initiate investigations into Joe Biden, 
who had officially entered the race for the Democratic 
nomination on April 25, and the baseless conspiracy theory 
about Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election. On May 9, 
the New York Times published an article in which Mr. Giuliani 
declared that he intended to travel to Ukraine on behalf of his 
client, President Trump, in order to meddle in an 
investigation. After public backlash, Mr. Giuliani canceled the 
trip, blaming ``some bad people'' around President Zelensky. 
Days later, President Trump rescinded the plans for Vice 
President Pence to attend President Zelensky's inauguration, 
which had not yet been scheduled. The staff member planning the 
trip was not provided an explanation for the about-face, but 
staff in the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv were disappointed that 
President Zelensky would not receive a ``high level'' show of 
support from the United States.
    In Vice President Pence's stead, Secretary of Energy Rick 
Perry led the American delegation to the Ukrainian President's 
inauguration. Ambassador Sondland, Special Representative for 
Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Kurt Volker, and Lt. Col. 
Vindman also attended. In comments that would foreshadow 
troubling events to come, Lt. Col. Vindman warned President 
Zelensky to stay out of U.S. domestic politics to avoid 
jeopardizing the bipartisan support Ukraine enjoyed in 
Congress.
    The delegation returned to the United States impressed with 
President Zelensky, especially his focus on anti-corruption 
reforms. Ambassador Sondland quickly organized a meeting with 
President Trump in the Oval Office on May 23, attended by most 
of the other members of the delegation. The three political 
appointees, who would describe themselves as the ``Three 
Amigos,'' relayed their positive impression of President 
Zelensky to President Trump and encouraged him to schedule the 
Oval Office meeting he promised in his April 21 phone call with 
the new leader.
    President Trump reacted poorly to the suggestion, claiming 
that Ukraine ``tried to take me down'' in 2016. In order to 
schedule a White House visit for President Zelensky, President 
Trump told the delegation that they would have to ``talk to 
Rudy.'' Ambassador Sondland testified that he understood the 
President's instruction to be a directive to work with Mr. 
Giuliani if they hoped to advance relations with Ukraine. 
President Trump directed the three senior U.S. government 
officials to assist Mr. Giuliani's efforts, which, it would 
soon become clear, were exclusively for the benefit of the 
President's reelection campaign.
    As the Three Amigos were given responsibility over the U.S. 
government's Ukraine portfolio, Bill Taylor, a former 
Ambassador to Ukraine, was considering whether to come out of 
retirement to accept a request to succeed Ambassador 
Yovanovitch in Kyiv. As of May 26, Ambassador Taylor was 
``still struggling with the decision,'' and, in particular, 
whether anyone can ``hope to succeed with the Giuliani-Biden 
issue swirling.'' After receiving assurances from Secretary 
Pompeo that U.S. policy toward Ukraine would not change, 
Ambassador Taylor accepted the position and arrived in Kyiv on 
June 17. Ambassador Taylor would quickly come to observe an 
``irregular channel'' led by Mr. Giuliani that, over time, 
began to undermine the official channel of diplomatic relations 
with Ukraine. Mr. Giuliani would prove to be, as the 
President's National Security Advisor Ambassador John Bolton 
would tell a colleague, a ``hand grenade that was going to blow 
everyone up.''

             The President Froze Vital Military Assistance

    For fiscal year 2019, Congress appropriated and authorized 
$391 million in security assistance to Ukraine: $250 million in 
funds administered by DOD and $141 million in funds 
administered by the State Department. On June 18, DOD issued a 
press release announcing its intention to provide $250 million 
in taxpayer-funded security assistance to Ukraine following the 
certification that all legitimate conditions on the aid, 
including anti-corruption reforms, had been met. Shortly after 
this announcement, however, both the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and DOD received inquiries from the President 
related to the funds. At that time, and throughout the next few 
months, support for Ukraine security assistance was 
overwhelming and unanimous among all of the relevant agencies 
and within Congress.
    By July 3, OMB blocked a Congressional notification which 
would have cleared the way for the release of $141 million in 
State Department security assistance funds. By July 12, 
President Trump had placed a hold on all military support 
funding for Ukraine. On July 18, OMB announced the hold to all 
of the relevant agencies and indicated that it was directed by 
the President. No other reason was provided.
    During a series of policy meetings involving increasingly 
senior officials, the uniform and consistent position of all 
policymaking agencies supported the release of funding. Ukraine 
experts at DOD, the State Department, and the NSC argued that 
it was in the national security interest of the United States 
to continue to support Ukraine. As Mr. Morrison testified, 
``The United States aids Ukraine and her people so that they 
can fight Russia over there, and we don't have to fight Russia 
here.''
    Agency officials also expressed concerns about the legality 
of President Trump's direction to withhold assistance to 
Ukraine that Congress had already appropriated for this express 
purpose. Two OMB career officials, including one of its legal 
counsels, would resign, in part, over concerns regarding the 
hold.
    By July 25, the date of President Trump's call with 
President Zelensky, DOD was also receiving inquiries from 
Ukrainian officials about the status of the security 
assistance. Nevertheless, President Trump continued to withhold 
the funding to Ukraine without explanation, against the 
interests of U.S. national security, and over the objections of 
these career experts.

   The President Conditioned a White House Meeting on Investigations

    By the time Ukrainian officials were first learning about 
an issue with the anticipated military assistance, the 
President's hand-picked representatives to Ukraine had already 
informed their Ukrainian counterparts that President Zelensky's 
coveted White House meeting would only happen after Ukraine 
committed to pursuing the two political investigations that 
President Trump and Mr. Giuliani demanded.
    Ambassador Sondland was unequivocal in describing this 
conditionality, testifying, ``I know that members of this 
committee frequently frame these complicated issues in the form 
of a simple question: Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified 
previously with regard to the requested White House call and 
the White House meeting, the answer is yes.'' Ambassadors 
Sondland and Volker worked to obtain the necessary assurance 
from President Zelensky that he would personally commit to 
initiate the investigations in order to secure both.
    On July 2, in Toronto, Canada, Ambassador Volker conveyed 
the message directly to President Zelensky, specifically 
referencing the ``Giuliani factor'' in President Zelensky's 
engagement with the United States. For his part, Mr. Giuliani 
made clear to Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, who were 
directly communicating with the Ukrainians, that a White House 
meeting would not occur until Ukraine announced its pursuit of 
the two political investigations. After observing Mr. 
Giuliani's role in the ouster of a U.S. Ambassador and learning 
of his influence with the President, Ukrainian officials soon 
understood that ``the key for many things is Rudi [sic].''
    On July 10, Ambassador Bolton hosted a meeting in the White 
House with two senior Ukrainian officials, several American 
officials, including Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, Secretary 
Perry, Dr. Fiona Hill, Senior Director for Europe and Russia at 
the NSC, and Lt. Col. Vindman. As had become customary each 
time Ukrainian officials met with their American counterparts, 
the Ukrainians asked about the long-delayed White House 
meeting. Ambassador Bolton demurred, but Ambassador Sondland 
spoke up, revealing that he had worked out an arrangement with 
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney to schedule the White House 
visit after Ukraine initiated the ``investigations.'' 
Ambassador Bolton ``stiffened'' and quickly ended the meeting.
    Undaunted, Ambassador Sondland ushered many of the 
attendees to the Ward Room downstairs to continue their 
discussion. In the second meeting, Ambassador Sondland 
explained that he had an agreement with Mr. Mulvaney that the 
White House visit would come only after Ukraine announced the 
Burisma/Biden and 2016 Ukraine election interference 
investigations. At this second meeting, both Lt. Col. Vindman 
and Dr. Hill objected to intertwining a ``domestic political 
errand'' with official foreign policy, and they indicated that 
a White House meeting would have to go through proper channels.
    Following these discussions, Dr. Hill reported back to 
Ambassador Bolton, who told her to ``go and tell [the NSC Legal 
Advisor] that I am not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and 
Mulvaney are cooking up on this.'' Both Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. 
Vindman separately reported the incident to the NSC Legal 
Advisor.

             The President's Agents Pursued a ``Drug Deal''

    Over the next two weeks, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker 
worked closely with Mr. Giuliani and senior Ukrainian and 
American officials to arrange a telephone call between 
President Trump and President Zelensky and to ensure that the 
Ukrainian President explicitly promised to undertake the 
political investigations required by President Trump to 
schedule the White House meeting. As Ambassador Sondland would 
later testify: ``Mr. Giuliani was expressing the desires of the 
President of the United States, and we knew these 
investigations were important to the President.''
    On July 19, Ambassador Volker had breakfast with Mr. 
Giuliani and his associate, Lev Parnas, at the Trump Hotel in 
Washington, D.C. Mr. Parnas would subsequently be indicted for 
campaign finance violations as part of an investigation that 
remains ongoing. During the conversation, Ambassador Volker 
stressed his belief that the attacks being leveled publicly 
against Vice President Biden related to Ukraine were false and 
that the former Vice President was ``a person of integrity.'' 
He counseled Mr. Giuliani that the Ukrainian prosecutor pushing 
the false narrative, Mr. Lutsenko, was promoting ``a self-
serving narrative to preserve himself in power.'' Mr. Giuliani 
agreed, but his promotion of Mr. Lutsenko's false accusations 
for the benefit of President Trump did not cease. Ambassador 
Volker also offered to help arrange an in-person meeting 
between Mr. Giuliani and Andriy Yermak, one of President 
Zelensky's most trusted advisors, which would later take place 
in Madrid, Spain in early August.
    After the breakfast meeting at the Trump Hotel, Ambassador 
Volker reported back to Ambassadors Sondland and Taylor about 
his conversation with Mr. Giuliani, writing in a text message 
that, ``Most impt [sic] is for Zelensky to say that he will 
help investigation and address any specific personnel issues if 
there are any,'' likely referencing President Zelensky's 
decision to remove Mr. Lutsenko as prosecutor general, a 
decision with which Mr. Giuliani disagreed. The same day, 
Ambassador Sondland spoke with President Zelensky and 
recommended that the Ukrainian leader tell President Trump that 
he ``will leave no stone unturned'' regarding the political 
investigations during the upcoming presidential phone call.
    Ambassador Sondland emailed several top Administration 
officials, including Secretary of State Pompeo, Acting Chief of 
Staff Mulvaney, and Secretary Perry, stating that President 
Zelensky confirmed that he would ``assure'' President Trump 
that ``he intends to run a fully transparent investigation and 
will `turn over every stone.''' According to Ambassador 
Sondland, he was referring in the email to the Burisma/Biden 
and 2016 election interference investigations. Secretary Perry 
and Mr. Mulvaney responded affirmatively that the call would 
soon take place, and Ambassador Sondland testified later that 
``everyone was in the loop'' on plans to condition the White 
House meeting on the announcement of political investigations 
beneficial to President Trump. The arrangement troubled the 
Ukrainian President, who ``did not want to be used as a pawn in 
a U.S. reelection campaign.''

    The President Pressed President Zelensky to Do a Political Favor

    On the morning of July 25, Ambassador Volker sent a text 
message to President Zelensky's top aide, Mr. Yermak, less than 
30 minutes before the presidential call. He stated: ``Heard 
from White House--assuming President Z convinces trump he will 
investigate`get to the bottom of what happened' in 2016, we 
will nail down date for visit to Washington. Good luck!'' 
Shortly before the call, Ambassador Sondland spoke directly 
with President Trump.
    President Zelensky followed this advice during his 
conversation with President Trump. President Zelensky assured 
that he would pursue the investigations that President Trump 
had discussed--into the Bidens and 2016 election interference--
and, in turn, pressed for the White House meeting that remained 
outstanding.
    The following day, Ambassadors Volker, Sondland, and Taylor 
met with President Zelensky in Kyiv. The Ukrainian President 
told them that President Trump had mentioned ``sensitive 
issues'' three times during the previous day's phone call. 
Following the meeting with the Ukrainian leader, Ambassador 
Sondland had a private, one-on-one conversation with Mr. Yermak 
in which they discussed ``the issue of investigations.'' He 
then retired to lunch at an outdoor restaurant terrace with 
State Department aides where he called President Trump directly 
from his cellphone. The White House confirmed that the 
conversation lasted five minutes.
    At the outset of the call, President Trump asked Ambassador 
Sondland whether President Zelensky ``was going to do the 
investigation'' that President Trump had raised with President 
Zelensky the day before. Ambassador Sondland stated that 
President Zelensky was ``going to do it'' and ``would do 
anything you ask him to.'' According to David Holmes, the State 
Department aide sitting closest to Ambassador Sondland and who 
overheard the President's voice on the phone, Ambassador 
Sondland and President Trump spoke only about the investigation 
in their discussion about Ukraine. The President made no 
mention of other major issues of importance in Ukraine, 
including President Zelensky's aggressive anti-corruption 
reforms and the ongoing war it was fighting against Russian-led 
forces in eastern Ukraine.
    After hanging up the phone, Ambassador Sondland explained 
to Mr. Holmes that President Trump ``did not give a shit about 
Ukraine.'' Rather, the President cared only about ``big stuff'' 
that benefited him personally, like ``the Biden investigation 
that Mr. Giuliani was pitching,'' and that President Trump had 
pushed for in his July 25 call with the Ukrainian leader. 
Ambassador Sondland did not recall referencing Biden 
specifically, but he did not dispute Mr. Holmes' recollection 
of the call with the President or Ambassador Sondland's 
subsequent discussion with Mr. Holmes.

The President's Representatives Ratcheted up Pressure on the Ukrainian 
                               President

    In the weeks following the July 25 call, the President's 
hand-picked representatives increased the President's pressure 
campaign on Ukrainian government officials--in person, over the 
phone, and by text message--to secure a public announcement of 
the investigations beneficial to President Trump's reelection 
campaign.
    In discussions with Ukrainian officials, Ambassador 
Sondland understood that President Trump did not require that 
Ukraine conduct investigations as a prerequisite for the White 
House meeting so much as publicly announce the investigations--
making clear that the goal was not the investigations, but the 
political benefit Trump would derive from their announcement 
and the cloud they might put over a political opponent.
    On August 2, President Zelensky's advisor, Mr. Yermak, 
traveled to Madrid to meet Mr. Giuliani in person. There, they 
agreed that Ukraine would issue a public statement, and they 
discussed potential dates for a White House meeting. A few days 
later, Ambassador Volker told Mr. Giuliani that it ``would be 
good'' if Mr. Giuliani would report to ``the boss,'' President 
Trump, about ``the results'' of his Madrid discussion so that 
President Trump would finally agree to a White House visit by 
President Zelensky.
    On August 9, Ambassador Volker and Mr. Giuliani spoke twice 
by phone, and Ambassador Sondland spoke twice to the White 
House for a total of about 20 minutes. In a text message to 
Ambassador Volker later that day, Ambassador Sondland wrote, 
``I think potus [sic] really wants the deliverable,'' which 
Ambassador Sondland acknowledged was the public statement 
announcing the two political investigations sought by President 
Trump and Mr. Giuliani.
    The following day, Ambassador Sondland briefed State 
Department Counselor Ulrich Brechbuhl, a top advisor to 
Secretary Pompeo, on these discussions about President Zelensky 
issuing a statement that would include an announcement of the 
two political investigations. Ambassador Sondland also emailed 
Secretary Pompeo directly, copying the State Department's 
executive secretary and Mr. Brechbuhl, to inform them about the 
agreement for President Zelensky to give the press conference. 
He expected to see a draft of the statement, which would be 
``delivered for our review in a day or two.'' Ambassador 
Sondland noted his hope that the draft statement would ``make 
the boss happy enough to authorize an invitation.''
    On August 12, Mr. Yermak sent the proposed statement to 
Ambassador Volker, but it lacked specific references to the two 
investigations politically beneficial to President Trump's 
reelection campaign. The following morning, Ambassadors 
Sondland and Volker spoke with Mr. Giuliani, who made clear 
that if the statement ``doesn't say Burisma and 2016, it's not 
credible.'' Ambassador Volker revised the statement following 
this direction to include those references and returned it to 
the Ukrainian President's aide.
    Mr. Yermak balked at getting drawn into U.S. politics and 
asked Ambassador Volker whether the United States had inquired 
about investigations through any appropriate Department of 
Justice channels. The answer was no, and several witnesses 
testified that a request to a foreign country to investigate a 
U.S. citizen ``for political reasons'' goes ``against 
everything'' the United States sought to promote in eastern 
Europe, specifically the rule of law. Ambassador Volker 
eventually agreed with Mr. Yermak that the announcement of the 
Biden/Burisma and 2016 elections investigations would ``look 
like it would play into our domestic politics,'' so the 
statement was temporarily ``shelved.''
    Nevertheless, Ambassador Sondland, in accordance with 
President Trump's wishes, continued to pursue the statement 
into early September 2019.

 Ukrainians Inquired about the President's Hold on Security Assistance

    Once President Trump placed security assistance on hold in 
July, ``it was inevitable that it was eventually going to come 
out.'' On July 25, DOD officials learned that diplomats at the 
Ukrainian Embassy in Washington had made multiple overtures to 
DOD and the State Department ``asking about security 
assistance.'' Separately, two different contacts at the 
Ukrainian Embassy approached Ambassador Volker's special 
advisor, Catherine Croft, to ask her in confidence about the 
hold. Ms. Croft was surprised at the effectiveness of their 
``diplomatic tradecraft,'' noting that they ``found out very 
early on'' that the United States was withholding critical 
military aid to Ukraine. By mid-August, before the freeze on 
aid became public, Lt. Col. Vindman had also received inquiries 
from an official at the Ukrainian Embassy.
    The hold remained in place throughout August against the 
unanimous judgment of American officials focused on Ukraine 
policy. Without an explanation for the hold, which ran contrary 
to the recommendation of all relevant agencies, and with 
President Trump already conditioning a White House visit on the 
announcement of the political investigations, it became 
increasingly apparent to multiple witnesses that the military 
aid was also being withheld in exchange for the announcement of 
them. As both Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Holmes would later 
testify, it became as clear as ``two plus two equals four.''
    On August 22, Ambassador Sondland emailed Secretary Pompeo 
again, recommending a plan for a potential meeting between 
President Trump and President Zelensky in Warsaw, Poland on 
September 1. Ambassador Sondland noted that President Zelensky 
should ``look him in the eye'' and tell President Trump that 
once new prosecutorial officials were in place in Ukraine, 
``Zelensky should be able to move forward publicly and with 
confidence on those issues of importance to Potus and the 
U.S.'' Ambassador Sondland testified that this was a reference 
to the political investigations that President Trump discussed 
on the July 25 call, which Secretary Pompeo had listened to. 
Ambassador Sondland hoped this would ``break the logjam''--the 
hold on critical security assistance to Ukraine. Secretary 
Pompeo replied three minutes later: ``Yes.''

         The President's Security Assistance Hold Became Public

    On August 28, Politico published a story revealing 
President Trump's weeks-long hold on U.S. military assistance 
to Ukraine. Senior Ukrainian officials expressed grave concern, 
deeply worried about the practical impact on their efforts to 
fight Russian aggression, but also about the public message it 
sent to the Russian government, which would almost certainly 
seek to exploit any real or perceived crack in U.S. resolve 
toward Ukraine.
    On August 29, at the urging of National Security Advisor 
Bolton, Ambassador Taylor wrote a first-person cable to 
Secretary Pompeo. This was the only first-person cable the 
Ambassador had ever sent in his decades of government service. 
He explained the ``folly'' of withholding security assistance 
to Ukraine as it fought a hot war against Russia on its 
borders. He wrote that he ``could not and would not defend such 
a policy.'' Ambassador Taylor stated that Secretary Pompeo may 
have carried the cable with him to a meeting at the White 
House.
    The same day that Ambassador Taylor sent his cable, 
President Trump cancelled his planned trip to Warsaw for a 
World War II commemoration event, where he was scheduled to 
meet with President Zelensky. Vice President Pence traveled in 
his place. Ambassador Sondland also traveled to Warsaw and, at 
a pre-briefing discussion with the Vice President before he met 
President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland raised the issue of the 
hold on security assistance. He told Vice President Pence that 
he was concerned that the security assistance ``had become tied 
to the issue of investigations'' and that ``everything is being 
held up until these statements get made.'' Vice President Pence 
nodded in response, apparently expressing neither surprise nor 
dismay at the linkage between the two.
    At the meeting, President Zelensky expressed concern that 
even an appearance of wavering support from the United States 
for Ukraine could embolden Russia. Vice President Pence 
reiterated U.S. support for Ukraine, but could not promise that 
the hold would be lifted. Vice President Pence said he would 
relay his support for lifting the hold to President Trump so a 
decision could be made on security assistance as soon as 
possible. Vice President Pence spoke with President Trump that 
evening, but the hold was not lifted.
    Following this meeting, Ambassador Sondland pulled aside 
President Zelensky's advisor, Mr. Yermak, to explain that the 
hold on security assistance was conditioned on the public 
announcement of the Burisma/Biden and the 2016 election 
interference investigations. After learning of the 
conversation, Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassador Sondland: 
``Are we now saying that security assistance and WH meeting are 
conditioned on investigations?''
    The two then spoke by phone. Ambassador Sondland explained 
that he had previously made a ``mistake'' in telling Ukrainian 
officials that only the White House meeting was conditioned on 
a public announcement of the political investigations 
beneficial to President Trump. He clarified that 
``everything''--the White House meeting and hundreds of 
millions of dollars of security assistance to Ukraine--was now 
conditioned on the announcement. President Trump wanted 
President Zelensky in a ``public box,'' which Ambassador Taylor 
understood to mean that President Trump required that President 
Zelensky make a public announcement about the investigations 
and that a private commitment would not do.
    On September 7, President Trump and Ambassador Sondland 
spoke. Ambassador Sondland stated to his colleagues that the 
President said, ``there was no quid pro quo,'' but that 
President Zelensky would be required to announce the 
investigations in order for the hold on security assistance to 
be lifted, ``and he should want to do it.'' Ambassador Sondland 
passed on a similar message directly to President Zelensky and 
Mr. Yermak that, ``although this was not a quid pro quo, if 
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would 
be at a stalemate,'' referring to the hold on security 
assistance. Arrangements were made for the Ukrainian President 
to make a public statement during an interview on CNN.
    After speaking with Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Taylor 
texted Ambassadors Sondland and Volker: ``As I said on the 
phone, I think it's crazy to withhold security assistance for 
help with a political campaign.'' Notwithstanding his long-held 
understanding that the White House meeting was conditioned on 
the public announcement of two political investigations desired 
by President Trump--and not broader anti-corruption concerns--
Ambassador Sondland responded hours later:

          Bill, I believe you are incorrect about President 
        Trump's intentions. The President has been crystal 
        clear: no quid pro quo's of any kind. The President is 
        trying to evaluate whether Ukraine is truly going to 
        adopt the transparency and reforms that President 
        Zelensky promised during his campaign. I suggest we 
        stop the back and forth by text. If you still have 
        concerns, I recommend you give Lisa Kenna or [Secretary 
        Pompeo] a call to discuss with them directly. Thanks.

    Ambassador Sondland's subsequent testimony revealed this 
text to be a false exculpatory--an untruthful statement that 
can later be used to conceal incriminating information. In his 
public testimony, Ambassador Sondland testified that the 
President's direction to withhold a presidential telephone call 
and a White House meeting for President Zelensky were both quid 
pro quos designed to pressure Ukraine to announce the 
investigations. He also testified that he developed a clear 
understanding that the military aid was also conditioned on the 
investigations, that it was as simple as 2+2=4. Sondland 
confirmed that his clear understanding was unchanged after 
speaking with President Trump, which he then communicated to 
the Ukrainians--President Zelensky had to publicly announce the 
two investigations if he wanted to get the meeting or the 
military aid.
    In Ambassador Sondland's testimony, he was not clear on 
whether he had one conversation with the President in which the 
subject of a quid pro quo came up, or two, or on precisely 
which date the conversation took place during the period of 
September 6 through 9. In one version of the conversation, 
which Ambassador Sondland suggested may have taken place on 
September 9, he claimed that the President answered an open 
question about what he wanted from Ukraine with an immediate 
denial--``no quid pro quo.'' In another, he admitted that the 
President told him that President Zelensky should go to a 
microphone and announce the investigations, and that he should 
want to do so--effectively confirming a quid pro quo.
    Both Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Morrison, relying on their 
contemporaneous notes, testified that the call between 
Ambassador Sondland and President Trump occurred on September 
7, which is further confirmed by Ambassador Sondland's own text 
message on September 8, in which he wrote that he had 
``multiple convos'' with President Zelensky and President 
Trump. A call on September 9, which would have occurred in the 
middle of the night, is at odds with the weight of the evidence 
and not backed up by any records the White House was willing to 
provide Ambassador Sondland. Regardless of the date, Ambassador 
Sondland did not contest telling both Mr. Morrison and 
Ambassador Taylor of a conversation he had with the President 
in which the President reaffirmed Ambassador Sondland's 
understanding of the quid pro quo for the military aid.
    As Ambassador Sondland acknowledged bluntly in his 
conversation with Mr. Holmes, President Trump's sole interest 
with respect to Ukraine was the ``big stuff'' that benefited 
him personally, such as the investigations into former Vice 
President Biden, and not President Zelensky's promises of 
transparency and reform.

                    The President's Scheme Unraveled

    By early September, President Zelensky was ready to make a 
public announcement of the two investigations to secure a White 
House meeting and the military assistance his country 
desperately needed. He proceeded to book an interview on CNN, 
during which he could make such an announcement, but other 
events soon intervened.
    On September 9, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Committees on Oversight and Reform, and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs announced an investigation into 
the scheme by President Trump and his personal attorney, Mr. 
Giuliani, ``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to 
assist the President's bid for reelection.'' The Committees 
sent document production and preservation requests to the White 
House and the State Department related to the investigation. 
NSC staff members believed this investigation might have had 
``the effect of releasing the hold'' on Ukraine military 
assistance because it would have been ``potentially politically 
challenging'' to ``justify that hold.''
    Later that day, the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community (ICIG) sent a letter to Chairman Schiff and Ranking 
Member Nunes notifying the Committee that a whistleblower had 
filed a complaint on August 12 that the ICIG had determined to 
be both an ``urgent concern'' and ``credible.'' Nevertheless, 
the Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) took the 
unprecedented step of withholding the complaint from the 
Congressional Intelligence Committees, in coordination with the 
White House and the Department of Justice.
    The White House had been aware of the whistleblower 
complaint for several weeks, and press reports indicate that 
the President was briefed on it in late August. The ICIG's 
notification to Congress of the complaint's existence, and the 
announcement of a separate investigation into the same subject 
matter, telegraphed to the White House that attempts to 
condition the security assistance on the announcement of the 
political investigations beneficial to President Trump--and 
efforts to cover up that misconduct--would not last.
    On September 11, in the face of growing public and 
Congressional scrutiny, President Trump lifted the hold on 
security assistance to Ukraine. As with the implementation of 
the hold, no clear reason was given. By the time the President 
ordered the release of security assistance to Ukraine, DOD was 
unable to spend approximately 14 percent of the funds 
appropriated by Congress for Fiscal Year 2019. Congress had to 
pass a new law to extend the funding in order to ensure the 
full amount could be used by Ukraine to defend itself.
    Even after the hold was lifted, President Zelensky still 
intended to sit for an interview with CNN in order to announce 
the investigations--indeed, he still wanted the White House 
meeting. At the urging of Ambassador Taylor, President Zelensky 
cancelled the CNN interview on September 18 or 19. The White 
House meeting, however, still has not occurred.

    The President's Chief of Staff Confirmed Aid was Conditioned on 
                             Investigations

    The conditioning of military aid to Ukraine on the 
investigations sought by the President was as clear to 
Ambassador Sondland as ``two plus two equals four.'' In fact, 
the President's own Acting Chief of Staff, someone who meets 
with him daily, admitted that he had discussed security 
assistance with the President and that his decision to withhold 
it was directly tied to his desire to get Ukraine to conduct a 
political investigation.
    On October 17, at a press briefing in the White House, 
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney confirmed that President 
Trump withheld the essential military aid for Ukraine as 
leverage to pressure Ukraine to investigate the conspiracy 
theory that Ukraine had interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. 
As Dr. Hill made clear in her testimony, this false narrative 
has been promoted by President Putin to deflect away from 
Russia's systemic interference in our election and to drive a 
wedge between the United States and a key partner.
    According to Mr. Mulvaney, President Trump ``[a]bsolutely'' 
mentioned ``corruption related to the DNC server'' in 
connection with the security assistance during his July 25 
call. Mr. Mulvaney also stated that the server was part of 
``why we held up the money.'' After a reporter attempted to 
clarify this explicit acknowledgement of a quid pro quo, Mr. 
Mulvaney replied: ``We do that all the time with foreign 
policy.'' He added, ``I have news for everybody: get over it. 
There is going to be political influence in foreign policy.''
    Ambassador Taylor testified that in his decades of military 
and diplomatic service, he had never seen another example of 
foreign aid conditioned on the personal or political interests 
of the President. Rather, ``we condition assistance on issues 
that will improve our foreign policy, serve our foreign policy, 
ensure that taxpayers'' money is well-spent,'' not specific 
investigations designed to benefit the political interests of 
the President of the United States.
    In contrast, President Trump does not appear to believe 
there is any such limitation on his power to use White House 
meetings, military aid or other official acts to procure 
foreign help in his reelection. When asked by a reporter on 
October 3 what he had hoped President Zelensky would do 
following their July 25 call, President Trump responded: 
``Well, I would think that, if they were honest about it, 
they'd start a major investigation into the Bidens. It's a very 
simple answer.''

        SECTION II--THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF 
                  REPRESENTATIVES' IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY


    The President Obstructed the Impeachment Inquiry by Instructing 
 Witnesses and Agencies to Ignore Subpoenas for Documents and Testimony


       An Unprecedented Effort to Obstruct an Impeachment Inquiry

    Donald Trump is the first President in the history of the 
United States to seek to completely obstruct an impeachment 
inquiry undertaken by the House of Representatives under 
Article I of the Constitution, which vests the House with the 
``sole Power of Impeachment.'' He has publicly and repeatedly 
rejected the authority of Congress to conduct oversight of his 
actions and has directly challenged the authority of the House 
to conduct an impeachment inquiry into his actions regarding 
Ukraine.
    President Trump ordered federal agencies and officials to 
disregard all voluntary requests for documents and defy all 
duly authorized subpoenas for records. He also directed all 
federal officials in the Executive Branch not to testify--even 
when compelled.
    No other President has flouted the Constitution and power 
of Congress to conduct oversight to this extent. No President 
has claimed for himself the right to deny the House's authority 
to conduct an impeachment proceeding, control the scope of a 
power exclusively vested in the House, and forbid any and all 
cooperation from the Executive Branch. Even President Richard 
Nixon--who obstructed Congress by refusing to turn over key 
evidence--accepted the authority of Congress to conduct an 
impeachment inquiry and permitted his aides and advisors to 
produce documents and testify to Congressional committees.
    Despite President Trump's unprecedented and categorical 
commands, the House gathered overwhelming evidence of his 
misconduct from courageous individuals who were willing to 
follow the law, comply with duly authorized subpoenas, and tell 
the truth. In response, the President engaged in a brazen 
effort to publicly attack and intimidate these witnesses.
    If left unanswered, President Trump's ongoing effort to 
thwart Congress' impeachment power risks doing grave harm to 
the institution of Congress, the balance of power between our 
branches of government, and the Constitutional order that the 
President and every Member of Congress have sworn to protect 
and defend.

  Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and Impeachment

    The House's Constitutional and legal authority to conduct 
an impeachment inquiry is clear, as is the duty of the 
President to cooperate with the House's exercise of this 
authority.
    Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives the House of 
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment.'' The Framers 
intended the impeachment power to be an essential check on a 
President who might engage in corruption or abuse of power. 
Congress is empowered to conduct oversight and investigations 
to carry out its authorities under Article I. Because the 
impeachment power is a core component of the nation's 
Constitutional system of checks and balances, Congress' 
investigative authority is at its zenith during an impeachment 
inquiry.
    The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress' authority 
to investigate includes the authority to compel the production 
of information by issuing subpoenas, a power the House has 
delegated to its committees pursuant to its Constitutional 
authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings.''
    Congress has also enacted statutes to support its power to 
investigate and oversee the Executive Branch. These laws impose 
criminal and other penalties on those who fail to comply with 
inquiries from Congress or block others from doing so, and they 
reflect the broader Constitutional requirement to cooperate 
with Congressional investigations.
    Unlike President Trump, past Presidents who were the 
subject of impeachment inquiries--including Presidents Andrew 
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton--recognized and, to 
varying degrees, complied with information requests and 
subpoenas.
    President Nixon, for example, agreed to let his staff 
testify voluntarily in the Senate Watergate investigation, 
stating: ``All members of the White House Staff will appear 
voluntarily when requested by the committee. They will testify 
under oath, and they will answer fully all proper questions.'' 
President Nixon also produced documents in response to the 
House's subpoenas as part of its impeachment inquiry, including 
more than 30 transcripts of White House recordings and notes 
from meetings with the President. When President Nixon withheld 
tape recordings and produced heavily edited and inaccurate 
records, the House Judiciary Committee approved an article of 
impeachment for obstruction.

             The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply

    Even before the House of Representatives launched its 
investigation regarding Ukraine, President Trump rejected the 
authority of Congress to investigate his actions, proclaiming, 
``We're fighting all the subpoenas,'' and ``I have an Article 
II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as 
president.''
    When the Intelligence, Oversight and Reform, and Foreign 
Affairs Committees began reviewing the President's actions as 
part of the House's impeachment inquiry, the President 
repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of the investigation in 
word and deed. His rhetorical attacks appeared intended not 
only to dispute reports of his misconduct, but to persuade the 
American people that the House lacks authority to investigate 
the President.
    On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress 
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the Constitution 
and that there ``should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally, 
through the courts.'' A common theme of his defiance has been 
his claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and 
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been 
following the same investigative rules that Republicans 
championed when they were in control.
    On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone sent a 
letter to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the Chairmen of the 
investigating Committees confirming that President Trump 
directed his entire Administration not to cooperate with the 
House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Cipollone wrote: ``President 
Trump cannot permit his Administration to participate in this 
partisan inquiry under these circumstances.''
    Mr. Cipollone's letter advanced remarkably politicized 
arguments and legal theories unsupported by the Constitution, 
judicial precedent, and more than 200 years of history. If 
allowed to stand, the President's defiance, as justified by Mr. 
Cipollone, would represent an existential threat to the 
nation's Constitutional system of checks and balances, 
separation of powers, and rule of law.

  The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed Documents

    Following President Trump's categorical order, not a single 
document has been produced by the White House, the Office of 
the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the 
Department of Energy in response to 71 specific, individualized 
requests or demands for records in their possession, custody, 
or control. These subpoenas remain in full force and effect. 
These agencies and offices also blocked many current and former 
officials from producing records directly to the Committees.
    Certain witnesses defied the President's sweeping, 
categorical, and baseless order and identified the substance of 
key documents. For example, Ambassador Gordon Sondland attached 
ten exhibits to his written hearing testimony reflecting 
reproductions of certain communications with high-level 
Administration officials, including Acting White House Chief of 
Staff Mick Mulvaney, former National Security Advisor John 
Bolton, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Secretary of Energy 
Rick Perry. Other witnesses identified numerous additional 
documents that the President and various agencies are 
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry.
    Like the White House, the Department of State refused to 
produce a single document in response to its subpoena, even 
though there is no legal basis for the Department's actions. In 
fact, on November 22, the Department was forced to produce 99 
pages of emails, letters, notes, timelines, and news articles 
to a non-partisan, nonprofit ethics watchdog organization 
pursuant to a court order in a lawsuit filed under the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA). Although limited in scope, this 
production affirms that the Department is withholding 
responsive documents from Congress without any valid legal 
basis.

         The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify

    No other President in history has issued an order 
categorically directing the entire Executive Branch not to 
testify before Congress, including in the context of an 
impeachment inquiry. President Trump issued just such an order.
    As reflected in Mr. Cipollone's letter, President Trump 
directed government witnesses to violate their legal 
obligations and defy House subpoenas--regardless of their 
offices or positions. President Trump even extended his order 
to former officials no longer employed by the federal 
government. This Administration-wide effort to prevent all 
witnesses from providing testimony was coordinated and 
comprehensive.
    At President Trump's direction, twelve current or former 
Administration officials refused to testify as part of the 
House's impeachment inquiry, ten of whom did so in defiance of 
duly authorized subpoenas:
     Mick Mulvaney, Acting White House Chief of Staff
     Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the President and 
Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff
     Ambassador John Bolton, Former National Security 
Advisor
     John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the President 
for National Security Affairs and Legal Advisor, National 
Security Council
     Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the 
President and Deputy Legal Advisor, National Security Council
     Preston Wells Griffith, Senior Director for 
International Energy and Environment, National Security Council
     Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant 
to the President for National Security Affairs, National 
Security Council
     Russell T. Vought, Acting Director, Office of 
Management and Budget
     Michael Duffey, Associate Director for National 
Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget
     Brian McCormack, Associate Director for Natural 
Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of Management and Budget
     T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of 
State
     Secretary Rick Perry, Department of Energy
    These witnesses were warned that their refusal to testify 
``shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a 
contempt proceeding'' and ``may be used as an adverse inference 
against you and the President.''

   The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Other Key Witnesses

    Despite President Trump's orders that no Executive Branch 
employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment 
inquiry, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized 
subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and 
public hearings. These officials not only served their nation 
honorably, but they fulfilled their oath to support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States.
    In addition to the President's broad orders seeking to 
prohibit all Executive Branch employees from testifying, many 
of these witnesses were personally directed by senior political 
appointees not to cooperate with the House's impeachment 
inquiry. These directives frequently cited or enclosed copies 
of Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter conveying the President's 
order not to comply.
    For example, the State Department, relying on President 
Trump's order, attempted to block Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch 
from testifying, but she fulfilled her legal obligations by 
appearing at a deposition on October 11 and a hearing on 
November 15. More than a dozen current and former officials 
followed her courageous example by testifying at depositions 
and public hearings over the course of the last two months. The 
testimony from these witnesses produced overwhelming and clear 
evidence of President Trump's misconduct, which is described in 
detail in the first section of this report.

               The President's Intimidation of Witnesses

    President Trump publicly attacked and intimidated witnesses 
who came forward to comply with duly authorized subpoenas and 
testify about his misconduct, raising grave concerns about 
potential violations of criminal laws intended to protect 
witnesses appearing before Congressional proceedings. For 
example, the President attacked:
     Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, who served the 
United States honorably for decades as a U.S. diplomat and 
anti-corruption advocate in posts around the world under six 
different Presidents;
     Ambassador Bill Taylor, who graduated at the top 
of his class at West Point, served as an infantry commander in 
Vietnam, and earned a Bronze Star and an Air Medal with a V 
device for valor;
     Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, an active-
duty Army officer for more than 20 years who earned a Purple 
Heart for wounds he sustained in an improvised explosive device 
attack in Iraq, as well as the Combat Infantryman Badge; and
     Jennifer Williams, who is Vice President Mike 
Pence's top advisor on Europe and Russia and has a 
distinguished record of public service under the Bush, Obama, 
and Trump Administrations.
    The President engaged in this effort to intimidate these 
public servants to prevent them from cooperating with Congress' 
impeachment inquiry. He issued threats, openly discussed 
possible retaliation, made insinuations about their character 
and patriotism, and subjected them to mockery and derision--
when they deserved the opposite. The President's attacks were 
broadcast to millions of Americans--including witnesses' 
families, friends, and coworkers.
    It is a federal crime to intimidate or seek to intimidate 
any witness appearing before Congress. This prohibition applies 
to anyone who knowingly ``uses intimidation, threatens, or 
corruptly persuades'' another person in order to ``influence, 
delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official 
proceeding.'' Violations of this law can carry a criminal 
sentence of up to 20 years in prison.
    In addition to his relentless attacks on witnesses who 
testified in connection with the House's impeachment inquiry, 
the President also repeatedly threatened and attacked a member 
of the Intelligence Community who filed an anonymous 
whistleblower complaint raising an ``urgent concern'' that 
``appeared credible'' regarding the President's conduct. The 
whistleblower filed the complaint confidentially with the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, as authorized 
by the relevant whistleblower law. Federal law prohibits the 
Inspector General from revealing the whistleblower's identity. 
Federal law also protects the whistleblower from retaliation.
    In more than 100 public statements about the whistleblower 
over a period of just two months, the President publicly 
questioned the whistleblower's motives, disputed the accuracy 
of the whistleblower's account, and encouraged others to reveal 
the whistleblower's identity. Most chillingly, the President 
issued a threat against the whistleblower and those who 
provided information to the whistleblower regarding the 
President's misconduct, suggesting that they could face the 
death penalty for treason.
    The President's campaign of intimidation risks discouraging 
witnesses from coming forward voluntarily, complying with 
mandatory subpoenas for documents and testimony, and disclosing 
potentially incriminating evidence in this inquiry and future 
Congressional investigations.

                          KEY FINDINGS OF FACT

    Based on witness testimony and evidence collected during 
the impeachment inquiry, the Intelligence Committee has found 
that:
    I. Donald J. Trump, the 45th President of the United 
States--acting personally and through his agents within and 
outside of the U.S. government--solicited the interference of a 
foreign government, Ukraine, in the 2020 U.S. presidential 
election. The President engaged in this course of conduct for 
the benefit of his reelection, to harm the election prospects 
of a political opponent, and to influence our nation's upcoming 
presidential election to his advantage. In so doing, the 
President placed his personal political interests above the 
national interests of the United States, sought to undermine 
the integrity of the U.S. presidential election process, and 
endangered U.S. national security.
    II. In furtherance of this scheme, President Trump--
directly and acting through his agents within and outside the 
U.S. government--sought to pressure and induce Ukraine's newly-
elected president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to publicly announce 
unfounded investigations that would benefit President Trump's 
personal political interests and reelection effort. To advance 
his personal political objectives, President Trump encouraged 
the President of Ukraine to work with his personal attorney, 
Rudy Giuliani.
    III. As part of this scheme, President Trump, acting in his 
official capacity and using his position of public trust, 
personally and directly requested from the President of Ukraine 
that the government of Ukraine publicly announce investigations 
into (1) the President's political opponent, former Vice 
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. and his son, Hunter Biden, and 
(2) a baseless theory promoted by Russia alleging that 
Ukraine--rather than Russia--interfered in the 2016 U.S. 
election. These investigations were intended to harm a 
potential political opponent of President Trump and benefit the 
President's domestic political standing.
    IV. President Trump ordered the suspension of $391 million 
in vital military assistance urgently needed by Ukraine, a 
strategic partner, to resist Russian aggression. Because the 
aid was appropriated by Congress, on a bipartisan basis, and 
signed into law by the President, its expenditure was required 
by law. Acting directly and through his subordinates within the 
U.S. government, the President withheld from Ukraine this 
military assistance without any legitimate foreign policy, 
national security, or anti-corruption justification. The 
President did so despite the longstanding bipartisan support of 
Congress, uniform support across federal departments and 
agencies for the provision to Ukraine of the military 
assistance, and his obligations under the Impoundment Control 
Act.
    V. President Trump used the power of the Office of the 
President and exercised his authority over the Executive 
Branch, including his control of the instruments of the federal 
government, to apply increasing pressure on the President of 
Ukraine and the Ukrainian government to announce the 
politically-motivated investigations desired by President 
Trump. Specifically, to advance and promote his scheme, the 
President withheld official acts of value to Ukraine and 
conditioned their fulfillment on actions by Ukraine that would 
benefit his personal political interests:
          A. President Trump--acting through agents within and 
        outside the U.S. government--conditioned a head of 
        state meeting at the White House, which the President 
        of Ukraine desperately sought to demonstrate continued 
        United States support for Ukraine in the face of 
        Russian aggression, on Ukraine publicly announcing the 
        investigations that President Trump believed would aid 
        his reelection campaign.
          B. To increase leverage over the President of 
        Ukraine, President Trump, acting through his agents and 
        subordinates, conditioned release of the vital military 
        assistance he had suspended to Ukraine on the President 
        of Ukraine's public announcement of the investigations 
        that President Trump sought.
          C. President Trump's closest subordinates and 
        advisors within the Executive Branch, including Acting 
        Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, Secretary of State Mike 
        Pompeo, Secretary of Energy J. Richard Perry, and other 
        senior White House and Executive Branch officials had 
        knowledge of, in some cases facilitated and furthered 
        the President's scheme, and withheld information about 
        the scheme from the Congress and the American public.
    VI. In directing and orchestrating this scheme to advance 
his personal political interests, President Trump did not 
implement, promote, or advance U.S. anti-corruption policies. 
In fact, the President sought to pressure and induce the 
government of Ukraine to announce politically-motivated 
investigations lacking legitimate predication that the U.S. 
government otherwise discourages and opposes as a matter of 
policy in that country and around the world. In so doing, the 
President undermined U.S. policy supporting anti-corruption 
reform and the rule of law in Ukraine, and undermined U.S. 
national security.
    VII. By withholding vital military assistance and 
diplomatic support from a strategic foreign partner government 
engaged in an ongoing military conflict illegally instigated by 
Russia, President Trump compromised national security to 
advance his personal political interests.
    VIII. Faced with the revelation of his actions, President 
Trump publicly and repeatedly persisted in urging foreign 
governments, including Ukraine and China, to investigate his 
political opponent. This continued solicitation of foreign 
interference in a U.S. election presents a clear and present 
danger that the President will continue to use the power of his 
office for his personal political gain.
    IX. Using the power of the Office of the President, and 
exercising his authority over the Executive Branch, President 
Trump ordered and implemented a campaign to conceal his conduct 
from the public and frustrate and obstruct the House of 
Representatives' impeachment inquiry by:
          A. refusing to produce to the impeachment inquiry's 
        investigating Committees information and records in the 
        possession of the White House, in defiance of a lawful 
        subpoena;
          B. directing Executive Branch agencies to defy lawful 
        subpoenas and withhold the production of all documents 
        and records from the investigating Committees;
          C. directing current and former Executive Branch 
        officials not to cooperate with the Committees, 
        including in defiance of lawful subpoenas for 
        testimony; and
          D. intimidating, threatening, and tampering with 
        prospective and actual witnesses in the impeachment 
        inquiry in an effort to prevent, delay, or influence 
        the testimony of those witnesses.
    In so doing, and despite the fact that the Constitution 
vests in the House of Representatives the ``sole Power of 
Impeachment,'' the President sought to arrogate to himself the 
right to determine the propriety, scope, and nature of an 
impeachment inquiry into his own misconduct, and the right to 
deny any and all information to the Congress in the conduct of 
its constitutional responsibilities.
                               SECTION I.


                       THE PRESIDENT'S MISCONDUCT


       1. The President Forced Out the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine


The President forced out the United States Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie 
        Yovanovitch, following a baseless smear campaign promoted by 
        President Trump's personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, and others. 
        The campaign publicized conspiracy theories that benefited the 
        President's personal political interests and undermined 
        official U.S. policy, some of which the President raised during 
        his July 25 call with the President of Ukraine.

                                Overview

    On April 24, 2019, President Donald J. Trump abruptly 
recalled the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch. 
Ambassador Yovanovitch, an award-winning 33-year veteran 
Foreign Service officer, aggressively advocated for anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine consistent with U.S. foreign 
policy. President Trump forced her out following a baseless 
smear campaign promoted by his personal attorney, Rudy 
Giuliani, associates of Mr. Giuliani, and corrupt Ukrainians.
    Ambassador Yovanovitch was told by the State Department 
that President Trump had lost confidence in her, but she was 
never provided a substantive justification for her removal. Her 
ouster set the stage for other U.S. officials appointed by 
President Trump to work in cooperation with Mr. Giuliani to 
advance a scheme in support of the President's reelection.
    Mr. Giuliani and his associates promoted false conspiracy 
theories about Ukraine colluding with Democrats to interfere in 
the 2016 U.S. election. This false claim was promoted by 
Russian President Vladimir Putin in February 2017--less than a 
month after the unanimous U.S. Intelligence Community 
assessment that Russia alone was responsible for a covert 
influence campaign aimed at helping President Trump during the 
2016 election. Mr. Giuliani also made discredited public 
allegations about former Vice President Joe Biden and his son, 
Hunter, in an apparent effort to hurt President Trump's 
political rival in the 2020 presidential election. Mr. 
Giuliani's associates, with their own ties to President Trump, 
also worked to enter into arrangements with current and former 
corrupt Ukrainian officials to promote these false 
allegations--the same unfounded allegations President Trump 
requested that Ukraine investigate on his July 25 call with 
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
    President Trump amplified these baseless allegations by 
tweeting them just a month before he recalled Ambassador 
Yovanovitch. Despite requests from Ambassador Yovanovitch and 
other senior State Department officials, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo refused to issue a statement of support for the 
Ambassador or the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine for fear of being 
undermined by a tweet by President Trump.
    The removal of Ambassador Yovanovitch left a vacuum in the 
leadership of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine at an important time. 
A new president had just been elected on an anti-corruption 
platform, and the country was in a period of transition as it 
continued to defend itself against Russia-led military 
aggression in the east.

    Anti-Corruption Ceremony Interrupted to Recall Anti-Corruption 
                               Ambassador

    Ambassador Yovanovitch represented the United States of 
America as the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 2016 to 2019. 
She is a non-partisan career public servant, first selected for 
the American Foreign Service in 1986. President George W. Bush 
named her as an Ambassador twice, to the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Armenia, and President Barack Obama nominated her for the 
posting in Kyiv.\1\
    On the evening of April 24, Ambassador Yovanovitch 
approached a podium in front of gold drapes at the U.S. 
Ambassador's residence in Ukraine's capital city. She was 
hosting an event to present an award of courage to the father 
of Kateryna Handziuk, who was brutally murdered by people who 
opposed her efforts to expose and root out public corruption in 
Ukraine. In 2018, attackers threw sulfuric acid at Ms. 
Handziuk, burning more than 30 percent of her body. After 
months of suffering and nearly a dozen surgeries, she died at 
the age of 33.\2\ Her attackers have still not been held to 
account.\3\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch began her speech by noting that Ms. 
Handziuk ``was a woman of courage who committed herself to 
speaking out against wrongdoing.'' She lamented how Ms. 
Handziuk had ``paid the ultimate price for her fearlessness in 
fighting against corruption and for her determined efforts to 
build a democratic Ukraine.'' She pledged that the United 
States would ``continue to stand with those engaged in the 
fight for a democratic Ukraine free of corruption, where people 
are held accountable'' and commended Ukrainians who ``have 
demonstrated to the world that they are willing to fight for a 
better system.''\4\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch concluded her remarks by holding Ms. 
Handziuk's story up as an inspiration to the many Ukrainians 
striving to chart a new course for their country in the face of 
Russian interference and aggression:

          I think we can all see what a remarkable woman 
        Kateryna Handziuk was, but she continues to inspire all 
        of us to fight for justice. She was a courageous woman, 
        who wanted to make Ukraine a better place. And she is 
        continuing to do so. And I'll just leave you with one 
        thought that was expressed in Washington at the 
        ceremony--that courage is contagious. I think we saw 
        that on the Maidan in 2014, we see that on the front 
        lines every day in the Donbas, we see it in the work 
        that Kateryna Handziuk did here in Ukraine. And we see 
        it in the work of all of you--day in, day out--fighting 
        for Ukraine and the future of Ukraine.\5\

    Ambassador Yovanovitch's evening was interrupted around 
10:00 p.m. by a telephone call from the State Department's 
headquarters in Washington, D.C.
    Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of 
Human Resources Ambassador Carol Perez warned that the 
Department's leaders had ``great concern'' and ``were worried'' 
about her. Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that it is ``hard 
to know how to react to something like that.'' Ambassador Perez 
said she did not know what the concerns were but pledged she 
would ``try to find out more'' and would try to call back ``by 
midnight.''\6\
    Finally, at 1:00 a.m. in Kyiv, Ambassador Perez called 
again: The ``concerns'' were from ``up the street'' at the 
White House. Ambassador Perez said that Ambassador Yovanovitch 
needed to ``come home immediately, get on the next plane to the 
U.S.'' She warned that there were concerns about Ambassador 
Yovanovitch's ``security.'' When Ambassador Yovanovitch asked 
if Ambassador Perez was referring to her physical safety, 
Ambassador Perez relayed that she ``hadn't gotten that 
impression that it was a physical security issue,'' but that 
Ambassador Yovanovitch ``needed to come home right away.''\7\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch asked Ambassador Perez specifically 
whether this order had anything to do with President Trump's 
personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, who had been making unfounded 
allegations against her in the media. Ambassador Perez said she 
``didn't know.''\8\ Ambassador Yovanovitch argued that this 
order to return to Washington, D.C. was ``extremely irregular'' 
and that no one had provided her a reason.\9\ In the end, 
however, Ambassador Yovanovitch swiftly returned to 
Washington.\10\

 Rudy Giuliani, on Behalf of President Trump, Led a Smear Campaign to 
                      Oust Ambassador Yovanovitch

    Ambassador Yovanovitch's recall followed a concerted smear 
campaign by Mr. Giuliani and his associates, promoted by 
President Trump. The campaign was largely directed by Mr. 
Giuliani, President Trump's personal attorney since early 
2018.\11\ A cast of supporting characters, which included 
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutors, now-indicted middlemen, 
conservative media pundits, and attorneys close to President 
Trump, assisted Mr. Giuliani. Among those associates were two 
U.S. citizens, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman. Mr. Parnas and Mr. 
Fruman were Florida-based businessmen who were represented by 
Mr. Giuliani ``in connection with their personal and business 
affairs'' and who also ``assisted Mr. Giuliani in connection 
with his representation of President Trump.''\12\ Both Mr. 
Parnas and Mr. Fruman were criminally indicted in the Southern 
District of New York in October and face charges of conspiring 
to violate the federal ban on foreign donations and 
contributions in connection with federal and state 
elections.\13\ Dr. Fiona Hill, former Deputy Assistant to the 
President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National 
Security Council (NSC), learned from her colleagues that 
``these guys were notorious in Florida and that they were bad 
news.''\14\
    The campaign was also propelled by individuals in Ukraine, 
including two prosecutors general. Yuriy Lutsenko served as the 
Prosecutor General of Ukraine under former Ukrainian President 
Petro Poroshenko--the incumbent who lost to President Zelensky 
in April 2019--and previously was the head of President 
Poroshenko's faction in the Ukrainian parliament.\15\ Viktor 
Shokin was Mr. Lutsenko's predecessor and was removed from 
office in 2016.\16\ Mr. Shokin has been described as ``a 
typical Ukraine prosecutor who lived a lifestyle far in excess 
of his government salary, who never prosecuted anybody known 
for having committed a crime,'' and ``covered up crimes that 
were known to have been committed.''\17\
    In late 2018, Ukrainian officials informed Ambassador 
Yovanovitch about Mr. Giuliani's and Mr. Lutsenko's plans to 
target her. They told her that Mr. Lutsenko ``was in 
communication with Mayor Giuliani'' and that ``they were going 
to, you know, do things, including to me.''\18\ Soon 
thereafter, Ambassador Yovanovitch learned that ``there had 
been a number of meetings'' between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. 
Lutsenko, who was looking to ``hurt'' her ``in the U.S.''\19\
    The allegations against Ambassador Yovanovitch, which later 
surfaced publicly, concerned false claims that she had provided 
a ``do-not-prosecute list'' to Mr. Lutsenko and made 
disparaging comments about President Trump.\20\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch inferred that Mr. Lutsenko was 
spreading ``falsehoods'' about her because she was ``effective 
at helping Ukrainians who wanted reform, Ukrainians who wanted 
to fight against corruption, and . . . that was not in his 
interest.''\21\ Anti-corruption reform was not in Mr. 
Lutsenko's interest because he himself was known to be 
corrupt.\22\ David Holmes, Counselor for Political Affairs at 
the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, explained that:

          In mid-March 2019, an Embassy colleague learned from 
        a Ukrainian contact that Mr. Lutsenko had complained 
        that Ambassador Yovanovitch had, quote, unquote, 
        destroyed him, with her refusal to support him until he 
        followed through with his reform commitments and ceased 
        using his position for personal gain.\23\

    Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent similarly 
summarized Mr. Lutsenko's smear campaign against Ambassador 
Yovanovitch, which was facilitated by Mr. Giuliani and his 
associates, as motivated by revenge:

          Over the course of 2018 and 2019, I became 
        increasingly aware of an effort by Rudy Giuliani and 
        others, including his associates Lev Parnas and Igor 
        Fruman, to run a campaign to smear Ambassador 
        Yovanovitch and other officials at the U.S. Embassy in 
        Kyiv. The chief agitators on the Ukrainian side of this 
        effort were some of those same corrupt former 
        prosecutors I had encountered, particularly Yuriy 
        Lutsenko and Viktor Shokin. They were now peddling 
        false information in order to extract revenge against 
        those who had exposed their misconduct, including U.S. 
        diplomats, Ukrainian anticorruption officials, and 
        reform-minded civil society groups in Ukraine.\24\

    Mr. Kent succinctly summarized, ``[y]ou can't promote 
principled anti-corruption efforts without pissing off corrupt 
people.''\25\ By doing her job, Ambassador Yovanovitch drew Mr. 
Lutsenko's ire.
    In late 2018 and early 2019, Mr. Lutsenko also risked 
losing his job as Prosecutor General, and risked possible 
criminal investigation, if then-candidate Volodymyr Zelensky 
won the presidency. Special Representative for Ukraine 
Negotiations, Ambassador Kurt Volker, explained:

          As is often the case in Ukraine, a change in power 
        would mean change in prosecutorial powers as well, and 
        there have been efforts in the past at prosecuting the 
        previous government. I think Mr. Lutsenko, in my 
        estimation, and I said this to Mayor Giuliani when I 
        met with him, was interested in preserving his own 
        position. He wanted to avoid being fired by a new 
        government in order to prevent prosecution of himself, 
        possible prosecution of himself.\26\

    Officials in Ukraine have also speculated that Mr. Lutsenko 
cultivated his relationship with Mr. Giuliani in an effort to 
hold on to his position.\27\ Ambassador Yovanovitch described 
Mr. Lutsenko as an ``opportunist'' who ``will ally himself, 
sometimes simultaneously . . . with whatever political or 
economic forces he believes will suit his interests best at the 
time.''\28\
    Mr. Lutsenko promoted debunked conspiracy theories that had 
gained traction with President Trump and Mr. Giuliani. Those 
debunked conspiracy theories alleged that the Ukrainian 
government--not Russia--was behind the hack of the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC) server in 2016, and that former Vice 
President Biden had petitioned for the removal of Mr. Shokin to 
prevent an investigation into Burisma Holdings, a Ukrainian 
energy company for which Vice President Biden's son, Hunter, 
served as a board member.
    Both conspiracy theories served the personal political 
interests of President Trump because they would help him in his 
campaign for reelection in 2020. The first would serve to 
undercut Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation, which 
was still underway when Mr. Giuliani began his activities in 
Ukraine and was denounced as a ``witch hunt'' by the President 
and his supporters.\29\ The second would serve to damage 
Democratic presidential candidate Vice President Biden.
    These conspiracies lacked any basis in fact. The 
Intelligence Community, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, both the Majority and Minority of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
investigation undertaken by Special Counsel Robert Mueller 
concluded that Russia was responsible for interfering in the 
2016 election.\30\ President Trump's former Homeland Security 
Advisor, Tom Bossert, said that the idea of Ukraine hacking the 
DNC server was ``not only a conspiracy theory, it is completely 
debunked.''\31\
    Russia has pushed the false theory that Ukraine was 
involved in the 2016 election to distract from its own 
involvement.\32\ Mr. Holmes testified that it was to President 
Putin's advantage to promote the theory of Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. elections for several reasons:

          First of all, to deflect from the allegations of 
        Russian interference. Second of all, to drive a wedge 
        between the United States and Ukraine which Russia 
        wants to essentially get back into its sphere of 
        influence. Thirdly, to besmirch Ukraine and its 
        political leadership, [and] to degrade and erode 
        support for Ukraine from other key partners in Europe 
        and elsewhere.\33\

    The allegations that Vice President Biden inappropriately 
pressured the Ukrainians to remove Mr. Shokin also are without 
merit. Mr. Shokin was widely considered to be ineffective and 
corrupt.\34\ When he urged the Ukrainian government to remove 
Mr. Shokin, Vice President Biden was advocating for anti-
corruption reform and pursuing official U.S. policy.\35\ 
Moreover, Mr. Shokin's removal was supported by other 
countries, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, 
and was ``widely understood internationally to be the right 
policy.''\36\ In May 2019, even Mr. Lutsenko himself admitted 
that there was no credible evidence of wrongdoing by Hunter 
Biden or Vice President Biden.\37\
    Nevertheless, Mr. Giuliani engaged with both Mr. Lutsenko 
and Mr. Shokin regarding these baseless allegations. According 
to documents provided to the State Department Office of 
Inspector General, in January 23, 2019, Mr. Giuliani, Mr. 
Parnas, and Mr. Fruman participated in a conference call with 
Mr. Shokin. According to notes of the call, Mr. Shokin made 
allegations about Vice President Biden and Burisma. Mr. Shokin 
also claimed that Ambassador Yovanovitch had improperly denied 
him a U.S. visa and that she was close to Vice President 
Biden.\38\
    Mr. Giuliani separately met with Mr. Lutsenko in New 
York.\39\ Over the course of two days, on January 25 and 26, 
Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Lutsenko, Mr. Parnas, and Mr. Fruman, 
reportedly discussed whether Ambassador Yovanovitch was ``loyal 
to President Trump,'' as well as investigations into Burisma 
and the Bidens.\40\ For his part, Mr. Lutsenko later said he 
``understood very well'' that Mr. Giuliani wanted Mr. Lutsenko 
to investigate former Vice President Biden and his son, Hunter. 
``I have 23 years in politics,'' Mr. Lutsenko said. ``I knew . 
. . . I'm a political animal.''\41\
    Mr. Giuliani later publicly acknowledged that he was 
seeking information from Ukrainians on behalf of his client, 
President Trump. On October 23, Mr. Giuliani tweeted 
``everything I did was to discover evidence to defend my client 
against false charges.''\42\ Then, in a series of tweets on 
October 30, Mr. Giuliani stated:

          All of the information I obtained came from 
        interviews conducted as . . . private defense counsel 
        to POTUS, to defend him against false allegations. I 
        began obtaining this information while Mueller was 
        still investigating his witch hunt and a full 5 months 
        before Biden even announced his run for Pres.\43\

    President Trump and Mr. Giuliani's efforts to investigate 
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and 
Vice President Biden negatively impacted the U.S. Embassy in 
Kyiv. Mr. Holmes testified:

          Beginning in March 2019, the situation at the Embassy 
        and in Ukraine changed dramatically. Specifically, the 
        three priorities of security, economy, and justice and 
        our support for Ukrainian democratic resistance to 
        Russian aggression became overshadowed by a political 
        agenda promoted by former New York City Mayor Rudy 
        Giuliani and a cadre of officials operating with a 
        direct channel to the White House.\44\

    U.S. national interests in Ukraine were undermined and 
subordinated to the personal, political interests of President 
Trump.

           The Smear Campaign Accelerated in Late March 2019

    The smear campaign entered a more public phase in the 
United States in late March 2019 with the publication of a 
series of opinion pieces in The Hill.
    On March 20, 2019, John Solomon penned an opinion piece 
quoting a false claim by Mr. Lutsenko that Ambassador 
Yovanovitch had given him a do-not-prosecute list.\45\ Mr. 
Lutsenko later retracted the claim.\46\ Mr. Solomon's work also 
included false allegations that Ambassador Yovanovitch had 
``made disparaging statements about President Trump.''\47\ 
Ambassador Yovanovitch called this allegation ``fictitious,'' 
and the State Department issued a statement describing the 
allegations as a ``fabrication.''\48\
    The Committees uncovered evidence of close ties and 
frequent contacts between Mr. Solomon and Mr. Parnas, who was 
assisting Mr. Giuliani in connection with his representation of 
the President. Phone records show that in the 48 hours before 
publication of The Hill opinion piece, Mr. Parnas spoke with 
Mr. Solomon.\49\ In addition, The Hill piece cited a letter 
dated May 9, 2018, from Representative Pete Sessions (R-Texas) 
to Secretary Pompeo, in which Rep. Sessions accused Ambassador 
Yovanovitch of speaking ``privately and repeatedly about her 
disdain for the current administration.''\50\ A federal 
criminal indictment alleges that in or about May 2018, Mr. 
Parnas sought a congressman's assistance to remove Ambassador 
Yovanovitch, at the request of one or more Ukrainian government 
officials.\51\
    On March 20, 2019, the day The Hill opinion piece was 
published, Mr. Parnas again spoke with Mr. Solomon for 11 
minutes.\52\ Shortly after that phone call, President Trump 
promoted Mr. Solomon's article in a tweet.\53\
    Following President Trump's tweet, the public attacks 
against Ambassador Yovanovitch were further amplified on social 
media and were merged with the conspiracy theories regarding 
both Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election and the 
Bidens. On March 22, 2019, Mr. Giuliani tweeted: ``Hillary, 
Kerry, and Biden people colluding with Ukrainian operatives to 
make money and affect 2016 election.'' He also gave an 
interview to Fox News in which he raised Hunter Biden and 
called for an investigation.\54\ Then, on March 24, Donald 
Trump, Jr. called Ambassador Yovanovitch a ``joker'' on Twitter 
and called for her removal.\55\
    This campaign reverberated in Ukraine. Mr. Kent testified 
that ``starting in mid-March'' Mr. Giuliani was ``almost 
unmissable'' during this ``campaign of slander'' against 
Ambassador Yovanovitch.\56\ According to Mr. Kent, Mr. 
Lutsenko's press spokeswoman retweeted Donald Trump, Jr.'s 
tweet attacking the Ambassador.\57\

   Concerns About President Trump Kept State Department From Issuing 
                          Statement of Support

    At the end of March, as this smear campaign intensified, 
Ambassador Yovanovitch sent Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs David Hale an email identifying her concerns 
with the false allegations about her and asking for a strong 
statement of support from the State Department. She explained 
that, otherwise, ``it makes it hard to be a credible ambassador 
in a country.''\58\ Ambassador Hale had been briefed on the 
smears in a series of emails from Mr. Kent.\59\ Ambassador Hale 
agreed that the allegations were without merit.\60\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch was told that State Department 
officials were concerned that if they issued a public statement 
supporting her, ``it could be undermined'' by ``[t]he 
President.''\61\ Ambassador Hale explained that a statement of 
support ``would only fuel further negative reaction'' and that 
``it might even provoke a public reaction from the President 
himself about the Ambassador.''\62\ In short, State Department 
officials were concerned ``that the rug would be pulled out 
from underneath the State Department.''\63\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch turned to the U.S. Ambassador to the 
European Union, Gordon Sondland, for advice. According to 
Ambassador Yovanovitch, Ambassador Sondland suggested that, in 
response to the smear campaign, she make a public statement in 
support of President Trump. She said Ambassador Sondland told 
her, ``you need to go big or go home'' and ``tweet out there 
that you support the President, and that all these are lies and 
everything else.''\64\ Ambassador Yovanovitch said she felt 
that this ``was advice that I did not see how I could implement 
in my role as an Ambassador, and as a Foreign Service 
officer.''\65\
    Ultimately, Secretary Pompeo refused to issue a public 
statement of support for Ambassador Yovanovitch. At the same 
time Secretary Pompeo was refusing to issue a statement, he was 
communicating with one of the individuals involved in the smear 
campaign against her. Records and witness testimony indicate 
that Secretary Pompeo spoke to Mr. Giuliani on March 26, 28, 
and 29, not long after Mr. Solomon's first article in The 
Hill.\66\

   The Smear Campaign was a Coordinated Effort by Mr. Giuliani, His 
       Associates, and One or More Individuals at the White House

    In April, Mr. Solomon continued to publish opinion pieces 
about Ambassador Yovanovitch and other conspiracy theories 
being pursued by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of President Trump. Mr. 
Solomon was not working alone. As further described below, 
there was a coordinated effort by associates of President Trump 
to push these false narratives publicly, as evidenced by public 
statements, phone records, and contractual agreements.
    On April 1, Mr. Solomon published an opinion piece in The 
Hill alleging that Vice President Biden had inappropriately 
petitioned for the removal of Mr. Shokin to protect his son, 
Hunter.\67\ The opinion piece was entitled, ``Joe Biden's 2020 
Ukrainian Nightmare: A Closed Probe is Revived.'' Many of the 
allegations in the piece were based on information provided by 
Mr. Lutsenko. The following day, Donald Trump, Jr. retweeted 
the article.\68\
    Phone records obtained by the Committees show frequent 
communication between key players during this phase of the 
scheme. Between April 1 and April 7, Mr. Parnas exchanged 
approximately 16 calls with Mr. Giuliani (longest duration 
approximately seven minutes) and approximately 10 calls with 
Mr. Solomon (longest duration approximately nine minutes).\69\
    On April 7, Mr. Solomon followed up with another opinion 
piece. The piece accused Ambassador Yovanovitch of preventing 
the issuance of U.S. visas for Ukrainian officials who wished 
to travel to the United States to provide purported evidence of 
wrongdoing by ``American Democrats and their allies in 
Kiev.''\70\ One of those Ukrainian officials allegedly denied a 
visa was Kostiantyn Kulyk, a deputy to Mr. Lutsenko. Mr. Kulyk 
participated in a ``wide-ranging interview'' with Mr. Solomon 
and was extensively quoted.\71\
    These Ukrainian officials claimed to have evidence of 
wrongdoing about Vice President Biden's efforts in 2015 to 
remove Mr. Shokin, Hunter Biden's role as a Burisma board 
member, Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election in 
favor of Hillary Clinton, and the misappropriation and transfer 
of Ukrainian funds abroad.\72\ The opinion piece also made 
clear that Mr. Giuliani was pursuing these very same theories 
on behalf of the President:

          More recently, President Trump's private attorney 
        Rudy Giuliani--former mayor and former U.S. attorney in 
        New York City--learned about some of the allegations 
        while, on behalf of the Trump legal team, he looked 
        into Ukrainian involvement in the 2016 election.

    According to Mr. Solomon's piece, Mr. Lutsenko was reported 
to have sufficient evidence, ``particularly involving Biden, 
his family and money spirited out of Ukraine--to warrant a 
meeting with U.S. Attorney General William Barr.''\73\
    On the same day that Mr. Solomon published these 
allegations, Mr. Giuliani appeared on Fox News. Mr. Giuliani 
discussed how he learned about alleged Ukrainian interference 
in the 2016 U.S. elections and the Bidens' purported misconduct 
in Ukraine:

          Let me tell you my interest in that. I got 
        information about three or four months ago that a lot 
        of the explanations for how this whole phony 
        investigation started will be in the Ukraine, that 
        there were a group of people in the Ukraine that were 
        working to help Hillary Clinton and were colluding 
        really--[LAUGHTER]--with the Clinton campaign. And it 
        stems around the ambassador and the embassy, being used 
        for political purposes. So I began getting some people 
        that were coming forward and telling me about that. And 
        then all of a sudden, they revealed the story about 
        Burisma and Biden's son . . . [Vice President Biden] 
        bragged about pressuring Ukraine's president to firing 
        [sic] a top prosecutor who was being criticized on a 
        whole bunch of areas but was conducting investigation 
        of this gas company which Hunter Biden served as a 
        director.\74\
    The next day, April 8, Mr. Giuliani tweeted about Mr. 
Solomon's opinion piece.\75\
    Over the course of the four days following the April 7 
article, phone records show contacts between Mr. Giuliani, Mr. 
Parnas, Ranking Member Nunes, and Mr. Solomon. Specifically, 
Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas were in contact with one another, 
as well as with Mr. Solomon.\76\ Phone records also show 
contacts on April 10 between Mr. Giuliani and Ranking Member 
Nunes, consisting of three short calls in rapid succession, 
followed by a nearly three-minute call.\77\ Later that same 
day, Mr. Parnas and Mr. Solomon had a four minute, 39 second 
call.\78\
    Victoria Toensing, a lawyer who, along with her partner 
Joseph diGenova, once briefly represented President Trump in 
connection with Special Counsel Robert Mueller's 
investigation,\79\ also was in phone contact with Mr. Giuliani 
and Mr. Parnas at the beginning of April.\80\
    Beginning in mid-April, Ms. Toensing signed retainer 
agreements between diGenova & Toensing LLP and Mr. Lutsenko, 
Mr. Kulyk, and Mr. Shokin--all of whom feature in Mr. Solomon's 
opinion pieces.\81\ In these retainer agreements, the firm 
agreed to represent Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk in meetings with 
U.S. officials regarding alleged ``evidence'' of Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. elections, and to represent Mr. 
Shokin ``for the purpose of collecting evidence regarding his 
March 2016 firing as Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the role 
of Vice President Biden in such firing, and presenting such 
evidence to U.S. and foreign authorities.''\82\ On July 25, 
President Trump would personally press President Zelensky to 
investigate these very same matters.
    On April 23, Mr. Parnas had a call with Mr. Solomon, and 
multiple phone contacts with Mr. Giuliani.\83\ On that same 
day, Mr. Giuliani had a series of short phone calls (ranging 
from 11 to 18 seconds) with a phone number associated with the 
White House, followed shortly thereafter by an eight minute, 
28-second call with an unidentified number that called him.\84\ 
Approximately half an hour later, Mr. Giuliani had a 48-second 
call with a phone number associated with Ambassador John 
Bolton, National Security Advisor to the President.\85\
    That same day, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:

          Hillary is correct the report is the end of the 
        beginning for the second time . . . NO COLLUSION. Now 
        Ukraine is investigating Hillary campaign and DNC 
        conspiracy with foreign operatives including Ukrainian 
        and others to affect 2016 election. And there's no 
        Comey to fix the result.\86\

    The next day, on the morning of April 24, Mr. Giuliani 
appeared on Fox and Friends, lambasting the Mueller 
investigation. Mr. Giuliani also promoted the false conspiracy 
theories about Ukraine and Vice President Biden:

          And I ask you to keep your eye on Ukraine, because in 
        Ukraine, a lot of the dirty work was done in digging up 
        the information. American officials were used, 
        Ukrainian officials were used. That's like collusion 
        with the Ukrainians. And, or actually in this case, 
        conspiracy with the Ukrainians. I think you'd get some 
        interesting information about Joe Biden from Ukraine. 
        About his son, Hunter Biden. About a company he was on 
        the board of for years, which may be one of the most 
        crooked companies in Ukraine. . . . And Biden bragged 
        about the fact that he got the prosecutor general 
        fired. The prosecutor general was investigating his son 
        and then the investigation went south.\87\

    Later that day, Mr. Giuliani had three phone calls with a 
number associated with OMB, and eight calls with a White House 
phone number.\88\ One of the calls with the White House was 
four minutes, 53 seconds, and another was three minutes, 15 
seconds.
    Later that evening, the State Department phoned Ambassador 
Yovanovitch and abruptly called her home because of 
``concerns'' from ``up the street'' at the White House.\89\

     Ambassador Yovanovitch Was Informed That the President ``Lost 
                          Confidence'' in Her

    When Ambassador Yovanovitch returned to the United States 
at the end of April, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan 
informed her that she had ``done nothing wrong,'' but ``there 
had been a concerted campaign'' against her and that President 
Trump had ``lost confidence'' in her leadership.\90\ He also 
told her that ``the President no longer wished me to serve as 
Ambassador to Ukraine, and that, in fact, the President had 
been pushing for my removal since the prior summer.''\91\ 
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, offered 
a similar assessment. He explained to Ambassador Yovanovitch 
that Secretary Pompeo had tried to ``protect'' her, but ``was 
no longer able to do that.''\92\
    Counselor of the Department of State T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
who had been handling Ambassador Yovanovitch's recall, refused 
to meet with her.\93\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch's final day as U.S. Ambassador to 
Ukraine was May 20, 2019. This was the same day as President 
Zelensky's inauguration, which was attended by Secretary of 
Energy Rick Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador 
Volker.\94\ Rather than joining the official delegation at the 
inaugural festivities, she finished packing her personal 
belongings and boarded an airplane for her final flight home. 
Three days later, President Trump met in the Oval Office with 
his hand-picked delegation and gave them the ``directive'' to 
``talk with Rudy [Giuliani]'' about Ukraine.\95\

   The President Provided No Rationale for the Recall of Ambassador 
                              Yovanovitch

    Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that she was never 
provided a justification for why President Trump recalled 
her.\96\ Only two months earlier, in early March 2019, 
Ambassador Yovanovitch had been asked by Ambassador Hale to 
extend her assignment as Ambassador to Ukraine until 2020.\97\
    Ambassador Hale testified that Ambassador Yovanovitch was 
``an exceptional officer doing exceptional work at a very 
critical embassy in Kyiv.''\98\ He added, ``I believe that she 
should've been able to stay at post and continue to do the 
outstanding work that she was doing.''\99\
    During her more than three-decade career, Ambassador 
Yovanovitch received a number of awards, including: the 
Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the Secretary's 
Diplomacy in Human Rights Award, the Senior Foreign Service 
Performance Award six times, and the State Department's 
Superior Honor Award five times.\100\
    Career foreign service officer Ambassador P. Michael 
McKinley, former Senior Advisor to Secretary Pompeo, testified 
that Ambassador Yovanovitch's reputation was ``excellent, 
serious, committed.''\101\ Ambassador Reeker described her as 
an ``[o]utstanding diplomat,'' ``very precise, very--very 
professional,'' ``an excellent mentor,'' and ``a good 
leader.''\102\

Ambassador Yovanovitch Strongly Advocated for the U.S. Policy to Combat 
                               Corruption

    Throughout the course of her career, and while posted to 
Kyiv, Ambassador Yovanovitch was a champion of the United 
States' longstanding priority of combatting corruption.
    Mr. Kent described U.S. foreign policy in Ukraine as 
encompassing the priorities of ``promoting the rule of law, 
energy independence, defense sector reform, and the ability to 
stand up to Russia.''\103\ Ambassador Yovanovitch testified 
that it ``was and remains a top U.S. priority to help Ukraine 
fight corruption'' because corruption makes Ukraine more 
``vulnerable to Russia.''\104\ Additionally, she testified that 
an honest and accountable Ukrainian leadership makes a U.S.-
Ukrainian partnership more reliable and more valuable to the 
United States.\105\
    Mr. Holmes testified that Ambassador Yovanovitch was 
successful in implementing anti-corruption reforms in Ukraine 
by achieving, for example, ``the hard-fought passage of a law 
establishing an independent court to try corruption 
cases.''\106\ Mr. Holmes said Ambassador Yovanovitch was ``[a]s 
good as anyone known for'' combatting corruption.\107\ The 
reforms achieved by Ambassador Yovanovitch helped reduce the 
problem faced by many post-Soviet countries of selective 
corruption prosecutions to target political opponents.\108\
    There was a broad consensus that Ambassador Yovanovitch was 
successful in helping Ukraine combat pervasive and endemic 
corruption.

   The President's Authority Does Not Explain Removal of Ambassador 
                              Yovanovitch

    While ambassadors serve at the pleasure of the president, 
the manner and circumstances of Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
removal were unusual and raise questions of motive.\109\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch queried ``why it was necessary to 
smear my reputation falsely.''\110\ She found it difficult to 
comprehend how individuals ``who apparently felt stymied by our 
efforts to promote stated U.S. policy against corruption'' were 
``able to successfully conduct a campaign of disinformation 
against a sitting ambassador using unofficial back 
channels.''\111\
    Dr. Hill similarly testified that while the President has 
the authority to remove an ambassador, she was concerned 
``about the circumstances in which [Ambassador Yovanovitch's] 
reputation had been maligned, repeatedly, on television and in 
all kinds of exchanges.'' Dr. Hill ``felt that that was 
completely unnecessary.''\112\

  The Recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch Threatened U.S.-Ukraine Policy

    The smear campaign questioning Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
loyalty undermined U.S. diplomatic efforts in Ukraine, a key 
U.S. partner and a bulwark against Russia's expansion into 
Europe. As Ambassador Yovanovitch explained:

          Ukrainians were wondering whether I was going to be 
        leaving, whether we really represented the President, 
        U.S. policy, et cetera. And so I think it was--you 
        know, it really kind of cut the ground out from 
        underneath us.\113\

    Summarizing the cumulative impact of the attacks, she 
emphasized: ``If our chief representative is kneecapped it 
limits our effectiveness to safeguard the vital national 
security interests of the United States.''\114\
    President Trump's recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch left the 
U.S. Embassy in Ukraine without an ambassador at a time of 
electoral change in Ukraine and when the Embassy was also 
without a deputy chief of mission. Mr. Kent explained:

          During the late spring and summer of 2019, I became 
        alarmed as those efforts bore fruit. They led to the 
        outer [ouster] of Ambassador Yovanovitch and hampered 
        U.S. efforts to establish rapport with the new Zelensky 
        administration in Ukraine.\115\
        . . .
          One of the unfortunate elements of the timing was 
        that we were also undergoing a transition in my old job 
        as deputy chief of mission. The person who replaced me 
        had already been moved early to be our DCM and Charge 
        in Sweden, and so we had a temporary acting deputy 
        chief of mission. So that left the embassy not only 
        without--the early withdrawal of Ambassador Yovanovitch 
        left us not only without an Ambassador but without 
        somebody who had been selected to be deputy chief of 
        mission.\116\

    It was not until late May that Secretary Pompeo asked 
Ambassador Bill Taylor, who had previously served as Ambassador 
to Ukraine, to return to Kyiv as Charge d'Affaires to lead the 
embassy while it awaited a confirmed Ambassador. Ambassador 
Taylor did not arrive in Kyiv until June 17, more than a month 
after Ambassador Yovanovitch officially left Kyiv.\117\ His 
mission to carry out U.S. objectives there would prove 
challenging in the face of ongoing efforts by Mr. Giuliani and 
others--at the direction of the President--to secure 
investigations demanded by the President to help his 
reelection.

2. The President Put Giuliani and the Three Amigos in Charge of Ukraine 
                                 Issues


After President Trump recalled Ambassador Yovanovitch, his personal 
        agent, Rudy Giuliani, intensified the President's campaign to 
        pressure Ukraine's newly-elected president to interfere in the 
        2020 U.S. election. President Trump directed his own political 
        appointees to coordinate with Mr. Giuliani on Ukraine, while 
        National Security Council officials expressed alarm over the 
        efforts to pursue a ``domestic political errand'' for the 
        political benefit of the President. Officials at the highest 
        levels of the White House and Trump Administration were aware 
        of the President's scheme.

                                Overview

    On April 21, 2019, the day that Ukrainian President 
Volodymyr Zelensky was elected as president of Ukraine, 
President Trump called to congratulate him. After a positive 
call--in which Mr. Zelensky complimented President Trump and 
requested that President Trump attend his inauguration--
President Trump instructed Vice President Mike Pence to lead 
the U.S. delegation to the inauguration. However, on May 13--
before the inauguration date was even set--President Trump 
instructed Vice President Pence not to attend.
    Rudy Giuliani also announced a plan to visit Ukraine in 
mid-May 2019--not on official U.S. government business, but 
instead to pursue on behalf of his client, President Trump, the 
debunked conspiracy theories about alleged Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 election and discredited claims about 
the Bidens. After public scrutiny in response to his announced 
visit, Mr. Giuliani cancelled his trip and alleged that 
President-elect Zelensky was surrounded by ``enemies of the 
President.''
    Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, Ambassador to the European 
Union Gordon Sondland, and Ambassador Kurt Volker, Special 
Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, ultimately led the 
U.S. delegation to President Zelensky's inauguration. Upon 
returning to Washington, D.C., the three U.S. officials--who 
dubbed themselves the ``Three Amigos''--debriefed the President 
in the Oval Office and encouraged him to engage with President 
Zelensky. Instead of accepting their advice, President Trump 
complained that Ukraine is ``a terrible place, all corrupt, 
terrible people,'' and asserted that Ukraine ``tried to take me 
down in 2016.'' The President instructed the ``Three Amigos'' 
to ``talk to Rudy'' and coordinate with him on Ukraine matters. 
They followed the President's orders.
    Dr. Fiona Hill, Deputy Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National Security 
Council, would later observe that Ambassador Sondland ``was 
being involved in a domestic political errand, and we [the NSC 
staff] were being involved in national security foreign policy, 
and those two things had just diverged.''

  A Political Newcomer Won Ukraine's Presidential Election on an Anti-
                          Corruption Platform

    On April 21, popular comedian and television actor, 
Volodymyr Zelensky, won a landslide victory in Ukraine's 
presidential election, earning the support of 73 percent of 
voters and unseating the incumbent Petro Poroshenko. Mr. 
Zelensky, who had no prior political experience, told voters a 
week before his victory: ``I'm not a politician. I'm just a 
simple person who came to break the system.''\118\ Five years 
earlier, in late 2013, Ukrainians had gathered in Kyiv and 
rallied against the corrupt government of former President 
Viktor Yanukovych, eventually forcing him to flee to the safety 
of Vladimir Putin's Russia. Mr. Zelensky's victory in April 
2019 reaffirmed the Ukrainian people's strong desire to 
overcome an entrenched system of corruption and pursue closer 
partnership with the West.\119\
    Following the election results, at 4:29 p.m. Eastern Time, 
President Trump was connected by telephone to President-elect 
Zelensky and congratulated him ``on a job well done . . . a 
fantastic election.'' He declared, ``I have no doubt you will 
be a fantastic president.''\120\
    According to a call record released publicly by the White 
House, President Trump did not openly express doubts about the 
newly-elected leader.\121\ And contrary to a public readout of 
the call originally issued by the White House, President Trump 
did not mention corruption in Ukraine, despite the NSC staff 
preparing talking points on that topic.\122\ Indeed, 
``corruption'' was not mentioned once during the April 21 
conversation, according to the official call record.\123\
    In the call, President-elect Zelensky lauded President 
Trump as ``a great example'' and invited him to visit Ukraine 
for his upcoming inauguration--a gesture that President Trump 
called ``very nice.''\124\ President Trump told Mr. Zelensky:

          I'll look into that, and well--give us the date and, 
        at a very minimum, we'll have a great representative. 
        Or more than one from the United States will be with 
        you on that great day. So, we will have somebody, at a 
        minimum, at a very, very high level, and they will be 
        with you.\125\

    Mr. Zelensky persisted. ``Words cannot describe our 
country,'' he went on, ``so it would be best for you to see it 
yourself. So, if you can come, that would be great. So again, I 
invite you to come.''\126\ President Trump responded, ``Well, I 
agree with you about your country and I look forward to 
it.''\127\ In a nod to his past experience working with Ukraine 
as a businessman, President Trump added, ``When I owned Miss 
Universe . . . Ukraine was always very well represented.''\128\
    President Trump then invited Mr. Zelensky to the White 
House to meet, saying: ``When you're settled in and ready, I'd 
like to invite you to the White House. We'll have a lot of 
things to talk about, but we're with you all the way.'' Mr. 
Zelensky promptly accepted the President's invitation, adding 
that the ``whole team and I are looking forward to that 
visit.''\129\
    Mr. Zelensky then reiterated his interest in President 
Trump attending his inauguration, saying, ``it will be 
absolutely fantastic if you could come and be with us.'' 
President Trump promised to let the Ukrainian leader know 
``very soon'' and added that he would see Mr. Zelensky ``very 
soon, regardless.''\130\
    Shortly after the April 21 call, Jennifer Williams, Special 
Advisor to the Vice President for Europe and Russia, learned 
that President Trump asked Vice President Pence to attend Mr. 
Zelensky's inauguration.\131\ Ms. Williams testified that in a 
separate phone call between Vice President Pence and President-
elect Zelensky two days later, ``the Vice President accepted 
that invitation from President Zelensky, and looked forward to 
being able to attend . . . if the dates worked out.''\132\ Ms. 
Williams and her colleagues began planning for the Vice 
President's trip to Kyiv.\133\

  Rudy Giuliani and his Associates Coordinated Efforts to Secure and 
      Promote the Investigations With Ukrainian President Zelensky

    As previously explained in Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani, acting 
on behalf of President Trump, had for months engaged corrupt 
current and former Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian 
Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko. The April election of Mr. 
Zelensky, however, raised the possibility that Mr. Lutsenko 
might lose his job as Prosecutor General once Mr. Zelensky took 
power.
    In the immediate aftermath of President-elect Zelensky's 
election, Mr. Giuliani continued publicly to project confidence 
that Ukraine would deliver on investigations related to the 
Bidens. On April 24--before Ambassador Yovanovitch received 
calls abruptly summoning her back to Washington--Mr. Giuliani 
stated in an interview on Fox and Friends that viewers should,

          [K]eep your eye on Ukraine . . . I think you'd get 
        some interesting information about Joe Biden from 
        Ukraine. About his son, Hunter Biden. About a company 
        he was on the board of for years, which may be one of 
        the most crooked companies in Ukraine.\134\

    Behind the scenes, however, Mr. Giuliani was taking steps 
to engage the new Ukrainian leader and his aides.
    The day before, on April 23, the same day that Vice 
President Pence confirmed his plans to attend President-elect 
Zelensky's inauguration, Mr. Giuliani dispatched his own 
delegation--consisting of Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman--to meet 
with Ihor Kolomoisky, a wealthy Ukrainian with ties to 
President-elect Zelensky. Instead of going to Kyiv, they booked 
tickets to Israel, where they met with Mr. Kolomoisky.\135\ Mr. 
Kolomoisky owned Ukraine's largest bank until 2016, when 
Ukrainian authorities nationalized the failing financial 
institution. Although he denied allegations of committing any 
crimes, Mr. Kolomoisky subsequently left Ukraine for Israel, 
where he remained until President Zelensky assumed power.\136\
    Mr. Kolomoisky confirmed to the New York Times that he met 
with Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman in late April 2019. He claimed 
they sought his assistance in facilitating a meeting between 
Mr. Giuliani and President-elect Zelensky, and he told them, 
``you've ended up in the wrong place,'' and declined to arrange 
the requested meeting.\137\
    Mr. Giuliani was not deterred.
    During the time surrounding Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
recall, Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas connected over a flurry of 
calls around a planned trip to Ukraine by Mr. Giuliani, which 
he would eventually cancel after growing public scrutiny. As 
previously described in Chapter 1, call records obtained by the 
Committees show a series of contacts on April 23 and 24 between 
Mr. Giuliani, the White House, Mr. Parnas, and John Solomon, 
among others.\138\
    On April 25, 2019, former Vice President Biden publicly 
announced his campaign for the Democratic nomination for 
President of the United States and launched his effort to 
unseat President Trump in the 2020 election.\139\
    That evening, Mr. Solomon published a new opinion piece in 
The Hill entitled, ``How the Obama White House Engaged Ukraine 
to Give Russia Collusion Narrative an Early Boost.'' Like Mr. 
Solomon's previous work, this April 25 piece repeated 
unsubstantiated conspiracy theories about alleged Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.\140\
    Meanwhile, in Kyiv, David Holmes, Counselor for Political 
Affairs at the U.S. Embassy, learned on April 25 that Mr. 
Giuliani had reached out to Mr. Zelensky's campaign chair, Ivan 
Bakanov, seeking a channel to the newly-elected leader. Mr. 
Bakanov told Mr. Holmes ``that he had been contacted by, quote, 
someone named Giuliani, who said he was an advisor to the Vice 
President, unquote.''\141\ Mr. Holmes clarified that Mr. 
Bakanov was ``speaking in Russian'' and that he did not ``know 
what he [Bakanov] meant'' by his reference to the Vice 
President, ``but that's what he [Bakanov] said.''\142\ 
Regardless of Mr. Bakanov's apparent confusion as to who Mr. 
Giuliani represented, Mr. Holmes explained that by this point 
in time, Ukrainian officials seemed to think that Mr. Giuliani 
``was a significant person in terms of managing their 
relationship with the United States.''\143\
    At 7:14 p.m. Eastern Time on April 25, Mr. Giuliani once 
again received a call from an unknown ``-1'' number, which 
lasted four minutes and 40 seconds.\144\ Minutes later, Mr. 
Giuliani held a brief 36 second call with Sean Hannity, a Fox 
News opinion host.\145\
    On the night of April 25, President Trump called into Mr. 
Hannity's prime time Fox News show. In response to a question 
about Mr. Solomon's recent publication, President Trump said:

          It sounds like big stuff. It sounds very interesting 
        with Ukraine. I just spoke to the new president a 
        little while ago, two days ago, and congratulated him 
        on an incredible race. Incredible run. A big surprise 
        victory. That's 75 percent of the vote. But that sounds 
        like big, big stuff. I'm not surprised.\146\

    As Mr. Holmes later learned on July 26 from Ambassador 
Sondland, President Trump did not care about Ukraine, he cared 
about this ``big stuff''--such as the investigation into Vice 
President Biden.\147\
    In the same Fox News interview, Mr. Hannity asked President 
Trump whether America needed to see the purported evidence 
possessed by the unnamed Ukrainians noted in Mr. Solomon's 
piece. The President replied, invoking Attorney General William 
P. Barr:

          Well, I think we do. And, frankly, we have a great 
        new attorney general who has done an unbelievable job 
        in a very short period of time. And he is very smart 
        and tough and I would certainly defer to him. I would 
        imagine he would want to see this. People have been 
        saying this whole--the concept of Ukraine, they have 
        been talking about it actually for a long time. You 
        know that, and I would certainly defer to the attorney 
        general. And we'll see what he says about it. He calls 
        them straight. That's one thing I can tell you.\148\

    Ukraine's current Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka, 
who assumed his new position in late August 2019, told the 
Financial Times in late November 2019 that Attorney General 
Barr had made no contact regarding a potential investigation 
into allegations of wrongdoing by former Vice President 
Biden.\149\ In an apparent reference to President Trump's 
demand for Ukrainian interference in U.S. elections, Mr. 
Ryaboshapka stated: ``It's critically important for the west 
not to pull us into some conflicts between their ruling elites, 
but to continue to support so that we can cross the point of no 
return.''\150\

President Trump Promoted False Information About Former Vice President 
                               Joe Biden

    In early May, Mr. Giuliani continued his outreach to 
President-elect Zelensky and promoted the need for Ukrainian 
investigations into former Vice President Biden that served 
President Trump's political needs.
    On May 2, at 6:21 a.m. Eastern Time, President Trump 
retweeted a link to an article in the New York Times, which 
assessed that Mr. Giuliani's efforts underscored ``the Trump 
campaign's concern about the electoral threat from the former 
vice president's presidential campaign'' and noted that ``Mr. 
Giuliani's involvement raises questions about whether Mr. Trump 
is endorsing an effort to push a foreign government to proceed 
with a case that could hurt a political opponent at 
home.''\151\
    Later that evening, in an interview with Fox News at the 
White House, President Trump referenced the false allegations 
about the firing of a corrupt former Ukrainian prosecutor, 
Viktor Shokin, that Mr. Giuliani had been promoting. He was 
asked, ``Should the former vice president explain himself on 
his feeling in Ukraine and whether there was a conflict . . . 
with his son's business interests?''\152\ President Trump 
replied:

          I'm hearing it's a major scandal, major problem. Very 
        bad things happened, and we'll see what that is. They 
        even have him on tape, talking about it. They have Joe 
        Biden on tape talking about the prosecutor. And I've 
        seen that tape. A lot of people are talking about that 
        tape, but that's up to them. They have to solve that 
        problem.\153\

    ``The tape'' President Trump referenced in his interview 
was a publicly available video of former Vice President Biden 
speaking in January 2018 at an event hosted by the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR), a nonpartisan think-tank focused on 
foreign policy matters. During an interview with the CFR 
president, Vice President Biden detailed how the United 
States--consistent with the policy of its European allies and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)--withheld $1 billion in 
loan guarantees until the Ukrainian government acceded to 
uniform American and international demands to fire the corrupt 
prosecutor.\154\
    By late 2015, Ukrainians were agitating for Mr. Shokin's 
removal, and in March 2016, Ukraine's parliament voted to 
dismiss the prosecutor general.\155\ Multiple witnesses 
testified that Mr. Shokin's dismissal in 2016 made it more--not 
less--likely that Ukrainian authorities might investigate any 
allegations or wrongdoing at Burisma or other allegedly corrupt 
companies.\156\ Nonetheless, President Trump and his supporters 
sought to perpetuate the false narrative that Mr. Shokin should 
not have been removed from office and that Vice President Biden 
had acted corruptly in carrying out U.S. policy.

    Rudy Giuliani Was ``Meddling in an Investigation'' on Behalf of 
                            President Trump

    On May 7, 2019, Christopher Wray, the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified before the U.S. 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
Science, and Related Agencies regarding foreign interference in 
U.S. elections:

          My view is that, if any public official or member of 
        any campaign is contacted by any nation-state or 
        anybody acting on behalf of a nation-state about 
        influencing or interfering with our election, then that 
        is something that the FBI would want to know 
        about.\157\

    Mr. Giuliani nonetheless pressed forward with his plan to 
personally convey to President-elect Zelensky, on behalf of his 
client President Trump, the importance of opening 
investigations that would assist President Trump's reelection 
campaign.
    On the morning of May 8, Mr. Giuliani called the White 
House Switchboard and connected for six minutes and 26 seconds 
with someone at the White House.\158\ That same day, Mr. 
Giuliani also connected with Mr. Solomon for almost six minutes 
and separately with Mr. Parnas. Mr. Parnas connected for one 
minute 13 seconds and with Derek Harvey, a member of Ranking 
Member Nunes' staff on the Intelligence Committee, on the same 
day.\159\
    During a meeting that same day, Ukraine Minister of 
Interior Arsen Avakov disclosed to Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State George Kent that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman would soon 
visit Kyiv ``and that they were coming with their associate, 
the Mayor Giuliani.''\160\ Minister Avakov confided to Mr. Kent 
that ``Mayor Giuliani had reached out to him and invited him to 
come and meet the group of them in Florida'' in February 
2019.\161\ Although he declined that offer, Minister Avakov 
indicated that he intended to accept their new invitation to 
meet in Kyiv.\162\
    The next day, on May 9, the New York Times publicized Mr. 
Giuliani's plan to visit Ukraine.\163\ Mr. Giuliani confirmed 
that he planned to meet with President Zelensky and press the 
Ukrainians to pursue investigations that President Trump 
promoted only days earlier on Fox News.\164\ The New York Times 
described Mr. Giuliani's planned trip as:

          [P]art of a monthslong effort by the former New York 
        mayor and a small group of Trump allies working to 
        build interest in the Ukrainian inquiries. Their 
        motivation is to . . . undermine the case against Paul 
        Manafort, Mr. Trump's imprisoned former campaign 
        chairman; and potentially to damage Mr. Biden, the 
        early front-runner for the 2020 Democratic presidential 
        nomination.\165\

    Mr. Giuliani claimed, ``We're not meddling in an election, 
we're meddling in an investigation, which we have a right to 
do.''\166\
    Only a few days after Director Wray's public comments about 
foreign interference in U.S. elections, Mr. Giuliani 
acknowledged that ``[s]omebody could say it's improper'' to 
pressure Ukraine to open investigations that would benefit 
President Trump. But, Mr. Giuliani argued:

          [T]his isn't foreign policy--I'm asking them to do an 
        investigation that they're doing already, and that 
        other people are telling them to stop. And I'm going to 
        give them reasons why they shouldn't stop it because 
        that information will be very, very helpful to my 
        client, and may turn out to be helpful to my 
        government.\167\

    Mr. Giuliani's ``client'' was President Trump, as Mr. 
Giuliani repeatedly stated publicly. According to Mr. Giuliani, 
the President fully supported putting pressure on Ukraine to 
open investigations that would benefit his 2020 reelection 
campaign.\168\ Mr. Giuliani emphasized that President Trump 
``basically knows what I'm doing, sure, as his lawyer.''\169\ 
Underscoring his commitment to pressuring Ukraine until it 
opened the investigations President Trump promoted on Fox News, 
Mr. Giuliani told the Washington Post that he would ``make sure 
that nothing scuttles the investigation that I want.''\170\
    On May 9, following public revelation of his trip by the 
New York Times, Mr. Giuliani connected in quick succession with 
Mr. Solomon and then Mr. Parnas for several minutes at a 
time.\171\ Mr. Giuliani then made brief connections with the 
White House Switchboard and Situation Room several times, 
before connecting at 1:43 p.m. Eastern Time with someone at the 
White House for over four minutes.\172\ He connected, 
separately, thereafter with Mr. Parnas several times in the 
afternoon and into the evening.\173\
    That evening, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:

          If you doubt there is media bias and corruption then 
        when Democrats conspiring with Ukrainian officials 
        comes out remember much of the press, except for Fox, 
        the Hill, and NYT, has suppressed it. If it involved 
        @realDonaldTrump or his son it would have been front 
        page news for weeks.\174\

    Shortly thereafter, on the night of May 9, he made an 
appearance on Fox News and reiterated that his trip to Ukraine 
was intended to further the President's personal and political 
interests by pressuring the Ukrainian government to investigate 
the Bidens:

          It's a big story. It's a dramatic story. And I 
        guarantee you, Joe Biden will not get to election day 
        without this being investigated, not because I want to 
        see him investigated. This is collateral to what I was 
        doing.\175\

    The next morning, on May 10, amidst the press coverage of 
his trip, Mr. Giuliani tweeted:

          Explain to me why Biden shouldn't be investigated if 
        his son got millions from a Russian loving crooked 
        Ukrainian oligarch while He was VP and point man for 
        Ukraine. Ukrainians are investigating and your fellow 
        Dems are interfering. Election is 17 months away. Let's 
        answer it now\176\

    He then had another flurry of calls with Mr. Parnas. 
Shortly after 2:00 p.m., Eastern Time, Mr. Giuliani also spoke 
with Ambassador Volker on the phone.\177\ Ambassador Volker had 
learned that Mr. Giuliani intended to travel to Ukraine ``to 
pursue these allegations that Lutsenko had made, and he was 
going to investigate these things''--specifically, the debunked 
story that Vice President Biden had improperly pressured 
Ukraine to fire a corrupt prosecutor general, as well as the 
Russian-backed conspiracy that the Ukrainians interfered in the 
2016 U.S. election.\178\ Ambassador Volker testified that he 
had a simple warning for Mr. Giuliani: Prosecutor General 
Lutsenko ``is not credible. Don't listen to what he is 
saying.''\179\ Call records obtained by the Committees reveal 
that their call lasted more than 30 minutes.\180\
    Call records also show that around midday on May 10, Mr. 
Giuliani began trading aborted calls with Kashyap ``Kash'' 
Patel, an official at the National Security Council who 
previously served on Ranking Member Nunes' staff on the 
Intelligence Committee. Mr. Patel successfully connected with 
Mr. Giuliani less than an hour after Mr. Giuliani's call with 
Ambassador Volker. Beginning at 3:23 p.m., Eastern Time, Mr. 
Patel and Mr. Giuliani spoke for over 25 minutes.\181\ Five 
minutes after Mr. Patel and Mr. Giuliani disconnected, an 
unidentified ``-1'' number connected with Mr. Giuliani for over 
17 minutes.\182\ Shortly thereafter, Mr. Giuliani spoke with 
Mr. Parnas for approximately 12 minutes.\183\
    That same afternoon, President Trump conducted a 15-minute 
long phone interview with Politico. In response to a question 
about Mr. Giuliani's upcoming visit to Kyiv, the President 
replied, ``I have not spoken to him at any great length, but I 
will . . . I will speak to him about it before he 
leaves.''\184\
    Recently, when asked what Mr. Giuliani was doing in Ukraine 
on his behalf, the President responded: ``Well, you have to ask 
that to Rudy, but Rudy, I don't, I don't even know. I know he 
was going to go to Ukraine, and I think he canceled a 
trip.''\185\ Prior to that, on October 2, the President 
publicly stated; ``And just so you know, we've been 
investigating, on a personal basis--through Rudy and others, 
lawyers--corruption in the 2016 election.''\186\ On October 4, 
the President publicly stated: ``If we feel there's corruption, 
like I feel there was in the 2016 campaign there was tremendous 
corruption against me--if we feel there's corruption, we have a 
right to go to a foreign country.''\187\
    By the evening of May 10, Mr. Giuliani appeared to have 
concerns about the incoming Ukrainian President. He appeared on 
Fox News and announced, ``I'm not going to go'' to Ukraine 
``because I think I'm walking into a group of people that are 
enemies of the President.''\188\ In a text message to Politico, 
Mr. Giuliani alleged the original offer for a meeting with 
President-elect Zelensky was a ``set up'' orchestrated by 
``several vocal critics'' of President Trump who were advising 
President-elect Zelensky.\189\ Mr. Giuliani declared that 
President-elect Zelensky ``is in [the] hands of avowed enemies 
of Pres[ident] Trump.''\190\
    Like Mr. Giuliani, President Trump would express hostility 
toward Ukraine in the days and weeks to come.

 Russian President Putin and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban Counseled 
                       President Trump on Ukraine

    In early May, Mr. Giuliani was not the only person who 
conveyed his skepticism of Ukraine to President Trump. The 
President reportedly discussed Ukraine with Russian President 
Vladimir Putin when they spoke by phone on May 3. President 
Trump posted on Twitter that he ``[h]ad a long and very good 
conversation with President Putin of Russia'' and discussed 
``even the ``Russian Hoax''--an apparent reference to the 
unanimous finding by the U.S. Intelligence Community that 
Russia interfered in the 2016 election with the aim of 
assisting President Trump's candidacy.\191\ Mr. Kent 
subsequently heard from Dr. Hill, the NSC's Senior Director for 
Europe and Russia, that President Putin also expressed negative 
views about Ukraine to President Trump. He testified that 
President Putin's motivation in undercutting President-elect 
Zelensky was ``very clear'':

          He denies the existence of Ukraine as a nation and a 
        country, as he told President Bush in Bucharest in 
        2008. He invaded and occupied 7 percent of Ukraine's 
        territory and he's led to the death of 13,000 
        Ukrainians on Ukrainian territory since 2014 as a 
        result of aggression. So that's his agenda, the agenda 
        of creating a greater Russia and ensuring that Ukraine 
        does not survive independently.\192\

    On May 13, President Trump met one-on-one for an hour with 
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. President Trump offered 
the leader a warm reception in the Oval Office and claimed 
Prime Minister Orban had ``done a tremendous job in so many 
different ways. Highly respected. Respected all over 
Europe.''\193\ The European Union and many European leaders, 
however, have widely condemned Prime Minister Orban for 
undermining Hungary's democratic institutions and promoting 
anti-Semitism and xenophobia.\194\
    Mr. Kent explained to the Committees that Prime Minister 
Orban's ``animus towards Ukraine is well-known, documented, and 
has lasted now two years.'' Due to a dispute over the rights of 
130,000 ethnic Hungarians who live in Ukraine, Mr. Kent noted 
that Prime Minister Orban ``blocked all meetings in NATO with 
Ukraine at the ministerial level or above,'' undercutting U.S. 
and European efforts to support Ukraine in its war against 
Russia.\195\ Nonetheless, President Trump told reporters prior 
to his meeting with Prime Minister Orban to not ``forget 
they're a member of NATO, and a very good member of 
NATO.''\196\
    Commenting on what Dr. Hill shared with him following the 
May 3 call and May 13 meeting, Mr. Kent said he understood 
President Trump's discussions about Ukraine with President 
Putin and Prime Minister Orban ``as being similar in tone and 
approach.'' He explained that ``both leaders'' had 
``extensively talked Ukraine down, said it was corrupt, said 
Zelensky was in the thrall of oligarchs'' the effect of which 
was ``negatively shaping a picture of Ukraine, and even 
President Zelensky personally.''\197\ The veteran State 
Department diplomat concluded, ``[T]hose two world leaders 
[Putin and Orban], along with former Mayor Giuliani, their 
communications with President Trump shaped the President's view 
of Ukraine and Zelensky, and would account for the change from 
a very positive first call on April 21 to his negative 
assessment of Ukraine.''\198\

President Trump Instructs Vice President Pence Not to Attend President 
                        Zelensky's Inauguration

    On Monday, May 13, at approximately 11:00 a.m. Eastern 
Time, Ms. Williams received a call from an assistant to the 
Vice President's Chief of Staff.\199\ President Trump, the 
assistant relayed, had ``decided that the Vice President would 
not attend the inauguration in Ukraine,'' despite the fact that 
Vice President Pence previously had accepted the 
invitation.\200\ Ms. Williams was never given a reason for the 
change in President Trump's decision.\201\
    Mr. Holmes later testified that:

          [The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv had] gone back and forth 
        with NSC staff about proposing a list of potential 
        members of the delegation. It was initially quite a 
        long list. We had asked who would be the senior [U.S.] 
        member of that delegation. We were told that Vice 
        President Pence was likely to be that senior member, it 
        was not yet fully agreed to. And so we were 
        anticipating that to be the case. And then the Giuliani 
        event happened, and then we heard that he was not going 
        to play that role.\202\

    Asked to clarify what he meant by ``the Giuliani event,'' 
Mr. Holmes replied, ``the interview basically saying that he 
had planned to travel to Ukraine, but he canceled his trip 
because there were, quote, unquote, enemies of the U.S. 
President in Zelensky's orbit.''\203\
    One of the individuals around President-elect Zelensky whom 
Mr. Giuliani publicly criticized was the oligarch Mr. 
Kolomoisky, who had refused to set up a meeting between Mr. 
Giuliani and President Zelensky. On May 18, Mr. Giuliani 
complained on Twitter that the oligarch ``returned from a long 
exile and immediately threatened and defamed two Americans, Lev 
Parnas and Igor Fruman. They are my clients and I have advised 
them to press charges.''\204\
    Mr. Kolomoisky responded to Mr. Giuliani in a televised 
interview and declared, ``Look, there is Giuliani, and two 
clowns, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, who were engaging in 
nonsense. They are Giuliani's clients.'' He added: ``They came 
here and told us that they would organize a meeting with 
Zelensky. They allegedly struck a deal with [Prosecutor-General 
Yuriy] Lutsenko about the fate of this criminal case--Burisma, 
[former Vice President] Biden, meddling in the U.S. election 
and so on.''\205\ He warned that a ``big scandal may break out, 
and not only in Ukraine, but in the United States. That is, it 
may turn out to be a clear conspiracy against Biden.''\206\
    Despite Ukraine's significance to U.S. national security as 
a bulwark against Russian aggression and the renewed 
opportunity that President Zelensky's administration offered 
for bringing Ukraine closer to the United States and Europe, 
President Trump did not ask Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, 
Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, or National 
Security Advisor John Bolton to lead the delegation to 
President Zelensky's inauguration. Instead, according to Mr. 
Holmes, the White House ``ultimately whittled back an initial 
proposed list for the official delegation to the inauguration 
from over a dozen individuals to just five.''\207\
    Topping that list was Secretary Perry. Accompanying him 
were Ambassador Sondland, U.S. Special Representative for 
Ukraine Negotiations Ambassador Volker, and NSC Director for 
Ukraine Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman.\208\ Acting Deputy Chief of 
Mission (Charged'Affaires) of U.S. Embassy Kyiv Joseph 
Pennington joined the delegation, in place of outgoing U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch. U.S. Senator Ron 
Johnson also attended the inauguration and joined several 
meetings with the presidential delegation. When asked if this 
delegation was ``a good group,'' Mr. Holmes replied that it 
``was not as senior a delegation as we [the U.S. embassy] might 
have expected.''\209\
    Secretary Perry, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland 
subsequently began to refer to themselves as the ``Three 
Amigos.'' During the delegation's meeting with President 
Zelensky, Mr. Holmes recounted that ``Secretary Perry passed 
President Zelensky a list of, quote, ``people he trusts'' from 
whom Zelensky could seek advice on energy sector reform, which 
was the topic of subsequent meetings between Secretary Perry 
and key Ukrainian energy sector contacts, from which Embassy 
personnel were excluded by Secretary Perry's staff.''\210\
    Mr. Holmes assessed that the delegation's visit proceeded 
smoothly, although ``at one point during a preliminary meeting 
of the inaugural delegation, someone in the group wondered 
aloud about why Mr. Giuliani was so active in the media with 
respect to Ukraine.''\211\ Ambassador Sondland responded: 
``Dammit, Rudy. Every time Rudy gets involved he goes and effs 
everything up.''\212\ Mr. Holmes added: ``He used the `F' 
word.''\213\
    By the time of the inauguration, Mr. Holmes assessed that 
President Zelensky and the Ukrainians were already starting to 
feel pressure to conduct political investigations related to 
former Vice President Biden.\214\ Lt. Col. Vindman also was 
concerned about the potentially negative consequences of Mr. 
Giuliani's political efforts on behalf of President Trump--both 
for U.S. national security and also Ukraine's longstanding 
history of bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress.\215\
    During the U.S. delegation's meeting with President 
Zelensky on the margins of the inauguration, Lt. Col. Vindman 
was the last person to speak.\216\ He ``offered two pieces of 
advice'' to President Zelensky. First, he advised the new 
leader, ``be particularly cautious with regards to Russia, and 
its desire to provoke Ukraine.''\217\ And second, Lt. Col. 
Vindman warned, ``stay out of U.S. domestic . . . 
politics.''\218\ Referencing the activities of Mr. Giuliani, 
Lt. Col Vindman explained:

          [I]n the March and April timeframe, it became clear 
        that there were--there were actors in the U.S., public 
        actors, nongovernmental actors that were promoting the 
        idea of investigations and 2016 Ukrainian interference. 
        And it was consistent with U.S. policy to advise any 
        country, all the countries in my portfolio, any country 
        in the world, to not participate in U.S. domestic 
        politics. So I was passing the same advice consistent 
        with U.S. policy.\219\

U.S. Officials Briefed President Trump About Their Positive Impressions 
                               of Ukraine

    Ambassadors Volker and Sondland left Kyiv with ``a very 
favorable impression'' of the new Ukrainian leader.\220\ They 
believed it was important that President Trump ``personally 
engage with the President of Ukraine in order to demonstrate 
full U.S. support for him,'' including by inviting him to 
Washington for a meeting in the Oval Office.\221\ It was agreed 
that the delegation would request a meeting with President 
Trump and personally convey their advice. They were granted 
time with President Trump on May 23.
    According to Mr. Kent, the delegation was able to secure 
the Oval Office meeting shortly after the return from Kyiv 
because of Ambassador Sondland's ``connections'' to Acting 
White House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney and President 
Trump.\222\ Christopher Anderson, Special Advisor to Ambassador 
Kurt Volker, also attributed the delegation's ability to 
quickly confirm a meeting with President Trump to Ambassador 
Sondland's ``connections to the White House.''\223\
    At the May 23 meeting, Ambassadors Sondland and Volker were 
joined by Secretary Perry, Senator Johnson, and Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, the Deputy National Security Advisor. Mr. Mulvaney 
may have also participated.\224\
    Lt. Col. Vindman, who had represented the White House at 
President Zelensky's inauguration, did not participate in the 
meeting. Dr. Hill directed him not to join, because she had 
learned that ``there was some confusion'' from the President 
``over who the director for Ukraine is.''\225\ Specifically, 
Dr. Hill testified that around the time of the May 23 
debriefing in the Oval Office, she ``became aware by chance and 
accident'' that President Trump had requested to speak with the 
NSC's Ukraine director about unspecified ``materials.''\226\ A 
member of the NSC executive secretary's staff stated that in 
response to the President's request, ``we might be reaching out 
to Kash.''\227\
    Dr. Hill testified that she understood the staff to be 
referring to Mr. Patel, who then served as a director in the 
NSC's directorate of International Organizations and Alliances, 
not the directorate of Europe and Russia.\228\ She subsequently 
consulted with Dr. Kupperman and sought to clarify if Mr. Patel 
``had some special . . . Ambassador Sondland-like 
representational role on Ukraine'' that she had not been 
informed about, but ``couldn't elicit any information about 
that.''\229\ All Dr. Kupperman said was that he would look into 
the matter.\230\ Dr. Hill also testified that she never saw or 
learned more about the Ukraine-related ``materials'' that the 
President believed he had received from Mr. Patel, who 
maintained a close relationship with Ranking Member Nunes after 
leaving his staff to join the NSC.\231\

 President Trump Put the Three Amigos in Charge of the United States' 
   Ukraine Relationship and Directed Them to ``Talk to Rudy'' About 
                                Ukraine

    According to witness testimony, the May 23 debriefing with 
the President in the Oval Office proved consequential for two 
reasons. President Trump authorized Ambassador Sondland, 
Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Volker to lead engagement with 
President Zelensky's new administration in Ukraine. He 
instructed them, however, to talk to and coordinate with his 
personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani.
    Ambassador Sondland, Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry, 
and Senator Johnson ``took turns'' making their case ``that 
this is a new crowd, it's a new President'' in Ukraine who was 
``committed to doing the right things,'' including fighting 
corruption.\232\ According to Ambassador Sondland, the group 
``emphasized the strategic importance of Ukraine'' and the 
value to the United States of strengthening the relationship 
with President Zelensky.\233\ They recommended that President 
Trump once again call President Zelensky and follow through on 
his April 21 invitation for President Zelensky to meet with him 
in the Oval Office.\234\
    President Trump reacted negatively to the positive 
assessment of Ukraine. Ambassador Volker recalled that 
President Trump said Ukraine is ``a terrible place, all 
corrupt, terrible people'' and was ``just dumping on 
Ukraine.''\235\ This echoed Mr. Giuliani's public statements 
about Ukraine during early May.
    According to both Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, 
President Trump also alleged, without offering any evidence, 
that Ukraine ``tried to take me down'' in the 2016 
election.\236\ The President emphasized that he ``didn't 
believe'' the delegation's positive assessment of the new 
Ukrainian President, and added ``that's not what I hear'' from 
Mr. Giuliani.\237\ President Trump said that Mr. Giuliani 
``knows all of these things'' and knows that President Zelensky 
has ``some bad people around him.''\238\ Rather than committing 
to an Oval Office meeting with the Ukrainian leader, President 
Trump directed the delegation to ``[t]alk to Rudy, talk to 
Rudy.''\239\
    Ambassador Sondland testified that the ``Three Amigos'' saw 
the writing on the wall and concluded ``that if we did not talk 
to Rudy, nothing would move forward on Ukraine.''\240\ He 
continued:

          [B]ased on the President's direction we were faced 
        with a choice. We could abandon the goal of a White 
        House meeting for President Zelensky, which we all 
        believed was crucial to strengthening U.S.-Ukrainian 
        ties . . . or we could do as President Trump directed 
        and talk to Mr. Giuliani to address the President's 
        concerns. We chose the latter path.\241\

    Ambassador Volker reached a similar conclusion. He believed 
``that the messages being conveyed by Mr. Giuliani were a 
problem, because they were at variance with what our official 
message to the President was, and not conveying that positive 
assessment that we all had. And so, I thought it was important 
to try to step in and fix the problem.''\242\ Ultimately, 
however, the ``problem'' posed by the President's instruction 
to coordinate regarding Ukraine with his personal attorney 
persisted and would become more acute.
    After the May 23 meeting, Ambassador Sondland stayed behind 
with President Trump and personally confirmed that the Three 
Amigos ``would be working on the Ukraine file.''\243\
    Multiple witnesses testified about this shift in personnel 
in charge of the Ukraine relationship.\244\ Mr. Kent recalled 
that, after the Oval Office meeting, Secretary Perry, 
Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Volker began ``asserting 
that, going forward, they would be the drivers of the 
relationship with Ukraine.''\245\ Catherine Croft, Special 
Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker, recalled that ``Sondland, 
Volker, and sort of Perry, as a troika, or as the Three Amigos, 
had been sort of tasked with Ukraine policy'' by President 
Trump.\246\ Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
David Hale testified about his understanding of the meeting, 
``[I]t was clear that the President, from the readout I had 
received, the President had tasked that group, members of that 
delegation to pursue these objectives: the meeting, and the 
policy goals that I outlined earlier. So I was, you know, 
knowing I was aware that Ambassador Volker and Ambassador 
Sondland would be doing that.''\247\
    On a June 10 conference call with the Three Amigos, 
``Secretary Perry laid out for Ambassador Bolton the notion 
that'' they ``would assist Ambassador Taylor on Ukraine and be 
there to support'' him as the U.S.-Ukraine relationship 
``move[ed] forward.''\248\
    This de facto change in authority was never officially 
communicated to other officials, including Dr. Hill, who had 
responsibility for Ukraine at the National Security 
Council.\249\

     U.S. Officials Collaborated with Rudy Giuliani to Advance the 
                      President's Political Agenda

    Ambassador Sondland testified that in the weeks and months 
after the May 23 Oval Office meeting, ``everyone was in the 
loop'' regarding Mr. Giuliani's role in advancing the 
President's scheme regarding Ukraine.\250\ The ``Three Amigos'' 
did as the President ordered and began communicating with Mr. 
Giuliani. E-mail messages described to the Committees by 
Ambassador Sondland showed that he informed Mr. Mulvaney, 
Ambassador Bolton, and Secretaries Pompeo and Perry, as well as 
their immediate staffs, of his Ukraine-related efforts on 
behalf of the President.\251\
    According to Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry agreed to 
reach out to Mr. Giuliani first ``given their prior 
relationship.''\252\ Secretary Perry discussed with Mr. 
Giuliani the political concerns that President Trump 
articulated in the May 23 meeting.\253\
    Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
Sondland, and Secretary Perry ``gave us every impression that 
they were meeting with Rudy Giuliani at this point, and Rudy 
Giuliani was also saying on the television, and indeed has said 
subsequently, that he was closely coordinating with the State 
Department.''\254\ These meetings ran counter to Ambassador 
Bolton's repeated declarations that ``nobody should be meeting 
with Giuliani.''\255\
    Like Dr. Hill, Ambassador Bolton also closely tracked Mr. 
Giuliani's activities on behalf of the President. According to 
Dr. Hill, Ambassador Bolton closely monitored Mr. Giuliani's 
public statements and repeatedly referred to Mr. Giuliani as a 
``hand grenade that was going to blow everyone up.''\256\ 
During a meeting on June 13, Ambassador Bolton made clear that 
he supported more engagement with Ukraine by senior White House 
officials but warned that ``Mr. Giuliani was a key voice with 
the President on Ukraine.''\257\ According to Ambassador 
Bolton, Mr. Giuliani's influence ``could be an obstacle to 
increased White House engagement.''\258\ Ambassador Bolton 
joked that ``every time Ukraine is mentioned, Giuliani pops 
up.''\259\
    Ambassador Bolton also reportedly joined Dr. Hill in 
warning Ambassador Volker against contacting Mr. Giuliani.\260\ 
Dr. Hill was particularly concerned about engagement with Mr. 
Giuliani because ``the more you engage with someone who is 
spreading untruths, the more validity you give to those 
untruths.''\261\ She further testified that she also discussed 
Mr. Giuliani's activities with Dr. Kupperman, specifically her 
concern that ``Ukraine was going to be played by Giuliani in 
some way as part of the campaign.''\262\
    On June 18, Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary 
of State Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Secretary Perry, 
Ambassador Sondland, and State Department Counselor T. Ulrich 
Brechbuhl participated in a meeting at the Department of Energy 
to follow up to the May 23 Oval Office meeting.\263\ Ambassador 
William Taylor, Charge d'Affaires for U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, who 
had arrived in Ukraine just the day before, participated by 
phone from Kyiv.\264\ The group agreed that a meeting between 
President Trump and President Zelensky would be valuable.\265\ 
However, Ambassadors Volker and Sondland subsequently relayed 
to Ambassador Taylor that President Trump ``wanted to hear from 
Zelensky before scheduling the meeting in the Oval 
Office.''\266\ Ambassador Taylor testified that he did not 
understand, at that time, what the President wanted to hear 
from his Ukrainian counterpart.\267\ However, Ambassador 
Volker's assistant, Mr. Anderson, recalled ``vague 
discussions'' about addressing ``Mr. Giuliani's continued calls 
for a corruption investigation.''\268\
    The quid pro quo--conditioning the Oval Office meeting that 
President Trump first offered the Ukrainian leader during their 
April 21 call on the Ukrainians' pursuit of investigations that 
would benefit President Trump politically--was beginning to 
take shape. As Ambassador Sondland testified, the conditions 
put on the White House meeting and on Ukraine's continued 
engagement with the White House would get ``more insidious'' 
with the passage of time.\269\

   President Trump Invited Foreign Interference in the 2020 Election

    As U.S. officials debated how to meet the President's 
demands as articulated by Mr. Giuliani, President Trump 
publicly disclosed on June 12 in an Oval Office interview with 
ABC News anchor George Stephanopoulos that there was ``nothing 
wrong with listening'' to a foreign power who offered political 
dirt on an opponent. The President added, ``I think I'd want to 
hear it.''
    Mr. Stephanopoulos then pressed the President directly, 
``You want that kind of interference in our elections?'' to 
which President Trump replied, ``It's not an interference, they 
have information. I think I'd take it.''\270\ President Trump 
also made clear that he did not think a foreign power offering 
damaging information on an opponent was necessarily wrong, and 
said only that he would ``maybe'' contact the FBI ``if I 
thought there was something wrong.''\271\
    President Trump's willingness to accept foreign 
interference in a U.S. election during his interview with Mr. 
Stephanopoulos was consistent with tweets and interviews by Mr. 
Giuliani at this time. For example, on June 21, Mr. Giuliani 
tweeted:

          New Pres of Ukraine still silent on investigation of 
        Ukrainian interference in 2016 election and alleged 
        Biden bribery of Pres Poroshenko. Time for leadership 
        and investigate both if you want to purge how Ukraine 
        was abused by Hillary and Obama people.\272\

    On June 18, Dr. Hill met with Ambassador Sondland at the 
White House. She ``asked him quite bluntly'' what his role was 
in Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland replied that ``he was in charge 
of Ukraine.''\273\ Dr. Hill was taken aback and a bit 
irritated. She prodded Ambassador Sondland again and asked, 
``Who put you in charge of Ukraine?'' Dr. Hill testified: 
``And, you know, I'll admit, I was a bit rude. And that's when 
he told me the President, which shut me up.''\274\
    Dr. Hill tried to impress upon Ambassador Sondland the 
``importance of coordinating'' with other national security 
officials in the conduct of Ukraine policy, including the NSC 
staff and the State Department. Ambassador Sondland 
``retorted'' that he was ``coordinating with the President'' 
and Mr. Mulvaney, ``filling in'' Ambassador Bolton, and talking 
to State Department Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl. Ambassador 
Sondland asked: ``Who else did he have to inform?''\275\
    Dr. Hill stated that, in hindsight, with the benefit of the 
sworn testimony by others during the impeachment inquiry and 
seeing documents displayed by witnesses, she realized that she 
and Ambassador Sondland were working on two fundamentally 
different tasks. Dr. Hill testified:

          But it struck me when yesterday, when you put up on 
        the screen Ambassador Sondland's emails and who was on 
        these emails, and he said, These are the people who 
        need to know, that he was absolutely right. Because he 
        was being involved in a domestic political errand, and 
        we were being involved in national security foreign 
        policy, and those two things had just diverged. So he 
        was correct. And I had not put my finger on that at the 
        moment, but I was irritated with him and angry with him 
        that he wasn't fully coordinating. And I did say to 
        him, Ambassador Sondland, Gordon, I think this is all 
        going to blow up. And here we are.\276\

    Reflecting on her June 18 conversation with Ambassador 
Sondland, Dr. Hill concluded:

          Ambassador Sondland is not wrong that he had been 
        given a different remit than we had been. And it was at 
        that moment that I started to realize how those things 
        had diverged. And I realized, in fact, that I wasn't 
        really being fair to Ambassador Sondland, because he 
        was carrying out what he thought he had been instructed 
        to carry out, and we were doing something that we 
        thought was just as--or perhaps even more important, 
        but it wasn't in the same channel.\277\

         3. The President Froze Military Assistance to Ukraine


The President froze military assistance to Ukraine against U.S. 
        national security interests and over the objections of career 
        experts.

                                Overview

    Since 2014, the United States has maintained a bipartisan 
policy of delivering hundreds of millions of dollars in 
security assistance to Ukraine each year. These funds benefit 
the security of the United States and Europe by ensuring that 
Ukraine is equipped to defend itself against Russian 
aggression. In 2019, that bipartisan policy was undermined when 
President Trump ordered, without justification, a freeze on 
military assistance to Ukraine.
    For fiscal year 2019, Congress authorized and appropriated 
$391 million in security assistance: $250 million through the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) Ukraine Security Assistance 
Initiative and $141 million through the State Department's 
Foreign Military Financing program. In July 2019, however, 
President Trump ordered the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) to put a hold on all $391 million in security assistance 
to Ukraine.
    The hold surprised experts from DOD and the State 
Department. DOD had already announced its intent to deliver 
security assistance to Ukraine after certifying that the 
country had implemented sufficient anti-corruption reforms, and 
the State Department was in the process of notifying Congress 
of its intent to deliver foreign military financing to Ukraine. 
In a series of interagency meetings, every represented agency 
other than OMB (which is headed by Mick Mulvaney, who is also 
the President's Acting Chief of Staff) supported the provision 
of assistance to Ukraine and objected to President Trump's 
hold. Ukraine experts at DOD, the State Department, and the 
National Security Council (NSC) argued that it was in the 
national security interest of the United States to continue to 
support Ukraine. Agency experts also expressed concerns about 
the legality of President Trump withholding assistance to 
Ukraine that Congress had already appropriated for this express 
purpose.
    Despite these concerns, OMB devised a plan to implement 
President Trump's hold on the assistance. On July 25, 2019, OMB 
began using a series of footnotes in funding documents to 
notify DOD that the assistance funds were temporarily on hold 
to allow for interagency review. Throughout August and 
September, OMB continued to use this method and rationale to 
maintain the hold, long after the final interagency meeting on 
Ukraine assistance occurred on July 31. The hold continued 
despite concerns from DOD that the hold would threaten its 
ability to fully spend the money before the end of the fiscal 
year, as legally required.
    On July 25--the same day as President Trump's call with 
President Zelensky--officials at Ukraine's embassy emailed DOD 
to ask about the status of the hold. By mid-August, officials 
at DOD, the State Department, and the NSC received numerous 
questions from Ukrainian officials about the hold. President 
Trump's hold on the Ukraine assistance was publicly reported on 
August 28, 2019.

 Security Assistance to Ukraine is Important to U.S. National Security 
                               Interests

    The United States has an interest in providing security 
assistance to Ukraine to support the country in its 
longstanding battle against Russian aggression and to shore it 
up as an independent and democratic country that can deter 
Kremlin influence in both Ukraine and other European countries. 
In early 2014, in what became known as the Revolution of 
Dignity, Ukrainian citizens demanded democratic reforms and an 
end to corruption, thereby forcing the ouster of pro-Kremlin 
Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine's President. Shortly thereafter, 
Russian military forces and their proxies began an incursion 
into Ukraine that led to Russia's illegal annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine, as well as the ongoing, Russian-
led armed conflict in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. 
Approximately 13,000 people have been killed as a result of the 
conflict and over 1.4 million people have been displaced.\278\
    Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, 
noted that ``militants in eastern Ukraine report directly to 
the Russian military, which arms them, trains them, leads them, 
and fights alongside them.''\279\ Similarly, then-Secretary of 
Defense James Mattis, during a visit to Ukraine in 2017, chided 
Russia, stating that ``despite Russia's denials, we know they 
are seeking to redraw international borders by force, 
undermining the sovereign and free nations of Europe.''\280\
    In response to Russia's aggression, the international 
community imposed financial and visa sanctions on Russian 
individuals and entities, and committed to providing billions 
of dollars in economic, humanitarian, and security assistance 
to Ukraine to continue to support its sovereignty and 
democratic development.
    The European Union is the single largest contributor of 
total foreign assistance to Ukraine, having provided =15 
billion in grants and loans since 2014.\281\ In addition to 
economic and humanitarian assistance, the United States has 
contributed a substantial amount of security assistance, mostly 
lethal and non-lethal military equipment and training, to 
Ukraine. In fact, the United States is the largest contributor 
of security assistance to Ukraine. Since 2014, the United 
States has delivered approximately $1.5 billion in security 
assistance to Ukraine.\282\
    Multiple witnesses--including Ambassador William Taylor, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent, Lt. Col. 
Alexander Vindman, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Laura Cooper--testified that this security assistance to 
Ukraine is vital to the national security of the United States 
and Europe.\283\ As Ambassador Taylor noted:

          [R]adar and weapons and sniper rifles, communication, 
        that saves lives. It makes the Ukrainians more 
        effective. It might even shorten the war. That's what 
        our hope is, to show that the Ukrainians can defend 
        themselves and the Russians, in the end, will say 
        ``Okay, we're going to stop.''\284\

    State Department Special Advisor for Ukraine, Catherine 
Croft, further emphasized that Ukrainians currently ``face 
casualties nearly every day in defense of their own territory 
against Russian aggression.''\285\ Ambassador Taylor testified 
that American aid is a concrete demonstration of the United 
States' ``commitment to resist aggression and defend 
freedom.''\286\
    Witnesses also testified that it is in the interest of the 
United States for Russian aggression to be halted in Ukraine. 
In the 20th century, the United States fought two bloody wars 
to resist the aggression of a hostile power that tried to 
change the borders of Europe by force. As Ambassador Taylor put 
it, Russian aggression in Ukraine ``dismissed all the 
principles that have kept the peace and contributed to 
prosperity in Europe since World War II.''\287\
    Timothy Morrison, former Senior Director for Europe and 
Russia at the NSC, put the importance of U.S. assistance in 
stark terms:

          Russia is a failing power, but it is still a 
        dangerous one. The United States aids Ukraine and her 
        people so that they can fight Russia over there, and we 
        don't have to fight Russia here.\288\

         Bipartisan Support for Security Assistance to Ukraine

    Congressional support for security assistance to Ukraine 
has been overwhelming and bipartisan. Congress provided $391 
million in security assistance to Ukraine for fiscal year 2019: 
$250 million through the DOD-administered Ukraine Security 
Assistance Initiative (USAI) and $141 million through the State 
Department-administered Foreign Military Financing program.
    On September 26, 2018, Congress appropriated $250 million 
for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which is funded 
through DOD. The funding law made clear that the funding was 
only ``available until September 30, 2019.'' President Trump 
signed the bill into law on September 28, 2018.\289\
    The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative--a 
Congressionally-mandated program codifying portions of the 
European Reassurance Initiative, which was originally launched 
by the Obama Administration in 2015--authorizes DOD to provide 
``security assistance and intelligence support, including 
training, equipment, and logistics support, supplies and 
services, to military and other security forces of the 
Government of Ukraine.''\290\ Recognizing that strengthening 
Ukraine's institutions, in addition to its military, is vital 
to helping it break free of Russia's influence, Congress 
imposed conditions upon DOD before it could spend a portion of 
the security assistance funds. Half of the money was held in 
reserve until the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, certified to Congress that Ukraine had 
undertaken sufficient anti-corruption reforms, such as in 
civilian control of the military and increased transparency and 
accountability.\291\
    On February 28, 2019, John C. Rood, Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, notified Congress that DOD intended to 
deliver the first half ($125 million) of assistance 
appropriated in September 2018 to Ukraine, including ``more 
than $50 million of assistance to deliver counter-artillery 
radars and defensive lethal assistance.''\292\ Congress cleared 
the Congressional notification, which enabled DOD to begin 
obligating (spending) funds.\293\
    For Ukraine to qualify to receive the remaining $125 
million of assistance, Congress required that the Secretary of 
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, certify 
that the Government of Ukraine had taken substantial 
anticorruption reform actions.\294\ Ms. Cooper and others at 
DOD conducted a review to evaluate whether Ukraine had met the 
required benchmarks.\295\ Ms. Cooper explained that the review 
involved ``pulling in all the views of the key experts on 
Ukraine defense, and coming up with a consensus view,'' which 
was then run ``up the chain in the Defense Department, to 
ensure we have approval.''\296\
    On May 23, 2019, Under Secretary Rood certified to Congress 
that Ukraine had completed the requisite defense institutional 
reforms to qualify for the remaining $125 million in funds. He 
wrote:

          On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and in 
        coordination with the Secretary of State, I have 
        certified that the Government of Ukraine has taken 
        substantial actions to make defense institutional 
        reforms for the purposes of decreasing corruption, 
        increasing accountability, and sustaining improvements 
        of combat capability enabled by U.S. assistance.\297\

    Congress then cleared the related Congressional 
notification, which enabled DOD to begin obligating the 
remaining $125 million in funds.\298\
    On June 18, 2019, DOD issued a press release announcing its 
intention to provide $250 million in security assistance funds 
to Ukraine ``for additional training, equipment, and advisory 
efforts to build the capacity of Ukraine's armed forces.'' DOD 
announced that the security assistance would provide Ukraine 
with sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and 
counter-artillery radars, command and control, electronic 
warfare detection and secure communications, military mobility, 
night vision, and military medical treatment.\299\
    On February 15, 2019, Congress also appropriated $115 
million for Ukraine through the State Department-administered 
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF).\300\ The Foreign 
Military Financing Program is administered by the State 
Department and provides grants or loans to foreign countries to 
help them purchase military services or equipment manufactured 
by U.S. companies in the United States. In addition to the $115 
million appropriated for fiscal year 2019, approximately $26 
million carried over from fiscal year 2018.\301\ Thus, the 
total amount of foreign military financing available for 
Ukraine was approximately $141 million.
    Before a country receives foreign military financing, the 
State Department must first seek Congressional approval through 
a notification to Congress.\302\ The State Department never 
sent the required Congressional notification to Congress in the 
spring or summer of 2019. As described below, OMB blocked the 
notification.\303\

    President Trump had Questions About Ukraine Security Assistance

    The day after DOD issued its June 18 press release 
announcing $250 million in security assistance funds for 
Ukraine, President Trump started asking OMB questions about the 
funding for Ukraine. On June 19, Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate 
Director for National Security Programs at OMB, was copied on 
an email from his boss, Michael Duffey, Associate Director for 
National Security Programs at OMB, to Elaine McCusker, Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) that said that ``the 
President had questions about the press report and that he was 
seeking additional information.''\304\ Notably, the same day, 
President Trump gave an interview on Fox News where he raised 
the so-called ``Crowdstrike'' conspiracy theory that Ukraine, 
rather than Russia, had interfered in the 2016 election, a line 
he would repeat during his July 25 call with the Ukrainian 
president.\305\
    On June 20, in response to the President's inquiry, Ms. 
McCusker responded to President Trump's inquiry by providing 
Mr. Sandy information on the security assistance program.\306\ 
Mr. Sandy shared the document with Mr. Duffey, who had follow-
up questions about the ``financial resources associated with 
the program, in particular,'' the ``history of the 
appropriations, [and] any more details about the intent of the 
program.''\307\ Mr. Sandy said that his staff provided the 
relevant information to Mr. Duffey, but he did not know whether 
Mr. Duffey shared the information with the White House.\308\
    Ms. Cooper also recalled receiving an email inquiring about 
DOD-administered Ukraine security assistance a ``few days'' 
after DOD's June 18, 2019, press release.\309\ The email was 
from the Secretary of Defense's Chief of Staff, ``asking for 
follow-up on a meeting with the President.'' The email 
contained three questions:

          And the one question was related to U.S. industry. 
        Did U.S.--is U.S. industry providing any of this 
        equipment? The second question that I recall was 
        related to international contributions. It asked, what 
        are other countries doing, something to that effect. 
        And then the third question, I don't recall--I mean, 
        with any of these I don't recall the exact wording, but 
        it was something to the effect of, you know, who gave 
        this money, or who gave this funding?\310\

    Like Mr. Sandy, Ms. Cooper believed that the President's 
inquiries were spurred by DOD's June 18 press release. She 
testified, ``we did get that series of questions just within a 
few days after the press release and after that one article 
that had the headline.''\311\ Ms. Cooper noted that it was 
``relatively unusual'' to receive questions from the President, 
and that she and her staff at the DOD responded ``as quickly'' 
as they could.\312\ According to Ms. Cooper, DOD officials 
included in their answers that security assistance funding 
``has strong bipartisan support,'' but never received a 
response.\313\

               President Trump Froze Military Assistance

    Despite the fact that DOD experts demonstrated that the 
security assistance was crucial for both Ukraine and U.S. 
national security and had strong bipartisan support in 
Congress, President Trump ordered OMB to freeze the funds in 
July.
    On July 3, the State Department notified DOD and NSC staff 
that OMB was blocking the State Department from transmitting a 
Congressional notification for the provision of State 
Department-administered security assistance to Ukraine (the 
$141 million in foreign military financing).\314\ Because the 
State Department is legally required to transmit such a 
notification to Congress before spending funds, blocking the 
Congressional notification effectively barred the State 
Department from spending the funding.\315\ Ms. Williams 
testified that she saw the news in a draft email that was being 
prepared as part of the nightly update for the National 
Security Advisor.\316\ She agreed that the hold came ``out of 
the blue'' because it had not been discussed previously by OMB 
or the NSC.\317\
    On or about July 12, 2019, President Trump directed that a 
hold be placed on security assistance funding for Ukraine. That 
day, Robert Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior 
Advisor to the Chief of Staff, sent an email to Mr. Duffey at 
OMB about Ukraine security assistance.\318\ Mr. Sandy, who was 
on personal leave at the time but later received a copy of the 
email from Mr. Duffey, testified that in the July 12 email, Mr. 
Blair communicated ``that the President is directing a hold on 
military support funding for Ukraine.''\319\ The email 
mentioned no concerns about any other country, security 
assistance package, or aid of any sort.\320\
    On or about July 15, Mr. Morrison learned from Deputy 
National Security Advisor Charles Kupperman ``that it was the 
President's direction to hold the assistance.''\321\ On or 
about July 17 or 18, 2019, Mr. Duffey and Mr. Blair again 
exchanged emails about Ukraine security assistance.\322\ Mr. 
Sandy later received a copy of the emails, which showed that 
when Mr. Duffey asked Mr. Blair about the reason for the hold, 
Mr. Blair provided no explanation and instead said, ``we need 
to let the hold take place'' and then ``revisit'' the issue 
with the President.\323\
    On July 18 or 19, when he returned from two weeks of 
personal leave, Mr. Sandy learned for the first time that the 
President had placed a hold on Ukraine security assistance from 
Mr. Duffey.\324\ According to Mr. Sandy, Mr. Duffey was not 
aware of the reason but ``there was certainly a desire to learn 
more about the rationale'' for the hold.\325\

 Agency Experts Repeatedly Objected to the Hold on Security Assistance

    Between July 18 and July 31, 2019, the NSC staff convened a 
series of interagency meetings, at which the hold on security 
assistance was discussed in varying degrees of detail. Over the 
course of these meetings, it became evident that:
       the President directed the hold through OMB;
       no justification was provided for the hold;
       with the exception of OMB, all represented 
agencies supported Ukraine security assistance because it was 
in the national security interests of the United States; and
       there were concerns about the legality of the 
hold.
    The first interagency meeting was held on July 18 at the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary level (i.e., a ``sub-Policy 
Coordination Committee''). It was supposed to be a ``routine 
Ukraine policy meeting.''\326\ Ambassador Taylor, Lt. Col. 
Vindman, Ms. Croft, and Mr. Kent were among the attendees. 
Witnesses testified that OMB announced at the meeting that 
President Trump had directed a hold on Ukraine security 
assistance. Mr. Kent testified that at the meeting, an OMB 
staff person announced that Acting White House Chief of Staff 
Mick Mulvaney ``at the direction of the President had put a 
hold on all security assistance to the Ukraine.''\327\ 
Ambassador Taylor testified that the ``directive had come from 
the President to the Chief of Staff to OMB'' and that when he 
learned of the hold on military assistance, he ``realized that 
one of the key pillars of our strong support for Ukraine was 
threatened.''\328\
    According to Ms. Croft, when Mr. Kent raised the issue of 
security assistance, it ``blew up the meeting.''\329\ 
Ambassador Taylor testified that he and others on the call 
``sat in astonishment'' when they learned about the hold.\330\ 
David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, 
was also on the call. He testified he was ``shocked'' and 
thought the hold was ``extremely significant.''\331\ He thought 
the hold undermined what he had understood to be longstanding 
U.S. policy in Ukraine.\332\
    Ms. Croft testified that ``the only reason given was that 
the order came at the direction of the President.''\333\ Ms. 
Cooper, who did not participate but received a readout of the 
meeting, testified that the fact that the hold was announced 
without explanation was ``unusual.''\334\ Mr. Kent testified 
that ``[t]here was great confusion among the rest of us because 
we didn't understand why that had happened.''\335\ He explained 
that ``[s]ince there was unanimity that this [security 
assistance to Ukraine] was in our national interest, it just 
surprised all of us.''\336\
    With the exception of OMB, all agencies present at the July 
18 meeting advocated for the lifting of the hold.\337\
    There was also a lack of clarity as to whether the hold 
applied only to the State Department-administered Foreign 
Military Financing to Ukraine or whether it also applied to the 
DOD-administered Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 
funding.\338\ Ms. Cooper and her colleagues at the DOD were 
``concerned'' about the hold.\339\ After the meeting, DOD 
sought further clarification from the NSC and State Department 
about its impact on the DOD-administered funding.\340\ However, 
there was no ``specific guidance for DOD at the time.''\341\
    The second interagency meeting to discuss the hold on 
Ukraine security assistance was held at the Assistant Secretary 
level (i.e., a ``Policy Coordination Committee'') on July 23, 
2019.\342\ The meeting was chaired by Mr. Morrison.\343\ Ms. 
Cooper, who participated via secure video teleconference, 
testified that ``the White House chief of staff ha[d] conveyed 
that the President has concerns about Ukraine and Ukraine 
security assistance.''\344\ Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor 
to Vice President Pence for Europe and Eurasia, who also 
attended the meeting on behalf of the Vice President, testified 
that the ``OMB representative conveyed that they had been 
directed by the Chief of Staff, the White House Chief of Staff, 
to continue holding it [the Ukraine security assistance] until 
further notice.''\345\ Similar to the July 18 meeting, the July 
23 meeting did not provide clarity about whether the 
President's hold applied to the DOD-administered funding or 
only to the funds administered by the State Department.\346\
    Again, no reason was provided for the hold.\347\ Mr. Sandy 
did not attend the July 23 meeting as the representative for 
OMB, but he received a readout that other agencies expressed 
concerns about the hold. Specifically, the concerns related to 
the lack of rationale for the hold, the hold's implications on 
U.S. assistance and ``overall policy toward Ukraine,'' and 
``similar legal questions.''\348\
    Mr. Morrison also testified that there was a discussion at 
the July 23 meeting about the legality of the hold, and 
specifically whether it is ``actually legally permissible for 
the President to not allow for the disbursement of the 
funding.''\349\ Mr. Morrison recalled that DOD raised concerns 
about possible violations of the Impoundment Control Act.\350\ 
The Impoundment Control Act gives the President the authority 
to delay spending, or not spend, funds only if Congress is 
notified of those intentions and approves the proposed action 
(see below for further discussion of the act).\351\
    With the exception of OMB, all agencies present at the July 
23rd meeting advocated for the lifting of the hold.\352\ 
Ambassador Taylor explained that the State Department ``made a 
strong statement about the importance of this assistance'' and 
that Ms. Cooper, on behalf of DOD, ``made a very strong case 
and continued to make a very strong case for the 
effectiveness'' of the security assistance.\353\ Lt. Col. 
Vindman, who also attended the meeting, testified that there 
was agreement that the issue should be elevated to the Agency 
deputies ``as quickly as possible to recommend a release of 
security assistance.''\354\
    The third interagency meeting, a Deputies Small Group 
meeting at the Cabinet Deputies level, was held on July 26, 
2019. Mr. Duffey was the OMB representative, and Mr. Sandy 
prepared Mr. Duffey for the meeting.\355\ Mr. Sandy explained 
that he prepared Mr. Duffey to get policy guidance on six 
critical issues: (1) the reason for the hold; (2) the extent of 
the hold; (3) the duration of the hold; (4) the Congressional 
affairs approach; (5) the public affairs approach; and (6) and 
the diplomatic approach.\356\ Mr. Sandy testified that on July 
26, OMB still did not have an understanding of the reason for 
the hold.\357\ According to Mr. Sandy, at that time, there was 
no discussion within OMB about the amount of money that was 
being contributed to Ukraine by other countries, or whether 
that topic was the reason for the President's hold.\358\
    Mr. Morrison, Lt. Col. Vindman, Ms. Cooper, Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs David Hale, and Mr. Duffey 
attended the July 26 meeting. At the meeting, OMB stated that 
``they had guidance from the President and from Acting Chief of 
Staff Mulvaney to freeze the assistance.''\359\ It also was 
``stated very clearly'' that the hold applied to both the State 
Department and Defense Department security assistance 
funds.\360\ Ambassador Hale, as the representative for the 
Department of State, ``advocated strongly for resuming the 
assistance,'' as did representatives from all agencies other 
than OMB.\361\
    Mr. Morrison testified that, at the meeting, ``OMB 
represented that--and the Chief of Staff's Office was present--
that the President was concerned about corruption in Ukraine, 
and he wanted to make sure that Ukraine was doing enough to 
manage that corruption.''\362\ Ms. Cooper had a similar 
recollection but received no further understanding of what OMB 
meant by ``corruption.''\363\ Ms. Cooper recalled that the 
deputies did not consider corruption to be a legitimate reason 
for the hold because they unanimously agreed that Ukraine was 
making sufficient progress on anti-corruption reforms, as had 
been certified by DOD on May 23.\364\

   President Trump Continued the Hold Despite Agency Concerns About 
                                Legality

    Prior to the passage of the Impoundment Control Act, 
presidents had frequently impounded--i.e., refused to spend--
Congressionally-appropriated funds to enforce their policy 
priorities when they diverged from Congress'. However, most of 
these impoundments were small (i.e., no more than a few percent 
of the total program budget) or temporary (i.e., funds were 
released in time for them to be spent before the end of the 
fiscal year) and rooted in policy, rather than political 
interests of the President. It was not until President Richard 
Nixon that presidential impoundment of funds would prompt 
Congress to take action citing constitutional concerns.\365\
    Unlike his predecessors, President Nixon undertook 
impoundments that were both substantial and, in some cases, 
permanent, which raised concerns for Congress over its Article 
I powers. In fact, between 1969 and 1972, President Nixon 
impounded between 15% and 20% of Congressionally-appropriated 
funds in various accounts.\366\
    To reassert Congressional authority over the budget, in 
1973, Congress established the Joint Study Committee on Budget 
Control, which held a series of hearings and produced more than 
4,600 pages of testimony and reports. The Joint Study 
Committee's findings ultimately led to the overwhelmingly 
bipartisan passage--over President Nixon's veto--of the 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, one of a series of reform 
bills designed to reign in presidential power. Looking back at 
that moment in history, Rep. Bill Archer (R-TX), a fiscal 
conservative who served 30 years in the House of 
Representatives, including as the Chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee, remarked, ``the culture then was that the 
president had too much power . . . the president is abusing his 
power.''\367\
    In addition to establishing the Congressional Budget 
Committees and the independent Congressional Budget Office, the 
Impoundment Control Act also limits the circumstances under 
which a president can legally impound Congressionally-
appropriated funds. According to the Act, although the 
President may request authority from Congress to withhold or 
permanently cancel the availability of budget authority, such 
an action is not allowed without Congressional approval. Any 
amount of budget authority proposed to be deferred (i.e., 
temporarily withheld) or rescinded (i.e., permanently withheld) 
must be made available for obligation unless Congress, within 
45 legislative days, completes action on a bill rescinding all 
or part of the amount proposed for rescission.\368\ The 
Impoundment Control Act does not permit the withholding of 
funds through their date of expiration, which would be a de 
facto rescission without Congressional approval.\369\
    At the July 26 interagency meeting, senior agency officials 
raised serious concerns about the legality of the hold under 
the Impoundment Control Act. Ms. Cooper testified:

          A: Well, I'm not an expert on the law, but in that 
        meeting immediately deputies began to raise concerns 
        about how this could be done in a legal fashion because 
        there was broad understanding in the meeting that the 
        funding--the State Department funding related to an 
        earmark for Ukraine and that the DOD funding was 
        specific to Ukraine security assistance. So the 
        comments in the room at the deputies' level reflected a 
        sense that there was not an understanding of how this 
        could legally play out. And at that meeting the 
        deputies agreed to look into the legalities and to look 
        at what was possible.
          Q: Okay. So is it fair to say the deputies thought 
        the President was not authorized to place a hold on 
        these funds?
          A: They did not use that term, but the expression in 
        the room that I recall was a sense that there was not 
        an available mechanism to simply not spend money that 
        has been in the case of USAI [DOD security assistance] 
        already notified to Congress.\370\

    Lt. Col. Vindman testified that the issue needed to be 
``elevated to a PC [Principals Committee] as quickly as 
possible to release the hold on security assistance'' so that 
the funds could be obligated before the end of the fiscal 
year.\371\
    A Principals Committee meeting was never convened.\372\ 
According to Mr. Morrison, National Security Advisor John 
Bolton ``believed that it was unnecessary, that he already had 
a reasonable idea of where the principals were, and he wanted 
to get directly to the President as early as possible in the 
most effective way.''\373\ Ambassador Bolton understood that 
the principals ``were all supportive of the continued 
disbursement of the aid.''\374\ As had been clear since the 
very first interagency meeting on July 18, the lifting of the 
hold was ``the unanimous position of the entire 
interagency.''\375\ At this point, it remained unclear to many 
officials why the President continued to hold the funds.
    On July 31, 2019, a fourth and final interagency meeting 
was held at the Policy Coordination Committee level. Ms. Cooper 
attended the meeting on behalf of DOD. According to Ms. Cooper, 
the agenda ``was largely focused on just routine Ukraine 
business, postelection follow up,'' and ``security assistance 
was not actually an explicit agenda item.''\376\ Ms. Cooper 
nevertheless raised security assistance and expressed her 
understanding, after consulting with DOD counsel, that there 
were only two legally available options to implement the hold: 
a Presidential rescission notice to Congress (i.e., requesting 
that Congress ``take back'' funds it had already appropriated) 
or for the Defense Department to do a reprogramming action 
(i.e., use Congressionally-appropriated funds for a different 
purpose).\377\ In either case, the law requires that the 
Executive Branch notify, and seek approval from, Congress 
before taking any action.\378\
    At the July 31 meeting, Ms. Cooper emphasized to the 
participants that because ``there are only two legally 
available options and we do not have direction to pursue 
either,'' DOD would have to start obligating the funds on or 
about August 6.\379\ She explained at her deposition that DOD 
would have had to begin obligating the funds by that date or 
risk violation of the Impoundment Control Act.\380\
    The Administration, however, never proposed a rescission or 
reprogramming of funds for Ukraine security assistance and 
never notified Congress of its intent to withhold funds.\381\

OMB Used Unusual Process to Implement President's Hold, Skirting Legal 
                                Concerns

    OMB plays a critical role in the release of security 
assistance funding. The Antideficiency Act requires that, 
before any department or agency may spend Congressionally-
appropriated funding, the Director of OMB or his delegates must 
``apportion'' (i.e., make available to spend) the funds in 
writing.\382\ Through this mechanism, OMB has the ability to 
directly impact security assistance funding or funding of any 
kind that is appropriated by Congress.
    In parallel with the interagency meetings that occurred 
during the latter half of July 2019, OMB devised a way to 
implement the President's hold on security assistance to 
Ukraine, notwithstanding DOD's Congressional notifications of 
February 28 and May 23. Over the course of his twelve-year 
career at OMB, Mr. Sandy could not recall any other time when a 
hold had been placed on security assistance after a 
Congressional notification had been sent.\383\
    When speaking with Mr. Duffey on or about July 18 or 19, 
Mr. Sandy immediately raised concerns about how to implement 
the hold without violating the Impoundment Control Act, which 
required that the funds be obligated (i.e., spent) before they 
expired at the end of the fiscal year, on September 30.\384\ In 
light of that legal requirement, the hold would have to be 
temporary.\385\ An additional hurdle was the fact that OMB had 
already authorized DOD to spend the security assistance funds 
DOD administered for fiscal year 2019.\386\ Therefore, when 
President Trump directed the hold in July, OMB scrambled to 
reverse that prior authorization.
    From July 19 through July 24, Mr. Sandy consulted with the 
OMB Office of General Counsel as well as Ms. McCusker at DOD on 
how to legally implement a hold on the funds.\387\ Mr. Sandy's 
staff at OMB also conferred with OMB's Budget Review 
Division.\388\ Based on these consultations, OMB decided to 
implement the hold through a series of nine funding documents, 
known legally as ``apportionments.''\389\ Apportionments 
typically are used to convey authority to an agency to spend 
funds, not to withhold funds; thus, in order to bar DOD from 
spending money, these particular apportionments included 
footnotes that would impose the holds while using creative 
language to skirt legal concerns. Mr. Sandy testified that 
``the purpose of the footnote was to preclude obligation for a 
limited period of time but enable planning and casework to 
continue.''\390\ He also testified that this use of footnotes 
was unusual and that in his 12 years of OMB experience, he 
could ``not recall another event like it.''\391\
    On July 25, OMB issued the first funding document 
implementing the hold. In this document, the relevant footnote 
notified DOD that the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 
funds ``are not available for obligation until August 5, 2019, 
to allow for an interagency process to determine the best use 
of such funds.'' The footnote also stated that:

          Based on OMB's communication with DOD on July 25, 
        2019, OMB understands from the Department that this 
        brief pause in obligations will not preclude DOD's 
        timely execution of the final policy direction. DOD may 
        continue its planning and casework for the Initiative 
        during this period.\392\

    Mr. Sandy explained that the ``interagency process'' 
referenced in the footnote referred to the NSC-led interagency 
meetings convened during the latter half of July, and that the 
August 5 date provided a ``reasonable timeframe for an 
interagency process'' to produce ``clear guidance'' on the 
hold.\393\ The August 5 date was determined in consultation 
with Mr. Duffey at OMB and Ms. McCusker at DOD.\394\
    Mr. Sandy further testified that the second sentence in the 
footnote--which states, in relevant part, that ``OMB 
understands from the Department that this brief pause in 
obligations will not preclude DOD's timely execution of the 
final policy direction''--was critical to the implementation of 
the hold:

          Well, that gets to the heart of that issue about 
        ensuring that we don't run afoul of the Impoundment 
        Control Act, which means that you have to allow for the 
        timely execution. And this reflects my conversation 
        with--conversations plural with Elaine McCusker that 
        they can confirm that, during this brief period, they 
        would not foresee any problem fully executing the 
        program by the end of the fiscal year.\395\

    The sentence, in effect, affirmed that if the hold remained 
in place only until August 5, DOD would still have sufficient 
time to spend all security assistance funds by September 30, 
2019. President Trump, however, would continue the hold long 
past August 5.

 Trump Appointee Took Over Signing Authority from Career Budget Expert

    Since becoming Deputy Associate Director for National 
Security in 2013, Mr. Sandy was responsible for approving 
release of the funding for programs within his portfolio, 
including the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative.\396\ Mr. 
Sandy approved and signed the July 25 funding document.\397\ On 
July 29, however, Mr. Duffey--a political appointee of 
President Trump whose prior position had been as Executive 
Director of the Republican Party of Wisconsin--told Mr. Sandy--
a career civil servant with decades of experience in this 
area--that he would no longer be responsible for approving the 
release of funding for Ukraine Security Assistance 
Initiative.\398\ Mr. Duffey also revoked the authority for 
approving the release of funding for Foreign Military Financing 
from Mr. Sandy's colleague at OMB.\399\ Instead, Mr. Duffey 
would himself assume authority for the $250 million in DOD-
administered Ukraine security assistance and authority for 
approving the release of funding for the $141 million in State 
Department-administered Foreign Military Financing to 
Ukraine.\400\
    Mr. Duffey did not tell Mr. Sandy whether he requested this 
change in authority but did say that ``it was in essence a 
joint decision reflecting both guidance from the Acting 
Director and also his support.''\401\ Over the course of 
several days, Mr. Duffey explained to Mr. Sandy and others in 
the National Security Division that ``there was interest among 
the leadership in tracking the uses of moneys [sic] 
closely.''\402\ Mr. Duffey expressed an ``interest in being 
more involved in daily operations'' and ``regarded this 
responsibility as a way for him to learn more about specific 
accounts within his area.''\403\
    Mr. Sandy testified that prior to July 29, he had never 
heard Mr. Duffey state any interest in approving the release of 
funding.\404\ Furthermore, when they learned that Mr. Duffey 
was taking on this new responsibility, Mr. Sandy and other 
staff relayed their concerns to Mr. Duffey that it was a 
substantial workload.\405\ Mr. Sandy also testified that 
``people were curious what he thought he would learn from 
apportionments about the accounts as opposed to the other, you 
know, sources of information.''\406\ Mr. Sandy agreed that 
there are more efficient ways of learning about accounts and 
programs, and that ``I can think of other ways--other materials 
that I personally would find more informative.''\407\
    Mr. Sandy was not aware of any prior instance when a 
political appointee assumed this kind of funding approval 
authority.\408\
    After the July 31 interagency meeting at which Ms. Cooper 
announced that DOD would have to start obligating the funds on 
or about August 6, Mr. Duffey sought clarification.\409\ Ms. 
Cooper explained to Mr. Duffey that at a certain point DOD 
would not have sufficient time to fully obligate the funds 
before they expired at the end of the fiscal year. In response, 
Mr. Duffey ``wanted more information on the precise nature of 
how long does it take to obligate, and how many cases, and that 
sort of thing.''\410\ Ms. Cooper referred Mr. Duffey to the DOD 
comptroller and to the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency.\411\ During the month of August, Mr. Duffey and Ms. 
McCusker communicated about the implementation of the hold on 
the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds.\412\
    On August 6 and August 15, Mr. Duffey approved two more 
funding documents that contained footnotes with language nearly 
identical to the footnote in the July 25 funding document that 
initiated the hold; the only difference was that the date funds 
would become available for spending was changed from August 5 
to August 12.\413\
    The August 6 and 15 footnotes, and all subsequent footnotes 
through September 10, continued to state that the hold was in 
place ``to allow for an interagency process to determine the 
best use of such funds,'' even though the final interagency 
meeting regarding Ukraine security assistance occurred on July 
31.\414\ Not only was there no active interagency process after 
July, but Ms. Cooper also was not aware of any review of the 
funding conducted by DOD in July, August, or September.\415\ In 
fact, Ms. Cooper noted that months before, DOD had completed 
its review of whether Ukraine ``had made sufficient progress in 
meeting defense reform and anticorruption goals consistent with 
the NDAA,'' and certified to Congress in May 2019 that Ukraine 
had met the requirements to receive funding.\416\ Similarly, 
Mr. Kent testified that the State Department did not conduct, 
and was never asked to conduct, a review of the security 
assistance funding administered by the State Department.\417\
    At the same time that OMB was implementing the President's 
hold through the funding footnotes, officials inside OMB were 
advocating for release of the funds. On August 7, the National 
Security Division, International Affairs Division, and Office 
of Legal Counsel of OMB drafted and transmitted a memo on 
Ukraine security assistance to OMB Acting Director Vought ``in 
anticipation of a principals-level discussion to address the 
topic.''\418\ The National Security Division's portion of the 
memorandum recommended to remove the hold because (1) the 
assistance was consistent with the national security strategy 
in terms of supporting a stable, peaceful Europe; (2) the aid 
countered Russian aggression; and (3) there was bipartisan 
support for the program.\419\ Mr. Duffey approved the 
memorandum and agreed with the policy recommendation.\420\
    Sometime in mid-August, DOD raised concerns that it might 
not be able to fully obligate the Defense Department-
administered funds before the end of the fiscal year.\421\ Ms. 
Cooper testified that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
estimated that $100 million of aid might not be obligated in 
time and was at risk.\422\
    Because of this, DOD concluded that it could no longer 
support OMB's claim in the footnote that ``this brief pause in 
obligations will not preclude DOD's timely execution of the 
final policy direction.''\423\ As mentioned above, Mr. Sandy 
testified that this sentence was at ``the heart of that issue 
about ensuring that we don't run afoul of the Impoundment 
Control Act.''\424\
    As a result of DOD's concerns, all of the subsequent 
footnotes issued by OMB during the pendency of the hold 
approved by Mr. Duffey on August 20, 27, and 31, and September 
5, 6, and 10--removed the sentence regarding DOD's ability to 
fully obligate by the end of the fiscal year.\425\ Each 
footnote extended the hold for a period of two to six 
days.\426\
    Mr. Sandy and his staff ``continued to express concerns [to 
Mr. Duffey] about the potential implications vis-a-vis the 
Impoundment Control Act,''\427\ and advised Mr. Duffey to 
consult with OMB's Office of General Counsel ``on every single 
footnote.''\428\ Mr. Sandy was copied on emails with the Office 
of General Counsel on these topics.\429\ Although Mr. Sandy 
understood that the Office of General Counsel supported the 
footnotes, he noted that there were dissenting opinions within 
the Office of General Counsel.\430\ Concerns about whether the 
Administration was bending, if not breaking, the law by holding 
back this vital assistance contributed to at least two OMB 
officials resigning, including one attorney in the Office of 
General Counsel.\431\ Mr. Sandy testified that the resignation 
was motivated in part by concerns about the way OMB was 
handling the hold on Ukraine security assistance.\432\ 
According to Mr. Sandy, the colleague disagreed with the Office 
of General Counsel about the application of the Impoundment 
Control Act to the hold on Ukraine security assistance.\433\
    Nevertheless, at the direction of the President, OMB 
continued to implement the hold through September 11.

Senior Officials Failed to Convince President Trump to Release the Aid 
                               in August

    Sometime prior to August 16, Ambassador Bolton had a one-
on-one meeting with President Trump about the aid.\434\ 
According to Mr. Morrison, at that meeting the President ``was 
not yet ready to approve the release of the assistance.''\435\ 
Following the meeting, Ambassador Bolton instructed Mr. 
Morrison to look for opportunities to get the principals 
together ``to have the direct, in-person conversation with the 
President about this topic.''\436\
    On or about August 13 or 14, Lt. Col. Vindman was directed 
to draft a Presidential Decision Memorandum for Ambassador 
Bolton and the other principals to present to President Trump 
for a decision on Ukraine security assistance.\437\ The 
memorandum, finalized on August 15, recommended that the hold 
should be lifted, explained why, and included the consensus 
views from the July 26 meeting that the funds should be 
released.\438\ Lt. Col. Vindman received conflicting accounts 
about whether the memorandum was presented to the 
President.\439\
    Mr. Morrison, who was Lt. Col. Vindman's supervisor at the 
NSC and agreed with the recommendation to lift the hold, 
testified that the memorandum was never provided to the 
President.\440\ Mr. Morrison explained that Ambassador Bolton 
intended to present the memorandum to the President during an 
unrelated meeting in Bedminster, New Jersey, on August 15, but 
the ``other subject matter of that meeting consumed all the 
time.''\441\ However, while at Bedminster, the principals ``all 
represented to Ambassador Bolton that they were prepared to 
tell the President they endorsed the swift release and 
disbursement of the funding.''\442\
    Mr. Morrison testified that he attempted to gather the 
``the right group of principals'' to meet with the President 
but was unable to do so because of scheduling issues.\443\ 
According to Mr. Morrison, the next possible opportunity was 
during a trip to Warsaw, Poland at the beginning of September, 
but President Trump did not end up making that trip.\444\
    Ms. Cooper recalled receiving an email at the end of August 
from Secretary of Defense Esper referencing a meeting or 
discussion with the President, and that there was ``no decision 
on Ukraine.''\445\

        Ukrainian Officials Learned About the Hold in July 2019

    Witnesses testified that officials in the Ukraine 
government knew of President Trump's hold on security 
assistance before it was publicly reported in the press on 
August 28, 2019. Ms. Croft testified that after July 18--when 
the hold was announced by OMB at the interagency meeting--it 
was ``inevitable that it was eventually going to come 
out.''\446\
    Two individuals from the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington, 
D.C., approached Ms. Croft approximately a week apart ``quietly 
and in confidence to ask me about an OMB hold on Ukraine 
security assistance.''\447\ Ms. Croft could not precisely 
recall the dates of these conversations, but testified that she 
was ``very surprised at the effectiveness of my Ukrainian 
counterparts'' diplomatic tradecraft, as in to say they found 
out very early on or much earlier than I expected them 
to.''\448\
    Ms. Croft explained that the Ukrainian officials came to 
her quietly because they would not want the hold to become 
public:

          I think that if this were public in Ukraine it would 
        be seen as a reversal of our policy and would, just to 
        say sort of candidly and colloquially, this would be a 
        really big deal, it would be a really big deal in 
        Ukraine, and an expression of declining U.S. support 
        for Ukraine.\449\

    DOD also received questions from the Ukraine Embassy about 
the status of the military assistance. Ms. Cooper testified 
that those occurred on July 25, 2019--the same day as President 
Trump's call with President Zelensky:

          On July 25th, a member of my staff got a question 
        from a Ukraine Embassy contact asking what was going on 
        with Ukraine security assistance, because at that time, 
        we did not know what the guidance was on USAI [DOD-
        administered funds]. The OMB notice of apportionment 
        arrived that day, but this staff member did not find 
        out about it until later. I was informed that the staff 
        member told the Ukrainian official that we were moving 
        forward on USAI, but recommended that the Ukraine 
        Embassy check in with State regarding the FMF [State 
        Department-administered funds].\450\

    On July 25, Ms. Cooper's staff received two emails from the 
State Department revealing that the Ukrainian Embassy was 
``asking about security assistance'' and that ``the Hill knows 
about the FMF situation to an extent, and so does the Ukrainian 
Embassy.''\451\
    One of Ms. Cooper's staff members reported that sometime 
during the week of August 6, a Ukrainian Embassy officer stated 
that ``a Ukrainian official might raise concerns about security 
assistance in an upcoming meeting,'' but that the issue was 
``not, in fact, raised.''\452\ Ms. Cooper's staff further 
reported that Ukrainian officials were aware of the hold on 
security assistance in August.\453\
    Lt. Col. Vindman testified that, by mid-August, he too was 
getting questions from Ukrainians about the status of the hold 
on security assistance:

          So to the best of my knowledge, the Ukrainians, first 
        of all, are in general pretty sophisticated, they have 
        their network of, you know, Ukrainian interest groups 
        and so forth. They have bipartisan support in Congress. 
        And certainly there are--it was no secret, at least 
        within government and official channels, that security 
        assistance was on hold. And to the best of my 
        recollection, I believe there were some of these light 
        inquires in the mid-August timeframe.\454\

    While numerous individuals, including Ukrainians, were 
aware of the hold, it did not become publicly known until a 
Politico report on August 28, 2019.\455\

4. The President's Meeting With the Ukrainian President Was Conditioned 
                  on an Announcement of Investigations


President Trump demanded the public announcement by President Zelensky 
        of investigations into President Trump's political rival and 
        alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election in 
        exchange for an Oval Office meeting. The President's 
        representatives made that quid pro quo clear to Ukrainian 
        officials.

                                Overview

    After ordering the hold on security assistance to Ukraine 
against the unanimous advice of the relevant U.S. government 
agencies, President Trump used his hand-picked representatives 
to demand that Ukrainian leaders publicly announce 
investigations into his political rival, former Vice President 
Joe Biden, and into the debunked conspiracy theory that 
Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. 
President Trump, through his agents, made clear that his demand 
needed to be met before a coveted White House meeting with 
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would be scheduled. A 
face-to-face meeting with President Trump in the Oval Office 
would have conferred on the new Ukrainian leader much-sought 
prestige and would have signaled to Russia that Ukraine could 
continue to count on the support of the President of the United 
States, which was particularly important as Russia continued to 
wage war in eastern Ukraine.
    To date, the White House meeting for President Zelensky has 
not occurred. Following the May 23 meeting in the Oval Office, 
President Trump's hand-picked representatives--the so-called 
``Three Amigos''--worked with the President's personal 
attorney, Rudy Giuliani, to pressure Ukrainian leaders to 
announce publicly investigations that would benefit the 
President's reelection campaign. Testimony of multiple 
witnesses and contemporaneous text messages exchanged between 
and among President Trump's representatives confirm that the 
White House meeting--and later the release of security 
assistance for Ukraine--was conditioned on Ukraine acquiescing 
to the President's demands.
    In the weeks leading up to the July 25 call between 
President Trump and President Zelensky, President Trump's 
representatives repeatedly relayed the message of 
conditionality to Ukrainian government officials--including to 
President Zelensky himself--in meetings in Kyiv, Toronto, and 
Washington, D.C. President Zelensky and his advisors struggled 
to navigate these demands, recognizing that President Trump's 
desire that Ukraine announce these political investigations 
threatened to render Ukraine a ``pawn'' in U.S. domestic 
reelection politics.

An Oval Office Meeting for President Zelensky Was Important to Ukraine 
                       and U.S. National Security

    A face-to-face meeting with the President of the United 
States in the Oval Office was critical to President Zelensky as 
the newly-elected Ukrainian leader sought U.S. support for his 
ambitious anti-corruption agenda and to repel Russian 
aggression. A White House meeting was also important for U.S. 
national security because it would have served to bolster 
Ukraine's negotiating position in peace talks with Russia. It 
also would have supported Ukraine as a bulwark against further 
Russian advances in Europe.
    Multiple witnesses unanimously attested to the importance 
of a White House meeting for Ukraine and the United States. For 
example, David Holmes, the Political Counselor at the U.S. 
Embassy in Kyiv, testified that a White House meeting was 
``critical'' to President Zelensky's ability to ``encourage 
Russian President Putin to take seriously President Zelensky's 
peace efforts.''\456\ Likewise, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
George Kent explained that a White House meeting was ``very 
important'' for Ukrainians to demonstrate the strength of their 
relationship with ``Ukraine's strongest supporter.'' He also 
said that it ``makes sense'' for the United States to meet with 
the Ukrainians as they were on ``the front lines of Russian 
malign influence and aggression.''\457\
    Dr. Fiona Hill, Deputy Assistant to the President and 
Senior Director of Europe and Russia at the NSC, explained that 
a White House meeting would supply the new Ukrainian Government 
with ``the legitimacy that it needed, especially vis-a-vis the 
Russians,''--and that the Ukrainians viewed a White House 
meeting as ``a recognition of their legitimacy as a sovereign 
state.''\458\ Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, the NSC Director for 
Ukraine, testified that a White House meeting would provide a 
``show of support'' from ``the most powerful country in the 
world and Ukraine's most significant benefactor,'' which would 
help the Ukrainian President ``establish his bona fides'' and 
``implement his agenda.''\459\
    Ambassador Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine 
Negotiations, also recognized that it was ``a tremendous symbol 
of support'' to have President Zelensky visit the White 
House.\460\ He explained that a meeting ``enhances [President 
Zelensky's] stature, that he is accepted, that he is seen at 
the highest level. The imagery you get from being at the White 
House is the best in the world, in terms of how it enhances 
someone's image.''\461\

President Trump ``Wanted to Hear from Zelensky'' Before Scheduling Oval 
                             Office Meeting

    Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr. arrived in Ukraine as the 
new Charge d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv on June 17, 
2019. After arriving, Ambassador Taylor worked to secure an 
Oval Office meeting between President Trump and President 
Zelensky. This was ``an agreed-upon goal'' of policymakers in 
both Ukraine and the United States.\462\
    Ambassador Taylor worked with Ambassador Volker and 
Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland--two of the 
Three Amigos--to try to schedule this meeting. Just days after 
beginning his new position, Ambassador Taylor learned that 
President Trump ``wanted to hear from Zelensky'' before 
scheduling the Oval Office meeting, but Ambassador Taylor did 
not understand what that meant at the time.\463\ On June 27, 
Ambassador Sondland informed Ambassador Taylor that President 
Zelensky needed to ``make clear'' to President Trump that he, 
President Zelensky, was not ``standing in the way of 
`investigations.'''\464\ Ambassador Taylor relayed this 
conversation to Mr. Holmes, who testified that he understood 
``investigations'' in that context to mean the ``Burisma-Biden 
investigations that Mr. Giuliani and his associates had been 
speaking about'' publicly.\465\
    On June 28, Secretary of Energy Rick Perry the--third of 
the Three Amigos--and Ambassadors Sondland, Volker, and Taylor 
participated in a conference call to prepare for a discussion 
later that day with President Zelensky. During this preparatory 
call, Ambassador Volker explained that he planned to be 
``explicit'' with President Zelensky in an upcoming one-on-one 
meeting in Toronto, Canada. Specifically, Ambassador Volker 
intended to inform President Zelensky that President Trump 
would require Ukraine to address ``rule of law, transparency, 
but also, specifically, cooperation on investigations to get to 
the bottom of things'' in order to ``get the meeting in the 
White House.''\466\
    For the subsequent call with President Zelensky on June 28, 
Ambassador Sondland sought to limit the number of U.S. 
government personnel listening in. According to Ambassador 
Taylor, Ambassador Sondland stated that he did not want to 
include ``most of the regular interagency participants'' and 
that ``he wanted to make sure no one was transcribing or 
monitoring'' the call when President Zelensky was patched in. 
Ambassador Taylor testified that he considered Ambassador 
Sondland's requests to be ``odd.''\467\ During that call, 
President Zelensky and the U.S. officials discussed energy 
policy and the conflict with Russia in eastern Ukraine. The 
Ukrainian president also noted that he looked forward to the 
White House visit that President Trump had offered in a letter 
dated May 29.\468\
    The exclusion of State Department staff and notetakers from 
the June 28 call was an early indication to Ambassador Taylor 
that separate channels of diplomacy related to Ukraine policy--
an official channel and an irregular channel--were 
``diverging.'' Ambassador Taylor testified:

          This suggested to me that there were the two 
        channels. This suggested to me that the normal channel, 
        where you would have staff on the phone call, was being 
        cut out, and the other channel, of people who were 
        working, again, toward a goal which I supported, which 
        was having a meeting to further U.S.-Ukrainian 
        relations, I supported, but that irregular channel 
        didn't have a respect for or an interest in having the 
        normal staff participate in this call with the head of 
        state.\469\

    Given Ambassador Sondland's efforts to exclude staff on the 
June 28 call with President Zelensky, Ambassador Taylor asked 
Ambassadors Sondland and Volker by text message how they 
planned to handle informing other U.S. officials about the 
contents of the call. Ambassador Volker responded: ``I think we 
just keep it among ourselves to try to build working 
relationship and just get the d*** date for the meeting!''\470\ 
Ambassador Sondland then texted: ``Agree with KV. Very close 
hold.''\471\ Nevertheless, Ambassador Taylor informed Mr. Kent 
about the call and wrote a memo for the record dated June 30 
that summarized the conversation with President Zelensky.\472\

Ambassador Volker Pressed ``Investigations'' With President Zelensky in 
                                Toronto

    On July 2, Ambassador Volker met with President Zelensky 
and his chief of staff on the sidelines of the Ukraine Reform 
Conference in Toronto. As he later texted to Ambassador Taylor, 
Ambassador Volker ``pulled the two of them aside at the end and 
explained the Giuliani factor.''\473\ Ambassador Volker 
clarified that by ``the Giuliani factor,'' he meant ``a 
negative narrative about Ukraine'' that was ``being amplified 
by Rudy Giuliani'' and was unfavorably impacting ``Ukraine's 
image in the United States and our ability to advance the 
bilateral relationship.''\474\ Ambassador Volker later informed 
Ukraine's incoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vadym 
Prystaiko, about his pull-aside with President Zelensky in 
Toronto via text message: ``I talked to him privately about 
Giuliani and impact on president T[rump].''\475\
    On July 3, the day after his pull-aside with President 
Zelensky in Toronto, Ambassador Volker sent a message to 
Ambassador Taylor emphasizing that ``The key thing is to tee up 
a phone call w potus and then get visit nailed down.''\476\ 
Ambassador Volker told Ambassador Taylor that during the 
Toronto conference, he counseled the Ukrainian president about 
how he could ``prepare for the phone call with President 
Trump.'' Specifically, Ambassador Volker told the Ukrainian 
leader that President Trump ``would like to hear about the 
investigations.''\477\ In his public testimony, Ambassador 
Volker confirmed that he mentioned ``investigations'' to 
President Zelensky in Toronto, explaining that he was 
``thinking of Burisma and 2016'' in raising the subject, and 
that his ``assumption'' was that Ukrainian officials also 
understood his reference to ``investigations'' to be ``Burisma/
2016.''\478\
    Ambassador Volker's efforts to prepare President Zelensky 
for his phone call with President Trump appear to have borne 
fruit. As discussed further in Chapter 5, during the July 25 
call, President Zelensky expressed his openness to pursuing 
investigations into President Trump's political rival, former 
Vice President Biden, and the conspiracy theory that Ukraine, 
rather than Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. election. 
President Zelensky also specifically referenced ``Burisma'' 
during the call.

  Ambassadors Volker and Sondland Worked to get Mr. Giuliani What he 
                                 Needed

    According to Ambassador Sondland, President Zelensky's 
commitment to make a public announcement about investigations 
into Burisma and the 2016 election was a ``prerequisite[]'' for 
the White House meeting.\479\ In fact, Ambassador Sondland 
testified that the announcement of the investigations--and not 
the investigations themselves--was the price President Trump 
sought in exchange for a White House meeting with Ukrainian 
President Zelensky:

          Q: But he had to get those two investigations if that 
        official act was going to take place, correct?
          A: He had to announce the investigations. He didn't 
        actually have to do them, as I understood it.
          Q: Okay. President Zelensky had to announce the two 
        investigations the President wanted, make a public 
        announcement, correct?
          A: Correct.\480\

    Ambassadors Sondland and Volker understood that they needed 
to work with Mr. Giuliani, who was publicly pressing for the 
announcement of investigations that would benefit President 
Trump politically. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ambassador 
Sondland testified that the key to overcoming President Trump's 
skepticism about Ukraine was satisfying the President's 
personal attorney. Sondland said, ``Nonetheless, based on the 
President's direction, we were faced with a choice: We could 
abandon the efforts to schedule the White House phone call and 
a White House visit'' or ``do as President Trump had directed 
and `talk with Rudy''' because ``it was the only constructive 
path open to us.''\481\
    Ambassador Volker discussed his intention to contact Mr. 
Giuliani with Mr. Kent. Ambassador Volker explained that he 
intended to reach out to Mr. Giuliani because it was clear that 
the former mayor ``had influence'' with President Trump ``in 
terms of the way the President thought of Ukraine.''\482\ 
Ukrainian officials also understood the importance of working 
through Mr. Giuliani, something that was underscored by his 
successful effort to smear and remove Ambassador Marie 
Yovanovitch from Kyiv in late April.\483\
    In response to Ambassador Volker's stated intention to 
reach out to Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Kent raised concerns about Mr. 
Giuliani's ``track record,'' including ``asking for a visa for 
a corrupt former prosecutor,'' attacking Ambassador 
Yovanovitch, and ``tweeting that the new President needs to 
investigate Biden and the 2016 campaign.'' Mr. Kent also warned 
Ambassador Volker that ``asking another country to investigate 
a prosecution for political reasons undermines our advocacy of 
the rule of law.''\484\
    On July 10, Ambassador Taylor met with Ukrainian officials 
in Kyiv, before their Ukrainian colleagues were scheduled to 
meet with National Security Advisor John Bolton at the White 
House later that day. At the meeting in Kyiv, the Ukrainian 
officials expressed that they were ``very concerned'' because 
they had heard from former Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko, 
who had learned from Mr. Giuliani, that President Trump had 
decided not to meet with President Zelensky.\485\
    Ambassador Taylor texted Ambassador Volker to explain the 
situation and advised that he had also informed T. Ulrich 
Brechbuhl, Counselor of the Department of State:

          Volker: Good grief. Please tell Vadym to let the 
        official USG representatives speak for the U.S. 
        lutsenko has his own self-Interest here . . .
          Taylor: Exactly what I told them.
          Taylor: And I said that RG is a private citizen.
          Taylor: I briefed Ulrich this afternoon on this.\486\

    Despite his text message to Ambassador Taylor that official 
U.S. government representatives should be allowed to ``speak 
for the U.S.,'' and notwithstanding Mr. Kent's warnings about 
engaging with Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador Volker almost 
immediately reached out to Mr. Giuliani. Four minutes after 
sending the text message above, Ambassador Volker texted Mr. 
Giuliani to request a meeting to ``update you on my 
conversations about Ukraine.'' He told Mr. Giuliani that he 
believed he had ``an opportunity to get you what you 
need.''\487\
    One hour later, around 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador 
Volker met Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy Yermak for coffee 
at the Trump Hotel before they traveled down Pennsylvania 
Avenue to their afternoon meetings at the White House.\488\ 
Over coffee, Mr. Yermak asked Ambassador Volker to connect him 
to Mr. Giuliani, thus further demonstrating the Ukrainians' 
understanding that satisfying Mr. Giuliani's demands was a key 
to getting what they wanted from President Trump, namely the 
Oval Office meeting.\489\

     July 10 White House Meetings: Ambassador Sondland Explicitly 
   Communicated the ``Prerequisite of Investigations'' to Ukrainians

    On July 10, during two separate meetings at the White 
House, Ambassador Sondland informed senior Ukrainian officials 
that there was a ``prerequisite of investigations'' before an 
Oval Office meeting between President Trump and President 
Zelensky would be scheduled.\490\
    The first meeting took place in Ambassador Bolton's office. 
NSC officials, including Ambassador Bolton's staff responsible 
for Ukraine--Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman--attended, as did 
the Three Amigos: Secretary Perry, Ambassador Sondland, and 
Ambassador Volker. The Ukrainian delegation included Mr. 
Yermak, a senior aide to President Zelensky, and Oleksandr 
``Sasha'' Danyliuk, the incoming Ukrainian National Security 
Advisor.\491\ The purpose of the meeting was twofold. The 
Ukrainians were seeking advice and assistance from Ambassador 
Bolton about how to ``revamp'' the Ukrainian National Security 
Council, and they were also ``very anxious to set up a meeting, 
a first meeting between President Zelensky and our 
President.''\492\
    Near the end of the meeting, the Ukrainian officials raised 
the scheduling of the Oval Office meeting for President 
Zelensky. According to Dr. Hill, Ambassador Sondland, who is 
``a fairly big guy, kind of leaned over'' and then ``blurted 
out: Well, we have an agreement with the [White House] Chief of 
Staff for a meeting if these investigations in the energy 
sector start.'' Dr. Hill described that others in the room 
looked up from their notes, thinking the comment was ``somewhat 
odd.'' Ambassador Bolton ``immediately stiffened'' and ended 
the meeting. Dr. Hill recounted that Ambassador Bolton was 
polite but was ``very abrupt. I mean, he looked at the clock as 
if he had, you know, suddenly another meeting and his time was 
up, but it was obvious he ended the meeting,'' she added.\493\
    Lt. Col. Vindman similarly testified that the meeting in 
Ambassador Bolton's office ``proceeded well'' until Ukrainian 
officials raised the meeting between President Trump and 
President Zelensky. The Ukrainians stated that they considered 
the Oval Office meeting to be ``critically important in order 
to solidify the support for their most important international 
partner.'' When Ambassador Sondland mentioned Ukraine 
``delivering specific investigations in order to secure the 
meeting with the President,'' Ambassador Bolton cut the meeting 
short.\494\
    Although Ambassador Volker did not recall any mention of 
``investigations'' during the July 10 meeting at his 
deposition,\495\ he later testified at his public hearing, ``As 
I remember, the meeting [in Ambassador Bolton's office] was 
essentially over when Ambassador Sondland made a general 
comment about investigations. I think all of us thought it was 
inappropriate'' and ``not what we should be talking 
about.''\496\
    After Ambassador Bolton ended the meeting in his office, 
Ambassador Sondland ``went out into the office in front of 
Ambassador Bolton'' and made ``unusual'' arrangements for the 
Ukrainians, Ambassador Volker, Secretary Perry, and others to 
go to a second meeting in the Ward Room of the White House, 
located near the secure spaces of the White House Situation 
Room. As Dr. Hill described it, the purpose of the Ward Room 
meeting was ``to talk to the Ukrainians about next steps'' 
regarding the Oval Office meeting for President Zelensky.\497\ 
As Dr. Hill was leaving Ambassador Bolton's office, he pulled 
her aside and directed her to attend the Ward Room meeting to 
``find out what they're talking about and come back'' and 
report to him. Dr. Hill followed his instruction.\498\
    During the Ward Room meeting, which occurred after a brief 
photo opportunity outside the West Wing, Ambassador Sondland 
was more explicit in pressing the Ukrainians to undertake the 
investigations in order to secure an Oval Office meeting for 
President Zelensky. Lt. Col. Vindman testified that when the 
group entered the Ward Room, Ambassador Sondland began to 
``review what the deliverable would be in order to get the 
meeting,'' and that ``to the best of my recollection, he did 
specifically say `investigation of the Bidens.''' Lt. Col. 
Vindman said the request ``was explicit. There was no 
ambiguity'' and that Ambassador Sondland also mentioned 
``Burisma.''\499\
    Dr. Hill entered the Ward Room as the discussion was 
underway. She testified that ``Ambassador Sondland, in front of 
the Ukrainians, as I came in, was talking about how he had an 
agreement with Chief of Staff Mulvaney for a meeting with the 
Ukrainians if they were going to go forward with 
investigations. And my director for Ukraine [Lt. Col. Vindman] 
was looking completely alarmed.''\500\ Dr. Hill recalled that 
Ambassador Sondland mentioned ``Burisma'' in the presence of 
the Ukrainians, in response to which Mr. Danyliuk also appeared 
``very alarmed'' and as if he did not know what was 
happening.\501\
    Dr. Hill confronted Ambassador Sondland, informing him that 
Ambassador Bolton had sent her there to ensure that the U.S. 
officials did not commit ``at this particular juncture'' to a 
meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky. 
Ambassador Sondland responded that he and the Ukrainians 
already had an agreement that the meeting would go 
forward.\502\ At Dr. Hill's urging, however, Ambassador 
Sondland excused the Ukrainian officials, who moved into the 
corridor near the White House Situation Room.
    Dr. Hill then told Ambassador Sondland: ``Look, I don't 
know what's going on here, but Ambassador Bolton wants to make 
it very clear that we have to talk about, you know, how are we 
going to set up this meeting. It has to go through proper 
procedures.'' Lt. Col. Vindman relayed his own concerns to 
Ambassador Sondland in the Ward Room.\503\ He explained that 
``the request to investigate the Bidens and his son had nothing 
to do with national security, and that such investigations were 
not something that the NSC was going to get involved in or 
push.''\504\
    Ambassador Sondland responded that he had had conversations 
with Mr. Mulvaney and he also mentioned Mr. Giuliani. Lt. Col. 
Vindman confirmed that Ambassador Sondland described an 
agreement he had with Mr. Mulvaney about the Oval Office 
meeting: ``I heard him say that this had been coordinated with 
White House Chief of Staff Mr. Mick Mulvaney . . . He just said 
that he had had a conversation with Mr. Mulvaney, and this is 
what was required in order to get a meeting.''\505\ Dr. Hill 
then cut the conversation short because she ``didn't want to 
get further into this discussion at all.'' She testified that 
Ambassador Sondland ``was clearly annoyed with this, but then, 
you know, he moved off. He said he had other meetings.''\506\
    Later on July 10, when Ambassador Taylor asked Ambassador 
Volker how the meetings went with the Ukrainian officials and 
whether they had resulted in a decision on a presidential call, 
Ambassador Volker replied: ``Not good lets talk.''\507\
    Following the July 10 White House meetings, Mr. Yermak 
followed up with Ambassador Volker by text message: ``Thank you 
for meeting and your clear and very logical position. Will be 
great meet with you before my departure and discuss. I feel 
that the key for many things is Rudi and I ready to talk with 
him at any time.''\508\

  Concerned Officials Reported Details of This ``Drug Deal'' to White 
                             House Lawyers

    After the Ward Room meeting, Dr. Hill returned to 
Ambassador Bolton's office and relayed what she had just 
witnessed. Ambassador Bolton was ``very angry'' and instructed 
her to report the conversation to John Eisenberg, Deputy 
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and the 
Legal Advisor to the National Security Council:

          And he told me, and this is a direct quote from 
        Ambassador Bolton: You go and tell Eisenberg that I am 
        not part of whatever drug deal Sondland and Mulvaney 
        are cooking up on this, and you go and tell him what 
        you've heard and what I've said.\509\

    Dr. Hill explained that ``drug deal'' referred to 
Ambassador Sondland's and Mr. Mulvaney's conditioning of a 
White House meeting on investigations.\510\ By this point, Dr. 
Hill explained, it was clear that investigations were ``code, 
at least, for Burisma. Because that had been mentioned, you 
know, in the course of Mr. Giuliani's appearances on 
television.''\511\ Numerous U.S. officials, including 
Ambassadors Sondland, Volker, and Bolton, as well as Lt. Col. 
Vindman and others, were well aware of Mr. Giuliani's efforts 
to push Ukraine to pursue these political investigations.
    Following the meeting with Ambassador Bolton, Dr. Hill 
reported what had occurred to Mr. Eisenberg. She conveyed to 
Mr. Eisenberg the details of the two meetings, including 
Ambassador Sondland's agreement with Mr. Mulvaney to provide 
the White House meeting if Ukraine agreed to pursue the 
investigations.\512\ The initial conversation between Dr. Hill 
and Mr. Eisenberg was brief, and they scheduled a longer 
discussion for the next day.\513\
    On July 11, Dr. Hill enlisted another NSC official who 
attended the July 10 meetings, Senior Director for 
International Energy and Environment P. Wells Griffith, to 
attend the longer discussion with Mr. Eisenberg.\514\ Dr. Hill 
and Mr. Griffith went over the events of July 10 and further 
explained that Ambassador Sondland said that he had been 
communicating with Mr. Giuliani. Mr. Eisenberg was ``very 
concerned'' and stated that he would follow up. Dr. Hill 
understood that Mr. Eisenberg later discussed the issue with 
his ``reporting authority,'' specifically, White House Counsel 
Pat Cipollone.\515\
    Lt. Col. Vindman separately reported his concerns about the 
July 10 meetings to Mr. Eisenberg. He told Mr. Eisenberg that 
Ambassador Sondland had asked for investigations into ``Bidens 
and Burisma,'' which he thought was ``inappropriate.''\516\ Lt. 
Col. Vindman also reported that the investigation ``Mr. 
Giuliani was pushing was now being pulled into a, you know, 
national security dialogue.''\517\ Mr. Eisenberg said that he 
would look into it and invited Lt. Col. Vindman to return if 
any further concerns arose. No one from the of the White House 
Counsel's Office, however, followed up with Lt. Col. Vindman on 
this issue.\518\
    Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman discussed their reactions and 
alarm about the July 10 discussions with each other. They both 
believed that Ambassador Sondland's statements were 
inappropriate and ``had nothing to do with national security,'' 
and that they would not get involved with the scheme.\519\ On 
July 19, they also shared their concerns about Ambassador 
Sondland's comments during the July 10 meetings with Ambassador 
Taylor.\520\

 Ambassador Sondland Coached President Zelensky on Investigations and 
 Kept Senior White House and State Department Officials ``In the Loop''

    In mid-July, Dr. Hill was preparing to depart the NSC and 
transitioning her role to Timothy Morrison, who had been 
serving in another role at the NSC.\521\ On July 13, Ambassador 
Sondland emailed Mr. Morrison, explaining that the ``[s]ole 
purpose'' of a presidential call was for President Zelensky to 
assure President Trump that, ``Corruption ending, unbundling 
moving forward and any hampered investigations will be allowed 
to move forward transparently.'' In exchange, Ambassador 
Sondland wrote, the ``Goal is for Potus to invite him to Oval. 
Volker, Perry, Bolton and I strongly recommend.''\522\ Later 
that evening, Mr. Morrison responded, ``Thank you. 
Tracking.''\523\
    On July 19, a little over a week after the July 10 meetings 
at the White House, Ambassador Sondland spoke directly to 
President Zelensky about the upcoming call between the two 
presidents: ``It was a short call. I think I said: It looks 
like your call is finally on, and I think it's important that 
you, you know, give President Trump--he wanted this--some kind 
of a statement about corruption.''\524\
    Following his call with President Zelensky, Ambassador 
Sondland emailed several senior Trump Administration officials, 
including Mr. Mulvaney, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, 
Secretary Perry, and their staffs. The subject line of the July 
19 email read: ``I Talked to Zelensky just now.'' Ambassador 
Sondland wrote:

          He is prepared to receive Potus' call. Will assure 
        him that he intends to run a fully transparent 
        investigation and will ``turn over every stone''. He 
        would greatly appreciate a call prior to Sunday so that 
        he can put out some media about a ``friendly and 
        productive call'' (no details) prior to Ukraine 
        election on Sunday.\525\

    Secretary Perry responded that Mr. Mulvaney had confirmed a 
call would be set up ``for tomorrow by NSC,''\526\ and Mr. 
Mulvaney also responded to confirm that he had asked the NSC to 
set up the call between the presidents for the following day, 
July 20.\527\
    Ambassador Sondland explained that this email chain showed 
that ``[e]veryone was in the loop'' regarding his discussions 
with Ukrainian officials about the need for the Ukrainian 
leader to confirm to President Trump that he would announce the 
investigations. As Ambassador Sondland further testified:

          It was no secret. Everyone was informed via email on 
        July 19th, days before the Presidential call. As I 
        communicated to the team, I told President Zelensky in 
        advance that assurances to run a fully transparent 
        investigation and turn over every stone were necessary 
        in his call with President Trump.\528\

    Call records reviewed by the Committees show repeated 
contact between Ambassador Sondland and the White House around 
this time. For example, on July 19, at 10:43 a.m. Eastern Time, 
a number associated with the White House dialed Ambassador 
Sondland. Four minutes later, at 10:47 a.m., Ambassador 
Sondland called a White House phone number and connected for 
approximately seven minutes.\529\
    Later in the afternoon of July 19, Ambassador Sondland 
texted Ambassadors Volker and Taylor: ``Looks like Potus call 
tomorrow. I spike [sic] directly to Zelensky and gave him a 
full briefing. He's got it.''\530\ Ambassador Volker replied: 
``Good. Had breakfast with Rudy this morning--teeing up call w 
Yermak Monday. Must have helped. Most impt is for Zelensky to 
say that he will help investigation--and address any specific 
personnel issues--if there are any.''\531\

    Mr. Giuliani Met with State Department Officials and Ukrainian 
                          Government Officials

    As Ambassador Volker informed Ambassador Sondland in the 
above text message, on July 19, Ambassador Volker met Mr. 
Giuliani and his now-indicted associate Lev Parnas for 
breakfast at the Trump Hotel in Washington, D.C.\532\ 
Ambassador Volker also texted Mr. Yermak to inform him that he 
and Mr. Giuliani were meeting that day: ``Having our long 
anticipated breakfast today--will let you know and try to 
connect you directly.''\533\
    During the breakfast, Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador Volker 
discussed the discredited allegations against former Vice 
President Biden relating to Ukraine. Ambassador Volker 
testified that he pushed back against the allegations during 
his breakfast with Mr. Giuliani:

          One of the things that I said in that breakfast that 
        I had with Mr. Giuliani, the only time Vice President 
        Biden was ever discussed with me, and he was 
        repeating--he wasn't making an accusation and he wasn't 
        seeking an investigation--but he was repeating all of 
        the things that were in the media that we talked about 
        earlier about, you know, firing the prosecutor general 
        and his son being on the company and all that.
          And I said to Rudy in that breakfast the first time 
        we sat down to talk that it is simply not credible to 
        me that Joe Biden would be influenced in his duties as 
        Vice President by money or things for his son or 
        anything like that. I've known him a long time, he's a 
        person of integrity, and that's not credible.\534\

    Ambassador Volker further advised Mr. Giuliani during the 
breakfast that the then-Ukrainian Prosecutor General, Yuriy 
Lutsenko, was promoting a ``self-serving narrative to preserve 
himself in power.'' Mr. Giuliani agreed with Ambassador Volker 
and stated that he had come to that conclusion as well.\535\
    Following the breakfast, Ambassador Volker connected Mr. 
Giuliani with Mr. Yermak by text message:

          Volker: Mr Mayor--really enjoyed breakfast this 
        morning. As discussed, connecting you here with Andrey 
        Yermak, who is very close to President Zelensky. I 
        suggest we schedule a call together on Monday--maybe 
        10am or 11am Washington time? Kurt
          Giuliani: Monday 10 to 11
          Yermak: Ok, thank you
          Volker: I will set up call--10 am--thanks--Kurt
          Yermak: T\536\

    On the morning of July 22, Mr. Yermak texted Ambassador 
Volker about the upcoming call with Mr. Giuliani, writing that 
it was ``very good'' that their discussion would take place 
before the call between President Trump and President 
Zelensky.\537\ Later that day, the three men spoke by phone. 
Ambassador Volker described the July 22 discussion as merely an 
``introductory phone call,''\538\ although phone records 
indicate that the call lasted for approximately 38 
minutes.\539\
    Ambassador Volker testified that during the call, Mr. 
Giuliani and Mr. Yermak discussed plans for an in-person 
meeting in Madrid in early August.\540\ Afterward, Ambassador 
Volker texted Mr. Yermak that he thought the call had been 
``very useful'' and recommended that Mr. Yermak send Mr. 
Giuliani a text message to schedule a date for the Madrid 
meeting.\541\ Mr. Yermak texted Mr. Giuliani later that day 
about a plan to ``take this relationship to a new level'' and 
to meet in person as soon as possible.\542\
    Later on July 22, Ambassador Volker updated Ambassador 
Sondland on the ``great call'' he ``[o]rchestrated'' between 
Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Yermak, noting that ``Rudy is now 
advocating for phone call,'' an apparent reference to the call 
between President Trump and President Zelensky that would occur 
on July 25. Ambassador Volker also recommended that Ambassador 
Sondland inform Mr. Mulvaney that ``Rudy agrees,'' and that he 
planned to convey the same information to Ambassador Bolton. 
Ambassador Sondland replied that Mr. Morrison of the White 
House NSC was also in support of the call.\543\ Ambassador 
Volker also told Ambassador Sondland that Mr. Giuliani and Mr. 
Yermak would meet in person in Madrid within a couple of 
weeks.\544\

   President Zelensky Feared Becoming ``A Pawn'' in U.S. Reelection 
                                Campaign

    Around this time, senior Ukrainian officials informed U.S. 
officials that the new Ukrainian president did not want Ukraine 
to become enmeshed in U.S. domestic reelection politics.
    On July 20, Ambassador Taylor spoke with Mr. Danyliuk, the 
Ukrainian national security advisor, who conveyed that 
President Zelensky ``did not want to be used as a pawn in a 
U.S. reelection campaign.''\545\ Ambassador Taylor discussed 
President Zelensky's concern with Ambassador Volker and, the 
next day, texted Ambassador Sondland:

          Taylor: Gordon, one thing Kurt and I talked about 
        yesterday was Sasha Danyliuk's point that President 
        Zelenskyy is sensitive about Ukraine being taken 
        seriously, not merely as an instrument in Washington 
        domestic, reelection politics.
          Sondland: Absolutely, but we need to get the 
        conversation started and the relationship built, 
        irrespective of the pretext. I am worried about the 
        alternative.\546\

    Ambassador Taylor explained that his reference to 
``Washington domestic reelection politics'' was ``a reference 
to the investigations that Mr. Giuliani wanted to 
pursue.''\547\ According to Ambassador Taylor, President 
Zelensky understood what President Trump and Mr. Giuliani meant 
by ``investigations,'' and ``he did not want to get involved.'' 
Specifically, the Ukrainians understood that the 
``investigations were pursuant to Mr. Giuliani's request to 
develop information, to find information about Burisma and the 
Bidens. This was very well known in public. Mr. Giuliani had 
made this point clear in several instances in the beginning--in 
the springtime.''\548\ Ambassador Taylor also testified that 
the ``whole thrust'' of the activities undertaken by Mr. 
Giuliani and Ambassador Sondland ``was to get these 
investigations, which Danyliuk and presumably Zelensky were 
resisting because they didn't want to be seen to be interfering 
but also to be a pawn.''\549\
    Despite the Ukrainian resistance, Ambassador Sondland said 
he believed that the public announcement of investigations 
would ``fix'' an impasse between the Ukrainian government and 
President Trump. When asked what he meant by ``irrespective of 
the pretext'' in his July 21 text message to Ambassador Taylor, 
Ambassador Sondland explained, ``Well, the pretext being the 
agreed-upon interview or the agreed-upon press statement. We 
just need to get by it so that the two can meet, because, 
again, it was back to once they meet, all of this will be 
fixed.''\550\

Witnesses Confirmed the President Conditioned an Oval Office Meeting on 
                             Investigations

    Multiple witnesses testified that the conditioning of an 
Oval Office meeting on President Zelensky's announcement of 
investigations to benefit the President's reelection campaign 
came from the very top: President Trump.
    Ambassador Sondland testified that he, Secretary Perry, and 
Ambassador Volker worked with Mr. Giuliani ``at the express 
direction of the President of the United States.''\551\ 
Ambassador Sondland stated that ``Mr. Giuliani was expressing 
the desires of the President of the United States, and we knew 
these investigations were important to the President.''\552\ 
Ambassador Sondland explained that he ``followed the directions 
of the President'' and that ``we followed the President's 
orders.''\553\
    Ambassador Sondland further testified that President Trump 
expressed--both directly and through Mr. Giuliani--that he 
wanted ``a public statement from President Zelensky committing 
to the investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election'' as 
``prerequisites for the White House call and the White House 
meeting.''\554\ Ambassador Sondland explained:

          I know that members of this committee frequently 
        frame these complicated issues in the form of a simple 
        question: Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified 
        previously with regard to the requested White House 
        call and the White House meeting, the answer is 
        yes.\555\

    Ambassador Sondland also testified that knowledge of this 
quid pro quo was widespread among the President's advisers: 
``Everyone was in the loop'' about the President's expectation 
that President Zelensky had to announce these specific 
investigations to secure an Oval Office meeting. As an example, 
Ambassador Sondland cited an email--copying Senior Advisor to 
the White House Chief of Staff Robert Blair, State Department 
Executive Secretary Lisa Kenna, Chief of Staff to the Secretary 
of Energy Brian McCormack, Mr. Mulvaney, Secretary Perry, and 
Secretary Pompeo--where ``[e]veryone was informed.''\556\
    Other U.S. government officials also understood this scheme 
as a quid pro quo. Ambassador Taylor testified that as early as 
mid-July, it was ``becoming clear'' to him that ``the meeting 
President Zelensky wanted was conditioned on investigations of 
Burisma and alleged Ukrainian influence in the 2016 elections'' 
and that ``this condition was driven by the irregular policy 
channel I had come to understand was guided by Mr. 
Giuliani.''\557\ Mr. Holmes similarly understood that by July, 
``it was made clear that some action on a Burisma/Biden 
investigation was a precondition for an Oval Office 
visit.''\558\ Dr. Hill testified that this quid pro quo was 
readily apparent after reading the July 25 call summary, 
explaining that it revealed that the White House meeting was 
used as ``some kind of asset'' that was ``dangled out to the 
Ukrainian Government'' to secure a political benefit.\559\

Final Preparation for Trump-Zelensky Call: Ambassador Volker Counseled 
       Ukrainians and Ambassador Sondland Prepped President Trump

    Ambassador Taylor testified that the call between President 
Trump and President Zelensky that ultimately occurred on July 
25 was not confirmed until the last minute: ``We were trying to 
schedule it for about a week in advance, that whole week. As I 
say, back and forth, yes, no, this time, that time. . . . it 
may have been about the day before that it was actually locked 
down, so about the 24th.''\560\ According to Ambassador Taylor, 
at least one person had prescient concerns about the call 
before it occurred: ``Ambassador Bolton was not interested in 
having--did not want to have the call because he thought it was 
going to be a disaster. He thought that there could be some 
talk of investigations or worse on the call.''\561\
    Before the call took place on July 25, Ambassador Volker 
had lunch with Mr. Yermak in Kyiv. Ambassador Volker followed 
up with a text message to Mr. Yermak approximately 30 minutes 
before the call, noting that a White House visit was still on 
the table if, during the call, President Zelensky convinced 
President Trump that Ukraine would ``investigate'' and ``get to 
the bottom of what happened'' in 2016:

          Volker: Good lunch--thanks. Heard from White House--
        assuming President Z convinces trump he will 
        investigate / ``get to the bottom of what happened'' in 
        2016, we will nail down date for visit to Washington. 
        Good luck! See you tomorrow--kurt

    Ambassador Volker later informed Ambassador Sondland that 
he had relayed this ``message'' to Mr. Yermak, which Ambassador 
Sondland had conveyed to Ambassador Volker earlier that day:

          Volker: Hi Gordon--got your message. Had a great 
        lunch w Yermak and then passed your message to him. He 
        will see you tomorrow. Think everything in place\562\

    Ambassador Sondland testified that the ``message'' that 
Ambassador Volker conveyed to Mr. Yermak in advance of the July 
25 call likely originated from an earlier conversation that 
Ambassador Sondland had with President Trump:

          Q: So is it fair to say that this message is what you 
        received from President--Trump on that phone call that 
        morning?
          A: Again, if he testified to that, to refresh my own 
        memory, then, yes, likely I would have received that 
        from President Trump.
          Q: But the sequence certainly makes sense, right?
          A: Yeah, it does.
          Q: You talked to President Trump.
          A: Yeah.
          Q: You told Kurt Volker to call you. You left a 
        message for Kurt Volker. Kurt Volker sent this text 
        message to Andriy Yermak to prepare President Zelensky 
        and then President Trump had a phone call where 
        President Zelensky spoke very similar to what was in 
        this text message, right?
          A: Right.
          Q: And you would agree that the message in this--that 
        is expressed here is that President Zelensky needs to 
        convince Trump that he will do the investigations in 
        order to nail down the date for a visit to Washington, 
        D.C. Is that correct?
          A: That's correct.\563\

    Ambassador Sondland testified that he spoke with President 
Trump before the call with President Zelensky.\564\ Mr. 
Morrison also confirmed that President Trump and Ambassador 
Sondland spoke before President Trump's call with President 
Zelensky.\565\ Mr. Morrison stated that Ambassador Sondland 
emailed him on the morning of the call and listed ``three 
topics that he was working on, the first of which was `I spoke 
to the President this morning to brief him on the call.'''\566\ 
According to Mr. Morrison, Ambassador Sondland ``believed'' 
that he helped to facilitate the July 25 call between President 
Trump and President Zelensky.\567\
    On July 26, the day after the call between President Trump 
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Volker acknowledged his role 
in prepping President Zelensky for the call with President 
Trump in a text to Mr. Giuliani: ``Hi Mr Mayor--you may have 
heard--the President has [sic] a great phone call with the 
Ukrainian President yesterday. Exactly the right messages as we 
discussed.''\568\

   5. The President Asked the Ukrainian President to Interfere in the 
   2020 U.S. Election by Investigating the Bidens and 2016 Election 
                              Interference


During a call on July 25, President Trump asked President Zelensky of 
        Ukraine to ``do us a favor though'' and investigate his 
        political opponent, former Vice President Joe Biden, and a 
        debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 
        U.S. election. The next day, Ambassador Gordon Sondland 
        informed President Trump that President Zelensky ``was gonna do 
        the investigation'' and ``anything'' President Trump asked of 
        him.

                                Overview

    During a telephone call on July 25, 2019, President Donald 
J. Trump asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to 
investigate his political rival, former Vice President Joseph 
Biden, and a debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered 
in the 2016 U.S. election. President Trump also discussed the 
removal of Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, former U.S. Ambassador 
to Ukraine, said that she was ``bad news,'' and warned that she 
would ``go through some things.'' Two witnesses who listened to 
the call testified that they immediately reported the details 
of the call to senior White House lawyers.
    When asked by a reporter on October 3, 2019, what he had 
hoped President Zelensky would do following the call, President 
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were 
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the 
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.''
    Witnesses unanimously testified that President Trump's 
claims about former Vice President Biden and alleged Ukrainian 
interference in the 2016 U.S. election have been discredited. 
The witnesses reaffirmed that in late 2015 and early 2016, when 
former Vice President Biden advocated for the removal of a 
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor, he acted in accordance with a 
``broad-based consensus'' and the official policy of the United 
States, the European Union, and major international financial 
institutions. Witnesses also unanimously testified that the 
removal of that prosecutor made it more likely that Ukraine 
would investigate corruption, not less likely.
    Dr. Fiona Hill, former Deputy Assistant to the President 
and Senior Director for Europe and Russia at the National 
Security Council, testified that the conspiracy theories about 
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election touted by 
President Trump are a ``fictional narrative that is being 
perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services.'' 
She noted that President Trump's former Homeland Security 
Advisor Tom Bossert and former National Security Advisor H.R. 
McMaster repeatedly advised the President that the so-called 
``CrowdStrike'' conspiracy theory that President Trump raised 
in the July 25 call is completely ``debunked,'' and that 
allegations Ukraine interfered in the 2016 U.S. election are 
false.
    Nonetheless, on July 26, 2019, U.S. Ambassador to the 
European Union Gordon Sondland met with senior Ukrainian 
officials in Kyiv and then informed President Trump that 
President Zelensky ``was gonna do the investigation'' into 
former Vice President Biden and alleged Ukrainian interference 
in the 2016 U.S. election. Ambassador Sondland added that 
President Zelensky would ``do anything'' President Trump asked 
of him. After the call, Ambassador Sondland told David Holmes, 
Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, 
that President Trump ``did not give a shit about Ukraine'' and 
that he only cared about the ``big stuff'' that benefited his 
personal interests, like the ``Biden investigation.''

    President Trump's Call With President Zelensky on July 25, 2019

    On July 25, 2019, President Zelensky finally had a long-
awaited phone call with Ukraine's most important international 
partner: The President of the United States.
    It had been over three months since the two leaders first 
spoke. Despite a warm but largely non-substantive call on April 
21, President Trump had since declined President Zelensky's 
invitation to attend his inauguration and directed Vice 
President Mike Pence not to attend either.\569\ Ukrainian 
efforts to set a date for a promised Oval Office meeting with 
President Trump were stalled. As Mr. Holmes explained, 
following the April 21 call:

          President Zelensky's team immediately began pressing 
        to set a date for that visit. President Zelensky and 
        senior members of his team made clear that they wanted 
        President Zelensky's first overseas trip to be to 
        Washington, to send a strong signal of American 
        support, and requested a call with President Trump as 
        soon as possible.\570\

    Before scheduling the July 25 call or a White House visit, 
President Trump met on June 28 with Russian President Vladimir 
Putin--whose armed forces were engaged in a war of attrition 
against U.S.-backed Ukrainian forces--on the sidelines of the 
G20 summit in Osaka, Japan.\571\ During their meeting, 
President Trump and President Putin shared a joke about 
Russia's meddling in the 2016 U.S. election.\572\
    On July 25, President Trump joined the call with President 
Zelensky from the Executive Residence at the White House, away 
from a small group of senior national security aides who would 
normally join him in the Oval Office for a conversation with a 
foreign head of state. President Trump and President Zelensky 
began to speak at 9:03 a.m. Washington time--4:03 p.m. in Kyiv. 
According to Tim Morrison, the newly-installed Senior Director 
for Europe and Russia on the NSC, President Zelensky spoke in 
Ukrainian and occasionally in ``chopped English.''\573\ 
Translators interpreted the call on both sides.\574\ American 
aides listening to the call from the White House Situation Room 
hoped that what was said over the next 30 minutes would provide 
President Zelensky with the strong U.S. endorsement he needed 
in order to successfully negotiate an end to the five-year-old 
war with Russia that had killed over 13,000 Ukrainian soldiers 
and to advance President Zelensky's ambitious anti-corruption 
initiatives in Ukraine.\575\
    The Trump Administration's subject-matter experts, NSC 
Director for Ukraine Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman and Mr. 
Morrison, were both on the call.\576\ They had prepared talking 
points for President Trump and were taking detailed notes of 
what both leaders said, so that they could promptly implement 
any agreed-upon actions.\577\ They were joined by Lt. Gen. 
Keith Kellogg, National Security Advisor to the Vice President, 
and Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President 
for Europe and Russia. Assistant to the President Robert Blair, 
a senior aide to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, was also 
present, along with an NSC press officer.\578\ Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo listened from a different location, as did 
Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, the Deputy National Security 
Advisor.\579\
    Notably, Secretary Pompeo did not reveal that he listened 
to the July 25 call when asked directly about it on This Week 
on September 22.\580\ Neither Secretary Pompeo nor the State 
Department corrected the record until September 30, when ``a 
senior State Department official'' disclosed the Secretary of 
State's participation in the July 25 call.\581\
    The two presidents first exchanged pleasantries. President 
Trump congratulated the Ukrainian leader on his party's 
parliamentary victory. In a nod to their shared experience as 
political outsiders, President Zelensky called President Trump 
``a great teacher'' who informed his own efforts to involve 
``many many new people'' in Ukraine's politics and ``drain the 
swamp here in our country.''\582\
    The discussion turned to U.S. support for Ukraine. 
President Trump contrasted U.S. assistance to that of America's 
closest European allies, stating: ``We spend a lot of effort 
and a lot of time. Much more than the European countries are 
doing and they should be helping you more than they are.'' The 
call then took a more ominous turn. President Trump stated that 
with respect to U.S. support for Ukraine, ``I wouldn't say that 
it's reciprocal necessarily because things are happening that 
are not good but the United States has been very very good to 
Ukraine.''\583\
    President Zelensky, whose government receives billions of 
dollars in financial support from the European Union and its 
member states, responded that European nations were ``not 
working as much as they should work for Ukraine,'' including in 
the area of enforcing sanctions against Russia.\584\ He noted 
that ``the United States is a much bigger partner than the 
European Union'' and stated that he was ``very grateful'' 
because ``the United States is doing quite a lot for 
Ukraine.''\585\
    President Zelensky then raised the issue of U.S. military 
assistance for Ukraine with President Trump: ``I also would 
like to thank you for your great support in the area of 
defense''--an area where U.S. support is vital.\586\ President 
Zelensky continued: ``We are ready to continue to cooperate for 
the next steps specifically we are almost ready to buy more 
Javelins from the United States for defense purposes.''\587\ 
The Javelin anti-tank missiles, first transferred to Ukraine by 
the United States in 2018, were widely viewed by U.S. officials 
as a deterrent against further Russian encroachment into 
Ukrainian territory.\588\
    Immediately after the Ukrainian leader raised the issue of 
U.S. military assistance to Ukraine, President Trump replied: 
``I would like you to do us a favor though because our country 
has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it.''\589\

                  Request to Investigate 2016 Election

    President Trump then explained the ``favor'' he wanted 
President Zelensky to do. He first requested that Ukraine 
investigate a discredited conspiracy theory aimed at 
undercutting the U.S. Intelligence Community's unanimous 
conclusion that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 
U.S. election.\590\ Specifically, President Trump stated:

          I would like you to find out what happened with this 
        whole situation with Ukraine, they say Crowdstrike . . 
        . I guess you have one of your wealthy people . . . The 
        server, they say Ukraine has it. There are a lot of 
        things that went on, the whole situation. I think 
        you're surrounding yourself with some of the same 
        people. I would like to have the Attorney General call 
        you or your people and I would like you to get to the 
        bottom of it. As you saw yesterday, that whole nonsense 
        ended with a very poor performance by a man named 
        Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance, but they 
        say a lot of it started with Ukraine. Whatever you can 
        do, it's very important that you do it if that's 
        possible.\591\

    President Trump was referencing the widely debunked 
conspiracy theory that the Ukrainian government--and not 
Russia--was behind the hack of Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) servers in 2016, and that the American cybersecurity firm 
CrowdStrike moved the DNC's servers to Ukraine to prevent U.S. 
law enforcement from examining them. This theory is often 
referred to in shorthand as ``CrowdStrike'' and has been 
promoted by the Russian government.\592\
    For example, during a press conference in February 2017, 
just weeks after the U.S. Intelligence Community unanimously 
assessed in a public report that Russia interfered in the 2016 
U.S. election to benefit the candidacy of Donald J. Trump, 
President Putin falsely asserted that ``the Ukrainian 
government adopted a unilateral position in favour of one 
candidate. More than that, certain oligarchs, certainly with 
the approval of the political leadership, funded this 
candidate, or female candidate, to be more precise.''\593\ 
President Trump's reference in his July 25 telephone call to 
``one of your wealthy people'' tracked closely with President 
Putin's accusations that ``certain oligarchs'' in Ukraine 
meddled in the 2016 U.S. election to support Democratic 
candidate Hillary Clinton.
    Dr. Hill, an expert on Russia and President Putin, 
testified that the claim that ``Russia and its security 
services did not conduct a campaign against our country and 
that perhaps, somehow for some reason, Ukraine did'' is ``a 
fictional narrative that is being perpetrated and propagated by 
the Russian security services themselves.'' Dr. Hill reaffirmed 
that the U.S. Intelligence Community's January 2017 conclusion 
that Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. election is ``beyond 
dispute, even if some of the underlying details must remain 
classified.''\594\
    Tom Bossert, President Trump's former Homeland Security 
Advisor, stated publicly that the CrowdStrike theory is ``not 
only a conspiracy theory, it is completely debunked.''\595\ Dr. 
Hill testified that White House officials--including Mr. 
Bossert and former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster--
``spent a lot of time'' refuting the CrowdStrike conspiracy 
theory to President Trump. Dr. Hill explained that Mr. Bossert 
and others ``who were working on cybersecurity laid out to the 
President the facts about the interference.'' She affirmed that 
President Trump was advised that ``the alternative theory that 
Ukraine had interfered in the election was false.''\596\
    President Zelensky did not directly address President 
Trump's reference to CrowdStrike during the July 25 call, but 
he tried to assure President Trump that ``it is very important 
for me and everything that you just mentioned earlier.''\597\ 
President Zelensky committed to proceed with an investigation, 
telling President Trump that he had ``nobody but friends'' in 
the new Ukrainian presidential administration, possibly 
attempting to rebut Rudy Giuliani's earlier claims that 
President Zelensky was surrounded by ``enemies'' of President 
Trump. President Zelensky then specifically noted that one of 
his assistants ``spoke with Mr. Giuliani just recently and we 
are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani will be able to travel 
to Ukraine and we will meet once he comes to Ukraine.''\598\
    Significantly, President Zelensky referenced Mr. Giuliani 
even before President Trump had mentioned him, demonstrating 
the Ukrainian leader's understanding that Mr. Giuliani 
represented President Trump's interests in Ukraine. The 
Ukrainian leader then reassured President Trump, ``I also plan 
to surround myself with great people and in addition to that 
investigation'' into the CrowdStrike conspiracy theory. He 
said, ``I guarantee as the President of Ukraine that all the 
investigations will be done openly and candidly. That I can 
assure you.''\599\ President Trump replied, ``Rudy very much 
knows what's happening and he is a very capable guy. If you 
could speak to him that would be great.''\600\

                     Request to Investigate Bidens

    President Trump then returned to his requested ``favor,'' 
asking President Zelensky about the ``[t]he other thing'': that 
Ukraine investigate President Trump's U.S. political rival, 
former Vice President Biden, for allegedly ending an 
investigation into the Ukrainian energy company Burisma 
Holdings. Vice President Biden's son, Hunter Biden, served as a 
member of Burisma's board of directors. President Trump told 
President Zelensky:

          The other thing, There's a lot of talk about Biden's 
        son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of 
        people want to find out about that so whatever you can 
        do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden went 
        around bragging that he stopped the prosecution so if 
        you can look into it . . . It sounds horrible to 
        me.\601\

    President Trump later continued, ``I will have Mr. Giuliani 
give you a call and I am also going to have Attorney General 
Barr call and we will get to the bottom of it. I'm sure you 
will figure it out.''\602\
    In public remarks on October 3, 2019, a reporter asked 
President Trump, ``what exactly did you hope Zelensky would do 
about the Bidens after your phone call? Exactly.'' President 
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were 
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the 
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.''\603\
    When President Trump asserted to President Zelensky during 
the July 25 call that former Vice President ``Biden went around 
bragging that he stopped the prosecution,'' President Trump was 
apparently referring to Vice President Biden's involvement in 
the removal of the corrupt former Ukrainian prosecutor general, 
Viktor Shokin.
    Multiple witnesses--including Dr. Hill, former U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, Mr. Holmes, and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State George Kent--testified that they 
were not aware of any credible evidence to support the claim 
that former Vice President Biden acted inappropriately when he 
advocated for the removal of Mr. Shokin.\604\ To the contrary, 
those witnesses confirmed that it was the official policy of 
the United States, the European Union, and major international 
financial institutions, to demand Mr. Shokin's dismissal. As 
Mr. Kent testified, there was ``a broad-based consensus'' that 
Mr. Shokin was ``a typical Ukraine prosecutor who lived a 
lifestyle far in excess of his government salary, who never 
prosecuted anybody known for having committed a crime'' and who 
``covered up crimes that were known to have been 
committed.''\605\ Mr. Kent further explained:

          What former Vice President Biden requested of former 
        President of Ukraine Poroshenko was the removal of a 
        corrupt prosecutor general, Viktor Shokin, who had 
        undermined a program of assistance that we had spent, 
        again, U.S. taxpayer money to try to build an 
        independent investigator unit to go after corrupt 
        prosecutors.\606\

    As Ambassador Yovanovitch testified, the removal of a 
corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor general, who was not prosecuting 
enough corruption, increased the chance that alleged corruption 
in companies in Ukraine could be investigated.\607\
    Mr. Shokin was a known associate of Mr. Giuliani. As 
described in Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani had been communicating 
with Mr. Shokin since at least 2018.\608\ Mr. Giuliani also 
lobbied the White House on behalf of Mr. Shokin to intervene 
earlier in 2019 when the State Department rejected a visa 
application for Mr. Shokin to visit the United States based 
upon Mr. Shokin's notorious corrupt conduct.\609\ Ambassador 
Kurt Volker, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine 
Negotiations, testified that he explicitly warned Mr. 
Giuliani--to no avail--against pursuing ``the conspiracy theory 
that Vice President Biden would have been influenced in his 
duties as Vice President by money paid to his son.''\610\ 
Ambassador Volker affirmed that former Vice President Biden is 
``an honorable man, and I hold him in the highest 
regard.''\611\

                 Attacks Against Ambassador Yovanovitch

    During the July 25 call, President Trump also attacked 
Ambassador Yovanovitch, whom he had ousted as the U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine three months earlier after a concerted 
smear campaign perpetuated by Mr. Giuliani. As described in 
Chapter 1, Mr. Giuliani viewed Ambassador Yovanovitch--a 
decorated diplomat who had championed Ukrainian anti-corruption 
officials and activists--as an impediment to his activities in 
Ukraine.\612\ President Trump told President Zelensky: ``The 
former ambassador from the United States, the woman, was bad 
news and the people she was dealing with in the Ukraine were 
bad news so I just want to let you know that.'' He later added: 
``Well, she's going to go through some things.''\613\
    Ambassador Yovanovitch described her visceral reaction when 
she first read the call record, after the White House released 
it publicly on September 25, 2019. She testified, ``I was 
shocked. I mean, I was very surprised that President Trump 
would--first of all, that I would feature repeatedly in a 
Presidential phone call, but secondly, that the President would 
speak about me or any ambassador in that way to a foreign 
counterpart.''\614\ When asked whether she felt ``threatened'' 
by President Trump's statement that ``she's going to go through 
some things,'' Ambassador Yovanovitch answered that she 
did.\615\

             Praise of Corrupt Former Ukrainian Prosecutor

    After disparaging Ambassador Yovanovitch, who had an 
extensive record of combatting corruption, President Trump 
praised an unnamed former Ukrainian prosecutor general--
referring to Yuriy Lutsenko--who was widely considered to be 
corrupt and had promoted false allegations against Ambassador 
Yovanovitch.\616\ President Trump told President Zelensky: 
``Good because I heard you had a prosecutor who was very good 
and he was shut down and that's really unfair. A lot of people 
are talking about that, the way they shut your very good 
prosecutor down and you had some very bad people 
involved.''\617\ He later added, ``I heard the prosecutor was 
treated very badly and he was a very fair prosecutor so good 
luck with everything.''\618\
    At the time of the July 25 call, Mr. Lutsenko--who was 
collaborating with Mr. Giuliani to smear Ambassador Yovanovitch 
and the Bidens--was still the Ukrainian prosecutor general. Mr. 
Holmes testified that Mr. Lutsenko ``was not a good partner. He 
had failed to deliver on the promised reforms that he had 
committed to when he took office, and he was using his office 
to insulate and protect political allies while presumably 
enriching himself.''\619\ By July 2019, Mr. Holmes assessed 
that Mr. Lutsenko was ``trying to angle to keep his job'' under 
the new Zelensky Administration and that part of his strategy 
was ``appealing to Rudy Giuliani and Donald Trump by pushing 
out these false theories about the Bidens and the 2016 
election.''\620\
    Multiple witnesses testified that another former Ukrainian 
prosecutor, Mr. Shokin, was also considered to be corrupt. For 
example, Mr. Kent testified during his deposition that Mr. 
Lutsenko and Mr. Shokin were ``corrupt former prosecutors'' who 
were ``peddling false information in order to extract revenge 
against those who had exposed their misconduct, including U.S. 
diplomats, Ukrainian anticorruption officials, and reform-
minded civil society groups in Ukraine.''\621\ Ambassador 
Volker testified at his public hearing that Mr. Lutsenko was 
``not credible, and was acting in a self-serving 
capacity.''\622\ Mr. Holmes further noted that Mr. Lutsenko 
``resisted fully empowering truly independent anticorruption 
institutions that would help ensure that no Ukrainians, however 
powerful, were above the law.''\623\
    After the call, the White House press office issued a short 
and incomplete summary of the call, omitting major elements of 
the conversation. The press statement read:

    Today, President Donald J. Trump spoke by telephone with 
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine to congratulate him on 
his recent election. President Trump and President Zelenskyy 
discussed ways to strengthen the relationship between the 
United States and Ukraine, including energy and economic 
cooperation. Both leaders also expressed that they look forward 
to the opportunity to meet.\624\

        Concerns Raised by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman

    Prior to President Trump's July 25 call with President 
Zelensky, Lt. Col. Vindman had prepared--with Mr. Morrison's 
review and approval--a call briefing package, including talking 
points for President Trump's use. This was consistent with the 
NSC's regular process of preparing for the President's phone 
calls with foreign leaders.\625\ The NSC-drafted talking points 
did not include any reference to Biden, Burisma, CrowdStrike, 
or alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
election.\626\
    Lt. Col. Vindman testified during his deposition that, 
prior to the July 25 call, he was aware of concerns from former 
National Security Advisor John Bolton and other U.S. officials 
that President Trump might raise these discredited issues with 
President Zelensky.\627\ Indeed, Ambassador Bolton had resisted 
scheduling the call because he believed it might be a 
``disaster.''\628\
    As he sat in the White House Situation Room listening to 
the leaders, Lt. Col. Vindman quickly recognized that the 
President's conversation was diverging from the talking points 
he helped prepare based on the interagency policy process, and 
``straying'' into an ``unproductive narrative'' promoted by Mr. 
Giuliani and other ``external and nongovernmental 
influencers''\629\--topics that Lt. Col. Vindman dubbed ``stray 
voltage.''\630\
    Lt. Col. Vindman knew immediately that he had a duty to 
report the contents of the call to the White House lawyers. He 
explained, ``I had concerns, and it was my duty to report my 
concerns to the proper--proper people in the chain of 
command.''\631\ Lt. Col. Vindman testified that President 
Trump's request that a foreign leader dependent on the United 
States open an investigation into his U.S. political opponent 
constituted a ``demand'' that President Zelensky had to meet in 
order to secure a White House meeting:

          So, Congressman, the power disparity between the 
        President of the United States and the President of 
        Ukraine is vast, and, you know, in the President asking 
        for something, it became--there was--in return for a 
        White House meeting, because that's what this was 
        about. This was about getting a White House meeting. It 
        was a demand for him to fulfill his--fulfill this 
        particular prerequisite in order to get the 
        meeting.\632\

    Lt. Col. Vindman further testified that President Trump's 
demand of the Ukrainian leader was ``inappropriate'' and 
``improper,'' and that it would undermine U.S. national 
security:

          Chairman, as I said in my statement, it was 
        inappropriate. It was improper for the President to 
        request--to demand an investigation into a political 
        opponent, especially a foreign power where there's, at 
        best, dubious belief that this would be a completely 
        impartial investigation, and that this would have 
        significant implications if it became public knowledge, 
        and it would be perceived as a partisan play. It would 
        undermine our Ukraine policy, and it would undermine 
        our national security.\633\

    Within an hour of the call ending, Lt. Col. Vindman 
reported his concerns to John A. Eisenberg, the Deputy Counsel 
to the President for National Security Affairs and the Legal 
Advisor to the NSC, and Michael Ellis, a Senior Associate 
Counsel to the President and the Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
NSC.\634\ Lt. Col. Vindman recounted the content of the call 
based on his handwritten notes and told the lawyers that he 
believed it was ``wrong'' for President Trump to ask President 
Zelensky to investigate Vice President Biden.\635\

                  Concerns Raised by Timothy Morrison

    After 17 years as a Republican Congressional staffer and 
approximately a year serving elsewhere on the NSC staff, Mr. 
Morrison assumed his position as the NSC's Senior Director for 
Europe and Russia on July 15, 2019, only 10 days before 
President Trump's call with President Zelensky.\636\
    Before he transitioned into his new role, Mr. Morrison met 
with his predecessor, Dr. Hill. She advised him to stay away 
from efforts orchestrated by Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador 
Sondland to pressure Ukraine into investigating a ``bucket of 
issues'' that included ``Burisma the company,'' and ``Hunter 
Biden on the board.''\637\ Dr. Hill also warned Mr. Morrison 
before the July 25 call about the President's interest in 
alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election 
related to the DNC server.\638\
    Mr. Morrison testified that he had no knowledge of any 
investigations at the time, but after performing a Google 
search of ``what is Burisma?'' and seeing the name Hunter 
Biden, Mr. Morrison decided to ``stay away.''\639\ Even though 
he was new to the portfolio, Mr. Morrison promptly concluded 
that because ``Burisma'' involved Hunter Biden, and because 
former Vice President Biden was running for President, such 
investigations could be a ``problematic'' area.\640\ Mr. 
Morrison further explained that he tried to stay away from 
requests related to Burisma and the 2016 U.S. election because 
these investigations were not related to ``the proper policy 
process that I was involved in on Ukraine,'' and ``had nothing 
to do with the issues that the interagency was working 
on.''\641\
    With that background in mind, Mr. Morrison admitted he was 
``concerned'' when, while listening to the call on July 25, he 
heard President Trump raise ``issues related to the [DNC] 
server.'' Ultimately, Mr. Morrison said, ``the call was not the 
full-throated endorsement of the Ukraine reform agenda that I 
was hoping to hear.''\642\
    In ``fairly short order,'' Mr. Morrison reported the 
contents of the call to Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Ellis, the NSC 
lawyers. He asked them to review the call, which he feared 
would be ``damaging'' if leaked.\643\ Mr. Morrison stated that 
at the time of the call, he ``did not have a view'' on whether 
the call was ``appropriate and proper.''\644\ He also stated 
that he ``was not concerned that anything illegal was 
discussed.''\645\ During his deposition, however, Mr. Morrison 
clarified, ``I did not then and I do not now opine . . . as to 
the legality'' of what happened on the call.\646\
    In a second meeting with Mr. Eisenberg, Mr. Morrison 
requested that access to the electronic files of the call 
record be restricted. This was an unusual request. Mr. Morrison 
confirmed to the Committee that he had never before asked the 
NSC Legal Advisor to restrict access to a presidential call 
record.\647\ It was also unusual because Mr. Morrison raised 
restricting access with Mr. Eisenberg despite the fact that Mr. 
Morrison himself had the authority, as an NSC senior director, 
to recommend restrictions on the relevant files to the NSC's 
Executive Secretariat.
    Lt. Col. Vindman also discussed restricting access to the 
July 25 call summary with Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Ellis. At some 
point after the call, Lt. Col. Vindman discussed with the NSC 
lawyers the ``sensitivity'' of the matters raised on the call 
and ``the fact that . . . there are constant leaks.''\648\ Lt. 
Col. Vindman explained that ``[f]rom a foreign policy 
professional perspective, all of these types of calls would 
inherently be sensitive.''\649\ But the July 25 call was 
particularly sensitive because it could ``undermine our 
relationship with the Ukrainians'' given that it ``would 
implicate a partisan play.''\650\ The NSC lawyers, therefore, 
believed that it was ``appropriate to restrict access for the 
purpose of the leaks'' and ``to preserv[e] the integrity'' of 
the transcript.\651\ Lt. Col. Vindman recalled that Mr. Ellis 
raised the idea of placing the call summary on the NSC's server 
for highly classified information and Mr. Eisenberg ``gave the 
go-ahead.''\652\
    Some weeks after his discussions with the NSC attorneys, 
Mr. Morrison could not locate the call record. He contacted the 
staff of the NSC's Executive Secretariat in search of an 
explanation and was informed that ``John Eisenberg had directed 
it to be moved to a different server'' utilized by the NSC 
staff for highly classified information.\653\ This transfer 
occurred despite Mr. Morrison's view that the call record did 
not meet the requirements to be placed on the highly classified 
system.\654\
    Mr. Eisenberg later told Mr. Morrison that the call record 
had been placed on the highly classified system by 
``mistake.''\655\ Even after Mr. Eisenberg stated that the call 
record was moved to the highly classified system by 
``mistake,'' it nevertheless remained on that system until at 
least the third week of September 2019, shortly before its 
declassification and public release by the White House.\656\

                  Concerns Raised by Jennifer Williams

    Vice President Pence's advisor, Ms. Williams, had listened 
to nearly a dozen phone calls between President Trump and other 
heads of state prior to July 25, 2019, as well as Vice 
President Pence's April 23 call with President Zelensky.\657\ 
As she sat listening to President Trump's July 25 call, she was 
struck by his requests relating to Vice President Biden. She 
stated that she believed that President Trump's comments were 
``unusual and inappropriate.''\658\
    Ms. Williams testified that she thought that ``references 
to specific individuals and investigations, such as former Vice 
President Biden and his son'' were ``political in nature, given 
that the former Vice President is a political opponent of the 
President.''\659\ The comments struck her as ``more specific to 
the President in nature, to his personal political agenda,'' as 
opposed to ``a broader foreign policy objective of the United 
States.''\660\ She added, ``it was the first time I had heard 
internally the President reference particular investigations 
that previously I had only heard about through Mr. Giuliani's 
press interviews and press reporting.''\661\
    Significantly, Ms. Williams, who had learned about the hold 
on security assistance for Ukraine on July 3, also said that 
the Trump-Zelensky call ``shed some light on possible other 
motivations behind a security assistance hold.''\662\

                  ``Burisma'' Omitted from Call Record

    Mr. Morrison, Lt. Col. Vindman, and Ms. Williams all agreed 
that the publicly released record of the call was substantially 
accurate, but Lt. Col. Vindman and Ms. Williams both testified 
that President Zelensky made an explicit reference to 
``Burisma'' that was not included in the call record. 
Specifically, Lt. Col. Vindman testified that his notes 
indicated President Zelensky used the word ``Burisma''--instead 
of generically referring to ``the company''--when discussing 
President Trump's request to investigate the Bidens.\663\ Ms. 
Williams' notes also reflected that President Zelensky had said 
``Burisma'' later in the call when referring to a 
``case.''\664\
    Lt. Col. Vindman indicated that President Zelensky's 
mention of ``Burisma'' was notable because it suggested that 
the Ukrainian leader was ``prepped for this call.'' He 
explained that ``frankly, the President of Ukraine would not 
necessarily know anything about this company Burisma.'' Lt. 
Col. Vindman continued, ``he would certainly understand some of 
this--some of these elements because the story had been 
developing for some time, but the fact that he mentioned 
specifically Burisma seemed to suggest to me that he was 
prepped for this call.''\665\

         The Substance of the Call Remained Tightly Controlled

    Ms. Williams testified that staff in the Office of the Vice 
President placed the draft call record in the Vice President's 
nightly briefing book on July 25.\666\
    Separately, and following established protocols for 
coordinating U.S. government activities toward Ukraine, Lt. 
Col. Vindman provided Mr. Kent at the State Department with a 
readout. Because Mr. Kent had worked on Ukraine policy for many 
years, Lt. Col. Vindman sought Mr. Kent's ``expert view'' on 
the investigations requested by the President. Mr. Kent 
informed him that ``there was no substance'' behind the 
CrowdStrike conspiracy theory and ``took note of the fact that 
there was a call to investigate the Bidens.''\667\ Recalling 
this conversation, Mr. Kent testified that Lt. Col. Vindman 
said ``he could not share the majority of what was discussed 
[on the July 25 call] because of the very sensitive nature of 
what was discussed,'' but that Lt. Col. Vindman noted that the 
call ``went into the direction of some of the most extreme 
narratives that have been discussed publicly.''\668\

   Ambassador Sondland Followed Up on President Trump's Request for 
                             Investigations

    Soon after arriving in Kyiv from Brussels on July 25, 
Ambassador Sondland asked the U.S. Embassy to arrange a meeting 
the next day with Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy 
Yermak.\669\
    On the morning of July 26, Ambassadors Sondland, Volker and 
Taylor--accompanied by Mr. Holmes, who acted as their official 
notetaker--went to the Presidential Administration Building in 
central Kyiv for meetings with Ukrainian officials.\670\ 
Contrary to standard procedure, Mr. Holmes and Ambassador 
Taylor did not receive readouts of the July 25 call, so they 
were unaware of what President Trump and President Zelensky had 
discussed.\671\ Ambassador Volker also did not receive an 
official readout of the July 25 call from the NSC staff. He 
testified that Andriy Yermak, a senior aide to President 
Zelensky, simply characterized it as a ``good call'' in which 
``President Zelensky did reiterate his commitment to reform and 
fighting corruption in Ukraine.''\672\
    The first meeting on July 26 was with Chief of Staff to 
President Zelensky Andriy Bohdan.\673\ Regarding the July 25 
call, Mr. Holmes recalled Mr. Bohdan sharing that ``President 
Trump had expressed interest . . . in President Zelensky's 
personnel decisions related to the Prosecutor General's office 
[PGO].''\674\ Mr. Holmes further testified that Mr. Bohdan then 
``started asking . . . about individuals I've since come to 
understand they were considering appointing to different roles 
in the PGO.''\675\ Mr. Holmes explained that he ``didn't 
understand it,'' and that ``[i]t wasn't until I read the July 
25th phone call transcript that I realized that the President 
[Trump] had mentioned Mr. Lutsenko in the call.''\676\
    Subsequently, Ambassadors Sondland, Taylor, and Volker met 
with President Zelensky and other senior officials. Mr. Holmes 
once again took notes.\677\ He testified ``During the meeting, 
President Zelensky stated that, during the July 25th call, 
President Trump had, quote, `three times raised some very 
sensitive issues' and that he would have to follow up--he, 
Zelensky--would have to follow up on those issues when he and 
President Trump met in person.''\678\ After he read the 
transcript of the July 25 call, Mr. Holmes determined that 
President Zelensky's mention of ``sensitive issues'' was a 
reference to President Trump's demands for a ``Burisma Biden 
investigation.''\679\
    Catherine Croft, Special Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker, 
was also in Kyiv on July 26. Although she did not attend the 
meeting with President Zelensky, she received a readout from 
Ambassadors Volker and Taylor later that day, as they were 
traveling in an embassy vehicle. Ms. Croft testified that her 
handwritten notes from that readout indicate ``the President 
[Trump] had raised investigations multiple times'' in his July 
25 call with President Zelensky.\680\ Ambassadors Sondland and 
Taylor told the Committee that they did not recall President 
Zelensky's comments about investigations.\681\ Ambassador 
Volker similarly did not recall that the issue of 
investigations was discussed, but testified that he did not 
dispute the validity of ``notes taken contemporaneously at the 
meeting.''\682\

  Ambassador Sondland Met One-on-One With Ukrainian Presidential Aide

    The meeting with President Zelensky ended around noon.\683\ 
After the meeting, Ambassadors Taylor and Volker departed the 
Presidential Administration building for a visit to the front 
lines of the war with Russia in eastern Ukraine.\684\ 
Ambassador Sondland separately headed for Mr. Yermak's office. 
Mr. Holmes testified that, at the last minute, he received 
instruction from his leadership at the U.S. Embassy to join 
Ambassador Sondland.\685\ By that point, Mr. Holmes recalled, 
he ``was a flight of stairs behind Ambassador Sondland as he 
headed to meet with Mr. Yermak.''\686\ Mr. Holmes continued, 
``When I reached Mr. Yermak's office, Ambassador Sondland had 
already gone in to the meeting.''\687\ Mr. Holmes then 
``explained to Mr. Yermak's assistant that I was supposed to 
join the meeting as the Embassy's representative and strongly 
urged her to let me in, but she told me that Ambassador 
Sondland and Mr. Yermak had insisted that the meeting be one on 
one with no note taker.''\688\ Mr. Holmes ``then waited in the 
anteroom until the meeting ended, along with a member of 
Ambassador Sondland's staff and a member of the U.S. Embassy 
Kyiv staff.''\689\
    Ambassador Sondland's meeting with Mr. Yermak lasted 
approximately 30 minutes.\690\ When it ended, Ambassador 
Sondland did not provide Mr. Holmes an explanation of what they 
discussed.\691\ Ambassador Sondland later testified that he did 
not ``recall the specifics'' of his conversation with Mr. 
Yermak, but he believed ``the issue of investigations was 
probably a part of that agenda or meeting.''\692\

 Call Between President Trump and Ambassador Sondland on July 26, 2019

    After a busy morning of meetings with Ukrainian officials 
on July 26, Ambassador Sondland indicated that he wanted to get 
lunch. Mr. Holmes interjected that he would ``be happy to 
join'' Ambassador Sondland and two other State Department 
colleagues accompanying him ``if he wanted to brief me out on 
his meeting with Mr. Yermak or discuss other issues.''\693\ 
Ambassador Sondland accepted the offer. The diplomats proceeded 
``to a nearby restaurant and sat on an outdoor terrace.''\694\ 
Mr. Holmes ``sat directly across from Ambassador Sondland,'' 
close enough that they could ``share an appetizer.''\695\
    Mr. Holmes recounted that ``at first, the lunch was largely 
social. Ambassador Sondland selected a bottle of wine that he 
shared among the four of us, and we discussed topics such as 
marketing strategies for his hotel business.''\696\ Later 
during the meal, Ambassador Sondland ``said that he was going 
to call President Trump to give him an update.''\697\ 
Ambassador Sondland then placed a call on his unsecure mobile 
phone. Mr. Holmes was taken aback. He told the Committee, ``it 
was, like, a really extraordinary thing, it doesn't happen very 
often''--a U.S. Ambassador picking up his mobile phone at an 
outdoor cafe and dialing the President of the United 
States.\698\
    Mr. Holmes, who was sitting directly opposite from 
Ambassador Sondland, said he ``heard him announce himself 
several times, along the lines of, `Gordon Sondland, holding 
for the President.' It appeared that he was being transferred 
through several layers of switchboards and assistants, and I 
then noticed Ambassador Sondland's demeanor changed and 
understood that he had been connected to President 
Trump.''\699\
    Mr. Holmes stated he was able to hear the first part of 
Ambassador Sondland's conversation with President Trump because 
it was ``quite loud'' and ``quite distinctive'' when the 
President began speaking. When President Trump started 
speaking, Ambassador Sondland ``sort of winced and held the 
phone away from his ear,'' and ``did that for the first couple 
exchanges.''\700\
    Recounting the conversation that followed, Mr. Holmes 
testified:

          I heard Ambassador Sondland greet the President and 
        explain he was calling from Kyiv. I heard President 
        Trump then clarify that Ambassador Sondland was in 
        Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland replied, yes, he was in 
        Ukraine, and went on to state that President Zelensky, 
        quote, ``loves your ass.'' I then heard President Trump 
        ask, ``So he's going to do the investigation?'' 
        Ambassador Sondland replied that he is going to do it, 
        adding that President Zelensky will do ``anything you 
        ask him to do.''\701\

    President Trump has denied that he spoke to Ambassador 
Sondland on July 26 and told reporters, ``I know nothing about 
that.''\702\ But in his public testimony before the Committee, 
Ambassador Sondland noted that White House call records made 
available to his legal counsel confirmed that the July 26 call 
in fact occurred.\703\ Ambassador Sondland further explained 
that Mr. Holmes's testimony--specifically, a ``reference to 
A$AP Rocky''--refreshed his recollection about the July 26 
call, which Ambassador Sondland had not originally disclosed to 
the Committee.\704\
    Although Ambassador Sondland did not believe he mentioned 
the Bidens by name, he testified that with regard to the 
substance of his July 26 conversation with President Trump: ``I 
have no reason to doubt that this conversation included the 
subject of investigations.''\705\ He added that he had ``no 
reason'' to doubt Mr. Holmes' testimony about the contents of 
the call, and that he would ``have been more surprised if 
President Trump had not mentioned investigations, particularly 
given what we were hearing from Mr. Giuliani about the 
President's concerns.''\706\ Asked about his statement to 
President Trump that President Zelensky ``loves your ass,'' 
Ambassador Sondland replied: ``That sounds like something I 
would say. That's how President Trump and I communicate, a lot 
of four-letter words, in this case three letter.''\707\
    After the call between Ambassador Sondland and President 
Trump ended, Ambassador Sondland remarked to Mr. Holmes that 
``the President was in a bad mood,'' as ``was often the case 
early in the morning.''\708\ Mr. Holmes, who had learned about 
the freeze on U.S. security assistance days earlier, was 
attempting to clarify the President's thinking, and said he 
``took the opportunity to ask Ambassador Sondland for his 
candid impression of the President's views on Ukraine'':

          In particular, I asked Ambassador Sondland if it was 
        true that the President did not give a shit about 
        Ukraine. Ambassador Sondland agreed that the President 
        did not give a shit about Ukraine. I asked, why not, 
        and Ambassador Sondland stated, the President only 
        cares about, quote, unquote, ``big stuff.'' I noted 
        there was, quote, unquote, big stuff going on in 
        Ukraine, like a war with Russia. And Ambassador 
        Sondland replied that he meant, quote, unquote, ``big 
        stuff'' that benefits the President, like the, quote, 
        unquote, ``Biden investigation'' that Mr. Giuliani was 
        pushing. The conversation then moved on to other 
        topics.\709\

    Ambassador Sondland did not dispute the substance of Mr. 
Holmes' recollection of this discussion. He stated, ``I don't 
recall my exact words, but clearly the President, beginning on 
May 23, when we met with him in the Oval Office, was not a big 
fan'' of Ukraine. Asked whether President Trump ``was a big fan 
of the investigations,'' Ambassador Sondland replied: 
``Apparently so.''\710\ Asked to clarify if, during his July 26 
conversation with Mr. Holmes, he recalled ``at least referring 
to an investigation that Rudy Giuliani was pushing,'' 
Ambassador Sondland replied, ``I would have, yes.''\711\

  Mr. Holmes Informed U.S. Embassy Leadership about President Trump's 
                     Call with Ambassador Sondland

    After the lunch, Mr. Holmes dropped off Ambassador Sondland 
at his hotel, the Hyatt Regency Kyiv. Mr. Holmes then returned 
to the U.S. Embassy.\712\ Ambassador Taylor, the acting 
Ambassador in Kyiv, was still visiting the front line. So when 
he arrived at the Embassy, Mr. Holmes briefed his immediate 
supervisor, Kristina Kvien, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S. 
Embassy Kyiv, about the President's call with Ambassador 
Sondland and Ambassador Sondland's subsequent description of 
President Trump's priorities for Ukraine.\713\
    After taking a long-planned vacation from July 27 to August 
5, Mr. Holmes told Ambassador Taylor about his lunch with 
Ambassador Sondland on the first day he returned to work, 
August 6.\714\ Mr. Holmes told the Committee that he did not 
brief the call in detail to Ambassador Taylor because ``it was 
obvious what the President was pressing for'':

          Of course that's what's going on. Of course the 
        President is pressing for a Biden investigation before 
        he'll do these things the Ukrainians want. There was 
        nodding agreement. So did I go through every single 
        word in the call? No, because everyone by that point 
        agreed, it was obvious what the President was pressing 
        for.\715\

    In October 2019, following the public release of testimony 
by several witnesses pursuant to the Committee's impeachment 
inquiry, Mr. Holmes reminded Ambassador Taylor about Ambassador 
Sondland's July 26 conversation with President Trump. 
Ambassador Taylor was preparing to return to Washington and 
testify publicly before the Committee. Mr. Holmes had been 
following news coverage of the inquiry and realized he had 
unique, firsthand evidence that ``potentially bore on the 
question of whether the President did, in fact, have 
knowledge'' of efforts to press the Ukrainian President to 
publicly announce investigations:

          I came to realize that I had firsthand knowledge 
        regarding certain events on July 26 that had not 
        otherwise been reported and that those events 
        potentially bore on the question of whether the 
        President did, in fact, have knowledge that those 
        senior officials were using the levers of diplomatic 
        power to influence the new Ukrainian President to 
        announce the opening of a criminal investigation 
        against President Trump's political opponent. It is at 
        that point that I made the observation to Ambassador 
        Taylor that the incident I had witnessed on July 26th 
        had acquired greater significance, which is what he 
        reported in his testimony last week and is what led to 
        the subpoena for me to appear here today.\716\

    Mr. Holmes testified that the July 26 call became ``sort of 
a touchstone piece of information'' for diplomats at the U.S. 
Embassy in Kyiv who ``were trying to understand why we weren't 
able to get the meeting'' between President Trump and President 
Zelensky and ``what was going on with the security hold.''\717\ 
He elaborated:

          I would refer back to it repeatedly in our, you know, 
        morning staff meetings. We'd talk about what we're 
        trying to do. We're trying to achieve this, that. Maybe 
        it will convince the President to have the meeting. And 
        I would say, `Well, as we know, he doesn't really care 
        about Ukraine. He cares about some other things. And 
        we're trying to keep Ukraine out of our politics and 
        so, you know, that's what we're up against.' And I 
        would refer--use that repeatedly as a refrain.\718\

     6. The President Wanted Ukraine to Announce the Investigations 
                                Publicly


In the weeks following the July 25 call, President Trump's hand-picked 
        representatives carried out his wishes to condition a coveted 
        White House meeting for the Ukrainian President on the public 
        announcement of investigations beneficial to President Trump. 
        Top U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State and 
        Secretary of Energy, were ``in the loop.''

                                Overview

    In the weeks following the July 25 call, during which 
President Trump had pressed Ukrainian President Volodymyr 
Zelensky to ``do us a favor though,'' the President's 
representatives worked to secure from the Ukrainian President a 
public announcement about the requested investigations as a 
condition for the White House meeting.
    That meeting would have conferred vital support on a new 
president who relied on the United States to help defend his 
nation militarily, diplomatically, and politically against 
Russian aggression. U.S. Ambassador to the European Union 
Gordon Sondland provided testimony and quoted from documents 
demonstrating that he kept everyone ``in the loop'' about the 
plan, including the Secretaries of State and Energy.
    Ambassadors Sondland and Volker worked closely with Mr. 
Giuliani, the President's personal lawyer, to help draft 
Ukraine's public statement. They sought to ensure that 
President Zelensky explicitly used the words ``Burisma''--a 
reference to allegations about former Vice President Biden and 
his son--and ``2016 elections.''
    Ukrainian officials were ``very uncomfortable'' with the 
provision of this statement, which they understood to be a 
requirement and a ``deliverable'' demanded by President Trump. 
The Ukrainian President was elected on a platform of rooting 
out public corruption, and so he resisted issuing the 
statement. Instead, President Zelensky's aides asked whether an 
official request for legal assistance with investigations had 
been made through appropriate channels at the U.S. Department 
of Justice. No such formal request was ever made. Consequently, 
Ukrainian officials made clear to Ambassador Volker that they 
did not support issuing a public statement because it could 
``play into'' U.S. domestic politics. Nevertheless, U.S. 
efforts to secure a public statement continued.

 Giuliani Met with Ukrainian Presidential Aide Andriy Yermak in Madrid 
                  and Discussed a White House Meeting

    On July 26, the day after the call between President Trump 
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Volker wrote to Mr. Giuliani 
to confirm that he would soon be meeting with Andriy Yermak, a 
Ukrainian presidential aide, to ``help'' efforts.\719\
    Ambassador Volker texted: ``Please send dates when you will 
be in Madrid. I am seeing Yermak tomorrow morning. He will come 
to you in Madrid. Thanks for your help! Kurt.''\720\ Mr. 
Giuliani replied that he would travel to Spain from August 1 to 
5, and Ambassador Volker affirmed that he would tell the 
Ukrainian presidential aide to ``visit with you there.''\721\ 
Ambassador Volker kept himself apprised of plans, texting Mr. 
Yermak on August 1 to ensure that everything was ``on track'' 
for the meeting in Spain's capital. He also asked whether Mr. 
Yermak planned to visit Washington.\722\
    On August 2, Mr. Yermak and Mr. Giuliani met in 
Madrid.\723\ Ambassador Volker received a meeting summary from 
Mr. Yermak the same day: ``My meeting with Mr. Mayor was very 
good.'' Mr. Yermak added: ``We asked for White House meeting 
during week start [sic] 16 Sept. Waiting for confirmation. 
Maybe you know the date?''\724\
    The Madrid meeting set off a ``series of discussions'' 
among Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador Volker, and Ambassador Sondland 
about the need for President Zelensky to issue a public 
statement about the investigations into Burisma and the 2016 
election conspiracy theory in order to secure a White House 
meeting with President Trump.\725\ Ambassador Volker first 
spoke to Mr. Giuliani, who said that he thought Ukraine 
``should issue a statement.''\726\ Ambassador Volker then spoke 
to Mr. Yermak, who affirmed that the Ukrainian leader was 
``prepared to make a statement'' that ``would reference Burisma 
and 2016 in a wider context of bilateral relations and rooting 
out corruption anyway.''\727\
    Mr. Giuliani, acting as President Trump's personal 
attorney, exerted significant influence in the process. On 
August 4, Mr. Yermak inquired again about the presidential 
meeting. Ambassador Volker replied that he would speak with Mr. 
Giuliani later that day and would call the Ukrainian aide 
afterward.\728\ Ambassador Volker texted the former mayor about 
the Madrid meeting and asked for a phone call. Mr. Giuliani 
replied: ``It was excellent I can call a little later.''\729\
    Phone records obtained by the Committees show a 16 minute 
call on August 5 between Ambassador Volker and Mr. 
Giuliani.\730\ Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Yermak: ``Hi 
Andrey--had a good long talk w Rudy--call anytime--Kurt.''\731\ 
During the same period, Ambassador Volker informed Ambassador 
Sondland that ``Giuliani was happy with that meeting,'' and 
``it looks like things are turning around.''\732\

``Potus Really Wants the Deliverable'' Before Scheduling a White House 
                      Visit for President Zelensky

    Things had not turned around by August 7. Ambassador Volker 
texted Mr. Giuliani to recommend that he report to ``the 
boss''--President Trump--about his meeting with Mr. Yermak in 
Madrid. He wrote:

          Hi Rudy--hope you made it back safely. Let's meet if 
        you are coming to DC. And would be good if you could 
        convey results of your meeting in Madrid to the boss so 
        we can get a firm date for a visit.\733\

    The Committees did not find evidence that Mr. Giuliani 
responded to Ambassador Volker's text message.
    However, call records show that the next day, on August 8, 
Mr. Giuliani connected with the White House Situation Room 
switchboard in the early afternoon, Eastern Time, for 42 
seconds, and then again for one minute, 25 seconds.\734\
    The same day, Mr. Giuliani texted several times with a 
number associated with the White House. The Committees were 
unable to identify the official associated with the phone 
number. In the mid-afternoon, someone using a telephone number 
associated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
called Mr. Giuliani, and the call lasted for nearly 13 minutes. 
Mr. Giuliani called the OMB number and the White House 
Situation Room several more times that evening, but each time 
connected for only a few seconds or not at all.

                  RUDY GIULIANI CALL HISTORY, AUGUST 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Connecting   Duration
   Date     Time (EDT)   of Call     Caller            Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/08/19   12:44:56     0:42       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\735\
08/08/19   12:45:38     1:25       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\736\
08/08/19   13:02:37     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\737\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   13:02:37     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\738\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   13:02:57     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\739\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   14:14:53     TEXT       White      Giuliani, Rudy\740\
                                    House
                                    Number
08/08/19   14:15:17     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\741\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   14:21:13     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\742\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   15:13:05     12:56      OMB        Giuliani, Rudy\743\
                                    Number
08/08/19   15:56:44     0:00       Giuliani,  OMB-Associated Number\744\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   15:56:51     0:00       Giuliani,  OMB-Associated Number\745\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   15:57:05     0:00       Giuliani,  OMB-Associated Number\746\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   15:57:21     0:22       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\747\
08/08/19   17:20:33     0:17       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\748\
08/08/19   19:14:48     0:00       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\749\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Approximately 30 minutes after his text to Mr. Giuliani on 
August 7, Ambassador Volker received a text message from Mr. 
Yermak: ``Do you have some news about White House meeting 
date?''\750\ Ambassador Volker responded that he had asked Mr. 
Giuliani to ``weigh in,'' presumably with the President, 
``following your meeting,'' and that Ambassador Sondland would 
be speaking with President Trump on Friday, August 9. 
Ambassador Volker added: ``We are pressing this.''\751\ The 
next day, on August 8, Mr. Yermak texted Ambassador Volker to 
report that he had ``some news.''\752\ Ambassador Volker 
replied that he was available to speak at that time.\753\
    Later on the evening of August 8, Eastern Time, Mr. 
Giuliani sent a text message to a phone number associated with 
the White House. Approximately one hour 15 minutes later, 
someone using an unidentified number (``-1'') dialed Mr. 
Giuliani three times in rapid succession. Less than three 
minutes later, Mr. Giuliani dialed the White House switchboard 
for the White House Situation Room. When the call did not 
connect, Mr. Giuliani immediately dialed another general number 
for the White House switchboard and connected for 47 seconds. 
Approximately 16 minutes later, someone using the ``-1'' number 
called Mr. Giuliani and connected for just over four 
minutes.\754\

            RUDY GIULIANI CALL HISTORY, AUGUST 8 (CONTINUED)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Connecting   Duration
   Date     Time (EDT)   of Call     Caller            Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
08/08/19   20:53:13     TEXT       Giuliani,  White House Number\755\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   22:09:31     0:00       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy\756\
08/08/19   22:09:32     0:05       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy\757\
08/08/19   22:09:46     0:00       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy (Cell
                                               2)\758\
08/08/19   22:09:47     0:02       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy (Cell
                                               2)\759\
08/08/19   22:10:08     0:05       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy\760\
08/08/19   22:11:52     0:00       Giuliani,  OMB-Associated Number\761\
                                    Rudy
08/08/19   22:12:16     0:00       Giuliani,  White House Switchboard
                                    Rudy       (Situation Room)\762\
08/08/19   22:12:25     0:47       Giuliani,  White House
                                    Rudy       Switchboard\763\
08/08/19   22:28:51     4:06       ``-1''     Giuliani, Rudy\764\
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Late the next morning Washington time, on August 9, 
Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador Sondland:

          Hi Mr. Mayor! Had a good chat with Yermak last night. 
        He was pleased with your phone call. Mentioned Z 
        [President Zelensky] making a statement. Can we all get 
        on the phone to make sure I advise Z [President 
        Zelensky] correctly as to what he should be saying? 
        Want to make sure we get this done right. Thanks!\765\

    It is unclear which ``phone call'' Ambassador Volker was 
referencing.
    Text messages and call records obtained by the Committees 
show that Ambassador Volker and Mr. Giuliani connected by phone 
twice around noon Eastern Time on August 9 for several minutes 
each.\766\ Following the calls with Mr. Giuliani, Ambassador 
Volker created a three-way group chat using WhatsApp that 
included Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Mr. 
Yermak.\767\
    At 2:24 p.m. Eastern Time on August 9, Ambassador Volker 
texted the group: ``Hi Andrey--we have all consulted here, 
including with Rudy. Can you do a call later today or tomorrow 
your afternoon time?''\768\ Ambassador Sondland texted that he 
had a call scheduled for 3 p.m. Eastern Time ``for the three of 
us. [State Department] Ops will call.''\769\
    Call records obtained by the Committees show that on August 
9, Ambassador Sondland twice called numbers associated with the 
White House, once in early afternoon for approximately 18 
minutes, and once in late afternoon for two minutes, 25 seconds 
with a number associated with OMB.\770\
    By early evening, minutes after his second call with the 
OMB-associated number, Ambassador Volker and Ambassador 
Sondland discussed a breakthrough they had reached in obtaining 
a date for a White House visit, noting that President Trump 
really wanted ``the deliverable'':

          Sondland: [Tim] Morrison ready to get dates as soon 
        as Yermak confirms.
          Volker: Excellent!! How did you sway him? :)
          Sondland: Not sure i did. I think potus really wants 
        the deliverable
          Volker: But does he know that?
          Sondland: Yep
          Sondland: Clearly lots of convos going on
          Volker: Ok--then that's good it's coming from two 
        separate sources\771\

    Ambassador Sondland told the Committees that the 
``deliverable'' required by President Trump was a press 
statement from President Zelensky committing to ``do the 
investigations'' pushed by President Trump and Mr. 
Giuliani.\772\
    To ensure progress, immediately after their text exchange, 
Ambassador Sondland recommended to Ambassador Volker that Mr. 
Yermak share a draft of the press statement to ``avoid 
misunderstandings'' and so they would know ``exactly what they 
propose to cover.'' Ambassador Sondland explained: ``Even 
though Ze [President Zelensky] does a live presser [press 
event] they can still summarize in a brief statement.'' 
Ambassador Volker agreed.\773\
    As they were negotiating the language that would appear in 
a press statement, ``there was talk about having a live 
interview or a live broadcast'' during which President Zelensky 
would make the agreed-upon statement.\774\ Ambassador Sondland 
suggested reviewing a written summary of the statement because 
he was ``concerned'' that President Zelensky would ``say 
whatever he would say on live television and it still wouldn't 
be good enough for Rudy, slash, the President [Trump].''\775\

  ``Everyone Was in the Loop'' About Plan for Ukrainians to Deliver a 
  Public Statement about Investigations in Exchange for a White House 
                                 Visit

    As negotiations continued, on August 10, Mr. Yermak texted 
Ambassador Volker in an attempt to schedule a White House 
meeting before the Ukrainian president made a public statement 
in support of investigations into Burisma and the 2016 
election. He wrote:

          I think it's possible to make this declaration and 
        mention all these things. Which we discussed yesterday. 
        But it will be logic [sic] to do after we receive a 
        confirmation of date. We inform about date of visit 
        about our expectations and our guarantees for future 
        visit. Let [sic] discuss it\776\

    Ambassador Volker responded that he agreed, but that first 
they would have to ``iron out [a] statement and use that to get 
[a] date,'' after which point President Zelensky would go 
forward with making the statement.\777\ They agreed to have a 
call the next day, and to include Ambassador Sondland. Mr. 
Yermak texted:

          Excellent. Once we have a date, will call for a press 
        briefing, announcing upcoming visit and outlining 
        vision for the reboot of the US-UKRAINE relationship, 
        including, among other things, Burisma and election 
        meddling in investigations.\778\

    Ambassador Volker forwarded the message to Ambassador 
Sondland, and they agreed to speak with Mr. Yermak the next 
day.\779\
    Ambassador Sondland testified that ``everyone was in the 
loop'' regarding this plan.\780\ Also on August 10, Ambassador 
Sondland informed Ambassador Volker that he briefed T. Ulrich 
Brechbuhl, Counselor of the Department of State, noting: ``I 
briefed Ulrich. All good.''\781\ Ambassador Sondland testified 
that he ``may have walked [Mr. Brechbuhl] through where we 
were.''\782\ When asked if Mr. Brechbuhl briefed Secretary 
Pompeo, Ambassador Sondland noted that it was Mr. Brechbuhl's 
``habit'' to ``consult with Secretary Pompeo frequently.''\783\
    Secretary of Energy Rick Perry was also made aware of 
efforts to pressure Ukraine to issue a public statement about 
political investigations in exchange for a White House meeting. 
Ambassador Sondland testified:

          Mr. Giuliani conveyed to Secretary Perry, Ambassador 
        Volker, and others that President Trump wanted a public 
        statement from President Zelensky committing to 
        investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election. Mr. 
        Giuliani expressed those requests directly to the 
        Ukrainians. Mr. Giuliani also expressed those requests 
        directly to us. We all understood that these 
        prerequisites for the White House call and the White 
        House meeting reflected President Trump's desires and 
        requirements.\784\

    On August 11, Ambassador Volker requested a phone call with 
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Giuliani, noting that he had heard 
from Mr. Yermak that the Ukrainians were ``writing the 
statement now and will send to us.''\785\ According to call 
records obtained by the Committees, Ambassador Volker and Mr. 
Giuliani connected for 34 seconds.\786\
    The same day, Ambassador Sondland updated Mr. Brechbuhl and 
Lisa Kenna, Executive Secretary of the State Department, about 
efforts to secure a public statement and a ``big presser'' from 
President Zelensky, which he hoped might ``make the boss happy 
enough to authorize an invitation.'' He addressed the email to 
Secretary Pompeo:

          Mike, Kurt [Volker] and I negotiated a statement from 
        Zelensky to be delivered for our review in a day or 
        two. The contents will hopefully make the boss happy 
        enough to authorize an invitation. Zelensky plans to 
        have a big presser on the openness subject (including 
        specifics) next week.\787\

    Ambassador Sondland made clear in his hearing testimony 
that by ``specifics,'' he meant the ``2016 and the Burisma'' 
investigations; ``the boss'' referred to ``President Trump;'' 
and ``the invitation'' referred to ``the White House 
meeting.''\788\ Ms. Kenna replied to Ambassador Sondland that 
she would ``pass to S [Secretary Pompeo]. Thank you.''\789\ 
Ambassador Sondland cited the email as evidence that ``everyone 
was in the loop'' on plans to condition a White House meeting 
on a public statement about political investigations.\790\

    President Trump's Agents Negotiated a Draft Statement about the 
                             Investigations

    In the evening of the next day, August 12, Mr. Yermak 
texted Ambassador Volker an initial version of the draft 
statement, which read:

          Special attention should be paid to the problem of 
        interference in the political processes of the United 
        States, especially with the alleged involvement of some 
        Ukrainian politicians. I want to declare that this is 
        unacceptable. We intend to initiate and complete a 
        transparent and unbiased investigation of all available 
        facts and episodes, which in turn will prevent the 
        recurrence of this problem in the future.\791\

    The draft statement did not explicitly mention Burisma or 
2016 election interference, as expected.
    On August 13, around 10 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador 
Volker texted Mr. Giuliani: ``Mr mayor--trying to set up call 
in 5 min via state Dept. If now is not convenient, is there a 
time later today?''\792\ Phone records show that, shortly 
thereafter, someone using a State Department number called Mr. 
Giuliani and connected for more than nine minutes.\793\ 
Ambassador Volker told the Committees that, during the call, 
Mr. Giuliani stated: ``If [the statement] doesn't say Burisma 
and 2016, it's not credible, because what are they 
hiding?''\794\ Ambassador Volker asked whether inserting 
references to ``Burisma and 2016'' at the end of the statement 
would make it ``more credible.'' Mr. Giuliani confirmed that it 
would.\795\
    Two minutes after the call ended, Ambassador Volker sent a 
WhatsApp message to Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak: ``Hi 
Andrey--we spoke with Rudy. When is good to call you?''\796\ 
Ambassador Sondland replied that it was, ``Important. Do you 
have 5 mins.''\797\ They agreed to a call approximately 10 
minutes later.\798\ When Ambassador Sondland suggested having 
his ``operator'' in Brussels dial in the group, Ambassador 
Volker asked if they could ``do this one on what's App?''\799\ 
Text messages and calls in the WhatsApp cell phone application 
are encrypted from end-to-end, ensuring that WhatsApp employees 
and third parties cannot listen in or retrieve deleted 
communications.\800\
    Shortly before the call, Ambassador Volker sent a revised 
draft of the proposed statement to Ambassador Sondland. It had 
been edited to include reference to Burisma and the 2016 
elections:

          Special attention should be paid to the problem of 
        interference in the political processes of the United 
        States, especially with the alleged involvement of some 
        Ukrainian politicians. I want to declare that this is 
        unacceptable. We intend to initiate and complete a 
        transparent and unbiased investigation of all available 
        facts and episodes including those involving Burisma 
        and the 2016 US elections, which in turn will prevent 
        the recurrence of this problem in the future.\801\

    Ambassador Sondland replied: ``Perfect. Lets send to Andrey 
after our call.''\802\
    Following the call, Ambassador Volker texted Ambassador 
Sondland and Mr. Yermak: ``Andrey--good talking--following is 
text with insert at the end for the 2 key items.''\803\ 
Ambassador Volker then sent to them the revised statement that 
included the explicit references to ``Burisma and 2016 
elections.''\804\

                     COMPARISON OF DRAFT STATEMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Giuliani-Volker-Sondland Draft
       Yermak Draft August 12                     August 13
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special attention should be paid to  Special attention should be paid to
 the problem of interference in the   the problem of interference in the
 political processes of the United    political processes of the United
 States, especially with the          States, especially with the
 alleged involvement of some          alleged involvement of some
 Ukrainian politicians. I want to     Ukrainian politicians. I want to
 declare that this is unacceptable.   declare that this is unacceptable.
 We intend to initiate and complete   We intend to initiate and complete
 a transparent and unbiased           a transparent and unbiased
 investigation of all available       investigation of all available
 facts and episodes, which in turn    facts and episodes, including
 will prevent the recurrence of       those involving Burisma and the
 this problem in the future.          2016 US elections, which in turn
                                      will prevent the recurrence of
                                      this problem in the future.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A ``Quid Pro Quo'' from ``The President of the United States''

    Ambassador Volker testified that the language reflected 
what Mr. Giuliani deemed necessary for the statement to be 
``credible.''\805\ Ambassador Sondland noted the language was 
``proposed by Giuliani.''\806\ Ambassador Sondland explained 
that the language was a clear quid pro quo that expressed ``the 
desire of the President of the United States'':

          Mr. Giuliani's requests were a quid pro quo for 
        arranging a White House visit for President Zelensky. 
        Mr. Giuliani demanded that Ukraine make a public 
        statement announcing investigations of the 2016 
        election/DNC server and Burisma. Mr. Giuliani was 
        expressing the desires of the President of the United 
        States, and we knew that these investigations were 
        important to the President.\807\

    Shortly after Ambassador Volker sent the revised statement 
to Mr. Yermak on August 13, Ambassador Sondland called Mr. 
Giuliani and connected for nearly four minutes.

  Ukrainian Officials and Career State Department Became Increasingly 
                               Concerned

    On August 13--while Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, 
and Mr. Yermak were negotiating the draft statement about 
investigations--Mr. Yermak asked Ambassador Volker ``whether 
any request had ever been made by the U.S. to investigate 
election interference in 2016.'' He appeared interested in 
knowing whether the U.S. Department of Justice had made an 
official request to Ukraine's law enforcement agency for legal 
assistance in such a matter.\808\ When Ambassador Volker sent 
Mr. Giuliani's approved draft statement to Mr. Yermak, he 
stated that he would ``work on official request.''\809\
    Ambassador Volker testified: ``When I say official request, 
I mean law enforcement channels, Department of Justice to law 
enforcement in Ukraine, please investigate was there any effort 
to interfere in the U.S. elections.''\810\ Ambassador Volker 
explained:

          He [Yermak] said, and I think quite appropriately, 
        that if they [Ukraine] are responding to an official 
        request, that's one thing. If there's no official 
        request, that's different. And I agree with that.\811\

    According to Ambassador Volker, he was merely trying to 
``find out'' if there was ever an official request made by the 
Department of Justice: ``As I found out the answer that we had 
not, I said, well, let's just not go there.''\812\
    On September 25, within hours of the White House's public 
release of the record of the July 25 call between President 
Trump and President Zelensky, a Justice Department spokesperson 
issued a statement, apparently confirming that no such formal 
request had been made:

          The President has not spoken with the Attorney 
        General about having Ukraine investigate anything 
        relating to former Vice President Biden or his son. The 
        President has not asked the Attorney General to contact 
        Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The Attorney 
        General has not communicated with Ukraine--on this or 
        any other subject.\813\

    Ukraine's current Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka, 
who assumed his new position in late August 2019, confirmed the 
Justice Department's account. He told the Financial Times in 
late November 2019 that Attorney General Barr had made no 
formal request regarding a potential investigation into 
allegations of wrongdoing by former Vice President Biden.\814\ 
In an apparent reference to President Trump's demand that 
Ukraine interfere in U.S. elections, Mr. Ryaboshapka added: 
``It's critically important for the west not to pull us into 
some conflicts between their ruling elites, but to continue to 
support so that we can cross the point of no return.''\815\
    Neither Ambassador Taylor in Ukraine nor Deputy Assistant 
Secretary George Kent in Washington were aware of the efforts 
by Ambassadors Sondland and Volker, in coordination with Mr. 
Giuliani, to convince Ukrainian officials to issue a statement 
in real time. Ambassador Taylor told the Committees that, on 
August 16, in a text message exchange with Ambassador Volker, 
he ``learned that Mr. Yermak had asked that the United States 
submit an official request for an investigation into Burisma's 
alleged violations of Ukrainian law, if that is what the United 
States desired.''\816\ Ambassador Taylor noted that ``a formal 
U.S. request to the Ukrainians to conduct an investigation 
based on violations of their own law'' was ``improper'' and 
advised Ambassador Volker to ``stay clear.''\817\
    Nevertheless, Ambassador Volker requested Ambassador 
Taylor's help with the matter.\818\ ``To find out the legal 
aspects of the question,'' Ambassador Taylor gave Ambassador 
Volker the name of an official at the Department of Justice 
``whom I thought would be the proper point of contact for 
seeking a U.S. referral for a foreign investigation.''\819\
    On August 15, Ambassador Volker texted Ambassador Sondland 
that Mr. Yermak wanted to ``know our status on asking them to 
investigate.''\820\ Two days later, Ambassador Volker wrote: 
``Bill [Taylor] had no info on requesting an investigation--
calling a friend at DOJ.'' Ambassador Volker testified that he 
was not able to connect with his contact at the Department of 
Justice.\821\
    Mr. Kent testified that on August 15, Catherine Croft, 
Ambassador Volker's special assistant, approached him to ask 
whether there was any precedent for the United States asking 
Ukraine to conduct investigations on its behalf. Mr. Kent 
advised Ms. Croft:

          [I]f you're asking me have we ever gone to the 
        Ukrainians and asked them to investigate or prosecute 
        individuals for political reasons, the answer is, I 
        hope we haven't, and we shouldn't because that goes 
        against everything that we are trying to promote in 
        post-Soviet states for the last 28 years, which is the 
        promotion of the rule of law.\822\

    Mr. Kent testified that the day after his conversation with 
Ms. Croft, he spoke with Ambassador Taylor, who ``amplified the 
same theme'' and told Mr. Kent that ``Yermak was very 
uncomfortable'' with the idea of investigations and suggested 
that ``it should be done officially and put in writing.'' As a 
result, it became clear to Mr. Kent in mid-August that Ukraine 
was being pressured to conduct politically-motivated 
investigations. Mr. Kent told Ambassador Taylor ``that's wrong, 
and we shouldn't be doing that as a matter of U.S. 
policy.''\823\
    After speaking to Ms. Croft and Ambassador Taylor, Mr. Kent 
wrote a memo to file on August 16 documenting his ``concerns 
that there was an effort to initiate politically motivated 
prosecutions that were injurious to the rule of law, both in 
Ukraine and U.S.''\824\ Mr. Kent testified:

          At the time, I had no knowledge of the specifics of 
        the [July 25] call record, but based on Bill Taylor's 
        account of the engagements with Andriy Yermak that were 
        engagements of Yermak with Kurt Volker, at that point 
        it was clear that the investigations that were being 
        suggested were the ones that Rudy Giuliani had been 
        tweeting about, meaning Biden, Burisma, and 2016.\825\

    On August 17, Mr. Yermak reached out to both Ambassador 
Sondland and Ambassador Volker.\826\ Ambassador Sondland texted 
Ambassador Volker that ``Yermak just tapped on me about dates. 
Havent responded. Any updates?''\827\ Ambassador Volker 
responded that ``I've got nothing'' and stated that he was 
contacting the Department of Justice to find out about 
requesting an investigation.\828\
    Ambassador Sondland then asked: ``Do we still want Ze 
[Zelensky] to give us an unequivocal draft with 2016 and 
Boresma [sic]?'' Ambassador Volker replied: ``That's the clear 
message so far. . . .'' Ambassador Sondland said that he would 
ask that Mr. Yermak ``send us a clean draft,'' to which 
Ambassador Volker replied that he had spoken to Mr. Yermak and 
suggested that he and Ambassador Sondland speak the following 
day, August 18, to discuss ``all the latest.''\829\
    Ambassador Volker claimed that he ``stopped pursuing'' the 
statement from the Ukrainians around this time because of 
concerns raised by Mr. Yermak that Yuriy Lutsenko was still the 
Prosecutor General. Mr. Lutsenko was likely to be replaced by 
President Zelensky, and because Mr. Lutsenko was alleging the 
same false claims that President Trump and Mr. Giuliani were 
demanding of President Zelensky, Ukrainian officials ``did not 
want to mention Burisma or 2016.''\830\ Ambassador Volker 
testified that he ``agreed'' and advised Mr. Yermak that 
``making those specific refences was not a good idea'' because 
making those statements might ``look like it would play into 
our domestic politics.''\831\
    Mr. Yermak agreed and, according to Ambassador Volker, 
plans to put out a statement were ``shelved.''\832\ Ambassador 
Volker reasoned that the plan for a public statement did not 
materialize partly because of ``the sense that Rudy was not 
going to be convinced that it meant anything, and, therefore, 
convey a positive message to the President if it didn't say 
Burisma and 2016.''\833\ He added:

          I agreed with the Ukrainians they shouldn't do it, 
        and in fact told them just drop it, wait till you have 
        your own prosecutor general in place. Let's work on 
        substantive issues like this, security assistance and 
        all. Let's just do that. So we dropped it.\834\

    Ambassador Volker testified that, ``From that point on, I 
didn't have any further conversations about this 
statement.''\835\ Nevertheless, efforts to secure a 
presidential statement announcing the two investigations into 
the Bidens and the 2016 U.S. election interference continued 
well into September.
    On August 19, Ambassador Sondland told Ambassador Volker 
that he ``drove the `larger issue' home'' with Mr. Yermak: that 
this was bigger than just a White House meeting and was about 
``the relationship per se.''\836\ Ambassador Volker told the 
Committees that he understood this referred to ``the level of 
trust that the President has with President Zelensky. He has 
this general negative assumption about everything Ukraine, and 
that's the larger issue.''\837\ That negative assumption would 
prove difficult to overcome as Ukrainian and U.S. officials 
sought to finally obtain a White House meeting and shake free 
from the White House hundreds of millions of dollars in 
Congressionally-approved security assistance for Ukraine.

  7. The President's Conditioning of Military Assistance and a White 
      House Meeting on Announcement of Investigations Raised Alarm


Following the public disclosure in late August 2019 of a hold on U.S. 
        security assistance to Ukraine, President Trump made clear that 
        ``everything''--an Oval Office meeting and the release of 
        taxpayer-funded U.S. security assistance--was contingent on the 
        Ukrainian president announcing investigations into former Vice 
        President Joe Biden and a debunked conspiracy theory about 
        Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election. President 
        Trump wanted the Ukrainian leader ``in a public box,'' even as 
        Ambassador Bill Taylor warned that it was ``crazy to withhold 
        security assistance for help with a political campaign.''

                                Overview

    On August 28, 2019, Politico first reported that President 
Trump was withholding hundreds of millions of dollars of 
Congressionally-appropriated U.S. security assistance from 
Ukraine, a fact that had been previously suspected by Ukrainian 
officials in July. Public revelations about the freeze raised 
questions--about the U.S. commitment to Ukraine and harming 
efforts to deter Russian influence and aggression in Europe.
    Around this time, American officials made clear to 
Ukrainians that a public announcement about investigations into 
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election and former Vice 
President Joe Biden was a pre-condition--not only to obtain a 
White House meeting for President Zelensky, but also to end the 
freeze on military and other security assistance for Ukraine.
    In early September, Ambassador Gordon Sondland conveyed 
President Trump's demands to both U.S. and Ukrainian officials. 
On September 1, he informed a senior Ukrainian official that 
the military aid would be released if the ``prosecutor general 
would to go the mike [sic]'' and announce the investigations. 
Later, on September 7, President Trump informed Ambassador 
Sondland that he wanted President Zelensky--not the Prosecutor 
General--in a ``public box'' and demanded that the Ukrainian 
president personally announce the investigations to ``clear 
things up.'' Only then would Ukraine end the ``stalemate'' with 
the White House related to security assistance. President 
Zelensky proceeded to schedule an interview on CNN in order to 
announce the investigations and satisfy President Trump.
    The President's efforts to withhold vital military and 
security assistance in exchange for political investigations 
troubled U.S. officials. NSC Senior Director for Europe and 
Russia Timothy Morrison twice reported what he understood to be 
the President's requirement of a quid pro quo to National 
Security Advisor John Bolton, who advised him to ``make sure 
the lawyers are tracking.'' Ambassador Bill Taylor expressed 
his concerns to Ambassador Sondland, stating plainly that it 
was ``crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a 
political campaign.''

Secretary Pompeo and Ambassador Sondland Worked to ``Break the Logjam''

    President Trump's hold on security assistance persisted 
throughout August, without explanation to U.S. officials and 
contrary to the consensus recommendation of the President's 
national security team. At the same time, President Trump 
refused to schedule a coveted White House visit for President 
Zelensky until he announced two investigations that could 
benefit President Trump's reelection prospects. The confluence 
of those two circumstances led some American officials, 
including Ambassador Sondland and David Holmes, Counselor for 
Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, to conclude that 
the military assistance was conditioned on Ukraine's public 
announcement of the investigations.\838\
    On August 20, Ambassador Kurt Volker met with Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper. Ms. Cooper and 
Ambassador Volker agreed that if the hold on security 
assistance was not lifted, ``it would be very damaging to the 
relationship'' between the U.S. and Ukraine.\839\ During this 
meeting, Ambassador Volker mentioned that he was talking to an 
advisor to President Zelensky about making a statement ``that 
would somehow disavow any interference in U.S. elections and 
would commit to the prosecution of any individuals involved in 
election interference.''\840\ Ambassador Volker indicated that 
if his efforts to get a statement were successful, the hold on 
security assistance might be lifted.\841\
    Although he did not mention that conversation during his 
deposition, Ambassador Volker had a similar recollection, 
during his public testimony, of the meeting with Ms. Cooper. 
Ambassador Volker recalled discussing with Ms. Cooper the draft 
statement that had been coordinated with Ukrainian presidential 
aide Andriy Yermak--which included reference to the two 
investigations that President Trump demanded in the July 25 
call--and that such a statement ``could be helpful in getting a 
reset of the thinking of the President, the negative view of 
Ukraine that he had'' which might, in turn, ``unblock[] 
whatever hold there was on security assistance.''\842\
    Around this time, Ambassador Sondland sought to ``break the 
logjam'' on the security assistance and the White House meeting 
by coordinating a meeting between the two Presidents through 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. On August 22, Ambassador 
Sondland emailed Secretary Pompeo, copying the State 
Department's Executive Secretary, Lisa Kenna:

          Should we block time in Warsaw for a short pull-aside 
        for POTUS to meet Zelensky? I would ask Zelensky to 
        look him in the eye and tell him that once Ukraine's 
        new justice folks are in place (mid-Sept) Ze should be 
        able to move forward publicly and with confidence on 
        those issues of importance to Potus and to the US. 
        Hopefully, that will break the logjam.\843\
          Secretary Pompeo replied, ``Yes.''\844\

    Ambassador Sondland testified that when he referenced 
``issues of importance to Potus,'' he meant the investigation 
into the false allegations about Ukrainian interference in the 
2016 election and the investigation into the Bidens.\845\ He 
told the Committee that his goal was to ``do what was necessary 
to get the aid released, to break the logjam.''\846\ Ambassador 
Sondland believed that President Trump would not release the 
aid until Ukraine announced the two investigations the 
President wanted.\847\
    Ambassador Sondland testified: ``Secretary Pompeo 
essentially gave me the green light to brief President Zelensky 
about making those announcements.''\848\ He explained:

          This was a proposed briefing that I was going to give 
        President Zelensky, and I was going to call President 
        Zelensky and ask him to say what is in this email. And 
        I was asking essentially . . . [Secretary] Pompeo's 
        permission to do that, which he said yes.\849\

    He then forwarded the email to Ms. Kenna, seeking 
confirmation of ``10-15 min on the Warsaw sched[ule]'' for the 
pull-aside meeting. The Ambassador stated that he was seeking 
confirmation in order to brief President Zelensky. Ms. Kenna 
replied, ``I will try for sure.''\850\
    On August 24, Ukraine celebrated its Independence Day. 
According to Mr. Holmes, Ukrainian Independence Day presented 
``another good opportunity to show support for Ukraine.''\851\ 
However, nobody senior to Ambassador Volker attended the 
festivities, even though Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
attended in 2017 and Ambassador Bolton attended in 2018.\852\
    Two days later, on August 26, Ambassador Bolton's office 
requested Mr. Giuliani's contact information from Ambassador 
Sondland. Ambassador Sondland sent Ambassador Bolton the 
information directly.\853\ Ambassador Sondland testified that 
he had ``no idea'' why Ambassador Bolton requested the contact 
information.\854\

                     Ambassador Bolton Visited Kyiv

    On August 27, Ambassador Bolton arrived in Kyiv for an 
official visit. Ambassador Bolton emphasized to Andriy Bohdan, 
President Zelensky's chief of staff, that an upcoming meeting 
between Presidents Trump and Zelensky, scheduled for September 
1 in Warsaw, Poland, would be ``crucial to cementing their 
relationship.''\855\ Mr. Holmes, who accompanied Ambassador 
Bolton in Kyiv, testified that he also heard ``Ambassador 
Bolton express to Ambassador Taylor and Mr. Morrison his 
frustration about Mr. Giuliani's influence with the President, 
making clear there was nothing he could do about it.''\856\
    Prior to Ambassador Bolton's departure from Kyiv, 
Ambassador Taylor asked to meet with him privately. Ambassador 
Taylor expressed his ``serious concern about the withholding of 
military assistance to Ukraine while the Ukrainians were 
defending their country from Russian aggression.''\857\ During 
the conversation, Ambassador Bolton ``indicated that he was 
very sympathetic'' to Ambassador's Taylor's concerns.\858\ He 
advised that Ambassador Taylor ``send a first-person cable to 
Secretary Pompeo directly relaying my concerns'' about the 
withholding of military assistance.\859\
    Mr. Holmes testified that Ambassador Bolton advised during 
his trip that ``the hold on security assistance would not be 
lifted prior to the upcoming meeting between President Trump 
and President Zelensky in Warsaw, where it would hang on 
whether Zelensky was able to favorably impress President 
Trump.''\860\

  Ukrainian Concern Over Military Aid Intensified After First Public 
                             Report of Hold

    On August 28, 2019, Politico first reported that President 
Trump had implemented a hold on nearly $400 million of U.S. 
military assistance to Ukraine that had been appropriated by 
Congress.
    Almost immediately after the news became public, Ukrainian 
officials expressed alarm to their American counterparts. Mr. 
Yermak sent Ambassador Volker a link to the Politico story and 
then texted: ``Need to talk with you.''\861\ Other Ukrainian 
officials also expressed concerns to Ambassador Volker that the 
Ukrainian government was being ``singled out and penalized for 
some reason.''\862\
    On August 29, Mr. Yermak also contacted Ambassador Taylor 
to express that he was ``very concerned'' about the hold on 
military assistance.\863\ Mr. Yermak and other Ukrainian 
officials told Ambassador Taylor that they were ``just 
desperate'' and would be willing to travel to Washington to 
raise with U.S. officials the importance of the assistance. 
Ambassador Taylor described confusion among Ukrainian officials 
over the hold on military aid:

          I mean, the obvious question was, ``Why?'' So Mr. 
        Yermak and others were trying to figure out why this 
        was . . . They thought that there must be some rational 
        reason for this being held up, and they just didn't--
        and maybe in Washington they didn't understand how 
        important this assistance was to their fight and to 
        their armed forces. And so maybe they could figure--so 
        they were just desperate.\864\

    Without any official explanation for the hold, American 
officials could provide little reassurance to their Ukrainian 
counterparts. Ambassador Taylor continued, ``And I couldn't 
tell them. I didn't know and I didn't tell them, because we 
hadn't--we hadn't--there'd been no guidance that I could give 
them.''\865\

   Ambassador Taylor's First-Person Cable Described the ``Folly'' in 
                        Withholding Military Aid

    The same day that Ambassador Taylor heard from Mr. Yermak 
about his concerns about the hold on military aid, Ambassador 
Taylor transmitted his classified, first-person cable to 
Washington. It was the first and only time in Ambassador 
Taylor's career that he sent such a cable to the Secretary of 
State.\866\ The cable described ``the folly I saw in 
withholding military aid to Ukraine at a time when hostilities 
were still active in the east and when Russia was watching 
closely to gauge the level of American support for the 
Ukrainian Government.''\867\
    Ambassador Taylor worried about the public message that 
such a hold on vital military assistance would send in the 
midst of Ukraine's hot war with Russia: ``The Russians, as I 
said at my deposition, would love to see the humiliation of 
President Zelensky at the hands of the Americans. I told the 
Secretary that I could not and would not defend such a 
policy.''\868\
    The cable also sought to explain clearly ``the importance 
of Ukraine and the security assistance to U.S. national 
security,'' according to Mr. Holmes.\869\ However, Mr. Holmes 
worried that the national security argument might not achieve 
its purpose given the reasons he suspected for the hold on 
military aid. His ``clear impression'' at the time was that 
``the security assistance hold was likely intended by the 
President either as an expression of dissatisfaction with the 
Ukrainians, who had not yet agreed to the Burisma/Biden 
investigation, or as an effort to increase the pressure on them 
to do so.''\870\ Mr. Holmes viewed this as ``the only logical 
conclusion.''\871\ He had ``no other explanation for why there 
was disinterest in this [White House] meeting that the 
President had already offered'' and there was a ``hold of the 
security assistance with no explanation whatsoever.''\872\
    Ambassador Taylor never received a response to his cable, 
but was told that Secretary Pompeo carried it with him to a 
White House meeting about security assistance to Ukraine.\873\

     Ambassador Sondland Told Senator Johnson That Ukraine Aid Was 
                     Conditioned on Investigations

    The next day, on August 30, Republican Senator Ron Johnson 
spoke with Ambassador Sondland to express his concern about 
President Trump's decision to withhold military assistance to 
Ukraine. According to Senator Johnson, Ambassador Sondland told 
him that if Ukraine would commit to ``get to the bottom of what 
happened in 2016--if President Trump has that confidence, then 
he'll release the military spending.''\874\
    On August 31, Senator Johnson spoke by phone with President 
Trump regarding the decision to withhold aid to Ukraine.\875\ 
President Trump denied the quid pro quo that Senator Johnson 
had learned of from Ambassador Sondland.\876\ At the same time, 
however, President Trump refused to authorize Senator Johnson 
to tell Ukrainian officials that the aid would be 
forthcoming.\877\
    The message that Ambassador Sondland communicated to 
Senator Johnson mirrored that used by President Trump during 
his July 25 call with President Zelensky, in which President 
Trump twice asked that the Ukrainian leader ``get to the bottom 
of it,'' including in connection to an investigation into the 
debunked conspiracy theory that Ukraine interfered in the 2016 
election to help Hillary Clinton.\878\ To the contrary, the 
U.S. Intelligence Community unanimously assessed that Russia 
interfered in the 2016 election to help Donald Trump, as did 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller.\879\
    In a November 18 letter to House Republicans, Senator 
Johnson confirmed the accuracy of the Wall Street Journal's 
account of his August 30 call with Ambassador Sondland.\880\
    Ambassador Sondland testified that he had ``no reason to 
dispute'' Senator Johnson's recollection of the August 30 call 
and testified that by late August 2019, he had concluded that 
``if Ukraine did something to demonstrate a serious intention 
to fight corruption, and specifically addressing Burisma and 
the 2016, then the hold on military aid would be lifted.''\881\

Ambassador Sondland Raised the Link Between Investigations and Security 
   Assistance to Vice President Pence Before Meeting with President 
                                Zelensky

    On September 1, President Trump was scheduled to meet 
President Zelensky in Warsaw, Poland during an event 
commemorating World War II. Citing the approach of Hurricane 
Dorian towards American soil, the President canceled his trip 
just days beforehand. Vice President Mike Pence traveled to 
Warsaw instead.\882\
    Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President 
for Europe and Russia, learned of the change in the President's 
travel plans on August 29 and ``relied heavily on the NSC 
briefing papers'' originally prepared for President Trump. Ms. 
Williams recalled that ``prior to leaving, [National Security 
Advisor to the Vice President] General Kellogg had asked, at 
the request of the Vice President, for an update on the status 
of the security assistance that was at that time still on 
hold.'' Given the public reporting about the hold on August 29, 
White House officials expected that President Zelensky would 
seek further information on the status of the funds.\883\
    The delegation arrived in Warsaw and gathered in a hotel 
room to brief the Vice President shortly before his engagement 
with President Zelensky. Ambassador Bolton, who had just 
arrived from Kyiv, led the Ukraine briefing. He updated Vice 
President Pence on President Zelensky's efforts to combat 
corruption and explained ``what the security assistance was 
for.'' Advisors in the room ``agreed on the need to get a final 
decision on that security assistance as soon as possible so 
that it could be implemented before the end of the fiscal 
year.''\884\
    Before the bilateral meeting between Vice President Pence 
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland attended a 
``general briefing'' for the Vice President.\885\ Ambassador 
Sondland testified that he raised concerns that the delay in 
security assistance had ``become tied to the issue of 
investigations.''\886\ The Vice President ``nodded like, you 
know, he heard what I said.''\887\
    During Ambassador Sondland's public testimony, Vice 
President Pence's office issued a carefully worded statement 
claiming that the Vice President ``never had a conversation 
with Gordon Sondland about investigating the Bidens, Burisma, 
or the conditional release of financial aid to Ukraine based 
upon potential investigations,'' and that ``Ambassador Gordon 
Sondland was never alone with the Vice President on the 
September 1 trip to Poland.''\888\ Ambassador Sondland did not 
testify that he specifically mentioned the Bidens, Burisma, or 
the conditional release of financial aid to Ukraine during his 
discussion with Vice President Pence, nor did he testify that 
he was alone with the Vice President.
    Before Vice President Pence's meeting with President 
Zelensky, Ukrainian National Security Advisor Oleksandr 
``Sasha'' Danyliuk wrote Ambassador Taylor, incorrectly 
describing the failure to provide security assistance as a 
``gradually increasing problem.''\889\ In the hours before Vice 
President Pence's meeting with President Zelensky, Ambassador 
Taylor replied, clarifying that ``the delay of U.S. security 
assistance was an all-or-nothing proposition, in the sense that 
if the White House did not lift the hold prior to the end of 
the fiscal year, September 30th, the funds would expire and 
Ukraine would receive nothing.''\890\ Ambassador Taylor wanted 
to make sure Mr. Danyliuk understood that if the assistance was 
not provided ``by the end of the fiscal year, then it goes 
away.''\891\

    President Zelensky Immediately Asked Vice President Pence About 
                          Security Assistance

    As expected, at the outset of the bilateral meeting, 
President Zelensky immediately asked Vice President Pence about 
the status of U.S. security assistance. It was ``the very first 
question'' that he raised.\892\ President Zelensky emphasized 
the multifold importance of American assistance, stating that 
``the symbolic value of U.S. support in terms of security 
assistance . . . was just as valuable to the Ukrainians as the 
actual dollars.''\893\ President Zelensky also expressed 
concern that ``any hold or appearance of reconsideration of 
such assistance might embolden Russia to think that the United 
States was no longer committed to Ukraine.''\894\
    According to Ms. Williams, the Vice President ``assured 
President Zelensky that there was no change in U.S. policy in 
terms of our . . . full-throated support for Ukraine and its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.''\895\ Vice President 
Pence also assured the Ukrainian delegation that he would 
convey to President Trump the details of President Zelensky's 
``good progress on reforms, so that hopefully we could get a 
decision on the security assistance as soon as possible.''\896\
    The reassurance proved to be ineffective. The Washington 
Post later reported that one of President Zelensky's aides told 
Vice President Pence: ``You're the only country providing us 
military assistance. You're punishing us.''\897\
    Mr. Holmes testified that President Trump's decision to 
cancel his Warsaw trip effectively meant that ``the hold [on 
security assistance] remained in place, with no clear means to 
get it lifted.''\898\

Ambassador Sondland Informed President Zelensky's Advisor that Military 
  Aid Was Contingent on Ukraine Publicly Announcing the Investigations

    After the bilateral meeting between Vice President Pence 
and President Zelensky, Ambassador Sondland briefly spoke to 
President Zelensky's aide, Mr. Yermak. Ambassador Sondland 
conveyed his belief that ``the resumption of U.S. aid would 
likely not occur until Ukraine took some kind of action on the 
public statement that we had been discussing for many weeks'' 
regarding the investigations that President Trump discussed 
during the July 25 call.\899\
    Immediately following the conversation, Ambassador Sondland 
told Mr. Morrison what had transpired during his aside with Mr. 
Yermak. Mr. Morrison recounted to the Committees that 
Ambassador Sondland told Mr. Yermak ``what could help them move 
the aid was if the prosecutor general would go to the mike 
[sic] and announce that he was opening the Burisma 
investigation.''\900\

Mr. Morrison Reported Ambassador Sondland's Proposal to Get Ukrainians 
 ``Pulled Into Our Politics'' to White House Officials and Ambassador 
                                 Taylor

    Mr. Morrison felt uncomfortable with ``any idea that 
President Zelensky should allow himself to be involved in our 
politics.''\901\ He promptly reported the conversation between 
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak to Ambassador Bolton. Mr. 
Morrison had concerns with ``what Gordon was proposing about 
getting the Ukrainians pulled into our politics.''\902\ 
Ambassador Bolton told Mr. Morrison--consistent with his own 
``instinct''--to ``make sure the lawyers are tracking.''\903\ 
Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Morrison reported his 
concerns to NSC lawyers John Eisenberg and Michael Ellis.\904\
    Mr. Morrison testified that, in speaking to the NSC legal 
advisors, he wanted to ensure ``that there was a record of what 
Ambassador Sondland was doing, to protect the President.''\905\ 
At this point, Mr. Morrison was not certain that the President 
had authorized Ambassador Sondland's activities, but Mr. 
Morrison agreed that if the President had been aware of 
Ambassador Sondland's activities, the effect could be to create 
a paper trail that incriminated President Trump.\906\
    Mr. Morrison also reported the conversation to Ambassador 
Taylor ``because I wanted him to be in a position to advise the 
Ukrainians not to do it.''\907\ Ambassador Taylor said that he 
was ``alarmed'' to hear about the remarks to Mr. Yermak.\908\ 
He explained that ``this was the first time that I had heard 
that the security assistance, not just the White House meeting, 
was conditioned on the investigations.''\909\ To Ambassador 
Taylor, ``It's one thing to try to leverage a meeting in the 
White House. It's another thing, I thought, to leverage 
security assistance . . . to a country at war, dependent on 
both the security assistance and the demonstration of 
support.''\910\

President Trump Wanted President Zelensky in a ``Public Box,'' and Said 
        ``Everything'' Depended on Announcing the Investigations

    Upon hearing from Mr. Morrison about the conditionality of 
the military aid on Ukraine publicly announcing the two 
investigations, Ambassador Taylor sent a text message to 
Ambassador Sondland: ``Are we now saying that security 
assistance and WH meeting are conditioned on investigations?'' 
Ambassador Sondland responded, ``Call me.''\911\
    Ambassador Sondland confirmed over the phone to Ambassador 
Taylor that ``everything''--the Oval Office meeting and the 
security assistance--was dependent on the Ukrainian government 
publicly announcing the political investigations President 
Trump requested on July 25. Informed by a review of 
contemporaneous notes that he took during his phone call, 
Ambassador Taylor testified:

          During that phone call, Ambassador Sondland told me 
        that President Trump had told him that he wants 
        President Zelensky to state publicly that Ukraine will 
        investigate Burisma and alleged Ukrainian interference 
        in the 2016 election. Ambassador Sondland also told me 
        that he now recognized that he had made a mistake by 
        earlier telling Ukrainian officials that only a White 
        House meeting with President Zelensky was dependent on 
        a public announcement of the investigations. In fact, 
        Ambassador Sondland said, everything was dependent on 
        such an announcement, including security assistance. He 
        said that President Trump wanted President Zelensky in 
        a public box, by making a public statement about 
        ordering such investigations.\912\

    By this point, Ambassador Taylor's ``clear understanding'' 
was that President Trump would withhold security assistance 
until President Zelensky ``committed to pursue the 
investigation.''\913\ He agreed that the U.S. position was ``if 
they don't do this,'' referring to the investigations, ``they 
are not going to get that,'' referring to the security 
assistance.\914\ Ambassador Taylor also concurred with the 
statement that ``if they don't do this, they are not going to 
get that'' was the literal definition of a quid pro quo.\915\
    Ambassador Taylor testified that his contemporaneous notes 
of the phone call with Ambassador Sondland reflect that 
Ambassador Sondland used the phrase ``public box'' to describe 
President Trump's desire to ensure that the initiation of his 
desired investigations was announced publicly.\916\ Ambassador 
Sondland, who did not take contemporaneous notes of any of his 
conversations, did not dispute that he used those words.\917\ 
He also testified that, when he spoke to Mr. Yermak, he 
believed that it would be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of President Trump and Mr. Giuliani if the new 
Ukrainian prosecutor general issued a statement about 
investigations, but his understanding soon changed.\918\

 President Trump Informed Ambassador Sondland that President Zelensky 
     Personally ``Must Announce the Opening of the Investigations''

    On September 7, Ambassador Sondland called Mr. Morrison to 
report that he had just concluded a call with President Trump. 
Mr. Morrison testified that Ambassador Sondland told him ``that 
there was no quid pro quo, but President Zelensky must announce 
the opening of the investigations and he should want to do 
it.''\919\ This led Mr. Morrison to believe that a public 
announcement of investigations by the Ukrainian president--and 
not the prosecutor general--was a prerequisite for the release 
of the security assistance.\920\ He reported the conversation 
to Ambassador Bolton, who once again instructed him to ``tell 
the lawyers,'' which Mr. Morrison did.\921\
    Later on September 7, Mr. Morrison relayed the substance of 
Ambassador Sondland's conversation with President Trump to 
Ambassador Taylor. Ambassador Taylor explained:

          I had a conversation with Mr. Morrison in which he 
        described a phone conversation earlier that day between 
        Ambassador Sondland and President Trump. Mr. Morrison 
        said that he had a sinking feeling after learning about 
        this conversation from Ambassador Sondland. According 
        to Mr. Morrison, President Trump told Ambassador 
        Sondland he was not asking for a quid pro quo, but 
        President Trump did insist that President Zelensky go 
        to a microphone and say he is opening investigations of 
        Biden and 2016 election interference and that President 
        Zelensky should want to do this himself. Mr. Morrison 
        said that he told Ambassador Bolton and the NSC lawyers 
        of this phone call between President Trump and 
        Ambassador Sondland.\922\

    The following day, on September 8, Ambassador Sondland 
texted Ambassadors Volker and Taylor: ``Guys multiple convos 
with Ze, Potus. Lets talk.'' Ambassador Taylor responded one 
minute later, ``Now is fine with me.''\923\ On the phone, 
Ambassador Sondland ``confirmed that he had talked to President 
Trump'' and that ``President Trump was adamant that President 
Zelensky himself had to clear things up and do it in public. 
President Trump said it was not a quid pro quo.''\924\ 
Ambassador Sondland also shared that he told President Zelensky 
and Mr. Yermak that, ``although this was not a quid pro quo, if 
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would 
be at a stalemate.''\925\
    Ambassador Taylor testified that he understood 
``stalemate'' to mean that ``Ukraine would not receive the 
much-needed military assistance.''\926\ During his public 
testimony, Ambassador Sondland did not dispute Ambassador 
Taylor's recollection of events and agreed that the term 
``stalemate'' referred to the hold on U.S. security assistance 
to Ukraine.\927\
    Although Ambassador Sondland otherwise could not 
independently recall any details about his September 7 
conversation with President Trump, he testified that he had no 
reason to dispute the testimony from Ambassador Taylor or Mr. 
Morrison--which was based on their contemporaneous notes--
regarding this conversation.\928\ Ambassador Sondland, however, 
did recall that President Zelensky agreed to make a public 
announcement about the investigations into Burisma and the 
Bidens and the 2016 election in an interview on CNN.''\929\
    According to Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Sondland 
explained that President Trump was a ``businessman,'' and that 
when ``a businessman is about to sign a check to someone who 
owes him something, the businessman asks that person to pay up 
before signing the check.''\930\ Ambassador Taylor was 
concerned that President Trump believed Ukraine ``owed him 
something'' in exchange for the hundreds of millions of dollars 
in taxpayer-funded U.S. security assistance.\931\ He argued to 
Ambassador Sondland that ``the explanation made no sense. The 
Ukrainians did not owe President Trump anything. And holding up 
security assistance for domestic political gain was 
crazy.''\932\ Ambassador Sondland did not recall this exchange 
specifically, but did not dispute Ambassador Taylor's 
testimony.\933\

   Ambassador Taylor Texted Ambassador Sondland that ``It's Crazy to 
   Withhold Security Assistance for Help with a Political Campaign''

    Ambassador Taylor remained concerned by the President's 
directive that ``everything'' was conditioned on President 
Zelensky publicly announcing the investigations. He also 
worried that, even if the Ukrainian leader did as President 
Trump required, the President might continue to withhold the 
vital U.S. security assistance in any event. Ambassador Taylor 
texted his concerns to Ambassadors Volker and Sondland stating: 
``The nightmare is they give the interview and don't get the 
security assistance. The Russians love it. (And I quit.)''\934\
    Ambassador Taylor testified:

          ``The nightmare'' is the scenario where President 
        Zelensky goes out in public, makes an announcement that 
        he's going to investigate the Burisma and the . . . 
        interference in 2016 election, maybe among other 
        things. He might put that in some series of 
        investigations. But . . . the nightmare was he would 
        mention those two, take all the heat from that, get 
        himself in big trouble in this country and probably in 
        his country as well, and the security assistance would 
        not be released. That was the nightmare.\935\

    Early in the morning in Europe on September 9, Ambassador 
Taylor reiterated his concerns about the President's ``quid pro 
quo'' in another series of text messages with Ambassadors 
Volker and Sondland:

          Taylor: The message to the Ukrainians (and Russians) 
        we send with the decision on security assistance is 
        key. With the hold, we have already shaken their faith 
        in us. Thus my nightmare scenario.
          Taylor: Counting on you to be right about this 
        interview, Gordon.
          Sondland: Bill, I never said I was ``right''. I said 
        we are where we are and believe we have identified the 
        best pathway forward. Lets hope it works.
          Taylor: As I said on the phone, I think it's crazy to 
        withhold security assistance for help with a political 
        campaign.\936\

    By ``help with a political campaign,'' Ambassador Taylor 
was referring to President Trump's 2020 reelection effort.\937\ 
Ambassador Taylor testified: ``The investigation of Burisma and 
the Bidens was clearly identified by Mr. Giuliani in public for 
months as a way to get information on the two Bidens.''\938\
    Ambassador Taylor framed the broader national security 
implications of President Trump's decision to withhold vital 
security assistance from Ukraine. He said:

          [T]he United States was trying to support Ukraine as 
        a frontline state against Russian attack. And, again, 
        the whole notion of a rules-based order was being 
        threatened by the Russians in Ukraine. So our security 
        assistance was designed to support Ukraine. And it was 
        not just the United States; it was all of our 
        allies.\939\

    Ambassador Taylor explained:

          [S]ecurity assistance was so important for Ukraine as 
        well as our own national interests, to withhold that 
        assistance for no good reason other than help with a 
        political campaign made no sense. It was 
        counterproductive to all of what we had been trying to 
        do. It was illogical. It could not be explained. It was 
        crazy.\940\

  Ambassador Sondland Repeated the President's Denial of a ``Quid Pro 
 Quo'' to Ambassador Taylor, While He and President Trump Continued to 
                      Demand Public Investigations

    In response to Ambassador Taylor's text message that it was 
``crazy to withhold security assistance for help with a 
political campaign,'' Ambassador Sondland denied that the 
President had demanded a ``quid pro quo.''
    At approximately 5:17 a.m. Eastern Time, Ambassador 
Sondland responded to Ambassador Taylor:

          Bill, I believe you are incorrect about President 
        Trump's intentions. The President has been crystal 
        clear: no quid pro quo's of any kind. The President is 
        trying to evaluate whether Ukraine is truly going to 
        adopt the transparency and reforms that President 
        Zelensky promised during his campaign. I suggest we 
        stop the back and forth by text. If you still have 
        concerns, I recommend you give Lisa Kenna or S 
        [Secretary Pompeo] a call to discuss them directly. 
        Thanks.\941\

    Notably, Ambassador Sondland recalled that President Trump 
raised the possible existence of a quid pro quo entirely on his 
own, without any prompting. Ambassador Sondland asked President 
Trump what he affirmatively wanted from Ukraine, yet President 
Trump reportedly responded by asserting what was not the case:

          Q: Okay. During that telephone conversation with 
        President Trump, you didn't ask the President directly 
        if there was a quid pro quo, correct?
          A: No. As I testified, I asked the question open 
        ended, what do you want from Ukraine?
          Q: President Trump was the first person to use the 
        word ``quid pro quo,'' correct?
          A: That is correct.\942\

    In contrast, Ambassador Sondland testified unequivocally 
there was a quid pro quo in connection to a telephone call 
between President Trump and President Zelensky, as well as a 
White House meeting for President Zelensky.\943\ He 
acknowledged that the reference to ``transparency and reforms'' 
in his text message to Ambassador Taylor ``was my clumsy way of 
saying he wanted these announcement to be made.''\944\
    Ambassador Sondland also testified that President Trump 
immediately followed his stated denial of a quid pro quo by 
demanding that President Zelensky still make a public 
announcement, while the military assistance remained on an 
unexplained hold. Ambassador Sondland agreed that President 
Trump said that he wanted President Zelensky to ``clear things 
up and do it in public,'' as Ambassador Taylor had 
testified.\945\ Ambassador Sondland testified that nothing on 
his call with President Trump changed his understanding of a 
quid pro quo and, at least as of September 8, he was 
``absolutely convinced'' the White House meeting and President 
Trump's release of the military assistance were conditioned on 
the public announcement of the investigations President Trump 
sought.\946\
    After hearing from President Trump, Ambassador Sondland 
promptly told the Ukrainian leader and Mr. Yermak that ``if 
President Zelensky did not clear things up in public, we would 
be at a stalemate.''\947\ President Zelensky responded to the 
demand relayed by Ambassador Sondland, by agreeing to make an 
announcement of investigations on CNN.\948\
    Regardless of when the call between President Trump and 
Ambassador Sondland occurred, both that phone call and 
Ambassador's Sondland text message denying any quid pro quo 
occurred after the White House had been informed of the 
whistleblower complaint discussing the hold on security 
assistance. The White House first received notice of the 
whistleblower complaint alleging wrongdoing concerning the 
President's July 25 call with President Zelensky on August 26--
over a week before the ``no quid pro quo'' denial.\949\ In 
addition, Ambassador Sondland wrote his text message on 
September 9, the same day that the ICIG informed the Committee 
of the existence of a ``credible'' and ``urgent'' whistleblower 
complaint that was later revealed to be related to 
Ukraine.\950\ The Administration received prior notice of the 
ICIG's intent to inform the Committee.\951\

  Ambassador Sondland's Testimony is the Only Evidence the Committees 
Received Indicating That President Trump Denied Any ``Quid Pro Quo'' on 
                        the Phone on September 9

    Ambassador Sondland testified in his deposition that he 
sent a text message to Ambassador Taylor after speaking 
directly with President Trump on September 9. However, 
testimony from other witnesses and documents available to the 
Committees do not confirm that Ambassador Sondland and 
President Trump spoke on that day.
    Ambassador Sondland's own testimony indicated some 
ambiguity in his recollection of the timing of the call. At a 
public hearing on November 20, Ambassador Sondland testified 
that he ``still cannot find a record of that call [on September 
9] because the State Department and the White House cannot 
locate it.''\952\ While Ambassador Sondland testified that 
``I'm pretty sure I had the call on that day,''\953\ he 
acknowledged that he might have misremembered the date of the 
September 9 call--``I may have even spoken to him on September 
6th''--and that without his call records, he could not be 
certain about when he spoke to President Trump.\954\
    After the deposition transcripts of Ambassador Taylor and 
Mr. Morrison were made public, including their detailed 
accounts of the September 7 conversation that Ambassador 
Sondland had with President Trump, Ambassador Sondland 
submitted a written addendum to his deposition based on his 
``refreshed'' recollection.\955\ In that addendum, Ambassador 
Sondland amended his testimony and stated, ``I cannot 
specifically recall if I had one or two phone calls with 
President Trump in the September 6-9 time frame.''\956\
    Furthermore, the conversation recalled by Ambassador 
Sondland as having taken place on September 9 is consistent 
with a conversation that Ambassador Sondland relayed to Mr. 
Morrison and Ambassador Taylor during the previous two days. 
Both Mr. Morrison and Ambassador Taylor, after reviewing their 
contemporaneous written notes, provided detailed testimony 
about Ambassador Sondland's description of his call with 
President Trump. For example, Ambassador Sondland shared with 
Ambassador Taylor that even though President Trump asserted 
that ``there is no quid pro quo,'' President Trump ``did insist 
that President Zelensky go to a microphone and say he is 
opening investigations of Biden and 2016 election 
interference.''\957\ Mr. Morrison and Ambassador Taylor both 
testified that this conversation occurred on September 7.\958\ 
Ambassador Sondland acknowledged that he had no basis to 
dispute the recollections of Mr. Morrison and Ambassador 
Taylor.\959\ Ambassador Sondland, who testified that he does 
not take notes, stated: ``If they have notes and they recall 
that, I don't have any reason to dispute it.''\960\
    Text messages produced to the Committees also indicate that 
Ambassador Sondland spoke to President Trump prior to September 
8. On September 4, Ambassador Volker texted Mr. Yermak that 
Ambassador Sondland planned to speak to President Trump on 
September 6 or 7. Ambassador Volker wrote: ``Hi Andrey. Reports 
are that pence liked meeting and will press trump on scheduling 
Ze visit. Gordon will follow up with pence and, if nothing 
moving, will have a chance to talk with President on Saturday 
[September 7].''\961\ Ambassador Volker then corrected himself: 
``Sorry--on Friday [September 6].''\962\
    On Sunday, September 8, at 11:20 a.m. Eastern Time, 
Ambassador Sondland texted Ambassadors Taylor and Volker: 
``Guys multiple convos with Ze, Potus. Lets talk.''\963\ 
Shortly after this text, Ambassador Taylor testified that he 
spoke to Ambassador Sondland, who recounted his conversation 
with President Trump on September 7, as well as a separate 
conversation that Ambassador Sondland had with President 
Zelensky.
    The timing of the text messages also raises questions about 
Ambassador Sondland's recollection. If Ambassador Sondland 
spoke to President Trump after receiving Ambassador Taylor's 
text message on September 9, and before he responded, then the 
timing of the text messages would mean that President Trump 
took Ambassador Sondland's call in the middle of the night in 
Washington, D.C. Ambassador Taylor sent his message on 
September 9 at 12:47 a.m. Eastern Time, and Ambassador Sondland 
responded less than five hours later at 5:19 a.m. Eastern 
Time.\964\
    In any event, President Trump's purported denial of the 
``quid pro quo'' was also contradicted when Acting Chief of 
Staff Mick Mulvaney publicly admitted that security assistance 
was withheld in order to pressure Ukraine to conduct an 
investigation into the 2016 election.
    On October 17, at a press briefing in the White House, Mr. 
Mulvaney confirmed that President Trump withheld the essential 
military aid for Ukraine as leverage to pressure Ukraine to 
investigate the conspiracy theory that Ukraine had interfered 
in the 2016 U.S. election, which was also promoted by Vladimir 
Putin.\965\ Mr. Mulvaney confirmed that President Trump 
``absolutely'' mentioned ``corruption related to the DNC 
server. . . . No question about that.''\966\ When the White 
House press corps attempted to clarify this acknowledgement of 
a quid pro quo related to security assistance, Mr. Mulvaney 
replied: ``We do that all the time with foreign policy.'' He 
continued. ``I have news for everybody: get over it.''\967\

                 8. The President's Scheme Was Exposed


President Trump lifted the hold on U.S. military assistance to Ukraine 
        on September 11 after it became clear to the White House and 
        President Trump that his scheme was exposed.

                                Overview

    As news of the President's hold on military assistance to 
Ukraine became public on August 28, Congress, the press, and 
the public increased their scrutiny of President Trump's 
actions regarding Ukraine, which risked exposing President 
Trump's scheme. By this date, the White House had learned that 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (ICIG), 
Michael Atkinson, had determined that a whistleblower complaint 
related to the same Ukraine matters was ``credible'' and an 
``urgent concern,'' and, pursuant to the applicable statute, 
recommended to the Acting Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), Joseph Maguire, that the complaint should be transmitted 
to Congress.
    In early September, bipartisan Members of both houses of 
Congress--publicly, and privately--expressed concerns to the 
White House about the hold on military assistance. On September 
9, after months of internal discussion due to growing concern 
about the activity of President Trump's personal attorney, Rudy 
Giuliani, regarding Ukraine, the Chairs of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and the Committee on Oversight and Reform announced a joint 
investigation into efforts by President Trump and Mr. Giuliani, 
``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to assist the 
President's bid for reelection,'' including by withholding 
Congressionally-appropriated military assistance.
    Later that same day, the ICIG notified Chairman Schiff and 
Ranking Member Nunes that, despite uniform past practice and a 
statutory requirement that credible, ``urgent concern'' 
complaints be provided to the intelligence committees, the 
Acting DNI was nevertheless withholding the whistleblower 
complaint from Congress. The Acting DNI later testified that 
his office initially withheld the complaint on the advice of 
the White House, with guidance from the Department of Justice.
    Two days later, on September 11, the President lifted the 
hold on the military assistance to Ukraine. Numerous witnesses 
testified that they were never aware of any official reason for 
why the hold was either implemented or lifted.
    Notwithstanding this ongoing inquiry, President Trump has 
continued to urge Ukraine to investigate his political rival, 
former Vice President Biden. For example, when asked by a 
journalist on October 3 what he hoped Ukraine's President would 
do about the Bidens in response to the July 25 call, President 
Trump responded: ``Well, I would think that, if they were 
honest about it, they'd start a major investigation into the 
Bidens. It's a very simple answer.'' President Trump reiterated 
his affinity for the former Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 
Yuriy Lutsenko, whom numerous witnesses described as inept and 
corrupt: ``And they got rid of a prosecutor who was a very 
tough prosecutor. They got rid of him. Now they're trying to 
make it the opposite way.''

 Public Scrutiny of President Trump's Hold on Military Assistance for 
                                Ukraine

    After news of the President's freeze on U.S. military 
assistance to Ukraine became public on August 28, both houses 
of Congress increased their ongoing scrutiny of President 
Trump's decision.\968\ On September 3, a bipartisan group of 
Senators, including Senator Rob Portman and Senator Ron 
Johnson, sent a letter to Acting White House Chief of Staff 
Mick Mulvaney expressing ``deep concerns'' that the 
``Administration is considering not obligating the Ukraine 
Security Initiative funds for 2019.''\969\ The Senators' letter 
urged that the ``vital'' funds be obligated 
``immediately.''\970\ On September 5, the Chairman and Ranking 
Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee sent a letter to 
Mr. Mulvaney and Acting Director of the OMB Russell Vought 
expressing ``deep concern'' about the continuing hold on 
security assistance funding for Ukraine.\971\
    On September 5, the Washington Post editorial board 
reported concerns that President Trump was withholding military 
assistance for Ukraine and a White House meeting in order to 
force President Zelensky to announce investigations of Mr. 
Biden and purported Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
election. The Post editorial board wrote:

          [W]e're reliably told that the president has a second 
        and more venal agenda: He is attempting to force Mr. 
        Zelensky to intervene in the 2020 U.S. presidential 
        election by launching an investigation of the leading 
        Democratic candidate, Joe Biden. Mr. Trump is not just 
        soliciting Ukraine's help with his presidential 
        campaign; he is using U.S. military aid the country 
        desperately needs in an attempt to extort it.

    It added:

        4  The White House claims Mr. Trump suspended Ukraine's 
        military aid in order for it [sic] be reviewed. But, as 
        CNN reported, the Pentagon has already completed the 
        study and recommended that the hold be lifted. Yet Mr. 
        Trump has not yet acted. If his recalcitrance has a 
        rationale, other than seeking to compel a foreign 
        government to aid his reelection, the president has yet 
        to reveal it.\972\

    On the same day that the Washington Post published its 
editorial, Senators Christopher Murphy and Ron Johnson visited 
Kyiv, and met with President Zelensky. They were accompanied by 
Ambassador Bill Taylor and Counselor for Political Affairs 
David Holmes of U.S. Embassy Kyiv. President Zelensky's ``first 
question to the Senators was about the withheld security 
assistance.''\973\ Ambassador Taylor testified that both 
Senators ``stressed that bipartisan support for Ukraine in 
Washington was Ukraine's most important strategic asset and 
that President Zelensky should not jeopardize that bipartisan 
support by getting drawn into U.S. domestic politics.''\974\
    As Senator Johnson and Senator Murphy later recounted, the 
Senators sought to reassure President Zelensky that there was 
bipartisan support in Congress for providing Ukraine with 
military assistance for Ukraine and that they would continue to 
urge President Trump to lift the hold--as Senator Johnson had 
already tried, unsuccessfully, before traveling to 
Ukraine.\975\

  Three Committees Announced Joint Investigation of President's Scheme

    On September 9, the Chairs of the House Intelligence 
Committee, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee 
on Oversight and Reform publicly announced a joint 
investigation of the scheme by President Trump and Mr. Giuliani 
``to improperly pressure the Ukrainian government to assist the 
President's bid for reelection.''\976\ The Committees had been 
planning and coordinating this investigation since early 
summer, after growing public scrutiny of Mr. Giuliani's 
activities in Ukraine and questions about Ambassador 
Yovanovitch's abrupt removal following a public smear campaign 
targeting her.
    In a letter sent to White House Counsel Pat Cipollone the 
same day, the three Chairs stated that President Trump and Mr. 
Giuliani ``appear to have acted outside legitimate law 
enforcement and diplomatic channels to coerce the Ukrainian 
government into pursuing two politically-motivated 
investigations under the guise of anti-corruption activity''--
investigations into purported Ukrainian interference in the 
2016 election and Vice President Biden and his son.\977\
    With respect to the hold on Ukraine military assistance, 
the Chairs observed that ``[i]f the President is trying to 
pressure Ukraine into choosing between defending itself from 
Russian aggression without U.S. assistance or leveraging its 
judicial system to serve the ends of the Trump campaign, this 
would represent a staggering abuse of power, a boon to Moscow, 
and a betrayal of the public trust.''\978\ The Chairs requested 
that the White House preserve all relevant records and produce 
them by September 16, including the transcript of the July 25 
call between President Trump and President Zelensky.\979\
    On the same day, the Chairs of the three Committees sent a 
similar letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo seeking the 
preservation and production of all relevant records at the 
Department of State by September 16.\980\ To date, and as 
explained more fully in Section II, Secretary Pompeo has not 
produced a single document sought by the Committees pursuant to 
a lawful subpoena.
    NSC Senior Director for Russia and Europe Timothy Morrison 
recalled seeing a copy of the letter that was sent by the three 
Chairs to the White House.\981\ He also recalled that the three 
Committees' Ukraine investigation was discussed at meeting of 
senior-level NSC staff soon after it was publicly 
announced.\982\ The NSC's legislative affairs staff issued a 
notice of the investigation to NSC staff members, although it 
is unclear exactly when.\983\ NSC Director for Ukraine 
Alexander Vindman recalled discussions among NSC staff members, 
including Mr. Morrison's deputy, John Erath, that the 
investigation ``might have the effect of releasing the hold'' 
on Ukraine military assistance because it would be 
``potentially politically challenging'' for the Administration 
to ``justify that hold'' to the Congress.\984\

      Inspector General Notified Intelligence Committee that the 
         Administration Was Withholding Whistleblower Complaint

    Later that same day, September 9, Inspector General 
Atkinson sent a letter to Chairman Schiff and Ranking Member 
Nunes notifying them that an Intelligence Community 
whistleblower had filed a complaint with the ICIG on August 
12.\985\ Pursuant to a statute governing whistleblower 
disclosures, the Inspector General--after a condensed, 
preliminary review--had determined that the complaint 
constituted an ``urgent concern'' and that its allegations 
appeared to be ``credible.''\986\ The Inspector General's 
September 9 letter did not disclose the substance or topic of 
the whistleblower complaint.
    Contrary to uniform past practice and the clear 
requirements of the whistleblower statute, Acting DNI Maguire 
withheld the whistleblower complaint based on advice from the 
White House.\987\ Acting DNI Maguire also relied upon an 
unprecedented intervention by the Department of Justice into 
Intelligence Community whistleblower matters to overturn the 
ICIG's determination based on a preliminary investigation.\988\
    The White House had been aware of the whistleblower 
complaint weeks prior to the ICIG's letter of September 9.\989\ 
Acting DNI Maguire testified that, after receiving the 
whistleblower complaint from the Inspector General on August 
26, his office contacted the White House Counsel's Office for 
guidance.\990\
    Consistent with Acting DNI Maguire's testimony, the New 
York Times reported that in late August, Mr. Cipollone and 
National Security Council Legal Advisor John Eisenberg 
personally briefed President Trump about the complaint's 
existence--and explained to the President that they believed 
the complaint could be withheld on executive privilege 
grounds.\991\ The report alleged that Mr. Cipollone and Mr. 
Eisenberg ``told Mr. Trump they planned to ask the Justice 
Department's Office of Legal Counsel to determine whether they 
had to disclose the complaint to lawmakers.''\992\
    On September 10, Chairman Schiff wrote to Acting DNI 
Maguire to express his concern about the Acting DNI's 
``unprecedented departure from past practice'' in withholding 
the whistleblower complaint from the Congressional intelligence 
committees notwithstanding his ``express obligations under the 
law'' and the Inspector General's determination.\993\ Chairman 
Schiff observed that the ``failure to transmit to the Committee 
an urgent and credible whistleblower complaint, as required by 
law, raises the prospect that an urgent matter of a serious 
nature is being purposefully concealed from the 
Committee.''\994\
    Also on September 10, Ambassador John Bolton resigned from 
his position as National Security Advisor. Ambassador Bolton's 
deputy, Dr. Charles Kupperman, became the Acting National 
Security Advisor. The Committee was unable to determine if 
Ambassador Bolton's departure related to the matters under 
investigation because neither he nor Dr. Kupperman agreed to 
appear for testimony as part of this inquiry.
    On September 13, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) General Counsel informed the Committee that 
DOJ had overruled the ICIG's determination, and that the ODNI 
could not transmit the complaint to the Committee at its 
discretion because it involved ``potentially privileged 
communications by persons outside the Intelligence 
Community''--presumably presidential communications.\995\ In 
response, Chairman Schiff issued a subpoena to the Acting DNI 
on September 13 and announced to the public that ODNI was 
withholding a ``credible'' whistleblower complaint of ``urgent 
concern.''\996\ Following intense pressure from the public and 
Congress, on September 25, the White House released the 
complaint to the intelligence committees and the July 25 call 
record to the public.\997\

   President Trump Lifted the Hold on Military Assistance for Ukraine

    On September 11--two days after the three Committees 
launched their investigation into President Trump's scheme, and 
one day after Chairman Schiff requested that Acting DNI Maguire 
produce a copy of the whistleblower complaint--President Trump 
lifted the hold on military assistance for Ukraine.
    On the evening of September 11, prior to lifting the hold, 
President Trump met with Vice President Mike Pence, Mr. 
Mulvaney, and Senator Portman to discuss the hold.\998\ Around 
8:00 p.m. on September 11, the Chief of Staff's office informed 
Dr. Kupperman that the hold had been lifted.\999\
    Just like there was no official explanation for why the 
hold on Ukraine security assistance was implemented, numerous 
witnesses testified that they were not provided with a reason 
for why the hold was lifted on September 11.\1000\ For example, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper testified 
that President Trump's lifting of the hold ``really came quite 
out of the blue . . . It was quite abrupt.''\1001\ Jennifer 
Williams, Special Advisor to the Vice President for Europe and 
Russia, testified that from the time when she first learned 
about the hold on July 3 until it was lifted on September 11, 
she never came to understand why President Trump ordered the 
hold.\1002\
    OMB Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs 
Mark Sandy, who was the senior career official overseeing the 
administration of some of the Ukraine military assistance, only 
learned of a possible rationale for the hold in early 
September--after the Acting DNI had informed the White House 
about the whistleblower complaint.\1003\ Mr. Sandy testified 
that he could not recall another instance ``where a significant 
amount of assistance was being held up'' and he ``didn't have a 
rationale for as long as I didn't have a rationale in this 
case.''\1004\ However, in ``early September,'' approximately 
two months after President Trump had implemented the hold, and 
several weeks after the White House learned of the 
whistleblower complaint, Mr. Sandy received an email from OMB 
Associate Director of National Security Programs Michael 
Duffey. For the first time, it ``attributed the hold to the 
President's concern about other countries not contributing more 
to Ukraine'' and requested ``information on what additional 
countries were contributing to Ukraine.''\1005\
    Mr. Sandy testified that he was not aware of any other 
countries committing to provide more financial assistance to 
Ukraine prior to the lifting of the hold on September 11.\1006\ 
According to Lt. Col. Vindman, none of the ``facts on the 
ground'' changed before the President lifted the hold.\1007\

After the Hold was Lifted, Congress was Forced to Pass a Law to Ensure 
        All of the Military Aid Could Be Distributed to Ukraine

    The lengthy delay created by the hold on Ukraine military 
assistance prevented the Department of Defense from spending 
all of the Congressionally-appropriated funds by the end of the 
fiscal year, which meant that the funds would expire on 
September 30 because unused funds do not roll over to the next 
fiscal year.\1008\ This confirmed the fears expressed by Ms. 
Cooper, Mr. Sandy, and others related to the illegal 
impoundment of Congressionally-mandated funding--concerns that 
were discussed in some depth within the relevant agencies in 
late July and throughout August.\1009\
    Prior to the release of the funds, DOD's internal analysis 
raised concerns that up to $100 million of military assistance 
could go unspent as a result of the hold imposed by the 
President.\1010\ Ultimately, approximately $35 million of 
Ukraine military assistance--14% of the total funds--remained 
unspent by the end of fiscal year 2019.\1011\ Typically, DOD 
averages between 2 and 5 percent unspent funds for similar 
programs, substantially less than the 14 percent left unspent 
in this case.\1012\
    In order to ensure that Ukraine did not permanently lose 
$35 million of the critical military assistance frozen by the 
White House,\1013\ Congress passed a provision on September 
27--three days before funds were set to expire--to ensure that 
the remaining $35 million in 2019 military assistance to 
Ukraine could be spent.\1014\ Ms. Cooper testified that such an 
act of Congress was unusual--indeed, she had never heard of 
funding being extended in this manner.\1015\
    As of November 2019, Pentagon officials confirmed that the 
$35 million in security assistance originally held by the 
President and extended by Congress had still yet to be 
disbursed. When asked for an explanation, the Pentagon only 
confirmed that the funds had not yet been spent but declined to 
say why.\1016\

Pressure to Announce Investigations Continued After the Hold was Lifted

    Before President Trump lifted the hold on security 
assistance, Ukrainian officials had relented to the American 
pressure campaign to announce the investigations and had 
scheduled President Zelensky to appear on CNN.\1017\ Even after 
President Trump lifted the hold on September 11, President 
Zelensky did not immediately cancel his planned CNN 
interview.\1018\
    On September 12, Ambassador Taylor personally informed 
President Zelensky and the Ukrainian foreign minister that 
President Trump's hold on military assistance had been 
lifted.\1019\ Ambassador Taylor remained concerned, however, 
that ``there was some indication that there might still be a 
plan for the CNN interview in New York'' during which President 
Zelensky would announce the investigations that President Trump 
wanted Ukraine to pursue.\1020\ Ambassador Taylor testified 
that he ``wanted to be sure that that didn't happen, so I 
addressed it with Zelensky's staff.''\1021\
    On September 13, a staff member at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv 
texted Mr. Holmes to relay a message that ``Sondland said the 
Zelensky interview is supposed to be today or Monday, and they 
plan to announce that a certain investigation that was `on 
hold' will progress.''\1022\ The Embassy Kyiv staffer stated 
that he ``did not know if this was decided or if Sondland was 
advocating for it. Apparently he's been discussing this with 
Yermak.''\1023\
    On September 13, during a meeting in President Zelensky's 
office, Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy Yermak ``looked 
uncomfortable'' when Ambassador Taylor sought to confirm that 
there were no plans for President Zelensky to announce the 
investigations during a CNN interview.\1024\ Although President 
Zelensky's National Security Advisor Oleksandr Danyliuk 
indicated that there were no plans for President Zelensky to do 
the CNN interview, Ambassador Taylor was still concerned after 
he and Mr. Holmes saw Mr. Yermak following the meeting.\1025\ 
According to Ambassador Taylor, Mr. Yermak's ``body language 
was such that it looked to me like he was still thinking they 
were going to make that statement.''\1026\ Mr. Holmes also 
recalled that when he and Ambassador Taylor ran into Mr. Yermak 
following the meeting, Ambassador Taylor ``stressed the 
importance of staying out of U.S. politics and said he hoped no 
interview was planned,'' but ``Mr. Yermak shrugged in 
resignation and did not answer, as if to indicate he had no 
choice.''\1027\
    That same day, September 13, President Zelensky reportedly 
met with CNN's Fareed Zakaria, who was in Kyiv to moderate the 
Yalta European Strategy Conference.\1028\ During the meeting 
with Mr. Zakaria, President Zelensky did not cancel his planned 
CNN interview.\1029\
    Conflicting advice prompted the Ukrainian foreign minister 
to observe in a meeting with Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
Taylor, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent, 
``You guys are sending us different messages in different 
channels.''\1030\
    For example, at a September 14 meeting in Kyiv attended by 
Ambassador Volker, Mr. Yermak, and the Ukrainian foreign 
minister, Ambassador Volker stated that when the two Presidents 
finally meet, ``it's important that President Zelensky give the 
messages that we discussed before,'' apparently referring to 
President Zelensky's ``willingness to open investigations in 
the two areas of interest to the President and that had been 
pushed previously by Rudy Giuliani.''\1031\ Ambassador Taylor, 
however, replied: ``Don't do that.''\1032\
    On September 18 or 19, President Zelensky cancelled his 
scheduled interview with CNN.\1033\ Although President Zelensky 
did not publicly announce the investigations that President 
Trump wanted, he remains under pressure from President Trump, 
particularly because he requires diplomatic, financial, and 
military backing from the United States, the most powerful 
supporter of Ukraine. That pressure continues to this day. As 
Mr. Holmes testified:

          [A]lthough the hold on the security assistance may 
        have been lifted, there were still things they wanted 
        that [the Ukrainians] weren't getting, including a 
        meeting with the President in the Oval Office. Whether 
        the hold--the security assistance hold continued or 
        not, Ukrainians understood that that's something the 
        President wanted, and they still wanted important 
        things from the President.
          And I think that continues to this day. I think 
        they're being very careful. They still need us now 
        going forward. In fact, right now, President Zelensky 
        is trying to arrange a summit meeting with President 
        Putin in the coming weeks, his first face to face 
        meeting with him to try to advance the peace process. 
        He needs our support. He needs President Putin to 
        understand that America supports Zelensky at the 
        highest levels. So this doesn't end with the lifting of 
        the security assistance hold. Ukraine still needs us, 
        and as I said, still fighting this war this very 
        day.\1034\

            Vice President Pence Spoke to President Zelensky

    On September 18, approximately one week before President 
Trump was scheduled to meet with President Zelensky at the 
United Nations General Assembly in New York, Vice President 
Pence spoke with President Zelensky by telephone.\1035\ 
According to Ms. Williams, during the call, Vice President 
Pence ``reiterat[ed] the release of the funds'' and ``ask[ed] a 
bit more about . . . how Zelensky's efforts were going.''\1036\
    On November 26, Ms. Williams submitted a classified 
addendum to her hearing testimony on November 19 related to 
this telephone call. According to Ms. Williams' counsel, the 
Office of the Vice President informed Ms. Williams' counsel 
that certain portions of the September 18 call, including the 
additional information in Ms. Williams' addendum, are 
classified. The Committee has requested that the Office of the 
Vice President conduct a declassification review so that the 
Committee may share this additional information regarding the 
substance of the September 18 call publicly. On October 9, Vice 
President Pence told reporters, ``I'd have no objection'' to 
the White House releasing the transcript of his calls with 
President Zelensky and said that ``we're discussing that with 
White House counsel as we speak.''\1037\ In a November 7 
interview with Fox Business, Vice President Pence reiterated, 
``I have no objection at all'' to releasing records of his 
calls.\1038\

  President Trump and Rudy Giuliani, Undeterred, Continued to Solicit 
                 Foreign Interference in Our Elections

    On September 19, Rudy Giuliani was interviewed by Chris 
Cuomo on CNN. During the interview, Mr. Giuliani confirmed that 
he had urged Ukraine to investigate ``the allegations that 
there was interference in the election of 2016, by the 
Ukrainians, for the benefit of Hillary Clinton[.]'' When asked 
specifically if he had asked Ukraine to look into Vice 
President Biden, Mr. Giuliani replied immediately, ``of course 
I did.''
    Seconds later, Mr. Giuliani attempted to clarify his 
admission, insisting that he had not asked Ukraine to 
investigate Vice President Biden but instead ``to look into the 
allegations that related to my client [President Trump], which 
tangentially involved Joe Biden in a massive bribery scheme.'' 
Mr. Giuliani insisted that his conduct was appropriate, telling 
Mr. Cuomo later in the interview that ``it is perfectly 
appropriate for a President to say to a leader of a foreign 
country, investigate this massive bribe . . . that was paid by 
a former Vice President.''\1039\
    President Trump also has continued to publicly urge 
President Zelensky to launch an investigation of Vice President 
Biden and alleged 2016 election interference by Ukraine. On 
September 23, in a public press availability, President Trump 
stated:

          I put no pressure on them whatsoever. I could have. I 
        think it would probably, possibly, have been okay if I 
        did. But I didn't. I didn't put any pressure on them 
        whatsoever. You know why? Because they want to do the 
        right thing.\1040\

    On September 24, in public remarks upon arriving at the 
opening session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Trump 
stated: ``What Joe Biden did for his son, that's something they 
should be looking at.''\1041\
    On September 25--in a joint public press availability with 
President Zelensky--President Trump stated that ``I want him to 
do whatever he can'' in reference to the investigation of the 
Biden family. He added, ``Now, when Biden's son walks away with 
millions of dollars from Ukraine, and he knows nothing, and 
they're paying him millions of dollars, that's corruption.'' 
President Trump added, ``He [President Zelensky] was elected--I 
think, number one--on the basis of stopping corruption, which 
unfortunately has plagued Ukraine. And if he could do that, 
he's doing, really, the whole world a big favor. I know--and I 
think he's going to be successful.''\1042\
    On September 30, during his remarks at the swearing-in 
ceremony of Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia, President Trump 
stated:

          Now, the new President of Ukraine ran on the basis of 
        no corruption. That's how he got elected. And I believe 
        that he really means it. But there was a lot of 
        corruption having to do with the 2016 election against 
        us. And we want to get to the bottom of it, and it's 
        very important that we do.\1043\

    On October 2, in a public press availability, President 
Trump discussed the July 25 call with President Zelensky and 
stated that ``the conversation was perfect; it couldn't have 
been nicer.'' He added:

          The only thing that matters is the transcript of the 
        actual conversation that I had with the President of 
        Ukraine. It was perfect. We're looking at 
        congratulations. We're looking at doing things 
        together. And what are we looking at? We're looking at 
        corruption. And, in, I believe, 1999, there was a 
        corruption act or a corruption bill passed between 
        both--and signed--between both countries, where I have 
        a duty to report corruption. And let me tell you 
        something: Biden's son is corrupt, and Biden is 
        corrupt.\1044\

    On October 3, in remarks before he departed on Marine One, 
President Trump expressed his ``hope'' that Ukraine would 
investigate Mr. Biden and his son. Specifically, President 
Trump stated that he had hoped--after his July 25 
conversation--that Ukraine would ``start a major investigation 
into the Bidens.'' The President also stated that ``by the way, 
likewise, China should start an investigation into the Bidens, 
because what happened in China is just about as bad as what 
happened with--with Ukraine.'' He addressed the corrupt 
prosecutor general, Yuriy Lutsenko, who had recently been 
removed by Parliament: ``And they got rid of a prosecutor who 
was a very tough prosecutor. They got rid of him. Now they're 
trying to make it the opposite way.\1045\
    The next day, on October 4, in remarks before he departed 
on Marine One, the President again said:

          When you look at what Biden and his son did, and when 
        you look at other people--what they've done. And I 
        believe there was tremendous corruption with Biden, but 
        I think there was beyond--I mean, beyond corruption--
        having to do with the 2016 campaign, and what these 
        lowlifes did to so many people, to hurt so many people 
        in the Trump campaign--which was successful, despite 
        all of the fighting us. I mean, despite all of the 
        unfairness.\1046\

    President Trump reiterated his willingness to solicit 
foreign assistance related to his personal interests: ``Here's 
what's okay: If we feel there's corruption, like I feel there 
was in the 2016 campaign--there was tremendous corruption 
against me--if we feel there's corruption, we have a right to 
go to a foreign country.''\1047\ President Trump added that 
asking President Xi of China to investigate the Bidens ``is 
certainly something we can start thinking about.''\1048\
    Consistent with the President's remarks after this inquiry 
began, Ambassador Volker understood that references to fighting 
``corruption'' in Ukraine, when used by President Trump and Mr. 
Giuliani, in fact referred to the two investigations into 
``Burisma''--and former Vice President Biden--and the 2016 
election interference that President Trump sought to benefit 
his reelection efforts.\1049\

   The President's Scheme Undermined U.S. Anti-Corruption Efforts in 
                                Ukraine

    Rather than combatting corruption in Ukraine, President 
Trump's ongoing efforts to urge Ukraine to pursue an 
investigation into former Vice President Biden undermine 
longstanding U.S. anti-corruption policy, which encourages 
countries to refrain from using the criminal justice system to 
investigate political opponents. When it became clear that 
President Trump was pressuring Ukraine to investigate his 
political rival, career public servants charged with 
implementing U.S. foreign policy in a non-partisan manner, such 
as Lt. Col. Vindman and Ambassador Taylor, communicated to 
President Zelensky and his advisors that Ukraine should avoid 
getting embroiled in U.S. domestic politics.\1050\
    Mr. Kent, an anti-corruption and rule of law expert, 
explained that U.S. anti-corruption efforts prioritize 
``building institutional capacity so that the Ukrainian 
Government has the ability to go after corruption and 
effectively investigate, prosecute, and judge alleged criminal 
activities using appropriate institutional mechanisms, that is, 
to create and follow the rule of law.\1051\
    Mr. Holmes concurred:

          [O]ur longstanding policy is to encourage them 
        [Ukraine] to establish and build rule of law 
        institutions, that are capable and that are independent 
        and that can actually pursue credible allegations. 
        That's our policy. We've been doing that for quite some 
        time with some success. So focusing on [particular] 
        cases, including [] cases where there is an interest of 
        the President, it's just not part of what we've done. 
        It's hard to explain why we would do that.\1052\

    Mr. Kent emphasized that when foreign government officials 
``hear diplomats on the ground saying one thing, and they hear 
other U.S. leaders saying something else,'' it raises concerns 
about the United States' credibility on anti-corruption 
efforts.\1053\ Ambassador Taylor agreed, stating that ``[o]ur 
credibility is based on a respect for the United States'' and 
``if we damage that respect, then it hurts our credibility and 
makes it more difficult for us to do our jobs.''\1054\
    Mr. Kent, like many other witnesses, explained that urging 
Ukraine to engage in ``selective politically associated 
investigations or prosecutions'' undermined the rule of law 
more generally:

          As a general principle, I do not believe the United 
        States should ask other countries to engage in 
        selective politically associated investigations or 
        prosecutions against opponents of those in power 
        because such selective actions undermine the rule of 
        law, regardless of the country.\1055\

    Mr. Kent agreed that pressuring Ukraine to conduct 
political investigations is not a part of U.S. foreign policy 
to promote the rule of law in Ukraine and around the 
world.\1056\ Mr. Kent concluded that the President's request 
for investigations ``went against U.S. policy'' and ``would've 
undermined the rule of law and our longstanding policy goals in 
Ukraine, as in other countries, in the post-Soviet 
space.''\1057\
    These conflicting messages came to a head at a September 14 
meeting between American and Ukrainian officials in Kyiv. 
During that meeting, Ambassador Volker advised Mr. Yermak about 
the ``potential problems'' with investigations that the 
Zelensky administration was contemplating into former Ukrainian 
President Petro Poroshenko.\1058\ Mr. Yermak retorted, ``what, 
you mean like asking us to investigate Clinton and 
Biden?''\1059\ Ambassador Volker did not respond.\1060\

                           SECTION I ENDNOTES

    \1\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 16-17.
    \2\Kateryna Handziuk, Ukrainian Activist, Dies From Acid Attack, 
New York Times (Nov. 5, 2018) (online at www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/
world/europe/kateryna-handziuk-dies-ukraine.html).
    \3\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 30-31.
    \4\U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Department of State, Ambassador 
Yovanovitch's Remarks at a Women of Courage Reception in Honor of 
Kateryna Handziuk (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at https://ua.usembassy.gov/
ambassador-yovanovitchs-remarks-at-a-women-of-courage-reception-in-
honor-of-kateryna-handziuk/).
    \5\U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Department of State, Ambassador 
Yovanovitch's Remarks at a Women of Courage Reception in Honor of 
Kateryna Handziuk (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at https://ua.usembassy.gov/
ambassador-yovanovitchs-remarks-at-a-women-of-courage-reception-in-
honor-of-kateryna-handziuk/).
    \6\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 31.
    \7\Id. at 31-32.
    \8\Id. at 32.
    \9\Id. at 31.
    \10\Id. at 31-32.
    \11\Giuliani to Join Trump's Legal Team, New York Times (April 19, 
2018) (online at www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/us/politics/giuliani-
trump.html).
    \12\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 3, 2019).
    \13\Department of Justice, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman Charged with 
Conspiring to Violate Straw and Foreign Donor Bans (Oct. 10, 2019) 
(online at www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lev-parnas-and-igor-fruman-
charged-conspiring-violate-straw-and-foreign-donor-bans).
    \14\Hill Dep. Tr. at 59.
    \15\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 28-29.
    \16\Ukraine Ousts Victor Shokin, Top Prosecutor, and Political 
Stability Hangs in the Balance, New York Times (Mar. 29, 2016) (online 
at www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/europe/political-stability-in-the-
balance-as-ukraine-ousts-top-prosecutor.html).
    \17\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \18\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
    \19\Id. at 31-32.
    \20\Id. at 21.
    \21\Id. at 32-33, 38 (``I think that he felt that I and the embassy 
were effective at helping Ukrainians who wanted reform, Ukrainians who 
wanted to fight against corruption, and he did not you know, that was 
not in his interest.'').
    \22\Id. at 30.
    \23\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 14.
    \24\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
    \25\Id. at 132.
    \26\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \27\Nickolay Kapitonenko, an advisor to the Ukrainian Parliament's 
Foreign Policy Committee, described Giuliani as a ``mythical link to 
the U.S.'' who is viewed as ``an extension of Trump.'' Giuliani Sits at 
the Center of the Ukraine Controversy, Wall Street Journal (Sept. 26, 
2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/giuliani-sits-at-the-center-of-
the-ukraine-controversy-11569546774); David Sakvarelidze, a former 
Ukrainian deputy prosecutor general, stated, ``Lutsenko was trying to 
save his political skin by pretending to be Trumpist at the end of his 
career.'' Meet the Ukrainian Ex-Prosecutor Behind the Impeachment 
Furor, New York Times (Oct. 5, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/05/world/europe/ukraine-prosecutor-trump.html).
    \28\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 30.
    \29\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Jan. 17, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1086096691613323265) (``Gregg 
Jarrett: `Mueller's prosecutors knew the `Dossier' was the product of 
bias and deception.' It was a Fake, just like so much news coverage in 
our Country. Nothing but a Witch Hunt, from beginning to end!'').
    \30\Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to 
``Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections'': 
The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017) 
(online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf); Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and 
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election (May 8, 2018) (online at 
www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/report-select-committee-
intelligence-united-states-senate-russian-active-measures); House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active 
Measures (Mar. 22, 2018) (online at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/
IG00/20180322/108023/HRPT-115-1_1-p1-U3.pdf); House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Minority Views (Mar. 26, 2018) (online at 
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20180411_-_final_-
_hpsci_minority_views_on_majority_report.pdf).
    \31\President Trump's Former National Security Advisor `Deeply 
Disturbed' by Ukraine Scandal: `Whole World Is Watching,' ABC News 
(Sept. 29, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-
trumps-national-security-advisor-deeply-disturbed-ukraine/
story?id=65925477).
    \32\Charges of Ukrainian Meddling? A Russian Operation, U.S. 
Intelligence Says, New York Times (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/us/politics/ukraine-russia-
interference.html).
    \33\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 56-57.
    \34\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \35\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 330.
    \36\Id. at 330; Explainer: Biden, Allies, Pushed Out Ukrainian 
Prosecutor Because He Didn't Pursue Corruption Cases, USA Today (Oct. 
3, 2019) (online at www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/10/03/
what-really-happened-when-biden-forced-out-ukraines-top-prosecutor/
3785620002/).
    \37\See, e.g., Ukraine Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by 
Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-
by-bidens) (``Hunter Biden did not violate any Ukrainian laws--at least 
as of now, we do not see any wrongdoing. A company can pay however much 
it wants to its board . . . Biden was definitely not involved . . . We 
do not have any grounds to think that there was any wrongdoing starting 
from 2014.'').
    \38\Notes of Call with Viktor Shokin (Jan. 23, 2019); Ukraine 
Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 
2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-
prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-by-bidens).
    \39\Giuliani Pursued Business in Ukraine While Pushing for 
Inquiries for Trump, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/nyregion/giuliani-ukraine-business-
trump.html); Ukraine Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by 
Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-
by-bidens).
    \40\Notes of Meeting with Yuriy Lutsenko (Jan. 25, 2019); Ukraine 
Prosecutor Says No Evidence of Wrongdoing by Bidens, Bloomberg (May 16, 
2019) (online at www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-16/ukraine-
prosecutor-says-no-evidence-of-wrongdoing-by-bidens).
    \41\Giuliani Pursued Business in Ukraine While Pushing for 
Inquiries for Trump, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/nyregion/giuliani-ukraine-business-
trump.html).
    \42\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1187168034835894272).
    \43\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Oct. 30, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1189667101079932928).
    \44\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 19.
    \45\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton 
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
    \46\Ukraine Prosecutor General Lutsenko Admits U.S. Ambassador 
Didn't Give Him a Do Not Prosecute List, The Ukrainian (Apr. 18, 2019) 
(online at www.unian.info/politics/10520715-ukraine-prosecutor-general-
lutsenko-admits-u-s-ambassador-didn-t-give-him-a-do-not-prosecute-
list.html).
    \47\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton 
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
    \48\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 21, 37.
    \49\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00768-
ATTHPSCI_
20190930_00772, ATTHPSCI_20190930_00775. The Committee did not subpoena 
the call detail records of any member of Congress or staff, including 
Ranking Member Devin Nunes, nor of any journalist, including John 
Solomon. To the extent that congressional members or staff, or 
journalists, appear in the report, call records indicate that they were 
in contact with individuals of interest to the investigation. A 
subpoena served to the White House requesting certain call records was 
obstructed in full by President Trump. Nevertheless, the Committee's 
investigation into these and other call records remains ongoing.
    \50\As Russia Collusion Fades, Ukrainian Plot to Help Clinton 
Emerges, The Hill (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/campaign/435029-as-russia-collusion-fades-ukrainian-plot-to-
help-clinton-emerges).
    \51\Department of Justice, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman Charged with 
Conspiring to Violate Straw and Foreign Donor Bans (Oct. 10, 2019) 
(online at www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lev-parnas-and-igor-fruman-
charged-conspiring-violate-straw-and-foreign-donor-bans) (alleging that 
in May and June 2018, Mr. Parnas sought the assistance of an unnamed 
congressman in causing the removal or recall of the then-U.S. 
ambassador to Ukraine).
    \52\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00775.
    \53\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1108559080204001280).
    \54\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Mar. 22, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1109117167176466432); Giuliani Slams 
Mueller Leak, Fox News (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at https://
www.foxnews.com/transcript/giuliani-slams-mueller-leak).
    \55\Donald Trump, Jr., Twitter (Mar. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/donaldjtrumpjr/status/1109850575926108161).
    \56\Kent Dep. Tr. at 57-58.
    \57\Id. at 178.
    \58\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 62.
    \59\Hale Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
    \60\Id. at 99-100.
    \61\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 63-64.
    \62\Hale Dep. Tr. at 27.
    \63\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 124.
    \64\Id. at 267-268.
    \65\Id. at 268.
    \66\Email from [Redacted] to S_All (Mar. 26, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/
AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Email from Operations Center to 
[Redacted] (Mar. 29, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf). (The same 
State Department records show that Secretary Pompeo was scheduled to 
have a secure call with Rep. Nunes on April 1, 2019.); Email from 
Operations Center to [Redacted] (Mar. 29, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Email from 
[Redacted] to S_Scheduling (Mar. 28, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf); Hale Dep. Tr. at 34 (stating 
that Secretary Pompeo 
spoke with Mr. Giuliani on March 28 and March 29); AT&T Document 
Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02034-ATTHPSCI _20190930_02053, 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_03538-ATTHPSCI_20190930_03539.
    \67\Joe Biden's 2020 Ukrainian Nightmare: A Closed Probe is 
Revived, The Hill (Apr. 1, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/white-house/436816-joe-bidens-2020-ukrainian-nightmare-a-
closed-probe-is-revived).
    \68\Donald Trump, Jr., Twitter (Apr. 2, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/donaldjtrumpjr/status/1113046659456528385).
    \69\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00848-
ATTHPSCI_
20190930_00884. Mr. Parnas also had an aborted call that lasted 5 
seconds on April 5, 2019 with an aide to Rep. Devin Nunes on the 
Intelligence Committee, Derek Harvey. Id. at Bates 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00876. Call records obtained by the Committees show 
that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Harvey had connected previously, including a 
four minute 42 second call on January 31, 2019, a one minute 7 second 
call on February 4, and a one minute 37 second call on February 7, 
2019. Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00617, ATTHPSCI_20190930_00630, 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00641. As explained later in this Chapter, Rep. Nunes 
would connect separately by phone on April 10 and 11 with Mr. Giuliani, 
and on April 12 with Mr. Parnas. Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00913-
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00914; ATTHPSCI_20190930-02125, ATTHPSCI_20190930-
02129.
    \70\Ukrainian to US Prosecutors: Why Don't You Want Our Evidence on 
Democrats?, The Hill (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
opinion/white-house/437719-ukrainian-to-us-prosecutors-why-dont-you-
want-our-evidence-on-democrats).
    \71\Id.
    \72\Id.
    \73\Id.
    \74\Giuliani Slams Mueller Leak, Fox News (Apr. 7, 2019) (online at 
www.foxnews.com/transcript/giuliani-slams-mueller-leak).
    \75\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Apr. 8, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1115171828618731520).
    \76\Specifically, between April 8 and April 11, phone records show 
the following phone contacts:
     at least six calls between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Parnas 
(longest duration approximately five minutes), AT&T Document 
Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02115-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02131.
     at least four calls between Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Solomon 
(all on April 8, longest duration approximately one minute, 30 seconds) 
AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02114-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-02115;
     at least nine calls between Mr. Parnas and Mr. Solomon 
(longest duration four minutes, 39 seconds) AT&T Document Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00885-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00906; and
     at least three calls between Mr. Parnas and Ms. Toensing 
(longest duration approximately six minutes), AT&T Document Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00885-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00905.
    The Committee did not subpoena the call detail records of any 
member of Congress or staff, including Ranking Member Devin Nunes, nor 
of any journalist, including John Solomon. To the extent that 
congressional members or staff, or journalists, appear in the report, 
records indicate that they were in contact with individuals of interest 
to the investigation. A subpoena served to the White House requesting 
certain call records was obstructed in full by President Trump. 
Nevertheless, the Committee's investigation into these and other call 
records remains ongoing.
    \77\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02125, ATTHPSCI_20190930-03236.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Connecting   Duration
   Date      Time (ET)    of Call         Caller           Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/10/19    12:00:36     0:35       Giuliani, Rudy     Nunes, Devin
04/10/19    12:10:35     0:00       Nunes, Devin       Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19    12:10:37     0:31       Nunes, Devin       Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19    12:11:10     SMS        UNKNOWN            Giuliani, Rudy
04/10/19    12:12:35     2:50       Giuliani, Rudy     Nunes, Devin
04/10/19    12:15:38     0:00       Giuliani, Rudy     Nunes, Devin
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\Id. Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00902.
    \79\Jay Sekulow, personal counsel to President Trump, stated that 
the President was disappointed that Mr. diGenova and Ms. Toensing had 
to withdraw due to a conflict of interest, but noted that ``those 
conflicts do not prevent them from assisting the President in other 
legal matters. The President looks forward to working with them.'' 
Trump's Legal Team Remains in Disarray as New Lawyer Will No Longer 
Represent Him in Russia Probe, Washington Post (Mar. 25, 2018) (online 
at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-another-blow-to-trumps-efforts-
to-combat-russia-probe-digenova-will-no-longer-join-legal-team/2018/03/
25/8ac8c8d2-3038-11e8-94fa-32d48460b955_story.html).
    \80\For example, between April 1 and April 7, Ms. Toensing 
exchanged at least five calls with Mr. Parnas and two calls with Mr. 
Giuliani. ATTHPSCI_20190930-02089-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02110; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930-00871-ATTHPSCI_20190930-00884. In addition, on April 
10, Ms. Toensing and Mr. Giuliani spoke for approximately six minutes, 
19 seconds. AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02126. 
Mr. diGenova and Ms. Toensing were also very active on social media in 
promoting these conspiracy theories as well as the false accusations 
against Ambassador Yovanovitch. See, e.g., Ryan Saavedra, Twitter (Mar. 
23, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/RealSaavedra/status/
1109546629672009728); Victoria Toensing, Twitter (Mar. 21, 2019) 
(online at https://twitter.com/VicToensing/status/1108751525239762944); 
Victoria Toensing, Twitter (Mar. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/VicToensing/status/1109882728101625856).
    \81\Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and 
Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019); Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, 
LLP, Viktor Shokin (Apr. 15, 2019).
    \82\On April 12, less than a week after the latest piece in The 
Hill, Ms. Toensing signed a retainer agreement between diGenova & 
Toensing, LLP, Mr. Lutsenko, and his former deputy Kostiantyn Kulyk, 
two of the primary sources for Mr. Solomon's articles. The Committees 
obtained a copy of this document which is not signed by the Ukrainians, 
but a spokesman for Ms. Toensing and Mr. diGenova confirmed that the 
firm represented Mr. Lutsenko. See Giuliani Weighed Doing Business with 
Ukrainian Government, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at 
www.wsj.com/articles/giuliani-weighed-doing-business-with-ukrainian-
government-11574890951).
    The first paragraph of the retainer agreement sets forth the 
services to be provided by diGenova & Toensing, LLP to their Ukrainian 
clients:
    Yurii Lutsenko and Kostiantyn Kulyk (``Clients'') hereby engage the 
firm of diGenova & Toensing, LLP (``Firm'' or ``Attorneys'') to 
represent them in connection with recovery and return to the Ukraine 
government of funds illegally embezzeled from that country and 
providing assistance to meet and discuss with United States government 
officials the evidence of illegal conduct in Ukraine regarding the 
United States, for example, interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.
    See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and 
Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019).
    The scope of representation--which includes representing Mr. 
Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk in meetings with U.S. officials regarding 
Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections--mirrors the 
allegations reported in The Hill, pursued by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of 
President Trump, and pushed by the President on his July 25 call with 
President Zelensky. According to the retainer agreement, Mr. Lutsenko 
was to pay diGenova & Toensing, LLP $25,000 per month, plus costs, for 
four months for this work. See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, 
LLP, Yuriy Lutsenko, and Kostiantyn Kulyk (Apr. 12, 2019).
    On April 12, the same day Ms. Toensing signed the retainer 
agreement with Mr. Lutsenko, phone records show contacts between Ms. 
Toensing, Mr. Giuliani, and Mr. Parnas, as well as contacts between Mr. 
Parnas and Mr. Solomon, and Mr. Parnas and Rep. Nunes. In addition, 
among these calls are contacts between Mr. Giuliani and a phone number 
associated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an 
unidentified number (``-1''), and a phone number associated with the 
White House:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Connecting Time   Duration  of
     Date             (ET)             Call           Caller         Recipient                Source
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/12/19        9:48:57           0:24            Toensing,       Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Victoria                        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00908
04/12/19        10:40:19          3:25            Parnas, Lev     Toensing,       AT&T Document Production,
                                                                   Victoria        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00909
04/12/19        11:05:25          0:03            OMB-Associated  Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Phone Number                    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02134
04/12/19        11:05:39          12:10           ``-1''          Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02134
04/12/19        13:13:49          0:12            Giuliani, Rudy  White House     AT&T Document Production,
                                                                   Phone Number    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02135
04/12/19        13:18:46          0:07            Toensing,       Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Victoria                        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02135
04/12/19        13:26:54          0:24            Giuliani        Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Partners                        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00911
04/12/19        14:11:22          0:03            ``-1''          Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02136
04/12/19        14:11:27          0:03            OMB-Associated  Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Phone Number                    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02136
04/12/19        14:17:46          0:07            Toensing,       Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Victoria                        Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19        15:09:22          0:02            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19        15:09:32          0:01            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19        15:16:09          1:38            Parnas, Lev     Solomon, John   AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00912
04/12/19        15:48:09          0:03            OMB-Associated  Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                   Phone Number                    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02137
04/12/19        16:10:49          0:00            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        16:10:51          0:02            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
4/12/19         16:12:53          1:00            Parnas, Lev     Nunes, Devin    AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        16:54:11          0:00            Nunes, Devin    Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        16:54:13          0:02            Nunes, Devin    Parnas, Lev     AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        17:07:20          1:27            Parnas, Lev     Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00913
04/12/19        17:17:36          7:52            Sekulow, Jay    Giuliani, Rudy  AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-03565
04/12/19        17:24:05          1:49            Parnas, Lev     Solomon, John   AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19        17:26:48          0:28            Parnas, Lev     Solomon, John   AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19        17:30:19          8:34            Parnas, Lev     Nunes, Devin    AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19        17:39:25          0:53            Parnas, Lev     Solomon, John   AT&T Document Production,
                                                                                   Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00914
04/12/19        19:56:43          5:03            Giuliani, Rudy  White House     AT&T Document Production,
                                                                   Phone Number    Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02139
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As part of the investigation, the Committees uncovered contact 
between Mr. Giuliani and a landline number with a prefix associated 
with the Office of Management and Budget within the Executive Office of 
the President, according to public directories. This number appears to 
obscure the identity of outgoing calls, but does not itself accept 
incoming calls. The Committees continue to investigate the 
originator(s) of these calls, including to determine whether other 
offices or landlines within the White House may also show up with the 
same landline number when outgoing calls are made and to clarify who at 
the White House spoke to Mr. Giuliani at these key points in time under 
investigation. A subpoena served to the White House requesting certain 
call records was obstructed in full by President Trump. Nevertheless, 
the Committee's investigation into these and other call records remains 
ongoing.
    Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Kulyk were not the only Ukrainians who appear 
to have engaged with diGenova & Toensing, LLP. On April 15, Ms. 
Toensing signed another retainer agreement between diGenova & Toensing, 
LLP and former Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin. Again, the Committees' 
copy is not signed by Mr. Shokin. A spokesman for Ms. Toensing and Mr. 
diGenova acknowledged that the firm represented ``Ukrainian 
whistleblowers,'' but claimed that the identities of those clients 
(other that Mr. Lutsenko) are protected by attorney-client privilege. 
See Giuliani Weighed Doing Business with Ukrainian Government, Wall 
Street Journal (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/
giuliani-weighed-doing-business-with-ukrainian-government-11574890951).
    The first paragraph of the retainer agreement outlined the services 
to be rendered:
    Viktor Shokin (``Client'') hereby engaged the firm diGenova & 
Toensing, LLP (``Firm'' or ``Attorneys'') to represent him for the 
purpose of collecting evidence regarding his March 2016 firing as 
Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the role of then-Vice President Joe 
Biden in such firing, and presenting such evidence to U.S. and foreign 
authorities.
    See Retainer Letter, diGenova & Toensing, LLP, Viktor Shokin (Apr. 
15, 2019).
    The subject matter of the agreement--the activities of Vice 
President Biden--again echo Mr. Solomon's pieces in The Hill, 
conspiracy theories spread by Mr. Giuliani on behalf of President 
Trump, and the President's statements about Vice President Biden on his 
July 25 call with President Zelensky.
    \83\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-00947-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-00950.
    \84\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02222-ATTHPSCI_20190930-02223.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Connecting   Duration
   Date      Time (ET)    of Call         Caller           Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/23/19    14:00:56     1:50       Giuliani, Rudy     Parnas, Lev
04/23/19    14:15:18     0:18       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/23/19    14:15:43     0:11       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/23/19    15:20:17     0:11       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/23/19    15:50:23     8:28       ``-1''             Giuliani, Rudy
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02224.
    \86\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (Apr. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1120798794692612097).
    \87\Giuliani Fires Back at Hillary Clinton's Remarks on Mueller 
Probe, Fox News (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at www.youtube.com/
watch?v=FDtg8z12Q7s&feature=youtu.be).
    \88\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930-02229-
ATTHPSCI_20190930-02237.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Connecting   Duration
   Date      Time (ET)    of Call         Caller           Recipient
------------------------------------------------------------------------
04/24/19    7:17:48      0:42       OMB-Associated     Giuliani, Rudy
                                     Phone Number
04/24/19    7:47:57      0:37       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    7:48:39      0:21       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    7:49:00      0:31       OMB-Associated     Giuliani, Rudy
                                     Phone Number
04/24/19    7:49:00      0:20       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    7:49:35      4:53       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    7:54:52      0:24       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    13:03:50     13:44      OMB-Associated     Giuliani, Rudy
                                     Phone Number
04/24/19    16:42:52     8:00       Parnas, Lev        Giuliani, Rudy
04/24/19    18:38:57     0:44       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    18:42:43     8:42       ``-1''             Giuliani, Rudy
04/24/19    20:09:14     0:06       Giuliani, Rudy     White House Phone
                                                        Number
04/24/19    20:12:08     3:15       White House Phone  Giuliani, Rudy
                                     Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \90\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 22.
    \91\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 21-22.
    \92\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 129.
    \93\Id. at 139.
    \94\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \95\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 21.
    \96\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 131-132.
    \97\Hale Dep. Tr. at 16-17, 112-113; Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 21.
    \98\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 63 (``I only met her when I took 
this job, but immediately I understood that we had an exceptional 
officer doing exceptional work at a very critical embassy in Kyiv. And 
during my visits to Kyiv, I was very impressed by what she was doing 
there, to the extent that I asked her if she'd be willing to stay, if 
that was a possibility, because we had a gap coming up.'').
    \99\Id. at 64.
    \100\Biography of Marie L. Yovanovitch, Department of State (online 
at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/261588.htm).
    \101\McKinley Transcribed Interview Tr. at 37.
    \102\Reeker Dep. Tr. at 26.
    \103\Kent Dep. Tr. at 188-189.
    \104\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 18-19.
    \105\Id.
    \106\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 18-19, 45-46.
    \107\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 142.
    \108\What ``Corruption'' Means in the Impeachment Hearings, New 
Yorker (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/the-corruption-of-the-word-corruption-and-so-much-else-amid-
the-impeachment-hearings).
    \109\22 U.S.C. Sec. 3941.
    \110\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 110-111.
    \111\Ambassador Yovanovitch said: ``Although then and now I have 
always understood that I served at the pleasure of the President, I 
still find it difficult to comprehend that foreign and private 
interests were able to undermine U.S. interests in this way. 
Individuals who apparently felt stymied by our efforts to promote 
stated U.S. policy against corruption, that is, to do our mission, were 
able to successfully conduct a campaign of disinformation against a 
sitting ambassador using unofficial back channels. As various witnesses 
have recounted, they shared baseless allegations with the President and 
convinced him to remove his ambassador despite the fact that the State 
Department fully understood that the allegations were false and the 
sources highly suspect.'' Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 22.
    \112\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 78-79.
    \113\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 313-314.
    \114\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 22.
    \115\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
    \116\Kent. Dep. Tr. at 131-132.
    \117\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \118\Comedian Volodymyr Zelensky Unseats Incumbent in Ukraine's 
Presidential Election, Exit Polls Show, Washington Post (Apr. 21, 2019) 
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-ukraine-votes-in-
presidential-runoff-a-comedian-looks-to-unseat-the-incumbent/2019/04/
21/b7d69a38-603f-11e9-bf24-db4b9fb62aa2_story.html).
    \119\Id.
    \120\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 
21, 2019) (online at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
6550349/First-Trump-Ukraine-Call.pdf).
    \121\Id.
    \122\Conflicting White House accounts of 1st Trump-Zelenskiy call, 
Associated Press (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at https://apnews.com/
2f3c9910e0a14ec08d6d76ed93148059).
    \123\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 
21, 2019) (online at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
6550349/First-Trump-Ukraine-Call.pdf).
    \124\Id.
    \125\Id.
    \126\Id.
    \127\Id.
    \128\Id.
    \129\Id.
    \130\Id.
    \131\Williams Dep. Tr. at 36.
    \132\Id. at 37.
    \133\Id. at 36.
    \134\Fox & Friends, Fox News (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDtg8z12Q7s#action=share).
    \135\Why Giuliani Singled Out 2 Ukrainian Oligarchs to Help Look 
for Dirt, New York Times (Nov. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/25/us/giuliani-ukraine-oligarchs.html).
    \136\Ukraine's Unlikely President, Promising a New Style of 
Politics, Gets a Taste of Trump's Swamp, New Yorker (Oct. 25, 2019) 
(online at www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/04/how-trumps-emissaries-
put-pressure-on-ukraines-new-president).
    \137\Why Giuliani Singled Out 2 Ukrainian Oligarchs to Help Look 
for Dirt, New York Times (Nov. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/25/us/giuliani-ukraine-oligarchs.html).
    \138\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_00947; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_00949; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02222; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02223.
    \139\Joe Biden Announces 2020 Run for President, After Months of 
Hesitation, New York Times (Apr. 25, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/25/us/politics/joe-biden-2020-announcement.html).
    \140\How the Obama White House Engaged Ukraine to Give Russia 
Collusion Narrative an Early Boost, The Hill (Apr. 25, 2019) (online at 
https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/440730-how-the-obama-white-
house-engaged-ukraine-to-give-russia-collusion).
    \141\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 17.
    \142\Id. at 116.
    \143\Id.
    \144\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02245.
    \145\Id.
    \146\Sean Hannity Interviews Trump on Biden, Russia Probe, FISA 
Abuse, Comey, Fox News (Apr. 26, 2019) (online at 
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/26/
full_video_sean_hannity_interviews_trump_on_biden_russia_probe_fisa_abus
e_comey.html).
    \147\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 55-56.
    \148\Sean Hannity Interviews Trump on Biden, Russia Probe, FISA 
Abuse, Comey, Fox News (Apr. 26, 2019) (online at 
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/04/26/
full_video_sean_hannity_interviews_trump_on_biden_russia_probe_fisa_abus
e_comey.html). As discussed later in this report, on the morning of 
September 25, 2019, the Department of Justice would quickly issue a 
statement after President Trump released the record of his July 25 call 
with President Zelensky. The statement asserted that that Attorney 
General Barr had not engaged on Ukraine matters at the President's 
request:
    The President has not spoken with the Attorney General about having 
Ukraine investigate anything relating to former Vice President Biden or 
his son. The President has not asked the Attorney General to contact 
Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The Attorney General has not 
communicated with Ukraine--on this or any other subject.
    \149\Cleaning Up Ukraine in the Shadow of Trump, Financial Times 
(Nov. 28, 2019) (online at www.ft.com/content/eb8e4004-1059-11ea-a7e6-
62bf4f9e548a).
    \150\Id.
    \151\Biden Faces Conflict of Interest Questions That Are Being 
Promoted by Trump and Allies, New York Times (May 1, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/us/politics/biden-son-ukraine.html).
    \152\Transcript: Fox News Interview with President Trump, Fox News 
(May 7, 2019) (online at www.foxnews.com/politics/transcript-fox-news-
interview-with-president-trump).
    \153\Id.
    \154\Foreign Affairs Issue Launch with Former Vice President Joe 
Biden, Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 23, 2018) (online at: 
www.cfr.org/event/foreign-affairs-issue-launch-former-vice-president-
joe-biden).
    \155\Ukraine Ousts Viktor Shokin, Top Prosecutor, and Political 
Stability Hangs in the Balance, New York Times (Mar. 29, 2016) (online 
at www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/europe/political-stability-in-the-
balance-as-ukraine-ousts-top-prosecutor.html).
    \156\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 50; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 115.
    \157\Trump Says He'd Consider Accepting Information from Foreign 
Governments on His Opponents, Washington Post (June 12, 2019) (online 
at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-hed-consider-accepting-
dirt-from-foreign-governments-on-his-opponents/2019/06/12/b84ba860-
8d5c-11e9-8f69-a2795fca3343_story.html).
    \158\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02313.
    \159\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02314; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02316; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02318; ATTHPSCI_20190930_01000.
    \160\Kent Dep. Tr. at 137.
    \161\Id.
    \162\Id.
    \163\Rudy Giuliani Plans Ukraine Trip to Push for Inquiries That 
Could Help Trump, New York Times (May 9, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/us/politics/giuliani-ukraine-trump.html).
    \164\Id.
    \165\Id.
    \166\Id.
    \167\Id.
    \168\Id.
    \169\Id.
    \170\Trump's Interest in Stirring Ukraine Investigations Sows 
Confusion in Kiev, Washington Post (May 11, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/trumps-interest-stirring-ukraine-
investigations-sows-confusion-in-kiev/2019/05/11/cb94f7f4-73ea-11e9-
9331-30bc5836f48e_story.html).
    \171\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02321; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02322.
    \172\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02320, 
02321, 02322, 02323, 03612.
    \173\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03614; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_02326; ATTHPSCI_20190930_02327; 
ATTHPSCI_20190930_03614.
    \174\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1126701386224156673).
    \175\Giuliani: Massive Collusion Between DNC, Obama Admin, Clinton 
People & Ukraine To Create False Info About Trump, Real Clear Politics 
(May 10, 2019) (online at www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/05/10/
giuliani_massive_collusion_between_dnc_obama_admin_clinton_people_ukrain
e_to_create_false_info_about_trump.html).
    \176\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 10, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/rudygiuliani/status/1126858889209831424?lang=en).
    \177\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02334.
    \178\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 227; see also id. at 32-
33, 36 (describing the allegations).
    \179\Id. at 227.
    \180\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02334.
    \181\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02335.
    \182\Id.
    \183\Id.
    \184\Trump: Discussing a Biden Probe with Barr Would Be 
`Appropriate,' Politico (May 10, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/
story/2019/05/10/trump-biden-ukraine-barr-1317601).
    \185\Trump Denies Sending Rudy Giuliani to Ukraine to Push Biden, 
Election Probes, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at www.cnbc.com/2019/11/
27/trump-denies-sending-rudy-giuliani-to-ukraine-to-push-biden-
election-probes.html).
    \186\Remarks by President Trump and President Niinisto of the 
Republic of Finland in Joint Press Conference, The White House (Oct. 2, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-president-niinisto-republic-finland-joint-press-
conference/).
    \187\Remarks by President Trump before Marine One Departure, The 
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-68/).
    \188\Giuliani: I Didn't Go to Ukraine to Start an Investigation, 
There Already Was One, Fox News (May 11, 2019) (online at https://
video.foxnews.com/v/6035385372001/#sp=show-clips).
    \189\Trump: Discussing a Biden Probe with Barr Would Be 
`Appropriate', Politico (May 10, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/
story/2019/05/10/trump-biden-ukraine-barr-1317601) (documenting 
Giuliani text message).
    \190\Id.
    \191\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (May 3, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1124359594418032640).
    \192\Kent Dep. Tr. at 338-339.
    \193\Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Orban of Hungary 
Before Bilateral Meeting, The White House (May 13, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-
minister-orban-hungary-bilateral-meeting/).
    \194\In Hungary, a Freewheeling Trump Ambassador Undermines U.S. 
Diplomats, New York Times (Oct. 22, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/22/world/europe/david-cornstein-hungary-trump-orban.html); 
Hungarian Prime Minister Earns Rare Rebuke from European Bloc that Has 
Long Backed Him, Washington Post (Mar. 20, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/hungarys-orban-earns-rare-rebuke-
from-european-bloc-that-has-long-backed-him/2019/03/20/83be110a-4b17-
11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html).
    \195\Kent Dep. Tr. at 339.
    \196\Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Orban of Hungary 
Before Bilateral Meeting, The White House (May 13, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-
minister-orban-hungary-bilateral-meeting/).
    \197\Kent Dep. Tr. at 253.
    \198\Id. at 254.
    \199\Williams Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
    \200\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 14. Other witnesses testified 
that Vice President Pence may not have been able to attend on account 
of scheduling issues. See Hill Dep. Tr. at 316 (``there was a lot of 
scheduling issues'' regarding the attempts to schedule the Vice 
President's participation in the delegation); Kent Dep. Tr. at 189-191 
(Vice President Pence was not available); Volker Transcribed Interview 
Tr. at 288-290, 293 (Volker ``wasn't surprised'' Pence could not make 
it and assumed it was a matter of scheduling). However, Ms. Williams 
was the only staff member in the Office of the Vice President to 
testify before the Committees, and the only witness to testify to 
having heard an explanation from Vice President Pence's staff about why 
Vice President Pence did not attend the inauguration.
    \201\Williams Dep. Tr. at 39.
    \202\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 37.
    \203\Id.
    \204\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (May 18, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1129761193755910144).
    \205\Kolomoisky: We Called Varkuch and Asked: `Do You Support 
Zelensky or No?', Pravda (May 27, 2019) (online at www.pravda.com.ua/
rus/articles/2019/05/27/7216183/).
    \206\Id.
    \207\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 16.
    \208\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 288-290; Vindman Dep. Tr. 
at 125.
    \209\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 101.
    \210\Id. at 18.
    \211\Id. 17-18.
    \212\Id. at 18.
    \213\Id.
    \214\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \215\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 26.
    \216\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \217\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 26.
    \218\Id.
    \219\Id.; David Holmes separately testified that Lt. Col. Vindman 
``made a general point about the importance of Ukraine to our national 
security, and he said it's very important that the Zelensky 
administration stay out of U.S. domestic politics.'' Hill-Holmes 
Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \220\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 30.
    \221\Id. at 29-30.
    \222\Kent Dep. Tr. at 193.
    \223\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 15, 54. Ambassador Sondland testified 
that he did not specifically recall who arranged the May 23 meeting and 
conjectured that ``either Rick Perry or I reached out to someone at the 
NSC saying: Doesn't the President want a briefing about the 
inauguration. And I think--I think it was Perry, if I recall correctly, 
that got it nailed down.'' Sondland Dep. Tr. at 87.
    \224\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 29, 303; Vindman Dep. Tr. 
at 168.
    \225\Hill Dep. Tr. at 311.
    \226\Id. at 308.
    \227\Id.
    \228\Id. at 309-310.
    \229\Id.
    \230\Id.
    \231\Nunes Ally Kash Patel Who Fought Russia Probe Gets Senior 
White House National Security Job, The Daily Beast (July 31, 2019) 
(online at www.thedailybeast.com/kash-patel-devin-nunes-ally-who-
fought-russia-probe-gets-senior-white-house-national-security-job).
    \232\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 304.
    \233\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 25.
    \234\Id.
    \235\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 304.
    \236\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 337; Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 
304; Hill Dep. Tr. at 320-321 (describing Volker's readout); Croft Dep. 
Tr. at 90 (describing Volker's readout); Anderson Dep. Tr. at 57 
(describing Volker's readout).
    \237\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 305.
    \238\Id.
    \239\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 62; Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. 305; 
Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 40.
    \240\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 71.
    \241\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 26. See also id. at 87-90.
    \242\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 131.
    \243\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 167.
    \244\In addition to the testimony cited in this paragraph, see also 
Hill Dep. Tr. at 113; Hale Dep. Tr. at 90; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 58, 285; 
and Reeker Dep. Tr. at 148.
    \245\Kent Dep. Tr. at 195.
    \246\Croft Dep. Tr. at 91.
    \247\Hale Dep. Tr. at 73.
    \248\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 151-152.
    \249\Hill Dep. Tr. at 59-60.
    \250\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 24, 27, 123-124, 125-126.
    \251\Id. at 27-30.
    \252\Id. at 22.
    \253\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 77-78.
    \254\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 94.
    \255\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127. According to call records obtained by 
the Committees, Mr. Giuliani connected with Ambassador Bolton's office 
three times for brief calls of under a minute between April 23 and May 
10, 2019--a time period that corresponds with the recall of Ambassador 
Yovanovitch and the acceleration of Mr. Giuliani's efforts, on behalf 
of President Trump, to pressure Ukraine into opening investigations 
that would benefit his reelection campaign. AT&T Document Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02224, 02322, 02330.
    \256\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127.
    \257\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 15.
    \258\Id.
    \259\Id. at 101.
    \260\Hill Dep. Tr. at 127-128.
    \261\Id. at 116-117.
    \262\Id. at 130.
    \263\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 16.
    \264\Id.; Taylor Dep. Tr. at 24-25, 167.
    \265\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 25.
    \266\Id.
    \267\Id.
    \268\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 16-17.
    \269\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 240.
    \270\ABC News' Oval Office Interview with President Trump, ABC News 
(June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-
oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/story?id=63688943).
    \271\ABC News' Oval Office Interview with President Trump, ABC News 
(June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/abc-news-
oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/story?id=63688943) 
(emphasis added).
    \272\Rudy Giuliani, Twitter (June 21, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/status/1142085975230898176).
    \273\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 77.
    \274\Id. at 91.
    \275\Hill Dep. Tr. at 222-223.
    \276\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 92.
    \277\Id. at 93.
    \278\Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16 November 
2018 to 15 February 2019 (online at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/
UA/ReportUkraine16Nov2018-15Feb2019.pdf); Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights 
Situation in Ukraine: 16 August to 15 November 2017 (online at 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport20th_EN.pdf); Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Conflict in 
Ukraine Enters its Fourth Year with No End in Sight (June 13, 2017) 
(online at www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21730&LangID=E). These figures do not include 
the 298 civilians of 13 different nationalities killed aboard Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 17, which a Dutch-led joint investigation found was 
shot down by a Russian missile system from a Russian military unit, a 
conclusion supported by U.S. intelligence. See Dutch Safety Board, 
Report on the Crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 (Oct. 13, 2015) 
(online at www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/3546/crash-mh17-17-july-2014); 
U.S. Discloses Intelligence on Downing of Malaysian Jet, Washington 
Post (July 22, 2014) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-discloses-intelligence-on-downing-of-malaysian-jet/2014/07/
22/b178fe58-11e1-11e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html).
    \279\Ambassador Nikki Haley, United States Mission to the United 
Nations, Remarks at a U.N. Security Council Briefing on Ukraine (May 
29, 2018) (online at https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-
security-council-briefing-on-ukraine-2/).
    \280\Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
Remarks with President Petro Poroshenko (Aug. 24, 2017) (online at 
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/1291430/secretary-of-
defense-james-mattis-remarks-with-president-petro-poroshenko/).
    \281\European Union External Action, EU-Ukraine Relations Factsheet 
(Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headQuarters-homepage/4081/eu-ukraine-relations-factsheet_en); NATO, 
Fact Sheet: NATO's Support to Ukraine (Nov. 2018) (www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181106_1811-factsheet-nato-
ukraine-support-eng.pdf).
    \282\DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, U.S. Department of Defense 
(June 18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/
Article/1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-ukraine/).
    \283\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 21, 28-29, 50; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 
40-41, 113; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 15-16.
    \284\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 153.
    \285\Croft Dep. Tr. at 16.
    \286\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \287\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 20.
    \288\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 11.
    \289\Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, 
and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations 
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, Sec. 9013 (2018).
    \290\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. 
L. 114-92, Sec. 1250 (2015), amended by the National Defense Act 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234 
(2017), and most recently amended by the John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 
Sec. 1246 (2018).
    \291\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 114-328, Sec. 1237 (2016); National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234 (2018); John S. 
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. 
No. 115-232, Sec. 1246 (2018).
    \292\Letter from John C. Rood, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, Department of Defense, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Feb. 28, 2019).
    \293\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
    \294\National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. 
L. No. 114-92, Sec. 1250 (2015), as amended by the National Defense Act 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, Sec. 1234 
(2017), and most recently amended by the John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 
Sec. 1246 (2018).
    \295\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 24.
    \296\Id.
    \297\Letter from John C. Rood, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, Department of Defense, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (May 23, 2019).
    \298\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 31-32.
    \299\DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, Department of Defense (June 
18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/
1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-ukraine/).
    \300\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, 
Sec. 7046(a)(2) (2019); Conference Report to Accompany Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2019, H.R. Rep. No. 116-9, p. 869 (2019).
    \301\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 
Title VIII (2017).
    \302\Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, 
Sec. 7015(c) (2019); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-141, Sec. 7015(c) (2017).
    \303\OMB Circular No. A-11, Sec. 22.3 (2019) (requiring that the 
State Department receive clearance from OMB before notifying Congress).
    \304\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 25; DOD Announces $250M to Ukraine, 
Department of Defense (June 18, 2019) (online at www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1879340/dod-announces-250m-to-
ukraine/).
    \305\Sean Hannity Interviews Donald Trump via Telephone, Fox News 
(June 19, 2019) (transcript at https://factba.se/transcript/donald-
trump-interview-sean-hannity-fox-telephone-june-19-2019).
    \306\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 26-27.
    \307\Id. at 27-28.
    \308\Id. at 29-30.
    \309\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 33-34.
    \310\Id. at 33.
    \311\Id. at 34.
    \312\Id. at 38.
    \313\Id. at 37-38.
    \314\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 14; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 178-179. 
See also Stalled Ukraine Military Aid Concerned Members of Congress for 
Months, CNN (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/09/30/
politics/ukraine-military-aid-congress/index.html) (suggesting that the 
State Department sought OMB's approval for $141 million in FMF funds on 
June 21, 2019).
    \315\OMB Circular No. A-11, Sec. 22.3 (2019) (requiring that the 
State Department receive clearance from OMB before notifying Congress).
    \316\Williams Dep. Tr. at 54-55.
    \317\Id. at 55.
    \318\Blair previously served as Associate Director of National 
Security Programs at OMB (Blair was Duffey's predecessor), and left OMB 
for the White House Office of Chief of Staff with Mick Mulvaney. Sandy 
Dep. Tr. at 36-38.
    \319\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 38-39.
    \320\Id. at 39.
    \321\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 161.
    \322\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 141-142.
    \323\Id. at 142.
    \324\Id. at 31-32.
    \325\Id. at 41-42.
    \326\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40; see also Croft Dep. Tr. at 83 (``very 
routine low-level business'').
    \327\Kent Dep. Tr. at 303-305.
    \328\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 27-28.
    \329\Croft Dep. Tr. at 83.
    \330\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 27.
    \331\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 154.
    \332\Id.
    \333\Croft Dep. Tr. at 15.
    \334\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \335\Kent Dep. Tr. at 304.
    \336\Id. at 305.
    \337\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 99; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182.
    \338\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40. Morrison, who did not attend the sub-
PCC meeting but received a readout, testified that he thought OMB 
announced at the July 18th meeting that the hold ``covered all dollars, 
DOD and Department of State, and it was--it was beyond funds not yet 
obligated to include funds that had, in fact, been obligated but not 
yet expended.'' Morrison Dep. Tr. at 161.
    \339\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 40.
    \340\Id. at 44-45.
    \341\Id. at 40.
    \342\Kent Dep. Tr. at 307-308.
    \343\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162.
    \344\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 46.
    \345\Williams Dep. Tr. at 91-92; see also Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162 
(testifying that representatives from OMB stated that the hold ``had 
been imposed by the chief of staff's office'' and that the hold ``was 
at the direction of the President'').
    \346\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 46.
    \347\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 162-163; Kent Dep. Tr. at 310; Sandy Dep. 
Tr. at 91.
    \348\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 91.
    \349\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 163.
    \350\Id.
    \351\2 U.S.C. Sec. 601 et seq.
    \352\Williams Dep. Tr. at 91-92; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182; Morrison 
Dep. Tr. at 162; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 99.
    \353\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 195.
    \354\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 182.
    \355\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 54.
    \356\Id. at 54, 96-98.
    \357\Id. at 97.
    \358\Id. at 97.
    \359\Hale Dep. Tr. at 81.
    \360\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 47.
    \361\Hale Dep. Tr. at 81; see also Vindman Dep. Tr. at 184 (``It 
was unanimous consensus on the approach that we had laid out in 
expanding engagement, the areas of cooperation that we wanted to focus 
on, and that this should be elevated to a PC as quickly as possible to 
release the hold on security assistance because we're talking about the 
end of July, and time these funds were set to expire September 30th, so 
there was some urgency to it.''); Cooper Dep. Tr. at 49 (``Although 
each member went around to talk about how important it [security 
assistance] was and how they assessed the future in Ukraine based on 
the recent election results.'').
    \362\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 165.
    \363\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 93.
    \364\Id. at 49, 93.
    \365\Nixon's Presidency: Crisis for Congress, New York Times (Mar. 
5, 1973) (online at www.nytimes.com/1973/03/05/archives/nixons-
presidency-crisis-for-congress-this-is-the-second-of-a.html).
    \366\Congressional Research Service, The Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) Legislative History and Analysis (Feb. 26, 1975) 
(online at https://budgetcounsel.files.wordpress.com/2018/05/added-crs-
the-congressional-budget-act-of-1974-p-l-93-344-legislative-history-
and-analysis-order-code-75-94-s-february-26-1975.pdf).
    \367\Calvin Coolidge Presidential Foundation, The History of the 
1921 and 1974 Budget Acts (Nov. 26, 2014); So . . . this is Nixon's 
Fault?, Politico (Oct. 21, 2015) (online at www.politico.com/agenda/
story/2015/10/richard-nixon-congressional-budget-control-act-history-
000282).
    \368\2 U.S.C. Sec. 683.
    \369\U.S. Government Accountability Office, Impoundment Control 
Act--Withholding of Funds through Their Date of Expiration (Dec. 10, 
2018) (online at www.gao.gov/assets/700/695889.pdf).
    \370\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 47-48. With regard to interagency 
discussions about the legality of the hold, Vindman testified ``[s]o 
I'm not a legal expert, but there was a sufficient amount of--a 
significant amount of work done to determine whether it was legal for 
OMB to be able to place the hold. . . . I think at the--so my 
recollection in the [July 18th] sub-PCC was that the matter was raised; 
at the [July 23rd] PCC, it was tasked for further development; and I 
think by the time it got to our [July 26th] DSG it was determined that, 
you know, there was a legal basis to hold.'' Vindman Dep. Tr. at 185.
    \371\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 184.
    \372\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 165.
    \373\Id. at 264.
    \374\Id.
    \375\Id.
    \376\ Cooper Dep. Tr. at 51.
    \377\Id.; see also id. at 113 (explaining that she relied on a 
conversation with DOD legal to form her understanding of the two proper 
legal mechanisms).
    \378\2 U.S.C. Sec. 683.
    \379\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 58-59.
    \380\Id. at 114.
    \381\Id. at 51, 57; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 147-148.
    \382\31 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1511-1516.
    \383\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 87, 163.
    \384\Id. at 34-35.
    \385\Id. at 51.
    \386\Id. at 23.
    \387\Id. at 33-35, 51-52.
    \388\Id. at 86.
    \389\Id. at 86-87.
    \390\Id. at 86.
    \391\Id. at 87-88.
    \392\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (July 
25, 2019).
    \393\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 94.
    \394\Id.
    \395\Id. at 94-95; SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB 
Footnote A4 (July 25, 2019).
    \396\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 87.
    \397\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (July 
25, 2019); Sandy Dep. Tr. at 92.
    \398\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 101.
    \399\Id. at 102.
    \400\Id. at 96-97, 102.
    \401\Id. at 101-102.
    \402\Id. at 63.
    \403\Id.
    \404\Id. at 102.
    \405\Id. at 64-65.
    \406\Id. at 65.
    \407\Id. at 108-109.
    \408\Id. at 104, 119-120.
    \409\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 58-59.
    \410\Id.
    \411\Id. at 59.
    \412\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 74-75, 127-128.
    \413\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (August 
6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 
(August 15, 2019). Because of a drafting error in which OMB forgot to 
extend the date, the footnotes technically did not restrict DOD from 
spending funds between August 12 and August 20 (the date of the 
subsequent funding document reinstating the hold). However, Sandy 
testified that the hold was still in place and that the direction from 
the President remained unchanged. Sandy Dep. Tr. at 124-126.
    \414\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (August 
6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 
(August 15, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote 
A4 (August 20, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, OMB 
Footnote A4 (August 27, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019, 
OMB Footnote A4 (August 31, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 
2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 5, 2019); SF-13; SF-132 Apportionment 
Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 6, 2019); Apportionment 
Schedule FY 2019, OMB Footnote A4 (Sept. 10, 2019).
    \415\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 91-92.
    \416\Id. at 92.
    \417\Kent Dep. Tr. at 318-319.
    \418\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 56-61.
    \419\Id. at 59-60.
    \420\Id. at 60-61.
    \421\Id. at 75, 127-128; Cooper Dep. Tr. at 57-58; see also id. at 
59 (``And along the way, [the] Defense Security Cooperation Agency was 
expressing doubt that they could do it.'').
    \422\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 80-81. Ultimately, as described below, DOD 
was able to obligate all but approximately $35 million in USAI funds by 
September 30th. Sandy Dep. Tr. at 146-147.
    \423\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 127-128.
    \424\Id. at 95.
    \425\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 20, 2019); SF-
132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 27, 2019); SF-132 
Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 31, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment 
Schedule FY 2019 (September 5, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 
2019 (September 6, 2019); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 
(September 10, 2019).
    \426\SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 20, 2019) (funds 
not available for obligation until August 26); SF-132 Apportionment 
Schedule FY 2019 (August 27, 2019) (funds not available for obligation 
until August 31); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (August 31, 
2019) (funds not available for obligation until September 5); SF-132 
Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (September 5, 2019) (funds not available 
for obligation until September 7); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 
2019 (September 6, 2019) (funds not available for obligation until 
September 11); SF-132 Apportionment Schedule FY 2019 (September 10, 
2019) (funds not available for obligation until September 12).
    \427\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 131.
    \428\Id. at 136-137.
    \429\Id. at 136.
    \430\Id. at 135-137, 150-155.
    \431\Id. at 149-152.
    \432\Id. at 152.
    \433\Id. at 150-156.
    \434\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 266-267.
    \435\Id. at 268.
    \436\Id. at 267.
    \437\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 186.
    \438\Id.
    \439\Id. at 187-188.
    \440\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 167-168.
    \441\Id. at 170-171.
    \442\Id. at 265-266.
    \443\Id. at 172, 266.
    \444\Id. at 266.
    \445\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 68.
    \446\Croft Dep. Tr. at 86.
    \447\Id. at 86-87.
    \448\Id. at 86-87, 101.
    \449\Id. at 97-98.
    \450\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr. at 14.
    \451\Id. at 13-14.
    \452\Id. at 14.
    \453\Id. at 15.
    \454\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 221-222.
    \455\Trump Holds Up Ukraine Military Aid Meant to Confront Russia, 
Politico (Aug. 28, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/story/2019/08/28/
trump-ukraine-military-aid-russia-1689531).
    \456\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 18 (``It is important to understand that a 
White House visit was critical to President Zelensky. He needed to 
demonstrate U.S. support at the highest levels, both to advance his 
ambitious anti-corruption agenda at home and to encourage Russian 
President Putin to take seriously President Zelensky's peace 
efforts.'').
    \457\Kent Dep. Tr. at 202 (``The President of the United States is 
a longtime acknowledged leader of the free world, and the U.S. is 
Ukraine's strongest supporter. And so in the Ukraine context, it's very 
important to show that they can establish a strong relationship with 
the leader of the United States. That's the Ukrainian argument and 
desire to have a meeting. The foreign policy argument is it's a very 
important country in the front lines of Russian malign influence and 
aggression. And the U.S. spends a considerable amount of our resources 
supporting Ukraine and therefore it makes sense.'').
    \458\Hill Dep. Tr. at 158 (``He was just generally concerned about 
actually not having a meeting because he felt that this would deprive 
Ukraine, the new Ukrainian Government of the legitimacy that it needed, 
especially vis--vis the Russians. So this gets to, you know, the heart 
of our national security dilemma. You know, the Ukrainians at this 
point, you know, are looking at a White House meeting or looking at a 
meeting with the President of the United States as a recognition of 
their legitimacy as a sovereign state.'').
    \459\Vindman Hearing Tr. at 38-39 (``The show of support for 
President Zelensky, still a brand-new President, frankly, a new 
politician on the Ukrainian political scene, looking to establish his 
bona fides as a regional and maybe even a world leader, would want to 
have a meeting with the United States, the most powerful country in the 
world and Ukraine's most significant benefactor, in order to be able to 
implement his agenda.'').
    \460\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 59.
    \461\Id. at 328.
    \462\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 5 (``In late June, one of the 
goals of both channels was to facilitate a visit by President Zelensky 
to the White House for a meeting with President Trump, which President 
Trump had promised in his congratulatory letter of May 29. The 
Ukrainians were clearly eager for the meeting to happen. During a 
conference call with Ambassador Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State for European and Eurasian Affairs Phil Reeker, Secretary Perry, 
Ambassador Sondland, and Counsel of the U.S. Department of State Ulrich 
Brechbuhl on June 18, it was clear that a meeting between the two 
presidents was an agreed-upon goal.'').
    \463\Id. at 25 (``[D]uring my subsequent communications with 
Ambassadors Volker and Sondland, they relayed to me that the President 
wanted to hear from Zelensky' before scheduling the meeting in the Oval 
Office. It was not clear to me what this meant.'').
    \464\Id.
    \465\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 20.
    \466\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 25-26.
    \467\Id. at 25. See also id. at 128.
    Q: But Ambassador Sondland made it clear not only that he didn't 
wish to include most of the regular interagency participants but also 
that no one was transcribing or monitoring the call as they added 
President Zelensky. What struck you as odd about that?
    A: Same concern. That is, in the normal, regular channel, the State 
Department operations center that was putting the call together would 
stay on the line, in particular when you were having a conversation 
with the head of state, they would stay on the line, transcribe, take 
notes so that there could be a record of the discussion with this head 
of state. It is an official discussion. When he wanted to be sure that 
there was not, the State Department operations center agreed.
    \468\Id. at 26.
    \469\Id. at 127.
    \470\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \471\Id.
    \472\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 26.
    \473\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000027 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \474\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 242-243.
    \475\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000055 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \476\Id at. Bates KV00000027.
    Taylor: Are you OK with me briefing Ulrich on these conversations? 
Maybe you have already?
    Volker: I have not--please feel free.
    Volker: The key thing is to tee up a phone call w potus and then 
get visit nailed down.
    Taylor: I agree. Is Ze on board with a phone call?
    Volker: Yes--bogdan was a little skeptical, but Zelensky was ok 
with it. Now we need to get it on potus schedule . . .
    Taylor: The three amigos are on a roll. Let me know when I can 
help.
    \477\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 65-66 (``Kurt told me that he had discussed 
how President Zelensky could prepare for the phone call with President 
Trump. And without going into--without providing me any details about 
the specific words, did talk about investigations in that conversation 
. . . Kurt suggested that President Trump would like to hear about the 
investigations.'').
    \478\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 94.
    Q: In the July 2nd or 3rd meeting in Toronto that you had with 
President Zelensky, you also mentioned investigations to him, right?
    A: Yes.
    Q: And again, you were referring to the Burisma and the 2016 
election.
    A: I was thinking of Burisma and 2016.
    Q: And you understood that that what the Ukrainians interpreted 
references to investigations to be, related to Burisma and the 2016 
election?
    A: I don't know specifically at that time if we had talked that 
specifically, Burisma/2016. That was my assumption, though, that they 
would've been thinking that too.
    \479\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \480\Id. at 43.
    \481\Id. at 21-22.
    \482\Kent Dep. Tr. at 246.
    \483\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 59.
    \484\Kent Dep. Tr. at 246-247 (``I do not recall whether the 
follow-on conversation I had with Kurt about this was in Toronto, or 
whether it was subsequently at the State Department. But he did tell me 
that he planned to start reaching out to former Mayor of New York, Rudy 
Giuliani. And when I asked him why, he said that it was clear that the 
former mayor had influence on the President in terms of the way the 
President though of Ukraine. And I think by that moment in time, that 
was self-evidence to anyone who was working on the issues, and 
therefore, it made sense to try to engage the mayor. When I raised with 
Kurt, I said, about what? Because former Mayor Giuliani has a track 
record of, you know, asking for a visa for a corrupt former prosecutor. 
He attacked Masha, and he's tweeting that the new President needs to 
investigate Biden and the 2016 campaign. And Kurt's reaction or 
response to me at that was, well, if there's nothing there, what does 
it matter? And if there is something there, it should be investigated. 
My response to him was asking another country to investigate a 
prosecution for political reasons undermines our advocacy of the rule 
of law.'').
    \485\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \486\Id.
    \487\Id. at Bates KV00000006.
    \488\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 308; Kurt Volker Document 
Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2, 2019).
    \489\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 138.
    \490\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23.
    \491\Hill Dep. Tr. at 63.
    \492\Id. at 63-67, 155.
    \493\Id.
    Q: Did anything happen in that meeting that was out of the 
ordinary?
    A: Yes. At one point during that meeting, Ambassador Bolton was, 
you know, basically trying very hard not to commit to a meeting, 
because, you know--and, again, these meetings have to be well-prepared. 
They're not just something that you say, yes, we're going to have a 
meeting without there being a clear understanding of what the content 
of that meeting is going to be. . . . And Ambassador Bolton is always 
was always very cautious and always very much, you know, by the book 
and was not going to certainly commit to a meeting right there and 
then, certainly not one where it wasn't--it was unclear what the 
content of the meeting would be about, what kind of issues that we 
would discuss that would be pertaining to Ukrainian-U.S. relations. . . 
. Then Ambassador Sondland blurted out: Well, we have an agreement with 
the chief of staff for a meeting if these investigations in the energy 
sector start. And Ambassador Bolton immediately stiffened. He said 
words to the effect--I can't say word for word what he said because I 
was behind them sitting on the sofa with our Senior Director of Energy, 
and we all kind of looked up and thought that was somewhat odd. And 
Ambassador Bolton immediately stiffened and ended the meeting.
    Q: Right then, he just ended the meeting?
    A: Yeah. He said: Well, it was very nice to see you. You know, I 
can't discuss a meeting at this time. We'll clearly work on this. And, 
you know, kind of it was really nice to see you. So it was very abrupt. 
I mean, he looked at the clock as if he had, you know, suddenly another 
meeting and his time was up, but it was obvious he ended the meeting.
    \494\ Vindman Dep. Tr. at 17 (``The meeting proceeded well until 
the Ukrainians broached the subject of a meeting between the two 
Presidents. The Ukrainians saw this meeting as critically important in 
order to solidify the support for their most important international 
partner. Ambassador Sondland started--when Ambassador Sondland started 
to speak about Ukraine delivering specific investigations in order to 
secure the meeting with the President, Ambassador Bolton cut the 
meeting short.'')
    \495\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 310.
    \496\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23, 73, 103.
    \497\Hill Dep. Tr. at 68 (``And Ambassador Sondland said to 
Ambassador Volker and also Secretary Perry and the other people who 
were with him, including the Ukrainians, to come down to--there's a 
room in the White House, the Ward Room, to basically talk about next 
steps. And that's also unusual. I mean, he meant to talk to the 
Ukrainians about next steps about the meeting.'')
    \498\Id. (``And Ambassador Bolton pulled me back as I was walking 
out afterwards and said: Go down to the Ward Room right now and find 
out what they're talking about and come back and talk to me. So I did 
go down.'').
    \499\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 64-65.
    Q: And what do you recall specifically of what Sondland said to the 
Ukrainians--
    A: Right.
    Q: --in the Ward Room?
    A: So that is right, the conversation unfolded with Sondland 
proceeding to kind of, you know, review what the deliverable would be 
in order to get the meeting, and he talked about the investigation into 
the Bidens, and, frankly, I can't 100 percent recall because I didn't 
take notes of it, but Burisma, that it seemed--I mean, there was no 
ambiguity, I guess, in my mind. He was calling for something, calling 
for an investigation that didn't exist into the Bidens and Burisma.
    Q: Okay. Ambiguity in your mind is different from what you--
    A: Sure.
    Q: --actually heard?
    A: Right. Correct.
    Q: What did you hear Sondland say?
    A: That the Ukrainians would have to deliver an investigation into 
the Bidens.
    Q: Into the Bidens. So in the Ward Room he mentioned the word 
``Bidens''?
    A: To the best of my recollection, yes.
    Q: Okay. Did he mention 2016?
    A: I don't recall.
    Q: Did he mention Burisma?
    A: My visceral reaction to what was being called for suggested that 
it was explicit. There was no ambiguity.
    . . .
    A: Again, based on my visceral reaction, it was explicit what he 
was calling for. And to the best of my recollection, he did 
specifically say ``investigation of the Bidens.''
    . . .
    A: So the meeting that occurred in the Ward Room referenced 
investigations into the Bidens, to the best of my recollection, Burisma 
and 2016.
    \500\Hill Dep. Tr. at 69.
    \501\Id. at 151-152.
    \502\Id. at 69-70.
    \503\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 31.
    Q: Did Ambassador Sondland--were the Ukrainian officials in the 
room when he was describing the need for these investigations in order 
to get the White House meeting?
    A: So they were in the room initially. I think, once it became 
clear that there was some sort of discord amongst the government 
officials in the room, Ambassador Sondland asked them to step out of 
the room.
    Q: What was the discord?
    A: The fact that it was clear that I, as the representative--I, as 
the representative of the NSC, thought it was inappropriate and that we 
were not going to get involved in investigations.
    Q: Did you say that to Ambassador Sondland?
    A: Yes, I did.
    \504\Id. at 18. While not specifically disagreeing with any of the 
content of the discussion in the Ward Room, Ambassador Sondland 
generally disputed Dr. Hill and Lt. Col. Vindman's accounts, saying 
that he did not recall ``any yelling or screaming . . . as others have 
said.'' Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23. Neither Dr. Hill nor Lt. Col. 
Vindman described yelling or screaming in the meetings.
    Ambassador Sondland also testified that ``those recollections of 
protest do not square with the documentary record of our interactions 
with the NSC in the days and weeks that followed.'' Sondland Hearing 
Tr. at 23. As an example, Sondland provided text from a July 13 email 
that he sent--not to Dr. Hill, but to her successor Tim Morrison--which 
said that the ``sole purpose'' of the call between President Trump and 
President Zelensky was to give the former ``assurances of new sheriff' 
in town.'' Sondland Hearing Tr. at 23. The email that Ambassador 
Sondland provided does not undermine Dr. Hill's or Lt. Col. Vindman's 
testimony that they objected to Ambassador Sondland's conduct in the 
Ward Room meeting. The email provided by Ambassador Sondland, however, 
was sent to Mr. Morrison, not Dr. Hill. Mr. Morrison had not yet 
started working as NSC Senior Director for Europe and was not at the 
July 10 meeting.
    \505\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 29.
    A: So I heard him say that this had been coordinated with White 
House Chief of Staff Mr. Mick Mulvaney.
    Q: What did he say about that?
    A: He just said that he had had a conversation with Mr. Mulvaney, 
and this is what was required in order to get a meeting.
    \506\ Hill Dep. Tr. at 69-70.
    \507\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000036 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    Taylor: Eager to hear if your meeting with Danyliuk and Bolton 
resulted in a decision on a call.
    Taylor: How did the meeting go?
    Volker: Not good--lets talk--kv
    \508\Id. at Bates KV00000018.
    \509\Hill Dep. Tr. at 70-72.
    \510\Id. at 126-27.
    Q: Okay. But what did you understand him to mean by that?
    A: Well, based on what had happened in the July 10th meeting and 
Ambassador Sondland blurting out that he'd already gotten agreement to 
have a meeting at the White House for Zelensky if these investigations 
were started up again, clearly Ambassador Bolton was referring directly 
to those.
    \511\Id. at 129.
    \512\Id. at 139. (``I told him exactly, you know, what had 
transpired and that Ambassador Sondland had basically indicated that 
there was an agreement with the Chief of Staff that they would have a 
White House meeting or, you know, a Presidential meeting if the 
Ukrainians started up these investigations again.'').
    \513\Id.
    \514\Id. at 146-147.
    \515\Id. at 158-159, 161.
    Q: What was Mr. Eisenberg's reaction to what you explained to him 
had and Mr. Griffith had explained to him had occurred the day before?
    A: Yeah. He was also concerned. I mean, he wasn't aware that 
Sondland, Ambassador Sondland was, you know, kind of running around 
doing a lot of these, you know, meetings and independently. We talked 
about the fact that, you know, Ambassador Sondland said he'd been 
meeting with Giuliani and he was very concerned about that. And he said 
that he would follow up on this.
    \516\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 37. (``Sir, I think I--I mean, the top 
line I just offered, I'll restate it, which is that Mr. Sondland asked 
for investigations, for these investigations into Bidens and Burisma. I 
actually recall having that particular conversation. Mr. Eisenberg 
doesn't really work on this issue, so I had to go a little bit into the 
back story of what these investigations were, and that I expressed 
concerns and thought it was inappropriate.'').
    \517\Id. at 36.
    \518\Id. at 38.
    Q: Did he say anything to you, that, all right, I'm going to do 
anything with it?
    A: I vaguely recall something about: I'll take a look into it. You 
know, there might not be anything here. We'll take a look into it, 
something of that nature. But--and then he offered to, you know, if I 
have any concerns in the future, you know, that I should be open--I 
should be--feel free to come back and, you know, share those concerns.
    Q: Did either he or anyone from the legal staff circle back to you 
on this issue?
    A: No.
    \519\Id. at 39-40.
    \520\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 29. (``In the same July 19th phone call, 
they gave me an account of the July 10th meeting with the Ukrainian 
officials at the White House. Specifically, they told me that 
Ambassador Sondland had connected investigations with an Oval Office 
meeting for President Zelensky, which so irritated Ambassador Bolton 
that he abruptly ended the meeting, telling Dr. Hill and Mr. Vindman 
that they should have nothing to do with domestic politics.'').
    \521\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 12.
    \522\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019) (``2. The call between 
Zelensky and Potus should happen before 7/21. (Parliamentary Elections) 
Sole purpose is for Zelensky to give Potus assurances of `new sheriff' 
in town. Corruption ending, unbundling moving forward and any hampered 
investigations will be allowed to move forward transparently. Goal is 
for Potus to invite him to Oval. Volker, Perry, Bolton and I strongly 
recommend.'').
    \523\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 21 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \524\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 227.
    \525\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 21 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \526\Id.
    \527\Id.
    \528\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \529\Verizon Document Production. It is unclear whether this call 
occurred before or after Ambassador Sondland spoke with President 
Zelensky, and it is also unclear whether the White House caller was an 
Administration official or the President himself.
    \530\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \531\Id.
    \532\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 229-230.
    \533\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \534\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 202-203.
    \535\Id. at 232.
    \536\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000002 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \537\Id. at Bates KV00000018.
    \538\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 138-139.
    \539\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02705.
    \540\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 139.
    \541\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000018 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \542\Id. at Bates KV00000002-KV00000003.
    \543\Id. at Bates KV00000042.
    Volker: Orchestrated a great call w Rudy and Yermak. They are going 
to get together when Rudy goes to Madrid in a couple of weeks.
    Volker: In the meantime, Rudy is now advocating for phone call
    Volker: I have call into Fiona's replacement and will call Bolton 
if needed.
    Volker: But I can tell Bolton and you can tell Mick that Rudy 
agrees on a call, if that helps
    Sondland: I talked to Tim Morrison. (Fiona's replacement). He is 
pushing but feel free as well.
    \544\Id.
    \545\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 30.
    \546\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \547\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 74.
    \548\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 68.
    \549\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 177.
    \550\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 183.
    \551\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 17.
    \552\Id. at 18.
    \553\Id. at 19, 17.
    \554\Id. at 27.
    \555\Id. at 26.
    \556\Id. at 27.
    \557\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 26.
    \558\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 25.
    \559\Hill Dep. Tr. at 420-421.
    Q: You've mentioned repeatedly concerns that you had about, in 
particular, Mr. Giuliani and his efforts. When you read the call 
transcript of July 25th, the call record, which you must have done just 
a couple weeks ago, did it crystalize in your head in any way a better 
understanding of what was transpiring while you were there?
    A: In terms of providing, you know, more information with 
hindsight, unfortunately, yes.
    Q: And in what way?
    A: The specific references, also juxtaposed with the release of the 
text messages by Ambassador Volker--you know, what I said before--
really was kind of my worst fears and nightmares, in terms of, you 
know, there being some kind of effort not just to subvert the national 
security process but to try to subvert what really should be, you know, 
kind of, a diplomatic effort to, you know, kind of, set up a 
Presidential meeting.
    Q: This may--
    A: There seems to be an awful lot of people involved in, you know, 
basically turning a White House meeting into some kind of asset.
    Q: What do you mean by ``asset''?
    A: Well, something that was being, you know, dangled out to the 
Ukrainian Government. They wanted the White House meeting very much. 
And this was kind of laying out that it wasn't just a question of 
scheduling or having, you know, the national security issues worked 
out, that there were all of these alternative discussions going on 
behind.
    \560\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 174.
    \561\Id.
    \562\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \563\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 53-55.
    \564\Id. at 52-53.
    \565\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 30-31, 101, 247, 256.
    \566\Id. at 31.
    \567\Id. at 111.
    \568\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 102-103; Kurt Volker 
Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 2019). In his testimony, 
Ambassador Volker did not explain to the Committees what he had heard 
about the July 25 call put him in a position to tell Mr. Giuliani that 
the ``right messages'' were, in fact, discussed.
    Ambassador Volker testified twice about the readouts that he 
received of the July 25 call. In his deposition, he told the Committees 
that he received ``the same'' readout from both the State Department 
and Mr. Yermak: that there was a message of congratulations to 
President Zelensky, that President Zelensky promised to fight 
corruption and that President Trump repeated the invitation to visit 
the White House. Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 102-103. 
Ambassador Volker described it as a ``superficial'' readout. Volker 
Transcribed Interview Tr. at 19.
    In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker repeated that claim: the 
readouts from Mr. Yermak and Ambassador Volker's U.S. sources ``were 
largely the same, that it was a good call, that it was a congratulatory 
phone call for the President winning the parliamentary election.'' 
Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. at 74. Ambassador Volker did testify that 
he ``expected'' the call to cover the material in his July 25 text 
message--that the Ukrainians would ``investigate/`get to the bottom of 
what happened' in 2016''--but did not receive anything more than a 
``barebones'' description of what was said Volker-Morrison Hearing Tr. 
at 87-88, 75.
    If Ambassador Volker is correctly describing the readouts he 
received, it is not clear what he heard that gave him the basis to tell 
Mr. Giuliani that ``exactly the right messages'' were discussed.
    \569\Williams Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
    \570\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 23.
    \571\Id. at 25.
    \572\Trump and Putin Share Joke About Election Meddling, Sparking 
New Furor, New York Times (June 28, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/06/28/us/politics/trump-putin-election.html) (``As he sat down on 
Friday with Mr. Putin on the sidelines of an international summit in 
Japan, Mr. Trump was asked by a reporter if he would tell Russia not to 
meddle in American elections. `Yes, of course I will,' Mr. Trump said 
Turning to Mr. Putin, he said, with a half-grin on his face and mock 
seriousness in his voice, `Don't meddle in the election, 
President.''').
    \573\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 41.
    \574\Williams Dep. Tr. at 131.
    \575\See Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42, 109; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 41.
    \576\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 18; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 15.
    \577\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42-43; Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 32.
    \578\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 39; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \579\U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Italy, Secretary Michael R. 
Pompeo and Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio at a Press 
Availability (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at https://it.usembassy.gov/
secretary-michael-r-pompeo-and-italian-foreign-minister-luigi-di-maio-
at-a-press-availability/). Mr. Morrison testified that Dr. Kupperman 
was not in the Situation Room, but Mr. Morrison was informed after the 
fact that Dr. Kupperman was listening. Morrison Dep. Tr. at 39-40. Ms. 
Williams and Lt. Col. Vindman testified that they both believed Dr. 
Kupperman was present, but neither had a clear recollection. Williams 
Dep. Tr. at 64; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \580\See Transcript, This Week with George Stephanopoulos, ABC News 
(Sept. 22, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-
transcript-22-19-secretary-mike-pompeo-gen/story?id=65778332) (Q: And I 
want to turn to this whistleblower complaint, Mr. Secretary. The 
complaint involving the president and a phone call with a foreign 
leader to the director of national intelligence inspector general. 
That's where the complaint was launched by the whistle-blower. `The 
Wall Street Journal' is reporting that President Trump pressed the 
president of Ukraine eight times to work with Rudy Giuliani to 
investigate Joe Biden's son. What do you know about those 
conversations? A: So, you just gave me a report about a I.C. whistle-
blower complaint, none of which I've seen.. . .'').
    \581\Pompeo Took Part in Ukraine Call, Official Says, Wall Street 
Journal (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at www.wsj.com/articles/pompeo-took-
part-in-ukraine-call-official-says-11569865002).
    \582\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \583\Id.
    \584\Id. See European Union External Action Service, EU-Ukraine 
Relations Factsheet (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/4081/eu-ukraine-relations-
factsheet_en).
    \585\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \586\Id.; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 29.
    \587\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \588\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 114.
    \589\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \590\See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing 
Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections (Jan. 6, 
2017) (online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).
    \591\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \592\Charges of Ukrainian Meddling? A Russian Operation, U.S. 
Intelligence Says, New York Times (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/us/politics/ukraine-russia-
interference.html).
    \593\The President of Russia, Joint News Conference with Hungarian 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban (Feb. 2, 2017) (online at http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53806).
    \594\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 39-40.
    \595\President Trump's Former National Security Advisor `Deeply 
Disturbed' by Ukraine Scandal: `Whole World Is Watching,' ABC News 
(Sept. 29, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-
trumps-national-security-advisor-deeply-disturbed-ukraine/
story?id=65925477).
    \596\Hill Dep. Tr. at 234-235.
    \597\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \598\Id.
    \599\Id.
    \600\Id.
    \601\Id.
    \602\Id.
    \603\The White House, Remarks by President Trump before Marine One 
(Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-
67/).
    \604\Hill Dep. Tr. at 400; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 73; Hill-
Holmes Hearing Tr. at 63-64; Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 49-50; 
Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23.
    \605\Kent Dep. Tr. at 45.
    \606\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 116.
    \607\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 50.
    \608\See Section I, Chapter 1.
    \609\Kent Dep. Tr. at 44-50.
    \610\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 23.
    \611\Id.
    \612\See Section I, Chapter 1.
    \613\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \614\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 192-193.
    \615\Id.
    \616\Ambassador Volker was the only witness to testify that 
President Trump's reference to the ``prosecutor'' during the July 25 
call was to Mr. Shokin, not Mr. Lutsenko. See Volker Transcribed 
Interview Tr. at 355. However, Mr. Holmes testified that, on July 26--
the day after the call--he spoke with President Zelensky's Chief of 
Staff Andriy Bohdan who told Holmes that ``President Trump had 
expressed interest during the previous day's phone call in President 
Zelensky's personnel decisions related to the Prosecutor General's 
office,'' which Mr. Holmes understood to refer to Mr. Lutsenko once he 
saw the July 25 call transcript. Holmes Dep. Tr. at 22, 49. In 
addition, in a text message to Taylor and Sondland after his July 19 
breakfast with Giuliani, Volker emphasized that ``Most impt [important] 
is for Zelensky to say'' on the July 25 call ``that he will help 
investigation--and address any specific personnel issues--if there are 
any.'' Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000037 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \617\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \618\Id.
    \619\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 55.
    \620\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 49-50.
    \621\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 25.
    \622\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 19.
    \623\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 18.
    \624\In-Town Pool Report #6--Ukraine Call, White House Pool Report 
(July 25, 2019) (online at https://publicpool.kinja.com/subject-in-
town-pool-report-6-ukraine-call-1836700221).
    \625\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
    \626\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 31-33; Morrison-Volker Hearing 
Tr. at 34.
    \627\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 46-47.
    \628\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 29.
    \629\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 94.
    \630\Id. at 46-47.
    \631\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \632\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 147.
    \633\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 28-29.
    \634\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 96-97.
    \635\Id. at 97-98.
    \636\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 29.
    \637\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 23-24.
    \638\Id. at 41-42, 191-192.
    \639\Id. at 97.
    \640\Id.
    \641\Id. at 101.
    \642\Id. at 41.
    \643\Id. at 43.
    \644\Id. at 44.
    \645\Id. at 16.
    \646\Id. at 101.
    \647\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 38.
    \648\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 121.
    \649\Id. at 122.
    \650\Id. at 122-123.
    \651\Id. at 121.
    \652\Id. at 123-124.
    \653\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 121.
    \654\Id. at 55-56.
    \655\Id. at 55-56, 121-123.
    \656\Id. at 270.
    \657\Williams Dep. Tr. at 16, 63.
    \658\Id. at 149.
    \659\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 34.
    \660\Williams Dep. Tr. at 148.
    \661\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 29.
    \662\Williams Dep. Tr. at 54, 149.
    \663\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 54-55 (``There's one other substantive 
item in the next paragraph from Zelensky, where it says `He or she will 
look into the situation specifically to the company' it shouldn't be 
`the company. It should be `to Burisma that you mentioned.' Because I 
think, you know, frankly these are not necessarily folks that are 
familiar with the substance. So President Zelensky specifically 
mentioned the company Burisma.'').
    \664\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \665\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 89.
    \666\Williams Dep. Tr. at 68-69.
    Q: Okay. When the transcript was made available to the VP's office, 
do you remember when that occurred?
    A: My colleagues--I can't remember the precise time, but before the 
end of the day that day my colleagues who help prepare the Vice 
President's briefing book received a hard copy of the transcript from 
the White House Situation Room to include in that book. I didn't 
personally see it, but I understood that they had received it because 
we wanted to make sure the Vice President got it.
    Q: On the 25th or 26th?
    A: It was on the 25th.
    \667\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 139-141.
    \668\Kent Dep. Tr. at 163-165.
    \669\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 107.
    \670\Id. at 21-22.
    \671\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38; Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 26.
    \672\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 74 (``Yes. So I was not on the 
phone call. I had arrived in Ukraine, and I had had that lunch with Mr. 
Yermak that we saw on the day of the phone call. I had been pushing for 
the phone call because I thought it was important to renew the personal 
connection between the two leaders and to congratulate President 
Zelensky on the parliamentary election. The readout I received from Mr. 
Yermak and also from the U.S. side--although I'm not exactly sure who 
it was on the U.S. side, but there was U.S. and a Ukrainian readout--
were largely the same, that it was a good call, that it was a 
congratulatory phone call for the President winning the parliamentary 
election. President Zelensky did reiterate his commitment to reform and 
fighting corruption in Ukraine, and President Trump did reiterate his 
invitation to President Zelensky to come visit him in the White House. 
That's exactly what I thought the phone call would be, so I was not 
surprised at getting that as the readout.'').
    \673\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 22.
    \674\Id. at 22, 48-49.
    \675\Id. at 49.
    \676\Id. at 49.
    \677\Id. at 22.
    \678\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \679\Id. at 48-49.
    \680\Croft Dep. Tr. at 118-119.
    \681\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 25; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38.
    \682\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 89-90.
    \683\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 64.
    \684\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 38.
    \685\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 27.
    \686\Id.
    \687\Id. at 27-28.
    \688\Id.
    \689\Id.
    \690\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 108.
    \691\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 49.
    \692\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 25-26.
    \693\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \694\Id.
    \695\Id. at 49 (``The restaurant has sort of glass doors that open 
onto a terrace, and we were at the first tables on the terrace, so 
immediately outside of the interior of the restaurant. The doors were 
all wide open. There were--there was tables, a table for four, while I 
recall it being two tables for two pushed together. In any case, it was 
quite a wide table, and the table was set. There was sort of a table 
runner down the middle. I was directly across from Ambassador Sondland. 
We were close enough that we could, you know, share an appetizer 
between us, and then the two staffers were off to our right at this 
next table.'').
    \696\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \697\Id.
    \698\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 160.
    \699\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \700\Id. at 50.
    Q: Now, you said that you were able to hear President Trump's voice 
through the receiver. How were you able to hear if it was not on 
speaker phone?
    A: It was several things. It was quite loud when the President came 
on, quite distinctive. I believe Ambassador Sondland also said that he 
often speaks very loudly over the phone, and I certainly experienced 
that. When the President came on, he sort of winced and held the phone 
away from his ear like this, and he did that for the first couple 
exchanges. I don't know if he then turned the volume down, if he got 
used to it, if the President moderated his volume. I don't know. But 
that's how I was able to hear.
    \701\Id. at 28-29.
    \702\Trump Denies Discussing Ukraine Investigations with Sondland 
in July Phone Call, Axios (Nov. 13, 2019) (online at: www.axios.com/
trump-denies-ukraine-investigation-sondland-6063f555-2629-4f99-b2f9-
fd38739c0548.html).
    \703\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26.
    \704\Id. at 46.
    \705\Id. at 26.
    \706\Id.
    \707\Id. at 48.
    \708\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 25.
    \709\Id. at 25-26.
    \710\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 49-50. Ambassador Sondland opined 
that, while he may have referred to an investigation that Mr. Giuliani 
was pushing as an example of an investigation that President Trump 
cared about, he believed that he would have said ``Burisma, not 
Biden.'' He testified, however:
    Q: But do you recall saying at least referring to an investigation 
that Rudy Giuliani was pushing? Is that something that you likely would 
have said?
    A: I would have, yes.
    Id. at 50.
    \711\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 50.
    \712\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 67.
    \713\Id. at 68-69.
    \714\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \715\Id. at 107.
    \716\Id. at 34.
    \717\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 80.
    \718\Id. at 80-81.
    \719\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \720\Id.
    \721\Id.
    \722\Id. at Bates KV00000019.
    \723\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 112.
    \724\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \725\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 42.
    \726\Id.
    \727\Id. at 20-21.
    \728\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \729\Id. at Bates KV00000007.
    \730\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02786.
    \731\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \732\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 192-193.
    \733\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000007 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \734\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02797.
    \735\Id.
    \736\Id.
    \737\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03326.
    \738\Id.
    \739\Id.
    \740\Id.
    \741\Id.
    \742\Id.
    \743\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02798.
    \744\Id.
    \745\Id.
    \746\Id.
    \747\Id.
    \748\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02799.
    \749\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02801.
    \750\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \751\Id.
    \752\Id.
    \753\Id.
    \754\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02802-03, 
02813, 03326, 03719.
    \755\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03326.
    \756\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02802.
    \757\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02803.
    \758\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_03719.
    \759\Id.
    \760\Id. at Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02803.
    \761\Id.
    \762\Id.
    \763\Id.
    \764\Id.
    \765\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000004-KV00000005 
(Oct. 2, 2019).
    \766\Id. at Bates KV00000004-KV00000005; AT&T Document Production, 
Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02805-06.
    \767\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000023 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \768\Id.
    \769\Id.
    \770\Verizon Document Production.
    \771\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \772\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 290; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 100-101.
    \773\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \774\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 291.
    \775\Id.
    \776\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000019 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \777\Id.
    \778\Id.
    \779\Id. at Bates KV00000042.
    \780\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 15 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \781\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000042 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \782\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 291-292.
    \783\Id.
    \784\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 14 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \785\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000005 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \786\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02816.
    \787\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 22 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \788\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 102.
    \789\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 22 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \790\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \791\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \792\Id. at Bates KV00000007.
    \793\AT&T Document Production, Bates ATTHPSCI_20190930_02828.
    \794\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 113.
    \795\Id. at 71-72.
    \796\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000023 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \797\Id.
    \798\Id.
    \799\Id.
    \800\WhatsApp Security (online at www.whatsapp.com/security/) 
(accessed Nov. 29, 2019).
    \801\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \802\Id.
    \803\Id. at Bates KV00000023.
    \804\Id.
    \805\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 43-44, 113-114.
    \806\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 5 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \807\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 18.
    \808\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 191, 197-198.
    \809\Id. at 191-192.
    \810\Id. at 201.
    \811\Id. at 198.
    \812\Id. at 197.
    \813\Trump Hasn't Talked to Attorney General About Having Ukraine 
Investigate Biden, DOJ Says, CNN (Sept. 25, 2019) (online at 
www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-impeachment-inquiry-09-25-2019/
h_619f3c67775916f27e22898fbed210f2).
    \814\Cleaning Up Ukraine in the Shadow of Trump, The Financial 
Times (Nov. 28, 2019) (online at www.ft.com/content/eb8e4004-1059-11ea-
a7e6-62bf4f9e548a).
    \815\Id.
    \816\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 9.
    \817\Id.
    \818\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 196-197.
    \819\Taylor Dep. Opening Statement at 9.
    \820\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \821\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 196-197.
    \822\Kent Dep. Tr. at 261
    \823\Id. at 262-263.
    \824\Id. at 264.
    \825\Id. at 264-265.
    \826\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \827\Id. at Bates KV00000043.
    \828\Id.
    \829\Id.
    \830\Volker Transcribed Interview Opening Statement at 8.
    \831\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 44.
    \832\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 21.
    \833\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 259-260.
    \834\Id. at 260.
    \835\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 128.
    \836\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000043 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \837\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 199-200.
    \838\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32, 68; Sondland Hearing Tr. at 
55-57.
    \839\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 71.
    \840\Id. at 62, 66.
    \841\Id. at 62.
    \842\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 90-91.
    \843\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 23, Impeachment, 116th 
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \844\Id.
    \845\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 104.
    \846\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 18, Impeachment, 116th 
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \847\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 44.
    \848\Id. at 75.
    \849\Id. at 76.
    \850\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, at 23, Impeachment, 116th 
Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \851\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \852\Id.
    \853\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 28.
    \854\Id. at 106.
    \855\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \856\Id. at 31.
    \857\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
    \858\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 230.
    \859\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
    \860\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 8.
    \861\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \862\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 80-81.
      A: By the time it hit Politico publicly, I believe it was the end 
of August. And I got a text message from, it was either the Foreign 
Minister or--I think it was the future Foreign Minister. And, you know, 
basically, you're just--you're--I have to verbalize this. You're just 
trying to explain that we are trying this. We have a complicated 
system. We have a lot of players in this. We are working this. Give us 
time to fix it.
      Q: So anybody on the Ukrainian side of things ever express like 
grave concern that this would not get worked out?
      A: Not that it wouldn't get worked out, no, they did not. They 
expressed concern that, since this has now come out publicly in this 
Politico article, it looks like that they're being, you know, singled 
out and penalized for some reason. That's the image that that would 
create in Ukraine.
    \863\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 34.
    \864\Id. at 137-138.
    \865\Id.
    \866\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 174.
    \867\Id. at 40.
    \868\Id.
    \869\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \870\Id.
    \871\Id. at 68.
    \872\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 58.
    \873\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 40.
    \874\Trump, in August Call with GOP Senator, Denied Official's 
Claim on Ukraine Aid, Wall Street Journal (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at 
www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-used-potential-meeting-to-
pressure-ukraine-on-biden-texts-indicate-11570205661).
    \875\Id.
    \876\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin 
Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019) 
(online at www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-
42e6-88b1-b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf).
    \877\Id.
    \878\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \879\Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Background to 
``Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections'': 
The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017) 
(online at www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf).
    \880\Letter from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan, 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin Nunes, 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019) (online at 
www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-42e6-88b1-
b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf).
    \881\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \882\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr. at 251-252; Kent-Taylor 
Hearing Tr. at 41.
    \883\Williams Dep. Tr. at 74-77.
    \884\Id. at 76.
    \885\Id. at 78-79.
    \886\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 30.
    \887\Id. at 38. See also Sondland Hearing Tr. at 57:
      A: I don't know exactly what I said to him. This was a briefing 
attended by many people, and I was invited at the very last minute. I 
wasn't scheduled to be there. But I think I spoke up at some point late 
in the meeting and said, it looks like everything is being held up 
until these statements get made, and that's my, you know, personal 
belief.
      Q: And Vice President Pence just nodded his head?
      A: Again, I don't recall any exchange or where he asked me any 
questions. I think he--it was sort of a duly noted response.
      Q: Well, he didn't say, Gordon, what are you talking about?
      A: No, he did not.
      Q: He didn't say, what investigations?
      A: He did not.
    \888\Pence Disputes that Sondland Raised Concerns to Him About 
Ukraine Aid-Investigations Link, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 20, 2019) 
(online at www.wsj.com/livecoverage/gordon-sondland-testifies-
impeachment/card/1574268547).
    \889\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 190.
    \890\Id. at 35.
    \891\Id. at 190-191.
    \892\Williams Dep. Tr. at 81.
    \893\Id. at 82.
    \894\Id. at 82-83.
    \895\Id. at 83.
    \896\Id.
    \897\How a CIA Analyst, Alarmed by Trump's Shadow Foreign Policy, 
Triggered an Impeachment Inquiry, Washington Post (Nov. 16, 2019) 
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/how-a-cia-analyst-
alarmed-by-trumps-shadow-foreign-policy-triggered-an-impeachment-
inquiry/2019/11/15/042684a8-03c3-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \898\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 31.
    \899\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 31.
    \900\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 134.
    \901\Id. at 155.
    \902\Id.
    \903\Id. at 137.
    \904\Id. at 182.
    \905\Id. at 184.
    \906\Id. at 228.
    \907\Id. at 154.
    \908\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 42.
    \909\Id.
    \910\Id. at 57.
    \911\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000039 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \912\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 42.
    \913\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 190.
    \914\Id.
    \915\Id.
    \916\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 60.
    \917\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 59.
    \918\Id. at 59-60.
    \919\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-191.
    \920\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 52.
    \921\Id. at 53-54; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 238.
    \922\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-44.
    \923\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \924\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 44.
    \925\Id.
    \926\Id.
    \927\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 109-110.
    \928\Id.
    \929\Id. at 110-111.
    \930\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 45.
    \931\Id. at 45, 63.
    \932\Id. at 45.
    \933\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 110. Ambassador Volker also testified 
that Ambassador Sondland used the same analogy to him when discussing 
the release of the hold on security assistance. Morrison-Volker Hearing 
Tr. at 96-97.
    \934\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \935\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 209.
    \936\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \937\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 54.
    \938\Id.
    \939\Id.
    \940\Id.
    \941\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000053 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \942\Sondland Dep. Tr. at 217.
    \943\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 26 (``Was there a quid pro quo? As I 
testified previously with regard to the requested White House call and 
the White House meeting, the answer is yes.'').
    \944\Id. at 41.
    \945\Id. at 112
    \946\Id. at 61-62.
    \947\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 39.
    \948\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 39.
    \949\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 110; Whistleblower Compl. Appendix 2. 
Public reporting indicates that ``[l]awyers from the White House 
counsel's office told Mr. Trump in late August about the complaint, 
explaining that they were trying to determine whether they were legally 
required to give it to Congress.'' Trump Knew of Whistle-Blower 
Complaint When He Released Aid to Ukraine, New York Times (Nov. 26, 
2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/us/politics/trump-whistle-
blower-complaint-ukraine.html).
    \950\Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff and Ranking Member 
Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 9, 
2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
20190909_-_ic_ig_letter_to_hpsci_on_whistleblower.pdf).
    \951\Id.
    \952\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 118. See also Witness Testimony and 
Records Raise Questions About Account of Trump's `No Quid Pro Quo' 
Call, Washington Post (Nov. 27, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/witness-testimony-and-records-raise-
questions-about-account-of-trumps-no-quid-pro-quo-call/2019/11/27/
425545c2-0d49-11ea-8397-a955cd542d00_story.html).
    \953\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 118.
    \954\Id. at 73.
    \955\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of 
State, at 1 (Nov. 4, 2019). This addendum did not address the July 26 
telephone conversation that Sondland had with President Trump, which he 
only recalled following the testimony of David Holmes on November 15, 
2019. Sondland Hearing Tr. at 46.
    \956\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of 
State, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \957\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-44; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-
191.
    \958\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 190-191; Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43-
44.
    \959\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 109.
    \960\Id. at 45, 109.
    \961\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000020 (Oct. 2, 
2019).
    \962\Id.
    \963\Id. at Bates KV00000053.
    \964\Id.
    \965\The White House, Press Briefing by Acting Chief of Staff Mick 
Mulvaney (Oct. 17, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/press-briefing-acting-chief-staff-mick-mulvaney/).
    \966\Id.
    \967\Id. Ambassador Taylor's testimony contradicted Mr. Mulvaney's 
statement about the ubiquity of such quid pro quos in American foreign 
policy. Ambassador Taylor testified that in his decades of military and 
diplomatic service, he had never seen another example of foreign aid 
conditioned on the personal or political interests of the President. 
Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 55. Rather, ``[w]e condition assistance on 
issues that will improve our foreign policy, serve our foreign policy, 
ensure that taxpayers' money is well-spent.'' Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. 
at 150.
    \968\There were early concerns raised in the House and Senate about 
the frozen aid, even before the news became public. On August 9, the 
Democratic leadership of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees 
wrote to OMB and the White House warning that the August 3 letter 
apportionment might constitute an illegal impoundment of funds. They 
urged the Trump Administration to adhere to the law and obligate the 
withheld funding. Letter from Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy, Senate 
Committee on Appropriations, and Chairwoman Nita M. Lowey, House 
Committee on Appropriations, to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, 
The White House, and Acting Director Russell Vought, Office of 
Management and Budget (Aug. 9, 2019) (online at https://
appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.house.gov/
files/documents/SFOPS%20Apportionment%20Letter%20Lowey-
Leahy%20Signed%202019.8.9.pdf). On August 19, the Democratic leadership 
of the House and Senate Budget Committees wrote to OMB and the White 
House urging the Administration to comply with appropriations law and 
the Impoundment Control Act. Letter from Chairman John Yarmuth, House 
Committee on the Budget, and Ranking Member Bernard Sanders, Senate 
Committee on the Budget, to Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, The 
White House (Aug. 19, 2019) (online at https://budget.house.gov/sites/
democrats.budget.house.gov/files/documents/OMB%20Letter_081919.pdf).
    \969\Letter from Senators Jeanne Shaheen, Rob Portman, Richard 
Durbin, Ron Johnson, and Richard Blumenthal to Acting White House Chief 
of Staff Mick Mulvaney (Sept. 3, 2019) (online at 
www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Ukraine%20Security%20Letter%209.3.2019.pdf).
    \970\Id.
    \971\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel and Ranking Member Michael 
T. McCaul, House Foreign Affairs Committee to Mick Mulvaney, Director, 
and Russell Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget, 
The White House (Sept. 5, 2019) (online at https://
foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/c/4/c49328c2-941b-4c41-8c00-
8c1515f0972f/
D1968A9&fxsp0C42455BB3&fxsp0AFC38F&fxsp097D966&fxsp0857B.ele-
mccaul-letter-to-mulvaney-vought-on-ukraine-assistance.pdf).
    \972\Trump Tries to Force Ukraine to Meddle in the 2020 Election, 
Washington Post (Sept. 5, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/global-opinions/is-trump-strong-arming-ukraines-new-president-
for-political-gain/2019/09/05/4eb239b0-cffa-11e9-8c1c-
7c8ee785b855_story.html).
    \973\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 37-38.
    \974\Id. at 38.
    \975\See Letter from Senator Christopher Murphy to Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Acting 
Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, House Committee on Oversight and Reform 
(Nov. 19, 2019) (online at www.murphy.senate.gov/download/111919-sen-
murphy-letter-to-house-impeachment-investigators-on-ukraine) (``Senator 
Johnson and I assured Zelensky that Congress wanted to continue this 
funding, and would press Trump to release it immediately.''); Letter 
from Senator Ron Johnson to Ranking Member Jim Jordan, Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, and Ranking Member Devin Nunes, Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 18, 2019) (online at 
www.ronjohnson.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/e0b73c19-9370-42e6-88b1-
b2458eaeeecd/johnson-to-jordan-nunes.pdf) (``I explained that I had 
tried to persuade the president to authorize me to announce the hold 
was released but that I was unsuccessful.'').
    \976\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Three House 
Committees Launch Probe Into Trump and Giuliani Pressure Campaign 
(Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=685).
    \977\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \978\Id.
    \979\Id.
    \980\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of 
State (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \981\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 245.
    \982\Id.
    \983\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 303.
    \984\Id. at 304.
    \985\Letter from Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff and Ranking Member 
Devin Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 9, 
2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
20190909_-_ic_ig_letter_to_hpsci_on_whistleblower.pdf).
    \986\Id. see also 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3033(k)(5) (setting forth 
procedures for reporting of complaints or information with respect to 
an ``urgent concern'' to Congressional intelligence committees).
    \987\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 14 (``As a result, we consulted with 
the White House Counsel's Office, and we were advised that much of the 
information in the complaint was, in fact, subject to executive 
privilege, a privilege that I do not have the authority to waive. 
Because of that, we were unable to immediately share the details of the 
complaint with this committee but continued to consult with the White 
House counsels in an effort to do so.'').
    \988\Id. at 15-16 (``Because the allegation on its face did not 
appear to fall in the statutory framework, my office consulted with the 
United States Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel. . . . 
After reviewing the complaint and the Inspector General's transmission 
letter, the Office of Legal Counsel determined that the complaint's 
allegations do not meet the statutory definition concerning legal 
urgent concern, and found that I was not legally required to transmit 
the material to our oversight committee under the Whistleblower 
Protection Act.'').
    \989\Id. at 22-23. See also CIA's Top Lawyer Made `Criminal 
Referral' on Complaint about Trump Ukraine Call, NBC News (Oct. 4, 
2019) (online at www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-impeachment-inquiry/
cia-s-top-lawyer-made-criminal-referral-whistleblower-s-complaint-
n1062481) (reporting that the CIA's General Counsel, Courtney Simmons 
Elwood, informed NSC chief lawyer John Eisenberg about an anonymous 
whistleblower complaint on August 14, 2019).
    \990\Maguire Hearing Tr. at 14, 21-22. On September 26, Acting DNI 
Maguire testified that he and the ODNI General Counsel first consulted 
with the White House counsel's office before discussing the 
whistleblower complaint with the Department of Justice's Office of 
Legal Counsel:
    The Chairman.I'm just trying to understand the chronology. You 
first went to the Office of Legal Counsel, and then you went to the 
White House Counsel?
    Acting Director Maguire. No, no, no, sir. No, sir. No. We went to 
the White House first to determine_to ask the question_
    The Chairman. That's all I want to know is the chronology. So you 
went to the White House first. So you went to the subject of the 
complaint for advice first about whether you should provide the 
complaint to Congress?
    Acting Director Maguire. There were issues within this, a couple of 
things: One, it did appear that it has executive privilege. If it does 
have executive privilege, it is the White House that determines that. I 
cannot determine that, as the Director of National Intelligence.
    Id. at 21-22.
    \991\Trump Knew of Whistle-Blower Complaint When He Released Aid to 
Ukraine, New York Times (Nov. 26, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/26/us/politics/trump-whistle-blower-complaint-ukraine.html).
    \992\Id. The Administration repeatedly referenced privilege 
concerns in connection with the whistleblower complaint. See, e.g., 
Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019) (noting that ``the 
complaint involves confidential and potentially privileged 
communications by persons outside the Intelligence Community'') 
(emphasis added); Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 17, 2019) 
(characterizing subpoena to the Acting DNI for documents as demanding 
``sensitive and potentially privileged'' materials and whistleblower 
complaint as involving ``potentially privileged matters relating to the 
interests of other stakeholders within the Executive Branch'') 
(emphasis added).
    However, the White House never formally invoked executive privilege 
as to the whistleblower complaint. See Maguire Hearing Tr. at 20 
(``Chairman Schiff: So they never asserted executive privilege, is that 
the answer? Acting Director Maguire: Mr. Chairman, if they did, we 
would not have released the letters yesterday and all the information 
that has been forthcoming.'').
    \993\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of 
National Intelligence (Sept. 10, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190910_-
_chm_schiff_letter_to_acting_dni_maguire.pdf).
    \994\Id.
    \995\See Letter from Jason Klitenic, General Counsel, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019).
    \996\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of 
National Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190913_-
_chm_schiff_letter_to_acting_dni_re_whistleblower_-_subpoena.pdf).
    \997\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 
25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \998\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 305-06; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 242.
    \999\Morrison Dep. Tr. at 242.
    \1000\See, e.g., Id. at 244; Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306; Williams Dep. 
Tr. at 147.
    \1001\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 68-69.
    \1002\Williams Dep. Tr. at 147. Ms. Williams did testify that 
President Trump's pressure on President Zelensky to open investigations 
into the Bidens on the July 25 call ``shed some light on possible other 
motivations behind a security assistance hold.'' Williams Dep. Tr. at 
149.
    \1003\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 42, 139-140. According to a press report, 
after Congress began investigating President Trump's scheme, the White 
House Counsel's Office reportedly opened an internal investigation 
relating to the July 25 call. As part of that internal investigation, 
White House lawyers gathered and reviewed ``hundreds of documents'' 
that ``reveal extensive efforts to generate an after-the-fact 
justification'' for the hold on military assistance for Ukraine ordered 
by President Trump. These documents reportedly include ``early August 
email exchanges between acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and White 
House budget officials seeking to provide an explanation for 
withholding the funds after the president had already ordered a hold in 
mid-July on the nearly $400 million in security assistance.'' White 
House Review Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify 
Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 
24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-
review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-
decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-
bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html). The White House has withheld these 
documents from the Committee, so the Committee cannot verify the 
accuracy of the reporting as of the publication of this report.
    \1004\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 49.
    \1005\Id. at 42, 44.
    \1006\Id. at 180.
    \1007\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 306.
    \1008\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 83.
    \1009\Id. at 47-48, 58, 112-114; Sandy Dep. Tr. at 34-35, 85-86, 
95, 128, 129-131, 133; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 163; Kent Dep. Tr. at 308-
309; Reeker Dep. Tr. at 133. News reports indicate that a confidential 
White House review of President Trump's hold on military assistance to 
Ukraine has identified hundreds of documents revealing ``extensive 
efforts to generate an after-the-fact justification for the decision 
and a debate over whether the delay was legal.'' White House Review 
Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify Trump's Decision to 
Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-review-turns-up-emails-
showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-decision-to-block-ukraine-
military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-bd9d-
c628fd48b3a0_story.html). According to ``two people briefed on an 
internal White House review,'' in August, Acting Chief of Staff 
Mulvaney ``asked . . . whether there was a legal justification for 
withholding hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to 
Ukraine.'' Mulvaney Asked About Legal Justification for Withholding 
Ukraine Aid, New York Times (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/11/24/us/politics/mulvaney-ukraine-aid.html). Reports indicate 
that, ``[e]mails show [OMB Director] Vought and OMB staffers arguing 
that withholding aid was legal, while officials at the National 
Security Council and State Department protested. OMB lawyers said that 
it was legal to withhold the aid, as long as they deemed it a 
`temporary' hold.'' White House Review Turns Up Emails Showing 
Extensive Effort to Justify Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military 
Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/white-house-review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-
to-justify-trumps-decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/
2121cf98-0d57-11ea-bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html). The White House and 
State Department's obstruction of Congress has prevented the Committee 
from obtaining any documents on this matter and, therefore, the 
Committee cannot verify the accuracy of this reporting as of the 
publication of this report.
    \1010\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 80.
    \1011\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 146-147.
    \1012\See Department of Defense, DOD Budget Materials (FY2011-
FY2018) (online at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/). 
In 1974, President Nixon impounded 15-20 percent of a number of 
specific programs, which prompted the passage of the Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974. Congressional Research Service, The Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) Legislative History and Analysis (Feb. 
26, 1975).
    \1013\Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, 
and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations 
Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, Sec. 9013 (2018); Sandy Dep. Tr. at 
147.
    \1014\Continuing Appropriations Act 2020, and Health Extenders Act 
of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-59, Sec. 124 (2019).
    \1015\Cooper Dep. Tr. at 98.
    \1016\$35 Million in Pentagon Aid Hasn't Reached Ukraine Despite 
White House Assurances, L.A. Times (Nov. 19, 2019) (online at 
www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-11-19/documents-show-nearly-40-
million-in-ukraine-aid-delayed-despite-white-house-assurances).
    \1017\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's 
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \1018\Id.
    \1019\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 40.
    \1020\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 106.
    \1021\Id.
    \1022\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 33.
    \1023\Id.
    \1024\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 41.
    \1025\Id. at 217-18.
    \1026\Id.
    \1027\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 30.
    \1028\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's 
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \1029\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 33; see also Zelensky Planned to 
Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's What Happened, Washington 
Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-
what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-072a-11ea-8292-
c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \1030\Kent. Dep. Tr. at 333.
    \1031\Id. at 329-31.
    \1032\Id. at 330.
    \1033\Zelensky Planned to Announce Trump's `Quo' on My Show. Here's 
What Happened, Washington Post (Nov. 14, 2019) (online at 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zelensky-was-planning-to-announce-
trumps-quid-pro-quo-on-my-show-heres-what-happened/2019/11/14/47938f32-
072a-11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \1034\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46-47.
    \1035\Williams Dep. Tr. at 156.
    \1036\Id.
    \1037\Pence Says He's Working to Release Transcripts of His Calls 
with Ukraine Leader, Politico (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at 
www.politico.com/news/2019/10/09/pence-ukraine-zelensky-biden-043684).
    \1038\Pence: I Don't Object To Releasing My Call Transcripts With 
Zelensky, Fox Business (Nov. 7, 2019) (online at 
www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2019/11/07/
pence_i_dont_object_to_releasing_my_call_transcripts_with_zelensky.html)
    \1039\Rudy Giuliani's Remarkable Ukraine Interview, Annotated, 
Washington Post (Sept. 20, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2019/09/20/rudy-giulianis-remarkable-ukraine-interview-
annotated/).
    \1040\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President 
Duda of Poland Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 23, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-duda-poland-bilateral-meeting/).
    \1041\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon Arriving at 
the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-
arriving-u-n-general-assembly-new-york-ny/).
    \1042\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President 
Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept 25, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-zelensky-ukraine-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/).
    \1043\The White House, Remarks by President Trump at the Swearing-
in Ceremony of Secretary of Labor Eugene Scalia (Sept 30, 2019) (online 
at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
swearing-ceremony-secretary-labor-eugene-scalia/).
    \1044\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President 
Niinisto of the Republic of Finland Before Bilateral Meeting (Oct. 2, 
2019) (www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-niinisto-republic-finland-bilateral-meeting/).
    \1045\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-67/).
    \1046\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-68).
    \1047\Id.
    \1048\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Oct. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-67/). These 
recent statements by President inviting foreign assistance for his 
personal political interests are consistent with his statements to 
George Stephanopoulos of ABC News on June 12, when President Trump 
indicated a desire to receive dirt on a political opponent provided by 
a foreign country. ABC News' Oval Office interview with President 
Trump, ABC News (June 13, 2019) (online at https://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/abc-news-oval-office-interview-president-donald-trump/
story?id=63688943).
    \1049\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 46-47, 91-92.
    \1050\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 158-19; Holmes Dep. Tr. at 100; Kent-
Taylor Hearing Tr. at 43.
    \1051\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 24.
    \1052\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 46.
    \1053\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 165.
    \1054\Id.
    \1055\Id. at 24.
    \1056\Id. at 55-56.
    \1057\Id. at 164.
    \1058\Kent Dep. Tr. at 329; Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 138-139.
    \1059\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr. at 139.
    \1060\Id.

                              SECTION II.

     THE PRESIDENT'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' 
                          IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY

      1. Constitutional Authority for Congressional Oversight and 
                              Impeachment


Article I of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the 
        ``sole Power of Impeachment.'' Congress is authorized to 
        conduct oversight and investigations in support of its Article 
        I powers. The Supreme Court--and previous Presidents--have 
        acknowledged these authorities.

                                Overview

    The House's Constitutional and legal authority to conduct 
an impeachment inquiry is clear, as is the duty of the 
President to cooperate with the House's exercise of this 
authority. The Constitution vests in the House of 
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment'' as well as 
robust oversight powers. As the Founders intended, the courts 
have agreed, and prior Presidents have acknowledged, the 
House's sweeping powers to investigate are at their peak during 
an impeachment inquiry of a President. Congress has also 
enacted statutes to support its power to investigate and 
oversee the Executive Branch.
    Unlike President Donald J. Trump, past Presidents who were 
the subject of impeachment inquiries acknowledged Congress' 
authority to investigate and--to varying degrees--complied with 
information requests and subpoenas. Even so, the House has 
previously determined that partial noncooperation can serve as 
a ground for an article of impeachment against a President as 
it would upend the separation of powers to allow the President 
to dictate the scope of an impeachment inquiry. When President 
Richard Nixon withheld tape recordings and produced heavily 
edited and inaccurate records, the House Judiciary Committee 
approved an article of impeachment for obstruction.

     Constitutional Power of Congress to Investigate_and to Impeach

    Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives the House of 
Representatives the ``sole Power of Impeachment.''\1\ The 
Framers intended the impeachment power to be an essential check 
on a President who might engage in corruption or abuse power. 
For example, during the Constitutional Convention, George Mason 
stated:

          No point is of more importance than that the right of 
        impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above 
        Justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can 
        commit the most extensive injustice? . . . Shall the 
        man who has practised corruption & by that means 
        procured his appointment in the first instance, be 
        suffered to escape punishment, by repeating his 
        guilt?\2\

    Congress is empowered to conduct oversight and 
investigations to carry out its authorities under Article I.\3\ 
In light of the core nature of the impeachment power to the 
nation's Constitutional system of checks and balances, 
Congress' investigative authority is at its zenith during an 
impeachment inquiry.\4\
    As the House Judiciary Committee explained during the 
impeachment of President Nixon:

          Whatever the limits of legislative power in other 
        contexts--and whatever need may otherwise exist for 
        preserving the confidentiality of Presidential 
        conversations--in the context of an impeachment 
        proceeding the balance was struck in favor of the power 
        of inquiry when the impeachment provision was written 
        into the Constitution.\5\

    This conclusion echoed an early observation on the floor of 
the House of Representatives that the ``House possessed the 
power of impeachment solely, and that this authority certainly 
implied the right to inspect every paper and transaction in any 
department, otherwise the power of impeachment could never be 
exercised with any effect.''\6\
    The House's ``sole Power of Impeachment'' is the mechanism 
provided by the Constitution to hold sitting Presidents 
accountable for serious misconduct. The Department of Justice 
has highlighted the importance of the impeachment power in 
justifying the Department's view that a sitting President 
cannot be indicted or face criminal prosecution while in 
office.\7\ The Department's position that the President is 
immune from prosecution has not been endorsed by Congress or 
the courts, but as long as the Department continues to refuse 
to prosecute a sitting President, Congress has a heightened 
responsibility to exercise its impeachment power, if necessary, 
to ensure that no President is ``above the law.''\8\
    The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has broad 
oversight authority under the Constitution to inquire about a 
wide array of topics, even outside the context of impeachment:

          The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress 
        throughout our history, over the whole range of the 
        national interests concerning which Congress might 
        legislate or decide upon due investigation not to 
        legislate; it has similarly been utilized in 
        determining what to appropriate from the national 
        purse, or whether to appropriate. The scope of the 
        power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and 
        farreaching as the potential power to enact and 
        appropriate under the Constitution.\9\

    The Supreme Court has made clear that Congress' authority 
to investigate includes the authority to compel the production 
of information by issuing subpoenas,\10\ a power the House has 
delegated to its committees pursuant to its Constitutional 
authority to ``determine the Rules of its Proceedings.''\11\
    The Supreme Court has affirmed that compliance with 
Congressional subpoenas is mandatory:

          It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to 
        cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain 
        the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It 
        is their unremitting obligation to respond to 
        subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and 
        its committees and to testify fully with respect to 
        matters within the province of proper 
        investigation.\12\

    Federal courts have held that the ``legal duty'' to respond 
to Congressional subpoenas extends to the President's ``senior-
level aides'' and that the failure to comply violates the 
separation of powers principles in the Constitution.\13\ As one 
court recently explained:

          [W]hen a committee of Congress seeks testimony and 
        records by issuing a valid subpoena in the context of a 
        duly authorized investigation, it has the 
        Constitution's blessing, and ultimately, it is acting 
        not in its own interest, but for the benefit of the 
        People of the United States. If there is fraud or abuse 
        or waste or corruption in the federal government, it is 
        the constitutional duty of Congress to find the facts 
        and, as necessary, take corrective action. Conducting 
        investigations is the means that Congress uses to carry 
        out that constitutional obligation. Thus, blatant 
        defiance of Congress' centuries-old power to compel the 
        performance of witnesses is not an abstract injury, nor 
        is it a mere banal insult to our democracy. It is an 
        affront to the mechanism for curbing abuses of power 
        that the Framers carefully crafted for our protection, 
        and, thereby, recalcitrant witnesses actually undermine 
        the broader interests of the People of the United 
        States.\14\

                        Laws Passed by Congress

    Congress has enacted statutes to support its power to 
investigate and oversee the Executive Branch. These laws impose 
criminal and other penalties on those who fail to comply with 
inquiries from Congress or block others from doing so, and they 
reflect the broader Constitutional requirement to cooperate 
with Congressional investigations. For example:
     Obstructing Congress: Obstructing a Congressional 
investigation is a crime punishable by up to five years in 
prison. An individual is guilty of obstruction if he or she 
``corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening 
letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede'' the ``due and 
proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry 
or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee 
of either House.''\15\
     Concealing Material Facts: Concealing information 
from Congress is also punishable by up to five years in prison. 
This prohibition applies to anyone who ``falsifies, conceals, 
or covers up'' a ``material fact'' in connection with ``any 
investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of 
any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the 
Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or 
Senate.''\16\
     Intimidating and Harassing Witnesses: Intimidating 
witnesses in a Congressional investigation is a crime 
punishable by up to twenty years in prison. This statute 
applies to anyone who ``knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, 
or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or 
engages in misleading conduct toward another person,'' with the 
intent to ``influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any 
person in an official proceeding.''\17\ An individual who 
``intentionally harasses another person and thereby hinders, 
delays, prevents, or dissuades'' a person from ``attending or 
testifying in an official proceeding'' is also guilty of a 
crime punishable by fines and up to three years in prison.\18\
     Retaliating Against Employees Who Provide 
Information to Congress: Employees who speak to Congress have 
the right not to have adverse personnel actions taken against 
them. Retaliatory actions taken against Executive Branch 
employees who cooperate with Congress may constitute violations 
of this law.\19\ Any Executive Branch official who ``prohibits 
or prevents'' or ``attempts or threatens to prohibit or 
prevent'' any officer or employee of the federal government 
from speaking with Congress could have his or her salary 
withheld.\20\

      Precedent of Previous Impeachments and Other Investigations

    Unlike President Trump, past Presidents who were the 
subject of impeachment inquiries--including Presidents Andrew 
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton--acknowledged 
Congress' authority to investigate and, to varying degrees, 
complied with information requests and subpoenas.
    For example, President Johnson complied with the House's 
requests for information. According to a report subsequently 
adopted by the House Judiciary Committee, ``There is no 
evidence that Johnson ever asserted any privilege to prevent 
disclosure of presidential conversations to the Committee, or 
failed to comply with any of the Committee's requests.''\21\
    Similarly, President Clinton provided written responses to 
81 interrogatories from the House Judiciary Committee during 
the House's impeachment inquiry.\22\
    Even President Nixon agreed to let his staff testify 
voluntarily in the Senate Watergate investigation, stating: 
``All members of the White House Staff will appear voluntarily 
when requested by the committee. They will testify under oath, 
and they will answer fully all proper questions.''\23\ As a 
result, numerous senior White House officials testified, 
including White House Counsel John Dean III, White House Chief 
of Staff H.R. Haldeman, Deputy Assistant to the President 
Alexander Butterfield, and Chief Advisor to the President for 
Domestic Affairs John D. Ehrlichman.\24\ President Nixon also 
produced numerous documents and records in response to the 
House's subpoenas as part of its impeachment inquiry, including 
more than 30 transcripts of White House recordings and notes 
from meetings with the President.\25\
    However, President Nixon's production of documents was 
incomplete. For example, he did not produce tape recordings, 
and transcripts he produced were heavily edited or inaccurate. 
President Nixon claimed that his noncompliance with House 
subpoenas was necessary to protect the confidentiality of 
Presidential conversations, but the House Judiciary Committee 
rejected these arguments and approved an article of impeachment 
for obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry.\26\
    In a letter to President Nixon, Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Peter Rodino explained that it would upend the 
separation of powers to allow the President to dictate the 
scope of an impeachment inquiry:

          Under the Constitution it is not within the power of 
        the President to conduct an inquiry into his own 
        impeachment, to determine which evidence, and what 
        version or portion of that evidence, is relevant and 
        necessary to such an inquiry. These are matters which, 
        under the Constitution, the House has the sole power to 
        determine.\27\

    Consistent with that long-settled understanding, other 
Presidents have recognized that they must comply with 
information requests issued in a House impeachment inquiry. In 
1846, for example, President James Polk stated in a message to 
the House:

          It may be alleged that the power of impeachment 
        belongs to the House of Representatives, and that with 
        a view to the exercise of this power, that House has 
        the right to investigate the conduct of all public 
        officers under the government. This is cheerfully 
        admitted. In such a case, the safety of the Republic 
        would be the supreme law; and the power of the House in 
        the pursuit of this object would penetrate into the 
        most secret recesses of the executive departments. It 
        could command the attendance of any and every agent of 
        the government, and compel them to produce all papers, 
        public or private, official or unofficial, and to 
        testify on oath to all facts within their 
        knowledge.\28\

    Past Presidents have also produced documents and permitted 
senior officials to testify in connection with other 
Congressional investigations, including inquiries into 
Presidential actions.
    For example, in the Iran-Contra inquiry, President Ronald 
Reagan's former National Security Advisor, Oliver North, and 
the former Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, John Poindexter, testified before Congress.\29\ 
President Reagan also produced ``relevant excerpts of his 
personal diaries to Congress.''\30\
    During the Clinton Administration, Congress obtained 
testimony from top advisors to President Clinton, including 
Chief of Staff Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, 
White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum, and White House Counsel 
Jack Quinn.\31\
    Similarly, in the Benghazi investigation, led by Chairman 
Trey Gowdy, President Barack Obama made many of his top aides 
available for transcribed interviews, including National 
Security Advisor Susan Rice and Deputy National Security 
Advisor for Strategic Communications Benjamin Rhodes.\32\ The 
Obama Administration also produced more than 75,000 pages of 
documents in that investigation, including 1,450 pages of White 
House emails containing communications of senior officials on 
the National Security Council.\33\

            2. The President's Categorical Refusal to Comply


President Trump categorically directed the White House, federal 
        departments and agencies, and federal officials not to 
        cooperate with the House's inquiry and not to comply with duly 
        authorized subpoenas for documents or testimony.

                                Overview

    Donald Trump is the first and only President in American 
history to openly and indiscriminately defy all aspects of the 
Constitutional impeachment process, ordering all federal 
agencies and officials categorically not to comply with 
voluntary requests or compulsory demands for documents or 
testimony.
    On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress 
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the Constitution 
and that there ``should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally, 
through the courts.'' A common theme of his defiance has been 
his claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and 
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been 
following the same investigative rules that Republicans 
championed when they were in control.
    On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone--acting on 
behalf of President Trump--sent a letter to House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi and the three investigating Committees confirming that 
President Trump directed his entire Administration not to 
cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Cipollone 
wrote: ``President Trump cannot permit his Administration to 
participate in this partisan inquiry under these 
circumstances.''
    Mr. Cipollone's letter elicited immediate criticism from 
legal experts across the political spectrum. He advanced 
remarkably politicized arguments and legal theories unsupported 
by the Constitution, judicial precedent, and more than 200 
years of history. If allowed to stand, the President's 
defiance, as justified by Mr. Cipollone, would represent an 
existential threat to the nation's Constitutional system of 
checks and balances, separation of powers, and rule of law.

           The House's Impeachment Inquiry of President Trump

    In January, the House of Representatives voted to adopt its 
rules for the 116th Congress. These rules authorized House 
Committees to conduct investigations, hold hearings, issue 
subpoenas for documents and testimony, and depose 
witnesses.\34\ Significantly, these authorities are similar to 
those adopted when Republicans controlled the House during 
previous Congresses.\35\
    In April, Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, who was 
appointed by then-Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein to 
investigate Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
election and potential obstruction of justice by President 
Trump, issued a two-volume report.\36\ In connection with that 
report, the Committee on the Judiciary began an inquiry into 
``whether to approve articles of impeachment with respect to 
the President.''\37\ The Judiciary Committee detailed its 
authority and intent to conduct this investigation in a series 
of reports, memoranda, and legal filings.\38\
    On August 22, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, the Chairman of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, sent a letter requesting that the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 
Committee on Financial Services provide ``information, 
including documents and testimony, depositions, and/or 
interview transcripts'' relevant to the ``ongoing impeachment 
investigation relating to President Trump.''\39\
    In September, the Intelligence Committee, the Oversight 
Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee sent letters 
requesting documents and interviews from the White House and 
the Department of State regarding the actions of President 
Trump, the President's personal agent, Rudy Giuliani, and 
others to pressure Ukraine to launch investigations into former 
Vice President Joe Biden and a debunked conspiracy theory 
alleging Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election.\40\
    On September 22, President Trump admitted to discussing 
former Vice President Biden and his son with the President of 
Ukraine during a telephone call on July 25.\41\
    On September 24, Speaker Pelosi stated publicly that the 
House Committees were ``moving forward'' to ``proceed with 
their investigations under that umbrella of impeachment 
inquiry.'' She explained that, for the past several months, the 
House had been ``investigating in our Committees and litigating 
in the courts, so the House can gather `all the relevant facts 
and consider whether to exercise its full Article I powers, 
including a constitutional power of the utmost gravity--
approval of articles of impeachment.'''\42\
    On September 25, the White House made public a Memorandum 
of Telephone Conversation of President Trump's call with 
President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 25. As discussed in detail 
in Section I, this call record documented how President Trump 
directly and explicitly asked President Zelensky to launch 
investigations of former Vice President Biden and the 2016 
election.\43\
    Following the Speaker's announcement and the release of the 
call record, the Intelligence Committee, the Oversight 
Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee continued their 
investigation, requesting documents and information, issuing 
subpoenas, and conducting interviews and depositions. The 
Committees made clear that this information would be 
``collected as part of the House's impeachment inquiry and 
shared among the Committees, as well as with the Committee on 
the Judiciary as appropriate.''\44\
    On October 31, the House voted to approve House Resolution 
660, directing the Committees ``to continue their ongoing 
investigations as part of the existing House of Representatives 
inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of 
Representatives to exercise its Constitutional power to impeach 
Donald John Trump, President of the United States of America.'' 
The resolution set forth the process for holding public 
hearings, releasing deposition transcripts, presenting a report 
to the Judiciary Committee, holding proceedings within the 
Judiciary Committee, and submitting to the House of 
Representatives ``such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or 
other recommendations as it deems proper.''\45\

          President Trump's Unprecedented Order Not to Comply

    President Trump's categorical and indiscriminate order and 
efforts to block witness testimony and conceal documentary 
evidence from the Committees investigating his conduct as part 
of the House's impeachment inquiry stand in contrast to his 
predecessors and challenge the basic tenets of the 
Constitutional system of checks and balances.
    Even before the House of Representatives launched its 
investigation regarding Ukraine, President Trump made numerous 
statements rejecting the fundamental authority of Congress to 
investigate his actions as well as those of his Administration. 
For example, on April 24, he stated, in response to 
Congressional investigations: ``We're fighting all the 
subpoenas.''\46\ Similarly, during a speech on July 23, he 
stated: ``I have an Article II, where I have to the right to do 
whatever I want as president.''\47\
    When the three investigating Committees began reviewing the 
President's actions as part of the House's impeachment inquiry, 
President Trump repeatedly challenged the investigation's 
legitimacy in word and deed. President Trump's rhetorical 
attacks appeared intended not just to dispute public reports of 
his misconduct, but to persuade the public that the House lacks 
authority to investigate the President and the inquiry is 
therefore invalid and fraudulent. For example, the President 
described the impeachment inquiry as:
     ``a COUP''\48\
     ``illegal, invalid, and unconstitutional''\49\
     ``an unconstitutional power grab''\50\
     ``Ukraine Witch Hunt''\51\
     ``a continuation of the Greatest and most 
Destructive Witch Hunt of all time''\52\
     ``a total Witch Hunt Scam by the Democrats''\53\
     ``bad for the country''\54\
     ``all a hoax''\55\
     ``the single greatest witch hunt in American 
history''\56\
     ``Democrat Scam''\57\
     ``just another Democrat Hoax''\58\
     ``a fraud against the American people''\59\
     ``A Witch Hunt Scam''\60\
     ``a con being perpetrated on the United States 
public and even the world''\61\
     ``ridiculous''\62\
     ``a continuation of the greatest Scam and Witch 
Hunt in the history of our Country''\63\
     ``Ukraine Hoax''\64\
     ``No Due Process Scam''\65\
     ``the phony Impeachment Scam''\66\
     ``the phony Impeachment Hoax''\67\
    On September 26, President Trump argued that Congress 
should not be ``allowed'' to impeach him under the 
Constitution: ``What these guys are doing--Democrats--are doing 
to this country is a disgrace and it shouldn't be allowed. 
There should be a way of stopping it--maybe legally, through 
the courts.''\68\
    A common theme of President Trump's defiance has been his 
claims that Congress is acting in an unprecedented way and 
using unprecedented rules. However, the House has been 
following the same investigative rules that Republicans 
championed when they were in control and conducted aggressive 
oversight of previous Administrations.\69\

    White House Counsel's Letters Implementing the President's Order

    On October 8, White House Counsel Pat Cipollone sent a 
letter to Speaker Pelosi and the three Committees explaining 
that President Trump had directed his entire Administration not 
to cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry. He wrote:

          Consistent with the duties of the President of the 
        United States, and in particular his obligation to 
        preserve the rights of future occupants of his office, 
        President Trump cannot permit his Administration to 
        participate in this partisan inquiry under these 
        circumstances.\70\

    On October 10, President Trump confirmed that Mr. Cipollone 
was indeed conveying his orders, stating:

          As our brilliant White House Counsel wrote to the 
        Democrats yesterday, he said their highly partisan and 
        unconstitutional effort threatens grave and lasting 
        damage to our democratic institutions, to our system of 
        free elections, and to the American people. That's what 
        it is. To the American people. It's so terrible. 
        Democrats are on a crusade to destroy our democracy. 
        That's what's happening. We will never let it happen. 
        We will defeat them.\71\

    Mr. Cipollone's letter elicited immediate criticism from 
legal experts from across the political spectrum.\72\
    Mr. Cipollone wrote a second letter to the Committees on 
October 18, declaring that the White House would refuse to 
comply with the subpoena issued to it for documents.\73\
    On November 1--after the House had already issued several 
subpoenas to the White House and other Executive Branch 
officials for testimony--the Trump Administration issued a new 
``Letter Opinion'' from Assistant Attorney General Steven A. 
Engel to Mr. Cipollone. The Office of Legal Counsel opinion 
sought to extend the reach of the President's earlier direction 
to defy Congressional subpoenas and to justify noncompliance by 
officials who could not plausibly be considered among the 
President's closest advisors.
    Mr. Engel's opinion asserted that the House's impeachment 
inquiry seeks information that is ``potentially protected by 
executive privilege'' and claimed the Committees' deposition 
subpoenas are ``invalid'' and ``not subject to civil or 
criminal enforcement'' because the House's long-standing 
deposition rules do not allow the participation of attorneys 
from the White House or other government agencies.\74\ These 
claims are without basis and unsupported by precedent.
    The Letter Opinion cited statements from previous 
Presidents and Attorneys General that directly undercut the 
Administration's position. For example, President James K. 
Polk, stated that in an impeachment inquiry the House had power 
to ``penetrate into the most secret recesses of the Executive 
Departments.''\75\ In addition, Attorney General Robert H. 
Jackson, who later served on the Supreme Court, stated that 
``pertinent information would be supplied in impeachment 
proceedings, usually instituted at the suggestion of the 
Department and for the good of the administration of 
justice.''\76\
    In his letters conveying the President's direction, Mr. 
Cipollone advanced remarkably politicized arguments and legal 
theories unsupported by the Constitution, judicial precedent, 
and more than 200 years of history. These letters effectuated 
the President's order and campaign to obstruct and thwart the 
House's exercise of its sole power of impeachment under the 
Constitution. They are rebutted as follows:
     The Impeachment Inquiry is Constitutional: 
According to Mr. Cipollone, ``the President did nothing 
wrong,'' and ``there is no basis for an impeachment 
inquiry.''\77\ President Trump has repeatedly described his 
call with President Zelensky as ``perfect.''\78\ Speaking for 
President Trump, Mr. Cipollone also asserted that the 
impeachment inquiry is ``partisan and unconstitutional,'' ``a 
naked political strategy that began the day he was inaugurated, 
and perhaps even before,'' and that it ``plainly seeks to 
reverse the election of 2016 and to influence the election of 
2020.''\79\
    However, as this report details in Section I, Congress 
found abundant evidence of a scheme directed by the President 
to solicit foreign election interference by pressing the newly-
elected President of Ukraine to announce publicly politically-
motivated investigations to benefit President Trump's own 
reelection campaign. Fundamentally, the Constitutional validity 
of an impeachment inquiry cannot depend on a President's view 
that he did nothing wrong or on the political composition of 
the House. Such an extreme reimagining of the Constitution 
would render the Article I impeachment power meaningless and 
provide the President with power the Constitution does not 
grant him to thwart, manipulate, and stonewall an impeachment 
inquiry conducted by the House, including by concealing 
information of his own misconduct.\80\ Taken to its logical 
conclusion, the President's position would eliminate the 
impeachment power in every year during which a political party 
other than the President's is in power. Under this approach, 
the impeachments of President Clinton, President Nixon, and 
President Andrew Johnson would not have been permitted.\81\
    The purpose of an impeachment inquiry is for the House to 
collect evidence to determine for itself whether the President 
may have committed an impeachable offense warranting articles 
of impeachment. Because the Constitution vests the House alone 
with ``the sole Power of Impeachment,'' it is not for the 
President to decide whether the House is exercising that power 
properly or prudently. The President is not free to arrogate 
the House's power to himself--or to order across-the-board 
defiance of House subpoenas--based solely on his unilateral 
characterization of legislative motives or because he opposes 
the House's decision to investigate his actions.
     The Impeachment Inquiry is Properly Authorized: 
According to Mr. Cipollone, the ``House has not expressly 
adopted any resolution authorizing an impeachment 
investigation'' nor has it ``delegated such authority to any of 
your Committees by rule.''\82\ However, nothing in either the 
Constitution or the House Rules requires the full House to vote 
to authorize an impeachment inquiry.\83\ The impeachment 
inquiries into Presidents Andrew Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton 
all began prior to the House's consideration and approval of a 
resolution authorizing the investigations.\84\ The same is true 
of many judicial impeachments;\85\ indeed, numerous judges have 
been impeached without any prior vote of the full House 
authorizing a formal inquiry.\86\ Even though Mr. Cipollone's 
argument is inherently invalid, the House has taken two floor 
votes that render it obsolete the first on January 9 to adopt 
rules authorizing committees to conduct investigations, and the 
second on October 31 to set forth procedures for open hearings 
in the Intelligence Committee and for additional proceedings in 
the Judiciary Committee.\87\ Even following passage of House 
Resolution 660, whereby the House confirmed the preexisting and 
ongoing impeachment inquiry, the President and the White House 
Counsel, acting on the President's behalf, have persisted in 
their obstructive conduct.
     President Has No Valid Due Process Claims: 
According to Mr. Cipollone, ``the Committees have not 
established any procedures affording the President even the 
most basic protections demanded by due process under the 
Constitution and by fundamental fairness,'' and the Committees 
``have denied the President the right to cross-examine 
witnesses, to call witnesses, to receive transcripts of 
testimony, to have access to evidence,'' and ``to have counsel 
present.''\88\ Yet, there is no requirement that the House 
provide these procedures during an impeachment inquiry. The 
Constitution vests the House with ``the sole Power of 
Impeachment,'' and provides no constraints on how the House 
chooses to conduct its impeachment process.\89\ Nevertheless, 
Mr. Cipollone's complaints are unfounded as the House has 
implemented procedural protections for the President in its 
exercise of its Constitutional power. House Resolution 660 
authorizes procedures to ``allow for the participation of the 
President and his counsel.''\90\ The Committee Report 
accompanying House Resolution 660 explains that these 
protections for the President are part of the Judiciary 
Committee hearing process and are ``based on those provided 
during the Nixon and Clinton inquiries.'' These procedures 
include ``that the president and his counsel are invited to 
attend all hearings; the ability for the president's counsel to 
cross-examine witnesses and object to the admissibility of 
testimony; and the ability of the president's counsel to make 
presentations of evidence before the Judiciary Committee, 
including the ability to call witnesses.''\91\
     Fact-Finding Was Appropriately Transparent: 
According to Mr. Cipollone, the Committees conducted their 
proceedings ``in secret.''\92\ This argument fundamentally 
misconstrues and misapprehends the fact-gathering process 
required at this initial stage of the House's impeachment 
inquiry. Unlike in the cases of Presidents Nixon and Clinton, 
the House conducted a significant portion of the factual 
investigation itself because no independent prosecutor was 
appointed to investigate President Trump's conduct regarding 
Ukraine. Attorney General William P. Barr refused to authorize 
a criminal investigation into the serious allegations of 
misconduct, and even this decision was limited to possible 
violations of federal campaign finance laws.\93\ The 
investigative Committees proceeded consistent with the House's 
rules of procedure and in keeping with investigative best 
practices, including the need to reduce the risk that witnesses 
may try to coordinate or align testimony. As the House 
explained in its report accompanying House Resolution 660:

          The initial stages of an impeachment inquiry in the 
        House are akin to those preceding a prosecutorial 
        charging decision. Under this process, the House is 
        responsible for collecting the evidence and, rather 
        than weighing the question of returning an indictment, 
        the Members of the House have the obligation to decide 
        whether to approve articles of impeachment.\94\

    The Committees have released transcripts of all interviews 
and depositions conducted during the investigation. As these 
transcripts make clear, all Members of all three Committees--
including 47 Republican Members of Congress--had the 
opportunity to ask questions, and these transcripts are now 
available to the President and his counsel. These same 
procedures were supported by Acting White House Chief of Staff 
Mick Mulvaney when he served as a Member of the Oversight 
Committee and by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo when he served 
as a Member of the Benghazi Select Committee. In fact, some of 
the same Members and staff currently conducting depositions as 
part of the present impeachment inquiry participated directly 
in depositions during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama 
Administrations.\95\ The Intelligence Committee also held 
public hearings with 12 of these witnesses.
     Agency Attorneys Can Be (And Should Be) Excluded 
from Depositions: According to Mr. Cipollone, ``it is 
unconstitutional to exclude agency counsel from participating 
in congressional depositions.''\96\ Mr. Cipollone cites no case 
law to support his position because there is none. Instead, he 
relies on a single opinion from the Trump Administration's 
Office of Legal Counsel and ignores the ample legal authority 
and historical precedent that clearly support the Committees' 
actions. For example, the Constitution expressly delegates to 
Congress the authority to ``determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings,''\97\ which includes the power to determine the 
procedures used for gathering information from witnesses 
whether via interview, staff deposition, or in a public 
hearing.\98\ The basis for the rule excluding agency counsel is 
straightforward: it prevents agency officials who are directly 
implicated in the abuses Congress is investigating from trying 
to prevent their own employees from coming forward to tell the 
truth to Congress. The rule protects the rights of witnesses by 
allowing them to be accompanied in depositions by personal 
counsel. Agency attorneys have been excluded from Congressional 
depositions of Executive Branch officials for decades, under 
both Republicans and Democrats, including Chairmen Dan Burton, 
Henry Waxman, Darrell Issa, Jason Chaffetz, Trey Gowdy, Kevin 
Brady, and Jeb Hensarling, among others.\99\
     Congress Can Exercise Its Broad Oversight 
Authority: According to Mr. Cipollone, ``you simply cannot 
expect to rely on oversight authority to gather information for 
an unauthorized impeachment inquiry that conflicts with all 
historical precedent and rides roughshod over due process and 
the separation of powers.''\100\ But, of course, the present 
impeachment inquiry does neither. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that Congress' ``power of inquiry'' is ``as 
penetrating and farreaching as the potential power to enact and 
appropriate under the Constitution.''\101\ The subject matter 
of the impeachment inquiry implicates the House's impeachment-
specific as well as legislative and oversight authorities and 
interests. The activity under investigation, for instance, 
relates to a broad array of issues in which Congress has 
legislated and may legislate in the future, including 
government ethics and transparency, election integrity, 
appropriations, foreign affairs, abuse of power, bribery, 
extortion, and obstruction of justice. In fact, Members of 
Congress have already introduced legislation on issues related 
to the impeachment inquiry.\102\ The House does not forfeit its 
Constitutional authority to investigate and legislate when it 
initiates an impeachment inquiry.\103\ Congress passed sweeping 
legislative reforms following the scandal over the Watergate 
break-in and President Nixon's resignation.\104\
     ``Confidentiality Interests'' Do Not Eliminate 
Congress' Authority: According to Mr. Cipollone, the 
Administration would also not comply with the Committees' 
demands for documents and testimony because of unspecified 
Executive Branch ``confidentiality interests.''\105\ There is 
no basis in the law of executive privilege for declaring a 
categorical refusal to respond to any House subpoena. In an 
impeachment inquiry, the House's need for information and its 
Constitutional authority are at their greatest, and the 
Executive's interest in confidentiality must yield. Only the 
President can assert executive privilege, yet he has not done 
so in the House's impeachment inquiry. Prior to asserting 
executive privilege, the Executive Branch is obligated to seek 
to accommodate the legitimate informational needs of Congress, 
which, as discussed below, it has not done.\106\ In any event, 
much of the information sought by the Committees would not be 
covered by executive privilege under any theory,\107\ and the 
privilege--where validly asserted on a particularized basis and 
not outweighed by the legitimate needs of the impeachment 
inquiry--would protect any legitimate Executive Branch interest 
in confidentiality.\108\
     President's Top Aides Are Not ``Absolutely 
Immune'': According to Mr. Cipollone, the President's top aides 
are ``absolutely immune'' from being compelled to testify 
before Congress.\109\ This extreme position has been explicitly 
and repeatedly rejected by Congress--which has received 
testimony from senior aides to many previous Presidents--and by 
federal courts. In 2008, a federal court rejected an assertion 
by President George W. Bush that White House Counsel Harriet 
Miers was immune from being compelled to testify, noting that 
the President had failed to identify even a single judicial 
opinion to justify his claim.\110\ On November 25, 2019, 
another federal judge rejected President Trump's claim of 
absolute immunity for former White House Counsel Don McGahn, 
concluding: ``Stated simply, the primary takeaway from the past 
250 years of recorded American history is that Presidents are 
not kings,'' and that ``Executive branch officials are not 
absolutely immune from compulsory congressional process--no 
matter how many times the Executive branch has asserted as much 
over the years--even if the President expressly directs such 
officials'' non-compliance.''\111\ Mr. Cipollone's position, 
adopted by President Trump, has thus been repudiated by 
Congress and the courts, and is not salvaged by Executive 
Branch legal opinions insisting upon a wholly fictional ground 
for non-compliance. In ordering categorical defiance of House 
subpoenas, President Trump has confirmed the unlimited breadth 
of his position and his unprecedented view that no branch of 
government--even the House--is empowered to investigate whether 
he may have committed constitutional offenses.
    In addition to advancing specious legal arguments, 
President Trump has made no effort to accommodate the House's 
interests in conducting the impeachment inquiry. For example, 
the Committees first requested documents from the White House 
on September 9, but the White House disregarded the 
request.\112\ The Committees made a second request on September 
24, but the White House again ignored the request.\113\ 
Finally, on October 4, the Committees transmitted a subpoena 
for the documents.\114\ However, on October 18, the White House 
Counsel sent a letter stating that ``the White House cannot 
comply with the October 4 subpoena.''\115\
    Since then, there has been no evidence of a willingness by 
the President to produce any of the documents covered by the 
subpoena to the White House. The State Department made passing 
references to potentially engaging in an ``accommodations'' 
process in response to its September 27 subpoena.\116\ However, 
there has been no effort to do so, and departments and agencies 
have not produced any documents in response to subpoenas issued 
as part of the House impeachment inquiry. The President also 
made no apparent effort to accommodate the House's need for 
witness testimony and instead continued to flatly refuse to 
allow Executive Branch officials to testify.

 3. The President's Refusal to Produce Any and All Subpoenaed Documents


Pursuant to the President's orders, the White House, federal 
        departments and agencies, and key witnesses refused to produce 
        any documents in response to duly authorized subpoenas issued 
        pursuant to the House's impeachment inquiry.

                                Overview

    Following President Trump's categorical order, not a single 
document has been produced by the White House, the Office of 
the Vice President, the Office of Management and Budget, the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, or the 
Department of Energy in response to 71 specific, individualized 
requests or demands for records in their possession, custody, 
or control. The subpoenas to federal departments and agencies 
remain in full force and effect. These agencies and offices 
also blocked many current and former officials from producing 
records directly to the Committees.
    Certain witnesses defied the President's sweeping, 
categorical, and baseless order and identified the substance of 
key documents. Other witnesses identified numerous additional 
documents that the President and various agencies are 
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry.
    The President's personal attorney, Mr. Giuliani, although a 
private citizen, also sought to rely on the President's order, 
as communicated in Mr. Cipollone's letter on October 8, to 
justify his decision to disobey a lawful subpoena for 
documents.

                            The White House

    On September 9, the Committees sent a letter to White House 
Counsel Pat Cipollone seeking six categories of documents in 
response to reports indicating that, ``for nearly two years, 
the President and his personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, appear 
to have acted outside legitimate law enforcement and diplomatic 
channels to coerce the Ukrainian government into pursuing two 
politically-motivated investigations under the guise of anti-
corruption activity.''\117\ The Committees asked the White 
House to voluntarily produce responsive documents by September 
16.\118\ The White House did not provide any response by that 
date.
    On September 24, the Committees sent a follow-up letter 
requesting that the White House produce the documents by 
September 26.\119\ Again, the White House did not provide any 
documents or respond by that date.
    Having received no response from the White House, then-
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings sent a memorandum to Members of the 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, which has jurisdiction over 
the Executive Office of the President, explaining that he was 
preparing to issue a subpoena in light of the White House's 
non-compliance and non-responsiveness. He wrote:

          Over the past several weeks, the Committees tried 
        several times to obtain voluntary compliance with our 
        requests for documents, but the White House has refused 
        to engage with--or even respond to--the 
        Committees.\120\

    On October 4, the Committees sent a letter to Acting White 
House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney transmitting a subpoena 
issued by Chairman Cummings compelling the White House to 
produce documents by October 18.\121\
    As discussed above, on October 8, the White House Counsel 
sent a letter to Speaker Pelosi and the Committees stating that 
``President Trump cannot permit his Administration to 
participate in this partisan inquiry under these 
circumstances.''\122\ The White House Counsel also sent a 
letter on October 18, confirming that ``the White House cannot 
comply with the October 4 subpoena to Acting Chief of Staff 
Mulvaney.''\123\
    To date, the White House has not produced a single document 
in response to the subpoena.\124\ Instead, the White House has 
released to the public only two documents--call records from 
the President's phone calls with President Zelensky on April 21 
and July 25.\125\
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that the President is 
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry, including but not limited to:
     briefing materials for President Trump's call with 
President Zelensky on July 25 prepared by Lt. Col. Alexander S. 
Vindman, Director for Ukraine at the National Security 
Council;\126\
     notes relating to the July 25 call taken by Lt. 
Col. Vindman and Tim Morrison, the former Senior Director for 
Europe and Russia on the National Security Council;\127\
     an August 15 ``Presidential decision memo'' 
prepared by Lt. Col. Vindman and approved by Mr. Morrison 
conveying ``the consensus views from the entire deputies small 
group'' that ``the security assistance be released'';\128\
     National Security Council staff summaries of 
conclusions from meetings at the principal, deputy, or sub-
deputy level relating to Ukraine, including military 
assistance;\129\
     call records between President Trump and 
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, United States Ambassador to the 
European Union;\130\
     National Security Council Legal Advisor John 
Eisenberg's notes and correspondence relating to discussions 
with Lt. Col. Vindman regarding the July 10 meetings in which 
Ambassador Sondland requested investigations in exchange for a 
White House meeting;\131\
     the memorandum of conversation from President 
Trump's meeting in New York with President Zelensky on 
September 25;\132\ and
     as explained below, emails and other messages 
between Ambassador Sondland and senior White House officials, 
including Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, Senior Advisor 
to the Chief of Staff Rob Blair, and then-National Security 
Advisor John Bolton, among other high-level Trump 
Administration officials.\133\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the White House is in possession of and continues to withhold 
significantly more documents and records responsive to the 
subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment inquiry.
    The Committees have closely tracked public reports that the 
White House is in possession of other correspondence and 
records of direct relevance to the impeachment inquiry. On 
November 24, for instance, a news report revealed that the 
White House had conducted a confidential, internal records 
review of the hold on military assistance in response to the 
Committees' inquiry. The review reportedly ``turned up hundreds 
of documents that reveal extensive efforts to generate an 
after-the-fact justification for the decision and a debate over 
whether the delay was legal.''\134\

                      Office of the Vice President

    On October 4, the Committees sent a letter to Vice 
President Mike Pence seeking 13 categories of documents in 
response to reports that he and his staff were directly 
involved in the matters under investigation. The Committees 
wrote:

          Recently, public reports have raised questions about 
        any role you may have played in conveying or 
        reinforcing the President's stark message to the 
        Ukrainian President. The reports include specific 
        references to a member of your staff who may have 
        participated directly in the July 25, 2019, call, 
        documents you may have obtained or reviewed, including 
        the record of the call, and your September 1, 2019, 
        meeting with the Ukrainian President in Warsaw, during 
        which you reportedly discussed the Administration's 
        hold on U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\135\

    The Committees asked the Vice President to produce 
responsive documents by October 15.\136\ On that date, Matthew 
E. Morgan, Counsel to the Vice President, responded to the 
Committees by refusing to cooperate and reciting many of the 
same baseless arguments as the White House Counsel. He wrote:

          [T]he purported ``impeachment inquiry'' has been 
        designed and implemented in a manner that calls into 
        question your commitment to fundamental fairness and 
        due process rights. Never before in history has the 
        Speaker of the House attempted to launch an 
        ``impeachment inquiry'' against a President without a 
        majority of the House of Representatives voting to 
        authorize a constitutionally acceptable process.\137\

    To date, the Vice President has not produced a single 
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any 
intent to do so going forward.
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that the Vice 
President is withholding that are directly relevant to the 
impeachment inquiry, including but not limited to:
     notes taken by Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor 
to the Vice President for Europe and Russia, during the call 
between President Trump and President Zelensky on July 25;\138\
     notes taken by Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, National 
Security Advisor to the Vice President, during the call between 
President Trump and President Zelensky on July 25;\139\
     materials regarding the July 25 call that were 
placed in the Vice President's briefing book that same 
day;\140\
     the memorandum of conversation from Vice President 
Pence's call with President Zelensky on September 18;\141\ and
     briefing materials prepared for Vice President 
Pence's meeting with President Zelensky September 1 in Warsaw, 
Poland.\142\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Office of the Vice President is in possession of and 
continues to withhold significantly more documents and records 
responsive to their request and of direct relevance to the 
impeachment inquiry.

                    Office of Management and Budget

    On October 7, the Committees sent a letter to Russell 
Vought, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), conveying a subpoena issued by the Intelligence 
Committee for nine categories of documents in response to 
public reports that the President directed OMB to freeze 
hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance 
appropriated by Congress to help Ukraine counter Russian 
aggression. The Committees wrote:

          According to multiple press reports, at some point in 
        July 2019, President Trump ordered Acting Chief of 
        Staff and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
        Director Mick Mulvaney to freeze the military aid to 
        Ukraine, and Mr. Mulvaney reportedly conveyed the 
        President's order ``through the budget office to the 
        Pentagon and the State Department, which were told only 
        that the administration was looking at whether the 
        spending was necessary.''\143\

    The subpoena compelled Acting Director Vought to produce 
responsive documents by October 15.\144\ On that day, OMB 
Associate Director for Legislative Affairs Jason Yaworske 
responded by refusing to produce any documents and reciting 
many of the same baseless arguments as the White House Counsel:

          [T]he President has advised that ``[g]iven that your 
        inquiry lacks any legitimate constitutional foundation, 
        any pretense of fairness, or even the most elementary 
        due process protections, the Executive Branch cannot be 
        expected to participate in it.'' . . . President Trump 
        cannot permit his Administration to participate in this 
        partisan inquiry under these circumstances.\145\

    To date, Acting Director Vought has not produced a single 
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any 
intent to do so going forward.
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that Acting Director 
Vought is withholding that are directly relevant to the 
impeachment inquiry, including but not limited to:
     a June 19 email from OMB Associate Director of 
National Security Programs Michael Duffey to Department of 
Defense (DOD) Deputy Comptroller Elaine McCusker regarding the 
fact that ``the President had seen a media report and he had 
questions about the assistance'' and expressing ``interest in 
getting more information from the Department of Defense,'' 
specifically a ``description of the program'';\146\
     a July 12 email from White House Assistant to the 
President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff Robert Blair 
to Associate Director Duffey explaining that the ``President is 
directing a hold on military support for Ukraine'' and not 
mentioning any other country or security assistance 
package;\147\ and
     an August 7 memorandum drafted in preparation for 
Acting Director Vought's attendance at a Principals Committee 
meeting on Ukrainian security assistance, which included a 
recommendation to lift the military assistance hold.\148\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Office of Management and Budget is in possession of and 
continues to withhold significantly more documents and records 
responsive to the subpoena and of direct relevance to the 
impeachment inquiry.

                          Department of State

    On September 9, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo requesting six categories of documents in 
response to reports that ``President Trump and his personal 
attorney appear to have increased pressure on the Ukrainian 
government and its justice system in service of President 
Trump's reelection campaign'' and ``the State Department may be 
abetting this scheme.''\149\ The Committees requested that 
Secretary Pompeo produce responsive documents by September 16. 
The Secretary did not provide any documents or response by that 
date.
    On September 23, the Committees sent a follow-up letter 
asking Secretary Pompeo to ``inform the Committees by close of 
business on Thursday, September 26, 2019, whether you intend to 
fully comply with these requests or whether subpoenas will be 
necessary.''\150\ The Secretary did not provide any documents 
or respond by that date.
    On September 27, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary 
Pompeo conveying a subpoena for documents issued by Rep. Eliot 
Engel, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
compelling the production of documents by October 4.\151\
    Since Secretary Pompeo had failed to respond, the 
Committees also sent separate letters to six individual State 
Department employees seeking documents in their possession and 
requesting that they participate in depositions with the 
Committees.\152\
    On October 1, Secretary Pompeo responded to the Committees 
for the first time. He objected to the Committees seeking 
documents directly from State Department employees after he 
failed to produce them, claiming inaccurately that such a 
request was ``an act of intimidation and an invitation to 
violate federal records laws.''\153\ He also claimed that the 
Committees' inquiry was ``an attempt to intimidate, bully, and 
treat improperly the distinguished professionals of the 
Department of State.''\154\
    To the contrary, Deputy Assistant Secretary George Kent, 
one of the State Department professionals from whom the 
Committees sought documents and testimony, testified that he 
``had not felt bullied, threatened, and intimidated.''\155\ 
Rather, Mr. Kent said that the language in Secretary Pompeo's 
letter, which had been drafted by a State Department attorney 
without consulting Mr. Kent, ``was inaccurate.''\156\ Mr. Kent 
explained that, when he raised this concern, the State 
Department attorney ``spent the next 5 minutes glaring at me'' 
and then ``got very angry.'' According to Mr. Kent, the 
official ``started pointing at me with a clenched jaw and 
saying, What you did in there, if Congress knew what you were 
doing, they could say that you were trying to sort of control, 
or change the process of collecting documents.''\157\
    With respect to his own compliance with the subpoena for 
documents, Secretary Pompeo wrote that he ``intends to respond 
to that subpoena by the noticed return date of October 4, 
2019.''\158\
    Later on October 1, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy 
Secretary of State John J. Sullivan in light of new evidence 
that Secretary Pompeo participated on President Trump's call 
with President Zelensky on July 25. The Committees wrote:

          We are writing to you because Secretary Pompeo now 
        appears to have an obvious conflict of interest. He 
        reportedly participated personally in the July 25, 2019 
        call, in which President Donald Trump pressed President 
        Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine to investigate the son of 
        former Vice President Joseph Biden immediately after 
        the Ukrainian President raised his desire for United 
        States military assistance to counter Russian 
        aggression.
          If true, Secretary Pompeo is now a fact witness in 
        the impeachment inquiry. He should not be making any 
        decisions regarding witness testimony or document 
        production in order to protect himself or the 
        President. Any effort by the Secretary or the 
        Department to intimidate or prevent witnesses from 
        testifying or withhold documents from the Committees 
        shall constitute evidence of obstruction of the 
        impeachment inquiry.\159\

    The following day, at a press conference in Italy, 
Secretary Pompeo publicly acknowledged that he had been on the 
July 25 call between Presidents Trump and Zelensky.\160\
    On October 7, Committee staff met with State Department 
officials who acknowledged that they had taken no steps to 
collect documents in response to the September 9 letter, but 
instead had waited for the September 27 subpoena before 
beginning to search for responsive records. During that 
conversation, the Committees made a good-faith attempt to 
engage the Department in the constitutionally-mandated 
accommodations process. The Committees requested, on a priority 
basis, ``any and all documents that it received directly from 
Ambassador Sondland,'' as well as ``documents--especially those 
documents identified by the witnesses as responsive--related to 
Ambassador Yovanovitch and DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] 
Kent.'' The depositions of these witnesses--Ambassador 
Sondland, Ambassador Yovanovitch, and Mr. Kent--were scheduled 
for the days shortly after that October 7 meeting. The 
Department's representatives stated that they would take the 
request back to senior State Department officials, but never 
provided any further response.\161\
    To date, Secretary Pompeo has not produced a single 
document sought by the Committees and has not indicated any 
intent to do so going forward. In addition, the Department has 
ordered its employees not to produce documents in their 
personal possession. For example, on October 14, the Department 
sent a letter to Mr. Kent's personal attorney warning that 
``your client is not authorized to disclose to Congress any 
records relating to official duties.''\162\
    Moreover, the Department appears to have actively 
discouraged its employees from identifying documents responsive 
to the Committees' subpoena. Mr. Kent testified in his 
deposition that he informed a Department attorney about 
additional responsive records that the Department had not 
collected, including an email from Assistant Secretary of State 
for Consular Affairs David Risch, who ``had spoken to Rudy 
Giuliani several times in January about trying to get a visa 
for the corrupt former prosecutor general of Ukraine, Viktor 
Shokin.''\163\ The Department attorney ``objected to [Mr. Kent] 
raising of the additional information'' and ``made clear that 
he did not think it was appropriate for [Mr. Kent] to make the 
suggestion.''\164\ Mr. Kent responded that what he was ``trying 
to do was make sure that the Department was being fully 
responsive.''\165\
    Certain witnesses defied the President's directive and 
produced the substance of key documents. For example, 
Ambassador Sondland attached ten exhibits to his written 
hearing statement.\166\ These exhibits contained replicas of 
emails and WhatsApp messages between Ambassador Sondland and 
high-level Trump Administration officials, including Secretary 
Pompeo, Secretary Perry, Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, 
and former National Security Advisor John Bolton.\167\ The 
exhibits also contained a replica of a WhatsApp message between 
Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak.\168\
    Earlier in the investigation, Ambassador Kurt Volker had 
produced key text messages with Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador 
Sondland, President Zelensky's senior aide, Andriy Yermak, Mr. 
Giuliani, and others very soon after the Committees requested 
them and prior to Mr. Cipollone's letter on October 8 conveying 
the President's directive not to comply.\169\
    The Department also prevented Ambassador Sondland--a 
current State Department employee--from accessing records to 
prepare for his testimony. As described above, federal law 
imposes fines and up to five years in prison for anyone who 
corruptly or by threats ``impedes or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede'' the ``due and proper exercise of the 
power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is 
being had by either House, or any committee of either 
House.''\170\ Ambassador Sondland explained that the 
Department's actions directly impeded his testimony:

          I have not had access to all of my phone records, 
        State Department emails, and other State Department 
        documents. And I was told I could not work with my EU 
        Staff to pull together the relevant files. Having 
        access to the State Department materials would have 
        been very helpful to me in trying to reconstruct with 
        whom I spoke and met, when, and what was said. . . .
          My lawyers and I have made multiple requests to the 
        State Department and the White House for these 
        materials. Yet, these materials were not provided to 
        me. They have also refused to share these materials 
        with this Committee. These documents are not classified 
        and, in fairness, should have been made available.\171\

    He testified, ``I have been hampered to provide completely 
accurate testimony without the benefit of those 
documents.''\172\ Ambassador Sondland also stated:

          Despite repeated requests to the White House and the 
        State Department, I have not been granted access to all 
        of the phone records, and I would like to review those 
        phone records, along with any notes and other documents 
        that may exist, to determine if I can provide more 
        complete testimony to assist Congress.\173\

    On November 22, the Department produced 99 pages of emails, 
letters, notes, timelines, and news articles to a non-partisan, 
nonprofit ethics watchdog organization pursuant to a court 
order in a lawsuit filed under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).\174\ This handful of documents was limited to a narrow 
window of time and specific people, but it clearly indicates 
that the Department is withholding documents that are 
responsive to the Committees' requests.
    For example, the Department's FOIA production contains an 
email from the Office Manager to the Secretary of State to 
``S--All'' sent on March 26 which states that ``S is speaking 
with Rudy Giuliani.''\175\ It also contains a March 27 email in 
which Madeleine Westerhout, the Personal Secretary to President 
Trump, facilitates another phone call between Rudy Giuliani and 
Secretary Pompeo.\176\ These documents are directly responsive 
to the September 27 subpoena for ``all documents and 
communications, from January 20, 2017 to the present, relating 
or referring to: Communications between any current or former 
State Department officials or employees and Rudolph W. 
Giuliani, including any text messages using personal or work-
related devices.''\177\
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that Secretary Pompeo 
is withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry, including but not limited to:
     a cable on August 29 from Ambassador Bill Taylor, 
at the recommendation of then-National Security Advisor John 
Bolton, sent directly to Secretary Pompeo ``describing the 
folly I saw in withholding military aid to Ukraine at a time 
when hostilities were still active in the east and when Russia 
was watching closely to gauge the level of American support for 
the Ukrainian Government'' and telling Secretary Pompeo ``that 
I could not and would not defend such a policy'';\178\
     WhatsApp messages and emails that Ambassador 
Sondland replicated and provided as exhibits to the 
Intelligence Committee showing key communications between 
Ambassador Sondland and high-level Trump Administration 
officials, including Secretary Pompeo, Secretary Perry, Acting 
Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, and Ambassador Bolton, as well as 
President Zelensky's senior aide, Andriy Yermak;\179\
     notes and memoranda to file from Mr. Kent, 
Ambassador Taylor, and others, including Ambassador Taylor's 
``little notebook'' in which he would ``take notes on 
conversations, in particular when I'm not in the office,'' such 
as meetings with Ukrainians or when out and receiving a phone 
call,'' as well as his ``small, little spiral notebook'' of 
calls that took place in the office;\180\
     emails among Philip Reeker, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; 
David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Mr. 
Kent; and others regarding the unsuccessful effort to issue a 
public statement in support of Ambassador Yovanovitch, 
including the ``large number of emails related to the press 
guidance and the allegations about the Ambassador'' from the 
``late March timeframe.''\181\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Department of State is in possession of and continues to 
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to 
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment 
inquiry.

                         Department of Defense

    On October 7, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of 
Defense Mark Esper conveying a subpoena issued by the 
Intelligence Committee for 14 categories of documents in 
response to reports that the President directed a freeze of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid appropriated by 
Congress to help Ukraine counter Russian aggression. The 
Committees wrote:

          Officials at the Departments of State and Defense 
        reportedly were ``puzzled and alarmed'' after learning 
        about the White House's directive. Defense Department 
        officials reportedly ``tried to make a case to the 
        White House that the Ukraine aid was effective and 
        should not be looked at in the same manner as other 
        aid,'' but ``those arguments were ignored.''\182\

    The subpoena required Secretary Esper to produce responsive 
documents by October 15. On October 13, Secretary Esper stated 
in a public interview that the Department would comply with the 
Intelligence Committee's subpoena:

          Q: Very quickly, are you going to comply with the 
        subpoena that the House provided you and provide 
        documents to them regarding to the halt to military aid 
        to Ukraine?
          A: Yeah we will do everything we can to cooperate 
        with the Congress. Just in the last week or two, my 
        general counsel sent out a note as we typically do in 
        these situations to ensure documents are retained.
          Q: Is that a yes?
          A: That's a yes.
          Q: You will comply with the subpoena?
          A: We will do everything we can to comply.\183\

    On October 15, however, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Legislative Affairs Robert R. Hood responded by refusing to 
produce any documents and reciting many of the same legally 
unsupportable arguments as the White House Counsel:

          In light of these concerns, and in view of the 
        President's position as expressed in the White House 
        Counsel's October 8 letter, and without waiving any 
        other objections to the subpoena that the Department 
        may have, the Department is unable to comply with your 
        request for documents at this time.\184\

    To date, Secretary Esper has not produced a single document 
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do 
so going forward, notwithstanding his public promise to ``do 
everything we can to comply.''\185\
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple additional documents that Secretary Esper 
is withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry, including but not limited to:
     DOD staff readouts from National Security Council 
meetings at the principal, deputy, or sub-deputy level relating 
to Ukraine, including military assistance;\186\
     an email from Secretary Esper's Chief of Staff, to 
Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, in late July ``asking for follow-
up on a meeting with the President,'' including information on 
whether ``U.S. industry [is] providing any of this equipment,'' 
``international contributions'' to Ukraine, and ``who gave this 
funding'';\187\
     fact sheets and other information provided by Ms. 
Cooper in response to the email request;\188\
     an email sent to Ms. Cooper's staff on July 25 at 
2:31 p.m.--the same day as President's Trump's call with 
Ukrainian President Zelensky--stating that the Ukrainian 
Embassy was inquiring about the status of military aid, 
suggesting that Ukrainian officials were concerned about the 
status of the military aid much earlier than ever previously 
acknowledged by the Executive Branch;\189\
     an email sent to Ms. Cooper's staff on July 25 at 
4:25 p.m. stating that the Ukrainian Embassy and The Hill 
newspaper had become aware of the situation with the military 
assistance funding;\190\ and
     an email received by Ms. Cooper's staff on July 3 
at 4:23 p.m.--from the Department of State explaining that the 
Department of State ``had heard the CN [Congressional 
Notification] is currently being blocked by OMB.''\191\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Department of Defense is in possession of and continues to 
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to 
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment 
inquiry.

                          Department of Energy

    On October 10, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of 
Energy Rick Perry conveying a subpoena issued by the 
Intelligence Committee for ten categories of documents in 
response to reports about his involvement with matters under 
investigation. The Committees wrote:

          Recently, public reports have raised questions about 
        any role you may have played in conveying or 
        reinforcing the President's stark message to the 
        Ukrainian President. These reports have also raised 
        significant questions about your efforts to press 
        Ukrainian officials to change the management structure 
        at a Ukrainian state-owned energy company to benefit 
        individuals involved with Rudy Giuliani's push to get 
        Ukrainian officials to interfere in our 2020 
        election.\192\

    The subpoena required Secretary Perry to produce responsive 
documents by October 18. On that day, Melissa F. Burnison, the 
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Congressional and 
Intergovernmental Affairs, responded by refusing to produce any 
documents and reciting many of the same flawed arguments as the 
White House Counsel:

          Pursuant to these concerns, the Department restates 
        the President's position: ``Given that your inquiry 
        lacks any legitimate constitutional foundation, any 
        pretense of fairness, or even the most elementary due 
        process protections, the Executive Branch cannot be 
        expected to participate in it.''\193\

    To date, Secretary Perry has not produced a single document 
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do 
so going forward.
    Witnesses who testified before the Committees have 
identified multiple documents that Secretary Perry is 
withholding that are directly relevant to the impeachment 
inquiry, including but not limited to:
     a document passed directly from Secretary Perry to 
President Zelensky in a May 2019 meeting with a list of 
``people he trusts'' that President Zelensky could seek advice 
from on issues of relating to ``key Ukrainian energy-sector 
contacts,'' according to David Holmes, the Political Counselor 
at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv;\194\
     a June 5 email from Philip Reeker, Acting 
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian 
Affairs, to Secretary Perry and others, regarding ``Zelenskyy's 
visit to Brussels, and the critical perhaps historic role of 
the dinner and engagement Gordon [Ambassador Sondland] 
coordinated'';\195\ and
     a July 19 email from Secretary Perry in which he 
states ``Mick [Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney] just 
confirmed the call being set up for tomorrow by NSC'' in 
reference to a call between President Trump and President 
Zelensky.\196\
    The Committees also have good-faith reason to believe that 
the Department of Energy is in possession of and continues to 
withhold significantly more documents and records responsive to 
the subpoena and of direct relevance to the impeachment 
inquiry.

                    Rudy Giuliani and His Associates

    On September 30, the Committees sent a letter conveying a 
subpoena issued by the Intelligence Committee to the 
President's personal attorney, Rudy Giuliani, compelling the 
production of 23 categories of documents relating to his 
actions in Ukraine.\197\
    On October 15, Mr. Giuliani's counsel responded to the 
Committees by stating that Mr. Giuliani ``will not participate 
because this appears to be an unconstitutional, baseless, and 
illegitimate `impeachment inquiry.'''\198\ He also stated: 
``Mr. Giuliani adopts all the positions set forth in Mr. 
Cipollone's October 8, 2019 letter on behalf of President 
Donald J. Trump.''\199\
    To date, Mr. Giuliani has not produced a single document 
sought by the Committees and has not indicated any intent to do 
so going forward.
    On September 30, the Committees sent letters to two of Mr. 
Giuliani's business associates--Igor Fruman and Lev Parnas--
requesting testimony and eleven categories of documents from 
each.\200\ The Committees sought documents from Mr. Fruman and 
Mr. Parnas related to their efforts to influence U.S. 
elections.
    According to press reports, Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman 
reportedly were ``assisting with Giuliani's push to get 
Ukrainian officials to investigate former vice president Joe 
Biden and his son as well as Giuliani's claim that Democrats 
conspired with Ukrainians in the 2016 campaign.'' Press reports 
also indicate that Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman were involved with 
efforts to press Ukrainian officials to change the management 
structure at a Ukrainian state-owned energy company, Naftogaz, 
to benefit individuals involved with Mr. Giuliani's push to get 
Ukrainian officials to interfere in the 2020 election.\201\
    On October 3, counsel to Mr. Fruman and Mr. Parnas 
responded to Committee staff, explaining his clients' 
relationship with Mr. Giuliani and President Trump:

          Be advised that Messrs. Parnas and Fruman assisted 
        Mr. Giuliani in connection with his representation of 
        President Trump. Mr. Parnas and Mr. Fruman have also 
        been represented by Mr. Giuliani in connection with 
        their personal and business affairs. They also assisted 
        Joseph DiGenova and Victoria Toensing in their law 
        practice.\202\

    With respect to preparing Mr. Fruman's and Mr. Parnas' 
response, their counsel wrote: ``The amount of time required is 
difficult to determine. [sic] but we are happy to keep you 
advised of our progress and engage in a rolling production of 
non-privileged documents.''
    On October 8, their counsel wrote again to Committee staff, 
stating:

          This is an update. We continue to meet with Mr. 
        Parnas and Mr. Fruman to gather the facts and documents 
        related to the many subjects and persons detailed in 
        your September 30 letter and to evaluate all of that 
        information in light of the privileges we raised in our 
        last letter.\203\

    On October 9, their counsel wrote to Committee staff, 
stating, ``Please be advised that Messrs. Parnas and Fruman 
agree with and adopt the position of White House Counsel 
pertaining to Democrat inquiry.''\204\
    On October 10, the Committees transmitted subpoenas 
compelling Mr. Fruman and Mr. Parnas to produce eleven 
categories of documents.\205\ That same day, their counsel 
responded:

          As I did in my recent letter of October 8, 2019, 
        please be advised we were in the formative stages of 
        recovering and reviewing records on October 9 when 
        Messrs. Parnas and Fruman were arrested by the FBI and 
        locked up in Virginia pursuant to Four Count Indictment 
        by a Federal Grand Jury in the Southern District of New 
        York unsealed on October 10, 2019.
          Further, their records and other belongings, 
        including materials sought by your subpoenas, were 
        seized pursuant warrants [sic] by the FBI in several 
        locations on the 9th and 10th of October.\206\

    To date, Mr. Fruman has not produced a single document in 
response to his subpoena and has not indicated any intent to do 
so going forward.
    With respect to Mr. Parnas, he obtained new counsel during 
the course of the impeachment inquiry. His new attorney has 
asserted that Mr. Parnas will cooperate with the House's 
inquiry, stating: ``We will honor and not avoid the committee's 
requests to the extent they are legally proper, while 
scrupulously protecting Mr. Parnas' privileges including that 
of the Fifth Amendment.''\207\
    In contrast to Mr. Giuliani and Mr. Fruman, Mr. Parnas has 
begun rolling production of certain records in his possession, 
custody, or control in response to the subpoena, which the 
Committees are evaluating. The Committees expect Mr. Parnas' 
full compliance with the subpoena.

        4. The President's Refusal to Allow Top Aides to Testify


At President Trump's direction, twelve current or former Administration 
        officials refused to testify as part of the House's impeachment 
        inquiry, ten of whom did so in defiance of duly authorized 
        subpoenas. The President's orders were coordinated and executed 
        by the White House Counsel and others, and they prevented 
        testimony from officials from the White House, National 
        Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, Department 
        of State, and Department of Energy.

                                Overview

    No other President in history has issued an order 
categorically directing the entire Executive Branch not to 
testify before Congress, including in the context of an 
impeachment inquiry. President Trump issued just such an order.
    As reflected in White House Counsel Pat Cipollone's October 
8 letter, President Trump directed all government witnesses to 
violate their legal obligations by defying House subpoenas 
regardless of their office or position.\208\ President Trump 
even extended his order to former officials no longer employed 
by the federal government. This Administration-wide effort to 
prevent all witnesses from providing testimony was coordinated 
and comprehensive.
    These witnesses were warned that their refusal to testify 
``shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a 
contempt proceeding'' and ``may be used as an adverse inference 
against you and the President.''
    Despite the President's unprecedented commands, the House 
gathered a wealth of evidence of his conduct from courageous 
individuals who were willing to follow the law, comply with 
duly authorized subpoenas, and tell the truth. Nevertheless, 
the President's efforts to obstruct witness testimony deprived 
Congress and the public of additional evidence.
    In following President Trump's orders to defy duly 
authorized Congressional subpoenas, several Administration 
officials who, to date, remain under subpoena may have placed 
themselves at risk of being held in criminal contempt of 
Congress.\209\ These witnesses were warned explicitly that 
their refusal to obey lawful orders to testify ``shall 
constitute evidence that may be used against you in a contempt 
proceeding'' and could also result in adverse inferences being 
drawn against both them and the President.\210\

            Mick Mulvaney, Acting White House Chief of Staff

    On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Acting White 
House Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney seeking his appearance at a 
deposition on November 8.\211\ The Committees received no 
response to this letter.
    On November 7, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena 
compelling Mr. Mulvaney's appearance at a deposition on 
November 8.\212\ On November 8, Mr. Mulvaney's personal 
attorney sent an email to Committee staff stating that ``Mr. 
Mulvaney will not be attending the deposition today, and he is 
considering the full range of his legal options.''\213\
    Mr. Mulvaney's personal attorney provided a letter that was 
sent on November 8 from Mr. Cipollone, stating that ``the 
President directs Mr. Mulvaney not to appear at the Committee's 
scheduled deposition on November 8, 2019.''\214\ Mr. Mulvaney's 
personal attorney also provided a letter sent on November 7 
from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General at the Office 
of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, to Mr. 
Cipollone, stating, ``Mr. Mulvaney is absolutely immune from 
compelled congressional testimony in his capacity as a senior 
advisor to the President.''\215\
    Mr. Mulvaney did not appear at the deposition on November 
8, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The Committees met, 
and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Mulvaney's absence, 
stating:

          Neither Congress nor the courts recognize a blanket 
        absolute immunity as a basis to defy a congressional 
        subpoena. Mr. Mulvaney and the White House, therefore, 
        have no legitimate legal basis to evade a duly 
        authorized subpoena. The President's direction to Mr. 
        Mulvaney to defy our subpoena can, therefore, only be 
        construed as an effort to delay testimony and obstruct 
        the inquiry, consistent with the White House Counsel's 
        letter dated October 8, 2019.\216\

    Chairman Schiff also explained Mr. Mulvaney's knowledge of 
and role in facilitating the President's conduct:

          Mr. Mulvaney's role in facilitating the White House's 
        obstruction of the impeachment inquiry does not occur 
        in a vacuum. Over the past several weeks, we have 
        gathered extensive evidence of the President's abuse of 
        power related to pressuring Ukraine to pursue 
        investigations that would benefit the President 
        personally and politically and jeopardize national 
        security in doing so. Some of that evidence has 
        revealed that Mr. Mulvaney was a percipient witness to 
        misconduct by the President and may have had a role in 
        certain actions under investigation. The evidence shows 
        that Mr. Mulvaney may have coordinated with U.S. 
        Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland, Rudy 
        Giuliani, and others to carry out President Trump's 
        scheme to condition a White House meeting with 
        President Zelensky on the Ukrainians' pursuit of 
        investigations of the Bidens, Burisma holdings, and 
        purported Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. 
        Presidential election. In addition, evidence suggests 
        that Mr. Mulvaney may have played a central role in 
        President Trump's attempt to coerce Ukraine into 
        launching his desired political investigations by 
        withholding nearly $400 million in vital security 
        assistance from Ukraine that had been appropriated by 
        Congress. At a White House press briefing on October 
        17, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney admitted publicly that President 
        Trump ordered the hold on Ukraine security assistance 
        to further the President's own personal political 
        interests rather than the national interest. . . .
          Based on the record evidence gathered to date, we can 
        only infer that Mr. Mulvaney's refusal to testify is 
        intended to prevent the Committees from learning 
        additional evidence of President Trump's misconduct and 
        that Mr. Mulvaney's testimony would corroborate and 
        confirm other witnesses' accounts of such misconduct. 
        If the White House had evidence to contest those facts, 
        they would allow Mr. Mulvaney to be deposed. Instead, 
        the President and the White House are hiding and trying 
        to conceal the truth from the American people. Given 
        the extensive evidence the Committees have already 
        uncovered, the only result of this stonewalling is to 
        buttress the case for obstruction of this inquiry.\217\

    To date, Mr. Mulvaney has not changed his position about 
compliance with the subpoena.\218\

 Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the 
                             Chief of Staff

    On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Robert B. 
Blair, an Assistant to the President and the Senior Advisor to 
Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney, seeking Mr. Blair's appearance 
at a deposition on November 1.\219\ On November 2, Mr. Blair's 
personal attorney sent a letter to the Committees stating:

          Mr. Blair has been directed by the White House not to 
        appear and testify at the Committees' proposed 
        deposition, based on the Department of Justice's advice 
        that the Committees may not validly require an 
        executive branch witness to appear at such a deposition 
        without the assistance of agency counsel. In light of 
        the clear direction he has been given by the Executive 
        Branch, Mr. Blair must respectfully decline to testify, 
        as you propose, on Monday, November 4, 2019.\220\

    On November 3, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Blair's 
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling Mr. Blair 
to appear at a deposition on November 4.\221\
    On November 4, Mr. Blair did not appear for the scheduled 
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The 
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Blair's 
absence, stating:

          Although the committees requested a copy of the 
        correspondence from the White House and Department of 
        Justice, Mr. Blair's Counsel did not provide it to the 
        Committees. This new and shifting rationale from the 
        White House, like the others it has used to attempt to 
        block witnesses from appearing to provide testimony 
        about the President's misconduct, has no basis in law 
        or the Constitution and is a serious affront to decades 
        of precedent in which Republicans and Democrats have 
        used exactly the same procedures to depose executive 
        branch officials without agency counsel present, 
        including some of the most senior aides to multiple 
        previous Presidents.\222\

    Unlike President Trump's directive to Acting Chief of Staff 
Mulvaney, neither Mr. Blair nor the White House have asserted 
that Mr. Blair is ``absolutely immune'' from providing 
testimony to Congress. To date, Mr. Blair has not changed his 
position or contacted the Committees about compliance with the 
subpoena.

        Ambassador John Bolton, Former National Security Advisor

    On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to the personal 
attorney of Ambassador John Bolton, the former National 
Security Advisor to President Trump, seeking his appearance at 
a deposition on November 7.\223\ Later that day, Ambassador 
Bolton's personal attorney sent an email to Committee staff 
stating, ``As you no doubt have anticipated, Ambassador Bolton 
is not willing to appear voluntarily.''\224\
    On November 7, Ambassador Bolton did not appear for the 
scheduled deposition. On November 8, Ambassador Bolton's 
personal attorney sent a letter to Douglas Letter, the General 
Counsel of the House of Representatives, suggesting that, if 
Ambassador Bolton were subpoenaed, he would file a lawsuit and 
would comply with the subpoena only if ordered to do so by the 
court. He referenced a lawsuit filed by another former 
official, Dr. Charles Kupperman, represented by the same 
attorney, and stated:

          As I emphasized in my previous responses to letters 
        from the House Chairs, Dr. Kupperman stands ready, as 
        does Ambassador Bolton, to testify if the Judiciary 
        resolves the conflict in favor of the Legislative 
        Branch's position respecting such testimony.\225\
          To date, Ambassador Bolton has not changed his 
        position or come forward to testify.\226\

    John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the President for National 
     Security Affairs and Legal Advisor, National Security Council

    On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to John A. 
Eisenberg, the Deputy Counsel to the President for National 
Security Affairs and the Legal Advisor at the National Security 
Council, seeking his appearance at a deposition on November 
4.\227\ The Committees received no response to this 
letter.\228\
    On November 1, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. 
Eisenberg transmitting a subpoena compelling his appearance at 
a deposition on November 4.\229\ On November 4, Mr. Eisenberg's 
personal attorney sent a letter to the Committees, stating:

          Even if Mr. Eisenberg had been afforded a reasonable 
        amount of time to prepare, the President has instructed 
        Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the deposition. Enclosed 
        with this letter is the President's instruction as 
        relayed by Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, 
        in a letter dated November 3, 2019. We also enclose a 
        letter, also dated November 3, 2019, from Steven A. 
        Engel, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of 
        Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice, to Mr. 
        Cipollone advising that Mr. Eisenberg is ``absolutely 
        immune from compelled congressional testimony in his 
        capacity as a senior advisor to the President.'' Under 
        these circumstances, Mr. Eisenberg has no other option 
        that is consistent with his legal and ethical 
        obligations except to follow the direction of his 
        client and employer, the President of the United 
        States. Accordingly, Mr. Eisenberg will not be 
        appearing for a deposition at this time.\230\

    Enclosed was a letter sent on November 3 from Mr. Cipollone 
to Mr. Eisenberg's personal attorney stating that ``the 
President directs Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the 
Committee's deposition on Monday, November 4, 2019.''\231\ Also 
enclosed was a letter sent on November 3 from the Office of 
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice to Mr. Cipollone 
stating:

          You have asked whether the Committee may compel Mr. 
        Eisenberg to testify. We conclude that he is absolutely 
        immune from compelled congressional testimony in his 
        capacity as a senior advisor to the President.\232\

    Mr. Eisenberg did not appear for the scheduled deposition, 
in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The Committees met and 
Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Eisenberg's absence, stating:

          Despite his legal obligations to comply, Mr. 
        Eisenberg is not present here today and has therefore 
        defied a duly authorized congressional subpoena. This 
        morning, in an email received at 9:00 a.m., when the 
        deposition was supposed to commence, Mr. Eisenberg's 
        personal attorney sent a letter to the committee 
        stating that President Trump had, quote, ``instructed 
        Mr. Eisenberg not to appear at the deposition,'' 
        unquote. The attorney attached correspondence from 
        White House counsel Pat Cipollone and a letter from the 
        Office of Legal Counsel at Department of Justice. The 
        OLC letter informs the White House that Mr. Eisenberg 
        is purportedly, quote, ``absolutely immune from 
        compelled congressional testimony in his capacity as a 
        senior advisor to the President,'' unquote. . . .
          Moreover, neither Congress nor the courts recognize a 
        blanket, quote, ``absolute immunity,'' unquote, as a 
        basis to defy a congressional subpoena. Mr. Eisenberg 
        and the White House, therefore, have no basis for 
        evading a lawful subpoena. As such, the President's 
        direction to Mr. Eisenberg to defy a lawful compulsory 
        process can only be construed as an effort to delay 
        testimony and obstruct the inquiry, consistent with the 
        White House counsel's letter dated October 8, 2019. As 
        Mr. Eisenberg was informed, the Committees may consider 
        his noncompliance with the subpoena as evidence in a 
        future contempt proceeding. His failure or refusal to 
        appear, moreover, shall constitute evidence of 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may 
        be used as an adverse inference against the President. 
        The subpoena remains in full force. The committees 
        reserve all of their rights, including the right to 
        raise this matter at a future Intelligence Committee 
        proceeding, at the discretion of the chair of the 
        committee.
          Mr. Eisenberg's nonappearance today adds to a growing 
        body of evidence of the White House seeking to obstruct 
        the White House's impeachment inquiry. To the extent 
        the White House believes that an issue could be raised 
        at the deposition that may implicate a valid claim of 
        privilege, the White House may seek to assert that 
        privilege with the Committee in advance of the 
        deposition. To date, as has been the case in every 
        other deposition as part of the inquiry, the White 
        House has not done so. Mr. Eisenberg's failure to 
        appear today also flies in the face of historical 
        precedent. Even absent impeachment proceedings, 
        congressional committees have deposed senior White 
        House officials, including White House counsels and 
        senior White House lawyers.\233\

  Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy 
                Legal Advisor, National Security Council

    On October 30, the Committees sent a letter to Michael 
Ellis, a Senior Associate Counsel to the President and the 
Deputy Legal Advisor at the National Security Council, seeking 
his appearance at a deposition on November 4.\234\ On November 
2, Mr. Ellis' personal attorney sent an email to Committee 
staff stating:

          [W]e are in receipt of an opinion from the Office of 
        Legal Counsel providing guidance on the validity of a 
        subpoena under the current terms and conditions and 
        based on that guidance we are not in a position to 
        appear for a deposition at this time.\235\

    This email followed the November 1 Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion, discussed above, which sought to extend the reach of 
the President's earlier direction to defy Congressional 
subpoenas and provided justification for noncompliance by 
officials who could not plausibly be considered among the 
President's closest advisors.
    On November 3, Mr. Ellis' personal attorney sent another 
email to Committee staff stating:

          [O]ur guidance is that the failure to permit agency 
        counsel to attend a deposition of Mr. Ellis would not 
        allow sufficient protection of relevant privileges and 
        therefore render any subpoena constitutionally invalid. 
        As an Executive branch employee Mr. Ellis is required 
        to follow this guidance.\236\

    On November 3, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Ellis' 
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling his 
appearance at a deposition on November 4, stating:

          Mr. Ellis' failure or refusal to comply with the 
        subpoena, including at the direction or behest of the 
        President or the White House, shall constitute further 
        evidence of obstruction of the House's impeachment 
        inquiry and may be used as an adverse inference against 
        Mr. Ellis and the President.\237\

    On November 4, Mr. Ellis did not appear for the scheduled 
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The 
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Ellis' 
absence, stating:

          Other than the White House's objections to 
        longstanding congressional practice, the committees are 
        aware of no other valid constitutional privilege 
        asserted by the White House to direct Mr. Ellis to defy 
        this subpoena.\238\

    To date, Mr. Ellis has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

 Preston Wells Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and 
                 Environment, National Security Council

    On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Preston 
Wells Griffith, the Senior Director for International Energy 
and Environment at the National Security Council, seeking his 
appearance at a deposition on November 5.\239\ On November 4, 
Mr. Griffith's personal attorney sent a letter to the 
Committees stating:

          As discussed with Committee counsel, Mr. Griffith 
        respectfully declines to appear for a deposition before 
        the joint Committees conducting the impeachment 
        inquiry, based upon the direction of White House 
        Counsel that he not appear due to agency counsel not 
        being permitted.\240\

    Later that day, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. 
Griffith's personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling 
his appearance at a deposition on November 5, stating:

          Mr. Griffith's failure or refusal to comply with the 
        subpoena, including at the direction or behest of the 
        President or the White House, shall constitute further 
        evidence of obstruction of the House's impeachment 
        inquiry and may be used as an adverse inference against 
        Mr. Griffith and the President.\241\

    On November 5, Mr. Griffith did not appear for the 
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. 
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. 
Griffith's absence, stating:

          Although the committees requested a copy of any 
        written direction from the White House, Mr. Griffith's 
        counsel has not provided any such documentation to the 
        committees. The White House's newly invented rationale 
        for obstructing the impeachment inquiry appears based 
        on a legal opinion that was issued by the Department of 
        Justice Office of Legal Counsel just last Friday, 
        November 1. It is noteworthy and telling that OLC 
        issued this opinion after multiple current and former 
        White House, State Department, and Department of 
        Defense officials testified before the committees, both 
        voluntarily and pursuant to subpoena, all without 
        agency counsel present. The White House's invocation of 
        this self-serving OLC opinion should therefore be seen 
        for what it is: a desperate attempt to staunch the flow 
        of incriminating testimony from the executive branch 
        officials about the President's abuse of power.\242\

    To date, Mr. Griffith has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for 
          National Security Affairs, National Security Council

    On October 16, the Committees sent a letter to Dr. Charles 
M. Kupperman, a former Deputy Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, seeking his appearance at a 
deposition on October 23.\243\
    On October 25, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena 
compelling Dr. Kupperman to appear at a deposition on October 
28.\244\
    Later that day, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent an 
email to Committee staff attaching a 17-page complaint in 
federal court seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether he 
should comply with the subpoena.\245\ His counsel wrote:

          Pending the courts' determination as to which Branch 
        should prevail, Dr. Kupperman will not effectively 
        adjudicate the conflict by appearing and testifying 
        before the Committees.\246\

    Enclosed as part of the complaint was a letter sent on 
October 25 from Mr. Cipollone to Dr. Kupperman's personal 
attorney stating that ``the President directs Mr. Kupperman not 
to appear at the Committee's scheduled hearing on Monday, 
October 28, 2019.''\247\ Also enclosed was a letter sent on 
October 25 from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department 
of Justice, to Mr. Cipollone stating that Dr. Kupperman ``is 
absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony in his 
capacity as a former senior advisor to the President.''\248\
    On October 26, the Committees sent a letter to Dr. 
Kupperman's personal attorneys, stating:

          In light of the direction from the White House, which 
        lacks any valid legal basis, the Committees shall 
        consider your client's defiance of a congressional 
        subpoena as additional evidence of the President's 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry.\249\

    Later that day, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent a 
letter to Committee staff, stating: ``The proper course for Dr. 
Kupperman, we respectfully submit, is to lay the conflicting 
positions before the Court and abide by the Court's judgment as 
to which is correct.''\250\ On October 27, Dr. Kupperman's 
personal attorney sent a letter to Committee staff, writing: 
``If your clients'' position on the merits of this issue is 
correct, it will prevail in court, and Dr. Kupperman, I assure 
you again, will comply with the Court's judgment.''\251\
    On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Dr. 
Kupperman's personal attorneys withdrawing the subpoena, 
stating:

          The question whether the Executive Branch's 
        ``absolute immunity'' theory has any basis in law is 
        currently before the court in Committee on the 
        Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-cv-2379 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 
        7, 2019). In addition to not suffering from the 
        jurisdictional flaws in Dr. Kupperman's suit, McGahn is 
        procedurally much further along.\252\

    On November 8, Dr. Kupperman's personal attorney sent a 
letter to Douglas Letter, the General Counsel of the House of 
Representatives, stating that Dr. Kupperman stands ready to 
testify ``if the Judiciary resolves the conflict in favor of 
the Legislative Branch's position respecting such 
testimony.''\253\
    On November 25, the district court in McGahn held that 
``with respect to senior-level presidential aides, absolute 
immunity from compelled congressional process simply does not 
exist.'' The court explained there is ``no basis in the law'' 
for a claim of absolute immunity regardless of the position of 
the aides in question or whether they ``are privy to national 
security matters, or work solely on domestic issues.''\254\ To 
date and notwithstanding the ruling in McGahn as it relates to 
Presidential aides who ``are privy to national security 
matters,'' Dr. Kupperman continues to refuse to testify, and 
his case remains pending in federal court.\255\

  Russell T. Vought, Acting Director, Office of Management and Budget

    On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Russell T. 
Vought, the Acting Director of OMB, seeking his appearance at a 
deposition on October 25.\256\ On October 21, an attorney at 
OMB sent an email to Committee staff stating:

          Per the White House Counsel's October 8, 2019 letter, 
        the President has directed that ``[c]onsistent with the 
        duties of the President of the United States, and in 
        particular his obligation to preserve the rights of 
        future occupants of his office, [he] cannot permit his 
        Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry 
        under these circumstances.'' Therefore, Acting Director 
        Vought will not be participating in Friday's 
        deposition.\257\

    That same day, Mr. Vought publicly stated:

          I saw some Fake News over the weekend to correct. As 
        the WH letter made clear two weeks ago, OMB officials--
        myself and Mike Duffey--will not be complying with 
        deposition requests this week. #shamprocess.\258\

    On October 25, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Mr. Vought's appearance at a deposition on 
November 6.\259\
    On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director 
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman 
Schiff stating:

          The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reasserts 
        its position that, as directed by the White House 
        Counsel's October 8, 2019, letter, OMB will not 
        participate in this partisan and unfair impeachment 
        inquiry. . . . Therefore, Mr. Vought, Mr. Duffey, and 
        Mr. McCormack will not appear at their respective 
        depositions without being permitted to bring agency 
        counsel.\260\

    On November 5, Mr. Vought did not appear for the scheduled 
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The 
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Vought's 
absence, stating:

          On Monday of this week, OMB reasserted its position 
        that, quote, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's 
        October 8, 2019, letter, OMB will not participate in 
        this partisan and unfair impeachment inquiry,'' 
        unquote. OMB argues that the impeachment inquiry lacks 
        basic due process protections and relies on OLC opinion 
        that the committee cannot lawfully bar agency counsel 
        from depositions. This new and shifting rationale from 
        the White House, like the others it has used to attempt 
        to block witnesses from appearing to provide testimony 
        about the President's misconduct, has no basis in law 
        or the Constitution and is a serious affront to decades 
        of precedent in which Republicans and Democrats have 
        used exactly the same procedures to depose executive 
        branch officials without agency counsel present, 
        including some of the most senior aides to multiple 
        previous Presidents.\261\

    To date, Mr. Vought has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

  Michael Duffey, Associate Director for National Security Programs, 
                    Office of Management and Budget

    On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Michael 
Duffey, the Associate Director for National Security Programs 
at OMB, seeking his appearance at a deposition on October 
23.\262\
    On October 21, an attorney at OMB sent an email to 
Committee staff stating:

          Per the White House Counsel's October 8, 2019 letter, 
        the President has directed that ``[c]onsistent with the 
        duties of the President of the United States, and in 
        particular his obligation to preserve the rights of 
        future occupants of his office, [he] cannot permit his 
        Administration to participate in this partisan inquiry 
        under these circumstances.'' Therefore, Mike Duffey 
        will not be participating in Wednesday's 
        deposition.\263\

    On October 25, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Mr. Duffey to appear at a deposition on 
November 5, stating:

          Your failure or refusal to appear at the deposition, 
        including at the direction or behest of the President 
        or the White House, shall constitute evidence of 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may 
        be used as an adverse inference against the 
        President.\264\

    On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director 
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman 
Schiff stating that, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's 
October 8, 2019, letter,'' Mr. Duffey will not appear at his 
deposition.\265\
    On November 5, Mr. Duffey did not appear for the scheduled 
deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. The 
Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. Duffey's 
absence, stating:

          This effort by the President to attempt to block Mr. 
        Duffey from appearing can only be interpreted as a 
        further effort by the President and the White House to 
        obstruct the impeachment inquiry and Congress's lawful 
        and constitutional functions.\266\

    To date, Mr. Duffey has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

Brian McCormack, Associate Director for Natural Resources, Energy, and 
                Science, Office of Management and Budget

    On October 24, the Committees sent a letter to Brian 
McCormack, the Associate Director for Natural Resources, 
Energy, and Science at OMB, seeking his appearance at a 
deposition on November 4.\267\
    On November 1, the Committees sent a letter transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Mr. McCormack's appearance at a deposition 
on November 4.\268\
    On November 4, Jason A. Yaworske, the Associate Director 
for Legislative Affairs at OMB, sent a letter to Chairman 
Schiff stating that, ``as directed by the White House Counsel's 
October 8, 2019, letter,'' Mr. McCormack will not appear at his 
deposition.\269\
    On November 4, Mr. McCormack did not appear for the 
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. 
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. 
McCormack's absence, stating:

          At approximately 11:30 a.m. today, committee staff 
        received via email a letter from the Associate Director 
        for Legislative Affairs at OMB. The letter states that, 
        quote, ``As directed by the White House counsel's 
        October 8, 2019, letter,'' unquote, OMB will not 
        participate in the House's impeachment inquiry. The 
        letter further states that, based on the advice of the 
        Office of Legal Counsel that, quote, ``the committee 
        cannot lawfully bar agency counsel from these 
        depositions,'' unquote, Mr. McCormack will not appear 
        at his deposition today without agency counsel present. 
        As Mr. McCormack was informed, the committees may 
        consider his noncompliance with a subpoena as evidence 
        in a future contempt proceeding. His failure or refusal 
        to appear, moreover, shall constitute evidence of 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may 
        be used as an adverse inference against the 
        President.\270\

    To date, Mr. McCormack has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

          T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State

    On September 13, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo seeking transcribed interviews with 
Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl and other officials.\271\ The 
Committees received no direct, substantive response to this 
letter.
    On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing 
Secretary Pompeo that Mr. Brechbuhl's deposition was being 
scheduled on October 8, stating:

          On September 13, the Committees wrote to request that 
        you make State Department employees available for 
        transcribed interviews. We asked you to provide, by 
        September 20, dates by which the employees would be 
        made available for transcribed interviews. You failed 
        to comply with the Committees' request.\272\

    That same day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Mr. 
Brechbuhl seeking his appearance at a deposition on October 
8.\273\
    On October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the 
Committees stating, ``Based on the profound procedural and 
legal deficiencies noted above, the Committee's requested dates 
for depositions are not feasible.''\274\
    Later that day, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy 
Secretary of State John J. Sullivan stating that the State 
Department ``must immediately halt all efforts to interfere 
with the testimony of State Department witnesses before 
Congress.''\275\
    On October 2, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney sent an 
email to Committee staff stating:

          My law firm is in the process of being formally 
        retained to assist Mr. Brechbuhl in connection with 
        this matter. It will take us some time to complete 
        those logistics, review the request and associated 
        request for documents, and to meet with our client to 
        insure he is appropriately prepared for any deposition. 
        It will not be possible to accomplish those tasks 
        before October 8, 2019. Thus, as I am sure that you can 
        understand, Mr. Brechbuhl will not be able to appear on 
        that date as he requires a sufficient opportunity to 
        consult with counsel. Moreover, given the concerns 
        expressed in Secretary Pompeo's letter of October 1, 
        2019, to Chairman Engel, any participation in a 
        deposition would need to be coordinated with our 
        stakeholders.\276\

    On October 8, Committee staff sent an email to Mr. 
Brechbuhl's personal attorney stating: ``The Committees have 
agreed to reschedule Mr. Brechbuhl's deposition to Thursday, 
October 17. Please confirm that Mr. Brechbuhl intends to appear 
voluntarily.''\277\ On October 9, Committee staff sent an email 
to Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney asking him to ``confirm by 
COB today whether Mr. Brechbuhl intends to appear 
voluntarily.''\278\ Later that day, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal 
attorney sent an email to Committee staff stating, ``I am still 
seeking clarification from the State Department regarding this 
deposition.''\279\
    On October 25, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. 
Brechbuhl's personal attorney transmitting a subpoena 
compelling Mr. Brechbuhl's appearance at a deposition on 
November 6.\280\
    On November 5, Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney sent a 
letter to the Committees stating:

          Mr. Brechbuhl respects the important Constitutional 
        powers vested in the United States Congress. And, 
        indeed, he would welcome the opportunity to address 
        through testimony an existing inaccuracy in the public 
        record--the false claim that Mr. Brechbuhl in any way 
        personally participated in the telephone call between 
        President Trump and President Zelensky that occurred on 
        July 25, 2019. However, Mr. Brechbuhl has received a 
        letter of instruction from the State Department, 
        directing that he not appear. The State Department 
        letter of instruction asserts significant Executive 
        Branch interests as the basis for direction not to 
        appear and also asserts that the subpoena Mr. Brechbuhl 
        received is invalid. The letter is supported by 
        analysis from the United States Department of Justice. 
        We are also aware that litigation has recently been 
        initiated in the United States District Court for the 
        District of Columbia that may bear on resolving the 
        significant issues now arising between the Committees 
        and the President. Given these circumstances, Mr. 
        Brechbuhl is not able to appear on November 6, 
        2019.\281\

    On November 6, Mr. Brechbuhl did not appear for the 
scheduled deposition, in defiance of the Committees' subpoena. 
The Committees met and Chairman Schiff acknowledged Mr. 
Brechbuhl's absence, stating:

          The committees requested a copy of the State 
        Department's letter and the Department of Justice 
        analysis, but Mr. Brechbuhl's attorney has not 
        responded. While the letter from Mr. Brechbuhl's 
        attorney provides only vague references to unidentified 
        executive branch interests and a DOJ analysis as the 
        basis for the State Department's blocking of Mr. 
        Brechbuhl's testimony, the Department's latest 
        obstruction of this inquiry appears to be predicated on 
        the opinion issued by the Department of Justice Office 
        of Legal Counsel just last Friday, November 1, well 
        after the subpoena was issued to Mr. Brechbuhl. It is 
        noteworthy and telling that the OLC issued this opinion 
        only after multiple State Department officials 
        testified in this inquiry, both voluntarily and 
        pursuant to subpoena, all without agency counsel 
        present. Indeed, this morning, the third-highest-
        ranking official at the State Department, Under 
        Secretary David Hale, appeared and has begun testifying 
        in accordance with his legal obligations pursuant to a 
        subpoena.\282\

    The Committees sent Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney two 
separate inquiries asking him to provide a copy of the ``letter 
of instruction'' that Mr. Brechbuhl claimed to have received 
from the State Department directing him to defy a congressional 
subpoena.\283\ Mr. Brechbuhl's personal attorney furnished the 
Committees with a copy of the letter on December 2. The State 
Department's letter to Mr. Brechbuhl is dated November 4, 
2019.\284\
    To date, Mr. Brechbuhl has not changed his position or 
contacted the Committees about compliance with the subpoena.

               Secretary Rick Perry, Department of Energy

    On November 1, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary of 
Energy Rick Perry seeking his appearance at a deposition on 
November 6, stating:

          Your failure or refusal to appear at the deposition, 
        including at the direction or behest of the President 
        or the White House, shall constitute evidence of 
        obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may 
        be used as an adverse inference against the 
        President.\285\

    On November 5, an attorney at the Department of Energy sent 
a letter to the Committees stating:

          Please be advised that the Secretary will not appear 
        on Wednesday, November 6, 2019, at 2:00 pm for a 
        deposition to be conducted jointly by the Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Oversight and 
        Reform.\286\

    To date, Secretary Perry has not changed his position or 
come forward to testify.

     5. The President's Unsuccessful Attempts to Block Key Witnesses


Despite President Trump's explicit orders that no Executive Branch 
        employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment inquiry 
        and efforts by federal agencies to limit the testimony of those 
        who did, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized 
        subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and 
        public hearings. These officials adhered to the rule of law and 
        obeyed lawful subpoenas.

                                Overview

    Despite President Trump's orders that no Executive Branch 
employees should cooperate with the House's impeachment 
inquiry, multiple key officials complied with duly authorized 
subpoenas and provided critical testimony at depositions and 
public hearings. These officials not only served their nation 
honorably, but they fulfilled their oath to support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States.
    In addition to the President's broad orders seeking to 
prohibit all Executive Branch employees from testifying, many 
of these witnesses were personally directed by senior political 
appointees not to cooperate with the House's impeachment 
inquiry. These directives frequently cited or enclosed copies 
of Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter conveying the President's 
order not to comply.
    For example, the State Department, relying on President 
Trump's order, attempted to block Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch 
from testifying, but she fulfilled her legal obligations by 
appearing at a deposition on October 11 and a hearing on 
November 15. More than a dozen current and former officials 
followed her courageous example by testifying at depositions 
and public hearings over the course of the last two months. The 
testimony from these witnesses produced overwhelming and clear 
evidence of President Trump's misconduct, which is described in 
detail in Section I of this report.

   Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, 
                          Department of State

    On September 13, the Committees sent a letter to Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo seeking a transcribed interview with 
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch and other State Department 
officials.\287\ The Committees received no direct, substantive 
response to this letter.
    On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing 
Secretary Pompeo that Ambassador Yovanovitch's deposition was 
being scheduled on October 2, stating:

          On September 13, the Committees wrote to request that 
        you make State Department employees available for 
        transcribed interviews. We asked you to provide, by 
        September 20, dates by which the employees would be 
        made available for transcribed interviews. You failed 
        to comply with the Committees' request.\288\

    Also on September 27, the Committees sent a letter directly 
to Ambassador Yovanovitch seeking her appearance at a 
deposition on October 2.\289\
    On October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the 
Committees stating:

          Therefore, the five officials subject to your letter 
        may not attend any interview or deposition without 
        counsel from the Executive Branch present to ensure 
        that the Executive Branch's constitutional authority to 
        control the disclosure of confidential information, 
        including deliberative matters and diplomatic 
        communications, is not impaired.\290\

    After further discussions with Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
counsel, her deposition was rescheduled for October 11. On 
October 10, Brian Bulatao, the Under Secretary of State for 
Management, sent a letter to Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal 
attorney directing Ambassador Yovanovitch not to appear for her 
deposition and enclosing Mr. Cipollone's October 8 letter 
stating that President Trump and his Administration would not 
participate in the House's impeachment inquiry. Mr. Bulatao's 
letter stated:

          Accordingly, in accordance with applicable law, I 
        write on behalf of the Department of State, pursuant to 
        the President's instruction reflected in Mr. 
        Cipollone's letter, to instruct your client (as a 
        current employee of the Department of State), 
        consistent with Mr. Cipollone's letter, not to appear 
        before the Committees under the present 
        circumstances.\291\

    That same day, October 10, when asked whether he intended 
to block Ambassador Yovanovitch from testifying the next day, 
President Trump stated: ``You know, I don't think people should 
be allowed. You have to run a country, I don't think you should 
be allowed to do that.''\292\
    On the morning of Ambassador Yovanovitch's deposition on 
October 11, the Committees sent a letter to her personal 
attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling her appearance, 
stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct your client not to appear voluntarily for the 
        deposition, the enclosed subpoena now compels your 
        client's mandatory appearance at today's deposition on 
        October 11, 2019.\293\

    Later on October 11, Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal 
attorney sent a letter to Mr. Bulatao, stating:

          In my capacity as counsel for Ambassador Marie 
        Yovanovitch, I have received your letter of October 10, 
        2019, directing the Ambassador not to appear 
        voluntarily for her scheduled deposition testimony on 
        October 11, 2019 before the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform 
        in connection with the House of Representatives's 
        impeachment inquiry. Just this morning, the Ambassador 
        received a subpoena issued by the House Permanent 
        Select Committee on Intelligence, requiring her to 
        appear for the deposition as scheduled. Although the 
        Ambassador has faithfully and consistently honored her 
        professional duties as a State Department employee--
        including at all times following her abrupt termination 
        as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine--she is unable to obey 
        your most recent directive. As the recipient of a duly 
        issued congressional subpoena, Ambassador Yovanovitch 
        is, in my judgment, legally obligated to attend the 
        depositions as scheduled.\294\

    Ambassador Yovanovitch participated in the deposition on 
October 11, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\295\ 
During her deposition, Ambassador Yovanovitch's personal 
attorney confirmed that ``she received a direction by the Under 
Secretary to decline to appear voluntarily.''\296\
    On November 15, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ambassador Yovanovitch compelling her to testify at a public 
hearing of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\297\ 
Ambassador Yovanovitch complied with the Committees' subpoena 
and testified at the public hearing. During the hearing, 
Chairman Schiff acknowledged Ambassador Yovanovitch's 
compliance, stating:

          Ambassador, I want to thank you for your decades of 
        service. I want to thank you, as Mr. Maloney said, for 
        being the first one through the gap. What you did in 
        coming forward and answering a lawful subpoena was to 
        give courage to others that also witnessed wrongdoing, 
        that they, too, could show the same courage that you 
        have, that they could stand up, speak out, answer 
        questions, they could endure whatever threats, insults 
        may come their way. And so in your long and 
        distinguished career you have done another great public 
        service in answering the call of our subpoena and 
        testifying before us today.\298\

  Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, 
                          Department of State

    On September 27, 2019, the Committees sent a letter 
informing Secretary Pompeo that Ambassador Gordon Sondland's 
deposition was being scheduled on October 10.\299\ That same 
day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Ambassador 
Sondland seeking his appearance at the deposition.\300\ On 
October 1, Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the Committees 
stating that Ambassador Sondland ``may not attend'' the 
deposition.\301\
    After further discussions with Ambassador Sondland's 
personal attorney, his deposition was rescheduled for October 
8. On October 7, Mr. Bulatao sent a letter to Ambassador 
Sondland's personal attorney, stating:

          Based on consultations with the White House, the 
        State Department hereby instructs your client, 
        Ambassador Gordon Sondland, not to appear tomorrow for 
        his voluntary deposition based on the Executive Branch 
        confidentiality interests remaining to be addressed, 
        including, in particular, the Committee's refusal to 
        permit agency counsel to appear.\302\

    On October 8, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney sent 
an email to the Committees stating:

          I am incredibly disappointed to report that, 
        overnight, the State Department advised that it will 
        direct Ambassador Sondland not to appear before the 
        Committee this morning. While we have not yet gotten 
        written confirmation of that direction, we wanted to 
        advise you of this development at the earliest 
        opportunity. As the sitting US Ambassador to the EU and 
        employee of the State Department, Ambassador Sondland 
        is required to follow this direction. I hope that 
        whatever concerns the Department has can be resolved 
        promptly and that Ambassador Sondland's testimony can 
        be scheduled at the earliest opportunity. I am very 
        sorry for the inexcusably late notice, but we are 
        sharing this with you as soon as it was confirmed to 
        us. Ambassador Sondland is personally disappointed that 
        he will not be able to answer the Committee's questions 
        this morning.\303\

    On October 8, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador 
Sondland transmitting a subpoena compelling his appearance at a 
deposition on October 16, stating:

          The Committees have not received any communication 
        directly from the White House or the State Department 
        about this matter. In light of Secretary Pompeo's 
        direct intervention to block your appearance before our 
        Committees, we are left with no choice but to compel 
        your appearance at a deposition pursuant to the 
        enclosed subpoena.\304\

    On October 14, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador 
Sondland stating:

          We hereby write to memorialize our agreement with 
        your counsel, Mr. Robert Luskin, Esq., to adjourn the 
        date and time of your document production and 
        deposition to October 17, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. at the 
        Capitol, HVC-304.\305\

    Ambassador Sondland participated in the deposition on 
October 17, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\306\ 
During the deposition, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney 
stated:

          But we also wish to emphasize that it's his belief, 
        and ours, that the Committee should have access to all 
        relevant documents, and he regrets that they have not 
        been provided in advance of his testimony. Having those 
        documents would lead to a more fulsome and accurate 
        inquiry into the matters at hand. Indeed, Ambassador 
        Sondland has not had access to all of the State 
        Department records that would help him refresh his 
        recollection in anticipation of this testimony.\307\

    During the deposition, Ambassador Sondland stated:

          I was truly disappointed that the State Department 
        prevented me at the last minute from testifying earlier 
        on October 8, 2019. But your issuance of a subpoena has 
        supported my appearance here today, and I'm pleased to 
        provide the following testimony.\308\

    On November 4, Ambassador Sondland's personal attorney 
transmitted to the Committees a sworn declaration from 
Ambassador Sondland, which supplemented his deposition 
testimony and noted that despite ``repeated requests to the 
White House and the State Department,'' he still had not been 
granted access to records he sought to review to determine if 
he could ``provide more complete testimony to assist 
Congress.''\309\
    On November 20, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ambassador Sondland compelling him to testify at a public 
hearing of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\310\ 
Ambassador Sondland complied with the Committees' subpoena and 
testified at the public hearing. During the hearing, Ambassador 
Sondland described the direction he received from the White 
House:

          Q: Ambassador Sondland, in your deposition, you 
        lamented, quote: I was truly disappointed that the 
        State Department prevented me at the last minute from 
        testifying earlier on October 8, 2019, but your 
        issuance of a subpoena has supported my appearance here 
        today, and I am pleased to provide the following 
        testimony. So it is clear that the White House, the 
        State Department did not want you to testify at that 
        deposition. Is that correct?
          A: That is correct.
          Q: And since then, you have on numerous occasions 
        during your opening statement today indicated that you 
        have not been able to access documents in the State 
        Department. Is that correct?
          A: Correct.
          Q: So you have been hampered in your ability to 
        provide testimony to this committee. Is that correct?
          A: I have been hampered to provide completely 
        accurate testimony without the benefit of those 
        documents.\311\

George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European 
               and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State

    On September 13, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to 
Secretary of State Pompeo seeking a transcribed interview with 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent and other State 
Department officials.\312\ The Committees received no direct, 
substantive response to this letter.
    On September 27, the Committees sent a letter informing 
Secretary Pompeo that Mr. Kent's deposition was being scheduled 
on October 7.\313\ That same day, the Committees sent a letter 
directly to Mr. Kent seeking his appearance at the deposition 
on that date.\314\ Later that day, Mr. Kent sent an email to 
Committee staff acknowledging receipt of the Committees' 
request and copying an official from the Office of Legislative 
Affairs at the Department of State.\315\ On October 1, 
Secretary Pompeo sent a letter to the Committees stating that 
Mr. Kent ``may not attend'' the deposition.\316\
    After consulting with Mr. Kent's personal attorney, the 
Committees rescheduled his deposition for October 15.\317\ On 
October 10, Under Secretary Bulatao sent a letter to Mr. Kent's 
personal attorney enclosing the White House Counsel's letter of 
October 8, and stating:

          I write on behalf of the Department of State, 
        pursuant to the President's instruction reflected in 
        Mr. Cipollone's letter, to instruct your client (as a 
        current employee of the Department of State), 
        consistent with Mr. Cipollone's letter, not to appear 
        before the Committees under the present 
        circumstances.\318\

    On October 15, the Committees sent a letter to Mr. Kent's 
personal attorney transmitting a subpoena compelling him to 
appear at a deposition on that date.\319\
    Mr. Kent participated in the deposition on October 15, in 
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\320\ During the 
deposition, he stated:

          As you all know, I am appearing here in response to 
        your congressional subpoena. If I did not appear I 
        would have been exposed to being held in contempt. At 
        the same time, I have been instructed by my employer, 
        the U.S. Department of State, not to appear. I do not 
        know the Department of State's views on disregarding 
        that order.\321\

    On November 13, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Mr. Kent compelling him to testify at a public hearing before 
the Intelligence Committee on that day.\322\ Mr. Kent complied 
with the Committees' subpoena and testified at the public 
hearing. During the hearing, Mr. Kent described the direction 
he received from the White House, stating that he ``received, 
initially, a letter directing me not to appear. And once the 
committees issued a subpoena, I was under legal obligation to 
appear, and I am here today under subpoena.''\323\

 Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge D affaires for U.S. Embassy 
                      in Kyiv, Department of State

    On October 4, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy 
Secretary of State John Sullivan seeking a deposition with 
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr. on October 15.\324\ That same 
day, the Committees sent a letter directly to Ambassador Taylor 
seeking his appearance at the deposition.\325\
    On October 14, after consulting with Ambassador Taylor's 
counsel, the Committees sent a letter to Ambassador Taylor 
stating: ``We hereby write to adjourn the date and time of your 
deposition to Tuesday, October 22, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. at the 
Capitol, HVC-304.''\326\
    On October 22, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ambassador Taylor's personal attorneys compelling Ambassador 
Taylor to appear at a deposition on that date, stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for 
        depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your 
        client's mandatory appearance at today's 
        deposition.\327\

    Ambassador Taylor participated in the deposition on October 
22, in compliance with the Committees' subpoena. During the 
deposition, Ambassador Taylor's personal attorney stated, in 
regard to communications with the Department of State:

          They sent us the directive that said he should not 
        appear under I think the quote is under the present 
        circumstances. We told the majority that we could not 
        appear; he'd been instructed not to. We saw the 
        pattern.\328\

    On November 13, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ambassador Taylor compelling him to testify at a public hearing 
of the Intelligence Committee that same day.\329\ Ambassador 
Taylor complied with the Committees' subpoena and testified at 
the public hearing. During the hearing, Ambassador Taylor 
described the direction he received from the State Department:

          Q: Ambassador, were you also asked not to be part of 
        the deposition?
          A: Mr. Quigley, I was told by the State Department: 
        Don't appear under these circumstances. That was in the 
        letter to me. And when I got the subpoena, exactly as 
        Mr. Kent said, that was different circumstances and 
        obeyed a legal subpoena. So, yes, sir, I'm here for 
        that reason.\330\

     Catherine Croft and Christopher Anderson, Department of State

    On October 24, 2019, the Committees sent letters to the 
personal attorney representing two State Department officials, 
Catherine Croft and Christopher Anderson, seeking their 
attendance at depositions on October 30 and November 1, 
respectively.\331\
    On October 25, their attorney sent a letter to the 
Committees acknowledging receipt of the Committees' requests 
and stating that ``we are in the process of contacting the 
Office of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State in an 
effort to learn the disposition of that Office with regard to 
the Committee's request.''\332\
    On October 28, Under Secretary Bulatao sent letters to the 
personal attorney for Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson. Both letters 
enclosed the White House Counsel's October 8 letter and stated:

          Pursuant to Mr. Cipollone's letter and in light of 
        these defects, we are writing to inform you and Ms. 
        Croft of the Administration-wide direction that 
        Executive Branch personnel ``cannot participate in [the 
        impeachment] inquiry under these circumstances.''\333\

    On October 30, the Committees transmitted subpoenas to the 
personal attorney for Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson compelling 
their appearance at depositions on October 30, stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for 
        depositions, the enclosed subpoenas compel your 
        clients' mandatory appearance.\334\

    Ms. Croft and Mr. Anderson participated in their 
depositions on October 30, in compliance with the Committees' 
subpoenas.\335\ During Ms. Croft's deposition, her personal 
attorney stated:

          On October 28th, 2019, Ms. Croft received a letter 
        through her lawyers from Under Secretary of State Brian 
        Bulatao, in which we were instructed that Ms. Croft 
        cannot participate in the impeachment inquiry being 
        conducted by the House of Representatives and these 
        committees. Under Secretary Bulatao's letter stated 
        that these instructions were issued pursuant to a 
        directive from the Office of White House Counsel. 
        Nonetheless, Ms. Croft has been served with a valid 
        subpoena, and so she is obliged to be here today.\336\

    During Mr. Anderson's deposition, his personal attorney 
stated:

          On October 28th, 2019, Mr. Anderson received a 
        letter, through his lawyers, from Under Secretary of 
        State Brian Bulatao in which we were instructed that 
        Mr. Anderson cannot participate in the impeachment 
        inquiry being conducted by the House of Representatives 
        and these committees. Under Secretary Bulatao's letter 
        stated that these instructions were issued pursuant to 
        a directive from the Office of White House Counsel. 
        Nonetheless, Mr. Anderson has been served with a valid 
        subpoena, and so he is obliged to be here today.\337\

  Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, 
              Ukraine, and Eurasia, Department of Defense

    On October 11, the Committees sent a letter to Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura K. Cooper seeking her 
attendance at a deposition on October 18.\338\
    After consulting with Ms. Cooper's personal attorney, the 
Committees rescheduled her deposition for October 23.
    On October 22, Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. 
Norquist sent a letter to Ms. Cooper's personal attorney, 
stating:

          This letter informs you and Ms. Cooper of the 
        Administration-wide direction that Executive Branch 
        personnel ``cannot participate in [the impeachment] 
        inquiry under these circumstances''' [Tab C]. In the 
        event that the Committees issue a subpoena to compel 
        Ms. Cooper's appearance, you should be aware that the 
        Supreme Court has held, in United States v. Rumely, 345 
        U.S. 41 (1953), that a person cannot be sanctioned for 
        refusing to comply with a congressional subpoena 
        unauthorized by House Rule or Resolution.\339\

    On October 23, the Committees sent an email transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Ms. Cooper to appear at a deposition on 
that date, stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for 
        depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your 
        client's mandatory appearance at today's 
        deposition.\340\

    Ms. Cooper participated in the deposition on October 23, in 
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\341\
    During her deposition, Ms. Cooper stated with regard to the 
Department of Defense, ``They instructed me yesterday not to 
participate.''\342\
    On November 20, the Committees transmitted a subpoena to 
Ms. Cooper compelling her to testify at a public hearing before 
the Intelligence Committee on that day.\343\ Ms. Cooper 
complied with the Committees' subpoena and testified at the 
public hearing.\344\

 Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs, 
                    Office of Management and Budget

    On November 5, the Committees sent a letter to Mark Sandy, 
the Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs at 
OMB, seeking his appearance at a deposition on November 8.\345\ 
On November 6, Mr. Sandy responded to confirm receipt of the 
Committees' letter.\346\
    On November 7, an attorney at OMB sent an email to 
Committee staff stating:

          In light of the Committee's rules that prohibit 
        agency counsel from being present in a deposition of an 
        executive branch witness and consistent with the 
        November 1, 2019 OLC letter opinion addressing this 
        issue, OMB has directed Mr. Sandy not to appear at 
        tomorrow's deposition.\347\

    After consulting with Mr. Sandy's personal attorney, the 
Committees rescheduled his deposition for November 16.
    On November 16, the Committees sent an email transmitting a 
subpoena compelling Mr. Sandy to appear at a deposition on that 
date, stating:

          In light of recent attempts by the Administration to 
        direct witnesses not to appear voluntarily for 
        depositions, the enclosed subpoena compels your 
        client's mandatory appearance.\348\

    Mr. Sandy participated in the deposition on November 16, in 
compliance with the Committees' subpoena.\349\ During his 
deposition, Mr. Sandy also testified that the Administration 
sent his personal attorney an official communication with 
further direction, stating: ``It did direct me to have my 
personal counsel ask for a postponement until agency counsel 
could accompany me.''\350\

  Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
       Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council

    On October 9, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking 
Dr. Hill's testimony at a deposition on October 14.\351\ On 
October 13, Dr. Hill's personal attorney informed the White 
House that she intended to appear at the scheduled 
deposition.\352\ On October 14, the White House sent a letter 
to Dr. Hill's personal attorney stating that ``Dr. Hill is not 
authorized to reveal or release any classified information or 
any information subject to executive privilege.''\353\ Also on 
October 14, the Committees sent Dr. Hill a subpoena seeking her 
testimony the same day.\354\ Dr. Hill complied and participated 
in the deposition.\355\
    On November 18, Dr. Hill's personal attorney sent a letter 
to the White House stating that Dr. Hill had been invited to 
provide testimony at a public hearing on November 21, and 
stating: ``We continue to disagree with regard to the 
parameters of executive privilege as you articulated it on 
October 14 and our prior telephone calls.''\356\ On November 
20, the White House sent a letter to Dr. Hill's personal 
attorney stating that Dr. Hill ``continues to be bound by 
important obligations to refrain from disclosing classified 
information or information subject to executive privilege in 
her upcoming testimony before the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.''\357\ On November 21, the 
Committees sent Dr. Hill a subpoena seeking her testimony the 
same day.\358\ Dr. Hill also complied with this subpoena and 
testified at the public hearing.\359\

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National 
                            Security Council

    On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking 
Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman's testimony at a deposition on 
October 24.\360\ After discussions with Lt. Col. Vindman's 
personal attorneys, the deposition was rescheduled to October 
29. On October 29, the Committees sent Lt. Col. Vindman a 
subpoena seeking his testimony the same day.\361\ Lt. Col. 
Vindman complied.\362\ In addition, on November 19, the 
Committees conveyed a subpoena seeking Lt. Col. Vindman's 
testimony at a public hearing that same day.\363\ Lt. Col. 
Vindman also complied with this subpoena and testified at the 
public hearing.\364\

 Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
       Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council

    On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to 
Timothy Morrison seeking his testimony at a deposition on 
October 25.\365\ After discussions with Mr. Morrison's personal 
attorney, the deposition was rescheduled to October 31. On 
October 31, the Committees sent Mr. Morrison a subpoena seeking 
his testimony the same day.\366\ Mr. Morrison complied.\367\ In 
addition, on November 19, the Committees conveyed a subpoena 
seeking Mr. Morrison's testimony at a public hearing that same 
day.\368\ Mr. Morrison also complied with this subpoena and 
testified at the public hearing.\369\

 David Hale, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State

    On November 1, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking 
Under Secretary David Hale's testimony at a deposition on 
November 6.\370\ On November 5, Mr. Hale's counsel wrote to the 
Committees, stating that Mr. Hale would be willing to testify 
pursuant to a subpoena.\371\
    On November 6, the Committees sent Mr. Hale a subpoena 
seeking his testimony the same day.\372\ Mr. Hale 
complied.\373\ In addition, on November 20, the Committees 
conveyed a subpoena seeking Mr. Hale's testimony at a public 
hearing that same day.\374\ Mr. Hale also complied with this 
subpoena and testified at the public hearing.\375\

 David Holmes, Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in 
                   Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State

    On November 12, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to 
Political Counselor David Holmes' personal attorney seeking his 
testimony at a deposition on November 15.\376\ On November 15, 
the Committees conveyed a subpoena to Mr. Holmes' personal 
attorney seeking his testimony the same day.\377\ Mr. Holmes 
complied.\378\ In addition, on November 21, the Committees 
conveyed a subpoena seeking Mr. Holmes' testimony at a public 
hearing that same day.\379\ Mr. Holmes also complied with this 
subpoena and testified at the public hearing.\380\

Ambassador P. Michael McKinley, Former Senior Advisor to the Secretary 
                     of State, Department of State

    On October 12, 2019, Committee staff emailed Ambassador P. 
Michael McKinley requesting his voluntary participation in a 
transcribed interview on October 16.\381\ On October 14, the 
Committees sent a letter formalizing this request.\382\ On 
October 16, Ambassador McKinley participated in the scheduled 
transcribed interview.\383\

  Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
           European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State

    On October 16, 2019, the Committees sent a letter seeking 
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker's testimony at a deposition on 
October 23.\384\ On October 25, the Committees sent Ambassador 
Reeker a subpoena seeking his testimony on October 26.\385\ 
Ambassador Reeker complied and testified at the scheduled 
deposition.\386\

Ambassador Kurt Volker, Former U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine 
                   Negotiations, Department of State

    On September 13, 2019, the Committees wrote a letter to 
Secretary Pompeo requesting the testimony of four witnesses, 
including Ambassador Kurt Volker.\387\ On September 27, the 
Committees sent a follow up letter to Secretary Pompeo, noting 
that Ambassador Volker's deposition had been scheduled for 
October 3.\388\ On that same day, the Committees sent a letter 
directly to Ambassador Volker, seeking his testimony at the 
deposition scheduled for October 3.\389\
    On October 1, Secretary Pompeo responded to the Committees, 
refusing to make Ambassador Volker available on the requested 
date.\390\ On October 2, the Department of State wrote a letter 
to Ambassador Volker's counsel instructing Ambassador Volker 
not to reveal classified or privileged information and 
prohibiting Ambassador Volker from producing any government 
documents.\391\
    On October 2, Ambassador Volker produced copies of text 
messages in response to the Committees' request.\392\ On 
October 3, Ambassador Volker voluntarily participated in a 
transcribed interview.\393\ In addition, on November 19, 
Ambassador Volker testified voluntarily at a public 
hearing.\394\

Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the 
                             Vice President

    On November 4, 2019, the Committees sent a letter to 
Jennifer Williams seeking her testimony at a deposition on 
November 7.\395\ On November 7, the Committees sent Ms. 
Williams a subpoena seeking her testimony the same day.\396\ 
Ms. Williams complied.\397\ On November 11, Ms. Williams sent a 
letter to Chairman Schiff to make one amendment to her 
deposition testimony.\398\ In addition, on November 19, the 
Committees conveyed a subpoena seeking Ms. William's testimony 
at a public hearing on November 19.\399\ Ms. Williams also 
complied with this subpoena and testified at the public 
hearing.\400\

              6. The President's Intimidation of Witnesses


President Trump publicly attacked and intimidated witnesses who came 
        forward to comply with duly authorized subpoenas and testify 
        about his conduct. The President also threatened and attacked 
        an Intelligence Community whistleblower.

                                Overview

    President Trump engaged in a brazen effort to publicly 
attack and intimidate witnesses who came forward to comply with 
duly authorized subpoenas and testify about his conduct, 
raising grave concerns about potential violations of the 
federal obstruction statute and other criminal laws intended to 
protect witnesses appearing before Congressional proceedings. 
President Trump issued threats, openly discussed possible 
retaliation, made insinuations about witnesses' character and 
patriotism, and subjected them to mockery and derision. The 
President's attacks were broadcast to millions of Americans 
including witnesses' families, friends, and coworkers and his 
actions drew criticism from across the political spectrum, 
including from his own Republican supporters.
    It is a federal crime to intimidate or seek to intimidate 
any witness appearing before Congress. This statute applies to 
all citizens, including federal officials. Violations of this 
law can carry a criminal sentence of up to 20 years in prison.
    This campaign of intimidation risks discouraging witnesses 
from coming forward voluntarily, complying with mandatory 
subpoenas for documents and testimony, and disclosing evidence 
that may support consideration of articles of impeachment.

   Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, 
                          Department of State

    As discussed above, President Trump removed Marie 
Yovanovitch as the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine in May 2019 
following a concerted effort by Rudy Giuliani, his associates 
Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman, and others to spread false 
conspiracy theories about her. The smearing of the Ambassador 
was part of the larger campaign undertaken by Mr. Giuliani at 
President Trump's direction and in his capacity as President 
Trump's representative. During her deposition on October 11, 
Ambassador Yovanovitch explained that she felt threatened and 
``very concerned'' after she read President Trump's statements 
about her during his July 25 call with President Zelensky, 
including President Trump's claim that ``she's going to go 
through some things.''\401\
    On November 15, Ambassador Yovanovitch testified at a 
public hearing that she was ``shocked'' and ``devastated'' by 
the President's statements about her:

          I was shocked and devastated that I would feature in 
        a phone call between two heads of state in such a 
        manner, where President Trump said that I was bad news 
        to another world leader and that I would be ``going 
        through some things.'' So I was it was it was a 
        terrible moment. A person who saw me actually reading 
        the transcript said that the color drained from my 
        face. I think I even had a physical reaction. I think, 
        you know, even now, words kind of fail me.\402\

    Ambassador Yovanovitch was also asked about her reaction to 
the President's comment that she would ``go through some 
things.'' She acknowledged feeling threatened, stating: ``It 
didn't sound good. It sounded like a threat.''\403\
    As Ambassador Yovanovitch was in the process of testifying 
before the Committee, President Trump tweeted an attack against 
her. He wrote:

          Everywhere Marie Yovanovitch went turned bad. She 
        started off in Somalia, how did that go? Then fast 
        forward to Ukraine, where the new Ukrainian President 
        spoke unfavorably about her in my second phone call 
        with him. It is a U.S. President's absolute right to 
        appoint ambassadors.\404\

    During the hearing, Chairman Schiff asked Ambassador 
Yovanovitch for her reaction to the President's attacks:

          Q: Ambassador, you've shown the courage to come 
        forward today and testify, notwithstanding the fact you 
        were urged by the White House or State Department not 
        to; notwithstanding the fact that, as you testified 
        earlier, the President implicitly threatened you in 
        that call record. And now, the President in real-time 
        is attacking you. What effect do you think that has on 
        other witnesses' willingness to come forward and expose 
        wrongdoing?
          A: Well, it's very intimidating.
          Q: It's designed to intimidate, is it not?
          A: I--I--I mean, I can't speak to what the President 
        is trying to do, but I think the effect is to be 
        intimidating.
          Q: Well, I want to let you know, Ambassador, that 
        some of us here take witness intimidation very, very 
        seriously.\405\

    In response to the President's attacks, Rep. Liz Cheney, 
Chair of the House Republican Caucus, stated that the President 
``was wrong'' and that Ambassador Yovanovitch ``clearly is 
somebody who's been a public servant to the United States for 
decades and I don't think the President should have done 
that.''\406\ Rep. Francis Rooney, also a Republican, stated: 
``I don't necessarily think it's right to be harassing or 
beating up on our professional diplomatic service.''\407\
    Even after these rebukes, the President continued to attack 
and threaten Ambassador Yovanovitch. For example, in an 
interview on November 22, President Trump stated: ``This was 
not an angel, this woman, okay? And there are a lot of things 
that she did that I didn't like. And we will talk about that at 
some time.''\408\

Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National 
                            Security Council

    On October 29, President Trump tweeted that Lt. Col. 
Alexander Vindman is a ``Never Trumper.''\409\ When asked by a 
reporter what evidence he had for his claim, the President 
responded: ``We'll be showing that to you real soon. 
Okay?''\410\ President Trump continued attacking Lt. Col. 
Vindman during his testimony on November 19, seeking to 
question his loyalty to the United States. The President 
retweeted: ``Lt. Col. Vindman was offered the position of 
Defense Minister for the Ukrainian Government THREE 
times!''\411\ Allies of the President also questioned Lt. Col. 
Vindman's loyalty to the country and amplified the smear.\412\
    For his part, Lt. Col. Vindman stated during his testimony:

          I want to take a moment to recognize the courage of 
        my colleagues who have appeared and are scheduled to 
        appear before this Committee. I want to state that the 
        vile character attacks on these distinguished and 
        honorable public servants is reprehensible.\413\

 Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge d'Affaires for U.S. Embassy 
                      in Kyiv, Department of State

    On October 23, one day after Ambassador William Taylor's 
deposition, the President sent a tweet comparing ``Never 
Trumper Republicans'' to ``human scum.''\414\ An hour later, he 
described Ambassador Taylor in a tweet as a ``Never 
Trumper.''\415\
    On October 25, the President discussed Ambassador Taylor's 
testimony with reporters, and again dismissed the Ambassador as 
a ``Never Trumper.'' After a reporter noted that Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo had hired Ambassador Taylor, the President 
responded: ``Hey, everybody makes mistakes.'' He then had the 
following exchange about Ambassador Taylor:

          Q: Do you want him out now as the top diplomat?
          A: He's a Never Trumper. His lawyer is the head of 
        the Never Trumpers. They're a dying breed, but they're 
        still there.\416\

    On the morning of November 13, just before Ambassador 
Taylor and George Kent testified at a public hearing, the 
President tweeted: ``NEVER TRUMPERS!''\417\

Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the 
                             Vice President

    On November 17, two days before Jennifer Williams testified 
at a public hearing, President Trump sent a tweet attacking her 
and stating that ``she should meet with the other Never 
Trumpers, who I don't know & mostly never even heard of, & work 
out a better presidential attack!''\418\ During the hearing, 
Rep. Jim Himes asked Ms. Williams what impression the 
President's tweet had made on her. She responded: ``It 
certainly surprised me. I was not expecting to be called out by 
name.'' Rep. Himes noted that the tweet ``surprised me, too, 
and it looks an awful lot like witness intimidation and 
tampering, and an effort to try to get you to perhaps shape 
your testimony today.''\419\

                         Threats of Retaliation

    The President suggested that witnesses who testified as 
part of the impeachment inquiry could face retaliation. For 
example, on November 16, the President sent a pair of tweets 
indicating that three witnesses appearing before the 
impeachment inquiry could face dismissals as a result of their 
testimony. The President tweeted language he attributed to 
radio host Rush Limbaugh:

          ``My support for Donald Trump has never been greater 
        than it is right now. It is paramountly obvious 
        watching this, these people have to go. You elected 
        Donald Trump to drain the Swamp, well, dismissing 
        people like Yovanovitch is what that looks like. 
        Dismissing people like Kent . . . and Taylor, 
        dismissing everybody involved from the Obama holdover 
        days trying to undermine Trump, getting rid of those 
        people, dismissing them, this is what it looks like. It 
        was never going to be clean, they were never going to 
        sit by idly and just let Trump do this!'' Rush L\420\

                  Intelligence Community Whistleblower

    In addition to his relentless attacks on witnesses who 
testified in connection with the House's impeachment inquiry, 
the President also repeatedly threatened and attacked a member 
of the Intelligence Community who filed an anonymous 
whistleblower complaint raising an ``urgent concern'' regarding 
the President's conduct. The whistleblower filed the complaint 
confidentially with the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, as authorized by the relevant whistleblower law. 
Federal law prohibits the Inspector General from revealing the 
whistleblower's identity.\421\ Federal law also protects the 
whistleblower from retaliation.\422\
    On September 9, the Inspector General notified Congress 
that this individual had filed a credible complaint regarding 
an ``urgent concern,'' but that the Acting Director of National 
Intelligence was withholding the complaint from Congress 
contrary to his statutory obligation to have submitted the 
complaint to the congressional intelligence committees by no 
later than September 2.\423\ On September 13, 2019, the 
Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena to the Acting Director 
of National Intelligence for the whistleblower's complaint and 
other records.\424\
    On September 26, the Intelligence Committee received the 
declassified whistleblower complaint and made it available to 
the public.\425\
    That day, the President issued a chilling threat against 
the whistleblower and those who provided information to the 
whistleblower regarding the President's misconduct, suggesting 
that they could face the death penalty for treason. President 
Trump stated:

          I want to know who's the person who gave the whistle-
        blower the information because that's close to a spy. 
        You know what we used to do in the old days when we 
        were smart with spies and treason, right? We used to 
        handle it a little differently than we do now.\426\

    In response, the Committees warned President Trump to stop 
attacking the whistleblower, stating:

          The President's comments today constitute--
        reprehensible--witness intimidation and an attempt to 
        obstruct Congress' impeachment inquiry. We condemn the 
        President's attacks, and we invite our Republican 
        counterparts to do the same because Congress must do 
        all it can to protect this whistleblower, and all 
        whistleblowers. Threats of violence from the leader of 
        our country have a chilling effect on the entire 
        whistleblower process, with grave consequences for our 
        democracy and national security.\427\

    Yet the President's attacks did not stop. Instead, he 
continued to threaten the whistleblower, publicly questioned 
the whistleblower's motives, disputed the accuracy of the 
whistleblower's account, and encouraged others to reveal the 
whistleblower's identity. The President's focus on the 
whistleblower has been obsessive, with the President making 
more than 100 public statements about the whistleblower over a 
period of just two months. For example, the President stated:
     ``I want to meet not only my accuser, who 
presented SECOND & THIRD HAND INFORMATION, but also the person 
who illegally gave this information, which was largely 
incorrect, to the Whistleblower.' Was this person SPYING on the 
U.S. President? Big Consequences!''\428\
     ``I think it's outrageous that a Whistleblower is 
a CIA agent.''\429\
     ``But what they said is he's an Obama person. It 
was involved with Brennan; Susan Rice, which means Obama. But 
he was like a big--a big anti-Trump person. Hated Trump.''\430\
     ``The Whistleblower got it sooo wrong that HE must 
come forward. The Fake News Media knows who he is but, being an 
arm of the Democrat Party, don't want to reveal him because 
there would be hell to pay. Reveal the Whistleblower and end 
the Impeachment Hoax!''\431\
     ``But the whistleblower should be revealed because 
the whistleblower gave false stories. Some people would call it 
a fraud; I won't go that far. But when I read it closely, I 
probably would. But the whistleblower should be 
revealed.''\432\
     ``I think that the whistleblower gave a lot of 
false information.''\433\
     ``The whistleblower is not a whistleblower. He's a 
fake. . . . Everybody knows who the whistleblower is. And the 
whistleblower is a political operative.''\434\
    In response to a request from Intelligence Committee 
Ranking Member Nunes to call the whistleblower to testify at an 
open hearing, Chairman Schiff underscored the danger posed by 
the President's threats against the whistleblower and why the 
whistleblower's testimony was now unnecessary:

          The Committee also will not facilitate efforts by 
        President Trump and his allies in Congress to threaten, 
        intimidate, and retaliate against the whistleblower who 
        courageously raised the initial alarm. It remains the 
        duty of the Intelligence Committee to protect 
        whistleblowers, and until recently, this was a 
        bipartisan priority. The whistleblower has a right 
        under laws championed by this Committee to remain 
        anonymous and to be protected from harm.
          The impeachment inquiry, moreover, has gathered an 
        ever-growing body of evidence--from witnesses and 
        documents, including the President's own words in his 
        July 25 call record--that not only confirms, but far 
        exceeds, the initial information in the whistleblower's 
        complaint. The whistleblower's testimony is therefore 
        redundant and unnecessary. In light of the President's 
        threats, the individual's appearance before us would 
        only place their personal safety at grave risk.\435\

    Until President Trump's attacks on the whistleblower, 
Republicans and Democrats were united in protecting 
whistleblowers' right to report abuses of power and be free 
from retaliation.\436\ For example, Ranking Member Nunes, 
serving in 2017 as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, 
spoke in defense of whistleblowers, stating: ``We want people 
to come forward and we will protect the identity of those 
people at all cost.''\437\ He also stated:

          As you know, and I've said this several times, we 
        don't talk about sources at this committee. . . . The 
        good thing is, is that we have continued to have people 
        come forward, voluntarily, to this committee and we 
        want to continue that and I will tell you that that 
        will not happen if we tell you who our sources are and 
        people that come come to the committee.\438\

    Other Republican Members of Congress have opposed efforts 
to expose the whistleblower. For example, Senator Charles 
Grassley stated:

          This person appears to have followed the 
        whistleblower protection laws and ought to be heard out 
        and protected. We should always work to respect 
        whistleblowers' requests for confidentiality. Any 
        further media reports on the whistleblower's identity 
        don't serve the public interest--even if the conflict 
        sells more papers or attracts clicks.\439\

    Senator Richard Burr, the Chair of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, affirmed that he would ``never'' 
want the identity of the whistleblower revealed and stated, 
``We protect whistleblowers. We protect witnesses in our 
committee.''\440\
    Senator Mitt Romney also called for support of the 
whistleblower's rights, stating: ``[W]histleblowers should be 
entitled to confidentiality and privacy, because they play a 
vital function in our democracy.''\441\

                          SECTION II ENDNOTES

    \1\U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5.
    \2\Statement of George Mason, Madison Debates (July 20, 1787).
    \3\McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (``We are of [the] 
opinion that the power of inquiry--with process to enforce--it is an 
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.''); 
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (``the 
power to investigate is inherent in the power to make laws''); 
Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379, 
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019) (``[T]he House 
of Representatives has the constitutionally vested responsibility to 
conduct investigations of suspected abuses of power within the 
government, and to act to curb those improprieties, if required.''). As 
of this report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 
(D.C. Cir.).
    \4\Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (``Vigilant 
oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of 
office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment.''); 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing in dicta the ``inquiry into 
presidential impeachment'' opened by the House Judiciary Committee 
regarding President Nixon and explaining, ``The investigative authority 
of the Judiciary Committee with respect to presidential conduct has an 
express constitutional source.''); In re Report & Recommendation of 
June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to House of 
Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) (``[I]t should not be 
forgotten that we deal in a matter of the most critical moment to the 
Nation, an impeachment investigation involving the President of the 
United States. It would be difficult to conceive of a more compelling 
need than that of this country for an unswervingly fair inquiry based 
on all the pertinent information.''). In 1833, Justice Joseph Story 
reasoned--while explaining why pardons cannot confer immunity from 
impeachment--that, ``The power of impeachment will generally be applied 
to persons holding high office under the government; and it is of great 
consequence that the President should not have the power of preventing 
a thorough investigation of their conduct, or of securing them against 
the disgrace of a public conviction by impeachment, should they deserve 
it. The constitution has, therefore, wisely interposed this check upon 
his power.'' Joseph L. Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States Sec. 1501 (1873 ed., T.M. Cooley (ed.)).
    \5\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
    \6\Statement of Rep. William Lyman, Annals of Congress, 4th Cong. 
601 (1796).
    \7\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, A Sitting 
President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution (Oct. 
16, 2000) (explaining that a President ``who engages in criminal 
behavior falling into the category of `high Crimes and Misdemeanors''' 
is ``always subject to removal from office upon impeachment by the 
House and conviction by the Senate'') (online at www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olc-v024-p0222_0.pdf).
    \8\Id. (``Moreover, the constitutionally specified impeachment 
process ensures that the immunity [of a sitting President from 
prosecution] would not place the President `above the law.'''). 
President Trump's personal lawyers have staked out the more extreme 
position that the President may not be investigated by law enforcement 
agencies while in office. For example, President Trump's personal 
attorney asserted in court that the President could not be investigated 
by local authorities if he committed murder while in office. If Trump 
Shoots Someone on 5th Ave., Does He Have Immunity? His Lawyer Says Yes, 
New York Times (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/
nyregion/trump-taxes-vance.html). A federal district court and appeals 
court rejected this argument. Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631 (2nd Cir. 
2019) (``presidential immunity does not bar the enforcement of a state 
grand jury subpoena directing a third party to produce non-privileged 
material, even when the subject matter under investigation pertains to 
the President''); Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(calling the President's claims of ``unqualified and boundless'' 
immunity from judicial process ``repugnant to the nation's governmental 
structure and constitutional values''). The case is currently being 
appealed.
    \9\Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
    \10\McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (``A legislative body 
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information 
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect 
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the 
requisite information--which not infrequently is true--recourse must be 
had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere 
requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that 
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so 
some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.''); 
Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (``the 
subpoena power may be exercised by a committee acting, as here, on 
behalf of one of the Houses''); Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 
558 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2008) (``In short, there can be no question 
that Congress has a right--derived from its Article I legislative 
function--to issue and enforce subpoenas, and a corresponding right to 
the information that is the subject of such subpoenas. . . . 
Congress''s power of inquiry is as broad as its power to legislate and 
lies at the very heart of Congress's constitutional role. Indeed, the 
former is necessary to the proper exercise of the latter: according to 
the Supreme Court, the ability to compel testimony is necessary to the 
effective functioning of courts and legislatures.''') (citation 
omitted).
    \11\U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2.
    \12\Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
    \13\See Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 84 
(D.D.C. 2008) (``Thus, federal precedent dating back as far as 1807 
contemplates that even the Executive is bound to comply with duly 
issued subpoenas.'').
    \14\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379, 
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this 
report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. 
Cir.).
    \15\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505.
    \16\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 (also prohibiting making ``any materially 
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation'' or 
making or using ``any false writing or document knowing the same to 
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
entry'' in connection with a Congressional investigation).
    \17\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b); See also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1515(a) 
(defining ``official proceeding'' to include ``a proceeding before the 
Congress'').
    \18\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(d).
    \19\See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302; 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1034; P.L. 113-
126.
    \20\P.L. 116-6, Sec. 713 (``No part of any appropriation contained 
in this or any other Act shall be available for the payment of the 
salary of any officer or employee of the Federal Government, who . . . 
prohibits or prevents, or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent, 
any other officer or employee of the Federal Government from having any 
direct oral or written communication or contact with any Member, 
committee, or subcommittee of the Congress in connection with any 
matter pertaining to the employment of such other officer or employee 
or pertaining to the department or agency of such other officer or 
employee in any way, irrespective of whether such communication or 
contact is at the initiative of such other officer or employee or in 
response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee, or 
subcommittee.'').
    \21\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
    \22\House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(H. Rep. 105-830).
    \23\The White House, The President's Remarks Announcing 
Developments and Procedures to be Followed in Connection with the 
Investigation (Apr. 17, 1973). President Nixon initially stated that 
members of his ``personal staff'' would ``decline a request for a 
formal appearance before a committee of the Congress,'' but reversed 
course approximately one month later. The White House, Statement by the 
President, Executive Privilege (Mar. 12, 1973).
    \24\See, e.g., Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities, Testimony of John Dean, Watergate and Related Activities, 
Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 93rd Cong. (June 25, 1973); Senate 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of H.R. 
Haldeman, Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate 
Investigation, 93rd Cong. (July 30, 1973); Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of Alexander Butterfield, 
Watergate and Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 
93rd Cong. (July 16, 1973); Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, Testimony of John Ehrlichman, Watergate and 
Related Activities, Phase I: Watergate Investigation, 93rd Cong. (July 
24, 1973).
    \25\See House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305).
    \26\Id.
    \27\Id. (quoting letter from Chairman Peter W. Rodino, Jr., House 
Committee on the Judiciary, to President Richard M. Nixon (May 30, 
1974)).
    \28\H.R. Jour., 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 693 (Apr. 20, 1846).
    \29\Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran 
and the Nicaraguan Opposition and House Select Committee to Investigate 
Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Testimony of Oliver North, Iran-
Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee 
to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select 
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan 
Oppositions, 100th Cong. (July 7, 1987); Senate Select Committee on 
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and 
House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with 
Iran, Testimony of John Poindexter, Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint 
Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Secret 
Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Oppositions, 100th Cong. 
(July 15, 1987).
    \30\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Civ. No. 1:19-cv-02379, 
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this 
report, an appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. 
Cir.).
    \31\Committee on Government Reform, Democratic Staff, Congressional 
Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 2006) (online at 
https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/http://oversight-
archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-91336.pdf) (noting 
that Republican Dan Burton, Chairman of the Committee on Government 
Reform, deposed 141 Clinton Administration officials during his 
tenure).
    \32\Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist 
Attack in Benghazi, Final Report of the Select Committee on the Events 
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(H. Rep. 114-848) (noting that the Select Committee interviewed or 
received testimony from 107 people none of whom was instructed not to 
appear including 57 current and former State Department officials such 
as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Chief of Staff and Counselor to 
the Secretary of State Cheryl Mills, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director 
of Policy Planning Jacob Sullivan, and Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations Huma Abedin; 24 Defense Department officials such as 
Secretary Leon Panetta and General Carter Ham; and 19 Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials such as Director David Petraeus and 
former Deputy Director Michael Morell).
    \33\Id. (including productions of 71,640 pages of State Department 
documents, 300 pages of CIA intelligence analyses, 200 pages of Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) documents, 900 pages of Defense 
Department documents, and 750 pages of National Security Agency 
documents).
    \34\See, e.g., House rule X, clause 2(a) (assigning ``general 
oversight responsibilities'' to committees); House Rule XI, clause 2(m) 
(authorizing Committees to ``hold such hearings as it considers 
necessary'' and to ``require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance 
and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, 
records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as it 
considers necessary''); H. Res. 6 (2019) (granting deposition authority 
to committees); 116th Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition 
Authority, Congressional Record (Jan. 25, 2019) (establishing 
procedures for committee depositions).
    \35\See, e.g., House Rules (2017); H. Res. 5 (2017); 115th Congress 
Staff Deposition Authority Procedures, Congressional Record (Jan. 13, 
2017).
    \36\Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller III, Department of Justice, 
Report on The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 
Presidential Election, Vol. I (March 2019) (online at www.justice.gov/
storage/report.pdf); Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Department 
of Justice, Report on The Investigation Into Russian Interference In 
The 2016 Presidential Election, Vol. II (March 2019) (online at 
www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume2.pdf).
    \37\See H. Res. 430; see also H. Rep. 116-105 (2019) (the purposes 
of the Judiciary Committee's investigation include ``considering 
whether any of the conduct described in the Special Counsel's Report 
warrants the Committee in taking any further steps under Congress' 
Article I powers,'' including ``whether to approve articles of 
impeachment with respect to the President or any other Administration 
official'').
    \38\See Letter from Chairman Jerrold Nadler, House Committee on the 
Judiciary, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Chairwoman Maxine Waters, House Committee on Financial 
Services, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and 
Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Aug. 22, 2019) (online at https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/
democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/
FiveChairsLetter8.22.pdf).
    \39\Id.
    \40\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, 
The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf); Letter from 
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman 
Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, 
to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State (Sept. 9, 2019) 
(online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf); Letter from 
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah 
E. Cummings, Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. 
Pompeo, Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov;/sites;/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/;2019-
09-13.EEC%20EL;E%20Schiff;%20re%20Ukraine.pdf).
    \41\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Sept. 22, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-66/) (``We had 
a great conversation. The conversation I had was largely 
congratulatory. It was largely corruption all of the corruption taking 
place. It was largely the fact that we don't want our people, like Vice 
President Biden and his son, creating to the corruption already in the 
Ukraine.'').
    \42\Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Remarks Announcing 
Impeachment Inquiry (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at www.speaker.gov/
newsroom/92419-0).
    \43\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (July 25, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/
Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \44\See, e.g., Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Mick Mulvaney, Acting 
Chief of Staff, The White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-10-04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-
WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \45\H. Res. 660 (2019).
    \46\Trump Vows Stonewall of `All' House Subpoenas, Setting Up Fight 
Over Powers, New York Times (Apr. 24, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/24/us/politics/donald-trump-subpoenas.html).
    \47\While Bemoaning Mueller Probe, Trump Falsely Says the 
Constitution Gives Him `The Right to do Whatever I Want', Washington 
Post (July 23, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/
07/23/trump-falsely-tells-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-
right-do-whatever-i-want/).
    \48\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1179179573541511176).
    \49\At Louisiana Rally, Trump Lashes Out at Impeachment Inquiry and 
Pelosi, New York Times (Oct. 11, 2019) (online at www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/11/us/trump-rally-louisiana-lake-charles.html).
    \50\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 18, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1185374394350215169) (purporting to 
quote former Rep. Jason Chaffetz).
    \51\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 21, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1175409914384125952).
    \52\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1176559970390806530).
    \53\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1176623010230525953).
    \54\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President Salih 
of Iraq Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-salih-iraq-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny-2/).
    \55\The White House, Remarks by President Trump and President 
Bukele of El Salvador Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 25, 2019) (online 
at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
president-bukele-el-salvador-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/).
    \56\The White House, Remarks by President Trump in a Multilateral 
Meeting on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Sept. 25, 2019) 
(online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-multilateral-meeting-bolivarian-republic-venezuela-new-york-ny/).
    \57\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 26, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1177285017636093953).
    \58\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1179023004241727489).
    \59\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 5, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1180482408522629120).
    \60\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181761045486080002).
    \61\The White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of 
Executive Orders on Transparency in Federal Guidance and Enforcement 
(Oct. 9, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-orders-transparency-federal-
guidance-enforcement/).
    \62\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1181913137483829250).
    \63\ Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1181969511697788928).
    \64\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 20, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1186035686396321793).
    \65\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 12, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1194214569591394304).
    \66\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1198733640722718725).
    \67\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 26, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1199352977934487553).
    \68\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon Air Force One 
Arrival (Sept. 26, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-air-force-one-arrival-prince-
georges-county-md/).
    \69\See, e.g., Co-Equal, Investigative Rules and Practices Followed 
by House Republicans (online at www.co-equal.org/guide-to-
congressional-oversight/investigative-rules-and-practices-followed-by-
house-republicans). See also Committee on Government Reform, Democratic 
Staff, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 
2006) (online at https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/
http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-
91336.pdf) (noting that House Republicans conducted hundreds of 
confidential depositions of both political appointees and career 
officials without agency counsel present, with one Committee alone 
conducting over 140 depositions of Clinton Administration officials).
    \70\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \71\Speech: Donald Trump Holds a Political Rally in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, Factbase Videos (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at www.youtube.com/
watch?time_continue=742&v=_y8Al_mGwmc&feature=emb_logo).
    \72\Gregg Nunziata, a former legal counsel and senior policy 
advisor to Senator Marco Rubio, stated: ``This letter is bananas. A 
barely-lawyered temper tantrum.'' Gregg Nunziata, Twitter (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at https://twitter.com/greggnunziata/status/
1181685021926662144). Jonathan Turley, a law professor who has 
represented House Republicans, stated: ``A President cannot simply pick 
up his marbles and leave the game because he does not like the other 
players. A refusal to cooperate with a constitutionally mandated 
process can itself be an abuse of power.'' White House Issues Defiant 
Letter Refusing to Cooperate in Impeachment Proceedings, Res Ipsa 
Loquitur (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at https://jonathanturley.org/2019/10/
09/white-house-issues-defiant-letter-refusing-to-cooperate-in-
impeachment-proceedings/). Preet Bharara, the former U.S. Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York, stated, ``It's one of the worst 
letters I've seen from the White House counsel's office.'' George 
Conway, a prominent conservative attorney, called Mr. Cipollone's 
letter ``a disgrace to the country, a disgrace to the presidency, and a 
disgrace to the legal profession.'' He accused the White House of 
``clearly engaging in obstructionist tactics.'' Diagnosing Trump (with 
George Conway), Stay Tuned with Preet Bharara (Oct. 9, 2019) (online at 
https://cafe.com/stay-tuned-transcript-diagnosing-trump-with-george-
conway/). Mr. Conway also stated: ``I cannot fathom how any self-
respecting member of the bar could affix his name to this letter. It's 
pure hackery, and it disgraces the profession.'' George T. Conway, III, 
Twitter (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/gtconway3d/
status/1181685229687394307).
    \73\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \74\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Exclusion of 
Agency Counsel from Congressional Depositions in the Impeachment 
Context (Nov. 1, 2019) (online at www.justice.gov/olc/file/1214996/
download).
    \75\Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Legal Aspects 
of Impeachment: An Overview (1974) (quoting President James K. Polk) 
(online at www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/980036/download).
    \76\Position of the Executive Department Regarding Investigative 
Reports, 40 Op. Atty Gen. 45 (1941).
    \77\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \78\See, e.g., The White House, Remarks by President Trump and 
President Salih of Iraq Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 24, 2019) 
(online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-president-salih-iraq-bilateral-meeting-new-york-ny/) (``The phone 
call was perfect.''); The White House, Remarks by President Trump Upon 
Arriving at the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-upon-
arriving-u-n-general-assembly-new-york-ny/) (``That call was 
perfect.''); Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 11, 2019) (online at 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1193615188311912449) (``The 
call to the Ukrainian President was PERFECT.'').
    \79\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \80\See House Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong. (1974) (H. Rep. 93-
1305) (Impeachment Article III: ``In refusing to produce these papers 
and things, Richard M. Nixon, substituting his judgment as to what 
materials were necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the 
presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of 
Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions and judgments 
necessary to the exercise of the sole power of impeachment vested by 
the Constitution in the House of Representatives.'').
    \81\In this case, one Republican Member of the House of 
Representatives supported impeaching President Trump--Rep. Justin Amash 
from Michigan. In explaining his support, Rep. Amash noted the 
importance of upholding Congress' ``duties under our Constitution'' 
rather than ``loyalty to a political party.'' After Rep. Amash 
announced his support for impeachment, President Trump denounced him as 
a ``total lightweight'' and a ``loser.'' Rep. Amash subsequently 
declared that he was leaving the Republican party. See Justin Amash, 
Twitter (May 18, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/justinamash/
status/1129831626844921862); Trump Calls Representative Justin Amash a 
`Loser' Over Impeachment Talk, New York Times (May 19, 2019) (online at 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/us/politics/trump-justin-amash-
impeachment.html); Justin Amash: Our politics is in a partisan death 
spiral. That's why I'm leaving the GOP, Washington Post (July 4, 2019) 
(online at www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justin-amash-our-politics-
is-in-a-partisan-death-spiral-thats-why-im-leaving-the-gop/2019/07/04/
afbe0480-9e3d-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html).
    \82\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \83\Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice Sec. 603 (stating 
that ``various events have been credited with setting an impeachment in 
motion,'' including ``facts developed and reported by an investigating 
committee of the House''). On October 25, 2019, a federal district 
court affirmed that ``no governing law requires'' the House to hold a 
such a vote. In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857 
(D.D.C. 2019). More than 300 legal scholars agreed, concluding that 
``the Constitution does not mandate the process for impeachment and 
there is no constitutional requirement that the House of 
Representatives authorize an impeachment inquiry before one begins.'' 
An Open Letter from Legal Scholars on Trump Impeachment Inquiry (Oct. 
17, 2019) (online at www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/
Open-Letter-from-Legal-Scholars-re-Impeachment.pdf).
    \84\In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857 (D.D.C. 
2019).
    \85\See, e.g., 3 Deschler Ch. 14 Sec. 5 (discussing impeachment of 
Justice William O. Douglas).
    \86\See, e.g., H. Res. 87, 101st Cong. (1989) (impeachment of Judge 
Walter L. Nixon, Jr.); H. Res. 461, 99th Cong. (1986) (impeachment of 
Judge Harry E. Claiborne).
    \87\H. Res. 6 (2019); H. Res. 660 (2019). In addition, on June 11, 
2019, the House approved House Resolution 430, which, in part, 
authorized the House Committee on the Judiciary to seek judicial 
enforcement of subpoenas in the ongoing investigation related to 
Special Counsel Mueller's report. The resolution granted the Committee 
``any and all necessary authority under Article I of the Constitution'' 
to seek judicial enforcement. The accompanying report by the House 
Committee on Rules explained that this authority is intended to further 
the Judiciary Committee's ongoing investigation, the purpose of which 
includes assessing whether to recommend ``articles of impeachment with 
respect to the President.'' H. Rep. 116-108, quoting H. Rep. 116-105.
    \88\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf). President Trump has also made these claims 
directly, stating: ``we had a great two weeks watching these crooked 
politicians, not giving us due process, not giving us lawyers, not 
giving us the right to speak, and destroying their witnesses,'' and 
``we weren't allowed any rights.'' Speech: Donald Trump Holds a 
Political Rally in Sunrise, Florida, Factbase Videos (Nov. 26, 2019) 
(online atwww.youtube.com/watch?v=zoRcCRULQl8&feature=youtu.be).
    \89\Indeed, Mr. Cipollone articulated no basis under the 
Constitution for his various ``due process'' demands and there is no 
such basis, especially when the House is engaged in a fact-finding 
investigation as part of its efforts to ascertain whether to consider 
articles of impeachment. See H. Rept. 116-266 (2019).
    \90\H. Res. 660 (2019).
    \91\H. Rept. 116-266 (2019) (``The purpose of providing these 
protections is to ensure that the president has a fair opportunity to 
present evidence to the Judiciary Committee if it must weigh whether to 
recommend articles of impeachment against him to the full House.'').
    \92\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, to 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, 
Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf).
    \93\In a September 25, 2019, statement, a Department of Justice 
spokesperson stated: ``The Attorney General was first notified of the 
President's conversation with Ukrainian President Zelensky several 
weeks after the call took place, when the Department of Justice learned 
of a potential referral. The President has not spoken with the Attorney 
General about having Ukraine investigate anything relating to former 
Vice President Biden or his son. The President has not asked the 
Attorney General to contact Ukraine--on this or any other matter. The 
Attorney General has not communicated with Ukraine--on this or any 
other subject. Nor has the Attorney General discussed this matter, or 
anything relating to Ukraine, with Rudy Giuliani.'' As to the 
President's conduct with regard to Ukraine, the Department stated: ``In 
August, the Department of Justice was referred a matter relating to a 
letter the Director of National Intelligence had received from the 
Inspector General for the Intelligence Community regarding a purported 
whistleblower complaint. The Inspector General's letter cited a 
conversation between the President and Ukrainian President Zelensky as 
a potential violation of federal campaign finance law, while 
acknowledging that neither the Inspector General nor the complainant 
had firsthand knowledge of the conversation. Relying on established 
procedures set forth in the Justice Manual, the Department's Criminal 
Division reviewed the official record of the call and determined, based 
on the facts and applicable law, that there was no campaign finance 
violation and that no further action was warranted. All relevant 
components of the Department agreed with this legal conclusion, and the 
Department has concluded the matter.'' Department of Justice (Sept. 25, 
2019) (as emailed by the Department of Justice to the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence).
    \94\H. Rept. 116-266 (2019) (The report continued: ``As previously 
described, an impeachment inquiry is not a criminal trial and should 
not be confused with one. The president's liberty is not at stake and 
the constitutional protections afforded a criminal defendant do not as 
a matter of course apply. The constitutionally permitted consequences 
of impeachment are limited to immediate removal from office and 
potentially being barred from holding future federal office. Moreover, 
it is the Senate that conducts the trial to determine whether the 
conduct outlined in the articles warrant the president's removal from 
office, which requires a 2/3 majority vote. Indeed, given the nature of 
the ongoing investigation into the Ukraine matter, President Trump has 
received additional procedural protections. During closed door 
depositions held by HPSCI and others related to the Ukraine matter, 
minority members have been present and granted equal time to question 
witnesses brought before the committees. This is unlike the process in 
the preceding two presidential impeachment inquiries, which relied 
significantly upon information gathered by third-party 
investigators.'').
    \95\See Committee on Government Reform, Democratic Staff, 
Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration (Jan. 17, 2006) 
(online at https://wayback.archive-it.org/4949/20141031200116/http://
oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20060117103516-91336.pdf) 
(explaining that when Rep. Dan Burton served as Chairman of the 
Committee on Government Reform, the Committee deposed 141 Clinton 
Administration officials without agency counsel present--including 
White House Chief of Staff Mack McLarty; White House Chief of Staff 
Erskine Bowles; White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum; White House 
Counsel Jack Quinn; Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey; Deputy 
White House Counsel Cheryl Mills; Deputy White House Chief of Staff 
Harold Ickes; Chief of Staff to the Vice President Roy Neel; and Chief 
of Staff to the First Lady Margaret Williams).
    \96\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. 
Cummings, Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf). On November 1, 2019, after the House approved H. Res. 
660, the Administration continued to press this spurious claim, with 
the Office of Legal Counsel issuing an opinion asserting that 
``Congressional committees participating in an impeachment inquiry may 
not validly compel executive branch witnesses to testify about matters 
that potentially involve information protected by executive privilege 
without the assistance of agency counsel.'' Department of Justice, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Exclusion of Agency Counsel from Congressional 
Depositions in the Impeachment Context (Nov. 1, 2019) (online at 
www.justice.gov/olc/file/1214996/download). As discussed in this 
section, this position is entirely unsupported by judicial precedent 
and erroneous.
    \97\U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2.
    \98\The regulations that govern House depositions state: ``Only 
members, Committee staff designated by the chair or ranking minority 
member, an official reporter, the witness, and the witness's counsel 
are permitted to attend. Observers or counsel for other persons, 
including counsel for government agencies, may not attend.'' 116th 
Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition Authority, Congressional 
Record, H1216 (Jan. 25, 2019) (online at www.congress.gov/116/crec/
2019/01/25/CREC-2019-01-25-pt1-PgH1216-2.pdf).
    \99\Committee on Oversight and Reform, Committee Depositions in the 
House of Representatives: Longstanding Republican and Democratic 
Practice of Excluding Agency Counsel (Nov. 5, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
Committee%20Depositions%20in%20the%20House%20of%20Representatives_Longst
anding% 20Republican%20and%20Democratic%20Practice%20of 
%20Excluding%20Agency%20  CounselCounsel.pdf).
    \100\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \101\Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
    \102\See, e.g., S. 2537 (requiring an investigation by the State 
Department Inspector General into the withholding of aid to Ukraine, 
directing the President to immediately obligate previously appropriated 
funds, and authorizing funds to counter Russian influence); H.R. 3047 
(providing support to Ukraine to defend its independence, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity).
    \103\In re Application of the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States House of Representatives, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184857 (D.D.C. 
2019), quoting Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30475 
(D.D.C. 2019) (``Nothing in the Constitution or case law . . . compels 
Congress to abandon its legislative role at the first scent of 
potential illegality and confine itself exclusively to the impeachment 
process.''').
    \104\See, e.g., the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information 
Act, P.L. 93-502; Ethics in Government Act of 1978, P.L. 95-52; 
Presidential Records Act of 1978, P.L. 95-591; Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, P.L. 93-443.
    \105\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf); Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Eliot L. Engel, 
Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \106\United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (``Rather, each branch should take cognizance of an implicit 
constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a 
realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the 
particular fact situation.'').
    \107\For example, on November 22, 2019, the Department of State 
produced to a private party 99 pages of emails, letters, notes, 
timelines, and news articles under a court order pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act. State Department Releases Ukraine Documents 
to American Oversight, American Oversight (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/state-department-releases-ukraine-documents-
to-american-oversight).
    \108\Even if the President were to make a colorable assertion of 
executive privilege, which he has not, the Supreme Court has held that 
the privilege is not absolute. In the context of a grand jury subpoena, 
the Supreme Court found that the President's ``generalized assertion of 
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in 
a pending criminal trial.'' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held that executive privilege 
is a ``qualified'' privilege and that ``courts must balance the public 
interests at stake in determining whether the privilege should yield in 
a particular case, and must specifically consider the need of the party 
seeking privileged evidence.'' In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). As described above, Congress' need for information during 
an impeachment inquiry is particularly ``compelling.'' In re Report & 
Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of 
Evidence to House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974) 
(``[I]t should not be forgotten that we deal in a matter of the most 
critical moment to the Nation, an impeachment investigation involving 
the President of the United States. It would be difficult to conceive 
of a more compelling need than that of this country for an unswervingly 
fair inquiry based on all the pertinent information.'').
    \109\See, e.g., Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House, to William Pittard, Counsel to Mick 
Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 8, 2019) 
(asserting that Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney ``is absolutely 
immune from compelled congressional testimony with respect to matters 
related to his service as a senior advisor to the President'' and that 
``[s]ubjecting a senior presidential advisor to the congressional 
subpoena power would be akin to requiring the President himself to 
appear before Congress on matters relating to the performance of his 
constitutionally assigned executive functions'').
    \110\Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 
(D.D.C. 2008) (``The Executive cannot identify a single judicial 
opinion that recognizes absolute immunity for senior presidential 
advisors in this or any other context. That simple yet critical fact 
bears repeating: the asserted absolute immunity claim here is entirely 
unsupported by existing case law. In fact, there is Supreme Court 
authority that is all but conclusive on this question and that 
powerfully suggests that such advisors do not enjoy absolute immunity. 
The Court therefore rejects the Executive's claim of absolute immunity 
for senior presidential aides.'').
    \111\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Case No. 1:19-cv-02379, 
Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 46 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019). As of this 
report, an appeal is pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir.).
    \112\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \113\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 24, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2019-09-
24.eec_engel_schiff_to_cipollone-wh_re_potus_ukraine.pdf).
    \114\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/
sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \115\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \116\Email from Bureau of Legislative Affairs, Department of State, 
to Committee Staff (Oct. 2, 2019).
    \117\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_cipollone_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \118\Id.
    \119\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the 
President, The White House (Sept. 24, 2019).
    \120\Memorandum from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings to Members of the 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Notice of Intent to Issue 
Subpoenas (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
02.COR%20WH%20Subpoena%20Memo%20and%20Schedule.pdf).
    \121\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/
sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \122\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf).
    \123\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 18, 2019).
    \124\On September 13, the Intelligence Committee issued a subpoena 
pursuant to its oversight authority to the Acting Director of National 
Intelligence to compel the production of a complaint submitted by an 
Intelligence Community whistleblower, as well as other records. The 
Intelligence Committee issued this subpoena before Speaker Pelosi 
announced on September 24 that the Intelligence Committee and other 
committees would be continuing their work under the umbrella of the 
impeachment inquiry being conducted by the Judiciary Committee. As a 
result, this subpoena should not be conflated with subpoenas issued as 
part of the impeachment inquiry. See Letter from Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph 
Maguire, Acting Director of National Intelligence, Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (Sept. 13, 2019).
    \125\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 
21, 2019) (online at http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2019/images/11/15/4-21-
19.trump-zelensky.call.pdf); The White House, Memorandum of Telephone 
Conversation (July 25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/09/Unclassified09.2019.pdf).
    \126\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 31-32.
    \127\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 53; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 19-20.
    \128\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 186-187; Morrison Dep. Tr. at 166-167.
    \129\See, e.g., Cooper Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
    \130\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 78-79.
    \131\Vindman Dep. Tr. at 36-37.
    \132\Holmes Dep. Tr. at 31.
    \133\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \134\The review reportedly uncovered ``early August email exchanges 
between acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and White House budget 
officials seeking to provide an explanation for withholding the funds 
after the president had already ordered a hold in mid-July on the 
nearly $400 million in security assistance.'' The review also 
reportedly included interviews with ``some key White House officials 
involved in handling Ukraine aid and dealing with complaints and 
concerns in the aftermath of the call between Trump and Zelensky.'' 
White House Review Turns Up Emails Showing Extensive Effort to Justify 
Trump's Decision to Block Ukraine Military Aid, Washington Post (Nov. 
24, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-house-
review-turns-up-emails-showing-extensive-effort-to-justify-trumps-
decision-to-block-ukraine-military-aid/2019/11/24/2121cf98-0d57-11ea-
bd9d-c628fd48b3a0_story.html).
    \135\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Vice President Michael R. Pence 
(Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
04.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20re%20Request%20to%20VP%2010-04-
19%20Letter%20and%20Schedule.pdf).
    \136\Id.
    \137\Letter from Matthew E. Morgan, Counsel to the Vice President, 
Office of the Vice President, to Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \138\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 61.
    \139\Williams Dep. Tr. at 129.
    \140\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 15.
    \141\Id. at 23-24.
    \142\Williams Dep. Tr. at 74-75.
    \143\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Acting Director Russell T. Vought, Office of 
Management and Budget (Oct. 7, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2019-10-
07.eec_engel_schiff_to_vought-_omb_breb_subpoena.pdf).
    \144\Id.
    \145\Letter from Jason Yaworske, Associate Director for Legislative 
Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \146\Sandy Dep. Tr. at 23-26.
    \147\Id. at 36-41.
    \148\Id. at 57-60, 62-63.
    \149\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 9, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
ele_schiff_cummings_letter_to_sec_pompeo_on_ukraine.pdf).
    \150\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 23, 2019).
    \151\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Document%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \152\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State 
(Oct. 8, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
08.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Sondland%20re%20Subpoena.pdf); Letter 
from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador William Taylor, Department of State 
(Oct. 4, 2019); Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Counselor T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/20190927_-
_eec_engel_schiff_to_brechbuhl_re_individual_deposition_request.pdf); 
Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Deputy Assistant Secretary George P. Kent, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019); Letter from Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah 
E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador 
Kurt Volker, Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019); Letter from Chairman 
Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to 
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
    \153\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same 
day).
    \154\Id.
    \155\Kent Dep. Tr. at 27.
    \156\Id. at 33-34.
    \157\Id. at 34-35.
    \158\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same 
day).
    \159\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Deputy Secretary John J. 
Sullivan, Department of State (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/4/6/4683bc86-be2a-49fc-9e76-
7cdbf669592f/98BEBD8006DE62BA36BEBD175775F744.2019-10-1-ele-abs-eec-to-
depsec-sullivan.pdf).
    \160\Pompeo: `I Was on the Phone Call' with Trump and Ukrainian 
President, CNN (Oct. 2, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/10/02/
politics/mike-pompeo-ukraine-call/index.html).
    \161\Email from Committee Staff to Bureau of Legislative Affairs, 
Department of State (Oct. 7, 2019).
    \162\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for 
Management, Department of State, to Andrew Wright, Counsel to Deputy 
Assistant Secretary George P. Kent, Department of State (Oct. 14, 
2019).
    \163\Kent Dep. Tr. at 30-31, 46.
    \164\Id. at 32.
    \165\Id. at 35.
    \166\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \167\Id.
    \168\Id. In addition, Dr. Fiona Hill, the former Senior Director 
for Europe and Russia at the National Security Council, produced 
calendar entries relating to relevant meetings. Fiona Hill Document 
Production, Bates Hill0001-Hill0049 (Oct. 13, 2019).
    \169\Kurt Volker Document Production, Bates KV00000001-KV00000065 
(Oct. 2, 2019).
    \170\18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505.
    \171\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 3-4 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \172\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 160.
    \173\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of 
State, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \174\State Department Releases Ukraine Documents to American 
Oversight, American Oversight (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.americanoversight.org/state-department-releases-ukraine-documents-
to-american-oversight); American Oversight v. Dep't of State, Case No. 
19-cv-2934, Doc. No. 15 (D.D.C. November 25, 2019).
    \175\Email from Office Manager to the Secretary of State to S_All 
(Mar. 26, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_1Docs_11-22.pdf).
    \176\Email from Madeleine Westerhout to State Department Official, 
(Mar. 27, 2019) (online at www.americanoversight.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/11/AO_State_Ukraine_Docs_11-22.pdf).
    \177\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Document%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \178\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 33-34.
    \179\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong., at 20-23 (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \180\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 45-46.
    \181\Hale Dep. Tr. at 147-148.
    \182\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Mark Esper, Department of Defense 
(Oct. 7, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2019-10-07.eec_engel_schiff_to_esper-dod_re_subpoena.pdf).
    \183\Transcript: Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on ``Face the 
Nation,'' October 13, 2019, CBS News (Oct. 13, 2019) (online at 
www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper-on-
face-the-nation-october-13-2019/).
    \184\Letter from Robert R. Hood, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \185\Transcript: Secretary of Defense Mark Esper on ``Face the 
Nation,'' October 13, 2019, CBS News (Oct. 13, 2019) (online at 
www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-secretary-of-defense-mark-esper-on-
face-the-nation-october-13-2019/).
    \186\See, e.g., Cooper Dep. Tr. at 42-43.
    \187\Id. at 33.
    \188\Id. at 33-38.
    \189\Cooper Hearing Tr. at 13-14.
    \190\Id. at 14.
    \191\Id.
    \192\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Rick Perry, Department 
of Energy (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-10-
10.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Perry-
DOE%20Joint%20Cover%20Letter%20re%20Subpoena.pdf).
    \193\Letter from Melissa F. Burnison, Assistant Secretary for 
Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Energy, to 
Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman 
Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform 
(Oct. 18, 2019).
    \194\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr. at 160.
    \195\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \196\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Opening 
Statement of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, Department of State, 
Impeachment, 116th Cong. (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \197\Letter from Chairman Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Rudy Giuliani (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-%20Giuliani%20HPSCI%20Subpoena%20Letter.pdf).
    \198\Letter from Jon A. Sale, Counsel to Rudy Giuliani, to 
Committee Staff (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \199\Id.
    \200\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Igor Fruman (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-
%20Fruman%20Letter%20and%20Doc%20Request%20Schedule.pdf); Letter from 
Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight 
and Reform, to Lev Parnas (Sept. 30, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/20190930%20-
%20Parnas%20Letter%20and%20Doc%20Request%20Schedule.pdf).
    \201\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/2019-10-
09.eec_engel_schiff_to_parnas_fruman_re_subpoena.pdf).
    \202\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 3, 2019).
    \203\Letter from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 8, 2019).
    \204\Email from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 9, 2019).
    \205\Email from Committee Staff to John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor 
Fruman and Lev Parnas (Oct. 10, 2019).
    \206\Email from John M. Dowd, Counsel to Igor Fruman and Lev 
Parnas, to Committee Staff (Oct. 10, 2019).
    \207\Exclusive: Giuliani Associate Parnas Will Comply with Trump 
Impeachment Inquiry--Lawyer, Reuters (Nov. 4, 2019) (online at 
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-impeachment-parnas-exclusiv/
exclusive-giuliani-associate-now-willing-to-comply-with-trump-
impeachment-inquiry-lawyer-idUSKBN1XE297). On November 23, 2019, Mr. 
Parnas' attorney informed the press that ``Mr. Parnas learned from 
former Ukrainian Prosecutor General Victor Shokin that [Ranking Member 
Devin] Nunes had met with Shokin in Vienna last December.'' According 
to the report, ``Parnas says he worked to put Nunes in touch with 
Ukrainians who could help Nunes dig up dirt on Biden and Democrats in 
Ukraine, according to Bondy.'' Exclusive: Giuliani Associate Willing to 
Tell Congress Nunes Met with Ex-Ukrainian Official to Get Dirt on 
Biden, CNN (Nov. 23, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/2019/11/22/politics/
nunes-vienna-trip-ukrainian-prosecutor-biden/index.html). On November 
24, 2019, Mr. Parnas' attorney told press that his client had arranged 
skype and phone calls earlier this year between Ranking Member Nunes' 
staff and Ukraine's chief anti-corruption prosecutor, Nazar 
Kholodnytsky, as well as a deputy in Ukraine's Prosecutor General's 
office, Kostantyn Kulyk. According to Mr. Parnas' attorney, Ranking 
Member Nunes had actually planned a trip to Ukraine instead of the 
calls, but cancelled the trip when his staff realized it would require 
alerting Chairman Schiff about the travel. Giuliani Associate Parnas 
Wants to Testify that Nunes Aides Hid Ukraine Meetings on Biden Dirt 
from Schiff, CNBC (Nov. 24, 2019) (online at www.cnbc.com/2019/11/24/
giuliani-ally-would-testify-that-nunes-staffers-hid-ukraine-meetings-
from-schiff.html).
    \208\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. 
Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee, and Chairman 
Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 8, 
2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-
Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \209\See 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 192, 194. Witnesses who received 
subpoenas that were subsequently withdrawn would not face a similar 
risk of being held in contempt of Congress.
    \210\See, e.g., Email from Committee Staff to Mick Mulvaney, Acting 
Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019) (``Your failure or 
refusal to comply with the subpoena, including at the direction or 
behest of the President, shall constitute further evidence of 
obstruction of the House's impeachment inquiry and may be used as an 
adverse inference against you and the President. Moreover, your failure 
to appear shall constitute evidence that may be used against you in a 
contempt proceeding.'').
    \211\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of 
Staff, The White House (Nov. 5, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2019-11-
05.CBM%20Engel%20Schiff%20to%20Mulvaney-WH%20re%20Depo%20Notice.pdf).
    \212\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief of Staff, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019).
    \213\Email from William Pittard, Counsel to Mick Mulvaney, Acting 
Chief of Staff, The White House, to Committee Staff (Nov. 8, 2019).
    \214\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to William Pittard, Counsel to Mick Mulvaney, Acting Chief 
of Staff, The White House (Nov. 8, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-10.08.2019.pdf).
    \215\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone, 
Counsel to the President, The White House (Nov. 7, 2019).
    \216\Mulvaney Dep. Tr. at 5.
    \217\Id. at 7-9.
    \218\On November 8, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney filed a motion in federal 
court seeking to join a lawsuit, discussed below, filed by Dr. Charles 
Kupperman seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether he should comply 
with the Committees' subpoena. On November 11, 2019, Mr. Mulvaney 
withdrew his request to join the case. White House Chief of Staff 
Mulvaney Drops Bid to Join Kupperman Impeachment Lawsuit, Washington 
Post (Nov. 11, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-
issues/bolton-and-kupperman-reject-white-house-chief-of-staff-
mulvaneys-bid-to-join-impeachment-lawsuit/2019/11/11/cdf40226-04ac-
11ea-8292-c46ee8cb3dce_story.html).
    \219\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Robert B. Blair, Assistant 
to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, The White 
House (Oct. 24, 2019).
    \220\Letter from Whitney C. Ellerman, Counsel to Robert B. Blair, 
Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, 
The White House, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 2, 2019).
    \221\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Whitney C. Ellerman, Counsel to Robert 
B. Blair, Assistant to the President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of 
Staff, The White House (Nov. 3, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Robert B. Blair, Assistant to the 
President and Senior Advisor to the Chief of Staff, The White House 
(Nov. 3, 2019).
    \222\Blair Dep. Tr. at 6-7.
    \223\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Charles J. Cooper and 
Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Ambassador John Bolton, Former National 
Security Advisor, The White House (Oct. 30, 2019).
    \224\Email from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Ambassador John 
Bolton, Former National Security Advisor, The White House, to Committee 
Staff (Oct. 30, 2019).
    \225\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Ambassador John 
Bolton, Former National Security Advisor, The White House, to Douglas 
N. Letter, General Counsel, House of Representatives (Nov. 8, 2019).
    \226\In early November 2019, Ambassador Bolton's personal attorney 
also informed Committee staff that if the Committees were to issue a 
subpoena to compel his testimony, he would seek to join the lawsuit 
filed by Dr. Kupperman. On November 24, 2019, Chairman Schiff stated, 
``We've certainly been in touch with his lawyer and what we've been 
informed by his lawyer because we invited him and he did not choose to 
come in and testify, notwithstanding the fact that his deputy Fiona 
Hill and his other deputy Colonel Vindman and Tim Morrison and others 
on the National Security Council have shown the courage to come in is 
if we subpoena him, they will sue us in court.'' Schiff Pushes Bolton 
to Testify But Will Not Go to Court to Force Him, CNN (Nov. 24, 2019) 
(online at www.cnn.com/2019/11/24/politics/adam-schiff-house-democrats-
impeachment-state-of-the-union-cnntv/index.html).
    \227\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy 
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House (Oct. 30, 2019).
    \228\Eisenberg Dep. Tr. at 6 (``Mr. Eisenberg never acknowledged 
receipt or otherwise responded to the committees' deposition request, 
nor did any official at the White House.'').
    \229\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy 
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House (Nov. 1, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy Counsel to the 
President for National Security Affairs and Legal Advisor to the 
National Security Council, The White House (Nov. 1, 2019).
    \230\Letter from William A. Burck, Counsel to John A. Eisenberg, 
Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \231\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to William A. Burck, Counsel to John A. Eisenberg, Deputy 
Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
    \232\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone, 
Counsel to the President, the White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
    \233\Eisenberg Dep. Tr. at 6-8.
    \234\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Michael Ellis, Senior 
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House 
(Oct. 30, 2019).
    \235\Email from Paul Butler, Counsel to Michael Ellis, Senior 
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House, 
to Committee Staff (Nov. 2, 2019).
    \236\Email from Paul Butler, Counsel to Michael Ellis, Senior 
Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the 
National Security Council, National Security Council, The White House, 
to Committee Staff (Nov. 3, 2019).
    \237\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Paul W. Butler, Counsel to Michael 
Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Deputy Legal 
Advisor to the National Security Council, National Security Council, 
The White House (Nov. 3, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to Michael Ellis, Senior Associate Counsel to 
the President and Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security 
Council, National Security Council, The White House (Nov. 3, 2019).
    \238\Ellis Dep. Tr. at 7.
    \239\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Preston Wells Griffith, 
Senior Director for International Energy and Environment, National 
Security Council (Oct. 24, 2019).
    \240\Letter from Karen D. Williams, Counsel to Preston Wells 
Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and Environment, 
National Security Council, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \241\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Karen D. Williams, Counsel to Preston 
Wells Griffith, Senior Director for International Energy and 
Environment, National Security Council (Nov. 4, 2019); House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Preston Wells Griffith, 
Senior Director for International Energy and Environment, National 
Security Council (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \242\Griffith Dep. Tr. at 5-6.
    \243\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former 
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
National Security Council (Oct. 16, 2019).
    \244\Email from Committee Staff to Charles J. Cooper and Michael W. 
Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council 
(Oct. 25, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Subpoena to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council 
(Oct. 25, 2019).
    \245\Compl., Kupperman v. U.S. House of Representatives et al., No. 
19 Civ. 3224 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 25, 2019).
    \246\Email from Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
25, 2019).
    \247\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The 
White House, to Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, 
Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 
National Security Council (Oct. 25, 2019).
    \248\Letter from Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Pat A. Cipollone, 
Counsel to the President, The White House (Oct. 25, 2019).
    \249\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Charles J. Cooper and Michael W. 
Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council 
(Oct. 26, 2019).
    \250\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
26, 2019).
    \251\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
27, 2019).
    \252\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform to Charles J. Cooper and 
Michael W. Kirk, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. Kupperman, Former Deputy 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National 
Security Council, (Nov. 5, 2019).
    \253\Letter from Charles J. Cooper, Counsel to Dr. Charles M. 
Kupperman, Former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, National Security Council, to Douglas N. Letter, 
General Counsel, House of Representatives (Nov. 8, 2019).
    \254\Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn, Memorandum Opinion 
(D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2019) (``To make the point as plain as possible, it is 
clear to this Court for the reasons explained above that, with respect 
to senior-level presidential aides, absolute immunity from compelled 
congressional process simply does not exist. Indeed, absolute 
testimonial immunity for senior-level White House aides appears to be a 
fiction that has been fastidiously maintained over time through the 
force of sheer repetition in OLC opinions, and through accommodations 
that have permitted its proponents to avoid having the proposition 
tested in the crucible of litigation. And because the contention that a 
President's top advisors cannot be subjected to compulsory 
congressional process simply has no basis in the law, it does not 
matter whether such immunity would theoretically be available to only a 
handful of presidential aides due to the sensitivity of their 
positions, or to the entire Executive branch. Nor does it make any 
difference whether the aides in question are privy to national security 
matters, or work solely on domestic issues.''). As of this report, an 
appeal is pending in the D.C. Circuit. No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir.).
    \255\See Kupperman v. U.S. House of Representatives, et al., No. 19 
Civ. 3224 (D.D.C.). As of this report, the House Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss (Nov. 14, 2019), ECF No. 41, remains pending. Although the 
Committee will not reissue the subpoena to Dr. Kupperman and the court 
case is moot, he could choose to appear on a voluntary basis to assist 
Congress in the discharge of its Constitutional responsibilities.
    \256\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Acting Director Russell T. 
Vought, Office of Management and Budget (Oct. 11, 2019).
    \257\Email from Jessica L. Donlon, Deputy General Counsel for 
Oversight, Office of Management and Budget, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
21, 2019).
    \258\Russell T. Vought, Twitter (Oct. 21, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/RussVought45/status/1186276793172578306?s=20).
    \259\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Acting Director Russell T. 
Vought, Office of Management and Budget (Oct. 25, 2019).
    \260\Letter from Jason A. Yaworske, Associate Director for 
Legislative Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam 
B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 4, 
2019).
    \261\Vought Dep. Tr. at 10-11.
    \262\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Associate Director Michael 
Duffey, Office of Management and Budget (Oct. 11, 2019).
    \263\Email from Jessica L. Donlon, Deputy General Counsel for 
Oversight, Office of Management and Budget, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
21, 2019).
    \264\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Michael Duffey, Associate 
Director of National Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget 
(Oct. 25, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/20191025_-_letter_duffey_re_subpoena.pdf); House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Michael Duffey, 
Associate Director of National Security Programs, Office of Management 
and Budget (Oct. 25, 2019).
    \265\Letter from Jason A. Yaworske, Associate Director for 
Legislative Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam 
B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 4, 
2019).
    \266\Duffey Dep. Tr. at 7.
    \267\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Brian McCormack, Associate 
Director for Natural Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of 
Management and Budget (Oct. 24, 2019).
    \268\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Brian McCormack, Associate 
Director for Natural Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of 
Management and Budget (Nov. 1, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Brian McCormack, Associate Director for 
Natural Resources, Energy, and Science, Office of Management and Budget 
(Nov. 1, 2019).
    \269\Letter from Jason A. Yaworske, Associate Director for 
Legislative Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, to Chairman Adam 
B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 4, 
2019).
    \270\McCormack Dep. Tr. at 6.
    \271\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019).
    \272\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (internal citations omitted) 
(online at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/
democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2019-09-
27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Depositions.pdf).
    \273\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
    \274\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same 
day).
    \275\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Deputy Secretary of State John J. 
Sullivan, Department of State (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-10-01%20ELE%20ABS%20EEC%20TO%20DEPSEC%20SULLIVAN.pdf).
    \276\Email from Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
Counselor, Department of State, to Committee Staff (Oct. 2, 2019).
    \277\Email from Committee Staff, to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. 
Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State (Oct. 8, 2019).
    \278\Email from Committee Staff, to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. 
Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State (Oct. 9, 2019).
    \279\Email from Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
Counselor, Department of State, to Committee Staff (Oct. 9, 2019).
    \280\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
Counselor, Department of State (Oct. 25, 2019); House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, 
Department of State (Oct. 25, 2019).
    \281\Letter from Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
Counselor, Department of State to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. 
Maloney, House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Nov. 5, 2019).
    \282\Brechbuhl Dep. Tr. at 4-5.
    \283\Email from Committee staff to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. 
Ulrich Brechbuhl, Counselor, Department of State (Nov. 5, 2019); Email 
from Committee Staff to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich 
Brechbuhl, Counselor (Nov. 22, 2019).
    \284\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for 
Management, to Ronald J. Tenpas, Counsel to T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
Counselor, Department of State (Nov. 4, 2019.)
    \285\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Rick Perry, 
Department of Energy (Nov. 1, 2019).
    \286\Letter from General Counsel Bill Cooper, Department of Energy, 
to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform (Nov. 5, 2019).
    \287\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019).
    \288\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (internal citations omitted).
    \289\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, 
Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of State (Sept. 27, 
2019).
    \290\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same 
day).
    \291\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for 
Management, Department of State, to Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to 
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, 
Department of State (Oct. 10, 2019).
    \292\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Oct. 10, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-69/).
    \293\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to Ambassador 
Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of 
State (Oct. 11, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of State (Oct. 11, 2019).
    \294\Letter from Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to Ambassador Marie 
Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of State, to 
Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for Management, Department of 
State (Oct. 11, 2019) (citations omitted).
    \295\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr.
    \296\Id. at 70.
    \297\Email from Committee Staff to Lawrence S. Robbins, Counsel to 
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, 
Department of State (Nov. 15, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine, Department of State (Nov. 15, 2019).
    \298\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 157-158.
    \299\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department 
of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (internal citations omitted) (online at 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff@%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Depositions.pdf).
    \300\Letter from Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. 
Ambassador to the European Union, Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
    \301\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same 
day).
    \302\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for 
Management, Department of State, to Robert Luskin, Counsel to 
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, 
Department of State (Oct.7, 2019).
    \303\Email from Robert Luskin, Counsel to Ambassador Gordon 
Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, Department of State, 
to Committee Staff (Oct. 8, 2019).
    \304\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to 
the European Union, Department of State (Oct. 8, 2019); House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Ambassador Gordon 
Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, Department of State 
(Oct. 11, 2019).
    \305\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to 
the European Union, Department of State (Oct. 14, 2019).
    \306\Sondland Dep. Tr.
    \307\Id. at 16.
    \308\Id. at 17.
    \309\Letter from Robert Luskin, Counsel to Ambassador Gordon 
Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, Department of State, 
to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence (Nov. 4, 2019); Declaration of Ambassador Gordon Sondland, 
Department of State (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \310\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
Ambassador Gordon Sondland, U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, 
Department of State (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \311\Sondland Hearing Tr. at 160.
    \312\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019).
    \313\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019) (online at https://
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/
documents/2019-09-27.EEC%20Engel%20Schiff%20%20to%20Pompeo-
%20State%20re%20Depositions.pdf) (internal citations omitted).
    \314\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department 
of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
    \315\Email from George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State, to 
Committee Staff (Sept. 27, 2019).
    \316\Letter from Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Secretary Pompeo sent identical letters to Chairman Elijah. E. 
Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the same 
day).
    \317\Email from Committee Staff to Andrew M. Wright, Counsel to 
George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European 
and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 8, 2019).
    \318\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for 
Management, Department of State, to Andrew M. Wright, Counsel to George 
P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 10, 2019).
    \319\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform, to Andrew M. Wright, Counsel to George P. Kent, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian 
Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 15, 2019); House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Department 
of State (Oct. 15, 2019).
    \320\Kent Dep. Tr.
    \321\Id. at 17.
    \322\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
George P. Kent, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European 
and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \323\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 142-143.
    \324\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John J. Sullivan, Deputy 
Secretary of State, Department of State (Oct. 4, 2019).
    \325\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador William B. Taylor, 
Jr., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Kyiv, Department of State (Oct. 
4, 2019).
    \326\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee 
on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge 
d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Kyiv, Department of State (Oct. 14, 2019).
    \327\Email from Committee Staff to John B. Bellinger, III, and 
Jeffrey H. Smith, Counsel to Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge 
d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Kyiv, Department of State (Oct. 22, 2019); 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, 
Kyiv, Department of State (Oct. 22, 2019).
    \328\Taylor Dep. Tr. at 83.
    \329\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
Ambassador William B. Taylor, Jr., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, 
Kyiv, Department of State (Nov. 13, 2019).
    \330\Kent-Taylor Hearing Tr. at 143.
    \331\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Mark J. MacDougall, Counsel 
to Catherine Croft, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State (Oct. 
24, 2019); Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Mark J. MacDougall, Counsel 
to Christopher Anderson, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State 
(Oct. 24, 2019).
    \332\Letter from Mark J. MacDougall, Counsel to Catherine Croft, 
Foreign Service Officer, Department of State, and Christopher Anderson, 
Foreign Service Officer, Department of State, to Committee Staff (Oct. 
25, 2019).
    \333\Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under Secretary of State for 
Management, Department of State, to Mark J. MacDougall, Counsel to 
Catherine Croft, Foreign Service Officer, Department of State (Oct. 28, 
2019) (bracketed text in original); Letter from Brian Bulatao, Under 
Secretary of State for Management, Department of State, to Mark J. 
MacDougall, Counsel to Christopher Anderson, Foreign Service Officer, 
Department of State (Oct. 28, 2019) (bracketed text in original); see 
Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President, The White 
House, to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 8, 2019) (online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PAC-Letter-
10.08.2019.pdf).
    \334\Email from Committee Staff to Mark J. MacDougall and Abbey 
McNaughton, Counsel to Catherine Croft, Foreign Service Officer, 
Department of State and Christopher Anderson, Foreign Service Officer, 
Department of State (Oct. 30, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Catherine Croft, Foreign Service Officer, 
Department of State (Oct. 30, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, Subpoena to Christopher Anderson, Foreign Service 
Officer, Department of State (Oct. 30, 2019).
    \335\Croft Dep. Tr.; Anderson Dep. Tr.
    \336\Croft Dep. Tr. at 12.
    \337\Anderson Dep. Tr. at 11-12.
    \338\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Department of 
Defense (Oct. 11, 2019).
    \339\Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense David L. Norquist to 
Daniel Levin, Counsel to Laura K. Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Department of Defense (Oct. 22, 
2019).
    \340\Email from Committee Staff to Dan Levin, Counsel to Laura K. 
Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, 
Eurasia, Department of Defense (Oct. 23, 2019); House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Laura K. Cooper, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Department 
of Defense (Oct. 23, 2019).
    \341\Cooper Dep. Tr.
    \342\Id. at 108.
    \343\Email from Committee Staff to Dan Levin, Counsel to Laura K. 
Cooper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, 
Eurasia, Department of Defense (Nov. 20, 2019); House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Laura K. Cooper, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, Department 
of Defense (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \344\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr.
    \345\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director 
of National Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget (Nov. 5, 
2019).
    \346\Email from Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director of National 
Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget, to Committee Staff 
(Nov. 6, 2019).
    \347\Email from Jessica L. Donlon, Deputy General Counsel for 
Oversight, Office of Management and Budget, to Committee Staff (Nov. 7, 
2019).
    \348\Email from Committee Staff to Barbara Van Gelder, Counsel to 
Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate Director of National Security Programs, 
Office of Management and Budget (Nov. 16, 2019); House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Mark Sandy, Deputy Associate 
Director of National Security Programs, Office of Management and Budget 
(Nov. 16, 2019).
    \349\Sandy Dep. Tr.
    \350\Id. at 161.
    \351\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, 
National Security Council (Oct. 9, 2019).
    \352\Letter from Lee S. Wolosky, Counsel to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former 
Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and 
Russia, National Security Council, to Michael M. Purpura, Deputy 
Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President, The White House, and 
Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the 
President, The White House (Oct. 13, 2019).
    \353\Letter from Michael M. Purpura, Deputy Counsel and Deputy 
Assistant to the President, The White House, to Lee S. Wolosky, Counsel 
to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Oct. 14, 
2019).
    \354\Email from Committee Staff to Lee S. Wolosky and Samuel S. 
Ungar, Counsel to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the 
President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National Security 
Council (Oct. 14, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to 
the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National 
Security Council (Oct. 14, 2019).
    \355\Hill Dep. Tr.
    \356\Letter from Lee S. Wolosky, Counsel to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former 
Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and 
Russia, National Security Council, to Michael M. Purpura, Deputy 
Counsel and Deputy Assistant to the President, The White House (Nov. 
18, 2019).
    \357\Letter from Michael M. Purpura, Deputy Counsel and Deputy 
Assistant to the President, The White House, to Lee S. Wolosky, Counsel 
to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Nov. 20, 
2019).
    \358\Email from Committee Staff to Lee S. Wolosky and Samuel S. 
Ungar, Counsel to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to the 
President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National Security 
Council (Nov. 21, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to Dr. Fiona Hill, Former Deputy Assistant to 
the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, National 
Security Council (Nov. 21, 2019).
    \359\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr.
    \360\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. 
Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National Security Council (Oct. 16, 
2019).
    \361\Email from Committee Staff to Michael Volkov and Matt 
Stankiewicz, Counsel to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, 
Director for Ukraine, National Security Council (Oct. 29, 2019); House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Lieutenant 
Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National Security 
Council (Oct. 29, 2019).
    \362\Vindman Dep. Tr. (During the deposition, Lieutenant Colonel 
Vindman stated: ``I was subpoenaed to appear here. You know, absent a 
subpoena, I would believe I was operating under the President's 
guidance to not appear, but I was subpoenaed and I presented myself.'' 
Vindman Dep. Tr. at 232).
    \363\Email from Committee Staff, to Michael Volkov and Matt 
Stankiewicz, Counsel to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, 
Director for Ukraine, National Security Council (Nov. 19, 2019); House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Lieutenant 
Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Director for Ukraine, National Security 
Council (Nov. 19, 2019).
    \364\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr.
    \365\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy 
Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, 
National Security Council (Oct. 16, 2019).
    \366\Email from Committee Staff to Barbara Van Gelder, Counsel to 
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Oct. 31, 
2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Oct. 31, 
2019).
    \367\Morrison Dep. Tr.
    \368\Email from Committee Staff to Barbara Van Gelder, Counsel to 
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Nov. 19, 
2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
Timothy Morrison, Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior 
Director for Europe and Russia, National Security Council (Nov. 19, 
2019).
    \369\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr.
    \370\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, to David Hale, Under Secretary 
of State for Political Affairs, Department of State (Nov. 1, 2019).
    \371\Letter from Brian A. Glasser, Counsel to David Hale, Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State, to 
Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House Committee on 
Oversight and Reform (Nov. 5, 2019).
    \372\Email from Committee Staff to Brian Glasser and Cary Joshi, 
Counsel for David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
Department of State (Nov. 6, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to David Hale, Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, Department of State (Nov. 6, 2019).
    \373\Hale Dep. Tr.
    \374\Email from Committee Staff to Brian A. Glasser, Counsel to 
David Hale, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department 
of State (Nov. 20, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to David Hale, Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, Department of State (Nov. 20, 2019).
    \375\Cooper-Hale Hearing Tr.
    \376\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Kenneth L. Wainstein, Counsel to 
David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, 
Department of State (Nov. 12, 2019).
    \377\Email from Committee Staff to Kenneth L. Wainstein, Paul J. 
Nathanson, and Katherine Swan, Counsel to David Holmes, Political 
Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State 
(Nov. 15, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Subpoena to David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in 
Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State (Nov. 15, 2019).
    \378\Holmes Dep. Tr.
    \379\Email from Committee Staff to Kenneth L. Wainstein, Paul J. 
Nathanson, and Katherine Swan, Counsel to David Holmes, Political 
Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State 
(Nov. 21, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Subpoena to David Holmes, Political Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in 
Kyiv, Ukraine, Department of State (Nov. 21, 2019).
    \380\Hill-Holmes Hearing Tr.
    \381\Email from Committee Staff to Ambassador P. Michael McKinley, 
Former Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State, Department of State 
(Oct. 12, 2019).
    \382\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to John B. Bellinger, III, Counsel 
to Ambassador P. Michael McKinley, Former Senior Advisor to the 
Secretary of State, Department of State (Oct. 14, 2019).
    \383\McKinley Transcribed Interview Tr.
    \384\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, 
Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 
Department of State (Oct. 16, 2019).
    \385\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Margaret E. Daum, Counsel to 
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 25, 2019); 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to 
Ambassador Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
European and Eurasian Affairs, Department of State (Oct. 25, 2019).
    \386\Reeker Dep. Tr.
    \387\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 13, 2019).
    \388\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Secretary Michael R. Pompeo, 
Department of State (Sept. 27, 2019).
    \389\Letter from Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, to Ambassador Kurt Volker, U.S. 
Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, Department of State 
(Sept. 27, 2019).
    \390\Letter from Secretary Michael F. Pompeo, Department of State, 
to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Oct. 1, 
2019) (Identical letters transmitted to Chairman Schiff and Chairman 
Cummings).
    \391\Letter from Marik A. String, Acting Legal Advisor, Department 
of State, to Margaret E. Daum, Counsel to Ambassador Kurt Volker, U.S. 
Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, Department of State 
(Oct. 2, 2019).
    \392\Letter from Margaret E. Daum, Counsel to Ambassador Kurt 
Volker, U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, 
Department of State, to Chairman Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Chairman Elijah E. Cummings, House 
Committee on Oversight and Reform (Oct. 2, 2019); Kurt Volker Document 
Production, Bates KV0000000-KV00000065 (Oct. 2, 2019).
    \393\Volker Transcribed Interview Tr.
    \394\Morrison-Volker Hearing Tr.
    \395\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, 
House Committee on Oversight and Reform, and Chairman Eliot L. Engel, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to Justin Shur, Counsel to Jennifer 
Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice 
President (Nov. 4, 2019).
    \396\Email from Committee Staff to Justin Shur, Counsel to Jennifer 
Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice 
President (Nov. 7, 2019); House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Subpoena to Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe 
and Russia, Office of the Vice President (Nov. 7, 2019).
    \397\Williams Dep. Tr.
    \398\Letter from Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and 
Russia, Office of the Vice President, Justin Shur, Emily K. Damrau, and 
Caleb Hayes-Deats, Counsel to Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for 
Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice President, to Chairman Adam B. 
Schiff, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 11, 
2019).
    \399\Email from Committee Staff to Justin Shur and Caleb Hayes-
Deats, Counsel to Jennifer Williams, Special Advisor for Europe and 
Russia, Office of the Vice President (Nov. 19, 2019); House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Subpoena to Jennifer Williams, 
Special Advisor for Europe and Russia, Office of the Vice President 
(Nov. 19, 2019).
    \400\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr.
    \401\Yovanovitch Dep. Tr. at 193.
    \402\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 37-38.
    \403\Id. at 38.
    \404\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1195356198347956224).
    \405\Yovanovitch Hearing Tr. at 46.
    \406\The Latest: Ousted Ukraine Ambassador Has Her Say in Hearing, 
Associated Press (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at https://apnews.com/
2f420045618b4106b6fa7419a3d75b8e).
    \407\Impeachment Inquiry Hearing with Former US Ambassador to 
Ukraine, CNN (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/
impeachment-hearing-11-15-19/h_fb32b149181437e02e5d937c6fc64f35). 
During a recess in the hearing at which Ambassador Yovanovitch was 
testifying, a federal jury returned a verdict of guilty against 
President Trump's longest-serving political advisor, Roger Stone, on 
seven criminal counts, including witness tampering and obstruction of 
Congress' investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election 
and possible links to President Trump's campaign. Mr. Stone used 
threats and intimidation to attempt to persuade a witness to withhold 
information and lie to Congress. He has yet to be sentenced. See Roger 
Stone Guilty on All Counts of Lying to Congress, Witness Tampering, 
Washington Post (Nov. 15, 2019) (online at www.washingtonpost.com/
local/public-safety/roger-stone-jury-weighs-evidence-and-a-defense-
move-to-make-case-about-mueller/2019/11/15/554fff5a-06ff-11ea-8292-
c46ee8cb3dce_story.html). Mr. Stone was convicted of giving false and 
misleading statements to the Intelligence Committee, failing to produce 
and lying about the existence of records responsive to Committee 
requests, and attempting to persuade a witness to give false testimony 
to the Committee. Among other acts of witness tampering, Mr. Stone told 
the witness to ``Stonewall it. Plead the Fifth'' and to ``be honest w 
fbi'' that ``there was no back channel.'' He also called the witness a 
``rat'' and ``stoolie'' and threatened retaliation. United States v. 
Roger Stone, Indictment, No. 1:19-cr-00018-ABJ (Jan. 24, 2019). Mr. 
Stone was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1505 (obstruction), 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1001 (false statements), and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b) 
(witness tampering).
    \408\Fox and Friends, Fox News (Nov. 22, 2019) (online at 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNqKhRcpktU).
    \409\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1189167309455331328).
    \410\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Nov. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-74/).
    \411\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 19, 2019) (retweeting Dan 
Scavino Jr., Twitter (Nov. 19, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/
Scavino45/status/1196860213233684480)).
    \412\See, e.g., Berman Shocked by Republican's Attacks on US War 
Vet, CNN (Oct. 29, 2019) (online at www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2019/
10/29/duffy-berman-spar-over-vindman-loyalty newday-vpx.cnn) (former 
Rep. Sean Duffy claiming that Lt. Col Vindman ``has an affinity, I 
think for the Ukraine,'' that ``it seems very clear that he is 
incredibly concerned about Ukrainian defense,'' and that ``I don't know 
that he's concerned about American policy''); see also Rudy Giuliani, 
Twitter (Oct. 30, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/RudyGiuliani/
status/1189732605383630850) (claiming that Lt. Col. Vindman was 
``giving advice to two countries'' and stating that ``I thought he 
worked for US'').
    \413\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Written 
Statement of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander S. Vindman, Impeachment, 
116th Cong. (Nov. 19, 2019).
    \414\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1187063301731209220).
    \415\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 23, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1187080923961012228).
    \416\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Oct. 25, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-72/).
    \417\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 13, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1194608482793795584).
    \418\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 17, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1196155347117002752).
    \419\Vindman-Williams Hearing Tr. at 97.
    \420\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1195727871765073921); Donald J. 
Trump, Twitter (Nov. 16, 2019) (online at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1195727879780360193).
    \421\50 U.S.C. Sec. 3033(g)(3) (when a complaint is received from a 
member of the Intelligence Community, ``the Inspector General shall not 
disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the 
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure 
is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure 
is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for 
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken'').
    \422\50 U.S.C. Sec. 3234(b).
    \423\Letter from Michael K. Atkinson, Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, to Chairman Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and Ranking Member Devin Nunes, House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 9, 2019); see also 50 
U.S.C. Sec. 3033(k)(5)(C) (``Upon receipt of the transmittal from the 
ICIG, the Director shall within 7 calendar days of such receipt, 
forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence committees, 
together with any comments the Director considers appropriate.'')
    \424\Letter from Chairman, Adam B. Schiff, House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of 
National Intelligence, Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(Sept. 13, 2019).
    \425\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House 
Intelligence Committee Releases Whistleblower Complaint (Sept. 26, 
2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=708).
    \426\Listen: Audio of Trump Discussing Whistleblower at Private 
Event: `That's Close to a Spy,' Los Angeles Times (Sept. 26, 2019) 
(online at www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-09-26/trump-at-private-
breakfast-who-gave-the-whistle-blower-the-information-because-thats-
almost-a-spy).
    \427\House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairmen 
Warn President to Stop Attacking Whistleblower and Witnesses to His 
Misconduct and to Halt Efforts to Obstruct Impeachment Inquiry (Sept. 
26, 2019) (online at https://intelligence.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=709).
    \428\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Sept. 29, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1178442765736333313?s=20).
    \429\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Oct. 4, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1180123504924151809).
    \430\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Nov. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-74/).
    \431\Donald J. Trump, Twitter (Nov. 3, 2019) (online at https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1191000516580519937).
    \432\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Nov. 3, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-74/).
    \433\The White House, Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One 
Departure (Nov. 4, 2019) (online at www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-75/).
    \434\The White House, Remarks by President Trump After Tour of 
Apple Manufacturing Plant (Nov. 20, 2019) (online www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-tour-apple-manufacturing-
plant-austin-tx/).
    \435\Letter from Chairman Adam B. Schiff to Ranking Member Devin 
Nunes, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Nov. 9, 2019).
    \436\In 2017, every Republican Member of Congress joined a 
unanimous vote in the House of Representatives to increase penalties 
for retaliation against whistleblowers. U.S. House of Representatives, 
Roll Call Vote Approving S. 585, The Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 (Oct. 12, 2017) (420 yeas, 0 nays) 
(online at www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/115-2017/h568).
    \437\House Intelligence Chair News Conference, C-SPAN (Mar. 24, 
2017) (online at www.c-span.org/video/?425953-1/paul-manafort-
volunteered-intelligence-committee-chairman-nunes).
    \438\Id.
    \439\Office of Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Statement Regarding 
Intel Community Whistleblower (Oct. 1, 2019) (online at 
www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-statement-
regarding-intel-community-whistleblower).
    \440\Senate Intel Chair Doesn't Want Whistleblower's Identity 
Disclosed, The Hill (Nov. 7, 2019) (online at https://thehill.com/
homenews/senate/469455-senate-intel-chair-doesnt-want-whistleblowers-
identity-disclosed).
    \441\Republicans Break with Trump and Rand Paul on Whistleblower 
Unmasking, Politico (Nov. 5, 2019) (online at www.politico.com/news/
2019/11/05/rand-paul-trump-whistleblower-065917).

                   APPENDIX A: KEY PEOPLE AND ENTITIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         -
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anderson, Christopher J................  Special Advisor for Ukraine
                                          Negotiations, Department of
                                          State, August 2017-July 2019
Atkinson, Michael K....................  Inspector General of the
                                          Intelligence Community, May
                                          2018-present
Avakov, Arsen..........................  Ukrainian Minister of Internal
                                          Affairs, February 2014-present
Bakanov, Ivan..........................  Head of Security Service of
                                          Ukraine, August 2019-present;
                                          First Deputy Chief of the
                                          Security Service of Ukraine,
                                          May 2019-August 2019
Barr, William P........................  Attorney General, Department of
                                          Justice, February 2019-present
Biden, Hunter..........................  Son of former Vice President
                                          Joe Biden
Biden, Joseph R., Jr...................  U.S. Vice President, January
                                          2009-January 2017
Blair, Robert B........................  Assistant to the President and
                                          Senior Advisor to the Chief of
                                          Staff, February 2019-present
Bohdan (Bogdan), Andriy................  Head of Ukrainian Presidential
                                          Administration, May 2019-
                                          present
Bolton, John...........................  National Security Advisor,
                                          March 2018-September 2019
Brechbuhl, T. Ulrich...................  Counselor, Department of State,
                                          May 2018-present
Bulatao, Brian.........................  Under Secretary of State for
                                          Management, Department of
                                          State, May 2019-present
Burisma Holdings.......................  Ukrainian energy company
Cipollone, Pat.........................  White House Counsel, December
                                          2018-present
Clinton, Hillary Rodham................  Democratic Presidential
                                          candidate, November 2016
Cooper, Laura K........................  Deputy Assistant Secretary of
                                          Defense for Russia, Ukraine,
                                          Eurasia, Department of
                                          Defense, 2016-present
Croft, Catherine M.....................  Special Advisor for Ukraine
                                          Negotiations, Department of
                                          State, July 2019-present;
                                          Ukraine director, National
                                          Security Council, July 2017-
                                          July 2018
CrowdStrike............................  Cybersecurity company; object
                                          of conspiracy theories
                                          claiming that CrowdStrike
                                          framed Russia in hack of the
                                          DNC server in the 2016 U.S.
                                          election
Danyliuk (Danylyuk), Oleksandr           Secretary, Ukrainian National
 ``Sasha''.                               Security and Defense Council,
                                          May 2019-September 2019
diGenova, Joseph.......................  Attorney allegedly working for
                                          President Trump to obtain
                                          information from Ukrainian
                                          officials on the Bidens
Duffey, Michael........................  Associate Director, National
                                          Security Programs, Office of
                                          Management and Budget, May
                                          2019-present
Eisenberg, John........................  Legal Advisor to the National
                                          Security Council and Deputy
                                          Counsel to the President for
                                          National Security Affairs,
                                          February 2017-present
Ellis, Michael.........................  Senior Associate Counsel to the
                                          President and Deputy Legal
                                          Advisor to the National
                                          Security Council, March 2017-
                                          present
Elwood, Courtney Simmons...............  General Counsel, Central
                                          Intelligence Agency, June 2017-
                                          present
Engel, Steven A........................  Assistant Attorney General,
                                          Office of Legal Counsel,
                                          Department of Justice,
                                          November 2017-present
Esper, Mark............................  Secretary of Defense,
                                          Department of Defense, July
                                          2019-present; Acting Secretary
                                          of Defense, June 2019-July
                                          2019
Fruman, Igor...........................  Giuliani associate named in
                                          indictment unsealed on October
                                          10, 2019
Giuliani, Rudolph ``Rudy''.............  President Trump's agent and
                                          personal attorney
Griffith, P. Wells.....................  Senior Director for
                                          International Energy and
                                          Environment, National Security
                                          Council, April 2018-present
Hale, David M..........................  Under Secretary of State for
                                          Political Affairs, Department
                                          of State, August 2018-present
Hannity, Sean..........................  Host of Hannity, Fox News,
                                          January 2009-present
Hill, Fiona............................  Deputy Assistant to the
                                          President and Senior Director
                                          for Europe and Russia,
                                          National Security Council,
                                          April 2017-July 2019
Hochstein, Amos J......................  Supervisory Board Member,
                                          Naftogaz, November 2017-
                                          present
Holmes, David A........................  Political Counselor, U.S.
                                          Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine,
                                          August 2017-present
Johnson, Ron...........................  Senator from Wisconsin,
                                          Chairman, Senate Homeland
                                          Security and Governmental
                                          Affairs Committee, January
                                          2015-present
Kellogg, Keith.........................  National Security Advisor to
                                          the Vice President, April 2018-
                                          present
Kenna, Lisa D..........................  Executive Secretary in the
                                          Office of the Secretary,
                                          Department of State, June 2017-
                                          present
Kent, George P.........................  Deputy Assistant Secretary of
                                          State, Bureau of European and
                                          Eurasian Affairs, September
                                          2018-present; Deputy Chief of
                                          Mission in Kyiv, Ukraine, 2015-
                                          2018
Kholodnitsky, Nazar....................  Head, Ukrainian Specialized
                                          Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's
                                          Office, November 2015-present
Klitenic, Jason........................  General Counsel, Office of the
                                          Director of National
                                          Intelligence
Kulyk, Kostiantyn......................  Deputy Head of the Ukrainian
                                          Department of International
                                          Legal Cooperation of the
                                          Prosecutor General's Office,
                                          November 2018-November 2019
Kupperman, Charles M...................  Deputy National Security
                                          Advisor, January 2019-
                                          September 2019
Kushner, Jared.........................  Assistant to the President and
                                          Senior Advisor, 2017-present
Kvien, Kristina........................  Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
                                          Embassy in Kyiv, May 2019-
                                          present
Lutsenko, Yuriy........................  Ukrainian Prosecutor General,
                                          May 2016-August 2019
McCormack, Brian.......................  Associate Director for Natural
                                          Resources, Office of
                                          Management and Budget,
                                          September 2019-present; Chief
                                          of Staff, Department of
                                          Energy, March 2017-September
                                          2019
McKinley, P. Michael...................  Senior Advisor to the
                                          Secretary, Department of
                                          State, May 2018-October 2019
McKusker, Elaine A.....................  Deputy Under Secretary of
                                          Defense (Comptroller),
                                          Department of Defense, August
                                          2017-present
Maguire, Joseph........................  Acting Director of National
                                          Intelligence, August 2019-
                                          present
Manafort, Paul.........................  Chairman, Donald J. Trump
                                          presidential campaign, May
                                          2016-August 2016; convicted in
                                          August 2018 on two counts of
                                          bank fraud, five counts of tax
                                          fraud, and one count of
                                          failure to disclose a foreign
                                          bank account
Morrison, Tim..........................  Deputy Assistant to the
                                          President for National
                                          Security, National Security
                                          Council, July 2019-October
                                          2019
Mueller, Robert S., III................  Special Counsel, Department of
                                          Justice, May 2017-May 2019
Mulvaney, John Michael ``Mick''........  Acting Chief of Staff, White
                                          House, January 2019-present
Murphy, Chris..........................  Senator from Connecticut,
                                          Ranking Member, Subcommittee
                                          on Near East, South Asia,
                                          Central Asia, and
                                          Counterterrorism, Senate
                                          Committee on Foreign
                                          Relations, formerly Ranking
                                          Member, Subcommittee on Europe
                                          and Regional Security
                                          Cooperation, Senate Committee
                                          on Foreign Relations, January
                                          2017-January 2019
Naftogaz...............................  Ukrainian state-owned national
                                          gas company
Parnas, Lev............................  Giuliani associate named in
                                          indictment unsealed on October
                                          10, 2019
Patel, Kashyap ``Kash''................  Senior Director for
                                          Counterterrorism, National
                                          Security Council, July 2019-
                                          present; former Staff,
                                          Directorate of International
                                          Organizations and Alliances,
                                          National Security Council,
                                          February 2019-July 2019;
                                          former National Security
                                          Advisor, House Permanent
                                          Select Committee on
                                          Intelligence, March 2018-
                                          January 2019; former Senior
                                          Counsel for Counterterrorism,
                                          House Permanent Select
                                          Committee on Intelligence,
                                          April 2017-March 2018
Pence, Michael R.......................  Vice President, January 2017-
                                          present
Pennington, Joseph.....................  Charge d'Affaires, of the U.S.
                                          Embassy in Ukraine, May 2019
Perez, Carol Z.........................  Director General of the Foreign
                                          Service and Director of Human
                                          Services, January 2019-present
Perry, James Richard ``Rick''..........  Secretary of Energy, March 2017-
                                          December 2019
Pompeo, Michael........................  Secretary of State, April 2018-
                                          present
Poroshenko, Petro......................  President of Ukraine, June 2014-
                                          May 2019
Portman, Robert........................  U.S. Senator from Ohio, January
                                          2011-present; Chairman,
                                          Permanent Subcommittee on
                                          Investigations, Senate
                                          Homeland Security and
                                          Governmental Affairs
                                          Committee, January 2015-
                                          present
Purpura, Michael.......................  Deputy Counsel to the
                                          President, December 2018-
                                          present
Putin, Vladimir........................  Russian President, May 2012-
                                          present
Reeker, Philip T.......................  Acting Assistant Secretary,
                                          Bureau of European and
                                          Eurasian Affairs, Department
                                          of State, March 2019-present
Rood, John C...........................  Under Secretary of Defense for
                                          Policy, Department of Defense,
                                          January 2018-present
Sandy, Mark............................  Deputy Associate Director for
                                          National Security at the
                                          Office of Management and
                                          Budget, December 2013-present;
                                          Acting Director of the Office
                                          of Management and Budget,
                                          January 2017-February 2017
Sekulow, Jay...........................  Personal attorney for President
                                          Trump
Shokin, Viktor.........................  Ukrainian Prosecutor General of
                                          Ukraine, February 2015-March
                                          2016
Short, Marc............................  Chief of Staff to Vice
                                          President Mike Pence, February
                                          2019-present
Solomon, John..........................  Author of articles promoting
                                          debunked conspiracy theories
                                          about the Bidens, Crowdstrike,
                                          and the 2016 U.S. election
Sondland, Gordon.......................  U.S. Ambassador to the European
                                          Union, July 2018-present
String, Marik..........................  Acting Legal Advisor, Office of
                                          the Legal Advisor, Department
                                          of State, June 2019-present
Sullivan, John J.......................  Deputy Secretary of State,
                                          Department of State, June 2017-
                                          present
Taylor, William B., Jr.................  Charge d'Affaires for the U.S.
                                          Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, June
                                          2019-present
``Three Amigos''.......................  Secretary of Energy Rick Perry,
                                          Ambassador Gordon Sondland,
                                          and Ambassador Kurt Volker
Toensing, Victoria.....................  Attorney allegedly working
                                          ``off the books'' for
                                          President Trump to obtain
                                          information from Ukrainian
                                          officials on the Bidens
Trump, Donald J........................  U.S. President, January 2017-
                                          present
Trump, Donald J., Jr...................  Son of President Trump
Vindman, Alexander S...................  Director for Ukraine, National
                                          Security Council, July 2018-
                                          present; Lieutenant Colonel,
                                          U.S. Army
Volker, Kurt...........................  U.S. Special Representative for
                                          Ukraine Negotiations,
                                          Department of State, July 2017-
                                          September 2019
Vought, Russell T......................  Acting Director, Office of
                                          Management and Budget, January
                                          2019-present
Whistleblower..........................  Author of complaint
                                          declassified by the Office of
                                          the Director of National
                                          Intelligence on September 25,
                                          2019
Williams, Jennifer.....................  Special Advisor for Europe and
                                          Russia, Office of the Vice
                                          President, April 2019-present
Yermak, Andriy.........................  Assistant to the President of
                                          Ukraine, May 2019-present
Yovanovitch, Marie L...................  U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine,
                                          August 2016-May 2019
Zakaria, Fareed........................  Host, Fareed Zakaria GPS, June
                                          2008-present
Zelensky, Volodymyr....................  President of Ukraine, May 2019-
                                          present
------------------------------------------------------------------------


               APPENDIX B: ABBREVIATIONS AND COMMON TERMS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AntAC.....................................  Anti-Corruption Action
                                             Center
CDA.......................................  Charge d'Affaires / Acting
                                             Ambassador
CIA.......................................  Central Intelligence Agency
Charge d'Affaires.........................  Acting Ambassador
CN........................................  Congressional Notification
COM.......................................  Chief of Mission
DAS.......................................  Deputy Assistant Secretary
DC........................................  Deputies Committee
DCM.......................................  Deputy Chief of Mission
DNI.......................................  Director of National
                                             Intelligence
DNC.......................................  Democratic National
                                             Committee
DOD.......................................  Department of Defense
DOE.......................................  Department of Energy
DOJ.......................................  Department of Justice
DOS.......................................  Department of State
DSCA......................................  Defense Security Cooperation
                                             Agency
EDI.......................................  European Deterrence
                                             Initiative
ERI.......................................  European Reassurance
                                             Initiative
FBI.......................................  Federal Bureau of
                                             Investigation
FMF.......................................  Foreign Military Financing
FMS.......................................  Foreign Military Sales
FSB.......................................  Russian Federal Security
                                             Service
IC........................................  Intelligence Community
ICIG......................................  Inspector General for the
                                             Intelligence Community
IO........................................  Bureau of International
                                             Organizations
IG........................................  Inspector General
Legatt....................................  Legal Attache
LNG.......................................  Liquefied Natural Gas
MEMCON....................................  Memorandum of Conversation
MLAT......................................  Mutual Legal Assistance
                                             Treaty
NABU......................................  National Anti-Corruption
                                             Bureau of Ukraine
NBU.......................................  National Bank of Ukraine
NDAA......................................  National Defense
                                             Authorization Act
NSC.......................................  National Security Council
ODNI......................................  Office of the Director of
                                             National Intelligence
OFAC......................................  Office of Foreign Assets
                                             Control
OMB.......................................  Office of Management and
                                             Budget
OSCE......................................  Organization for Security
                                             and Co-operation in Europe
OVP.......................................  Office of the Vice President
PAC.......................................  Political Action Committee
PC........................................  Principals Committee
PCC.......................................  Policy Coordination
                                             Committee
PDB.......................................  President's Daily Briefing
PDM.......................................  Presidential Decision
                                             Memorandum
PGO.......................................  Prosecutor General's Office
SAPO......................................  Specialized Anti-Corruption
                                             Prosecutor's Office
SBU.......................................  Security Service of Ukraine
SDN.......................................  Specially Designated
                                             Nationals and Blocked
                                             Persons
SMM.......................................  Special Monitoring Mission
SOC.......................................  Summary of Conclusions
SVTC......................................  Secure Video Teleconference
TCG.......................................  Trilateral Contact Group
UNSCR.....................................  United Nations Security
                                             Council Resolution
USAI......................................  Ukraine Security Assistance
                                             Initiative
USAID.....................................  United States Agency for
                                             International Development
WHSR......................................  White House Situation Room
YES.......................................  Yalta European Strategy
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                             MINORITY VIEWS

                             Congress of the United States,
                                  Washington, DC, December 5, 2019.
Hon. Adam B. Schiff,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2(l), 
we hereby transit minority views to The Trump-Ukraine 
Impeachment Inquiriy Report issued by the Committee on December 
3, 2019.
            Sincerely,
                                   Devin Nunes,
                                           Ranking Member.
                                   Michael R. Turner.
                                   Chris Stewart.
                                   Will Hurd.
                                   Jim Jordon.
                                   K. Michael Conaway.
                                   Brad Wenstrup.
                                   Elise Stefanik.
                                   John Ratcliffe.
    Enclosure.
    
    
                           EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    On November 8, 2016, nearly 63 million Americans from 
around the country chose Donald J. Trump to be the 45th 
President of the United States. Now, less than a year before 
the next presidential election, 231 House Democrats in 
Washington, D.C., are trying to undo the will of the American 
people.* As one Democrat admitted, the pursuit of this extreme 
course of action is because they want to stop President Trump's 
re-election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    *H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019) (Roll call vote 604).
    Weekends with Alex Witt (MSNBC television broadcast May 5 
2019) (interview with Rep. Al Green).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Democrats in the House of Representatives have been working 
to impeach President Trump since his election. Democrats 
introduced four separate resolutions in 2017 and 2018 seeking 
to impeach President Trump.= In January 2019, on their first 
day in power, House Democrats again introduced articles of 
impeachment.Sec.  That same day, a newly elected Congresswoman 
promised to an audience of her supporters, ``we're going to go 
in there and we're going to impeach the [expletive 
deleted].''** Her comments are not isolated. Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi called President Trump ``an impostor'' and said it is 
``dangerous'' to allow American voters to evaluate his 
performance in 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    =H., Res. 705, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 646, 115th Cong. (2017); 
H. Res. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); H. Res. 438, 115th Cong. (2017).
    Sec. H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019).
    **Amy B. Wong, Rep. Rashida Tlaib profanely promised to impeach 
Trump. She's not sorry., Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2019.
    Emily Tillett, Nancy Pelosi says Trump's attacks on 
witnesses ``very significant'' to impeachment probe CBS News, No. 15, 
2019; Dear Colleague Letter from Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Nov. 18, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Democrats' impeachment inquiry is not the organic 
outgrowth of serious misconduct; it is an orchestrated campaign 
to upend our political system. The Democrats are trying to 
impeach a duly elected President based on the accusations and 
assumptions of unelected bureaucrats who disagreed with 
President Trump's policy initiatives and processes. They are 
trying to impeach President Trump because some unelected 
bureaucrats were discomforted by an elected President's 
telephone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. 
They are trying to impeach President Trump because some 
unelected bureaucrats chafed at an elected President's 
``outside the beltway'' approach to diplomacy.
    The sum and substance of the Democrats' case for 
impeachment is that President Trump abused his authority to 
pressure Ukraine to investigate former Vice President Joe 
Biden, President Trump's potential political rival, for 
President Trump's benefit in the 2020 election. Democrats say 
this pressure campaign encompassed leveraging a White House 
meeting and the release of U.S. security assistance to force 
the Ukrainian President to succumb to President Trump's 
political wishes. Democrats say that Mayor Rudy Giuliani, the 
President's personal attorney, and a ``shadow'' group of U.S. 
officials conspired to benefit the President politically.
    The evidence presented does not prove any of these Democrat 
allegations, and none of the Democrats' witnesses testified to 
having evidence of bribery, extortion, or any high crime or 
misdemeanor.
    The evidence does not support the accusation that President 
Trump pressured President Zelensky to initiate investigations 
for the purpose of benefiting the President in the 2020 
election. The evidence does not support the accusation that 
President Trump covered up the summary of his phone 
conversation with President Zelensky. The evidence does not 
support the accusation that President Trump obstructed the 
Democrats' impeachment inquiry.
    At the heart of the matter, the impeachment inquiry 
involves the actions of only two people: President Trump and 
President Zelensky. The summary of their July 25, 2019, 
telephone conversation shows no quid pro quo or indication of 
conditionality, threats, or pressure--much less evidence of 
bribery or extortion. The summary reflects laughter, 
pleasantries, and cordiality. President Zelensky has said 
publicly and repeatedly that he felt no pressure. President 
Trump has said publicly and repeatedly that he exerted no 
pressure.
    Even examining evidence beyond the presidential phone call 
shows no quid pro quo, bribery, extortion, or abuse of power. 
The evidence shows that President Trump holds a deep-seated, 
genuine, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its 
history of pervasive corruption. The President has also been 
vocal about his skepticism of U.S. foreign aid and the need for 
European allies to shoulder more of the financial burden for 
regional defense. Senior Ukrainian officials under former 
President Petro Poroshenko publicly attacked then-candidate 
Trump during the 2016 campaign--including some senior Ukrainian 
officials who remained in their positions after President 
Zelensky's term began. All of these factors bear on the 
President's state of mind and help to explain the President's 
actions toward Ukraine and President Zelensky.
    Understood in this proper context, the President's initial 
hesitation to meet with President Zelensky or to provide U.S. 
taxpayer-funded security assistance to Ukraine without 
thoughtful review is entirely prudent. Ultimately, President 
Zelensky took decisive action demonstrating his commitment to 
promoting reform, combatting corruption, and replacing 
Poroshenko-era holdovers with new leadership in his 
Administration. President Trump then released security 
assistance to Ukraine and met with President Zelensky in 
September 2019--all without Ukraine taking any action to 
investigate President Trump's political rival.
    House Democrats allege that Ukraine felt pressure to bend 
to the President's political will, but the evidence shows a 
different reality. Ukraine felt good about its relationship 
with the United States in the early months of the Zelensky 
Administration, having had several high-level meetings with 
senior U.S. officials between July and September. Although U.S. 
security assistance was temporarily paused, the U.S. government 
did not convey the pause to the Ukrainians because U.S. 
officials believed the pause would get worked out and, if 
publicized, may be mischaracterized as a shift in U.S. policy 
towards Ukraine. U.S. officials said that the Ukrainian 
government in Kyiv never knew the aid was delayed until reading 
about it in the U.S. media. Ambassador Kurt Volker, the key 
American interlocutor trusted by the Ukrainian government, said 
the Ukrainians never raised concerns to him until after the 
pause became public in late August.
    The Democrats' impeachment narrative ignores Ukraine's 
dramatic transformation in its fight against endemic 
corruption. President Trump was skeptical of Ukrainian 
corruption and his Administration sought proof that newly-
elected President Zelensky was a true reformer. And after 
winning a parliamentary majority, the new Zelensky 
administration took rapid strides to crack down on corruption. 
Several high-level U.S. officials observed firsthand these 
anti-corruption achievements in Kyiv, and the security 
assistance was released soon afterward.
    The Democrats' impeachment narrative also ignores President 
Trump's steadfast support for Ukraine in its war against 
Russian occupation. Several of the Democrats' witnesses 
described how President Trump's policies toward Ukraine to 
combat Russian aggression have been substantially stronger than 
those of President--Obama then under the stewardship of Vice 
President Biden. Where President Obama and Vice President Biden 
gave the Ukrainians night-vision goggles and blankets, the 
Trump Administration provided the Ukrainians with lethal 
defensive assistance, including Javelin anti-tank missiles.
    The Democrats nonetheless tell a story of an illicit 
pressure campaign run by President Trump through his personal 
attorney, Mayor Giuliani, to coerce Ukraine to investigate the 
President's political rival by withholding a meeting and 
security assistance. There is, however, no direct, firsthand 
evidence of any such scheme. The Democrats are alleging guilt 
on the basis of hearsay, presumptions, and speculation--all of 
which are reflected in the anonymous whistleblower complaint 
that sparked this inquiry. The Democrats' narrative is so 
dependent on speculation that one Democrat publicly justified 
hearsay as ``better'' than direct evidence.== Where there are 
ambiguous facts, the Democrats interpret them in a light most 
unfavorable to the President. In the absence of real evidence, 
the Democrats appeal to emotion--evaluating how unelected 
bureaucrats felt about the events in question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    == ``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr. 
George Kent'': Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 
116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rep. Mike Quigley).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The fundamental disagreement apparent in the Democrats' 
impeachment inquiry is a difference of world views and a 
discomfort with President Trump's policy decisions. To the 
extent that some unelected bureaucrats believed President Trump 
had established an ``irregular'' foreign policy apparatus, it 
was because they were not a part of that apparatus. There is 
nothing illicit about three senior U.S. officials--each with 
official interests relating to Ukraine shepherding the U.S.-
Ukraine relationship and reporting their actions to State 
Department and NSC leadership. There is nothing inherently 
improper with Mayor Giuliani's involvement as well because the 
Ukrainians knew that he was a conduit to convince President 
Trump that President Zelensky was serious about reform.
    There is also nothing wrong with asking serious questions 
about the presence of Vice President Biden's son, Hunter Biden, 
on the board of directors of Burisma, a corrupt Ukrainian 
company, or about Ukraine's attempts to influence the 2016 
presidential election. Biden's Burisma has an international 
reputation as a corrupt company. As far back as 2015, the Obama 
State Department had concerns about Hunter Biden's role on 
Burisma's board. Ukrainian anti-corruption activists noted 
concerns as well. Publicly available--and irrefutable--evidence 
shows how senior Ukrainian government officials sought to 
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election in opposition to 
President Trump's candidacy, and that some in the Ukrainian 
embassy in Washington worked with a Democrat operative to 
achieve that goal. While Democrats reflexively dismiss these 
truths as conspiracy theories, the facts are indisputable and 
bear heavily on the Democrats' impeachment inquiry.

                                 * * *

    In our system of government, power resides with the 
American people, who delegate executive power to the President 
through an election once every four years. Unelected officials 
and career bureaucrats assist in the execution of the laws. The 
unelected bureaucracy exists to serve the elected 
representatives of the American people. The Democrats' 
impeachment narrative flips our system on its head in service 
of their political ambitions.
    The Democrats' impeachment inquiry, led by House 
Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff, is merely the 
outgrowth of their obsession with re-litigating the results of 
the 2016 presidential election. Despite their best efforts, the 
evidence gathered during the Democrats' partisan and one-sided 
impeachment inquiry does not support that President Trump 
pressured Ukraine to investigate his political rival to benefit 
the President in the 2020 presidential election. The evidence 
does not establish any impeachable offense.
    But that is not for Democrats' want of trying.
    For the first phase of the Democrats' impeachment inquiry, 
Chairman Schiff led the inquiry from his Capitol basement 
bunker, preventing transparency on the process and 
accountability for his actions. Because the fact-finding was 
unclassified, the closed-door process was purely for 
information control. This arrangement allowed Chairman Schiff--
who had already publicly fabricated evidence and misled 
Americans about his interaction with the anonymous 
whistleblower--to selectively leak information to paint 
misleading public narratives, while simultaneously imposing a 
gag rule on Republican members. From his basement bunker, 
Chairman Schiff provided no due process protections for the 
President and he directed witnesses called by the Democrats not 
to answer Republican questions. Chairman Schiff also ignored 
Republican requests to secure the testimony of the anonymous 
whistleblower, despite promising earlier that the whistleblower 
would provide ``unfiltered testimony.''
    When the Democrats emerged from the bunker for the public 
phase of their impeachment inquiry, Chairman Schiff continued 
to deny fundamental fairness and minority rights. Chairman 
Schiff interrupted Republican Members and directed witnesses 
not to answer Republican questions. Chairman Schiff refused to 
allow Republicans to exercise the limited procedural rights 
afforded to them. Chairman Schiff rejected witnesses identified 
by Republicans who would inject some semblance of fairness and 
objectivity. Chairman Schiff denied Republican subpoenas for 
testimony and documents, violating the Democrats' own rules to 
vote down these subpoenas with no notice to Republicans.
    Speaker Pelosi, Chairman Schiff, and House Democrats seek 
to impeach President Trump--not because they have proof of a 
high crime or misdemeanor, but because they disagreed with the 
President's actions and his policies. But in our system of 
government, the President is accountable to the American 
people. The accountability to the American people comes at the 
ballot box, not in House Democrats' star chamber.

                                FINDINGS

    Democrats allege that President Trump pressured Ukraine to 
initiate investigations into his political rival, former Vice 
President Biden, for the purpose of benefiting the President in 
the 2020 U.S. presidential election. The evidence does not 
support the Democrats' allegations. Instead, the findings 
outlined below are based on the evidence presented and 
information available in the public realm.
     President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and 
reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of 
pervasive corruption.
     President Trump has a long-held skepticism of U.S. 
foreign assistance and believes that Europe should pay its fair 
share for mutual defense.
     President Trump's concerns about Hunter Biden's 
role on Burisma's board are valid. The Obama State Department 
noted concerns about Hunter Biden's relationship with Burisma 
in 2015 and 2016.
     There is indisputable evidence that senior 
Ukrainian government officials opposed President Trump's 
candidacy in the 2016 election and did so publicly. It has been 
publicly reported that a Democratic National Committee 
operative worked with Ukrainian officials, including the 
Ukrainian Embassy, to dig up dirt on then-candidate Trump.
     The evidence does not establish that President 
Trump pressured Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice 
President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in 
the 2016 election for the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 
election.
     The evidence does not establish that President 
Trump withheld a meeting with President Zelensky for the 
purpose of pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, 
Vice President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence 
in the 2016 election.
     The evidence does not support that President Trump 
withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine for the purpose of 
pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice 
President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in 
the 2016 election.
     The evidence does not support that President Trump 
orchestrated a shadow foreign policy apparatus for the purpose 
of pressuring Ukraine to investigate Burisma Holdings, Vice 
President Joe Biden, Hunter Biden, or Ukrainian influence in 
the 2016 election.
     The evidence does not support that President Trump 
covered up the substance of his telephone conversation with 
President Zelensky by restricting access to the call summary.
     President Trump's assertion of longstanding claims 
of executive privilege is a legitimate response to an unfair, 
abusive, and partisan process, and does not constitute 
obstruction of a legitimate impeachment inquiry.












                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................   251
FINDINGS.........................................................   255
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................   257
TABLE OF NAMES...................................................   260
I. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured 
  the Ukrainian government to investigate his political rival for 
  the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 U.S. presidential 
  election.......................................................   262
    A. The evidence does not establish that President Trump 
      pressured President Zelensky during the July 25 phone call 
      to investigate the President's political rival for the 
      purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election.............   264
        1. The call summary does not reflect any improper 
          pressure or conditionality to pressure Ukraine to 
          investigate President Trump's political rival..........   264
        2. President Zelensky has publicly and repeatedly said he 
          felt no pressure to investigate President Trump's 
          political rival........................................   267
        3. President Trump has publicly and repeatedly said he 
          did not pressure President Zelensky to investigate his 
          political rival........................................   269
        4. Read-outs of the phone call from both the State 
          Department and the Ukrainian government did not reflect 
          that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to 
          investigate his political rival........................   270
        5. The National Security Council leadership did not see 
          the call as illegal or improper........................   272
        6. The anonymous, secondhand whistleblower complaint 
          misstated details about the July 25 call, which has 
          falsely colored the call's public characterization.....   273
    B. The evidence does not establish that President Trump 
      withheld a meeting with President Zelensky to pressure 
      Ukraine to investigate the President's political rival for 
      the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election.........   274
        1. Ukraine has a long history of pervasive corruption....   275
        2. President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and 
          reasonable skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of 
          pervasive corruption...................................   276
        3. Senior Ukrainian government officials publicly 
          attacked President Trump during the 2016 campaign......   277
        4. U.S. foreign policy officials were split on President 
          Zelensky, a political novice with untested views on 
          anti-corruption and a close relationship with a 
          controversial oligarch.................................   279
        5. President Trump extended an invitation to the White 
          House to President Zelensky on three occasions without 
          conditions.............................................   281
        6. Despite difficulty scheduling a face-to-face 
          presidential meeting, senior Ukrainian officials 
          interacted often with senior American officials between 
          May and September 2019.................................   283
        7. The evidence does not establish a linkage between a 
          White House meeting and Ukrainian investigations into 
          President Trump's political rival......................   284
        8. The evidence does not establish that President Trump 
          directed Vice President Pence not to attend President 
          Zelensky's inauguration to pressure Ukraine to 
          investigate the President's political rival............   289
        9. President Trump and President Zelensky met during the 
          United Nations General Assembly in September 2019 
          without any Ukrainian action to investigate President 
          Trump's political rival................................   291
    C. The evidence does not establish that President Trump 
      withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine to pressure 
      Ukraine to investigate the President's political rival for 
      the purpose of benefiting him in the 2020 election.........   292
        1. President Trump has been skeptical about U.S. 
          taxpayer-funded foreign assistance.....................   292
        2. President Trump has been clear and consistent in his 
          view that Europe should pay its fair share for regional 
          defense................................................   294
        3. U.S. foreign aid is often conditioned or paused, and 
          U.S. security assistance to Ukraine has been paused 
          before.................................................   296
        4. Despite President Trump's skepticism, the Trump 
          Administration's policies have shown greater commitment 
          and support to Ukraine than those of the Obama 
          Administration.........................................   298
        5. Although security assistance to Ukraine was paused in 
          July 2019, several witnesses testified that U.S. 
          security assistance was not linked to any Ukrainian 
          action on investigations...............................   300
        6. President Trump rejected any linkage between U.S. 
          security assistance and Ukrainian action on 
          investigations.........................................   305
        7. Senior U.S. officials never substantively discussed 
          the delay in security assistance with Ukrainian 
          officials before the July 25 call......................   307
        8. The Ukrainian government denied any awareness of a 
          linkage between U.S. security assistance and 
          investigations.........................................   310
        9. The Ukrainian government considered issuing a public 
          anti-corruption statement to convey that President 
          Zelensky was ``serious and different'' from previous 
          Ukrainian regimes......................................   311
        10. President Zelensky never raised a linkage between 
          security assistance and investigations in his meetings 
          with senior U.S. government officials..................   316
        11. In early September 2019, President Zelensky's 
          government implemented several anti-corruption reform 
          measures...............................................   318
        12. The security assistance was ultimately disbursed to 
          Ukraine in September 2019 without any Ukrainian action 
          to investigate President Trump's political rival.......   320
    D. The evidence does not establish that President Trump set 
      up a shadow foreign policy apparatus to pressure Ukraine to 
      investigate the President's political rival for the purpose 
      of benefiting him in the 2020 election.....................   321
        1. The President has broad Constitutional authority to 
          conduct the foreign policy of the United States........   322
        2. President Trump was likely skeptical of the 
          established national security apparatus as a result of 
          continual leaks and resistance from the federal 
          bureaucracy............................................   322
        3. The President has the constitutional authority to 
          remove Ambassador Yovanovitch..........................   324
        4. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary 
          Perry were all senior U.S. government officers with 
          official interests in Ukraine policy...................   325
        5. Referencing Ukrainian corruption, President Trump told 
          Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary 
          Perry to talk to Mayor Giuliani........................   326
        6. At the Ukrainian government's request, Ambassador 
          Volker connected them with Mayor Giuliani to change his 
          impression about the Zelensky regime...................   328
        7. The Ukrainian government understood that Mayor 
          Giuliani was not speaking on behalf of President Trump.   329
        8. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary 
          Perry kept the National Security Council and the State 
          Department informed about their actions................   331
        9. Although some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment 
          bristled, the roles of Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
          Sondland, and Secretary Perry and their interactions 
          with Mayor Giuliani did not violate the law or harm 
          national security......................................   331
    E. President Trump is not wrong to raise questions about 
      Hunter Biden's role with Burisma or Ukrainian government 
      officials' efforts to influence the 2016 campaign..........   333
        1. It is appropriate for Ukraine to investigate 
          allegations of corruption in its country...............   334
        2. There are legitimate concerns surrounding Hunter 
          Biden's position on the board of Ukrainian energy 
          company Burisma during his father's term as Vice 
          President of the United States.........................   335
        3. There are legitimate questions about the extent to 
          which Ukrainian government officials worked to oppose 
          President Trump's candidacy in the 2016 election.......   340
    F. The anonymous whistleblower who served as the basis for 
      the impeachment inquiry has no firsthand knowledge of 
      events and a bias against President Trump..................   343
        1. The anonymous whistleblower acknowledged having no 
          firsthand knowledge of the events in question..........   344
        2. Press reports suggest that the anonymous whistleblower 
          acknowledged having a professional relationship with 
          former Vice President Biden............................   345
        3. The anonymous whistleblower secretly communicated with 
          Chairman Schiff or his staff...........................   346
II. The evidence does not establish that President Trump engaged 
  in a cover-up of his interactions with Ukrainian President 
  Zelensky.......................................................   349
    A. President Trump declassified and released publicly the 
      summary of his July 25 phone call with President Zelensky..   349
    B. President Trump released a redacted version of the 
      classified anonymous whistleblower complaint...............   350
    C. President Trump released publicly the summary of his April 
      21 phone call with President Zelensky......................   350
    D. The Trump Administration has experienced a surge in 
      sensitive leaks, including details of the President's 
      communications with foreign leaders........................   350
    E. The evidence does not establish that access to the July 25 
      call summary was restricted for inappropriate reasons......   351
III. The evidence does not establish that President Trump 
  obstructed Congress in the Democrats' impeachment inquiry......   353
    A. Democrats have abandoned long-standing precedent by 
      failing to guarantee due process and fundamental fairness 
      in their impeachment inquiry...............................   355
    B. Democrats have engaged in an abusive process toward a pre-
      determined outcome.........................................   356
    C. President Trump may raise privileges and defenses in 
      response to unfair, abusive proceedings....................   358
    D. Although declining to submit to the Democrats' abusive and 
      unfair process, President Trump has released information to 
      help the American public understand the issues.............   359
IV. Conclusion...................................................   361

                             TABLE OF NAMES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Anderson...................  Foreign Service Officer, U.S.
                                          Department of State
Michael Atkinson.......................  Inspector General of the
                                          Intelligence Community (May
                                          2018-present)
Arsen Avakov...........................  Ukrainian Minister of Internal
                                          Affairs (February 2014-
                                          present)
Hunter Biden...........................  Board Member, Burisma Holdings
                                          (April 2014-October 2019)
Joseph R. Biden........................  Vice President of the United
                                          States (January 2009-January
                                          2017)
Robert Blair...........................  Senior Advisor to the White
                                          House Chief of Staff (January
                                          2019-present)
Andriy Bohdan..........................  Head of Ukrainian Office of
                                          Presidential Administration
                                          (May 2019-present)
John Bolton............................  U.S. National Security Advisor
                                          (April 2018-September 2019)
T. Ulrich Brechbuhl....................  Counselor to the U.S. Secretary
                                          of State, U.S. Department of
                                          State (May 2018-present)
Alexandra Chalupa......................  Former contractor, Democratic
                                          National Committee
Valeriy Chaly..........................  Ukrainian Ambassador to the
                                          United States (July 2015-July
                                          2019)
Laura Cooper...........................  Deputy Assistant Secretary of
                                          Defense for Russia, Ukraine,
                                          and Eurasia, U.S. Department
                                          of Defense
Catherine Croft........................  Foreign Service Officer, U.S.
                                          Department of State Director
                                          for European Affairs, National
                                          Security Council (July 2017-
                                          July 2018)
Oleksandr Danylyuk.....................  Secretary of the Ukrainian
                                          National Security and Defense
                                          Council (May 2019-September
                                          2019)
Michael Duffey.........................  Associate Director for National
                                          Security Programs, U.S. Office
                                          of Management and Budget (May
                                          2019-present)
John Eisenberg.........................  Legal Advisor, National
                                          Security Council (2017-
                                          present)
Michael Ellis..........................  Deputy Legal Advisor, National
                                          Security Council (March 2017-
                                          present)
Rudy Giuliani..........................  Mayor of New York City (1994-
                                          2001), Personal Attorney to
                                          President Trump (April 2018-
                                          present)
Preston Wells Griffith.................  Associate Director for Natural
                                          Resources, Energy & Science,
                                          U.S. Office of Management and
                                          Budget (April 2018-present)
David Hale.............................  Under Secretary of State for
                                          Political Affairs, U.S.
                                          Department of State (August
                                          2018-present)
Fiona Hill.............................  Senior Director for European
                                          and Russian Affairs, National
                                          Security Council (April 2017-
                                          July 2019)
David Holmes...........................  Political Counselor, U.S.
                                          Embassy KyivSec. Sec.  (August
                                          2017-present)
Keith Kellogg..........................  National Security Advisor to
                                          the Vice President (April 2018-
                                          present)
George Kent............................  Deputy Assistant Secretary of
                                          State, Bureau of European and
                                          Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
                                          Department of State (September
                                          2018-present)
Igor Kolomoisky........................  Co-owner, PrivatBank Co-owner,
                                          1+1 Media Group
Charles Kupperman......................  U.S. Deputy National Security
                                          Advisor (January 2019-
                                          September 2019)
Serhiy Leshchenko......................  Ukrainian Member of Parliament
                                          (November 2014-July 2019)
Yuriy Lutsenko.........................  Prosecutor General of Ukraine
                                          (May 2016-August 2019)
Joseph Maguire.........................  Acting U.S. Director of
                                          National Intelligence (August
                                          2019-present)
Brian McCormack........................  Associate Director for Natural
                                          Resources, Energy & Science,
                                          U.S. Office of Management and
                                          Budget (September 2018-
                                          present)
Michael McKinley.......................  Senior Advisor to the U.S.
                                          Secretary of State, U.S.
                                          Department of State (November
                                          2018-October 2019)
Tim Morrison...........................  Senior Director for European
                                          and Russian Affairs, National
                                          Security Council (July 2019-
                                          November 2019)
Mick Mulvaney..........................  Director of the U.S. Office of
                                          Management and Budget
                                          (February 2017-present),
                                          Acting Chief of Staff to the
                                          President (January 2019-
                                          present)
Nellie Ohr.............................  Contractor, Fusion GPS
Mike Pence.............................  Vice President of the United
                                          States (January 2017-present)
Rick Perry.............................  U.S. Secretary of Energy (March
                                          2017-present)
Mike Pompeo............................  U.S. Secretary of State (April
                                          2018-present)
Petro Poroshenko.......................  President of Ukraine (June 2014-
                                          May 2019)
Vadym Prystaiko........................  Minister of Foreign Affairs of
                                          Ukraine (August 2019-present)
Philip Reeker..........................  Acting Assistant Secretary of
                                          State, Bureau of European and
                                          Eurasian Affairs, U.S.
                                          Department of State (March
                                          2019-present)
Mark Sandy.............................  Deputy Associate Director for
                                          National Security, U.S. Office
                                          of Management and Budget
                                          (December 2013-present)
Viktor Shokin..........................  Prosecutor General of Ukraine
                                          (February 2015-March 2016)
Oksana Shulyar.........................  Deputy Chief of Mission,
                                          Embassy of Ukraine to the U.S.
Gordon Sondland........................  U.S. Ambassador to the European
                                          Union (July 2018-present)
William Taylor.........................  U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
                                          (June 2006-May 2009), U.S.
                                          Charge d'Affaires, a.i. U.S.
                                          Embassy Kyiv (June 2019-
                                          present)
Andrii Telizhenko......................  Political officer, Embassy of
                                          Ukraine to the U.S.
Donald J. Trump........................  President of the United States
                                          (January 2017-present)
Alexander Vindman......................  Director for European Affairs,
                                          National Security Council
                                          (July 2018-present)
Kurt Volker............................  U.S. Special Representative for
                                          Ukraine Negotiations, U.S.
                                          Department of State (July 2017-
                                          September 2019)
Russell Vought.........................  Acting Director, U.S. Office of
                                          Management and Budget
Kathryn Wheelbarger....................  Acting Assistant Secretary of
                                          Defense for International
                                          Affairs, U.S. Department of
                                          Defense (November 2018-
                                          present)
Jennifer Williams......................  Special Adviser for Europe and
                                          Russia, Office of the Vice
                                          President
Viktor Yanukovych......................  President of Ukraine (February
                                          2010-February 2014)
Arseniy Yatsenyuk......................  Prime Minister of Ukraine
                                          (February 2014-April 2016)
Andrey Yermak..........................  Adviser to President of Ukraine
                                          Volodymyr Zelensky
Marie Yovanovitch......................  U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
                                          (August 2016-May 2019)
Volodymyr Zelensky***..................  President of Ukraine (May 2019-
                                          present)
Mykola Zlochevsky......................  Co-founder, Burisma Holdings
                                          (2002-present), Ukrainian
                                          Minister of Ecology and
                                          Natural Resources (July 2010-
                                          April 2012)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. Sec. Consistent with the U.S. Board on Geographic Names, this
  report spells the Ukrainian capital as ``Kyiv'' throughout.
*** Although some sources use alternate spellings of the Ukrainian
  President's surname, this report uses the spelling ``Zelensky'' for
  consistency throughout.

 I. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured the 
Ukrainian government to investigate his political rival for the purpose 
       of benefiting him in the 2020 U.S. presidential election.

    Democrats have alleged that President Trump exerted 
pressure on Ukrainian President Zelensky to force the Ukrainian 
government to manufacture ``dirt'' or otherwise investigate a 
potential Democrat candidate in the 2020 U.S. presidential 
election for President Trump's political benefit.\1\ Democrats 
allege that President Trump sought to use the possibility of a 
White House meeting with President Zelensky and release of U.S. 
security assistance to Ukraine as leverage to force Ukraine to 
help the President politically. Democrats allege that President 
Trump orchestrated a ``shadow'' foreign policy apparatus that 
worked to accomplish the President's political goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\``Whistleblower Disclosure'': Hearing of the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. 
on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff, 
Chairman); Rep. Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter (Oct. 12, 2019, 
2:53 p.m.), https://twitter.com/repadamschiff/status/11831386 
29130035200; Lieu accuses Trump of asking Ukraine to ``manufacture 
dirt'' on Biden, The Hill, Sept. 25, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The evidence obtained in the Democrats' impeachment 
inquiry, however, does not support these Democrat allegations. 
In fact, witnesses called by the Democrats denied having any 
awareness of criminal activity or an impeachable offense. Rep. 
John Ratcliffe asked Ambassador Bill Taylor and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary George Kent whether they were ``assert[ing] 
there was an impeachable offense in [the July 25] call.''\2\ 
Neither said there was.\3\ Rep. Chris Stewart asked Ambassador 
Marie Yovanovitch if she had any information about President 
Trump's involvement in criminal activity.\4\ Ambassador 
Yovanovitch said no.\5\ Rep. Ratcliffe asked National Security 
Council (NSC) staff member LTC Alexander Vindman and Office of 
the Vice President special adviser Jennifer Williams if they 
have labeled the President's conduct as ``bribery.''\6\ Both 
said no.\7\ Rep. Elise Stefanik asked Ambassador Kurt Volker, 
the U.S. special envoy for Ukraine negotiations, and Tim 
Morrison, the NSC senior director for Europe, whether they saw 
any bribery, extortion, or quid pro quo.\8\ Both said no.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr. 
George Kent'': Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 
116th Cong. (2019).
    \3\Id.
    \4\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch'': Hearing 
before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019).
    \5\Id.
    \6\``Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer 
Williams'': Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 
116th Cong. (2019). This report abbreviates military titles consistent 
with the U.S. Government Printing Office style manual. See U.S. Gov't 
Printing Off., Style Manual 227 (2016).
    \7\Id.
    \8\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison'': Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 
116th Cong. (2019).
    \9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contrary to Democrat assertions, the evidence does not show 
that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to 
investigate his political rival during the July 25 phone call. 
The best evidence of the conversation--the call summary--shows 
no evidence of conditionality, threats, or pressure. President 
Zelensky and President Trump have both said there was no 
pressure, the initial read-out from the State Department and 
the Ukrainian government reflected no concerns, and the NSC 
leadership saw no illegality or impropriety with the call.
    The evidence does not show that President Trump withheld a 
meeting with President Zelensky to pressure Ukraine to 
investigate his political rival. The evidence shows that 
President Trump has a long-standing, deep-seated skepticism of 
Ukraine due to its history of pervasive corruption. President 
Zelensky was a political newcomer with untested views on anti-
corruption and a close association with a Ukrainian oligarch. 
Even so, President Trump agreed to invite President Zelensky to 
the White House, and in the interim, Ukrainian officials had 
several high-level meetings with U.S. officials. President 
Trump and President Zelensky met in September 2019 without 
Ukraine ever taking any action on investigating President 
Trump's political rival.
    In addition, the evidence does not show that President 
Trump withheld U.S. security assistance to Ukraine to pressure 
Ukraine to investigate his political rival. The evidence shows 
that President Trump has a skepticism of U.S. taxpayer-funded 
foreign aid and believes Europe should carry more financial 
burden for its regional defense. Although U.S. security 
assistance was paused temporarily, Democrats' witnesses denied 
there being any direct link to investigations of the 
President's political rival. Both the Ukrainian government and 
President Trump separately denied any linkage. U.S. officials 
did not tell the Ukrainian officials about the delay because 
they thought it would get worked out. Ambassador Volker, a 
senior U.S. diplomat and primary interlocutor with senior 
Ukrainian government officials, testified that the Ukrainians 
did not raise concerns to him about a delay in aid until after 
the pause was made public in late August 2019. The U.S. 
security assistance to Ukraine was ultimately disbursed without 
Ukraine taking any action to investigate President Trump's 
political rival.
    The evidence does not show that President Trump established 
a ``shadow'' foreign policy apparatus to pressure Ukraine to 
investigate his political rival. The President has broad 
Constitutional authority over U.S. foreign policy, and 
President Trump is likely suspicious of the national security 
apparatus due to continual leaks of sensitive information and 
the resistance within the federal bureaucracy. The three U.S. 
officials who Democrats accuse of conducting an ``irregular'' 
foreign policy channel had legitimate responsibilities for 
Ukraine policy. They kept the State Department and NSC aware of 
their actions. To the extent Mayor Giuliani was involved, he 
was in communication with these officials and the Ukrainians 
did not see him as speaking on behalf of the President.
    Although Democrats reflexively criticize President Trump 
for promoting ``conspiracy theories'' about Hunter Biden's role 
on Burisma's board or Ukrainian attempts to influence the 2016 
election, evidence suggests there are legitimate questions 
about both issues. The Democrats' witnesses testified that it 
would be appropriate for Ukraine to investigate allegations of 
corruption in Ukraine.
    Finally, there are fundamental flaws with the anonymous 
whistleblower complaint that initiated the Democrats' 
impeachment inquiry. The complaint contained inaccurate and 
misleading information that prejudiced the public understanding 
of President Trump's conversation with President Zelensky. The 
whistleblower had no firsthand knowledge of the events in 
question and a bias against President Trump. The whistleblower 
communicated with Chairman Schiff or his staff prior to 
submitting the whistleblower complaint to the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community. Several witnesses contradicted 
assertions made by the anonymous whistleblower. The 
whistleblower's complaint did not accurately reflect the tone 
and substance of the phone call, which is unsurprising given 
the whistleblower's reliance on secondhand information that had 
likely already been colored by biases of the original sources.

A. The evidence does not establish that President Trump pressured 
        President Zelensky during the July 25 phone call to investigate 
        the President's political rival for the purpose of benefiting 
        him in the 2020 election.

    On July 25, 2019, President Trump and President Zelensky 
spoke by telephone.\10\ This conversation would later serve as 
the basis for the anonymous whistleblower complaint and the 
spark for the Democrats' impeachment inquiry. Contrary to 
allegations that President Trump pressured Ukraine to 
investigate a domestic political rival during this call,\11\ 
the evidence shows that President Trump did not pressure 
President Zelensky to investigate his political rival.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\President Trump had spoken with then-President-elect Zelensky 
on April 21, 2019, to congratulate him on his election. See The White 
House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Apr. 21, 2019). This 
conversation too contained no indication of pressure, intimidation or 
threats. See id.
    \11\See, e.g., Josh Dawsey et al., How Trump and Giuliani pressured 
Ukraine to investigate the President's rivals, Wash. Post, (Sept. 20, 
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The call summary and initial read-outs of the conversation 
reflect no indication of conditionality, coercion, or 
intimidation--elements that would have been present if 
President Trump had used his authority to pressure President 
Zelensky to investigate his political rival. Importantly, both 
President Zelensky and President Trump have said publicly there 
was no pressure or anything inappropriate about their 
conversation. The anonymous whistleblower complaint--which 
sparked the impeachment inquiry--contains sensational rhetoric 
about the July 25 phone conservation that has prejudged 
subsequent views of the call.

1. The call summary does not reflect any improper pressure or 
        conditionality to pressure Ukraine to investigate President 
        Trump's political rival.

    The best evidence of the telephone conversation between 
President Trump and President Zelensky is the contemporaneous 
summary prepared by the White House Situation Room. The 
Democrats' witnesses described how National Security Council 
(NSC) policy staffers and White House Situation Room duty 
officers typically listen in on presidential conversations with 
foreign leaders to transcribe the contents of the 
conversation.\12\ This process occurred for President Trump's 
July 25 phone call with President Zelensky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\See, e.g., Deposition of Dr. Fiona Hill, in Wash., D.C., at 
297-300 (Oct. 14, 2019) [hereinafter ``Hill deposition'']. Although 
some have alleged that the presence of ellipses in the call summary 
connotes missing text, witnesses testified that call summaries often 
use ellipses to denote unfinished thoughts and not to ``read too much'' 
into the use of ellipses. See, e.g., id. at 307. LTC Vindman testified 
in his closed-door deposition that any editing decisions or missing 
words were not done maliciously. See Deposition of LTC Alexander 
Vindman, in Wash., D.C., at 253 (Oct. 29, 2019) [hereinafter ``Vindman 
deposition'']. In his public testimony, LTC Vindman explained that 
although the summary did not mention the word ``Burisma,'' it was ``not 
a significant omission.'' Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman 
and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6. Morrison testified in his 
deposition that he believed the call memorandum was an ``accurate and 
complete'' reflection of the substance of the call. Deposition of 
Timothy Morrison, in Wash., D.C., at 60 (Oct. 31, 2019) [hereinafter 
``Morrison deposition''].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As transcribed, the call summary denotes laughter, 
pleasantries, and compliments exchanged between President Trump 
and President Zelensky. The summary does not evince any 
threats, coercion, intimidation, or indication of 
conditionality. Democrats even acknowledged that the call 
summary reflected no quid pro quo.\13\ The summary bears 
absolutely no resemblance to House Intelligence Committee 
Chairman Adam Schiff's self-described ``parody'' interpretation 
of the call, which the Chairman performed at a public hearing 
on September 26.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\See, e.g., MSNBC Live with Craig Melvin (MSNBC television 
broadcast Sept. 25, 2019) (interview with Rep. Ro Khanna) (saying 
evidence of a quid pro quo on the call summary is ``irrelevant'').
    \14\Whistleblower Disclosure, supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The summary of the July 25 phone call begins by President 
Trump congratulating President Zelensky on a ``great victory,'' 
a ``terrific job,'' and a ``fantastic achievement.''\15\ 
President Zelensky reciprocated by complimenting President 
Trump, saying:

          Well, yes, to tell you the truth, we are trying to 
        work hard because we wanted to drain the swamp here in 
        our country. We brought in many, many new people. Not 
        the old politicians, not the typical politicians, 
        because we want to have a new format and a new type of 
        government. You are a great teacher for us and in 
        that.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\The White House, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation 1 (July 
25, 2019).
    \16\Id. at 2.

    President Trump expressed his concern that European 
countries were not providing their fair share in terms of 
assistance to Ukraine\17\--a topic about which President Trump 
has been vocal.\18\ President Zelensky responded that President 
Trump was ``absolutely right'' and that he had expressed 
concerns to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French 
President Emmanuel Macron.\19\ President Zelensky thanked 
President Trump for U.S. military support and said Ukraine was 
``almost ready to buy more Javelins from the United States for 
defense purposes.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\Id. 
    \18\See infra section I.C.2.
    \19\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 2.
    \20\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Trump then transitioned to discuss the allegation 
that some Ukrainian officials sought to influence the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. Although Democrats have seized on the 
President's phrasing--``I would like you to do us a favor 
though''\21\--to accuse the President of pressuring President 
Zelensky to target his 2020 political rival for his political 
benefit,\22\ they omit the remainder of his sentence. The full 
sentence shows that President Trump was not asking President 
Zelensky to investigate his political rival, but rather asking 
him to assist in ``get[ting] to the bottom'' of potential 
Ukrainian involvement in the 2016 election.\23\ This reading is 
supported by President Trump's subsequent reference to Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller, who had testified the day before about 
his findings,\24\ and to Attorney General William Barr, who had 
initiated an official inquiry into the origins of the U.S. 
government's 2016 Russia investigation.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\Id. at 3.
    \22\See, e.g., Whistleblower Disclosure, supra note 1 (statement of 
Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman).
    \23\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3. The 
President's reference to ``Crowdstrike'' during the conversation refers 
to a cybersecurity firm that examined the Democratic National Committee 
server following intrusion by the Russian government in 2016.
    \24\``Oversight of the Report on the Investigation into Russian 
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Former Special Counsel 
Robert S. Mueller, III'': Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
116th Cong. (2019).
    \25\See, e.g., Adam Goldman et al., Barr assigns U.S. Attorney in 
Connecticut to review origins of Russia inquiry, N.Y. Times, May 13, 
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Zelensky did not express any concern that 
President Trump had raised the allegations about Ukrainian 
influence in the 2016 election. In fact, President Zelensky 
responded by reiterating his commitment to cooperation between 
Ukraine and the United States and mentioning that he had 
recalled the Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, Valeriy 
Chaly.\26\ Ambassador Chaly had authored an op-ed in The Hill 
during the height of the presidential campaign in 2016 
criticizing a statement that President Trump had made by 
Crimea.\27\ President Zelensky said he planned to surround 
himself with ``the best and most experienced people'' and 
pledged that ``as the President of Ukraine that all the 
investigations will be done openly and candidly.''\28\ 
President Zelensky also raised former New York Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani, saying ``we are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani 
will be able to travel to Ukraine and we will meet once he 
comes to Ukraine.''\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3.
    \27\Valeriy Chaly, Ukraine's ambassador: Trump's comments send 
wrong message to world, The Hill, Aug. 4, 2016.
    \28\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3.
    \29\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The call summary shows that the discussion then intertwined 
several different topics. In response to President Zelensky's 
statement about new personnel, President Trump and President 
Zelensky discussed the position of prosecutor general.\30\ 
President Zelensky did not express any discomfort discussing 
the prosecutor general position. He said the new prosecutor 
general would be ``100% my person, my candidate'' and said the 
prosecutor would look into the matters raised by President 
Trump to ``mak[e] sure to restore the honesty'' of the 
investigation.\31\ President Zelensky later said ``we will be 
very serious about the case and will work on the 
investigation.''\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\Id. at 3-4.
    \31\Id. at 4.
    \32\Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to President Zelensky's reference to Mayor 
Giuliani, President Trump said Mayor Giuliani is ``a highly 
respected man'' who ``very much knows what's happening and he 
is a very capable guy.''\33\ President Trump said that he would 
ask Mayor Giuliani to call President Zelensky, along with 
Attorney General Barr, to ``get to the bottom of it.''\34\ 
President Zelensky did not express any concern about Mayor 
Giuliani's engagement--in fact, President Zelensky, not 
President Trump, first referenced Mayor Giuliani in the 
conversation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\Id. at 3-4.
    \34\Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Trump then raised former U.S. Ambassador to 
Ukraine, Marie Yovanovitch, saying that she was ``bad news'' 
and ``the people she was dealing with in the Ukraine were bad 
news.''\35\ President Zelensky did not express any hesitancy in 
discussing the ambassador. Contrary to Democrats' assertion 
that he felt obligated to agree with President Trump's 
assessment, President Zelensky stated his independent negative 
assessment of Ambassador Yovanovitch:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\Id.

        Her attitude toward me was far from the best as she 
        admired the previous President and she was on his side. 
        She would not accept me as a new President well 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        enough.\36\

    President Trump also raised in passing--using the 
transition phrase ``the other thing''--the topic of Vice 
President Joe Biden's son, Hunter Biden, referring to his 
position on the board of a Ukrainian energy company, Burisma, 
known for its corruption.\37\ President Trump said ``a lot of 
people want to find out about that so whatever you can do with 
the Attorney General would be great.''\38\ President Zelensky 
did not reply to President Trump's reference to the Bidens, and 
the two did not discuss the topic substantively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\Id.
    \37\Id.
    \38\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The call concluded with President Zelensky raising energy 
cooperation between Ukraine and the United States and with 
President Trump reiterating his invitation for President 
Zelensky to visit the White House.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although some later expressed concern about the call, the 
call summary--the best evidence of the conversation--shows no 
indication of conflict, intimidation, or pressure. President 
Trump never conditioned a White House meeting on any action by 
President Zelensky. President Trump never mentioned U.S. 
security assistance to Ukraine. President Zelensky never 
verbalized any disagreement, hostility, or concern about any 
facet of the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship.

2. President Zelensky has publicly and repeatedly said he felt no 
        pressure to investigate President Trump's political rival.

    Since President Trump declassified and publicly released 
the content of his July 25 phone conversation with President 
Zelensky, President Zelensky and other senior Ukrainian 
officials have publicly and repeatedly asserted that President 
Zelensky felt no pressure to investigate President Trump's 
political rival. President Zelensky has variously asserted, 
``nobody pushed . . . me,'' ``I was never pressured,'' and 
there was no ``blackmail.''
    On September 25, President Zelensky and President Trump met 
face-to-face for a bilateral meeting on the margins of the 74th 
United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly in New York. The 
presidents jointly participated in a media availability, during 
which President Zelensky asserted that he felt no pressure.\40\ 
President Zelensky said then:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\Press Release, The White House, Remarks by President Trump and 
President Zelensky of Ukraine Before Bilateral Meeting (Sept. 25, 
2019), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
remarks-president-trump-president-zelensky-ukraine-bilateral-meeting-
new-york-ny/.

          Q. President Zelensky, have you felt any pressure 
        from President Trump to investigate Joe Biden and 
        Hunter Biden?
          A. I think you read everything. So I think you read 
        text. I'm sorry, but I don't want to be involved to 
        democratic, open elections--elections of USA. No, you 
        heard that we had, I think, good phone call. It was 
        normal. We spoke about many things. And I--so I think, 
        and you read it, that nobody pushed--pushed me.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\Id. (emphasis added).

    President Zelensky again reiterated that he was not 
pressured to investigate President Trump's political rival 
during an interview with a Kyodo News, a Japanese media outlet, 
published on October 6. Kyodo News quoted President Zelensky as 
saying, ``I was never pressured and there were no conditions 
being imposed'' on a White House meeting or U.S. security 
assistance to Ukraine.\42\ President Zelensky denied ``reports 
by U.S. media that [President] Trump's requests were 
conditions'' for a White House meeting or U.S. security 
assistance.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\Ukraine president denies being pushed by Trump to investigate 
Biden, Kyodo News, Oct. 6, 2019.
    \43\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On October 10, during an all-day media availability in 
Kyiv, President Zelensky again emphasized that he felt no 
pressure to investigate President Trump's political rival. 
President Zelensky said there was ``no blackmail'' during the 
conversation, explaining: ``This is not corruption. It was just 
a call.''\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\Ukraine's president says no blackmail' in Trump call, BBC, Oct. 
10, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, on September 21--before President Trump had 
even declassified and released the call summary--Ukrainian 
Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko denied that President Trump 
had pressured President Zelensky to investigate President 
Trump's political rival\45\ Foreign Minister Prystaiko said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\``Trump did not pressure Zelenskyy, Ukraine is independent 
state''--Foreign Minister Prystaiko, Hromadske, Sept. 21, 2019.

          I know what the conversation was about and I think 
        there was no pressure. There was talk, conversations 
        are different, leaders have the right to discuss any 
        problems that exist. This conversation was long, 
        friendly, and it touched on a lot of questions, 
        including those requiring serious answers.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\Id. (emphasis added).

    Similarly, Ambassador Bill Taylor explained that he had 
dinner with Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-Secretary of the National 
Security and Defense Council, the night of the phone 
conversation between President Trump and President 
Zelensky.\47\ He explained that Danylyuk said that the 
Ukrainian government ``seemed to think that the call went fine, 
the call went well. He wasn't disturbed by anything. He wasn't 
disturbed that he told us about the phone call.''\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\Deposition of Ambassador William B. Taylor, in Wash., D.C., at 
80 (Oct. 22, 2019).
    \48\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Zelensky's repeated denials that President Trump 
pressured him to investigate domestic political rival--
corroborated by Foreign Minister Prystaiko's similar denial--
carry significant weight.

3. President Trump has publicly and repeatedly said he did not pressure 
        President Zelensky to investigate his political rival.

    Like President Zelensky, President Trump has repeatedly and 
publicly stated that he did not pressure President Zelensky to 
investigate his political rival. During the September 25 
bilateral meeting with President Zelensky, President Trump said 
to the assembled members of the media: ``There was no pressure. 
And you know there was--and, by the way, you know there was no 
pressure. All you have to do it see it, what went on the 
call.''\49\ When asked whether he wanted President Zelensky to 
``do more'' to investigate Vice President Biden, President 
Trump responded: ``No. I want him to do whatever he can. This 
was not his fault; he wasn't there. He's just been here 
recently. But whatever he can do in terms of corruption, 
because the corruption is massive.''\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\Remarks by President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine 
Before Bilateral Meeting, supra note 40.
    \50\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the President's statements, some allege that an 
overheard conversation the day after President Trump's 
conversation with President Zelensky shows that the President 
sought to pressure President Zelensky. On July 26, following a 
meeting with President Zelensky, Ambassador Gordon Sondland, 
the U.S. Ambassador to the European Union, telephoned President 
Trump from Kyiv.\51\According to a subsequent account of David 
Holmes, a Political Counselor at U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ambassador 
Sondland told the President that he was in Ukraine and stated 
President Zelensky ``loves your ass.''\52\ Holmes recounted 
that President Trump asked Ambassador Sondland, ``So he's going 
to do the investigation?''\53\ Ambassador Sondland allegedly 
replied, ``He's going to do it.''\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\Deposition of David Holmes, in Wash., D.C., at 23-25 (Nov. 15, 
2019) [hereinafter ``Holmes deposition'']. Ambassador Sondland did not 
mention this phone call in his deposition. See generally Deposition of 
Ambassador Gordon D. Sondland, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 17, 2019) 
[hereinafter ``Sondland deposition''].
    \52\Holmes deposition, supra note 51, at 24
    \53\Id.
    \54\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This conversation is not definitive evidence that President 
Trump pressured President Zelensky to investigate his political 
rival. First, according to Ambassador Sondland, it was not 
clear that President Trump meant an investigation into the 
Bidens. In his closed-door deposition, Ambassador Sondland 
testified that he only had ``five or six'' conversations with 
the President and did not mention this particular 
conversation.\55\ In his public testimony, however, Ambassador 
Sondland suddenly recalled the conversation, saying that it 
``did not strike me as significant at the time'' and that the 
primary purpose of the call was to discuss rapper A$AP Rocky, 
who was imprisoned in Sweden.\56\ Ambassador Sondland testified 
that he has no recollection of discussing Vice President Biden 
or his son, Hunter Biden, with President Trump.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 56.
    \56\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland'': Hearing 
before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. (2019).
    \57\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, Holmes testified that although he disclosed 
Ambassador Sondland's conversation with the President to 
multiple friends on multiple occasions, he did not feel 
compelled to disclose it to the State Department or Congress 
until weeks into the impeachment inquiry.\58\ Although Holmes 
testified that he told his boss, Ambassador Taylor, about the 
call on August 6 and received a ``knowing'' response, and that 
he referred to the call often in staff meetings, Ambassador 
Taylor testified publicly that he was ``not aware of this 
information'' at the time of his October 22 deposition, and 
that he only became aware of the Holmes account on November 8, 
2019, two days after his hearing was publicly announced, at 
which point he referred it (for the first time) to the Legal 
Adviser for the Department of State.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\Holmes deposition, supra note 51, at 31, 158-62.
    \59\Id. at 81-82, 121-22, 167; see generally Taylor deposition, 
supra note 47; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and 
Mr. George Kent, supra note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Read-outs of the phone call from both the State Department and the 
        Ukrainian government did not reflect that President Trump 
        pressured President Zelensky to investigate his political 
        rival.

    Immediately following the telephone conversation between 
President Trump and President Zelensky, senior U.S. and 
Ukrainian government officials provided read-outs of the 
conversation. According to witness testimony, none of these 
read-outs indicated that the conversation between the 
presidents was substantively concerning.
    Ambassador Volker testified that he received informal read-
outs of the call from both his State Department assistant and 
his high-level Ukrainian contacts.\60\ These read-outs did not 
indicate any concern with the phone call. Ambassador Volker 
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\Transcribed interview of Ambassador Kurt Volker, in Wash., 
D.C., at 102-03 (Oct. 3, 2019) [hereinafter ``Volker transcribed 
interview'']. Ambassador Volker's assistant at the time, Catherine 
Croft, testified that she only received a read-out of the phone call 
was based on what President Zelensky told Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
Taylor, and Ambassador Sondland on July 26. Deposition of Catherine 
Croft, in Wash., D.C., at 16 (Oct. 30, 2019) [hereinafter ``Croft 
deposition''].

          A. I got an oral readout from the staffer who works 
        for me in the State Department and our charge, as well 
        as from Andrey Yermak, who had been on the call in 
        Ukraine himself.
          Q. So you got two readouts?
          A. Yeah.
          Q. One from each side?
          A. Correct.
          Q. What was the top line message you got from the 
        State Department?
          A. Well, they were the same, actually, which is 
        interesting. But the message was congratulations from 
        the President to President Zelensky; President Zelensky 
        reiterating that he is committed to fighting corruption 
        and reform in the Ukraine; and President Trump 
        reiterating an invitation for President Zelensky to 
        visit him at the White House. That was it.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 102-03.

    In fact, in his public testimony, Ambassador Volker 
testified that President Zelensky was ``very upbeat about the 
fact of the call.''\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Sondland received a summary of the phone call 
from his staff.\63\ Ambassador Sondland testified that he was 
pleased to learn that it was a ``good call.''\64\ George Kent, 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State covering Ukraine, 
testified that he received a read-out of the call from NSC 
staffer LTC Alexander Vindman.\65\ According to Kent, although 
LTC Vindman said the ``atmospherics'' of the conversation was 
cooler and reserved, LTC Vindman did not mention Vice President 
Biden's name or anything relating to 2016.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 116.
    \64\Id.
    \65\Deposition of George Kent, in Wash., D.C., at 163 (Oct. 15, 
2019) [hereinafter ``Kent deposition''].
    \66\Id. at 163-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, the Office of the President of Ukraine issued 
an official statement following the phone call.\67\ The 
official statement also signaled no concern about the call or 
any indication of coercion, intimidation, or pressure from 
President Trump. The statement read in full:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\Press Release, Office of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr 
Zelenskyy had a phone conversation with President of the United States 
(July 25, 2019), available at https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/
volodimir-zelenskij-proviv-telefonnu-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-s-56617.

          President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky had a phone 
        conversation with President of the United States Donald 
        Trump. President of the United States congratulated 
        Ukraine on successful holding free and democratic 
        parliamentary elections as well as Volodymyr Zelensky 
        with victory the Servant of the People Party.
          Donald Trump is convinced that the new Ukrainian 
        government will be able to quickly improve image of 
        Ukraine, complete investigation of corruption cases, 
        which inhibited the interaction between Ukraine and the 
        USA.
          He also confirmed continued support of the 
        sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine by the 
        United States and the readiness of the American side to 
        fully contribute to the implementation of a Large-Scale 
        Reform Program in our country.
          Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Donald Trump for US 
        leadership in preserving and strengthening the 
        sanctions pressure on Russia.
          The Presidents agreed to discuss practical issues of 
        Ukrainian-American cooperation during the visit of 
        Volodymyr Zelensky to the United States.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\Id.

    The initial read-outs of the July 25 telephone conversation 
between President Trump and President Zelensky provide 
compelling evidence that the key message conveyed during the 
conversation was about fighting corruption in Ukraine--and not 
about digging up dirt on President Trump's political rival for 
the President's political benefit.

5. The National Security Council leadership did not see the call as 
        illegal or improper.

    The evidence shows that the NSC leadership did not see the 
telephone conversation between President Trump and President 
Zelensky as improper. Timothy Morrison, who served as the 
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, 
listened in on the conversation.\69\ He testified that he was 
concerned information from the call could leak, but he was not 
concerned that anything discussed on the call was illegal or 
improper.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 15.
    \70\Id. at 16, 60-61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    LTG Keith Kellogg, Vice President Pence's National Security 
Advisor, also listened in on the July 25 telephone 
conversation.\71\ LTG Kellogg stated that like Morrison: ``I 
heard nothing wrong or improper on the call. I had and have no 
concerns.''\72\ LTG Kellogg's subordinate, Jennifer Williams, 
testified that although she found the call to be ``unusual,'' 
she did not raise concerns to LTG Kellogg.\73\ LTG Kellogg 
similarly noted that Williams never raised concerns to him.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\The White House, Statement from Lieutenant General Keith 
Kellogg, National Security Advisor to Vice President Mike Pence (Nov. 
19, 2019) [hereinafter ``Statement from Lieutenant General Kellogg''].
    \72\Id.
    \73\Deposition of Jennifer Williams, in Wash., D.C., at 129 (Nov. 
7, 2019) [hereinafter ``Williams deposition'']; Impeachment Inquiry: 
LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6.
    \74\Statement from Lieutenant General Kellogg, supra note 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Morrison's subordinate, LTC Vindman, listened in on the 
conversation.\75\ At the time of the call, LTC Vindman handled 
Ukraine policy for the NSC.\76\ He testified that he was 
concerned by the conversation and raised his concerns to the 
NSC's Legal Advisor, John Eisenberg.\77\ Eisenberg, according 
to LTC Vindman, did not share the concern.\78\ LTC Vindman did 
not raise any concerns to Morrison, his immediate 
supervisor.\79\ In his public testimony, Morrison explained 
that he had concerns with LTC Vindman's judgment and deviation 
from the chain of command.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 18.
    \76\Id. at 16.
    \77\Id. at 96.
    \78\Id. at 97, 258.
    \79\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 59.
    \80\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The evidence suggests that any wider concerns about the 
July 25 phone call originated from LTC Vindman. Williams 
testified that she discussed the call with no one outside the 
NSC.\81\ LTC Vindman, on the other hand, testified that he 
discussed the phone call with two people outside of the NSC, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent and an unidentified 
intelligence community employee.\82\ Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Kent explained that LTC Vindman felt ``uncomfortable'' and 
would not share the majority of the substance of the 
conversation.\83\ According to Kent's recollection, LTC Vindman 
did not mention that the conversation included any reference to 
Vice President Biden.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer 
Williams, supra note 6.
    \82\Id.
    \83\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 163-64.
    \84\Id. at 165-66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. The anonymous, secondhand whistleblower complaint misstated details 
        about the July 25 call, which has falsely colored the call's 
        public characterization.

    The anonymous whistleblower did not listen in on the July 
25 call between President Trump and President Zelensky. The 
whistleblower's subsequent complaint about the conversation, 
compiled with secondhand information, misstated key details 
about the conversation.
    The whistleblower sensationally alleged that President 
Trump ``sought to pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions 
to help the President's 2020 reelection bid.''\85\ The call 
summary, however, contains no reference to 2020 or President 
Trump's reelection bid.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\Letter to Richard Burr, Chairman, S. Sel. Comm. on 
Intelligence, & Adam Schiff, Chairman, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on 
Intelligence 2 (Aug. 12, 2019) [hereinafter ``Whistleblower letter''].
    \86\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The whistleblower alleged that President Trump 
``pressured'' President Zelensky to ``initiate or continue an 
investigation into the activities of former Vice President 
Joseph Biden and his son, Hunter Biden.''\87\ The call summary, 
however, shows that President Trump referenced the Bidens only 
in passing and that the presidents did not discuss the topic 
substantively.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 2.
    \88\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The whistleblower alleged that President Trump 
``pressured'' President Zelensky to ``locate and turn over 
servers used by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and 
examined by the U.S. cyber security firm Crowdstrike.''\89\ The 
call summary, however, demonstrates that while President Trump 
mentioned Crowdstrike and ``the server,'' President Trump never 
made any request that President Zelensky locate or turn over 
any material.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 2.
    \90\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The whistleblower alleged that President Trump ``praised 
Ukraine's Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuriy Lutsenko, and suggested 
that Mr. Zelensky might want to keep him in his position.''\91\ 
The call summary is not clear about which prosecutor general 
President Trump is referring to--Ambassador Volker testified he 
believed President Trump was referring to Lutsenko's 
predecessor, Viktor Shokin\92\--and President Trump never 
specifically referenced Lutsenko.\93\ President Trump also 
never suggested or intimated that President Zelensky should 
``keep [Lutsenko] in his position.''\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 3.
    \92\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 355.
    \93\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
    \94\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The whistleblower also alleged that T. Ulrich Brechbuhl, 
Counselor to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, listened in on the 
July 25 phone call.\95\ Subsequent reporting, confirmed by a 
letter sent by Brechbuhl's attorney, indicated that Brechbuhl 
was not on the call.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 3.
    \96\Christina Ruffini (@EenaRuffini), Twitter (Sept. 26, 2019, 
12:41 p.m.), https://twitter.com/EenaRuffini/status/
1177307225024544768; Letter from Ronald Tenpas to Adam Schiff, 
Chairman, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence (Nov. 5, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 * * *

    Setting aside the whistleblower's mischaracterization of 
President Trump's phone call with President Zelensky, the best 
available evidence shows no coercion, threats, or pressure for 
Ukraine to investigate the President's political rival for the 
President's political benefit. The call summary shows no quid 
pro quo, the initial read-outs relayed no substantive concerns, 
and both President Zelensky and President Trump have repeatedly 
said publicly there was no pressure. These facts refute the 
Democrats' allegations.

B. The evidence does not establish that President Trump withheld a 
        meeting with President Zelensky to pressure Ukraine to 
        investigate the President's political rival for the purpose of 
        benefiting him in the 2020 election.

    Democrats allege that President Trump withheld a meeting 
with President Zelensky as a way of pressuring Ukraine to 
investigate President Trump's political rival.\97\ Here, too, 
the evidence obtained during the impeachment inquiry does not 
support this allegation. President Trump and President Zelensky 
met without Ukraine ever investigating Vice Present Biden or 
his son, Hunter Biden.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\See, e.g., Karoun Demirjian et al., Officials' texts reveals 
belief that Trump wanted probes as condition of Ukraine meeting, Wash. 
Post, Oct. 4, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The evidence strongly suggests, instead, that President 
Trump was reluctant to meet with President Zelensky for a 
different reason--Ukraine's long history of pervasive 
corruption and uncertainty about whether President Zelensky 
would break from this history and live up to his anti-
corruption campaign platform. The Democrats' witnesses 
described how President Trump has a deep-seated and genuine 
skepticism of Ukraine due to its corruption and that the 
President's view was reasonable. Because of President Trump's 
skepticism and because President Zelensky was a first-time 
candidate with relatively untested views, Ukraine and U.S. 
officials sought to convince President Trump that President 
Zelensky was the ``real deal'' on reform. President Trump 
ultimately signed a letter to President Zelensky on May 29 
inviting him to the White House.
    Although there were several months between President 
Trump's invitation on May 29 and the bilateral meeting on 
September 25, the evidence does not show the delay was 
intentional or aimed at pressuring President Zelensky. The 
Democrats' witnesses described the difficulty in scheduling 
high-level meetings and how an anticipated presidential meeting 
in Poland in early September was cancelled due to Hurricane 
Dorian. Nonetheless, U.S. foreign policy officials believed 
that the Ukrainian government felt good about its relationship 
with the Trump Administration because of several high-level 
bilateral meetings held between May and September 2019, 
including President Zelensky's meeting with Vice President 
Pence on September 1. Ultimately, of course, President Trump 
and President Zelensky met during the U.N. General Assembly in 
New York on September 25, without Ukraine taking steps to 
investigate President Trump's political rival.

1. Ukraine has a long history of pervasive corruption.

    Since it became an independent nation following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been plagued by 
systemic corruption. The Guardian has called Ukraine ``the most 
corrupt nation in Europe''\98\ and Ernst & Young cites Ukraine 
among the three most-corrupt nations of the world.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\Oliver Bullough, Welcome to Ukraine, the Most Corrupt Nation in 
Europe, Guardian, (Feb. 6, 2015).
    \99\See, e.g., 14th Global Fraud Survey, Ernst & Young, (2016), 
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-corporate-misconduct-
individual-consequences/$FILE/EY-corporate-misconduct-individual-
consequences.pdf (noting that 88% of Ukrainian's agree that ``bribery/
corrupt practices happen widely in business in [Ukraine]''). See also 
Viktor Tkachuk, People First: The Latest in the Watch on Ukrainian 
Democracy, Kyiv Post, (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.kyivpost.com/
article/opinion/op-ed/people-first-the-latest-in-the-watch-on-
ukrainian-democracy-5-312797.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) explained Ukraine's history of corruption in a 2006 
report:

          From the early 1990s, powerful officials in [the 
        Ukrainian] government and politics acquired and 
        privatized key economic resources of the state. As 
        well, shadowy businesses, allegedly close to organized 
        crime, became powerful economic forces in several 
        regions of the country. Over the course of the past 
        decade, these business groupings--or clans--as they 
        became called, grew into major financial-industrial 
        structures that used their very close links with and 
        influence over government, political parties, the mass 
        media and the state bureaucracy to enlarge and fortify 
        their control over the economy and sources of wealth. 
        They used ownership ties, special privileges, relations 
        with government and direct influence over the courts 
        and law enforcement and regulatory organizations to 
        circumvent weaknesses in governmental 
        institutions.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\U.S. Agency for International Development, Final Report, 
Corruption Assessment: Ukraine (2006), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf _docs/
PNADK247.pdf.

    Corruption is so pervasive in Ukraine that in 2011, 68.8% 
of Ukrainian citizens reported that they had bribed a public 
official within the preceding twelve months.\101\ Bribery and 
facilitation payments\102\ are common schemes by which 
Ukrainian officials demand payment in exchange for ensuring 
public services are delivered either on time or at all.\103\ 
Corruption also presents an obstacle to private and public 
business in Ukraine.\104\ In 2011, then-President Petro 
Poroshenko estimated that 15%, or $7.4 billion, of the state 
budget ``ends up in the pockets of officials'' through corrupt 
public procurement practices.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\Fighting Corruption in Ukraine: Ukrainian Style, Gorshenin 
Inst., (Mar. 7, 2011), http://gpf-europe.com/upload/iblock/333/round 
_table _eng.pdf.
    \102\See Facilitation Payments, Corruption Dictionary, 
Ganintegrity.com, (last visited Oct. 23, 2019), https://
www.ganintegrity.com/portal/corruption-dictionary/. Facilitation 
payments, also known as ``grease payments,'' are a form of bribery made 
with the purpose of expediting or securing the performance of a routine 
action to which the payer is legally entitled. Id.
    \103\People & Corruption: Citizens' Voices from Around the World, 
Transparency Int'l, (2017), https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/
publication/people and corruption_citizens_voices _from _around _the 
_world.
    \104\Id.
    \105\Mark Rachkevych, Under Yanukovych, Ukraine Slides Deeper in 
Ranks of Corrupt Nations, Kyiv Post, (Dec. 1, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pervasive corruption in Ukraine has been one of the primary 
impediments to Ukraine joining the European Union.\106\ 
Corruption-related concerns also figure prominently in the 
E.U.-Ukrainian Association Agreement, the document establishing 
a political and economic association between the E.U. and 
Ukraine.\107\ The Agreement was entered into with the intent of 
Ukraine committing to gradually conform to E.U. technical and 
consumer standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\See, e.g., Vladimir Isachenkov, Ukraine's integration into 
West dashed by war and corruption, Assoc. Press, Mar. 26, 2019.
    \107\E.U.-Ukraine Ass'n Agreement, art. 14, Mar. 21, 2014, 57 Off. 
J. of the E.U. L161/3 (``In their cooperation on justice, freedom and 
security, the Parties shall attach particular importance to the 
consolidation of the rule of law and the reinforcement of institutions 
at all levels in the areas of administration in general and law 
enforcement and the administration of justice in particular. 
Cooperation will, in particular, aim at strengthening the judiciary, 
improving its efficiency, safeguarding its independence and 
impartiality, and combating corruption. Respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms will guide all cooperation on justice, freedom and 
security.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    State Department witnesses called by the Democrats during 
the impeachment inquiry confirmed Ukraine's reputation for 
corruption. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent 
described Ukraine's corruption problem as ``serious'' and said 
corruption has long been ``part of the high-level dialogue'' 
between the United States and Ukraine.\108\ Ambassador Bill 
Taylor said corruption in Ukraine is a ``big issue.''\109\ 
Ambassador Kurt Volker testified that ``Ukraine has a long 
history of pervasive corruption throughout the economy[,] 
throughout the country, and it has been incredibly difficult 
for Ukraine as a country to deal with this, to investigate it, 
to prosecute it.''\110\ He later elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\Kent deposition, supra note 65 at 105, 151.
    \109\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 86.
    \110\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 76.

          Ukraine had for decades a reputation of being just a 
        corrupt place. There are a handful of people who own a 
        disproportionate amount of the economy. Oligarchs, they 
        use corruption as kind of the coin of the realm to get 
        what they want, including influencing the Parliament, 
        the judiciary, the government, state-owned industries. 
        And so businessmen generally don't want to invest in 
        Ukraine, even to this day, because they just fear that 
        it's a horrible environment to be working in, and they 
        don't want to put--expose themselves to that risk. I 
        would have to believe that President Trump would be 
        aware of that general climate.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\Id. at 148-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. President Trump has a deep-seated, genuine, and reasonable 
        skepticism of Ukraine due to its history of pervasive 
        corruption.

    Multiple Democrat witnesses offered firsthand testimony of 
President Trump's skeptical view of Ukraine, as far back as 
September 2017. Ambassador Volker explained: ``President Trump 
demonstrated that he had a very deeply rooted negative view of 
Ukraine based on past corruption. And that's a reasonable 
position. Most people who would know anything about Ukraine 
would think that.''\112\ He elaborated that the President's 
concern about Ukraine was genuine,\113\ and that this concern 
contributed to a delay in the meeting with President Zelensky. 
He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \112\Id. at 30.
    \113\Id. at 295.

          So the issue as I understood it was this deep-rooted, 
        skeptical view of Ukraine, a negative view of Ukraine, 
        preexisting 2019, you know, going back. When I started 
        this, I had one other meeting with President Trump and 
        [then-Ukrainian] President Poroshenko. It was in 
        September of 2017. And at that time he had a very 
        skeptical view of Ukraine. So I know he had a very 
        deep-rooted skeptical view. And my understanding at the 
        time was that even though he agreed in the [May23] 
        meeting that we had with him, say, okay, I'll invite 
        him, he didn't really want to do it. And that's why the 
        meeting kept being delayed and delayed.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\Id. at 41.

    Other testimony confirms Ambassador Volker's statements. 
Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch confirmed 
the President's skepticism, saying that she observed it during 
President Trump's meeting with President Poroshenko in 
September 2017.\115\ She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\Deposition of Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, in Wash., D.C., at 
142 (Oct. 11, 2019).

          Q. Were you aware of the President's deep-rooted 
        skepticism about Ukraine's business environment?
          A. Yes.
          Q. And what did you know about that?
          A. That he--I mean, he shared that concern directly 
        with President Poroshenko in their first meeting in the 
        Oval Office.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\Id.

    Dr. Fiona Hill, NSC Senior Director for Europe, also 
testified that President Trump was ``quite publicly'' skeptical 
of Ukraine and that ``everyone has expressed great concerns 
about corruption in Ukraine.''\117\ Catherine Croft, a former 
NSC director, similarly attested to President's Trump 
skepticism when she staffed President Trump for two Ukraine 
matters in 2017, explaining: ``Throughout both, I heard, 
directly and indirectly, President Trump described Ukraine as a 
corrupt country.''\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 118.
    \118\Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Senior Ukrainian government officials publicly attacked President 
        Trump during the 2016 campaign.

    President Trump's skepticism about Ukraine was compounded 
by statements made by senior Ukrainian government officials in 
2016 that were critical of then-candidate Trump and supportive 
of his opponent, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. 
Although Democrats have attempted to discredit these assertions 
as ``debunked,'' the statements by Ukrainian leaders speak for 
themselves and shed light on President Trump's mindset when 
interacting with President Zelensky in 2019.
    In August 2016, less than three months before the election, 
Valeriy Chaly, then-Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, 
authored an op-ed in the Washington-based publication The Hill 
criticizing candidate Trump for comments he made about Russia's 
occupation of Crimea.\119\ Ambassador Chaly wrote that 
candidate Trump's comments ``have raised serious concerns in 
[Kyiv] and beyond Ukraine.''\120\ Although President Zelensky 
dismissed Ambassador Chaly on July 19, 2019,\121\ the 
ambassador's op-ed remains on the website of the Ukrainian 
Embassy in the U.S. as of the date of this report.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \119\See Chaly, supra note 27.
    \120\Id.
    \121\Zelensky dismisses Valeriy Chaly from post of Ukraine's envoy 
to US, Kyiv Post (July 19, 2019).
    \122\Embassy of Ukraine in the United States of America, Op-ed by 
Ambassador of Ukraine to the USA Valeriy Chaly for the Hill: ``Trump's 
comments send wrong message to world,'' https://usa.mfa.gov.ua/en/
press-center/publications/4744-posol-ukrajini-vislovlyuvannya-trampa-
nadsilajuty-nevirnij-signal-svitu.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Later that month, the Financial Times published an article 
asserting that Trump's candidacy led ``Kyiv's wider political 
leadership to do something they would never have attempted 
before: intervene, however indirectly, in a US election.''\123\ 
The article quoted Serhiy Leshchenko, a Ukrainian Member of 
Parliament, to detail how the Ukrainian government was 
supporting Secretary Clinton's candidacy.\124\ The article 
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\Roman Olearchyk, Ukraine's leaders campaign against `pro-
Putin' Trump, Financial Times, Aug. 28, 2016.
    \124\Id.

          Though most Ukrainians are disillusioned with the 
        country's current leadership for stalled reforms and 
        lackluster anti-corruption efforts, Mr. Leshchenko said 
        events of the past two years had locked Ukraine on to a 
        pro-western course. The majority of Ukraine's 
        politicians, he added, are ``on Hillary Clinton's 
        side.''\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\Id. (emphasis added).

    The Financial Times reported that during the U.S. 
presidential campaign, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk had warned on Facebook that candidate Trump 
``challenged the very values of the free world.''\126\ On 
Twitter, Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Arsen Avakov 
called Trump a ``clown'' who is ``an even bigger danger to the 
US than terrorism.''\127\ In a Facebook post, Avakov called 
Trump ``dangerous for Ukraine and the US'' and said that 
Trump's Crimea comments were the ``diagnosis of a dangerous 
misfit.''\128\ Avakov continues to serve in President 
Zelensky's government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \126\Id.
    \127\Kenneth P. Vogel & David Stern, Ukrainian efforts to sabotage 
Trump backfire, Politico, Jan. 11, 2017.
    \128\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Multiple Democrat witnesses testified that these Ukrainian 
actions during the 2016 election campaign likely also colored 
President Trump's views of President Zelensky. Ambassador 
Volker said:

          Q. And you mentioned that the President was 
        skeptical, had a deep-rooted view of the Ukraine. Is 
        that correct?
          A. That is correct.
          Q. And that, whether fair or unfair, he believed 
        there were officials in Ukraine that were out to get 
        him in the run-up to his election?
          A. That is correct.
          Q. So, to the extent there are allegations lodged, 
        credible or uncredible, if the president was made aware 
        of those allegations, whether it was via The Hill or, 
        you know, via Mr. Giuliani or via cable news, if the 
        President was made aware of these allegations, isn't it 
        fair to say that he may, in fact, have believed they 
        were credible?
          A. Yes, I believe so.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 70-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Sondland similarly testified:
          Q. Did [President Trump] mention anything about 
        Ukraine's involvement in the 2016 election?
          A. I think he said: They tried to take me down. He 
        kept saying that over and over.
          Q. In connection with the 2016 election?
          A. Probably, yeah.
          Q. That was what your understanding was?
          A. That was my understanding, yeah.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \130\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. U.S. foreign policy officials were split on President Zelensky, a 
        political novice with untested views on anti-corruption and a 
        close relationship with a controversial oligarch.

    Evidence obtained during the Democrats' impeachment inquiry 
shows that the U.S. foreign policy apparatus was divided on the 
question of whether President Trump should meet with President 
Zelensky. President Zelensky was a first-time candidate and a 
newcomer to the Ukrainian political scene. Although President 
Zelensky ran on an anti-corruption and reform platform, the 
Democrats' witnesses explained that the State Department was 
unsure how he would govern as president. In addition, others in 
the U.S. government worried about President Zelensky's 
association with Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoisky.
    President Zelensky won a landslide victory on April 21, 
2019, defeating incumbent President Petro Poroshenko by a 73-24 
percent margin.\131\ The win came as a surprise to many.\132\ 
At the time of his election, Mr. Zelensky was a comedic 
television personality. Ambassador Volker testified that 
``Zelensky kind of came up out of nowhere. . . . When he arose 
kind of meteorically, as an outside figure and a popular 
candidate, I think it did take everybody by surprise.''\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\Ukraine election: Comedian Zelensky wins presidency by 
landside, BBC News (Apr. 22, 2019).
    \132\Id.
    \133\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60 at 152-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Yovanovitch also testified that Zelensky's 
election came as a surprise. She explained:

          And I think that there was, you know, as is true, I 
        think, probably in any country during Presidential 
        elections, a lot of--a lot of concerns among people. 
        This was I think a big surprise for the political elite 
        of Ukraine, which is relatively small. And so, I don't 
        think they saw it coming really until the very end. 
        And, so, there was surprise and, you know, all the 
        stages of grief, anger, disbelief, how is this 
        happening?\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 73-74.

    Ambassador Yovanovitch agreed that President Zelensky was 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
an ``untried'' politician:

          Q. And how did you feel about [Zelensky winning the 
        election]? What were your views of Zelensky? Did you 
        think he was going to be a good advocate for the 
        anticorruption initiatives, as he was campaigning on?
          A. We didn't know. I mean, he was an untried 
        politician. Obviously, he has a background as a 
        comedian, as an actor, as a businessperson, but we 
        didn't know what he would be like as a President.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\Id. at 74.

    Ambassador Sondland testified that there was a difference 
in opinion regarding whether to schedule a call between 
Presidents Trump and Zelensky. Ambassador Sondland recalled 
that he, Ambassador Volker, and Secretary Perry advocated for a 
call between the presidents, while NSC officials 
disagreed.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\Sondland note 51, at 27-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Evidence suggests that U.S. officials had concerns about 
some people surrounding President Zelensky. Ambassador Volker 
testified that President Zelensky's chief of presidential 
administration, Andriy Bohdan, had earlier been an attorney for 
``a very famous oligarch in Ukraine.''\137\ Senator Ron 
Johnson, who attended President Zelensky's inauguration in May 
2019, recalled ``concern over rumors that [President] Zelensky 
was going to appoint Andriy Bohdan, the lawyer for oligarch 
Igor Kolomoisky, as his chief of staff. The delegation [to the 
inauguration] viewed Bohdan's rumored appointment to be 
contrary to the goal of fighting corruption and maintaining 
U.S. support.''\138\ President Zelensky appointed Bohdan to be 
head of presidential administration in May 2019.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 137.
    \138\Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson to Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H. 
Comm. on Oversight & Reform, & Devin Nunes, Ranking Member, H. Perm. 
Sel. Comm. on Intelligence 3 (Nov. 18, 2019).
    \139\Roman Olearchyk, Volodymyr Zelensky hires oligarch's lawyer as 
chief of staff, Financial Times, May 22, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, Dr. Hill explained that the NSC had a concern 
about President Zelensky's relationship with Kolomoisky, an 
oligarch who had owned the television station on which 
Zelensky's comedy show aired.\140\ Under the Poroshenko regime, 
the Ukrainian government had accused Kolomoisky of embezzling 
from PrivatBank, which he co-owned, causing Kolomoisky to flee 
Ukraine.\141\ According to Ambassador Volker, ``the Ukrainian 
taxpayer officially is bailing out the bank for the money that 
Kolomoisky stole. Because the IMF provides budgetary support to 
Ukraine, we [the U.S. taxpayers] actually ended up bailing out 
this bank.''\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 76-77.
    \141\Andrew E. Kramer, Oligarch's return raises alarm in Ukraine, 
N.Y. Times, May 16, 2019.
    \142\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Taylor testified that he discussed these 
concerns about Kolomoisky directly with President Zelensky:

          [T]he influence of one particular oligarch over Mr. 
        Zelensky is of particular concern, and that's this 
        fellow Kolomoisky, so--and Kolomoisky has growing 
        influence. And this is one of the concerns that I have 
        expressed to President Zelensky and his team on several 
        occasions very explicitly, saying that, you know, Mr. 
        President, Kolomoisky was not elected. You were elected 
        and he, Mr. Kolomoisky, is increasing his influence in 
        your government, which could cause you to fail. So I've 
        had that conversation with him a couple of times.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \143\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 86.

    Kolomoisky returned to Ukraine following President 
Zelensky's victory.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\Kramer, supra note 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. President Trump extended an invitation to the White House to 
        President Zelensky on three occasions without conditions.

    The evidence demonstrates that President Trump had a deep 
skepticism of Ukraine based on its history of pervasive 
corruption. This inherent skepticism, coupled with certain 
Ukrainian government officials' criticism of candidate Trump 
during the 2016 campaign and President Zelensky's untested 
views, contributed to President Trump's reticence to meet with 
President Zelensky. In spring and summer 2019, however, the 
President extended an invitation to the White House to 
President Zelensky on three occasions without any conditions.
    On April 21, 2019, President Trump placed a brief 
congratulatory call to President-elect Zelensky.\145\ President 
Trump said: ``When you're settled in and ready, I'd like to 
invite you to the White House.''\146\ The presidents did not 
discuss any investigations, and President Trump placed no 
conditions on his invitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \145\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 10.
    \146\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On May 23, President Trump met with Ambassador Volker, 
Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, and Senator Johnson--the 
senior U.S. officials who had comprised the official U.S. 
delegation to President Zelensky's inauguration days before. 
The delegation sought to convey to President Trump a positive 
impression of President Zelensky.\147\ According to Ambassador 
Volker:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \147\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 320.

          President Trump demonstrated that he had a very 
        deeply rooted negative view of Ukraine based on past 
        corruption. And that's a reasonable position. Most 
        people who would know anything about Ukraine would 
        think that. That's why it was important that we wanted 
        to brief him, because we were saying, it's different, 
        this guy is different. But the President had a very 
        deeply rooted negative view. We urged that he invite 
        President Zelensky to meet with him at the White House. 
        He was skeptical of that. We persisted. And he finally 
        agreed, okay, I'll do it.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \148\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 30-31.

    Later in his transcribed interview, Ambassador Volker 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
provided more context for the May 23 discussion:

          What I heard from President Trump in the meeting in 
        the oval office was blanket, like, ``this--these are 
        terrible people, this is a corrupt country,'' you know, 
        ``I don't believe it.'' I made the argument that 
        President Zelensky is the real deal, he is going to try 
        to fix things, and, you know, he just did not believe 
        it. He waved it off. So there's a general issue there.
          He did not mention investigations to me in that 
        meeting, or call for investigations. I was not aware 
        that he did so in the July 25th call later. His 
        attitude towards Ukraine was just general and 
        negative.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \149\Id. at 280.

    Ambassador Sondland similarly testified that President 
Trump expressed negative views about Ukraine in this meeting 
and mentioned how ``they tried to take me down'' in 2016.\150\ 
Although Ambassador Sondland said he was discouraged by the 
President's viewpoint, he was pleased and surprised that the 
President later agreed to invite President Zelensky to the 
White House.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \150\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 74-75.
    \151\Id. at 74, 81, 85-87.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Johnson recalled that in this meeting, President 
Trump ``expressed strong reservations about support for 
Ukraine. He made it crystal clear that he viewed Ukraine as a 
thoroughly corrupt country both generally and, specifically, 
regarding rumored meddling in the 2016 election.''\152\ Senator 
Johnson further explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson, supra note 138, at 4.

          It was obvious that [the President's] viewpoint and 
        reservations were strongly held, and that we would have 
        a significant sales job ahead of us in getting him to 
        change his mind. I specifically asked him to keep his 
        viewpoint and reservations private and not to express 
        them publicly until he had a chance to meet [President] 
        Zelensky. He agreed to do so, but he added that he 
        wanted [President] Zelensky to know exactly how he felt 
        about the corruption in Ukraine prior to any future 
        meeting.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\Id.

    Senator Johnson recounted that he did not recall President 
Trump mentioning Burisma or the Bidens, but it was ``obvious'' 
that President Trump was aware of ``rumors that corrupt actors 
in Ukraine might have played a part in helping create the false 
Russia collusion narrative.''\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \154\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On May 29, President Trump wrote to President Zelensky to 
invite him to Washington, D.C. ``as soon as we can find a 
mutually convenient time.''\155\ President Trump's letter did 
not mention any investigations and placed no conditions on 
President Zelensky's invitation to the White House. On July 25, 
during their phone conversation, President Trump reiterated his 
invitation to President Zelensky, again without 
conditions.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \155\Letter from President Donald J. Trump to His Excellency 
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine (May 29, 2019). Dr. Hill 
testified that Ambassador Sondland claimed he had dictated the 
paragraph inviting President Zelensky to the White House, see Hill 
deposition, supra note 12, at 74; however, Ambassador Sondland 
testified that he had no role in drafting the letter. Sondland 
deposition, supra note 51, at 81.
    \156\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Despite difficulty scheduling a face-to-face presidential meeting, 
        senior Ukrainian officials interacted often with senior 
        American officials between May and September 2019.

    By late May 2019, President Trump had formally extended an 
invitation for President Zelensky to visit the White House. 
Although the two presidents did not meet face-to-face until 
September 25, the Democrats' witnesses testified that 
presidential meetings can often take time to schedule and that 
senior Ukrainian officials met frequently with American 
counterparts in the interim.\157\ Ambassador Volker explained 
that the new Zelensky regime was ``actually feeling pretty good 
by then'' about its relationship with the Trump 
Administration.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 231; Volker transcribed 
interview, supra note 60, at 127.
    \158\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 4, President Zelensky attended an Independence Day 
dinner at the U.S. mission to the E.U. hosted by Ambassador 
Sondland and also attended by White House Senior Advisor Jared 
Kushner.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \159\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 26-27, 148-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 3, while in Toronto, Canada, for the Ukraine Reform 
Conference, President Zelensky met with Ambassador Volker and 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 241; Volker transcribed 
interview, supra note 60, at 137.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 9, Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-Secretary of the 
National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and Andrey 
Yermak, a senior adviser to President Zelensky, met with LTG 
Keith Kellogg, Vice President Pence's National Security 
Advisor; Jennifer Williams, a special advisor covering European 
issues for Vice President Pence; and NSC staff member LTC 
Alexander Vindman.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \161\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 51-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 10, Danylyuk and Yermak met at the White House with 
National Security Advisor John Bolton, Secretary Perry, 
Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Dr. Hill, and LTC 
Vindman.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \162\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 66-67; Hill 
deposition, supra note 12, at 62-63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 25, President Trump and President Zelensky spoke by 
telephone.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 26, President Zelensky met with Ambassador Volker, 
Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Taylor in Kyiv.\164\ 
Ambassador Volker testified that the meeting was scheduled 
before the presidents' phone call.\165\ He said President 
Zelensky was ``pleased that the call had taken place. . . . 
They thought it went well. And they were encouraged again 
because the President had asked them to pick dates for coming 
to the White House.''\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \164\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 312-33; 
Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 29.
    \165\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 102.
    \166\Id. at 313.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 27, President Zelensky met with National Security 
Advisor Bolton in Kyiv.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 229-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 1, President Zelensky met with Vice President 
Pence in Warsaw, Poland, after an event commemorating the 80th 
anniversary of the beginning of World War II.\168\ President 
Trump had been scheduled to attend but was forced to cancel due 
to Hurricane Dorian.\169\ According to Ambassador Taylor's 
testimony, Vice President Pence reiterated President Trump's 
views for ``Europeans to do more to support Ukraine and that he 
wanted the Ukrainians to do more to fight corruption.''\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \168\The White House, Readout of Vice President Mike Pence's 
Meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Sept. 1, 2019); 
Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 34-35.
    \169\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 130; Taylor 
deposition, supra note 47, at 35.
    \170\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 17, Secretary of State Pompeo had a telephone 
conversation with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym 
Prystaiko.\171\ According to a readout from the U.S. Embassy in 
Kyiv, Secretary Pompeo ``affirmed U.S. support for Ukraine as 
it advances critical reforms to tackle corruption, strengthen 
the rule of law, and foster an economic environment that 
promotes competition and investment. The Secretary expressed 
unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.''\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \171\U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, Secretary Michael R. Pompeo's Call 
with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Vadym Prystayko (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://ua.usembassy.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeos-call-with-
ukrainian-foreign-minister-vadym-prystayko/.
    \172\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 18, President Zelensky and Vice President 
Pence spoke by telephone.\173\ The two discussed President 
Zelensky's upcoming meeting with President Trump on the margins 
of the U.N. General Assembly and Ukraine's effort to address 
its corruption challenges.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \173\The White House, Readout of Vice President Mike Pence's Phone 
Call with President of Ukraine (Sept. 18, 2019).
    \174\Id.; see also Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 
317-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. The evidence does not establish a linkage between a White House 
        meeting and Ukrainian investigations into President Trump's 
        political rival.

    The evidence in the Democrats' impeachment inquiry does not 
show that a White House meeting was conditioned on Ukraine's 
willingness to investigate President Trump's political rival. 
Although the anonymous whistleblower, citing ``multiple'' 
secondhand sources, alleged that President Trump sought to 
withhold a meeting to pressure President Zelensky to ``play 
ball,''\175\ publicly available information contradicts the 
whistleblower's claim. For example, Andrey Yermak, a senior 
adviser to President Zelensky, admitted in an August 2019 New 
York Times article that he discussed with Mayor Giuliani both 
meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky and 
investigations.\176\ The Times reported, however, that Yermak 
and Mayor Giuliani ``did not discuss a link between the 
two.''\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \175\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 7.
    \176\Kenneth P. Vogel & Andrew E. Kramer, Giuliani renews push for 
Ukraine to investigate Trump's political opponents, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
21, 2019.
    \177\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other firsthand testimony obtained during the impeachment 
inquiry supports this finding. For example, Ambassador Volker, 
the key interlocutor with the Ukrainian government, clearly 
testified that there was no ``linkage'' between a White House 
meeting and Ukrainian actions to investigate President Trump's 
political rival. He explained:

          Q. Did the President ever withhold a meeting with 
        President Zelensky until the Ukrainians committed to 
        investigating those allegations?
          A.We had a difficult time scheduling a bilateral 
        meeting between President Zelensky and President Trump.
          Q. Ambassador Volker, that was a yes-or-no question.
          A.Well, if I--can you repeat the question then?
          Q. Sure. Did President Trump ever withhold a meeting 
        with President Zelensky or delay a meeting with 
        President Zelensky until the Ukrainians committed to 
        investigate the allegations that you just described 
        concerning the 2016 Presidential election?
          A. The answer to the question is no, if you want a 
        yes-or-no answer. But the reason the answer is no is we 
        did have difficulty scheduling a meeting, but there was 
        no linkage like that.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \178\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 35-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 * * *

          Q. So before we move to the text messages, I want to 
        ask you a clarifying question. You said that you were 
        not aware of any linkage between the delay in the Oval 
        Office meeting between President Trump and President 
        Zelensky and the Ukrainian commitment to investigate 
        the two allegations as you described them, correct?
          A. Correct.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \179\Id. at 40.

    Ambassador Sondland was the only witness to allege a quid 
pro quo with respect to a White House meeting. However, to the 
extent that Ambassador Sondland testified that he believed a 
White House meeting was conditioned on Ukrainian actions, his 
belief was that a meeting was conditioned on a public statement 
about anti-corruption--not on investigations into President 
Trump's political rival.\180\ Ambassador Sondland testified in 
his closed-door deposition that ``nothing about the request 
raised any red flags for me, Ambassador Volker, or Ambassador 
Taylor.''\181\ In his public testimony, Ambassador Sondland 
clarified that he believed there was linkage, but that 
President Trump had never discussed with him any preconditions 
for a White House visit by President Zelensky.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \180\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 30, 331.
    \181\Id. at 30.
    \182\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note 
56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, there is conflicting testimony about what 
occurred during a July 10 meeting between two senior Ukrainian 
officials and senior U.S. officials in National Security 
Advisor John Bolton's office. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
Sondland, Secretary Perry joined Ambassador Bolton to meet with 
Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-Secretary of Ukraine's National 
Security and Defense Council, and Andrey Yermak, an adviser to 
President Zelensky.\183\ Dr. Hill and LTC Vindman from the NSC 
staff attended as well.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \183\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 27; Volker transcribed 
interview, supra note 60, at 50-51.
    \184\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 63; Vindman deposition, 
supra note 12, at 17-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dr. Hill and LTC Vindman alleged that during the meeting, 
Ambassador Sondland raised potential Ukrainian actions on 
investigations, leading Ambassador Bolton to abruptly end the 
meeting.\185\ Dr. Hill recounted that Ambassador Bolton told 
her to brief the NSC Legal Advisor, John Eisenberg, and said he 
would not be a part of what he termed a ``drug deal.''\186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \185\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 67; Vindman deposition, 
supra note 12, at 17.
    \186\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 70-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Dr. Hill testified that she confronted Ambassador 
Sondland over his discussion of investigations,\187\ Ambassador 
Sondland testified in his closed-door deposition that ``neither 
Ambassador Bolton, Dr. Hill, or anyone else on the NSC staff 
ever expressed any concerns to me about our efforts . . . or, 
most importantly, any concerns that we were acting 
improperly.''\188\ Ambassador Sondland testified in his 
deposition that he recalled no ``unpleasant conversation'' with 
Dr. Hill.\189\ Likewise, although Ambassador Volker assessed 
that the meeting was ``not good,'' he said it was because 
Danylyuk poorly conveyed the appropriate top-level message to 
Ambassador Bolton during the meeting.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \187\Id. at 68-71. Dr. Hill testified that she also had a ``blow 
up'' with Ambassador Sondland in June about Ukraine, saying that 
Ambassador Sondland got ``testy.'' Id. at 113.
    \188\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 28.
    \189\Id. at 114.
    \190\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker acknowledged 
that Ambassador Sondland made a ``general comment about 
investigations,'' but he disputed that the July 10 meeting 
ended abruptly.\191\ He also testified that preconditions were 
not discussed during the meeting.\192\ Although Ambassador 
Sondland denied in his closed-door depositions that he raised 
investigations during July 10 meeting,\193\ he acknowledged 
that he did in his public testimony.\194\ Even still, 
Ambassador Sondland denied that the July 10 meeting ended 
abruptly: ``I don't recall any abrupt ending of the meeting or 
people storming out or anything like that. That would have been 
very memorable if someone had stormed out of a meeting, based 
on something I said.''\195\ He explained that Dr. Hill never 
raised concerns to him, and that any discussion of 
investigations did not mention specific investigations.\196\ He 
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.
    \192\Id.
    \193\Id. at 109-10.
    \194\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note 
56.
    \195\Id.
    \196\Id.

          Q. And, in fact, after the meeting, you went out and 
        you took a picture, right?
          A. Yeah. We--Ambassador Bolton--or his assistant 
        indicated that he was out of time, that he needed--he 
        had another meeting to attend. And we all walked out of 
        the White House. Everyone was smiling, everyone was 
        happy, and we took a picture on the lawn on a nice 
        sunny day.
          Q. Okay. Then did you retire to the Ward Room?
          A. I think Secretary Perry asked to use the Ward Room 
        to continue the conversation. And the real subject that 
        was under debate--and it wasn't an angry debate, it was 
        a debate--should the call from President Trump to 
        President Zelensky be made prior to the parliamentary 
        elections in Ukraine or after the parliamentary 
        elections? And there was good reason for both. We 
        felt--Ambassador Perry, Ambassador Volker, and I 
        thought it would help President Zelensky to have 
        President Trump speak to him prior to the parliamentary 
        elections, because it would give President Zelensky 
        more credibility, and ultimately he would do better 
        with his people in the parliamentary elections. Others, 
        I believe, pushed back and said, no, it's not 
        appropriate to do it before. It should be done after. 
        And ultimately, it was done after.
          Q. Okay. There was no mention of Vice President Biden 
        in the Ward Room?
          A. Not that I remember, no.
          Q. Or any specific investigation?
          A. Just the generic investigations.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \197\Id.

    Contemporaneous evidence contradicts the idea that there 
was serious discord during the meeting. Following the meeting, 
Ambassador Bolton retweeted a statement from Secretary Perry 
about the July 10 meeting, writing it was a ``great discussion 
. . . on U.S. support for Ukrainian reforms and the peaceful 
restoration of Ukrainian territory.''\198\ The picture in the 
tweet of the U.S. and Ukrainian officials--taken immediately 
after the meeting in Ambassador Bolton's office\199\--shows 
smiling faces and no indication of hostility or discord between 
Ambassador Bolton and Ambassador Sondland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \198\John Bolton (@AmbJohnBolton), Twitter (July 10, 2019, 4:39 
p.m.), https://twitter.com/AmbJohnBolton/status/1149100798632026112.
    \199\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 110.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Figure 1: Ambassador Bolton tweet following July 10 meeting





  Figure 2: Picture of smiling U.S. and Ukrainian officials following 
                            July 10 meeting



8. The evidence does not establish that President Trump directed Vice 
        President Pence not to attend President Zelensky's inauguration 
        to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President's political 
        rival.

    The evidence also does not establish that President Trump 
directed Vice President Pence not to attend President 
Zelensky's inauguration as a means of pressuring Ukraine to 
investigate the President's political rival. During their 
initial April 21 phone call, President Trump told President 
Zelensky that a ``great'' representative of the U.S. would 
attend the Zelensky inauguration.\200\ The anonymous 
whistleblower alleged that President Trump later ``instructed 
Vice President Pence to cancel his planned travel to Ukraine to 
attend President Zelensky's inauguration. . . . [I]t was also 
`made clear' to them that the President did not want to meet 
with Mr. Zelensky until he saw how Zelensky `chose to act' in 
office.''\201\ The evidence in the Democrats' impeachment 
inquiry does not support this assertion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \200\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 10.
    \201\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at app. 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Jennifer Williams, a special adviser in the Office 
of the Vice President, testified in her closed-door deposition 
that a colleague told her that President Trump directed Vice 
President Pence not to attend the inauguration,\202\ she had no 
firsthand knowledge of any such direction or the reasons given 
for any such direction.\203\ Williams explained that the Office 
of the Vice President provided three dates--May 30, May 31 and 
June 1--during which Vice President Pence would be available to 
attend the inauguration.\204\ Williams explained that ``if it 
wasn't one of those dates it would be very difficult or 
impossible'' for Vice President Pence to attend.\205\ Neither 
the Secret Service nor advance teams deployed to Ukraine to 
prepare for Vice President Pence's travel.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \202\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 37.
    \203\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer 
Williams, supra note 6.
    \204\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 58; Impeachment 
Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6.
    \205\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 58.
    \206\Id. at 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During this same period, Vice Present Pence was planning 
travel to Ottawa, Canada, on May 30 to promote the U.S.-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (USMCA).\207\ Williams acknowledged in her 
public testimony that the Office of the Vice President had 
``competing trips . . . for the same window.''\208\ Williams 
elaborated that due to international travel by President Trump 
and Vice President Pence, there was a ``narrow window'' within 
which Vice President Pence was able to attend President 
Zelensky's inauguration.\209\ Dr. Hill explained that the 
President and Vice President cannot travel internationally at 
the same time, testifying that Vice President Pence's 
attendance at President Zelensky's inauguration was just 
dependent on scheduling and she had no knowledge that the Vice 
President was directed not to attend the inauguration.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \207\See The White House, Joint Statement by Vice President Mike 
Pence and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (May 30, 2019).
    \208\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer 
Williams, supra note 6.
    \209\Id.
    \210\``Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes'': 
Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 
(2019); Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 185 (``It depended on the 
date. I mean, we were hoping, you know, if others couldn't attend that 
[Vice President Pence] could. I mean, I myself couldn't attend because 
of the date, that the way that it--again, there were several different 
dates, and then the date that was announced in May was very quickly 
announced.''); id. at 316 (``And it was going to be very tight for the 
Vice President to make it for the inauguration. So I, you know, have no 
knowledge that he was actually ordered not to go, but it was going to 
be very difficult for him to go.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ultimately, on May 16, the Ukrainian Parliament scheduled 
President Zelensky's inauguration for only four days later, May 
20, which was a date not offered by the Vice President's 
Office.\211\ Williams testified that this scheduling posed a 
problem: ``To be honest, we hadn't looked that closely at the 
Vice President's schedule before the President's trip [to 
Japan] at the end of May just because we weren't expecting the 
Ukrainians to look at that timeframe.''\212\ Kent explained 
that this short notice sent the State Department 
``scrambl[ing]'' to find a U.S. official to lead the 
delegation.\213\ Secretary Pompeo was traveling, so the 
decision was made to ask Secretary Perry to lead the 
delegation.\214\ On May 20, the day of President Zelensky's 
inauguration, Vice President Pence attended an event in 
Jacksonville, Florida, to promote the USMCA.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \211\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 189.
    \212\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 60.
    \213\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 190.
    \214\Id. at 190-91.
    \215\The White House, Remarks by Vice President Pence at America 
First Policies Event USMCA: A Better Deal for American Worker (May 20, 
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. President Trump and President Zelensky met during the United Nations 
        General Assembly in September 2019 without any Ukrainian action 
        to investigate President Trump's political rival.

    On September 25, President Trump and President Zelensky met 
during the U.N. General Assembly in New York.\216\ Ambassador 
Volker said that President Trump and President Zelensky had a 
``positive'' meeting. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \216\Remarks by President Trump and President Zelensky of Ukraine 
Before Bilateral Meeting, supra note 40.

          Q. Turning back to President Trump's skepticism of 
        Ukraine and the corruption there, do you think you made 
        any inroads in convincing him that Zelensky was a good 
        partner?
          A. I do. I do. I attended the President's meeting 
        with President Zelensky in New York on, I guess it was 
        the 25th of September. And I could see the body 
        language and the chemistry between them was positive, 
        and I felt that this is what we needed all along.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \217\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 87-88.

    Ambassador Taylor testified that the meeting was ``good'' 
and President Trump ``left pleased that they had finally met 
face to face.''\218\ Ambassador Taylor said there was no 
discussion about investigations during the September 25 
meeting.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \218\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 288.
    \219\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notably, President Trump and President Zelensky met in New 
York without Ukraine ever investigating President Trump's 
political rival.

                                 * * *

    The evidence presented in the impeachment inquiry does not 
support the Democrats' assertion that President Trump sought to 
withhold a White House meeting to pressure the Ukrainian 
government to investigate the President's political rival. 
President Trump and President Zelensky met in September 2019 
without Ukraine ever investigating Vice President Biden or 
Hunter Biden.
    Contrary to the assertions in the anonymous whistleblower 
complaint, the evidence shows that President Trump has a 
genuine, deep-seated, and reasonable skepticism of Ukraine 
given its history of pervasive corruption. In addition, U.S. 
foreign policy officials were divided on whether President 
Trump should meet with President Zelensky, in part due to 
President Zelensky's close association with an oligarch accused 
of embezzlement. In May 2019, President Trump formally invited 
President Zelensky to the White House. For several months, 
there were attempts to arrange a meeting between President 
Trump and President Zelensky. Although President Trump 
indicated during their July 25 call that they may meet in 
Warsaw in September, Hurricane Dorian forced President Trump to 
cancel. Vice President Pence met with President Zelensky 
instead. President Trump and President Zelensky ultimately met 
without Ukraine ever investigating any of President Trump's 
political rival.

C. The evidence does not establish that President Trump withheld U.S. 
        security assistance to Ukraine to pressure Ukraine to 
        investigate the President's political rival for the purpose of 
        benefiting him in the 2020 election.

    Democrats allege that President Trump conspired to withhold 
U.S. security assistance to Ukraine as a way of pressuring 
Ukraine to investigate President Trump's political rival.\220\ 
Here, too, the evidence obtained during the impeachment inquiry 
does not support this allegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \220\See, e.g., Rishika Dugyala, Democratic Senator: `No doubt' 
Ukraine `felt pressure', Politico (Oct. 27, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The evidence suggests a far less nefarious reality. Just as 
President Trump holds a deep-seated skepticism about Ukraine, 
the President is highly skeptical of foreign assistance. Any 
examination of the President's actions must consider this 
factor. President Trump has been vocal about his view that U.S. 
allies in Europe should contribute a fair share for regional 
security. As Ukrainian government officials worked with U.S. 
officials to convince President Trump that President Zelensky 
was serious about reform and worthy of U.S. assistance, they 
discussed a public statement conveying that commitment. 
Although the security assistance was paused in July, it is not 
unusual for U.S. foreign assistance to become delayed. 
Assistance to Ukraine has been delayed before. Most telling, 
the Trump Administration has been stronger than the Obama 
Administration in providing Ukraine with lethal defensive arms 
to deter Russian aggression.
    The Democrats' witnesses testified that U.S. security 
assistance to Ukraine was not conditioned on Ukrainian action 
on investigations. U.S. officials did not raise the issue of 
the delay in security assistance with Ukrainian officials 
because they viewed it as a bureaucratic issue that would be 
resolved. The Ukrainian government in Kyiv was not even aware 
that the aid was paused until it was reported publicly, only 
two weeks before the aid was released, as senior U.S. officials 
confidently predicted it would be. Ultimately, the U.S. 
disbursed security assistance to Ukraine without Ukraine ever 
investigating Vice Present Biden or his son, Hunter Biden.

1. President Trump has been skeptical about U.S. taxpayer-funded 
        foreign assistance.

    Evidence suggests that President Trump is generally 
skeptical of U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. President 
Trump's skepticism of U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign assistance 
is long-standing. On June 16, 2015, when President Trump 
announced his candidacy for president, he said:

          It is time to stop sending jobs overseas through bad 
        foreign trade deals. We will renegotiate our trade 
        deals with the toughest negotiators our country has . . 
        . the ones who have actually read ``The Art of the 
        Deal'' and know how to make great deals for our 
        country.
          It is time to close loopholes for Wall Street and 
        create far more opportunities for small businesses.
          It is necessary that we invest in our infrastructure, 
        stop sending foreign aid to countries that hate us and 
        use that money to rebuild our tunnels, roads, bridges 
        and schools and nobody can do that better than me.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \221\Donald Trump, Announcement of Candidacy for President of the 
United States, in New York, N.Y. (June 16, 2015) (emphasis added).

    During the 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Trump 
continued to express his skepticism of U.S. taxpayer-funded 
foreign aid. In March 2016, he told the Washington Post, ``I do 
think it's a different world today and I don't think we should 
be nation building anymore. I think it's proven not to work. 
And we have a different country than we did then. You know we 
have 19 trillion dollars in debt. . . . And I just think we 
have to rebuild our country.''\222\ That same month, then-
candidate Trump told the New York Times, ``We're going to be 
friendly with everybody, but we're not going to be taken 
advantage of by anybody. . . . I think we'll be very worldview 
[sic], but we're not going to be ripped off anymore by all of 
these countries.''\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \222\A transcript of Donald Trump's meeting with the Washington 
Post editorial board, Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 2016.
    \223\Maggie Haberman & David Sanger, Transcript: Donald Trump 
Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As president, President Trump has sought to reduce U.S. 
taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. In his fiscal year 2018 
budget proposal, the President proposed ``to reduce or end 
direct funding for international programs and organizations 
whose missions do not substantially advance U.S. foreign policy 
interests. The Budget also renews attention on the appropriate 
U.S. share of international spending . . . for many other 
global issues where the United States currently pays more than 
its fair share.''\224\ The President's 2020 budget proposal 
submitted in March 2019 likewise ``supports America's reliable 
allies, but reflects a new approach toward countries that have 
taken unfair advantage of the United States' generosity.''\225\ 
The President's Budget specifically sought ``greater 
accountability by international partners along with donor 
burden sharing that is more balanced.''\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \224\Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2018 at 13 (May 23, 
2017).
    \225\Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2020 at 71 (Mar. 11, 
2019).
    \226\Id. at 73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Testimony from the Democrats' witnesses reinforces the 
President's skepticism of foreign assistance. Ambassador 
Taylor, U.S. charge a.i. in Kyiv, testified that on August 22, 
2019, he had a phone conversation with NSC Senior Director for 
Europe Tim Morrison in which Morrison said that the ``President 
doesn't want to provide any assistance at all.''\227\ Morrison 
testified that President Trump generally does not like giving 
foreign aid to other countries and believes U.S. ``ought not'' 
to be the only country providing security assistance.\228\ LTC 
Vindman, the NSC director handling Ukraine policy, similarly 
testified that President Trump is skeptical of foreign 
aid.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \227\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 33.
    \228\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 78-79, 132.
    \229\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer 
Williams, supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, evidence suggests that President Trump sought to 
review U.S. taxpayer-funded foreign assistance across the 
board. Ambassador David Hale, the Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, testified that the Trump Administration was 
undertaking a ``review'' of foreign assistance globally.\230\ 
He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \230\Deposition of Ambassador David Hale, in Wash., D.C., at 80 
(Nov. 6, 2019) [hereinafter ``Hale deposition''].

          Q. You mentioned that there was a foreign assistance 
        review undergoing--
          A. Yes.
          Q. --at that time. What can you tell us about that?
          A. Well, it had been going on for quite a while, and 
        the concept, you know, the administration did not want 
        to take a, sort of, business-as-usual approach to 
        foreign assistance, a feeling that once a country has 
        received a certain assistance package, it's a--it's 
        something that continues forever. It's very difficult 
        to end those programs and to make sure that we have a 
        very rigorous measure of why we are providing the 
        assistance.

    We didn't go to zero base, but almost a zero-based concept 
that each assistance program and each country that receives the 
program had to be evaluated that they were actually worthy 
beneficiaries of our assistance; that the program made sense; 
that we have embarked on, you know, calling everything that we 
do around the world countering violent extremism, but, rather, 
that's actually focused on tangible and proven means to deal 
with extremist problems; that we avoid nation-building 
strategies; and that we not provide assistance to countries 
that are lost to us in terms of policy, to our adversaries.

          Q. And do you know if the President also had concerns 
        about whether the allies of Ukraine, in this example, 
        were contributing their fair share?
          A. That's another factor in the foreign affairs 
        review is appropriate burden sharing. But it was not, 
        in the deputies committee meeting, OMB [the U.S. Office 
        of Management and Budget] did not really explain why 
        they were taking the position other than they had been 
        directed to do so.
          Q. Okay. You are aware of the President's skeptical 
        views on foreign assistance? Right?
          A. Absolutely.
          Q. And that's a genuinely held belief, correct?
          A. It is what guided the foreign affairs review.
          Q. Okay. It's not just related to Ukraine?
          A. Absolutely not. It's global in nature.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \231\Id. at 81-83.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. President Trump has been clear and consistent in his view that 
        Europe should pay its fair share for regional defense.

    Since his 2016 presidential campaign, President Trump has 
emphasized his view that U.S. foreign assistance should be 
spent wisely and cautiously. As President, he has continued to 
be critical of sending U.S. taxpayer dollars to foreign 
countries and asked our allies to share the financial burden 
for international stewardship.
    In a March 2016 interview with the New York Times, then-
candidate Trump said: ``Now, I'm a person that you notice I 
talk about economics quite a bit [in foreign policy] because it 
is about economics, because we don't have money anymore because 
we've been taking care of so many people in so many different 
forms that we don't have money.''\232\ Then-candidate Trump 
elaborated about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
a collective defense alliance between the U.S., Canada, and 
European countries:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \232\Haberman & Sanger, supra note 223.

          I mean, we defend everybody. (Laughs.) We defend 
        everybody. No matter who it is, we defend everybody. 
        We're defending the world. But we owe, soon, it's soon 
        to be $21 trillion. You know, it's 19 now but it's soon 
        to be $21 trillion. But we defend everybody. When in 
        doubt, come to the United States. We'll defend you. In 
        some cases free of charge. And in all cases for a 
        substantially, you know, greater amount. We spend a 
        substantially greater amount than what the people are 
        paying.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \233\Id.

    That same month, candidate Trump spoke to CBS News about 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. spending to NATO. He said then:

          NATO was set up when we were a richer country. We're 
        not a rich country anymore. We're borrowing, we're 
        borrowing all of this money . . . NATO is costing us a 
        fortune and yes, we're protecting Europe with NATO but 
        we're spending a lot of money. Number one, I think the 
        distribution of costs has to be changed.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \234\Shayna Freisleben, A Guide to Trump's Past Comments about 
NATO, CBS News, (Apr. 12, 2017).

    As president, President Trump has continued to press 
European allies to contribute more NATO defense. For example, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in a tweet on July 9, 2018, President Trump wrote:

          The United States is spending far more on NATO than 
        any other Country. This is not fair, nor is it 
        acceptable. While these countries have been increasing 
        their contributions since I took office, they must do 
        much more. Germany is at 1%, the U.S. is at 4%, and 
        NATO benefits. . . .\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \235\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jul. 9, 2018, 
7:55 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1016289620596789248.

    Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary-General, acknowledged 
in an interview that President Trump's message has ``helped'' 
NATO member countries to increase defense spending, commending 
the President on ``his strong message on burden sharing.''\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \236\David Greene, After Trump's NATO Criticism, Countries Spend 
More on Defense, NPR.org, (May 18, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NSC Senior Director Tim Morrison explained the President's 
specific views about burden sharing regarding Ukraine during 
his public testimony. He testified:

          Q. And the President was also interested, was he not, 
        in better understanding opportunities for increased 
        burden sharing among the Europeans?
          A. Yes.
          Q. And what can you tell us about that?
          A. The President was concerned that the United States 
        seemed to--to bear the exclusive brunt of security 
        assistance to Ukraine. He wanted to see the Europeans 
        step up and contribute more security assistance.
          Q. And was there any interagency activity, whether it 
        be with the State Department for or the Defense 
        Department, in coordination by the National Security 
        Council, to look into that a little bit for the 
        President?
          A. We were surveying the data to understand who was 
        contributing what and sort of in what categories.
          Q. And so the President's evinced concerns, the 
        interagency tried to address them?
          A. Yes.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \237\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.

    In his public testimony, LTC Vindman confirmed the 
President's concerns about U.S. allies sharing the burden for 
mutual defense.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \238\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer 
Williams, supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. U.S. foreign aid is often conditioned or paused, and U.S. security 
        assistance to Ukraine has been paused before.

    U.S. taxpayer-funded assistance to foreign governments is 
not an entitlement. The United States often conditions foreign 
aid on actions by recipient nations. In addition, foreign aid 
can, and often does, get delayed for various reasons. The pause 
of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine in this case is 
therefore not presumptive evidence of misconduct.
    The United States conditions foreign assistance to a number 
of nations as a result of concerns about corruption, human 
rights abuses, or other issues. On October 31, 2019, the Trump 
Administration announced that it would withhold $105 million in 
security assistance for Lebanon shortly after the resignation 
of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri.\239\ In September 
2019, the State Department announced that it was withholding 
$160 million in aid from Afghanistan, citing corruption.\240\ 
In June 2019, the Administration told Congress that it would 
reallocate $370 million in aid to Central American nations and 
suspend an additional $180 million in an effort to incentivize 
those countries to reduce the number of migrants reaching the 
U.S. border.\241\ In 2017, President Trump froze $195 million 
in security assistance to Egypt one of the largest recipients 
of U.S. aid due to frustration with the country's poor track 
record on human rights and a recently enacted law regarding 
nongovernmental organizations.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \239\Patricia Zengerle & Mike Stone, Exclusive: U.S. withholding 
$105 million in security aid for Lebanon- sources, Reuters, Oct. 31, 
2019.
    \240\Tal Axelrod, US withholds $160M in Afghan aid citing 
corruption, The Hill, Sept. 9, 2019.
    \241\Lesley Wroughton & Patricia Zengerle, As promised, Trump 
slashes aid to Central America over migrants, Reuters, Jun. 17, 2019.
    \242\Gardiner Harris & Declan Walsh, U.S. Slaps Egypt on Human 
Rights Record and Ties to North Korea, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Democrats' witnesses explained that it is not unusual 
for foreign aid to be paused or even withheld. Ambassador 
Taylor testified that U.S. aid to foreign countries can be 
paused in various instances, such as a Congressional hold.\243\ 
Ambassador Volker testified that foreign assistance can be 
delayed for a multitude of reasons and that ``this hold on 
security assistance [to Ukraine] was not significant.''\244\ 
Ambassador Volker elaborated during his public testimony:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \243\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 170-71.
    \244\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 78-80.

          Q. Ambassador Volker, you testified during your 
        deposition that aid, in fact, does get held up from 
        time-to-time for a whole assortment of reasons. Is that 
        your understanding?
          A. That is true.
          Q. And sometimes the holdups are rooted in something 
        at OMB, sometimes it's at the Defense Department, 
        sometimes it's at the State Department, sometimes it's 
        on the Hill. Is that correct?
          A. That is correct.
          Q. And so, when the aid was held up for 55 days for 
        Ukraine, that didn't in and of itself strike you as 
        uncommon?
          A. No. It's something that had happened in my career 
        in the past. I had seen holdups of assistance. I just 
        assumed it was part of the decision-making process. 
        Somebody had an objection, and we had to overcome 
        it.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \245\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.

    Ambassador David Hale, the Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, agreed that U.S. taxpayer-funded aid has 
been paused from several countries around the world for various 
reasons and, in some cases, for unknown reasons.\246\ 
Ambassador Hale elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \246\``Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale'': 
Hearing before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 
(2019).

          We've often heard at the State Department that the 
        President of the United States wants to make sure that 
        foreign assistance is reviewed scrupulously to make 
        sure that it's truly in U.S. national interests, and 
        that we evaluate it continuously, so that it meets 
        certain criteria that the President has 
        established.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \247\Id.

    Ambassador Hale explained that the NSC launched a review of 
U.S. foreign assistance to ensure U.S. taxpayer money was spent 
efficiently and to advance ``[t]he principle of burden sharing 
by allies and other like-minded states.''\248\ Dr. Hill, the 
NSC's Senior Director for Europe, testified that as she was 
leaving NSC in July 2019, ``there had been more scrutiny'' to 
assistance:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \248\Id.

          As I understood them, there had been a directive for 
        whole-scale review of our foreign policy, foreign 
        policy assistance, and the ties between our foreign 
        policy objectives and the assistance. This had been 
        going on actually for many months. And in the period 
        when I was wrapping up my time there, there had been 
        more scrutiny than specific assistance to specific sets 
        of countries as a result of that overall view--
        review.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \249\Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes, 
supra note 210.

    The Democrats' witnesses also described how U.S. foreign 
assistance to Ukraine has been delayed in the past. Dr. Hill 
testified that security assistance to Ukraine has been paused 
before ``at multiple junctures'' during her time at NSC, even 
with bipartisan support for the assistance.\250\ Dr. Hill 
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \250\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 304.

          Q. On the issue of the security assistance freeze, 
        had assistance for Ukraine ever been held up before 
        during your time at NSC?
          A. Yes.
          Q. For what--and when was that?
          A. At multiple junctures. You know, it gets back to 
        the question that [Republican staff] asked before. 
        There's often a question raised about assistance, you 
        know, a range of assistance--
          Q. But for Ukraine specifically?
          A. Yeah, that's correct.
          Q. Okay. Even though there's been bipartisan support 
        for the assistance?
          A. Correct.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \251\Id. at 303-04.

    Catherine Croft, a former NSC director, offered an example 
in her deposition, explaining that OMB paused the sale of 
Javelin missiles to Ukraine in November or December 2017.\252\ 
This pause, too, was eventually lifted and Ukraine received the 
missiles.\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \252\Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 67.
    \253\Id. at 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Despite President Trump's skepticism, the Trump Administration's 
        policies have shown greater commitment and support to Ukraine 
        than those of the Obama Administration.

    Several of the Democrats' witnesses testified that 
President Trump has taken a stronger stance in supporting 
Ukraine. Dr. Hill testified that President Trump's decision to 
support Ukraine with lethal defensive weapons was a more robust 
policy than under the Obama Administration.\254\ Ambassador 
Taylor characterized President Trump's policy as a 
``substantial improvement.''\255\ Ambassador Yovanovitch 
agreed, testifying:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \254\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 196.
    \255\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 155.

          And I actually felt that in the 3 years that I was 
        there, partly because of my efforts, but also the 
        interagency team, and President Trump's decision to 
        provide lethal weapons to Ukraine, that our policy 
        actually got stronger over the three last 3 years 
        [sic].\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \256\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 140-41 (emphasis 
added).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    She added:

          Q. Can you testify to the difference [to] the changes 
        in aid to Ukraine with the new administration starting 
        in 2017? The different initiatives, you know, as far as 
        providing lethal weapons and--
          A. Yeah. Well, I think that most of the assistance 
        programs that we had, you know, continued, and due to 
        the generosity of the Congress actually were increased. 
        And so that was a really positive thing, I think, for 
        Ukraine and for us. In terms of lethal assistance, we 
        all felt it was very significant that this 
        administration made the decision to provide lethal 
        weapons to Ukraine.\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \257\Id. at 144.

    Ambassador Volker also explained how President Trump's 
policies of providing lethal defensive assistance to Ukraine 
have been ``extremely helpful'' in deterring Russian aggression 
in Ukraine.\258\ He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \258\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 87.

          So there has been U.S. assistance provided to Ukraine 
        for some time, under the Bush administration, Obama 
        administration, and now under the Trump administration. 
        I was particularly interested in the security 
        assistance and lethal defensive weapons. The reason for 
        this is this was something that the Obama 
        administration did not approve. They did not want to 
        send lethal defensive arms to Ukraine.
          I fundamentally disagreed with that decision. It is 
        not my--you know, I was just a private citizen, but 
        that's my opinion. I thought that this is a country 
        that is defending itself against Russian aggression. 
        They had their military largely destroyed by Russia in 
        2014 and '15 and needed the help. And humanitarian 
        assistance is great, and nonlethal assistance, you 
        know, MREs and blankets and all, that's fine, but if 
        you're being attacked with mortars and artilleries and 
        tanks, you need to be able to fight back.
          The argument against this assistance being provided, 
        the lethal defensive assistance, was that it would be 
        provocative and could escalate the fighting with 
        Russia. I had a fundamentally different view that if we 
        did not provide it, it's an inducement to Russia to 
        keep up the aggression, and there's no deterrence of 
        Russia from trying to go further into Ukraine. So I 
        believed it was important to help them rebuild their 
        defensive capabilities and to deter Russia. It's also a 
        symbol of U.S. support.
          So I argued very strongly from the time I was 
        appointed by Secretary Tillerson that the rationale for 
        why we were not providing lethal defensive assistance 
        to me doesn't hold water and that is a much stronger 
        rationale that we should be doing it.
          That eventually became administration policy. It took 
        a while, but Secretary Tillerson, you know, he wanted 
        to think it through, see how that would play out. How 
        would the allies react to this? How would Russia react 
        to this? How would the Ukrainians handle it? And we 
        managed those issues. Secretary Mattis was very much in 
        favor. And they met. I did not meet with the President 
        about this, but they met with the President and the 
        President approved it.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \259\Id. at 84-86.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Although security assistance to Ukraine was paused in July 2019, 
        several witnesses testified that U.S. security assistance was 
        not linked to any Ukrainian action on investigations.

    Several witnesses testified that U.S. security assistance 
was not linked to or conditioned on any Ukrainian action to 
investigate President Trump's political rival. Even after U.S. 
officials learned in early-to mid-July that the security 
assistance had been paused for unknown reasons, evidence 
suggests that there was not a link between U.S. security 
assistance and Ukrainian action to investigate President 
Trump's political rival.
    LTC Vindman testified that he learned about a pause on 
security assistance on July 3.\260\ Morrison said he learned of 
the pause around July 15.\261\ According to Ambassador Taylor, 
he learned via conference call on July 18 that OMB had paused 
the security assistance to Ukraine.\262\ Ambassador Taylor 
relayed that according to the OMB representative on the call, 
the pause was done at the direction of the President and the 
chief of staff.\263\ Although a reason was not provided for the 
pause at the time, OMB official Mark Sandy testified that he 
learned in early September 2019 that the pause was related ``to 
the President's concern about other countries contributing more 
to Ukraine.''\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \260\Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 178.
    \261\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 16.
    \262\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 27.
    \263\Id. at 28.
    \264\Deposition of Mark Sandy, in Wash., D.C., at 42 (Nov. 16, 
2019). Sandy testified that in early September, OMB received ``requests 
for information on what additional countries were contributing to 
Ukraine.'' Id. at 44. OMB provided that information sometime in the 
first week of September. Id. at 82.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the pause, testimony from the Democrats' witnesses 
suggests the assistance was not linked to Ukraine investigating 
President Trump's political rival. Ambassador Volker, the key 
intermediary between the Ukrainian government and U.S. 
officials, testified that he was aware of no quid pro quo and 
that the Ukrainian government never raised concerns to him 
about a quid pro quo.\265\ He said that when Ambassador Taylor 
raised questions about the appearance of a quid pro quo, ``I 
discussed with him that there is no linkage here. I view this 
as an internal thing, and we are going to get it fixed.''\266\ 
Ambassador Volker further explained that even if Ukrainians 
perceived the aid was linked to investigations, they ``never 
raised'' that possibility with him.\267\ Ambassador Volker 
believed that given the trust he had developed with the 
Ukrainian government, the Ukrainians would have come to him 
with concerns about the security assistance.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \265\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 170, 300-01.
    \266\Id. at 130.
    \267\Id. at 284.
    \268\Id. at 300-01.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff attempted 
to get Ambassador Volker to testify in his closed-door 
deposition that the Ukrainian government would have felt 
pressure to investigate President Trump's political rival once 
they learned that the security assistance was delayed.\269\ 
Ambassador Volker refused to accept Chairman Schiff's 
conclusion. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \269\Id. at 124-28.

          Q. The request is made. And even though the 
        suspension may have occurred earlier, the request is 
        made to investigate the Bidens, and then Ukraine 
        learns, for mysterious reasons, hundreds of millions in 
        military support is being withheld. Do I have the 
        chronology correct?
          A. Yes.
          Q. At the point they learned that, wouldn't that give 
        them added urgency to meet the President's request on 
        the Bidens?
          A. I don't know the answer to that. The--
          Q. Ambassador--
          A. When that--no--
          Q. --as a career diplomat, you can't venture--
          A. But, Congressman, this is why I'm trying to the 
        say the context is different, because at the time they 
        learned that, if we assume it's August 29th, they had 
        just had a visit from the National Security Advisor, 
        John Bolton. That's a high level meeting already. He 
        was recommending and working on scheduling the visit of 
        President Zelensky to Washington. We were also working 
        on a bilateral meeting to take place in Warsaw on the 
        margins of a commemoration on the beginning of World 
        War II. And in that context, I think the Ukrainians 
        felt like things are going the right direction, and 
        they had not done anything on--they had not done 
        anything on an investigation, they had not done 
        anything on a statement, and things were ramping up in 
        terms of their engagement with the administration. So I 
        think they were actually feeling pretty good by then.
          Q. Ambassador, I find it remarkable as a career 
        diplomat that you have difficulty acknowledging that 
        when Ukraine learned that their aid had been suspended 
        for unknown reasons, that this wouldn't add additional 
        urgency to a request by the President of the United 
        States. I find that remarkable.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \270\Id. at 126-28 (question and answer with Chairman Adam Schiff).

    During his public testimony, in an exchange with Rep. Mike 
Turner, Ambassador Volker reiterated that there was no linkage 
between U.S. security assistance and investigations. He 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:

          Q. Did the President of the United States ever say to 
        you that he was not going to allow aid from the United 
        States to go to the Ukraine unless there were 
        investigations into Burisma, the Bidens, or the 2016 
        elections?
          A. No, he did not.
          Q. Did the Ukrainians ever tell you that they 
        understood that they would not get a meeting with the 
        President of the United States, a phone call with the 
        President of the United States, military aid or foreign 
        aid from the United States unless they undertook 
        investigations of Burisma, the Bidens, or the 2016 
        elections?
          A. No, they did not.
          Q. So I would assume, then, that the Ukrainians never 
        told you that [Mayor] Giuliani had told them that, in 
        order to get a meeting with the President, a phone call 
        with the President, military aid or foreign aid from 
        the United States, that they would have to do these 
        investigations.
          A. No.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \271\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.

    Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent testified in his 
closed-door deposition that he also did not ``associate'' the 
security assistance to investigations.''\272\ Kent relayed how 
Ambassador Taylor had told him that Ambassador Sondland was 
``pushing'' President Zelensky to give an interview during the 
Yalta European Strategy (YES) conference in Kyiv in mid-
September.\273\ Ambassador Taylor told Kent that the ``hope'' 
was if President Zelensky gave a public signal on 
investigations, the security assistance pause would lift; 
however, Ambassador Taylor asserted that ``both Tim Morrison 
and Gordon Sondland said that they did not believe the two 
issues were linked.''\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \272\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 323.
    \273\Id. at 269.
    \274\Id.; see also id. at 323.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During his sworn deposition, Ambassador Sondland testified 
that he could not recall ``any discussions with the White House 
about withholding U.S. security assistance from Ukraine in 
exchange for assistance with President Trump's 2020 election 
campaign.''\275\ Ambassador Sondland testified that he was 
``never'' aware of any preconditions on the delay of security 
assistance to Ukraine, or that the aid was tied to Ukraine 
undertaking any investigations.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \275\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 35.
    \276\Id. at 197.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although media reports allege that Ambassador Sondland 
later recanted this testimony to ``confirm'' a quid pro 
quo,\277\ those reports exaggerate the supplemental information 
that Ambassador Sondland later provided. In a written 
supplement to his deposition testimony, Ambassador Sondland 
asserted that by the beginning of September 2019, ``in the 
absence of any credible explanation for the suspension of aid, 
[he] presumed that the aid suspension had become linked to the 
proposed anti-corruption statement.''\278\ Ambassador Sondland 
asserted that he spoke to Yermak in Warsaw on September 1 and 
conveyed that U.S. aid would not ``likely'' flow until Ukraine 
provided an anti-corruption statement.\279\ Yermak, however, in 
an interview with Bloomberg, disputed Ambassador Sondland's 
account, saying that he ``bumped into'' Ambassador Sondland and 
``doesn't remember any reference to military aid.''\280\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \277\See, e.g., Andrew Desiderio & Kyle Cheney, Sondland reverses 
himself on Ukraine, confirming quid pro quo, Politico, Nov. 5, 2019.
    \278\Declaration of Ambassador Gordon D. Sondland at para.4 (Nov. 
4, 2019) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ``Sondland declaration''].
    \279\Id. at para.5.
    \280\Stephanie Baker & Daryna Krasnolutska, Ukraine's fraught 
summer included a rogue embassy in Washington, Bloomberg, Nov. 22, 
2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Sondland's addendum does not prove a nefarious 
quid pro quo. At most, and even discounting Yermak's subsequent 
denial, the addendum shows that as of September 1, Ambassador 
Sondland assumed there was a connection and relayed this 
assumption to Yermak--an assumption that the President would 
later tell Ambassador Sondland was inaccurate.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \281\See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During his deposition, Ambassador Taylor testified that he 
spoke by phone with Ambassador Sondland on September 8.\282\ 
Ambassador Taylor recounted how Ambassador Sondland told him 
that President Trump wanted President Zelensky to ``clear 
things up and do it in public'' but there was no ``quid pro 
quo.''\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \282\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 39.
    \283\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 9, Ambassador Sondland texted Ambassador 
Volker and Ambassador Taylor: ``The President has been crystal 
clear: no quid pro quo's [sic] of any kind. The President is 
trying to evaluate whether Ukraine is truly going to adopt the 
transparency and reforms that President Zelensky promised 
during his campaign.''\284\ When asked about this text message 
during his transcribed interview, Ambassador Volker testified 
that ``Gordon was repeating here what we all understood.''\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \284\Text message from Gordon Sondland to William Taylor and Kurt 
Volker (Sept. 9, 2019, 5:19 a.m.) [KV00000053].
    \285\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 170.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his public testimony, Ambassador Taylor clarified his 
statement from his closed-door deposition that he had ``clear 
understanding'' that Ukraine would not receive security 
assistance until President Zelensky committed to 
investigations.\286\ He explained his ``clear understanding'' 
came from Ambassador Sondland, who acknowledged that he had 
presumed there to be a linkage. In an exchange with Rep. Jim 
Jordan, Ambassador Taylor testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \286\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr. 
George Kent, supra note 2.

          Q. So what I'm wondering is, where did you get this 
        clear understanding?
          A. As I testified, Mr. Jordan, this came from 
        Ambassador Sondland.

                                 * * *

          Q. You said you got this from Ambassador Sondland.
          A. That is correct. Ambassador Sondland also said he 
        had talked to President Zelensky and Mr. Yermak and had 
        told them that, although this was not a quid pro quo, 
        if President Zelensky did not clear things up in 
        public, we would be at a stalemate. That was the--that 
        was one point.

                                 * * *

          Q. All right. So, again, just to recap, you had three 
        meetings with President Zelensky; no linkage in those 
        three meetings came up. Ambassador Zelensky didn't 
        announce that he was going [to] do any investigation of 
        the Bidens or Burisma before the aid was released. He 
        didn't--
          A. That was President--
          Q. --do a tweet, didn't do anything on CNN, didn't do 
        any of that. President Zelensky. Excuse me.
          A. Yeah. Right.
          Q. And then what you have in front of you is an 
        addendum that Mr. Sondland made to his testimony that 
        we got a couple weeks ago. It says, ``Declaration of 
        Ambassador Gordon Sondland. I, Gordon Sondland, do 
        hereby swear and affirm as follows.'' I want to you 
        look at point number two, bullet point number two, 
        second sentence. ``Ambassador Taylor recalls that Mr. 
        Morrison told Ambassador Taylor that I told Mr. 
        Morrison that I conveyed this message to Mr. Yermak on 
        September 1st, 2019, in connection with Vice President 
        Pence's visit to Warsaw and a meeting with President 
        Zelensky.'' Now, this is his clarification. Let me read 
        it one more time. ``Ambassador Taylor recalls that Mr. 
        Morrison told Ambassador Taylor that I told Mr. 
        Morrison that I had conveyed this message to Mr. Yermak 
        on September 1st, 2019, in connection with Vice 
        President Pence's visit to Warsaw and a meeting with 
        President Zelensky.'' We've got six people having four 
        conversations in one sentence, and you just told me 
        this is where you got your clear understanding, which--
        I mean, even though you had three opportunities with 
        President Zelensky for him to tell you, ``You know 
        what? We're going to do these investigations to get the 
        aid,'' he didn't tell you, three different times. Never 
        makes an announcement, never tweets about it, never 
        does the CNN interview. Ambassador, you weren't on the 
        call, were you? The President--you didn't listen in on 
        President Trump's call and President Zelensky's call?
          A. I did not.
          Q. You never talked with Chief of Staff Mulvaney.
          A. I never did.
          Q. You never met the President.
          A. That's correct.
          Q. You had three meetings again with Zelensky and it 
        didn't come up.
          A. And two of those, they had never heard about it, 
        as far as I know, so there was no reason for it to come 
        up.
          Q. And President Zelensky never made an announcement. 
        This is what I can't believe. And you're their star 
        witness. You're their first witness.
          A. Mr. Jordan--
          Q. You're the guy. You're the guy based on this, 
        based on--I mean, I've seen church prayer chains that 
        are easier to understand than this.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \287\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr. 
George Kent, supra note 2.

    During his public testimony, Ambassador Sondland made clear 
that no one had ever told him that the security assistance was 
tied to Ukraine investigating the President's political rival. 
In particular, Ambassador Sondland explained that ``President 
Trump never told me directly that the aid was conditioned on 
the meetings.''\288\ In an exchange with Rep. Turner, 
Ambassador Sondland elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \288\Impeachment inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note 
56.

          Q. What about the aid? [Ambassador Volker] says that 
        they weren't tied, that the aid was not tied
          A. And I didn't say they were conclusively tied 
        either. I said I was presuming it.
          Q. Okay. And so the President never told you they 
        were tied.
          A. That is correct.
          Q. So your testimony and [Ambassador Volker's] 
        testimony is consistent, and the President did not tie 
        aid to investigations.
          A. That is correct.

                                 * * *

          Q. So no one told you, not just the President. 
        [Mayor] Giuliani didn't tell you. [Acting Chief of 
        Staff] Mulvaney didn't tell you. Nobody--[Secretary] 
        Pompeo didn't tell you. Nobody else on this planet told 
        you that Donald Trump was tying aid to these 
        investigations. Is that correct?
          A. I think I already testified to that.
          Q. No. Answer the question. Is it correct? No one on 
        this planet told you that Donald Trump was tying aid to 
        the investigations? Because if your answer is yes, then 
        the chairman is wrong and the headline on CNN is wrong. 
        No one on this planet told you that President Trump was 
        tying aid to investigations, yes or no?
          A. Yes.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \289\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. President Trump rejected any linkage between U.S. security 
        assistance and Ukrainian action on investigations.

    The evidence also shows that when President Trump was asked 
about a potential linkage between U.S. security assistance and 
Ukrainian investigations into the President's political rival, 
the President vehemently denied any connection. This evidence 
is persuasive because the President made the same denial twice 
to two separate senior U.S. officials in private, where there 
is no reason for the President to be anything less than 
completely candid.
    In an interview with the Wall Street Journal and a detailed 
written submission to the impeachment inquiry, Senator Ron 
Johnson, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee on Europe, disclosed that he spoke to President 
Trump on August 31, after learning from Ambassador Sondland 
that U.S. security assistance may be linked to Ukraine's 
willingness to demonstrate its commitment to fight 
corruption.\290\ Senator Johnson explained that his purpose for 
calling President Trump was ``to inform President Trump of my 
upcoming trip to Ukraine and to try to persuade him to 
authorize me to tell [President] Zelensky that the hold would 
be lifted on military aid.''\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \290\Letter from Sen. Johnson, supra note 138, at 5; Siobhan Hughes 
& Rebecca Ballhaus, Trump, in August call with GOP Senator, denied 
official's claim on Ukraine aid, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 2019.
    \291\Letter from Sen. Johnson, supra note 138, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Johnson recounted that President Trump was ``not 
prepared'' to lift the pause on security assistance to Ukraine, 
citing Ukrainian corruption and frustration that Europe did not 
share more of the burden.\292\ Echoing his continual statements 
about U.S. allies sharing the financial burden for mutual 
defense, President Trump told Senator Johnson: ``Ron, I talk to 
Angela [Merkel, German chancellor] and ask her, `why don't you 
fund these things,' and she tells me, `because we know you 
will.' We're schmucks, Ron. We're schmucks.''\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \292\Id.
    \293\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When Senator Johnson raised the potential of a linkage 
between U.S. security assistance and investigations, President 
Trump vehemently denied it.\294\ According to Senator Johnson,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \294\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without hesitation, President Trump immediately denied such 
an arrangement existed. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, 
I quoted the President as saying, ``[Expletive deleted]--No 
way. I would never do that. Who told you that?'' I have 
accurately characterized his reaction as adamant, vehement and 
angry--there was more than one expletive that I have 
deleted.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \295\Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the end of the phone call, President Trump circled back 
to Senator Johnson's request to release the pause on security 
assistance. President Trump said: ``Ron, I understand your 
position. We're reviewing it now, and you'll probably like my 
final decision.''\296\ This conversation occurred on August 31, 
well before the Democrats initiated their impeachment inquiry, 
and undermines the assertion that the President fabricated 
legitimate reasons for the pause in security assistance in 
response to the Democrats' impeachment inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \296\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During his deposition, Ambassador Sondland testified that 
he called President Trump on September 9 and asked him ``What 
do you want from Ukraine?'' The President's response was 
``Nothing. There is no quid pro quo.''\297\ During his 
deposition, Ambassador Sondland testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \297\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 106.

          Q. So when you telephoned the President, tell us what 
        happened.
          A. Well, from the time that the aid was held up until 
        I telephoned the President there were a lot of rumors 
        swirling around as to why the aid had been held up, 
        including they wanted a review, they wanted Europe to 
        do more. There were all kinds of rumors. And I know in 
        my few previous conversations with the President he's 
        not big on small talk to I would have one shot to ask 
        him. And rather than asking him, ``Are you doing X 
        because of X or because of Y or because of Z?'' I asked 
        him one open-ended question: What do you want from 
        Ukraine? And as I recall, he was in a very bad mood. It 
        was a very quick conversation. He said: I wanted 
        nothing. I want no quid pro quo. I want Zelensky to do 
        the right thing. And I said: What does that mean? And 
        he said: I want him to do what he ran on.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \298\Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added).

    When asked about his conversation with Senator Johnson--
which prompted Senator Johnson to call President Trump--
Ambassador Sondland testified that he was ``speculating'' about 
the linkage between security assistance and 
investigations.\299\ He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \299\Id. at 196.

          I noticed in the media [Senator Johnson] had come out 
        and said that he and I had a conversation on the phone 
        about it. And he had said that I told him--this is in 
        the media report, and I haven't discussed this with him 
        since that media report--that I had said there was a 
        quid pro quo. And I don't remember telling him that 
        because I'm not sure I knew that at that point. I think 
        what I might have done is I might have been 
        speculating--I hope there's no, I hope this isn't being 
        held up for nefarious reasons.\300\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \300\Id.

    Although Democrats and some in the media believe that 
Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney confirmed the existence of 
a quid pro quo during an October 2019 press briefing,\301\ a 
careful reading of his statements shows otherwise. Chief of 
Staff Mulvaney cited President Trump's concerns about Ukrainian 
corruption and foreign aid in general as the ``driving 
factors'' in the temporary pause on security assistance.\302\ 
He explained that Ukraine's actions in the 2016 election ``was 
part of the thing that [the President] was worried about in 
corruption with that nation.''\303\ Chief of Staff Mulvaney 
specified, however, that ``the money held up had absolutely 
nothing to do with [Vice President] Biden.''\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \301\Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes, 
supra note 210 (statement of Rep. Adam Schiff, Chairman); Aaron Blake, 
Trump's acting chief of staff admits it: There was a Ukraine quid pro 
quo, Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 2019.
    \302\The White House, Press Briefing by Acting Chief of Staff Mick 
Mulvaney (Oct. 17, 2019).
    \303\Id.
    \304\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Senior U.S. officials never substantively discussed the delay in 
        security assistance with Ukrainian officials before the July 25 
        call.

    Evidence also suggests that the senior levels of the 
Ukrainian government did not know that U.S. security assistance 
was delayed until some point after the July 25 phone call 
between President Trump and President Zelensky. Although the 
assistance was delayed at the time of the July 25 call, 
President Trump never raised the assistance with President 
Zelensky or implied that the aid was in danger. As Ambassador 
Volker testified, because Ukrainian officials were unaware of 
the pause on security assistance, ``there was no leverage 
implied.''\305\ This evidence undercuts the allegation that the 
President withheld U.S. security assistance to pressure 
President Zelensky to investigate his political rival.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \305\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 124-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most of the Democrats' witnesses, including Ambassador 
Taylor, traced their knowledge of the pause to a July 18 
interagency conference call, during which OMB announced a pause 
on security assistance to Ukraine.\306\ However, the two U.S. 
diplomats closest the Ukrainian government--Ambassador Volker 
and Ambassador Taylor--testified that Ukraine did not know 
about the delay ``until the end of August,'' six weeks later, 
after it was reported publicly by Politico on August 28.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \306\See, e.g., Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 27.
    \307\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 125, 266-67; 
Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 119-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Volker, the chief interlocutor with the 
Ukrainian government, testified that he never informed the 
Ukrainians about the delay.\308\ The Ukrainian government only 
raised the issue with Ambassador Volker after reading about the 
delay in Politico in late August.\309\ Explaining why the delay 
was not ``significant,'' Ambassador Volker testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \308\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 80.
    \309\Id. at 80-81; Text message from Andrey Yermak to Kurt Volker, 
(Aug. 29, 2019, 03:06:14 AM), [KV00000020]; see Caitlin Emma & Connor 
O'Brien, Trump holds up Ukraine military aid meant to confront Russia, 
Politico, Aug. 28, 2019.

          Q. Looking back on it now, is [the delayed security 
        assistance] something, in the grand scheme of things, 
        that's very significant? I mean, is this worthy of 
        investigating, or is this just another chapter in the 
        rough and tumble world of diplomacy and foreign 
        assistance?
          A. In my view, this hold on security assistance was 
        not significant. I don't believe--in fact, I am quite 
        sure that at least I, Secretary Pompeo, the official 
        representatives of the U.S., never communicated to 
        Ukrainians that it is being held for a reason. We never 
        had a reason. And I tried to avoid talking to 
        Ukrainians about it for as long as I could until it 
        came out in Politico a month later because I was 
        confident we were going to get it fixed 
        internally.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \310\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 80.

    During his public testimony, Ambassador Volker confirmed 
that he did not have any communication with the Ukrainian 
government about the pause on U.S. security assistance until 
they raised the topic with him.\311\ Morrison likewise 
testified that he avoided discussing the pause on security 
assistance with the Ukrainian government.\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \311\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.
    \312\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Taylor similarly testified that the Ukrainian 
government was not aware of the pause on U.S. security 
assistance until late August 2019. In an exchange with Rep. 
Ratcliffe, he explained:

          Q. So, based on your knowledge, nobody in the 
        Ukrainian government became aware of a hold on military 
        aid until 2 days later, on August 29th.
          A. That's my understanding.
          Q. That's your understanding. And that would have 
        been well over a month after the July 25th call between 
        President Trump and President Zelensky.
          A. Correct.
          Q. So you're not a lawyer, are you, Ambassador 
        Taylor?
          A. I am not.
          Q. Okay. So the idea of a quid pro quo is it's a 
        concept where there is a demand for an action or an 
        attempt to influence action in exchange for something 
        else. And in this case, when people are talking about a 
        quid pro quo, that something else is military aid. So, 
        if nobody in the Ukrainian government is aware of a 
        military hold at the time of the Trump-Zelensky call, 
        then, as a matter of law and as a matter of fact, there 
        can be no quid pro quo based on military aid. I just 
        want to be real clear that, again, as of July 25th, you 
        have no knowledge of a quid pro quo involving military 
        aid.
          A. July 25th is a week after the hold was put on the 
        security assistance. And July 25th, they had a 
        conversation between the two presidents where it was 
        not discussed.
          Q. And to your knowledge, nobody in the Ukrainian 
        government was aware of the hold?
          A. That is correct.\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \313\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 119-20.

    Likewise, Philip Reeker, the Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State for Europeans Affairs, testified that he was unaware of 
any U.S. official conveying to a Ukrainian official that 
President Trump sought political investigations.\314\ Acting 
Assistant Secretary Reeker testified that he was not aware of 
whether Ambassador Volker or Ambassador Sondland had such 
conversations with the Ukrainians.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \314\Deposition of Philip Reeker in Wash., D.C., at 149 (Oct. 26, 
2019).
    \315\Id. at 150.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some witnesses testified that the Ukrainian embassy made 
informal inquiries about the status of the security assistance. 
LTC Vindman recalled receiving ``light queries'' from his 
Ukrainian embassy counterparts about the aid in either early- 
or mid-August, but he was unable to pinpoint specific dates, or 
even the week, that he had such conversations.\316\ LTC Vindman 
testified that Ukrainian questions about the delay were not 
``substantive'' or ``definitive'' until around the time of the 
Warsaw summit, on September 1.\317\ State Department official 
Catherine Croft testified that two individuals from the 
Ukrainian embassy approached her about a pause on security 
assistance at some point before August 28, but Croft told them 
she ``was confident that any issues in process would get 
resolved.''\318\ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura 
Cooper testified publicly that her staff received inquiries 
from the Ukrainian embassy in July that ``there was some kind 
of issue'' with the security assistance; however, she did not 
know what the Ukrainian government knew at the time.\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \316\Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 135-37, 189-90.
    \317\Id. at 189-90.
    \318\Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 86-87.
    \319\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale, 
supra note 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although this evidence suggests that Ukrainian officials in 
Washington were vaguely aware of an issue with the security 
assistance before August 28, the evidence does not show that 
the senior leadership of Ukrainian government in Kyiv was aware 
of the pause until late August. A New York Times story claimed 
that unidentified Ukrainian officials were aware of a delay in 
``early August'' 2019 but said there was no stated link between 
that delay and any investigative demands.\320\ However, a 
subsequent Bloomberg story reported that President Zelensky 
``and his key advisers learned of [the pause on U.S. security 
assistance] only in a Politico report in late August.''\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \320\Andrew E. Kramer & Kenneth P. Vogel, Ukraine knew of aid 
freeze by early August, undermining Trump defense, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 
2019.
    \321\Baker & Krasnolutska, supra note 280.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Bloomberg story detailed how Ukraine's embassy in 
Washington--led by then-Ambassador Chaly, who had been 
appointed by President Zelensky's predecessor--went ``rogue'' 
in the early months of the Zelensky administration.\322\ 
According to Andrey Yermak, a close adviser to President 
Zelensky, the Ukrainian embassy officials, who were loyal to 
former President Poroshenko, did not inform President Zelensky 
that there was any issue with the U.S. security 
assistance.\323\ This information explains the conflicting 
testimony between witnesses like LTC Vindman and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Cooper, who testified that the Ukrainian 
embassy raised questions about the security assistance, and 
Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Taylor, who testified that the 
Zelensky government did not know about any pause in security 
assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \322\Id.
    \323\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the Ukrainian government, President Zelensky 
and his senior advisers only learned of the pause on security 
assistance from Politico--severely undercutting the idea that 
President Trump was seeking to pressure Ukraine to investigate 
his political rival.

8. The Ukrainian government denied any awareness of a linkage between 
        U.S. security assistance and investigations.

    Publicly available information also shows clearly that the 
Ukrainian government leadership denied any awareness of a 
linkage between U.S. security assistance and investigations 
into the President's political rival. The Ukrainian government 
leaders made this assertion following public reports that 
Ambassador Sondland had raised the potential connection in 
early September. This understanding is supported by information 
provided by Senator Johnson.
    In Ambassador Sondland's addendum to his closed-door 
testimony, dated November 5, 2019, he wrote how he came to 
perceive a connection between security assistance and the 
investigations. He wrote:

          [B]y the beginning of September 2019, and in the 
        absence of any credible explanation for the suspension 
        of aid, I presumed that the aid suspension had become 
        linked to the proposed anti-corruption statement. . . . 
        And it would have been natural for me to have voiced 
        what I had presumed to Ambassador Taylor, Senator 
        Johnson, the Ukrainians, and Mr. Morrison.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \324\Sondland declaration, supra note 278, at 4.

    Following media reports of Ambassador Sondland's addendum, 
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Prystaiko told the media that 
Ambassador Sondland had not linked the security assistance to 
Ukrainian action on investigations.\325\ He said: ``Ambassador 
Sondland did not tell us, and certainly did not tell me, about 
a connection between the assistance and the 
investigations.''\326\ Minister Prystaiko went further to say 
that he was never aware of any connection between security 
assistance and investigations: ``I have never seen a direct 
relationship between investigations and security assistance. 
Yes, the investigations were mentioned, you know, in the 
conversation of the presidents. But there was no clear 
connection between these events.''\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \325\U.S. envoy Sondland did not link Biden probe to aid: Ukraine 
minister, Reuters, Nov. 14, 2019.
    \326\Id.
    \327\Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senator Johnson explained that he had three meetings with 
senior Ukrainian government officials in June and July 
2019.\328\ Two of meetings were with Oleksandr Danylyuk, then-
secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, 
and Valeriy Chaly, then-Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S.\329\ 
Senator Johnson said that none of the these Ukrainian officials 
raised any concerns with him about security assistance or 
investigations: ``At no time during those meetings did anyone 
from Ukraine raise the issue of the withholding of military aid 
or express concerns regarding pressure being applied by the 
president or his administration.''\330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \328\Letter from Sen. Ron Johnson, supra note 138, at 4.
    \329\Id.
    \330\Id. at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. The Ukrainian government considered issuing a public anti-corruption 
        statement to convey that President Zelensky was ``serious and 
        different'' from previous Ukrainian regimes.

    Evidence shows that in light of President Trump's deep-
rooted skepticism about Ukraine, and working in tandem with 
senior U.S. officials, the Ukrainian government sought to 
convince President Trump that the new regime took corruption 
seriously. This commitment took two potential forms: a public 
statement that Ukraine would investigate corruption or a media 
interview about investigations. Although the parties later 
discussed the inclusion of specific investigations proposed by 
Mayor Giuliani, U.S. officials explained that the intent of the 
statement was to convey a public commitment to anti-corruption 
reform and that they did not associate the statement with an 
investigation of the President's political rival.
    Ambassador Volker explained the goal of having Ukraine 
convey President Zelensky's commitment to reform and fighting 
corruption in a public message. He testified:

          A. So the issue as I understood it was this deep-
        rooted, skeptical view of Ukraine, a negative view of 
        Ukraine, preexisting 2019, you know, going back. When I 
        started this I had one other meeting with President 
        Trump and President Poroshenko. It was in September of 
        2017. And at that time he had a very skeptical view of 
        Ukraine. So I know he had a very deep-rooted skeptical 
        view. And my understanding at the time was that even 
        though he agreed in the [May 23] meeting that we had 
        with him, say, okay, I'll invite him, he didn't really 
        want to do it. And that's why the meeting kept being 
        delayed and delayed. And we ended up at a point in 
        talking with the Ukrainians--who we'll come to this, 
        but, you know, who had asked to communicate with 
        Giuliani--that they wanted to convey that they really 
        are different. And we ended up talking about, well, 
        then, make a statement about investigating corruption 
        and your commitment to reform and so forth.
          Q. Is that the statement that you discussed in your 
        text messages--
          A. Yes.
          Q. --around August of 2019?
          A. Yes.
          Q. Okay.
          A. Yeah. To say make a statement along those lines. 
        And the thought behind that was just trying to be 
        convincing that they are serious and different from the 
        Ukraine of the past.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \331\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 41-42 
(emphasis added).

    Ambassador Volker elaborated during his public testimony 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that a public statement is not unusual. He explained:

          I didn't find it that unusual. I think when you're 
        dealing with a situation where I believe the President 
        was highly skeptical about President Zelensky being 
        committed to really changing Ukraine after his entirely 
        negative view of the country, that he would want to 
        hear something more from President Zelensky to be 
        convinced that, ``Okay, I'll give this guy a 
        chance.''\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \332\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.

    The Democrats' witnesses explained how the idea of a public 
statement arose. Ambassador Volker testified that Andrey 
Yermak, a senior adviser to President Zelensky, sent him a 
draft statement following Yermak's meeting with Mayor Giuliani 
on August 2.\333\ Ambassador Volker said that he believed the 
statement was ``valuable for getting the Ukrainian Government 
on the record about their commitment to reform and change and 
fighting corruption because I believed that would be helpful in 
overcoming this deep skepticism that the President had about 
Ukraine.''\334\ Ambassador Volker, however, did not see the 
statement as a ``necessary condition'' for President Zelensky 
securing a White House meeting.\335\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \333\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 71.
    \334\Id.
    \335\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Volker explained that although the statement 
evolved to include specific references to ``Burisma'' and 
``2016,'' the goal was still to show that President Zelensky 
was ``different.'' He testified:

          Q. And the draft statement went through some 
        iterations. Is that correct?
          A. Yeah. It was pretty quick, though. I don't know 
        the timeline exactly. We have it. But, basically, 
        Andrey [Yermak] sends me a text. I share it with Gordon 
        Sondland. We have a conversation with Rudy to say: The 
        Ukrainians are looking at this text. Rudy says: Well, 
        if it doesn't say Burisma and if it doesn't say 2016, 
        what does it mean? You know, it's not credible. You 
        know, they're hiding something. And so we talked and I 
        said: So what you're saying is just at the end of the--
        same statement, just insert Burisma and 2016, you think 
        that would be more credible? And he said: Yes. So I 
        sent that back to Andrey, conveyed the conversation 
        with him--because he had spoken with Rudy prior to 
        that, not me--conveyed the conversation, and Andrey 
        said that he was not--he did not think this was a good 
        idea, and I shared his view.
          Q. You had testified from the beginning you didn't 
        think it was a good idea to mention Burisma or 2016.
          A. Correct.
          Q. But then, as I understand it, you came to believe 
        that if we're going to do the statement, maybe it's 
        necessary to have that reference in there, correct?
          A. I'd say I was in the middle. I wouldn't say I 
        thought it was necessary to have it in there because I 
        thought the target here is not the specific 
        investigations. The target is getting Ukraine to be 
        seen as credible in changing the country, fighting 
        corruption, introducing reform, that Zelensky is the 
        real deal. You may remember that there was a statement 
        that Rudy Giuliani made when he canceled his visit to 
        Ukraine in May of 2019 that President Zelensky is 
        surrounded by enemies of the United States. And I just 
        knew that to be fundamentally not true. And so I think, 
        when you talk about overcoming skepticism, that's kind 
        of what I'm talking about, getting these guys out there 
        publicly saying: We are different.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \336\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 71-73.

    Although subsequent reporting has connoted a connection 
between ``Burisma'' and the Bidens,\337\ the Democrats' 
witnesses testified that they did not have that understanding 
while working with the Ukrainian government about a potential 
statement. Ambassador Volker explained that ``there is an 
important distinction about Burisma'' and that Vice President 
Biden or Hunter Biden were ``never part of the conversation'' 
with the Ukrainians.\338\ He also testified that the Ukrainians 
did not link Burisma to the Bidens: ``They never mentioned 
Biden to me.''\339\ Ambassador Volker also made clear that 
following his initial conversation with Mayor Giuliani in May 
2019, Mayor Giuliani ``never brought up Biden or Bidens with me 
again. And so when we talked or heard Burisma, I literally 
meant Burisma and that, not the conflation of that with the 
Bidens.''\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \337\See, e.g., Paul Sonne, Michael Kranish, & Matt Viser, The gas 
tycoon and the vice president's son: The story of Hunter Biden's foray 
into Ukraine, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 2019.
    \338\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 73.
    \339\Id. at 193.
    \340\Id. at 213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Sondland testified that he was unaware that 
``Burisma'' may have meant ``Biden'' until the White House 
released the July 25th call transcript on September 25.\341\ In 
fact, Ambassador Sondland testified that he recalled no 
discussions with any State Department or White House official 
about former Vice President Joe Biden or Hunter Biden.\342\ 
Ambassador Sondland testified that he did not recall Mayor 
Giuliani ever discussing the Bidens with him.\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \341\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 70.
    \342\Id. at 33. Ambassador Sondland testified that Burisma was 
``one of many examples'' of Ukrainian corruption. Id. Ambassador 
Sondland mentioned Naftogaz as another example of Ukrainian corruption 
and lack of transparency that ``[came] up at every conversation.'' Id. 
at 71, 99.
    \343\Id. at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Testimony and text messages reflect that Ambassador Volker, 
Ambassador Sondland, and Ambassador Taylor communicated about 
Ukraine's commitment to fight corruption throughout the summer. 
Ambassador Taylor testified that in a phone conversation on 
June 27, Ambassador Sondland told him that President Zelensky 
``needed to make clear to President Trump that he, President 
Zelensky, was not standing in the way of 
`investigations.''\344\ Ambassador Taylor said he did not know 
to what ``investigations'' Ambassador Sondland was referring, 
but that Ambassador Volker ``intended to pass that message [to 
President Zelensky] in Toronto several days later.''\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \344\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 25.
    \345\Id. at 62-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In early July, Ambassador Volker explained the dynamic 
directly to President Zelensky in Toronto, emphasizing the need 
to demonstrate a commitment to reform. Ambassador Volker 
testified:

          I believe [Mayor Giuliani] was getting bad 
        information, and I believe that his negative messaging 
        about Ukraine would be reinforcing the President's 
        already negative position about Ukraine. So I discussed 
        this with President Zelensky when I saw him in Toronto 
        on July 3rd, and I said I think this is a problem that 
        we have Mayor Giuliani--so I didn't discuss his meeting 
        with Lutsenko then. That came later. I only learned 
        about that later. But I discussed even on July 3rd with 
        President Zelensky that you have a problem with your 
        message of being, you know, clean, reform, that we need 
        to support you, is not getting--or is getting 
        countermanded or contradicted by a negative narrative 
        about Ukraine, that it is still corrupt, there's still 
        terrible people around you. At this time, there was 
        concern about his chief of presidential administration, 
        Andriy Bohdan, who had been a lawyer for a very famous 
        oligarch in Ukraine. And so I discussed this negative 
        narrative about Ukraine that Mr. Giuliani seemed to be 
        furthering with the President.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \346\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 137.

    On July 21, Ambassador Sondland sent a text message to 
Ambassador Taylor that read: ``[W]e need to get the 
conversation started and the relationship built, irrespective 
of the pretext. I am worried about the alternative.''\347\ 
Ambassador Sondland testified that the word ``pretext'' 
concerned agreement on an interview or press statement and that 
the ``alternative'' was no engagement at all between President 
Trump and President Zelensky.\348\ Ambassador Sondland 
testified that he viewed giving a press interview or making a 
press statement as different from pressuring Ukraine to 
investigate political rival.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \347\Text message from Gordon Sondland to Kurt Volker & William 
Taylor (July 21, 2019, 4:45 a.m.) [KV00000037].
    \348\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 183-84.
    \349\Id. at 170-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 9, Ambassador Sondland sent a text message to 
Ambassador Volker, writing in part: ``I think potus [sic] 
really wants the deliverable.''\350\ Ambassador Sondland 
testified that ``deliverable'' referred to the Ukrainian press 
statement.\351\ Ambassador Volker testified that President 
Trump wanted a public commitment to reform as a 
``deliverable'':
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \350\Text message from Gordon Sondland to Kurt Volker (Aug. 9, 
2019, 5:47 p.m.) [KV00000042].
    \351\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 290.

          Q. And what--yeah, what did you understand what the 
        President wanted by deliverable?
          A. That statement that had been under conversation.
          Q. That was the deliverable from Zelensky that the 
        President wanted before he would commit to--
          A. He wanted to see that they're going to come out 
        publicly and commit to reform, investigate the past, et 
        cetera.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \352\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 184 (emphasis 
added).

    According to Ambassador Taylor, on September 8, Ambassador 
Sondland relayed to Ambassador Taylor that he had told 
President Zelensky and Yermak that if President Zelensky ``did 
not clear things up in public, we would be at a 
stalemate.''\353\ Ambassador Taylor interpreted Ambassador 
Sondland's use of ``stalemate'' to mean that there would be no 
security assistance to Ukraine.\354\ Ambassador Taylor 
recounted that Ambassador Sondland said that President Trump is 
a businessman and businessmen ask for something before 
``signing a check.''\355\ Ambassador Taylor testified that he 
understood that ``signing a check'' related to security 
assistance.\356\ Ambassador Sondland did not recall the 
conversation with Ambassador Taylor and denied making a 
statement about President Trump seeking something for signing a 
check to Ukraine.\357\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \353\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 39.
    \354\Id.
    \355\Id. at 40.
    \356\Id.
    \357\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 198-99, 351.

          Q. So you hadn't--did you ever, in the course of 
        this, ever make a statement to the effect of, you know, 
        we're cutting a big check to the Ukraine, you know, 
        what should we get for his?
          A. That's not something I would have said. I don't 
        remember that at all.
          Q. Okay. So you've never made a statement relating 
        the aid to conditions that the Ukrainians ought to 
        comply with?
          A. I don't remember that, no.
          Q. But if someone suggested that you made that 
        statement, that would be out of your own character, 
        you're saying?
          A. Yes.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \358\Id. at 198-99.

    Although Ambassador Sondland's statements imply that the 
President personally sought a conditionality on the security 
assistance, other witnesses testified that Ambassador Sondland 
had a habit of exaggerating his interactions with President 
Trump.\359\ Ambassador Sondland himself acknowledged that he 
only spoke with the President five or six times, one of which 
was a Christmas greeting.\360\ It is not readily apparent that 
Ambassador Sondland was speaking on behalf of President Trump 
in this context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \359\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 240-41; Kent deposition, 
supra note 65, at 257.
    \360\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. President Zelensky never raised a linkage between security 
        assistance and investigations in his meetings with senior U.S. 
        government officials.

    Between July 18--the date on which OMB announced the pause 
on security assistance to Ukraine during an interagency 
conference--call and September 11--when the pause was lifted 
President Zelensky had five separate meetings with high-ranking 
U.S. government officials. The evidence shows that President 
Zelensky never raised any concerns in those meeting that he 
felt pressure to investigate President Trump's political rival 
or that U.S. security assistance to Ukraine was conditioned on 
any such investigations.
    On July 25, President Zelensky spoke by telephone with 
President Trump. Although President Zelensky noted a desire to 
purchase additional Javelin missiles from the United States--an 
expenditure separate from security assistance--the call summary 
otherwise does not show that the President discussed a pause on 
U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \361\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 26, President Zelensky met in Kyiv with Ambassador 
Volker, Ambassador Taylor, and Ambassador Sondland.\362\ 
According to Ambassador Sondland's closed-door deposition, 
President Zelensky did not raise any concern about a pause on 
security assistance or a linkage between the aid and 
investigations into President Trump's political rival.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \362\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 31; Sondland deposition, 
supra note 51, at 29.
    \363\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 252.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 27, President Zelensky met in Kyiv with President 
Trump's then-National Security Advisor John Bolton.\364\ 
According to Ambassador Taylor, President Zelensky and 
Ambassador Bolton did not discuss U.S. security 
assistance.\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \364\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 33.
    \365\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 1, President Zelensky met in Warsaw with Vice 
President Pence, after the existence of the security assistance 
pause became public. Tim Morrison, Senior Director at the NSC, 
testified that President Zelensky raised the security 
assistance directly with Vice President Pence during their 
meeting.\366\ According to Morrison, Vice President Pence 
relayed President Trump's concern about corruption, the need 
for reform in Ukraine, and his desire for other countries to 
contribute more to Ukrainian defense.\367\ As Jennifer 
Williams, senior adviser for Europe in the Office of the Vice 
President, testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \366\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 131-34.
    \367\Id.

          Once the cameras left the room, the very first 
        question that President Zelensky had was about the 
        status of security assistance. And the VP responded by 
        really expressing our ongoing support for Ukraine, but 
        wanting to hear from President Zelensky, you know, what 
        the status of his reform efforts were that he could 
        then convey back to the President, and also wanting to 
        hear if there was more that European countries could do 
        to support Ukraine.\368\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \368\Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 81.

    Vice President Pence did not discuss any investigations 
with President Zelensky.\369\ Morrison said that Vice President 
Pence spoke to President Trump that evening, who was ``still 
skeptical'' due to the fact that U.S. allies were not 
adequately contributing to Ukraine.\370\ Although Ambassador 
Sondland claimed in his public hearing that he informed Vice 
President Pence of his assumption of a link between security 
assistance and investigations in advance of the Vice 
President's meeting with President Zelensky,\371\ the Vice 
President's office said Ambassador Sondland never raised 
investigations or conditionality on the security 
assistance.\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \369\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8; Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and 
Ms. Jennifer Williams, supra note 6. In fact, Williams testified that 
Vice President Pence has ``never brought up'' these investigations. 
Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer Williams, 
supra note 6.
    \370\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 133-34.
    \371\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note 
56.
    \372\Office of the Vice President, Statement from VP Chief of Staff 
Marc Short (Nov. 20, 2019). In addition, the summary of President 
Trump's July 25 call with President Zelensky was not included in Vice 
President Pence's briefing book for his meeting with President 
Zelensky. Williams deposition, supra note 73, at 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 5, President Zelensky met in Kyiv with Senator 
Ron Johnson, Senator Chris Murphy, and Ambassador Taylor.\373\ 
President Zelensky raised the issue of the security assistance, 
and Senator Johnson relayed to him what President Trump had 
told Senator Johnson during their August 31 conversation.\374\ 
Senator Murphy then warned President Zelensky ``not to respond 
to requests from American political actors or he would risk 
losing Ukraine's bipartisan support.''\375\ Senator Johnson 
recalled that he did not comment on Senator Murphy's statement 
but began discussing a potential presidential meeting.\376\ To 
help President Zelensky understand President Trump's mindset, 
Senator Johnson ``tried to portray [President Trump's] strongly 
held attitude and reiterated the reasons President Trump 
consistently gave [Senator Johnson] for his reservations 
regarding Ukraine: endemic corruption and inadequate European 
support.''\377\ Senator Johnson recounted how President 
Zelensky raised no concerns about pressure:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \373\Sen. Johnson letter, supra note 138, at 6.
    \374\Id.
    \375\Id. at 7.
    \376\Id.
    \377\Id.

          This was a very open, frank, and supportive 
        discussion. There was no reason for anyone on either 
        side not to be completely honest or to withhold any 
        concerns. At no time during this meeting or any other 
        meeting on this trip was there any mention by 
        [President] Zelensky or any Ukrainian that they were 
        feeling pressure to do anything in return for military 
        aid, not even after [Senator] Murphy warned them about 
        getting involved in the 2020 election which would have 
        been the perfect time to discuss any pressure.\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \378\Id. at 8 (emphasis added).

    After Senator Johnson offered his perspective, Senator 
Murphy similarly provided an account of the September 5 
meeting.\379\ Senator Murphy did not dispute the facts as 
recounted by Senator Johnson, including that President Zelensky 
raised no concerns about feeling pressure to investigate the 
President's political rival.\380\ Senator Murphy, however, 
interpreted President Zelensky's silence to mean that he felt 
pressure.\381\ This ``interpretation''--based on what President 
Zelensky did not say--is unpersuasive in light of President 
Zelensky's repeated and consistent statements that he felt no 
pressure.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \379\Letter from Sen. Chris Murphy to Adam Schiff, Chairman, H. 
Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, & Carolyn Maloney, Acting Chairwoman, 
H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (Nov. 19, 2019).
    \380\Id. at 5.
    \381\Id.
    \382\See supra Section I.A.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. In early September 2019, President Zelensky's government 
        implemented several anti-corruption reform measures.

    Publicly available information shows that following the 
seating of Ukraine's new parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Rada), 
on August 29, 2019, the Zelensky government initiated 
aggressive anti-corruption reforms. Almost immediately, 
President Zelensky appointed a new prosecutor general and 
opened Ukraine's Supreme Anti-Corruption Court.\383\ On 
September 3, the Rada passed a bill that removed parliamentary 
immunity.\384\ President Zelensky signed the bill on September 
11.\385\ On September 18, the Rada approved a bill streamlining 
corruption prosecutions and allowing the Supreme Anti-
Corruption Court to focus on high-level corruption cases.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \383\Stefan Wolff & Tatyana Malyarenko, In Ukraine, Volodymyr 
Zelenskiy must tread carefully or may end up facing another Maidan 
uprising, The Conversation, Nov. 11, 2019.
    \384\Bill on lifting parliamentary immunity submitted to Zelensky 
for signature, Unian, Sept. 4, 2019.
    \385\Zelensky signs law on stripping parliamentary immunity, 
Interfax-Ukraine, Sept. 11, 2019.
    \386\Anti-corruption Court to receive cases from NABU, SAPO, 112 
UA, Sept. 18, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Witnesses described how these legislative initiatives 
instilled confidence that Ukraine was delivering on anti-
corruption reform. NSC staffer LTC Vindman testified that the 
Rada's efforts were significant.\387\ In his deposition, 
Ambassador Taylor lauded President Zelensky for this 
demonstrable commitment to reform. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \387\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer 
Williams, supra note 6.

          President Zelensky was taking over Ukraine in a 
        hurry. He had appointed reformist ministers and 
        supported long-stalled anticorruption legislation. He 
        took quick executive action, including opening 
        Ukraine's High Anti-Corruption Court, which was 
        established under previous Presidential administration 
        but was never allowed to operate. . . . With his new 
        parliamentary majority, President Zelensky changed the 
        Ukrainian constitution to remove absolute immunity from 
        Rada deputies, which had been the source of raw 
        corruption for decades.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \388\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 22-23.

    Likewise, NSC Senior Director Tim Morrison recalled that 
President Zelensky's team had literally been working through 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the night on anti-corruption reforms. He testified:

          Q: And after the Rada was seated, do you know if 
        President Zelensky made an effort to implement those 
        [anti-corruption] reforms?
          A: I do.
          Q: And what reforms generally can you speak to?
          A: Well, he named a new prosecutor general. That was 
        something that we were specifically interested in. He 
        had his party introduce a spate of legislative reforms, 
        one of which was particularly significant was stripping 
        Rada members of their parliamentary immunity. That 
        passed fairly quickly, as I recall. Those kinds of 
        things.
          Q: And within what time period were some of those 
        initial reforms passed?
          A: Very, very quickly.
          Q: Okay. So in the month of August?
          A: When we were--when Ambassador Bolton was in 
        Ukraine and he met with President Zelensky, we observed 
        that everybody on the Ukrainian side of the table was 
        exhausted, because they had been up for days working 
        on, you know, reform legislation, working on the new 
        Cabinet, to get through as much as possible on the 
        first day.
          Q: Remind me again of Ambassador Bolton's visit. Was 
        that August, at the end of August?
          A: It was at the end of August. It was between the G7 
        and the Warsaw commemoration
          Q: So by Labor Day, for example?
          A: I seem to recall we were--we--we were there on the 
        opening day of the Rada. President--President Zelensky 
        met with Ambassador Bolton on the opening day of the 
        Rada, and they were in an all-night session. Yeah. So, 
        I mean, things were happening that day.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \389\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 128-29.

    These actions by the Ukrainian government in early 
September 2019 are significant in demonstrating President 
Zelensky's commitment to fighting corruption. Although the 
Department of Defense had certified Ukraine met its anti-
corruption benchmarks in Spring 2019, that certification 
occurred before President Zelensky's inauguration.\390\ Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Laura Cooper testified during 
her public hearing that the anti-corruption review examined the 
efforts of the Poroshenko administration and that President 
Zelensky had appointed a new Minister of Defense.\391\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \390\Deposition of Laura Cooper, in Wash., D.C., at 19, 99 (Oct. 
23, 2019).
    \391\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale, 
supra note 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As President Trump told Ambassador Sondland on September 9, 
he sought ``nothing'' from the Ukrainian government; he only 
wanted President Zelensky to ``do what he ran on.''\392\ 
President Zelensky had run on an anti-corruption platform, and 
these early aggressive actions provided confirmation that he 
was the ``real deal,'' as U.S. officials advised President 
Trump.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \392\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

12. The security assistance was ultimately disbursed to Ukraine in 
        September 2019 without any Ukrainian action to investigate 
        President Trump's political rival.

    On September 11, President Trump met with Vice President 
Pence, Senator Rob Portman, and Acting Chief of Staff Mick 
Mulvaney to discuss U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\393\ 
As recounted by NSC Senior Director Tim Morrison, the group 
discussed whether President Zelensky's progress on anti-
corruption reform--which Vice President Pence discussed during 
his bilateral meeting with President Zelensky on September 1--
was significant enough to justify releasing the aid.\394\ He 
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \393\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 242-43.
    \394\Id. at 243.

          I believe Senator Portman was relating, and I believe 
        the Vice President as well, related their view of the 
        importance of the assistance. The Vice President was 
        obviously armed with his conversation with President 
        Zelensky, and they were--they convinced the President 
        that the aid should be disbursed immediately.\395\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \395\Id.

    Following this meeting, the President decided to lift the 
pause on U.S. security assistance to Ukraine.\396\ The release 
was conveyed to the interagency the following morning.\397\ The 
U.S. disbursed this assistance without Ukraine ever acting to 
investigate President Trump's political rival.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \396\Id. at 211.
    \397\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Democrats cannot show conclusively that the Trump 
Administration lifted the pause on security assistance only as 
a result of their impeachment inquiry. In a private 
conversation with Senator Johnson on August 31, President Trump 
signaled that the aid would be released, saying then: ``We're 
reviewing it now, and you'll probably like my final 
decision.''\398\ A number of other events occurred within the 
same period. President Zelensky implemented serious anti-
corruption reforms in Ukraine and OMB conducted a review of 
foreign assistance globally and provided data on what other 
countries contribute to Ukraine. Bipartisan senators contacted 
the White House, telling the Administration that the Senate 
would act legislatively to undo the pause on security 
assistance.\399\ In fact, Senator Dick Durbin credited the 
release of the security assistance to the Senate's potential 
action.\400\ Senator Durbin said, ``It's beyond a coincidence 
that they released it the night before our vote in the 
committee.''\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \398\Letter from Sen. Johnson, supra note 138, at 5.
    \399\See Byron York, Why did Trump release Ukraine aid? The answer 
is simple, Wash. Exam., Nov. 24, 2019.
    \400\Caitlin Emma et al., Trump administration backs off hold on 
Ukraine military aid, Politico, Sept. 12, 2019.
    \401\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 * * *

    The evidence does not support the Democrats' allegation 
that President Trump sought to withhold U.S. security 
assistance to Ukraine to pressure President Zelensky to 
investigate his political rival for the President's political 
benefit. The Democrats' witnesses denied the two were linked. 
The U.S. officials never informed the Ukrainian government that 
the security assistance was delayed, and senior Ukrainian 
officials did not raise concerns to U.S. officials until after 
the delay was publicly reported. President Trump never raised 
the security assistance during his phone call with President 
Zelensky. President Zelensky never voiced concerns about 
pressure or conditionality on security assistance in any 
meetings he had with senior U.S. government officials. U.S. 
security assistance ultimately flowed to Ukraine without the 
Ukrainian government taking any action to investigate President 
Trump's political rival.

D. The evidence does not establish that President Trump set up a shadow 
        foreign policy apparatus to pressure Ukraine to investigate the 
        President's political rival for the purpose of benefiting him 
        in the 2020 election.

    Democrats allege that President Trump established an 
unauthorized, so-called ``shadow'' foreign policy apparatus to 
pressure Ukraine to investigate his political rival to benefit 
the President in the 2020 election.\402\ Democrats also alleged 
that President Trump's recall of Ambassador Yovanovitch was a 
``politically motivated'' decision to appease ``allies of 
President Trump.''\403\ Although the Constitution gives the 
President broad authority to conduct the foreign policy of the 
United States, the Democrats say that President Trump abused 
his power by disregarding the traditional State Department 
bureaucratic channels for his personal political benefit. These 
allegations fall flat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \402\Press Release, H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, Engel Floor 
Remarks on Resolution for Open Hearings on Trump's Abuse of Power (Oct. 
31, 2019); Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff) (Nov. 6, 2019, 10:58 AM), 
https://twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1192154367199260672.
    \403\Press Release, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Engel & Hoyer 
Statement on U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Masha Yovanovitch (May 7, 
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is impossible to fairly assess the facts without 
appreciating the circumstances in which they occurred. From the 
very first days of the Trump Administration--indeed even before 
it began--the unelected bureaucracy rejected President Trump 
and his policies. The self-proclaimed ``resistance'' organized 
protests and parody social media accounts, while high-level 
bureaucrats received praise from colleagues for openly defying 
the Administration's policies. Leaks of secret information 
became almost daily occurrence, including details about the 
President's sensitive conversations with foreign leaders. 
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice and FBI spent 22 months 
thoroughly investigating false allegations that the Trump 
campaign had colluded with the Russian government in the 2016 
election.
    The evidence shows that following President Zelensky's 
inauguration, the three senior U.S. officials who attended his 
inauguration--Ambassador Kurt Volker, Ambassador Gordon 
Sondland, and Secretary Rick Perry--assumed responsibility for 
shepherding the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. Contrary to 
assertions of an ``irregular'' foreign policy channel, all 
three men were senior U.S. leaders who had important official 
interests in Ukraine. The three men maintained regular 
communication with the NSC and the State Department about their 
work in Ukraine.
    Following President Zelensky's inauguration, Ambassador 
Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry sought to 
convince President Trump of Ukraine's commitment to reform. In 
that meeting, President Trump referenced Mayor Rudy Giuliani, 
who had experience in Ukraine. When President Zelensky's 
adviser Andrey Yermak asked Ambassador Volker to connect him 
with Mayor Giuliani, Ambassador Volker did so because he 
believed it would advance U.S.-Ukrainian interests. Mayor 
Giuliani informed Ambassador Volker about his communications 
with Yermak. Volker and Yermak both have said that Mayor 
Giuliani did not speak on behalf of the President in these 
discussions.
    Some pockets of the State Department and NSC grumbled that 
Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry had 
become so active in U.S.-Ukraine policy. Others criticized 
Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch's recall or fretted about Mayor 
Giuliani's involvement. Yet, despite these bureaucratic 
misgivings, there is no evidence that the involvement of 
Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, or 
Mayor Giuliani was illegal or hurt U.S. strategic interests. 
There is also no evidence that President Trump made this 
arrangement or recalled Ambassador Yovanovitch for the purpose 
of pressuring Ukraine to investigate the President's political 
rival for his benefit in the 2020 presidential election.

1. The President has broad Constitutional authority to conduct the 
        foreign policy of the United States.

    The Constitution vests the President of the United States 
with considerable authority over foreign policy.\404\ The 
President is the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces. The 
President has the power to make treaties with foreign nations, 
and he appoints and receives ``Ambassadors and other public 
ministers.''\405\ The Supreme Court has explained that the 
Constitution gives the President ``plenary and exclusive 
authority'' over the conduct of foreign affairs.\406\ The 
President is the ``sole organ of the federal government'' with 
respect to foreign affairs.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \404\U.S. Const. Art. II.
    \405\Id.
    \406\United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
320 (1936).
    \407\Id. Although the President makes treaties with the advice and 
consent of the Senate; the President alone negotiates. Cf. H. Jefferson 
Powell, The President's Authority Over Foreign Affairs: An Executive 
Branch Perspective, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 527, 546-47 (1999). Dealings 
with foreign nations require ``caution and unity of design,'' which 
depend on the President's authority to speak with ``one voice'' on 
behalf of U.S. interests. Id. at 546.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. President Trump was likely skeptical of the established national 
        security apparatus as a result of continual leaks and 
        resistance from the federal bureaucracy.

    In the wake of President Trump's electoral victory in 2016, 
he faced almost immediate intransigence from unelected--and 
often anonymous--federal employees. Since then, the 
``Resistance'' has protested President Trump and leaked 
sensitive national security information about the Trump 
Administration's policies and objectives. In this context, one 
can see how President Trump would be justifiably skeptical of 
the national security apparatus.
    Since the beginning of the Trump Administration, leaks of 
sensitive national security information have occurred at 
unprecedented rate. As the Washington Post noted, ``[e]very 
presidential administration leaks. So far, the Trump White 
House has gushed.''\408\ According to an analysis from the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in 
May 2017, the Trump Administration faced about one national 
security leak per day--flowing seven times faster in the Trump 
Administration than during the Obama or Bush 
Administrations.\409\ Unelected bureaucrats leaked details 
about President Trump's private conversations with world 
leaders and the investigation into Russian interference in the 
2016 election.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \408\Paul Farhi, The Trump administration has sprung a leak. Many 
of them, in fact, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2017.
    \409\Maj. Staff on S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 115th 
Cong., State Secrets: How An Avalanche Of Media Leaks Is Harming 
National Security (2017) [hereinafter ``HSGAC report''].
    \410\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In Kimberley Strassel's book Resistance (At All Costs), she 
described the Resistance as ``the legions of Americans who were 
resolutely opposed to the election of Trump, and who remain 
angrily determined to remove him from office.''\411\ This 
resistance included anonymous federal employees who criticized 
President Trump and his policies on parody U.S. government 
social media accounts.\412\ This resistance included high-level 
bureaucrats--including then-Acting Attorney General Sally 
Yates--who openly defied implementing Administration 
policies.\413\ The resistance included an anonymous employee 
who published an op-ed in the New York Times in September 2018 
titled, ``I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump 
Administration,'' detailing how he or she and other unelected 
bureaucrats were actively working at odds with the 
President.\414\ The op-ed earned the anonymous employee a book 
deal.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \411\Kimberley Strassel, Resistance (At All Costs): How Trump 
Haters Are Breaking America (2019).
    \412\Kimberley A. Strassel, Whistleblowers and the Real Deep State, 
Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 2019.
    \413\Id.
    \414\I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, 
N.Y. Times, Sep. 5, 2018.
    \415\Alexa Diaz, Anonymous Trump official who wrote resistance' op-
ed to publish tell-all book, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``Resistance'' extended to the U.S. national security 
apparatus as well, including FBI agents investigating unproven 
allegations of collusion between the Trump campaign and the 
Russian government.\416\ An FBI lawyer working the 
investigation, and later assigned to Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller's office, texted another FBI employee, ``Vive le 
resistance,'' in the month that President Trump was 
elected.\417\ In the week after election night, FBI Agent Peter 
Strzok and FBI lawyer Lisa Page--who were both involved in the 
Russia collusion investigation--wrote to each other: ``OMG THIS 
IS F*CKING TERRIFYING'' and ``I bought all the president's men. 
Figure I needed to brush up on watergate [sic].''\418\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \416\Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Report On The 
Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential 
Election, 1-2. Vol. 1 (2019) [hereinafter ``Mueller report''].
    \417\Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice, A Review of Various Actions 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in 
Advance of the 2016 Election, 396, 419 (2018).
    \418\Id. at 397, 400.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FBI surveilled Trump campaign associates using evidence 
delivered by Christopher Steele--a confidential human source 
funded by then-candidate Trump's political opponents and who 
admitted he was ``desperate'' that Donald Trump lose the 
election.\419\ During her deposition, Dr. Hill testified that 
Steele's reporting was likely a bogus Russia misinformation 
campaign against Steele.\420\ Yet, the FBI accepted Steele's 
information and used it to obtain surveillance warrants on 
Trump campaign associate Carter Page.\421\ Ultimately, Special 
Counsel Mueller's report concluded that the Trump campaign did 
not conspire or coordinate with Russian election interference 
actions.\422\ In considering the President's mindset, this 
context cannot be ignored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \419\F.B.I., Dep't of Just., 302 Interview with Bruce Ohr on Dec. 
19, 2016 at 3.
    \420\See Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 177-180 (``I think it 
was a rabbit hole. . . . The way that the Russians operate is that they 
will use whatever conduit they can to put out information that is both 
real and credible but that also masks a great deal of disinformation . 
. . .'').
    \421\Transcribed Interview of Sally Moyer, in Wash., D.C., at 162 
(Oct. 23, 2018).
    \422\Mueller report, supra note 416.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The President has the constitutional authority to remove Ambassador 
        Yovanovitch.

    U.S. ambassadors are the President's representatives 
abroad, serving at the pleasure of the President. Every 
ambassador interviewed during this impeachment inquiry 
recognized and appreciated this fact.\423\ Even Ambassador 
Yovanovitch understood that the President could remove any 
ambassador at any time for any reason, although she 
unsurprisingly disagreed with the reason for her removal.\424\ 
The removal of Ambassador Yovanovitch, therefore, is not per se 
evidence of wrongdoing for the President's political benefit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \423\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 19; Volker transcribed 
interview, supra note 60, at 88-89; Transcribed interview of Ambassador 
Michael McKinley, in Wash., D.C., at 37 (Oct. 16, 2019) [hereinafter 
``McKinley transcribed interview'']; Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 
115, at 23; Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 297; Hale deposition, 
supra note 230, at 38.
    \424\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 23. Evidence 
suggests that Ambassador Yovanovitch took steps to gain the President's 
trust. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent testified that 
Ambassador Yovanovitch taped videos in which she proclaimed support for 
the Trump Administration's foreign policies. Kent deposition, supra 
note 65, at 118-19. Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that she sought 
Ambassador Sondland's guidance on how to address negative news reports 
critical of her work as Ambassador to Ukraine. She said that Ambassador 
Sondland told her to ``go big or go home'' in publicly supporting the 
President. Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 267-28, 306-07. 
Ambassador Sondland, however, testified that he did not recall advising 
Ambassador Yovanovitch to make a public statement. Sondland deposition, 
supra note 51, at 58-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Evidence suggests that President Trump likely had concerns 
about Ambassador Yovanovitch's ability to represent him in 
Ukraine,\425\ and that then-Ukrainian President Poroshenko had 
authorized an effort to criticize Ambassador Yovanovitch.\426\ 
Ambassador Volker testified that he had no firsthand knowledge 
of Ambassador Yovanovitch criticizing the President; however, 
he said that ``President Trump would understandably be 
concerned if that was true because you want to have trust and 
confidence in your Ambassadors.''\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \425\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
    \426\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 232.
    \427\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite recognizing the President's prerogative to dismiss 
ambassadors, some in the U.S. foreign policy apparatus voiced 
concerns about Ambassador Yovanovitch's removal. Ambassador 
McKinley testified that he resigned from the State Department 
because he believed that it failed to protect its 
diplomats.\428\ However, Ambassador McKinley did not resign 
when he first learned that Ambassador Yovanovitch had been 
called home, despite knowing that she had been recalled.\429\ 
He only resigned months later, after the whistleblower's 
account and the President's comments to President Zelensky 
about Ambassador Yovanovitch during the July 25 call transcript 
became public.\430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \428\McKinley transcribed interview, supra note 423, at 20, 24-25.
    \429\Id. at 33-34.
    \430\Id. at 35-36. See also Karen DeYoung, Senior adviser to Pompeo 
resigns, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that her removal from Kyiv 
had little effect on her career with the State Department. Her 
post was scheduled to end only a matter of weeks after her 
recall.\431\ Although she had considered extending her tour, a 
decision had not been officially made.\432\ Ambassador 
Yovanovitch explained that she had been planning to retire 
following her tour in Ukraine and ``[s]o I don't think from a 
State Department point of view [the recall] has had any 
effect.''\433\ The recall also did not affect her 
compensation.\434\ Ambassador Yovanovitch explained that the 
State Department was helpful in securing her a position with 
Georgetown University.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \431\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 114-16, 140.
    \432\Id. at 22, 114-16, 122.
    \433\Id. at 139-40.
    \434\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, supra note 
4.
    \435\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 139.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry were all 
        senior U.S. government officers with official interests in 
        Ukraine policy.

    Contrary to allegations that President Trump orchestrated a 
``shadow'' foreign policy channel to pressure Ukraine to 
investigate his political rival, evidence shows that the U.S. 
interactions with Ukraine were led by senior U.S. officials. 
These officials, Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and 
Secretary Perry, had attended President Zelensky's inauguration 
in May 2019 and all had official interests in U.S. policy 
toward Ukraine.
    Ambassador Volker explained that ``we viewed ourselves as 
having been empowered as a Presidential delegation to go there, 
meet, make an assessment [of whether President Zelensky was a 
legitimate anti-corruption reformer], and report'' to President 
Trump.\436\ He said that they assumed responsibility to 
``shepherd this [U.S.-Ukrainian] relationship together as best 
we could.''\437\ The delegation assumed this responsibility at 
a time when the U.S. government lacked an experienced chief of 
mission in Kyiv.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \436\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 206.
    \437\Id. at 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Importantly, cutting against the idea of a ``shadow'' 
channel, each of these three men had an official role with 
respect to U.S. policy toward Ukraine.\438\ Ambassador Volker 
described his role as the Special Representative for Ukraine 
Negotiations as ``supporting democracy and reform in Ukraine, 
helping Ukraine better defend itself and deter Russian 
aggression, and leading U.S. negotiating efforts to end the war 
and restore Ukraine's territorial integrity.''\439\ As 
Ambassador to the European Union, Ambassador Sondland said that 
Ukraine issues were ``central'' to his responsibilities.\440\ 
In addition, the Department of Energy, led by Secretary Perry, 
has significant equities in energy policies in Ukraine.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \438\See Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes, 
supra note 210.
    \439\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 13.
    \440\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 20. During her 
deposition, Dr. Hill testified that Ambassador Sondland told her that 
President Trump had ``given him broad authority on all things related 
to Europe, that he was the President's point man on Europe.'' Hill 
deposition, supra note 12, at 60. Dr. Hill later acknowledged it that 
Ambassador Sondland could have been exaggerating, explaining that she 
often saw Ambassador Sondland coming out of West Wing saying he was 
seeing the President but she learned later that he was really seeing 
other staff. Id. at 204.
    \441\James Osborne, What Rick Perry was doing in Ukraine, Houston 
Chronicle, Oct. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the absence of a seasoned chief of mission in Kyiv--
before Ambassador Taylor's arrival--these three individuals 
assumed responsibility following President Zelensky's 
inauguration for shepherding U.S. engagement with President 
Zelensky's government. That each individual had an official 
interest in U.S. policy toward Ukraine undercuts the notion 
that they engaged in ``shadow'' diplomacy for illegitimate 
purposes.

5. Referencing Ukrainian corruption, President Trump told Ambassador 
        Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry to talk to 
        Mayor Giuliani.

    Evidence suggests that Mayor Giuliani's negative assessment 
of President Zelensky may have reinforced President Trump's 
existing skepticism about Ukraine and its history of 
corruption. In May 2019, Mayor Giuliani said that President-
elect Zelensky was ``surrounded by enemies'' of President 
Trump.\442\ When the U.S. delegation to President Zelensky's 
inauguration later tried to assure President Trump that 
President Zelensky was different, the President referenced 
Mayor Giuliani as someone knowledgeable about Ukrainian 
corruption and told the men to talk to Mayor Giuliani.\443\ 
Testimony differs, however, on whether the President's 
reference to Mayor Giuliani was a direction or an aside. Either 
way, because President Trump--constitutionally, the nation's 
``sole organ of foreign affairs''\444\--raised Mayor Giuliani 
as someone knowledgeable about Ukraine, this arrangement is not 
evidence of an unsanctioned and nefarious ``shadow'' foreign 
policy apparatus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \442\See Charles Creitz, Giuliani cancels Ukraine trip, says he'd 
be walking into a group of people that are enemies of the US,' Fox 
News, May 11, 2019.
    \443\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 25. According to public 
reports, Mayor Giuliani has over a decade of experience working in 
Ukraine. See, e.g., Rosalind S. Helderman et al., Impeachment Inquiry 
Puts New Focus on Giuliani's Work for Prominent Figures in Ukraine, 
Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 2019.
    \444\Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On May 23, the U.S. delegation to President Zelensky's 
inauguration briefed President Trump about their impressions of 
President Zelensky. Ambassador Sondland testified that the 
President relayed concerns about Ukrainian corruption, saying 
``Ukraine is a problem,'' ``tried to take me down,'' and ``talk 
to Rudy.''\445\ During his transcribed interview, Ambassador 
Volker elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \445\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 61-62, 75.

          Q. And can you describe the discussion--
          A. Yes.
          Q. --that occurred?
          A Yes. The President started the meeting and started 
        with kind of a negative assessment of the Ukraine. As 
        I've said earlier--
          Q. Yep.
          A. --it's a terrible place, all corrupt, terrible 
        people, just dumping on Ukraine.
          Q. And they were out to get me in 2016.
          A. And they were out to get--and they tried to take 
        me down.
          Q. In 2016?
          A. Yes. And each of us took turns from this 
        delegation giving our point of view, which was that 
        this is a new crowd, it's a new President, he is 
        committed to doing the right things. I believe I said, 
        he agrees with you. That's why he got elected. It is a 
        terrible place, and he campaigned on cleaning it up, 
        and that's why the Ukrainian people supported him.
          So, you know, we strongly encouraged him to engage 
        with this new President because he's committed to 
        fighting all of those things that President Trump was 
        complaining about.
          Q. And how did the President react?
          A. He just didn't believe it. He was skeptical. And 
        he also said, that's not what I hear. I hear, you know, 
        he's got some terrible people around him. And he 
        referenced that he hears from Mr. Giuliani as part of 
        that.
          Q. Can you explain a little bit more about what the 
        President said about Rudy Giuliani in that meeting?
          A. He said that's not what I hear. I hear a whole 
        bunch of other things. And I don't know how he phrased 
        it with Rudy, but it was--I think he said, not as an 
        instruction but just as a comment, talk to Rudy, you 
        know. He knows all of these things, and they've got 
        some bad people around him. And that was the nature of 
        it. It was clear that he also had other sources. It 
        wasn't only Rudy Giuliani. I don't know who those might 
        be, but he--or at least he said, I hear from 
        people.\446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \446\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 304-05. Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Kent testified that Dr. Hill relayed to him that 
President Trump had conversations with Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister 
of Hungary, and Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, which he said 
may have also colored President Trump's view of Ukraine. Kent 
deposition, supra note 65, at 253-54.

    In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker reiterated that 
he did not understand the President's comment, ``talk to 
Rudy,'' to be a direction.\447\ He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \447\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.

          I didn't take it as an instruction. I want to be 
        clear about that. He said: That's not what I hear. You 
        know, when we were giving him our assessment about 
        President Zelensky and where Ukraine is headed: That's 
        not what I hear. I hear terrible things. He's got 
        terrible people around him. Talk to Rudy. And I 
        understood, in that context, him just saying that's 
        where he hears it from. I didn't take it as an 
        instruction.''\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \448\Id.

    Ambassador Sondland, however, in both his closed-door 
deposition and his public testimony, characterized the 
President's comment as a ``direction.''\449\ In an interview 
with the Wall Street Journal, Energy Secretary Rick Perry 
stated that he called Mayor Giuliani following the May 23 
meeting, and that Mayor Giuliani told him ``to be careful with 
regards'' to President Zelensky.\450\ Secretary Perry said ``he 
never heard the president, any of his appointees, Mr. Giuliani, 
or the Ukrainian regime discuss the possibility of specifically 
investigating former Vice President Joe Biden, a Democratic 
presidential contender, and his son Hunter Biden.''\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \449\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note 
56; Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 25-26.
    \450\Timothy Puko & Rebecca Ballhaus, Rick Perry called Rudy 
Giuliani at Trump's direction on Ukraine concerns, Wall St. J., Oct. 
16, 2019.
    \451\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. At the Ukrainian government's request, Ambassador Volker connected 
        them with Mayor Giuliani to change his impression about the 
        Zelensky regime.

    Evidence shows that the Ukrainian government, and 
specifically Zelensky adviser Andrey Yermak, initiated contact 
with Mayor Giuliani--and not the other way around--to attempt 
to refute Mayor Giuliani's views about President Zelensky. 
Yermak later told Bloomberg that he had informed both 
Republicans and Democrats in Congress in July 2019 that he 
planned to engage with Mayor Giuliani and heard no 
objections.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \452\Baker & Krasnolutska, supra note 280.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Ambassador Volker, in May 2019, he ``became 
concerned that a negative narrative about Ukraine fueled by 
assertions made by Ukraine's departing prosecutor general'' was 
reaching President Trump via Mayor Giuliani.\453\ In July, 
Ambassador Volker shared his concerns with Yermak, who asked 
Ambassador Volker to connect him with Mayor Giuliani 
directly.\454\ Ambassador Volker explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \453\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 18.
    \454\Id.; see also id. at 137-38.

          After sharing my concerns with the Ukrainian 
        leadership, an adviser to President Zelensky asked me 
        to connect him to the President's personal lawyer, 
        Mayor Rudy Giuliani. I did so. I did so solely because 
        I understood that the new Ukrainian leadership wanted 
        to convince those, like Mayor Giuliani, who believed 
        such a negative narrative about Ukraine, that times 
        have changed and that, under President Zelensky, 
        Ukraine is worthy of U.S. support. I also made clear to 
        the Ukrainians on a number of occasions that Mayor 
        Giuliani is a private citizen and the President's 
        personal lawyer and that he does not represent the 
        United States Government.\455\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \455\Id. at 18.

    Ambassador Volker was clear during his transcribed 
interview that his action connecting Yermak with Mayor Giuliani 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
was in the best interests of the United States. He testified:

          Q. And so any of the facts here, you connecting Mr. 
        Giuliani with Mr. Yermak and to the extent you were 
        facilitating Mr. Giuliani's communication with anybody 
        in the Ukraine, you were operating under the best 
        interests of the United States?
          A. Absolutely.
          Q. And to the extent Mr. Giuliani is tight with the 
        President, has a good relationship with him, has the 
        ability to influence him, is it fair to say that, at 
        times, it was in the U.S.'s interest to have Mr. 
        Giuliani connecting with these Ukrainian officials?
          A. Yes. I would say it this way: It was I think in 
        the U.S. interest for the information that was reaching 
        the President to be accurate and fresh and coming from 
        the right people. And if some of what Mr. Giuliani 
        believed or heard from, for instance, the former 
        [Ukrainian] Prosecutor General Lutsenko was self-
        serving, inaccurate, wrong, et cetera, I think 
        correcting that perception that he has is important, 
        because to the extent that the President does hear from 
        him, as he would, you don't want this dissonant 
        information reaching the President.\456\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \456\Id. at 69-70.

    In an interview with Bloomberg, Yermak explained that he 
sought to engage with Mayor Giuliani to ``dispel the notion 
that the new Ukraine government was corrupt.''\457\ Yermak said 
the Zelensky regime was ``surprised'' that Mayor Giuliani 
believed them to be ``enemies of the U.S.'' and they sought to 
ask Mayor Giuliani directly why he believed that.\458\ Yermak 
recounted how, before his engaged with Mayor Giuliani, he 
sought bipartisan feedback from Congress about this 
approach.\459\ He said that he spoke with ``the top national 
security advisers to the minority and majority leaders in both 
the U.S. House and Senate'' and told them that ``he planned to 
talk to [Mayor] Giuliani to explain the nation's reform agenda 
and to urge him not to communicate with Ukraine through the 
media.''\460\ Yermak recalled, ``Everyone said: `good 
idea.'''\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \457\Baker & Krasnolutska, supra note 280.
    \458\Id.
    \459\Id.
    \460\Id.
    \461\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. The Ukrainian government understood that Mayor Giuliani was not 
        speaking on behalf of President Trump.

    Ambassador Volker was the chief interlocutor with the 
Ukrainian government. He described himself as someone who had 
the Ukrainian government's trust and who offered them counsel 
on how to address the negative narrative about Ukrainian 
corruption.\462\ Ambassador Volker testified that the Ukrainian 
government did not view Mayor Giuliani as President Trump's 
``agent'' on whose behalf he spoke.\463\ Instead, the 
Ukrainians saw Mayor Giuliani as a one-way method for conveying 
information to President Trump about President Zelensky's 
commitment to reform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \462\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 168-69.
    \463\Id. at 116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under examination by House Intelligence Committee Chairman 
Adam Schiff in his closed-door deposition, Ambassador Volker 
was resolute that the Ukrainian government saw Mayor Giuliani 
as someone who ``had the President's ear,'' not someone who 
spoke for the President. He explained:

          Q. You understood that the Ukrainians recognized that 
        Rudy Giuliani represented the President, that he was an 
        agent of the President, that he was a direct channel to 
        the President. Ukrainian officials you were dealing 
        with would have understood that, would they not?
          A. I would not say that they thought of him as an 
        agent, but that he was a way of communicating, that you 
        could get something to Giuliani and he would be someone 
        who would be talking to the President anyway, so it 
        would flow information that way.
          Q. So this was someone who had the President's ear?
          A. Yes. That's fair.\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \464\Id. (emphasis added).

    In his public testimony, Ambassador Volker reiterated that 
Mayor Giuliani was not speaking on the President's behalf. He 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained:

          I made clear to the Ukrainians that Mayor Giuliani 
        was a private citizen, the President's personal lawyer, 
        and not representing the U.S. Government. Likewise, in 
        my conversations with Mayor Giuliani, I never 
        considered him to be speaking on the President's 
        behalf, or giving instructions. Rather, the information 
        flow was the other way, from Ukraine to Mayor Giuliani, 
        in the hopes that this would clear up the information 
        reaching President Trump.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \465\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.

    During her closed-door deposition, Dr. Hill confirmed this 
assessment, explaining that she could not say that Mayor 
Giuliani was acting on President Trump's behalf.\466\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \466\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 424-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Andrey Yermak, in an August 2019 New York Times article, 
said it was also not clear to him whether Mayor Giuliani was 
speaking on behalf of President Trump.\467\ According to the 
Times, Mayor Giuliani ``explicitly stated that he was not'' 
speaking on behalf of the President.\468\ President Trump 
confirmed this fact in a November 2019 interview, explaining 
that he did not direct Mayor Giuliani's Ukraine 
activities.\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \467\Kramer & Vogel, supra note 176.
    \468\Id.
    \469\Daniel Chaitin, `I didn't direct him': Trump denies sending 
Giuliani to Ukraine, Wash. Exam., Nov. 26, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry kept the 
        National Security Council and the State Department informed 
        about their actions.

    As Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary 
Perry engaged with Ukrainian government officials, they 
maintained communications with the State Department and NSC. 
This coordination undercuts any notion that President Trump 
orchestrated a ``shadow'' foreign policy apparatus to work 
outside of the State Department or NSC.
    Ambassador Volker testified that ``while executing my 
duties, I kept my colleagues at the State Department and 
National Security Council informed and also briefed Congress 
about my actions.''\470\ Ambassador Volker and Ambassador 
Sondland also communicated regularly with Ambassador Bill 
Taylor once he became the charge d'affaires, a.i., in 
Kyiv.\471\ These briefings went as high as the Counselor to the 
Secretary of State, Ulrich Brechbuhl.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \470\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 19.
    \471\See generally text messages exchanged between Kurt Volker and 
Gordon Sondland [KV00000036-39].
    \472\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his public testimony, Ambassador Sondland explained that 
it was ``no secret'' what he, Ambassador Volker, and Secretary 
Perry were doing. As he stated, ``[w]e kept the NSC apprised of 
our efforts, including specifically our efforts to secure a 
public statement from the Ukrainians that would satisfy 
President Trump's concerns.''\473\ Ambassador Sondland 
testified that ``everyone was in the loop,'' although he 
conceded that he ``presumed'' a connection between 
investigations and security assistance without speaking to 
President Trump, Acting Chief of Staff Mulvaney, or Mayor 
Giuliani.\474\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \473\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, supra note 
56.
    \474\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. Although some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment bristled, the 
        roles of Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary 
        Perry and their interactions with Mayor Giuliani did not 
        violate the law or harm national security.

    Evidence suggests that some in the U.S. foreign policy 
establishment disliked the involvement of Ambassador Volker, 
Ambassador Sondland, and Secretary Perry in the U.S.-Ukrainian 
relationship. Some also expressed discomfort with Mayor 
Giuliani's interactions with Ukrainian officials. However, the 
use of private citizens, such as Mayor Giuliani, to assist 
effectuating U.S. foreign policy goals on specific issues is 
not per se inappropriate and the Democrats' witnesses testified 
that the use of private citizens can sometimes beneficial. 
There is no evidence that the arrangement here violated any 
laws or harmed national security.
    Some of the Democrats' witnesses criticized the non-
traditional diplomacy. Ambassador Taylor testified about his 
concern for what he characterized as ``two channels'' of U.S. 
policy-making in Ukraine: a regular, State Department channel 
and an ``irregular, informal'' channel featuring Ambassador 
Volker, Ambassador Sondland, Secretary Perry, and Mayor 
Giuliani.\475\ Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent testified that 
he was concerned that discussions were occurring outside the 
``formal policy process.''\476\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \475\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 23-24.
    \476\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 266-67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dr. Hill, too, disapproved of a non-traditional channel of 
communication, testifying that she disagreed with Ambassador 
Volker's decision to engage with Mayor Giuliani.\477\ Dr. Hill 
characterized Ambassador Sondland's conduct as a ``domestic 
political errand.''\478\ However, by the time that Dr. Hill 
left the NSC on July 19, Ambassador Volker had only met with 
Mayor Giuliani once and Ambassador Sondland had never 
communicated with him.\479\ Mayor Giuliani did not meet with 
the Ukrainian government until early August.\480\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \477\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 113-14. Ambassador Sondland 
recounted that when he met with Dr. Hill prior to her departure from 
the White House in mid-July, she was ``pretty upset about her role'' in 
the Administration and so mad that Ambassador Sondland said he had 
``never seen anyone so upset.'' Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 
266-67, 307. In her public testimony, Dr. Hill explained that she was 
angry with Ambassador Sondland for not coordinating with her 
sufficiently. Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes, 
supra note 210.
    \478\Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes, 
supra note 210.
    \479\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon 
Sondland, supra note 56.
    \480\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite this criticism, Ambassador Volker said that 
Ambassador Taylor never raised concerns to him about an 
``irregular'' foreign policy channel.\481\ The Democrats' 
witnesses also explained that unorthodox foreign policy 
channels are not unusual and can actually be helpful to advance 
U.S. interests. Ambassador Taylor testified that non-
traditional channels of diplomacy ``can be helpful.''\482\ 
Ambassador Volker testified that he always operated with the 
best interests of the U.S. in mind and to advance ``U.S. 
foreign policy goals with respect to Ukraine.''\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \481\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.
    \482\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 177.
    \483\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 15, 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The impeachment inquiry has uncovered no clear evidence 
that President Trump directed Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
Sondland, and Secretary Perry to work with Mayor Giuliani for 
the purpose of pressuring Ukraine to investigate his political 
rival. In fact, the evidence suggests that the White House 
actively worked to stop potential impropriety. When Mayor 
Giuliani attempted to obtain a visa for former Ukrainian 
Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin to travel to the U.S. in 
January 2019, the White House shut down the effort.\484\ The 
State Department had denied Shokin's visa and Mayor Giuliani 
apparently appealed to the White House.\485\ According to 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent, in settling the matter, White 
House senior advisor Rob Blair said: ``I heard what I need to 
know to protect the interest of the President.''\486\ Shokin 
did not receive a visa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \484\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 48-49.
    \485\Id. at 48-49.
    \486\Id. at 143.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 * * *

    The evidence does not support the Democrats' allegation 
that President Trump set up a shadow foreign policy apparatus 
to pressure Ukraine to investigate the President's political 
rival for his political benefit in the 2020 election. The 
Constitution vests the President with broad authority over U.S. 
foreign relations. The U.S. officials accused of conducting 
``shadow'' foreign policy--Ambassador Volker, Ambassador 
Sondland, and Secretary Perry--were all senior leaders with 
official interests in Ukraine who informed the State Department 
and NSC of their actions. Mayor Giuliani, whom President Trump 
referenced in the May 23 meeting with these three U.S. 
officials, also had experience in Ukraine.
    The Ukrainian government asked Ambassador Volker to connect 
them with Mayor Giuliani to help change Mayor Giuliani's 
skeptical view of President Zelensky and ``clear up'' 
information flowing to the President. The Ukrainian government 
saw Mayor Giuliani as someone who had the President's ear but 
they did not see him as speaking on behalf of the President. 
While some in the U.S. foreign policy establishment disagreed 
with these actions, there is no indication it harmed national 
security or violated any laws. Notably, Ambassador Volker said 
he operated at all times with the U.S. national interest in 
mind. Ultimately, Ukraine took no actions to investigate 
President Trump's political rival.

E. President Trump is not wrong to raise questions about Hunter Biden's 
        role with Burisma or Ukrainian government officials' efforts to 
        influence the 2016 campaign.

    Democrats allege that President Trump and Mayor Giuliani 
are spreading ``conspiracy theories'' by raising questions 
about Hunter Biden's role on the board of Burisma and certain 
Ukrainian government officials' efforts to influence the 2016 
election.\487\ The evidence available, however, shows that 
there are legitimate, unanswered questions about both issues. 
As Ukraine implements anti-corruption reforms, it is 
appropriate for the country to examine these allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \487\See, e.g., Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Gordon Sondland, 
supra note 56; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and 
Mr. George Kent, supra note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Democrats' witnesses described how Burisma has long 
been a subject of controversy in Ukraine. The company's 
founder, Mykola Zlochevsky, was Ukraine's Minister of Ecology 
and Natural Resources from 2010 to 2012. In that role, he 
allegedly granted Burisma licenses for certain mineral 
deposits. Hunter Biden and other well-connected Democrats 
joined Burisma's board at a time when the company faced 
criticism. Hunter Biden's role on Burisma was concerning enough 
to the Obama State Department that it raised the issue with 
Vice President Biden's office and even prepared Ambassador 
Yovanovitch for a potential question on the topic at her 
confirmation hearing in 2016.
    The extent of Ukraine's involvement in the 2016 election 
draws a much more visceral denial from Democrats, despite harsh 
rhetoric from prominent Democrats condemning foreign 
interference in U.S. election. It is undisputed that the then-
Ukraine Ambassador to the U.S. authored an op-ed criticizing 
candidate Trump in U.S. media at the height of the presidential 
campaign. It is undisputed that senior Ukrainian officials made 
negative and critical comments about candidate Trump. In 
addition, a well-researched January 2017 article in Politico 
chronicles attempts by some Ukrainian government officials to 
harm candidate Trump. The article quotes a former DNC 
contractor and Ukrainian embassy staffer to show how the 
Ukrainian embassy worked with Democrat operatives and the media 
to hurt President Trump's candidacy.

1. It is appropriate for Ukraine to investigate allegations of 
        corruption in its country.

    As Ukraine adopts anti-corruption reforms, the United 
States has encouraged the country's leaders to investigate and 
prosecute corruption. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian Affairs George Kent described Ukraine's 
corruption problem as ``serious'' and said corruption has long 
been ``part of the high-level dialogue'' between the United 
States and Ukraine.\488\ Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, the 
former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, testified that in Ukraine 
``corruption is not just prevalent, but frankly is the 
system.''\489\ Although Ukraine has established various anti-
corruption prosecutors, courts, and investigative agencies to 
address the pervasive problem, corruption remains a 
problem.\490\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \488\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 105, 151.
    \489\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 18.
    \490\Id. at 79-80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Democrats' witnesses testified that it is appropriate 
for Ukraine to investigate allegations of corruption, including 
allegations about Burisma and 2016 election influence. Dr. 
Fiona Hill, Senior Director for Europe at the NSC, explained 
that it is ``not actually . . . completely ridiculous'' for 
President Zelensky's administration to investigate allegations 
of corruption arising from prior Ukrainian 
administrations.\491\ Ambassador Volker testified that he 
``always thought [it] was fine'' for Ukraine to investigate 
allegations about 2016 election influence.\492\ Ambassador 
Yovanovitch testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \491\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 394.
    \492\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 146.

          Q. Ambassador Volker mentioned the fact that to the 
        extent there are corrupt Ukrainians and the United 
        States is advocating for the Ukraine to investigate 
        themselves, that certainly would be an appropriate 
        initiative for U.S. officials to advocate for. Is that 
        right?
          A. If that's what took place.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \493\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 294.

    With President Trump's deep-seated and genuine concern 
about corruption in Ukraine, it is not unreasonable that he 
would raise two examples of concern in a conversation with 
President Zelensky. Democrats are fundamentally wrong to argue 
that President Trump urged President Zelensky to 
``manufacture'' or ``dig up'' ``dirt'' by raising these issues. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Ambassador Volker testified:

          Q. Would you say that President Trump in the phone 
        call--and you've read the transcript and you're 
        familiar with all the parties--was asking President 
        Zelensky to manufacture dirt on the Bidens?
          A. No. And I've seen that phrase thrown around a lot. 
        And I think there's a difference between the 
        manufacture or dig up dirt versus finding out did 
        anything happen in the 2016 campaign or did anything 
        happen with Burisma. I think--or even if he's asking 
        them to investigate the Bidens, it is to find out what 
        facts there may be rather than to manufacture 
        something.
          Q. It is not an accurate statement of what the 
        President was asking Ukraine to sum it up as saying 
        that President Trump was asking Ukraine to manufacture 
        dirt?
          A. Yeah, I agree with that.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \494\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 212-213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. There are legitimate concerns surrounding Hunter Biden's position on 
        the board of Ukrainian energy company Burisma during his 
        father's term as Vice President of the United States.

    Burisma Holdings had a reputation in Ukraine as a corrupt 
company.\495\ The company was founded by Mykola Zlochevsky, who 
served as Ukraine's Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources 
from 2010 to 2012.\496\ During Zlochevsky's tenure in the 
Ukrainian government, Burisma received oil exploration licenses 
without public auctions.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \495\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 83.
    \496\Paul Sonne & Laura Mills, Ukrainians see conflict in Biden's 
anticorruption message, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 2015.
    \497\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the New York Times, Hunter Biden and two other 
well-connected Democrats--Christopher Heinz, then-Secretary of 
State John Kerry's stepson, and Devon Archer--``were part of a 
broad effort by Burisma to bring in well-connected Democrats 
during a period when the company was facing investigations 
backed not just by domestic Ukrainian forces but by officials 
in the Obama administration.''\498\ Hunter Biden joined 
Burisma's board when his father, Vice President Joe Biden, 
acted as the Obama Administration's point person on 
Ukraine.\499\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \498\Kenneth P. Vogel & Iuliia Mendel, Biden faces conflicts of 
interest questions that are being promoted by Trump and allies, N.Y. 
Times, May 1, 2019.
    \499\Adam Taylor, Hunter Biden's new job at a Ukrainian gas company 
is a problem for U.S. soft power, Wash. Post, May 14, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The appearance of a conflict of interest raised concerns 
during the Obama Administration. In May 2014, the Washington 
Post reported ``[t]he appointment of the vice president's son 
to a Ukrainian oil board looks nepotistic at best, nefarious at 
worst. No matter how qualified Biden is, it ties into the idea 
that U.S. foreign policy is self-interested, and that's a 
narrative Vladimir Putin has pushed during Ukraine's 
crisis.''\500\ The Post likened Hunter Biden's position with 
Burisma to ``children of Russian politicians'' who take 
``executive positions in companies at the top of the Forbes 500 
list, and China's `princelings' [who] have a similar 
habit.''\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \500\Id.
    \501\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent testified 
that while he served as acting Deputy Chief of Mission in Kyiv 
in early 2015, he raised concerns directly to Vice President 
Biden's office about Hunter Biden's service on Burisma's 
board.\502\ Kent said that the ``message'' he received back was 
that because Vice President Biden's elder son, Beau, was dying 
of brain cancer at the time, there was no ``bandwidth'' to deal 
with any other family issues.\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \502\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 226-27.
    \503\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In December 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported that 
Ukrainian anti-corruption activists complained that Vice 
President Biden's anti-corruption message ``is being undermined 
as his son receives money'' from Zlochevsky.\504\ According to 
the Journal, ``some anticorruption campaigners here [in Kyiv] 
worry the link with Mr. Biden may protect Mr. Zlochevsky from 
being prosecuted in Ukraine.''\505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \504\Sonne & Mills, supra, note 496.
    \505\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ambassador Yovanovitch testified that the Obama State 
Department actually prepared her to address Hunter Biden's role 
on Burisma if she received a question about it during her 
Senate confirmation hearing to be ambassador to Ukraine in June 
2016. She explained:

          Q. And you may have mentioned this when we were 
        speaking before lunch, but when did the issues related 
        to Burisma first get to your attention? Was that as 
        soon as you arrived in country?
          A. Not really. I first became aware of it when I was 
        being prepared for my Senate confirmation hearing. So 
        I'm sure you're familiar with the concept of questions 
        and answer and various other things. And so there was 
        one there about Burisma, and so, you know, that's when 
        I first heard that word.
          Q. Were there any other companies that were mentioned 
        in connection with Burisma?
          A. I don't recall.
          Q. And was it in the general sense of corruption, 
        there was a company bereft with corruption?
          A. The way the question was phrased in this model Q&A 
        was, what can you tell us about Hunter Biden's, you 
        know, being named to the board of Burisma?

                                 * * *

          Q. Did anyone at the State Department--when you were 
        coming on board as the new ambassador, did anyone at 
        the State Department brief you about this tricky issue, 
        that Hunter Biden was on the board of this company and 
        the company suffered from allegations of corruption, 
        and provide you guidance?
          A. Well, there was that Q&A that I mentioned.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \506\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 150-53.

    According to testimony, the Obama State Department actually 
took steps to prevent the U.S. government from associating with 
Burisma. In his closed-door deposition, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Kent recounted a story about how he stopped a 
taxpayer-funded partnership with Burisma in mid-2016.\507\ He 
said he learned that Burisma sought to cosponsor a U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) program to encourage 
Ukrainian school children to develop ideas for clean 
energy.\508\ Kent said he advised USAID not to work with 
Burisma due to its reputation for corruption.\509\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \507\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 88, 102-03.
    \508\Id. at 103
    \509\Id. at 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    U.S. law enforcement in the past has examined employment 
arrangements in which a company hires a seemingly unqualified 
individual to influence government action. In 2016, the Obama 
Justice Department fined a Hong Kong subsidiary of a 
multinational bank for a scheme similar to Burisma's use of 
Hunter Biden and other well-connected Democrats.\510\ There, 
the company hired otherwise unqualified candidates to 
``influence'' officials toward favorable business 
outcomes.\511\ At the time, then-Assistant Attorney General 
Leslie Caldwell explained that ``[a]warding prestigious 
employment opportunities to unqualified individuals in order to 
influence government officials is corruption, plain and 
simple.''\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \510\Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, JPMorgan's Investment 
Bank in Hong Kong Agrees to Pay $72 Million Penalty for Corrupt Hiring 
Scheme in China (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
jpmorgan-s-investment-bank-hong-kong-agrees-pay-72-million-penalty-
corrupt-hiring-scheme.
    \511\Id.
    \512\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During their public testimony, Democrat witnesses testified 
that Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board of directors 
created the potential for the appearance of a conflict of 
interest. LTC Vindman testified that Hunter Biden did not 
appear qualified to serve on Burisma's board.\513\ Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Kent explained that the issues surrounding 
Burisma were worthy of investigation by Ukrainian 
authorities.\514\ Kent testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \513\Impeachment Inquiry: LTC Alexander Vindman and Ms. Jennifer 
Williams, supra note 6.
    \514\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor and Mr. 
George Kent, supra note 2.

          Q. But given Hunter Biden's role on Burisma's board 
        of directors, at some point, you testified in your 
        deposition that you expressed some concern to the Vice 
        President's office. Is that correct?
          A. That is correct.
          Q. And what did they do about that concern that you 
        expressed?
          A. I have no idea. I reported my concern to the 
        Office of the Vice President.
          Q. Okay. That was the end of it? Nobody--
          A. Sir, you would have to ask people who worked in 
        the Office of the Vice President during 2015.
          Q. But after you expressed a concern of a perceived 
        conflict of interest, at the least, the Vice 
        President's engagement in the Ukraine didn't decrease, 
        did it?
          A. Correct, because the Vice President was promoting 
        U.S. policy objectives in Ukraine.
          Q. And Hunter Biden's role on the board of Burisma 
        didn't cease, did it?
          A. To the best of my knowledge, it didn't. And my 
        concern was that there was the possibility of a 
        perception of a conflict of interest.\515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \515\Id.

    Similarly, in her public testimony, Ambassador Yovanovitch 
agreed that concerns about Hunter Biden's presence on Burisma's 
board were legitimate. In an exchange with Rep. Ratcliffe, she 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:

          Q. You understood from Deputy Assistant Secretary 
        George Kent's testimony, as it's been related to you 
        that he testified a few days ago, do you understand 
        that that arrangement, Hunter Biden's role on the 
        Burisma board, caused him enough concern that, as he 
        testified in his statement, that ``in February of 2015, 
        I raised my concern that Hunter Biden's status as a 
        board member could create the perception of a conflict 
        of interest.'' Then he went on to talk about the Vice 
        President's responsibilities over the Ukraine--or over 
        Ukraine--Ukrainian policy as one of those factors. Do 
        you recall that?
          A. Yes.
          Q. Did you ever--do you agree with that?
          A. Yes.
          Q. That it was a legitimate concern to raise?
          A. I think that it could raise the appearance of a 
        conflict of interest.

                                 * * *

          Q. But the legitimate concern about Hunter Biden's 
        role was legitimate, correct?
          A. I think it creates a concern that there could be 
        an appearance of conflict of interest.\516\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \516\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, supra note 
4.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During her public testimony, Dr. Hill testified:

          Q. Dr. Hill, you told us during your deposition that, 
        indeed, that there are perceived conflict of interest 
        troubles when the child of a government official is 
        involved with something that government official has an 
        official policy role in, correct?
          A. I think any family member of any member of the 
        U.S. Government, Congress or the Senate, is open to all 
        kinds of questions about optics and of perhaps undue 
        outside influence, if they take part in any kind of 
        activity that could be misconstrued as being related to 
        their parent or the family member's work. So as a 
        matter of course, yes, I do think that's the case.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \517\Impeachment Inquiry: Dr. Fiona Hill and Mr. David Holmes, 
supra note 210.

    Despite this evidence, House Intelligence Committee 
Chairman Adam Schiff has prevented Republican Members from 
fully assessing the role of Hunter Biden on Burisma's board of 
directors. Chairman Schiff refused to invite Hunter Biden and 
Devon Archer to testify during public hearings.\518\ Chairman 
Schiff declined to concur with a Republican subpoena for Hunter 
Biden to testify in a closed-door deposition.\519\ Chairman 
Schiff declined to concur with a Republican subpoena for 
documents relating to Hunter Biden's role on Burisma.\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \518\See, e.g., Allan Smith, Democrats push back on GOP effort to 
have whistleblower, Hunter Biden testify, NBC News, Nov. 10, 2019.
    \519\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale, 
supra note 246.
    \520\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to Burisma, there are questions about why the 
Ukrainian government fired then-Prosecutor General Shokin--
according to Vice President Biden, at his insistence\521\--when 
it did not fire his successor, Prosecutor General Yuriy 
Lutsenko. Although Shokin and Lutsenko were both seen by State 
Department officials as corrupt and ineffective prosecutors, 
there was no effort to remove Lutsenko to the same degree or in 
the same way as there was with Shokin.\522\ Ambassador 
Yovanovitch testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \521\Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs Issue Launch 
with Former Vice President Joe Biden (Jan. 23, 2018).
    \522\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 90-98, 144-49.

          Q. And was he, in your experience--because you're 
        very knowledgeable about the region, so when I ask you 
        in your opinion, you have a very informed opinion--was 
        Lutsenko better or worse than Shokin?
          A. I mean, honestly, I don't know. I mean, I think 
        they're cut from the same cloth.

                                 * * *

          Q. There was never as much of a clamor to remove 
        Lutsenko as there was Shokin. Is that fair to say?
          A. Yeah, I think that's fair.
          Q. And what do you account for that?
          A. I would say that there was, I think, still a hope 
        that one could work with Mr. Lutsenko. There was also 
        that prospect of Presidential elections coming up, and 
        as seemed likely by, you know, December, January, 
        February, whatever the time was, that there would be a 
        change of government. And I think we certainly hoped 
        that Mr. Lutsenko would be replaced in the natural 
        order of things, which is, in fact, what happened. We 
        also had more leverage before. I mean, this was not 
        easy. President Poroshenko and Mr. Shokin go way back. 
        In fact, I think that they are godfathers to each 
        other's children. So this was, you know, this was a big 
        deal. But we had assistance, as did the IMF, that we 
        could condition.\523\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \523\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 102-03.

    Evidence suggests that Lutsenko's misconduct was not 
trivial. Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent explained that the 
U.S. government became disillusioned with Lutsenko in 2017 when 
he exposed an undercover investigator working to catch 
Ukrainian government officials selling fraudulent biometric 
passports.\524\ Kent said that Lutsenko's actions could have 
resulted in terrorists obtaining fraudulent biometric 
passports.\525\ Whereas Shokin only served for little over a 
year, Lutsenko served for years until President Zelensky 
removed him.\526\ Although both prosecutors were regarded as 
ineffective and corrupt, the U.S. government only took an 
official position with respect to Shokin's removal and never as 
to Lutsenko's.\527\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \524\Kent deposition, supra note 65, at 145-47.
    \525\Id. at 147-48.
    \526\Id. at 95-103.
    \527\Id. at 95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. There are legitimate questions about the extent to which Ukrainian 
        government officials worked to oppose President Trump's 
        candidacy in the 2016 election.

    Democrats reflexively oppose any discussion about whether 
senior Ukrainian government officials worked to oppose 
President Trump's candidacy and support former Secretary 
Clinton during the 2016 election. Calling these allegations 
``debunked'' and ``conspiracy theories,'' Democrats ignore 
irrefutable evidence that is inconvenient for their political 
narrative. The facts, however, show outstanding questions about 
Ukrainian influence in the 2016 presidential election--
questions that the Democrats' witnesses said would be 
appropriate for Ukraine to examine.
    Prominent Democrats expressed concern about foreign 
interference in U.S. elections when they believed that the 
Russian government colluded with the Trump campaign in 2016. 
For example, in a 2017 hearing about Russian election 
interference, then-Ranking Member Schiff said that the ``stakes 
are nothing less than the future of liberal democracy.''\528\ 
But where evidence suggests that Ukraine also sought to 
influence the election to the benefit of the Clinton campaign, 
now-Chairman Schiff and fellow Democrats have held their 
outrage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \528\Open hearing on Russian Active Measures Campaign: Hearing 
before the H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Democrats have posited a false choice: that influence in 
the 2016 election is binary--it could have been conducted by 
Russia or by Ukraine, but not both. This is nonsense. Under 
then-Chairman Devin Nunes, Republicans on the House 
Intelligence Committee issued a report in March 2018 detailing 
Russia's active measures campaign against the United 
States.\529\ But Russian interference in U.S. elections does 
not preclude Ukrainian officials from also attempting to 
influence the election. As Ambassador Volker testified during 
his public hearing, it is possible for more than one country to 
influence U.S. elections.\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \529\H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on Intelligence, Report on Russian Active 
Measures (Mar. 2018).
    \530\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Mr. Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indisputable evidence shows that senior Ukrainian 
government officials sought to influence the 2016 election in 
favor of Secretary Clinton and against then-candidate Trump. In 
August 2016, then-Ukrainian Ambassador to the United States, 
Valeriy Chaly, wrote an op-ed in The Hill criticizing Trump's 
policies toward Ukraine.\531\ The same month, the Financial 
Times reported that Trump's candidacy led ``Kyiv's wider 
political leadership to do something they would never have 
attempted before: intervene, however indirectly, in a US 
election.''\532\ Ukrainian parliamentarian Serhiy Leshchenko 
explained that Ukraine was ``on Hillary Clinton's side.\533\ 
Other senior Ukrainian officials called candidate Trump a 
``clown,'' a ``dangerous misfit,'' and ``dangerous,'' and 
alleged that candidate Trump ``challenged the very values of 
the free world.''\534\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \531\See Chaly, supra note 27.
    \532\Olearchyk, supra note 123.
    \533\Id.
    \534\Id.; Vogel & Stern, supra note 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other publicly available information reinforces the 
conclusion that senior Ukrainian government officials worked in 
2016 to support Secretary Clinton. A January 2017 Politico 
article by current-New York Times reporter Ken Vogel detailed 
the Ukrainian effort to ``sabotage'' the Trump campaign.\535\ 
Although Democrats reflexively dismiss the information 
presented in this article, neither Politico nor Vogel have 
retracted the story.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \535\Vogel & Stern, supra note 127.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Vogel's reporting, the Ukrainian government 
worked with a Democrat operative and the media in 2016 to boost 
Secretary Clinton's candidacy and hurt President Trump's. Vogel 
wrote:

          Ukrainian government officials tried to help Hillary 
        Clinton and undermine Trump by publicly questioning his 
        fitness for office. They also disseminated documents 
        implicating a top Trump aide in corruption and 
        suggested they were investigating the matter, only to 
        back away after the election. And they helped Clinton's 
        allies research damaging information on Trump and his 
        advisers, a Politico investigation found.\536\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \536\Id.

    Vogel reported how Alexandra Chalupa, a Ukrainian-American 
contractor paid by the DNC and working with the DNC and the 
Clinton campaign, ``traded information and leads'' about Paul 
Manafort, Trump's campaign manager, with staff at the Ukrainian 
embassy.\537\ Chalupa also told Vogel that the Ukrainian 
embassy ``worked directly with reporters researching Trump, 
Manafort, and Russia to point them in the right 
directions.''\538\ With the DNC's encouragement, Chalupa asked 
Ukrainian embassy staff ``to try to arrange an interview in 
which [Ukrainian President] Poroshenko might discuss Manafort's 
ties to [Russia-aligned former Ukrainian President Viktor] 
Yanukovych.''\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \537\Id. In April 2019, then-Ambassador Chaly issued a statement to 
The Hill denying that the Ukrainian embassy sought to influence the 
election. See Official April 25, 2019 statement of the Ukrainian 
embassy in Washington to The Hill concerning the activities of 
Democratic National Committee Alexandra Chalupa during the 2016 U.S. 
election, https://www.scribd.com/document/432699412/Ukraine-Chaly-
Statement-on-Chalupa-042519.
    \538\Vogel & Stern, supra note 127.
    \539\Id. Interestingly, in August 2019, when Chairman Schiff 
tweeted an allegation that U.S. security assistance to Ukraine was tied 
up with Ukrainian investigations, Alexandra Chalupa replied that she 
had ``a lot of information on this topic.'' See Adam Schiff 
(@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter (Aug. 28, 2019, 5:17 p.m.), https://
twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1166867471862829056. It is unknown 
whether Chalupa ever provided information to Chairman Schiff or his 
staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Vogel also spoke on the record to Andrii Telizhenko, a 
political officer in the Ukrainian Embassy under Ambassador 
Chaly, who corroborated Chalupa's account.\540\ Telizhenko said 
that he was instructed by Ambassador Chaly's top aide, Oksana 
Shulyar, to ``help Chalupa research connections between Trump, 
Manafort, and Russia'' with the goal of generating a hearing in 
Congress.\541\ Telizhenko also told Vogel that he was 
instructed not to speak to the Trump campaign:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \540\Vogel & Stern, supra note 127.
    \541\Id.

          We had an order not to talk to the Trump team, 
        because he was critical of Ukraine and the government 
        and his critical position on Crimea and the conflict. I 
        was yelled at when I proposed to talk to Trump. The 
        ambassador said not to get involved--Hillary is going 
        to win.\542\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \542\Id.

    Vogel also reported on the actions of Ukrainian 
parliamentarian Leshchenko, who spoke out against Manafort, in 
part, to show that candidate Trump was a ``pro-Russia 
candidate.''\543\ A separate congressional investigation in 
2018 learned that Leshchenko was a source for Fusion GPS, the 
opposition research firm hired by the DNC's law firm, Perkins 
Coie, to gather information about candidate Trump.\544\ Fusion 
GPS received information about Manafort that may have 
originated from Leshchenko.\545\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \543\Id.; Olearchyk, supra note 123.
    \544\Transcribed Interview of Nellie Ohr, in Wash., D.C., at 113-15 
(Oct. 19, 2018).
    \545\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Democrats' witnesses in the impeachment inquiry 
testified that the allegations of Ukrainian influence in the 
2016 election were appropriate to examine.\546\ Asked about the 
Politico reporting, Ambassador Taylor said that, if true, it is 
``disappointing'' that some Ukrainian officials worked against 
President Trump. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \546\See, e.g., Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 
146.

          Q. So isn't it possible that Trump administration 
        officials might have a good-founded belief, whether 
        true or untrue, that there were forces in the Ukraine 
        that were operating against them?
          A. [B]ased on this [January 2017] Politico article, 
        which, again, surprises me, disappoints me because I 
        think it's a mistake for any diplomat or any government 
        official in one country to interfere in the political 
        life of another country. That's disappointing.\547\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \547\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 101.

    Ambassador Taylor testified that he was ``surprise[ed] 
[and] disappoint[ed]'' that Avakov, an influential member of 
the Ukrainian government--who still serves in President 
Zelensky's government--had criticized President Trump during 
the 2016 campaign.\548\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \548\Id. at 98-99.

          Q. What do you know about Avakov?
          A. So he is the Minister of Internal Affairs and was 
        the Minister of Internal Affairs under President 
        Poroshenko as one of only two carryovers from the 
        Poroshenko Cabinet to the Zelensky Cabinet. He, as I 
        think I mentioned earlier when we were talking about 
        Lutsenko, the Minister of Interior, which Avakov is 
        now, controls the police, which gives him significant 
        influence in the government.
          Q. Avakov, he's a relatively influential Minister. Is 
        that right?
          A. That is correct.
          Q. Does it concern you that at one time he was being 
        highly critical of candidate Trump?
          A. It does.
          Q. And did you ever have any awareness of that before 
        I called your attention to this?
          A. I haven't. This is surprising. Disappointing, 
        but--\549\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \549\Id.

    Despite this testimony, Chairman Schiff has prevented 
Republican Members from fully assessing the nature and extent 
of Ukraine's influence in the 2016 election. Chairman Schiff 
refused to invite Alexandra Chalupa or Fusion GPS contractor 
Nellie Ohr to testify during public hearings.\550\ Chairman 
Schiff declined to concur with a Republican subpoena for 
documents relating to the DNC's communications with the 
Ukrainian government.\551\ Chairman Schiff declined to concur 
with a Republican subpoena for documents relating to the DNC's 
work with Alexandra Chalupa.\552\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \550\See, e.g., Riley Beggin, House Democrats deny Republicans' 
request for whistleblower testimony. Vox, Nov. 10, 2019.
    \551\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale, 
supra note 246.
    \552\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 * * *

    There are legitimate concerns about Burisma's corruption 
and Hunter Biden's role on the company's board, and Ukrainian 
government officials' actions to support Secretary Clinton over 
President Trump in the 2016 election. Democrats reflexively 
dismiss these concerns because acknowledging them would require 
an admission that past U.S. assistance to Ukraine may have been 
misspent. As Ambassador Yovanovitch testified:

          I think most Americans believe that there shouldn't 
        be meddling in our elections. And if Ukraine is the one 
        that had been meddling in our elections, I think the 
        support that all of you [in Congress] have provided to 
        Ukraine over the last almost 30 years, I don't know 
        that--I think people would ask themselves questions 
        about that.\553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \553\Yovanovitch deposition, supra note 115, at 137.

    Similarly, other career foreign service employees spoke 
about their emotional investment in U.S. foreign assistance to 
Ukraine. Speaking about his reaction to the recent events in 
Ukraine, Ambassador Taylor testified that he feels a strong 
``emotional attachment, bond, connection to this country and 
these people.''\554\ Deputy Assistant Secretary Kent, according 
to current State Department employee and former NSC staffer 
Catherine Croft, likewise ``has a lot of emotion tied into'' 
U.S. policy toward Ukraine, saying he ``feels very strongly in 
all aspects of our policy with regard to Ukraine.''\555\ 
President Trump's world view threatens these personal, 
subjective interests, which may explain why some are so eager 
to discount these allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \554\Taylor deposition, supra note 47, at 273.
    \555\Croft deposition, supra note 60, at 105-06.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. The anonymous whistleblower who served as the basis for the 
        impeachment inquiry has no firsthand knowledge of events and a 
        bias against President Trump.

    Democrats built their impeachment inquiry on the foundation 
of the anonymous whistleblower complaint submitted to the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community on August 12. 
This foundation is fundamentally flawed.
    The anonymous whistleblower acknowledged having no 
firsthand knowledge about the events he or she described. As a 
result, his or her complaint mischaracterized important facts 
and portrayed events in an inaccurate light. The anonymous 
whistleblower reportedly had a professional relationship with 
Vice President Joe Biden, which, if true, biases the 
whistleblower's impressions of the events as they relate to 
Vice President Biden. The anonymous whistleblower also 
reportedly communicated initially with House Intelligence 
Committee Chairman Adam Schiff, who has been an ardent and 
outspoken critic of President Trump, or his staff. Chairman 
Schiff's early secret awareness of the issue tainted the 
objectivity of the Democrats' impeachment inquiry.
    To this day, only one Member of Congress--Chairman Schiff--
knows the identity of the individual whose words sparked the 
impeachment of the President. Chairman Schiff has prevented any 
objective assessment of the whistleblower's credibility or 
knowledge. Chairman Schiff declined to invite the whistleblower 
to testify as part of the Democrats' impeachment inquiry, but 
only after Chairman Schiff's or his staff's communications with 
the whistleblower came to light.\556\ Chairman Schiff rejected 
a Republican subpoena for documents relating to the drafting of 
the whistleblower complaint and the whistleblower's personal 
memorandum written shortly after the July 25 telephone 
conversation.\557\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \556\See, e.g., Beggin, supra note 550.
    \557\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale, 
supra note 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The public reporting about the existence of a whistleblower 
and his or her sensational allegations about President Trump 
generated tremendous public interest. But Americans cannot 
assess the credibility, motivations, or biases of the 
whistleblower. This analysis is necessary because the 
whistleblower's inaccurate assertions, coupled with Chairman 
Schiff's selective leaks of cherry-picked information, have 
prejudiced the public narrative surrounding President Trump's 
telephone call with President Zelensky.

1. The anonymous whistleblower acknowledged having no firsthand 
        knowledge of the events in question.

    The anonymous whistleblower has no direct, firsthand 
knowledge of the events described in his or her complaint. In 
the complaint, the whistleblower acknowledged, ``I was not a 
direct witness to most of the events described,'' and admitted 
that he or she was not on the July 25 call between President 
Trump and President Zelensky.\558\ Instead, the anonymous 
whistleblower relied upon indirect, secondhand information 
provided by others--individuals who are also still 
unidentified. The whistleblower's lack of firsthand knowledge 
undermines the credibility of his or her accusations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \558\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 1; see also Letter 
from Hon. Michael Atkinson, Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty., 
to Hon. Joseph Maguire, Acting Dir. Of Nat'l Intelligence (Aug. 26, 
2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Testimony provided by officials with firsthand knowledge of 
the events rebuts the whistleblower's allegations. Ambassador 
Sondland testified that some of the concerns in the August 12 
whistleblower complaint may be inaccurate or hyperbole.\559\ 
For example, both Ambassador Volker and Ambassador Sondland 
testified that the whistleblower incorrectly alleged ``that 
State Department officials, including Ambassadors Volker and 
Sondland, had spoken with Mr. Giuliani to contain the damage' 
to U.S. national security.''\560\ The ambassadors also 
disagreed with the whistleblower's statement that they helped 
Ukrainian leadership ```navigate' the demands'' from President 
Trump.\561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \559\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 259-64, 311-14.
    \560\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 100-01; 
Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 261-62, 313.
    \561\Volker transcribed interview, supra note 60, at 101; Sondland 
deposition, supra note 51, at 259-61, 311-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, Ambassador Sondland took issue with the 
whistleblower's characterization of efforts to arrange a 
meeting between President Trump and President Zelensky. The 
whistleblower complaint stated:

          During this same timeframe, multiple U.S. officials 
        told me [the anonymous whistleblower] that the 
        Ukrainian leadership was led to believe that a meeting 
        or phone call between the President and President 
        Zelensky would depend on whether Zelensky showed 
        willingness to ``play ball'' on the issues that had 
        been publicly aired by Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. 
        Giuliani.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \562\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85, at 7.

    Ambassador Sondland testified that he never heard U.S. 
officials use the expression ``play ball'' in this 
context.\563\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \563\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 264.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Press reports suggest that the anonymous whistleblower acknowledged 
        having a professional relationship with former Vice President 
        Biden.

    The anonymous whistleblower reportedly acknowledged having 
a professional relationship with Vice President Biden. This 
admission is important because Vice President Biden was 
referenced in passing on the July 25 call and is a potential 
opponent of President Trump in the 2020 presidential election. 
It stands to reason that a mention of Vice President Biden--no 
matter how brief or innocuous--could stir the passion of 
someone who had a professional relationship with him.
    On August 26, 2019, Inspector General Atkinson wrote to 
Acting Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Joseph Maguire 
stating that he found ``some indicia of an arguable political 
bias on the part of the [anonymous whistleblower] in favor of a 
rival political candidate. . . .''\564\ News reports later 
reported that the ``rival political candidate'' referenced in 
Atkinson's letter was a 2020 Democrat presidential candidate 
with whom that the whistleblower acknowledged having a 
``professional relationship.''\565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \564\Letter from Hon. Michael Atkinson, Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, to Hon. Joseph Maguire, Dir. Of Nat'l 
Intelligence, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence (Aug. 26, 2019).
    \565\Byron York, Whistleblower Had `Professional' Tie to 2020 
Democratic Candidate, Wash. Exam., Oct. 8, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Subsequent news reports explained that the whistleblower is 
a CIA analyst who had been detailed to the NSC and would have 
worked closely with Vice President Biden's office.\566\ This 
relationship is significant because President Obama relied upon 
Vice President Biden to be the Obama Administration's point 
person for Ukrainian policy.\567\ This relationship suggests 
that aside from any partisan bias in support of Vice President 
Biden's 2020 presidential campaign, the whistleblower may also 
have had a bias in favor of Vice President Biden's Ukrainian 
policies instead of those of President Trump.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \566\See generally Rob Crilly, Steven Nelson, & David Drucker, Joe 
Biden Worked with Whistleblower When he was Vice President, Officials 
Reveal, Wash. Exam., Oct. 10, 2019; Ben Feuerherd, Whistleblower May 
Have Worked with Joe Biden in White House: Report, N.Y. Post, Oct. 10, 
2019; Julian Barnes, Michael Schmidt, Adam Goldman, & Katie Benner, 
White House Knew of Whistleblower's Allegations Soon After Trump's Call 
with Ukraine Leader, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2019.
    \567\Greg Myre, What Were the Bidens Doing in Ukraine? 5 Questions 
Answered, Nat'l Pub. Radio, Sept. 24, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The anonymous whistleblower secretly communicated with Chairman 
        Schiff or his staff.

    According to an admission from Chairman Schiff, the 
anonymous whistleblower communicated with Chairman Schiff's 
staff prior to submitting his or her complaint. This early, 
secret involvement of Chairman Schiff severely prejudices the 
objectivity of the whistleblower's allegations, given Chairman 
Schiff's obsession with attacking President Trump for partisan 
gain.
    Since 2016, Chairman Schiff has been a chief ringleader in 
Congress for asserting that President Trump colluded with 
Russia, going so far as to allege that he had secret evidence 
of collusion.\568\ Now Chairman Schiff is the investigator-in-
chief of President Trump's July 25 phone call with Ukrainian 
President Zelensky. Chairman Schiff led the investigation's 
first phase from behind the closed doors of his Capitol 
basement bunker, even though the depositions were all 
unclassified. Chairman Schiff did so purely for information 
control--allowing him to leak selected pieces of information to 
paint a misleading public narrative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \568\See, e.g., Kelsey Tamborrino, Warner: `Enormous amounts of 
evidence' of possible Russia collusion, Politico, Mar. 3, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Schiff has publicly fabricated evidence about 
President Trump's July 25 phone call and misled the American 
public about his awareness of the whistleblower allegations. On 
September 26, at a public hearing of the House Intelligence 
Committee, Chairman Schiff opened the proceedings by 
fabricating the contents of President Trump's call with 
President Zelensky to make the conversation seem sinister.\569\ 
Pretending to be President Trump, Chairman Schiff said in part:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \569\Whistleblower disclosure, supra note 1.

          I hear what you want. I have a favor I want from you 
        though. And I'm going to say this only seven times so 
        you better listen good. I want you to make up dirt on 
        my political opponent, understand. Lots of it.\570\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \570\Id.

    These words were never uttered by President Trump. When 
Chairman Schiff rightly faced criticism for his actions, he 
blamed others for not understanding that he was joking.\571\ 
Republicans sought to hold Chairman Schiff accountable for his 
fabrication of evidence; however, Democrats prevented the House 
from voting on a censure resolution.\572\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \571\Id.
    \572\Katherine Tully-McManus, Republican effort to censure Adam 
Schiff halted, Roll Call, Oct. 21, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In October 2019, the New York Times reported that the 
whistleblower contacted a staff member on the House 
Intelligence Committee--chaired by Chairman Schiff--after 
asking a colleague to convey his or her concerns about the July 
25 call to the CIA's top lawyer.\573\ Chairman Schiff, however, 
had denied ever communicating directly with the 
whistleblower,\574\ and the whistleblower failed to disclose 
that he or she had contacted Chairman Schiff's staff when asked 
by the Intelligence Community Inspector General.\575\ Chairman 
Schiff acknowledged his early awareness of the whistleblower's 
allegations only after he was caught.\576\ The Washington Post 
gave Chairman Schiff ``Four Pinocchios''--its worst rating--for 
``clearly ma[king] a statement that was false.''\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \573\Julian Barnes, Michael Schmidt, & Matthew Rosenberg, Schiff 
Got Early Account of Accusations as Whistleblower's Concerns Grew, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 2, 2019.
    \574\See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, Schiff's false claim his committee 
had not spoken to the whistleblower, Wash. Post, Oct. 4, 2019.
    \575\Andrew O'Reilly, Schiff Admits He Should Have Been `Much More 
Clear' About Contact with Whistleblower, Fox News, Oct. 13, 2019.
    \576\Schiff Got Early Account of Accusations as Whistleblower's 
Concerns Grew, supra note 573.
    \577\Schiff's false claim his committee had not spoken to the 
whistleblower, supra note 574.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Schiff's early awareness of the whistleblower 
complaint explains why he publicly posited a connection between 
paused U.S. security assistance and Ukrainian investigations 
well before the whistleblower complaint became public. On 
August 28, 2019, before the public became aware of the 
whistleblower complaint or any allegations that U.S. security 
assistance to Ukraine was linked to Ukraine investigating 
President Trump's political rival, Chairman Schiff made such a 
connection in a tweet.\578\ According to the New York Times, 
Chairman Schiff knew ``the outlines'' of the anonymous 
whistleblower complaint at the time that he issued this 
tweet.\579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \578\Adam Schiff (@RepAdamSchiff), Twitter, (Aug. 28, 2019, 8:17 
PM), https://twitter.com/RepAdamSchiff/status/1166867471862829056.
    \579\Barnes, Schmidt, & Rosenberg, supra note 573.

    
    

    Chairman Schiff's early awareness also explains why he 
pressured Inspector General Atkinson to produce the 
whistleblower's complaint to Congress, despite Acting DNI 
Maguire's determination that transmittal was not required 
because the complaint did not meet the legal definition of 
``urgent concern.''\580\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \580\U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, ``Urgent 
Concern'' Determination by the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community 2 (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 * * *

    The allegations of the anonymous whistleblower--the 
foundation for the Democrats' impeachment inquiry--are 
fundamentally flawed. The whistleblower acknowledged having no 
direct, firsthand knowledge of the events he or she described. 
The whistleblower reportedly acknowledged a professional 
relationship with Vice President Joe Biden, which, if true, 
suggests a bias toward Vice President Biden and against 
President Trump. Finally, the whistleblower secretly 
communicated with staff of Chairman Schiff, who subsequently 
misled the public about this communication.
    If Democrats are serious about impeaching the President--
about undoing the will of the American people--they cannot 
limit the evidence and information available to the House of 
Representatives. The motivations, biases, and credibility of 
the anonymous whistleblower are necessary aspects of any 
serious examination of the facts in question.

 II. The Evidence does not establish that President Trump engaged in a 
    cover-up of his interactions with Ukrainian President Zelensky.

    Democrats also argue that President Trump is engaged in a 
cover-up of his July 25 telephone conversation by hiding 
evidence of his alleged wrongdoing.\581\ There is no basis for 
this allegation. The President has been transparent about the 
issues surrounding the anonymous whistleblower complaint and 
the telephone call with President Zelensky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \581\See, e.g., Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Transcript of Pelosi Weekly 
Press Conference (Sept. 26, 2019) (``The [whistleblower] complaint 
reports `repeated abuse of an electronics record system designed to 
store classified, sensitive national security information, which the 
White House used to hide information of a political nature.' This is a 
cover-up. This is a cover-up.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 24, Speaker Pelosi launched the impeachment 
inquiry based solely on reports of the telephone call between 
President Trump and President Zelensky. She had not listened to 
the conversation; she had not read the call summary or the 
whistleblower complaint. The following day, to offer 
unprecedented transparency and prove there was no quid pro quo, 
President Trump declassified the July 25 call summary for the 
American people to read for themselves. President Trump also 
released a redacted version of the anonymous whistleblower 
complaint and he released the summary of his April 21 telephone 
conversation with President Zelensky. Even the Democrats' best 
evidence of a ``cover-up''--the restricted access to the call 
summary--is unpersuasive. Evidence suggests that the call 
summary was restricted not for a malicious intention but as a 
result of the proliferation of leaks by unelected bureaucrats, 
including leaks of President Trump's conversations with foreign 
leaders.

A. President Trump declassified and released publicly the summary of 
        his July 25 phone call with President Zelensky.

    On July 25, President Trump and President Zelensky spoke by 
telephone.\582\ Normally, presidential conversations with 
foreign leaders are presumptively classified because ``[t]he 
unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is 
presumed to cause damage to the national security.''\583\ In 
fact, the call summary of President Trump's call with President 
Zelensky was initially marked as classified.\584\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \582\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
    \583\Exec. Order 13,526 (2009).
    \584\See Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On September 25, after questions arose about the contents 
of the phone call, President Trump chose to declassify and 
release the transcript in the interest of full transparency. He 
wrote on Twitter: ``I am currently at the United Nations 
representing our Country, but have authorized the release 
tomorrow of the complete, fully declassified and unredacted 
transcript of my phone conversation with President Zelensky of 
Ukraine.''\585\ The President stressed his goal that Americans 
could read for themselves the contents of the call: ``You will 
see it was a very friendly and totally appropriate call. No 
pressure unlike Joe Biden and his son, NO quid pro quo! This is 
nothing more than a continuation of the Greatest and most 
Destructive Witch Hunt of all time.''\586\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \585\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019, 
11:12 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1176559966024556544.
    \586\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019, 
11:12 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1176559970390806530.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. President Trump released a redacted version of the classified 
        anonymous whistleblower complaint.

    Like the call summary, the anonymous whistleblower 
complaint was initially classified. The complaint was 
reportedly ``hand delivered . . . to Capitol Hill'' hours after 
President Trump released the call summary.\587\ Although a 
limited number of Members of Congress--like Chairman Schiff--
could access the classified complaint, the American public 
could not. The President released a redacted version of the 
anonymous whistleblower complaint so that every American could 
read it for themselves.\588\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \587\Dana Bash, et al, Whistleblower complaint about Trump 
declassified and may be released Thursday, CNN, Sept. 26, 2019.
    \588\Whistleblower complaint says White House tried to ``lock 
down'' Ukraine call records, CBS News, Sept. 26, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. President Trump released publicly the summary of his April 21 phone 
        call with President Zelensky.

    President Trump first spoke by telephone with President 
Zelensky on April 21, 2019, the date on which President 
Zelensky won the Ukrainian presidential election.\589\ On 
November 15, the President publicly released the summary of 
this April conversation.\590\ President Trump explained that he 
chose to release the summary of this call to ``continue being 
the most transparent President in history.''\591\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \589\Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, supra note 10.
    \590\Mark Mazzetti & Eileen Sullivan, Rough transcript of Trump's 
first phone call with Ukrainian leader released, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 
2019.
    \591\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 11, 2019, 
3:35 p.m.), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1194035922066714625.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. The Trump Administration has experienced a surge in sensitive leaks, 
        including details of the President's communications with 
        foreign leaders.

    The Trump Administration has experienced an unprecedented 
number of potentially damaging leaks from the U.S. national 
security apparatus.\592\ According to a report from the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in May 
2017, these leaks have flowed seven times faster under 
President Trump than during former Presidents Obama and Bush's 
administrations averaging--almost one per day.\593\ The report 
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \592\HSGAC report, supra note 409.
    \593\Id.

          From the morning of President Trump's inauguration, 
        when major newspapers published information about 
        highly sensitive intelligence intercepts, news 
        organizations have reported on an avalanche of leaks 
        from officials across the U.S. government. Many 
        disclosures have concerned the investigations of 
        alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election, with 
        the world learning details of whose communications U.S. 
        intelligence agencies are monitoring, what channels are 
        being monitored, and the results of those intercepts. 
        All such revelations are potential violations of 
        federal law, punishable by jail time.
          But the leak frenzy has gone far beyond the Kremlin 
        and has extended to other sensitive information that 
        could harm national security. President Trump's private 
        conversations with other foreign leaders have shown up 
        in the press, while secret operations targeting 
        America's most deadly adversaries were exposed in 
        detail.
          As The New York Times wrote in a candid self-
        assessment: ``Journalism in the Trump era has featured 
        a staggering number of leaks from sources across the 
        federal government.'' No less an authority than 
        President Obama's CIA director called the deluge of 
        state secrets ``appalling.'' These leaks do not occur 
        in a vacuum. They can, and do, have real world 
        consequences for national security.\594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \594\Id.

    As the Washington Post explained, ``Every presidential 
administration leaks. So far, the Trump White House has 
gushed.''\595\ Sensitive national security information--for 
which public disclosure could harm U.S. interests--found its 
way into mainstream news outlets such as the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, NBC, and Associated Press.\596\ This 
unfortunate reality helps to explain the circumstances by which 
the NSC handled the summary of President Trump's July 25 
telephone conversation with President Zelensky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \595\Paul Farhi, The Trump administration has sprung a leak. Many 
of them, in fact, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 2017.
    \596\HSGAC report, supra note 409.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. The evidence does not establish that access to the July 25 call 
        summary was restricted for inappropriate reasons.

    The anonymous whistleblower complaint alleged that NSC 
staffers deliberately placed the call summary of the July 25 
call on a highly secure server to hide its contents.\597\ This 
allegation has not been proven. In fact, the Democrats' 
witnesses testified that it was mistakenly place on a highly 
classified server. Evidence suggests that call summaries of the 
President's conversations with other foreign leaders have been 
subject to restricted access due to a pattern of leaks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \597\Whistleblower letter, supra note 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the Trump Administration dealt with an unprecedented 
number of national security leaks, it sought to take 
appropriate precautions. Public reporting indicates that the 
NSC began restricting access to summaries of the President's 
communications with foreign leaders following the leak of 
President Trump's conversation in May 2017 with senior Russian 
officials.\598\ Dr. Fiona Hill, the former NSC Senior Director 
for Europe, testified that a summary of this meeting was not 
initially restricted and that details of the conversation 
``seemed to immediately end up in the press.''\599\ Following 
this leak, the White House began a practice of restricting 
access to summaries of calls and meetings with foreign 
leaders.\600\ Current and former White House officials said 
that it made sense to restrict access to calls given the number 
of leaks.\601\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \598\See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes et al., White House Classified 
Computer System is Used to Hold Transcripts of Sensitive Calls, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 29, 2019.
    \599\Hill deposition, supra note 12, at 294.
    \600\Barnes, et al., supra note 598.
    \601\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to the summary of President Trump's 
conversation with President Zelensky on July 25, NSC Senior 
Director Tim Morrison testified in his closed-door deposition 
that although he ``was not concerned that anything illegal was 
discussed,'' he was concerned about a leak of the summary of 
President Trump's call with President Zelensky.\602\ He 
explained that he was ``concerned about how the contents [of 
the call summary] would be used in Washington's political 
process.''\603\ In his public testimony, Morrison elaborated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \602\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 16.
    \603\Id. at 44.

          Q. And you were concerned about it leaking because 
        you were worried about how it would play out in 
        Washington's polarized political environment, correct?
          A. Yes.
          Q. And you were also worried how that would lead to 
        the bipartisan support here in Congress towards 
        Ukraine, right?
          A. Yes.
          Q. And you were also concerned that it might affect 
        the Ukrainians' perception negatively.
          A. Yes.
          Q. And, in fact, all three of those things have 
        played out, haven't they?
          A. Yes.\604\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \604\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.

    LTC Vindman--the NSC staffer who raised concerns about the 
contents of call--testified there was no ``malicious intent'' 
in restricting access to the summary.\605\ Morrison also 
testified that call summary was mistakenly placed on a secure 
server with restricted access.\606\ He explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \605\Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 124.
    \606\Morrison deposition, supra note 12, at 54-57.

          Q. And were you ever provided with an explanation for 
        why [the call summary] was placed in the highly 
        classified system?
          A. Yes.
          Q. What was the explanation you were given?
          A. It was a mistake.
          Q. It was a mistake?
          A. Yes.\607\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \607\Id. at 54.

    In his public testimony, Morrison reiterated that the 
placement of the call summary on a secure server was an 
administrative error.\608\ He explained that NSC Legal Advisor 
John Eisenberg sought to restrict access to the summary, but 
that his direction was mistakenly interpreted to mean placing 
the summary on a secure server.\609\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \608\Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador Kurt Volker and Timothy 
Morrison, supra note 8.
    \609\Id.

          I spoke with the NSC Executive Secretariat staff, 
        asked them why [the summary had been removed from the 
        normal server]. And they did their research, and they 
        informed me it had been moved to the higher 
        classification system at the direction of John 
        Eisenberg, whom I then asked why. I mean, that's--if 
        that was the judgment he made, that's not necessarily 
        mine to question, but I didn't understand it. And he 
        essentially told me, ``I gave no such direction.'' He 
        did his own inquiry, and he represented back to me that 
        it was--his understanding was that it was a kind of 
        administrative error, that when he also gave direction 
        to restrict access, the Executive Secretariat staff 
        understood that as an apprehension that there was 
        something in the content of the [call summary] that 
        could not exist on the lower classification 
        system.\610\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \610\Id.

    Morrison also explained that there was no malicious intent 
in moving the transcript to the secure server.\611\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \611\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To the extent Democrats allege that President Trump sought 
to cover up his July 25 telephone conversation with President 
Zelensky, the facts do not support such a charge. Indeed, 
President Trump has declassified and publicly released the July 
25 call summary. He has also released a redacted version of the 
classified anonymous whistleblower complaint and released the 
call summary of his first phone call with President Zelensky, 
on April 21. Although the July 25 call summary was located on a 
secure White House server prior to its public release, 
testimony shows that its placement on the server was an 
``administrative error.'' In light of substantial leaks of 
sensitive national security information--including the 
President's conversations with foreign leaders--testimony shows 
that the NSC Legal Advisor sought to restrict access to the 
summary. In attempting to carry out this direction, the NSC 
executive secretariat staff incorrectly placed the summary on a 
secure server. Taken, together, these facts do not establish 
that President Trump sought to cover up his interactions with 
President Zelensky.

 III. The evidence does not establish that President Trump obstructed 
            Congress in the Democrats' impeachment inquiry.

    Democrats allege that President Trump has obstructed 
Congress by declining to participate in Speaker Pelosi's 
impeachment inquiry.\612\ Under any fair assessment of the 
facts, however, President Trump has not obstructed Congress. In 
fact, the President personally urged at least one witness to 
cooperate with the Democrats' impeachment inquiry and to 
testify truthfully.\613\ But Democrats cannot and should not 
impeach President Trump for declining to submit himself to an 
abusive and unfair process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \612\See, e.g., Amber Phillips, How the House Could Impeach Trump 
for Obstructing its Probe, Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 2019.
    \613\Sondland deposition, supra note 51, at 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the Democrats' impeachment inquiry, fairness is not an 
asset guaranteed or even recognized. Democrats have told 
witnesses in the inquiry that a failure to adhere strictly to 
their demands ``shall constitute evidence of obstruction of the 
House's impeachment inquiry and may be used as an adverse 
inference against the President.''\614\ Democrats have 
threatened to withhold the salaries for agency employees as 
punishment for not meeting Democrat demands.\615\ As Chairman 
Schiff explained the Democrat logic, any disagreement with 
Democrats amounts to obstruction: ``The failure to produce this 
witness, the failure to produce these documents, we consider 
yet additionally strong evidence of obstruction of the 
constitutional functions of Congress, a coequal branch of 
government.''\616\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \614\See, e.g., letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, et al. to John Eisenberg, Nat'l Sec. Council (Oct. 30, 
2019).
    \615\See letter from Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, et al. to John J. Sullivan, Dep. Sec'y, Dep't of State (Oct. 
1, 2019).
    \616\Phillips, supra note 612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Democrats' actions are fundamentally abusive. In any 
just proceeding, the President ought to be afforded an 
opportunity to raise defenses without Democrats considering it 
to be de facto evidence of obstruction. In any just proceeding, 
investigators would not impute the conduct of a witness to the 
President or use a witness's refusal to cooperate with an 
unfair process as an ``adverse inference'' against the 
President.
    The Democrats' obstruction arguments are also divorced from 
historical precedent for House impeachment proceedings and 
basic legal concepts of due process and the presumption of 
innocence. Past bipartisan precedent for presidential 
impeachment inquiries guaranteed fundamental fairness by 
authorizing bipartisan subpoena authority; providing the 
President unrestricted access to information presented; and 
allowing the President's counsel to identify relevant witnesses 
and evidence, cross examine witnesses, and respond to evidence 
collected. These guarantees of due process and fundamental 
fairness are not present in the Democrats' impeachment 
resolution against President Trump.
    Congressional oversight of the Executive Branch is an 
important and serious undertaking designed to improve the 
efficiency and accountability of the federal government. The 
White House has said that it is willing to work with Democrats 
on legitimate congressional oversight requests.\617\ However, 
public statements from prominent Democrats suggest they are 
pursuing impeachment purely for partisan reasons--that they are 
seeking to prevent President Trump's reelection in 2020.\618\ 
The Democrats' unfair and abusive impeachment process confirms 
that they are not interested in pursuing a full understanding 
of the facts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \617\See letter from Pat A. Cipollone, Counsel to the President to 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi et al. 8 (Oct. 8, 2019).
    \618\See, e.g., Weekends with Alex Witt (MSNBC television broadcast 
May 5, 2019) (interview with Rep. Al Green).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even despite the Democrats' partisan rhetoric and unfair 
process, President Trump has been transparent about his 
interactions with Ukrainian President Zelensky. President Trump 
has released to the public documents directly relevant the 
subject matter and he has spoken publicly about the issues. 
Democrats cannot justly condemn President Trump for declining 
to submit to their abusive and fundamentally unfair process.

A. Democrats have abandoned long-standing precedent by failing to 
        guarantee due process and fundamental fairness in their 
        impeachment inquiry.

    The two recent impeachment investigations into presidents 
by the House of Representatives were largely identical to each 
other despite the passage of two decades. In 1974, the House 
authorized an impeachment inquiry into President Nixon by 
debating and passing House Resolution 803.\619\ This resolution 
authorized the Committee on the Judiciary to issue subpoenas, 
including those offered by the minority; to sit and act without 
regard to whether the House stood in recess; and to expend 
funds in the pursuit of the investigation.\620\ In 1998, the 
House passed House Resolution 581, a nearly identical 
resolution authorizing an impeachment inquiry into President 
Clinton.\621\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \619\H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong. (1974).
    \620\See Id.
    \621\H. Res. 581, 105th Cong. (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1974, the House undertook this action because ``the rule 
of the House defining the jurisdiction of committees does not 
place jurisdiction over impeachment matters in the Judiciary 
Committee. In fact, it does not place such jurisdiction 
anywhere.''\622\ Passing a resolution authorizing the inquiry 
was ``a necessary step if we are to meet our obligations [under 
the Constitution].''\623\ By passing the resolution, the House 
sought to make ``[t]he committee's investigative authority . . 
. fully coextensive with the power of the House in an 
impeachment investigation. . . .''\624\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \622\130 Cong. Rec. 2351 (Feb. 6, 1974) (statement of Rep. 
Hutchinson).
    \623\Id. at 2350 (statement of Rep. Rodino).
    \624\H.R. Rep. No. 93-774, at 3 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notably, in empowering the Judiciary Committee to conduct 
the Nixon impeachment inquiry, the House granted subpoena power 
to the minority, an action that was ``against all precedents'' 
at the time.\625\ During debate, Members made it ``crystal 
clear that the authority given to the minority [ranking] member 
and to the chairman, the right to exercise authority [to issue 
a subpoena], is essentially the same. It is the same. Both are 
subject to a veto by a majority of the membership of that 
committee.''\626\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \625\130 Cong. Rec. at 2352 (statement of Rep. Brooks).
    \626\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1998, the House similarly passed a resolution 
authorizing an impeachment inquiry because the ``[Judiciary] 
Committee decided that it must receive authorization from the 
full House before proceeding. . . .''\627\ The Judiciary 
Committee reached this conclusion ``[b]ecause impeachment is 
delegated solely to the House of Representatives by the 
Constitution, [and therefore] the full House of Representatives 
should be involved in critical decision making regarding 
various stages of impeachment.''\628\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \627\H.R. Rep. No. 105-795, at 24 (1998).
    \628\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In putting forth this resolution for consideration by the 
House, the Judiciary Committee made several commitments with 
respect to ensuring ``procedural fairness'' of the impeachment 
inquiry. For instance, the Judiciary Committee voted to allow 
the President or his counsel to be present at all executive 
sessions and open hearings and to allow the President's counsel 
to cross examine witnesses, make objections regarding 
relevancy, suggest additional evidence or witnesses that the 
committee should receive, and to respond to the evidence 
collected.\629\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \629\Id. at 25-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The fundamental fairness and due process protections 
guaranteed in the Nixon and Clinton impeachment proceedings are 
missing from Speaker Pelosi's impeachment inquiry. The 
Democrats' impeachment inquiry offers a veneer of legitimacy 
that hides a deeply partisan and one-sided process. The 
impeachment resolution passed by Democrats in the House--
against bipartisan opposition--allows Democrats to maintain 
complete control of the proceedings.\630\ The resolution denies 
Republicans co-equal subpoena authority and requires the 
Democrat chairmen to concur with Republican subpoenas--unlike 
Democrat subpoenas, which the chairmen may issue with no 
Republican input.\631\ The Democrat impeachment resolution 
requires Republicans to specifically identify and explain the 
need for witnesses 72 hours before the first impeachment 
hearing without a similar requirement for Democrats.\632\ Most 
importantly, the Democrats' resolution excludes the President's 
counsel from House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam 
Schiff's proceedings and provides House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Jerry Nadler with discretion to do the same.\633\ In 
short, these partisan procedures dramatically contradict the 
bipartisan Nixon and Clinton precedents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \630\H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019).
    \631\Id.
    \632\Id.
    \633\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Democrats have engaged in an abusive process toward a pre-determined 
        outcome.

    Since the beginning of the 116 Congress, Democrats have 
sought to impeach President Trump. Just hours after her 
swearing in, Rep. Rashida Tlaib told a crowd at a public event 
that ``[Democrats are] going to go in there, and we're going to 
impeach the [expletive deleted].''\634\ Rep. Brad Sherman 
introduced articles of impeachment against President Trump on 
the very first day of the Democrat majority.\635\ Rep. Al Green 
separately introduced articles of impeachment in July 2019, and 
even forced the House to consider the measure.\636\ The House 
tabled Rep. Green's impeachment resolution by an overwhelming 
bipartisan majority--332 ayes to 95 nays.\637\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \634\Nicholas Fandos, Rashida Tlaib's Expletive-Laden Cry to 
Impeach Trump Upends Democrats' Talking Points, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 
2019.
    \635\H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019).
    \636\H. Res. 498, 116th Cong. (2019).
    \637\Id. (Roll call vote 483).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Such a fervor to impeach a political opponent for purely 
partisan reasons was what Alexander Hamilton warned of as the 
``greatest danger'' in Federalist No. 65: that ``the decision 
[to impeach] will be regulated more by the comparative strength 
of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or 
guilt.''\638\ Indicative of this partisan fervor, Democrats 
have already forced the House to consider three resolutions of 
impeachment--offered by Democrats after no investigation, 
report, or process of any kind--since President Trump took 
office.\639\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \638\Federalist No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
    \639\See H. Res. 646, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 705, 115th Cong. 
(2018); H. Res. 498, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the consideration of articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton, Democrats argued that ``[i]f we are to 
impeach the President, it should be at the end of a fair 
process. . . . [and not through decisions] made on a strictly 
partisan basis.''\640\ Rep. Zoe Lofgren, now a senior member of 
the Judiciary Committee, testified then before the Rules 
Committee on the resolution authorizing the Clinton impeachment 
inquiry. She said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \640\Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
the United States, 105th Cong., Consideration of Articles of 
Impeachment 82 (Comm. Print 1998) (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).

          Under our Constitution, the House of Representatives 
        has the sole power of impeachment. This is perhaps our 
        single most serious responsibility short of a 
        declaration of war. Given the gravity and magnitude of 
        this undertaking, only a fair and bipartisan approach 
        to this question will ensure that truth is discovered, 
        honest judgments rendered, and the constitutional 
        requirement observed. Our best yardstick is our 
        historical experience. We must compare the procedures 
        used today with what Congress did a generation ago when 
        a Republican President was investigated by a Democratic 
        House.\641\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \641\Hearing before the Committee on Rules on H. Res. 525, 105th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1998).

    However, Speaker Pelosi's impeachment inquiry has been 
divorced from historical experience and has borne no markings 
of a fair process. During the first several weeks, the Speaker 
asserted that a vote authorizing the inquiry was 
unnecessary.\642\ This process allowed Chairman Schiff to 
conduct his partisan inquiry behind closed doors with only a 
limited group of Members present. It also allowed Chairman 
Schiff to selectively leak cherry-picked information to paint a 
misleading public narrative. Chairman Schiff failed to respond 
to Republican requests for witnesses,\643\ and directed 
witnesses not to answer questions from Republicans.\644\ 
Chairman Schiff even declined to share closed-door deposition 
transcripts with Republican Members.\645\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \642\See, e.g., Haley Byrd, Kevin McCarthy Calls on Nancy Pelosi to 
Suspend Impeachment Inquiry, CNN, Oct. 3, 2019.
    \643\Letter from Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight 
& Reform, et al., to Adam Schiff, Chairman, H. Perm. Sel. Comm. on 
Intelligence (Oct. 23, 2019).
    \644\See, e.g., Vindman deposition, supra note 12, at 78-80, 103-
05.
    \645\See, e.g., Deirdre Shesgreen & Bart Jansen, House Republicans 
complain about limited access to closed-door House impeachment 
investigation sessions, USA Today, Oct. 16, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the public hearings, despite the modicum of minority 
rights outlined in the Democrats' impeachment resolution, 
Chairman Schiff has continued to trample long-held minority 
rights. Chairman Schiff interrupted Republican Members during 
questioning and directed witnesses not to answer Republican 
questions.\646\ Chairman Schiff declined to invite all the 
witnesses identified by Republicans as relevant to the 
inquiry.\647\ Chairman Schiff declined to honor Republican 
subpoenas for documents and witnesses, and then violated House 
rules and the Democrats' impeachment resolution to vote down 
the subpoenas without sufficient notice or even any 
debate.\648\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \646\See, e.g., Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador William B. Taylor 
and Mr. George Kent, supra note 2; Impeachment Inquiry: Ambassador 
Marie Yovanovitch, supra note 4.
    \647\See, e.g., Beggin, supra note 550.
    \648\Impeachment Inquiry: Ms. Laura Cooper and Mr. David Hale, 
supra note 246.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is the very sort of process that Democrats had 
previously decried as ``what happens when a legislative chamber 
is obsessively preoccupied with investigating the opposition 
rather than legislating for the people who elected them to 
office.''\649\ Rep. Jerrold Nadler, now chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee, once argued that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \649\Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
the United States, supra note 640, at 94 (statement of Rep. Zoe 
Lofgren).

          The effect of impeachment is to overturn the popular 
        will of voters as expressed in a national election. . . 
        . There must never be a narrowly voted impeachment or 
        an impeachment substantially supported by one of our 
        major political parties and largely opposed by the 
        other. Such an impeachment would lack legitimacy and 
        produce the divisiveness and bitterness in our politics 
        for years to come and will call into question the very 
        legitimacy of our political institutions.\650\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \650\Id. at 77 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) (emphasis added).

    During the impeachment proceedings for President Clinton, 
Democrats warned against ``dump[ing] mountains of salacious, 
uncross-examined and otherwise untested materials onto the 
Internet, and then . . . sorting through boxes of documents to 
selectively find support for a foregone conclusion.''\651\ But 
now, in Speaker Pelosi's impeachment inquiry, as conducted by 
Chairman Schiff, the Democrats' old warnings have become the 
very process by which their current impeachment inquiry has 
proceeded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \651\Id. at 82 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. President Trump may raise privileges and defenses in response to 
        unfair, abusive proceedings.

    Speaker Pelosi's impeachment inquiry, as conducted by 
Chairman Schiff, has abandoned due process and the presumption 
of innocence that lies at the heart of western legal 
systems.\652\ Due to this abusive conduct and the Democrats' 
relentless attacks on the Trump Administration, President Trump 
may be rightly concerned about receiving fair treatment from 
House Democrats during this impeachment inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \652\See, e.g., Id. at 102 (statement of Rep. Maxine Waters) (``As 
Members of Congress have sworn to uphold the Constitution, we must 
always insist on equal and just treatment under the law. The 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty is central and basic to 
our system of justice.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the Clinton impeachment proceedings, Rep. Bobby 
Scott, now a senior member of the Democrat caucus, argued that 
the impeachment process should ``determine[], with a 
presumption of innocence, whether those allegations [against 
President Clinton] were true by using cross-examination of 
witnesses and other traditionally reliable evidentiary 
procedures.''\653\ Similarly, Rep. Jerrold Nadler argued then 
that ``[w]e have been entrusted with the grave and awesome duty 
by the American people, by the Constitution and by history. We 
must exercise that duty responsibly. At a bare minimum, that 
means the President's accusers must go beyond hearsay and 
innuendo and beyond demands that the President prove his 
innocence of vague and changing charges.''\654\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \653\Id. at 82 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).
    \654\Id. at 78 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, Democrats had previously argued that the 
assertion of privileges by a president does not constitute an 
impeachable offense. During the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings, Rep. Scott stated:

          At the hearing when I posed the question of whether 
        any of the witnesses on the hearing's second panel 
        believed that the count involving invoking executive 
        privilege should be considered an impeachable offense, 
        the clear consensus on the panel was that the charge 
        was not an impeachable offense. In fact, one Republican 
        witness said, I do not think invoking executive 
        privilege even if frivolously, and I believe it was 
        frivolous in these circumstances, that that does not 
        constitute an impeachable offense.\655\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \655\Id. at 83 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).

    Despite this prior commitment to due process and a 
presumption of innocence, the Democrats now favor a presumption 
of guilt. Chairman Schiff has said publicly that the Trump 
Administration and witnesses asserting their constitutional 
rights and seeking to test the soundness of subpoenas have 
formed ``a very powerful case against the president for 
obstruction, an article of impeachment based on 
obstruction.''\656\ Similarly, Chairman Schiff has made 
clearthat he will simply assume that a witness's testimony is adverse 
to the President when that witness or the President asserts a right or 
privilege.\657\ These are not the hallmarks of a fair and transparent 
process; these are the tell-tale signs of a star chamber.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \656\Kyle Cheney, Trump Makes `Very Powerful Case' for Impeachment 
Based on Obstruction, Schiff Warns, Politico, Oct. 28, 2019.
    \657\See Id. (``Schiff also argued that the president is seeking to 
block Kupperman because he is concerned about a high-level source 
corroborating damning testimony that Trump pressured Ukraine to open 
investigations of his political rivals--and condition military aid and 
a White House visit on bending the European ally to his will.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Although declining to submit to the Democrats' abusive and unfair 
        process, President Trump has released information to help the 
        American public understand the issues.

    Just twenty-seven minutes after President Trump's 
inauguration on January 20, 2017, the Washington Post reported 
that the ``campaign to impeach President Trump has 
begun.''\658\ As the Post reported:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \658\Matea Gold, The campaign to impeach President Trump has begun, 
Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 2017.

          The effort to impeach President Donald John Trump is 
        already underway. At the moment the new commander in 
        chief was sworn in, a campaign to build public support 
        for his impeachment went live at 
        ImpeachDonaldTrumpNow.org, spearheaded by two liberal 
        advocacy groups aiming to lay the groundwork for his 
        eventual ejection from the White House. . . . The 
        impeachment drive comes as Democrats and liberal 
        activists are mounting broad opposition to stymie 
        Trump's agenda.\659\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \659\Id.

    In 2017 and 2018, Democrats introduced four separation 
resolution in the House with the goal of impeaching President 
Trump.\660\ On January 3, 2019, on the Democrats' first day in 
power, Rep. Al Green again introduced articles of 
impeachment.\661\ That same day, Rep. Rashida Tlaib promised, 
``we're going to go in there and we're going to impeach the 
[expletive deleted].''\662\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \660\H., Res. 705, 115th Cong. (2018); H. Res. 646, 115th Cong. 
(2017); H. Res. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); H. Res. 438, 115th Cong. 
(2017).
    \661\H. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019).
    \662\Amy B. Wong, Rep. Rashida Tlaib profanely promised to impeach 
Trump. She's not sorry., Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In this context, it is difficult to see the Democrats' 
impeachment inquiry as anything other than a partisan effort to 
undo the results of the 2016 election. Rep. Green said on MSNBC 
in May 2019, ``If we don't impeach this President, he will get 
re-elected.''\663\ Even as Democrats have conducted their 
impeachment inquiry, Speaker Pelosi has called President Trump 
``an impostor'' and said it is ``dangerous'' to allow American 
voters to evaluate his performance in 2020.\664\ The Democrats' 
impeachment process has mirrored this rhetoric, stacking the 
deck against the President.\665\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \663\Weekends with Alex Witt, supra note 618.
    \664\Emily Tillett, Nancy Pelosi says Trump's attacks on witnesses 
``very significant'' to impeachment probe, CBS News, Nov. 15, 2019; 
Dear Colleague Letter from Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Nov. 18, 2019).
    \665\See H. Res. 660, 116th Cong. (2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even so, the President is not entirely unwilling to 
cooperate with the Democrats' demands. In October 2019, Pat A. 
Cipollone, the Counsel to the President, wrote to Speaker 
Pelosi and the chairmen of the three ``impeachment'' 
committees:

          If the Committees wish to return to the regular order 
        of oversight requests, we stand ready to engage in that 
        process as we have in the past, in a manner consistent 
        with well-established bipartisan constitutional 
        protections and a respect for the separation of powers 
        enshrined in our Constitution.\666\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \666\Letter from Pat A. Cipollone, supra note 617.

    Speaker Pelosi did not respond to Mr. Cipollone's letter. 
President Trump explained that he would ``like people to 
testify'' but he is resisting the Democrats' unfair and abusive 
process ``for future Presidents and the Office of the 
President.''\667\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \667\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 26, 2019, 
7:43 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1199352946187800578.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the Democrats' abusive and unfair process has 
prevented his cooperation with the Democrats' impeachment 
inquiry, President Trump has nonetheless been transparent about 
his conduct. On September 25, President Trump declassified and 
released to the public the summary of his July 25 phone 
conversation with President Zelensky, stressing his goal that 
Americans could read for themselves the contents of the call: 
``You will see it was a very friendly and totally appropriate 
call.''\668\ On November 15, President Trump released to the 
public the summary of this April 21 phone conversation with 
President Zelensky in the interest of transparency.\669\ In 
addition, President Trump has spoken publicly about his 
actions, as has Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney.\670\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \668\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 24, 2019, 
11:12 a.m.), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1176559970390806530.
    \669\Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 11, 2019, 
3:35 p.m.), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1194035922066714625.
    \670\See, e.g., The White House, Remarks by President Trump before 
Marine One Departure (Nov. 20, 2019); Press Briefing by Acting Chief of 
Staff Mick Mulvaney, supra note 302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress has a serious and important role to play in 
overseeing the Executive Branch. When the House of 
Representatives considers impeachment of a president, 
bipartisan precedent dictates fundamental fairness and due 
process. In pursuing impeachment of President Trump, however, 
Democrats have abandoned those principles, choosing instead to 
use impeachment as a tool to pursue their partisan objectives. 
While the President has declined to submit himself to the 
Democrats' unfair and abusive process, he has still made an 
effort to be transparent with the Americans to whom he is 
accountable. Under these abusive and unfair circumstances, the 
Democrats cannot establish a charge of obstruction.

                             IV. Conclusion

    The impeachment of a president is one of the gravest and 
most solemn duties of the House of Representatives. For 
Democrats, impeachment is a tool for settling political scores 
and re-litigating election results with which they disagreed. 
This impeachment inquiry and the manner in which the Democrats 
are pursuing it sets a dangerous precedent.
    The Democrats have not established an impeachable offense. 
The evidence presented in this report does not support a 
finding that President Trump pressured President Zelensky to 
investigate his political rival for the President's benefit in 
the 2020 election. The evidence does not establish that 
President Trump withheld a White House meeting to pressure 
President Zelensky to investigate his political rival to 
benefit him in the 2020 election. The evidence does not support 
that President Trump withheld U.S. security assistance to 
pressure President Zelensky to investigate his political rival 
for the President's benefit in the 2020 election. The evidence 
does not establish that President Trump orchestrated a shadow 
foreign policy apparatus to pressure President Zelensky to 
investigate his political rival to benefit him in the 2020 
election.
    The best evidence of President Trump's interaction with 
President Zelensky is the ``complete and accurate'' call 
summary prepared by the White House Situation Room staff. The 
summary shows no indication of conditionality, pressure, or 
coercion. Both President Trump and President Zelensky have 
denied the existence of any pressure. President Zelensky and 
his senior advisers in Kyiv did not even know that U.S. 
security assistance to Ukraine was paused until it was publicly 
reported in U.S. media. Ultimately, Ukraine received the 
security assistance and President Zelensky met with President 
Trump, all without Ukraine ever investigating President Trump's 
political rival. These facts alone severely undercut the 
Democrat allegations.
    The evidence in the Democrats' impeachment inquiry shows 
that President Trump is skeptical about U.S. taxpayer-funded 
foreign assistance and strongly believes that European allies 
should shoulder more of the financial burden for regional 
defense. The President also has deeply-rooted, reasonable, and 
genuine concerns about corruption in Ukraine, including the 
placement of Vice President Biden's son on the board of a 
Ukrainian energy company notorious for corruption at a time 
when Vice President Biden was the Obama Administration's point 
person for Ukraine policy. There is also compelling and 
indisputable evidence that Ukrainian government officials--some 
working with a Democrat operative--sought to influence the U.S. 
presidential election in 2016 in favor of Secretary Clinton and 
in opposition to President Trump.
    The Democrats' impeachment narrative ignores the 
President's state of mind and it ignores the specific and 
concrete actions that the new Zelensky government took to 
address pervasive Ukrainian corruption. The Democrats' case 
rests almost entirely on hearsay, presumption, and emotion. 
Where there are ambiguous facts, the Democrats interpret them 
in a light most unfavorable to the President. The Democrats 
also flatly disregard any perception of potential wrongdoing 
with respect to Hunter Biden's presence on the board of Burisma 
Holdings or Ukrainian influence in the 2016 election.
    The evidence presented also does not support allegations 
that President Trump covered-up his conversation with President 
Zelensky by restricting access to it. In light of leaks of 
other presidential conversations with world leaders, the White 
House took reasonably steps to restrict access to the July 25 
call summary. The summary was mistakenly placed on a secure 
server; however, the Democrats' witnesses explained that there 
was no nefarious conduct or malicious intent associated with 
this action.
    Likewise, the evidence presented does not support 
allegations that President Trump obstructed the Democrats' 
impeachment inquiry by raising concerns about an unfair and 
abusive process. The Democrats deviated from prior bipartisan 
precedent for presidential impeachment and denied Republican 
attempts to inject basic fairness and objectivity into their 
partisan and one-sided inquiry. The White House has signaled 
that it is willing to work with Democrats but President Trump 
cannot be faulted for declining to submit himself to the 
Democrats' star chamber. Even so, President Trump has been 
transparent with the American people about his actions, 
releasing documents and speaking publicly about the subject 
matter.
    The Democrats' impeachment inquiry paints a picture of 
unelected bureaucrats within the foreign policy and national 
security apparatus who fundamentally disagreed with President 
Trump's style, world view, and decisions. Their disagreements 
with President Trump's policies and their discomfort with 
President Trump's actions set in motion the anonymous, 
secondhand whistleblower complaint. Democrats seized on the 
whistleblower complaint to fulfill their years-old obsession 
with removing President Trump from office.
    The unfortunate collateral damage of the Democrats' 
impeachment inquiry is the harm done to bilateral U.S.-Ukraine 
relations, the fulfillment of Russian President Vladimir 
Putin's desire to sow discord within the United States, and the 
opportunity costs to the American people. In the time that 
Democrats spent investigating the President, Democrats could 
have passed legislation to implement the U.S.-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement, lower the costs of prescription drugs, or secure our 
southern border. Instead, the Democrats' obsession with 
impeaching President Trump has paralyzed their already-thin 
legislative agenda. Less than a year before the 2020 election 
and Democrats in the House still cannot move on from the 
results of the last election.

                                  [all]