

URANIUM CLASSIFICATION ACT OF 2019

OCTOBER 4, 2019.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. GRIJALVA, from the Committee on Natural Resources,
submitted the following

REPORT

together with

DISSENTING VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 3405]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Natural Resources, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3405) to direct the Secretary of the Interior to revise the Final List of Critical Minerals, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendment is as follows:

The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Uranium Classification Act of 2019”.

SEC. 2. REVISION OF FINAL RULE REGARDING CRITICAL MINERALS

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior shall revise the Final List of Critical Minerals, and any related regulations, to remove uranium from such list.

(b) RESTRICTION.—The Secretary of the Interior may not add uranium to the Final List of Critical Minerals.

(c) FINAL LIST OF CRITICAL MINERALS.—The term “Final List of Critical Minerals” means the Final List of Critical Minerals issued pursuant to Executive Order 13817 (82 Fed. Reg. 60835, relating to a Federal strategy to ensure secure and reliable supplies of critical minerals).

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of H.R. 3405 is to direct the Secretary of the Interior to revise the Final List of Critical Minerals, and for other purposes.

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Executive Order (EO) 13,817,¹ issued on December 20, 2017, directed the U.S. government to adopt a national strategy for critical minerals. Pursuant to EO 13,817, the Department of Interior published a Final List of Critical Minerals on May 18th, 2018.² The list contains several minerals, including uranium, that do not meet the definition of a critical mineral under EO 13,817, or scientifically accepted definitions of criticality published by the National Research Council, the U.S. Department of Energy, the American Physical Society, the Materials Research Society, and the National Science and Technology Council of the Obama and Trump Administrations, among other organizations. The first requirement under EO 13,817 for a mineral to be critical is that it be: (a) a non-fuel mineral, or (b) a mineral material. The terms “non-fuel mineral” and “mineral material” are defined or used elsewhere in federal law in ways that clearly exclude uranium. The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970³ defines uranium as a “mineral fuel”—a definition consistently applied by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Bureau of Land Management, National Science and Technology Council, and others. Uranium is also not a “mineral material”—as defined by the Materials Act of 1947,⁴ a “mineral material” includes common varieties of sand, stone, gravel, pumice, pumicite, cinders, and clay, and other minerals that are considered “saleable.” Uranium is a mineral considered “locatable” under the General Mining Act of 1872,⁵ not saleable under the Materials Act.

Beyond the definition, uranium does not meet the other requirements of critical minerals under EO 13,817. The United States’ uranium supply chain is not vulnerable to disruption, nor is it highly concentrated in individual markets—two requirements identified in the Department of the Interior’s methodology for being considered a critical mineral. Although uranium is an important fuel mineral that the United States is 93 percent import-dependent on, world supplies are robust and uranium resources are heavily concentrated in friendly countries: Australia has the largest amount, with 30 percent of identified resources, while Canada has the third largest, with 11 percent. Those two countries provided 52 percent of U.S. uranium imports in 2017.

Additionally, the process the Department of Interior used to generate the critical minerals list was not transparent. The Department made it clear that a quantitative screening tool developed by the USGS⁶ was the starting point for generating the list, but the methodology document provided with the critical minerals list mentions the use of six additional factors.⁷ Those—such as “various inputs from the DOD” and “the judgment of subject-matter experts”⁸—are vague and subjective. Another factor listed was the Energy Information Administration’s Uranium Marketing Annual

¹ Exec. Order No. 13,817, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,835 (Dec. 20, 2017).

² 83 Fed. Reg. 23,295.

³ 30 U.S.C. § 21a.

⁴ *Id.* §§ 601 *et seq.*

⁵ *Id.* §§ 21 *et seq.*

⁶ Erin McCullough & Nedal T. Nassar, *Assessment of Critical Minerals: Updated Application of an Early-Warning Screening Methodology*, 30(3) Min. Econ. 257 (2017).

⁷ U.S. Geological Surv., Open-File Report 2018-1021, Draft Critical Mineral List—Summary of Methodology and Background Information—U.S. Geological Survey Technical Input Document in Response to Secretarial Order No. 3359, at 2 (2018).

⁸ *Id.*

Report, which was used to justify retaining uranium on the list rather than as part of an actual methodology for including it. No information was provided for any of the six factors that shows why uranium was deemed a critical mineral. It is further perplexing that in December 2017, less than two months before the draft critical minerals list was published by the USGS, that agency released an updated report on critical minerals that included no mention of uranium as a critical mineral.⁹

One of the purposes of creating a critical minerals list, as stated by EO 13,817, is “streamlining leasing and permitting processes to expedite exploration, production, processing, reprocessing, recycling, and domestic refining of critical minerals.”¹⁰ In June 2019, the Department of Commerce published its report required under the EO for developing a national critical minerals strategy. This report contains many recommendations for action, including, among others, fast-tracking mining permits and the review of existing mineral withdrawals.¹¹ Such a review could put every single mineral withdrawal at risk of reduction or elimination by the Trump Administration, particularly the one protecting the region around the Grand Canyon. Given the illogical classification of uranium as a critical mineral and the subsequent Department of Commerce report, the Committee is concerned that the Administration may use this new designation to speed uranium mine permits, assisting the uranium mining industry while putting a national treasure at risk and circumventing laws intended to protect the environment and public health.

The Toxic Legacy of Uranium Mining

Concerns about a revival of uranium mining are well-founded. Past uranium mining activities have taken a heavy toll across the Colorado Plateau, especially on Native American communities. Since the 1940s, the plateau has been home to at least 22 uranium mills and the majority of all uranium mining conducted in the United States. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates there are a total of 15,000 abandoned uranium mines across 14 western states. Most of those mines are found in Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming, and 75 percent of abandoned uranium mines are on federal and tribal lands.

There are over 1,000 mines and four uranium mills on the Navajo Nation alone. Today, more than 500 mines on the Navajo Nation have been abandoned by the mining companies that operated them and remain in need of cleanup.¹² To date, the EPA has entered into more than \$1.7 billion in enforcement agreements and settlements for the cleanup of fewer than half these sites. While the Navajo Nation and the EPA work to assess and clean up these sites, the abandoned mines continue to contaminate groundwater, crops, livestock, and homes. In 2008, several U.S. and tribal government agencies identified 29 water sources on the Navajo Nation

⁹U.S. Geological Surv., Professional Paper 1802, Critical Mineral Resources of the United States—Economic and Environmental Geology and Prospects for Future Supply (Klaus J. Schulz, John H. DeYoung, Jr., Robert R. Seal & Dwight C. Bradley, eds., 2017).

¹⁰82 Fed. Reg. 60,835, 60,836 (Dec. 20, 2017).

¹¹U.S. Dep’t of Com., A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals (2019).

¹²U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Navajo Nation: Cleaning Up Abandoned Uranium Mines (last updated July 19, 2019).

with uranium and other radionuclide levels in excess of drinking water standards.¹³ In 2016, an ongoing study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and several state and local groups surveyed 599 participants on the Navajo Nation and found elevated uranium levels in the urine of 27 percent of the participants, whereas the general U.S. population has such levels at only 5 percent.¹⁴

While some argue that modern uranium mines can be operated and cleaned up without contaminating land and water, there is little evidence to support these claims. Several recent accidents at uranium mines near the Grand Canyon demonstrate the considerable uncertainty surrounding pathways for uranium contamination. Radioactive dust from the Kanab North mine has been carried by the wind throughout the surrounding area. In 2017, the operator of Canyon Mine pierced an aquifer while digging a mine shaft—a problem that has yet to be remedied. The operator's solution is to mist the contaminated water from the mine shaft into the surrounding ecosystem to keep the mine's onsite storage pond from overflowing.

COMMITTEE ACTION

H.R. 3405 was introduced on June 21, 2019, by Chair Raúl M. Grijalva (D–AZ). The bill was referred solely to the Committee on Natural Resources, and within the Committee to the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources. The Subcommittee held a hearing to consider the bill on June 25, 2019. On July 17, 2019, the Natural Resources Committee met to consider the bill. The Subcommittee was discharged by unanimous consent. Chair Grijalva offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Representative Paul A. Gosar, D.D.S. (R–AZ) offered an amendment designated Gosar #5 to the Grijalva amendment in the nature of a substitute. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 14 yeas and 19 nays, as follows:

¹³See, e.g., Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Team (START) Team 9, TDD No. T05–09–07–11–0001, Navajo Nation Drinking Water Source Sampling, Feb.–Mar. 2008 (2008).

¹⁴See *For The Navajo Nation, Uranium Mining's Deadly Legacy Lingers*, NPR: Shots (Apr. 10, 2016, 5:07 AM ET), <https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/04/10/473547227/for-the-navajo-nation-uranium-minings-deadly-legacy-lingers>.

Date: July 17, 2019

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
116th Congress - Roll Call

Bill / Motion: H.R. 3405**Amendment:** Mr. Gosar #5 amendment to the Grijalva amendment in the nature of a substitute**Disposition:** Not agreed to by a roll call vote of 14 yeas and 19 nays.

	DEM. MEMBERS (25)	YEAS	NAYS	PRESENT
1	Mr. Brown, MD			
2	Mr. Cartwright, PA	X		
3	Mr. Case, HI	X		
4	Mr. Clay, MO	X		
5	Mr. Costa, CA	X		
6	Mr. Cox, CA	X		
7	Mr. Cunningham, SC	X		
8	Ms. DeGette, CO	X		
9	Mrs. Dingell, MI	X		
10	Mr. Gallego, AZ	X		
11	Mr. Grijalva, AZ (Chair)	X		
12	Ms. Haaland, NM	X		
13	Mr. Horsford, NV			
14	Mr. Huffman, CA	X		
15	Mr. Levin, CA	X		
16	Mr. Lowenthal, CA	X		
17	Mr. McEachin, VA			
18	Ms. Napolitano, CA	X		
19	Mr. Neguse, CO			
20	Mr. Sablan, CNMI	X		
21	Mr. San Nicolas, GU			
22	Mr. Soto, FL			
23	Mr. Van Drew, NJ	X		
24	Mr. Tonko, NY	X		
25	Ms. Velázquez, NY	X		
	REP. MEMBERS (19)	Y	N	P
1	Mr. Bishop, UT (Ranking)	X		
2	Ms. Cheney, WY	X		
3	Mr. Cook, CA	X		
4	Mr. Curtis, UT	X		
5	Mr. Fulcher, ID	X		
6	Mr. Gohmert, TX	X		
7	Ms. González-Colón, PR	X		
8	Mr. Gosar, AZ	X		
9	Mr. Graves, LA			
10	Mr. Hern, OK	X		
11	Mr. Hice, GA			
12	Mr. Johnson, LA			
13	Mr. Lamborn, CO	X		
14	Mr. McClintock, CA	X		
15	Mrs. Radewagen, AS	X		
16	Mr. Webster, FL			
17	Mr. Westerman, AR	X		
18	Mr. Wittman, VA	X		
19	Mr. Young, AK			
	TOTALS	14	19	
	Total: 44 / Quorum: 15 / Report: 23	YEAS	NAYS	PRESENT

Representative Gosar offered an amendment designated Gosar #1 to the Grijalva amendment in the nature of a substitute. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 14 yeas and 19 nays, as follows:

Date: July 17, 2019

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
116th Congress - Roll Call

Bill / Motion: H.R. 3405**Amendment:** Mr. Gosar #1 amendment to the Grijalva amendment in the nature of a substitute**Disposition:** Not agreed to by a roll call vote of 14 yeas and 19 nays.

	DEM. MEMBERS (25)	YEAS	NAYS	PRESENT
1	Mr. Brown, MD			
2	Mr. Cartwright, PA		X	
3	Mr. Case, HI		X	
4	Mr. Clay, MO		X	
5	Mr. Costa, CA		X	
6	Mr. Cox, CA		X	
7	Mr. Cunningham, SC		X	
8	Ms. DeGette, CO		X	
9	Mrs. Dingell, MI		X	
10	Mr. Gallego, AZ		X	
11	Mr. Grijalva, AZ (Chair)		X	
12	Ms. Haaland, NM		X	
13	Mr. Horsford, NV			
14	Mr. Huffman, CA		X	
15	Mr. Levin, CA		X	
16	Mr. Lowenthal, CA		X	
17	Mr. McEachin, VA			
18	Ms. Napolitano, CA		X	
19	Mr. Neguse, CO			
20	Mr. Sablan, CNMI		X	
21	Mr. San Nicolas, GU			
22	Mr. Soto, FL			
23	Mr. Van Drew, NJ		X	
24	Mr. Tonko, NY		X	
25	Ms. Velázquez, NY		X	
	REP. MEMBERS (19)	Y	N	P
1	Mr. Bishop, UT (Ranking)	X		
2	Ms. Cheney, WY	X		
3	Mr. Cook, CA	X		
4	Mr. Curtis, UT	X		
5	Mr. Fulcher, ID	X		
6	Mr. Gohmert, TX	X		
7	Ms. González-Colón, PR	X		
8	Mr. Gosar, AZ	X		
9	Mr. Graves, LA			
10	Mr. Hern, OK	X		
11	Mr. Hice, GA			
12	Mr. Johnson, LA			
13	Mr. Lamborn, CO	X		
14	Mr. McClintock, CA	X		
15	Mrs. Radewagen, AS	X		
16	Mr. Webster, FL			
17	Mr. Westerman, AR	X		
18	Mr. Wittman, VA	X		
19	Mr. Young, AK			
	TOTALS	14	19	
	Total: 44 / Quorum: 15 / Report: 23	YEAS	NAYS	PRESENT

The Grijalva amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to by voice vote. The bill, as amended, was ordered favorably reported to the House of Representatives by a roll call vote of 19 yeas and 15 nays, as follows:

Date: July 17, 2019

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
116th Congress - Roll Call

Bill / Motion: H.R. 3405

Amendment:

Disposition: Final Passage: H.R. 3405, as amended, was adopted and ordered favorably reported to the House of Representatives by a roll call vote of 19 yeas and 15 nays.

	DEM. MEMBERS (25)	YEAS	NAYS	PRESENT
1	Mr. Brown, MD			
2	Mr. Cartwright, PA	X		
3	Mr. Case, HI	X		
4	Mr. Clay, MO	X		
5	Mr. Costa, CA		X	
6	Mr. Cox, CA	X		
7	Mr. Cunningham, SC	X		
8	Ms. DeGette, CO	X		
9	Mrs. Dingell, MI	X		
10	Mr. Gallego, AZ	X		
11	Mr. Grijalva, AZ (Chair)	X		
12	Ms. Haaland, NM	X		
13	Mr. Horsford, NV	X		
14	Mr. Huffman, CA	X		
15	Mr. Levin, CA	X		
16	Mr. Lowenthal, CA	X		
17	Mr. McEachin, VA			
18	Ms. Napolitano, CA	X		
19	Mr. Neguse, CO			
20	Mr. Sablan, CNMI	X		
21	Mr. San Nicolas, GU			
22	Mr. Soto, FL			
23	Mr. Van Drew, NJ	X		
24	Mr. Tonko, NY	X		
25	Ms. Velázquez, NY	X		
	REP. MEMBERS (19)	Y	N	P
1	Mr. Bishop, UT (Ranking)		X	
2	Ms. Cheney, WY		X	
3	Mr. Cook, CA		X	
4	Mr. Curtis, UT		X	
5	Mr. Fulcher, ID		X	
6	Mr. Gohmert, TX		X	
7	Ms. González-Colón, PR		X	
8	Mr. Gosar, AZ		X	
9	Mr. Graves, LA			
10	Mr. Hern, OK		X	
11	Mr. Hice, GA			
12	Mr. Johnson, LA			
13	Mr. Lamborn, CO		X	
14	Mr. McClintonck, CA		X	
15	Mrs. Radewagen, AS		X	
16	Mr. Webster, FL			
17	Mr. Westerman, AR		X	
18	Mr. Wittman, VA		X	
19	Mr. Young, AK			
	TOTALS	19	15	
	Total: 44 / Quorum: 15 / Report: 23	YEAS	NAYS	PRESENT

HEARINGS

For the purposes of section 103(i) of H. Res. 6 of the 116th Congress—the following hearing was used to develop or consider H.R. 3405: a legislative hearing titled “Uranium Mining: Contamination and Criticality” held by the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources on Tuesday, June 25, 2019, at 10:00 a.m.

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Regarding clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Natural Resources’ oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in the body of this report.

COMPLIANCE WITH HOUSE RULE XIII AND CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT

1. *Cost of Legislation and the Congressional Budget Act.* With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) and (3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and sections 308(a) and 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following estimate for the bill from the Director of the Congressional Budget Office:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, August 6, 2019.

Hon. RAÚL M. GRIJALVA,
Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3405, the Uranium Classification Act of 2019.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Robert Reese.

Sincerely,

MARK P. HADLEY
(For Phillip L. Swagel, Director).

Enclosure.

H.R. 3405. Uranium Classification Act of 2019			
As ordered reported by the House Committee on Natural Resources on July 17, 2019			
By Fiscal Year, Millions of Dollars	2019	2019-2024	2019-2029
Direct Spending (Outlays)	0	0	0
Revenues	0	0	0
Increase or Decrease (-) in the Deficit	0	0	0
Spending Subject to Appropriation (Outlays)	0	*	*
Statutory pay-as-you-go procedures apply?	No	Mandate Effects	
Increases on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2030?	No	Contains intergovernmental mandate?	No
		Contains private-sector mandate?	No

* = between zero and \$500,000.

H.R. 3405 would direct the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) to remove uranium from the Final List of Critical Minerals published on May 18, 2018, pursuant to Executive Order 13817, which directed the federal government to identify and develop a national strategy for critical minerals.

CBO estimates that updating the list and associated regulations to exclude uranium would not significantly increase USGS costs over the 2020–2024 period. Any spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Robert Reese. The estimate was reviewed by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

2. *General Performance Goals and Objectives.* As required by clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII, the general performance goals and objectives of this bill is to direct the Secretary of the Interior to revise the Final List of Critical Minerals to exclude uranium.

EARMARK STATEMENT

This bill does not contain any Congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined under clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT STATEMENT

This bill contains no unfunded mandates.

EXISTING PROGRAMS

This bill does not establish or reauthorize a program of the federal government known to be duplicative of another program.

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

PREEMPTION OF STATE, LOCAL, OR TRIBAL LAW

Any preemptive effect of this bill over state, local, or tribal law is intended to be consistent with the bill's purposes and text and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

If enacted, this bill would make no changes to existing law.

DISSENTING VIEWS

We are opposed to H.R. 3405, which would direct the Secretary of the Interior to revise the Final List of Critical Minerals to omit uranium and prevent it from being added back in the future.

On December 20, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 1317, calling for a national strategy to support a domestic supply of critical minerals. The first step was the creation of a list of minerals deemed “critical” by the United States Geological Survey (USGS), which ultimately included 35 commodities, including uranium.¹ After significant consultation with the Department of the Interior, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and other agencies, the Department of Commerce released a report on June 4, 2019, detailing several strategies to support the stability and independence of America’s critical minerals supply chain.²

Each designation on the critical minerals list was made after consideration of a variety of vetted analysis tools and models, including the Herfindahl-Hirschman index used by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to identify highly concentrated markets.³ Additional tools used to produce the list were the U.S. net import reliance statistics generated by USGS, Defense Logistics Agency reports on the National Defense Stockpile, and the Energy Information Administration’s 2016 Uranium Marketing Annual Report.⁴

Proponents of H.R. 3405 argue that uranium is strictly a fuel mineral and therefore should not be included on the list of critical minerals. To the contrary, uranium is an extremely valuable element with both fuel and non-fuel applications. Because it is deemed a locatable mineral and governed under the General Mining Law of 1872, its inclusion in a list of non-fuel critical minerals seems entirely appropriate. Non-fuel applications of uranium include use in space missions, naval military operations, and medical isotope production and development.⁵

¹ 83 FR 23295.

² U.S. Department of Commerce. “A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals.” June 4, 2019. <https://www.commerce.gov/news/reports/2019/06/federal-strategy-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-critical-minerals>.

³ U.S. Geological Survey. Mineral Commodity Summaries 2019. <https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/mineral-commodity-summaries>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ U.S. Geological Survey. Draft Critical Minerals List—Summary of Methodology and Background Information. 2018. <https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2018/1021/ofr20181021.pdf>.

Supporters of this legislation also argue that the domestic supply of uranium is not at significant risk, as large percentages of imports are secured from allied nations, and therefore, uranium's designation as a critical mineral does not meet the criteria of having a supply chain vulnerable to disruption. However, in 2018, 97% of domestic demand for uranium was met by foreign imports.⁶ Total production from U.S. uranium mines in 2018 was 33 percent lower than production in 2017.⁷ Production in 2019 is likely to be even lower, less than what is needed to power just one of our 98 domestic nuclear reactors.⁸ Much of our current military demand is met by stockpiles built during the Cold War.⁹ The world's largest uranium producer is Kazakhstan, with Russia and Uzbekistan also major producers.¹⁰ China, too, is signaling an interest to enter the uranium market, buying large mines in Namibia.¹¹ Overall, more than half of imports to the United States in 2018 originated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, or Namibia.¹²

Admittedly, the U.S. also imports uranium from Canada and Australia, but their ability to be significant suppliers in the future is less certain. An increase in supply from Kazakhstan and other nations has lowered global prices, and as free market countries, they are vulnerable to being out-competed just like the United States. For instance, Canada's McArthur River Mine shut down indefinitely in 2018, representing about 15 percent of global production.¹³ With this closure, only one Canadian uranium mine remains operational.¹⁴

H.R. 3405 disregards the analysis of multiple defense, economic, and science-based government organizations in the listing of uranium as critical. This bill would not only remove uranium from the critical minerals list, but also prevents it from being added back at any point in the future, without contingency for sudden global supply disruptions. This legislation jeopardizes our ability to maintain a stable, domestic supply of a material invaluable to our national security, not to mention inexpensive, reliable nuclear power. For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 3405.

ROB BISHOP.
LIZ CHENEY.
PAUL A. GOSAR.
DON YOUNG.

⁶U.S. Energy Information Administration. "2018 Uranium Marketing Annual Report." May 2019. <https://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/pdf/umar2018.pdf>.

⁷U.S. Energy Information Administration. Domestic Uranium Production Report—Annual. May 16, 2019. <https://www.eia.gov/uranium/production/annual>.

⁸Uranium Producers of America staff briefing, June 2019.

⁹Thomas Duesterberg, "Opponents Of Trade Relief For Uranium Mining Have Unconvincing Case." Forbes. March 25, 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasduesterberg/2019/03/25/oppo-nents-of-section-232-relief-for-uranium-mining-relief-have-unconvincing-case/#274ce28b3f8d>.

¹⁰U.S. Department of Commerce. "A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals." June 4, 2019. <https://www.commerce.gov/news/reports/2019/06/federal-strategy-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-critical-minerals>.

¹¹Thomas Duesterberg, "Opponents Of Trade Relief For Uranium Mining Have Unconvincing Case." Forbes. March 25, 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasduesterberg/2019/03/25/oppo-nents-of-section-232-relief-for-uranium-mining-relief-have-unconvincing-case/#274ce28b3f8d>.

¹²U.S. Energy Information Administration. "2018 Uranium Marketing Annual Report." May 2019. <https://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/pdf/umar2018.pdf>.

¹³Natalie Obiko Pearson, Stephen Staczyński, and Joe Deaux. "Cameco Suspends Production Indefinitely at Uranium Mine." Bloomberg. July 25, 2018. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-25/cameco-suspends-production-at-canadian-uranium-mine-indefinitely>.

¹⁴Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. "Uranium mines and mills." <http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/uranium/mines-and-mills/index.cfm>.

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