[House Report 116-151]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
116th Congress } { Rept. 116-151
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
----------
R E P O R T
of the
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
July 11, 2019.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
116th Congress } { Rept. 116-151
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
__________
R E P O R T
of the
HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
July 11, 2019.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
37-060 WASHINGTON : 2019
116th Congress } { Rept. 116-151
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session } { Part 1
======================================================================
DAMON PAUL NELSON AND MATTHEW YOUNG POLLARD INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018, 2019, AND 2020
_______
July 11, 2019.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Schiff, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 3494]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 3494) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with
amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendments are as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020''.
SEC. 2. DIVISIONS AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Divisions.--This Act is organized into two divisions as follows:
(1) Division A--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Year
2020.
(2) Division B--Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Years
2018 and 2019.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Divisions and table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Intelligence community management account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 303. Paid parental leave.
Sec. 304. Unfunded requirements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Extending the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982.
Sec. 306. Intelligence community public-private talent exchange.
Sec. 307. Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain
security and counterintelligence concerns.
Sec. 308. Required counterintelligence briefings and notifications.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 401. Establishment of Climate Security Advisory Council.
Sec. 402. Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Sec. 501. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Communist Party of China.
Sec. 502. Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the
Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 503. Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to influence
election in Taiwan.
Sec. 504. Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and other
assets of Vladimir Putin.
Sec. 505. Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the
Russian Federation.
Sec. 506. Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi.
TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Sec. 601. Definitions.
Sec. 602. Annual strategic intelligence assessment of and comprehensive
report on domestic terrorism.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 701. Modification of requirements for submission to Congress of
certain reports.
Sec. 702. Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget of
the United States.
Sec. 703. Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign
influence operations.
Sec. 704. Study on role of retired and former personnel of intelligence
community with respect to certain foreign intelligence operations.
Sec. 705. Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-
generation wireless network technology.
Sec. 706. Establishment of 5G prize competition.
Sec. 707. Establishment of deepfakes prize competition.
DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019
TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 2101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 2103. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
Sec. 2201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 2202. Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 2301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 2302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 2303. Modification of special pay authority for science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition of
special pay authority for cyber positions.
Sec. 2304. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer of
the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2305. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of
positions within the intelligence community on the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 2306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task
Force.
Sec. 2307. Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and
cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with foreign
governments and entities.
Sec. 2308. Cyber protection support for the personnel of the
intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber attack.
Sec. 2309. Elimination of sunset of authority relating to management of
supply-chain risk.
Sec. 2310. Limitations on determinations regarding certain security
classifications.
Sec. 2311. Joint Intelligence Community Council.
Sec. 2312. Intelligence community information technology environment.
Sec. 2313. Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for
intelligence community.
Sec. 2314. Policy on minimum insider threat standards.
Sec. 2315. Submission of intelligence community policies.
Sec. 2316. Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts.
TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 2401. Authority for protection of current and former employees of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 2402. Designation of the program manager-information sharing
environment.
Sec. 2403. Technical modification to the executive schedule.
Sec. 2404. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 2405. Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 2411. Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel
assigned to austere locations.
Sec. 2412. Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation
payments and other payments for Central Intelligence Agency personnel.
Sec. 2413. Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 2414. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for
certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
Department of Energy
Sec. 2421. Consolidation of Department of Energy Offices of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 2422. Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
Sec. 2423. Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive
Committee and budget reporting requirement.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 2431. Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of
Defense Security Service as an element of intelligence community.
Sec. 2432. Notice not required for private entities.
Sec. 2433. Establishment of advisory board for National Reconnaissance
Office.
Sec. 2434. Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security
personnel at field locations.
TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS
Sec. 2501. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against
United States election infrastructure.
Sec. 2502. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect
against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the Presidential
election.
Sec. 2503. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal
elections.
Sec. 2504. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United
States elections.
Sec. 2505. Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda.
Sec. 2506. Information sharing with State election officials.
Sec. 2507. Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and
active measures campaigns directed at elections for Federal offices.
Sec. 2508. Designation of counterintelligence officer to lead election
security matters.
TITLE XXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 2601. Definitions.
Sec. 2602. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and
background investigations.
Sec. 2603. Improving the process for security clearances.
Sec. 2604. Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security
clearances.
Sec. 2605. Security Executive Agent.
Sec. 2606. Report on unified, simplified, Governmentwide standards for
positions of trust and security clearances.
Sec. 2607. Report on clearance in person concept.
Sec. 2608. Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of
departments and agencies.
Sec. 2609. Intelligence community reports on security clearances.
Sec. 2610. Periodic report on positions in the intelligence community
that can be conducted without access to classified information,
networks, or facilities.
Sec. 2611. Information sharing program for positions of trust and
security clearances.
Sec. 2612. Report on protections for confidentiality of whistleblower-
related communications.
TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
Sec. 2701. Limitation relating to establishment or support of
cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation.
Sec. 2702. Report on returning Russian compounds.
Sec. 2703. Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia.
Sec. 2704. Notification of an active measures campaign.
Sec. 2705. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States.
Sec. 2706. Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from United
States adversaries to the United States technology sector.
Sec. 2707. Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and
Lebanon.
Sec. 2708. Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign
military and terrorist activities.
Sec. 2709. Expansion of scope of committee to counter active measures
and report on establishment of Foreign Malign Influence Center.
Subtitle B--Reports
Sec. 2711. Technical correction to Inspector General study.
Sec. 2712. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer of
the Department of Homeland Security.
Sec. 2713. Review of intelligence community whistleblower matters.
Sec. 2714. Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments.
Sec. 2715. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against United
States telecommunications networks.
Sec. 2716. Biennial report on foreign investment risks.
Sec. 2717. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of
foreign diplomats.
Sec. 2718. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 2719. Congressional notification of designation of covered
intelligence officer as persona non grata.
Sec. 2720. Reports on intelligence community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process of Federal Government.
Sec. 2721. Inspectors General reports on classification.
Sec. 2722. Reports on global water insecurity and national security
implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and pandemics.
Sec. 2723. Annual report on memoranda of understanding between elements
of intelligence community and other entities of the United States
Government regarding significant operational activities or policy.
Sec. 2724. Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline
and wireless telephone calls.
Sec. 2725. Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring and
retention of minority employees.
Sec. 2726. Reports on intelligence community loan repayment and related
programs.
Sec. 2727. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 2728. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on
senior executives of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Sec. 2729. Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering
permanent residence to sources and cooperators.
Sec. 2730. Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources.
Sec. 2731. Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by
terrorist actors.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
Sec. 2741. Public Interest Declassification Board.
Sec. 2742. Technical and clerical amendments to the National Security
Act of 1947.
Sec. 2743. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy.
Sec. 2744. Sense of Congress on notification of certain disclosures of
classified information.
Sec. 2745. Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage activities
when considering whether or not to provide visas to foreign individuals
to be accredited to a United Nations mission in the United States.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' has the meaning given
such term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3003).
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
DIVISION A--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2020
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 101 for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of
section 101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the
President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3),
the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection
(a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the
executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50
U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget;
or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2020 the sum of
$565,637,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for
fiscal year 2020 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year
2020.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 303. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.
(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to--
(1) help the intelligence community recruit and retain a
dynamic, multi-talented, and diverse workforce capable of
meeting the security goals of the United States; and
(2) establish best practices and processes for other elements
of the Federal Government seeking to pursue similar policies.
(b) Authorization of Paid Parental Leave for Intelligence Community
Employees.--
(1) In general.--Title III of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 304 the following:
``SEC. 305. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.
``(a) Paid Parental Leave.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a civilian employee of an element of the intelligence community
shall have available a total of 12 administrative workweeks of paid
parental leave in the event of the birth of a son or daughter of the
employee, or placement of a son or daughter with the employee for
adoption or foster care in order to care for such son or daughter. Such
paid parental leave shall be used during the 12-month period beginning
on the date of the birth or placement. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to modify or otherwise affect the eligibility of an employee
of an element of the intelligence community for benefits relating to
leave under any other provision of law.
``(b) Treatment of Parental Leave Request.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law--
``(1) an element of the intelligence community shall
accommodate an employee's leave request under subsection (a),
including a request to use such leave intermittently or to
create a reduced work schedule, to the extent that the
requested leave schedule does not unduly disrupt operations;
and
``(2) to the extent that an employee's requested leave
described in paragraph (1) arises out of medical necessity
related to a serious health condition connected to the birth of
a son or daughter, the employing element shall handle the
scheduling consistent with the treatment of employees who are
using leave under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section 6382(a)(1)
of title 5, United States Code.
``(c) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law--
``(1) an employee may not be required to first use all or any
portion of any unpaid leave available to the employee before
being allowed to use the paid parental leave described in
subsection (a); and
``(2) paid parental leave under subsection (a)--
``(A) shall be payable from any appropriation or fund
available for salaries or expenses for positions within
the employing element;
``(B) may not be considered to be annual or vacation
leave for purposes of section 5551 or 5552 of title 5,
United States Code, or for any other purpose;
``(C) if not used by the employee before the end of
the 12-month period described in subsection (a) to
which the leave relates, may not be available for any
subsequent use and may not be converted into a cash
payment;
``(D) may be granted only to the extent that the
employee does not receive a total of more than 12 weeks
of paid parental leave in any 12-month period beginning
on the date of a birth or placement;
``(E) may not be granted--
``(i) in excess of a lifetime aggregate total
of 30 administrative workweeks based on
placements of a foster child for any individual
employee; or
``(ii) in connection with temporary foster
care placements expected to last less than 1
year;
``(F) may not be granted for a child being placed for
foster care or adoption if such leave was previously
granted to the same employee when the same child was
placed with the employee for foster care in the past;
``(G) shall be used in increments of hours (or
fractions thereof), with 12 administrative workweeks
equal to 480 hours for employees with a regular full-
time work schedule and converted to a proportional
number of hours for employees with part-time, seasonal,
or uncommon tours of duty; and
``(H) may not be used during off-season (nonpay
status) periods for employees with seasonal work
schedules.
``(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
the enactment of this section, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an
implementation plan that includes--
``(1) processes and procedures for implementing the paid
parental leave policies under subsections (a) through (c);
``(2) an explanation of how the implementation of subsections
(a) through (c) will be reconciled with policies of other
elements of the Federal Government, including the impact on
elements funded by the National Intelligence Program that are
housed within agencies outside the intelligence community; and
``(3) all costs or operational expenses associated with the
implementation of subsections (a) through (c).
``(e) Directive.--Not later than 180 days after the Director of
National Intelligence submits the implementation plan under subsection
(d), the Director of National Intelligence shall issue a written
directive to implement this section, which directive shall take effect
on the date of issuance.
``(f) Annual Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report
that--
``(1) details the number of employees of each element of the
intelligence community who applied for and took paid parental
leave under subsection (a) during the year covered by the
report;
``(2) details the number of--
``(A) employees of each element of the intelligence
community stationed abroad who applied for and took
paid parental leave under subsection (a) during the
year covered by the report; and
``(B) employees of each element of the intelligence
community stationed abroad who applied for paid
parental leave but such application was not granted
because of an undue impact on operations as specified
in subsection (b)(1); and
``(3) includes updates on major implementation challenges or
costs associated with paid parental leave.
``(g) Definition of Son or Daughter.--For purposes of this section,
the term `son or daughter' has the meaning given the term in section
6381 of title 5, United States Code.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the matter
preceding section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3002) is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 304 the following:
``Sec. 305. Paid parental leave.''.
(c) Applicability.--Section 305 of the National Security Act of 1947,
as added by subsection (b), shall apply with respect to leave taken in
connection with the birth or placement of a son or daughter that occurs
on or after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence
issues the written directive under subsection (e) of such section 305.
SEC. 304. UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 512. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
``(a) Briefings.--Upon the request of an appropriate congressional
committee, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the
committee a briefing on the unfunded priorities of an element of the
intelligence community.
``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and
``(B) the Committees on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives and the Senate.
``(2) Unfunded priority.--The term `unfunded priority', in
the case of a fiscal year, means a program, activity, or other
initiative of an element of the intelligence community that--
``(A) was submitted by the head of the element to the
Director of National Intelligence in the budget
proposal for the element for that fiscal year, but was
not included by the Director in the consolidated budget
proposal submitted to the President for that fiscal
year; or
``(B) was submitted by the Director in the
consolidated budget proposal submitted to the President
for that fiscal year, but was not included in the
budget of the President submitted to Congress for that
fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31,
United States Code.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections in the first section
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
511 the following new item:
``Sec. 512. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.''.
SEC. 305. EXTENDING THE INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT OF 1982.
Section 605(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3126(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) by striking clause (ii);
(B) in clause (i), by striking ``, and'' and
inserting ``;''; and
(C) by striking ``agency--'' and all that follows
through ``whose identity'' and inserting ``agency whose
identity''; and
(2) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``resides and acts
outside the United States'' and inserting ``acts''.
SEC. 306. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PUBLIC-PRIVATE TALENT EXCHANGE.
(a) Policies, Processes, and Procedures Required.--Not later than 270
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall develop policies, processes, and procedures
to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the intelligence community
to the private sector, and personnel from the private sector to the
intelligence community.
(b) Detail Authority.--Under policies developed by the Director
pursuant to subsection (a), pursuant to a written agreement with a
private-sector organization, and with the consent of the employee, a
head of an element of the intelligence community may arrange for the
temporary detail of an employee of such element to such private-sector
organization, or from such private-sector organization to such element
under this section.
(c) Agreements.--
(1) In general.--A head of an element of the intelligence
community exercising the authority of the head under subsection
(a) shall provide for a written agreement among the element of
the intelligence community, the private-sector organization,
and the employee concerned regarding the terms and conditions
of the employee's detail under this section. The agreement--
(A) shall require that the employee of the element,
upon completion of the detail, serve in the element, or
elsewhere in the civil service if approved by the head
of the element, for a period that is at least equal to
the length of the detail;
(B) shall provide that if the employee of the element
fails to carry out the agreement, such employee shall
be liable to the United States for payment of all non-
salary and benefit expenses of the detail, unless that
failure was for good and sufficient reason, as
determined by the head of the element;
(C) shall contain language informing such employee of
the prohibition on sharing, using, or otherwise
improperly handling classified of unclassified non-
public information for the benefit or advantage of the
private-sector organization;
(D) shall contain language governing the handling of
classified information by such employee during the
detail; and
(E) shall contain language requiring the employee to
acknowledge the obligations of the employee under
section 1905 of title 18, United States Code.
(2) Amount of liability.--An amount for which an employee is
liable under paragraph (1) shall be treated as a debt due the
United States.
(3) Waiver.--The head of an element of the intelligence
community may waive, in whole or in part, collection of a debt
described in paragraph (2) based on a determination that the
collection would be against equity and good conscience and not
in the best interests of the United States, after taking into
account any indication of fraud, misrepresentation, fault, or
lack of good faith on the part of the employee.
(d) Termination.--A detail under this section may, at any time and
for any reason, be terminated by the head of the element of the
intelligence community concerned or the private-sector organization
concerned.
(e) Duration.--
(1) In general.--A detail under this section shall be for a
period of not less than 3 months and not more than 2 years,
renewable up to a total of 3 years.
(2) Longer periods.--A detail under this section may be for a
period in excess of 2 years, but not more than 3 years, if the
head of the element making the detail determines that such
detail is necessary to meet critical mission or program
requirements.
(3) Limitation.--No employee of an element of the
intelligence community may be detailed under this section for
more than a total of 5 years, inclusive of all such details.
(f) Status of Federal Employees Detailed to Private-sector
Organizations.--
(1) In general.--An employee of an element of the
intelligence community who is detailed to a private-sector
organization under this section shall be considered, during the
period of detail, to be on a regular work assignment in the
element. The written agreement established under subsection
(c)(1) shall address the specific terms and conditions related
to the employee's continued status as a Federal employee.
(2) Requirements.--In establishing a temporary detail of an
employee of an element of the intelligence community to a
private-sector organization, the head of the element shall--
(A) certify that the temporary detail of such
employee shall not have an adverse or negative impact
on mission attainment or organizational capabilities
associated with the detail; and
(B) in the case of an element of the intelligence
community in the Department of Defense, ensure that the
normal duties and functions of such employees are not,
as a result of and during the course of such temporary
detail, performed or augmented by contractor personnel
in violation of the provisions of section 2461 of title
10, United States Code.
(g) Terms and Conditions for Private-sector Employees.--An employee
of a private-sector organization who is detailed to an element of the
intelligence community under this section--
(1) shall continue to receive pay and benefits from the
private-sector organization from which such employee is
detailed and shall not receive pay or benefits from the
element, except as provided in paragraph (2);
(2) is deemed to be an employee of the element for the
purposes of--
(A) chapters 73 and 81 of title 5, United States
Code;
(B) sections 201, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 603, 606,
607, 643, 654, 1905, and 1913 of title 18, United
States Code;
(C) sections 1343, 1344, and 1349(b) of title 31,
United States Code;
(D) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code
(commonly known as the ``Federal Tort Claims Act'') and
any other Federal tort liability statute;
(E) the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.); and
(F) chapter 21 of title 41, United States Code;
(3) may perform work that is considered inherently
governmental in nature only when requested in writing by the
head of the element;
(4) may not be used to circumvent any limitation or
restriction on the size of the workforce of the element;
(5) shall be subject to the same requirements applicable to
an employee performing the same functions and duties proposed
for performance by the private sector employee; and
(6) in the case of an element of the intelligence community
in the Department of Defense, may not be used to circumvent the
provisions of section 2461 of title 10, United States Code.
(h) Prohibition Against Charging Certain Costs to the Federal
Government.--A private-sector organization may not charge an element of
the intelligence community or any other agency of the Federal
Government, as direct costs under a Federal contract, the costs of pay
or benefits paid by the organization to an employee detailed to an
element of the intelligence community under this section for the period
of the detail and any subsequent renewal periods.
(i) Additional Administrative Matters.--In carrying out this section,
the Director, pursuant to procedures developed under subsection (a)--
(1) shall, to the degree practicable, ensure that small
business concerns are represented with respect to details
authorized by this section;
(2) may, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
establish criteria for elements of the intelligence community
to use appropriated funds to reimburse small business concerns
for the salaries and benefits of its employees during the
periods when the small business concern agrees to detail its
employees to the intelligence community under this section;
(3) shall take into consideration the question of how details
under this section might best be used to help meet the needs of
the intelligence community, including with respect to the
training of employees;
(4) shall take into consideration areas of private-sector
expertise that are critical to the intelligence community; and
(5) shall establish oversight mechanisms to determine whether
the public-private exchange authorized by this section improves
the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community.
(j) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Detail.--The term ``detail'' means, as appropriate in the
context in which such term is used--
(A) the assignment or loan of an employee of an
element of the intelligence community to a private-
sector organization without a change of position from
the intelligence community element that employs the
individual; or
(B) the assignment or loan of an employee of a
private-sector organization to an element of the
intelligence community without a change of position
from the private-sector organization that employs the
individual.
(2) Private-sector organization.--The term ``private-sector
organization'' means--
(A) a for-profit organization; or
(B) a not-for-profit organization.
(3) Small business concern.--The term ``small business
concern'' has the meaning given such term in section 3703(e)(2)
of title 5, United States Code.
SEC. 307. ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTING PRACTICES TO IDENTIFY CERTAIN
SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CONCERNS.
(a) Assessment.--
(1) Contracting practices.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall conduct an assessment of the authorities,
policies, processes, and standards used by the elements of the
intelligence community to ensure that the elements
appropriately weigh security and counterintelligence risks in
awarding a contract to a contractor that--
(A) carries out any joint research and development
activities with a covered foreign country; or
(B) performs any contract or other agreement entered
into with a covered foreign country.
(2) Elements.--The assessment under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) An assessment of whether the authorities,
policies, processes, and standards specified in
paragraph (1) sufficiently identify security and
counterintelligence concerns.
(B) Identification of any authority gaps in such
authorities, policies, processes, and standards that
prevent the intelligence community from considering the
activities specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
paragraph (1) when evaluating offers for a contract.
(3) Consultation.--In carrying out paragraph (1), the
Director shall consult with each head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
assessment under subsection (a)(1).
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The assessment under subsection (a)(1).
(B) An identification of any known contractors that
have--
(i) carried out activities specified in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(1);
and
(ii) submitted an offer for a contract with
an element of the intelligence community.
(C) A description of the steps that the Director and
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community
took to identify contractors under subparagraph (B).
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) Covered Foreign Country Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered foreign country'' means the government, or any entity
affiliated with the military or intelligence services of, the following
foreign countries:
(1) The People's Republic of China.
(2) The Russian Federation.
(3) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
(4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
SEC. 308. REQUIRED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS.
(a) Foreign Counterintelligence and Cybersecurity Threats to Federal
Election Campaigns.--
(1) Reports required.--
(A) In general.--As provided in subparagraph (B), for
each Federal election, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Under Secretary
of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
shall make publicly available on an Internet website an
advisory report on foreign counterintelligence and
cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for Federal
offices. Each such report shall include, consistent
with the protection of sources and methods, each of the
following:
(i) A description of foreign
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats
to election campaigns for Federal offices.
(ii) A summary of best practices that
election campaigns for Federal offices can
employ in seeking to counter such threats.
(iii) An identification of any publicly
available resources, including United States
Government resources, for countering such
threats.
(B) Schedule for submittal.--A report under this
subsection shall be made available as follows:
(i) In the case of a report regarding an
election held for the office of Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives during
2018, not later than the date that is 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(ii) In the case of a report regarding an
election for a Federal office during any
subsequent year, not later than the date that
is 1 year before the date of the election.
(C) Information to be included.--A report under this
subsection shall reflect the most current information
available to the Director of National Intelligence
regarding foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity
threats.
(2) Treatment of campaigns subject to heightened threats.--If
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis jointly determine that an election campaign for
Federal office is subject to a heightened foreign
counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat, the Director and
the Under Secretary, consistent with the protection of sources
and methods, may make available additional information to the
appropriate representatives of such campaign.
(b) Briefings on Counterintelligence Activities of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.), as amended by section 304, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 513. BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
``(a) Quarterly Briefings.--In addition to, and without any
derogation of, the requirement under section 501 to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of
the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the United
States, not less frequently than once each quarter, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to the congressional
intelligence committees a briefing on the counterintelligence
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall
include, at a minimum, an overview and update of--
``(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
``(2) counterintelligence investigations; and
``(3) any other information relating to the
counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the Director
determines necessary.
``(b) Notifications.--In addition to the quarterly briefings under
subsection (a), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees of any
counterintelligence investigation carried out by the Bureau with
respect to any counterintelligence risk or threat that is related to an
election or campaign for Federal office.
``(c) Guidelines.--
``(1) Development and consultation.--The Director shall
develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings
provided under subsection (a), the notifications provided under
subsection (b), and the information required by section
308(a)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
2020. The Director shall consult the congressional intelligence
committees during such development.
``(2) Submission.--The Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees--
``(A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon
issuance; and
``(B) any updates to such guidelines by not later
than 15 days after making such update.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents at the
beginning of such Act, as amended by section 304, is further
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 512 the
following new item:
``Sec. 513. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence
activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SEC. 401. ESTABLISHMENT OF CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
(a) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
``(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the purpose of--
``(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various elements of
the intelligence community with respect to analysis of climate
security and its impact on the areas of focus of such analysts;
``(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of the
intelligence community and elements of the Federal Government
that are not elements of the intelligence community in
collecting data on, and conducting analysis of, climate change
and climate security; and
``(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is adequately
prioritizing climate change in carrying out its activities.
``(b) Composition of Council.--
``(1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the
following individuals appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence:
``(A) An appropriate official from the National
Intelligence Council, who shall chair the Council.
``(B) The lead official with respect to climate and
environmental security analysis from--
``(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
``(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State;
``(iii) the National Geospacial-Intelligence
Agency;
``(iv) the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence of the Department of
Energy;
``(v) the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence; and
``(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(C) Three appropriate officials from elements of
the Federal Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community that are responsible for--
``(i) providing decision-makers with a
predictive understanding of the climate;
``(ii) making observations of our Earth
system that can be used by the public,
policymakers, and to support strategic
decisions; or
``(iii) coordinating Federal research and
investments in understanding the forces shaping
the global environment, both human and natural,
and their impacts on society.
``(D) Any other officials as the Director of National
Intelligence or the chair of the Council may determine
appropriate.
``(2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the Council
shall have responsibility for--
``(A) identifying agencies to supply individuals from
elements of the Federal Government that are not
elements of the intelligence community;
``(B) securing the permission of the relevant agency
heads for the participation of such individuals on the
Council; and
``(C) any other duties that the Director of National
Intelligence may direct.
``(c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council shall
carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
``(1) To meet at least quarterly to--
``(A) exchange appropriate data between elements of
the intelligence community and elements of the Federal
Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community;
``(B) discuss processes for the routine exchange of
such data and implementation of such processes; and
``(C) prepare summaries of the business conducted at
each meeting.
``(2) To assess and determine best practices with respect to
the analysis of climate security, including identifying
publicly available information and intelligence acquired
through clandestine means that enables such analysis.
``(3) To assess and identify best practices with respect to
prior efforts of the intelligence community to analyze climate
security.
``(4) To assess and describe best practices for identifying
and disseminating climate security indicators and warnings;
``(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of
climate security and the best practices identified under
paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic training
programs.
``(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change
or climate security and elements of the Federal Government that
are not elements of the intelligence community that conduct
analysis of climate change or climate security, for the purpose
of sharing information about ongoing efforts and avoiding
duplication of existing efforts.
``(7) To work with elements of the intelligence community
that conduct analysis of climate change or climate security and
elements of the Federal Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate change
or climate security--
``(A) to exchange appropriate data between such
elements, establish processes, procedures and practices
for the routine exchange of such data, discuss the
implementation of such processes; and
``(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of
findings and analysis between such elements.
``(8) To assess whether the elements of the intelligence
community that conduct analysis of climate change or climate
security may inform the research direction of academic work and
the sponsored work of the United States Government.
``(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to
convene conferences of analysts and non-intelligence community
personnel working on climate change or climate security on
subjects that the chair shall direct.
``(d) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on the date that is 4
years after the date of the enactment of this section.
``(e) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Climate security.--The term `climate security' means
the effects of climate change on the following:
``(A) The national security of the United States,
including national security infrastructure.
``(B) Subnational, national, and regional political
stability.
``(C) The security of allies and partners of the
United States.
``(D) Ongoing or potential political violence,
including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare,
insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil
war, and interstate war.
``(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--The
term `climate intelligence indications and warnings' means
developments relating to climate security with the potential
to--
``(A) imminently and substantially alter the
political stability or degree of human security in a
country or region; or
``(B) imminently and substantially threaten--
``(i) the national security of the United
States;
``(ii) the military, political, or economic
interests of allies and partners of the United
States; or
``(iii) citizens of the United States
abroad.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 119B the following new item:
``Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council.''.
(c) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
appoint the members of the Council under section 120 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 402. TRANSFER OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY TO THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Transfer.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall
transfer to the Director of National Intelligence the National
Intelligence University, including the functions, personnel, assets,
and liabilities of the University.
(b) Degree-granting Authority.--
(1) Regulations.--Under regulations prescribed by the
Director of National Intelligence, the President of the
National Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation
of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate degrees
upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.
(2) Limitation.--A degree may not be conferred under this
section unless--
(A) the appropriate head of a Department of the
Federal Government has recommended approval of the
degree in accordance with any Federal policy applicable
to the granting of academic degrees by departments and
agencies of the Federal Government; and
(B) the University is accredited by the appropriate
civilian academic accrediting agency or organization to
award the degree, as determined by such appropriate
head of a Department.
(c) Congressional Notification Requirements.--
(1) Notification.--When seeking to establish degree-granting
authority under this section, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees--
(A) a copy of the self-assessment questionnaire
required by the Federal policy specified in subsection
(b)(2)(A); and
(B) any subsequent recommendations and rationale of
the appropriate head of a Department specified in such
subsection regarding establishing such degree-granting
authority.
(2) Modification.--Upon any modification or redesignation of
existing degree-granting authority, the Director shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
containing the rationale for the proposed modification or
redesignation and any subsequent recommendation described in
paragraph (1)(B) with respect to the proposed modification or
redesignation.
(3) Actions on nonaccreditation.--The Director shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
containing an explanation of any action by the appropriate
academic accrediting agency or organization not to accredit the
University to award any new or existing degree.
(d) Conforming Repeal.--Effective 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, section 2161 of title 10, United States Code, is
repealed, and the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of
such title is amended by striking the item relating to such section
2161.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
SEC. 501. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE
UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.
(a) Reports.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 2718, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 1106. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN
THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.
``(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the influence
operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the
Communist Party of China.
``(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
``(1) A description of the organization of the United Front
Work Department of the People's Republic of China, or the
successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links
between the United Front Work Department and the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China.
``(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that
are associated with or receive funding from the United Front
Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the
United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist
Party or the Government of China.
``(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work
Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front
Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign
populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
``(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy,
consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese
Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front Work
Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese
Student Scholar Associations.
``(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the
United Front Work Department under the leadership of the
President of China.
``(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front
Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected
leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in
the United States, with respect to issues of importance to the
Chinese Communist Party.
``(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with
the United Front Work Department that are operating in the
United States as of the date of the report.
``(8) With respect to reports submitted after the first
report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics,
techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and
campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
``(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the Director
shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head
of an element of the intelligence community.
``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 2718, is
further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1105
the following new item:
``Sec. 1106. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in
the United States by the Communist Party of China.''.
(c) Initial Report.--The Director of the National Counterintelligence
and Security Center shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees the first report under section 1106 of the National Security
Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), by not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 502. REPORT ON REPRESSION OF ETHNIC MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE
XINJIANG REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Report.--Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on activity by the
People's Republic of China to repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the
Xinjiang region of China.
(b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) An assessment of the number of individuals detained in
``political reeducation camps'', and the conditions in such
camps for detainees, in the Xinjiang region of China, including
whether detainees endure torture, forced renunciation of faith,
or other mistreatment.
(2) A description, as possible, of the geographic location of
such camps.
(3) A description, as possible, of the methods used by China
to ``reeducate'' detainees and the elements of China
responsible for such ``reeducation''.
(4) A description of any forced labor in such camps, and any
labor performed in regional factories for low wages under the
threat of being sent back to ``political reeducation camps''.
(5) An assessment of the level of access China grants to
foreign persons observing the situation in Xinjiang and a
description of measures used to impede efforts to monitor the
conditions in Xinjiang.
(6) An assessment of the surveillance, detection, and control
methods used by China to target ethnic minorities, including
new ``high-tech'' policing models and a description of any
civil liberties or privacy protections provided under such
models.
(c) Coordination.--The Director of National Intelligence shall carry
out subsection (a) in coordination with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the head
of any other agency of the Federal Government that the Director of
National Intelligence determines appropriate.
(d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 503. REPORT ON EFFORTS BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO INFLUENCE
ELECTION IN TAIWAN.
(a) Report.--Consistent with section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act
(Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), not later than 45 days after the
date of the election for the President and Vice President of Taiwan in
2020, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on any--
(1) influence operations conducted by China to interfere in
or undermine such election; and
(2) efforts by the United States to disrupt such operations.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) A description of any significant efforts by the
intelligence community to coordinate technical and material
support for Taiwan to identify, disrupt, and combat influence
operations specified in subsection (a)(1).
(2) A description of any efforts by the United States
Government to build the capacity of Taiwan to disrupt external
efforts that degrade a free and fair election process.
(3) An assessment of whether and to what extent China
conducted influence operations specified in subsection (a)(1),
and, if such operations occurred--
(A) a comprehensive list of specific governmental and
nongovernmental entities of China that were involved in
supporting such operations and a description of the
role of each such entity; and
(B) an identification of any tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in such operations.
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 504. ASSESSMENT OF LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FINANCIAL AND OTHER
ASSETS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United
States should do more to expose the corruption of Vladimir Putin, whose
ill-gotten wealth is perhaps the most powerful global symbol of his
dishonesty and his persistent efforts to undermine the rule of law and
democracy in the Russian Federation.
(b) Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees an assessment, based
on all sources of intelligence, on the net worth and financial and
other assets, legitimate as well as illegitimate, of Russian President
Vladimir Putin and his family members, including--
(1) the estimated net worth of Vladimir Putin and his family
members;
(2) a description of their legitimately and illegitimately
obtained assets, including all real, personal, and intellectual
property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any other
financial or business interests or holdings, including those
outside of Russia;
(3) the details of the legitimately and illegitimately
obtained assets, including real, personal, and intellectual
property, bank or investment or similar accounts, and any other
financial or business interests or holdings, including those
outside of Russia, that are owned or controlled by, accessible
to, or otherwise maintained for the benefit of Vladimir Putin,
including their nature, location, manner of acquisition, value,
and publicly named owner (if other than Vladimir Putin);
(4) the methods used by Vladimir Putin or others acting at
his direction, with his knowledge, or for his benefit, to
conceal Putin's interest in his accounts, holdings, or other
assets, including the establishment of ``front'' or shell
companies and the use of intermediaries; and
(5) an identification of the most significant senior Russian
political figures, oligarchs, and any other persons who have
engaged in activity intended to conceal the true financial
condition of Vladimir Putin.
(c) Form.--The assessment required under subsection (b) shall be
submitted either--
(1) in unclassified form to the extent consistent with the
protection of intelligence sources and methods, and may include
a classified annex; or
(2) simultaneously as both an unclassified version and a
classified version.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, and
the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 505. ASSESSMENTS OF INTENTIONS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, and the
head of any element of the intelligence community that the Director
determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees each of the assessments described in subsection (b).
(b) Assessments Described.--The assessments described in this
subsection are assessments based on intelligence obtained from all
sources that assess the current intentions of the political leadership
of the Russian Federation with respect to the following:
(1) Potential military action against members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
(2) Potential responses to an enlarged United States or NATO
military presence in eastern Europe or to increased United
States military support for allies and partners in the region,
such as the provision of additional lethal military equipment
to Ukraine or Georgia.
(3) Potential actions taken for the purpose of exploiting
perceived divisions among the governments of Russia's Western
adversaries.
(c) Form.--Each assessment required under subsection (a) may be
submitted in classified form but shall also include an unclassified
executive summary, consistent with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed
Services of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate.
SEC. 506. REPORT ON DEATH OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI.
(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
death of Jamal Khashoggi. Such report shall include identification of
those who carried out, participated in, ordered, or were otherwise
complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi, to the
extent consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
(b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form.
TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM
SEC. 601. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate.
(2) Domestic terrorism.--The term ``domestic terrorism'' has
the meaning given that term in section 2331 of title 18, United
States Code.
(3) Hate crime.--The term ``hate crime'' means a criminal
offense under--
(A) sections 241, 245, 247, and 249 of title 18,
United States Code; and
(B) section 3631 of title 42, United States Code.
(4) International terrorism.--The term ``international
terrorism'' has the meaning given that term in section 2331 of
title 18, United States Code.
(5) Terms in attorney general's guidelines for domestic fbi
operations.--The terms ``assessments'', ``full
investigations'', ``enterprise investigations'',``predicated
investigations'', and ``preliminary investigations'' have the
meanings given those terms in the most recent, approved version
of the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI
Operations (or successor).
(6) Terms in fbi budget materials.--The terms ``Consolidated
Strategy Guide'', ``Field Office Strategic Plan'', ``Integrated
Program Management Process'', and ``Threat Review and
Prioritization'' have the meanings given those terms in the
materials submitted to Congress by the Attorney General in
support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation budget for
fiscal year 2020.
(7) Terrorism.--The term ``terrorism'' includes domestic
terrorism and international terrorism.
(8) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism
information'' has the meaning given that term in section
1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485).
(9) Time utilization and recordkeeping data.--The term ``time
utilization and recordkeeping data'' means data collected on
resource utilization and workload activity of personnel of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with Federal law.
SEC. 602. ANNUAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF AND COMPREHENSIVE
REPORT ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM.
(a) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through
2025, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall jointly
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on
domestic terrorism containing the following:
(A) Strategic intelligence assessment under
subsection (b).
(B) Discussion of activities under subsection (c).
(C) Data on domestic terrorism under subsection (d).
(2) Responsibilities.--
(A) Coordination of reports and integration of
information.--The Director of National Intelligence,
acting through the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, shall be the lead official for
coordinating the production of and integrating
terrorism information into--
(i) each report under paragraph (1); and
(ii) each strategic intelligence assessment
under subsection (b).
(B) Information sharing.--The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall
provide to the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center all appropriate information
requested by the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center to carry out this section.
(b) Strategic Intelligence Assessment.--The Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis
shall include--
(1) in the first report under subsection (a)(1), a strategic
intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in the United
States during fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019; and
(2) in each subsequent report under such subsection, a
strategic intelligence assessment of domestic terrorism in the
United States during the prior fiscal year.
(c) Discussion of Activities.--Each report under subsection (a)(1)
shall discuss and compare the following:
(1) The criteria for opening, managing, and closing domestic
and international terrorism investigations by the Federal
Government.
(2) Standards and procedures for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security, and the National
Counterterrorism Center, with respect to the review,
prioritization, and mitigation of domestic and international
terrorism threats in the United States.
(3) The planning, development, production, analysis, and
evaluation by the United States Government of intelligence
products relating to terrorism, including both raw and finished
intelligence.
(4) The sharing of information relating to domestic and
international terrorism by and between--
(A) the Federal Government;
(B) State, local, Tribal, territorial, and foreign
governments;
(C) the appropriate congressional committees;
(D) non-governmental organizations; and
(E) the private sector.
(5) The criteria and methodology used by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of
the Department of Homeland Security, and the National
Counterterrorism Center, to identify or assign terrorism
classifications to incidents of terrorism or investigations of
terrorism, including--
(A) a comparison of the criteria and methodology used
with respect to domestic terrorism and international
terrorism;
(B) the identification of any changes made to
investigative classifications; and
(C) a discussion of the rationale for any changes
identified under subparagraph (B).
(d) Data on Domestic Terrorism.--
(1) Data required.--The Director of National Intelligence,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis shall include in each report under subsection (a)(1)
the following data:
(A) For each completed or attempted incident of
domestic terrorism that has occurred in the United
States during the applicable period--
(i) a description of such incident;
(ii) the number and type of completed and
attempted Federal non-violent crimes committed
during such incident;
(iii) the number and type of completed and
attempted Federal and State property crimes
committed during such incident, including an
estimate of economic damages resulting from
such crimes; and
(iv) the number and type of completed and
attempted Federal violent crimes committed
during such incident, including the number of
people injured or killed as a result of such
crimes.
(B) For the applicable period--
(i) an identification of each assessment,
preliminary investigation, full investigation,
and enterprise investigation with a nexus to
domestic terrorism opened, pending, or closed
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(ii) the number of assessments or
investigations identified under clause (i)
associated with each domestic terrorism
investigative classification (including
subcategories);
(iii) the number and domestic terrorism
investigative classification (including
subcategories) with respect to such
investigations initiated as a result of a
referral or investigation by a State, local,
Tribal, territorial, or foreign government of a
hate crime;
(iv) the number of Federal criminal charges
with a nexus to domestic terrorism, including
the number of indictments and complaints
associated with each domestic terrorism
investigative classification (including
subcategories), a summary of the allegations
contained in each such indictment, the
disposition of the prosecution, and, if
applicable, the sentence imposed as a result of
a conviction on such charges;
(v) referrals of incidents of domestic
terrorism by State, local, Tribal, or
territorial governments to departments or
agencies of the Federal Government for
investigation or prosecution, including the
number of such referrals associated with each
domestic terrorism investigation classification
(including any subcategories), and a summary of
each such referral that includes the rationale
for such referral and the disposition of the
applicable Federal investigation or
prosecution;
(vi) intelligence products produced by the
intelligence community relating to domestic
terrorism, including--
(I) the number of such products
associated with each domestic terrorism
investigative classification (including
any subcategories); and
(II) with respect to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, at a minimum,
all relevant data available through the
Integrated Program Management Process;
(vii) with respect to the National
Counterterrorism Center, the number of staff
(expressed in terms of full-time equivalents
and positions) working on matters relating to
domestic terrorism described in clauses (i)
through (vi); and
(viii) with respect to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation--
(I) the number of staff (expressed in
terms of full-time equivalents and
positions) working on matters relating
to domestic terrorism described in
clauses (i) through (vi); and
(II) a summary of time utilization
and recordkeeping data for personnel
working on such matters, including the
number or percentage of such personnel
associated with each domestic terrorism
investigative classification (including
any subcategories) in the FBI
Headquarters Operational Divisions and
Field Divisions.
(2) Applicable period.--For purposes of this subsection, the
applicable period is the following:
(A) For the first report required under subsection
(a)(1)--
(i) with respect to the data described in
paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection, the period
on or after April 19, 1995; and
(ii) with respect to the data described in
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, each of
fiscal years 2017, 2018, and 2019.
(B) For each subsequent report required under
subsection (a)(1), the prior fiscal year.
(e) Provision of Other Documents and Materials.--
(1) In general.--Together with each report under subsection
(a)(1), the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall also
submit to the appropriate congressional committees the
following documents and materials:
(A) With respect to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, at a minimum, the most recent, approved
versions of--
(i) the Attorney General's Guidelines for
Domestic FBI Operations (or any successor);
(ii) the FBI Domestic Investigations and
Operations Guide (or any successor);
(iii) the FBI Counterterrorism Policy Guide
(or any successor);
(iv) materials relating to terrorism within
the Threat Review and Prioritization process
for the headquarters and field divisions of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(v) the Consolidated Strategy Guide (or any
successor); and
(vi) the Field Office Strategic Plans (or any
successor).
(B) With respect to the intelligence community, each
finished intelligence product described in subsection
(d)(1)(B)(vi).
(2) Nonduplication.--If any documents or materials required
under paragraph (1) have been previously submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees under such paragraph and
have not been modified since such submission, the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis may provide a list of such documents
or materials in lieu of making the submission under paragraph
(1) for those documents or materials.
(f) Format.--The information required under subsection (d) may be
provided in a format that uses the marking associated with the Central
Records System (or any successor system) of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(g) Classification and Public Release.--Each report under subsection
(a) shall be--
(1) unclassified, but may contain a classified annex;
(2) with respect to the unclassified portion of the report,
made available on the public internet website of the National
Counterterrorism Center in an electronic format that is fully
indexed and searchable; and
(3) with respect to a classified annex, submitted to the
appropriate congressional committees in an electronic format
that is fully indexed and searchable.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 701. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF
CERTAIN REPORTS.
(a) Modification of Reports Relating to Guantanamo Bay.--
(1) Modification.--Section 506I(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105(b)) is amended by striking ``once
every 6 months'' and inserting ``annually''.
(2) Modification.--Section 319(a) of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009 (10 U.S.C. 801 note) is amended by
striking ``every 90 days'' and inserting ``annually''.
(3) Repeal.--Section 601 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division N of Public Law 115-31; 131
Stat. 827) is repealed.
(b) Modification to Reports on Violations of Law or Executive
Order.--Section 511(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3110(a)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``The Director of National Intelligence'' and
inserting ``The head of each element of the intelligence
community''; and
(2) by striking ``an element'' and inserting ``the element''.
(c) Modification to Reports on Analytic Integrity.--Subsection (c) of
section 1019 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3364) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Reports'' and inserting
``Briefings''; and
(2) by striking ``submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the heads of the relevant elements of the
intelligence community, and the heads of analytic training
departments a report containing'' and inserting ``provide to
the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the
relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads
of analytic training departments a briefing with''.
(d) Repeal of Reports Relating to Intelligence Functions.--Section
506J of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3105a) is repealed
and the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended
by striking the item relating to section 506J.
(e) Repeal of Reports Relating to Cuba.--Section 108 of the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C.
6038) is repealed.
(f) Repeal of Reports Relating to Entertainment Industry.--Section
308 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (50
U.S.C. 3332) is amended by striking subsection (c).
SEC. 702. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY REGARDING COUNTERTERRORISM BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) Consistent with section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a)), the recent practice of the intelligence community has
been to release to the public--
(A) around the date on which the President submits to
Congress a budget for a fiscal year pursuant to section
1105 of title 31, United States Code, the ``top-line''
amount of total funding requested for the National
Intelligence Program for such fiscal year; and
(B) the amount of requested and appropriated funds
for the National Intelligence Program and Military
Intelligence Program for certain prior fiscal years,
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods.
(2) The Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning of the
National Counterterrorism Center is responsible for producing
an annual National Counterterrorism Budget report, which
examines the alignment of intelligence and other resources in
the applicable fiscal year budget with the counterterrorism
goals and areas of focus in the National Strategy for
Counterterrorism.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) despite the difficulty of compiling and releasing to the
public comprehensive information on the resource commitments of
the United States to counterterrorism activities and programs,
including with respect to such activities and programs of the
intelligence community, the United States Government could take
additional steps to enhance the understanding of the public
with respect to such resource commitments, in a manner
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods and other national security interests; and
(2) the United States Government should release to the public
as much information as possible regarding the funding of
counterterrorism activities and programs, including activities
and programs of the intelligence community, in a manner
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods and other national security interests.
(c) Briefing on Public Release of Information.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and not later than 90 days after the
beginning of each fiscal year thereafter, the President shall
ensure that the congressional intelligence committees receive a
briefing from appropriate personnel of the United States
Government on the feasibility of releasing to the public
additional information relating to counterterrorism efforts of
the intelligence community.
(2) Elements.--Each briefing required by paragraph (1) shall
include a discussion of the feasibility of--
(A) subject to paragraph (3), releasing to the public
the National Counterterrorism Budget report described
in subsection (a)(2) for the prior fiscal year; and
(B) declassifying other reports, documents, or
activities of the intelligence community relating to
counterterrorism and releasing such information to the
public in a manner consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods and other national
security interests.
(3) Release of national counterterrorism budget report.--The
President may satisfy the requirement under paragraph (2)(A)
during a fiscal year by, not later than 90 days after the
beginning of the fiscal year, releasing to the public the
National Counterterrorism Budget report (with any redactions
the Director determines necessary to protect intelligence
sources and methods and other national security interests) for
the prior fiscal year.
SEC. 703. TASK FORCE ON ILLICIT FINANCING OF ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.
(a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a task force to study and assess the illicit financing of
espionage and foreign influence operations directed at the United
States.
(b) Membership.--The task force shall be composed of the following
individuals (or designees of the individual):
(1) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(3) The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence
and Analysis.
(4) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research.
(5) Such other heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that the Director of National Intelligence determines
appropriate.
(c) Chairperson; Meetings.--
(1) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
appoint a senior official within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence to serve as the chairperson of the task
force.
(2) Meetings.--The task force shall meet regularly but not
less frequently than on a quarterly basis.
(d) Reports.--
(1) Initial report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the task force shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
illicit financing of espionage and foreign influence operations
directed at the United States. The report shall address the
following:
(A) The extent of the collection by the intelligence
community, from all sources (including the governments
of foreign countries), of intelligence and information
relating to illicit financing of espionage and foreign
influence operations directed at the United States, and
any gaps in such collection.
(B) Any specific legal, regulatory, policy, or other
prohibitions, or financial, human, technical, or other
resource limitations or constraints, that have affected
the ability of the Director of National Intelligence or
other heads of relevant elements of the intelligence
community in collecting or analyzing intelligence or
information relating to illicit financing of espionage
and foreign influence operations directed at the United
States.
(C) The methods, as of the date of the report, by
which hostile governments of foreign countries or
foreign organizations, and any groups or persons acting
on behalf of or with the support of such governments or
organizations, seek to disguise or obscure
relationships between such governments, organizations,
groups, or persons and United States persons, for the
purpose of conducting espionage or foreign influence
operations directed at the United States, including by
exploiting financial laws, systems, or instruments, of
the United States.
(D) The existing practices of the intelligence
community for ensuring that intelligence and
information relating to the illicit financing of
espionage and foreign influence operations is analyzed
and shared with other elements of the intelligence
community, and any recommendations for improving such
analysis and sharing.
(2) Annual update.--Not later than November 1, 2020, and each
year thereafter through the date specified in subsection (e),
the task force shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees an update on the report under paragraph (1).
(3) Form.--Each report submitted under this subsection may be
submitted in classified form, but if submitted in such form,
shall include an unclassified summary.
(e) Termination.--The task force shall terminate on January 1, 2025.
(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(3) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
SEC. 704. STUDY ON ROLE OF RETIRED AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a
study on former intelligence personnel providing covered intelligence
assistance.
(b) Elements.--The study under subsection (a) shall include the
following:
(1) An identification of, and discussion of the effectiveness
of, existing laws, policies, procedures, and other measures
relevant to the ability of elements of the intelligence
community to prevent former intelligence personnel from
providing covered intelligence assistance--
(A) without proper authorization; or
(B) in a manner that would violate legal or policy
controls if the personnel performed such assistance
while working for the United States Government; and
(2) Make recommendations for such legislative, regulatory,
policy, or other changes as may be necessary to ensure that the
United States consistently meets the objectives described in
paragraph (1).
(c) Report and Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees--
(1) a report on the findings of the Director with respect to
each element of the study under subsection (a); and
(2) a plan to implement any recommendations made by the
Director that the Director may implement without changes to
Federal law.
(d) Form.--The report and plan under subsection (c) may be submitted
in classified form.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered intelligence assistance.--The term ``covered
intelligence assistance'' means assistance--
(A) provided by former intelligence personnel
directly to, or for the benefit of, the government of a
foreign country or indirectly to, or for the benefit
of, such a government through a company or other
entity; and
(B) that relates to intelligence or law enforcement
activities of a foreign country, including with respect
to operations that involve abuses of human rights,
violations of the laws of the United States, or
infringements on the privacy rights of United States
persons.
(2) Former intelligence personnel.--The term ``former
intelligence personnel'' means retired or former personnel of
the intelligence community, including civilian employees of
elements of the intelligence community, members of the Armed
Forces, and contractors of elements of the intelligence
community.
SEC. 705. REPORT BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON FIFTH-
GENERATION WIRELESS NETWORK TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on--
(1) the threat to the national security of the United States
posed by the global and regional adoption of fifth-generation
wireless network (in this section referred to as ``5G wireless
network'') technology built by foreign companies; and
(2) possible efforts to mitigate the threat.
(b) Contents.--The report under subsection (a) shall include--
(1) the timeline and scale of global and regional adoption of
foreign 5G wireless network technology;
(2) the implications of such global and regional adoption on
the cyber and espionage threat to the United States, the
interests of the United States, and the cyber and collection
capabilities of the United States; and
(3) the effect of possible mitigation efforts, including with
respect to--
(A) a policy of the United States Government
promoting the use of strong, end-to-end encryption for
data transmitted over 5G wireless networks;
(B) a policy of the United States Government
promoting or funding free, open-source implementation
of 5G wireless network technology;
(C) subsidies or incentives provided by the United
States Government that could be used to promote the
adoption of secure 5G wireless network technology
developed by companies of the United States or
companies of allies of the United States; and
(D) a strategy by the United States Government to
reduce foreign influence and political pressure in
international standard-setting bodies.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 706. ESTABLISHMENT OF 5G PRIZE COMPETITION.
(a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719), the Director
of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, shall carry out a
program to award prizes competitively to stimulate research and
development relevant to 5G technology.
(b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a),
the Director may award not more than a total of $5,000,000 to one or
more winners of the prize competition.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a),
the Director may consult with the heads of relevant departments and
agencies of the Federal Government.
(d) 5G Technology Defined.--In this section, the term ``5G
technology'' means hardware, software, or other technologies relating
to fifth-generation wireless networks.
SEC. 707. ESTABLISHMENT OF DEEPFAKES PRIZE COMPETITION.
(a) Prize Competition.--Pursuant to section 24 of the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3719), the Director
of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency, shall carry out a
program to award prizes competitively to stimulate the research,
development, or commercialization of technologies to automatically
detect machine-manipulated media.
(b) Prize Amount.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a),
the Director may award not more than a total of $5,000,000 to one or
more winners of the prize competition.
(c) Consultation.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a),
the Director may consult with the heads of relevant departments and
agencies of the Federal Government.
(d) Machine-manipulated Media Defined.--In this section, the term
``machine-manipulated media'' means video, image, or audio recordings
generated or substantially modified using machine-learning techniques
in order to falsely depict events or to falsely depict the speech or
conduct of an individual.
DIVISION B--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2018 AND 2019
TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) Fiscal Year 2019.--Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated
for fiscal year 2019 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United
States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
(b) Fiscal Year 2018.--Funds that were appropriated for fiscal year
2018 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements of the United States set forth in subsection
(a) are hereby authorized.
SEC. 2102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts.--The amounts authorized to be
appropriated under section 2101 for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of
section 2101, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany this Act.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in subsection (a) shall be made available to the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and to the
President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph (3),
the President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection
(a), or of appropriate portions of such Schedule, within the
executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50
U.S.C. 3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget;
or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 2103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2019 the sum of
$522,424,000.
(b) Classified Authorization of Appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account for
fiscal year 2019 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 2102(a).
TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund $514,000,000 for fiscal year
2019.
SEC. 2202. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Computation of Annuities.--
(1) In general.--Section 221 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2031) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(3)(B), by striking the period
at the end and inserting ``, as determined by using the
annual rate of basic pay that would be payable for
full-time service in that position.'';
(B) in subsection (b)(1)(C)(i), by striking ``12-
month'' and inserting ``2-year'';
(C) in subsection (f)(2), by striking ``one year''
and inserting ``two years'';
(D) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``one year''
each place such term appears and inserting ``two
years'';
(E) by redesignating subsections (h), (i), (j), (k),
and (l) as subsections (i), (j), (k), (l), and (m),
respectively; and
(F) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
``(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor Annuity by
Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
``(1) Authority to make designation.--Subject to the rights
of former spouses under subsection (b) and section 222, at the
time of retirement a married participant found by the Director
to be in good health may elect to receive an annuity reduced in
accordance with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing
an individual having an insurable interest in the participant
to receive an annuity under the system after the participant's
death, except that any such election to provide an insurable
interest survivor annuity to the participant's spouse shall
only be effective if the participant's spouse waives the
spousal right to a survivor annuity under this Act. The amount
of the annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the
participant's reduced annuity.
``(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity
payable to the participant making such election shall be
reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under subsection
(a) and by an additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the
designated individual is younger than the participant. The
total reduction under this subparagraph may not exceed 40
percent.
``(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity payable
to the designated individual shall begin on the day after the
retired participant dies and terminate on the last day of the
month before the designated individual dies.
``(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death of
designated individual.--An annuity that is reduced under this
subsection shall, effective the first day of the month
following the death of the designated individual, be recomputed
and paid as if the annuity had not been so reduced.''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--
(A) Central intelligence agency retirement act.--The
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C.
2001 et seq.) is amended--
(i) in section 232(b)(1) (50 U.S.C.
2052(b)(1)), by striking ``221(h),'' and
inserting ``221(i),''; and
(ii) in section 252(h)(4) (50 U.S.C.
2082(h)(4)), by striking ``221(k)'' and
inserting ``221(l)''.
(B) Central intelligence agency act of 1949.--
Subsection (a) of section 14 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3514(a)) is
amended by striking ``221(h)(2), 221(i), 221(l),'' and
inserting ``221(i)(2), 221(j), 221(m),''.
(b) Annuities for Former Spouses.--Subparagraph (B) of section
222(b)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C.
2032(b)(5)(B)) is amended by striking ``one year'' and inserting ``two
years''.
(c) Prior Service Credit.--Subparagraph (A) of section 252(b)(3) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C.
2082(b)(3)(A)) is amended by striking ``October 1, 1990'' both places
that term appears and inserting ``March 31, 1991''.
(d) Reemployment Compensation.--Section 273 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2113) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Part-Time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall have the
authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time basis in accordance
with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.''.
(e) Effective Date and Application.--The amendments made by
subsection (a)(1)(A) and subsection (c) shall take effect as if enacted
on October 28, 2009, and shall apply to computations or participants,
respectively, as of such date.
TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 2301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this division shall not be
deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.
SEC. 2302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased
by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 2303. MODIFICATION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING, OR MATHEMATICS POSITIONS
AND ADDITION OF SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR CYBER
POSITIONS.
Section 113B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3049a)
is amended--
(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:
``(a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring Expertise in
Science, Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5,
United States Code, the head of each element of the
intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of
positions in such element that require expertise in science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics--
``(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay; and
``(B) make corresponding increases in all rates of
pay of the pay range for each grade or level, subject
to subsection (b) or (c), as applicable.
``(2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements resulting from
the establishment of higher rates under paragraph (1) shall be
basic pay for the same or similar purposes as those specified
in section 5305(j) of title 5, United States Code.'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as
subsections (c) through (g), respectively;
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the
Director of the National Security Agency may establish a
special rate of pay--
``(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for
level II of the Executive Schedule under section 5313
of title 5, United States Code, if the Director
certifies to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, in consultation with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, that the rate
of pay is for positions that perform functions that
execute the cyber mission of the Agency; or
``(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for
the Vice President of the United States under section
104 of title 3, United States Code, if the Director
certifies to the Secretary of Defense, by name,
individuals that have advanced skills and competencies
and that perform critical functions that execute the
cyber mission of the Agency.
``(2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special rate
under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an aggregate pay
limitation that parallels the limitation established in section
5307 of title 5, United States Code, except that--
``(A) any allowance, differential, bonus, award, or
other similar cash payment in addition to basic pay
that is authorized under title 10, United States Code,
(or any other applicable law in addition to title 5 of
such Code, excluding the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) shall also be counted as
part of aggregate compensation; and
``(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the rate
established for the Vice President of the United States
under section 104 of title 3, United States Code.
``(3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number of
individuals who receive basic pay established under paragraph
(1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
``(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special rates of
pay and the limitation established under paragraph (1)(B) may
not be used as comparative references for the purpose of fixing
the rates of basic pay or maximum pay limitations of qualified
positions under section 1599f of title 10, United States Code,
or section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
147).'';
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``A minimum'' and inserting ``Except as provided in
subsection (b), a minimum'';
(5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
inserting ``or (b)'' after ``by subsection (a)''; and
(6) in subsection (g), as redesignated by paragraph (2)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``Not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017''
and inserting ``Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 2018 and 2019''; and
(B) in paragraph (2)(A), by inserting ``or (b)''
after ``subsection (a)''.
SEC. 2304. MODIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3032(a)) is amended by striking ``President'' and inserting
``Director''.
SEC. 2305. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF PLACEMENT OF
POSITIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ON THE
EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Review.--The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination
with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall conduct
a review of positions within the intelligence community regarding the
placement of such positions on the Executive Schedule under subchapter
II of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code. In carrying out such
review, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, shall determine--
(1) the standards under which such review will be conducted;
(2) which positions should or should not be on the Executive
Schedule; and
(3) for those positions that should be on the Executive
Schedule, the level of the Executive Schedule at which such
positions should be placed.
(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date on which the
review under subsection (a) is completed, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the
Senate, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of
Representatives an unredacted report describing the standards by which
the review was conducted and the outcome of the review.
SEC. 2306. SUPPLY CHAIN AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISK MANAGEMENT TASK
FORCE.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of
the House of Representatives.
(b) Requirement to Establish.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall establish a Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management
Task Force to standardize information sharing between the intelligence
community and the acquisition community of the United States Government
with respect to the supply chain and counterintelligence risks.
(c) Members.--The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk
Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall be
composed of--
(1) a representative of the Defense Security Service of the
Department of Defense;
(2) a representative of the General Services Administration;
(3) a representative of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy of the Office of Management and Budget;
(4) a representative of the Department of Homeland Security;
(5) a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(6) the Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center; and
(7) any other members the Director of National Intelligence
determines appropriate.
(d) Security Clearances.--Each member of the Supply Chain and
Counterintelligence Risk Management Task Force established under
subsection (b) shall have a security clearance at the top secret level
and be able to access sensitive compartmented information.
(e) Annual Report.--The Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk
Management Task Force established under subsection (b) shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees an annual report that
describes the activities of the Task Force during the previous year,
including identification of the supply chain and counterintelligence
risks shared with the acquisition community of the United States
Government by the intelligence community.
SEC. 2307. CONSIDERATION OF ADVERSARIAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE WHEN SHARING
INTELLIGENCE WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND ENTITIES.
Whenever the head of an element of the intelligence community enters
into an intelligence sharing agreement with a foreign government or any
other foreign entity, the head of the element shall consider the
pervasiveness of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure,
equipment, and services provided by adversaries of the United States,
particularly China and Russia, or entities of such adversaries in the
country or region of the foreign government or other foreign entity
entering into the agreement.
SEC. 2308. CYBER PROTECTION SUPPORT FOR THE PERSONNEL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN POSITIONS HIGHLY
VULNERABLE TO CYBER ATTACK.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Personal accounts.--The term ``personal accounts'' means
accounts for online and telecommunications services, including
telephone, residential Internet access, email, text and
multimedia messaging, cloud computing, social media, health
care, and financial services, used by personnel of the
intelligence community outside of the scope of their employment
with elements of the intelligence community.
(2) Personal technology devices.--The term ``personal
technology devices'' means technology devices used by personnel
of the intelligence community outside of the scope of their
employment with elements of the intelligence community,
including networks to which such devices connect.
(b) Authority to Provide Cyber Protection Support.--
(1) In general.--Subject to a determination by the Director
of National Intelligence, the Director may provide cyber
protection support for the personal technology devices and
personal accounts of the personnel described in paragraph (2).
(2) At-risk personnel.--The personnel described in this
paragraph are personnel of the intelligence community--
(A) who the Director determines to be highly
vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information
collection activities because of the positions occupied
by such personnel in the intelligence community; and
(B) whose personal technology devices or personal
accounts are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks and
hostile information collection activities.
(c) Nature of Cyber Protection Support.--Subject to the availability
of resources, the cyber protection support provided to personnel under
subsection (b) may include training, advice, assistance, and other
services relating to cyber attacks and hostile information collection
activities.
(d) Limitation on Support.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed--
(1) to encourage personnel of the intelligence community to
use personal technology devices for official business; or
(2) to authorize cyber protection support for senior
intelligence community personnel using personal devices,
networks, and personal accounts in an official capacity.
(e) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the provision of cyber protection
support under subsection (b). The report shall include--
(1) a description of the methodology used to make the
determination under subsection (b)(2); and
(2) guidance for the use of cyber protection support and
tracking of support requests for personnel receiving cyber
protection support under subsection (b).
SEC. 2309. ELIMINATION OF SUNSET OF AUTHORITY RELATING TO MANAGEMENT OF
SUPPLY-CHAIN RISK.
Section 309 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (Public Law 112-87; 50 U.S.C. 3329 note) is amended by striking
subsection (g).
SEC. 2310. LIMITATIONS ON DETERMINATIONS REGARDING CERTAIN SECURITY
CLASSIFICATIONS.
(a) Prohibition.--An officer of an element of the intelligence
community who has been nominated by the President for a position that
requires the advice and consent of the Senate may not make a
classification decision with respect to information related to such
officer's nomination.
(b) Classification Determinations.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), in a
case in which an officer described in subsection (a) has been
nominated as described in such subsection and classification
authority rests with the officer or another officer who reports
directly to such officer, a classification decision with
respect to information relating to the officer shall be made by
the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Nominations of director of national intelligence.--In a
case described in paragraph (1) in which the officer nominated
is the Director of National Intelligence, the classification
decision shall be made by the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence.
(c) Reports.--Whenever the Director or the Principal Deputy Director
makes a decision under subsection (b), the Director or the Principal
Deputy Director, as the case may be, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report detailing the reasons for the
decision.
SEC. 2311. JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COUNCIL.
(a) Meetings.--Section 101A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``regular''; and
(2) by inserting ``as the Director considers appropriate''
after ``Council''.
(b) Report on Function and Utility of the Joint Intelligence
Community Council.--
(1) In general.--No later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence,
in coordination with the Executive Office of the President and
members of the Joint Intelligence Community Council, shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
the function and utility of the Joint Intelligence Community
Council.
(2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) The number of physical or virtual meetings held
by the Council per year since the Council's inception.
(B) A description of the effect and accomplishments
of the Council.
(C) An explanation of the unique role of the Council
relative to other entities, including with respect to
the National Security Council and the Executive
Committee of the intelligence community.
(D) Recommendations for the future role and operation
of the Council.
(E) Such other matters relating to the function and
utility of the Council as the Director considers
appropriate.
(3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
SEC. 2312. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Core service.--The term ``core service'' means a
capability that is available to multiple elements of the
intelligence community and required for consistent operation of
the intelligence community information technology environment.
(2) Intelligence community information technology
environment.--The term ``intelligence community information
technology environment'' means all of the information
technology services across the intelligence community,
including the data sharing and protection environment across
multiple classification domains.
(b) Roles and Responsibilities.--
(1) Director of national intelligence.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating the
performance by elements of the intelligence community of the
intelligence community information technology environment,
including each of the following:
(A) Ensuring compliance with all applicable
environment rules and regulations of such environment.
(B) Ensuring measurable performance goals exist for
such environment.
(C) Documenting standards and practices of such
environment.
(D) Acting as an arbiter among elements of the
intelligence community related to any disagreements
arising out of the implementation of such environment.
(E) Delegating responsibilities to the elements of
the intelligence community and carrying out such other
responsibilities as are necessary for the effective
implementation of such environment.
(2) Core service providers.--Providers of core services shall
be responsible for--
(A) providing core services, in coordination with the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) providing the Director with information requested
and required to fulfill the responsibilities of the
Director under paragraph (1).
(3) Use of core services.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in subparagraph
(B), each element of the intelligence community shall
use core services when such services are available.
(B) Exception.--The Director of National Intelligence
may provide for a written exception to the requirement
under subparagraph (A) if the Director determines there
is a compelling financial or mission need for such
exception.
(c) Management Accountability.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall designate and maintain one or more accountable executives of the
intelligence community information technology environment to be
responsible for--
(1) management, financial control, and integration of such
environment;
(2) overseeing the performance of each core service,
including establishing measurable service requirements and
schedules;
(3) to the degree feasible, ensuring testing of each core
service of such environment, including testing by the intended
users, to evaluate performance against measurable service
requirements and to ensure the capability meets user
requirements; and
(4) coordinate transition or restructuring efforts of such
environment, including phaseout of legacy systems.
(d) Security Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
develop and maintain a security plan for the intelligence community
information technology environment.
(e) Long-term Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal
quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a long-term roadmap that
shall include each of the following:
(1) A description of the minimum required and desired core
service requirements, including--
(A) key performance parameters; and
(B) an assessment of current, measured performance.
(2) implementation milestones for the intelligence community
information technology environment, including each of the
following:
(A) A schedule for expected deliveries of core
service capabilities during each of the following
phases:
(i) Concept refinement and technology
maturity demonstration.
(ii) Development, integration, and
demonstration.
(iii) Production, deployment, and
sustainment.
(iv) System retirement.
(B) Dependencies of such core service capabilities.
(C) Plans for the transition or restructuring
necessary to incorporate core service capabilities.
(D) A description of any legacy systems and
discontinued capabilities to be phased out.
(3) Such other matters as the Director determines
appropriate.
(f) Business Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and during each of the second and fourth fiscal
quarters thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a business plan that
includes each of the following:
(1) A systematic approach to identify core service funding
requests for the intelligence community information technology
environment within the proposed budget, including multiyear
plans to implement the long-term roadmap required by subsection
(e).
(2) A uniform approach by which each element of the
intelligence community shall identify the cost of legacy
information technology or alternative capabilities where
services of the intelligence community information technology
environment will also be available.
(3) A uniform effort by which each element of the
intelligence community shall identify transition and
restructuring costs for new, existing, and retiring services of
the intelligence community information technology environment,
as well as services of such environment that have changed
designations as a core service.
(g) Quarterly Presentations.--Beginning not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees
quarterly updates regarding ongoing implementation of the intelligence
community information technology environment as compared to the
requirements in the most recently submitted security plan required by
subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by subsection (e), and
business plan required by subsection (f).
(h) Additional Notifications.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall provide timely notification to the congressional intelligence
committees regarding any policy changes related to or affecting the
intelligence community information technology environment, new
initiatives or strategies related to or impacting such environment, and
changes or deficiencies in the execution of the security plan required
by subsection (d), long-term roadmap required by subsection (e), and
business plan required by subsection (f).
(i) Sunset.--The section shall have no effect on or after September
30, 2024.
SEC. 2313. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF SECURE MOBILE VOICE SOLUTION FOR
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Director of the National Security Agency, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a classified report on the
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule associated with
the implementation of a secure mobile voice solution for the
intelligence community.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include,
at a minimum, the following:
(1) The benefits and disadvantages of a secure mobile voice
solution.
(2) Whether the intelligence community could leverage
commercially available technology for classified voice
communications that operates on commercial mobile networks in a
secure manner and identifying the accompanying security risks
to such networks.
(3) A description of any policies or community guidance that
would be necessary to govern the potential solution, such as a
process for determining the appropriate use of a secure mobile
telephone and any limitations associated with such use.
SEC. 2314. POLICY ON MINIMUM INSIDER THREAT STANDARDS.
(a) Policy Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a policy for minimum insider threat standards that is
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.
(b) Implementation.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence
community shall implement the policy established under subsection (a).
SEC. 2315. SUBMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY POLICIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Electronic repository.--The term ``electronic
repository'' means the electronic distribution mechanism, in
use as of the date of the enactment of this Act, or any
successor electronic distribution mechanism, by which the
Director of National Intelligence submits to the congressional
intelligence committees information.
(2) Policy.--The term ``policy'', with respect to the
intelligence community, includes unclassified or classified--
(A) directives, policy guidance, and policy memoranda
of the intelligence community;
(B) executive correspondence of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
(C) any equivalent successor policy instruments.
(b) Submission of Policies.--
(1) Current policy.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees using the electronic repository all nonpublicly
available policies issued by the Director of National
Intelligence for the intelligence community that are in effect
as of the date of the submission.
(2) Continuous updates.--Not later than 15 days after the
date on which the Director of National Intelligence issues,
modifies, or rescinds a policy of the intelligence community,
the Director shall--
(A) notify the congressional intelligence committees
of such addition, modification, or removal; and
(B) update the electronic repository with respect to
such addition, modification, or removal.
SEC. 2316. EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RECRUITMENT EFFORTS.
In order to further increase the diversity of the intelligence
community workforce, not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with heads of elements of the Intelligence Community,
shall create, implement, and submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a written plan to ensure that rural and underrepresented
regions are more fully and consistently represented in such elements'
employment recruitment efforts. Upon receipt of the plan, the
congressional committees shall have 60 days to submit comments to the
Director of National Intelligence before such plan shall be
implemented.
TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 2401. AUTHORITY FOR PROTECTION OF CURRENT AND FORMER EMPLOYEES OF
THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3506(a)(4)) is amended by striking ``such personnel of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of
National Intelligence may designate;'' and inserting ``current and
former personnel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and their immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence
may designate;''.
SEC. 2402. DESIGNATION OF THE PROGRAM MANAGER-INFORMATION SHARING
ENVIRONMENT.
(a) Information Sharing Environment.--Section 1016(b) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C.
485(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``President'' and inserting
``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``President'' both places
that term appears and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(b) Program Manager.--Section 1016(f)(1) of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)(1)) is amended by
striking ``The individual designated as the program manager shall serve
as program manager until removed from service or replaced by the
President (at the President's sole discretion).'' and inserting
``Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Damon Paul Nelson and
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
2018, 2019 and 2020, each individual designated as the program manager
shall be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 2403. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center.''.
SEC. 2404. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3034(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence:
``The Chief Financial Officer shall report directly to the Director of
National Intelligence.''.
SEC. 2405. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 103G(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3032(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence:
``The Chief Information Officer shall report directly to the Director
of National Intelligence.''.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 2411. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SUBSISTENCE FOR PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO AUSTERE LOCATIONS.
Subsection (a) of section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3506) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).,''
and inserting ``(50 U.S.C. 403-4a),'';
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(3) in paragraph (7), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (8):
``(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide, during any
fiscal year, with or without reimbursement, subsistence to any
personnel assigned to an overseas location designated by the
Agency as an austere location.''.
SEC. 2412. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN MONTHLY WORKERS' COMPENSATION
PAYMENTS AND OTHER PAYMENTS FOR CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 19 the
following new section:
``SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY REASON OF
WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered dependent.--The term `covered dependent' means
a family member (as defined by the Director) of a covered
employee who, on or after September 11, 2001--
``(A) accompanies the covered employee to an assigned
duty station in a foreign country; and
``(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying
injury.
``(2) Covered employee.--The term `covered employee' means an
officer or employee of the Central Intelligence Agency who, on
or after September 11, 2001, becomes injured by reason of a
qualifying injury.
``(3) Covered individual.--The term `covered individual'
means an individual who--
``(A)(i) is detailed to the Central Intelligence
Agency from other agencies of the United States
Government or from the Armed Forces; or
``(ii) is affiliated with the Central Intelligence
Agency, as determined by the Director; and
``(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001, becomes
injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
``(4) Qualifying injury.--The term `qualifying injury' means
the following:
``(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an injury
incurred--
``(i) during a period in which the covered
dependent is accompanying the covered employee
to an assigned duty station in a foreign
country;
``(ii) in connection with war, insurgency,
hostile act, terrorist activity, or other
incident designated by the Director; and
``(iii) that was not the result of the
willful misconduct of the covered dependent.
``(B) With respect to a covered employee or a covered
individual, an injury incurred--
``(i) during a period of assignment to a duty
station in a foreign country;
``(ii) in connection with a war, insurgency,
hostile act, terrorist activity, or other
incident designated by the Director; and
``(iii) that was not the result of the
willful misconduct of the covered employee or
the covered individual.
``(b) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
``(1) Increase.--The Director may increase the amount of
monthly compensation paid to a covered employee under section
8105 of title 5, United States Code. Subject to paragraph (2),
the Director may determine the amount of each such increase by
taking into account--
``(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
``(B) the circumstances by which the covered employee
became injured; and
``(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
``(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5, United
States Code, the total amount of monthly compensation increased
under paragraph (1) may not exceed the monthly pay of the
maximum rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule
under section 5332 of such title.
``(c) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director may pay
the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered employee, a
covered individual, or a covered dependent, or may reimburse a covered
employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent for such costs,
that are not otherwise covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States
Code, or other provision of Federal law.
``(d) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to this section
shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter 81 of title 5, United
States Code.''.
(b) Regulations.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall--
(1) prescribe regulations ensuring the fair and equitable
implementation of section 19A of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a); and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees such
regulations.
(c) Application.--Section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949, as added by subsection (a), shall apply with respect to--
(1) payments made to covered employees (as defined in such
section) under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code,
beginning on or after the date of the enactment of this Act;
and
(2) treatment described in subsection (b) of such section 19A
occurring on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 2413. EXPANSION OF SECURITY PROTECTIVE SERVICE JURISDICTION OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Subsection (a)(1) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(a)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``500 feet;'' and
inserting ``500 yards;''; and
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``500 feet.'' and
inserting ``500 yards.''.
SEC. 2414. REPEAL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT FOR
CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Repeal of Foreign Language Proficiency Requirement.--Section 104A
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3036) is amended by
striking subsection (g).
(b) Conforming Repeal of Report Requirement.--Section 611 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-
487) is amended by striking subsection (c).
Subtitle C--Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
Department of Energy
SEC. 2421. CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICES OF
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization
Act (42 U.S.C. 7144b) is amended to read as follows:
``office of intelligence and counterintelligence
``Sec. 215. (a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms
`intelligence community' and `National Intelligence Program' have the
meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(b) In General.--There is in the Department an Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be under the
National Intelligence Program.
``(c) Director.--(1) The head of the Office shall be the Director of
the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, who shall be an
employee in the Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence
Service, the Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service
that the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of the Office shall
report directly to the Secretary.
``(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as the
Director from among individuals who have substantial expertise in
matters relating to the intelligence community, including foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence.
``(d) Duties.--(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and control
of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such duties and exercise
such powers as the Secretary may prescribe.
``(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing policy for
intelligence and counterintelligence programs and activities at the
Department.''.
(b) Conforming Repeal.--Section 216 of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7144c) is hereby repealed.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents at the beginning of
the Department of Energy Organization Act is amended by striking the
items relating to sections 215 and 216 and inserting the following new
item:
``Sec. 215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.''.
SEC. 2422. ESTABLISHMENT OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY CENTER.
Section 215 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C.
7144b), as amended by section 2421, is further amended by adding at the
end the following:
``(e) Energy Infrastructure Security Center.--(1)(A) The President
shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security Center, taking into
account all appropriate government tools to analyze and disseminate
intelligence relating to the security of the energy infrastructure of
the United States.
``(B) The Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall
appoint the head of the Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
``(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be located
within the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
``(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security Center, the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence shall
address the following missions and objectives to coordinate and
disseminate intelligence relating to the security of the energy
infrastructure of the United States:
``(A) Establishing a primary organization within the United
States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
pertaining to the security of the energy infrastructure of the
United States.
``(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and agencies have
full access to and receive intelligence support needed to
execute the plans or activities of the agencies, and perform
independent, alternative analyses.
``(C) Establishing a central repository on known and
suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure of the
United States, including with respect to any individuals,
groups, or entities engaged in activities targeting such
infrastructure, and the goals, strategies, capabilities, and
networks of such individuals, groups, or entities.
``(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating to the
security of the energy infrastructure of the United States,
including threats and analyses, to the President, to the
appropriate departments and agencies, and to the appropriate
committees of Congress.
``(3) The President may waive the requirements of this subsection,
and any parts thereof, if the President determines that such
requirements do not materially improve the ability of the United States
Government to prevent and halt attacks against the energy
infrastructure of the United States. Such waiver shall be made in
writing to Congress and shall include a description of how the missions
and objectives in paragraph (2) are being met.
``(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver authority
granted by paragraph (3), the President shall submit to Congress from
time to time updates and plans regarding the establishment of an Energy
Infrastructure Security Center.''.
SEC. 2423. REPEAL OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE AND BUDGET REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Section 214 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C.
7144a) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a)''; and
(2) by striking subsections (b) and (c).
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 2431. PLAN FOR DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COMPONENT OF
DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE AS AN ELEMENT OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence and Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives a plan to designate the counterintelligence component
of the Defense Security Service of the Department of Defense as an
element of the intelligence community by not later than January 1,
2020. Such plan shall--
(1) address the implications of such designation on the
authorities, governance, personnel, resources, information
technology, collection, analytic products, information sharing,
and business processes of the Defense Security Service and the
intelligence community; and
(2) not address the personnel security functions of the
Defense Security Service.
SEC. 2432. NOTICE NOT REQUIRED FOR PRIVATE ENTITIES.
Section 3553 of title 44, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following:
``(j) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to require the Secretary to provide notice to any private
entity before the Secretary issues a binding operational directive
under subsection (b)(2).''.
SEC. 2433. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE.
(a) Establishment.--Section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3041a) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(d) Advisory Board.--
``(1) Establishment.--There is established in the National
Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in this section
referred to as the `Board').
``(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
``(A) study matters relating to the mission of the
National Reconnaissance Office, including with respect
to promoting innovation, competition, and resilience in
space, overhead reconnaissance, acquisition, and other
matters; and
``(B) advise and report directly to the Director with
respect to such matters.
``(3) Members.--
``(A) Number and appointment.--
``(i) In general.--The Board shall be
composed of 5 members appointed by the Director
from among individuals with demonstrated
academic, government, business, or other
expertise relevant to the mission and functions
of the National Reconnaissance Office.
``(ii) Notification.--Not later than 30 days
after the date on which the Director appoints a
member to the Board, the Director shall notify
the congressional intelligence committees and
the congressional defense committees (as
defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United
States Code) of such appointment.
``(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed for a
term of 2 years. Except as provided by subparagraph
(C), a member may not serve more than 3 terms.
``(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a
vacancy occurring before the expiration of the term for
which the member's predecessor was appointed shall be
appointed only for the remainder of that term. A member
may serve after the expiration of that member's term
until a successor has taken office.
``(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who shall
be appointed by the Director from among the members.
``(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
subsistence, in accordance with applicable provisions
under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United
States Code.
``(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may appoint
an executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the
National Reconnaissance Office, to support the Board.
``(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than
quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of the
Director.
``(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year, the
Board shall submit to the Director and to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the activities and
significant findings of the Board during the preceding year.
``(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The Federal
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the
Board.
``(7) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the date
that is 3 years after the date of the first meeting of the
Board.''.
(b) Initial Appointments.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office shall appoint the initial 5 members to the advisory board under
subsection (d) of section 106A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3041a), as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 2434. COLLOCATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PERSONNEL AT FIELD LOCATIONS.
(a) Identification of Opportunities for Collocation.--Not later than
60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall
identify, in consultation with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration, the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the heads of such other elements of the Department of
Homeland Security as the Under Secretary considers appropriate,
opportunities for collocation of officers of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis in the field outside of the greater Washington, District
of Columbia, area in order to support operational units from U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other
elements of the Department of Homeland Security.
(b) Plan for Collocation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report that includes a plan for
collocation as described in subsection (a).
TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS
SEC. 2501. REPORT ON CYBER ATTACKS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST
UNITED STATES ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House
of Representatives;
(D) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
and
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(3) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to congressional leadership and
the appropriate congressional committees a report on cyber attacks and
attempted cyber attacks by foreign governments on United States
election infrastructure in States and localities in connection with the
2016 Presidential election in the United States and such cyber attacks
or attempted cyber attacks as the Under Secretary anticipates against
such infrastructure. Such report shall identify the States and
localities affected and shall include cyber attacks and attempted cyber
attacks against voter registration databases, voting machines, voting-
related computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and
other election officials of the various States.
(c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 2502. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S POSTURE TO COLLECT
AGAINST AND ANALYZE RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
(a) Review Required.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) complete an after action review of the posture of the
intelligence community to collect against and analyze efforts
of the Government of Russia to interfere in the 2016
Presidential election in the United States; and
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the findings of the Director with respect to such
review.
(b) Elements.--The review required by subsection (a) shall include,
with respect to the posture and efforts described in paragraph (1) of
such subsection, the following:
(1) An assessment of whether the resources of the
intelligence community were properly aligned to detect and
respond to the efforts described in subsection (a)(1).
(2) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred
within elements of the intelligence community.
(3) An assessment of the information sharing that occurred
between elements of the intelligence community.
(4) An assessment of applicable authorities necessary to
collect on any such efforts and any deficiencies in those
authorities.
(5) A review of the use of open source material to inform
analysis and warning of such efforts.
(6) A review of the use of alternative and predictive
analysis.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a)(2) shall
be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees in a
classified form.
SEC. 2503. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS TO FEDERAL
ELECTIONS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House
of Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(3) Security vulnerability.--The term ``security
vulnerability'' has the meaning given such term in section 102
of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C.
1501).
(b) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
heads of other relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall--
(1) commence not later than 1 year before any regularly
scheduled Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018,
and complete not later than 180 days before such election, an
assessment of security vulnerabilities of State election
systems; and
(2) not later than 180 days before any regularly scheduled
Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, submit a
report on such security vulnerabilities and an assessment of
foreign intelligence threats to the election to--
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
(c) Update.--Not later than 90 days before any regularly scheduled
Federal election occurring after December 31, 2018, the Director of
National Intelligence shall--
(1) update the assessment of foreign intelligence threats to
that election; and
(2) submit the updated assessment to--
(A) congressional leadership; and
(B) the appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 2504. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING RUSSIAN CYBER THREATS TO UNITED
STATES ELECTIONS.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(4) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(5) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Requirement for a Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall develop a whole-
of-government strategy for countering the threat of Russian cyber
attacks and attempted cyber attacks against electoral systems and
processes in the United States, including Federal, State, and local
election systems, voter registration databases, voting tabulation
equipment, and equipment and processes for the secure transmission of
election results.
(c) Elements of the Strategy.--The strategy required by subsection
(b) shall include the following elements:
(1) A whole-of-government approach to protecting United
States electoral systems and processes that includes the
agencies and departments indicated in subsection (b) as well as
any other agencies and departments of the United States, as
determined appropriate by the Director of National Intelligence
and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(2) Input solicited from Secretaries of State of the various
States and the chief election officials of the States.
(3) Technical security measures, including auditable paper
trails for voting machines, securing wireless and Internet
connections, and other technical safeguards.
(4) Detection of cyber threats, including attacks and
attempted attacks by Russian government or nongovernment cyber
threat actors.
(5) Improvements in the identification and attribution of
Russian government or nongovernment cyber threat actors.
(6) Deterrence, including actions and measures that could or
should be undertaken against or communicated to the Government
of Russia or other entities to deter attacks against, or
interference with, United States election systems and
processes.
(7) Improvements in Federal Government communications with
State and local election officials.
(8) Public education and communication efforts.
(9) Benchmarks and milestones to enable the measurement of
concrete steps taken and progress made in the implementation of
the strategy.
(d) Congressional Briefing.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly brief the appropriate
congressional committees on the strategy developed under subsection
(b).
SEC. 2505. ASSESSMENT OF SIGNIFICANT RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
DIRECTED AT FOREIGN ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA.
(a) Russian Influence Campaign Defined.--In this section, the term
``Russian influence campaign'' means any effort, covert or overt, and
by any means, attributable to the Russian Federation directed at an
election, referendum, or similar process in a country other than the
Russian Federation or the United States.
(b) Assessment Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing
an analytical assessment of the most significant Russian influence
campaigns, if any, conducted during the 3-year period preceding the
date of the enactment of this Act, as well as the most significant
current or planned such Russian influence campaigns, if any. Such
assessment shall include--
(1) a summary of such significant Russian influence
campaigns, including, at a minimum, the specific means by which
such campaigns were conducted, are being conducted, or likely
will be conducted, as appropriate, and the specific goal of
each such campaign;
(2) a summary of any defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns by the foreign state holding the
elections or referenda;
(3) a summary of any relevant activities by elements of the
intelligence community undertaken for the purpose of assisting
the government of such foreign state in defending against or
responding to such Russian influence campaigns; and
(4) an assessment of the effectiveness of such defenses and
responses described in paragraphs (2) and (3).
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) may be submitted in
classified form, but if so submitted, shall contain an unclassified
summary.
SEC. 2506. INFORMATION SHARING WITH STATE ELECTION OFFICIALS.
(a) State Defined.--In this section, the term ``State'' means any
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
(b) Security Clearances.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall support the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, and any other official of the
Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in sponsoring a security clearance up to the
top secret level for each eligible chief election official of a
State or the District of Columbia, and additional eligible
designees of such election official as appropriate, at the time
that such election official assumes such position.
(2) Interim clearances.--Consistent with applicable policies
and directives, the Director of National Intelligence may issue
interim clearances, for a period to be determined by the
Director, to a chief election official as described in
paragraph (1) and up to 1 designee of such official under such
paragraph.
(c) Information Sharing.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
assist the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis and the Under Secretary responsible
for overseeing critical infrastructure protection,
cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as
specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) with sharing any appropriate
classified information related to threats to election systems
and to the integrity of the election process with chief
election officials and such designees who have received a
security clearance under subsection (b).
(2) Coordination.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with the
Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary
responsible for overseeing critical infrastructure protection,
cybersecurity, and other related programs of the Department (as
specified in section 103(a)(1)(H) of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 113(a)(1)(H))) to facilitate the sharing of
information to the affected Secretaries of State or States.
SEC. 2507. NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN CYBER INTRUSIONS AND
ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS DIRECTED AT ELECTIONS FOR
FEDERAL OFFICES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Active measures campaign.--The term ``active measures
campaign'' means a foreign semi-covert or covert intelligence
operation.
(2) Candidate, election, and political party.--The terms
``candidate'', ``election'', and ``political party'' have the
meanings given those terms in section 301 of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(3) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(4) Cyber intrusion.--The term ``cyber intrusion'' means an
electronic occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes,
without lawful authority, electronic election infrastructure,
or the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of
information within such infrastructure.
(5) Electronic election infrastructure.--The term
``electronic election infrastructure'' means an electronic
information system of any of the following that is related to
an election for Federal office:
(A) The Federal Government.
(B) A State or local government.
(C) A political party.
(D) The election campaign of a candidate.
(6) Federal office.--The term ``Federal office'' has the
meaning given that term in section 301 of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101).
(7) High confidence.--The term ``high confidence'', with
respect to a determination, means that the determination is
based on high-quality information from multiple sources.
(8) Moderate confidence.--The term ``moderate confidence'',
with respect to a determination, means that a determination is
credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or
corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of
confidence.
(9) Other appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``other appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives.
(b) Determinations of Significant Foreign Cyber Intrusions and Active
Measures Campaigns.--The Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security shall jointly carry out subsection (c) if such
Directors and the Secretary jointly determine--
(1) that on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, a
significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign
intended to influence an upcoming election for any Federal
office has occurred or is occurring; and
(2) with moderate or high confidence, that such intrusion or
campaign can be attributed to a foreign state or to a foreign
nonstate person, group, or other entity.
(c) Briefing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 14 days after making a
determination under subsection (b), the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
jointly provide a briefing to the congressional leadership, the
congressional intelligence committees and, consistent with the
protection of sources and methods, the other appropriate
congressional committees. The briefing shall be classified and
address, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the significant foreign cyber
intrusion or active measures campaign, as the case may
be, covered by the determination.
(B) An identification of the foreign state or foreign
nonstate person, group, or other entity, to which such
intrusion or campaign has been attributed.
(C) The desirability and feasibility of the public
release of information about the cyber intrusion or
active measures campaign.
(D) Any other information such Directors and the
Secretary jointly determine appropriate.
(2) Electronic election infrastructure briefings.--With
respect to a significant foreign cyber intrusion covered by a
determination under subsection (b), the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall offer to the owner or operator of any
electronic election infrastructure directly affected by such
intrusion, a briefing on such intrusion, including steps that
may be taken to mitigate such intrusion. Such briefing may be
classified and made available only to individuals with
appropriate security clearances.
(3) Protection of sources and methods.--This subsection shall
be carried out in a manner that is consistent with the
protection of sources and methods.
SEC. 2508. DESIGNATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO LEAD ELECTION
SECURITY MATTERS.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
designate a national counterintelligence officer within the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and coordinate
counterintelligence matters relating to election security.
(b) Additional Responsibilities.--The person designated under
subsection (a) shall also lead, manage, and coordinate
counterintelligence matters relating to risks posed by interference
from foreign powers (as defined in section 101 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)) to the
following:
(1) The Federal Government election security supply chain.
(2) Election voting systems and software.
(3) Voter registration databases.
(4) Critical infrastructure related to elections.
(5) Such other Government goods and services as the Director
of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
TITLE XXVI--SECURITY CLEARANCES
SEC. 2601. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate;
(E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives;
(F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(G) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House
of Representatives; and
(H) the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Appropriate industry partners.--The term ``appropriate
industry partner'' means a contractor, licensee, or grantee (as
defined in section 101(a) of Executive Order 12829 (50 U.S.C.
3161 note; relating to National Industrial Security Program))
that is participating in the National Industrial Security
Program established by such Executive Order.
(3) Continuous vetting.--The term ``continuous vetting'' has
the meaning given such term in Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C.
3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to
suitability for government employment, fitness for contractor
employees, and eligibility for access to classified national
security information).
(4) Council.--The term ``Council'' means the Security,
Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability
Council established pursuant to such Executive Order, or any
successor entity.
(5) Security executive agent.--The term ``Security Executive
Agent'' means the officer serving as the Security Executive
Agent pursuant to section 803 of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by section 2605.
(6) Suitability and credentialing executive agent.--The term
``Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent'' means the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management acting as the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent in accordance
with Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to
reforming processes related to suitability for government
employment, fitness for contractor employees, and eligibility
for access to classified national security information), or any
successor entity.
SEC. 2602. REPORTS AND PLANS RELATING TO SECURITY CLEARANCES AND
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) ensuring the trustworthiness and security of the
workforce, facilities, and information of the Federal
Government is of the highest priority to national security and
public safety;
(2) the President and Congress should prioritize the
modernization of the personnel security framework to improve
its efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability;
(3) the current system for security clearance, suitability
and fitness for employment, and credentialing lacks
efficiencies and capabilities to meet the current threat
environment, recruit and retain a trusted workforce, and
capitalize on modern technologies; and
(4) changes to policies or processes to improve this system
should be vetted through the Council to ensure standardization,
portability, and reciprocity in security clearances across the
Federal Government.
(b) Accountability Plans and Reports.--
(1) Plans.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Council shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to
appropriate industry partners the following:
(A) A plan, with milestones, to reduce the background
investigation inventory to 200,000, or an otherwise
sustainable steady-level, by the end of year 2020. Such
plan shall include notes of any required changes in
investigative and adjudicative standards or resources.
(B) A plan to consolidate the conduct of background
investigations associated with the processing for
security clearances in the most effective and efficient
manner between the National Background Investigation
Bureau and the Defense Security Service, or a successor
organization. Such plan shall address required funding,
personnel, contracts, information technology, field
office structure, policy, governance, schedule,
transition costs, and effects on stakeholders.
(2) Report on the future of personnel security.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the
Council, in coordination with the members of the
Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and make available to appropriate industry
partners a report on the future of personnel security
to reflect changes in threats, the workforce, and
technology.
(B) Contents.--The report submitted under
subparagraph (A) shall include the following:
(i) A risk framework for granting and
renewing access to classified information.
(ii) A discussion of the use of technologies
to prevent, detect, and monitor threats.
(iii) A discussion of efforts to address
reciprocity and portability.
(iv) A discussion of the characteristics of
effective insider threat programs.
(v) An analysis of how to integrate data from
continuous evaluation, insider threat programs,
and human resources data.
(vi) Recommendations on interagency
governance.
(3) Plan for implementation.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the
Council, in coordination with the members of the Council, shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make
available to appropriate industry partners a plan to implement
the report's framework and recommendations submitted under
paragraph (2)(A).
(4) Congressional notifications.--Not less frequently than
quarterly, the Security Executive Agent shall make available to
the public a report regarding the status of the disposition of
requests received from departments and agencies of the Federal
Government for a change to, or approval under, the Federal
investigative standards, the national adjudicative guidelines,
continuous evaluation, or other national policy regarding
personnel security.
SEC. 2603. IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Reviews.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Security Executive Agent, in coordination with the
members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a report
that includes the following:
(1) A review of whether the information requested on the
Questionnaire for National Security Positions (Standard Form
86) and by the Federal Investigative Standards prescribed by
the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence appropriately supports the
adjudicative guidelines under Security Executive Agent
Directive 4 (known as the ``National Security Adjudicative
Guidelines''). Such review shall include identification of
whether any such information currently collected is unnecessary
to support the adjudicative guidelines.
(2) An assessment of whether such Questionnaire, Standards,
and guidelines should be revised to account for the prospect of
a holder of a security clearance becoming an insider threat.
(3) Recommendations to improve the background investigation
process by--
(A) simplifying the Questionnaire for National
Security Positions (Standard Form 86) and increasing
customer support to applicants completing such
Questionnaire;
(B) using remote techniques and centralized locations
to support or replace field investigation work;
(C) using secure and reliable digitization of
information obtained during the clearance process;
(D) building the capacity of the background
investigation labor sector; and
(E) replacing periodic reinvestigations with
continuous evaluation techniques in all appropriate
circumstances.
(b) Policy, Strategy, and Implementation.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive
Agent shall, in coordination with the members of the Council, establish
the following:
(1) A policy and implementation plan for the issuance of
interim security clearances.
(2) A policy and implementation plan to ensure contractors
are treated consistently in the security clearance process
across agencies and departments of the United States as
compared to employees of such agencies and departments. Such
policy shall address--
(A) prioritization of processing security clearances
based on the mission the contractors will be
performing;
(B) standardization in the forms that agencies issue
to initiate the process for a security clearance;
(C) digitization of background investigation-related
forms;
(D) use of the polygraph;
(E) the application of the adjudicative guidelines
under Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (known as
the ``National Security Adjudicative Guidelines'');
(F) reciprocal recognition of clearances across
agencies and departments of the United States,
regardless of status of periodic reinvestigation;
(G) tracking of clearance files as individuals move
from employment with an agency or department of the
United States to employment in the private sector;
(H) collection of timelines for movement of
contractors across agencies and departments;
(I) reporting on security incidents and job
performance, consistent with section 552a of title 5,
United States Code (commonly known as the ``Privacy Act
of 1974''), that may affect the ability to hold a
security clearance;
(J) any recommended changes to the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) necessary to ensure that
information affecting contractor clearances or
suitability is appropriately and expeditiously shared
between and among agencies and contractors; and
(K) portability of contractor security clearances
between or among contracts at the same agency and
between or among contracts at different agencies that
require the same level of clearance.
(3) A strategy and implementation plan that--
(A) provides for periodic reinvestigations as part of
a security clearance determination only on an as-
needed, risk-based basis;
(B) includes actions to assess the extent to which
automated records checks and other continuous
evaluation methods may be used to expedite or focus
reinvestigations; and
(C) provides an exception for certain populations if
the Security Executive Agent--
(i) determines such populations require
reinvestigations at regular intervals; and
(ii) provides written justification to the
appropriate congressional committees for any
such determination.
(4) A policy and implementation plan for agencies and
departments of the United States, as a part of the security
clearance process, to accept automated records checks generated
pursuant to a security clearance applicant's employment with a
prior employer.
(5) A policy for the use of certain background materials on
individuals collected by the private sector for background
investigation purposes.
(6) Uniform standards for agency continuous evaluation
programs to ensure quality and reciprocity in accepting
enrollment in a continuous vetting program as a substitute for
a periodic investigation for continued access to classified
information.
SEC. 2604. GOALS FOR PROMPTNESS OF DETERMINATIONS REGARDING SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
(a) Reciprocity Defined.--In this section, the term ``reciprocity''
means reciprocal recognition by Federal departments and agencies of
eligibility for access to classified information.
(b) In General.--The Council shall reform the security clearance
process with the objective that, by December 31, 2021, 90 percent of
all determinations, other than determinations regarding populations
identified under section 2603(b)(3)(C), regarding--
(1) security clearances--
(A) at the secret level are issued in 30 days or
fewer; and
(B) at the top secret level are issued in 90 days or
fewer; and
(2) reciprocity of security clearances at the same level are
recognized in 2 weeks or fewer.
(c) Certain Reinvestigations.--The Council shall reform the security
clearance process with the goal that by December 31, 2021,
reinvestigation on a set periodicity is not required for more than 10
percent of the population that holds a security clearance.
(d) Equivalent Metrics.--
(1) In general.--If the Council develops a set of performance
metrics that it certifies to the appropriate congressional
committees should achieve substantially equivalent outcomes as
those outlined in subsections (b) and (c), the Council may use
those metrics for purposes of compliance within this provision.
(2) Notice.--If the Council uses the authority provided by
paragraph (1) to use metrics as described in such paragraph,
the Council shall, not later than 30 days after communicating
such metrics to departments and agencies, notify the
appropriate congressional committees that it is using such
authority.
(e) Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Council shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and make available to appropriate industry partners a plan
to carry out this section. Such plan shall include recommended interim
milestones for the goals set forth in subsections (b) and (c) for 2019,
2020, and 2021.
SEC. 2605. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.
(a) In General.--Title VIII of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3161 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by redesignating sections 803 and 804 as sections 804 and
805, respectively; and
(2) by inserting after section 802 the following:
``SEC. 803. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.
``(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, or such
other officer of the United States as the President may designate,
shall serve as the Security Executive Agent for all departments and
agencies of the United States.
``(b) Duties.--The duties of the Security Executive Agent are as
follows:
``(1) To direct the oversight of investigations,
reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable, polygraphs
for eligibility for access to classified information or
eligibility to hold a sensitive position made by any Federal
agency.
``(2) To review the national security background
investigation and adjudication programs of Federal agencies to
determine whether such programs are being implemented in
accordance with this section.
``(3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent policies
and procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, timely, and
secure completion of investigations, polygraphs, and
adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for
access to classified information or eligibility to hold a
sensitive position.
``(4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the
final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to
conduct investigations of persons who are proposed for access
to classified information or for eligibility to hold a
sensitive position to ascertain whether such persons satisfy
the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to classified
information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as
applicable.
``(5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as the
final authority to designate a Federal agency or agencies to
determine eligibility for access to classified information or
eligibility to hold a sensitive position in accordance with
Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to access
to classified information).
``(6) To ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility for
access to classified information or eligibility to hold a
sensitive position among Federal agencies, including acting as
the final authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes among
such agencies involving the reciprocity of investigations and
adjudications of eligibility.
``(7) To execute all other duties assigned to the Security
Executive Agent by law.
``(c) Authorities.--The Security Executive Agent shall--
``(1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of
Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity,
centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness, and
security in processes relating to determinations by such
agencies of eligibility for access to classified information or
eligibility to hold a sensitive position, including such
matters as investigations, polygraphs, adjudications, and
reciprocity;
``(2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or waivers
of, national security investigative requirements, including
issuing implementing or clarifying guidance, as necessary;
``(3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in part, to
the head of any Federal agency (solely or jointly) any of the
duties of the Security Executive Agent described in subsection
(b) or the authorities described in paragraphs (1) and (2),
provided that the exercise of such assigned duties or
authorities is subject to the oversight of the Security
Executive Agent, including such terms and conditions (including
approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the Security
Executive Agent determines appropriate; and
``(4) define and set standards for continuous evaluation for
continued access to classified information and for eligibility
to hold a sensitive position.''.
(b) Report on Recommendations for Revising Authorities.--Not later
than 30 days after the date on which the Chairman of the Council
submits to the appropriate congressional committees the report required
by section 2602(b)(2)(A), the Chairman shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees such recommendations as the Chairman may have
for revising the authorities of the Security Executive Agent.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 103H(j)(4)(A) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 3033(j)(4)(A)) is amended by striking ``in section 804'' and
inserting ``in section 805''.
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the matter
preceding section 2 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3002) is amended by striking
the items relating to sections 803 and 804 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent.
``Sec. 804. Exceptions.
``Sec. 805. Definitions.''.
SEC. 2606. REPORT ON UNIFIED, SIMPLIFIED, GOVERNMENTWIDE STANDARDS FOR
POSITIONS OF TRUST AND SECURITY CLEARANCES.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing
Executive Agent, in coordination with the other members of the Council,
shall jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees and
make available to appropriate industry partners a report regarding the
advisability and the risks, benefits, and costs to the Government and
to industry of consolidating to not more than 3 tiers for positions of
trust and security clearances.
SEC. 2607. REPORT ON CLEARANCE IN PERSON CONCEPT.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that to reflect
the greater mobility of the modern workforce, alternative methodologies
merit analysis to allow greater flexibility for individuals moving in
and out of positions that require access to classified information,
while still preserving security.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees and make available to appropriate
industry partners a report that describes the requirements,
feasibility, and advisability of implementing a clearance in person
concept described in subsection (c).
(c) Clearance in Person Concept.--The clearance in person concept--
(1) permits an individual who once held a security clearance
to maintain his or her eligibility for access to classified
information, networks, and facilities for up to 3 years after
the individual's eligibility for access to classified
information would otherwise lapse; and
(2) recognizes, unless otherwise directed by the Security
Executive Agent, an individual's security clearance and
background investigation as current, regardless of employment
status, contingent on enrollment in a continuous vetting
program.
(d) Contents.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
address--
(1) requirements for an individual to voluntarily remain in a
continuous evaluation program validated by the Security
Executive Agent even if the individual is not in a position
requiring access to classified information;
(2) appropriate safeguards for privacy;
(3) advantages to government and industry;
(4) the costs and savings associated with implementation;
(5) the risks of such implementation, including security and
counterintelligence risks;
(6) an appropriate funding model; and
(7) fairness to small companies and independent contractors.
SEC. 2608. REPORTS ON RECIPROCITY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCES INSIDE OF
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
(a) Reciprocally Recognized Defined.--In this section, the term
``reciprocally recognized'' means reciprocal recognition by Federal
departments and agencies of eligibility for access to classified
information.
(b) Reports to Security Executive Agent.--The head of each Federal
department or agency shall submit an annual report to the Security
Executive Agent that--
(1) identifies the number of individuals whose security
clearances take more than 2 weeks to be reciprocally recognized
after such individuals move to another part of such department
or agency; and
(2) breaks out the information described in paragraph (1) by
type of clearance and the reasons for any delays.
(c) Annual Report.--Not less frequently than once each year, the
Security Executive Agent shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees and make available to industry partners an annual report
that summarizes the information received pursuant to subsection (b)
during the period covered by such report.
SEC. 2609. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) despite sustained efforts by Congress and the executive
branch, an unacceptable backlog in processing and adjudicating
security clearances persists, both within elements of the
intelligence community and in other departments of the Federal
Government, with some processing times exceeding a year or even
more;
(2) the protracted clearance timetable threatens the ability
of elements of the intelligence community to hire and retain
highly qualified individuals, and thus to fulfill the missions
of such elements;
(3) the prospect of a lengthy clearance process deters some
such individuals from seeking employment with the intelligence
community in the first place, and, when faced with a long wait
time, those with conditional offers of employment may opt to
discontinue the security clearance process and pursue different
opportunities;
(4) now more than ever, therefore, the broken security
clearance process badly needs fundamental reform; and
(5) in the meantime, to ensure the ability of elements of the
intelligence community to hire and retain highly qualified
personnel, elements should consider, to the extent possible and
consistent with national security, permitting new employees to
enter on duty immediately or nearly so, and to perform, on a
temporary basis pending final adjudication of their security
clearances, work that either does not require a security
clearance or requires only a low-level interim clearance.
(b) In General.--Section 506H of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 3104) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by inserting ``and''
after the semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(ii), by striking ``; and''
and inserting a period; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (C);
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c);
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsection (b):
``(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than March 1 of
each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on the
security clearances processed by each element of the intelligence
community during the preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall
separately identify security clearances processed for Federal employees
and contractor employees sponsored by each such element.
``(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include each of
the following for each element of the intelligence community for the
fiscal year covered by the report:
``(A) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
``(B) The total number of security clearance periodic
reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
``(C) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations for new applicants that were
adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to the
prospective applicant, including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated
favorably and granted access to classified information;
and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated
unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a
security clearance.
``(D) The total number of security clearance periodic
background investigations that were adjudicated with notice of
a determination provided to the existing employee, including--
``(i) the total number that were adjudicated
favorably; and
``(ii) the total number that were adjudicated
unfavorably and resulted in a denial or revocation of a
security clearance.
``(E) The total number of pending security clearance
background investigations, including initial applicant
investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were not
adjudicated as of the last day of such year and that remained
pending as follows:
``(i) For 180 days or less.
``(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12
months.
``(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than 18
months.
``(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than 24
months.
``(v) For 24 months or longer.
``(F) In the case of security clearance determinations
completed or pending during the year preceding the year for
which the report is submitted that have taken longer than 12
months to complete--
``(i) an explanation of the causes for the delays
incurred during the period covered by the report; and
``(ii) the number of such delays involving a
polygraph requirement.
``(G) The percentage of security clearance investigations,
including initial and periodic reinvestigations, that resulted
in a denial or revocation of a security clearance.
``(H) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that resulted in incomplete information.
``(I) The percentage of security clearance investigations
that did not result in enough information to make a decision on
potentially adverse information.
``(3) The report required under this subsection shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.''; and
(4) in subsection (c), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by
striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and inserting ``subsections
(a)(1) and (b)''.
SEC. 2610. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act
and not less frequently than once every 5 years thereafter, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report that reviews the intelligence
community for which positions can be conducted without access to
classified information, networks, or facilities, or may only require a
security clearance at the secret level.
SEC. 2611. INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAM FOR POSITIONS OF TRUST AND
SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) Program Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall establish
and implement a program to share between and among agencies of
the Federal Government and industry partners of the Federal
Government relevant background information regarding
individuals applying for and currently occupying national
security positions and positions of trust, in order to ensure
the Federal Government maintains a trusted workforce.
(2) Designation.--The program established under paragraph (1)
shall be known as the ``Trusted Information Provider Program''
(in this section referred to as the ``Program'').
(b) Privacy Safeguards.--The Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall ensure that the
Program includes such safeguards for privacy as the Security Executive
Agent and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent consider
appropriate.
(c) Provision of Information to the Federal Government.--The Program
shall include requirements that enable investigative service providers
and agencies of the Federal Government to leverage certain pre-
employment information gathered during the employment or military
recruiting process, and other relevant security or human resources
information obtained during employment with or for the Federal
Government, that satisfy Federal investigative standards, while
safeguarding personnel privacy.
(d) Information and Records.--The information and records considered
under the Program shall include the following:
(1) Date and place of birth.
(2) Citizenship or immigration and naturalization
information.
(3) Education records.
(4) Employment records.
(5) Employment or social references.
(6) Military service records.
(7) State and local law enforcement checks.
(8) Criminal history checks.
(9) Financial records or information.
(10) Foreign travel, relatives, or associations.
(11) Social media checks.
(12) Such other information or records as may be relevant to
obtaining or maintaining national security, suitability,
fitness, or credentialing eligibility.
(e) Implementation Plan.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make
available to appropriate industry partners a plan for the
implementation of the Program.
(2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national
security, suitability or fitness, credentialing, and
human resources or military recruitment processes.
(B) Such recommendations for legislative or
administrative action as the Security Executive Agent
and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent
consider appropriate to carry out or improve the
Program.
(f) Plan for Pilot Program on Two-way Information Sharing.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly
submit to the appropriate congressional committees and make
available to appropriate industry partners a plan for the
implementation of a pilot program to assess the feasibility and
advisability of expanding the Program to include the sharing of
information held by the Federal Government related to contract
personnel with the security office of the employers of those
contractor personnel.
(2) Elements.--The plan required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) Mechanisms that address privacy, national
security, suitability or fitness, credentialing, and
human resources or military recruitment processes.
(B) Such recommendations for legislative or
administrative action as the Security Executive Agent
and the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent
consider appropriate to carry out or improve the pilot
program.
(g) Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Security Executive Agent and the Suitability and
Credentialing Executive Agent shall jointly submit to the appropriate
congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry
partners a review of the plans submitted under subsections (e)(1) and
(f)(1) and utility and effectiveness of the programs described in such
plans.
SEC. 2612. REPORT ON PROTECTIONS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF WHISTLEBLOWER-
RELATED COMMUNICATIONS.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Security Executive Agent shall, in coordination with the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community, submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report detailing the controls employed by
the intelligence community to ensure that continuous vetting programs,
including those involving user activity monitoring, protect the
confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.
TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--Matters Relating to Russia and Other Foreign Powers
SEC. 2701. LIMITATION RELATING TO ESTABLISHMENT OR SUPPORT OF
CYBERSECURITY UNIT WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
(b) Limitation.--
(1) In general.--No amount may be expended by the Federal
Government, other than the Department of Defense, to enter into
or implement any bilateral agreement between the United States
and the Russian Federation regarding cybersecurity, including
the establishment or support of any cybersecurity unit, unless,
at least 30 days prior to the conclusion of any such agreement,
the Director of National Intelligence submits to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on such agreement
that includes the elements required by subsection (c).
(2) Department of defense agreements.--Any agreement between
the Department of Defense and the Russian Federation regarding
cybersecurity shall be conducted in accordance with section
1232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (Public Law 114-328), as amended by section 1231 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public
Law 115-91).
(c) Elements.--If the Director submits a report under subsection (b)
with respect to an agreement, such report shall include a description
of each of the following:
(1) The purpose of the agreement.
(2) The nature of any intelligence to be shared pursuant to
the agreement.
(3) The expected value to national security resulting from
the implementation of the agreement.
(4) Such counterintelligence concerns associated with the
agreement as the Director may have and such measures as the
Director expects to be taken to mitigate such concerns.
(d) Rule of Construction.--This section shall not be construed to
affect any existing authority of the Director of National Intelligence,
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or another head of an
element of the intelligence community, to share or receive foreign
intelligence on a case-by-case basis.
SEC. 2702. REPORT ON RETURNING RUSSIAN COMPOUNDS.
(a) Covered Compounds Defined.--In this section, the term ``covered
compounds'' means the real property in New York, the real property in
Maryland, and the real property in San Francisco, California, that were
under the control of the Government of Russia in 2016 and were removed
from such control in response to various transgressions by the
Government of Russia, including the interference by the Government of
Russia in the 2016 election in the United States.
(b) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives (only with respect to
the unclassified report), a report on the intelligence risks of
returning the covered compounds to Russian control.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by this section shall be
submitted in classified and unclassified forms.
SEC. 2703. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT FINANCE RELATING TO RUSSIA.
(a) Threat Finance Defined.--In this section, the term ``threat
finance'' means--
(1) the financing of cyber operations, global influence
campaigns, intelligence service activities, proliferation,
terrorism, or transnational crime and drug organizations;
(2) the methods and entities used to spend, store, move,
raise, conceal, or launder money or value, on behalf of threat
actors;
(3) sanctions evasion; and
(4) other forms of threat finance activity domestically or
internationally, as defined by the President.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing an assessment of Russian
threat finance. The assessment shall be based on intelligence from all
sources, including from the Office of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence of the Department of the Treasury.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
each of the following:
(1) A summary of leading examples from the 3-year period
preceding the date of the submittal of the report of threat
finance activities conducted by, for the benefit of, or at the
behest of--
(A) officials of the Government of Russia;
(B) persons subject to sanctions under any provision
of law imposing sanctions with respect to Russia;
(C) Russian nationals subject to sanctions under any
other provision of law; or
(D) Russian oligarchs or organized criminals.
(2) An assessment with respect to any trends or patterns in
threat finance activities relating to Russia, including common
methods of conducting such activities and global nodes of money
laundering used by Russian threat actors described in paragraph
(1) and associated entities.
(3) An assessment of any connections between Russian
individuals involved in money laundering and the Government of
Russia.
(4) A summary of engagement and coordination with
international partners on threat finance relating to Russia,
especially in Europe, including examples of such engagement and
coordination.
(5) An identification of any resource and collection gaps.
(6) An identification of--
(A) entry points of money laundering by Russian and
associated entities into the United States;
(B) any vulnerabilities within the United States
legal and financial system, including specific sectors,
which have been or could be exploited in connection
with Russian threat finance activities; and
(C) the counterintelligence threat posed by Russian
money laundering and other forms of threat finance, as
well as the threat to the United States financial
system and United States efforts to enforce sanctions
and combat organized crime.
(7) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) may be
submitted in classified form.
SEC. 2704. NOTIFICATION OF AN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGN.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(2) Congressional leadership.--The term ``congressional
leadership'' includes the following:
(A) The majority leader of the Senate.
(B) The minority leader of the Senate.
(C) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(D) The minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Requirement for Notification.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in cooperation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the head of any other relevant agency, shall notify
the congressional leadership and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or
Ranking Member of each of the appropriate congressional committees, and
of other relevant committees of jurisdiction, each time the Director of
National Intelligence determines there is credible information that a
foreign power has, is, or will attempt to employ a covert influence or
active measures campaign with regard to the modernization, employment,
doctrine, or force posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense.
(c) Content of Notification.--Each notification required by
subsection (b) shall include information concerning actions taken by
the United States to expose or halt an attempt referred to in
subsection (b).
SEC. 2705. NOTIFICATION OF TRAVEL BY ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
PERSONNEL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES.
In carrying out the advance notification requirements set out in
section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
(division N of Public Law 115-31; 131 Stat. 825; 22 U.S.C. 254a note),
the Secretary of State shall--
(1) ensure that the Russian Federation provides notification
to the Secretary of State at least 2 business days in advance
of all travel that is subject to such requirements by
accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the Russian
Federation in the United States, and take necessary action to
secure full compliance by Russian personnel and address any
noncompliance; and
(2) provide notice of travel described in paragraph (1) to
the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation within 1 hour of receiving
notice of such travel.
SEC. 2706. REPORT ON OUTREACH STRATEGY ADDRESSING THREATS FROM UNITED
STATES ADVERSARIES TO THE UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY
SECTOR.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the
term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Homeland
Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the
House of Representatives.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing
outreach by the intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise to United States industrial, commercial, scientific,
technical, and academic communities on matters relating to the efforts
of adversaries of the United States to acquire critical United States
technology, intellectual property, and research and development
information.
(c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
the following:
(1) A review of the current outreach efforts of the
intelligence community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
described in subsection (b), including the type of information
conveyed in the outreach.
(2) A determination of the appropriate element of the
intelligence community to lead such outreach efforts.
(3) An assessment of potential methods for improving the
effectiveness of such outreach, including an assessment of the
following:
(A) Those critical technologies, infrastructure, or
related supply chains that are at risk from the efforts
of adversaries described in subsection (b).
(B) The necessity and advisability of granting
security clearances to company or community leadership,
when necessary and appropriate, to allow for tailored
classified briefings on specific targeted threats.
(C) The advisability of partnering with entities of
the Federal Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community and relevant regulatory and
industry groups described in subsection (b), to convey
key messages across sectors targeted by United States
adversaries.
(D) Strategies to assist affected elements of the
communities described in subparagraph (C) in
mitigating, deterring, and protecting against the broad
range of threats from the efforts of adversaries
described in subsection (b), with focus on producing
information that enables private entities to justify
business decisions related to national security
concerns.
(E) The advisability of the establishment of a United
States Government-wide task force to coordinate
outreach and activities to combat the threats from
efforts of adversaries described in subsection (b).
(F) Such other matters as the Director of National
Intelligence may consider necessary.
(d) Consultation Encouraged.--In preparing the report required by
subsection (b), the Director is encouraged to consult with other
government agencies, think tanks, academia, representatives of the
financial industry, or such other entities as the Director considers
appropriate.
(e) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
SEC. 2707. REPORT ON IRANIAN SUPPORT OF PROXY FORCES IN SYRIA AND
LEBANON.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(2) Arms or related material.--The term ``arms or related
material'' means--
(A) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological
weapons or materials or components of such weapons;
(B) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or materials
or components of such weapons;
(C) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons;
(D) defense articles or defense services, as those
terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4),
respectively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2794);
(E) defense information, as that term is defined in
section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2403); or
(F) items designated by the President for purposes of
the United States Munitions List under section 38(a)(1)
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)).
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on Iranian
support of proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to
Israel, other United States regional allies, and other specified
interests of the United States as a result of such support.
(c) Matters for Inclusion.--The report required under subsection (b)
shall include information relating to the following matters with
respect to both the strategic and tactical implications for the United
States and its allies:
(1) A description of arms or related materiel transferred by
Iran to Hizballah since March 2011, including the number of
such arms or related materiel and whether such transfer was by
land, sea, or air, as well as financial and additional
technological capabilities transferred by Iran to Hizballah.
(2) A description of Iranian and Iranian-controlled
personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and Iran's
Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating within Syria,
including the number and geographic distribution of such
personnel operating within 30 kilometers of the Israeli borders
with Syria and Lebanon.
(3) An assessment of Hizballah's operational lessons learned
based on its recent experiences in Syria.
(4) A description of any rocket-producing facilities in
Lebanon for nonstate actors, including whether such facilities
were assessed to be built at the direction of Hizballah
leadership, Iranian leadership, or in consultation between
Iranian leadership and Hizballah leadership.
(5) An analysis of the foreign and domestic supply chains
that significantly facilitate, support, or otherwise aid
Hizballah's acquisition or development of missile production
facilities, including the geographic distribution of such
foreign and domestic supply chains.
(6) An assessment of the provision of goods, services, or
technology transferred by Iran or its affiliates to Hizballah
to indigenously manufacture or otherwise produce missiles.
(7) An identification of foreign persons that are based on
credible information, facilitating the transfer of significant
financial support or arms or related materiel to Hizballah.
(8) A description of the threat posed to Israel and other
United States allies in the Middle East by the transfer of arms
or related material or other support offered to Hizballah and
other proxies from Iran.
(d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 2708. ANNUAL REPORT ON IRANIAN EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN
MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.
(a) Annual Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once each year
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
Congress a report describing Iranian expenditures in the previous
calendar year on military and terrorist activities outside the country,
including each of the following:
(1) The amount spent in such calendar year on activities by
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including activities
providing support for--
(A) Hizballah;
(B) Houthi rebels in Yemen;
(C) Hamas;
(D) proxy forces in Iraq and Syria; or
(E) any other entity or country the Director
determines to be relevant.
(2) The amount spent in such calendar year for ballistic
missile research and testing or other activities that the
Director determines are destabilizing to the Middle East
region.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 2709. EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE MEASURES
AND REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MALIGN
INFLUENCE CENTER.
(a) Scope of Committee to Counter Active Measures.--
(1) In general.--Section 501 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31; 50
U.S.C. 3001 note) is amended--
(A) in subsections (a) through (h)--
(i) by inserting ``, the People's Republic of
China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other
nation state'' after ``Russian Federation''
each place it appears; and
(ii) by inserting ``, China, Iran, North
Korea, or other nation state'' after ``Russia''
each place it appears; and
(B) in the section heading, by inserting ``, the
people's republic of china, the islamic republic of
iran, the democratic people's republic of korea, or
other nation state'' after ``russian federation''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in section
1(b) of such Act is amended by striking the item relating to
section 501 and inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian
Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other nation states
to exert covert influence over peoples and governments.''.
(b) Report Required.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with such elements of the
intelligence community as the Director considers relevant,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a
center, to be known as the ``Foreign Malign Influence Response
Center'', that--
(A) is comprised of analysts from all appropriate
elements of the intelligence community, including
elements with related diplomatic and law enforcement
functions;
(B) has access to all intelligence and other
reporting acquired by the United States Government on
foreign efforts to influence, through overt and covert
malign activities, United States political processes
and elections;
(C) provides comprehensive assessment, and
indications and warning, of such activities; and
(D) provides for enhanced dissemination of such
assessment to United States policy makers.
(2) Contents.--The Report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A discussion of the desirability of the
establishment of such center and any barriers to such
establishment.
(B) Such recommendations and other matters as the
Director considers appropriate.
Subtitle B--Reports
SEC. 2711. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO INSPECTOR GENERAL STUDY.
Section 11001(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Audit'' and
inserting ``Review'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''; and
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ``audit'' and inserting
``review''.
SEC. 2712. REPORTS ON AUTHORITIES OF THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House
of Representatives.
(2) Homeland security intelligence enterprise.--The term
``Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise'' has the meaning
given such term in Department of Homeland Security Instruction
Number 264-01-001, or successor authority.
(b) Report Required.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress a report on the authorities of the Under Secretary.
(c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include
each of the following:
(1) An analysis of whether the Under Secretary has the legal
and policy authority necessary to organize and lead the
Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise, with respect to
intelligence, and, if not, a description of--
(A) the obstacles to exercising the authorities of
the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department and
the Homeland Security Intelligence Council, of which
the Chief Intelligence Officer is the chair; and
(B) the legal and policy changes necessary to
effectively coordinate, organize, and lead intelligence
activities of the Department of Homeland Security.
(2) A description of the actions that the Secretary has taken
to address the inability of the Under Secretary to require
components of the Department, other than the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department to--
(A) coordinate intelligence programs; and
(B) integrate and standardize intelligence products
produced by such other components.
SEC. 2713. REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS.
(a) Review of Whistleblower Matters.--The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, in consultation with the inspectors general for
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, shall conduct a review
of the authorities, policies, investigatory standards, and other
practices and procedures relating to intelligence community
whistleblower matters, with respect to such inspectors general.
(b) Objective of Review.--The objective of the review required under
subsection (a) is to identify any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or
other issues, which frustrate the timely and effective reporting of
intelligence community whistleblower matters to appropriate inspectors
general and to the congressional intelligence committees, and the fair
and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.
(c) Conduct of Review.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall take such measures as the Inspector General determines
necessary in order to ensure that the review required by subsection (a)
is conducted in an independent and objective fashion.
(d) Report.--Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written report
containing the results of the review required under subsection (a),
along with recommendations to improve the timely and effective
reporting of intelligence community whistleblower matters to inspectors
general and to the congressional intelligence committees and the fair
and expeditious investigation and resolution of such matters.
SEC. 2714. REPORT ON ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITH
RESPECT TO CERTAIN FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined
appropriate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the role of the Director in
preparing analytic materials in connection with the evaluation by the
Federal Government of national security risks associated with potential
foreign investments into the United States.
(b) Elements.--The report under subsection (a) shall include--
(1) a description of the current process for the provision of
the analytic materials described in subsection (a);
(2) an identification of the most significant benefits and
drawbacks of such process with respect to the role of the
Director, including the sufficiency of resources and personnel
to prepare such materials; and
(3) recommendations to improve such process.
SEC. 2715. REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST UNITED
STATES TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS.
(a) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
(1) The congressional intelligence committees.
(2) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(3) The Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing--
(1) any attempts known to the intelligence community by
foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities in
United States telecommunications networks (including Signaling
System No. 7) to target for surveillance United States persons,
including employees of the Federal Government; and
(2) any actions, as of the date of the enactment of this Act,
taken by the intelligence community to protect agencies and
personnel of the United States Government from surveillance
conducted by foreign governments.
SEC. 2716. BIENNIAL REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISKS.
(a) Intelligence Community Interagency Working Group.--
(1) Requirement to establish.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish an intelligence community
interagency working group to prepare the biennial reports
required by subsection (b).
(2) Chairperson.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
serve as the chairperson of such interagency working group.
(3) Membership.--Such interagency working group shall be
composed of representatives of each element of the intelligence
community that the Director of National Intelligence determines
appropriate.
(b) Biennial Report on Foreign Investment Risks.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once
every 2 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the
Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives a report on foreign investment risks prepared
by the interagency working group established under subsection
(a).
(2) Elements.--Each report required by paragraph (1) shall
include identification, analysis, and explanation of the
following:
(A) Any current or projected major threats to the
national security of the United States with respect to
foreign investment.
(B) Any strategy used by a foreign country that such
interagency working group has identified to be a
country of special concern to use foreign investment to
target the acquisition of critical technologies,
critical materials, or critical infrastructure.
(C) Any economic espionage efforts directed at the
United States by a foreign country, particularly such a
country of special concern.
SEC. 2717. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON TRAVEL OF
FOREIGN DIPLOMATS.
Section 502(d)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 (Public Law 115-31) is amended by striking ``the number'' and
inserting ``a best estimate''.
SEC. 2718. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered official.--The term `covered official' means--
``(A) the heads of each element of the intelligence
community; and
``(B) the inspectors general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the intelligence
community.
``(2) Investigation.--The term `investigation' means any
inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the existence of an
unauthorized public disclosure of classified information.
``(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information.--The
term `unauthorized disclosure of classified information' means
any unauthorized disclosure of classified information to any
recipient.
``(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified
information.--The term `unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information' means the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information to a journalist or media organization.
``(b) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, each covered official shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on investigations of
unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.
``(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-month period,
the following:
``(A) The number of investigations opened by the
covered official regarding an unauthorized public
disclosure of classified information.
``(B) The number of investigations completed by the
covered official regarding an unauthorized public
disclosure of classified information.
``(C) Of the number of such completed investigations
identified under subparagraph (B), the number referred
to the Attorney General for criminal investigation.
``(c) Department of Justice Reporting.--
``(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security of
the Department of Justice, in consultation with the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives a report on the status of each
referral made to the Department of Justice from any element of
the intelligence community regarding an unauthorized disclosure
of classified information made during the most recent 365-day
period or any referral that has not yet been closed, regardless
of the date the referral was made.
``(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall include, for each referral covered by the report, at a
minimum, the following:
``(A) The date the referral was received.
``(B) A statement indicating whether the alleged
unauthorized disclosure described in the referral was
substantiated by the Department of Justice.
``(C) A statement indicating the highest level of
classification of the information that was revealed in
the unauthorized disclosure.
``(D) A statement indicating whether an open criminal
investigation related to the referral is active.
``(E) A statement indicating whether any criminal
charges have been filed related to the referral.
``(F) A statement indicating whether the Department
of Justice has been able to attribute the unauthorized
disclosure to a particular entity or individual.
``(d) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this section
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have a classified
annex.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 1104 the following new item:
``Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.''.
SEC. 2719. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATION OF COVERED
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AS PERSONA NON GRATA.
(a) Covered Intelligence Officer Defined.--In this section, the term
``covered intelligence officer'' means--
(1) a United States intelligence officer serving in a post in
a foreign country; or
(2) a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer serving
in a United States post.
(b) Requirement for Reports.--Not later than 72 hours after a covered
intelligence officer is designated as a persona non grata, the Director
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a notification of that
designation. Each such notification shall include--
(1) the date of the designation;
(2) the basis for the designation; and
(3) a justification for the expulsion.
SEC. 2720. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN
VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES PROCESS OF FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Vulnerabilities equities policy and process document.--
The term ``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
document'' means the executive branch document entitled
``Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process'' dated November
15, 2017.
(2) Vulnerabilities equities process.--The term
``Vulnerabilities Equities Process'' means the interagency
review of vulnerabilities, pursuant to the Vulnerabilities
Equities Policy and Process document or any successor document.
(3) Vulnerability.--The term ``vulnerability'' means a
weakness in an information system or its components (for
example, system security procedures, hardware design, and
internal controls) that could be exploited or could affect
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information.
(b) Reports on Process and Criteria Under Vulnerabilities Equities
Policy and Process.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
written report describing--
(A) with respect to each element of the intelligence
community--
(i) the title of the official or officials
responsible for determining whether, pursuant
to criteria contained in the Vulnerabilities
Equities Policy and Process document or any
successor document, a vulnerability must be
submitted for review under the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process; and
(ii) the process used by such element to make
such determination; and
(B) the roles or responsibilities of that element
during a review of a vulnerability submitted to the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process.
(2) Changes to process or criteria.--Not later than 30 days
after any significant change is made to the process and
criteria used by any element of the intelligence community for
determining whether to submit a vulnerability for review under
the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, such element shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
describing such change.
(3) Form of reports.--Each report submitted under this
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.
(c) Annual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once each calendar
year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a classified report
containing, with respect to the previous year--
(A) the number of vulnerabilities submitted for
review under the Vulnerabilities Equities Process;
(B) the number of vulnerabilities described in
subparagraph (A) disclosed to each vendor responsible
for correcting the vulnerability, or to the public,
pursuant to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(C) the aggregate number, by category, of the
vulnerabilities excluded from review under the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process, as described in
paragraph 5.4 of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy
and Process document.
(2) Unclassified information.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified appendix that
contains--
(A) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed
to vendors or the public pursuant to the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process; and
(B) the aggregate number of vulnerabilities disclosed
to vendors or the public pursuant to the
Vulnerabilities Equities Process known to have been
patched.
(3) Non-duplication.--The Director of National Intelligence
may forgo submission of an annual report required under this
subsection for a calendar year, if the Director notifies the
intelligence committees in writing that, with respect to the
same calendar year, an annual report required by paragraph 4.3
of the Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process document
already has been submitted to Congress, and such annual report
contains the information that would otherwise be required to be
included in an annual report under this subsection.
SEC. 2721. INSPECTORS GENERAL REPORTS ON CLASSIFICATION.
(a) Reports Required.--Not later than October 1, 2019, each Inspector
General listed in subsection (b) shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report that includes, with respect to the
department or agency of the Inspector General, analyses of the
following:
(1) The accuracy of the application of classification and
handling markers on a representative sample of finished
reports, including such reports that are compartmented.
(2) Compliance with declassification procedures.
(3) The effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of
public or historical importance that merit prioritization for a
declassification review.
(b) Inspectors General Listed.--The Inspectors General listed in this
subsection are as follows:
(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
(2) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
(4) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The Inspector General of the National Reconnaissance
Office.
(6) The Inspector General of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 2722. REPORTS ON GLOBAL WATER INSECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS AND BRIEFING ON EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASE AND PANDEMICS.
(a) Reports on Global Water Insecurity and National Security
Implications.--
(1) Reports required.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently than once
every 5 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the implications of water insecurity on the national
security interest of the United States, including consideration
of social, economic, agricultural, and environmental factors.
(2) Assessment scope and focus.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of water insecurity
described in such subsection with a global scope, but focus on
areas of the world--
(A) of strategic, economic, or humanitarian interest
to the United States--
(i) that are, as of the date of the report,
at the greatest risk of instability, conflict,
human insecurity, or mass displacement; or
(ii) where challenges relating to water
insecurity are likely to emerge and become
significant during the 5-year or the 20-year
period beginning on the date of the report; and
(B) where challenges relating to water insecurity are
likely to imperil the national security interests of
the United States or allies of the United States.
(3) Consultation.--In researching a report required by
paragraph (1), the Director shall consult with--
(A) such stakeholders within the intelligence
community, the Department of Defense, and the
Department of State as the Director considers
appropriate; and
(B) such additional Federal agencies and persons in
the private sector as the Director considers
appropriate.
(4) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(b) Briefing on Emerging Infectious Disease and Pandemics.--
(1) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this
subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(A) the congressional intelligence committees;
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives; and
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations
of the Senate.
(2) Briefing.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a
briefing on the anticipated geopolitical effects of emerging
infectious disease (including deliberate, accidental, and
naturally occurring infectious disease threats) and pandemics,
and their implications on the national security of the United
States.
(3) Content.--The briefing under paragraph (2) shall include
an assessment of--
(A) the economic, social, political, and security
risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious
diseases on the United States and the international
political and economic system;
(B) the economic, social, political, and security
risks, costs, and impacts of a major transnational
pandemic on the United States and the international
political and economic system; and
(C) contributing trends and factors to the matters
assessed under subparagraphs (A) and (B).
(4) Examination of response capacity.--In examining the
risks, costs, and impacts of emerging infectious disease and a
possible transnational pandemic under paragraph (3), the
Director of National Intelligence shall also examine in the
briefing under paragraph (2) the response capacity within
affected countries and the international system. In considering
response capacity, the Director shall include--
(A) the ability of affected nations to effectively
detect and manage emerging infectious diseases and a
possible transnational pandemic;
(B) the role and capacity of international
organizations and nongovernmental organizations to
respond to emerging infectious disease and a possible
pandemic, and their ability to coordinate with affected
and donor nations; and
(C) the effectiveness of current international
frameworks, agreements, and health systems to respond
to emerging infectious diseases and a possible
transnational pandemic.
(5) Form.--The briefing under paragraph (2) may be
classified.
SEC. 2723. ANNUAL REPORT ON MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ELEMENTS
OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OTHER ENTITIES OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARDING SIGNIFICANT
OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OR POLICY.
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (50 U.S.C. 3313) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
(2) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following:
``(a) In General.--Each year, concurrent with the annual budget
request submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of
title 31, United States Code, each head of an element of the
intelligence community shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report that lists each memorandum of understanding or
other agreement regarding significant operational activities or policy
entered into during the most recently completed fiscal year between or
among such element and any other entity of the United States
Government.
``(b) Provision of Documents.--Each head of an element of an
intelligence community who receives a request from the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a copy of a memorandum
of understanding or other document listed in a report submitted by the
head under subsection (a) shall submit to such committee the requested
copy as soon as practicable after receiving such request.''.
SEC. 2724. STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ENCRYPTING UNCLASSIFIED WIRELINE
AND WIRELESS TELEPHONE CALLS.
(a) Study Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
complete a study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline
and wireless telephone calls between personnel in the intelligence
community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date on which the
Director completes the study required by subsection (a), the Director
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
the Director's findings with respect to such study.
SEC. 2725. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON HIRING AND
RETENTION OF MINORITY EMPLOYEES.
(a) Expansion of Period of Report.--Subsection (a) of section 114 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3050) is amended by
inserting ``and the preceding 5 fiscal years'' after ``fiscal year''.
(b) Clarification on Disaggregation of Data.--Subsection (b) of such
section is amended, in the matter before paragraph (1), by striking
``disaggregated data by category of covered person from each element of
the intelligence community'' and inserting ``data, disaggregated by
category of covered person and by element of the intelligence
community,''.
SEC. 2726. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LOAN REPAYMENT AND RELATED
PROGRAMS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) there should be established, through the issuing of an
Intelligence Community Directive or otherwise, an intelligence
community-wide program for student loan repayment, student loan
forgiveness, financial counseling, and related matters, for
employees of the intelligence community;
(2) creating such a program would enhance the ability of the
elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire, and
retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect to
mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions;
(3) such a program, including with respect to eligibility
requirements, should be designed so as to maximize the ability
of the elements of the intelligence community to recruit, hire,
and retain highly qualified personnel, including with respect
to mission-critical and hard-to-fill positions; and
(4) to the extent possible, such a program should be uniform
throughout the intelligence community and publicly promoted by
each element of the intelligence community to both current
employees of the element as well as to prospective employees of
the element.
(b) Report on Potential Intelligence Community-wide Program.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in cooperation with the heads of the elements of
the intelligence community and the heads of any other
appropriate department or agency of the Federal Government,
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on potentially establishing and carrying out an
intelligence community-wide program for student loan repayment,
student loan forgiveness, financial counseling, and related
matters, as described in subsection (a).
(2) Matters included.--The report under paragraph (1) shall
include, at a minimum, the following:
(A) A description of the financial resources that the
elements of the intelligence community would require to
establish and initially carry out the program specified
in paragraph (1).
(B) A description of the practical steps to establish
and carry out such a program.
(C) The identification of any legislative action the
Director determines necessary to establish and carry
out such a program.
(c) Annual Reports on Established Programs.--
(1) Covered programs defined.--In this subsection, the term
``covered programs'' means any loan repayment program, loan
forgiveness program, financial counseling program, or similar
program, established pursuant to title X of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3191 et seq.) or any other
provision of law that may be administered or used by an element
of the intelligence community.
(2) Annual reports required.--Not less frequently than once
each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
covered programs. Each such report shall include, with respect
to the period covered by the report, the following:
(A) The number of personnel from each element of the
intelligence community who used each covered program.
(B) The total amount of funds each element expended
for each such program.
(C) A description of the efforts made by each element
to promote each covered program pursuant to both the
personnel of the element of the intelligence community
and to prospective personnel.
SEC. 2727. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Correcting Long-standing Material Weaknesses.--Section 368 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 110-
259; 50 U.S.C. 3051 note) is hereby repealed.
(b) Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group.--Section
210D of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124k) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) as
subsections (c) through (h), respectively; and
(3) in subsection (c), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (8), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a period; and
(B) by striking paragraph (9).
(c) Inspector General Report.--Section 8H of the Inspector General
Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (g); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (h) and (i) as subsections
(g) and (h), respectively.
SEC. 2728. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORT ON
SENIOR EXECUTIVES OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Senior Executive Service Position Defined.--In this section, the
term ``Senior Executive Service position'' has the meaning given that
term in section 3132(a)(2) of title 5, United States Code, and includes
any position above the GS-15, step 10, level of the General Schedule
under section 5332 of such title.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
number of Senior Executive Service positions in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
(c) Matters Included.--The report under subsection (b) shall include
the following:
(1) The number of required Senior Executive Service positions
for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Whether such requirements are reasonably based on the
mission of the Office.
(3) A discussion of how the number of the Senior Executive
Service positions in the Office compare to the number of senior
positions at comparable organizations.
(d) Cooperation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community any information
requested by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that
is necessary to carry out this section by not later than 14 calendar
days after the date on which the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community makes such request.
SEC. 2729. BRIEFING ON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OFFERING
PERMANENT RESIDENCE TO SOURCES AND COOPERATORS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide to
the congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the ability of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to offer, as an inducement to
assisting the Bureau, permanent residence within the United States to
foreign individuals who are sources or cooperators in
counterintelligence or other national security-related investigations.
The briefing shall address the following:
(1) The extent to which the Bureau may make such offers,
whether independently or in conjunction with other agencies and
departments of the United States Government, including a
discussion of the authorities provided by section 101(a)(15)(S)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(15)(S)), section 7 of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act (50 U.S.C. 3508), and any other provision of law under
which the Bureau may make such offers.
(2) An overview of the policies and operational practices of
the Bureau with respect to making such offers.
(3) The sufficiency of such policies and practices with
respect to inducing individuals to cooperate with, serve as
sources for such investigations, or both.
(4) Whether the Director recommends any legislative actions
to improve such policies and practices, particularly with
respect to the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau.
SEC. 2730. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA REVENUE SOURCES.
(a) Assessment Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence
and Analysis, shall produce an intelligence assessment of the revenue
sources of the North Korean regime. Such assessment shall include
revenue from the following sources:
(1) Trade in coal, iron, and iron ore.
(2) The provision of fishing rights to North Korean
territorial waters.
(3) Trade in gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper,
silver, nickel, zinc, or rare earth minerals, and other stores
of value.
(4) Trade in textiles.
(5) Sales of conventional defense articles and services.
(6) Sales of controlled goods, ballistic missiles, and other
associated items.
(7) Other types of manufacturing for export, as the Director
of National Intelligence considers appropriate.
(8) The exportation of workers from North Korea in a manner
intended to generate significant revenue, directly or
indirectly, for use by the government of North Korea.
(9) The provision of nonhumanitarian goods (such as food,
medicine, and medical devices) and services by other countries.
(10) The provision of services, including banking and other
support, including by entities located in the Russian
Federation, China, and Iran.
(11) Online commercial activities of the Government of North
Korea, including online gambling.
(12) Criminal activities, including cyber-enabled crime and
counterfeit goods.
(b) Elements.--The assessment required under subsection (a) shall
include an identification of each of the following:
(1) The sources of North Korea's funding.
(2) Financial and non-financial networks, including supply
chain management, transportation, and facilitation, through
which North Korea accesses the United States and international
financial systems and repatriates and exports capital, goods,
and services; and
(3) the global financial institutions, money services
business, and payment systems that assist North Korea with
financial transactions.
(c) Submittal to Congress.--Upon completion of the assessment
required under subsection (a), the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a copy of
such assessment.
SEC. 2731. REPORT ON POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES BY
TERRORIST ACTORS.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Stop Terrorist
Use of Virtual Currencies Act''.
(b) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit to Congress a report on the
possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such
report shall include the following elements:
(1) An assessment of the means and methods by which
international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of
terrorism use virtual currencies.
(2) An assessment of the use by terrorist organizations and
State sponsors of terrorism of virtual currencies compared to
the use by such organizations and States of other forms of
financing to support operations, including an assessment of the
collection posture of the intelligence community on the use of
virtual currencies by such organizations and States.
(3) A description of any existing legal impediments that
inhibit or prevent the intelligence community from collecting
information on or helping prevent the use of virtual currencies
by international terrorist organizations and State sponsors of
terrorism and an identification of any gaps in existing law
that could be exploited for illicit funding by such
organizations and States.
(c) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Subtitle C--Other Matters
SEC. 2741. PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION BOARD.
Section 710(b) of the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000
(Public Law 106-567; 50 U.S.C. 3161 note) is amended by striking
``December 31, 2018'' and inserting ``December 31, 2028''.
SEC. 2742. TECHNICAL AND CLERICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ACT OF 1947.
(a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents at the beginning of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by inserting after the item relating to section 2 the
following new item:
``Sec. 3. Definitions.'';
(2) by striking the item relating to section 107;
(3) by striking the item relating to section 113B and
inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology,
engineering, or mathematics positions.'';
(4) by striking the items relating to sections 202, 203, 204,
208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, and 214; and
(5) by inserting after the item relating to section 311 the
following new item:
``Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.''.
(b) Other Technical Corrections.--Such Act is further amended--
(1) in section 102A--
(A) in subparagraph (G) of paragraph (1) of
subsection (g), by moving the margins of such
subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and
(B) in paragraph (3) of subsection (v), by moving the
margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left;
(2) in section 106--
(A) by inserting ``sec. 106.'' before ``(a)''; and
(B) in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (2) of
subsection (b), by moving the margins of such
subparagraph 2 ems to the left;
(3) by striking section 107;
(4) in section 108(c), by striking ``in both a classified and
an unclassified form'' and inserting ``to Congress in
classified form, but may include an unclassified summary'';
(5) in section 112(c)(1), by striking ``section 103(c)(7)''
and inserting ``section 102A(i)'';
(6) by amending section 201 to read as follows:
``SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
``Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 5, United States
Code, shall be applicable to the Department of Defense.'';
(7) in section 205, by redesignating subsections (b) and (c)
as subsections (a) and (b), respectively;
(8) in section 206, by striking ``(a)'';
(9) in section 207, by striking ``(c)'';
(10) in section 308(a), by striking ``this Act'' and
inserting ``sections 2, 101, 102, 103, and 303 of this Act'';
(11) by redesignating section 411 as section 312;
(12) in section 503--
(A) in paragraph (5) of subsection (c)--
(i) by moving the margins of such paragraph 2
ems to the left; and
(ii) by moving the margins of subparagraph
(B) of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
(B) in paragraph (2) of subsection (d), by moving the
margins of such paragraph 2 ems to the left; and
(13) in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subsection (a)
of section 504, by moving the margins of such subparagraph 2
ems to the right.
SEC. 2743. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.
(a) National Nuclear Security Administration Act.--
(1) Clarification of functions of the administrator for
nuclear security.--Subsection (b) of section 3212 of the
National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C.
2402(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraphs (11) and (12); and
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (13) through (19) as
paragraphs (11) through (17), respectively.
(2) Counterintelligence programs.--Section 3233(b) of the
National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C.
2423(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``Administration'' and inserting
``Department''; and
(B) by inserting ``Intelligence and'' after ``the
Office of''.
(b) Atomic Energy Defense Act.--Section 4524(b)(2) of the Atomic
Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2674(b)(2)) is amended by inserting
``Intelligence and'' after ``The Director of''.
(c) National Security Act of 1947.--Paragraph (2) of section 106(b)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3041(b)(2)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ``and
Counterintelligence'' after ``Office of Intelligence'';
(2) by striking subparagraph (F); and
(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (G), (H), and (I) as
subparagraphs (F), (G), and (H), respectively.
SEC. 2744. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN DISCLOSURES OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Adversary foreign government.--The term ``adversary
foreign government'' means the government of any of the
following foreign countries:
(A) North Korea.
(B) Iran.
(C) China.
(D) Russia.
(E) Cuba.
(2) Covered classified information.--The term ``covered
classified information'' means classified information that
was--
(A) collected by an element of the intelligence
community; or
(B) provided by the intelligence service or military
of a foreign country to an element of the intelligence
community.
(3) Established intelligence channels.--The term
``established intelligence channels'' means methods to exchange
intelligence to coordinate foreign intelligence relationships,
as established pursuant to law by the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Director of the National Security Agency, or other head of
an element of the intelligence community.
(4) Individual in the executive branch.--The term
``individual in the executive branch'' means any officer or
employee of the executive branch, including individuals--
(A) occupying a position specified in article II of
the Constitution;
(B) appointed to a position by an individual
described in subparagraph (A); or
(C) serving in the civil service or the Senior
Executive Service (or similar service for senior
executives of particular departments or agencies).
(b) Findings.--Congress finds that section 502 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3092) requires elements of the
intelligence community to keep the congressional intelligence
committees ``fully and currently informed'' about all ``intelligence
activities'' of the United States, and to ``furnish to the
congressional intelligence committees any information or material
concerning intelligence activities * * * which is requested by either
of the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out its
authorized responsibilities.''.
(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3092), together with other intelligence community
authorities, obligates an element of the intelligence community
to submit to the congressional intelligence committees written
notification, by not later than 7 days after becoming aware,
that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed
covered classified information to an official of an adversary
foreign government using methods other than established
intelligence channels; and
(2) each such notification should include--
(A) the date and place of the disclosure of
classified information covered by the notification;
(B) a description of such classified information;
(C) identification of the individual who made such
disclosure and the individual to whom such disclosure
was made; and
(D) a summary of the circumstances of such
disclosure.
SEC. 2745. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSIDERATION OF ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES
WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO PROVIDE VISAS TO
FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS TO BE ACCREDITED TO A UNITED
NATIONS MISSION IN THE UNITED STATES.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State, in
considering whether or not to provide a visa to a foreign individual to
be accredited to a United Nations mission in the United States, should
consider--
(1) known and suspected intelligence activities, espionage
activities, including activities constituting precursors to
espionage, carried out by the individual against the United
States, foreign allies of the United States, or foreign
partners of the United States; and
(2) the status of an individual as a known or suspected
intelligence officer for a foreign adversary.
Amend the title so as to read:
A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2018,
2019, and 2020 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 3494 is to authorize the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government for Fiscal Years (FY) 2018, 2019, and 2020.
Classified Annex and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this report includes the classified
schedule of authorizations and associated explanatory and
directive language. The classified schedule of authorizations
is incorporated directly into the legislation by Sections 102
and 2102 of the bill. It is the Committee's intent that
elements of the Intelligence Community shall strictly comply
with all Committee direction and other guidance set forth in
the classified annex.
The classified annex and classified schedule of
authorizations have been made available for review by all
Members of the House of Representatives, on conditions set by
the Committee at the time of its consideration of H.R. 3494.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee,
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the Homeland Security
Intelligence Program (HSIP), and the Information Systems
Security Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as
well as intelligence, intelligence-related, and
counterintelligence activities conducted by: the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Department of Defense, including the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National
Reconnaissance Office, and certain activities of the
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Department of
Energy; the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration; the
Department of Homeland Security, including the U.S. Coast Guard
and intelligence elements of DHS; Department of State; and the
Department of the Treasury. The Committee has exclusive or
concurrent legislative, authorizing, and oversight jurisdiction
of these activities--and exclusive jurisdiction to study the
sources and methods of the Intelligence Community.
Committee Statement, Views, and Unclassified Direction
H.R. 3494, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2020
(the Act) authorizes the activities of, and funding for, the 17
agencies that comprise the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).
Because most of the intelligence budget involves classified
programs, the bulk of the Committee's recommendations each year
are found in the classified annex accompanying the bill.
The Act's unclassified legislative text is divided into two
divisions: Division A and Division B. Division A contains the
FY20 Intelligence Authorization Act. Division B contains the
FY18 and FY19 Intelligence Authorization Acts. Unclassified
direction for both Division A and Division B is set out below.
Unclassified Direction to Accompany Division A: The Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
Increasing Data Security
The Committee is aware the Intelligence Community (IC)
faces challenges while trying to balance mission and enterprise
needs with IT modernization, including the migration of data
and applications to the cloud. With this in mind, the Committee
encourages the IC to identify and implement technologies that
increase the security posture of data and workloads and reduce
cyber risks.
The Committee further recommends that:
1. IC elements identify, develop, and implement tools
for bi-directional data migration and division
interoperability between data center and cloud
environments;
2. these tools include, but not be limited to,
encryption of data while both at rest and in motion,
and micro-segmentation of networks and workloads; and
3. IC elements prioritize shifting resources towards
automation as a way to respond more quickly to cyber
threats.
Anonymous Annual Survey Regarding Workplace Climate
Intelligence Community elements obtain mission-critical
information from the results of anonymous, annual surveys of
their employees, on issues related to workplace climate and
retention. As necessary as they are to the elements' own
activities, survey results are also vital to the Committee's
continuing oversight of elements' efforts to address workplace
climate and retention issues, and to propose legislative and
other remedies where appropriate.
The need for reliable information is especially acute with
respect to sexual harassment and discrimination, given that--
established policy and legal protections notwithstanding--an
employee may fear that directly raising concerns about such
matters risks exposing the employee to retaliatory personnel,
security clearance, or other actions. The anonymous survey
affords the element, and the committee, a mechanism for
inquiring further about the extent of this well-documented
chilling effect against reporting; and about the effectiveness
(or not) of ongoing programs to uncover and stamp out sexual
harassment, discrimination, and other illegal and/or
inappropriate activities at the workplace.
Therefore, the Committee directs that no later than 180
days after enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence must certify in writing to the congressional
intelligence committees that:
(1) at least once a year, each element of the
Intelligence Community submits a survey to its
employees regarding workplace climate and retention
matters, and affords employees completing such surveys
the option to remain anonymous;
(2) such survey includes questions regarding
employees' experiences with sexual assault,
discrimination, harassment, including sexual
harassment, and related retaliation, including, at a
minimum, the following questions:
a. Have you witnessed sexual harassment or
sexual assault?
i. Did you report it?
ii. If not, why not?
b. Have you experienced sexual harassment or
sexual assault?
i. Did you report it?
ii. If not, why not?
c. Have you experienced retaliation for
reporting harassment, discrimination, or sexual
assault?
i. Have you faced retribution for
taking leave for family, medical, or
other personal reasons?
ii. Did you fear retribution for
taking leave?
(3) each element includes in its survey questions
regarding the job series, position, age, gender, race
or ethnicity, field, and job location at the time of
the survey's completion;
(4) each element tracks employees' responses
according to job series, position, age, gender, race or
ethnicity, field, and location at the time of the
survey's completion; and
(5) each element reports the results of its survey
annually to the congressional intelligence committees.
Report to Congress on the Representation of Women and Minorities in the
Workforce
The Committee continues to strongly support Intelligence
Community (IC) efforts to identify, recruit, and retain a
highly diverse and highly qualified workforce--including, in
particular, its efforts to increase the representation within
elements of the Intelligence Community of women and minorities.
This is a data driven exercise. Bolstering and adjusting IC
workforce diversity programs depends in part on the Committee's
regularly obtaining current, detailed and reliable information,
and about specific matters relevant to the broader subject of
workforce diversity--such as rates and areas of promotion of
women and minority employees. But some elements may produce
such information only from time to time; others may make
regular submissions to the Committee but include only general
information.
Therefore, the Committee directs that every six months, the
head of each element of the Intelligence Community shall submit
to the Committee a written report which shall include, at a
minimum:
1. The total number of women and minorities hired by
that element during the reporting period and a
calculation of that figure as a percentage of the
agency's total hiring for that period;
2. The distribution of women and minorities at that
element by grade level and by job series in the
element's total workforce during the reporting period,
together with comparisons from the immediately
preceding two years;
3. The number of women and minorities who applied for
promotion at the element and the final number selected
for promotion during the reporting period;
4. The proportion of the total workforce of the
element occupied by each group or class protected by
law, as of the last day of the reporting period;
5. The numbers of minorities and women serving in
positions at the element requiring advanced,
specialized training or certification and the
proportion of the workforce those groups occupy; and
To the extent that such element deploys civilian employees
to hazardous duty locations, the number of women and minority
employees who departed government service subsequent to a
deployment undertaken by an employee in the previous two years.
Report on Geospatial Commercial Activities for Basic and
Applied Research and Development
The Committee directs the Director of NGA, in coordination
with the DNI, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, within
90 days of enactment of this Act, to submit to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report on
the feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of providing the
private sector and academia, on a need-driven and limited
basis--consistent with the protection of sources and methods,
as well as privacy and civil liberties--access to data in the
possession of the NGA for the purpose of assisting the efforts
of the private sector and academia in basic research, applied
research, data transfers, and the development of automation,
artificial intelligence, and associated algorithms. Such report
shall include:
1. Identification of any additional authorities that
the Director of NGA would require to provide the
private sector and academia with access to relevant
data on a need-driven and limited basis, consistent
with applicable laws and procedures relating to the
protection of sources, methods, privacy and civil
liberties; and
2. Market research to assess the commercial and
academic interest in such data and determine likely
private-sector entities and institutions of higher
education interested in public-private partnerships
relating to such data.
NRO Contracting Restrictions
The Committee continues to be very concerned that NRO
imposes unnecessary contractual restrictions that prohibits or
discourages a contractor from contacting or meeting with a
congressional intelligence committee or intelligence committee
Member offices. Therefore, the Committee directs NRO to remove
all restrictions that impacts contractors from contacting or
meeting with the congressional intelligence committees or
member offices in all current and future contracts to include
pre-coordination with executive branch agencies.
Enhancing Automation at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
The Committee strongly supports efforts to leverage
commercial advances in automation of imagery such as electro-
optical, infrared, Wide Area Motion Imagery (WAMI), Full Motion
Video (FMV), and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) products to
reduce manual processing and improve information flow to users.
However, the Committee is concerned that NGA does not dedicate
adequate resources to integrate new automation techniques which
have resulted in years of research into the issue, but limited
operation gains during day to day imagery processing.
Therefore, the Committee directs NGA, within 90 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
and defense committees on an updated plan to reduce manual
processing of imagery such as electro-optical, infrared, WAMI,
FMV, and SAR to improve information flow to users. The briefing
shall also address:
1. NGA's strategy to leverage commercial advances;
2. The various GEOINT automated exploitation
development programs across the National System for
Geospatial-Intelligence, and the associated funding and
specific purpose of said programs;
3. Any similar efforts by government entities outside
the National System for Geospatial-Intelligence of
which NGA is aware; and
4. Which of these efforts are duplicative?
Redundant Organic Software Development
The Committee is concerned that NGA is developing software
solutions that are otherwise available for purchase on the
commercial market. This practice most always, increases the
time it takes to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter;
increases the overall cost of the solution through expensive
operational and maintenance costs; and undermines the U.S.
software industrial base.
Therefore, the Committee directs NGA, within 60 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees, to identify all NGA developed software programs and
explain why they are being developed organically instead of
leveraging commercially available products.
Critical Skills Recruiting for Automation
Although cutting edge sensors have provided the
Intelligence Community and Department of Defense with exquisite
imagery, full motion video (FMV), and wide area motion imagery
(WAMI), intelligence analysts are unable to keep pace with the
volume of data being generated. This demands a transformation
in the way the intelligence enterprise processes, organizes,
and presents data. For that reason, the committee fully
supports the NGA's efforts to attract, recruit, and retain a
highly competent workforce that can acquire and integrate new
data automation tools.
Therefore, the Committee directs NGA, within 60 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
and defense committees on NGA's efforts to recruit critical
skills such as mathematicians, data scientists, and software
engineers that possess critical skills needed to support NGA's
objectives in automation.
Common Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
The Committee has become aware of several major impediments
for companies to perform work for agencies and organizations
like the NRO. For example, businesses without ownership of a
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) find it
very difficult to perform classified work. Additionally, these
small businesses are challenged with basic obstacles such as
becoming aware of classified work opportunities because it is
difficult to obtain access to the IC's and DoD's classified
marketplaces such as the Acquisition Resource Center (ARC).
Construction and accreditation of SCIF spaces is cost-
prohibitive for my small business and non-traditional
government contractors. Additionally, construction timeline
often exceeds the period of performance of a contract.
A modern trend for innovative and non-traditional
government contractors is the increase use of co-working space
environments. Additionally, public and private entities are
partnering to create emerging regional innovation hubs to help
identify technology solutions and products in the private
sector that can be utilized by the IC and DoD. These innovation
hubs currently produce an agile, neutral, but largely
unclassified development environment.
Therefore, the Committee directs DNI, within 90 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees on the following:
1. Steps necessary to establish new `Common SCIFs' in
areas of high demand;
2. What approaches allow for SCIF spaces to be
certified and accredited outside of a traditional
contractual arrangement;
3. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
issuing Department of Defense Contract Security
Specification (DD Form 254s) to ``Facilities'' as
opposed to ``Contracts'';
4. Options for classified co-use and shared workspace
environments such as: innovation, incubation, catalyst,
and accelerator environments;
5. Pros and cons for public, private, government, or
combination owned classified neutral facilities; and
6. Any other opportunities to support hose without
ownership of a SCIF effective access to a neutral SCIF.
Improving Use of the Unclassified Marketplaces
Another area where the Committee has become aware of major
impediments for companies to perform work for agencies and
organizations like the NRO are unclassified marketplaces such
as the Acquisition Resource Center (ARC). Instead of posting
data to unclassified marketplaces, unclassified NRO postings
often refer to the classified side for critical yet
unclassified information. If the NRO is serious about embracing
commercial innovation, unclassified marketplace postings should
remain on the unclassified side.
Therefore, the Committee directs NRO, within 90 days of
enactment of this Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees on options for improving the unclassified
marketplace process.
Satellite Servicing
No later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of national Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall jointly
provide the Intelligence Community and to the congressional
defense committees upon request, a briefing detailing the
costs, risks, and operation benefits of leveraging commercial
satellite servicing capabilities for national security
satellite systems. The briefing shall include the following:
1. A prioritized list, with a rationale, of
operational and planned assets of the Intelligence
Community that could be enhanced by satellite servicing
missions.
2. The costs, risks, and benefits of integrating
satellite servicing capabilities as part of operational
resilience.
3. Potential strategies that could allow future
national security space systems to leverage commercial
in-orbit servicing capabilities where appropriate and
feasible.
Commercial RF Mapping and SAR
U.S. commercial companies are now offering space-based
geolocation and GEOINT analysis of radio frequency (RF)
emitters as well as synthetic aperture radar (SAR) products.
These companies can identify, locate, and analyze previously
undetected activity, providing new insights for U.S. national
security and defense. The Intelligence Community currently has
contracts that leverage commercial electro-optical satellites,
however it does not have a program in place to take full
advantage of these emerging commercial space-based RF GEOINT
and SAR capabilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO and NGA to brief
the committee on how it will leverage these commercial
companies in the FY20 and beyond timeframe, to include funding
for, as well as test and evaluation efforts.
Commercial Remote Sensing
The Committee supports efforts to establish a light-touch
regulatory structure that enables the rapidly evolving
commercial space-based imagery, radio-frequency (RF) sensing
and radar industry markets promote U.S. leadership in these
areas. However, the Committee also supports the needs of the
USG to protect both IC and DoD personnel and assets. The
Committee believes there can be a balance that supports both
national security interests and the promotion of U.S.
innovation and leadership.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, to brief the Committee by 1 Dec
2019, on efforts that help address this balance and which
streamline the IC and DoD involvement in the rapidly evolving
U.S. commercial space-based imagery, radio-frequency (RF)
sensing and radar industries.
Deception detection techniques
The U.S. Government does not have sufficient security
screening capabilities available to determine deception in
individuals that intend to harm the United States. Polygraph
has been the most effective investigative tool at our disposal
to detect deception, but the cost and time required to
administer a polygraph examination is a major cause for
security clearance backlogs, and often limits the frequency of
periodic examinations to every 5-7 years. Entities within DoD/
IC including DIA, SOCOM, NGA, DSS, Air Force and others have
expressed a desire to begin piloting new systems such as ocular
deception detection systems. However, progress is being
hindered by DoD Directive 5210.91 and ODNI Security Agent
Directive 2, which direct some oversight of new deception
detection technologies to the DoD National Center of
Credibility Assessment (NCCA), which does not have sufficient
budget or resources to expeditiously evaluate non-polygraph
technologies.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI in coordination
with the DoD a briefing on what steps they are taking to ensure
pilot programs are established to evaluate these new
technologies to help reduce our backlog, improve efficiency and
reduce overall cost. Pilots program shall evaluate current and
emerging technologies to efficiently and rapidly verify the
accuracy and truthfulness of statements of candidates for
employment within the DoD/IC, including for interim security
clearances, for periodic screening of cleared DoD/IC personnel,
to screen foreign national collaborators and contractors
overseas to prevent Green-on-Blue attacks, for immigration
screening and for other purposes.
IC Industry Rotational Program
The Education With Industry (EWI) Program is a highly
selective, competitive, non-degree educational assignment
within an industry related to the fellow's career field. EWI
supports the USAF mission by providing Air Force officers and
civil service employees with on-the-job education, experience,
and exposure to private sectors of the economy or other
government agencies not available through formal courses of
instruction.
The EWI program is designed to improve the technical,
professional, and management competencies of participating
students by partnering with top tier public and private sector
innovative companies. During the ten-month tour, students are
embedded within an industry team to meet their career specific
desired learning objectives. Through hands on exposure to
industry best practices, students develop the necessary
competencies, skills, knowledge, and abilities to build,
sustain and retain a mission-ready workforce. In addition to
this, students learn how to better partner with industry, thus
developing Air Force leaders with greater business acumen and
empathy. The ultimate goal of the program is to provide
students the expertise to implement innovative practices when
they return to the Air Force as well as understand how to
better partner with industry in the future. Upon completion,
graduates are assigned to Air Force duty consistent with the
education. Unfortunately, the IC does not leverage this program
to its fullest extent.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to establish a
more robust EWI program for IC personnel. This would entail
sending IC technically skilled ambassadors (GS11-GS14) to be
embedded in U.S. companies for a one to two-year rotation. The
Committee further directs the DNI to brief the Committee on its
plans by 1 December 2019.
List of Foreign Entities That Pose a Threat to Critical Technologies
The Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to
identify, compose, and maintain a list of foreign entities,
including governments, corporations, nonprofit and for-profit
organizations, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an
entity, that the Director determines pose a threat of espionage
with respect to critical technologies or research projects,
including research conducted at institutions of higher
education.
Maintenance of this list will be critical to ensuring the
security of the most sensitive projects relating to U.S.
national security, such as defense and intelligence-related
research projects. The initial list shall be available to the
head of each qualified agency funding applicable projects and
will include the following entities already identified as
threatening: Huawei Technologies Company, ZTE Corporation,
Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital
Technology Company, Dahua Technology Company, Kaspersky Lab.
The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense, or a delegate from both agencies, shall brief the
findings to the House Committee on Armed Services and the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence no later than six
months following the enactment of this provision.
Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operational
Assessment
The Committee recognizes the critical role that Department
of Defense airborne intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities play supporting military
operations worldwide. The committee understands that
responsive, persistent, and precise collection of operational
information from the air will continue to provide an asymmetric
and decisive advantage to operational commanders and tactical
forces. The committee also recognizes that to meet the
objectives described in the National Defense Strategy, the
Department of Defense must modernize and adapt its ISR
operating concepts and joint force structure to ensure it can
maneuver, fight, and prevail in highly contested environments.
However, the committee notes that there is an apparent lack of
an integrated joint approach to the Department's ISR
modernization strategy. The committee is concerned by recent
military service decisions to reduce certain airborne ISR
collection platforms without a clear transition plan or
approved risk mitigation strategy, despite facing significant
deficiencies in collection capacity.
The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a
stress test of joint intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance enterprise capabilities required to achieve the
operational objectives of its highest priority global campaign
plans and evaluate the capability and capacity of existing
service programs of record to satisfy joint force requirements
for critical categories of intelligence. The committee also
directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the
House Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence by March 1, 2020, on the results of
this stress test. The briefing shall include capability and
capacity shortfalls in platforms, sensors, and personnel, as
well as address proposed risk mitigation strategies to address
critical deficiencies.
Protection of National Security Research
The Committee believes that institutes of higher learning,
laboratories, and other entities and organizations play
critical roles in advancing national security within the U.S.
science and technology ecosystem that is charged with
delivering the best capabilities to the warfighter in the near,
mid, and long-term. The Committee understands that near-peer
competitors such as China and Russia attempt to exploit and
benefit from the open and collaborative global research
environment created by the Reagan Administration's National
Security Decision Directive 189 on the National Policy on the
transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information,
which established that the products of ``fundamental
research''--defined as ``basic and applied research in science
and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published
and shared''--should re-main unrestricted.
The Committee is also aware that academia is not always
kept apprised by the interagency of a complete picture of
potential activities and threats in the research community,
such as improper technology transfer, intellectual property
theft, and cyber-attacks directly affiliated with nation-state
governments. Elsewhere in this bill and report, the Committee
includes measures to promote increased information sharing
across the interagency and with academia.
The Committee therefore directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
House of Representatives and Congressional Intelligence
Committees, not later than January 1, 2020, a report listing
Chinese and Russian academic institutions that have a history
of improper technology transfer, intellectual property theft,
cyber espionage, or operate under the direction of their
respective armed forces or intelligence agencies. The report
should be in unclassified form, though it may contain a
classified annex.
Congressional Notification
The Secretary of Defense maintains a responsibility to keep
the congressional intelligence and defense committees fully and
currently informed of all defense intelligence capabilities and
activities to support DOD operational strategic requirements.
The Committee is aware that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USDI) issued a memorandum in January 2017
providing guidance to defense intelligence components on the
necessity of providing timely and accurate notification to
Congress of all defense intelligence and counterintelligence
activities.
The Committee supports additional efforts to enhance the
Department's ability to provide timely, comprehensive, and
accurate congressional intelligence notification of
intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the defense
intelligence components listed in the January 2017 memorandum,
to include; the Deputy Chief of staff for Intelligence, U.S.
Army; Deputy Chief of staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and
reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force; Director of Naval Intelligence,
U.S. Navy; Directors of Intelligence, Combatant Commands;
Director, NSA; Director, DIA; Director, NGA; Director, NRO;
Director, Defense Security Service; and designated DOD
officials as reporting officials for defense intelligence and
counterintelligence.
Therefore, the Committee directs each of the Defense
Intelligence Components listed in the January 2017 memo to
provide, in writing, their internal guidance and delineated
compliance to the principles of timeliness of reporting, means
of reporting, completeness and accuracy of reporting as well as
to outline any restrictions, complications or limiting factors,
in fully satisfying the direction and intent of the Defense
Intelligence Component Reporting of Defense Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Activities Memorandum. For those elements
that are also IC elements, written explanation shall include
relevant processes and coordination with the ODNI.
The Committee further directs the USD(I) to provide a
briefing to the intelligence and defense committees by October
4, 2019, on DOD's current congressional notification policies
and procedures regarding defense intelligence activities and
support by defense intelligence components supporting DOD. The
briefing shall include:
1. Plans to strengthen this notification process by
the defense intelligence components, to include
notification of new and updated intelligence-sharing
arrangements and basic exchange and cooperation
agreements with second- and third-party international
allies and partners to support DOD requirements; and
2. A description of current and planned coordination
efforts with the interagency, specifically the ODNI, to
include any dispute resolution processes in regard to
conflicting use of defense intelligence capabilities to
support defense priorities and objectives.
Strengthening the Integrity of the MIP
The Committee recognizes the Department of Defense's (DOD)
efforts to comply with the direction in the committee report
accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019 (H. Rept. 115-676) to review the Military
Intel1igence Program (MIP) budget to more clearly define
guidance about which programs, projects, or activities should
be assigned to the MIP. The Committee supports the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's action to enhance DOD's
ability to make more informed decisions to balance appropriate
resourcing against program, projects, or activities on behalf
of the Secretary of Defense, while strengthening the overall
integrity of the MIP.
Reviewing the Integrated Defense Intelligence Priorities
The committee notes that the Department of Defense is a
major provider of intelligence capabilities to the intelligence
community, as well as a major consumer of intelligence
information. The committee is aware of the operational
constraints on the joint force that using the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework to guide the allocation of
Defense Intelligence Enterprise assets presents, especially for
those that are integral to warfighting functions. The committee
is concerned that the Integrated Defense Intelligence
Priorities (IDIP) activity is not providing the intelligence
support to defense operations that section 922 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113-
66) intended.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence to provide a briefing to the House
Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence by December 27, 2019, with the
current status of the IDIP activity, how the IDIP highlights
gaps in defense and national intelligence priorities, and the
measures in place to mitigate these gaps. The briefing shall
also include details on why the IDIP is distinct from the
National Intelligence Priorities Framework, an activity in
which IDIP customers currently participate. Finally, the
briefing shall also include a recommendation on whether the
Department of Defense will continue or suspend the IDIP
requirement.
Section 804 Authority
The Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Amendments Act
provided DOD accelerated acquisition authority under Section
804. This authority enhances the ability to streamline a number
of processes within the acquisition structure.
The Committee supports effective and efficient acquisition
of military intelligence platforms, though wants to ensure this
authority is being used in instances where it can be most
effective.
Therefore, the Committee directs DOD to provide a list of
those acquisition programs funded in whole or in part with MIP
that are utilizing authorities under Section 804. The list
should be provided to the intelligence and defense committees
by December 15, 2019.
Budget Track Presentation
It is important the military services have visibility on
all Congressional action which may impact their programs and
platforms. The Committee supports a robust and continuing
dialog with DOD on intelligence programs.
The budget roll outs are an important inflection point in
the dialog between the Congress and DOD. It has been the case
that DOD and the Services have not had the complete picture of
Congressional action and intent.
Therefore, the Committee directs that budget presentation
materials track action from all committees on jurisdiction, be
they within the MIP or NIP. Materials should be updated as
necessary and ready for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 budget cycle
and presentations.
Comprehensive Assessment of the Roles, Responsibilities, and
Organization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence
The Committee recognizes the importance of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence's (USD(I)) management and
oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and commends
the Under Secretary's continued efforts to mature the
organization's support to the operational requirements and
strategic priorities of the Secretary of Defense. However, the
committee notes the shift in priorities and focus of the Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)),
and potential impacts to the organization's ability to
effectively execute oversight of the policy, processes, and
procedures that guide the Department of Defense's intelligence
organizations. The committee further acknowledges that the
USD(I) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all intelligence,
intelligence-related, counterintelligence, and security
matters, and is responsible for exercising authority,
direction, and control over all associated defense intelligence
organizations and activities.
Since the establishment of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence (USD(I)) by the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314),
the roles and responsibilities assigned to the position and
office continue to evolve. In 2018, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense augmented the responsibilities of USD(I) to include the
protection of Department of Defense physical properties and
personnel. Additionally, the committee further clarified the
security related responsibilities of USD(I) in the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
(Public Law 115-232) to include enterprise-wide management and
execution of the planning and resourcing for the personnel,
physical, and industrial security components of the Department
of Defense, as well as the protections required of Department
classified information and controlled unclassified information.
Most recently, in April 2019, the President directed the
transfer of personnel background investigations from the
National Background Investigations Bureau to the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)),
inclusive of the transition of associated operations,
personnel, and resources.
As a result, the Defense Security Service, an organization
responsible to the USD(I), will be renamed the Defense
Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) and will serve
as the primary federal entity for conducting background
investigations for the federal government. DCSA will also
execute the responsibilities relating to continuous evaluation,
insider threat programs, and any other responsibilities
assigned to it by the Secretary of Defense. As such, the
committee is interested in better understanding how these
recent developments might impact the roles and responsibilities
of OUSD(I), and the ability of the organization to execute
objective oversight and management of the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise, as the organization continues to balance the range
of priorities specified by the National Defense Strategy.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Comptroller General
of the United States provide the congressional defense and
intelligence committees with an assessment of the roles,
missions, and responsibilities of Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence. The assessment should include
details regarding USD(I)'s roles and responsibilities, if and
how they have changed, and how the USD(I) addressed these
changes; to what extent has the USD(I) developed processes for
exercising authority, direction, and control over the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise (DIE); actions the USD(I) has taken to
adapt its approach to executing oversight and governance of the
DIE, to include resource management across the aligned defense
intelligence agencies; and to what extent the USD(I) has
identified any misalignment of its roles and responsibilities
regarding the DIE and efforts made to address such mismatch.
The committee further directs the Comptroller General of
the United States to provide a briefing to the House Committee
on Armed Services and House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence on preliminary findings with a report to follow to
the congressional defense and intelligence committees no later
than April 30, 2020.
Development and Integration of Project MAVEN Services
The Committee believes in the importance of developing
artificial intelligence capabilities to enhance and augment
execution of Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) activities
in support of DOD priorities. Activities such as Project MAVEN
are important efforts to modernize intelligence tradecraft and
develop capabilities that can create efficiencies across the
DIE and enhance effectiveness of defense operations. However,
the Committee is concerned about the broad scope of Project
MAVEN, and the totality of requirements increasingly levied
against the activity, without a comprehensive understanding of
the key milestones to track and measure progress and alignment
of MAVEN accomplishments against evolving DOD capabilities and
activities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the USD(I) to provide a
briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees by January 3, 2020 on Project MAVEN's strategy for
tracking and aligning the activity's milestones against key DIE
efforts, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency's Machine-
assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System (MARS) and the
service-wide Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), and
continued development of Department of Defense advanced
analytic tradecraft and foundational intelligence against
advance weapons systems and capabilities.
Governance of Data and Service Acquisitions Supporting Defense
Intelligence Requirements
The committee recognizes initiatives across the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise to collect, analyze, and share data to
support critical foundation intelligence mission needs through
various modernization initiatives like Project Maven and the
Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System (MARS).
However, the committee is concerned there is a lack of
coordination and alignment of individual activities ongoing
throughout the enterprise.
The committee lacks a comprehensive understanding of how
data, information, and services procured in support of defense
intelligence requirements are tracked, governed, and made
available across the enterprise. The committee is concerned
that as defense intelligence organizations move to cloud-based
data management infrastructures, there is not enough emphasis
on deconflicting these efforts to maximize investment and use
across the enterprise and foreign partner coalitions. The
committee notes that every effort should be made to ensure
acquisition strategies that support these procurements make
these products and services available to the entire enterprise,
including U.S. allies and partners.
Therefore, the committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence to provide a briefing to the House
Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence not later than December 6, 2019, on
an enterprise level strategy for data, information, and
services acquisitions. The briefing shall detail a strategy to
ensure these acquisitions are widely available across the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise, thus reducing duplicative
investments and creating efficiencies in the acquisition and
capability management process.
MAVEN Senior Steering Group
Project MAVEN is one of the leading US government programs
leveraging commercial technology, however neither the MAVEN
Senior Steering Group or the MAVEN Executive Steering Group
have representatives from the commercial sector.
Therefore, the Committee directs the MAVEN team to
establish a position for a senior commercial executive as an
advisor on the Senior Steering Group. The appointment shall be
for no longer than a period of two years. Such individual shall
comply with MAVEN conflict of interest protocols, file
necessary and required documents, and may not maintain a
financial interest in any company with a current MAVEN
contract.
Investments in Scientific and Technological Intelligence
The Committee remains interested in the continued efforts
of the Department of Defense to improve scientific and
technological intelligence (S&TI) capabilities and tradecraft
across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. The Committee
recognizes S&TI is critical to strategic competition with near-
peer competitors by ensuring comprehensive understanding of
adversary capabilities and ability to inform development of
joint force fifth-generation advanced weapons systems and other
emerging technologies.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence in collaboration with the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, to provide a briefing to the
House Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence by December 6, 2019, on the alignment
of current and planned Defense Intelligence Enterprise S&TI
investments and activities to Department of Defense operational
and strategic requirements.
The briefing shall also include information on how the
Department of Defense will continue the maturation of S&TI
capabilities and tradecraft across the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise.
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program
The Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program
(TENCAP) services as the centralized lead to identify and
execute national intelligence cross-agency solutions to
evaluate, enhance, prototype, and transition technologies
across the national intelligence enterprise into military
service systems and architectures to create tactical
intelligence effects. The Committee supports TENCAP and the
flexibility these programs require to mature, but believes that
DOD must develop metrics for measuring the impact of affiliated
and incubated programs, to more accurately capture which
activities and capabilities have successfully transitioned to
programs of record and substantiate effectiveness of the joint
force. Further, the Committee notes that failure is an
intrinsic, and sometimes necessary component of the innovation
process, and does not necessarily view failure to transition to
a program of record as a negative issue.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the directors of
the military service TENCAP offices, to provide a briefing to
the intelligence and defense committees by October 29, 2019 on
the plan to develop track, and evaluate metrics associated with
the TENCAP program for those projects which transition to a
program of record.
Intelligence Support to Defense Operations in the Information
Environment
The committee supports Department of Defense efforts to
improve capabilities and tradecraft to operate in the
information environment. The committee is concerned about the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise's (DIE) ability to provide the
information operations community with all-source intelligence
support, consistent with the support provided to operations in
other domains.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Joint Staff
Director for Intelligence and the Director of National
Intelligence, to provide a briefing to the House Committee on
Armed Services and House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence by November 1, 2019, on intelligence support to
information operations. The briefing should include
standardized defense intelligence lexicon for intelligence
preparation of the battlefield for information operations,
efforts to develop a process to ensure the full scope of
emerging defense information operations threat requirements are
structured to be addressed through the entirety of DIE
capabilities, and how the Department perceives the future of
defense operations in the information environment.
The briefing shall also include a description of how the
national intelligence community, through the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework, will account for a more
dynamic use of defense intelligence capabilities to augment and
enhance support to Department of Defense operations in the
information environment.
ROTC IC Recruitment Trial Program
The Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program,
with units or affiliates at approximately 1,600 U.S. colleges
and universities, is DOD's largest commissioning source,
providing approximately 6,500 new active duty officers to the
military each year.
Officer candidates enrolled in ROTC programs must meet all
graduation requirements of their academic institutions, enroll
in military, naval, or aerospace education courses, and attend
summer military training, making them ideal candidates for IC
placement. Currently, ROTC cadets only have the option to
utilize their training by joining one of the military services.
The Committee believes the government can find cost savings and
provide a wider range of opportunities to ROTC recruits by
leveraging the ROTC's existing training program for the IC.
Therefore, the Committee directs the USDI, in coordination
with ODNI, to conduct a feasibility study on creating a pathway
for ROTC recruits to find job placement in the IC, on a
reimbursable basis. The study should examine:
1. Pros and cons of instituting an ROTC IC
recruitment pipeline;
2. Approximate reimbursement cost per recruit; and
3. Legislative requirements for program execution.
The study results must be submitted via report to the
intelligence and defense committees by December 15, 2019.
Explosive Ordinance Disposal Intelligence
The Committee is concerned that the expertise of Explosive
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) personnel is not adequately accessible
and therefore, not sufficiently utilized by the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise and IC to provide the combatant
commands with the required intelligence to identify, combat,
and deter violent extremism and other asymmetric threats.
Explosive ordnance includes all munitions, improvised
explosive devices, devices containing explosives, propellants,
nuclear fission or fusion materials, biological, and chemical
agents. The primary consumer of this information are military
tactical explosive ordnance disposal units that employ the data
for threat identification and neutralization. However, the
required analysis to determine appropriate render-safe
capabilities requires operational and strategic intelligence to
process and analyze the data, and data management processes to
promulgate the resulting information. The Committee believes
DOD should modernize the processes and procedures to more
comprehensively track, manage, and coordinate the capability
and capacity of EOD intelligence within the IC and the DIE to
support all levels of render-safe capabilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Undersecretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the DNI, to
provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence and
defense committees by March 6, 2020 on the capability and
capacity of EOD intelligence expertise across the DIE and IC.
The briefing shall include:
1. An assessment of the coordination and integration of
defense and national intelligence capabilities against EOD
intelligence requirements, to include a mitigation strategy to
address any identified gaps or deficiencies, information-
sharing challenges, or any other impediments to integration of
EOD expertise across the defense and intelligence communities;
and
2. An assessment of the technical skills needed to address
EOD intelligence requirements, while identifying any gaps or
deficiencies in current personnel hiring and training
structures, and a long-term plan to develop proficiency of EOD
intelligence expertise in the defense and intelligence
communities.
Information-Sharing Arrangements with India, Japan, and the Republic of
Korea
International alliances and partnerships are critical to
the pursuit and sustainment of the United States national
security objectives, built upon foundations of shared values
and intent. The Committee recognizes the importance of the
Department of Defense sharing information with international
allies and partners in support of the planning and execution of
the National Defense Strategy, as allies and third-party
international partners enhance strategic stability across the
Department's purview while increasing effectiveness of
operations. The Committee believes the mechanisms to share
information across the ``Five Eyes'' alliance continue to
mature through established exercises, exchange of personnel,
and virtual data sharing, while that cooperation is potentially
less robust with third-party partners.
The Committee supports the roles and contributions of
third-party partners such as India, Japan, and the Republic of
Korea, and recognizes their ongoing contribution toward
maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The
Committee is interested in understanding the policies and
procedures governing the collaboration and information sharing
with India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the ``Five Eyes''
alliance, and if opportunities exist to strengthen those
arrangements.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of
National Intelligence, to provide a briefing to the House
Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence by December 1, 2019, on the benefits,
challenges, and risks of broadening the information-sharing
mechanisms between India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the
``Five Eyes'' alliance.
Transitioning the Function of Background Investigations to the
Department of Defense
Presidential Executive Order 13869 transitions the
background investigation functions of the Federal Government
from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), National
Background Investigations Bureau, to the Department of Defense,
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency. The committee
recognizes the importance of ensuring timely and efficient
background investigations to overcome workforce staffing
challenges of cleared individuals across the whole of
government and private sector, and to vet personnel who come
into contact with the Department's personnel, installations,
and technology. The committee is aware of the temporary
establishment of the Personnel Vetting Transformation Office in
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
to manage the transition of this activity from OPM to the
Department and improve the processes and procedures related to
vetting personnel for clearances across the whole of government
and private sector.
However, the Committee is concerned about the potential
risks to personnel management and mission such a transfer may
present, and believes that appropriate protections of civil
liberties and privacy must be prioritized throughout the
transition, through the implementation of modern and efficient
vetting measures. The Committee recognizes the Department's
leadership, through sharing best practices with the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, in reforming the vetting
process using modern techniques such as continuous evaluation,
and expects regular updates on the Department's progress in
addressing the current background investigations backlog.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of
the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, to provide
a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services and House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by December 27,
2019, on how the Department of Defense will transfer the
background investigation mission and establish an effective
personnel vetting capability to provide for the security of the
Department, while maintaining the civil liberties and privacy
protections of personnel under consideration to receive a
clearance.
Language Capability and Capacity
The Committee has long supported a robust Army training
language capability and capacity and renews that support in
light of the new National Defense Strategy and pivot to hard
targets. As is the rest of DOD and the IC, the Army is
challenged to meet the language requirement of 2+/2+ as set out
by the National Language Board.
Therefore, the Committee directs DOD to prioritize language
capability and fully execute the 2+/2+ Plan requirement. The
Committee further directs that OSDPR brief the committee on any
limiting factors on implementing the 2+/2+ Plan and intended
steps for mitigation which shall be briefed to the intelligence
and defense committees by October 29, 2019.
Terrestrial Layer System
The Committee has questions about what capabilities the TLS
will incorporate and how the platform will balance its signals
intelligence, electronic warfare, and cyber operations
capabilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Army to provide a
report and briefing on changes to the Army's doctrine,
organization, training, material, leadership, education,
personnel and facilities required to develop, procure and
employ the Terrestrial Layer System. The report and briefing
should be provided to the intelligence and defense committees
by December 15, 2019.
Triton Multi-Intelligence Fleet
Critical to the Triton unmanned aerial system is the
milestone C update, which added multi-INT capability to the key
system attributes. The FY 2020 funding supports aircraft and
ground station kit procurements for the Triton Multi INT
configuration and resources required to complete modification
of the fleet to a Multi-INT capability.
Regrettably, the retrofit to Multi-INT for Low rate initial
production 1 and Low rate initial production 2 slipped from 3QT
FY18 to 4th QT 19. This slip represents an unacceptable delay
of crucial Multi-INT capability for the fleet, particularly in
the face of increasing focus on the Pacific. There is little
which can be done to buy back the schedule; however, the Multi-
INT capability remains a priority for the Committee and should
be aggressively pursued by the Navy.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to immediately
notify the intelligence and defense committees of any potential
delay fielding the Multi-INT capability to the Triton fleet.
Future of Cable Laying and Repair
The USNS ZEUS is the Navy's only cable laying and repair
ship and is nearing the end of its service life. The USNS ZEUS
is a key component of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance
System with primary missions to transport, deploy, retrieve and
repair submarine cables and test underwater sound devices and
secondary missions to conduct acoustic, hydrographic and
bathymetric surveys. The T-ARC(X) supports the fixed
surveillance systems and are a key part of the IUSS.
A Cable Capacity Study in 2015 and Maritime Surveillance
System Capacity Study completed in 2017 determined that two T-
ARC's are required to meet US Government worldwide demand.
However, the USNS ZEUS decommission date of 2026 and the
bridging solution of a long term charter ships is only leased
through 2024, leaving cable laying and ship repair requirements
unmet.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to provide to the
intelligence and defense committees its plan to meet the
current and future for cable laying and repair requirements by
October 29, 2019.
Maritime Surveillance Evolution Plan
The Navy is undertaking a comprehensive review of the
future of maritime surveillance. This plan is critical to
understanding the needs of the Navy as they relate to maritime
surveillance.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to deliver the
report to the congressional intelligence and defense committees
within 30 days of completion and signature of the Maritime
Surveillance Evolution Plan.
RQ-21 Blackjack
The Committee has long supported aggressive development and
deployment of the RQ-21 Blackjack system, including approving
reprogramming funds for development of a v3 next generation
engine. The capability differences between the v2 and v3 engine
are significant and delay in the v3 engine remains a limiting
factor for more expansive deployment of the RQ-21 Blackjack.
The Committee is additionally concerned about divergent
requirements for capability for the RQ-21 which may be
detracting from development of the next generation engine.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to provide to the
intelligence and defense committees the timeline for
development, integration and deployment of the v3 engine noting
limiting factors and suggested mitigation.
Recapitalization of Navy Reserve P-3C Squadrons
The budget request contained $1.2 billion for six P-8A
Poseidon aircraft. The budget request for fiscal year 2020 did
not take into account the increased warfighter requirement of
21 additional P-- 8A aircraft. This increase is driven by the
proliferation of adversarial submarine fleets and their
increasingly active operational tempo. The new requirement
includes 12 aircraft to recapitalize the two maritime patrol
and reconnaissance squadrons assigned to the Navy Reserve.
These squadrons currently operate legacy P-3C Orion aircraft
and the Chief of Navy Reserve estimates they will decommission
by 2023 unless they are outfitted with new aircraft. The
Committee is encouraged by the Navy's recognition of the Navy
Reserve force and the contribution they can provide to the
increased requirement for the P-8A. However, the Committee was
discouraged that the Navy failed to budget for the additional
aircraft to meet the warfighting requirement.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy
to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services
and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by March
1, 2020, that outlines a plan to recapitalize the two Navy
Reserve squadrons with P-8A aircraft prior to 2023. The
briefing should include estimated acquisition costs,
acquisition timelines, aircraft fielding schedules, and
manpower impacts to the Navy Reserve. The committee also notes
that this information should have been briefed at the beginning
of the budget cycle.
Navy Research Lab FAR Requirements
The Committee is concerned that government programs too
often compete with widely available commercial technological
solutions, and in some cases work to duplicate existing and
more advanced commercial capabilities. Often, government
programs are underperforming, lacking capability, missing
delivery milestones, and vastly more expensive than commercial
solutions. Perhaps most concerning, this practice almost always
increases the time it takes to deliver new capabilities to the
warfighter.
In particular, Navy Research Labs (NRL) 7442 Geospatial
Computing Section has several programs that are competing with
commercial industry, even in some cases responding to mission
user requirements to provide a ``company X-like capability''.
The Committee is disturbed by such overt duplication of
commercial capabilities. Not only does this create a barrier to
entry for innovative small businesses and non-traditional
companies, the markedly higher expense of organic government
programs-which include labor, benefits, infrastructure,
hardware, sustainment, operations and maintenance, and
cybersecurity-does a disservice to the American taxpayer.
The Federal Acquisition Regulations System (FAR) aims to
address this issue, by requiring participants in the
acquisition process to deliver on a timely basis the best value
product or service to the customer, while maintaining the
public's trust and fulfilling policy objectives by: maximizing
the use of commercial products and services; using contractors
who have a track record of successful past performance or who
demonstrate a current superior ability to perform; promoting
competition; minimizing administrative operating costs; and
conducting business with integrity, fairness, and openness.
Therefore, the Committee expects that authorities within
the IC and DOD adhere to the FAR when making acquisition
decisions.
Furthermore, the Committee directs NRL to brief the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on its
identification of all NRL developed software programs and
elaborate reasoning for these organically developed programs,
vice leveraging commercially available products. Briefing shall
be completed by October 29, 2019.
Agile Operations Visualization
The Air Force has made great strides in utilizing agile
operations development for a variety of their programs,
including Distributed Common Ground System-Air Force. Agile
Operations create a nimble model for acquisition and
flexibility in programming and fielding capability.
However, the Air Force still struggles to represent the
acquisition updates on the traditional waterfall chart. Failure
to effectively display and explain the agile operations
environment creates confusion and potentially a failure to
accurately reflect changes in schedule and performance.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Air Force to create a
new format to represent and visualize programs which utilize
agile development models. Materials should be ready for the FY
2021 budget cycle and presentation.
Compass Call
The Air Force has made the decision to re-host the COMPASS
CALL mission from a C-130 aircraft to a commercial aircraft. In
addition, the mission will be 100% contractor logistics
support.
The implications of the re-host include increased costs for
logistics support, requirement of Federal Aviation Certificates
and potential challenges from transitioning a large aircraft to
a smaller platform. Additionally, there may be a capability or
capacity decrease in the intervening years during the
transition.
Therefore, the Committee directs a report on the transition
between platforms for the COMPASS CALL mission, due to the
intelligence and defense committees by December 15, 2019.
Unified Air Force Airborne Signals Intelligence Enterprise
The Committee notes the goal of the Air Force Airborne
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Enterprise (ASE) program is to
produce an integrated, service-wide, capability-focused SIGINT
architecture and investment strategy for the U.S. Air Force
(USAF). However, the committee observes that while investment
in the ASE program has produced significant advances in Air
Force SIGINT capability, particularly within the RC-135 Rivet
Joint program, the establishment of a true integrated airborne
SIGINT enterprise architecture continues to elude the USAF. The
committee is aware that significant capability gaps exist in
MQ-9 SIGINT sensor relevancy against current threats, and the
Air Force has not yet successfully addressed vanishing vendor
issues with the high-altitude Airborne Signals Intelligence
Payload (ASIP) program. Additionally, the USAF has not yet
achieved a unified enterprise for SIGINT processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (PED), despite having a
distributed technical architecture within both the RC-135 Rivet
Joint and Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (AF-DCGS)
programs. The committee believes the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence should lead synchronization efforts with the
intelligence community to integrate like data sources to enable
more comprehensive analysis and exploitation on behalf of the
military services.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Air Force to provide a
report to the House Committee on Armed Services and House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by March 1, 2020,
containing the Air Force's vision, strategy, and implementation
plan to utilize Air Force airborne SIGINT program resources to
establish a unified airborne SIGINT enterprise based on shared
joint and intelligence community standards. The committee looks
forward to additional clarification on how this enterprise will
allow RC-135, U-2, RQ-4, MQ-9, Air Force DCGS SIGINT systems,
and future SIGINT capabilities to operate as an integrated
enterprise using cloud-based technologies and distributed crew
concepts to directly deliver SIGINT data to the joint force
from a global Air Force SIGINT system.
OC-135B Open Skies Treaty aircraft recapitalization
The Committee notes that the current fleet of OC-135B
aircraft conducting the Open Skies Treaty flights are over 55
years old and experience significant sustainment and
reliability issues, resulting in an average mission completion
rate of 65 percent between 2007 and 2017. Further, the range of
the legacy OC-135 aircraft is insufficient to fully execute
mission options within the treaty's 96-hour in-country
observation period. In addition to maintenance and range
limitations, the current wet-film imaging used to collect data
will become obsolete sometime around 2022. To avoid any gap in
Open Skies Treaty collection capability, the committee supports
the Air Force's plan to upgrade the fleet with digital visual
imaging systems (DVIS) for the near-term, and ultimately
replace the OC-135 Open Skies aircraft with two commercially-
available small airliner class aircraft with integrated DVIS
sensors.
The committee supports recapitalization of the OC-35 but
remains concerned about the Air Force's ability to stay on
schedule and meet the fiscal year 2022 aircraft certification
and treaty compliance date. Unanticipated technical challenges
with the DVIS sensors have already affected the schedule and
could cause additional delays if not remedied soon.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed
Services and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
by October 1, 2019, on the Open Skies Treaty aircraft
recapitalization. The report shall include:
1. an assessment of the DVIS data technical package
maturity and the cost and feasibility of integrating it
onto the replacement commercial aircraft;
2. the plan for and status of developing or acquiring
associated ground processing systems;
3. the plan for management of programmatic risk and
an assessment of the ability to meet the fiscal year
2022 deadline for an upgraded, treaty-compliant system;
4. existing or planned mitigation options should the
Air Force not be able to achieve current DVIS and
treaty compliance milestones, and should there be any
future delay to the upgrade or replacement of the OC-
135; and
5. a copy of any assessment conducted by an
independent organization employed by the program for
technical assistance.
Budget Implications of the C4 Restructure
The Committee supports the restructure of the Marines' C4
apparatus, which integrates intelligence and operations.
However, the Committee has concerns about the impact on the
agility of those intelligence activities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Marine Corps to
provide to the intelligence and defense committees for the
implementation for the C4 Restructure to include budget
implications for the future year defense plan by October 29,
2019.
Security Certificate Requirements for DCGS-MC
Distributed Common Ground System--Marine Corps provides
core critical information for military intelligence corps.
DCGS-MC must stay compliant with cyber security certifications
and requirements to operate on the network. Schedule for
waivers and tech refresh. Staying current with dynamic cyber
threats and rapid updates to certifications can be
accomplished, however may impact the ability to properly budget
effectively to stay current in certifications.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Marines to provide and
brief the DCGS cyber security certificate requirement for the
future year defense plan (FYDP) to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees by October 29, 2019.
Joint Intelligence Operations Center Staffing
The Committee recognizes the evolving operational and
strategic priorities of the Department of Defense will impact
Defense Intelligence Enterprise capabilities and resources. The
committee recognizes the ongoing efforts by the Under Secretary
for Intelligence (USDI) to comply with direction specified by
the John. S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232) to reduce and prevent
imbalances in priorities and mitigate against insufficient or
misaligned resources within the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise.
While the Committee supports the efforts by the USDI to
create efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
organizations, to include the Service Intelligence Centers and
combatant command Joint Operations Intelligence Centers, and
enable those elements to plan and posture staffing requirements
accordingly, the committee is concerned that the shifts in
current and future resourcing are lacking coherence to support
the global mandate of the Department.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Undersecretary for
Defense Intelligence, in coordination with DIA, to provide a
briefing to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees by December 27, 2019 on how the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and DIA are managing
resourcing requirements to the combatant command Joint
Intelligence Operations Centers to meet current and future
needs of the combatant commanders and DOD.
China's Biological Weapons Program
The Committee remains interested in ensuring the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise is providing timely, accurate, and
effective intelligence to support information needs of the
Department of Defense, and is aware of a recent Government
Accountability Office report on long-range emerging threats
facing the United States that highlighted potential pursuit by
near-peer competitors of biological weapons using genetic
engineering and synthetic biology.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, to provide a briefing to the
House Committee on Armed Services and House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence by November 1, 2019, on an assessment
of China's current and projected biological weapons program,
the risks presented to the joint force, and the mitigation
strategies to protect U.S. military forces against said
threats.
Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid Repository System Government
Accountability Office Review
The re-emergence of great power competition will stress
DIA's ability to provide foundational military intelligence for
the IC and warfighters. As such, the Committee is supportive of
DIA's intent to replace the Modernized Integrated Database
(MIDB) with the Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid Repository
System (MARS).
However, the Committee is concerned that DIA has not
completed an information technology development and procurement
project of this scope in the thirty years since MIDB's
adoption. MARS's development and procurement will entail a
complex and extensive transformation that will impact the DIA's
delivery of foundational military intelligence.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) to provide a report to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees no later than
September 30, 2020 that describes:
1. The envisioned MIDB users and customer base and
how they would use the repository;
2. The extent to which DIA has gathered input from
current and historic MIDB users, as well as customers
about the capabilities that will be needed for the
transition to MARS;
3. The extent to which DIA has planned for MARS's
expected new capabilities and the corresponding
resources, to include funding and personnel
implications;
4. DIA's acquisition strategy for MARS to include the
use of any rapid acquisition or prototyping
authorities;
5. The extent to which DIA has identified challenges,
if any, that it will face in transitioning from MIDB to
MARS, and whether it has developed mitigation plans for
addressing any of these challenges.
The Committee expects DIA's full cooperation with the GAO
study.
The National Intelligence University
In the 115th Congress, the Committee recommended that DIA
transfer ancillary, though vital enterprise functions, such as
operation of the National Intelligence University (NIU) to the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The
Committee is aware the NIU will transfer to ODNI in FY 2021 and
is supportive of that effort.
However, the Committee is concerned that DIA will be unable
to complete the transfer during fiscal year 2021 due to the
unique role NIU serves within DOD's officer education system.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation
with the USD(I) and Director of DIA, to submit a report with
its FY 2021 budget request outlining the DIA to ODNI NIU
transition plan. At a minimum the report must provide a
timeline for the NIU transition, identify any statutory changes
required to support the transition, and assess risks to
completion of the transfer to include actions ODNI, DOD, or DIA
have taken to mitigate identified risks.
Update on the DIA Strategic Approach
In September 2018, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
adopted a Strategic Approach to enhance workforce development,
improve foundational military intelligence data management,
address perennial intelligence issues and realign roles and
missions. Improvements in these issue areas will enhance the
Agency's ability to support both the National Security Strategy
and National Defense Strategy.
The Committee supports the DIA's initiative to improve
those structures it assesses are critical to providing
warfighters the information needed to prevent and, if
necessary, decisively win wars, such as intelligence on foreign
militaries' capabilities.
Therefore, the Committee directs DIA to provide quarterly
briefings to the Congressional intelligence and defense
committees on its efforts to enhance workforce development,
improve foundational military intelligence data management,
address perennial intelligence issues and realign roles and
missions.
Report on Chinese Efforts Targeting Democratic Elections and U.S.
Alliances and Partnerships and Strategy to Counter Chinese
Election Interference
The committee directs the Director of National Intelligence
in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to provide a
report to the congressional defense committees, the
congressional intelligence committees, the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the
House Committee on Homeland Security, and the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on China's
influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic
elections.
The report shall be divided into two sections, which
respectively address influence operations and campaigns
targeting: (1) recent and upcoming elections in the United
States (dating back to January 1, 2017), and (2) military
alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a
member. The report should also include a strategy to counter
these activities. The committee further directs the Secretary
of Defense to provide an interim report not later than November
5, 2019, and a final report not later than September 30, 2020.
The report shall be unclassified and appropriate for
release to the public but may include a classified annex. At a
minimum, the report should include:
1. An assessment of China's objectives in influence
operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections
and military alliances and partnerships of which the
United States is a member, and how such objectives
relate to the China's broader strategic aims;
2. The United States' strategy and capabilities for
detecting, deterring, countering, and disrupting such
Chinese influence operations (including recommended
authorities and activities) and campaigns and a
discussion of the Department of Defense's and
intelligence community's respective roles in the
strategy;
3. A comprehensive list of specific Chinese state and
non-state entities involved in supporting such Chinese
influence operations and campaigns and the role of each
entity in supporting them;
4. An identification of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in previous Chinese influence
operations and campaigns;
5. A comprehensive identification of countries with
democratic election systems that have been targeted by
Chinese influence operations and campaigns since
January 1, 2017;
6. An assessment of the impact of previous Chinese
influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic
elections and military alliances and partnerships of
which the United States is a member, including the
views of senior Chinese officials about their
effectiveness in achieving Chinese objectives;
7. An identification of countries with democratic
elections systems that may be targeted in future
Chinese influence operations and campaigns and an
assessment of the likelihood that each such country
will be targeted;
8. An identification of all U.S. military alliances
and partnerships that have been targeted by Chinese
influence operations and campaigns since January 1,
2017;
9. An identification of all U.S. military alliances
and partnerships that may be targeted in future Chinese
influence operations and campaigns and an assessment of
the likelihood that each such country will be targeted;
and
10. An identification of tactics, techniques, and
procedures likely to be used in future Chinese
influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic
elections and military alliances and partnerships of
which the United States is a member.
Report on Russian Efforts Targeting Democratic Elections and U.S.
Alliances and Partnerships and Strategy to Counter Russian
Election Interference
The Committee directs the Director of National
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
to provide a report to the congressional defense committees,
the congressional intelligence committees, the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
the House Committee on Homeland Security, and the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on
Russia's influence operations and campaigns targeting
democratic elections.
The report shall be divided into two sections, which
respectively address influence operations and campaigns
targeting: (1) recent and upcoming elections in the United
States (dating back to January 1, 2017), and (2) military
alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a
member. The report should also include a strategy to counter
these activities. The committee further directs the Secretary
of Defense to provide an interim report not later than November
5, 2019, and a final report not later than September 30, 2020.
The report shall be unclassified and appropriate for
release to the public but may include a classified annex. At a
minimum, the report should include:
1. An assessment of Russia's objectives in influence
operations and campaigns targeting democratic elections
and military alliances and partnerships of which the
United States is a member, and how such objectives
relate to Russia's broader strategic aims;
2. The United States strategy and capabilities for
detecting, deterring, countering, and disrupting such
Russian influence operations (including recommended
authorities and activities) and campaigns and a
discussion of the Department of Defense's and
intelligence community's respective roles in the
strategy;
3. A comprehensive list of specific Russian state and
non-state entities involved in supporting such Russian
influence operations and campaigns and the role of each
entity in supporting them;
4. An identification of the tactics, techniques, and
procedures used in previous Russian influence
operations and campaigns;
5. A comprehensive identification of countries with
democratic election systems that have been targeted by
Russian influence operations and campaigns since
January 1, 2017;
6. An assessment of the impact of previous Russian
influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic
elections and military alliances and partnerships of
which the United States is a member, including the
views of senior Russian officials about their
effectiveness in achieving Russian objectives;
7. An identification of countries with democratic
elections systems that may be targeted in future
Russian influence operations and campaigns and an
assessment of the likelihood that each such country
will be targeted;
8. An identification of all U.S. military alliances
and partnerships that have been targeted by Russian
influence operations and campaigns since January 1,
2017;
9. An identification of all U.S. military alliances
and partnerships that may be targeted in future Russian
influence operations and campaigns and an assessment of
the likelihood that each such country will be targeted;
and
10. An identification of tactics, techniques, and
procedures likely to be used in future Russian
influence operations and campaigns targeting democratic
elections and military alliances and partnerships of
which the United States is a member.
Unclassified Direction to Accompany Division B: The Intelligence
Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019
Management of Intelligence Community Workforce
The Committee repeats direction from the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that IC elements should
build, develop, and maintain a workforce appropriately balanced
among its civilian, military, and contractor workforce sectors
to meet the missions assigned to it in law and by the
president. Starting in Fiscal Year 2019, the Committees no
longer authorize position ceiling levels in the annual Schedule
of Authorizations.
The Committees look forward to working with the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) as it develops an
implementation strategy and sets standards for workforce cost
analysis tools.
Countering Russian Propaganda
The Committee supports the IC's role in countering Russian
propaganda and other active measures. The Committee is
committed to providing the appropriate legal authorities,
financial resources, and personnel necessary to address these
hostile acts. The Committee specifically finds that language
capabilities are important to the IC's efforts in countering
Russia's hostile acts. The Committee encourages the IC to
commit considerable resources in the future to bolstering
officers' existing Russian language skills, recruiting Russian
language speakers, and training officers in Russian, in
particular key technical language skills. This effort will
require strategic planning both in recruiting and rotating
officers through language training. The Committee expects to
see these priorities reflected in future IC budget requests.
Protection of the Supply Chain in Intelligence Community Acquisition
Decisions
The Committee continues to have significant concerns about
risks to the supply chain in IC acquisitions. The report to
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 directed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to
review and consider changes to Intelligence Community Directive
(ICD) 801 (``Acquisition'') to reflect issuance in 2013 of ICD
731 (``Supply Chain Risk Management'') and issues associated
with cybersecurity. It specifically recommended the review
examine whether to: expand risk management criteria in the
acquisition process to include cyber and supply chain threats;
require counterintelligence and security assessments as part of
the acquisition and procurement process; propose and adopt new
education requirements for acquisition professionals on cyber
and supply chain threats; and factor in the cost of cyber and
supply chain security. This review was due in November 2017,
with a report on the process for updating ICD 801 in December
2017. The report was completed on June 18, 2018.
As a follow-on to this review, the Committees direct DNI to
address three other considerations: changes in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation that may be necessary; how changes
should apply to all acquisition programs; and how security
risks must be addressed across development, procurement, and
operational phases of acquisition. The Committees further
direct the DNI to submit a plan to implement necessary changes
within 60 days of completion of this review.
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Use of VERA and VSIP
Authorities
The Committee encourages the use by the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of Voluntary Early
Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive
Program (VSIP) offers to meet future goals of building a
workforce more attuned to automation of data production,
automation of analytic processes, and establishment of
development and operations (``DevOps'') software development
processes.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NGA to report to the
congressional intelligence committees, within 120 days of
enactment of the Act, on its use to date of VERA and VSIP
incentives, to include how they have been used to develop an
acquisition cadre skilled in ``DevOps'' software development
processes, as well as a plan for further use of these
incentives. The report should specify metrics for retooling its
workforce, including how it measures data literacy and
computational skills in potential hires, and an accounting of
the numbers of new hires who have met these higher standards.
Report on Engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with University
Community
The Committee recognizes that the survivability and
resiliency of United States satellites is critically important
to the United States intelligence and defense communities.
While the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) engages with the
university community in support of basic research and
developing an education workforce pipeline to help advance new
technologies and produce skilled professionals, it can do more
in this regard to focus on space survivability.
Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO to report, within
120 days of enactment of the Act, on NRO's current efforts and
future strategies to engage with university partners that are
strategically located, host secure information facilities, and
offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a particular focus
on space survivability and resiliency. This report should
provide a summary of NRO's current and planned university
engagement programs, levels of funding, and program research
and workforce objectives and metrics. The report should also
include an assessment of the strategic utility of chartering a
University Affiliated Research Center in this domain.
Clarification of Oversight Responsibilities
The Committee reinforces the requirement for all IC
agencies funded by the NIP to respond in a full, complete, and
timely manner to any request for information made by a member
of the congressional intelligence committees. In addition, the
Committees direct the DNI to issue guidelines, within 90 days
of enactment of the Act, to ensure that the intent of Section
501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091) is
carried out.
Clarification on Cooperation with Investigation on Russian Influence in
the 2016 Election
The Committee continues to reinforce the obligation for all
IC elements to cooperate in a full, complete, and timely manner
with the Committee's ongoing investigation into Russian
meddling in the 2016 Presidential election and related issues.
Supervisory Feedback as Part of Continuous Evaluation Program
The Committee directs the DNI to review the results of
ongoing pilot programs regarding the use of supervisory
feedback as part of the periodic reinvestigation and continuous
evaluation process and report, within 180 days of enactment of
the Act, on the establishment of a policy for its use across
the IC.
National Security Threats to Critical Infrastructure
The Committee is aware of significant threats to our
critical infrastructure and industrial control systems posed by
foreign adversaries. The sensitive nature of the information
related to these threats make the role of the IC of vital
importance to United States defensive efforts. The Committee
has grave concerns that current IC resources dedicated to
analyzing and countering these threats are neither sufficient
nor closely coordinated.
Framework for Cybersecurity and Intelligence Collection Doctrine
The Committees directs the ODNI, in coordination with
appropriate IC elements, to develop an analytic framework that
could support the eventual creation and execution of a
Government-wide cybersecurity and intelligence collection
doctrine. The ODNI shall provide this framework, which may
contain a classified annex, to the congressional intelligence
committees, within 180 days of enactment of the Act.
This framework shall include:
1. An assessment of the current and medium-term cyber
threats to the protection of the United States'
national security systems and critical infrastructure;
2. IC definitions of key cybersecurity concepts, to
include cyberespionage, cyber theft, cyber acts of
aggression, and cyber deterrence;
3. Intelligence collection requirements to ensure
identification of cyber actors targeting U.S. national
security interests, and to inform policy responses to
cyberattacks and computer network operations directed
against the United States;
4. The IC's methodology for assessing the impacts of
cyberattacks and computer network operations incidents
directed against the United States, taking into account
differing levels of severity of incidents;
5. Capabilities that the IC could employ in response
to cyberattacks and computer network operations
incidents, taking into account differing levels of
severity of incidents;
6. A policy and architecture for sharing
cybersecurity-related intelligence with government,
private sector, and international partners, including
existing statutory and other authorities which may be
exercised in pursuit of that goal; and
7. Any necessary changes in IC authorities,
governance, technology, resources, and policy to
provide more capable and agile cybersecurity.
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community Role and
Responsibilities.
The position of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (IC IG) was codified by the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 to ``conduct independent
reviews investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on
programs and activities within the responsibility and authority
of the Director of National Intelligence'' and to lead the IC's
IG community in its activities. The Committee is concerned that
this intent is not fully exercised by the IC IG and reiterates
the Congress's intent that the IC IG's role be over all IC-wide
activities in addition to the ODNI. To support this intent, the
Committee has directed a number of requirements to strengthen
the IC IG's role and expects full cooperation from all Offices
of Inspector General across the IC.
The Committee also remains concerned about the level of
protection afforded to whistleblowers within the IC and the
level of insight congressional committees have into their
disclosures. It is the Committee's expectation that all Offices
of IG across the IC will fully cooperate with the direction
provided elsewhere in the bill to ensure both the DNI and the
congressional committees have more complete awareness of the
disclosures made to any IG about any NIP-funded activity.
Space Launch Facilities
The Committee continues to believe it is critical to
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support
national security space missions, and encourages planned
launches such as the U.S. Air Force Orbital/Sub-Orbital Program
(OSP)-3 NRO-111 mission, to be launched in 2019 on a Minotaur 1
from the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport at Wallops Flight
Facility. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017, the Committee directed a brief from the ODNI, in
consultation with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S.
Air Force, on their plans to utilize state-owned and operated
spaceports, which leverage non-federal public and private
investments to bolster United States launch capabilities and
provide access to mid-to-low or polar-to-high inclination
orbits for national security missions.
The Committee directs that the ODNI supplement this brief
with how state investments in these spaceports may support
infrastructure improvements, such as payload integration and
launch capabilities, for national security launches.
Acquisition Research Center Postings
The Committee supports a flexible NRO acquisition process
that allows the NRO to choose the most appropriate contracting
mechanism, whether for small research and development efforts
or large acquisitions. The NRO's Acquisition Research Center
(ARC), a classified contracting and solicitation marketplace
that NRO and other agencies use, enables this flexible
acquisition process for classified efforts.
The Committee directs the NRO, within 60 days of enactment
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and defense
committees on options for modifying ARC posting procedures to
ensure fair and open competition. Those options should include
ensuring that unclassified NRO solicitations are posted on the
unclassified FEDBIZOPS site and identifying ways to better
utilize the ARC to encourage contract opportunities for a more
diverse industrial base that includes smaller and non-
traditional companies.
Ensuring Strong Strategic Analytical Tradecraft
The DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has
taken steps to improve the quality of its analysis, to identify
its core customers, and to tailor its production to meet
customer needs. The Committee concurs with I&A's implementation
of analytic standards and review mechanisms that have improved
the tradecraft behind I&A productions. The bedrock of these
efforts has been the development of a yearly program of
analysis (POA) and key intelligence questions, which are
essential tools for providing a roadmap and boundaries for the
office's production efforts.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Office of I&A to
continue to prioritize, develop and hone its strategic
intelligence capabilities and production, including the annual
development of a POA. Within 90 day of enactment of the Act,
and on an annual basis thereafter for two years, I&A shall
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the
development and execution of its POA. These briefings should
provide an overview of the POA, how customer needs have been
incorporated into the POA, and an update on execution against
the POA.
Cyber/Counterintelligence Analysis
DHS's Office of I&A's Counterintelligence Mission Center
analysis focuses on counterintelligence threats posed by
foreign technology companies and fills a gap in IC intelligence
production. Advanced technologies are increasingly ubiquitous
and necessary to the function of modern society. Consequently,
the scope of the threats from countries intent on using these
technologies as a vector for collecting intelligence from
within the United States will continue to expand. The Office of
I&A is well positioned to conduct a niche analysis critical to
national security that combines foreign intelligence with
domestic threat information.
The Committee strongly supports I&A's Counterintelligence
Mission Center's continued focus on these topics and the
increased resources the Fiscal Year 2019 dedicated to this
analysis. Therefore, the Committee directs the I&A, in
coordination with ODNI, to provide an update within 90 days of
enactment of the Act on its recent analytic production related
to counterintelligence threats posed by foreign technology
companies, including a review of the countries and companies
that present the greatest risks in this regard.
Intelligence Support to the Export Control Process
The Committee has significant concerns that China poses a
growing threat to United States national security, due in part
to its relentless efforts to acquire United States technology.
China purposely blurs the distinction between its military and
civilian activities through its policy of ``military-civilian
fusion,'' which compounds the risks of diversion of United
States technology to the Chinese military.
The Committee concludes that the United States Government
currently lacks a comprehensive policy and the tools needed to
address this problem. China exploits weaknesses in existing
U.S. mechanisms aimed at preventing dangerous technology
transfers, including the U.S. export control system, which is
run by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and
Security (BIS). The Committee has specific concerns about the
lack of adequate and effective IC support to BIS's export
license application review process and believes more robust IC
support could have prevented many of the ill-advised technology
transfers that have occurred in recent years.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to submit a plan,
within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to describe how the IC
will provide BIS with, at a minimum, basic but timely analysis
of any threat to U.S. national security posed by any proposed
export, re-export, or transfer of export-controlled technology.
The plan shall include detailed information on the appropriate
organizational structure, including how many IC personnel would
be required, where they would be located (including whether
they would be embedded at BIS to coordinate IC support), and
the amounts of necessary funding. In formulating the plan, the
DNI should study the ``National Security Threat Assessment''
process that the National Intelligence Council uses to inform
the actions of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States. The DNI shall submit the plan to the
congressional intelligence committees in classified form.
Social Media
The Committees encourages the IC, notably the FBI, to both
continue and enhance its efforts to assist in detecting,
understanding, and warning about foreign influence operations
using social media tools to target the United States.
Additionally, within the scope of the IC's authorities, and
with all necessary protections for U.S. person information, the
Committees encourage the IC to augment and prioritize these
ongoing efforts.
Trade-Based Money Laundering
Threats to our national security posed by trade-based money
laundering are concerning. Therefore, the Committee directs the
DNI, within 90 days of enactment of the Act, to submit a report
to the congressional intelligence committees on these threats,
including an assessment of the severity of the threats posed to
the United States' national security by trade-based money
laundering conducted inside and outside the United States; an
assessment of the scope of the financial threats to the U.S.
economy and financial systems posed by trade-based money
laundering; a description of how terrorist financing and drug
trafficking organizations are advancing their illicit
activities through the use of licit trade channels; an
assessment of the adequacy of the systems and tools available
to the Federal Government for combating trade-based money
laundering; and a description and assessment of the current
structure and coordination between Federal agencies, as well as
with foreign governments, to combat trade-based money
laundering. The report shall be submitted in classified form
with an unclassified summary to be made available to the
public.
Expansions of Security Protective Service Jurisdiction of the Central
Intelligence Agency
The Committee directs the Central Intelligence Agency, in
connection with the expansion of its security protective
service jurisdiction as set forth in Section 2413, to engage
with Virginia state and local law enforcement authorities to
ensure that a memorandum of understanding, akin to those in
place at other agencies setting forth the appropriate
allocation of duties and responsibilities, is in effect.
Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
The Committee is concerned by the recent widespread media
reports that purport to contain unauthorized disclosures of
classified information. Protecting the nation's secrets from
unauthorized disclosure is essential to safeguarding our
nation's intelligence sources and methods. An unlawful
disclosure of classified information can destroy sensitive
collection capabilities and endanger American lives, including
those individuals who take great personal risks to assist the
United States in collecting vital foreign intelligence.
Federal law prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of
classified information, but enforcement is often lacking or
inconsistent. Accordingly, the Committee desires to better
understand the number of potential unauthorized disclosures
discovered and investigated on a routine basis. Moreover, the
Committee has little visibility into the number of
investigations initiated by each IC agency or the number of
criminal referrals to the Department of Justice. Accordingly,
Section 2718 of the Act requires all IC agencies to provide the
congressional intelligence committees with a semi-annual report
of the number of investigations of unauthorized disclosures to
journalists or media organizations, including subsequent
referrals made to the United States Attorney General.
Additionally, the Committee wishes to better understand the
role of Inspectors General (IGs) within elements of the IC,
with respect to unauthorized disclosures of classified
information at those elements.
Therefore, the Committee directs the IC IG, within 180 days
of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a report regarding the role of IGs
with respect to investigating unauthorized disclosures. The
report shall address: the roles of IC elements' security
personnel and law enforcement regarding unauthorized
disclosures; the current role of IGs within IC elements
regarding such disclosures; what, if any, specific actions
could be taken by such IGs to increase their involvement in the
investigation of such matters; any laws, rules or procedures
that currently prevent IGs from increasing their involvement;
and the benefits and drawbacks of increased IG involvement, to
include potential impacts to IG's roles and missions.
Presidential Policy Guidance
The Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) dated May 22, 2013,
and entitled ``Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against
Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and Areas
of Active Hostilities'' provides for the participation by
elements of the IC in reviews of certain proposed
counterterrorism operations. The Committees expect to remain
fully and currently informed about the status of the PPG and
its implementation.
Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, within five days of
any change to the PPG, or to any successor policy guidance, to
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a written
notification thereof, that shall include a summary of the
change and the specific legal and policy justification(s) for
the change.
Centers for Academic Excellence
The Committee commends the commitment demonstrated by
ODNI's Centers for Academic Excellence (CAE) program managers,
IC agencies that sponsored CAE interns, and all other personnel
who contributed to the inaugural edition of the CAE Internship
Program in recent summers.
The Committees expect the CAE Program to build on this
foundation by showing measurable, swift progress, and
ultimately fulfilling Congress's intent that the Program serve
as a pipeline of the next generation of IC professionals.
Therefore, the Committee directs that the IC take all
viable action to expand the CAE Program by increasing, to the
fullest extent possible:
1. The number and racial and gender diversity of CAE
interns;
2. The number of CAE academic institutions and their
qualified internship candidates participating in the
CAE Program; and
3. The number of IC elements that sponsor CAE
interns.
Report on Violent Extremist Groups
Violent extremist groups like ISIS continue to exploit the
Internet for nefarious purposes: to inspire lone wolves; to
spread propaganda; to recruit foreign fighters; and to plan and
publicize atrocities. As a former Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has stated publicly:
[W]e need to counter our adversaries' successful use
of social media platforms to advance their propaganda
goals, raise funds, recruit, coordinate travel and
attack plans, and facilitate operations. . . . Our
future work must focus on denying our adversaries the
capability to spread their messages to at-risk
populations that they can reach through the use of
these platforms.
Section 403 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017 required the DNI, consistent with the
protection of sources and methods, to assist public and private
sector entities in recognizing online violent extremist
content--specifically, by making publicly available a list of
insignias and logos associated with foreign extremist groups
designated by the Secretary of State. The Committees believe
the IC can take additional steps.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of NCTC, in
coordination with other appropriate officials designated by the
DNI, within 180 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence committees on options for a pilot
program to develop and continually update best practices for
private technology companies to quickly recognize and lawfully
take down violent extremist content online. Such briefing shall
address:
1. The feasibility, risks, costs, and benefits of
such a program;
2. The U.S. Government agencies and private sector
entities that would participate; and
3. Any additional authorities that would be required
by the program's establishment.
South China Sea
The South China Sea is an area of great geostrategic
importance to the United States and its allies. However,
China's controversial territorial claims and other actions
stand to undercut international norms and erode the region's
stability. It is thus imperative the United States uphold
respect for international law in the South China Sea.
Fulfilling that objective in turn will require an optimal
intelligence collection posture.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DoD, in coordination
with DNI, within 30 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on known
intelligence collection gaps, if any, with respect to adversary
operations and aims in the South China Sea. The briefing shall
identify the gaps and whether those gaps are driven by lack of
access, lack of necessary collection capabilities or legal or
policy authorities, or by other factors. The briefing shall
also identify IC judgments that assess which intelligence
disciplines would be best-suited to answer the existing gaps,
and current plans to address the gaps over the Future Years
Defense Program.
Military Occupational Specialty-to-Degree Program
The Committee supports the Military Occupational Specialty
(MOS)-to-Degree program, which is an innovative framework that
enables enlisted Marines to receive credits towards an
associate's or a bachelor's degree while earning required MOS
credentials. The program partners with colleges and
universities to map a Marine's experience and training to
equivalent credit, and provides Marines with an awareness of
tuition assistance and scholarship programs to enable them to
complete the remaining credits towards their degree. The
Committees encourage the Marine Corps to expand the MOS-to-
Degree program through further curriculum development and
enhanced management of the program.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity (MCIA), within 90 days of the enactment
of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence and defense
committees on the Marine Corps' progress towards expanding the
MOS-to-Degree program.
Unmanned Aircraft System Pilot Retention
The Committee supports the Marine Corps' vision to grow a
more diverse, lethal, amphibious, and middleweight
expeditionary force by leveraging emerging technologies,
particularly in the area of unmanned and manned-unmanned
teaming. Additionally, the Committee is enthusiastic about the
Marine Corps' efforts to equip operating forces down to the
squad level with a Small Unit Remote Scouting System Family of
Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capable of operating in all
weather conditions across the full spectrum of conflict. The
Committee is also aware of the service's concept for a Marine
Air Ground Task Force Unmanned Expeditionary (MUX) capability.
However, the Committee is concerned with the projected cost
and delays associated with developing this new technology and
believe the Marine Corps is ill-prepared to address the growing
deficiency in expertise and the manpower challenges that will
accompany expansion of the unmanned fleet. Based on
observations of the Air Force's and Army's efforts, the
Committee believes the Marine Corps' UAS programs will
experience pilot and maintainer shortages based on inadequate
training, lack of reliable equipment, and the absence of
incentive.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Deputy Commandant of
Aviation, within 120 days of enactment of the Act, to brief the
congressional intelligence and defense committees on potential
interim solutions to the gap exposed by the long development
time for MUX. Such briefing should also address the Marine
Corps' UAS talent management plan, including a strategy for
pilot retention and a plan to unify unmanned training that will
build a base of instructors and encourage the professionalism
of the community.
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Training Strategy
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC)-passed FY 2018 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) (H. Rept. 115-200), the Committee directs the
Secretary of the Air Force, no later than 30 days after
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
and defense committees on the Air Force's approach to remotely
piloted aircraft (RPA) aircrew training, with a particular
focus on how the Air Force plans to field simulator capability
and training capacity among active and reserve component units
supporting RPA operations.
Wide-area Motion Imagery Intelligence Capability
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY 2018 NDAA (H.
Rept. 115-200), the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force no later than March 1, 2020, to provide to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report that
describes in detail the lifecycle weapon system sustainment and
modernization strategy for maintaining an enduring wide-area
motion imagery capability for the geographic combatant
commanders.
MQ-4C Triton Unmanned Aircraft System
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY 2018 NDAA (H.
Rept. 115-200), the Committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy, no later than 45 days after enactment of the Act, to
brief the congressional intelligence and defense committees on
MQ-4C mission execution and tasking, collection, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) processes. The briefing
shall include or explain:
1. A framework description of the manning, equipping,
and training requirements for the MQ-4C system;
2. A description of the baseline architecture of the
mission support infrastructure required to support MQ-
4C operations;
3. How the Navy plans to support and execute the
TCPED processes;
4. How the Navy plans to support flying operations
from either line-of-sight or beyond-line-of-sight
locations;
5. How many aircraft the Navy plans to dedicate
annually to the ISR Global Force Management Allocation
Process of the DoD; and
6. How many hours of collection the MQ-4C will be
able to provide annually in each of the intelligence
disciplines for combatant commanders.
E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY 2018 NDAA (H.
Rept. 115-200), the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force, no later than March 1, 2020, to provide to the
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report that
explains in detail all aspects of how and when the Air Force
will transition from legacy Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft capability to JSTARS
recapitalization aircraft capability.
Acceleration of Increment 2 of Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
Program
Referring to Section 111 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY
2018 NDAA, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Army, no
later than January 30, 2020, to submit to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees a report detailing
potential options for the acceleration of procurement and
fielding of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
Increment 2 program.
Cost-benefit Analysis of Upgrades to MQ-9
Referring to Section 134 of H.R. 2810, the HASC-passed FY
2018 NDAA, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force, within 180
days of enactment of the Act, to provide the congressional
intelligence and defense committees an analysis that compares
the costs and benefits of the following:
1. Upgrading fielded MQ-9 Reaper aircraft to a Block
5 configuration; and
2. Proceeding with the procurement of MQ-9B aircraft
instead of upgrading fielded MQ-9 Reaper aircraft to a
Block 5 configuration.
Policy on Minimum Insider Threat Standards
Executive Order 13587 and the National Insider Threat Task
Force established minimum insider threat standards. Such
standards are required for the sharing and safeguarding of
classified information on computer networks while ensuring
consistent, appropriate protections for privacy and civil
liberties. The Committee understands there are policies in
place to attempt implementation of such standards; however, the
Committee has found that several elements of the IC have not
fully implemented such standards. Therefore, given the several
high-profile insider threat issues, the Committee emphasizes
the importance of such minimums by statutorily requiring the
DNI to establish a policy on minimum insider threat standards,
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and IC
elements should expeditiously establish their own policies and
implement the DNI guidance.
Further, referring to the directive language found in the
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY
2019 NDAA, the Committee directs the Chief Management Officer
to provide a briefing to the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional armed services committees, no
later than 90 days after enactment of the Act, on the outcomes
of its cost and technical analyses required by this report, and
the Department's efforts to implement enterprise-wide programs
and policies for insider threat detection, user activity
monitoring, and cyber-attack detection and remediation.
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment
The Committee remains supportive of the goals of
Intelligence Community Information Technology Environment (IC
ITE) and the importance of the common, secure sharing
infrastructure it creates. The Committee further understands
that the path to implement a complex, technical environment
such as IC ITE needs to be sufficiently flexible and agile.
However, the Committee remains concerned with the lack of
consistency and substance in previous reports and briefings on
IC ITE. Therefore, Section 2312 requires a long-term roadmap,
business plan, and security plan that shall be reported to the
congressional intelligence committees at least quarterly with
additional notifications as necessary.
Intelligence Community Chief Financial Officer
The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 mandated
best practices for decision-making and accountability, as well
as improved decision-makers' access to reliable and timely
financial and performance information. The CFO Act, as amended,
requires that the chief financial officers of 24 departments
and agencies ``report directly to the head of the agency
regarding financial management matters.'' Section 2404 brings
the ODNI in line with the best practices implemented in the CFO
Act.
Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer
As codified in 44 U.S.C. 3506(a)(1)(A), each federal agency
head is responsible for `carrying out the information resources
management activities to improve agency productivity,
efficiency, and effectiveness.' Accordingly, Section 2405
expresses the Committee's intent to emphasize the importance of
the IC Chief Information Officer (CIO), as defined in 50 U.S.C.
3032(a), in assisting the DNI with information resource
management by requiring the IC CIO to report directly to the
DNI.
Central Intelligence Agency Subsistence for Personnel Assigned to
Austere Locations
Section 2411 permits the Director of the CIA to allow
subsistence for personnel assigned to austere locations.
Although the statute does not define ``austere,'' the Committee
believes that utilization of this authority should be minimal.
Therefore, within 180 days after the enactment of the Act, the
CIA shall brief the congressional intelligence committees on
the CIA's definition of ``austere'' and the CIA regulations in
place governing this authority.
Collocation of Certain Department of Homeland Security Personnel at
Field Locations
The Committee supports DHS I&A's intent to integrate into
operations across the broader DHS enterprise. Accordingly,
Section 2434 requires I&A to identify opportunities for
collocation of I&A field officers and to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a plan for deployment.
Limitations on Intelligence Community Elements' Communications with
Congress
Effective oversight of the IC requires unencumbered
communications between representatives of the agencies, members
of Congress, and congressional staff. The Committee directs the
DNI not to limit any element of the IC from having interactions
with the congressional intelligence committees, including but
not limited to, preclearance by the DNI of remarks, briefings,
discussions of agency resources or authorities requirements, or
mandatory reports to the DNI on conversations with the
congressional intelligence committees.
Intelligence Community Support to the National Vetting Center
On February 6, 2018, the President issued National Security
Policy Memorandum (NSPM)-9, ``Presidential Memorandum on
Optimizing the Use of Federal Government Information in Support
of National Vetting Enterprise.'' The memorandum directs the
DHS, in coordination with the ODNI and other agencies, to
establish the National Vetting Center. The memorandum also
requires agencies to ``provide the Center access to relevant
biographic, biometric, and related derogatory information.'' It
further directs DNI, in coordination with the heads of relevant
IC elements, to ``establish a support element to facilitate,
guide, and coordinate all IC efforts to use classified
intelligence and other relevant information within the IC
holdings in support of the center.'' The Committee wishes to
obtain regular updates and the most current information about
the activities of that support element.
Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of
the Act and annually thereafter, the Committee directs the DNI
and the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at DHS to
brief the congressional intelligence committees on the status
of IC support to the National Vetting Center, as established by
NSPM-9.
Update on Status of Attorney General-approved U.S. Person Procedures
under Executive Order 12333
The Committee acknowledges the difficult, labor-intensive
work undertaken by certain IC elements, to ensure the current
effectiveness of, and in some cases to substantially revise,
final Attorney General-approved procedures regarding the
collection, dissemination, and retention of United States
persons information. The Committees wish to better understand
the status of this project, throughout the IC.
Therefore, the Committee directs that, not later than 60
days after enactment of the Act, the DNI and the Attorney
General shall brief the congressional intelligence committees
on the issuance of final, Attorney General-approved procedures
by elements of the IC. Specifically, the briefing shall
identify (1) any such elements that have not yet issued final
procedures; and (2) with respect to such elements, the status
of the procedures' development, and any interim guidance or
procedures on which those elements currently rely.
Homegrown Violent Extremists Imprisoned in Department of Defense
Facilities
The Committee is concerned about an evident gap in
information sharing about individuals imprisoned in DoD
facilities who are categorized by the FBI as homegrown violent
extremists (HVEs). A recent FBI report underscores this gap,
highlighting the case of an individual who has been convicted
and sentenced to death by a U.S. military court martial and
remains incarcerated in a U.S. military facility. The Committee
understands that, despite his incarceration, this inmate openly
communicates with the outside world through written
correspondence and has continued to inspire extremists
throughout the world. The Committee further understands that
the FBI is unable to determine the full scope of this inmate's
contacts with the outside world because only a portion of his
communications have been provided by the DoD.
Therefore, no later than 180 days after the enactment of
the Act, the Committee directs the FBI to work with the DoD to
create a process by which the DoD provides to the FBI the
complete communications of individuals imprisoned in DoD
facilities and who are categorized by the FBI as HVEs.
Naming of Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters
According to statute enacted in 1972, the current FBI
headquarters building in Washington, D.C. must be ``known and
designated'' as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' That
tribute has aged poorly. It should be reconsidered, in view of
Hoover's record on civil liberties--including the effort to
disparage and undermine Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Even today,
Hoover's name evokes the Bureau's sordid ``COINTELPRO''
activities.
The Committee believes Congress should consider repealing
the provision requiring the existing Pennsylvania Avenue
building to be known as the ``J. Edgar Hoover FBI Building.'' A
new name should be determined, through a joint dialogue among
Bureau leadership, law enforcement personnel, elected
officials, and civil rights leaders.
Foundational Intelligence Analysis Modernization
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committee directs the Joint Staff Director for
Intelligence, in coordination with the USD(I) and the Director
of the DIA, to develop a plan within 60 days of enactment of
the Act, to modernize systems used to provide foundational
intelligence.
Further, the Committee directs the Joint Staff Director for
Intelligence, in coordination with the DIA Director, to provide
a briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional armed services committees, within 90 days after
enactment of the Act, on such plan to modernize foundational
intelligence systems. If a determination is made that a new
system is required, the Committees expect the Battlespace
Awareness Functional Capabilities Board to validate the
requirements for any new system, and that the acquisition plan
will follow best practices for the rapid acquisition and
improvement of technology dependent systems.
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math careers in Defense
Intelligence
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committee directs the Director of DIA to provide a briefing
to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional armed services committees, within 90 days after
enactment of the Act, on a plan to develop a Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Math career program that attracts
and maintains the defense intelligence cadre of Science and
Technical Intelligence analysts to meet tomorrow's threats.
Security and Intelligence Role in Export Control
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, in coordination with the USD(I), within 60 days of
enactment of the Act, to brief the congressional intelligence
committees and the congressional armed services committees, on
security support to export control.
Security Clearance Background Investigation Reciprocity
Referring to the directive language found in the committee
report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY 2019 NDAA,
the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the DNI and the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, to brief
the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
armed services committees on efforts to ensure seamless
transition of investigations between authorized investigative
agencies, as required by law.
Further, referring to the directive language found in the
committee report accompanying H.R. 5515, the HASC-passed FY
2019 NDAA, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
coordination with the DNI and the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, within 90 days of enactment of the Act,
to brief the congressional intelligence committees on efforts
to ensure reciprocity is a consideration for implementation of
continuous evaluation and continuous vetting across the federal
government.
Foreign Influence Task Force
The IC has warned of active measures taken by foreign
actors to interfere with and undermine the U.S. democratic
process, most recently and brazenly by the Russian Federation.
The Committee appreciates FBI efforts to confront this
challenge in part through creation of its Foreign Influence
Task Force. The Committee believes that confronting foreign
influence directed at the United States is of fundamental
importance, and thus desires to engage in a close and regular
dialogue with the FBI about the task force's activities.
Therefore, the Committee directs the FBI to provide
detailed, quarterly briefings to the congressional intelligence
committees, regarding the task force's activities, to include
its progress and any significant challenges.
Joint System Integration Lab Annual Briefing
The Joint System Integration Lab (JSIL) at Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama enables testing of critical military
intelligence capabilities, including unmanned aerial system
(UAS) sensors, modeling and simulation, and integration between
and among service UASs. The Committee seeks to remain fully and
currently informed about this important work.
Therefore, the Committee directs the JSIL, within 180 days
of enactment and annually for two years thereafter, to brief
the congressional intelligence and defense committees, on
intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by
the JSIL.
Enhanced Oversight of IC Contractors
A topic of sustained congressional intelligence committee
interest has been improving the federal government's oversight
of IC acquisition and procurement practices, including
activities by poorly performing IC contractors.
A framework exists to ensure that IC elements do not award
IC contracts to businesses that engage in negligence or even
gross negligence, consistently fail to appropriately safeguard
classified information, maintain poor financial practices, or
other issues. For example, an IC element may maintain a list of
contractors of concern, in order to ensure that proposals from
such contractors are rejected or subjected to additional
scrutiny. The Committee wishes to build on these practices and
is concerned about the existing framework's adequacy.
Therefore, the Committee directs all elements of the IC, to
the fullest extent consistent with applicable law and policy,
to share with one another information about contractors with
track records of concern--such as the commission of negligence
or gross negligence in the performance of IC contracts, or the
repeated failure to appropriately safeguard classified
information in a fashion that the contractor reasonably could
have been expected to prevent.
Additionally, no later than 30 days after enactment of the
Act, the DNI shall brief the congressional intelligence
committees on the authorities of IC elements with respect to
contractors with track records of concern--before, during, and
after procurement. An objective of the briefing will be to
discuss information sharing practices in this regard, and to
identify specific areas where the oversight framework can be
strengthened.
Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes
On June 27, 2019, the Committee met in open session to
consider H.R. 3494 and ordered the bill favorably reported.
In open session, the Committee considered an amendment in
the nature of a substitute, offered by Mr. Schiff to H.R. 3494.
The amendment was adopted by unanimous voice vote.
Mr. Schiff then moved to make the classified Fiscal Year
2020 schedule of authorizations available for Members of the
House to review. The motion was agreed to by a recorded vote of
20 ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Schiff; Himes; Sewell; Carson; Speier;
Quigley; Heck; Welch; Maloney; Demings; Krishnamoorthi;
Nunes; Conaway; Turner; Wenstrup; Stewart; Crawford;
Stefanik; Hurd; Ratcliffe
Voting no: None
The Committee then agreed to a motion by the Chairman to
favorably report H.R. 3494, as amended, to the House, including
by reference the classified schedules of authorizations. The
motion was agreed to by a unanimous voice vote.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Amendment
Section 1--Short Title; Table of contents
Section 1 lists the short title of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, 2019, and 2020 (the
Act).
Section 2--Divisions and table of contents
Section 2 sets out the divisions of the bill and the table
of contents for the bill. Division A consists of authorizations
for Fiscal Year 2020. Division B consists of authorizations
that were previously introduced for Fiscal Year 2018 and Fiscal
Year 2019.
Section 3--Definitions
Section 3 defines the terms ``congressional intelligence
committees'' and the ``Intelligence Community'' (IC) that will
be used in the Act.
DIVISION A
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the U.S. Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2020.
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the amounts authorized to be
appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities and the personnel levels for Fiscal Year 2020 are
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and
House of Representatives and to the President.
Section 103--Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 103 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2018 for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 301--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 302--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 303--Paid parental leave
Section 303 establishes a paid parental leave program for
employees of elements of the IC. Each IC element that receives
a request is required to grant that request unless the
requested leave would unduly disrupt operations. The IC
elements must each submit to the intelligence committees an
implementation plan that reports on the changes in processes to
implement the new benefit and explains how agencies contain a
mix of IC and non-IC offices are implementing this IC benefit.
The section requires the DNI to issue an Intelligence Community
Directive (ICD) implementing this benefit within 180 days of
the enactment of the statute.
Section 304--Unfunded requirements of the intelligence community
Section 304 requires the DNI, upon request, to provide a
briefing to the congressional intelligence and appropriations
committees about an IC element's unfunded priorities--i.e., an
element head's request that was not included in the DNI's
budget request to the President or that was requested by the
DNI but was not in the President's budget request that was sent
to Congress.
Section 305--Extending the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of
1982
Section 305 amends the definition of ``covert agent'' in
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 3126(4)) so
as to protect all intelligence officers whose identities as
such are currently classified, and all United States citizens
whose relationship to the United States is currently
classified--regardless of the location of the individuals'
government service or activities or time since separation from
service.
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (IIPA)
had amended the National Security Act to permit prosecution
only if, among other things, an individual disclosed the
classified identities of intelligence officers who were
currently serving overseas or had within the past five years;
or those of U.S. citizens having a classified intelligence
relationship to the United States and residing and acting for a
U.S. intelligence agency overseas. Section 305 removes the
IIPA's temporal and geographic limitations, both to account for
a changing threat environment, and to address the fact that
undercover IC officers and others assisting the IC can and
often do perform highly sensitive work warranting protection by
the IIPA--though without serving abroad in recent years.
Section 306--Intelligence community public-private talent exchange
Section 306 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to develop policies, processes, and procedures to allow for the
detail of IC employees to the private sector and the detail of
private sector employees to the IC. The section also provides
the heads of IC elements with authorities to detail employees
under the terms of the DNI's policies.
Section 307--Assessment of contracting practices to identify certain
security and counterintelligence concerns
Section 307 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to conduct an assessment of the authorities, policies,
processes, and standards used by the IC to ensure that the IC
is weighing security and counterintelligence risks in
contracting with companies that contract--or carry out joint
research and development--with the People's Republic of China,
the Russian Federation, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, or the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Section 308--Required counterintelligence briefings and notifications
Section 308 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to post publicly advisory reports on foreign
counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to federal
election campaigns. It also requires quarterly briefings
regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
counterintelligence activities and prompt notification of an
investigation carried out regarding a counterintelligence risk
related to a federal election or campaign.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Section 401--Establishment of the Climate Security Advisory Council
Section 401 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to establish an advisory council to assist analytic components
of the IC with incorporating analysis of climate security into
their work. The council will also facilitate coordination and
sharing of data between the IC and non-IC elements related to
climate change.
Section 402--Transfer of National Intelligence University to the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 402 requires the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency to transfer to the Director of National
Intelligence the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities
of the National Intelligence University.
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Section 501--Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in
the United States by the Communist Party of China
Section 501 requires the Director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to submit an annual
report to the congressional intelligence committees concerning
the influence operations and campaigns in the United States
conducted by the Communist Party of China.
Section 502--Report on repression of ethnic Muslim minorities in the
Xinjiang region of the People's Republic of China
Section 502 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees
concerning activity by the People's Republic of China to
repress ethnic Muslim minorities in the Xinjiang region of
China.
Section 503--Report on efforts by People's Republic of China to
influence election in Taiwan
Section 503 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report within 45 days of the 2020 Taiwan
Presidential and Vice Presidential elections concerning any
influence operations by China to interfere in or undermine the
election and efforts by the United States to disrupt those
operations.
Section 504--Assessment of legitimate and illegitimate financial and
other assets of Vladimir Putin
Section 504 expresses the sense of Congress that the United
States should do more to expose the corruption of Russian
President Vladimir Putin and directs the Director of National
Intelligence to submit to appropriate congressional committees
an assessment on the net worth and financial and other assets
of President Putin and his family members.
Section 505--Assessments of intentions of political leadership of the
Russian Federation
Section 505 directs the Intelligence Community to submit
assessments to certain congressional committees of the current
intentions of the political leadership of the Russian
Federation concerning potential military action against members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), responses to
an enlarged United States or NATO military presence in Eastern
Europe, and potential actions taken for the purpose of
exploiting perceived divisions among the governments of
Russia's Western adversaries.
Section 506--Report on death of Jamal Khashoggi
Section 506 directs the Director of National Intelligence
to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees
concerning the death of Jamal Khashoggi within thirty days of
the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act.
TITLE VI--FEDERAL EFFORTS AGAINST DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Section 601--Definitions
Section 601 sets forth certain definitions that apply to
Title VI.
Section 602--Annual strategic intelligence assessment of and
comprehensive report on domestic terrorism
Section 602 requires the annual submission of a joint
report to certain congressional committees on domestic
terrorism by the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis.
The report must contain a strategic intelligence assessment on
domestic terrorism; a discussion of the activities undertaken
by the federal government related to domestic terrorism
investigations; and data concerning domestic terrorism
incidents, investigations, the filing of federal or non-federal
charges against suspects, and the personnel levels and
intelligence products produced by the executive branch.
Finally, Section 602 requires the executive branch to provide
to the congressional committees certain policy documents.
TITLE VII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
Section 701--Modification of requirements for submission to congress of
certain reports
Section 701 amends or cancels numerous reporting
requirements under current law.
Section 702--Increased transparency regarding counterterrorism budget
of the United States
Section 702 makes several findings regarding the
transparency of the IC's counterterrorism budget and directs a
briefing from the executive branch on the feasibility of
releasing additional information to the public concerning the
IC's efforts on counterterrorism.
Section 703--Task force on illicit financing of espionage and foreign
influence operations
Section 703 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to establish a task force to study and assess the illicit
financing of espionage and foreign influence operations
directed at the United States and requires the task force to
issue a report on this subject to the appropriate congressional
committees.
Section 704--Study on role of retired and former personnel of
intelligence community with respect to certain foreign
intelligence operations
Section 704 requires the Director of National Intelligence
to conduct a study on former intelligence community personnel
providing intelligence assistance to or for the benefit of a
foreign country and to provide the study to the congressional
intelligence committees.
Section 705--Report by Director of National Intelligence on fifth-
generation wireless network technology
Section 705 directs the Director of National Intelligence
to submit to the intelligence committees a report on the threat
to the national security of the United States posed by adoption
of fifth-generation wireless network built by foreign companies
and possible efforts to mitigate the threat.
Section 706--Establishment of 5G prize competition
Section 706 establishes a program to award prizes to
stimulate research and development relevant to fifth-generation
wireless technology.
Section 707--Establishment of deepfakes prize competition
Section 707 establishes a program to award prizes to
stimulate the research, development, or commercialization of
technologies to automatically detect machine-manipulated media.
DIVISION B
TITLE XXI--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 2101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 2101 lists the United States Government
departments, agencies, and other elements for which the Act
authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities for Fiscal Year 2019. The bill deems
authorized the funds already appropriated for Fiscal Year 2018.
Section 2102--Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 2102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2019 are
contained in classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the
classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available
to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 2103--Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI for Fiscal Year
2019.
TITLE XXII--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
Section 2201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund for
Fiscal Year 2019.
Section 2202--Computation of annuities for employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 2202 makes technical changes to the CIA Retirement
Act to conform with various statutes governing the Civil
Service Retirement System.
TITLE XXIII--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Section 2301--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 2301 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.
Section 2302--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 2302 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 2303--Modification of special pay authority for science,
technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition
of special pay authority for cyber positions
Section 2303 provides an increased yearly cap for Science,
Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) employee
positions in the IC that support critical cyber missions.
Section 303 also permits the National Security Agency (NSA) to
establish a special rate of pay for positions that perform
functions that execute the agency's cyber mission.
Section 2304--Modification of appointment of chief information officer
of the intelligence community
Section 2304 changes the position of IC Chief Information
Officer from being subject to presidential appointment to being
subject to appointment by the DNI.
Section 2305--Director of national intelligence review of placement of
positions within the intelligence community on the executive
schedule
Section 2305 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Office of Personnel Management, to conduct a review of the
positions within the IC that may be appropriate for inclusion
on the Executive Schedule, and the appropriate levels for
inclusion.
Section 2306--Supply chain and counterintelligence risk management task
force
Section 2306 requires the DNI to establish a task force to
standardize information sharing between the IC and the United
States Government acquisition community with respect to supply
chain and counterintelligence risks. Section 2306 further
provides requirements for membership, security clearances, and
annual reports.
Section 2307--Consideration of adversarial telecommunications and
cybersecurity infrastructure when sharing intelligence with
foreign governments and entities
Section 2307 requires the IC, when entering into foreign
intelligence sharing agreements, to consider the pervasiveness
of telecommunications and cybersecurity infrastructure,
equipment, and services provided by United States adversaries
or entities thereof.
Section 2308--Cyber protection support for the personnel of the
intelligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber
attack
Section 2308 permits the DNI to provide cyber protection
support for the personal technology devices and personal
accounts of IC personnel whom the DNI determines to be highly
vulnerable to cyber attacks and hostile information collection
activities.
Section 2309--Elimination of sunset authority relating to management of
supply-chain risk
Section 2309 eliminates the sunset of certain IC
procurement authorities to manage and protect against supply
chain risks.
Section 2310--Limitations on determinations regarding certain security
classifications
Section 2310 prohibits an officer of the IC who is
nominated to a Senate-confirmed position from making certain
classification determinations posing potential conflicts of
interest regarding that nominee.
Section 2311--Joint intelligence community council
Section 2311 amends Section 101A of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3022(d)) as to the Joint Intelligence
Community Council meetings and to require a report on its
activities.
Section 2312--Intelligence community information technology environment
Section 2312 defines the roles and responsibilities for the
performance of the Intelligence Community Information
Technology Environment (IC ITE). Section 2312 requires certain
reporting and briefing requirements to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding the IC's ongoing
implementation of IC ITE.
Section 2313--Report on development of secure mobile voice solution for
intelligence community
Section 2313 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Directors of the CIA and NSA, provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a classified report on the
feasibility, desirability, cost, and required schedule
associated with the implementation of a secure mobile voice
solution for the intelligence community.
Section 2314--Policy on minimum insider threat standards
Section 2314 requires the DNI to develop minimum insider
threat standards to be followed by each element of the IC,
consistent with the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs.
Section 2315--Submission of intelligence community policies
Section 2315 requires the DNI to make all ODNI policies and
procedures available to the congressional intelligence
committees. Section 2315 also requires ODNI to notify the
congressional committees of any new or rescinded policies.
Section 2316--Expansion of intelligence community recruitment efforts
Section 2316 requires the DNI, in consultation with IC
elements, to submit a plan to congressional intelligence
committees as to each element's efforts in recruitment from
rural and underrepresented regions.
TITLE XXIV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Section 2401--Authority for protection of current and former employees
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 2401 amends Title 50, section 3506, to provide
protection for current and former ODNI personnel and designated
immediate family members, if there is a national security
threat that warrants such protection.
Section 2402--Designation of the Program Manager-Information Sharing
environment
Section 2402 amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Protection Act of 2004 so that the Program Manager-Information
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) is subject to appointment by the
DNI, not the President.
Section 2403--Technical modification to the Executive Schedule
Section 2403 amends the Executive Schedule to make the
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security
Center a Level IV position on the Executive Schedule.
Section 2404--Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community
Section 2404 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by
requiring the Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence
Community to directly report to the DNI.
Section 2405--Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community
Section 2405 amends the National Security Act of 1947 by
requiring the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community to directly report to the DNI.
SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 2411--Central Intelligence Agency subsistence for personnel
assigned to austere locations
Section 2411 authorizes the Director of the CIA to approve,
with or without reimbursement, subsistence to personnel
assigned to an austere overseas location.
Section 2412--Special rules for certain monthly workers' compensation
payments and other payments for Central Intelligence Agency
Personnel
Section 2412 authorizes the Director of the CIA to provide
enhanced injury benefits to a covered employee or qualifying
dependents who suffer an injury overseas due to war,
insurgency, hostile act, or terrorist activities.
Section 2413--Expansion of security protective service jurisdiction of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 2413 expands the security perimeter jurisdiction at
CIA facilities from 500 feet to 500 yards.
Section 2414--Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for
certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence
Agency
Section 2414 repeals Title 50, section 3036(g), with
conforming amendments to section 611 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487).
SUBTITLE C--OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OF
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Section 2421--Consolidation of Department of Energy Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Section 2421 amends the Department of Energy Organization
Act to consolidate the offices of intelligence and
counterintelligence into the DOE Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.
Section 2422--Establishment of Energy Infrastructure Security Center
Section 2422 establishes the Energy Infrastructure Security
Center under the Department of Energy Office of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence that will be responsible for
coordinating intelligence regarding the to the protection of
U.S. energy infrastructure.
Section 2423--Repeal of Department of Energy Intelligence Executive
Committee and Budget Reporting Requirement
Section 2423 amends the Department of Energy Organization
Act by repealing the Department of Energy Intelligence
Executive Committee, as well as certain budgetary reporting
requirements.
SUBTITLE D--OTHER ELEMENTS
Section 2431--Plan for designation of counterintelligence component of
defense security service as an element of intelligence
community
Section 2431 directs the DNI and the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of
the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, to
provide the congressional intelligence and defense committees
with an implementation plan to make the Defense Security
Service's (DSS's) Counterintelligence component an element of
the IC as defined in paragraph (4) of section 3 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)), by January 1, 2021.
Section 2431 further provides that the plan shall not address
the DSS's personnel security functions.
Section 2432--Notice not required for private entities
Section 2432 provides a Rule of Construction that the
Secretary of the DHS is not required to provide notice to
private entities before issuing directives on agency
information security policies and practices.
Section 2433--Establishment of advisory board for National
Reconnaissance Office
Section 2433 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
authorize the Director of the NRO to establish an advisory
board to study matters related to space, overhead
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters. Section 2433
provides that the board shall terminate three years after the
Director declares the board's first meeting.
Section 2434--Collocation of certain Department of Homeland Security
personnel at field locations
Section 2434 requires DHS I&A to identify opportunities for
collocation of I&A field officers and to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a plan for deployment.
TITLE XXV--ELECTION MATTERS
Section 2501--Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against
United States election infrastructure
Section 2501 directs the DHS Under Secretary for I&A to
submit a report on cyberattacks and attempted cyberattacks by
foreign governments on United States election infrastructure,
in connection with the 2016 presidential election. Section 2501
further requires this report to include identification of the
States and localities affected and include efforts to attack
voter registration databases, voting machines, voting-related
computer networks, and the networks of Secretaries of State and
other election officials.
Section 2502--Review of Intelligence Community's posture to collect
against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the
presidential election
Section 2502 requires the DNI to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, within one year of
enactment of the Act, a report on the Director's review of the
IC's posture to collect against and analyze Russian efforts to
interfere with the 2016 United States presidential election.
Section 2502 further requires the review to include assessments
of IC resources, information sharing, and legal authorities.
Section 2503--Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal
elections
Section 2503 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI,
Secretary of DHS, and heads of other relevant IC elements, to
commence assessments of security vulnerabilities of State
election systems one year before regularly scheduled Federal
elections. Section 2503 further requires the DNI to submit a
report on such assessments 180 days before regularly scheduled
Federal elections, and an updated assessment 90 days before
regularly scheduled Federal elections.
Section 2504--Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United
States elections
Section 2504 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Secretary of DHS, Director of the FBI, Director of the CIA,
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of the
Treasury, to develop a whole-of-government strategy for
countering Russian cyber threats against United States
electoral systems and processes. Section 2504 further requires
this strategy to include input from solicited Secretaries of
State and chief election officials.
Section 2505--Assessment of significant Russian influence campaigns
directed at foreign elections and referenda
Section 2505 requires the DNI to provide a report assessing
past and ongoing Russian influence campaigns against foreign
elections and referenda, to include a summary of the means by
which such influence campaigns have been or are likely to be
conducted, a summary of defenses against or responses to such
Russian influence campaigns, a summary of IC activities to
assist foreign governments against such campaigns, and an
assessment of the effectiveness of such foreign defenses and
responses.
Section 2506--Information sharing with state election officials
Section 2506 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment
of the Act, to support security clearances for each eligible
chief election official of a State, territory, or the District
of Columbia (and additional eligible designees), up to the Top
Secret level. Section 2506 also requires the DNI to assist with
sharing appropriate classified information about threats to
election systems.
Section 2507--Notification of significant foreign cyber intrusions and
active measures campaigns directed at elections for federal
offices
Section 2507 requires the Director of the FBI, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to brief the congressional
intelligence committees, congressional leadership, the armed
services committees, the appropriations committees, and the
homeland security committees (consistent with sources and
methods) not later than 14 days after a determination has been
made with moderate or high confidence that a significant
foreign cyber intrusion or active measures campaign intended to
influence an upcoming election for any Federal office has taken
place by a foreign state or foreign nonstate person, group, or
other entity. The briefing shall provide a description of the
significant foreign cyber intrusion or active measures
campaign, including an identification of the foreign state or
foreign nonstate person or group.
Section 2508--Designation of Counterintelligence Officer to lead
election security matters
Section 2508 requires the DNI to designate a national
counterintelligence officer within the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center to lead, manage, and
coordinate election security-related counterintelligence
matters, including certain risks from foreign power
interference.
TITLE XXVI--ELECTION MATTERS
Section 2601--Definitions
Section 2601 provides definitions for terminology used
throughout this Title.
Section 2602--Reports and plans relating to security clearances and
background investigations
Section 2602 requires the interagency Performance
Accountability Council (Council) to provide plans to reduce the
background investigation inventory and best align the
investigation function between the Department of Defense and
the National Background Investigation Bureau. Section 2602
further requires the Council to report on the future of the
clearance process and requires the DNI to notify the
appropriate committees upon determining requests to change
clearance standards, and the status of those requests'
disposition.
Section 2603--Improving the process for security clearances
Section 2603 requires the DNI to review the Questionnaire
for National Security positions (SF-86) and the Federal
Investigative Standards to determine potential unnecessary
information required and assess whether revisions are necessary
to account for insider threats. Section 2603 further requires
the DNI, in coordination with the Council, to establish
policies on interim clearances and consistency between the
clearance process for contract and government personnel.
Section 2604--Goals for promptness of determinations regarding security
clearances
Section 2604 requires the Council to implement a plan to be
able to process 90 percent of clearance requests at the Secret
level in thirty days, and at the Top Secret level in 90 days.
The plan shall also address how to recognize reciprocity in
accepting clearances among agencies within two weeks, and to
require that ninety percent of clearance holders not be subject
to a time-based periodic investigation.
Section 2605--Security Executive Agent
Section 2605 establishes the DNI as the government's
Security Executive Agent, consistent with Executive Order
13467, and sets forth relevant authorities.
Section 2606--Report on unified, simplified, governmentwide standards
for positions of trust and security clearances
Section 2606 directs the DNI and the Director of the Office
of Personnel Management to report on the advisability and
implications of consolidating the tiers for positions of trust
and security clearances from five to three tiers.
Section 2607--Report on clearance in person concept
Section 2607 requires the DNI to submit a report on a
concept whereby an individual can maintain eligibility for
access to classified information for up to three years after
access may lapse.
Section 2608--Reports on reciprocity for security clearances inside of
departments and agencies
Section 2608 requires each federal agency to submit a
report to the DNI that identifies the number of clearances that
take more than two weeks to reciprocally recognize and set
forth the reason for any delays. Section 2608 further requires
the DNI to submit an annual report summarizing reciprocity.
Section 2609--Intelligence Community reports on security clearances
Section 2609 requires the DNI to submit a report on each IC
element's security clearance metrics, segregated by Federal
employees and contractor employees.
Section 2610--Periodic report on positions in the Intelligence
Community that can be conducted without access to classified
information, networks, or facilities
Section 2610 requires the DNI to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on positions
that can be conducted without access to classified information,
networks, or facilities, or may require only a Secret-level
clearance.
Section 2611--Information sharing program for positions of trust and
security clearances
Section 2611 requires the Security Executive Agent and the
Suitability/Credentialing Executive Agent to establish a
program to share information between and among government
agencies and industry partners to inform decisions about
positions of trust and security clearances.
Section 2612--Report on protections for confidentiality of
whistleblower-related communications
Section 2612 requires the Security Executive Agent, in
coordination with the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, to submit a report detailing the IC's controls used
to ensure continuous evaluation programs protect the
confidentiality of whistleblower-related communications.
TITLE XXVII--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--MATTERS RELATING TO RUSSIA AND OTHER FOREIGN POWERS
Section 2701--Limitation relating to establishment or support of
cybersecurity unit with the Russian Federation
Section 2701 prohibits the Federal government from
expending any funds to establish or support a cybersecurity
unit or other cyber agreement that is jointly established or
otherwise implemented by the United States Government and the
Russian Federation, unless the DNI submits a report to the
appropriate congressional committees at least 30 days prior to
any such agreement. The report shall include the agreement's
purpose, intended shared intelligence, value to national
security, counterintelligence concerns, and any measures taken
to mitigate such concerns.
Section 2702--Report on returning Russian compounds
Section 2702 requires the IC to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, within 180 days of enactment of the
Act, both classified and unclassified reports on the
intelligence risks of returning the diplomatic compounds--in
New York, Maryland, and California--taken from Russia as a
reprisal for Russian meddling in the 2016 United States
presidential election. Section 2702 also establishes an ongoing
requirement for producing similar assessments for future
assignment of diplomatic compounds within the United States.
Section 2703--Assessment of threat finance relating to Russia
Section 2703 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and
Analysis, to submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, within 60 days of enactment of the Act, an
assessment of Russian threat finance, based on all-source
intelligence from both the IC and the Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence of the Treasury Department. Section 2703
further requires the assessment to include global nodes and
entry points for Russian money laundering; United States
vulnerabilities; connections between Russian individuals
involved in money laundering and the Russian Government;
counterintelligence threats to the United States posed by
Russian money laundering and other forms of threat finance; and
challenges to United States Government efforts to enforce
sanctions and combat organized crime.
Section 2704--Notification of an active measures campaign
Section 2704 requires the DNI to notify congressional
leadership, and the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking
Member of the appropriate congressional committees, each time
the DNI has determined there is credible information that a
foreign power has attempted, is attempting, or will attempt to
employ a covert influence or active measures campaign with
regard to the modernization, employment, doctrine, or force
posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile defense. Section
2704 further requires that such notification must include
information on any actions that the United States has taken to
expose or halt such attempts.
Section 2705--Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and
consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the United
States
Section 2705 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that
the Russian Federation provides notification at least two
business days in advance of all travel that is subject to such
requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of
the Russian Federation in the United States, and take necessary
action to secure full compliance by Russian personnel and
address any noncompliance.
Section 2706--Report on outreach strategy addressing threats from
United States adversaries to the United States technology
sector
Section 2706 requires the DNI to submit a report to
appropriate committees on the IC's and the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise's outreach to United States non-government entities
(including private businesses and academia), regarding the
United States' adversaries' efforts to acquire critical United
States infrastructure technology, intellectual property, and
research and development information.
Section 2707--Report on Iranian support of proxy forces in Syria and
Lebanon
Section 2707 requires the DNI to submit a report to
appropriate congressional committees on Iranian support of
proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon and the threat posed to
Israel and other United States regional allies and interests.
Section 2708--Annual report on Iranian expenditures supporting foreign
military and terrorist activates
Section 2708 requires the DNI to submit a report to
Congress describing Iranian expenditures on military and
terrorist activities outside the country.
Section 2709--Expansion of scope of Committee to Counter Active
Measures and report on establishment of Foreign Malign
Influence Center
Section 2709 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 to expand the scope of
the Committee to Counter Active Measures to add China, Iran,
North Korea, and other nation states. Section 2709 further
requires DNI, in coordination with relevant intelligence
community elements, to submit to congressional intelligence
committees a report on establishing a center to assess and
disseminate foreign influence activities, including the
desirability and barriers to such establishment.
SUBTITLE B--REPORTS
Section 2711--Technical correction to Inspector General study
Section 2711 amends Title 50, section 11001(d), by
replacing the IC IG's ``audit'' requirement for Inspectors
General with employees having classified material access, with
a ``review'' requirement.
Section 2712--Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer
of the Department of Homeland Security
Section 2712 requires the Secretary of DHS, in consultation
with the Under Secretary for I&A, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy
of the Under Secretary's authorities required as the Chief
Intelligence Officer to organize the Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise, and the legal and policy changes
necessary to coordinate, organize, and lead DHS intelligence
activities.
Section 2713--Review of Intelligence Community whistleblower matters
Section 2713 directs the Inspector General of the IC (IC
IG), in consultations with the IGs of other IC agencies, to
conduct a review of practices and procedures relating to IC
whistleblower matters.
Section 2714--Report on role of Director of National Intelligence with
respect to certain foreign investments
Section 2714 directs the DNI to submit a report on ODNI's
role in preparing analytic materials in connection with the
United States Government's evaluation of national security
risks associated with potential foreign investments.
Section 2715--Report on surveillance by foreign governments against
United States telecommunications networks
Section 2715 requires the DNI, in coordination with the
Director of the CIA, Director of the NSA, Director of the FBI,
and Secretary of DHS, to submit to the congressional
intelligence, judiciary, and homeland security committees,
within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report on known
attempts by foreign governments to exploit cybersecurity
vulnerabilities in United States telecommunications networks to
surveil United States persons, and any actions that the IC has
taken to protect United States Government agencies and
personnel from such surveillance.
Section 2716--Biennial report on foreign investment risks
Section 2716 requires the DNI to establish an IC working
group on foreign investment risks and prepare a biennial report
that includes an identification, analysis, and explanation of
national security vulnerabilities, foreign investment trends,
foreign countries' strategies to exploit vulnerabilities
through the acquisition of either critical technologies
(including components or items essential to national defense),
critical materials (including physical materials essential to
national security), or critical infrastructure (including
physical or virtual systems and assets whose destruction or
incapacity would have a debilitating impact on national
security), and market distortions caused by foreign countries.
Technologies, materials, and infrastructure are deemed to be
``critical'' under this provision if their exploitation by a
foreign government could cause severe harm to the national
security of the United States.
Section 2717--Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel
of foreign diplomats
Section 2717 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to require reporting of
``a best estimate'' of known or suspected violations of certain
travel requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of the Russian Federation.
Section 2718--Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information
Section 2718 requires the Assistant Attorney General for
National Security at the Department of Justice, in consultation
with the Director of the FBI, to submit to the congressional
intelligence and judiciary committees a semiannual report on
the status of IC referrals to the Department regarding
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Section
2718 also directs IC elements to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a semiannual report on the number of
investigations opened and completed by each agency regarding an
unauthorized public disclosure of classified information to the
media, and the number of completed investigations referred to
the Attorney General.
Section 2719--Congressional notification of designation of covered
intellgience officer as persona non grata
Section 2719 requires, not later than 72 hours after a
covered intelligence officer is designated as persona non
grata, that the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, submit to the designated committees a notification of
that designation, to include the basis for the designation and
justification for the expulsion.
Section 2720--Reports on Intelligence Community participation in
vulnerabilities equities process of Federal government
Section 2720 requires the DNI to submit, within 90 days of
enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence
committees a report describing the Vulnerabilities Equities
Process (VEP) roles and responsibilities for each IC element.
Section 2720 further requires each IC element to report to the
congressional intelligence committees within 30 days of a
significant change to that respective IC element's VEP process
and criteria. Section 2720 also requires the DNI to submit an
annual report to the congressional intelligence committees with
specified information on certain VEP metrics.
Section 2721--Inspectors General reports on classification
Section 2721 requires each designated IG to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the accuracy
in the application of classification and handling markings on a
representative sample of finished products, to include those
with compartments. Section 2721 also directs analyses of
compliance with declassification procedures and a review of the
effectiveness of processes for identifying topics of public or
historical importance that merit prioritization for
declassification review.
Section 2722--Reports on global water insecurity and national security
implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and
pandemics
Section 2722 requires the DNI to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report every five years
on the implications of global water insecurity on the United
States' national security interests. Section 2722 further
requires the DNI to provide a briefing to appropriate
congressional committees on the geopolitical effects of
emerging infectious disease and pandemics, and their
implications on the United States' national security.
Section 2722--Reports on global water insecurity and national security
implications and briefing on emerging infectious disease and
pandemics
Section 2722 requires the DNI to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report every five years
on the implications of global water insecurity on the United
States' national security interests. Section 2722 further
requires the DNI to provide a briefing to appropriate
congressional committees on the geopolitical effects of
emerging infectious disease and pandemics, and their
implications on the United States' national security.
Section 2723--Annual report on memoranda of understanding between
elements of intelligence community and other entities of the
United States government regarding significant operational
activities or policy
Section 2723 amends a provision in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, instead requiring each
IC element to submit an annual report to the congressional
intelligence committees that lists each significant memorandum
of understanding or other agreement entered into during the
preceding fiscal year. Section 2723 further requires each IC
element to provide such documents if an intelligence committee
so requests.
Section 2724--Study on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified
wireline and wireless telephone calls
Section 2724 requires the DNI to complete a study and
report on the feasibility of encrypting unclassified wireline
and wireless telephone calls between personnel in the IC.
Section 2725--Modification of requirement for annual report on hiring
and retention of minority employees
Section 2725 expands and clarifies current IC reporting
requirements on diversity of IC personnel to include five prior
fiscal years and to disaggregate data by IC element.
Section 2726--Reports on Intelligence Community loan repayment and
related programs
Section 2726 requires the DNI, in cooperation with the
heads of the elements of the IC, to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on potentially establishing an
IC-wide program for student loan repayment and forgiveness.
Section 2727--Repeal of certain reporting requirements
Section 2727 repeals certain intelligence community
reporting requirements.
Section 2728--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on
senior executives of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Section 2728 directs the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community to submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding senior executive service
staffing at the ODNI.
Section 2729--Briefing on Federal Bureau of Investigation offering
permanent residence to sources and cooperators
Section 2729 directs the FBI within 30 days of enactment of
this Act to provide a briefing to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding the FBI's ability to provide
permanent U.S. residence to foreign individuals who serve as
cooperators in national security-related investigations.
Section 2730--Intelligence assessment of North Korea revenue sources
Section 2730 requires the DNI, in coordination with other
relevant IC elements, to produce to the congressional
intelligence committees an intelligence assessment of the North
Korean regime's revenue sources.
Section 2731--Report on possible exploitation of virtual currencies by
terrorist actors
Section 2731 requires the DNI, in consultation with the
Secretary of Treasury, to submit to Congress a report on the
possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist
actors.
SUBTITLE C--OTHER MATTERS
Section 2741--Public Interest Declassification Board
Section 2741 reauthorizes the Public Interest
Declassification Board administered by the National Archives
for a term of ten years, expiring on December 31, 2028.
Section 2742--Technical and clerical amendments to the National
Security Act of 1947
Section 2742 makes certain edits to the National Security
Act of 1947 as amended for technical or clerical purposes.
Section 2743--Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy
Section 2743 provides technical corrections to certain
provisions regarding the Department of Energy's Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Section 2744--Sense of Congress on notifications of certain disclosures
of classified information
Section 2744 expresses the sense of Congress that, pursuant
to the requirement for the IC to keep the congressional
intelligence committees fully and currently informed'' in
Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, IC agencies
must submit prompt written notification after becoming aware
that an individual in the executive branch has disclosed
certain classified information outside established intelligence
channels to foreign adversaries--North Korea, Iran, China,
Russia, or Cuba.
Section 2745--Sense of Congress on consideration of espionage
activities when considering whether or not to provide visas to
foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations
Mission in the United States
Section 2745 provides a Sense of Congress that, as to
foreign individuals to be accredited to a United Nations
mission, the Secretary of State should consider known and
suspected intelligence and espionage activities, including
activities constituting precursors to espionage, carried out by
such individuals against the United States, or against foreign
allies or partners of the United States. Section 2745 further
provides that the Secretary of State should consider an
individual's status as a known or suspected intelligence
officer for a foreign adversary.
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee held multiple
hearings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R.
3494. The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects
conclusions reached by the Committee in light of this oversight
activity.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
The goals and objectives of H.R. 3494 are to authorize the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020. These
activities enhance the national security of the United States,
support and assist the armed forces of the United States, and
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of
the United States.
The classified annex that accompanies this report reflects
in great detail the Committee's specific performance goals and
objectives at the programmatic level with respect to classified
programs.
Unfunded Mandate Statement
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office
included herein.
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, July 11, 2019.
Hon. Adam Schiff,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3494, the Damon
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is William Ma.
Sincerely,
Phillip L. Swagel,
Director.
Enclosure.
Bill summary: H.R. 3494 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal years 2019 and 2020 for intelligence activities of the
U.S. government, including the Intelligence Community
Management Account and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS). The bill also would
modify the security clearance process for federal agencies,
expand personnel benefits for employees of the intelligence
community, and create or modify other intelligence programs.
CBO does not provide estimates for classified programs;
therefore, this estimate addresses only the unclassified
aspects of the bill. In addition, CBO cannot provide estimates
for certain provisions in the unclassified portion of the bill
because they concern classified programs. On that limited
basis, CBO estimates that implementing the unclassified
provisions of the bill would cost about $5.9 billion over the
2020-2024 period; that spending would be subject to the
appropriation of the specified and estimated amounts.
In addition, several provisions of the bill also would
increase and decrease direct spending; therefore, pay-as-you-go
procedures apply. On net, however, CBO estimates that those
effects would be insignificant over the 2020-2029 period.
Enacting the bill would not affect revenues.
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3494 would not
significantly increase net direct spending or on-budget
deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods
beginning in 2030.
H.R. 3494 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
Estimated Federal cost: The estimated budgetary effect of
H.R. 3494 is shown in Table 1. The costs of the legislation
fall within all budget functions that fund security and
suitability investigations.
TABLE 1--ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF H.R. 3494, AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ON JUNE 27, 2019
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, millions of dollarsa_
----------------------------------------------------------------------
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2019-2024
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Security Clearances:
Estimated Authorization Level 0 411 840 1,310 1,350 1,400 5,311
Estimated Outlays 0 361 800 1,260 1,350 1,400 5,171
Intelligence Community Management
Account:
Authorization Level 0 566 0 0 0 0 566
Estimated Outlays 0 368 158 20 8 3 557
Pay and Benefits:
Estimated Authorization Level 0 1 23 47 49 51 171
Estimated Outlays 0 1 23 47 49 51 171
Task Forces and Other Advisory Bodies:
Estimated Authorization Level 0 5 5 5 4 3 22
Estimated Outlays 0 5 5 5 4 3 22
Prize Competitions:
Estimated Authorization Level 0 11 * 0 0 0 11
Estimated Outlays 0 1 10 0 0 0 11
Assessments, and Briefings:
Estimated Authorization Level 0 5 * * * * 6
Estimated Outlays 0 5 * * * * 6
Totals:..............................
Estimated Authorization Level 0 999 868 1,362 1,403 1,454 6,087
Estimated Outlays 0 741 996 1,332 1,411 1,457 5,938
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Components may not sum to totals because of rounding; * = between -$500,000 and $500,000.
a. In addition to the budgetary effects shown above, enacting H.R. 3494 would affect direct spending by between
$500,000 and $500,000 over the 2020-2029 period.
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R.
3494 will be enacted near the beginning of fiscal year 2020.
Outlays are based on historical spending patterns for existing
or similar programs.
Spending subject to appropriation
CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost about
$5.9 billion over the 2020-2024 period. Such spending would be
subject to appropriation of the estimated and specified
amounts.
Security Clearances. Title XXVI of the bill would require
the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance
Accountability Council (the Council) to achieve the following
performance goals by December 31, 2021:\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\The Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance
Accountability Council was established by Executive Order 13467, as
amended, to oversee reform of the federal government's system for
determining the eligibility of individuals to access classified
information, hold sensitive positions (positions in which an individual
could affect national security or trust in the federal government
regardless of whether the individual has access to classified
information), and gain physical or logical access to federal facilities
or information systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue 90 percent of initial determinations for
secret and top secret clearances within 30 and 90 days,
respectively;
Accept 90 percent of security clearances for
employees moving between federal agencies within two weeks if
the clearances are equivalent; and
Reinvestigate not more than 10 percent of all
clearance holders at set intervals.
Title XXVI also would require the Council, the Director of
National Intelligence, and other federal entities to develop
plans, policies, and strategies, to perform reviews, and to
prepare reports on different aspects of the security clearance
process. In total, CBO estimates that implementing title XXVI
would cost about $5.2 billion over the 2020-2024 period.
Timeliness. Current law sets a goal of completing 90
percent of security-clearance determinations within an average
of 60 days from the date that the completed application is
received. The Administration only applies that timeliness
standard to initial determinations for secret clearances and
has adopted other standards for top secret clearances and
periodic reinvestigations. The current timeliness goals for the
fastest 90 percent of security-clearance determinations are:
An average of 60 days for initial secret
clearances (40 days to complete the investigative phase and 20
days to complete the adjudicative phase),
An average of 100 days for initial top secret
clearances (80 days to complete the investigative phase and 20
days to complete the adjudicative phase), and
An average of 180 days for periodic
reinvestigations regardless of clearance level (150 days to
complete the investigative phase and 30 days to complete the
adjudicative phase).
Those goals, whether determined by statute or policy,
however, currently are not being met. At the end of May 2019,
the backlog of pending cases totaled 433,000. CBO estimates
that the Administration will spend about $1.5 billion on all
investigative services and another $0.1 billion on adjudicative
services in 2019. With that backlog, and under those resource
levels, the average time it took to complete the investigative
and adjudicative phases for the fastest 90 percent of
clearances at the end of May 2019 was:
169 days for initial secret clearances (139 days
to complete the investigative phase and 30 days to complete the
adjudicative phase).
338 days for initial top secret clearances (296
days to complete the investigative phase and 42 days to
complete the adjudicative phase).
425 days for periodic reinvestigations (325 days
to complete the investigative phase and 100 days to complete
the adjudicative phase).
In order to meet the 30 and 90-day requirements of title
XXVI, the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB) must
first reduce the backlog to a level that would allow the
federal government to meet the existing investigative and
adjudicative processing goals. The bureau has been steadily
expanding its workforce and reports that it expects to reduce
the backlog to a manageable level in a couple of years.
Concurrently, as NBIB works to reduce the backlog, the bureau's
background-investigation program is being transferred to the
Department of Defense (DoD).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Section 925 of Public Law 115-91, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, authorized DoD to conduct
security, suitability, and credentialing background investigations for
DoD personnel. The Administration has since decided to transfer NBIB's
investigation program to DoD. Executive Order 13869, signed April 24,
2019, makes the newly formed Defense Counterintelligence and Security
Agency of DoD responsible for conducting background investigations for
the federal government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBO expects that the current and upcoming initiatives will
continue to reduce the backlog as planned and allow the current
timeliness goals to be met by 2022. We also assume that the
transfer of NBIB's responsibilities to DoD will be completed as
planned.
The difference between the current timeliness goals and
those prescribed by the bill is significant. The current
structure establishes goals for an average processing time for
the fastest 90 percent of cases. By contrast, the bill would
establish maximum processing times for the fastest 90 percent
of cases. Those targets would be significantly shorter than the
current average processing times. Taking that into
consideration, we estimate that the capacity to investigate and
adjudicate initial secret and top secret clearances would need
to increase by about 200 percent and 67 percent, respectively,
to meet the faster processing requirements of title XXVI. For
2019, CBO estimates that the executive branch will spend about
$0.4 billion and $0.6 billion on investigating and adjudicating
initial secret clearances and initial top secret clearances,
respectively. Thus, spending on those activities would
ultimately need to increase by about $1.2 billion annually.
Under title XXVI, DoD would have three years to hire and train
the necessary number of investigators and adjudicators to meet
the prescribed timeliness goals in fiscal year 2022. Accounting
for that implementation phase, CBO estimates that it would cost
about $0.4 billion in 2020 and about $5.2 billion over the
2020-2024 period.
Administrative Costs. Title XXVI would require federal
entities to develop policies, perform assessments, and prepare
reports on several aspects of the security-clearance process.
For entities in the intelligence community, CBO expects that
the administrative costs of those requirements would be covered
by the amounts authorized to be appropriated in the classified
annex and for the ICMA. For federal entities that are not part
of the intelligence community, CBO estimates total costs of $1
million over the 2020-2024 period.
Periodic Reinvestigations. Title XXVI would encourage the
Council to limit reinvestigations conducted on the schedules
set by the Administration to not more than 10 percent of all
clearance holders. In 2017, about 4 million individuals held
clearances, and this provision would require the federal
government to use methods other than periodic reinvestigations
on about 3.6 million of them to ensure that they remain
eligible to access classified information. CBO expects that the
method used to replace periodic reinvestigations would include,
but not be limited to, the use of automated records checks.
Any costs or savings realized by using automated records
checks as part of a larger effort to replace periodic
investigations would depend on the frequency (e.g. daily,
weekly, monthly, annually) with which they are conducted and
the methods used to obtain information they cannot provide.
Because CBO does not know how the Council would implement this
provision, we cannot estimate its effects on spending.
While most agencies are funded by annual appropriations,
some agencies are authorized to spend monies collected from
other sources, such as user fees. In addition to the increases
in spending subject to appropriation described above, any
increase in costs to process security clearances and satisfy
the requirements of this title incurred by those agencies would
be considered direct spending. Those effects are described
below in the ``Direct Spending'' section of this estimate.
Intelligence Community Management Account. Section 103
would authorize the appropriation of $566 million for fiscal
year 2020 for the ICMA. The ICMA is the principal source of
funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and for coordinating the intelligence activities of the federal
government. CBO estimates that implementing section 103 would
cost about $557 million over the 2020-2024 period, subject to
appropriation of the authorized amount.
Pay and Benefits. Sections 303 and 2303 would expand pay
and benefits offered to employees of the intelligence
community. In total, CBO estimates that implementing those
provisions would cost $171 million over the 2020-2024 period.
Paid Parental Leave. Section 303 would provide 12 weeks of
paid leave to employees of the intelligence community following
the birth or adoption of a child or the initial placement of a
foster child. Such leave would be available during the 12-month
period beginning on the date of the child's birth or placement.
DNI would have 18 months from the date of enactment of the bill
to implement the new leave program. Employees of the
intelligence community would become entitled to paid leave for
the birth or placement of a child that occurs on or after the
date of such implementation.
Under current law, federal employees are entitled to up to
12 weeks of leave without pay after the birth or adoption of a
child or the initial placement of a foster child. Employees may
get paid during that 12-week period by using any annual or sick
leave that they have accrued. The leave provided by this bill
would be in addition to any leave available to, or taken by,
those employees during the 12-week period provided by the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). CBO expects that employees
entitled to paid leave provided under H.R. 3494 would
substitute that leave for annual or sick leave they otherwise
would have taken during the 12-week FMLA leave period.
CBO estimates that implementing section 303 would cost $163
million over the 2020-2024 period. Because the exact number of
employees in each element of the intelligence community is
classified, CBO relied on publicly available information about
the amounts appropriated to DoD and the intelligence community,
as well as the number of people employed by DoD as the basis of
this estimate.
In addition to the increases in spending subject to
appropriation described above, enacting section 303 also would
affect direct spending. Those effects are described below in
the ``Direct Spending'' section of this estimate.
National Security Agency (NSA) Pay Authority. Section 2303
would authorize the NSA to establish higher pay rates for
employees in cybersecurity fields at the agency. In general,
the rates of pay established under that authority could not
exceed the rate of basic pay for level II of the Executive
Schedule ($192,300, in 2019); however, in certain
circumstances, up to 100 NSA employees at any given time could
receive up to the rate of basic pay for the Vice President of
the United States ($246,900, in 2019).
On the basis of information from DoD, CBO estimates that
about two to three dozen employees would receive an average of
$15,800 more in compensation in fiscal year 2020 under section
2303. That estimate is based on CBO's expectation that the new
pay rates would take effect six months following enactment
(halfway into the fiscal year) to allow NSA time to develop and
apply those higher rates of pay. After accounting for annual
pay increases and the expectation that NSA would expand its use
of this authority over time, CBO estimates that by 2024 the
average increase in annual compensation would be about $35,100
and the number of NSA employees receiving such increases would
double. Thus, CBO estimates that increasing pay for those NSA
employees would cost $8 million over the 2020-2024 period.
Task Forces and Other Advisory Bodies. Several sections of
the bill would require elements of the intelligence community
to establish task forces and other oversight and advisory
bodies; a handful of those would disband after a few years
while others would operate permanently. CBO estimates that
salaries for about two dozen full-time equivalents plus other
support costs to establish and carry out the responsibilities
of those groups would total $5 million in 2020 and $22 million
over the 2020-2024 period.
Prize Competitions. Sections 706 and 707 would authorize
the Director of National Intelligence to organize two
competitions to encourage research. In each of those
competitions, the Director could award prizes totaling up to $5
million. The competition authorized by section 706 would be
used to promote research and development of fifth-generation
wireless technology. The competition authorized by section 707
would be used to promote research and development of
technologies to detect forged or manipulated digital content.
CBO expects that it would take the Director one year to
organize those competitions and to publicly announce,
advertise, and publish the terms in advance of each
competition. Those efforts would cost $1 million in 2020 and as
competitions occurred, an additional $10 million in 2021, for a
total of $11 million over the 2020-2024 period, CBO estimates.
Reports, Briefings, and Assessments. Division B of the bill
would require several agencies to complete more than 60
reports, briefings, and assessments and to deliver those
products and findings to the Congress. On the basis of the
costs of similar activities, satisfying those requirements
would cost $6 million over the 2020-2024 period, CBO estimates.
Direct spending
H.R. 3494 would extend workers' compensation benefits to
certain private-sector employees, enhance the benefits offered
to certain annuitants of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and authorize appropriations
for 2019 and 2020. The bill also would affect spending by
agencies not funded through annual appropriations. On net, and
excluding provisions related to classified programs, CBO
estimates that enacting H.R. 3494 would have an insignificant
effect on direct spending over the 2020-2029 period.
Public-Private Talent Exchange. Section 306 would establish
a program for temporarily exchanging employees of elements of
the intelligence community and employees of entities in the
private sector. That exchange would increase direct spending
for compensation for private-sector employees who are injured
in the course of their work in the intelligence community.
Those related medical expenses would be paid through the
federal workers' compensation program; such payments are
classified as direct spending. CBO expects that few private-
sector employees would become injured while participating in
the program established by section 306; thus, the additional
liability would increase direct spending by less than $500,000
over the 2020-2029 period.
CIARDS Benefits Adjustments. Section 2202 would make a
number of changes to CIARDS to align the benefits offered to
employees, retirees, or survivors under CIARDS with the
benefits currently offered to employees, retirees, or survivors
under the Civil Service Retirement System. Those changes would
both increase and decrease spending on retirement benefits. For
example, the bill would increase retirement benefits for
employees who worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
before April 7, 1986, and at some point during their career,
worked on a part-time basis. The bill also would allow married
employees retiring under CIARDS after enactment to provide a
survivor annuity to someone with an insurable interest. (An
insurable interest exists when an individual derives financial
benefit from the retiring employee continuing to be alive.)
Total annuity payments for retirees who elect to provide a
survivor annuity to someone with an insurable interest would be
reduced or increased depending on how long they and the
designated beneficiary live. On the basis of information from
the CIA, CBO estimates that only a small number of individuals
would benefit from the changes in section 2202. On net, CBO
estimates that the difference in direct spending from enacting
the section would be less than $500,000 over the 2020-2029
period.
Security Clearances. Implementing any actions necessary to
comply with the requirements of title XXVI and preparing the
required reports would increase the administrative expenses for
agencies not funded through annual appropriations. Such
spending is considered direct spending. Because those agencies
are able to increase the fees that provide their funding as
necessary to cover their costs, CBO estimates that the net
difference in spending by those agencies would be insignificant
over the 2020-2029 period. (More information about the
requirements of title XXVI of the bill is provided above under
the heading, ``Spending Subject to Appropriation.'')
Paid Parental Leave. Section 303 would provide up to 12
weeks of paid leave to employees of the intelligence community
following the birth or adoption of a child or the initial
placement of a foster child. Once implemented, CBO estimates
that section 303 would increase balances of sick leave for
those employees who now would defer the use of some sick leave
they otherwise would have taken for child care under current
law. Any additional sick leave carried through to retirement
would be used in the computation of those employees' or
survivors' annuities; increases in annuity payments are
classified as direct spending. Because the effect on the
payment of future retirement annuities would be small, CBO
estimates that enacting section 303 would increase direct
spending by less than $500,000 over the 2020-2029 period. (More
information about Paid Parental Leave is provided above under
the heading, ``Spending Subject to Appropriation.'')
CIARDS Fund Payment. Sections 201 and 2201 would authorize
the appropriation of $514 million for CIARDS for fiscal years
2020 and 2019, respectively, to maintain the necessary funding
level for operating that retirement and disability system.
Appropriations to CIARDS are treated as direct spending in the
budget and are projected to continue at the authorized levels
in CBO's baseline pursuant to section 257 of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. Because the
amount that would be authorized by the bill is included in
CBO's baseline, that authorization would have no budgetary
effect relative to the baseline.
Uncertainty
The most significant area of uncertainty arises from
estimating the costs of changing the process for granting
security clearances. The bill would give the Council broad
latitude in reforming that process; thus, the steps taken by
the Council to meet the processing goals of security clearance
investigations and other matters could differ significantly
from CBO's estimate.
Additionally, the actual number of personnel employed by
the intelligence community is classified. The costs of
additional personnel benefits are also uncertain because the
number of personnel that would receive those benefits could
differ significantly from CBO's estimate.
Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go
Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement
procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or
revenues. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply to this legislation
because enacting it would affect direct spending; however, CBO
estimates that those effects would be insignificant.
Increase in long-term deficits: CBO estimates that enacting
H.R. 3494 would not increase on-budget deficits by more than $5
billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods
beginning in 2030.
Mandates: None.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: William Ma, Dan Ready
(federal pay), and Meredith Decker (workers' compensation);
Mandates: Brandon Lever.
Estimate reviewed by: David Newman, Chief, Defense,
International Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs Cost Estimates
Unit; Susan Willie, Chief, Mandates Unit; Leo Lex, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis; Theresa Gullo,
Assistant Director for Budget.
Statement on Congressional Earmarks
Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax
benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no
change is proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
short title
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Title I--Coordination for National Security
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 107. National Security Resources Board.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering,
or math positions.]
Sec. 113B. Special pay authority for science, technology, engineering,
or mathematics positions.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 120. Climate Security Advisory Council.
Title II--The Department of Defense
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 202. Secretary of Defense.
[Sec. 203. Military Assistants to the Secretary.
[Sec. 204. Civilian personnel.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 208. United States Air Force.
[Sec. 209. Effective date of transfers.
[Sec. 210. War Council.
[Sec. 211. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[Sec. 212. Joint Staff.
[Sec. 213. Munitions Board.
[Sec. 214. Research and Development Board.]
Title III--Miscellaneous
* * * * * * *
Sec. 305. Paid parental leave.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 312. Repealing and saving provisions.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 506J. Annual assessment of intelligence community performance by
function.]
* * * * * * *
Sec. 512. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community.
Sec. 513. Briefings and notifications on counterintelligence activities
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 803. Exceptions.
[Sec. 804. Definitions.]
Sec. 803. Security Executive Agent.
Sec. 804. Exceptions.
Sec. 805. Definitions.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1105. Semiannual reports on investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 1106. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the
United States by the Communist Party of China.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
joint intelligence community council
Sec. 101A. (a) Joint Intelligence Community Council.--There
is a Joint Intelligence Community Council.
(b) Membership.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council
shall consist of the following:
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, who shall
chair the Council.
(2) The Secretary of State.
(3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(4) The Secretary of Defense.
(5) The Attorney General.
(6) The Secretary of Energy.
(7) The Secretary of Homeland Security.
(8) Such other officers of the United States
Government as the President may designate from time to
time.
(c) Functions.--The Joint Intelligence Community Council
shall assist the Director of National Intelligence in
developing and implementing a joint, unified national
intelligence effort to protect national security by--
(1) advising the Director on establishing
requirements, developing budgets, financial management,
and monitoring and evaluating the performance of the
intelligence community, and on such other matters as
the Director may request; and
(2) ensuring the timely execution of programs,
policies, and directives established or developed by
the Director.
(d) Meetings.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
convene [regular] meetings of the Joint Intelligence Community
Council as the Director considers appropriate.
(e) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman.--(1)
A member of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (other
than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an
opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in
addition to, the advice presented by the Director of National
Intelligence to the President or the National Security Council,
in the role of the Chairman as Chairman of the Joint
Intelligence Community Council. If a member submits such advice
or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of
such member at the same time the Chairman presents the advice
of the Chairman to the President or the National Security
Council, as the case may be.
(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that
the presentation of the advice of the Chairman to the President
or the National Security Council is not unduly delayed by
reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of
another member of the Council.
(f) Recommendations to Congress.--Any member of the Joint
Intelligence Community Council may make such recommendations to
Congress relating to the intelligence community as such member
considers appropriate.
* * * * * * *
responsibilities and authorities of the director of national
intelligence
Sec. 102A. (a) Provision of Intelligence.--(1) The Director
of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that
national intelligence is provided--
(A) to the President;
(B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the
executive branch;
(C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
senior military commanders;
(D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and
the committees thereof; and
(E) to such other persons as the Director of National
Intelligence determines to be appropriate.
(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective,
independent of political considerations, and based upon all
sources available to the intelligence community and other
appropriate entities.
(b) Access to Intelligence.--Unless otherwise directed by the
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall have
access to all national intelligence and intelligence related to
the national security which is collected by any Federal
department, agency, or other entity, except as otherwise
provided by law or, as appropriate, under guidelines agreed
upon by the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) Budget Authorities.--(1) With respect to budget requests
and appropriations for the National Intelligence Program, the
Director of National Intelligence shall--
(A) based on intelligence priorities set by the
President, provide to the heads of departments
containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community, and to the heads of such
agencies and organizations, guidance for developing the
National Intelligence Program budget pertaining to such
agencies and organizations;
(B) based on budget proposals provided to the
Director of National Intelligence by the heads of
agencies and organizations within the intelligence
community and the heads of their respective departments
and, as appropriate, after obtaining the advice of the
Joint Intelligence Community Council, develop and
determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence
Program budget; and
(C) present such consolidated National Intelligence
Program budget, together with any comments from the
heads of departments containing agencies or
organizations within the intelligence community, to the
President for approval.
(2) In addition to the information provided under paragraph
(1)(B), the heads of agencies and organizations within the
intelligence community shall provide the Director of National
Intelligence such other information as the Director shall
request for the purpose of determining the annual consolidated
National Intelligence Program budget under that paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of
the annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any
successor program or programs.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
guidance for the development of the annual budget for each
element of the intelligence community that is not within the
National Intelligence Program.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the
effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities.
(5)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall be
responsible for managing appropriations for the National
Intelligence Program by directing the allotment or allocation
of such appropriations through the heads of the departments
containing agencies or organizations within the intelligence
community and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
with prior notice (including the provision of appropriate
supporting information) to the head of the department
containing an agency or organization receiving any such
allocation or allotment or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, pursuant to
relevant appropriations Acts for the National Intelligence
Program, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
shall exercise the authority of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget to apportion funds, at the exclusive
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, for
allocation to the elements of the intelligence community
through the relevant host executive departments and the Central
Intelligence Agency. Department comptrollers or appropriate
budget execution officers shall allot, allocate, reprogram, or
transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence
Program in an expeditious manner.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall monitor the
implementation and execution of the National Intelligence
Program by the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community that manage programs and activities that are part of
the National Intelligence Program, which may include audits and
evaluations.
(6) Apportionment and allotment of funds under this
subsection shall be subject to chapter 13 and section 1517 of
title 31, United States Code, and the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding
implementation of this section.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall report to the
President and the Congress not later than 15 days after
learning of any instance in which a departmental comptroller
acts in a manner inconsistent with the law (including permanent
statutes, authorization Acts, and appropriations Acts), or the
direction of the Director of National Intelligence, in carrying
out the National Intelligence Program.
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) No funds made available under
the National Intelligence Program may be transferred or
reprogrammed without the prior approval of the Director of
National Intelligence, except in accordance with procedures
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the Military Intelligence Program or
any successor program or programs.
(2) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection,
the Director of National Intelligence may transfer or reprogram
funds appropriated for a program within the National
Intelligence Program--
(A) to another such program;
(B) to other departments or agencies of the United
States Government for the development and fielding of
systems of common concern related to the collection,
processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination
of intelligence information; or
(C) to a program funded by appropriations not within
the National Intelligence Program to address critical
gaps in intelligence information sharing or access
capabilities.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer
or reprogram funds referred to in paragraph (1)(A)--
(A) with the approval of the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget; and
(B) after consultation with the heads of departments
containing agencies or organizations within the
intelligence community to the extent such agencies or
organizations are affected, and, in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency, after consultation with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(4) The amounts available for transfer or reprogramming in
the National Intelligence Program in any given fiscal year, and
the terms and conditions governing such transfers and
reprogrammings, are subject to the provisions of annual
appropriations Acts and this subsection.
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds may be made under
this subsection only if--
(i) the funds are being transferred to an activity
that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
(ii) the transfer or reprogramming supports an
emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or
increases efficiency;
(iii) the transfer or reprogramming does not involve
a transfer or reprogramming of funds to a Reserve for
Contingencies of the Director of National Intelligence
or the Reserve for Contingencies of the Central
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the transfer or reprogramming results in a
cumulative transfer or reprogramming of funds out of
any department or agency, as appropriate, funded in the
National Intelligence Program in a single fiscal year--
(I) that is less than $150,000,000, and
(II) that is less than 5 percent of amounts
available to a department or agency under the
National Intelligence Program; and
(v) the transfer or reprogramming does not terminate
an acquisition program.
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by
the head of the department involved or the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central
Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
(6) Funds transferred or reprogrammed under this subsection
shall remain available for the same period as the
appropriations account to which transferred or reprogrammed.
(7) Any transfer or reprogramming of funds under this
subsection shall be carried out in accordance with existing
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications for the
appropriate congressional committees. Any proposed transfer or
reprogramming for which notice is given to the appropriate
congressional committees shall be accompanied by a report
explaining the nature of the proposed transfer or reprogramming
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection. In
addition, the congressional intelligence committees shall be
promptly notified of any transfer or reprogramming of funds
made pursuant to this subsection in any case in which the
transfer or reprogramming would not have otherwise required
reprogramming notification under procedures in effect as of the
date of the enactment of this subsection.
(e) Transfer of Personnel.--(1)(A) In addition to any other
authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first
twelve months after establishment of a new national
intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and in consultation with the congressional
committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may
transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of
the intelligence community to such center.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives;
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(C) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.
(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence, with the
approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and in accordance with procedures to be developed by the
Director of National Intelligence and the heads of the
departments and agencies concerned, may transfer personnel
authorized for an element of the intelligence community to
another such element for a period of not more than 2 years.
(B) A transfer of personnel may be made under this paragraph
only if--
(i) the personnel are being transferred to an
activity that is a higher priority intelligence
activity; and
(ii) the transfer supports an emergent need, improves
program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.
(C) The Director of National Intelligence shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
(D) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (C) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this paragraph.
(3)(A) In addition to the number of full-time equivalent
positions authorized for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for a fiscal year, there is authorized for such
Office for each fiscal year an additional 100 full-time
equivalent positions that may be used only for the purposes
described in subparagraph (B).
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of
National Intelligence may use a full-time equivalent position
authorized under subparagraph (A) only for the purpose of
providing a temporary transfer of personnel made in accordance
with paragraph (2) to an element of the intelligence community
to enable such element to increase the total number of
personnel authorized for such element, on a temporary basis--
(i) during a period in which a permanent employee of
such element is absent to participate in critical
language training; or
(ii) to accept a permanent employee of another
element of the intelligence community to provide
language-capable services.
(C) Paragraph (2)(B) shall not apply with respect to a
transfer of personnel made under subparagraph (B).
(D) For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the
use of authorities under this paragraph. Each such report shall
include a description of--
(i) the number of transfers of personnel made by the
Director pursuant to subparagraph (B), disaggregated by
each element of the intelligence community;
(ii) the critical language needs that were fulfilled
or partially fulfilled through the use of such
transfers; and
(iii) the cost to carry out subparagraph (B).
(4) It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the nature of the national security threats
facing the United States will continue to challenge the
intelligence community to respond rapidly and flexibly
to bring analytic resources to bear against emerging
and unforeseen requirements;
(B) both the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and any analytic centers determined to be
necessary should be fully and properly supported with
appropriate levels of personnel resources and that the
President's yearly budget requests adequately support
those needs; and
(C) the President should utilize all legal and
administrative discretion to ensure that the Director
of National Intelligence and all other elements of the
intelligence community have the necessary resources and
procedures to respond promptly and effectively to
emerging and unforeseen national security challenges.
(f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1)(A) The Director of
National Intelligence shall--
(i) establish objectives, priorities, and guidance
for the intelligence community to ensure timely and
effective collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination (including access by users to collected
data consistent with applicable law and, as
appropriate, the guidelines referred to in subsection
(b) and analytic products generated by or within the
intelligence community) of national intelligence;
(ii) determine requirements and priorities for, and
manage and direct the tasking of, collection, analysis,
production, and dissemination of national intelligence
by elements of the intelligence community, including--
(I) approving requirements (including those
requirements responding to needs provided by
consumers) for collection and analysis; and
(II) resolving conflicts in collection
requirements and in the tasking of national
collection assets of the elements of the
intelligence community; and
(iii) provide advisory tasking to intelligence
elements of those agencies and departments not within
the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The authority of the Director of National Intelligence
under subparagraph (A) shall not apply--
(i) insofar as the President so directs;
(ii) with respect to clause (ii) of subparagraph (A),
insofar as the Secretary of Defense exercises tasking
authority under plans or arrangements agreed upon by
the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(iii) to the direct dissemination of information to
State government and local government officials and
private sector entities pursuant to sections 201 and
892 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121,
482).
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
National Counterterrorism Center, the National
Counterproliferation Center, and the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center and may establish such
other national intelligence centers as the Director determines
necessary.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe,
in consultation with the heads of other agencies or elements of
the intelligence community, and the heads of their respective
departments, personnel policies and programs applicable to the
intelligence community that--
(i) encourage and facilitate assignments and details
of personnel to national intelligence centers, and
between elements of the intelligence community;
(ii) set standards for education, training, and
career development of personnel of the intelligence
community;
(iii) encourage and facilitate the recruitment and
retention by the intelligence community of highly
qualified individuals for the effective conduct of
intelligence activities;
(iv) ensure that the personnel of the intelligence
community are sufficiently diverse for purposes of the
collection and analysis of intelligence through the
recruitment and training of women, minorities, and
individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic backgrounds;
(v) make service in more than one element of the
intelligence community a condition of promotion to such
positions within the intelligence community as the
Director shall specify; and
(vi) ensure the effective management of intelligence
community personnel who are responsible for
intelligence community-wide matters.
(B) Policies prescribed under subparagraph (A) shall not be
inconsistent with the personnel policies otherwise applicable
to members of the uniformed services.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States
by the Central Intelligence Agency and shall ensure such
compliance by other elements of the intelligence community
through the host executive departments that manage the programs
and activities that are part of the National Intelligence
Program.
(5) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure the
elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the
intelligence community.
(6) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish
requirements and priorities for foreign intelligence
information to be collected under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), and provide
assistance to the Attorney General to ensure that information
derived from electronic surveillance or physical searches under
that Act is disseminated so it may be used efficiently and
effectively for national intelligence purposes, except that the
Director shall have no authority to direct or undertake
electronic surveillance or physical search operations pursuant
to that Act unless authorized by statute or Executive order.
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall, if the
Director determines it is necessary, or may, if requested by a
congressional intelligence committee, conduct an accountability
review of an element of the intelligence community or the
personnel of such element in relation to a failure or
deficiency within the intelligence community.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall establish guidelines and
procedures for conducting an accountability review under
subparagraph (A).
(C)(i) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide
the findings of an accountability review conducted under
subparagraph (A) and the Director's recommendations for
corrective or punitive action, if any, to the head of the
applicable element of the intelligence community. Such
recommendations may include a recommendation for dismissal of
personnel.
(ii) If the head of such element does not implement a
recommendation made by the Director under clause (i), the head
of such element shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a notice of the determination not to implement the
recommendation, including the reasons for the determination.
(D) The requirements of this paragraph shall not be construed
to limit any authority of the Director of National Intelligence
under subsection (m) or with respect to supervision of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
(8) The Director of National Intelligence shall perform such
other functions as the President may direct.
(9) Nothing in this title shall be construed as affecting the
role of the Department of Justice or the Attorney General under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
(g) Intelligence Information Sharing.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure
maximum availability of and access to intelligence information
within the intelligence community consistent with national
security requirements. The Director of National Intelligence
shall--
(A) establish uniform security standards and
procedures;
(B) establish common information technology
standards, protocols, and interfaces;
(C) ensure development of information technology
systems that include multi-level security and
intelligence integration capabilities;
(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve
conflicts between the need to share intelligence
information and the need to protect intelligence
sources and methods;
(E) develop an enterprise architecture for the
intelligence community and ensure that elements of the
intelligence community comply with such architecture;
(F) have procurement approval authority over all
enterprise architecture-related information technology
items funded in the National Intelligence Program; and
(G) in accordance with Executive Order No. 13526 (75
Fed. Reg. 707; relating to classified national security
information) (or any subsequent corresponding executive
order), and part 2001 of title 32, Code of Federal
Regulations (or any subsequent corresponding
regulation), establish--
(i) guidance to standardize, in appropriate
cases, the formats for classified and
unclassified intelligence products created by
elements of the intelligence community for
purposes of promoting the sharing of
intelligence products; and
(ii) policies and procedures requiring the
increased use, in appropriate cases, and
including portion markings, of the
classification of portions of information
within one intelligence product.
(2) The President shall ensure that the Director of National
Intelligence has all necessary support and authorities to fully
and effectively implement paragraph (1).
(3) Except as otherwise directed by the President or with the
specific written agreement of the head of the department or
agency in question, a Federal agency or official shall not be
considered to have met any obligation to provide any
information, report, assessment, or other material (including
unevaluated intelligence information) to that department or
agency solely by virtue of having provided that information,
report, assessment, or other material to the Director of
National Intelligence or the National Counterterrorism Center.
(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a timely
manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation, policy, or
practice that the Director believes impedes the ability of the
Director to fully and effectively ensure maximum availability
of access to intelligence information within the intelligence
community consistent with the protection of the national
security of the United States.
(h) Analysis.--To ensure the most accurate analysis of
intelligence is derived from all sources to support national
security needs, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) implement policies and procedures--
(A) to encourage sound analytic methods and tradecraft
throughout the elements of the intelligence community;
(B) to ensure that analysis is based upon all sources
available; and
(C) to ensure that the elements of the intelligence community
regularly conduct competitive analysis of analytic products,
whether such products are produced by or disseminated to such
elements;
(2) ensure that resource allocation for intelligence
analysis is appropriately proportional to resource
allocation for intelligence collection systems and
operations in order to maximize analysis of all
collected data;
(3) ensure that differences in analytic judgment are fully
considered and brought to the attention of policymakers; and
(4) ensure that sufficient relationships are
established between intelligence collectors and
analysts to facilitate greater understanding of the
needs of analysts.
(i) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) The
Director of National Intelligence shall protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
(2) Consistent with paragraph (1), in order to maximize the
dissemination of intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence shall establish and implement guidelines for the
intelligence community for the following purposes:
(A) Classification of information under applicable
law, Executive orders, or other Presidential
directives.
(B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both
in final form and in the form when initially gathered.
(C) Preparation of intelligence products in such a
way that source information is removed to allow for
dissemination at the lowest level of classification
possible or in unclassified form to the extent
practicable.
(3) The Director may only delegate a duty or authority given
the Director under this subsection to the Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence.
(j) Uniform Procedures for Classified Information.--The
Director of National Intelligence, subject to the direction of
the President, shall--
(1) establish uniform standards and procedures for the grant
of access to sensitive compartmented information to any officer
or employee of any agency or department of the United States
and to employees of contractors of those agencies or
departments;
(2) ensure the consistent implementation of those
standards and procedures throughout such agencies and
departments;
(3) ensure that security clearances granted by individual
elements of the intelligence community are recognized by all
elements of the intelligence community, and under contracts
entered into by those agencies;
(4) ensure that the process for investigation and
adjudication of an application for access to sensitive
compartmented information is performed in the most
expeditious manner possible consistent with applicable
standards for national security;
(5) ensure that the background of each employee or
officer of an element of the intelligence community,
each contractor to an element of the intelligence
community, and each individual employee of such a
contractor who has been determined to be eligible for
access to classified information is monitored on a
continual basis under standards developed by the
Director, including with respect to the frequency of
evaluation, during the period of eligibility of such
employee or officer of an element of the intelligence
community, such contractor, or such individual employee
to such a contractor to determine whether such employee
or officer of an element of the intelligence community,
such contractor, and such individual employee of such a
contractor continues to meet the requirements for
eligibility for access to classified information; and
(6) develop procedures to require information sharing
between elements of the intelligence community
concerning potentially derogatory security information
regarding an employee or officer of an element of the
intelligence community, a contractor to an element of
the intelligence community, or an individual employee
of such a contractor that may impact the eligibility of
such employee or officer of an element of the
intelligence community, such contractor, or such
individual employee of such a contractor for a security
clearance.
(k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the
direction of the President and in a manner consistent with
section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
coordination of the relationships between elements of the
intelligence community and the intelligence or security
services of foreign governments or international organizations
on all matters involving intelligence related to the national
security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine
means.
(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1)(A) The Director of
National Intelligence shall, under regulations prescribed by
the Director, provide incentives for personnel of elements of
the intelligence community to serve--
(i) on the staff of the Director of National
Intelligence;
(ii) on the staff of the national intelligence
centers;
(iii) on the staff of the National Counterterrorism
Center; and
(iv) in other positions in support of the
intelligence community management functions of the
Director.
(B) Incentives under subparagraph (A) may include financial
incentives, bonuses, and such other awards and incentives as
the Director considers appropriate.
(2)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
personnel of an element of the intelligence community who are
assigned or detailed under paragraph (1)(A) to service under
the Director of National Intelligence shall be promoted at
rates equivalent to or better than personnel of such element
who are not so assigned or detailed.
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
paragraph.
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe
mechanisms to facilitate the rotation of personnel of the
intelligence community through various elements of the
intelligence community in the course of their careers in order
to facilitate the widest possible understanding by such
personnel of the variety of intelligence requirements, methods,
users, and capabilities.
(B) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) may
include the following:
(i) The establishment of special occupational
categories involving service, over the course of a
career, in more than one element of the intelligence
community.
(ii) The provision of rewards for service in
positions undertaking analysis and planning of
operations involving two or more elements of the
intelligence community.
(iii) The establishment of requirements for
education, training, service, and evaluation for
service involving more than one element of the
intelligence community.
(C) It is the sense of Congress that the mechanisms
prescribed under this subsection should, to the extent
practical, seek to duplicate for civilian personnel within the
intelligence community the joint officer management policies
established by chapter 38 of title 10, United States Code, and
the other amendments made by title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law
99-433).
(D) The mechanisms prescribed under subparagraph (A) and any
other policies of the Director--
(i) may not require an employee of an office of
inspector general for an element of the intelligence
community, including the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community, to rotate to a
position in an office or organization of such an
element over which such office of inspector general
exercises jurisdiction; and
(ii) shall be implemented in a manner that exempts
employees of an office of inspector general from a
rotation that may impact the independence of such
office.
(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and
subparagraph (D), this subsection shall not apply with respect
to personnel of the elements of the intelligence community who
are members of the uniformed services.
(B) Mechanisms that establish requirements for education and
training pursuant to paragraph (3)(B)(iii) may apply with
respect to members of the uniformed services who are assigned
to an element of the intelligence community funded through the
National Intelligence Program, but such mechanisms shall not be
inconsistent with personnel policies and education and training
requirements otherwise applicable to members of the uniformed
services.
(C) The personnel policies and programs developed and
implemented under this subsection with respect to law
enforcement officers (as that term is defined in section
5541(3) of title 5, United States Code) shall not affect the
ability of law enforcement entities to conduct operations or,
through the applicable chain of command, to control the
activities of such law enforcement officers.
(D) Assignment to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence of commissioned officers of the Armed Forces shall
be considered a joint-duty assignment for purposes of the joint
officer management policies prescribed by chapter 38 of title
10, United States Code, and other provisions of that title.
(m) Additional Authority With Respect to Personnel.--(1) In
addition to the authorities under subsection (f)(3), the
Director of National Intelligence may exercise with respect to
the personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence any authority of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency with respect to the personnel of the
Central Intelligence Agency under the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.), and other
applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the enactment
of this subsection to the same extent, and subject to the same
conditions and limitations, that the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency may exercise such authority with respect to
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) Employees and applicants for employment of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence shall have the same
rights and protections under the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as employees of the Central Intelligence
Agency have under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
and other applicable provisions of law, as of the date of the
enactment of this subsection.
(n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) In carrying out
the responsibilities and authorities under this section, the
Director of National Intelligence may exercise the acquisition
and appropriations authorities referred to in the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) other
than the authorities referred to in section 8(b) of that Act
(50 U.S.C. 403j(b)).
(2) For the purpose of the exercise of any authority referred
to in paragraph (1), a reference to the head of an agency shall
be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National
Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
(3)(A) Any determination or decision to be made under an
authority referred to in paragraph (1) by the head of an agency
may be made with respect to individual purchases and contracts
or with respect to classes of purchases or contracts, and shall
be final.
(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Director of
National Intelligence or the Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence may, in such official's discretion,
delegate to any officer or other official of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence any authority to make a
determination or decision as the head of the agency under an
authority referred to in paragraph (1).
(C) The limitations and conditions set forth in section 3(d)
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403c(d)) shall apply to the exercise by the Director of
National Intelligence of an authority referred to in paragraph
(1).
(D) Each determination or decision required by an authority
referred to in the second sentence of section 3(d) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 shall be based upon
written findings made by the official making such determination
or decision, which findings shall be final and shall be
available within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for a period of at least six years following the
date of such determination or decision.
(4)(A) In addition to the authority referred to in paragraph
(1), the Director of National Intelligence may authorize the
head of an element of the intelligence community to exercise an
acquisition authority referred to in section 3 or 8(a) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403c and
403j(a)) for an acquisition by such element that is more than
50 percent funded under the National Intelligence Program.
(B) The head of an element of the intelligence community may
not exercise an authority referred to in subparagraph (A)
until--
(i) the head of such element (without delegation)
submits to the Director of National Intelligence a
written request that includes--
(I) a description of such authority requested
to be exercised;
(II) an explanation of the need for such
authority, including an explanation of the
reasons that other authorities are
insufficient; and
(III) a certification that the mission of
such element would be--
(aa) impaired if such authority is
not exercised; or
(bb) significantly and measurably
enhanced if such authority is
exercised; and
(ii) the Director of National Intelligence issues a
written authorization that includes--
(I) a description of the authority referred
to in subparagraph (A) that is authorized to be
exercised; and
(II) a justification to support the exercise
of such authority.
(C) A request and authorization to exercise an authority
referred to in subparagraph (A) may be made with respect to an
individual acquisition or with respect to a specific class of
acquisitions described in the request and authorization
referred to in subparagraph (B).
(D)(i) A request from a head of an element of the
intelligence community located within one of the departments
described in clause (ii) to exercise an authority referred to
in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted to the Director of
National Intelligence in accordance with any procedures
established by the head of such department.
(ii) The departments described in this clause are the
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department
of State, and the Department of the Treasury.
(E)(i) The head of an element of the intelligence community
may not be authorized to utilize an authority referred to in
subparagraph (A) for a class of acquisitions for a period of
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize the use of such
an authority for not more than 6 years.
(ii) Each authorization to utilize an authority referred to
in subparagraph (A) may be extended in accordance with the
requirements of subparagraph (B) for successive periods of not
more than 3 years, except that the Director of National
Intelligence (without delegation) may authorize an extension
period of not more than 6 years.
(F) Subject to clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (E), the
Director of National Intelligence may only delegate the
authority of the Director under subparagraphs (A) through (E)
to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or a
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
(G) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit--
(i) to the congressional intelligence committees a
notification of an authorization to exercise an
authority referred to in subparagraph (A) or an
extension of such authorization that includes the
written authorization referred to in subparagraph
(B)(ii); and
(ii) to the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget a notification of an authorization to exercise
an authority referred to in subparagraph (A) for an
acquisition or class of acquisitions that will exceed
$50,000,000 annually.
(H) Requests and authorizations to exercise an authority
referred to in subparagraph (A) shall remain available within
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for a
period of at least 6 years following the date of such request
or authorization.
(I) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to alter or
otherwise limit the authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to independently exercise an authority under section 3
or 8(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403c and 403j(a)).
(o) Consideration of Views of Elements of Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out the duties and responsibilities
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall
take into account the views of a head of a department
containing an element of the intelligence community and of the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(p) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence
Regarding National Intelligence Program Budget Concerning the
Department of Defense.--Subject to the direction of the
President, the Director of National Intelligence shall, after
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that the
National Intelligence Program budgets for the elements of the
intelligence community that are within the Department of
Defense are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs
of the Department of Defense, including the needs of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the
unified and specified commands, and wherever such elements are
performing Government-wide functions, the needs of other
Federal departments and agencies.
(q) Acquisitions of Major Systems.--(1) For each intelligence
program within the National Intelligence Program for the
acquisition of a major system, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(A) require the development and implementation of a
program management plan that includes cost, schedule,
and performance goals and program milestone criteria,
except that with respect to Department of Defense
programs the Director shall consult with the Secretary
of Defense;
(B) serve as exclusive milestone decision authority,
except that with respect to Department of Defense
programs the Director shall serve as milestone decision
authority jointly with the Secretary of Defense or the
designee of the Secretary; and
(C) periodically--
(i) review and assess the progress made
toward the achievement of the goals and
milestones established in such plan; and
(ii) submit to Congress a report on the
results of such review and assessment.
(2) If the Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense are unable to reach an agreement on a
milestone decision under paragraph (1)(B), the President shall
resolve the conflict.
(3) Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the
authority of the Director of National Intelligence to delegate
to any other official any authority to perform the
responsibilities of the Director under this subsection.
(4) In this subsection:
(A) The term ``intelligence program'', with respect
to the acquisition of a major system, means a program
that--
(i) is carried out to acquire such major
system for an element of the intelligence
community; and
(ii) is funded in whole out of amounts
available for the National Intelligence
Program.
(B) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given
such term in section 4(9) of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 403(9)).
(r) Performance of Common Services.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of
departments and agencies of the United States Government
containing elements within the intelligence community and with
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinate the
performance by the elements of the intelligence community
within the National Intelligence Program of such services as
are of common concern to the intelligence community, which
services the Director of National Intelligence determines can
be more efficiently accomplished in a consolidated manner.
(s) Pay Authority for Critical Positions.--(1)
Notwithstanding any pay limitation established under any other
provision of law applicable to employees in elements of the
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence
may, in coordination with the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, grant authority to the head of a
department or agency to fix the rate of basic pay for one or
more positions within the intelligence community at a rate in
excess of any applicable limitation, subject to the provisions
of this subsection. The exercise of authority so granted is at
the discretion of the head of the department or agency
employing the individual in a position covered by such
authority, subject to the provisions of this subsection and any
conditions established by the Director of National Intelligence
when granting such authority.
(2) Authority under this subsection may be granted or
exercised only--
(A) with respect to a position that requires an
extremely high level of expertise and is critical to
successful accomplishment of an important mission; and
(B) to the extent necessary to recruit or retain an
individual exceptionally well qualified for the
position.
(3) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate
payable for level II of the Executive Schedule under section
5313 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written
approval of the Director of National Intelligence or as
otherwise authorized by law.
(4) The head of a department or agency may not fix a rate of
basic pay under this subsection at a rate greater than the rate
payable for level I of the Executive Schedule under section
5312 of title 5, United States Code, except upon written
approval of the President in response to a request by the
Director of National Intelligence or as otherwise authorized by
law.
(5) Any grant of authority under this subsection for a
position shall terminate at the discretion of the Director of
National Intelligence.
(6)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees not later than 30 days
after the date on which the Director grants authority to the
head of a department or agency under this subsection.
(B) The head of a department or agency to which the Director
of National Intelligence grants authority under this subsection
shall notify the congressional intelligence committees and the
Director of the exercise of such authority not later than 30
days after the date on which such head exercises such
authority.
(t) Award of Rank to Members of the Senior National
Intelligence Service.--(1) The President, based on the
recommendation of the Director of National Intelligence, may
award a rank to a member of the Senior National Intelligence
Service or other intelligence community senior civilian officer
not already covered by such a rank award program in the same
manner in which a career appointee of an agency may be awarded
a rank under section 4507 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) The President may establish procedures to award a rank
under paragraph (1) to a member of the Senior National
Intelligence Service or a senior civilian officer of the
intelligence community whose identity as such a member or
officer is classified information (as defined in section
606(1)).
(u) Conflict of Interest Regulations.--The Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations
prohibiting an officer or employee of an element of the
intelligence community from engaging in outside employment if
such employment creates a conflict of interest or appearance
thereof.
(v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted Service.--
(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the concurrence
of the head of the covered department concerned and in
consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management, may--
(A) convert competitive service positions, and the
incumbents of such positions, within an element of the
intelligence community in such department, to excepted
service positions as the Director of National
Intelligence determines necessary to carry out the
intelligence functions of such element; and
(B) establish new positions in the excepted service
within an element of the intelligence community in such
department, if the Director of National Intelligence
determines such positions are necessary to carry out
the intelligence functions of such element.
(2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service under
this section shall have the right to refuse such conversion.
Once such individual no longer occupies the position, the
position may be converted to the excepted service.
(3) A covered department may appoint an individual to a
position converted or established pursuant to this subsection
without regard to the civil-service laws, including parts II
and III of title 5, United States Code.
(4) In this subsection, the term ``covered department'' means
the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of State, or the Department of the Treasury.
(w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements Intelligence
Community Addendum.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the heads of the appropriate elements of the
intelligence community and the Secretary of State, shall
provide to the President, the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate an addendum to each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statement accompanying a civilian nuclear cooperation
agreement, containing a comprehensive analysis of the country's
export control system with respect to nuclear-related matters,
including interactions with other countries of proliferation
concern and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or
missile-related transfers to such countries.
(x) Requirements for Intelligence Community Contractors.--The
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
head of each department of the Federal Government that contains
an element of the intelligence community and the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, shall--
(1) ensure that--
(A) any contractor to an element of the intelligence
community with access to a classified network or classified
information develops and operates a security plan that is
consistent with standards established by the Director of
National Intelligence for intelligence community networks; and
(B) each contract awarded by an element of the intelligence
community includes provisions requiring the contractor comply
with such plan and such standards;
(2) conduct periodic assessments of each security
plan required under paragraph (1)(A) to ensure such
security plan complies with the requirements of such
paragraph; and
(3) ensure that the insider threat detection capabilities and
insider threat policies of the intelligence community apply to
facilities of contractors with access to a classified network.
(y) Fundraising.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence
may engage in fundraising in an official capacity for the
benefit of nonprofit organizations that--
(A) provide support to surviving family members of a
deceased employee of an element of the intelligence
community; or
(B) otherwise provide support for the welfare,
education, or recreation of employees of an element of
the intelligence community, former employees of an
element of the intelligence community, or family
members of such employees.
(2) In this subsection, the term ``fundraising'' means the
raising of funds through the active participation in the
promotion, production, or presentation of an event designed to
raise funds and does not include the direct solicitation of
money by any other means.
(3) Not later than 7 days after the date the Director engages
in fundraising authorized by this subsection or at the time the
decision is made to participate in such fundraising, the
Director shall notify the congressional intelligence committees
of such fundraising.
(4) The Director, in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to carry
out the authority provided in this subsection. Such regulations
shall ensure that such authority is exercised in a manner that
is consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and
principles, including the avoidance of any prohibited conflict
of interest or appearance of impropriety.
(z) Analyses and Impact Statements Regarding Proposed
Investment Into the United States.--(1) Not later than 20 days
after the completion of a review or an investigation of any
proposed investment into the United States for which the
Director has prepared analytic materials, the Director shall
submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representative copies of such analytic materials, including
any supplements or amendments to such analysis made by the
Director.
(2) Not later than 60 days after the completion of
consideration by the United States Government of any investment
described in paragraph (1), the Director shall determine
whether such investment will have an operational impact on the
intelligence community, and, if so, shall submit a report on
such impact to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives. Each such report shall--
(A) describe the operational impact of the investment
on the intelligence community; and
(B) describe any actions that have been or will be
taken to mitigate such impact.
* * * * * * *
chief information officer
Sec. 103G. (a) Chief Information Officer.--To assist the
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the
responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other
applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by
the [President] Director. The Chief Information Officer shall
report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) manage activities relating to the information
technology infrastructure and enterprise architecture
requirements of the intelligence community;
(2) have procurement approval authority over all
information technology items related to the enterprise
architectures of all intelligence community components;
(3) direct and manage all information technology-
related procurement for the intelligence community; and
(4) ensure that all expenditures for information
technology and research and development activities are
consistent with the intelligence community enterprise
architecture and the strategy of the Director for such
architecture.
(c) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief
Information Officer.--An individual serving in the position of
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer
of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the
United States Government.
inspector general of the intelligence community
Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.--There is within the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community is--
(1) to create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and
conduct independent investigations, inspections,
audits, and reviews on programs and activities within
the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence;
(2) to provide leadership and coordination and
recommend policies for activities designed--
(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of such programs and activities;
and
(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in
such programs and activities;
(3) to provide a means for keeping the Director of
National Intelligence fully and currently informed
about--
(A) problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs and activities
within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, to
ensure that the congressional intelligence committees
are kept similarly informed of--
(A) significant problems and deficiencies
relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions.
(c) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--(1)
There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as
Inspector General shall be made--
(A) without regard to political affiliation;
(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with
security standards of the intelligence community, and
prior experience in the field of intelligence or
national security; and
(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in
accounting, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or investigations.
(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the
removal not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of
such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to
prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other
than transfer or removal.
(d) Assistant Inspectors General.--Subject to the policies of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Audit
who shall have the responsibility for supervising the
performance of auditing activities relating to programs
and activities within the responsibility and authority
of the Director;
(2) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations who shall have the responsibility for
supervising the performance of investigative activities
relating to such programs and activities; and
(3) appoint other Assistant Inspectors General that,
in the judgment of the Inspector General, are necessary
to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.
(e) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community--
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the
investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews
relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence;
(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence
fully and currently informed concerning violations of
law and regulations, fraud, and other serious problems,
abuses, and deficiencies relating to the programs and
activities within the responsibility and authority of
the Director, to recommend corrective action concerning
such problems, and to report on the progress made in
implementing such corrective action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of
all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to
the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of
such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate
to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
(4) in the execution of the duties and
responsibilities under this section, to comply with
generally accepted government auditing.
(f) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review if
the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to
protect vital national security interests of the United States.
(2) Not later than seven days after the date on which the
Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an appropriately classified statement of the reasons
for the exercise of such authority.
(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the
time a statement under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such
statement.
(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on the statement of which
the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
(g) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall, subject to the
limitations in subsection (f), make such investigations and
reports relating to the administration of the programs and
activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General,
necessary or desirable.
(B) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee,
or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the
intelligence community needed for the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
(C) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other materials that relate to the programs
and activities with respect to which the Inspector General has
responsibilities under this section.
(D) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any
materials under subparagraph (C).
(E) The Director, or on the recommendation of the Director,
another appropriate official of the intelligence community,
shall take appropriate administrative actions against an
employee, or an employee of a contractor, of an element of the
intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the
Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss
of employment or the termination of an existing contractual
relationship.
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate, pursuant to subsection (h), complaints or
information from any person concerning the existence of an
activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of
laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of
funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or
information has been received from an employee of the
intelligence community--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that
such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the
investigation or the disclosure is made to an official
of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken,
and this provision shall qualify as a withholding
statute pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of
title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the
``Freedom of Information Act''); and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such
information to the Inspector General may be taken by
any employee in a position to take such actions, unless
the complaint was made or the information was disclosed
with the knowledge that it was false or with willful
disregard for its truth or falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall have the authority to
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or
affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit
when administered or taken by or before an employee of the
Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force
and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an
officer having a seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of
all information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including
electronically stored information, as well as any tangible
thing) and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by
subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on
behalf of, any component of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence or any element of the intelligence
community, including the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable
by order of any appropriate district court of the United
States.
(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized
by section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum
annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
(7) The Inspector General may, to the extent and in such
amounts as may be provided in appropriations, enter into
contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses,
and other services with public agencies and with private
persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this section.
(h) Coordination Among Inspectors General.--(1)(A) In the
event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an
investigation, inspection, audit, or review by both the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an
inspector general with oversight responsibility for an element
of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community and such other inspector general shall
expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general
shall conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review
to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the
inspectors general.
(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph
(A), the inspectors general concerned may request the
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General
Forum established under paragraph (2). In the event of a
dispute between an inspector general within a department or
agency of the United States Government and the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community that has not been
resolved with the assistance of such Forum, the inspectors
general shall submit the question to the Director of National
Intelligence and the head of the affected department or agency
for resolution.
(2)(A) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum, which shall consist of all statutory
or administrative inspectors general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
(B) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
serve as the Chair of the Forum established under subparagraph
(A). The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any
inspector general, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing
its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that
may be of common interest and discussing questions about
jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of contract
personnel, records, audits, reviews, documents,
recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of
assistance to more than one of its members.
(3) The inspector general conducting an investigation,
inspection, audit, or review covered by paragraph (1) shall
submit the results of such investigation, inspection, audit, or
review to any other inspector general, including the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to
conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review who
did not conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or
review.
(i) Counsel to the Inspector General.--(1) The Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community shall--
(A) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who
shall report to the Inspector General; or
(B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and
directly reporting to another inspector general or the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.
(2) The counsel appointed or obtained under paragraph (1)
shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may
prescribe.
(j) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office
space at central and field office locations, together with such
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for
the operation of such offices.
(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall
select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may
be necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of
the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that
any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has
security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such
officer or employee.
(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees
have the requisite training and experience to enable the
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector
General effectively.
(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and
objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
(3) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources
allocated by the Director of National Intelligence, the
Inspector General has final approval of--
(A) the selection of internal and external candidates
for employment with the Office of the Inspector
General; and
(B) all other personnel decisions concerning
personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the
Inspector General, including selection and appointment
to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all
security-based determinations that are not within the
authority of a head of a component of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
(4)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Inspector General may request such
information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from
any Federal, State (as defined [in section 804] in section
805), or local governmental agency or unit thereof.
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance from a department, agency, or element of the Federal
Government under subparagraph (A), the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable
and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction
or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to
the Inspector General, such information or assistance.
(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may,
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community and in coordination with that element's
inspector general pursuant to subsection (h), conduct, as
authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection,
audit, or review of such element and may enter into any place
occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the
duties of the Inspector General.
(k) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall, not later than October 31 and
April 30 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of
National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate,
unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period
ending September 30 and March 31, respectively. The Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any portion
of the report involving a component of a department of the
United States Government to the head of that department
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of
National Intelligence.
(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
(i) A list of the title or subject of each
investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted
during the period covered by such report.
(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration of
programs and activities of the intelligence community
within the responsibility and authority of the Director
of National Intelligence, and in the relationships
between elements of the intelligence community,
identified by the Inspector General during the period
covered by such report.
(iii) A description of the recommendations for
corrective action made by the Inspector General during
the period covered by such report with respect to
significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies
identified in clause (ii).
(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective action
has been completed on each significant recommendation
described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a
case where corrective action has been completed, a
description of such corrective action.
(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector
General has had full and direct access to all
information relevant to the performance of the
functions of the Inspector General.
(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (g)(5) by the Inspector
General during the period covered by such report.
(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration and implementation of programs and
activities within the responsibility and authority of
the Director of National Intelligence, and to detect
and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and
activities.
(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the
report to the congressional intelligence committees together
with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of the
report involving a component of such department simultaneously
with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with
such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of each
report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse,
or deficiency related to a component of such department
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the
congressional intelligence committees.
(3)(A) In the event that--
(i) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution
of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector
General;
(ii) an investigation, inspection, audit, or review
carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any
current or former intelligence community official who--
(I) holds or held a position in an element of
the intelligence community that is subject to
appointment by the President, whether or not by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
including such a position held on an acting
basis;
(II) holds or held a position in an element
of the intelligence community, including a
position held on an acting basis, that is
appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(III) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a
position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of
section 106;
(iii) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible
criminal conduct by a current or former official
described in clause (ii);
(iv) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving
prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current
or former official described in clause (ii); or
(v) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant
documentary information in the course of an
investigation, inspection, audit, or review,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify, and submit a
report to, the congressional intelligence committees on such
matter.
(B) The Inspector General shall submit to the committees of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government
any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves
an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by
the Inspector General focused on any current or former official
of a component of such department simultaneously with
submission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(4) The Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any report or findings and
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, audit, or
review conducted by the office which has been requested by the
Chairman or Vice Chairman or ranking minority member of either
committee.
(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector
General shall determine whether the complaint or information
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the
Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of
that determination, together with the complaint or information.
(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the
congressional intelligence committees, together with any
comments the Director considers appropriate.
(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph
(B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the
complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or
both of the congressional intelligence committees directly.
(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the
employee--
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of
the employee's complaint or information and notice of
the employee's intent to contact the congressional
intelligence committees directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through
the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
congressional intelligence committees in accordance
with appropriate security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information
under this subparagraph does so in that member or employee's
official capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is
taken.
(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General
under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
(G) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means any
of the following:
(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation
of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence
involving classified information, but does not include
differences of opinions concerning public policy
matters.
(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation
of an intelligence activity.
(iii) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United
States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of
reprisal prohibited under subsection (g)(3)(B) of this
section in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
(H) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the
protections afforded to an employee under section 17(d) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)) or
section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C.
App.).
(I) An individual who has submitted a complaint or
information to the Inspector General under this section may
notify any member of either of the congressional intelligence
committees, or a staff member of either of such committees, of
the fact that such individual has made a submission to the
Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was
made.
(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States
Code, the Inspector General shall expeditiously report to the
Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint
received by the Inspector General relating to violations of
Federal criminal law that involves a program or operation of an
element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships
between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent
with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
(l) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (h), the
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to
modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other
inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating
to such element.
(m) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures issued by the
Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget
a separate account for the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community.
(n) Budget.--(1) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community shall transmit a budget estimate
and request to the Director of National Intelligence that
specifies for such fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations
of the Inspector General;
(B) the amount requested for all training
requirements of the Inspector General, including a
certification from the Inspector General that the
amount requested is sufficient to fund all training
requirements for the Office of the Inspector General;
and
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
including a justification for such amount.
(2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a
fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
include for such fiscal year--
(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community;
(B) the amount requested for Inspector General
training;
(C) the amount requested to support the Council of
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and
(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any,
with respect to such proposed budget.
(3) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives for each fiscal
year--
(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate
transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1);
(B) the amount requested by the Director for the
Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(A);
(C) the amount requested by the Director for the
training of personnel of the Office of the Inspector
General pursuant to paragraph (2)(B);
(D) the amount requested by the Director for support
for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and
(E) the comments of the Inspector General under
paragraph (2)(D), if any, on the amounts requested
pursuant to paragraph (2), including whether such
amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector
General from performing the duties of the Office of the
Inspector General.
(o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of
the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including
methods to contact the Inspector General.
(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related
to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
chief financial officer of the intelligence community
Sec. 103I. (a) Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence
Community.--To assist the Director of National Intelligence in
carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under this
Act and other applicable provisions of law, there is within the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief
Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be
appointed by the Director. The Chief Financial Officer shall
report directly to the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Financial
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) serve as the principal advisor to the Director of
National Intelligence and the Principal Deputy Director
of National Intelligence on the management and
allocation of intelligence community budgetary
resources;
(2) participate in overseeing a comprehensive and
integrated strategic process for resource management
within the intelligence community;
(3) ensure that the strategic plan of the Director of
National Intelligence--
(A) is based on budgetary constraints as
specified in the Future Year Intelligence Plans
and Long-term Budget Projections required under
section 506G; and
(B) contains specific goals and objectives to
support a performance-based budget;
(4) prior to the obligation or expenditure of funds
for the acquisition of any major system pursuant to a
Milestone A or Milestone B decision, receive
verification from appropriate authorities that the
national requirements for meeting the strategic plan of
the Director have been established, and that such
requirements are prioritized based on budgetary
constraints as specified in the Future Year
Intelligence Plans and the Long-term Budget Projections
for such major system required under section 506G;
(5) ensure that the collection architectures of the
Director are based on budgetary constraints as
specified in the Future Year Intelligence Plans and the
Long-term Budget Projections required under section
506G;
(6) coordinate or approve representations made to
Congress by the intelligence community regarding
National Intelligence Program budgetary resources;
(7) participate in key mission requirements,
acquisitions, or architectural boards formed within or
by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
and
(8) perform such other duties as may be prescribed by
the Director of National Intelligence.
(c) Other Law.--The Chief Financial Officer of the
Intelligence Community shall serve as the Chief Financial
Officer of the intelligence community and, to the extent
applicable, shall have the duties, responsibilities, and
authorities specified in chapter 9 of title 31, United States
Code.
(d) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief
Financial Officer.--An individual serving in the position of
Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community may not,
while so serving, serve as the chief financial officer of any
other department or agency, or component thereof, of the United
States Government.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``major system'' has the meaning given
that term in section 506A(e).
(2) The term ``Milestone A'' has the meaning given
that term in section 506G(f).
(3) The term ``Milestone B'' has the meaning given
that term in section 506C(e).
* * * * * * *
director of the central intelligence agency
Sec. 104A. (a) Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--
There is a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
(b) Supervision.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall report to the Director of National Intelligence
regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(c) Duties.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall--
(1) serve as the head of the Central Intelligence
Agency; and
(2) carry out the responsibilities specified in
subsection (d).
(d) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) collect intelligence through human sources and by
other appropriate means, except that the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police,
subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal
security functions;
(2) correlate and evaluate intelligence related to
the national security and provide appropriate
dissemination of such intelligence;
(3) provide overall direction for and coordination of
the collection of national intelligence outside the
United States through human sources by elements of the
intelligence community authorized to undertake such
collection and, in coordination with other departments,
agencies, or elements of the United States Government
which are authorized to undertake such collection,
ensure that the most effective use is made of resources
and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to
the United States and those involved in such
collection; and
(4) perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the
President or the Director of National Intelligence may
direct.
(e) Termination of Employment of CIA Employees.--(1)
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in the discretion of
the Director, terminate the employment of any officer or
employee of the Central Intelligence Agency whenever the
Director deems the termination of employment of such officer or
employee necessary or advisable in the interests of the United
States.
(2) Any termination of employment of an officer or employee
under paragraph (1) shall not affect the right of the officer
or employee to seek or accept employment in any other
department, agency, or element of the United States Government
if declared eligible for such employment by the Office of
Personnel Management.
(f) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--Under the
direction of the Director of National Intelligence and in a
manner consistent with section 207 of the Foreign Service Act
of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 3927), the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the relationships between
elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or
security services of foreign governments or international
organizations on all matters involving intelligence related to
the national security or involving intelligence acquired
through clandestine means.
[(g) Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior Level
Positions in Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Except as
provided pursuant to paragraph (2), an individual in the
Directorate of Intelligence career service or the National
Clandestine Service career service may not be appointed or
promoted to a position in the Senior Intelligence Service in
the Directorate of Intelligence or the National Clandestine
Service of the Central Intelligence Agency unless the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency determines that the
individual has been certified as having a professional speaking
and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such proficiency
being at least level 3 on the Interagency Language Roundtable
Language Skills Level or commensurate proficiency level using
such other indicator of proficiency as the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency considers appropriate.
[(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in
the discretion of the Director, waive the application of
paragraph (1) to any position, category of positions, or
occupation otherwise covered by that paragraph if the Director
determines that foreign language proficiency is not necessary
for the successful performance of the duties and
responsibilities of such position, category of positions, or
occupation.]
* * * * * * *
appointment of officials responsible for intelligence-related
activities
Sec. 106. (a) Recommendation of DNI in Certain
Appointments.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a position
referred to in paragraph (2), the Director of National
Intelligence shall recommend to the President an individual for
nomination to fill the vacancy.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
(B) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Concurrence of DNI in Appointments to Positions in the
Intelligence Community.--(1) In the event of a vacancy in a
position referred to in paragraph (2), the head of the
department or agency having jurisdiction over the position
shall obtain the concurrence of the Director of National
Intelligence before appointing an individual to fill the
vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be
nominated to fill the vacancy. If the Director does not concur
in the recommendation, the head of the department or agency
concerned may not fill the vacancy or make the recommendation
to the President (as the case may be). In the case in which the
Director does not concur in such a recommendation, the Director
and the head of the department or agency concerned may advise
the President directly of the intention to withhold concurrence
or to make a recommendation, as the case may be.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office.
(C) The Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
(D) The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research.
(E) The Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
[(F) The Director of the Office of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.]
[(G)] (F) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
[(H)] (G) The Executive Assistant Director for
Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
any successor to that position.
[(I)] (H) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis.
(c) Consultation With DNI in Certain Positions.--(1) In the
event of a vacancy in a position referred to in paragraph (2),
the head of the department or agency having jurisdiction over
the position shall consult with the Director of National
Intelligence before appointing an individual to fill the
vacancy or recommending to the President an individual to be
nominated to fill the vacancy.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
(A) The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(B) The Assistant Commandant of the Coast Guard for
Intelligence.
(C) The Assistant Attorney General designated as the
Assistant Attorney General for National Security under
section 507A of title 28, United States Code.
SEC. 106A. DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) In General.--There is a Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office.
(b) Appointment.--The Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
(c) Functions and Duties.--The Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office shall be the head of the National
Reconnaissance Office and shall discharge such functions and
duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law or
executive order.
(d) Advisory Board.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the
National Reconnaissance Office an advisory board (in
this section referred to as the ``Board'').
(2) Duties.--The Board shall--
(A) study matters relating to the mission of
the National Reconnaissance Office, including
with respect to promoting innovation,
competition, and resilience in space, overhead
reconnaissance, acquisition, and other matters;
and
(B) advise and report directly to the
Director with respect to such matters.
(3) Members.--
(A) Number and appointment.--
(i) In general.--The Board shall be
composed of 5 members appointed by the
Director from among individuals with
demonstrated academic, government,
business, or other expertise relevant
to the mission and functions of the
National Reconnaissance Office.
(ii) Notification.--Not later than 30
days after the date on which the
Director appoints a member to the
Board, the Director shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees
and the congressional defense
committees (as defined in section
101(a) of title 10, United States Code)
of such appointment.
(B) Terms.--Each member shall be appointed
for a term of 2 years. Except as provided by
subparagraph (C), a member may not serve more
than 3 terms.
(C) Vacancy.--Any member appointed to fill a
vacancy occurring before the expiration of the
term for which the member's predecessor was
appointed shall be appointed only for the
remainder of that term. A member may serve
after the expiration of that member's term
until a successor has taken office.
(D) Chair.--The Board shall have a Chair, who
shall be appointed by the Director from among
the members.
(E) Travel expenses.--Each member shall
receive travel expenses, including per diem in
lieu of subsistence, in accordance with
applicable provisions under subchapter I of
chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
(F) Executive secretary.--The Director may
appoint an executive secretary, who shall be an
employee of the National Reconnaissance Office,
to support the Board.
(4) Meetings.--The Board shall meet not less than
quarterly, but may meet more frequently at the call of
the Director.
(5) Reports.--Not later than March 31 of each year,
the Board shall submit to the Director and to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
activities and significant findings of the Board during
the preceding year.
(6) Nonapplicability of certain requirements.--The
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall
not apply to the Board.
(7) Termination.--The Board shall terminate on the
date that is 3 years after the date of the first
meeting of the Board.
[national security resources board
[Sec. 107. (a) The Director of the Office of Defense
Mobilization, subject to the direction of the President, is
authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the
Classification Act of 1949, to appoint and fix the compensation
of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Director in
carrying out his functions.
[(b) It shall be the function of the Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization to advise the President concerning the
coordination of military, industrial, and civilian
mobilization, including--
[(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian
mobilization in order to assure the most effective
mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's
manpower in the event of war.
[(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of
the Nation's natural and industrial resources for
military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and
stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war,
and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs and
conditions;
[(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the
activities of Federal agencies and departments engaged
in or concerned with production, procurement,
distribution, or transportation of military or civilian
supplies, materials, and products;
[(4) the relationship between potential supplies of,
and potential requirements for, manpower, resources,
and productive facilities in time of war;
[(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of
strategic and critical material, and for the
conservation of these reserves;
[(6) the strategic relocation of industries,
services, government, and economic activities, the
continuous operation of which is essential to the
Nation's security.
[(c) In performing his functions, the Director of the Office
of Defense Mobilization shall utilize to the maximum extent the
facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the
Government.]
annual national security strategy report
Sec. 108. (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress
each year a comprehensive report on the national security
strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section
referred to as a national security strategy report'').
(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall
be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to
Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105
of title 31, United States Code.
(3) Not later than 150 days after the date on which a new
President takes office, the President shall transmit to
Congress a national security strategy report under this
section. That report shall be in addition to the report for
that year transmitted at the time specified in paragraph (2).
(b) Each national security strategy report shall set forth
the national security strategy of the United States and shall
include a comprehensive description and discussion of the
following:
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of
the United States that are vital to the national
security of the United States.
(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and
national defense capabilities of the United States
necessary to deter aggression and to implement the
national security strategy of the United States.
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the
political, economic, military, and other elements of
the national power of the United States to protect or
promote the interests and achieve the goals and
objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United
States to carry out the national security strategy of
the United States, including an evaluation of the
balance among the capabilities of all elements of the
national power of the United States to support the
implementation of the national security strategy.
(5) Such other information as may be necessary to
help inform Congress on matters relating to the
national security strategy of the United States.
(c) Each national security strategy report shall be
transmitted [in both a classified and an unclassified form] to
Congress in classified form, but may include an unclassified
summary.
* * * * * * *
restrictions on intelligence sharing with the united nations
Sec. 112. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to the
United Nations.--(1) No United States intelligence information
may be provided to the United Nations or any organization
affiliated with the United Nations, or to any officials or
employees thereof, unless the President certifies to the
appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and
implemented procedures, and has worked with the United Nations
to ensure implementation of procedures, for protecting from
unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources and
methods connected to such information.
(2) Paragraph (1) may be waived upon written certification by
the President to the appropriate committees of Congress that
providing such information to the United Nations or an
organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any
officials or employees thereof, is in the national security
interests of the United States.
(b) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or
assign the duties of the President under this section.
(c) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to--
(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the
Director of National Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to
[section 103(c)(7)] section 102A(i) of this Act; or
(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of
title V of this Act.
(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 113B. SPECIAL PAY AUTHORITY FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ENGINEERING,
OR MATHEMATICS POSITIONS.
[(a) Authority to Set Special Rates of Pay.--Notwithstanding
part III of title 5, United States Code, the head of each
element of the intelligence community may establish higher
minimum rates of pay for 1 or more categories of positions in
such element that require expertise in science, technology,
engineering, or mathematics (STEM).]
(a) Special Rates of Pay for Positions Requiring Expertise in
Science, Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding part III of title 5,
United States Code, the head of each element of the
intelligence community may, for 1 or more categories of
positions in such element that require expertise in
science, technology, engineering, or mathematics--
(A) establish higher minimum rates of pay;
and
(B) make corresponding increases in all rates
of pay of the pay range for each grade or
level, subject to subsection (b) or (c), as
applicable.
(2) Treatment.--The special rate supplements
resulting from the establishment of higher rates under
paragraph (1) shall be basic pay for the same or
similar purposes as those specified in section 5305(j)
of title 5, United States Code.
(b) Special Rates of Pay for Cyber Positions.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsection (c), the
Director of the National Security Agency may establish
a special rate of pay--
(A) not to exceed the rate of basic pay
payable for level II of the Executive Schedule
under section 5313 of title 5, United States
Code, if the Director certifies to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in
consultation with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, that the
rate of pay is for positions that perform
functions that execute the cyber mission of the
Agency; or
(B) not to exceed the rate of basic pay
payable for the Vice President of the United
States under section 104 of title 3, United
States Code, if the Director certifies to the
Secretary of Defense, by name, individuals that
have advanced skills and competencies and that
perform critical functions that execute the
cyber mission of the Agency.
(2) Pay limitation.--Employees receiving a special
rate under paragraph (1) shall be subject to an
aggregate pay limitation that parallels the limitation
established in section 5307 of title 5, United States
Code, except that--
(A) any allowance, differential, bonus,
award, or other similar cash payment in
addition to basic pay that is authorized under
title 10, United States Code, (or any other
applicable law in addition to title 5 of such
Code, excluding the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.)) shall also be
counted as part of aggregate compensation; and
(B) aggregate compensation may not exceed the
rate established for the Vice President of the
United States under section 104 of title 3,
United States Code.
(3) Limitation on number of recipients.--The number
of individuals who receive basic pay established under
paragraph (1)(B) may not exceed 100 at any time.
(4) Limitation on use as comparative reference.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, special
rates of pay and the limitation established under
paragraph (1)(B) may not be used as comparative
references for the purpose of fixing the rates of basic
pay or maximum pay limitations of qualified positions
under section 1599f of title 10, United States Code, or
section 226 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 147).
[(b)] (c) Maximum Special Rate of Pay.--[A minimum] Except as
provided in subsection (b), a minimum rate of pay established
for a category of positions under subsection (a) may not exceed
the maximum rate of basic pay (excluding any locality-based
comparability payment under section 5304 of title 5, United
States Code, or similar provision of law) for the position in
that category of positions without the authority of subsection
(a) by more than 30 percent, and no rate may be established
under this section in excess of the rate of basic pay payable
for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of
title 5, United States Code.
[(c)] (d) Notification of Removal From Special Rate of Pay.--
If the head of an element of the intelligence community removes
a category of positions from coverage under a rate of pay
authorized by subsection (a) or (b) after that rate of pay
takes effect--
(1) the head of such element shall provide notice of
the loss of coverage of the special rate of pay to each
individual in such category; and
(2) the loss of coverage will take effect on the
first day of the first pay period after the date of the
notice.
[(d)] (e) Revision of Special Rates of Pay.--Subject to the
limitations in this section, rates of pay established under
this section by the head of the element of the intelligence
community may be revised from time to time by the head of such
element and the revisions have the force and effect of statute.
[(e)] (f) Regulations.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall promulgate regulations to carry
out this section with respect to such element, which shall, to
the extent practicable, be comparable to the regulations
promulgated to carry out section 5305 of title 5, United States
Code.
[(f)] (g) Reports.--
(1) Requirement for reports.--[Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017] Not later than
90 days after the date of the enactment of the Damon
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019, the
head of each element of the intelligence community
shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on any rates of pay established for
such element under this section.
(2) Contents.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall contain for each element of the intelligence
community--
(A) a description of any rates of pay
established under subsection (a) or (b); and
(B) the number of positions in such element
that will be subject to such rates of pay.
annual report on hiring and retention of minority employees
Sec. 114.
(a) The Director of National Intelligence shall, on an annual
basis, submit to Congress a report on the employment of covered
persons within each element of the intelligence community for
the preceding fiscal year and the preceding 5 fiscal years.
(b) Each such report shall include [disaggregated data by
category of covered person from each element of the
intelligence community] data, disaggregated by category of
covered person and by element of the intelligence community, on
the following:
(1) Of all individuals employed in the element during
the fiscal year involved, the aggregate percentage of
such individuals who are covered persons.
(2) Of all individuals employed in the element during
the fiscal year involved at the levels referred to in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the percentage of covered
persons employed at such levels:
(A) Positions at levels 1 through 15 of the
General Schedule.
(B) Positions at levels above GS-15.
(3) Of all individuals hired by the element involved
during the fiscal year involved, the percentage of such
individuals who are covered persons.
(c) Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form,
but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed as providing
for the substitution of any similar report required under
another provision of law.
(e) In this section the term ``covered persons'' means--
(1) racial and ethnic minorities;
(2) women; and
(3) individuals with disabilities.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 120. CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL.
(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall establish a Climate Security Advisory Council for the
purpose of--
(1) assisting intelligence analysts of various
elements of the intelligence community with respect to
analysis of climate security and its impact on the
areas of focus of such analysts;
(2) facilitating coordination between the elements of
the intelligence community and elements of the Federal
Government that are not elements of the intelligence
community in collecting data on, and conducting
analysis of, climate change and climate security; and
(3) ensuring that the intelligence community is
adequately prioritizing climate change in carrying out
its activities.
(b) Composition of Council.--
(1) Members.--The Council shall be composed of the
following individuals appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence:
(A) An appropriate official from the National
Intelligence Council, who shall chair the
Council.
(B) The lead official with respect to climate
and environmental security analysis from--
(i) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(ii) the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State;
(iii) the National Geospacial-
Intelligence Agency;
(iv) the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence of the Department
of Energy;
(v) the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence; and
(vi) the Defense Intelligence Agency.
(C) Three appropriate officials from elements
of the Federal Government that are not elements
of the intelligence community that are
responsible for--
(i) providing decision-makers with a
predictive understanding of the
climate;
(ii) making observations of our Earth
system that can be used by the public,
policymakers, and to support strategic
decisions; or
(iii) coordinating Federal research
and investments in understanding the
forces shaping the global environment,
both human and natural, and their
impacts on society.
(D) Any other officials as the Director of
National Intelligence or the chair of the
Council may determine appropriate.
(2) Responsibilities of chair.--The chair of the
Council shall have responsibility for--
(A) identifying agencies to supply
individuals from elements of the Federal
Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community;
(B) securing the permission of the relevant
agency heads for the participation of such
individuals on the Council; and
(C) any other duties that the Director of
National Intelligence may direct.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities of Council.--The Council
shall carry out the following duties and responsibilities:
(1) To meet at least quarterly to--
(A) exchange appropriate data between
elements of the intelligence community and
elements of the Federal Government that are not
elements of the intelligence community;
(B) discuss processes for the routine
exchange of such data and implementation of
such processes; and
(C) prepare summaries of the business
conducted at each meeting.
(2) To assess and determine best practices with
respect to the analysis of climate security, including
identifying publicly available information and
intelligence acquired through clandestine means that
enables such analysis.
(3) To assess and identify best practices with
respect to prior efforts of the intelligence community
to analyze climate security.
(4) To assess and describe best practices for
identifying and disseminating climate security
indicators and warnings;
(5) To recommend methods of incorporating analysis of
climate security and the best practices identified
under paragraphs (2) through (4) into existing analytic
training programs.
(6) To consult, as appropriate, with other elements
of the intelligence community that conduct analysis of
climate change or climate security and elements of the
Federal Government that are not elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate
change or climate security, for the purpose of sharing
information about ongoing efforts and avoiding
duplication of existing efforts.
(7) To work with elements of the intelligence
community that conduct analysis of climate change or
climate security and elements of the Federal Government
that are not elements of the intelligence community
that conduct analysis of climate change or climate
security--
(A) to exchange appropriate data between such
elements, establish processes, procedures and
practices for the routine exchange of such
data, discuss the implementation of such
processes; and
(B) to enable and facilitate the sharing of
findings and analysis between such elements.
(8) To assess whether the elements of the
intelligence community that conduct analysis of climate
change or climate security may inform the research
direction of academic work and the sponsored work of
the United States Government.
(9) At the discretion of the chair of the Council, to
convene conferences of analysts and non-intelligence
community personnel working on climate change or
climate security on subjects that the chair shall
direct.
(d) Sunset.--The Council shall terminate on the date that is
4 years after the date of the enactment of this section.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Climate security.--The term ``climate security''
means the effects of climate change on the following:
(A) The national security of the United
States, including national security
infrastructure.
(B) Subnational, national, and regional
political stability.
(C) The security of allies and partners of
the United States.
(D) Ongoing or potential political violence,
including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare,
insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution,
civil war, and interstate war.
(2) Climate intelligence indications and warnings.--
The term ``climate intelligence indications and
warnings'' means developments relating to climate
security with the potential to--
(A) imminently and substantially alter the
political stability or degree of human security
in a country or region; or
(B) imminently and substantially threaten--
(i) the national security of the
United States;
(ii) the military, political, or
economic interests of allies and
partners of the United States; or
(iii) citizens of the United States
abroad.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
[Sec. 201.
[(d) Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act, the provisions of title IV of the Revised Statutes as
now of hereafter amended shall be applicable to the Department
of Defense.]
SEC. 201. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act or other provisions of law, the provisions of title 5,
United States Code, shall be applicable to the Department of
Defense.
department of the army
Sec. 205.
[(b)] (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions
relating to the Department of War or to any officer or activity
whose title is changed under this section shall, insofar as
they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be
deemed to relate to the Department of the Army within the
Department of Defense or to such officer or activity designated
by his or its new title.
[(c)] (b) the term ``Department of the Army'' as used in this
Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Army at
the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces,
reserve components, installations, activities, and functions
under the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.
department of the navy
Sec. 206. [(a)] The term ``Department of the Navy'' as used
in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the
Navy at the seat of government; the headquarters, United States
Marine Corps; the entire operating forces of the United States
Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine
Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all
field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations,
activities and functions under the control or supervision of
the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard
when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.
department of the air force
Sec. 207.
[(c)] The term ``Department of the Air Force'' as used in
this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air
Force at the seat of government and all field headquarters,
forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and
functions under the control or supervision of the Department of
the Air Force.
TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 305. PAID PARENTAL LEAVE.
(a) Paid Parental Leave.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, a civilian employee of an element of the intelligence
community shall have available a total of 12 administrative
workweeks of paid parental leave in the event of the birth of a
son or daughter of the employee, or placement of a son or
daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care in order
to care for such son or daughter. Such paid parental leave
shall be used during the 12-month period beginning on the date
of the birth or placement. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to modify or otherwise affect the eligibility of an
employee of an element of the intelligence community for
benefits relating to leave under any other provision of law.
(b) Treatment of Parental Leave Request.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law--
(1) an element of the intelligence community shall
accommodate an employee's leave request under
subsection (a), including a request to use such leave
intermittently or to create a reduced work schedule, to
the extent that the requested leave schedule does not
unduly disrupt operations; and
(2) to the extent that an employee's requested leave
described in paragraph (1) arises out of medical
necessity related to a serious health condition
connected to the birth of a son or daughter, the
employing element shall handle the scheduling
consistent with the treatment of employees who are
using leave under subparagraph (C) or (D) of section
6382(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code.
(c) Rules Relating to Paid Leave.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law--
(1) an employee may not be required to first use all
or any portion of any unpaid leave available to the
employee before being allowed to use the paid parental
leave described in subsection (a); and
(2) paid parental leave under subsection (a)--
(A) shall be payable from any appropriation
or fund available for salaries or expenses for
positions within the employing element;
(B) may not be considered to be annual or
vacation leave for purposes of section 5551 or
5552 of title 5, United States Code, or for any
other purpose;
(C) if not used by the employee before the
end of the 12-month period described in
subsection (a) to which the leave relates, may
not be available for any subsequent use and may
not be converted into a cash payment;
(D) may be granted only to the extent that
the employee does not receive a total of more
than 12 weeks of paid parental leave in any 12-
month period beginning on the date of a birth
or placement;
(E) may not be granted--
(i) in excess of a lifetime aggregate
total of 30 administrative workweeks
based on placements of a foster child
for any individual employee; or
(ii) in connection with temporary
foster care placements expected to last
less than 1 year;
(F) may not be granted for a child being
placed for foster care or adoption if such
leave was previously granted to the same
employee when the same child was placed with
the employee for foster care in the past;
(G) shall be used in increments of hours (or
fractions thereof), with 12 administrative
workweeks equal to 480 hours for employees with
a regular full-time work schedule and converted
to a proportional number of hours for employees
with part-time, seasonal, or uncommon tours of
duty; and
(H) may not be used during off-season (nonpay
status) periods for employees with seasonal
work schedules.
(d) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment of this section, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an implementation plan that includes--
(1) processes and procedures for implementing the
paid parental leave policies under subsections (a)
through (c);
(2) an explanation of how the implementation of
subsections (a) through (c) will be reconciled with
policies of other elements of the Federal Government,
including the impact on elements funded by the National
Intelligence Program that are housed within agencies
outside the intelligence community; and
(3) all costs or operational expenses associated with
the implementation of subsections (a) through (c).
(e) Directive.--Not later than 180 days after the Director of
National Intelligence submits the implementation plan under
subsection (d), the Director of National Intelligence shall
issue a written directive to implement this section, which
directive shall take effect on the date of issuance.
(f) Annual Report.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an
annual report that--
(1) details the number of employees of each element
of the intelligence community who applied for and took
paid parental leave under subsection (a) during the
year covered by the report;
(2) details the number of--
(A) employees of each element of the
intelligence community stationed abroad who
applied for and took paid parental leave under
subsection (a) during the year covered by the
report; and
(B) employees of each element of the
intelligence community stationed abroad who
applied for paid parental leave but such
application was not granted because of an undue
impact on operations as specified in subsection
(b)(1); and
(3) includes updates on major implementation
challenges or costs associated with paid parental
leave.
(g) Definition of Son or Daughter.--For purposes of this
section, the term ``son or daughter'' has the meaning given the
term in section 6381 of title 5, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
definitions
Sec. 308. (a) As used in [this Act] sections 2, 101, 102,
103, and 303 of this Act, the term ``function'' includes
functions, powers, and duties.
(b) As used in this Act, the term, ``Department of Defense''
shall be deemed to include the military departments of the
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and all agencies created
under title II of this Act.
* * * * * * *
repealing and saving provisions
Sec. [411.] 312. All laws, orders, and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this title are repealed
insofar as they are inconsistent with the powers, duties, and
responsibilities enacted hereby: Provided, That the powers,
duties, and responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense under
this title shall be administered in conformance with the policy
and requirements for administration of budgetary and fiscal
matters in the Government generally, including accounting and
financial reporting, and that nothing in this title shall be
construed as eliminating or modifying the powers, duties, and
responsibilities of any other department, agency, or officer of
the Government in connection with such matters, but no such
department, agency, or officer shall exercise any such powers,
duties, or responsibilities in a manner that will render
ineffective the provisions of this title.
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
presidential approval and reporting of covert actions
Sec. 503. (a) The President may not authorize the conduct of
a covert action by departments, agencies, or entities of the
United States Government unless the President determines such
an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy
objectives of the United States and is important to the
national security of the United States, which determination
shall be set forth in a finding that shall meet each of the
following conditions:
(1) Each finding shall be in writing, unless
immediate action by the United States is required and
time does not permit the preparation of a written
finding, in which case a written record of the
President's decision shall be contemporaneously made
and shall be reduced to a written finding as soon as
possible but in no event more than 48 hours after the
decision is made.
(2) Except as permitted by paragraph (1), a finding may not
authorize or sanction a covert action, or any aspect of any
such action, which already has occurred.
(3) Each finding shall specify each department,
agency, or entity of the United States Government
authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any
significant way in such action. Any employee,
contractor, or contract agent of a department, agency,
or entity of the United States Government other than
the Central Intelligence Agency directed to participate
in any way in a covert action shall be subject either
to the policies and regulations of the Central
Intelligence Agency, or to written policies or
regulations adopted by such department, agency, or
entity, to govern such participation.
(4) Each finding shall specify whether it is
contemplated that any third party which is not an
element of, or a contractor or contract agent of, the
United States Government, or is not otherwise subject
to United States Government policies and regulations,
will be used to fund or otherwise participate in any
significant way in the covert action concerned, or be
used to undertake the covert action concerned on behalf
of the United States.
(5) A finding may not authorize any action that would violate
the Constitution or any statute of the United States.
(b) To the extent consistent with due regard for the
protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and
methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director
of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments,
agencies, and entities of the United States Government involved
in a covert action--
(1) shall keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of all covert
actions which are the responsibility of, are engaged in
by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any
department, agency, or entity of the United States
Government, including significant failures; and
(2) shall furnish to the congressional intelligence
committees any information or material concerning covert
actions (including the legal basis under which the covert
action is being or was conducted) which is in the possession,
custody, or control of any department, agency, or entity of the
United States Government and which is requested by either of
the congressional intelligence committees in order to carry out
its authorized responsibilities.
(c)(1) The President shall ensure that any finding approved
pursuant to subsection (a) shall be reported in writing to the
congressional intelligence committees as soon as possible after
such approval and before the initiation of the covert action
authorized by the finding, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (2) and paragraph (3).
(2) If the President determines that it is essential to limit
access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances
affecting vital interests of the United States, the finding may
be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the
congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority
leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or
members of the congressional leadership as may be included by
the President.
(3) Whenever a finding is not reported pursuant to paragraph
(1) or (2) of this section, the President shall fully inform
the congressional intelligence committees in a timely fashion
and shall provide a statement of the reasons for not giving
prior notice.
(4) In a case under paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the
finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the
chairman of each congressional intelligence committee.
(5)(A) When access to a finding, or a notification provided
under subsection (d)(1), is limited to the Members of Congress
specified in paragraph (2), a written statement of the reasons
for limiting such access shall also be provided.
(B) Not later than 180 days after a statement of reasons is
submitted in accordance with subparagraph (A) or this
subparagraph, the President shall ensure that--
(i) all members of the congressional intelligence
committees are provided access to the finding or
notification; or
(ii) a statement of reasons that it is essential to
continue to limit access to such finding or such
notification to meet extraordinary circumstances
affecting vital interests of the United States is
submitted to the Members of Congress specified in
paragraph (2).
(d)(1) The President shall ensure that the congressional
intelligence committees, or, if applicable, the Members of
Congress specified in subsection (c)(2), are notified in
writing of any significant change in a previously approved
covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a
previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are
reported pursuant to subsection (c).
(2) In determining whether an activity constitutes a
significant undertaking for purposes of paragraph (1), the
President shall consider whether the activity--
(A) involves significant risk of loss of life;
(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities,
including authorities relating to research,
development, or operations;
(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds
or other resources;
(D) requires notification under section 504;
(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods; or
(F) presents a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious
damage to the diplomatic relations of the United States
if such activity were disclosed without authorization.
(e) As used in this title, the term ``covert action'' means
an activity or activities of the United States Government to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad,
where it is intended that the role of the United States
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but
does not include--
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to
acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence
activities, traditional activities to improve or
maintain the operational security of United States
Government programs, or administrative activities;
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine
support to such activities;
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted
by United States Government law enforcement agencies or
routine support to such activities; or
(4) activities to provide routine support to the
overt activities (other than activities described in
paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States
Government agencies abroad.
(f) No covert action may be conducted which is intended to
influence United States political processes, public opinion,
policies, or media.
(g)(1) In any case where access to a finding reported under
subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1)
is not made available to all members of a congressional
intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2),
the President shall notify all members of such committee that
such finding or such notification has been provided only to the
members specified in subsection (c)(2).
(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under
subsection (c) or notification provided under subsection (d)(1)
is not made available to all members of a congressional
intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2),
the President shall provide to all members of such committee a
general description regarding the finding or notification, as
applicable, consistent with the reasons for not yet fully
informing all members of such committee.
(3) The President shall maintain--
(A) a record of the members of Congress to whom a
finding is reported under subsection (c) or
notification is provided under subsection (d)(1) and
the date on which each member of Congress receives such
finding or notification; and
(B) each written statement provided under subsection
(c)(5).
(h) For each type of activity undertaken as part of a covert
action, the President shall establish in writing a plan to
respond to the unauthorized public disclosure of that type of
activity.
funding of intelligence activities
Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or
intelligence-related activity only if--
(1) those funds were specifically authorized by the
Congress for use for such activities; or
(2) in the case of funds from the Reserve for
Contingencies of the Central Intelligence Agency and
consistent with the provisions of section 503 of this
Act concerning any significant anticipated intelligence
activity, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency has notified the appropriate congressional
committees of the intent to make such funds available
for such activity; or
(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by
the Congress for a different activity--
(A) the activity to be funded is a higher
priority intelligence or intelligence-related
activity;
(B) the use of such funds for such activity
supports an emergent need, improves program
effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and
(C) the Director of National Intelligence,
the Secretary of Defense, or the Attorney
General, as appropriate, has notified the
appropriate congressional committees of the
intent to make such funds available for such
activity;
(4) nothing in this subsection prohibits obligation
or expenditure of funds available to an intelligence
agency in accordance with sections 1535 and 1536 of
title 31, United States Code.
(b) Funds available to an intelligence agency may not be made
available for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity
for which funds were denied by the Congress.
(c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any
covert action, as defined in section 503(e), unless and until a
Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of section 503
has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that
subsection.
(d)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law,
funds available to an intelligence agency that are not
appropriated funds may be obligated or expended for an
intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if those
funds are used for activities reported to the appropriate
congressional committees pursuant to procedures which
identify--
(A) the types of activities for which nonappropriated
funds may be expended; and
(B) the circumstances under which an activity must be
reported as a significant anticipated intelligence
activity before such funds can be expended.
(2) Procedures for purposes of paragraph (1) shall be jointly
agreed upon by the congressional intelligence committees and,
as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence or the
Secretary of Defense.
(e) As used in this section--
(1) the term ``intelligence agency'' means any
department, agency, or other entity of the United
States involved in intelligence or intelligence-related
activities;
(2) the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(3) the term ``specifically authorized by the
Congress'' means that--
(A) the activity and the amount of funds
proposed to be used for that activity were
identified in a formal budget request to the
Congress, but funds shall be deemed to be
specifically authorized for that activity only
to the extent that the Congress both authorized
the funds to be appropriated for that activity
and appropriated the funds for that activity;
or
(B) although the funds were not formally
requested, the Congress both specifically
authorized the appropriation of the funds for
the activity and appropriated the funds for the
activity.
* * * * * * *
reports on security clearances
Sec. 506H. (a) Report on Security Clearance Determinations.--
(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the President shall
submit to Congress a report on the security clearance process.
Such report shall include, for each security clearance level--
(A) the number of employees of the United States
Government who--
(i) held a security clearance at such level
as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
(ii) were approved for a security clearance
at such level during the preceding fiscal year;
and
(B) the number of contractors to the United States
Government who--
(i) held a security clearance at such level
as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
(ii) were approved for a security clearance
at such level during the preceding fiscal
year[; and].
[(C) for each element of the intelligence community--
[(i) the total amount of time it took to
process the security clearance determination
for such level that--
[(I) was among the 80 percent of
security clearance determinations made
during the preceding fiscal year that
took the shortest amount of time to
complete; and
[(II) took the longest amount of time
to complete;
[(ii) the total amount of time it took to
process the security clearance determination
for such level that--
[(I) was among the 90 percent of
security clearance determinations made
during the preceding fiscal year that
took the shortest amount of time to
complete; and
[(II) took the longest amount of time
to complete;
[(iii) the number of pending security
clearance investigations for such level as of
October 1 of the preceding year that have
remained pending for--
[(I) 4 months or less;
[(II) between 4 months and 8 months;
[(III) between 8 months and one year;
and
[(IV) more than one year;
[(iv) the percentage of reviews during the
preceding fiscal year that resulted in a denial
or revocation of a security clearance;
[(v) the percentage of investigations during
the preceding fiscal year that resulted in
incomplete information;
[(vi) the percentage of investigations during
the preceding fiscal year that did not result
in enough information to make a decision on
potentially adverse information; and
[(vii) for security clearance determinations
completed or pending during the preceding
fiscal year that have taken longer than one
year to complete--
[(I) the number of security clearance
determinations for positions as
employees of the United States
Government that required more than one
year to complete;
[(II) the number of security
clearance determinations for
contractors that required more than one
year to complete;
[(III) the agencies that investigated
and adjudicated such determinations;
and
[(IV) the cause of significant delays
in such determinations.]
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the President may
consider--
(A) security clearances at the level of confidential
and secret as one security clearance level; and
(B) security clearances at the level of top secret or
higher as one security clearance level.
(b) Intelligence Community Reports.--(1) Not later than March
1 of each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the
Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives a report on the security clearances processed
by each element of the intelligence community during the
preceding fiscal year. Each such report shall separately
identify security clearances processed for Federal employees
and contractor employees sponsored by each such element.
(2) Each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include
each of the following for each element of the intelligence
community for the fiscal year covered by the report:
(A) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations sponsored for new applicants.
(B) The total number of security clearance periodic
reinvestigations sponsored for existing employees.
(C) The total number of initial security clearance
background investigations for new applicants that were
adjudicated with notice of a determination provided to
the prospective applicant, including--
(i) the total number that were adjudicated
favorably and granted access to classified
information; and
(ii) the total number that were adjudicated
unfavorably and resulted in a denial or
revocation of a security clearance.
(D) The total number of security clearance periodic
background investigations that were adjudicated with
notice of a determination provided to the existing
employee, including--
(i) the total number that were adjudicated
favorably; and
(ii) the total number that were adjudicated
unfavorably and resulted in a denial or
revocation of a security clearance.
(E) The total number of pending security clearance
background investigations, including initial applicant
investigations and periodic reinvestigations, that were
not adjudicated as of the last day of such year and
that remained pending as follows:
(i) For 180 days or less.
(ii) For 180 days or longer, but less than 12
months.
(iii) For 12 months or longer, but less than
18 months.
(iv) For 18 months or longer, but less than
24 months.
(v) For 24 months or longer.
(F) In the case of security clearance determinations
completed or pending during the year preceding the year
for which the report is submitted that have taken
longer than 12 months to complete--
(i) an explanation of the causes for the
delays incurred during the period covered by
the report; and
(ii) the number of such delays involving a
polygraph requirement.
(G) The percentage of security clearance
investigations, including initial and periodic
reinvestigations, that resulted in a denial or
revocation of a security clearance.
(H) The percentage of security clearance
investigations that resulted in incomplete information.
(I) The percentage of security clearance
investigations that did not result in enough
information to make a decision on potentially adverse
information.
(3) The report required under this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
[(b)] (c) Form.--The reports required under [subsection
(a)(1)] subsections (a)(1) and (b) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees
held at united states naval station, guantanamo bay, cuba
Sec. 506I. (a) In General.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an
unclassified summary of--
(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees
currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention
Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of
Defense; and
(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such
detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with
persons in terrorist organizations.
(b) Updates.--Not less frequently than [once every 6 months]
annually, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make
publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the
information required by subsection (a) and the number of
individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist
activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station.
[SEC. 506J. ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERFORMANCE BY
FUNCTION.
[(a) in General.--Not later than April 1, 2016, and each year
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
consultation with the Functional Managers, submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on covered
intelligence functions during the preceding year.
[(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include for each covered intelligence function for the year
covered by such report the following:
[(1) An identification of the capabilities, programs,
and activities of such intelligence function,
regardless of the element of the intelligence community
that carried out such capabilities, programs, and
activities.
[(2) A description of the investment and allocation
of resources for such intelligence function, including
an analysis of the allocation of resources within the
context of the National Intelligence Strategy,
priorities for recipients of resources, and areas of
risk.
[(3) A description and assessment of the performance
of such intelligence function.
[(4) An identification of any issues related to the
application of technical interoperability standards in
the capabilities, programs, and activities of such
intelligence function.
[(5) An identification of the operational overlap or
need for de-confliction, if any, within such
intelligence function.
[(6) A description of any efforts to integrate such
intelligence function with other intelligence
disciplines as part of an integrated intelligence
enterprise.
[(7) A description of any efforts to establish
consistency in tradecraft and training within such
intelligence function.
[(8) A description and assessment of developments in
technology that bear on the future of such intelligence
function.
[(9) Such other matters relating to such intelligence
function as the Director may specify for purposes of
this section.
[(c) Definitions.--In this section:
[(1) The term ``covered intelligence functions''
means each intelligence function for which a Functional
Manager has been established under section 103J during
the year covered by a report under this section.
[(2) The term ``Functional Manager'' means the
manager of an intelligence function established under
section 103J.]
* * * * * * *
SEC. 511. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE ORDER.
(a) Annual Reports Required.--[The Director of National
Intelligence] The head of each element of the intelligence
community shall annually submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on violations of law or
executive order relating to intelligence activities by
personnel of [an element] the element of the intelligence
community that were identified during the previous calendar
year.
(b) Elements.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal
investigations, include a description of, and any action taken
in response to, any violation of law or executive order
(including Executive Order No. 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note))
relating to intelligence activities committed by personnel of
an element of the intelligence community in the course of the
employment of such personnel that, during the previous calendar
year, was--
(1) determined by the director, head, or general
counsel of any element of the intelligence community to
have occurred;
(2) referred to the Department of Justice for
possible criminal prosecution; or
(3) substantiated by the inspector general of any
element of the intelligence community.
SEC. 512. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Briefings.--Upon the request of an appropriate
congressional committee, the Director of National Intelligence
shall provide to the committee a briefing on the unfunded
priorities of an element of the intelligence community.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence
committees; and
(B) the Committees on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives and the Senate.
(2) Unfunded priority.--The term ``unfunded
priority'', in the case of a fiscal year, means a
program, activity, or other initiative of an element of
the intelligence community that--
(A) was submitted by the head of the element
to the Director of National Intelligence in the
budget proposal for the element for that fiscal
year, but was not included by the Director in
the consolidated budget proposal submitted to
the President for that fiscal year; or
(B) was submitted by the Director in the
consolidated budget proposal submitted to the
President for that fiscal year, but was not
included in the budget of the President
submitted to Congress for that fiscal year
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United
States Code.
SEC. 513. BRIEFINGS AND NOTIFICATIONS ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) Quarterly Briefings.--In addition to, and without any
derogation of, the requirement under section 501 to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of the intelligence and counterintelligence activities
of the United States, not less frequently than once each
quarter, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees a
briefing on the counterintelligence activities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Such briefings shall include, at a
minimum, an overview and update of--
(1) the counterintelligence posture of the Bureau;
(2) counterintelligence investigations; and
(3) any other information relating to the
counterintelligence activities of the Bureau that the
Director determines necessary.
(b) Notifications.--In addition to the quarterly briefings
under subsection (a), the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall promptly notify the congressional
intelligence committees of any counterintelligence
investigation carried out by the Bureau with respect to any
counterintelligence risk or threat that is related to an
election or campaign for Federal office.
(c) Guidelines.--
(1) Development and consultation.--The Director shall
develop guidelines governing the scope of the briefings
provided under subsection (a), the notifications
provided under subsection (b), and the information
required by section 308(a)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson
and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020. The Director
shall consult the congressional intelligence committees
during such development.
(2) Submission.--The Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees--
(A) the guidelines under paragraph (1) upon
issuance; and
(B) any updates to such guidelines by not
later than 15 days after making such update.
TITLE VI--PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
* * * * * * *
definitions
Sec. 605. For the purposes of this title:
(1) The term ``classified information'' means
information or material designated and clearly marked
or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of a
statute or Executive order (or a regulation or order
issued pursuant to a statute or Executive order), as
requiring a specific degree of protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
security.
(2) The term ``authorized'', when used with respect
to access to classified information, means having
authority, right, or permission pursuant to the
provisions of a statute, Executive order, directive of
the head of any department or agency engaged in foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities, order
of any United States court, or provisions of any Rule
of the House of Representatives or resolution of the
Senate which assigns responsibility within the
respective House of Congress for the oversight of
intelligence activities.
(3) The term ``disclose'' means to communicate,
provide, impart, transmit, transfer, convey, publish,
or otherwise make available.
(4) The term ``covert agent'' means--
(A) a present or retired officer or employee
of an intelligence agency or a present or
retired member of the Armed Forces assigned to
duty with an intelligence [agency--]
[(i) whose identity] agency whose
identity as such an officer, employee,
or member is classified information[,
and];
[(ii) who is serving outside the
United States or has within the last
five years served outside the United
States; or]
(B) a United States citizen whose
intelligence relationship to the United States
is classified information, and--
(i) who [resides and acts outside the
United States] acts as an agent of, or
informant or source of operational
assistance to, an intelligence agency,
or
(ii) who is at the time of the
disclosure acting as an agent of, or
informant to, the foreign
counterintelligence or foreign
counterterrorism components of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; or
(C) an individual, other than a United States
citizen, whose past or present intelligence
relationship to the United States is classified
information and who is a present or former
agent of, or a present or former informant or
source of operational assistance to, an
intelligence agency.
(5) The term ``intelligence agency'' means the
elements of the intelligence community, as that term is
defined in section 3(4).
(6) The term ``informant'' means any individual who
furnishes information to an intelligence agency in the
course of a confidential relationship protecting the
identity of such individual from public disclosure.
(7) The terms ``officer'' and ``employee'' have the
meanings given such terms by section 2104 and 2105,
respectively, of title 5, United States Code.
(8) The term ``Armed Forces'' means the Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
(9) The term ``United States'', when used in a
geographic sense, means all areas under the territorial
sovereignty of the United States and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.
(10) The term ``pattern of activities'' requires a
series of acts with a common purpose or objective.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
* * * * * * *
SEC. 803. SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, or
such other officer of the United States as the President may
designate, shall serve as the Security Executive Agent for all
departments and agencies of the United States.
(b) Duties.--The duties of the Security Executive Agent are
as follows:
(1) To direct the oversight of investigations,
reinvestigations, adjudications, and, as applicable,
polygraphs for eligibility for access to classified
information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position
made by any Federal agency.
(2) To review the national security background
investigation and adjudication programs of Federal
agencies to determine whether such programs are being
implemented in accordance with this section.
(3) To develop and issue uniform and consistent
policies and procedures to ensure the effective,
efficient, timely, and secure completion of
investigations, polygraphs, and adjudications relating
to determinations of eligibility for access to
classified information or eligibility to hold a
sensitive position.
(4) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as
the final authority to designate a Federal agency or
agencies to conduct investigations of persons who are
proposed for access to classified information or for
eligibility to hold a sensitive position to ascertain
whether such persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining
and retaining access to classified information or
eligibility to hold a sensitive position, as
applicable.
(5) Unless otherwise designated by law, to serve as
the final authority to designate a Federal agency or
agencies to determine eligibility for access to
classified information or eligibility to hold a
sensitive position in accordance with Executive Order
12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to access to
classified information).
(6) To ensure reciprocal recognition of eligibility
for access to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position among Federal agencies,
including acting as the final authority to arbitrate
and resolve disputes among such agencies involving the
reciprocity of investigations and adjudications of
eligibility.
(7) To execute all other duties assigned to the
Security Executive Agent by law.
(c) Authorities.--The Security Executive Agent shall--
(1) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of
Federal agencies to ensure appropriate uniformity,
centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, timeliness,
and security in processes relating to determinations by
such agencies of eligibility for access to classified
information or eligibility to hold a sensitive
position, including such matters as investigations,
polygraphs, adjudications, and reciprocity;
(2) have the authority to grant exceptions to, or
waivers of, national security investigative
requirements, including issuing implementing or
clarifying guidance, as necessary;
(3) have the authority to assign, in whole or in
part, to the head of any Federal agency (solely or
jointly) any of the duties of the Security Executive
Agent described in subsection (b) or the authorities
described in paragraphs (1) and (2), provided that the
exercise of such assigned duties or authorities is
subject to the oversight of the Security Executive
Agent, including such terms and conditions (including
approval by the Security Executive Agent) as the
Security Executive Agent determines appropriate; and
(4) define and set standards for continuous
evaluation for continued access to classified
information and for eligibility to hold a sensitive
position.
exceptions
Sec. [803.] 804. Except as otherwise specifically provided,
the provisions of this title shall not apply to the President
and Vice President, Members of the Congress, Justices of the
Supreme Court, and Federal judges appointed by the President.
definitions
Sec. [804.] 805. For purposes of this title--
(1) the term ``authorized investigative agency''
means an agency authorized by law or regulation to
conduct a counterintelligence investigation or
investigations of persons who are proposed for access
to classified information to ascertain whether such
persons satisfy the criteria for obtaining and
retaining access to such information;
(2) the term ``classified information'' means any
information that has been determined pursuant to
Executive Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, or
successor orders, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to
require protection against unauthorized disclosure and
that is so designated;
(3) the term ``consumer reporting agency'' has the
meaning given such term in section 603 of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a);
(4) the term ``employee'' includes any person who
receives a salary or compensation of any kind from the
United States Government, is a contractor of the United
States Government or an employee thereof, is an unpaid
consultant of the United States Government, or
otherwise acts for or on behalf of the United States
Government, except as otherwise determined by the
President;
(5) the terms ``financial agency'' and ``financial
institution'' have the meanings given to such terms in
section 5312(a) of title 31, United States Code, and
the term ``holding company'' has the meaning given to
such term in section 1101(6) of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401);
(6) the terms ``foreign power'' and ``agent of a
foreign power'' have the same meanings as set forth in
sections 101 (a) and (b), respectively, of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801);
(7) the term ``State'' means each of the several
States of the United States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia,
and the Republic of Palau, and any other possession of
the United States; and
(8) the term ``computer'' means any electronic,
magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed
data processing device performing logical, arithmetic,
or storage functions, and includes any data storage
facility or communications facility directly related to
or operating in conjunction with such device and any
data or other information stored or contained in such
device.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1105. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered official.--The term ``covered official''
means--
(A) the heads of each element of the
intelligence community; and
(B) the inspectors general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the
intelligence community.
(2) Investigation.--The term ``investigation'' means
any inquiry, whether formal or informal, into the
existence of an unauthorized public disclosure of
classified information.
(3) Unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.--The term ``unauthorized disclosure of
classified information'' means any unauthorized
disclosure of classified information to any recipient.
(4) Unauthorized public disclosure of classified
information.--The term ``unauthorized public disclosure
of classified information'' means the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information to a journalist or
media organization.
(b) Intelligence Community Reporting.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every
6 months, each covered official shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on
investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of
classified information.
(2) Elements.--Each report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include, with respect to the preceding 6-
month period, the following:
(A) The number of investigations opened by
the covered official regarding an unauthorized
public disclosure of classified information.
(B) The number of investigations completed by
the covered official regarding an unauthorized
public disclosure of classified information.
(C) Of the number of such completed
investigations identified under subparagraph
(B), the number referred to the Attorney
General for criminal investigation.
(c) Department of Justice Reporting.--
(1) In general.--Not less frequently than once every
6 months, the Assistant Attorney General for National
Security of the Department of Justice, in consultation
with the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives a report on the status of
each referral made to the Department of Justice from
any element of the intelligence community regarding an
unauthorized disclosure of classified information made
during the most recent 365-day period or any referral
that has not yet been closed, regardless of the date
the referral was made.
(2) Contents.--Each report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include, for each referral covered by the
report, at a minimum, the following:
(A) The date the referral was received.
(B) A statement indicating whether the
alleged unauthorized disclosure described in
the referral was substantiated by the
Department of Justice.
(C) A statement indicating the highest level
of classification of the information that was
revealed in the unauthorized disclosure.
(D) A statement indicating whether an open
criminal investigation related to the referral
is active.
(E) A statement indicating whether any
criminal charges have been filed related to the
referral.
(F) A statement indicating whether the
Department of Justice has been able to
attribute the unauthorized disclosure to a
particular entity or individual.
(d) Form of Reports.--Each report submitted under this
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may have a
classified annex.
SEC. 1106. ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE
UNITED STATES BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA.
(a) Requirement.--On an annual basis, the Director of the
National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
influence operations and campaigns in the United States
conducted by the Communist Party of China.
(b) Contents.--Each report under subsection (a) shall include
the following:
(1) A description of the organization of the United
Front Work Department of the People's Republic of
China, or the successors of the United Front Work
Department, and the links between the United Front Work
Department and the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China.
(2) An assessment of the degree to which
organizations that are associated with or receive
funding from the United Front Work Department,
particularly such entities operating in the United
States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist
Party or the Government of China.
(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front
Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the
United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and
influence foreign populations, particularly those of
ethnic Chinese descent.
(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy,
consulates, and organizations affiliated with the
Chinese Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the
United Front Work Department) to influence the United
States-based Chinese Student Scholar Associations.
(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the
United Front Work Department under the leadership of
the President of China.
(6) An assessment of the activities of the United
Front Work Department designed to influence the
opinions of elected leaders of the United States, or
candidates for elections in the United States, with
respect to issues of importance to the Chinese
Communist Party.
(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated
with the United Front Work Department that are
operating in the United States as of the date of the
report.
(8) With respect to reports submitted after the first
report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics,
techniques, and procedures of the influence operations
and campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
(c) Coordination.--In carrying out subsection (a), the
Director shall coordinate with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security
Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the
intelligence community.
(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
----------
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MILITARY LAW
* * * * * * *
PART III--TRAINING AND EDUCATION
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 108--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SCHOOLS
Sec.
[2161. Degree granting authority for National Intelligence University.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 2161. Degree granting authority for National Intelligence
University
[(a) Authority.--Under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense, the President of the National
Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation of the
faculty of the National Intelligence University, confer
appropriate degrees upon graduates who meet the degree
requirements.
[(b) Limitation.--A degree may not be conferred under this
section unless--
[(1) the Secretary of Education has recommended
approval of the degree in accordance with the Federal
Policy Governing Granting of Academic Degrees by
Federal Agencies; and
[(2) the National Intelligence University is
accredited by the appropriate civilian academic
accrediting agency or organization to award the degree,
as determined by the Secretary of Education.
[(c) Congressional Notification Requirements.--(1) When
seeking to establish degree granting authority under this
section, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of
Representatives--
[(A) a copy of the self assessment questionnaire
required by the Federal Policy Governing Granting of
Academic Degrees by Federal Agencies, at the time the
assessment is submitted to the Department of
Education's National Advisory Committee on
Institutional Quality and Integrity; and
[(B) the subsequent recommendations and rationale of
the Secretary of Education regarding the establishment
of the degree granting authority.
[(2) Upon any modification or redesignation of existing
degree granting authority, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and
House of Representatives a report containing the rationale for
the proposed modification or redesignation and any subsequent
recommendation of the Secretary of Education on the proposed
modification or redesignation.
[(3) The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a
report containing an explanation of any action by the
appropriate academic accrediting agency or organization not to
accredit the National Intelligence University to award any new
or existing degree.]
* * * * * * *
----------
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2009
* * * * * * *
TITLE III
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
* * * * * * *
(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)
* * * * * * *
Sec. 319. (a) Reports Required.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act and [every 90 days]
annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the members
and committees of Congress specified in subsection (b) a report
on the prisoner population at the detention facility at Naval
Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(b) Specified Members and Committees of Congress.--The
members and committees of Congress specified in this subsection
are the following:
(1) The majority leader and minority leader of the
Senate.
(2) The Chairman and Ranking Member on the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate.
(3) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(4) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate.
(5) The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
(6) The minority leader of the House of
Representatives.
(7) The Chairman and Ranking Member on the Committee
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(8) The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(9) The Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
(c) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) The name and country of origin of each detainee
at the detention facility at Naval Station Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, as of the date of such report.
(2) A current summary of the evidence, intelligence,
and information used to justify the detention of each
detainee listed under paragraph (1) at Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay.
(3) A current accounting of all the measures taken to
transfer each detainee listed under paragraph (1) to
the individual's country of citizenship or another
country.
(4) A current description of the number of
individuals released or transferred from detention at
Naval Station Guantanamo Bay who are confirmed or
suspected of returning to terrorist activities after
release or transfer from Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.
(5) An assessment of any efforts by al Qaeda to
recruit detainees released from detention at Naval
Station Guantanamo Bay.
(6) A summary of all known contact between any
individual formerly detained at Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay and any individual known or suspected to
be associated with a foreign terrorist group, which
contact included information or discussion about
planning for or conduct of hostilities against the
United States or its allies or the organizational,
logistical, or resource needs or activities of any
terrorist group or activity.
(7) For each individual described in paragraph (4),
the date on which such individual was released or
transferred from Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and the
date on which it is confirmed that such individual is
suspected or confirmed of reengaging in terrorist
activities.
(8) The average period of time described in paragraph
(7) for all the individuals described in paragraph (4).
(d) Additional Matters To Be Included in Initial Report.--The
first report submitted under subsection (a) shall also include
the following:
(1) A description of the process that was previously
used for screening the detainees described by
subsection (c)(4) prior to their release or transfer
from detention at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
(2) An assessment of the adequacy of that screening
process for reducing the risk that detainees previously
released or transferred from Naval Station Guantanamo
Bay would return to terrorist activities after release
or transfer from Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.
(3) An assessment of lessons learned from previous
releases and transfers of individuals who returned to
terrorist activities for reducing the risk that
detainees released or transferred from Naval Station
Guantanamo Bay will return to terrorist activities
after their release or transfer.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
* * * * * * *
DIVISION N--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This division may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this
division is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
[Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian
Federation to exert covert influence over peoples and
governments.]
Sec. 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian
Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
and other nation states to exert covert influence over peoples
and governments.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
* * * * * * *
SEC. 308. GUIDANCE AND REPORTING REQUIREMENT REGARDING THE INTERACTIONS
BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Engagement.--The term ``engagement''--
(A) means any significant interaction between
an element of the intelligence community and an
entertainment industry entity for the purposes
of contributing to an entertainment product
intended to be heard, read, viewed, or
otherwise experienced by the public; and
(B) does not include routine inquiries made
by the press or news media to the public
affairs office of an intelligence community.
(2) Entertainment industry entity.--The term
``entertainment industry entity'' means an entity that
creates, produces, promotes, or distributes a work of
entertainment intended to be heard, read, viewed, or
otherwise experienced by an audience, including--
(A) theater productions, motion pictures,
radio broadcasts, television broadcasts,
podcasts, webcasts, other sound or visual
recording, music, or dance;
(B) books and other published material; and
(C) such other entertainment activity, as
determined by the Director of National
Intelligence.
(b) Director of National Intelligence Guidance.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall issue, and release to the
public, guidance regarding engagements by elements of
the intelligence community with entertainment industry
entities.
(2) Criteria.--The guidance required by paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) permit an element of the intelligence
community to conduct engagements, if the head
of the element, or a designee of such head,
provides prior approval; and
(B) require an unclassified annual report to
the congressional intelligence committees
regarding engagements.
[(c) Annual Report.--Each report required by subsection
(b)(2)(B) shall include the following:
[(1) A description of the nature and duration of each
engagement included in the review.
[(2) The cost incurred by the United States
Government for each such engagement.
[(3) A description of the benefits to the United
States Government for each such engagement.
[(4) A determination of whether any information was
declassified, and whether any classified information
was improperly disclosed, or each such engagement.
[(5) A description of the work produced through each
such engagement.]
* * * * * * *
SEC. 311. NOTIFICATION OF MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING.
[(a) In general.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a copy of each memorandum of
understanding or other agreement regarding significant
operational activities or policy between or among such element
and any other entity or entities of the United States
Government--
[(1) for such a memorandum or agreement that is in
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, not
later than 60 days after such date; and
[(2) for such a memorandum or agreement entered into
after such date, in a timely manner and not more than
60 days after the date such memorandum or other
agreement is entered into.]
(a) In General.--Each year, concurrent with the annual budget
request submitted by the President to Congress under section
1105 of title 31, United States Code, each head of an element
of the intelligence community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report that lists each memorandum of
understanding or other agreement regarding significant
operational activities or policy entered into during the most
recently completed fiscal year between or among such element
and any other entity of the United States Government.
(b) Provision of Documents.--Each head of an element of an
intelligence community who receives a request from the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives for a
copy of a memorandum of understanding or other document listed
in a report submitted by the head under subsection (a) shall
submit to such committee the requested copy as soon as
practicable after receiving such request.
[(b)] (c) Administrative Memorandum or Agreement.--Nothing in
this section may be construed to require an element of the
intelligence community to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any memorandum or agreement that is
solely administrative in nature, including a memorandum or
agreement regarding joint duty or other routine personnel
assignments.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES
SEC. 501. COMMITTEE TO COUNTER ACTIVE MEASURES BY THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, OR OTHER NATION STATE TO EXERT
COVERT INFLUENCE OVER PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Active measures by russia to exert covert
influence.--The term ``active measures by Russia,
China, Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to
exert covert influence'' means activities intended to
influence a person or government that are carried out
in coordination with, or at the behest of, political
leaders or the security services of the Russian
Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, or other nation state and the role of the
Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, or other nation state has been
hidden or not acknowledged publicly, including the
following:
(A) Establishment or funding of a front
group.
(B) Covert broadcasting.
(C) Media manipulation.
(D) Disinformation and forgeries.
(E) Funding agents of influence.
(F) Incitement and offensive
counterintelligence.
(G) Assassinations.
(H) Terrorist acts.
(2) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the congressional intelligence
committees;
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
and
(C) the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Establishment.--There is established within the executive
branch an interagency committee to counter active measures by
the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, or other nation state to exert covert influence.
(c) Membership.--
(1) In general.--
(A) Appointment.--Each head of an agency or
department of the Government set out under
subparagraph (B) shall appoint one member of
the committee established by subsection (b)
from among officials of such agency or
department who occupy a position that is
required to be appointed by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate.
(B) Head of an agency or department.--The
head of an agency or department of the
Government set out under this subparagraph are
the following:
(i) The Director of National
Intelligence.
(ii) The Secretary of State.
(iii) The Secretary of Defense.
(iv) The Secretary of the Treasury.
(v) The Attorney General.
(vi) The Secretary of Energy.
(vii) The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
(viii) The head of any other agency
or department of the United States
Government designated by the President
for purposes of this section.
(d) Meetings.--The committee shall meet on a regular basis.
(e) Duties.--The duties of the committee established by
subsection (b) shall be as follows:
(1) To counter active measures by Russia, China,
Iran, North Korea, or other nation state to exert
covert influence, including by exposing falsehoods,
agents of influence, corruption, human rights abuses,
terrorism, and assassinations carried out by the
security services or political elites of the Russian
Federation, the People's Republic of China, the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, or other nation state or their proxies.
(2) Such other duties as the President may designate
for purposes of this section.
(f) Staff.--The committee established by subsection (b) may
employ such staff as the members of such committee consider
appropriate.
(g) Budget Request.--A request for funds required for the
functioning of the committee established by subsection (b) may
be included in each budget for a fiscal year submitted by the
President pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United
States Code.
(h) Annual Report.--
(1) Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
thereafter, and consistent with the protection of
intelligence sources and methods, the committee
established by subsection (b) shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report describing
steps being taken by the committee to counter active
measures by Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other
nation state to exert covert influence.
(2) Content.--Each report required by paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) A summary of the active measures by the
Russian Federation, the People's Republic of
China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or other
nation state to exert covert influence during
the previous year, including significant
incidents and notable trends.
(B) A description of the key initiatives of
the committee.
(C) A description of the implementation of
the committee's initiatives by the head of an
agency or department of the Government set out
under subsection (c)(1)(B).
(D) An analysis of the impact of the
committee's initiatives.
(E) Recommendations for changes to the
committee's initiatives from the previous year.
(3) Separate reporting requirement.--The requirement
to submit an annual report under paragraph (1) is in
addition to any other reporting requirements with
respect to Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or other
nation state.
SEC. 502. STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF TRAVEL PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES OF
ACCREDITED DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PERSONNEL OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives.
(b) Advance Notification Requirement.--The Secretary of State
shall, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Director of National Intelligence,
establish a mandatory advance notification regime governing all
travel by accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the
Russian Federation in the United States and take necessary
action to secure full compliance by Russian personnel and
address any noncompliance.
(c) Interagency Cooperation.--The Secretary of State, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Director of National Intelligence shall develop written
mechanisms to share information--
(1) on travel by accredited diplomatic and consular
personnel of the Russian Federation who are in the
United States; and
(2) on any known or suspected noncompliance by such
personnel with the regime required by subsection (b).
(d) Quarterly Reports.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter, and
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods--
(1) the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a written report
detailing the number of notifications submitted under
the regime required by subsection (b); and
(2) the Secretary of State and the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall jointly submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a written report
detailing [the number] a best estimate of known or
suspected violations of such requirements by any
accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the
Russian Federation.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS
[SEC. 601. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW WITH RESPECT TO DETAINEES
TRANSFERRED FROM UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
[(a) In general.--For each individual detained at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who was transferred
or released from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
[(1)(A) complete a declassification review of
intelligence reports regarding past terrorist
activities of that individual prepared by the National
Counterterrorism Center for the individual's Periodic
Review Board sessions, transfer, or release; or
[(B) if the individual's transfer or release occurred
prior to the date on which the National
Counterterrorism Center first began to prepare such
reports regarding detainees, such other intelligence
report or reports that contain the same or similar
information regarding the individual's past terrorist
activities;
[(2) make available to the public--
[(A) any intelligence reports declassified as
a result of the declassification review; and
[(B) with respect to each individual
transferred or released, for whom intelligence
reports are declassified as a result of the
declassification review, an unclassified
summary which shall be prepared by the
President of measures being taken by the
country to which the individual was transferred
or released to monitor the individual and to
prevent the individual from carrying out future
terrorist activities; and
[(3) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report setting out the results of the
declassification review, including a description of
intelligence reports covered by the review that were
not declassified.
[(b) Schedule.--
[(1) Transfer or release prior to enactment.--Not
later than 210 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit the report required by subsection (a)(3), which
shall include the results of the declassification
review completed for each individual detained at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who was
transferred or released from United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, prior to the date of the
enactment of this Act.
[(2) Transfer or release after enactment.--Not later
than 120 days after the date an individual detained at
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act is
transferred or released from United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, the Director shall submit the
report required by subsection (a)(3) for such
individual.
[(c) Past Terrorist Activities.--For purposes of this
section, the past terrorist activities of an individual shall
include all terrorist activities conducted by the individual
before the individual's transfer to the detention facility at
United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, including, at a
minimum, the following:
[(1) The terrorist organization, if any, with which
affiliated.
[(2) The terrorist training, if any, received.
[(3) The role in past terrorist attacks against
United States interests or allies.
[(4) The direct responsibility, if any, for the death
of United States citizens or members of the Armed
Forces.
[(5) Any admission of any matter specified in
paragraphs (1) through (4).
[(6) A description of the intelligence supporting any
matter specified in paragraphs (1) through (5),
including the extent to which such intelligence was
corroborated, the level of confidence held by the
intelligence community, and any dissent or reassessment
by an element of the intelligence community.]
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Homeland security information.--The term
``homeland security information'' has the meaning given
that term in section 892(f) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482(f)).
(2) Information sharing council.--The term
``Information Sharing Council'' means the Information
Systems Council established by Executive Order 13356,
or any successor body designated by the President, and
referred to under subsection (g).
(3) Information sharing environment.--The terms
``information sharing environment'' and ``ISE'' mean an
approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism and
homeland security information, which may include any
method determined necessary and appropriate for
carrying out this section.
(4) Program manager.--The term ``program manager''
means the program manager designated under subsection
(f).
(5) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism
information''--
(A) means all information, whether collected,
produced, or distributed by intelligence, law
enforcement, military, homeland security, or
other activities relating to--
(i) the existence, organization,
capabilities, plans, intentions,
vulnerabilities, means of finance or
material support, or activities of
foreign or international terrorist
groups or individuals, or of domestic
groups or individuals involved in
transnational terrorism;
(ii) threats posed by such groups or
individuals to the United States,
United States persons, or United States
interests, or to those of other
nations;
(iii) communications of or by such
groups or individuals; or
(iv) groups or individuals reasonably
believed to be assisting or associated
with such groups or individuals; and
(B) includes weapons of mass destruction
information.
(6) Weapons of mass destruction information.--The
term ``weapons of mass destruction information'' means
information that could reasonably be expected to assist
in the development, proliferation, or use of a weapon
of mass destruction (including a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapon) that could be used by
a terrorist or a terrorist organization against the
United States, including information about the location
of any stockpile of nuclear materials that could be
exploited for use in such a weapon that could be used
by a terrorist or a terrorist organization against the
United States.
(b) Information Sharing Environment.--
(1) Establishment.--The [President] Director of
National Intelligence shall--
(A) create an information sharing environment
for the sharing of terrorism information in a
manner consistent with national security and
with applicable legal standards relating to
privacy and civil liberties;
(B) designate the organizational and
management structures that will be used to
operate and manage the ISE; and
(C) determine and enforce the policies,
directives, and rules that will govern the
content and usage of the ISE.
(2) Attributes.--The [President] Director of National
Intelligence shall, through the structures described in
subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1), ensure that
the ISE provides and facilitates the means for sharing
terrorism information among all appropriate Federal,
State, local, and tribal entities, and the private
sector through the use of policy guidelines and
technologies. The [President] Director of National
Intelligence shall, to the greatest extent practicable,
ensure that the ISE provides the functional equivalent
of, or otherwise supports, a decentralized,
distributed, and coordinated environment that--
(A) connects existing systems, where
appropriate, provides no single points of
failure, and allows users to share information
among agencies, between levels of government,
and, as appropriate, with the private sector;
(B) ensures direct and continuous online
electronic access to information;
(C) facilitates the availability of
information in a form and manner that
facilitates its use in analysis, investigations
and operations;
(D) builds upon existing systems capabilities
currently in use across the Government;
(E) employs an information access management
approach that controls access to data rather
than just systems and networks, without
sacrificing security;
(F) facilitates the sharing of information at
and across all levels of security;
(G) provides directory services, or the
functional equivalent, for locating people and
information;
(H) incorporates protections for individuals'
privacy and civil liberties;
(I) incorporates strong mechanisms to enhance
accountability and facilitate oversight,
including audits, authentication, and access
controls;
(J) integrates the information within the
scope of the information sharing environment,
including any such information in legacy
technologies;
(K) integrates technologies, including all
legacy technologies, through Internet-based
services, consistent with appropriate security
protocols and safeguards, to enable
connectivity among required users at the
Federal, State, and local levels;
(L) allows the full range of analytic and
operational activities without the need to
centralize information within the scope of the
information sharing environment;
(M) permits analysts to collaborate both
independently and in a group (commonly known as
``collective and noncollective
collaboration''), and across multiple levels of
national security information and controlled
unclassified information;
(N) provides a resolution process that
enables changes by authorized officials
regarding rules and policies for the access,
use, and retention of information within the
scope of the information sharing environment;
and
(O) incorporates continuous, real-time, and
immutable audit capabilities, to the maximum
extent practicable.
(c) Preliminary Report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the program manager shall,
in consultation with the Information Sharing Council--
(1) submit to the President and Congress a
description of the technological, legal, and policy
issues presented by the creation of the ISE, and the
way in which these issues will be addressed;
(2) establish an initial capability to provide
electronic directory services, or the functional
equivalent, to assist in locating in the Federal
Government intelligence and terrorism information and
people with relevant knowledge about intelligence and
terrorism information; and
(3) conduct a review of relevant current Federal
agency capabilities, databases, and systems for sharing
information.
(d) Guidelines and Requirements.--As soon as possible, but in
no event later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall--
(1) leverage all ongoing efforts consistent with
establishing the ISE and issue guidelines for
acquiring, accessing, sharing, and using information,
including guidelines to ensure that information is
provided in its most shareable form, such as by using
tearlines to separate out data from the sources and
methods by which the data are obtained;
(2) in consultation with the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board established under section
1061, issue guidelines that--
(A) protect privacy and civil liberties in
the development and use of the ISE; and
(B) shall be made public, unless
nondisclosure is clearly necessary to protect
national security; and
(3) require the heads of Federal departments and
agencies to promote a culture of information sharing
by--
(A) reducing disincentives to information
sharing, including over-classification of
information and unnecessary requirements for
originator approval, consistent with applicable
laws and regulations; and
(B) providing affirmative incentives for
information sharing.
(e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the
ISE. The report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the functions, capabilities,
resources, and conceptual design of the ISE, including
standards.
(2) A description of the impact on enterprise
architectures of participating agencies.
(3) A budget estimate that identifies the incremental
costs associated with designing, testing, integrating,
deploying, and operating the ISE.
(4) A project plan for designing, testing,
integrating, deploying, and operating the ISE.
(5) The policies and directives referred to in
subsection (b)(1)(C), as well as the metrics and
enforcement mechanisms that will be utilized.
(6) Objective, systemwide performance measures to
enable the assessment of progress toward achieving the
full implementation of the ISE.
(7) A description of the training requirements needed
to ensure that the ISE will be adequately implemented
and properly utilized.
(8) A description of the means by which privacy and
civil liberties will be protected in the design and
operation of the ISE.
(9) The recommendations of the program manager, in
consultation with the Information Sharing Council,
regarding whether, and under what conditions, the ISE
should be expanded to include other intelligence
information.
(10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal
departments and agencies that will participate in the
ISE, including an identification of the agencies that
will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and
manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department
or agency components that are part of the ISE), with
such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
(A) the authority of the Director of National
Intelligence under this title, and the
amendments made by this title, to set standards
for information sharing throughout the
intelligence community; and
(B) the authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and
the role of the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of Justice, in coordinating
with State, local, and tribal officials and the
private sector.
(11) The recommendations of the program manager, in
consultation with the Information Sharing Council, for
a future management structure for the ISE, including
whether the position of program manager should continue
to remain in existence.
(f) Program Manager.--
(1) Designation.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, with notification to
Congress, the President shall designate an individual
as the program manager responsible for information
sharing across the Federal Government. [The individual
designated as the program manager shall serve as
program manager until removed from service or replaced
by the President (at the President's sole discretion).]
Beginning on the date of the enactment of the Damon
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019 and 2020,
each individual designated as the program manager shall
be appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
The program manager, in consultation with the head of
any affected department or agency, shall have and
exercise governmentwide authority over the sharing of
information within the scope of the information sharing
environment, including homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction
information, by all Federal departments, agencies, and
components, irrespective of the Federal department,
agency, or component in which the program manager may
be administratively located, except as otherwise
expressly provided by law.
(2) Duties and responsibilities.--
(A) In general.--The program manager shall,
in consultation with the Information Sharing
Council--
(i) plan for and oversee the
implementation of, and manage, the ISE;
(ii) assist in the development of
policies, as appropriate, to foster the
development and proper operation of the
ISE;
(iii) consistent with the direction
and policies issued by the President,
the Director of National Intelligence,
and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, issue
governmentwide procedures, guidelines,
instructions, and functional standards,
as appropriate, for the management,
development, and proper operation of
the ISE;
(iv) identify and resolve information
sharing disputes between Federal
departments, agencies, and components;
and
(v) assist, monitor, and assess the
implementation of the ISE by Federal
departments and agencies to ensure
adequate progress, technological
consistency and policy compliance; and
regularly report the findings to
Congress.
(B) Content of policies, procedures,
guidelines, rules, and standards.--The
policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and
standards under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall--
(i) take into account the varying
missions and security requirements of
agencies participating in the ISE;
(ii) address development,
implementation, and oversight of
technical standards and requirements;
(iii) take into account ongoing and
planned efforts that support
development, implementation and
management of the ISE;
(iv) address and facilitate
information sharing between and among
departments and agencies of the
intelligence community, the Department
of Defense, the homeland security
community and the law enforcement
community;
(v) address and facilitate
information sharing between Federal
departments and agencies and State,
tribal, and local governments;
(vi) address and facilitate, as
appropriate, information sharing
between Federal departments and
agencies and the private sector;
(vii) address and facilitate, as
appropriate, information sharing
between Federal departments and
agencies with foreign partners and
allies; and
(viii) ensure the protection of
privacy and civil liberties.
(g) Information Sharing Council.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established an
Information Sharing Council that shall assist the
President and the program manager in their duties under
this section. The Information Sharing Council shall
serve until removed from service or replaced by the
President (at the sole discretion of the President)
with a successor body.
(2) Specific duties.--In assisting the President and
the program manager in their duties under this section,
the Information Sharing Council shall--
(A) advise the President and the program
manager in developing policies, procedures,
guidelines, roles, and standards necessary to
establish, implement, and maintain the ISE;
(B) work to ensure coordination among the
Federal departments and agencies participating
in the ISE in the establishment,
implementation, and maintenance of the ISE;
(C) identify and, as appropriate, recommend
the consolidation and elimination of current
programs, systems, and processes used by
Federal departments and agencies to share
information, and recommend, as appropriate, the
redirection of existing resources to support
the ISE;
(D) identify gaps, if any, between existing
technologies, programs and systems used by
Federal departments and agencies to share
information and the parameters of the proposed
information sharing environment;
(E) recommend solutions to address any gaps
identified under subparagraph (D);
(F) recommend means by which the ISE can be
extended to allow interchange of information
between Federal departments and agencies and
appropriate authorities of State and local
governments;
(G) assist the program manager in identifying
and resolving information sharing disputes
between Federal departments, agencies, and
components;
(H) identify appropriate personnel for
assignment to the program manager to support
staffing needs identified by the program
manager; and
(I) recommend whether or not, and by which
means, the ISE should be expanded so as to
allow future expansion encompassing other
relevant categories of information.
(3) Consultation.--In performing its duties, the
Information Sharing Council shall consider input from
persons and entities outside the Federal Government
having significant experience and expertise in policy,
technical matters, and operational matters relating to
the ISE.
(4) Inapplicability of federal advisory committee
act.--The Information Sharing Council (including any
subsidiary group of the Information Sharing Council)
shall not be subject to the requirements of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).
(5) Detailees.--Upon a request by the Director of
National Intelligence, the departments and agencies
represented on the Information Sharing Council shall
detail to the program manager, on a reimbursable basis,
appropriate personnel identified under paragraph
(2)(H).
(h) Performance Management Reports.--
(1) In general.--Not later than two years after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and not later than
June 30 of each year thereafter, the President shall
submit to Congress a report on the state of the ISE and
of information sharing across the Federal Government.
(2) Content.--Each report under this subsection shall
include--
(A) a progress report on the extent to which
the ISE has been implemented, including how the
ISE has fared on the performance measures and
whether the performance goals set in the
preceding year have been met;
(B) objective system-wide performance goals
for the following year;
(C) an accounting of how much was spent on
the ISE in the preceding year;
(D) actions taken to ensure that procurement
of and investments in systems and technology
are consistent with the implementation plan for
the ISE;
(E) the extent to which all terrorism watch
lists are available for combined searching in
real time through the ISE and whether there are
consistent standards for placing individuals
on, and removing individuals from, the watch
lists, including the availability of processes
for correcting errors;
(F) the extent to which State, tribal, and
local officials are participating in the ISE;
(G) the extent to which private sector data,
including information from owners and operators
of critical infrastructure, is incorporated in
the ISE, and the extent to which individuals
and entities outside the government are
receiving information through the ISE;
(H) the measures taken by the Federal
government to ensure the accuracy of
information in the ISE, in particular the
accuracy of information about individuals;
(I) an assessment of the privacy and civil
liberties protections of the ISE, including
actions taken in the preceding year to
implement or enforce privacy and civil
liberties protections; and
(J) an assessment of the security protections
used in the ISE.
(i) Agency Responsibilities.--The head of each department or
agency that possesses or uses intelligence or terrorism
information, operates a system in the ISE, or otherwise
participates (or expects to participate) in the ISE shall--
(1) ensure full department or agency compliance with
information sharing policies, procedures, guidelines,
rules, and standards established under subsections (b)
and (f);
(2) ensure the provision of adequate resources for
systems and activities supporting operation of and
participation in the ISE;
(3) ensure full department or agency cooperation in
the development of the ISE to implement governmentwide
information sharing; and
(4) submit, at the request of the President or the
program manager, any reports on the implementation of
the requirements of the ISE within such department or
agency.
(j) Report on the Information Sharing Environment.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of enactment of the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the President shall
report to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Committee
on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives,
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives on the feasibility of--
(A) eliminating the use of any marking or
process (including ``Originator Control'')
intended to, or having the effect of,
restricting the sharing of information within
the scope of the information sharing
environment, including homeland security
information, terrorism information, and weapons
of mass destruction information, between and
among participants in the information sharing
environment, unless the President has--
(i) specifically exempted categories
of information from such elimination;
and
(ii) reported that exemption to the
committees of Congress described in the
matter preceding this subparagraph; and
(B) continuing to use Federal agency
standards in effect on such date of enactment
for the collection, sharing, and access to
information within the scope of the information
sharing environment, including homeland
security information, terrorism information,
and weapons of mass destruction information,
relating to citizens and lawful permanent
residents;
(C) replacing the standards described in
subparagraph (B) with a standard that would
allow mission-based or threat-based permission
to access or share information within the scope
of the information sharing environment,
including homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass
destruction information, for a particular
purpose that the Federal Government, through an
appropriate process established in consultation
with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board established under section 1061, has
determined to be lawfully permissible for a
particular agency, component, or employee
(commonly known as an ``authorized use''
standard); and
(D) the use of anonymized data by Federal
departments, agencies, or components
collecting, possessing, disseminating, or
handling information within the scope of the
information sharing environment, including
homeland security information, terrorism
information, and weapons of mass destruction
information, in any cases in which--
(i) the use of such information is
reasonably expected to produce results
materially equivalent to the use of
information that is transferred or
stored in a non-anonymized form; and
(ii) such use is consistent with any
mission of that department, agency, or
component (including any mission under
a Federal statute or directive of the
President) that involves the storage,
retention, sharing, or exchange of
personally identifiable information.
(2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term
``anonymized data'' means data in which the individual
to whom the data pertains is not identifiable with
reasonable efforts, including information that has been
encrypted or hidden through the use of other
technology.
(k) Additional Positions.--The program manager is authorized
to hire not more than 40 full-time employees to assist the
program manager in--
(1) activities associated with the implementation of
the information sharing environment, including--
(A) implementing the requirements under
subsection (b)(2); and
(B) any additional implementation initiatives
to enhance and expedite the creation of the
information sharing environment; and
(2) identifying and resolving information sharing
disputes between Federal departments, agencies, and
components under subsection (f)(2)(A)(iv).
(l) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated to carry out this section $30,000,000 for each
of fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1019. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO ANALYTIC
INTEGRITY.
(a) Assignment of Responsibilities.--For purposes of carrying
out section 102A(h) of the National Security Act of 1947 (as
added by section 1011(a)), the Director of National
Intelligence shall, not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, assign an individual or entity to be
responsible for ensuring that finished intelligence products
produced by any element or elements of the intelligence
community are timely, objective, independent of political
considerations, based upon all sources of available
intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic
tradecraft.
(b) Responsibilities.--(1) The individual or entity assigned
responsibility under subsection (a)--
(A) may be responsible for general oversight and
management of analysis and production, but may not be
directly responsible for, or involved in, the specific
production of any finished intelligence product;
(B) shall perform, on a regular basis, detailed
reviews of finished intelligence product or other
analytic products by an element or elements of the
intelligence community covering a particular topic or
subject matter;
(C) shall be responsible for identifying on an annual
basis functional or topical areas of analysis for
specific review under subparagraph (B); and
(D) upon completion of any review under subparagraph
(B), may draft lessons learned, identify best
practices, or make recommendations for improvement to
the analytic tradecraft employed in the production of
the reviewed product or products.
(2) Each review under paragraph (1)(B) should--
(A) include whether the product or products concerned
were based on all sources of available intelligence,
properly describe the quality and reliability of
underlying sources, properly caveat and express
uncertainties or confidence in analytic judgments,
properly distinguish between underlying intelligence
and the assumptions and judgments of analysts, and
incorporate, where appropriate, alternative analyses;
and
(B) ensure that the analytic methodologies,
tradecraft, and practices used by the element or
elements concerned in the production of the product or
products concerned meet the standards set forth in
subsection (a).
(3) Information drafted under paragraph (1)(D) should, as
appropriate, be included in analysis teaching modules and case
studies for use throughout the intelligence community.
(c) Annual [Reports] Briefings.--Not later than December 1
each year, the Director of National Intelligence shall [submit
to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the
relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads
of analytic training departments a report containing] provide
to the congressional intelligence committees, the heads of the
relevant elements of the intelligence community, and the heads
of analytic training departments a briefing with a description,
and the associated findings, of each review under subsection
(b)(1)(B) during such year.
(d) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees''
means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives.
* * * * * * *
----------
CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY (LIBERTAD) ACT OF 1996
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996''.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE CASTRO
GOVERNMENT
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 108. REPORTS ON COMMERCE WITH, AND ASSISTANCE TO, CUBA FROM OTHER
FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
[(a) Reports Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and by January 1 of each year
thereafter until the President submits a determination under
section 203(c)(l), the President shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees on commerce with, and
assistance to, Cuba from other foreign countries during the
preceding 12-month period.
[(b) Contents of Reports.--Each report required by subsection
(a) shall, for the period covered by the report, contain the
following, to the extent such information is available:
[(1) A description of all bilateral assistance
provided to Cuba by other foreign countries, including
humanitarian assistance.
[(2) A description of Cuba's commerce with foreign
countries, including an identification of Cuba's
trading partners and the extent of such trade.
[(3) A description of the joint ventures completed,
or under consideration, by foreign nationals and
business firms involving facilities in Cuba, including
an identification of the location of the facilities
involved and a description of the terms of agreement of
the joint. ventures and the names of the parties that
are involved.
[(4) A determination as to whether or not any of the
facilities described in paragraph (3) is the subject of
a claim against Cuba by a United States national.
[(5) A determination of the amount of debt of the
Cuban Government that is owed to each foreign country,
including--
[(A) the amount of debt exchanged, forgiven,
or reduced under the terms of each investment
or operation in Cuba involving foreign
nationals; and
[(B) the amount of debt owed the foreign
country that has been exchanged, forgiven, or
reduced in return for a grant by the Cuban
Government of an equity interest in a property,
investment, or operation of the Cuban
Government or of a Cuban national.
[(6) A description of the steps taken to assure that
raw materials and semifinished or finished goods
produced by facilities in Cuba involving foreign
nationals do not enter the United States market, either
directly or through third countries or parties.
[(7) An identification of countries that purchase, or
have purchased, arms or military supplies from Cuba or
that otherwise have entered into agreements with Cuba
that have a military application, including--
[(A) a description of the military supplies,
equipment, or other material sold, bartered, or
exchanged between Cuba and such countries,
[(B) a listing of the goods, services,
credits, or other consideration received by
Cuba in exchange for military supplies,
equipment, or material, and
[(C) the terms or conditions of any such
agreement.]
* * * * * * *
----------
HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS
Subtitle A--Information and Analysis; Access to Information
* * * * * * *
SEC. 210D. INTERAGENCY THREAT ASSESSMENT AND COORDINATION GROUP.
(a) In General.--To improve the sharing of information within
the scope of the information sharing environment established
under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) with State, local,
tribal, and private sector officials, the Director of National
Intelligence, through the program manager for the information
sharing environment, in coordination with the Secretary, shall
coordinate and oversee the creation of an Interagency Threat
Assessment and Coordination Group (referred to in this section
as the ``ITACG'').
(b) Composition of ITACG.--The ITACG shall consist of--
(1) an ITACG Advisory Council to set policy and
develop processes for the integration, analysis, and
dissemination of federally-coordinated information
within the scope of the information sharing
environment, including homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction
information; and
(2) an ITACG Detail comprised of State, local, and
tribal homeland security and law enforcement officers
and intelligence analysts detailed to work in the
National Counterterrorism Center with Federal
intelligence analysts for the purpose of integrating,
analyzing, and assisting in the dissemination of
federally-coordinated information within the scope of
the information sharing environment, including homeland
security information, terrorism information, and
weapons of mass destruction information, through
appropriate channels identified by the ITACG Advisory
Council.
[(c) Responsibilities of Program Manager.--The program
manager shall--
[(1) monitor and assess the efficacy of the ITACG;
[(2) not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007, and at least annually
thereafter, submit to the Secretary, the Attorney
General, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives a report on the progress
of the ITACG; and
[(3) in each report required by paragraph (2)
submitted after the date of the enactment of the
Reducing Over-Classification Act, include an assessment
of whether the detailees under subsection (d)(5) have
appropriate access to all relevant information, as
required by subsection (g)(2)(C).]
[(d)] (c) Responsibilities of Secretary.--The Secretary, or
the Secretary's designee, in coordination with the Director of
the National Counterterrorism Center and the ITACG Advisory
Council, shall--
(1) create policies and standards for the creation of
information products derived from information within
the scope of the information sharing environment,
including homeland security information, terrorism
information, and weapons of mass destruction
information, that are suitable for dissemination to
State, local, and tribal governments and the private
sector;
(2) evaluate and develop processes for the timely
dissemination of federally-coordinated information
within the scope of the information sharing
environment, including homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction
information, to State, local, and tribal governments
and the private sector;
(3) establish criteria and a methodology for
indicating to State, local, and tribal governments and
the private sector the reliability of information
within the scope of the information sharing
environment, including homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction
information, disseminated to them;
(4) educate the intelligence community about the
requirements of the State, local, and tribal homeland
security, law enforcement, and other emergency response
providers regarding information within the scope of the
information sharing environment, including homeland
security information, terrorism information, and
weapons of mass destruction information;
(5) establish and maintain the ITACG Detail, which
shall assign an appropriate number of State, local, and
tribal homeland security and law enforcement officers
and intelligence analysts to work in the National
Counterterrorism Center who shall--
(A) educate and advise National
Counterterrorism Center intelligence analysts
about the requirements of the State, local, and
tribal homeland security and law enforcement
officers, and other emergency response
providers regarding information within the
scope of the information sharing environment,
including homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass
destruction information;
(B) assist National Counterterrorism Center
intelligence analysts in integrating,
analyzing, and otherwise preparing versions of
products derived from information within the
scope of the information sharing environment,
including homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass
destruction information that are unclassified
or classified at the lowest possible level and
suitable for dissemination to State, local, and
tribal homeland security and law enforcement
agencies in order to help deter and prevent
terrorist attacks;
(C) implement, in coordination with National
Counterterrorism Center intelligence analysts,
the policies, processes, procedures, standards,
and guidelines developed by the ITACG Advisory
Council;
(D) assist in the dissemination of products
derived from information within the scope of
the information sharing environment, including
homeland security information, terrorism
information, and weapons of mass destruction
information, to State, local, and tribal
jurisdictions only through appropriate channels
identified by the ITACG Advisory Council;
(E) make recommendations, as appropriate, to
the Secretary or the Secretary's designee, for
the further dissemination of intelligence
products that could likely inform or improve
the security of a State, local, or tribal
government, (including a State, local, or
tribal law enforcement agency) or a private
sector entity; and
(F) report directly to the senior
intelligence official from the Department under
paragraph (6);
(6) detail a senior intelligence official from the
Department of Homeland Security to the National
Counterterrorism Center, who shall--
(A) manage the day-to-day operations of the
ITACG Detail;
(B) report directly to the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center or the
Director's designee; and
(C) in coordination with the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and subject to
the approval of the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, select a deputy from
the pool of available detailees from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in the National
Counterterrorism Center;
(7) establish, within the ITACG Advisory Council, a
mechanism to select law enforcement officers and
intelligence analysts for placement in the National
Counterterrorism Center consistent with paragraph (5),
using criteria developed by the ITACG Advisory Council
that shall encourage participation from a broadly
representative group of State, local, and tribal
homeland security and law enforcement agencies; and
(8) compile an annual assessment of the ITACG
Detail's performance, including summaries of customer
feedback, in preparing, disseminating, and requesting
the dissemination of intelligence products intended for
State, local and tribal government (including State,
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies) and private
sector entities[; and].
[(9) provide the assessment developed pursuant to
paragraph (8) to the program manager for use in the
annual reports required by subsection (c)(2).]
[(e)] (d) Membership.--The Secretary, or the Secretary's
designee, shall serve as the chair of the ITACG Advisory
Council, which shall include--
(1) representatives of--
(A) the Department;
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
(C) the National Counterterrorism Center;
(D) the Department of Defense;
(E) the Department of Energy;
(F) the Department of State; and
(G) other Federal entities as appropriate;
(2) the program manager of the information sharing
environment, designated under section 1016(f) of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(f)), or the program manager's
designee; and
(3) executive level law enforcement and intelligence
officials from State, local, and tribal governments.
[(f)] (e) Criteria.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and
the program manager of the information sharing environment
established under section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485), shall--
(1) establish procedures for selecting members of the
ITACG Advisory Council and for the proper handling and
safeguarding of products derived from information
within the scope of the information sharing
environment, including homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction
information, by those members; and
(2) ensure that at least 50 percent of the members of
the ITACG Advisory Council are from State, local, and
tribal governments.
[(g)] (f) Operations.--
(1) In general.--Beginning not later than 90 days
after the date of enactment of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the
ITACG Advisory Council shall meet regularly, but not
less than quarterly, at the facilities of the National
Counterterrorism Center of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence.
(2) Management.--Pursuant to section 119(f)(E) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o(f)(E)),
the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center,
acting through the senior intelligence official from
the Department of Homeland Security detailed pursuant
to subsection (d)(6), shall ensure that--
(A) the products derived from information
within the scope of the information sharing
environment, including homeland security
information, terrorism information, and weapons
of mass destruction information, prepared by
the National Counterterrorism Center and the
ITACG Detail for distribution to State, local,
and tribal homeland security and law
enforcement agencies reflect the requirements
of such agencies and are produced consistently
with the policies, processes, procedures,
standards, and guidelines established by the
ITACG Advisory Council;
(B) in consultation with the ITACG Advisory
Council and consistent with sections
102A(f)(1)(B)(iii) and 119(f)(E) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et
seq.), all products described in subparagraph
(A) are disseminated through existing channels
of the Department and the Department of Justice
and other appropriate channels to State, local,
and tribal government officials and other
entities;
(C) all detailees under subsection (d)(5)
have appropriate access to all relevant
information within the scope of the information
sharing environment, including homeland
security information, terrorism information,
and weapons of mass destruction information,
available at the National Counterterrorism
Center in order to accomplish the objectives
under that paragraph;
(D) all detailees under subsection (d)(5)
have the appropriate security clearances and
are trained in the procedures for handling,
processing, storing, and disseminating
classified products derived from information
within the scope of the information sharing
environment, including homeland security
information, terrorism information, and weapons
of mass destruction information; and
(E) all detailees under subsection (d)(5)
complete appropriate privacy and civil
liberties training.
[(h)] (g) Inapplicability of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act.--The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall
not apply to the ITACG or any subsidiary groups thereof.
[(i)] (h) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for
each of fiscal years 2008 through 2012 to carry out this
section, including to obtain security clearances for the State,
local, and tribal participants in the ITACG.
* * * * * * *
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
* * * * * * *
Part C--Computation of Annuities
SEC. 221. COMPUTATION OF ANNUITIES.
(a) Annuity of Participant.--
(1) Computation of annuity.--The annuity of a
participant is the product of--
(A) the participant's high-3 average pay (as
defined in paragraph (4)); and
(B) the number of years, not exceeding 35, of
service credit (determined in accordance with
sections 251 and 252) multiplied by 2 percent.
(2) Credit for unused sick leave.--The total service
of a participant who retires on an immediate annuity
(except under section 231) or who dies leaving a
survivor or survivors entitled to an annuity shall
include (without regard to the 35-year limitation
prescribed in paragraph (1)) the days of unused sick
leave to the credit of the participant. Days of unused
sick leave may not be counted in determining average
basic pay or eligibility for an annuity under this
title. A deposit shall not be required for days of
unused sick leave credited under this paragraph.
(3) Crediting of part-time service.--
(A) In general.--In the case of a participant
whose service includes service on a part-time
basis performed after April 6, 1986, the
participant's annuity shall be the sum of the
amounts determined under subparagraphs (B) and
(C).
(B) Computation of pre-april 7, 1986,
annuity.--The portion of an annuity referred to
in subparagraph (A) with respect to service
before April 7, 1986, shall be the amount
computed under paragraph (1) using the
participant's length of service before that
date (increased by the unused sick leave to the
credit of the participant at the time of
retirement) and the participant's high-3
average pay[.], as determined by using the
annual rate of basic pay that would be payable
for full-time service in that position.
(C) Computation of post-april 6, 1986,
annuity.--The portion of an annuity referred to
in subparagraph (A) with respect to service
after April 6, 1986, shall be the product of--
(i) the amount computed under
paragraph (1), using the participant's
length of service after that date and
the participant's high-3 average pay,
as determined by using the annual rate
of basic pay that would be payable for
full-time service; and
(ii) the ratio which the
participant's actual service after
April 6, 1986 (as determined by
prorating the participant's total
service after that date to reflect the
service that was performed on a part-
time basis) bears to the total service
after that date that would be
creditable for the participant if all
the service had been performed on a
full-time basis.
(D) Treatment of employment on temporary or
intermittent basis.--Employment on a temporary
or intermittent basis shall not be considered
to be service on a part-time basis for purposes
of this paragraph.
(4) High-3 average pay defined.--For purposes of this
subsection, a participant's high-3 average pay is the
amount of the participant's average basic pay for the
highest 3 consecutive years of the participant's
service for which full contributions have been made to
the fund.
(5) Computation of service.--In determining the
aggregate period of service upon which an annuity is to
be based, any fractional part of a month shall not be
counted.
(b) Spouse or Former Spouse Survivor Annuity.--
(1) Reduction in participant's annuity to provide
spouse or former spouse survivor annuity.--
(A) General rule.--Except to the extent
provided otherwise under a written election
under subparagraph (B) or (C), if at the time
of retirement a participant or former
participant is married (or has a former spouse
who has not remarried before attaining age 55),
the participant shall receive a reduced annuity
and provide a survivor annuity for the
participant's spouse under this subsection or
former spouse under section 222(b), or a
combination of such annuities, as the case may
be.
(B) Joint election for waiver or reduction of
spouse survivor annuity.--A married participant
or former participant and the participant's
spouse may jointly elect in writing at the time
of retirement to waive a survivor annuity for
that spouse under this section or to reduce
such survivor annuity under this section by
designating a portion of the annuity of the
participant as the base for the survivor
annuity. If the marriage is dissolved following
an election for such a reduced annuity and the
spouse qualifies as a former spouse, the base
used in calculating any annuity of the former
spouse under section 222(b) may not exceed the
portion of the participant's annuity designated
under this subparagraph.
(C) Joint election of participant and former
spouse.--If a participant or former participant
has a former spouse, such participant and the
participant's former spouse may jointly elect
by spousal agreement under section 264(b) to
waive, reduce, or increase a survivor annuity
under section 222(b) for that former spouse.
Any such election must be made (i) before the
end of the [12-month] 2-year period beginning
on the date on which the divorce or annulment
involving that former spouse becomes final, or
(ii) at the time of retirement of the
participant, whichever is later.
(D) Unilateral elections in absence of spouse
or former spouse.--The Director may prescribe
regulations under which a participant or former
participant may make an election under
subparagraph (B) or (C) without the
participant's spouse or former spouse if the
participant establishes to the satisfaction of
the Director that the participant does not
know, and has taken all reasonable steps to
determine, the whereabouts of the spouse or
former spouse.
(2) Amount of reduction in participant's annuity.--
The annuity of a participant or former participant
providing a survivor annuity under this section (or
section 222(b)), excluding any portion of the annuity
not designated or committed as a base for any survivor
annuity, shall be reduced by 2\1/2\ percent of the
first $3,600 plus 10 percent of any amount over $3,600.
The reduction under this paragraph shall be calculated
before any reduction under section 222(a)(5).
(3) Amount of surviving spouse annuity.--
(A) In general.--If a retired participant
receiving a reduced annuity under this
subsection dies and is survived by a spouse, a
survivor annuity shall be paid to the surviving
spouse. The amount of the annuity shall be
equal to 55 percent of (i) the full amount of
the participant's annuity computed under
subsection (a), or (ii) any lesser amount
elected as the base for the survivor annuity
under paragraph (1)(B).
(B) Limitation.--Notwithstanding subparagraph
(A), the amount of the annuity calculated under
subparagraph (A) for a surviving spouse in any
case in which there is also a surviving former
spouse of the retired participant who qualifies
for an annuity under section 222(b) may not
exceed 55 percent of the portion (if any) of
the base for survivor annuities which remains
available under section 222(b)(4)(B).
(C) Effective date and termination of
annuity.--An annuity payable from the fund to a
surviving spouse under this paragraph shall
commence on the day after the retired
participant dies and shall terminate on the
last day of the month before the surviving
spouse's death or remarriage before attaining
age 55. If such survivor annuity is terminated
because of remarriage, it shall be restored at
the same rate commencing on the date such
remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or
divorce if any lump sum paid upon termination
of the annuity is returned to the fund.
(c) 18-Month Open Period After Retirement To Provide Spouse
Coverage.--
(1) Survivor annuity elections.--
(A) Election when spouse coverage waived at
time of retirement.--A participant or former
participant who retires after March 31, 1992
and who--
(i) is married at the time of
retirement; and
(ii) elects at that time (in
accordance with subsection (b)) to
waive a survivor annuity for the
spouse,
may, during the 18-month period beginning on
the date of the retirement of the participant,
elect to have a reduction under subsection (b)
made in the annuity of the participant (or in
such portion thereof as the participant may
designate) in order to provide a survivor
annuity for the participant's spouse.
(B) Election when reduced spouse annuity
elected.--A participant or former participant
who retires after March 31, 1992, and--
(i) who, at the time of retirement,
is married, and
(ii) who, at that time designates (in
accordance with subsection (b)) that a
portion of the annuity of such
participant is to be used as the base
for a survivor annuity,
may, during the 18-month period beginning on
the date of the retirement of such participant,
elect to have a greater portion of the annuity
of such participant so used.
(2) Deposit required.--
(A) Requirement.--An election under paragraph
(1) shall not be effective unless the amount
specified in subparagraph (B) is deposited into
the fund before the end of that 18-month
period.
(B) Amount of deposit.--The amount to be
deposited with respect to an election under
this subsection is the amount equal to the sum
of the following:
(i) Additional cost to system.--The
additional cost to the system that is
associated with providing a survivor
annuity under subsection (b) and that
results from such election, taking into
account--
(I) the difference (for the
period between the date on
which the annuity of the
participant or former
participant commences and the
date of the election) between
the amount paid to such
participant or former
participant under this title
and the amount which would have
been paid if such election had
been made at the time the
participant or former
participant applied for the
annuity; and
(II) the costs associated
with providing for the later
election.
(ii) Interest.--Interest on the
additional cost determined under clause
(i), computed using the interest rate
specified or determined under section
8334(e) of title 5, United States Code,
for the calendar year in which the
amount to be deposited is determined.
(3) Voiding of previous elections.--An election by a
participant or former participant under this subsection
voids prospectively any election previously made in the
case of such participant under subsection (b).
(4) Reductions in annuity.--An annuity that is
reduced in connection with an election under this
subsection shall be reduced by the same percentage
reductions as were in effect at the time of the
retirement of the participant or former participant
whose annuity is so reduced.
(5) Rights and obligations resulting from reduced
annuity election.--Rights and obligations resulting
from the election of a reduced annuity under this
subsection shall be the same as the rights and
obligations that would have resulted had the
participant involved elected such annuity at the time
of retirement.
(d) Annuities for Surviving Children.--
(1) Participants dying before april 1, 1992.--In the
case of a retired participant who died before April 1,
1992, and who is survived by a child or children--
(A) if the retired participant was survived
by a spouse, there shall be paid from the fund
to or on behalf of each such surviving child an
annuity determined under paragraph (3)(A); and
(B) if the retired participant was not
survived by a spouse, there shall be paid from
the fund to or on behalf of each such surviving
child an annuity determined under paragraph
(3)(B).
(2) Participants dying on or after april 1, 1992.--In
the case of a retired participant who dies on or after
April 1, 1992, and who is survived by a child or
children--
(A) if the retired participant is survived by
a spouse or former spouse who is the natural or
adoptive parent of a surviving child of the
participant, there shall be paid from the fund
to or on behalf of each such surviving child an
annuity determined under paragraph (3)(A); and
(B) if the retired participant is not
survived by a spouse or former spouse who is
the natural or adoptive parent of a surviving
child of the participant, there shall be paid
to or on behalf of each such surviving child an
annuity determined under paragraph (3)(B).
(3) Amount of annuity.--
(A) The annual amount of an annuity for the
surviving child of a participant covered by
paragraph (1)(A) or (2)(A) of this subsection
(or covered by paragraph (1)(A) or (2)(A) of
section 232(c)) is the smallest of the
following:
(i) 60 percent of the participant's
high-3 average pay, as determined under
subsection (a)(4), divided by the
number of children.
(ii) $900, as adjusted under section
291.
(iii) $2,700, as adjusted under
section 291, divided by the number of
children.
(B) The amount of an annuity for the
surviving child of a participant covered by
paragraph (1)(B) or (2)(B) of this subsection
(or covered by paragraph (1)(B) or (2)(B) of
section 232(c)) is the smallest of the
following:
(i) 75 percent of the participant's
high-3 average pay, as determined under
subsection (a)(4), divided by the
number of children.
(ii) $1,080, as adjusted under
section 291.
(iii) $3,240, as adjusted under
section 291, divided by the number of
children.
(4) Recomputation of child annuities.--
(A) In the case of a child annuity payable
under paragraph (1), upon the death of a
surviving spouse or the termination of the
annuity of a child, the annuities of any
remaining children shall be recomputed and paid
as though the spouse or child had not survived
the retired participant.
(B) In the case of a child annuity payable
under paragraph (2), upon the death of a
surviving spouse or former spouse or
termination of the annuity of a child, the
annuities of any remaining children shall be
recomputed and paid as though the spouse,
former spouse, or child had not survived the
retired participant. If the annuity of a
surviving child who has not been receiving an
annuity is initiated or resumed, the annuities
of any other children shall be recomputed and
paid from that date as though the annuities of
all currently eligible children were then being
initiated.
(5) Definition of former spouse.--For purposes of
this subsection, the term ``former spouse'' includes
any former wife or husband of the retired participant,
regardless of the length of marriage or the amount of
creditable service completed by the participant.
(e) Commencement and Termination of Child Annuities.--
(1) Commencement.--An annuity payable to a child
under subsection (d), or under section 232(c), shall
begin on the day after the date on which the
participant or retired participant dies or, in the case
of an individual over the age of 18 who is not a child
within the meaning of section 102(b), shall begin or
resume on the first day of the month in which the
individual later becomes or again becomes a student as
described in section 102(b). Such annuity may not
commence until any lump-sum that has been paid is
returned to the fund.
(2) Termination.--Such an annuity shall terminate on
the last day of the month before the month in which the
recipient of the annuity dies or no longer qualifies as
a child (as defined in section 102(b)).
(f) Participants Not Married at Time of Retirement.--
(1) Designation of persons with insurable interest.--
(A) Authority to make designation.--Subject
to the rights of former spouses under sections
221(b) and 222, at the time of retirement an
unmarried participant found by the Director to
be in good health may elect to receive an
annuity reduced in accordance with subparagraph
(B) and designate in writing an individual
having an insurable interest in the participant
to receive an annuity under the system after
the participant's death. The amount of such an
annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of the
participant's reduced annuity.
(B) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The
annuity payable to the participant making such
election shall be reduced by 10 percent of an
annuity computed under subsection (a) and by an
additional 5 percent for each full 5 years the
designated individual is younger than the
participant. The total reduction under this
subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent.
(C) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The
annuity payable to the designated individual
shall begin on the day after the retired
participant dies and terminate on the last day
of the month before the designated individual
dies.
(D) Recomputation of participant's annuity on
death of designated individual.--An annuity
which is reduced under this paragraph shall,
effective the first day of the month following
the death of the designated individual, be
recomputed and paid as if the annuity had not
been so reduced.
(2) Election of survivor annuity upon subsequent
marriage.--A participant who is unmarried at the time
of retirement and who later marries may irrevocably
elect, in a signed writing received by the Director
within [one year] two years after the marriage, to
receive a reduced annuity as provided in section
221(b). Such election and reduction shall be effective
on the first day of the month beginning 9 months after
the date of marriage. The election voids prospectively
any election previously made under paragraph (1).
(g) Effect of Divorce After Retirement.--
(1) Recomputation of retired participant's annuity
upon divorce.--An annuity which is reduced under this
section (or any similar prior provision of law) to
provide a survivor annuity for a spouse shall, if the
marriage of the retired participant to such spouse is
dissolved, be recomputed and paid for each full month
during which a retired participant is not married (or
is remarried, if there is no election in effect under
paragraph (2)) as if the annuity had not been so
reduced, subject to any reduction required to provide a
survivor annuity under subsection (b) or (c) of section
222 or under section 226.
(2) Election of survivor annuity upon subsequent
remarriage.--
(A) In general.--Upon remarriage, the retired
participant may irrevocably elect, by means of
a signed writing received by the Director
within [one year] two years after such
remarriage, to receive a reduced annuity for
the purpose of providing an annuity for the new
spouse of the retired participant in the event
such spouse survives the retired participant.
Such reduction shall be equal to the reduction
in effect immediately before the dissolution of
the previous marriage (unless such reduction is
adjusted under section 222(b)(5) or elected
under subparagraph (B)).
(B) When annuity previously not (or not
fully) reduced.--
(i) Election.--If the retired
participant's annuity was not reduced
(or was not fully reduced) to provide a
survivor annuity for the participant's
spouse or former spouse as of the time
of retirement, the retired participant
may make an election under the first
sentence of subparagraph (A) upon
remarriage to a spouse other than the
spouse at the time of retirement. For
any remarriage that occurred before
August 14, 1991, the retired
participant may make such an election
within 2 years after such date.
(ii) Deposit required.--
(I) The retired participant
shall, within [one year] two
years after the date of the
remarriage (or by August 14,
1993 for any remarriage that
occurred before August 14,
1991), deposit in the fund an
amount determined by the
Director, as nearly as may be
administratively feasible, to
reflect the amount by which the
retired participant's annuity
would have been reduced if the
election had been in effect
since the date the annuity
commenced, plus interest.
(II) The annual rate of
interest for each year during
which the retired participant's
annuity would have been reduced
if the election had been in
effect since the date the
annuity commenced shall be 6
percent.
(III) If the retired
participant does not make the
deposit, the Director shall
collect such amount by offset
against the participant's
annuity, up to a maximum of 25
percent of the net annuity
otherwise payable to the
retired participant, and the
retired participant is deemed
to consent to such offset.
(IV) The deposit required by
this subparagraph may be made
by the surviving spouse of the
retired participant.
(C) Effects of election.--An election under
this paragraph and the reduction in the
participant's annuity shall be effective on the
first day of the month beginning 9 months after
the date of remarriage. A survivor annuity
elected under this paragraph shall be treated
in all respects as a survivor annuity under
subsection (b).
(h) Conditional Election of Insurable Interest Survivor
Annuity by Participants Married at the Time of Retirement.--
(1) authority to make designation.--Subject to the
rights of former spouses under subsection (b) and
section 222, at the time of retirement a married
participant found by the Director to be in good health
may elect to receive an annuity reduced in accordance
with subsection (f)(1)(B) and designate in writing an
individual having an insurable interest in the
participant to receive an annuity under the system
after the participant's death, except that any such
election to provide an insurable interest survivor
annuity to the participant's spouse shall only be
effective if the participant's spouse waives the
spousal right to a survivor annuity under this Act. The
amount of the annuity shall be equal to 55 percent of
the participant's reduced annuity.
(2) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The annuity
payable to the participant making such election shall
be reduced by 10 percent of an annuity computed under
subsection (a) and by an additional 5 percent for each
full 5 years the designated individual is younger than
the participant. The total reduction under this
subparagraph may not exceed 40 percent.
(3) Commencement of survivor annuity.--The annuity
payable to the designated individual shall begin on the
day after the retired participant dies and terminate on
the last day of the month before the designated
individual dies.
(4) Recomputation of participant's annuity on death
of designated individual.--An annuity that is reduced
under this subsection shall, effective the first day of
the month following the death of the designated
individual, be recomputed and paid as if the annuity
had not been so reduced.
[(h)] (i) Coordination of Annuities.--
(1) Surviving spouse.--A surviving spouse whose
survivor annuity was terminated because of remarriage
before attaining age 55 shall not be entitled under
subsection (b)(3)(C) to the restoration of that
survivor annuity payable from the fund unless the
surviving spouse elects to receive it instead of any
other survivor annuity to which the surviving spouse
may be entitled under the system or any other
retirement system for Government employees by reason of
the remarriage.
(2) Former spouse.--A surviving former spouse of a
participant or retired participant shall not become
entitled under section 222(b) or 224 to a survivor
annuity or to the restoration of a survivor annuity
payable from the fund unless the surviving former
spouse elects to receive it instead of any other
survivor annuity to which the surviving former spouse
may be entitled under this or any other retirement
system for Government employees on the basis of a
marriage to someone other than the participant.
(3) Surviving spouse of post-retirement marriage.--A
surviving spouse who married a participant after the
participant's retirement shall be entitled to a
survivor annuity payable from the fund only upon
electing that annuity instead of any other survivor
annuity to which the surviving spouse may be entitled
under this or any other retirement system for
Government employees on the basis of a marriage to
someone other than the retired participant.
[(i)] (j) Supplemental Survivor Annuities.--
(1) Spouse of recalled annuitant.--A married recalled
annuitant who reverts to retired status with
entitlement to a supplemental annuity under section
271(b) shall, unless the annuitant and the annuitant's
spouse jointly elect in writing to the contrary at the
time of reversion to retired status, have the
supplemental annuity reduced by 10 percent to provide a
supplemental survivor annuity for the annuitant's
spouse. Such supplemental survivor annuity shall be
equal to 55 percent of the supplemental annuity of the
annuitant.
(2) Regulations.--The Director shall prescribe
regulations to provide for the application of paragraph
(1) of this subsection and of subsection (b) of section
271 in any case in which an annuitant has a former
spouse who was married to the recalled annuitant at any
time during the period of recall service and who
qualifies for an annuity under section 222(b).
[(j)] (k) Offset of Annuities by Amount of Social Security
Benefit.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, an
annuity (including a disability annuity) payable under this
title to an individual described in sections 211(d)(1) and
301(c)(1) and any survivor annuity payable under this title on
the basis of the service of such individual shall be reduced in
a manner consistent with section 8349 of title 5, United States
Code, under conditions consistent with the conditions
prescribed in that section.
[(k)] (l) Information From Other Agencies.--
(1) Other agencies.--For the purpose of ensuring the
accuracy of the information used in the determination
of eligibility for and the computation of annuities
payable from the fund under this title, at the request
of the Director--
(A) the Secretary of Defense shall provide
information on retired or retainer pay paid
under title 10, United States Code;
(B) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs shall
provide information on pensions or compensation
paid under title 38, United States Code;
(C) the Secretary of Health and Human
Services shall provide information contained in
the records of the Social Security
Administration; and
(D) the Secretary of Labor shall provide
information on benefits paid under subchapter I
of chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Limitation on information requested.--The
Director shall request only such information as the
Director determines is necessary.
(3) Limitation on uses of information.--The Director,
in consultation with the officials from whom
information is requested, shall ensure that information
made available under this subsection is used only for
the purposes authorized.
[(l)] (m) Information on Rights Under the System.--The
Director shall, on an annual basis--
(1) inform each retired participant of the
participant's right of election under subsections (c),
(f)(2), and (g); and
(2) to the maximum extent practicable, inform spouses
and former spouses of participants, former
participants, and retired participants of their rights
under this Act.
SEC. 222. ANNUITIES FOR FORMER SPOUSES.
(a) Former Spouse Share of Participant's Annuity.--
(1) Pro rata share.--Unless otherwise expressly
provided by a spousal agreement or court order under
section 264(b), a former spouse of a participant,
former participant, or retired participant is entitled
to an annuity--
(A) if married to the participant, former
participant, or retired participant throughout
the creditable service of the participant,
equal to 50 percent of the annuity of the
participant; or
(B) if not married to the participant
throughout such creditable service, equal to
that proportion of 50 percent of such annuity
that is the proportion that the number of days
of the marriage of the former spouse to the
participant during periods of creditable
service of such participant under this title
bears to the total number of days of such
creditable service.
(2) Disqualification upon remarriage before age 55.--
A former spouse is not qualified for an annuity under
this subsection if before the commencement of that
annuity the former spouse remarries before becoming 55
years of age.
(3) Commencement of annuity.--The annuity of a former
spouse under this subsection commences on the day the
participant upon whose service the annuity is based
becomes entitled to an annuity under this title or on
the first day of the month after the divorce or
annulment involved becomes final, whichever is later.
(4) Termination of annuity.--The annuity of such
former spouse and the right thereto terminate on--
(A) the last day of the month before the
month in which the former spouse dies or
remarries before 55 years of age; or
(B) the date on which the annuity of the
participant terminates (except in the case of
an annuity subject to paragraph (5)(B)).
(5) Treatment of participant's annuity.--
(A) Reduction in participant's annuity.--The
annuity payable to any participant shall be
reduced by the amount of an annuity under this
subsection paid to any former spouse based upon
the service of that participant. Such reduction
shall be disregarded in calculating--
(i) the survivor annuity for any
spouse, former spouse, or other
survivor under this title; and
(ii) any reduction in the annuity of
the participant to provide survivor
benefits under subsection (b) or under
section 221(b).
(B) Treatment when annuitant returns to
service.--If an annuitant whose annuity is
reduced under subparagraph (A) is recalled to
service under section 271, or reinstated or
reappointed, in the case of a recovered
disability annuitant, or if any annuitant is
reemployed as provided for under sections 272
and 273, the pay of that annuitant shall be
reduced by the same amount as the annuity would
have been reduced if it had continued. Amounts
equal to the reductions under this subparagraph
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the
United States to the credit of the fund.
(6) Disability annuitant.--Notwithstanding paragraph
(3), in the case of a former spouse of a disability
annuitant--
(A) the annuity of that former spouse shall
commence on the date on which the participant
would qualify on the basis of the participant's
creditable service for an annuity under this
title (other than a disability annuity) or the
date on which the disability annuity begins,
whichever is later, and
(B) the amount of the annuity of the former
spouse shall be calculated on the basis of the
annuity for which the participant would
otherwise so qualify.
(7) Election of benefits.--A former spouse of a
participant, former participant, or retired participant
shall not become entitled under this subsection to an
annuity payable from the fund unless the former spouse
elects to receive it instead of any survivor annuity to
which the former spouse may be entitled under this or
any other retirement system for Government employees on
the basis of a marriage to someone other than the
participant.
(8) Limitation in case of multiple former spouse
annuities.--No spousal agreement or court order under
section 264(b) involving a participant may provide for
an annuity or a combination of annuities under this
subsection that exceeds the annuity of the participant.
(b) Former Spouse Survivor Annuity.--
(1) Pro rata share.--Subject to any election under
section 221(b)(1)(B) and (C) and unless otherwise
expressly provided by a spousal agreement or court
order under section 264(b), if an annuitant is survived
by a former spouse, the former spouse shall be
entitled--
(A) if married to the annuitant throughout
the creditable service of the annuitant, to a
survivor annuity equal to 55 percent of the
unreduced amount of the annuitant's annuity, as
computed under section 221(a); and
(B) if not married to the annuitant
throughout such creditable service, to a
survivor annuity equal to that proportion of 55
percent of the unreduced amount of such annuity
that is the proportion that the number of days
of the marriage of the former spouse to the
participant during periods of creditable
service of such participant under this title
bears to the total number of days of such
creditable service.
(2) Disqualification upon remarriage before age 55.--
A former spouse shall not be qualified for an annuity
under this subsection if before the commencement of
that annuity the former spouse remarries before
becoming 55 years of age.
(3) Commencement, termination, and restoration of
annuity.--An annuity payable from the fund under this
title to a surviving former spouse under this
subsection shall commence on the day after the
annuitant dies and shall terminate on the last day of
the month before the former spouse's death or
remarriage before attaining age 55. If such a survivor
annuity is terminated because of remarriage, it shall
be restored at the same rate commencing on the date
such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or
divorce if any lump sum paid upon termination of the
annuity is returned to the fund.
(4) Survivor annuity amount.--
(A) Maximum amount.--The maximum survivor
annuity or combination of survivor annuities
under this subsection (and section 221(b)(3))
with respect to any participant may not exceed
55 percent of the full amount of the
participant's annuity, as calculated under
section 221(a).
(B) Limitation on other survivor annuities
based on service of same participant.--Once a
survivor annuity has been provided under this
subsection for any former spouse, a survivor
annuity for another individual may thereafter
be provided under this subsection (or section
221(b)(3)) with respect to the participant only
for that portion (if any) of the maximum
available which is not committed for survivor
benefits for any former spouse whose
prospective right to such annuity has not
terminated by reason of death or remarriage.
(C) Finality of court order upon death of
participant.--After the death of a participant
or retired participant, a court order under
section 264(b) may not adjust the amount of the
annuity of a former spouse of that participant
or retired participant under this section.
(5) Effect of termination of former spouse
entitlement.--
(A) Recomputation of participant's annuity.--
If a former spouse of a retired participant
dies or remarries before attaining age 55, the
annuity of the retired participant, if reduced
to provide a survivor annuity for that former
spouse, shall be recomputed and paid, effective
on the first day of the month beginning after
such death or remarriage, as if the annuity had
not been so reduced, unless an election is in
effect under subparagraph (B).
(B) Election of spouse annuity.--Subject to
paragraph (4)(B), the participant may elect in
writing within [one year] two years after
receipt of notice of the death or remarriage of
the former spouse to continue the reduction in
order to provide a higher survivor annuity
under section 221(b)(3) for any spouse of the
participant.
(c) Optional Additional Survivor Annuities for Other Former
Spouse or Surviving Spouse.--
(1) In general.--In the case of any participant
providing a survivor annuity under subsection (b) for a
former spouse--
(A) such participant may elect, or
(B) a spousal agreement or court order under
section 264(b) may provide for,
an additional survivor annuity under this subsection
for any other former spouse or spouse surviving the
participant, if the participant satisfactorily passes a
physical examination as prescribed by the Director.
(2) Limitation.--Neither the total amount of survivor
annuity or annuities under this subsection with respect
to any participant, nor the survivor annuity or
annuities for any one surviving spouse or former spouse
of such participant under this section or section 221,
may exceed 55 percent of the unreduced amount of the
participant's annuity, as computed under section
221(a).
(3) Contribution for additional annuities.--
(A) Provision of additional survivor
annuity.--In accordance with regulations which
the Director shall prescribe, the participant
involved may provide for any annuity under this
subsection--
(i) by a reduction in the annuity or
an allotment from the basic pay of the
participant;
(ii) by a lump-sum payment or
installment payments to the fund; or
(iii) by any combination thereof.
(B) Actuarial equivalence to benefit.--The
present value of the total amount to accrue to
the fund under subparagraph (A) to provide any
annuity under this subsection shall be
actuarially equivalent in value to such
annuity, as calculated upon such tables of
mortality as may from time to time be
prescribed for this purpose by the Director.
(C) Effect of former spouse's death or
disqualification.--If a former spouse
predeceases the participant or remarries before
attaining age 55 (or, in the case of a spouse,
the spouse predeceases the participant or does
not qualify as a former spouse upon dissolution
of the marriage)--
(i) if an annuity reduction or pay
allotment under subparagraph (A) is in
effect for that spouse or former
spouse, the annuity shall be recomputed
and paid as if it had not been reduced
or the pay allotment terminated, as the
case may be; and
(ii) any amount accruing to the fund
under subparagraph (A) shall be
refunded, but only to the extent that
such amount may have exceeded the
actuarial cost of providing benefits
under this subsection for the period
such benefits were provided, as
determined under regulations prescribed
by the Director.
(D) Recomputation upon death or remarriage of
former spouse.--Under regulations prescribed by
the Director, an annuity shall be recomputed
(or a pay allotment terminated or adjusted),
and a refund provided (if appropriate), in a
manner comparable to that provided under
subparagraph (C), in order to reflect a
termination or reduction of future benefits
under this subsection for a spouse in the event
a former spouse of the participant dies or
remarries before attaining age 55 and an
increased annuity is provided for that spouse
in accordance with this section.
(4) Commencement and termination of additional
survivor annuity.--An annuity payable under this
subsection to a spouse or former spouse shall commence
on the day after the participant dies and shall
terminate on the last day of the month before the
spouse's or the former spouse's death or remarriage
before attaining age 55.
(5) Nonapplicability of cola provision.--Section 291
does not apply to an annuity under this subsection,
unless authorized under regulations prescribed by the
Director.
* * * * * * *
Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants
* * * * * * *
SEC. 232. DEATH IN SERVICE.
(a) Return of Contributions When No Annuity Payable.--If a
participant dies and no claim for an annuity is payable under
this title, the participant's lump-sum credit and any voluntary
contributions made under section 281, with interest, shall be
paid in the order of precedence shown in section 241(c).
(b) Survivor Annuity for Surviving Spouse or Former Spouse.--
(1) In general.--If a participant dies before
separation or retirement from the Agency and is
survived by a spouse or by a former spouse qualifying
for a survivor annuity under section 222(b), such
surviving spouse shall be entitled to an annuity equal
to 55 percent of the annuity computed in accordance
with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection and
section 221(a), and any such surviving former spouse
shall be entitled to an annuity computed in accordance
with section 222(b) and paragraph (2) of this
subsection as if the participant died after being
entitled to an annuity under this title. The annuity of
such surviving spouse or former spouse shall commence
on the day after the participant dies and shall
terminate on the last day of the month before the death
or remarriage before attaining age 55 of the surviving
spouse or former spouse (subject to the payment and
restoration provisions of sections 221(b)(3)(C),
[221(h),] 221(i), and 222(b)(3)).
(2) Computation.--The annuity payable under paragraph
(1) shall be computed in accordance with section
221(a), except that the computation of the annuity of
the participant under such section shall be at least
the smaller of (A) 40 percent of the participant's
high-3 average pay, or (B) the sum obtained under such
section after increasing the participant's length of
service by the difference between the participant's age
at the time of death and age 60.
(3) Limitation.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if
the participant had a former spouse qualifying for an
annuity under section 222(b), the annuity of a
surviving spouse under this section shall be subject to
the limitation of section 221(b)(3)(B), and the annuity
of a former spouse under this section shall be subject
to the limitation of section 222(b)(4)(B).
(4) Precedence of section 224 survivor annuity over
death-in-service annuity.--If a former spouse who is
eligible for a death-in-service annuity under this
section is or becomes eligible for an annuity under
section 224, the annuity provided under this section
shall not be payable and shall be superseded by the
annuity under section 224.
(c) Annuities for Surviving Children.--
(1) Participants dying before april 1, 1992.--In the
case of a participant who before April 1, 1992, died
before separation or retirement from the Agency and who
was survived by a child or children--
(A) if the participant was survived by a
spouse, there shall be paid from the fund to or
on behalf of each such surviving child an
annuity determined under section 221(d)(3)(A);
and
(B) if the participant was not survived by a
spouse, there shall be paid from the fund to or
on behalf of each such surviving child an
annuity determined under section 221(d)(3)(B).
(2) Participants dying on or after april 1, 1992.--In
the case of a participant who on or after April 1,
1992, dies before separation or retirement from the
Agency and who is survived by a child or children--
(A) if the participant is survived by a
spouse or former spouse who is the natural or
adoptive parent of a surviving child of the
participant, there shall be paid from the fund
to or on behalf of each such surviving child an
annuity determined under section 221(d)(3)(A);
and
(B) if the participant is not survived by a
spouse or former spouse who is the natural or
adoptive parent of a surviving child of the
participant, there shall be paid to or on
behalf of each such surviving child an annuity
determined under section 221(d)(3)(B).
(3) Former spouse defined.--For purposes of this
subsection, the term ``former spouse'' includes any
former wife or husband of a participant, regardless of
the length of marriage or the amount of creditable
service completed by the participant.
* * * * * * *
Part F--Period of Service for Annuities
* * * * * * *
SEC. 252. PRIOR SERVICE CREDIT.
(a) In General.--A participant may, subject to the provisions
of this section, include in the participant's period of
service--
(1) civilian service in the Government before
becoming a participant that would be creditable toward
retirement under subchapter III of chapter 83 of title
5, United States Code (as determined under section
8332(b) of such title); and
(2) honorable active service in the Armed Forces
before the date of the separation upon which
eligibility for an annuity is based, or honorable
active service in the Regular or Reserve Corps of the
Public Health Service after June 30, 1960, or as a
commissioned officer of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration after June 30, 1961.
(b) Limitations.--
(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2)
and (3), the total service of any participant shall
exclude--
(A) any period of civilian service on or
after October 1, 1982, for which retirement
deductions or deposits have not been made,
(B) any period of service for which a refund
of contributions has been made, or
(C) any period of service for which
contributions were not transferred pursuant to
subsection (c)(1);
unless the participant makes a deposit to the fund in
an amount equal to the percentages of basic pay
received for such service as specified in the table
contained in section 8334(c) of title 5, United States
Code, together with interest computed in accordance
with section 8334(e) of such title. The deposit may be
made in one or more installments (including by
allotment from pay), as determined by the Director.
(2) Effect of retirement deductions not made.--If a
participant has not paid a deposit for civilian service
performed before October 1, 1982, for which retirement
deductions were not made, such participant's annuity
shall be reduced by 10 percent of the deposit described
in paragraph (1) remaining unpaid, unless the
participant elects to eliminate the service involved
for the purpose of the annuity computation.
(3) Effect of refund of retirement contributions.--A
participant who received a refund of retirement
contributions under this or any other retirement system
for Government employees covering service for which the
participant may be allowed credit under this title may
deposit the amount received, with interest computed
under paragraph (1). Credit may not be allowed for the
service covered by the refund until the deposit is
made, except that a participant who--
(A) separated from Government service before
[October 1, 1990] March 31, 1991, and received
a refund of the participant's retirement
contributions covering a period of service
ending before [October 1, 1990] March 31, 1991;
(B) is entitled to an annuity under this
title (other than a disability annuity) which
commences after December 1, 1992; and
(C) does not make the deposit required to
receive credit for the service covered by the
refund;
shall be entitled to an annuity actuarially reduced in
accordance with section 8334(d)(2)(B) of title 5,
United States Code.
(4) Entitlement under another system.--Credit toward
retirement under the system shall not be allowed for
any period of civilian service on the basis of which
the participant is receiving (or will in the future be
entitled to receive) an annuity under another
retirement system for Government employees, unless the
right to such annuity is waived and a deposit is made
under paragraph (1) covering that period of service, or
a transfer is made pursuant to subsection (c).
(c) Transfer From Other Government Retirement Systems.--
(1) In general.--If an employee who is under another
retirement system for Government employees becomes a
participant in the system by direct transfer, the
Government's contributions (including interest accrued
thereon computed in accordance with section 8334(e) of
title 5, United States Code) under such retirement
system on behalf of the employee as well as such
employee's total contributions and deposits (including
interest accrued thereon), except voluntary
contributions, shall be transferred to the employee's
credit in the fund effective as of the date such
employee becomes a participant in the system.
(2) Consent of employee.--Each such employee shall be
deemed to consent to the transfer of such funds, and
such transfer shall be a complete discharge and
acquittance of all claims and demands against the other
Government retirement fund on account of service
rendered before becoming a participant in the system.
(3) Additional contributions; refunds.--A participant
whose contributions are transferred pursuant to
paragraph (1) shall not be required to make additional
contributions for periods of service for which full
contributions were made to the other Government
retirement fund, nor shall any refund be made to any
such participant on account of contributions made
during any period to the other Government retirement
fund at a higher rate than that fixed for employees by
section 8334(c) of title 5, United States Code, for
contributions to the fund.
(d) Transfer to Other Government Retirement Systems.--
(1) In general.--If a participant in the system
becomes an employee under another Government retirement
system by direct transfer to employment covered by such
system, the Government's contributions (including
interest accrued thereon computed in accordance with
section 8334(e) of title 5, United States Code) to the
fund on the participant's behalf as well as the
participant's total contributions and deposits
(including interest accrued thereon), except voluntary
contributions, shall be transferred to the
participant's credit in the fund of such other
retirement system effective as of the date on which the
participant becomes eligible to participate in such
other retirement system.
(2) Consent of employee.--Each such employee shall be
deemed to consent to the transfer of such funds, and
such transfer shall be a complete discharge and
acquittance of all claims and demands against the fund
on account of service rendered before the participant's
becoming eligible for participation in that other
system.
(e) Prior Military Service Credit.--
(1) Application to obtain credit.--If a deposit
required to obtain credit for prior military service
described in subsection (a)(2) was not made to another
Government retirement fund and transferred under
subsection (c)(1), the participant may obtain credit
for such military service, subject to the provisions of
this subsection and subsections (f) through (h), by
applying for it to the Director before retirement or
separation from the Agency.
(2) Employment starting before, on, or after october
1, 1982.--Except as provided in paragraph (3)--
(A) the service of a participant who first
became a Federal employee before October 1,
1982, shall include credit for each period of
military service performed before the date of
separation on which entitlement to an annuity
under this title is based, subject to section
252(f); and
(B) the service of a participant who first
becomes a Federal employee on or after October
1, 1982, shall include credit for--
(i) each period of military service
performed before January 1, 1957, and
(ii) each period of military service
performed after December 31, 1956, and
before the separation on which
entitlement to an annuity under this
title is based, only if a deposit (with
interest, if any) is made with respect
to that period, as provided in
subsection (h).
(3) Effect of receipt of military retired pay.--In
the case of a participant who is entitled to retired
pay based on a period of military service, the
participant's service may not include credit for such
period of military service unless the retired pay is
paid--
(A) on account of a service-connected
disability--
(i) incurred in combat with an enemy
of the United States; or
(ii) caused by an instrumentality of
war and incurred in the line of duty
during a period of war (as defined in
section 1101 of title 38, United States
Code); or
(B) under chapter 67 of title 10, United
States Code.
(4) Survivor annuity.--Notwithstanding paragraph (3),
the survivor annuity of a survivor of a participant--
(A) who was awarded retired pay based on any
period of military service, and
(B) whose death occurs before separation from
the Agency,
shall be computed in accordance with section 8332(c)(3)
of title 5, United States Code.
(f) Effect of Entitlement to Social Security Benefits.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of this section (except paragraph (3) of this
subsection) or section 253, any military service (other
than military service covered by military leave with
pay from a civilian position) performed by a
participant after December 1956 shall be excluded in
determining the aggregate period of service on which an
annuity payable under this title to such participant or
to the participant's spouse, former spouse, previous
spouse, or child is based, if such participant, spouse,
former spouse, previous spouse, or child is entitled
(or would upon proper application be entitled), at the
time of such determination, to monthly old-age or
survivors' insurance benefits under section 202 of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 402), based on such
participant's wages and self-employment income. If the
military service is not excluded under the preceding
sentence, but upon attaining age 62, the participant or
spouse, former spouse, or previous spouse becomes
entitled (or would upon proper application be entitled)
to such benefits, the aggregate period of service on
which the annuity is based shall be redetermined,
effective as of the first day of the month in which the
participant or spouse, former spouse, or previous
spouse attains age 62, so as to exclude such service.
(2) Limitation.--The provisions of paragraph (1)
relating to credit for military service do not apply
to--
(A) any period of military service of a
participant with respect to which the
participant has made a deposit with interest,
if any, under subsection (h); or
(B) the military service of any participant
described in subsection (e)(2)(B).
(3) Effect of entitlement before september 8, 1982.--
(A) The annuity recomputation required by paragraph (1)
shall not apply to any participant who was entitled to
an annuity under this title on or before September 8,
1982, or who is entitled to a deferred annuity based on
separation from the Agency occurring on or before such
date. Instead of an annuity recomputation, the annuity
of such participant shall be reduced at age 62 by an
amount equal to a fraction of the participant's old-age
or survivors' insurance benefits under section 202 of
the Social Security Act. The reduction shall be
determined by multiplying the participant's monthly
Social Security benefit by a fraction, the numerator of
which is the participant's total military wages and
deemed additional wages (within the meaning of section
229 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 429)) that
were subject to Social Security deductions and the
denominator of which is the total of all the
participant's wages, including military wages, and all
self-employment income that were subject to Social
Security deductions before the calendar year in which
the determination month occurs.
(B) The reduction determined in accordance with
subparagraph (A) shall not be greater than the
reduction that would be required under paragraph (1) if
such paragraph applied to the participant. The new
formula shall be applicable to any annuity payment
payable after October 1, 1982, including annuity
payments to participants who had previously reached age
62 and whose annuities had already been recomputed.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, the term
``determination month'' means--
(i) the first month for which the participant
is entitled to old-age or survivors' insurance
benefits (or would be entitled to such benefits
upon application therefor); or
(ii) October 1982, in the case of any
participant entitled to such benefits for that
month.
(g) Deposits Paid by Survivors.--For the purpose of survivor
annuities, deposits authorized by subsections (b) and (h) may
also be made by the survivor of a participant.
(h)(1)(A) Each participant who has performed military service
before the date of separation on which entitlement to an
annuity under this title is based may pay to the Agency an
amount equal to 7 percent of the amount of basic pay paid under
section 204 of title 37, United States Code, to the participant
for each period of military service after December 1956;
except, the amount to be paid for military service performed
beginning on January 1, 1999, through December 31, 2000, shall
be as follows:
7.25 percent of basic January 1, 1999, to December 31, 1999.
pay.
7.4 percent of basic January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2000.
pay.
(B) The amount of such payments shall be based on such
evidence of basic pay for military service as the participant
may provide or, if the Director determines sufficient evidence
has not been provided to adequately determine basic pay for
military service, such payment shall be based upon estimates of
such basic pay provided to the Director under paragraph (4).
(2) Any deposit made under paragraph (1) more than
two years after the later of--
(A) October 1, 1983, or
(B) the date on which the participant making
the deposit first becomes an employee of the
Federal Government,
shall include interest on such amount computed and
compounded annually beginning on the date of expiration
of the two-year period. The interest rate that is
applicable in computing interest in any year under this
paragraph shall be equal to the interest rate that is
applicable for such year under section 8334(e) of title
5, United States Code.
(3) Any payment received by the Director under this
subsection shall be deposited in the Treasury of the
United States to the credit of the fund.
(4) The provisions of section [221(k)] 221(l) shall
apply with respect to such information as the Director
determines to be necessary for the administration of
this subsection in the same manner that such section
applies concerning information described in that
section.
* * * * * * *
Part H--Retired Participants Recalled, Reinstated, or Reappointed in
the Agency or Reemployed in the Government
* * * * * * *
SEC. 273. REEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.
(a) Deduction From Basic Pay.--An annuitant who has retired
under this title and who is reemployed in the Federal
Government service in any appointive position (either on a
part-time or full-time basis) shall be entitled to receive the
annuity payable under this title, but there shall be deducted
from the annuitant's basic pay a sum equal to the annuity
allocable to the period of actual employment.
(b) Part-Time Reemployed Annuitants.--The Director shall have
the authority to reemploy an annuitant on a part-time basis in
accordance with section 8344(l) of title 5, United States Code.
[(b)] (c) Recovery of Overpayments.--In the event of an
overpayment under this section, the amount of the overpayment
shall be recovered by withholding the amount involved from the
basic pay payable to such reemployed annuitant or from any
other moneys, including the annuitant's annuity, payable in
accordance with this title.
[(c)] (d) Deposit in the Fund.--Sums deducted from the basic
pay of a reemployed annuitant under this section shall be
deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of
the fund.
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
general authorities
Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions,
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
(1) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies
such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and
Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or
activities authorized under section 104A of the National
Security Act of 1947 [(50 U.S.C. 403-4a).,] (50 U.S.C. 403-4a),
and any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or
receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any
provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between
appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance
with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under
the authority of this Act without regard to limitations of
appropriations from which transferred;
(2) Exchange funds without regard to section 3651 Revised
Statutes (31 U.S.C. 543);
(3) Reimburse other Government agencies for services of
personnel assigned to the Agency, and such other Government
agencies are hereby authorized, without regard to provisions of
law to the contrary, so to assign or detail any officer or
employee for duty with the Agency;
(4) Authorize personnel designated by the Director to carry
firearms to the extent necessary for the performance of the
Agency's authorized functions, except that, within the United
States, such authority shall be limited to the purposes of
protection of classified materials and information, the
training of Agency personnel and other authorized persons in
the use of firearms, the protection of Agency installations and
property, the protection of current and former Agency personnel
and their immediate families, defectors and their immediate
families, and other persons in the United States under Agency
auspices, and the protection of the Director of National
Intelligence and [such personnel of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence as the Director of National
Intelligence may designate;] current and former personnel of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and their
immediate families as the Director of National Intelligence may
designate;
(5) Make alterations, improvements, and repairs on premises
rented by the Agency, and pay rent therefor;
(6) Determine and fix the minimum and maximum limits of age
within which an original appointment may be made to an
operational position within the Agency, notwithstanding the
provision of any other law, in accordance with such criteria as
the Director, in his discretion, may prescribe; [and]
(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31,
United States Code, enter into multiyear leases for up
to 15 years[.]; and
(8) Upon the approval of the Director, provide,
during any fiscal year, with or without reimbursement,
subsistence to any personnel assigned to an overseas
location designated by the Agency as an austere
location.
(b) Scope of Authority for Expenditure.--(1) The authority to
enter into a multiyear lease under subsection (a)(7) shall be
subject to appropriations provided in advance for--
(A) the entire lease; or
(B) the first 12 months of the lease and the
Government's estimated termination liability.
(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1)--
(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides
that the contract shall be terminated if budget
authority (as defined by section 3(2) of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not provided specifically
for that project in an appropriations Act in advance of
an obligation of funds in respect thereto;
(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United
States Code, amounts obligated for paying termination
costs with respect to such lease shall remain available
until the costs associated with termination of such
lease are paid;
(C) funds available for termination liability shall
remain available to satisfy rental obligations with
respect to such lease in subsequent fiscal years in the
event such lease is not terminated early, but only to
the extent those funds are in excess of the amount of
termination liability at the time of their use to
satisfy such rental obligations; and
(D) funds appropriated for a fiscal year may be used
to make payments on such lease, for a maximum of 12
months, beginning any time during such fiscal year.
(c) Transfers for Acquisition of Land.--(1) Sums appropriated
or otherwise made available to the Agency for the acquisition
of land that are transferred to another department or agency
for that purpose shall remain available for 3 years.
(2) The Director shall submit to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on the
transfer of sums described in paragraph (1) each time that
authority is exercised.
* * * * * * *
retirement equity for spouses of certain employees
Sec. 14. (a) The provisions of sections 102, 221(b) (1)-(3),
221(f), 221(g), [221(h)(2), 221(i), 221(l),] 221(i)(2), 221(j),
221(m), 222, 223, 224, 225, 232(b), 241(b), 241(d), and 264(b)
of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C.
403 note) establishing certain requirements, limitations,
rights, entitlements, and benefits relating to retirement
annuities, survivor benefits, and lump-sum payments for a
spouse or former spouse of an Agency employee who is a
participant in the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System shall apply in the same manner and to the
same extent in the case of an Agency employee who is a
participant in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability
System.
(b) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in
consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to
implement the provisions of this section.
security personnel at agency installations
Sec. 15. (a)(1) The Director may authorize Agency personnel
within the United States to perform the same functions as
officers and agents of the Department of Homeland Security, as
provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United States Code,
with the powers set forth in that section, except that such
personnel shall perform such functions and exercise such
powers--
(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the
property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway
Administration located immediately adjacent to such
Compound;
(B) in the streets, sidewalks, and the open areas
within the zone beginning at the outside boundary of
such Compound and property and extending outward [500
feet;] 500 yards;
(C) within any other Agency installation and
protected property; and
(D) in the streets, sidewalks, and open areas within
the zone beginning at the outside boundary of any
installation or property referred to in subparagraph
(C) and extending outward [500 feet.] 500 yards.
(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under
subparagraph (B) or (D) of paragraph (1) shall be limited to
those circumstances where such personnel can identify specific
and articulable facts giving such personnel reason to believe
that the performance of such functions and exercise of such
powers is reasonable to protect against physical damage or
injury, or threats of physical damage or injury, to Agency
installations, property, or employees.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
preclude, or limit in any way, the authority of any Federal,
State, or local law enforcement agency, or any other Federal
police or Federal protective service.
(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel
shall be the rules and regulations prescribed by the Director
and shall only be applicable to the areas referred to in
subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (1).
(b) The Director is authorized to establish penalties for
violations of the rules or regulations promulgated by the
Director under subsection (a) of this section. Such penalties
shall not exceed those specified in section 1315(c)(2) of title
40, United States Code.
(c) Agency personnel designated by the Director under
subsection (a) of this section shall be clearly identifiable as
United States Government security personnel while engaged in
the performance of the functions to which subsection (a) of
this section refers.
(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Agency
personnel designated by the Director under subsection (a), or
designated by the Director under section 5(a)(4) to carry
firearms for the protection of current or former Agency
personnel and their immediate families, defectors and their
immediate families, and other persons in the United States
under Agency auspices, shall be considered for purposes of
chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or any other
provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting
within the scope of their office or employment when such Agency
personnel take reasonable action, which may include the use of
force, to--
(A) protect an individual in the presence of such
Agency personnel from a crime of violence;
(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who
has suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such
Agency personnel reasonably believe to have committed a
crime of violence in the presence of such Agency
personnel.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the
Attorney General under section 2679 of title 28, United States
Code.
(3) In this subsection, the term ``crime of violence'' has
the meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United
States Code.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 19A. SPECIAL RULES FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS INJURED BY REASON OF
WAR, INSURGENCY, HOSTILE ACT, OR TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered dependent.--The term ``covered
dependent'' means a family member (as defined by the
Director) of a covered employee who, on or after
September 11, 2001--
(A) accompanies the covered employee to an
assigned duty station in a foreign country; and
(B) becomes injured by reason of a qualifying
injury.
(2) Covered employee.--The term ``covered employee''
means an officer or employee of the Central
Intelligence Agency who, on or after September 11,
2001, becomes injured by reason of a qualifying injury.
(3) Covered individual.--The term ``covered
individual'' means an individual who--
(A)(i) is detailed to the Central
Intelligence Agency from other agencies of the
United States Government or from the Armed
Forces; or
(ii) is affiliated with the Central
Intelligence Agency, as determined by the
Director; and
(B) who, on or after September 11, 2001,
becomes injured by reason of a qualifying
injury.
(4) Qualifying injury.--The term ``qualifying
injury'' means the following:
(A) With respect to a covered dependent, an
injury incurred--
(i) during a period in which the
covered dependent is accompanying the
covered employee to an assigned duty
station in a foreign country;
(ii) in connection with war,
insurgency, hostile act, terrorist
activity, or other incident designated
by the Director; and
(iii) that was not the result of the
willful misconduct of the covered
dependent.
(B) With respect to a covered employee or a
covered individual, an injury incurred--
(i) during a period of assignment to
a duty station in a foreign country;
(ii) in connection with a war,
insurgency, hostile act, terrorist
activity, or other incident designated
by the Director; and
(iii) that was not the result of the
willful misconduct of the covered
employee or the covered individual.
(b) Adjustment of Compensation for Certain Injuries.--
(1) Increase.--The Director may increase the amount
of monthly compensation paid to a covered employee
under section 8105 of title 5, United States Code.
Subject to paragraph (2), the Director may determine
the amount of each such increase by taking into
account--
(A) the severity of the qualifying injury;
(B) the circumstances by which the covered
employee became injured; and
(C) the seniority of the covered employee.
(2) Maximum.--Notwithstanding chapter 81 of title 5,
United States Code, the total amount of monthly
compensation increased under paragraph (1) may not
exceed the monthly pay of the maximum rate of basic pay
for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of
such title.
(c) Costs for Treating Qualifying Injuries.--The Director may
pay the costs of treating a qualifying injury of a covered
employee, a covered individual, or a covered dependent, or may
reimburse a covered employee, a covered individual, or a
covered dependent for such costs, that are not otherwise
covered by chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, or other
provision of Federal law.
(d) Treatment of Amounts.--For purposes of section 104 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, amounts paid pursuant to this
section shall be treated as amounts paid under chapter 81 of
title 5, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
* * * * * * *
TITLE III
GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 309. ENHANCED PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY TO MANAGE SUPPLY
CHAIN RISK.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered agency.--The term ``covered agency''
means any element of the intelligence community other
than an element within the Department of Defense.
(2) Covered item of supply.--The term ``covered item
of supply'' means an item of information technology (as
that term is defined in section 11101 of title 40,
United States Code) that is purchased for inclusion in
a covered system, and the loss of integrity of which
could result in a supply chain risk for a covered
system.
(3) Covered procurement.--The term ``covered
procurement'' means--
(A) a source selection for a covered system
or a covered item of supply involving either a
performance specification, as provided in
section 3306(a)(3)(B) of title 41, United
States Code, or an evaluation factor, as
provided in section 3306(b)(1) of such title,
relating to supply chain risk;
(B) the consideration of proposals for and
issuance of a task or delivery order for a
covered system or a covered item of supply, as
provided in section 4106(d)(3) of title 41,
United States Code, where the task or delivery
order contract concerned includes a contract
clause establishing a requirement relating to
supply chain risk; or
(C) any contract action involving a contract
for a covered system or a covered item of
supply where such contract includes a clause
establishing requirements relating to supply
chain risk.
(4) Covered procurement action.--The term ``covered
procurement action'' means any of the following
actions, if the action takes place in the course of
conducting a covered procurement:
(A) The exclusion of a source that fails to
meet qualifications standards established in
accordance with the requirements of section
3311 of title 41, United States Code, for the
purpose of reducing supply chain risk in the
acquisition of covered systems.
(B) The exclusion of a source that fails to
achieve an acceptable rating with regard to an
evaluation factor providing for the
consideration of supply chain risk in the
evaluation of proposals for the award of a
contract or the issuance of a task or delivery
order.
(C) The decision to withhold consent for a
contractor to subcontract with a particular
source or to direct a contractor for a covered
system to exclude a particular source from
consideration for a subcontract under the
contract.
(5) Covered system.--The term ``covered system''
means a national security system, as that term is
defined in section 3542(b) of title 44, United States
Code.
(6) Supply chain risk.--The term ``supply chain
risk'' means the risk that an adversary may sabotage,
maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise
subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing,
production, distribution, installation, operation, or
maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny,
disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or
operation of such system.
(b) Authority.--Subject to subsection (c) and in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence, the head of a
covered agency may, in conducting intelligence and
intelligence-related activities--
(1) carry out a covered procurement action; and
(2) limit, notwithstanding any other provision of
law, in whole or in part, the disclosure of information
relating to the basis for carrying out a covered
procurement action.
(c) Determination and Notification.--The head of a covered
agency may exercise the authority provided in subsection (b)
only after--
(1) any appropriate consultation with procurement or
other relevant officials of the covered agency;
(2) making a determination in writing, which may be
in classified form, that--
(A) use of the authority in subsection (b)(1)
is necessary to protect national security by
reducing supply chain risk;
(B) less intrusive measures are not
reasonably available to reduce such supply
chain risk; and
(C) in a case where the head of the covered
agency plans to limit disclosure of information
under subsection (b)(2), the risk to national
security due to the disclosure of such
information outweighs the risk due to not
disclosing such information;
(3) notifying the Director of National Intelligence
that there is a significant supply chain risk to the
covered system concerned, unless the head of the
covered agency making the determination is the Director
of National Intelligence; and
(4) providing a notice, which may be in classified
form, of the determination made under paragraph (2) to
the congressional intelligence committees that includes
a summary of the basis for the determination, including
a discussion of less intrusive measures that were
considered and why they were not reasonably available
to reduce supply chain risk.
(d) Delegation.--The head of a covered agency may not
delegate the authority provided in subsection (b) or the
responsibility to make a determination under subsection (c) to
an official below the level of the service acquisition
executive for the agency concerned.
(e) Savings.--The authority under this section is in addition
to any other authority under any other provision of law. The
authority under this section shall not be construed to alter or
effect the exercise of any other provision of law.
(f) Effective Date.--The requirements of this section shall
take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and shall apply to contracts that are
awarded on or after such date.
[(g) Sunset.--The authority provided in this section shall
expire on the date that section 806 of the Ike Skelton National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-
383; 10 U.S.C. 2304 note) expires.]
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV
Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Administrator of General Services.
Associate Administrator of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
Assistant Administrators, Agency for International
Development (6).
Regional Assistant Administrators, Agency for
International Development (4).
Assistant Secretaries of Agriculture (3).
Assistant Secretaries of Commerce (11).
Assistant Secretaries of Defense (14).
Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force (4).
Assistant Secretaries of the Army (5).
Assistant Secretaries of the Navy (4).
Assistant Secretaries of Health and Human Services
(6).
Assistant Secretaries of the Interior (6).
Assistant Attorneys General (11).
Assistant Secretaries of Labor (10), one of whom
shall be the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Veterans'
Employment and Training.
Administrator, Wage and Hour Division, Department of
Labor.
Assistant Secretaries of State (24) and 4 other State
Department officials to be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury (10).
Members, United States International Trade Commission
(5).
Assistant Secretaries of Education (10).
General Counsel, Department of Education.
Director of Civil Defense, Department of the Army.
Deputy Director of the Office of Emergency Planning.
Deputy Director of the Office of Science and
Technology.
Deputy Director of the Peace Corps.
Assistant Directors of the Office of Management and
Budget (3).
General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture.
General Counsel of the Department of Commerce.
General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human
Services.
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior.
Solicitor of the Department of Labor.
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board.
General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury.
First Vice President of the Export-Import Bank of
Washington.
Members, Council of Economic Advisers.
Members, Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank
of Washington.
Members, Federal Communications Commission.
Member, Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
Directors, Federal Housing Finance Board.
Members, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Members, Federal Trade Commission.
Members, Surface Transportation Board.
Members, National Labor Relations Board.
Members, Securities and Exchange Commission.
Members, Merit Systems Protection Board.
Members, Federal Maritime Commission.
Members, National Mediation Board.
Members, Railroad Retirement Board.
Director of Selective Service.
Associate Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice.
Members, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (4).
Director, Community Relations Service.
Members, National Transportation Safety Board.
General Counsel, Department of Transportation.
Deputy Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration.
Assistant Secretaries of Transportation (5).
Deputy Federal Highway Administrator.
Administrator of the Saint Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation.
Assistant Secretary for Science, Smithsonian
Institution.
Assistant Secretary for History and Art, Smithsonian
Institution.
Deputy Administrator of the Small Business
Administration.
Assistant Secretaries of Housing and Urban
Development (8).
General Counsel of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.
Commissioner of Interama.
Federal Insurance Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
Executive Vice President, Overseas Private Investment
Corporation.
Members, National Credit Union Administration Board
(2).
Members, Postal Regulatory Commission (4).
Members, Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission.
Deputy Under Secretaries of the Treasury (or
Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury) (2).
Members, Consumer Product Safety Commission (4).
Members, Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Director of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
President, Government National Mortgage Association,
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere, the incumbent of which also serves as
Deputy Administrator of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.
Director, Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice.
Assistant Secretaries of Energy (8).
General Counsel of the Department of Energy.
Administrator, Economic Regulatory Administration,
Department of Energy.
Administrator, Energy Information Administration,
Department of Energy.
Director, Office of Indian Energy Policy and
Programs, Department of Energy.
Director, Office of Science, Department of Energy.
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and
Health.
Members, Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission.
President, National Consumer Cooperative Bank.
Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection
Board.
Chairman, Federal Labor Relations Authority.
Assistant Secretaries, Department of Homeland
Security.
Assistant Director for Cybersecurity, Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency.
Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security,
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
General Counsel, Department of Homeland Security.
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
Department of Homeland Security.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Homeland
Security.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Homeland
Security.
Deputy Director, Institute for Scientific and
Technological Cooperation.
Director of the National Institute of Justice.
Director of the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business
Administration.
Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances,
Environmental Protection Agency.
Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste,
Environmental Protection Agency.
Assistant Administrators, Environmental Protection
Agency (8).
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation,
Department of Defense.
Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation,
Department of Defense.
Special Representatives of the President for arms
control, nonproliferation, and disarmament matters,
Department of State.
Ambassadors at Large.
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director General
of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service.
Assistant Secretaries, Department of Veterans Affairs
(7).
General Counsel, Department of Veterans Affairs.
Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Department of Health
and Human Services
Chairman, Board of Veterans' Appeals.
Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention.
Director, United States Marshals Service.
Chairman, United States Parole Commission.
Director, Bureau of the Census, Department of
Commerce.
Director of the Institute of Museum and Library
Services.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Agriculture.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Commerce.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Education.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Health and
Human Services.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Housing and
Urban Development.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of the Interior.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Justice.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Labor.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of State.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of
Transportation.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of the Treasury.
Chief Financial Officer, Department of Veterans
Affairs.
Chief Financial Officer, Environmental Protection
Agency.
Chief Financial Officer, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
Commissioner, Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian
Relocation.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness.
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
General Counsel of the Department of the Army.
General Counsel of the Department of the Navy.
General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force.
Liaison for Community and Junior Colleges, Department
of Education.
Director of the Office of Educational Technology.
Director of the International Broadcasting Bureau.
The Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Department of
Labor.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Agriculture.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Commerce.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense
(unless the official designated as the Chief
Information Officer of the Department of Defense is an
official listed under section 5312, 5313, or 5314 of
this title).
Chief Information Officer, Department of Education.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Energy.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Health and
Human Services.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Housing and
Urban Development.
Chief Information Officer, Department of the
Interior.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Justice.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Labor.
Chief Information Officer, Department of State.
Chief Information Officer, Department of
Transportation.
Chief Information Officer, Department of the
Treasury.
Chief Information Officer, Department of Veterans
Affairs.
Chief Information Officer, Environmental Protection
Agency.
Chief Information Officer, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
Chief Information Officer, Agency for International
Development.
Chief Information Officer, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
Chief Information Officer, General Services
Administration.
Chief Information Officer, National Science
Foundation.
Chief Information Officer, Nuclear Regulatory Agency.
Chief Information Officer, Office of Personnel
Management.
Chief Information Officer, Small Business
Administration.
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration.
Additional Deputy Administrators of the National
Nuclear Security Administration (3), but if the Deputy
Administrator for Naval Reactors is an officer of the
Navy on active duty, (2).
Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property and Deputy Director of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office.
General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
Chief Medical Officer, Department of Homeland
Security.
Director of the National Counterintelligence and
Security Center.
* * * * * * *
SUBPART J--ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 110--ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS
Sec.
11001. Enhanced personnel security programs.
Sec. 11001. Enhanced personnel security programs
(a) Enhanced Personnel Security Program.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall direct each agency to implement a
program to provide enhanced security review of covered
individuals--
(1) in accordance with this section; and
(2) not later than the earlier of--
(A) the date that is 5 years after the date
of the enactment of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016; or
(B) the date on which the backlog of overdue
periodic reinvestigations of covered
individuals is eliminated, as determined by the
Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Comprehensiveness.--
(1) Sources of information.--The enhanced personnel
security program of an agency shall integrate relevant
and appropriate information from various sources,
including government, publicly available, and
commercial data sources, consumer reporting agencies,
social media, and such other sources as determined by
the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) Types of information.--Information obtained and
integrated from sources described in paragraph (1) may
include--
(A) information relating to any criminal or
civil legal proceeding;
(B) financial information relating to the
covered individual, including the credit
worthiness of the covered individual;
(C) publicly available information, whether
electronic, printed, or other form, including
relevant security or counterintelligence
information about the covered individual or
information that may suggest ill intent,
vulnerability to blackmail, compulsive
behavior, allegiance to another country, change
in ideology, or that the covered individual
lacks good judgment, reliability, or
trustworthiness; and
(D) data maintained on any terrorist or
criminal watch list maintained by any agency,
State or local government, or international
organization.
(c) Reviews of Covered Individuals.--
(1) Reviews.--
(A) In general.--The enhanced personnel
security program of an agency shall require
that, not less than 2 times every 5 years, the
head of the agency shall conduct or request the
conduct of automated record checks and checks
of information from sources under subsection
(b) to ensure the continued eligibility of each
covered individual to access classified
information and hold a sensitive position
unless more frequent reviews of automated
record checks and checks of information from
sources under subsection (b) are conducted on
the covered individual.
(B) Scope of reviews.--Except for a covered
individual who is subject to more frequent
reviews to ensure the continued eligibility of
the covered individual to access classified
information and hold a sensitive position, the
reviews under subparagraph (A) shall consist of
random or aperiodic checks of covered
individuals, such that each covered individual
is subject to at least 2 reviews during the 5-
year period beginning on the date on which the
agency implements the enhanced personnel
security program of an agency, and during each
5-year period thereafter.
(C) Individual reviews.--A review of the
information relating to the continued
eligibility of a covered individual to access
classified information and hold a sensitive
position under subparagraph (A) may not be
conducted until after the end of the 120-day
period beginning on the date the covered
individual receives the notification required
under paragraph (3).
(2) Results.--The head of an agency shall take
appropriate action if a review under paragraph (1)
finds relevant information that may affect the
continued eligibility of a covered individual to access
classified information and hold a sensitive position.
(3) Information for covered individuals.--The head of
an agency shall ensure that each covered individual is
adequately advised of the types of relevant security or
counterintelligence information the covered individual
is required to report to the head of the agency.
(4) Limitation.--Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to affect the authority of an agency to
determine the appropriate weight to be given to
information relating to a covered individual in
evaluating the continued eligibility of the covered
individual.
(5) Authority of the president.--Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed as limiting the authority
of the President to direct or perpetuate periodic
reinvestigations of a more comprehensive nature or to
delegate the authority to direct or perpetuate such
reinvestigations.
(6) Effect on other reviews.--Reviews conducted under
paragraph (1) are in addition to investigations and
reinvestigations conducted pursuant to section 3001 of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341).
(d) [Audit] Review.--
(1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the date of
the implementation of the enhanced personnel security
program of an agency under subsection (a), the
Inspector General of the agency shall conduct at least
1 [audit] review to assess the effectiveness and
fairness, which shall be determined in accordance with
performance measures and standards established by the
Director of National Intelligence, to covered
individuals of the enhanced personnel security program
of the agency.
(2) Submissions to dni.--The results of each [audit]
review conducted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
to the Director of National Intelligence to assess the
effectiveness and fairness of the enhanced personnel
security programs across the Federal Government.
(e) Definitions.--In this section--
(1) the term ``agency'' has the meaning given that
term in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341);
(2) the term ``consumer reporting agency'' has the
meaning given that term in section 603 of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a);
(3) the term ``covered individual'' means an
individual employed by an agency or a contractor of an
agency who has been determined eligible for access to
classified information or eligible to hold a sensitive
position;
(4) the term ``enhanced personnel security program''
means a program implemented by an agency at the
direction of the Director of National Intelligence
under subsection (a); and
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
* * * * * * *
TITLE VI--EDUCATION
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Improvement in Intelligence Community Foreign Language
Skills
SEC. 611. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL
POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--Section 104A of the National Security Act of
1947, amended by section 1011(a) of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, is further amended by adding
at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior Level
Positions in Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Except as
provided pursuant to paragraph (2), an individual may not be
appointed to a position in the Senior Intelligence Service in
the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of
Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency unless the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency determines that the
individual--
``(A) has been certified as having a professional
speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language,
such proficiency being at least level 3 on the
Interagency Language Roundtable Language Skills Level
or commensurate proficiency level using such other
indicator of proficiency as the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency considers appropriate; and
``(B) is able to effectively communicate the
priorities of the United States and exercise influence
in that foreign language.
``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in
the discretion of the Director, waive the application of
paragraph (1) to any position or category of positions
otherwise covered by that paragraph if the Director determines
that foreign language proficiency is not necessary for the
successful performance of the duties and responsibilities of
such position or category of positions.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)
shall apply with respect to appointments made on or after the
date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
[(c) Report on Waivers.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a report that
identifies positions within the Senior Intelligence Service in
the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of
Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency that are
determined by the Director to require waiver from the
requirements of section 104A(g) of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by subsection (a). The report shall include a
rationale for any waiver granted under section 104A(g)(2), as
so added, for each position or category of positions so
identified.]
* * * * * * *
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ORGANIZATION ACT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``Department of Energy Organization
Act''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Definitions.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 215. Office of Counterintelligence.
[Sec. 216. Office of Intelligence.]
Sec. 215. Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.
Sec. 217. Office of Indian Energy Policy and Programs.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT
* * * * * * *
establishment of security, counterintelligence, and intelligence
policies
Sec. 214. [(a)] The Secretary shall be responsible for
developing and promulgating the security, counterintelligence,
and intelligence policies of the Department. The Secretary may
use the immediate staff of the Secretary to assist in
developing and promulgating those policies.
[(b)(1) There is within the Department an Intelligence
Executive Committee. The Committee shall consist of the Deputy
Secretary of Energy, who shall chair the Committee, and each
Under Secretary of Energy.
[(2) The Committee shall be staffed by the Director
of the Office of Intelligence and the Director of the
Office of Counterintelligence.
[(3) The Secretary shall use the Committee to assist
in developing and promulgating the counterintelligence
and intelligence policies, requirements, and priorities
of the Department.
[(c) In the budget justification materials submitted to
Congress in support of each budget submitted by the President
to Congress under title 31, United States Code, the amounts
requested for the Department for intelligence functions and the
amounts requested for the Department for counterintelligence
functions shall each be specified in appropriately classified
individual, dedicated program elements. Within the amounts
requested for counterintelligence functions, the amounts
requested for the National Nuclear Security Administration
shall be specified separately from the amounts requested for
other elements of the Department.]
[office of counterintelligence
[Sec. 215. (a) There is within the Department an Office of
Counterintelligence.
[(b)(1) The head of the Office shall be the Director of the
Office of Counterintelligence, who shall be an employee in the
Senior Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the
Senior National Intelligence Service, or any other Service that
the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of the Office
shall report directly to the Secretary.
[(2) The Secretary shall select the Director of the Office
from among individuals who have substantial expertise in
matters relating to counterintelligence.
[(3) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may
detail, on a reimbursable basis, any employee of the Bureau to
the Department for service as Director of the Office. The
service of an employee of the Bureau as Director of the Office
shall not result in any loss of status, right, or privilege by
the employee within the Bureau.
[(c)(1) The Director of the Office shall be responsible for
establishing policy for counterintelligence programs and
activities at Department facilities in order to reduce the
threat of disclosure or loss of classified and other sensitive
information at such facilities.
[(2) The Director of the Office shall be responsible for
establishing policy for the personnel assurance programs of the
Department.
[(3) The Director shall inform the Secretary, the Director of
Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation on a regular basis, and upon specific request by
any such official, regarding the status and effectiveness of
the counterintelligence programs and activities at Department
facilities.
[(d)(1) Not later than March 1 each year, the Director of the
Office shall submit a report on the status and effectiveness of
the counterintelligence programs and activities at each
Department facility during the preceding year. Each such report
shall be submitted to the following:
[(A) The Secretary.
[(B) The Director of Central Intelligence.
[(C) The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
[(D) The Committee on Armed Services and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
[(E) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
[(2) Each such report shall include for the year covered by
the report the following:
[(A) A description of the status and effectiveness of
the counterintelligence programs and activities at
Department facilities.
[(B) A description of any violation of law or other
requirement relating to intelligence,
counterintelligence, or security at such facilities,
including--
[(i) the number of violations that were
investigated; and
[(ii) the number of violations that remain
unresolved.
[(C) A description of the number of foreign visitors
to Department facilities, including the locations of
the visits of such visitors.
[(D) The adequacy of the Department's procedures and
policies for protecting national security information,
making such recommendations to Congress as may be
appropriate.
[(E) A determination of whether each Department of
Energy national laboratory is in full compliance with
all departmental security requirements and, in the case
of any such laboratory that is not, what measures are
being taken to bring that laboratory into compliance.
[(3) Not less than 30 days before the date that the report
required by paragraph (1) is submitted, the director of each
Department of Energy national laboratory shall certify in
writing to the Director of the Office whether that laboratory
is in full compliance with all departmental security
requirements and, if not, what measures are being taken to
bring that laboratory into compliance and a schedule for
implementing those measures.
[(4) Each report under this subsection as submitted to the
committees referred to in subparagraphs (D) and (E) of
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.]
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Sec. 215. (a) Definitions.--In this section, the terms
``intelligence community'' and ``National Intelligence
Program'' have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
(b) In General.--There is in the Department an Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Such office shall be
under the National Intelligence Program.
(c) Director.--(1) The head of the Office shall be the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
who shall be an employee in the Senior Executive Service, the
Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior National Intelligence
Service, or any other Service that the Secretary, in
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,
considers appropriate. The Director of the Office shall report
directly to the Secretary.
(2) The Secretary shall select an individual to serve as the
Director from among individuals who have substantial expertise
in matters relating to the intelligence community, including
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
(d) Duties.--(1) Subject to the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary, the Director shall perform such
duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary may prescribe.
(2) The Director shall be responsible for establishing policy
for intelligence and counterintelligence programs and
activities at the Department.
(e) Energy Infrastructure Security Center.--(1)(A) The
President shall establish an Energy Infrastructure Security
Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to
analyze and disseminate intelligence relating to the security
of the energy infrastructure of the United States.
(B) The Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
shall appoint the head of the Energy Infrastructure Security
Center.
(C) The Energy Infrastructure Security Center shall be
located within the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.
(2) In establishing the Energy Infrastructure Security
Center, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence shall address the following missions and
objectives to coordinate and disseminate intelligence relating
to the security of the energy infrastructure of the United
States:
(A) Establishing a primary organization within the
United States Government for analyzing and integrating
all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United
States pertaining to the security of the energy
infrastructure of the United States.
(B) Ensuring that appropriate departments and
agencies have full access to and receive intelligence
support needed to execute the plans or activities of
the agencies, and perform independent, alternative
analyses.
(C) Establishing a central repository on known and
suspected foreign threats to the energy infrastructure
of the United States, including with respect to any
individuals, groups, or entities engaged in activities
targeting such infrastructure, and the goals,
strategies, capabilities, and networks of such
individuals, groups, or entities.
(D) Disseminating intelligence information relating
to the security of the energy infrastructure of the
United States, including threats and analyses, to the
President, to the appropriate departments and agencies,
and to the appropriate committees of Congress.
(3) The President may waive the requirements of this
subsection, and any parts thereof, if the President determines
that such requirements do not materially improve the ability of
the United States Government to prevent and halt attacks
against the energy infrastructure of the United States. Such
waiver shall be made in writing to Congress and shall include a
description of how the missions and objectives in paragraph (2)
are being met.
(4) If the President decides not to exercise the waiver
authority granted by paragraph (3), the President shall submit
to Congress from time to time updates and plans regarding the
establishment of an Energy Infrastructure Security Center.
[office of intelligence
[Sec. 216. (a) There is within the Department an Office of
Intelligence.
[(b)(1) The head of the Office shall be the Director of the
Office of Intelligence, who shall be an employee in the Senior
Executive Service, the Senior Intelligence Service, the Senior
National Intelligence Service, or any other Service that the
Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence, considers appropriate. The Director of the Office
shall report directly to the Secretary.
[(2) The Secretary shall select the Director of the Office
from among individuals who have substantial expertise in
matters relating to foreign intelligence.
[(c) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary, the Director of the Office shall perform such duties
and exercise such powers as the Secretary may prescribe.]
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 35--COORDINATION OF FEDERAL INFORMATION POLICY
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--INFORMATION SECURITY
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3553. Authority and functions of the Director and the Secretary
(a) Director.--The Director shall oversee agency information
security policies and practices, including--
(1) developing and overseeing the implementation of
policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on
information security, including through ensuring timely
agency adoption of and compliance with standards
promulgated under section 11331 of title 40;
(2) requiring agencies, consistent with the standards
promulgated under such section 11331 and the
requirements of this subchapter, to identify and
provide information security protections commensurate
with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from
the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of--
(A) information collected or maintained by or
on behalf of an agency; or
(B) information systems used or operated by
an agency or by a contractor of an agency or
other organization on behalf of an agency;
(3) ensuring that the Secretary carries out the
authorities and functions under subsection (b);
(4) coordinating the development of standards and
guidelines under section 20 of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 278g-3) with
agencies and offices operating or exercising control of
national security systems (including the National
Security Agency) to assure, to the maximum extent
feasible, that such standards and guidelines are
complementary with standards and guidelines developed
for national security systems;
(5) overseeing agency compliance with the
requirements of this subchapter and section 1326 of
title 41, including through any authorized action under
section 11303 of title 40, to enforce accountability
for compliance with such requirements; and
(6) coordinating information security policies and
procedures with related information resources
management policies and procedures.
(b) Secretary.--The Secretary, in consultation with the
Director, shall administer the implementation of agency
information security policies and practices for information
systems, except for national security systems and information
systems described in paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (e),
including--
(1) assisting the Director in carrying out the
authorities and functions under paragraphs (1), (2),
(3), (5), and (6) of subsection (a);
(2) developing and overseeing the implementation of
binding operational directives to agencies to implement
the policies, principles, standards, and guidelines
developed by the Director under subsection (a)(1) and
the requirements of this subchapter, which may be
revised or repealed by the Director if the operational
directives issued on behalf of the Director are not in
accordance with policies, principles, standards, and
guidelines developed by the Director, including--
(A) requirements for reporting security
incidents to the Federal information security
incident center established under section 3556;
(B) requirements for the contents of the
annual reports required to be submitted under
section 3554(c)(1);
(C) requirements for the mitigation of
exigent risks to information systems; and
(D) other operational requirements as the
Director or Secretary, in consultation with the
Director, may determine necessary;
(3) monitoring agency implementation of information
security policies and practices;
(4) convening meetings with senior agency officials
to help ensure effective implementation of information
security policies and practices;
(5) coordinating Government-wide efforts on
information security policies and practices, including
consultation with the Chief Information Officers
Council established under section 3603 and the Director
of the National Institute of Standards and Technology;
(6) providing operational and technical assistance to
agencies in implementing policies, principles,
standards, and guidelines on information security,
including implementation of standards promulgated under
section 11331 of title 40, including by--
(A) operating the Federal information
security incident center established under
section 3556;
(B) upon request by an agency, deploying,
operating, and maintaining technology to assist
the agency to continuously diagnose and
mitigate against cyber threats and
vulnerabilities, with or without reimbursement;
(C) compiling and analyzing data on agency
information security; and
(D) developing and conducting targeted
operational evaluations, including threat and
vulnerability assessments, on the information
systems; and
(7) other actions as the Director or the Secretary,
in consultation with the Director, may determine
necessary to carry out this subsection.
(c) Report.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the
Director, in consultation with the Secretary, shall submit to
Congress a report on the effectiveness of information security
policies and practices during the preceding year, including--
(1) a summary of the incidents described in the
annual reports required to be submitted under section
3554(c)(1), including a summary of the information
required under section 3554(c)(1)(A)(iii);
(2) a description of the threshold for reporting
major information security incidents;
(3) a summary of the results of evaluations required
to be performed under section 3555;
(4) an assessment of agency compliance with standards
promulgated under section 11331 of title 40; and
(5) an assessment of agency compliance with data
breach notification policies and procedures issued by
the Director.
(d) National Security Systems.--Except for the authorities
and functions described in subsection (a)(5) and subsection
(c), the authorities and functions of the Director and the
Secretary under this section shall not apply to national
security systems.
(e) Department of Defense and Intelligence Community
Systems.--(1) The authorities of the Director described in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall be delegated to
the Secretary of Defense in the case of systems described in
paragraph (2) and to the Director of National Intelligence in
the case of systems described in paragraph (3).
(2) The systems described in this paragraph are systems that
are operated by the Department of Defense, a contractor of the
Department of Defense, or another entity on behalf of the
Department of Defense that processes any information the
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification,
or destruction of which would have a debilitating impact on the
mission of the Department of Defense.
(3) The systems described in this paragraph are systems that
are operated by an element of the intelligence community, a
contractor of an element of the intelligence community, or
another entity on behalf of an element of the intelligence
community that processes any information the unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction of which would have a debilitating impact on the
mission of an element of the intelligence community.
(f) Consideration.--
(1) In general.--In carrying out the responsibilities
under subsection (b), the Secretary shall consider any
applicable standards or guidelines developed by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology and
issued by the Secretary of Commerce under section 11331
of title 40.
(2) Directives.--The Secretary shall--
(A) consult with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology regarding
any binding operational directive that
implements standards and guidelines developed
by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology; and
(B) ensure that binding operational
directives issued under subsection (b)(2) do
not conflict with the standards and guidelines
issued under section 11331 of title 40.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary to
direct the Secretary of Commerce in the development and
promulgation of standards and guidelines under section
11331 of title 40.
(g) Exercise of Authority.--To ensure fiscal and policy
consistency, the Secretary shall exercise the authority under
this section subject to direction by the President, in
coordination with the Director.
(h) Direction to Agencies.--
(1) Authority.--
(A) In general.--Subject to subparagraph (B),
in response to a known or reasonably suspected
information security threat, vulnerability, or
incident that represents a substantial threat
to the information security of an agency, the
Secretary may issue an emergency directive to
the head of an agency to take any lawful action
with respect to the operation of the
information system, including such systems used
or operated by another entity on behalf of an
agency, that collects, processes, stores,
transmits, disseminates, or otherwise maintains
agency information, for the purpose of
protecting the information system from, or
mitigating, an information security threat.
(B) Exception.--The authorities of the
Secretary under this subsection shall not apply
to a system described subsection (d) or to a
system described in paragraph (2) or (3) of
subsection (e).
(2) Procedures for use of authority.--The Secretary
shall--
(A) in coordination with the Director, and in
consultation with Federal contractors as
appropriate, establish procedures governing the
circumstances under which a directive may be
issued under this subsection, which shall
include--
(i) thresholds and other criteria;
(ii) privacy and civil liberties
protections; and
(iii) providing notice to potentially
affected third parties;
(B) specify the reasons for the required
action and the duration of the directive;
(C) minimize the impact of a directive under
this subsection by--
(i) adopting the least intrusive
means possible under the circumstances
to secure the agency information
systems; and
(ii) limiting directives to the
shortest period practicable;
(D) notify the Director and the head of any
affected agency immediately upon the issuance
of a directive under this subsection;
(E) consult with the Director of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology regarding
any directive under this subsection that
implements standards and guidelines developed
by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology;
(F) ensure that directives issued under this
subsection do not conflict with the standards
and guidelines issued under section 11331 of
title 40;
(G) consider any applicable standards or
guidelines developed by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology issued by the
Secretary of Commerce under section 11331 of
title 40; and
(H) not later than February 1 of each year,
submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report regarding the specific
actions the Secretary has taken pursuant to
paragraph (1)(A).
(3) Imminent threats.--
(A) In general.--Notwithstanding section
3554, the Secretary may authorize the use under
this subsection of the intrusion detection and
prevention capabilities established under
section 230(b)(1) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 for the purpose of ensuring the
security of agency information systems, if--
(i) the Secretary determines there is
an imminent threat to agency
information systems;
(ii) the Secretary determines a
directive under subsection (b)(2)(C) or
paragraph (1)(A) is not reasonably
likely to result in a timely response
to the threat;
(iii) the Secretary determines the
risk posed by the imminent threat
outweighs any adverse consequences
reasonably expected to result from the
use of the intrusion detection and
prevention capabilities under the
control of the Secretary;
(iv) the Secretary provides prior
notice to the Director, and the head
and chief information officer (or
equivalent official) of each agency to
which specific actions will be taken
pursuant to this paragraph, and
notifies the appropriate congressional
committees and authorizing committees
of each such agency within 7 days of
taking an action under this paragraph
of--
(I) any action taken under
this paragraph; and
(II) the reasons for and
duration and nature of the
action;
(v) the action of the Secretary is
consistent with applicable law; and
(vi) the Secretary authorizes the use
of the intrusion detection and
prevention capabilities in accordance
with the advance procedures established
under subparagraph (C).
(B) Limitation on delegation.--The authority
under this paragraph may not be delegated by
the Secretary.
(C) Advance procedures.--The Secretary shall,
in coordination with the Director, and in
consultation with the heads of Federal
agencies, establish procedures governing the
circumstances under which the Secretary may
authorize the use of the intrusion detection
and prevention capabilities under subparagraph
(A). The Secretary shall submit the procedures
to Congress.
(4) Limitation.--The Secretary may direct or
authorize lawful action or the use of the intrusion
detection and prevention capabilities under this
subsection only to--
(A) protect agency information from
unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, or destruction; or
(B) require the remediation of or protect
against identified information security risks
with respect to--
(i) information collected or
maintained by or on behalf of an
agency; or
(ii) that portion of an information
system used or operated by an agency or
by a contractor of an agency or other
organization on behalf of an agency.
(i) Annual Report to Congress.--Not later than February 1 of
each year, the Director and the Secretary shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report regarding the
specific actions the Director and the Secretary have taken
pursuant to subsection (a)(5), including any actions taken
pursuant to section 11303(b)(5) of title 40.
(j) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to require the Secretary to provide notice to any
private entity before the Secretary issues a binding
operational directive under subsection (b)(2).
[(j)] (k) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In
this section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the
Senate; and
(2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on
Homeland Security, the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, and the Committee on Science, Space,
and Technology of the House of Representatives.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle E--Other Matters
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 368. CORRECTING LONG-STANDING MATERIAL WEAKNESSES.
[(a) Definitions.--In this section:
[(1) Covered element of the intelligence community.--
The term ``covered element of the intelligence
community'' means--
[(A) the Central Intelligence Agency;
[(B) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
[(C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency;
[(D) the National Reconnaissance Office; or
[(E) the National Security Agency.
[(2) Independent auditor.--The term ``independent
auditor'' means an individual who--
[(A)(i) is a Federal, State, or local
government auditor who meets the independence
standards included in generally accepted
government auditing standards; or
[(ii) is a public accountant who meets such
independence standards; and
[(B) is designated as an auditor by the
Director of National Intelligence or the head
of a covered element of the intelligence
community, as appropriate.
[(3) Independent review.--The term ``independent
review'' means an audit, attestation, or examination
conducted by an independent auditor in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[(4) Long-standing, correctable material weakness.--
The term ``long-standing, correctable material
weakness'' means a material weakness--
[(A) that was first reported in the annual
financial report of a covered element of the
intelligence community for a fiscal year prior
to fiscal year 2007; and
[(B) the correction of which is not
substantially dependent on a business system
that was not implemented prior to the end of
fiscal year 2010.
[(5) Material weakness.--The term ``material
weakness'' has the meaning given that term under the
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123,
entitled ``Management's Responsibility for Internal
Control,'' revised December 21, 2004.
[(6) Senior intelligence management official.--The
term ``senior intelligence management official'' means
an official within a covered element of the
intelligence community who is--
[(A)(i) compensated under the Senior
Intelligence Service pay scale; or
[(ii) the head of a covered element of the
intelligence community; and
[(B) compensated for employment with funds
appropriated pursuant to an authorization of
appropriations in this Act.
[(b) Identification of Senior Intelligence Management
Officials.--
[(1) Requirement to identify.--Not later than 30 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the head
of a covered element of the intelligence community
shall designate a senior intelligence management
official of such element to be responsible for
correcting each long-standing, correctable material
weakness of such element.
[(2) Head of a covered element of the intelligence
community.--The head of a covered element of the
intelligence community may designate himself or herself
as the senior intelligence management official
responsible for correcting a long-standing, correctable
material weakness under paragraph (1).
[(3) Requirement to update designation.--If the head
of a covered element of the intelligence community
determines that a senior intelligence management
official designated under paragraph (1) is no longer
responsible for correcting a long-standing, correctable
material weakness, the head of such element shall
designate the successor to such official not later than
10 days after the date of such determination.
[(c) Notification.--Not later than 10 days after the date on
which the head of a covered element of the intelligence
community has designated a senior intelligence management
official pursuant to paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection (b),
the head of such element shall provide written notification of
such designation to the Director of National Intelligence and
to such senior intelligence management official.
[(d) Correction of Long-Standing, Material Weakness.--
[(1) Determination of correction of deficiency.--If a
long-standing, correctable material weakness is
corrected, the senior intelligence management official
who is responsible for correcting such long-standing,
correctable material weakness shall make and issue a
determination of the correction.
[(2) Basis for determination.--The determination of
the senior intelligence management official under
paragraph (1) shall be based on the findings of an
independent review.
[(3) Notification and submission of findings.--A
senior intelligence management official who makes a
determination under paragraph (1) shall--
[(A) notify the head of the appropriate
covered element of the intelligence community
of such determination at the time the
determination is made; and
[(B) ensure that the independent auditor
whose findings are the basis of a determination
under paragraph (1) submits to the head of the
covered element of the intelligence community
and the Director of National Intelligence the
findings that such determination is based on
not later than 5 days after the date on which
such determination is made.
[(e) Congressional Oversight.--The head of a covered element
of the intelligence community shall notify the congressional
intelligence committees not later than 30 days after the date--
[(1) on which a senior intelligence management
official is designated under paragraph (1) or (3) of
subsection (b) and notified under subsection (c); or
[(2) of the correction of a long-standing,
correctable material weakness, as verified by an
independent auditor under subsection (d)(2).]
* * * * * * *
----------
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
Sec. 8H. (a)(1)(A) An employee of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, or the National Security
Agency, or of a contractor of any of those Agencies, who
intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with
respect to an urgent concern may report the complaint or
information to the Inspector General of the Department of
Defense (or designee).
(B) An employee of an element of the intelligence community,
an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the
intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the
intelligence community, who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community.
(C) An employee of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or of
a contractor of the Bureau, who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of
the Department of Justice (or designee).
(D) Any other employee of, or contractor to, an executive
agency, or element or unit thereof, determined by the President
under section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of title 5, United States Code,
to have as its principal function the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities, who intends to
report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to
an urgent concern may report the complaint or information to
the appropriate Inspector General (or designee) under this Act,
section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, or
section 103H(k) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3033(k)).
(2) If a designee of an Inspector General under this section
receives a complaint or information of an employee with respect
to an urgent concern, that designee shall report the complaint
or information to the Inspector General within 7 calendar days
of receipt.
(3) The Inspectors General of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security
Agency shall be designees of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense for purposes of this section.
(b)(1) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period
beginning on the date of receipt of an employee complaint or
information under subsection (a), the Inspector General shall
determine whether the complaint or information appears
credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector
General shall transmit to the head of the establishment notice
of that determination, together with the complaint or
information.
(2) If the head of an establishment determines that a
complaint or information transmitted under paragraph (1) would
create a conflict of interest for the head of the
establishment, the head of the establishment shall return the
complaint or information to the Inspector General with that
determination and the Inspector General shall make the
transmission to the Director of National Intelligence and, if
the establishment is within the Department of Defense, to the
Secretary of Defense. In such a case, the requirements of this
section for the head of the establishment apply to each
recipient of the Inspector General's transmission.
(c) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General
under subsection (b), the head of the establishment shall,
within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such
transmittal to the intelligence committees, together with any
comments the head of the establishment considers appropriate.
(d)(1) If the Inspector General does not find credible under
subsection (b) a complaint or information submitted to the
Inspector General under subsection (a), or does not transmit
the complaint or information to the head of the establishment
in accurate form under subsection (b), the employee (subject to
paragraph (2)) may submit the complaint or information to
Congress by contacting either or both of the intelligence
committees directly.
(2) The employee may contact the intelligence committees
directly as described in paragraph (1) only if the employee--
(A) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
head of the establishment, through the Inspector
General, a statement of the employee's complaint or
information and notice of the employee's intent to
contact the intelligence committees directly; and
(B) obtains and follows from the head of the
establishment, through the Inspector General, direction
on how to contact the intelligence committees in
accordance with appropriate security practices.
(3) A member or employee of one of the intelligence
committees who receives a complaint or information under
paragraph (1) does so in that member or employee's official
capacity as a member or employee of that committee.
(e) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information under this section of each
action taken under this section with respect to the complaint
or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3
days after any such action is taken.
(f) An action taken by the head of an establishment or an
Inspector General under subsections (a) through (e) shall not
be subject to judicial review.
[(g)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security
Agency shall each submit to the congressional intelligence
committees each year a report that sets forth the following:
[(A) The personnel and funds requested by such
Inspector General for the fiscal year beginning in such
year for the activities of the office of such Inspector
General in such fiscal year.
[(B) The plan of such Inspector General for such
activities, including the programs and activities
scheduled for review by the office of such Inspector
General during such fiscal year.
[(C) An assessment of the current ability of such
Inspector General to hire and retain qualified
personnel for the office of such Inspector General.
[(D) Any matters that such Inspector General
considers appropriate regarding the independence and
effectiveness of the office of such Inspector General.
[(2) The submittal date for a report under paragraph (1) each
year shall be the date provided in section 507 of the National
Security Act of 1947.
[(3) In this subsection, the term ``congressional
intelligence committees'' shall have the meaning given that
term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a).]
[(h)] (g) An individual who has submitted a complaint or
information to an Inspector General under this section may
notify any member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, or a staff member of
either such Committee, of the fact that such individual has
made a submission to that particular Inspector General, and of
the date on which such submission was made.
[(i)] (h) In this section:
(1) The term ``urgent concern'' means any of the
following:
(A) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse,
violation of law or Executive order, or
deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operations of an
intelligence activity involving classified
information, but does not include differences
of opinions concerning public policy matters.
(B) A false statement to Congress, or a
willful withholding from Congress, on an issue
of material fact relating to the funding,
administration, or operation of an intelligence
activity.
(C) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5,
United States Code, constituting reprisal or
threat of reprisal prohibited under section
7(c) in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this section.
(2) The term ``intelligence committees'' means the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
* * * * * * *
----------
PUBLIC INTEREST DECLASSIFICATION ACT OF 2000
TITLE VII--DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION
* * * * * * *
SEC. 710. EFFECTIVE DATE; SUNSET.
(a) Effective Date.--This title shall take effect on the date
that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Sunset.--The provisions of this title shall expire on
[December 31, 2018] December 31, 2028.
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACT
* * * * * * *
TITLE XXXII--NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--Establishment and Organization
* * * * * * *
SEC. 3212. ADMINISTRATOR FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY.
(a) In General.--(1) There is at the head of the
Administration an Administrator for Nuclear Security (in this
title referred to as the ``Administrator'').
(2) Pursuant to subsection (c) of section 202 of the
Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7132), the
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of
Energy serves as the Administrator.
(b) Functions.--The Administrator has authority over, and is
responsible for, all programs and activities of the
Administration (except for the functions of the Deputy
Administrator for Naval Reactors specified in the Executive
order referred to in section 3216(b)), including the following:
(1) Strategic management.
(2) Policy development and guidance.
(3) Budget formulation, guidance, and execution, and
other financial matters.
(4) Resource requirements determination and
allocation.
(5) Program management and direction.
(6) Safeguards and security.
(7) Emergency management.
(8) Integrated safety management.
(9) Environment, safety, and health operations.
(10) Administration of contracts, including the
management and operations of the nuclear weapons
production facilities and the national security
laboratories.
[(11) Intelligence.
[(12) Counterintelligence.]
[(13)] (11) Personnel, including the selection,
appointment, distribution, supervision, establishing of
compensation, and separation of personnel in accordance
with subtitle C of this title.
[(14)] (12) Procurement of services of experts and
consultants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5,
United States Code.
[(15)] (13) Legal matters.
[(16)] (14) Legislative affairs.
[(17)] (15) Public affairs.
[(18)] (16) Eliminating inventories of surplus
fissile materials usable for nuclear weapons.
[(19)] (17) Liaison with other elements of the
Department of Energy and with other Federal agencies,
State, tribal, and local governments, and the public.
(c) Procurement Authority.--The Administrator is the senior
procurement executive for the Administration for the purposes
of section 1702(c) of title 41, United States Code.
(d) Policy Authority.--The Administrator may establish
Administration-specific policies, unless disapproved by the
Secretary of Energy.
(e) Membership on Joint Nuclear Weapons Council.--The
Administrator serves as a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons
Council under section 179 of title 10, United States Code.
(f) Reorganization Authority.--Except as provided by
subsections (b) and (c) of section 3291:
(1) The Administrator may establish, abolish, alter,
consolidate, or discontinue any organizational unit or
component of the Administration, or transfer any
function of the Administration.
(2) Such authority does not apply to the abolition of
organizational units or components established by law
or the transfer of functions vested by law in any
organizational unit or component.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Matters Relating to Security
* * * * * * *
SEC. 3233. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS.
(a) National Security Laboratories and Nuclear Weapons
Production Facilities.--The Secretary of Energy shall, at each
national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production
facility, establish and maintain a counterintelligence program
adequate to protect national security information at that
laboratory or production facility.
(b) Other Facilities.--The Secretary of Energy shall, at each
[Administration] Department facility not described in
subsection (a) at which Restricted Data is located, assign an
employee of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
of the Department of Energy who shall be responsible for and
assess counterintelligence matters at that facility.
* * * * * * *
----------
ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACT
* * * * * * *
DIVISION D--ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
TITLE XLV--SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY MATTERS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Classified Information
* * * * * * *
SEC. 4524. PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION DURING LABORATORY-TO-
LABORATORY EXCHANGES.
(a) Provision of Training.--The Secretary of Energy shall
ensure that all Department of Energy employees and Department
of Energy contractor employees participating in laboratory-to-
laboratory cooperative exchange activities are fully trained in
matters relating to the protection of classified information
and to potential espionage and counterintelligence threats.
(b) Countering of Espionage and Intelligence-Gathering
Abroad.--(1) The Secretary shall establish a pool of Department
employees and Department contractor employees who are specially
trained to counter threats of espionage and intelligence-
gathering by foreign nationals against Department employees and
Department contractor employees who travel abroad for
laboratory-to-laboratory exchange activities or other
cooperative exchange activities on behalf of the Department.
(2) The Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
the Department of Energy may assign at least one employee from
the pool established under paragraph (1) to accompany a group
of Department employees or Department contractor employees who
travel to any nation designated to be a sensitive country for
laboratory-to-laboratory exchange activities or other
cooperative exchange activities on behalf of the Department.
* * * * * * *
Disclosure of Directed Rule Making
H.R. 3494 does not specifically direct any rule makings
within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 551.
Duplication of Federal Programs
H.R. 3494 does not duplicate or reauthorize an established
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of
another Federal program, a program that was included in any
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance.
Hearings
For the purposes of Section 103(i) of H. Res. 6 of the
116th Congress, the following hearings were used to develop or
consider H.R. 3494--
1. The Committee held a hearing ``National Security
Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the
World'' on February 26, 2019. The Committee received
testimony from the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, the
Honorable Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Dr. Teng Biao and Dr.
Andrea Kendall-Taylor.
2. The Committee held a hearing ``Putin's Playbook:
The Kremlin's Use of Oligarchs, Money, and Intelligence
in 2016 and Beyond'' on Thursday, March 28, 2019. The
Committee received testimony from the Honorable Michael
McFaul, Mr. Steven Hall, Ms. Heather Conley, and Mr.
Eric Lorber.
3. The Committee held a closed hearing ``Fiscal Year
2020 Intelligence Community Budget Request Overview''
on April 3, 2019.
4. The Committee held a closed hearing ``Fiscal Year
2020 Central Intelligence Agency Program Budget Request
Hearing'' on May 2, 2019.
5. The Committee held a closed hearing ``Fiscal Year
2020 National Security Program Budget Request Hearing''
on May 8, 2019.
6. The Defense Intelligence and Warfighter Support
Subcommittee held a closed hearing ``Fiscal Year 2020
Defense Intelligence Agency and Military Services
Budget Request Hearing'' on May 9, 2019.
7. The Committee held a closed hearing
``Compartmented FY 2020 Budget Request'' on May 14,
2019.
8. The Committee held a hearing ``Mission Imperative:
Diversity and Inclusion in the Intelligence Community''
on May 23, 2019. The Committee received testimony from
the Honorable Kari Bingen, Mrs. Rita Sampson, and Mr.
Harry Coker.
9. The Committee held a hearing ``National Security
Implications of Climate Change'' on June 5, 2019. The
Committee received testimony from Mr. Peter Kiemel, Mr.
Jeff Ringhausen, and Dr. Rod Schoonover.
10. The Committee held a hearing ``Lessons from the
Mueller Report: Counterintelligence Implications of
Volume 1'' on June 12, 2019. The Committee received
testimony from Mrs. Stephanie Douglas, Mr. Robert
Anderson, and Mr. Andrew McCarthy.
11. The Committee held a hearing ``National Security
Challenges of Artificial Intelligence, Manipulated
Media, and ``Deepfakes'' on June 13, 2019. The
Committee received testimony from Mrs. Danielle Citron,
Mr. Jack Clark, Dr. David Doermann, and Mr. Clint
Watts.
In addition, the Committee held numerous briefings,
roundtables, and a markup to develop and consider H.R. 3494.