[Senate Report 115-2]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        Calendar No. 4
115th Congress     }                                       {    Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session       }                                       {     115-2

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

                                _______
                                

                January 20, 2017.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 133]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, to which was referred 
the bill (S. 133) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 
2017 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of 
the United States Government, the Community Management Account, 
and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability 
System, and for other purposes, having considered the same, 
reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that 
the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    On February 9, 2016, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly 
disclosed that the President's aggregate request for the 
National Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2017 is $53.5 
billion. Other than for limited unclassified appropriations, 
primarily the Intelligence Community Management Account, the 
classified nature of United States intelligence activities 
precludes any further disclosure, including by the Committee, 
of the details of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, 
the Committee has prepared a classified annex to this report 
that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by 
reference in the Intelligence Authorization Act (the ``Act'') 
and has the legal status of public law. The classified annex is 
made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives and to the President. 
It is also available for review by any Member of the Senate 
subject to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th 
Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2017 that is being reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2017.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2017 are contained in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment 
of civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2017 in excess of the 
number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three 
percent of the total limit applicable to each IC element under 
Section 102, and ten percent of the number of civilian 
personnel authorized under such schedule for the purposes of 
contractor conversions. The DNI may do so only if necessary to 
the performance of important intelligence functions.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the 
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA 
for Fiscal Year 2017.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2017 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 303. Support to nonprofit organizations assisting intelligence 
        community employees

    Section 303 permits the DNI to engage in fundraising in an 
official capacity for the benefit of nonprofit organizations 
that provide support to surviving family members of a deceased 
employee of an element of the IC or otherwise provide support 
for the welfare, education, or recreation of IC employees, 
former employees, or their family members. Section 303 requires 
the DNI to issue regulations ensuring that the fundraising 
authority is exercised consistent with all relevant ethical 
limitations and principles. Section 303 further requires that 
the DNI and the Director of the CIA notify the congressional 
intelligence committees within seven days after they engage in 
such fundraising.

Section 304. Promotion of science, technology, engineering, and 
        mathematics education in the intelligence community

    Section 304 requires the DNI to submit a five-year 
investment strategy for outreach and recruiting efforts in the 
fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
(STEM), to include cybersecurity and computer literacy. Section 
304 further requires elements of the IC to submit STEM 
investment plans supporting this strategy for each of the 
fiscal years 2018 through 2022, along with the materials 
justifying the budget request of each element for these STEM 
recruiting and outreach activities.

Section 305. Retention of employees of the intelligence community who 
        have science, technology, engineering, or mathematics expertise

    Section 305 authorizes a new payscale to permit salary 
increases for employees in the IC with STEM backgrounds. 
Section 305 also requires notifications to individual employees 
if a position is removed from this new payscale. Section 305 
further requires the head of each IC element to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the new rates 
of pay and number of positions authorized under this payscale.

Section 306. Multi-sector workforce

    Section 306 prohibits the Congress's use of government 
personnel ceilings in the management of the IC civilian 
workforce starting in Fiscal Year 2019. Section 306 requires 
the DNI to provide a written report and briefing on the 
methodology to calculate the full-time equivalent IC positions, 
the cost analysis tool used to calculate IC personnel costs, 
and the IC's implementation plans. Section 306 further requires 
the IC IG to provide a written report on the accuracy of IC 
workforce data. This section will bring the IC in line with how 
Congress oversees the Department of Defense (DoD) and other 
federal agency workforces.

Section 307. Notification of repair or modification of facilities to be 
        used primarily by the intelligence community

    Section 307 clarifies that the requirement to notify the 
congressional intelligence committees of improvement projects 
with an estimated cost greater than $1,000,000 for facilities 
used primarily by IC personnel includes repairs and 
modifications.

Section 308. Guidance and reporting requirement regarding interactions 
        between the intelligence community and entertainment industry

    Section 308 requires the DNI to issue public guidance 
regarding engagements by elements of the Intelligence Community 
with entertainment industry entities. The guidance will include 
DNI providing an annual report to the congressional 
intelligence committees detailing interactions between the IC 
and the entertainment industry. Section 308 also requires the 
report to include a description of the nature, duration, costs, 
benefits, and results of each engagement, as well as a 
determination that each engagement did not result in a 
disclosure of classified information and whether any 
information was declassified for the disclosure. Section 308 
further requires that before an IC element may engage with the 
entertainment industry, the head of that element must approve 
the proposed engagement. Contractual relationships for 
professional services and technical expertise are exempt from 
these reporting requirements.

Section 309. Protections for independent inspectors general of elements 
        of the intelligence community

    Section 309 requires the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) to develop and implement a uniform policy 
for each identified Inspector General (IG) office in the IC to 
better ensure their independence. The provision specifies 
elements to be incorporated in such a policy including (a) 
guidance regarding conflicts of interest, (b) standards to 
ensure independence, and (c) a waiver provision. Section 309 
further prohibits the DNI from requiring an employee of an OIG 
to rotate to a position in the element for which such office 
conducts oversight.

Section 310. Congressional oversight of policy directives and guidance

    Section 310 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees notifications and copies of any 
classified or unclassified Presidential Policy Directive, 
Presidential Policy Guidance, or other similar policy document 
issued by the President which assigns tasks, roles, or 
responsibilities to the IC, within the specified timeframes. 
Section 310 further requires the Director to notify the 
congressional intelligence committees of guidance to implement 
such policies.

Section 311. Notification of memoranda of understanding

    Section 311 requires the head of each element of the IC to 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees copies of 
each memorandum of understanding or other agreement regarding 
significant operational activities or policy entered into 
between or among such element and any other entity or entities 
of the federal government within specified timeframes.
    Section 311 does not require an IC element to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees any memorandum or 
agreement that is solely administrative in nature, including a 
memorandum or agreement regarding joint duty or other routine 
personnel assignments. An IC element also may redact any 
personally identifiable information from a memorandum or 
agreement which must be submitted to the intelligence 
committees.

Section 312. Assistance for nationally significant critical 
        infrastructure

    Section 312 requires the DHS, supported by the appropriate 
elements of the IC, to carry out a program to provide 
assistance to certain critical infrastructure entities, on a 
voluntary basis, for the purpose of reducing the likelihood of 
catastrophic harm resulting from a cyber attack.

Section 313. Technical correction to Executive Schedule

    Section 313 contains a technical correction regarding the 
annual rate of basic pay for the Director of the National 
Counter Proliferation Center.

Section 314. Maximum amount charged for declassification reviews

    Section 314 prohibits the head of an element of the IC from 
charging reproduction fees for a mandatory declassification 
review in excess of reproduction fees that the head would 
charge for a request for information under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). It also permits agency heads to waive 
processing fees for declassification reviews in the same manner 
as for FOIA.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence


Section 401. Designation of the Director of the National 
        Counterintelligence and Security Center

    Section 401 renames the National Counterintelligence 
Executive as the ``National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center,'' with conforming amendments.

Section 402. Analyses and impact statements by Director of National 
        Intelligence regarding proposed investment into the United 
        States

    Section 402 directs the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, after the completion of a review or an 
investigation of any proposed investment into the United 
States, any analytic materials prepared by the DNI. This 
requirement includes, but is not limited to, national security 
threat assessments provided to the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in connection with 
national security reviews and investigations conducted by CFIUS 
pursuant to Section 721(b) of the Defense Production Act of 
1950 (50 U.S.C. Sec. 4565). This section is not intended to 
limit the ability of the DNI to transmit supplementary 
materials to the congressional intelligence committees along 
with the threat assessments.
    Section 402 also directs the DNI to provide the committees 
with impact statements when the DNI determines a proposed 
investment into the United States will have an operational 
impact on the IC.

Section 403. Assistance for governmental entities and private entities 
        in recognizing online violent extremist content

    Section 403 requires the DNI to publish on a publicly 
available Internet website a list of all logos, symbols, 
insignia, and other markings commonly associated with, or 
adopted by, State Department-designated foreign terrorist 
organizations.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency


Section 411. Enhanced death benefits for personnel of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 411 authorizes the Director of the CIA to pay death 
benefits substantially similar to those authorized for members 
of the Foreign Service, and requires the Director to submit 
implementing regulations to the congressional intelligence 
committees.

Section 412. Pay and retirement authorities of the Inspector General of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 412 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 to authorize the IG of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) to consider certain positions as law enforcement officers 
for purposes of calculating retirement eligibility and 
entitlements under chapters 83 and 84 of title 5, United States 
Code, if such officer or employee is appointed to a position 
with responsibility for investigating suspected offenses 
against the criminal laws of the United States. Section 412 may 
not be construed to confer on the IG of the CIA, or any other 
officer or employee of the CIA, any police or law enforcement 
or internal security functions or authorities.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements


Section 421. Enhancing the technical workforce for the Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation

    Section 421 requires the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to produce a comprehensive strategic workforce report to 
demonstrate progress in expanding initiatives to effectively 
integrate information technology expertise in the investigative 
process. Section 421 further requires the report to include: 
(1) progress on training, recruitment, and retention of cyber-
related personnel; (2) an assessment of whether FBI officers 
with these skill sets are fully integrated in the FBI's 
workforce; (3)the FBI's collaboration with the private sector 
on cyber issues; and (4)an assessment of the utility of 
reinstituting and leveraging the FBI Director's Advisory Board.

Section 422. Plan on assumption of certain weather missions by the 
        National Reconnaissance Office

    Section 422 requires the Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to develop a plan to carry out 
certain space-based environmental monitoring missions currently 
performed by the Air Force. It also authorizes certain pre-
acquisition activities and directs that an independent cost 
estimate be submitted to the congressional intelligence and 
defense committees. The Director of NRO may waive the 
requirement of Section 422 if the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, jointly submit a certification to 
the congressional intelligence and defense committees.

             TITLE V--MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Section 501. Committee to counter active measures by the Russian 
        Federation to exert covert influence over peoples and 
        governments

    Section 501 requires the President to establish an 
interagency committee to counter active measures by the Russian 
Federation that constitute Russian actions to exert covert 
influence over peoples and governments.

Section 502. Strict enforcement of travel protocols and procedures of 
        accredited diplomatic and consular personnel of the Russian 
        Federation in the United States

    Section 502 requires the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Director of the FBI and the DNI, to 
establish an advance notification regime governing all Russian 
Federation accredited diplomatic and consular personnel in the 
United States, as well as to take action to strictly secure 
compliance and address noncompliance with the notification 
requirement. Section 502 also requires the Secretary of State, 
the Director of the FBI, and the DNI to develop written 
mechanisms to share such travel information and address 
noncompliance. Section 502 further requires written reporting 
to the specified committees detailing the number of 
notifications, and the number of known or suspected violations 
of such personnel requirements.

Section 503. Study and report on enhanced intelligence and information 
        sharing with Open Skies Treaty member states

    Section 503 requires the DNI, with support of other federal 
agencies, to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of 
creating an intelligence sharing arrangement and database among 
parties to the Open Skies Treaty (OST) with higher frequency, 
quality, and efficiency than that currently provided by the 
parameters of the OST. Section 503 also requires the Director 
to issue a report that includes an intelligence assessment on 
Russian Federation warfighting doctrine, the extent to which 
Russian Federation flights under the Open Skies Treaty 
contribute to the warfighting doctrine, a counterintelligence 
analysis as to the Russian Federation's capabilities, and a 
list of the covered parties that have been updated with this 
information.

                  TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Section 601. Declassification review with respect to detainees 
        transferred from United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, 
        Cuba

    Section 601 requires the DNI to complete a declassification 
review of intelligence reports prepared by the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) on the past terrorist activities 
of each Guantanamo detainee, for a detainee's Periodic Review 
Board (PRB) sessions, transfer, or release from Guantanamo. To 
the extent a transfer or release preceded the PRB's 
establishment, or the NCTC's preparation of intelligence 
reports, Section 601 requires the DNI to conduct a 
declassification review of intelligence reports containing the 
same or similar information as the intelligence reports 
prepared by the NCTC for PRB sessions, transfers, or releases.
    Section 601 further requires the President to make any 
declassified intelligence reports publicly available, including 
unclassified summaries of measures being taken by the 
transferee countries to monitor the individual and prevent 
future terrorist activities. Section 601 requires the DNI to 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
setting forth the results of the declassification review, 
including a description of covered reports that were not 
declassified. Section 601 also sets the schedule for such 
reviews and further defines past terrorist activities to 
include terrorist organization affiliations, terrorist 
training, role in terrorist attacks, responsibility for the 
death of United States citizens or members of the Armed Forces, 
any admission thereof, and a description of the intelligence 
supporting the past terrorist activities, including 
corroboration, confidence level, and any dissent or 
reassessment by the IC.

Section 602. Cyber Center for Education and Innovation--Home of the 
        National Cryptologic Museum

    Section 602 amends 10 U.S.C. Sec. 449 to enable the 
establishment of a Cyber Center for Education and Innovation--
Home of the National Cryptologic Museum (the ``Center''). 
Section 602 also establishes in the Treasury a fund for the 
benefit and operation of the Center.

Section 603. Report on national security systems

    Section 603 requires the Director of the National Security 
Agency (NSA), in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on national 
security systems.

Section 604. Joint facilities certification

    Section 604 requires that before an element of the IC 
purchases, leases, or constructs a new facility that is 20,000 
square feet or larger, the head of that element must first 
certify that all prospective joint facilities have been 
considered, that it is unable to identify a joint facility that 
meets its operational requirements, and it must list the 
reasons for not participating in joint facilities in that 
instance.

Section 605. Leadership and management of space activities

    Section 605 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, to issue an update to the strategy for a comprehensive 
review of the United States national security overhead 
satellite architecture required in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. Section 605 requires 
the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to 
submit a plan to functionally integrate the IC's governance, 
operations, analysis, collection, policy, and acquisition 
activities related to space and counterspace. The congressional 
intelligence committees believe the current fragmented 
arrangement across the IC does not provide sufficient coherence 
to meet the threat, fosters duplication, hinders integrated 
congressional oversight, and impedes effective alignment with 
the DoD space activities. Section 605 also requires the DNI to 
submit a workforce plan for space and counterspace operations, 
policy, and acquisition. Section 605 further requires the 
Director of the NRO and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command 
to submit a concept of operations and requirements documents 
for the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center, and 
to conduct quarterly update briefings.

Section 606. Advances in life sciences and biotechnology

    The congressional intelligence committees recognize the 
rapid advancements in the life sciences and biotechnology and 
firmly believes that biology in the twenty-first century will 
transform the world as physics did in the twentieth century. 
The potential risks associated with these advancements are less 
clear. The posture of the IC to follow and predict this rapidly 
changing landscape is a matter of concern recognizing the 
global diffusion and dual-use nature of life sciences and 
biotechnology along with the dispersed responsibility of the 
life sciences related issues across several National 
Intelligence Officer portfolios.
    Section 606 requires the DNI to brief the congressional 
intelligence committees and the congressional defense 
committees on a proposed plan and actions to monitor advances 
in life sciences and biotechnology to be carried out by the 
DNI. The Director's plan should include, first, a description 
of the IC's approach to leverage the organic life science and 
biotechnology expertise both within and outside the 
Intelligence Community; second, an assessment of the current 
life sciences and biotechnology portfolio, the risks of genetic 
editing technologies, and the implications of these advances on 
future biodefense requirements; and, third, an analysis of 
organizational requirements and responsibilities to include 
potentially creating new positions. Section 606 further 
requires the DNI to submit a written report and provide a 
briefing to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
congressional defense committees on the role of the IC in the 
event of a biological attack, including a technical 
capabilities assessment to address potential unknown pathogens.

Section 607. Reports on declassification proposals

    Section 607 requires the DNI to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees with a report and briefing on the IC's 
progress in producing four feasibility studies undertaken in 
the course of the IC's fundamental classification guidance 
review, as required under Executive Order 13526. Section 607 
further requires the Director to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees with a briefing, interim report, and 
final report on the final feasibility studies produced by 
elements of the IC and an implementation plan for each 
initiative.

Section 608. Improvement in government classification and 
        declassification

    Section 608 assesses government classification and 
declassification in a digital era by requiring the DNI to 
review the system by which the Government classifies and 
declassifies national security information to improve the 
protection of such information, enable information sharing with 
allies and partners, and support appropriate declassification. 
Section 608 requires the DNI to submit a report with its 
findings and recommendations to the congressional intelligence 
committees. Section 608 further requires the DNI to provide an 
annual written notification to the congressional intelligence 
committees on the creation, validation, or substantial 
modification (to include termination) of existing and proposed 
controlled access programs, and the compartments and 
subcompartments within each. This certification shall include 
the rationale for each controlled access program, compartment, 
or subcompartment and how each controlled access program is 
being protected.

Section 609. Report on implementation of research and development 
        recommendations

    Section 609 requires the DNI to conduct and provide to the 
congressional intelligence committees a current assessment of 
the IC's implementation of the recommendations issued in 2013 
by the National Commission for the Review of the Research and 
Development (R&D) Programs of the IC.

Section 610. Report on Intelligence Community Research and Development 
        Corps.

    Section 610 requires the DNI to develop and brief the 
congressional intelligence committees on a plan, with 
milestones and benchmarks, to implement a R&D Reserve Corps, as 
recommended in 2013 by the bipartisan National Commission for 
the Review of the R&D Programs of the IC, including any funding 
and potential changes to existing authorities that may be 
needed to allow for the Corps' implementation.

Section 611. Report on information relating to academic programs, 
        scholarships, fellowships, and internships sponsored, 
        administered, or used by the intelligence community

    Section 611 requires the DNI to submit to congressional 
intelligence committees a report on information that the IC 
collects on certain academic programs, scholarships, and 
internships sponsored, administered, or used by the IC.

Section 612. Report on intelligence community employees detailed to 
        National Security Council

    Section 612 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a classified written report listing, by 
year, the number of employees of an element of the IC who have 
been detailed to the National Security Council during each of 
the previous ten years.

Section 613. Intelligence community reporting to Congress on foreign 
        fighter flows

    Section 613 directs DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on foreign fighter flows to 
and from terrorist safe havens abroad.

Section 614. Report on cybersecurity threats to seaports of the United 
        States and maritime shipping.

    Section 614 directs the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
cybersecurity threats to seaports of the United States and 
maritime shipping.

Section 615. Report on counter-narrative activities

    Section 615 directs the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for I&A, in coordination with DHS's Office of 
Community Partnerships, to submit to reference committees a 
report on the counter-narrative activities of DHS with respect 
to the Islamic State and other extremist groups.

Section 616. Report on reprisals against contractors of the 
        intelligence community

    Section 616 directs the IC IG to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on known or 
claimed reprisals made against employees of contractors of 
elements of the IC during the preceding three-year period. 
Section 616 further requires the report to include an 
evaluation of the usefulness of establishing a prohibition on 
reprisals as a means of encouraging IC contractors to make 
protected disclosures, and any recommendations the IC IG deems 
appropriate.

                           Committee Comments


Managing a multi-sector workforce in the intelligence community

    The Committee believes that IC elements should have the 
flexibility to build, develop, and maintain a workforce 
appropriately balanced among its civilian, military and 
contractor workforce sectors to meet the missions assigned to 
it in law and by the president. It is the Committee's view that 
the size and shape of the IC's multi-sector workforce should be 
based on activities that are funded, and not arbitrary 
government personnel ceilings. It is also the Committee's 
continued position that the IC should reduce its reliance on 
contractors wherever appropriate, both as a matter of general 
policy and as a way to conserve resources. The flexibility 
afforded in this provision should support this position. In 
addition, section 103 provides an increase in the number of 
civilian personnel authorized in the Schedule of Authorizations 
for the purposes of such contractor conversions in the interim 
for the remainder of fiscal year 2017.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that the ODNI provide the 
congressional intelligence committees a briefing on the 
workforce initiative as directed in section 306, not later than 
July 1, 2018, with benchmarks and milestones, for IC elements 
managing a multi-sector workforce without personnel ceilings 
starting in fiscal year 2019. The ODNI, in coordination with 
the IC elements, shall establish a common methodology for 
collecting and reporting data, and include new exhibits in the 
annual congressional budget justification books that display 
full-time equivalents (government civilians, core contractors, 
and non-core contractors), by program, expenditure center and 
project.
    Finally, the transfer of non-personnel service funding in 
below-threshold reprogramming is a concern to the Committee. 
Therefore, the Committee designates personnel services and non-
personnel service funding at the program level as congressional 
special interest items.

Commercial Geospatial Intelligence Strategy

    The Committee applauds the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency (NGA) for issuing its October 2015 Commercial Geospatial 
Intelligence (GEOINT) Strategy, which states a goal of 
fostering a ``more diverse, resilient, agile, and responsive 
GEOINT program that provides seamless user access to the best 
mix of commercial GEOINT . . . to fulfill National System for 
Geospatial-Intelligence (NSG) and Allied System for Geospatial-
Intelligence (ASG) mission needs.'' The Committee also finds 
merit in the NGA's ``GEOINT Pathfinder'' project, which seeks 
to maximize the use of unclassified and commercially available 
data sources that can be easily and rapidly shared with a 
variety of military, United States and allied government, and 
non-government customers, and supports the project's 
continuation and expansion.
    The Committee further commends the NGA for pursuing new 
methods of intelligence collection and analysis to inform, 
complement, and add to its support of warfighter requirements 
by looking to emerging commercial technology providers, 
including small satellite companies, which hold the promise of 
rapid technological innovation and potentially significant 
future cost savings to the U.S. taxpayer. The Committee further 
encourages the Director of the NGA to ensure sufficient funding 
is available to acquire new, unclassified sources, including 
commercial satellite imagery providing unprecedented global 
persistence, as well as products and services that provide 
information and context about changes relevant to geospatial 
intelligence. The Committee also encourages the NGA to pursue 
new business models, including commercial acquisition 
practices, to enable the NGA's access to data, products, and 
services in ways consistent with best commercial practices.
    The Committee fully supports the NGA's course of action in 
partnering with the commercial GEOINT industry to meet future 
warfighter intelligence requirements, while recognizing the 
need to take appropriate steps to protect national security, 
and encourage the Director of the NGA and the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Intelligence to keep the Committee informed of 
their progress in implementing this strategy. Therefore, the 
Committee directs the DoD, in building future-year budgets, to 
ensure continued funding is provided for implementation, 
through at least Fiscal Year 2021, of the Commercial Geospatial 
Intelligence Strategy issued by the NGA in October 2015.

Space launch facilities

    The Committee continues to believe it is critical to 
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support 
national security space missions. Spaceports or launch and 
range complexes may provide capabilities to reach mid-to-low or 
polar-to-high inclination orbits. The Committee believes an 
important component of this effort may be state-owned and 
operated spaceports that are commercially licensed by the 
Federal Aviation Administration, which leverage non-federal 
public and private investments to bolster U.S. launch 
capabilities. Additionally, the Committee believes that these 
facilities may be able to provide additional flexibility and 
resilience to the Nation's launch infrastructure, especially as 
the nation considers concepts such as the reconstitution of 
satellites to address the growing foreign counterspace threat. 
The Committee notes recent testimony by the Chief of Staff of 
the U.S. Air Force, General Mark Welsh, who stated,

        As we look at this space enterprise and how we do it 
        differently in the future, as we look more at 
        disaggregation, microsats, cube sats, small sats, 
        things that don't have to go from a large launch 
        complex all the time, I think proliferating launch 
        complexes is probably going to be a natural outshoot of 
        this. I think it's commercially viable, it may be a way 
        for companies to get into the launch business who could 
        not afford to get into it or don't see a future in it 
        and for large national security space launches, but I 
        think this has got to be part of the strategy that this 
        whole national team puts together as we look to the 
        future.

    Therefore, the Committee directs the IC, in partnership 
with the U.S. Air Force, to consider the role and contribution 
of spaceports or launch and range complexes to our national 
security space launch capacity, and directs the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the DoD 
and the U.S. Air Force, to brief the congressional intelligence 
committees on their plans to utilize such facilities within 90 
days of enactment of this Act.

National Reconnaissance Office workforce optimization strategy

    The Committee has had longstanding interest in, and support 
for, a permanent government cadre to provide the NRO with a 
stable, expert acquisition workforce. The Committee applauds 
the substantial progress that the NRO has made in the past year 
in this regard. The Committee has parallel interests in 
providing the IC with flexibility to manage a multi-sector 
workforce and in continuing the reduction in the reliance on 
contractors.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO to conduct a 
workforce review to optimize the mix between government 
civilians and contractors and report to the Committee with a 
strategy within 90 days of enactment of this Act.

Guidance and reporting requirement regarding interactions between the 
        intelligence community and entertainment industry

    The Committee believes that there are important, valid 
reasons for elements of the IC to engage with the entertainment 
industry, among other things to ensure the correction of 
inaccuracies, demonstrate the IC's commitment to transparency, 
and to ensure that the IC recruits and retains highly qualified 
personnel to the fullest extent possible. The Committee further 
believes that IC engagement with the entertainment industry 
should be conducted in the most cost effective and deliberate 
fashion possible, while ensuring that classified information is 
protected from unauthorized disclosure.
    These engagements--some of which have been described in 
partially-declassified inspector general reports--cost taxpayer 
dollars, raise potential ethics concerns, increase the risk of 
disclosure of classified information, and consume the time and 
attention of IC personnel responsible for United States 
national security. Neither the production of entertainment nor 
the self-promotion of IC entities are legitimate purposes for 
these engagements.

Review of the National Intelligence University

    The National Intelligence University (NIU) has made 
significant progress in recent years in its transition from a 
defense intelligence college to a national intelligence 
university that provides advanced education in a classified 
format. Such advanced education is integral to making 
intelligence a profession with recognized standards for 
performance and ethics and fostering an integrated IC 
workforce. While progress has been significant since the DNI 
and Secretary of Defense agreed to redesignate Defense 
Intelligence Agency's (DIA) National Defense Intelligence 
College as NIU in 2011, the institution must continue to adapt 
to functioning as a university with a robust research agenda, 
and to serving the entire IC, not just elements of DoD.
    Fiscal years 2017 and 2018 are of great significance for 
NIU, as it moves its principal facility to the IC Campus at 
Bethesda, completes activities associated with its 2018 
decennial regional accreditation reaffirmation, and receives a 
new president. The Committee believes that these developments 
position NIU to make further progress in its vision to become 
the center of academic life for the IC.
    To guide these next steps, the Committee directs DIA, in 
coordination with ODNI and the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, to, no later than 30 days after 
enactment of this Act, select a five member, external, and 
independent panel to conduct a review of NIU. The panel shall 
submit a report detailing the results of such review to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees within 180 
days of enactment of this Act. The panel should be composed of 
recognized academics, personnel from other DoD joint 
professional military education institutions, national security 
experts, and at least one member of NIU's Board of Visitors.
    This review and the resulting report shall, among other 
things, assess:
          (1) Methods for ensuring a student body that is more 
        representative of all IC elements;
          (2) Incentives for IC elements to send personnel to 
        NIU to earn a degree or certificate, to include 
        designating attendance at NIU as positions reimbursable 
        by ODNI and requiring IC elements to employ the 
        workforce concept of ``float'' for personnel enrolled 
        in higher-education programs;
          (3) How certificate programs align with NIU's unique 
        value as an institution of advanced intelligence 
        education;
          (4) Methods to enhance NIU's research program, to 
        include publication of a journal, hosting of 
        conferences and other collaborative fora, and more 
        formalized relationships with intelligence studies 
        scholars;
          (5) Whether and how educational components of other 
        IC elements could provide educational offerings as part 
        of the NIU curriculum;
          (6) Potential advantages and risks associated with 
        alternative governance models for NIU, to include 
        moving it under the auspices of ODNI; and
          (7) The feasibility and resource constraints of NIU 
        tailoring degree offerings to meet the needs of IC 
        personnel at different stages in their careers, similar 
        to DoD's joint professional military education model.

Cost of living consideration

    The Committee is concerned with the high cost of living for 
military, civilian, and contractor personnel at overseas 
Combatant Command intelligence centers. Although the Committee 
recognizes the benefits of co-locating intelligence analysts 
with the operational commander, the intelligence centers for 
both U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and U.S. Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM) are located over 600 miles from their Combatant 
Command headquarters. Combatant Commanders based in the United 
States regularly communicate with forward deployed units, and 
the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM intelligence centers have developed 
mechanisms to effectively employ various teleconferencing and 
virtual communication tools to ensure collaboration across 
large distances.
    The Committee is concerned that despite the utility of 
these virtual collaboration tools, DoD has not taken action to 
reduce the number of intelligence personnel stationed in high 
cost of living areas. These costs can exceed $65,000 per 
person, per year in annual cost of living allowances compared 
to the continental United States (CONUS) expenses. The 
additional costs associated with stationing intelligence 
personnel in high-cost overseas locations detract from other 
critical intelligence priorities. The Committee is further 
concerned that DoD does not adequately account for the long-run 
expense of high costs of living when selecting locations for 
intelligence facilities.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DIA to evaluate 
alternate mechanisms for staffing overseas Combatant Command 
intelligence centers, particularly those that are not co-
located with Combatant Command headquarters, and to identify 
cost-savings opportunities by shifting personnel to lower cost 
locations, including in the continental United States.

Defense Intelligence Agency education opportunities

    DIA presently allows DIA employees to receive pay for a 
single year only while attending certain graduate degree 
programs on a full-time basis. Employees may pursue such 
opportunities at the National Intelligence University and 
similar institutions; and, in certain circumstances, also at 
public and private civilian universities. However, the one-year 
limit discourages DIA personnel from pursuing multi-year 
graduate degree programs. Expanding DIA's program to allow 
highly qualified DIA employees to pursue multi-year graduate 
degree programs from accredited civilian universities would 
further improve retention, recruitment, and foster diversity of 
thought at DIA.
    Therefore, the Committee directs DIA, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to:
          (1) Provide for and fund a program that allows for 
        DIA employees to attend civilian graduate degree 
        programs for up to two years each, based on the 
        standard length of the relevant program, provided that:
                  (a) Where DIA deems appropriate, employees 
                may pursue academic programs extending beyond 
                two years. Consistent with current practices, 
                the program should be made available to at 
                least five employees each year, with each 
                employee receiving a full-time salary while 
                participating in the program; and
                  (b) Each DIA participant shall be subject to 
                any program approvals, service obligations, 
                repayment obligations, and other requirements 
                pertaining to academic programs, as prescribed 
                by applicable laws and policies.
          (2) Brief the congressional intelligence committees 
        on the status of the program's implementation.

Mental health prevalence

    The Committee is committed to supporting the men and women 
of the IC, who bravely risk their lives serving their country 
as civilians in conflict zones and other dangerous locations 
around the world. These individuals often serve next to their 
military counterparts in areas of active hostilities. As such, 
they are often exposed to many of the emotional stresses 
generally associated with a tour of duty abroad. The Committee 
believes there are deficiencies and inconsistencies in the pre- 
and post-deployment mental health and wellness services 
available to civilian employees.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NSA, NGA, CIA, and 
DIA, no later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, to 
provide a joint briefing to the congressional intelligence 
committees on the mental health screenings and related services 
that these agencies offer employees, both before and after they 
deploy to combat zones. Such briefing shall include a 
description of:
          (1) Existing services available;
          (2) Agency resources for and analysis of these 
        services, including the frequency of use by employees 
        compared to the total number returning from deployment; 
        and
          (3) How agencies with deployed civilian employees are 
        sharing best practices and leveraging services or 
        resources outside their agencies.

Review of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    It has been more than ten years since the Congress 
established the position of the DNI in the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, building on its 
predecessor, the Director of Central Intelligence. Given this 
experience and the evolving security environment, the Committee 
believes it appropriate to review the DNI's roles, missions and 
functions and adapt its authorities, organization and resources 
as needed.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the President to form an 
independent, external panel of at least five individuals with 
significant intelligence and national security expertise to 
review ODNI's roles, missions and functions and make 
recommendations, as needed, regarding its authorities, 
organization and resources. The panel shall:
          (1) Evaluate ODNI's ability to fulfill the 
        responsibilities assigned to it in law given its 
        current scope and structure;
          (2) Assess whether any roles and responsibilities 
        currently assigned to the DNI could be more effectively 
        or efficiently executed by other IC components or 
        government agencies outside the IC;
          (3) Analyze the personnel, funding, and authorities 
        required for each component of ODNI to perform each of 
        its assigned responsibilities;
          (4) Evaluate the organizational structure of ODNI;
          (5) Review the size, role, purpose and function of 
        ODNI's mission centers;
          (6) Assess the value of the national intelligence 
        manager construct;
          (7) Review the size and mix of the ODNI workforce--to 
        include the ratio between cadre and detailees, the 
        balance between government and contractors, and grade 
        structure--to perform its roles, missions and 
        functions; and
          (8) Make recommendations regarding the above.
    The Committee directs the President, no later than 30 days 
after the enactment of this Act, to select the individuals who 
will serve on the external panel and notify the congressional 
intelligence committees of such selection.
    In addition, the Committee directs the panel, no later than 
180 days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a report 
on this review to the congressional intelligence committees. 
This report shall be unclassified, but may contain a classified 
annex. The Committee further directs ODNI to reimburse the 
Executive Office of the President for any costs associated with 
the review.

Improving pre-publication review

    The Committee is concerned that current and former IC 
personnel have published written material without completing 
mandatory pre-publication review procedures or have rejected 
changes required by the review process, resulting in the 
publication of classified information. The Committee is 
particularly troubled by press reports suggesting that 
officials are unaware of the existence or scope of pre-
publication review requirements.
    The Committee is also aware of the perception that the pre-
publication review process can be unfair, untimely, and unduly 
onerous--and that these burdens may be at least partially 
responsible for some individuals ``opting out'' of the 
mandatory review process. The Committee further understands 
that IC agencies' pre-publication review mechanisms vary, and 
that there is no binding, IC-wide guidance on the subject.
    The Committee believes that all IC personnel must be made 
aware of pre-publication review requirements and that the 
review process must yield timely, reasoned, and impartial 
decisions that are subject to appeal. The Committee also 
believes that efficiencies can be identified by limiting the 
information subject to pre-publication review, to the fullest 
extent possible, to only those materials that might reasonably 
contain or be derived from classified information obtained 
during the course of an individual's association with the IC. 
In short, the pre-publication review process should be improved 
to better incentivize compliance and to deter ensure personnel 
from violating fulfill their commitments.
    Therefore, the Committee directs that, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, the DNI shall issue an 
IC-wide policy regarding pre-publication review. The DNI shall 
transmit this policy to the congressional intelligence 
committees concurrently with its issuance. The policy should 
require each IC agency to develop and maintain a pre-
publication policy that contains, at a minimum, the following 
elements:
          (1) Identification of the individuals subject to pre-
        publication review requirements (``covered 
        individuals'');
          (2) Guidance on the types of information that must be 
        submitted for pre-publication review, including works 
        (a) unrelated to an individual's IC employment; or (b) 
        published in cooperation with a third party, e.g.--
                  (a) Authored jointly by covered individuals 
                and third parties;
                  (b) Authored by covered individuals but 
                published under the name of a third party; or
                  (c) Authored by a third party but with 
                substantial input from covered individuals.
          (3) Guidance on a process by which covered 
        individuals can participate in pre-publication reviews, 
        and communicate openly and frequently with reviewers;
          (4) Requirements for timely responses, as well as 
        reasoned edits and decisions by reviewers;
          (5) Requirements for a prompt and transparent appeal 
        process;
          (6) Guidelines for the assertion of interagency 
        equities in pre-publication review;
          (7) A summary of the lawful measures each agency may 
        take to enforce its policy, to include civil and 
        criminal referrals; and
          (8) A description of procedures for post-publication 
        review of documents that are alleged or determined to 
        reveal classified information but were not submitted 
        for pre-publication review.
    Additionally, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the adequacy 
of IC information technology efforts to improve and expedite 
pre-publication review processes, and the resources needed to 
ensure that IC elements can meet this direction.
    The Committee further directs the DNI, no later than 270 
days after the enactment of this Act, to certify to the 
congressional intelligence committees that IC elements' pre-
publication review policies, non-disclosure agreements, and any 
other agreements imposing pre-publication review obligations 
reflect the policy described above.

Student loan debt report

    IC components need to be able to recruit talented young 
professionals. However, the soaring cost of college and post-
graduate education in the United States is causing many young 
people to forgo public service in favor of career opportunities 
with more competitive pay or loan forgiveness benefits.
    Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to provide a report to 
the congressional intelligence committees on programs that seek 
to help IC personnel manage student loan debt. The report shall 
include details about each IC element's program, including loan 
forgiveness, loan repayment, and financial counseling programs; 
efforts to inform prospective and current employees about such 
programs; and the number of employees who use such programs. 
The report shall also include an analysis of the benefits and 
drawbacks of creating new programs and expanding existing 
programs, and shall identify any barriers to the establishment 
of IC-wide programs.

Workforce development partnership

    The Committee has long promoted novel recruiting, hiring, 
and retention practices, especially with respect to highly 
expert, highly sought-after Science, Technology, Engineering, 
and Math (STEM) students and professionals. Despite these 
efforts, the IC continues to struggle with meeting STEM 
recruitment, hiring, and retention goals inside the IC.
    The Committee is therefore encouraged to learn that the IC 
is considering new and creative practices in this regard. For 
example, the Committee was intrigued by the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory's (PNNL) budding Workforce Development 
Partnership with the CIA. Partnerships like this may allow IC 
agencies to leverage PNNL's robust employee recruiting network 
and seek out STEM students who might not otherwise consider IC 
employment.
    Similarly, to address concerns that potential hires will 
accept other job offers while awaiting clearances, NGA has a 
program to allow interim hires to work on unclassified projects 
until clearances are adjudicated. In addition, several IC 
agencies have instituted a unique pay scale for their junior 
STEM workforce. The Committee recognizes the benefits of these 
initiatives, and believes that such efforts could have wider 
applicability across the IC.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI Chief Human 
Capital Officer, no later than 180 days after the enactment of 
this Act, to provide to the congressional intelligence 
committees an interagency briefing on new approaches, including 
outreach and advertising, the IC is considering or conducting 
to attract a diverse, robust Science, Technology, Engineering, 
and Math and information technology workforce to meet the 
increasing demands in the IC.

Distributed Common Ground/Surface System--Army

    The Committee believes the Distributed Common Ground/
Surface System--Army (DCGS-A) provides operational and tactical 
commanders with enhanced, state-of-the-art intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasking, processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination capabilities and connectivity 
to the defense intelligence information enterprise. DCGS-A is a 
critical tool for enabling military intelligence warfighters to 
process, fuse, and exploit data. In the past, the Army has 
struggled to keep pace for pre-deployment and in-theater 
training for DCGS-A. However, training for military 
intelligence analysts must be prioritized in the pre-deployment 
readiness cycle to ensure that those using this intelligence 
tool can effectively utilize its capabilities.
    The Army has fielded over 95 percent of DCGS-A Increment 1 
systems, with mixed results and often negative feedback from 
the users. The Army is in the process of fielding Increment 1, 
Release 2, which will address many of the initial concerns and 
deficiencies of Increment 1. The Committee remains concerned 
that the Army has not sufficiently planned for user training in 
support of the release of Increment 1, Release 2 to operational 
users.
    Therefore, the Committee requests that the Army, no later 
than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, submit a plan to 
the congressional intelligence and defense committees on how 
the Army will fully incorporate Distributed Common Ground/
Surface System-Army (DCGS-A) training into the readiness cycle 
for Army personnel. The plan should specifically address any 
lessons learned from the fielding of DCGS-A Increment 1 and any 
ongoing corrective actions to improve the roll-out of Increment 
1, Release 2.

Common controller for unmanned aircraft systems

    The Committee supports the Army's efforts to develop a 
common controller for the RQ-7A/B Shadow and the RQ-11B Raven 
tactical unmanned aerial vehicles. However, the Committee is 
concerned that the Army is not collaborating with the Marine 
Corps on similar efforts to develop a ground controller for the 
Marine Corps family of tactical unmanned aerial systems (UAS), 
including the RQ-11B Raven, the RQ-12A Wasp, and the RQ-20A 
Puma.
    Therefore, the Committee requests that the Army and the 
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), no later than 90 
days after the enactment of this Act, jointly submit a report 
to the congressional intelligence and defense committees on the 
feasibility of developing a common controller for all Brigade 
and Below unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) airframes, as well as 
U.S. Marine Corps small unit UAS. The report should address the 
potential performance and operational benefits of a common 
controller, anticipated development costs, and anticipated 
life-cycle cost savings of a common controller.

Review of dual-hatting relationship

    The Committee supports further evaluation of the dual-
hatting of a single individual as both Commander of U.S. Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM) and Director of the National Security 
Agency (DIRNSA).
    Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, 
no later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, to 
provide to the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees a briefing that reviews and provides an assessment 
of the dual-hatting of DIRNSA and Commander, USCYBERCOM. This 
briefing should address:
          (1) Roles and responsibilities, including 
        intelligence authorities, of USCYBERCOM and NSA;
          (2) Assessment of the current impact of the dual-
        hatting relationship, including advantages and 
        disadvantages;
          (3) Plans and recommendations on courses of action 
        that would be necessary to end the dual-hatting of 
        DIRNSA and Commander, USCYBERCOM, which satisfy Section 
        1642 of the conference report accompanying S. 2943, the 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2017;
          (4) Suggested timelines for carrying out such courses 
        of action;
          (5) Recommendations for any changes in law that would 
        be required by the end of dual-hatting; and
          (6) Any additional topics as identified by the 
        intelligence and defense committees.
    The Committee further believes that a larger organizational 
review of NSA should be conducted with respect to the eventual 
termination of the dual-hatting relationship. The Committee 
seeks to promote the efficient and effective execution of NSA's 
national intelligence mission. Specifically, the Committee 
believes that the organization of NSA should be examined to 
account for the evolution of its mission since its 
establishment, the current structure of the intelligence 
community, and the fact that the NSA is predominantly funded 
through the NIP.
    Therefore, the Committee further directs the DNI, no later 
than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, to conduct an 
assessment and provide a briefing to the congressional 
intelligence committees on options to better align the 
structure, budgetary procedures, and oversight of NSA with its 
national intelligence mission in the event of a termination of 
the dual-hatting relationship. This briefing should include:
          (1) An assessment of the feasibility of transitioning 
        NSA to civilian leadership appointed by the DNI in lieu 
        of military leadership appointed by the Secretary of 
        Defense;
          (2) How NSA could be organizationally separated from 
        DoD if USCYBERCOM were elevated to become a unified 
        combatant command; and
          (3) Any challenges, such as those requiring changes 
        in law, associated with such a separation.

Acquisition security improvement

    The Committee remains concerned about supply chain and 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the IC. The Committee believes 
the IC should implement a more comprehensive approach to 
address these vulnerabilities, particularly during the 
acquisition process. However, ICD 801, the IC guideline 
governing the acquisition process, is outdated and must be 
revised to reflect current risks. In particular, despite 
issuance of ICD 731, Supply Chain Risk Management, in 2013, ICD 
801 has not been updated to reflect this policy nor does it 
include consideration of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
mitigation.
    Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to review and consider 
amendments to Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 801 to 
better reflect and anticipate supply chain and cybersecurity 
risks and threats, as well as to outline policies to mitigate 
both risks and threats. In particular, the review should 
examine whether to:
          (1) Expand risk management criteria in the 
        acquisition process to include cyber and supply chain 
        threats;
          (2) Require counterintelligence and security 
        assessments as part of the acquisition and procurement 
        process;
          (3) Propose and adopt new education requirements for 
        acquisition professionals on cyber and supply chain 
        threats; and
          (4) Factor in the cost of cyber and supply chain 
        security.
    The Committee further directs ODNI, no later than 210 days 
after the enactment of this Act, to provide to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report describing the 
review, including ODNI's process for considering amendments to 
ICD 801, and specifically addressing ODNI's analysis and 
conclusions with respect to paragraphs (1) through (4) above.

Cyber information sharing and customer feedback

    The Committee commends NSA's new policies and procedures to 
facilitate greater information sharing of cyber threat 
indicators and defensive measures with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) at the unclassified level.
    With the recent enactment of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, 
which encourages greater information sharing between private 
sector stakeholders, as well as with government entities, the 
Committee believes the next step is to ensure the entire IC is 
working to disseminate timely, actionable information to 
private sector stakeholders so they can better protect their 
information technology networks. The vast majority of U.S. 
networks reside in the private sector, and it is good 
governance to ensure that those networks are safe and secure 
for the general public.
    The Committee appreciates that the IC has begun efforts to 
increase unclassified cyber threat sharing. Because an increase 
in the quantity of reporting does not necessarily indicate 
effectiveness or usefulness, this Committee continues to 
monitor the quality of the information distributed.
    Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 120 
days after the enactment of this Act, to brief the 
congressional intelligence committees on IC-wide efforts to 
share more information with the DHS for further dissemination 
to the private sector. This briefing shall specifically address 
types of information shared, metrics on output, tabulation of 
low output producing agencies, recommendations on how low 
output agencies can increase sharing, timeliness of information 
shared, and average total time it takes for information to 
transit the system.
    The Committee also directs ODNI, in coordination with the 
DHS I&A, to conduct a survey of government and private sector 
participants of the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC). The survey shall be anonymous, 
provide an accurate assessment of the usefulness and timeliness 
of the data received, and determine if customers are satisfied 
with intelligence briefings on threat actors impacting their 
specific industry. The Committee further directs ODNI, no later 
than one year after the enactment of this Act, to provide to 
the congressional intelligence and homeland security committees 
an unclassified report detailing the results of this survey.

Department of Homeland Security utilization of National Labs expertise

    The Committee believes that the Department of Energy (DOE) 
National Labs represent a unique and invaluable resource for 
the government and the IC in particular.
    Therefore, the Committee directs, no later than 180 days 
after the enactment of this Act, DHS I&A, in coordination with 
DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE-IN), to 
provide to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
on the current utilization of Department of Energy (DOE) 
National Labs expertise by DHS I&A. This report should address 
opportunities to increase DHS I&A's utilization of 
cybersecurity expertise of the National Labs as well as the 
budgetary implications of taking advantage of these potential 
opportunities.

Cybersecurity courses for Centers of Academic Excellence

    The Committee is concerned by a recent analysis from a 
security firm, which determined that not one of the nation's 
leading undergraduate computer science programs requires 
students to take a cybersecurity course before graduating. 
Cybersecurity depends on IC professionals having a strong 
understanding of the cyber threat and how to mitigate it--which 
in turn requires a strong academic background. NSA and DHS co-
sponsor the Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) in Cyber 
Defense program, which includes an emphasis on basic 
cybersecurity. Nevertheless, even some CAE-designated 
institutions lack cybersecurity course prerequisites in their 
computer science curricula.
    Therefore, the Committee directs ODNI, no later than 180 
days after the enactment of this Act, to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on improving 
cybersecurity training within NIP-funded undergraduate and 
graduate computer science programs. The report should 
specifically address:
          (1) The potential advantages and disadvantages of 
        conditioning an institution's receipt of such funds on 
        its computer science program's requiring cybersecurity 
        as a precondition to graduation;
          (2) How Centers of Academic Excellence programs might 
        bolster cybersecurity educational requirements; and
          (3) Recommendations to support the goal of ensuring 
        that federally-funded computer science programs 
        properly equip students to confront future 
        cybersecurity challenges.

                            Committee Action

    On January 12, 2017, a quorum being present, the Committee 
met to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Vote to report the committee bill

    By voice vote, the Committee agreed to report the bill and 
adopt the classified annex and Committee report. Senator Harris 
was recorded separately as ``present.''

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also 
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On January 
12, 2017, the Committee transmitted this bill to the 
Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the 
costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    I am supporting the final version of the Fiscal Year 2017 
Intelligence Authorization Act because of the removal of the 
objectionable provisions I identified in my June 15, 2016, 
Minority Views. I appreciate the efforts of my colleagues in 
amending the legislation in two critical areas.
    First, the June 2016 bill would have authorized individual 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field offices to obtain 
Americans' email and internet records through National Security 
Letters, with no court oversight. This expansion of government 
surveillance authorities was both far-reaching and intrusive, 
potentially covering records related to Americans' email 
exchanges as well as their login history, IP addresses, and 
internet browsing history. The provision was also unnecessary 
in that email and internet records can be obtained through the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court if they are ``relevant 
to an investigation.'' Moreover, section 102 of the USA FREEDOM 
Act, which I strongly supported, authorizes the FBI to obtain 
records immediately in emergency situations and later seek 
court approval.
    Second, the June 2016 bill would have narrowed the 
jurisdiction of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB) to cover only programs that have an impact on the 
privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. Restricting the 
Board's purview in this manner could have prevented it from 
examining broader programs that may have implications for 
Americans. It would also have sent a damaging message to our 
allies whose views of U.S. surveillance activities inform both 
important data sharing agreements and vital trade relationships 
in the tech industry. While I appreciate that this provision 
has been removed, I am disappointed that the current version of 
the Act also excludes a provision that would have allowed the 
Board to hire staff when the Board's chair position is vacant. 
The effectiveness of the PCLOB is critical to protecting 
Americans' rights and privacy and it is my intent to continue 
to support this provision, as well as other reform efforts 
designed to strengthen the Board.
                                   Ron Wyden.

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