[Senate Report 115-169]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                            Calendar No. 239
  
115th Congress   }                                          {    Report
                                SENATE                          
1st Session      }                                          {    115-169
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                                       


     REGULATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE IN NEED OF SCRUTINY ACT OF 2017

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                          WITH MINORITY VIEWS

                              to accompany

                                 S. 21

         TO AMEND CHAPTER 8 OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, TO
            PROVIDE THAT MAJOR RULES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
SHALL HAVE NO FORCE OR EFFECT UNLESS A JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL IS 
                            ENACTED INTO LAW
                            
                            

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



                October 16, 2017.--Ordered to be printed
                
                
                
                         _________ 
                                  
            U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
 79-010              WASHINGTON : 2017       
              
                
                
                
                
                
        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota            MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
STEVE DAINES, Montana                KAMALA D. HARRIS, California

                  Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
                   Satya P. Thallam, Chief Economist
               Margaret E. Daum, Minority Staff Director
               Stacia M. Cardille, Minority Chief Counsel
       Charles A. Moskowitz, Minority Senior Legislative Counsel
                 Katherine C. Sybenga, Minority Counsel
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk






                                                       Calendar No. 239
                                                       
                                                       
115th Congress    }                                           {    Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session      }                                           {   115-169

======================================================================



 
     REGULATIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE IN NEED OF SCRUTINY ACT OF 2017

                                _______
                                

                October 16, 2017.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                          [To accompany S. 21]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 21) to amend 
chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, to provide that major 
rules of the executive branch shall have no force or effect 
unless a joint resolution of approval is enacted into law, 
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with 
amendments and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and the Need for Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................4
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................5
  V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................7
 VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................7
VII. Minority Views..................................................10
VIII.Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........13


                         I. Purpose and Summary

    The Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act 
of 2017 (REINS Act) revises the Congressional Review Act of 
1996 (CRA) to increase accountability and transparency in the 
Federal regulatory process.\1\ The CRA, which originated from a 
desire to instill more active congressional control over a 
rapidly growing body of Federal regulation, created an 
expedited process for Congress to review and disapprove any 
rule after it is issued by a Federal agency.\2\ The REINS Act 
would amend the CRA by adding a mandatory congressional 
approval procedure for major agency rules before they can go 
into effect.\3\ By requiring prior congressional approval for 
major rules, regulations will be more carefully crafted and the 
regulatory process will be more accountable to the American 
people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 801-808); 
see also Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 
2017, S. 21, 115th Cong. (2017) (CRA was included as part of the 
Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996).
    \2\H.R. Rep. No. 114-214, pt. 1, at 7 (2015).
    \3\S. 21, 115th Cong. (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              II. Background and the Need for Legislation

    Under the CRA, a major rule cannot take effect for at least 
60 days after a report on the rule is submitted to both Houses 
of Congress and the rule itself is published in the Federal 
Register (whichever occurs later).\4\ However, unless Congress 
acts to formally disapprove the rule, it automatically goes 
into effect.\5\ The REINS Act would reverse this process for 
major rules, preventing implementation of major rules that do 
not receive explicit approval by Congress. A major rule is one 
that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
determines will have a likely annual effect of $100 million or 
more on the economy, cause a major increase in costs or prices, 
or have significant international anti-competitive effects.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\See 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 801-808 (2012).
    \5\Id.
    \6\See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 804(2) (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The costs and burdens associated with Federal regulatory 
activity have increased significantly over the last 40 
years.\7\ However, despite an increasing regulatory burden,\8\ 
the legislative structure has not meaningfully changed to 
commensurately increase accountability. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, there has been an escalation of 
congressional delegation of regulatory authority to Federal 
agencies.\9\ By delegating broad regulatory authority to 
Federal agencies, Congress has lost legislative control and 
political accountability over the exercise of that delegated 
regulatory authority.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\See Jonathan H. Adler, Placing ``Reins'' On Regulations: 
Assessing the Proposed REINS Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 1, 
2-36 (2013).
    \8\Aggregate measurement of federal regulatory scope and cost is 
difficult, though there have been attempts at using a structural model 
to estimate costs, as well as machine-learning methods to ``read'' the 
extensive Code of Federal Regulations to count the number of 
regulations. See Bentley Coffey et al., The Cumulative Cost of 
Regulations (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, April 2016), https://
www.mercatus.org/system/files/Coffey-Cumulative-Cost-Regs-v3.pdf (``Had 
regulation been held constant at levels observed in 1980, our model 
predicts that the economy would have been 25 percent larger by 2012 . . 
. or about $13,000 per capita); see also Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. 
McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical Database on Industry-specific 
Regulations for All United States Industries and Federal Regulations, 
1997-2012, 11 Reg. & Governance 1, 109-123 (2017).
    \9\Adler, supra note 7.
    \10\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The purpose of the CRA was to ``redress the balance [of 
power], reclaiming for Congress some of its policymaking 
authority.''\11\ The sponsors observed that Congress was 
increasingly delegating its legislative functions, effectively 
``abdicat[ing] its constitutional role.''\12\ Previous 
Congresses have contemplated other means of disapproving of 
Executive actions vis-a-vis delegated powers, employing various 
means to assert authority over Federal agencies and restore 
legislative control.\13\ These means have included everything 
from ordinary congressional oversight activities to the use of 
the unicameral legislative veto, which goes back to 1932.\14\ 
On the latter tool, ``the Supreme Court struck down any 
procedure where executive action could be overturned by less 
than the full process required under the Constitution to make 
laws.''\15\ The CRA outlines a process similar to a legislative 
veto, but which requires participation of both Houses of 
Congress and the President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\142 Cong. Rec. 96, 6922, 6926 (1996) (Joint Explanatory 
Statement of House and Senate sponsors for CRA).
    \12\Id.
    \13\See H.R. Rep. No. 114-214 at 8.
    \14\See Act of June 30, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-212, ch. 314, 
Sec. 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414 (repealed 1966); see also James Abourezk, 
The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive 
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind. L. J. 323, 324 n.5 
(1977) (cited in I.N.S. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2793 (White, J., 
dissenting)); Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law 
By Any Other Name?, 21 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 3-4, 28 (1984).
    \15\142 Cong. Rec. 96, 6922, 6926 (1996); see also I.N.S. v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite its conceptual intentions, the CRA has not had much 
success reigning in the pace of regulations promulgated by 
Federal agencies.\16\ Since the enactment of the CRA, agencies 
have issued more than 85,000 new final Federal regulations,\17\ 
over 1,500 of which are major rules.\18\ However only a small 
fraction have received some form of Congressional action via a 
Congressional resolution--to date only 20 have been passed by 
both chambers and sent to the President; of those, only 15 have 
been signed into law.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\See H.R. Rep. No. 114-214 at 8; see also Adler, supra note 7, 
at 21.
    \17\See U.S. Fed. Reg., https://www.federalregister.gov/ (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2017) (search Mar. 30, 1996 through Sept. 13, 2017).
    \18\See U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., http://www.gao.gov/legal/
congressional-review-act/overview (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (search 
Mar. 30, 1996 through Sept. 13, 2017).
    \19\See generally S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); S.J. Res. 
22, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); S.J. Res. 23, 114th Cong. (2015-2016); 
S.J. Res. 24 114th Cong. (2015-2016); H.J. Res. 88, 114th Cong. (2015-
2016) (the five vetoed resolutions); see also S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 107-5); H.J. Res. 41, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 155-4); H.J. Res. 38, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 155-5); H.J. Res. 40, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-8); H.J. Res. 37, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 155-11); H.J. Res. 44, 155th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 155-12); H.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-13); H.J. Res. 58, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-14); H.J. Res. 42, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-17); H.J. Res. 69, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-20); H.J. Res. 83, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-21); S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-22); H.J. Res. 43, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-23); H.J. Res. 67, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-24); H.J. Res. 66, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 115-35) (the fifteen resolutions overturning 
rules and signed into law).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One limitation of the CRA is that it forces Congress to 
take its own initiative to overturn any regulations of which it 
disapproves.\20\ Additionally, the CRA essentially requires a 
super-majority in Congress to overturn any regulations because 
a sitting President is likely to veto any joint congressional 
resolutions meant to disapprove of regulations promulgated by 
his own administration.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\Adler, supra note 7, at 19.
    \21\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is a need for further reform of the regulatory 
process. Under the CRA, unless Congress disapproves of a rule, 
the rule goes into effect without any congressional action.\22\ 
Therefore, as a matter of course, even rules to which many in 
Congress (perhaps even a majority) may object go unchallenged, 
and individual members can hold at arm's length any undesirable 
outcomes--avoiding ``a degree of visible responsibility.''\23\ 
Legal scholar Laurence Tribe described that ``through 
rulemaking . . . exercises of delegated authority change legal 
rights and privileges no less than do full-fledged laws.''\24\ 
This means that changes to and creation of new Federal 
regulations carry the full force and effect of law, and can 
proceed without the active participation of the Congress, which 
may have only vaguely authorized regulation in a particular 
area months, years, or decades prior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\See 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 801-808 (2012).
    \23\Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 Geo. L.J. 
785, 793-96 (1984).
    \24\Tribe, supra note 14, at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The REINS Act revises the CRA by inverting this process for 
major rules by preventing them from going into effect without 
Congress' explicit approval. Under the REINS Act, any new major 
rule would require Congress to pass within 70 session or 
legislative days of the rule being submitted to Congress, and 
the President to sign, a joint resolution approving the new 
major rule before it could take effect. Accordingly, the REINS 
Act, like the CRA, would require approval by both Houses of 
Congress and presentment to the President. Then-Judge Stephen 
Breyer and constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe have 
opined that a congressional approval mechanism for 
regulations--similar to that outlined in the REINS Act--would 
be constitutional.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\Breyer, supra note 23, at 28; see also H.R. Rep. No. 114-214 at 
11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The REINS Act provides for a few exceptions to its process. 
First, a major rule may take effect for a 90-day period without 
congressional approval if the President determines it is 
necessary under certain circumstances. Second, any rules 
affecting budget authority, outlays, or receipts are ``assumed 
to be effective unless [they are] not approved in accordance'' 
with this bill.
    Finally, the REINS Act ensures Congress has the ability to 
efficiently review major rules before they take effect by 
providing an expedited process. This process includes a 
prohibition on amendments to congressional joint resolutions of 
approval, a limited period of up to 15 session days for 
committees to discharge such resolutions, limited time allowed 
for floor debate, and a deadline by which both chambers of 
Congress must take a vote on final passage of the resolution in 
question.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\S. 21, 115th Cong. (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These processes are designed to increase Congress' 
accountability for the content of major rules and foster more 
deliberation before major rules take effect.

                        III. Legislative History

    Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) introduced S. 21 on January 4, 
2017, with Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO), Todd Young (R-IN), Mike 
Rounds (R-SD), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Cory Gardner (R-CO), Joni 
Ernst (R-IA), Tom Cotton (R-AR), Shelly Moore Capito (R-WV), 
Steve Daines (R-MT), John McCain (R-AZ), Tim Scott (R-SC), Ted 
Cruz (R-TX), John Barrasso (R-WY), Mike Crapo (R-ID), John 
Thune (R-SD), James M. Inhofe (R-OK), Deb Fischer (R-NE), Ron 
Johnson (R-WI), John Boozman (R-AR), Dean Heller (R-NV), Dan 
Sullivan (R-AK), Michael B. Enzi (R-WY), Mike Lee (R-UT), Pat 
Roberts (R-KS), Ben Sasse (R-NE), Jerry Moran (R-KS), and Bill 
Cassidy (R-LA). Senators Roger Wicker (R-MS), John Cornyn (R-
TX), James E. Risch (ID), David Perdue (R-GA), Rob Portman (R-
OH), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), John Kennedy (R-LA), and Johnny Isakson 
(R-GA) later joined as cosponsors.
    The bill was referred to the Committee. The Committee 
considered S. 21 at a May 17, 2017 business meeting.
    The Committee ordered S. 21 reported favorably on May 17, 
2017, by a roll call vote of 8 yeas to 6 nays. Senators voting 
in the affirmative were Johnson, McCain, Portman, Paul, 
Lankford, Enzi, Hoeven, and Daines. Senators voting in the 
negative were McCaskill, Tester, Heitkamp, Peters, Hassan, and 
Harris. For the record only, Senator Carper voted nay by proxy. 
Consistent with Committee Rule 11, the Committee reports the 
bill with a technical amendment by mutual agreement of the 
Chairman and Ranking Member.

        IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported


Section 1. Short title

    This section provides the bill's short title, the 
``Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 
2017.''

Section 2. Purpose

    This section describes the bill's purpose as increasing 
Congressional responsibility in the regulatory process. It 
states that despite the ``Constitution grant[ing] all 
legislative powers to Congress,'' such power have been 
increasingly delegated to non-legislative authorities. By 
requiring Congress to explicitly vote to approve major 
regulations, the bill will result in more accountability to the 
public for the regulations with which they must comply.

Section 3. Congressional review of agency rulemaking

    This section amends sections 801 to 807 of the CRA to 
reflect new requirements for promulgating a Federal regulation 
as well as new review and approval mechanisms for Congress to 
consider rules.
    The bill amends Section 801 subparagraph (a)(1)(A) of the 
CRA to require the agency submitting a rule for review to 
include, in the Federal Register and in a report to Congress 
and the Comptroller General, additional information and 
analysis pertaining to the rule. Subparagraph (a)(2)(A) adds a 
requirement that the Comptroller General provide a report to 
Congress on any major rules which includes ``an assessment of 
whether the major rule imposes any new limits or mandates on 
private-sector activity.'' Subparagraph (a)(2)(B) requires 
Federal agencies to information to the Comptroller General 
relevant to the major rule report l.
    Subparagraph (a)(3) stipulates that a major rule's 
effective date is when a joint resolution on the rule is 
enacted, or the date included in the rule, whichever is later.
    Subparagraph (a)(4) stipulates that nonmajor rules take 
effect only if they are submitted to Congress and Congress does 
not disapprove of the rule.
    Subparagraph (a)(5) prohibits Congress from approving a 
major rule beyond the period specified in this bill.
    Subsection (b) states that Congress must enact a joint 
resolution of approval within 70 session days from receipt of a 
major rule for it to take effect.
    Subsection (c) allows the President to temporarily put into 
effect (for up to 90 days) a major rule if he or she makes a 
determination that the rule is needed due to: an imminent 
threat to health and safety; enforcement of criminal laws; 
national security; or implementation of international trade 
agreement. This determination does not affect the resolution 
procedures in Section 802.
    Subsection (d) provides a new review period for rules 
submitted during the last 60 session days (in the Senate) or 
legislative days (in the House) before a Congress adjourns, all 
the way through to the convening of the next session. The new 
review window begins as if the rule is first published or 
submitted on the 15th session day (Senate) or legislative day 
(House) of the new session and otherwise treated the same as 
any other rule.
    Subsections 802(a) through (h) describe the specific 
requirements for the content of the joint resolution and 
expedited procedures related to a resolution of approval for a 
major rule. They require the majority leader in each chamber to 
introduce a joint resolution (after receipt of a major rule's 
report) within three session or legislative days, whichever is 
applicable, with no amendments allowed at any point. It is then 
referred to the committee(s) of jurisdiction which has 15 
(session/legislative) days to consider the resolution. The 
subsections further prescribe specific floor procedures in each 
chamber which limit debate, prevent moving on to other business 
without disposal of the resolution, or postponing a vote on 
final passage beyond the allowed review period described in 
section 801.
    Section 803 describes the disapproval procedure for 
nonmajor rules. This section is largely based on the existing 
authorities in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 802. Under this section, Congress 
is given a limited period of time in which to enact a joint 
resolution of disapproval for a nonmajor rule, otherwise the 
rule goes into effect by default. The amount of time committees 
are given to consider and report the rule is changed from 20 
calendar days (in current law) to 15 session days which may be 
the same, longer, or shorter depending on scheduling. This 
section also describes procedures for floor consideration, 
including what motions are privileged and allowable time for 
debate.
    Section 804 amends the existing section to provide for new 
definitions for ``nonmajor rule'' and ``submission or 
publication date,'' while retaining definitions for ``Federal 
agency,'' ``major rule,'' and ``rule.''
    Section 805 adds to the existing section to clarify the 
scope of allowable judicial review. It states that courts may 
review whether an agency complied with the requirements under 
this chapter for a rule to take effect. It also clarifies that 
should Congress enact a resolution of approval of a rule, that 
resolution should not be interpreted as changing or expanding 
the regulatory authority of an agency nor will it enter the 
judicial record except on the question of whether a rule is in 
effect.
    Section 806 exempts rules and policies concerning monetary 
policy and the Federal Reserve from this chapter.
    Section 807 is the same as existing Section 808 and allows 
for certain rules (dealing with hunting, fishing, or camping) 
to take effect when the agency determines they should. The same 
applies to rules where the agency finds good cause that notice 
and comment are ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest'' and explains its reasoning for doing so 
in the rule itself.

Section 4. Budgetary effects of rules subject to section 802 of title 
        5, United States Code

    This section amends the Balanced Budget and Emergency 
Deficit Control Act of 1985 to state that major rules, which 
otherwise require approval in this bill, that are budgetary in 
nature are treated as in effect unless not approved under the 
major rules procedures.

Section 5. Government Accountability Office study of rules

    This section requires the Comptroller General to submit a 
study within one year of enactment that identifies the number 
of rules in effect, how many of those rules are major, and an 
estimate of their aggregate economic cost.

                   V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has 
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined 
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning 
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional 
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose no costs on 
state, local, or tribal governments.

             VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                                     July 14, 2017.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
        Senate Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 21, the Regulations 
from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Kathleen 
Gramp.
            Sincerely,
                                                Keith Hall.
    Enclosure.

S. 21--Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017

    Summary: Under current law, a final federal rule can take 
effect unless the Congress enacts a joint resolution of 
disapproval. In contrast, S. 21 would require the Congress to 
enact a joint resolution of approval before any major rule 
could take effect. Thus under S. 21 new major regulations would 
depend on future legislation.
    CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
cannot determine the budgetary effect of making all future 
major rules subject to Congressional approval, but we expect 
that, in the absence of subsequent legislative action affecting 
those rules, enacting S. 21 would have significant effects on 
both direct spending and revenues. Pay-as-you-go procedures 
apply because enacting S. 21 would affect direct spending and 
revenues.
    CBO cannot determine whether enacting S. 21 would increase 
net direct spending or on-budget deficits by more than $5 
billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods 
beginning in 2028.
    CBO expects that implementing S. 21 also could have a 
significant impact on spending subject to appropriation, 
although we cannot determine the magnitude of that effect.
    CBO expects that S. 21 would impose no intergovernmental or 
private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act (UMRA).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government:

Background

    The Congressional Review Act (CRA) of 1996 requires federal 
agencies to submit final rules to the Congress and the 
Comptroller General before they may take effect. Final rules 
may be annulled by the Congress if a joint resolution of 
disapproval is enacted into law. S. 21 would amend current law 
to require instead that the Congress enact a joint resolution 
of approval before any major rule may take effect, thereby 
making implementation of major rules contingent on future 
Congressional action.
    The CRA defines a major rule as one that the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) finds has resulted in or is likely 
to result in:
           An annual effect on the economy of 
        $100,000,000 or more;
           A major increase in costs or prices for 
        consumers, individual industries, federal, state, or 
        local government agencies, or geographic regions; or
           Significant adverse effects on competition, 
        employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or 
        the ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete with 
        foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export 
        markets.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\See 5 USC Sec. 804(2).
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    S. 21 would establish special Congressional procedures and 
explicit timelines for enacting a joint resolution of approval 
for major rules. Under the bill, if a joint resolution of 
approval is not enacted within 70 legislative (or session) days 
of the Congress receiving the major rule and an accompanying 
report from a federal agency, the rule would not take effect. 
Further, the Congress could not reconsider a joint resolution 
of approval relating to that rule in the same Congress. 
However, a major rule could take effect for one 90-calendar-day 
period without Congressional approval if the President 
determines, via an executive order, that it was necessary for 
one of four reasons: (1) to respond to an imminent threat to 
health or safety, (2) to enforce criminal laws, (3) to protect 
national security, or (4) to implement an international trade 
agreement.
    Historical data show that federal agencies published 117 
major rules in 2016, and 84 major rules, on average, over the 
past five calendar years.\2\ Major rules published in recent 
years include ones that established standards for the 
reliability of critical infrastructure, set Medicare payment 
rates for inpatient psychiatric facilities, and established 
national ambient air quality standards for ozone pollution. 
However, looking to recent major rules as a way to estimate the 
number or scope of future major rules that would be affected by 
S. 21 may not be a good guide to what would happen under the 
bill because agencies might change course if the bill was 
enacted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\GAO Federal Rules Database, www.gao.gov/legal/congressional-
review-act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because major rules are issued to implement current law, 
the budgetary effects of anticipated rules are reflected in 
CBO's baseline projections. For example, annual rules establish 
new payment rates for a variety of Medicare services that 
reflect changes in the price indices used for those services 
under current law. Those rules often result in an increase in 
payment rates and thus an increase in spending, which are 
incorporated in the baseline.
    Under the Deficit Control Act, which governs the contents 
of the baseline, actions that are contingent on future 
Congressional action are generally not included in CBO's 
projections. S. 21 would amend that Act to require that CBO 
continue to assume that any planned major rule will go into 
effect, unless the rule has already been promulgated and the 
Congress has not enacted a resolution of approval within the 
specified 70-day period. (Without that provision amending the 
Deficit Control Act, S. 21 would result in baseline projections 
that did not reflect the budgetary impact of major rules.)
    Under S. 21, CBO's baseline projections would continue to 
include the budgetary impact of major rules even though future 
Congressional action would be necessary to approve them. For 
example, if S. 21 is enacted, baseline projections would 
continue to reflect the assumption that payment rates and 
related federal spending for Medicare providers would rise over 
time, even though raising those rates would require future 
Congressional action. Accordingly, a Congressional resolution 
of approval for a major rule raising such rates would be 
estimated as having no cost relative to CBO's baseline 
projections. (CBO's subsequent baseline projections would be 
updated to exclude the budgetary impact of the proposed rule if 
it is not approved.)

Impact on direct spending

    To assess the budgetary effects of S. 21, CBO considered 
the costs and savings that would be realized if anticipated 
major rules do not take effect. The consequences would vary 
tremendously because the budgetary impact of different rules 
varies considerably.
    Preventing some major rules from taking effect would result 
in costs to the federal government, while preventing others 
would result in savings. On net, CBO estimates that enacting S. 
21 would probably have a significant effect on direct spending 
(more than $500,000), but we cannot determine the magnitude or 
sign of those changes for any year or over time.
    Many major rules that occur routinely under current law are 
related to the government's health care programs, in particular 
Medicare. For example, some rules establish annual updates to 
payment rates for services provided by hospitals, physicians, 
and other Medicare providers. Enacting S. 21 would freeze 
payment structures for those providers at current levels 
pending future Congressional actions. Similarly, payment rates 
(such as the annual benefit amount for each individual) under 
some other federal programs might also be frozen under the bill 
in the absence of future Congressional actions. CBO cannot 
estimate the net impact of all such changes.

Impact on revenues

    Enacting S. 21 would also affect tax revenues, and JCT 
expects that preventing regulations from going into effect 
could reduce collections of revenues in some cases and increase 
collections in other cases. JCT cannot determine the sign or 
magnitude of the possible effects on revenues.

Impact on spending subject to appropriation

    S. 21 also would affect programs funded through the annual 
appropriation process. However, CBO cannot determine the 
magnitude of such effects. For example, if the major rules 
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency could not take 
effect, spending by the agency would decline, assuming future 
appropriations were reduced accordingly.
    The legislation also would require the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to prepare a study on the rules and 
their economic cost. Based on information from agencies and on 
similar GAO reports, CBO estimates that completing the study 
would cost less than $500,000 over the next few years.
    Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go 
Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement 
procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or 
revenues. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply to S. 21 because 
enacting the legislation would affect direct spending and 
revenues. CBO and JCT cannot determine the sign or magnitude of 
those effects.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: CBO expects 
that S. 21 would impose no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in UMRA. By requiring major rules to be 
approved by a joint resolution of Congress and potentially 
delaying or halting the implementation of those rules, the bill 
could affect public or private entities in a number of ways, 
including slowing reimbursements and eliminating or changing 
regulatory requirements. Although the costs and savings tied to 
those individual effects could be significant, CBO has no basis 
for estimating either the overall direction or magnitude of 
those effects on public or private entities because of 
uncertainty about the nature and number of regulations 
affected.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Kathleen Gramp; Impact 
on state, local, and tribal governments: Zachery Byrum; Impact 
on the private sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
    Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director for 
Budget Analysis.

                          VII. Minority Views


 Minority Views of Senators Claire McCaskill, Thomas R. Carper, Heidi 
                       Heitkamp and Maggie Hassan

    While it is important for Congress to conduct regular 
oversight of the federal rulemaking process, S. 21, the 
Regulations in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017 (REINS) is a 
significant departure from the longstanding separation of 
powers between the Legislative and Executive branches that 
would abolish the regulatory process for major rules and 
undermine much-needed protections for the American people.
    Critics of the federal rulemaking process raise a variety 
of concerns. Most observers agree, for example, that the 
process needs to be more open, transparent and accessible. Some 
argue that the process is stacked to favor inaction, denying 
Americans the protections they need and deserve. Others argue 
that agencies are given too much authority to regulate and do 
not do enough to take competing interests into account when 
promulgating regulations. However, rather than thoughtfully 
seeking to resolve these, or any other issue raised by 
stakeholders, the REINS Act would create additional bureaucracy 
and political considerations into a process intended to be 
based on sound and thorough analysis.
    The REINS Act would require both houses of Congress to 
approve any major rule within a 70 day window. Absent 
Congressional action within 70 days, the rule would not take 
effect. This is a reversal from current law--the existing 
Congressional Review Act process allows a regulation takes 
effect unless Congress acts to affirmatively block the 
proposal.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 801-808.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nonpartisan observers have long opposed this idea, and the 
concept may be unconstitutional. As early as 1977 the 
nonpartisan Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS) recommended that, ``Congress should not, in general 
legislation or as a routine practice, provide for prior 
submission of agency rules for Congressional review and 
possible veto.''\2\ This recommendation later became moot 
following INS vs. Chadha where the Supreme Court ruled that a 
one-house legislative veto was unconstitutional.\3\ Indeed the 
REINS Act itself may violate this prohibition of a one-house 
legislative veto.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\4 ACUS 63 (1977).
    \3\Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pursuant to the REINS Act, if just one chamber votes 
against a resolution to approve a major rule, the rule will not 
take effect. Even more concerning, either chamber could simply 
refuse to bring a resolution to the floor to approve of the 
rule within the 70-day window, killing the regulation without 
even allowing a vote on it, giving either chamber a one-house 
legislative veto through inaction. While the committee report 
cites instances where legal scholars have said a process such 
as the one in this bill could be constitutional, significant 
uncertainty remains around that question. As Ronald M. Levin, 
Professor of Law at the Washington University Law School in St. 
Louis testified before the House Judiciary Committee, ``there 
is reason to think that the Act might not survive 
constitutional scrutiny'' since ``the Act is intended to enable 
a single House of Congress to control the implementation of 
laws through the rulemaking process.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\Statement of Ronald M. Levin, William R. Orthwein Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis, H.R. 367 the 
REINS Act of 2013: Promoting Jobs, Growth, and American 
Competitiveness, Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Regulatory, Commercial and 
Antitrust Law (March, 5, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One practical effect of the REINS Act would be to 
discourage agencies from taking on major rulemakings in the 
first place and could grind the entire rulemaking process to a 
halt if they choose to pursue rulemaking. The REINS Act would 
replace the current system's reliance on science, expertise and 
public process in developing rules with Congress' partisan 
considerations and the potential influence of industry 
lobbyists. Today the Federal rulemaking process relies on 
technical expertise, data gathering and analysis and input from 
stakeholders. These are areas of core competency and expertise 
for Federal agencies. Members of Congress simply do not have 
the technical and scientific expertise that agencies possess, 
especially since Congress defunded its own Office of Technology 
Assessment. As a result, agencies will be disinclined to put 
the multi-year effort into the development of major rules that 
would become mere recommendations that could be discarded 
through Congressional inaction in just 70 days.
    The process for regulating toxic chemicals established by 
bipartisan and recently passed Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical 
Safety for the 21st Century Act is a perfect example of the 
deleterious effect the REINS Act would have on the regulatory 
process and the potential impact it could have on the health of 
Americans. Passage of that law was predicated on the notion 
that the Environmental Protection Agency needed more resources 
and clearer processes to accelerate its pace of rulemaking 
because the previous regulatory regime for identifying and 
regulating toxic chemicals was widely regarded as a failure.\5\ 
However, if the REINS Act were to be enacted, it would allow 
Congress's political considerations to supersede the best 
scientific information available to determine the safety of new 
chemicals, determinations that nearly every Member of Congress 
is ill-equipped to make.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\P.L. 114-182
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Supporters argue that the REINS Act is simply reinserting 
Congressional involvement in the rulemaking process. However, 
this argument willfully ignores Congress' critical role in the 
current process: the rules issued by a federal agency are based 
on underlying authority given the agency by Congress in 
legislation that directs such rulemaking in the first place. 
Should Congress wish to limit rulemaking, it can already do so 
by either enacting self-enforcing laws or being more 
prescriptive in legislation to limit agencies' flexibility 
rather than creating a potentially unconstitutional single-
house veto for every major rule.
    Additionally, Congress already has other tools to ensure 
effective oversight of agency regulatory actions, including the 
ability to control appropriations and conduct agency oversight. 
Should Congress wish to overturn a regulation, it does not need 
additional tools to do so; it can pass a law overturning the 
regulation or restrict funding to carry out the rule. Congress 
can also hold hearings to publicize its concerns with the rule. 
As we have seen this year, it can also disapprove final rules 
before they are implemented under the current Congressional 
Review Act process.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\5 U.S.C. Sec. 801(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not only would S. 21 throw sand in the gears of rulemaking 
it would also throw sand in the gears of legislating. Congress 
currently struggles to fulfill its basic functions of passing 
budgets and thirteen appropriation bills annually. In fact it 
has been over 20 years sign the legislative branch was able to 
pass all of the appropriations bills on time.\7\ In addition, 
Members of Congress introduced 10,078 bills in the 114th 
Congress, and sent 329 of those to President Obama. In the 
113th Congress, Members introduced 8,911 bills and sent 282 to 
President Obama. It seems unlikely, then, that both chambers of 
Congress would act on the majority of the major rules presented 
for consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/can-congress-deliver-
appropriations-bills-on-time/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Whatever we do here in Congress and on this Committee to 
reform the regulatory process should encourage reducing burdens 
and increasing transparency while achieving the greatest public 
benefit. It should be our goal to have the most efficient, 
effective, and transparent regulatory process possible, and to 
ensure that process results in common-sense regulations. We do 
not believe this bill would improve the regulatory process, and 
in fact would make the process far less efficient and insert 
additional political considerations into the process. For these 
reasons we strongly oppose S. 21 and urge our colleagues to 
join us in opposition.

      VIII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
S. 21 as reported are shown as follows (existing law proposed 
to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in 
italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is 
shown in roman):

UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE 2--THE CONGRESS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 20--EMERGENCY POWERS TO ELIMINATE BUDGET DEFICITS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



  Subchapter I--Elimination of Deficits in Excess of Maximum Deficit 
Amount

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 907. THE BASELINE.

    (a) * * *
    (b) * * *
          (1) * * *
          (2) * * *
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (D) * * *
                  (E) Budgetary effects of rules subject to 
                section 802 of title 5, united states code.--
                Any rules subject to the congressional approval 
                procedure set forth in section 802 of chapter 8 
                of title 5, United States Code, affecting 
                budget authority, outlays, or receipts shall be 
                assumed to be effective unless it is not 
                approved in accordance with such section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE 5--GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART I--THE AGENCIES GENERALLY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



          CHAPTER 8--CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING

Sec.
801. Congressional review.
802. Congressional [disapproval] approval procedure for major rules.
803. [Special rule on statutory, regulatory, and judicial deadlines] 
          Congressional disapproval procedure for nonmajor rules.
804. Definitions.
805. Judicial review.
806. [Applicability; severability] Exemption for monetary policy.
807. [Exemption for monetary policy] Effective date of certain rules.
[808. Effective date of certain rules.]

SEC. 801. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW

    (a)(1)(A) Before a rule [can] may take effect, the Federal 
agency promulgating such rule shall publish in the Federal 
Register a list of information on which the rule is based, 
including data, scientific and economic studies, and cost-
benefit analyses, and identify how the public can access such 
information online, and shall submit to each House of the 
Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing--
          (i) a copy of the rule;
          (ii) a concise general statement relating to the 
        rule[, including whether it is a major rule; and];
          (iii) [the proposed effective date of the rule.] a 
        classification of the rule as a major or nonmajor rule, 
        including an explanation of the classification 
        specifically addressing each criteria for a major rule 
        contained within subparagraphs (A) through (C) of 
        section 804(2);
          (iv) a list of any other related regulatory actions 
        intended to implement the same statutory provision or 
        regulatory objective as well as the individual and 
        aggregate economic effects of those actions; and
          (v) the proposed effective date of the rule.
    (B) On the date of the submission of the report under 
subparagraph (A), the Federal agency promulgating the rule 
shall submit to the Comptroller General and make available to 
each House of Congress--
          (i) a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis of 
        the rule, if any[;], including an analysis of any jobs 
        added or lost, differentiating between public and 
        private sector jobs;
          (ii) the agency's actions [relevant] pursuant to 
        sections 603, 604, 605, 607, and 609[;] of this title;
          (iii) the agency's actions [relevant] pursuant to 
        sections 202, 203, 204, and 205 of the Unfunded 
        Mandates Reform Act of 1995; and
          (iv) any other relevant information or requirements 
        under any other Act and any relevant Executive orders.
    (C) Upon receipt of a report submitted under subparagraph 
(A), each House shall provide copies of the report to the 
chairman and ranking member of each standing committee with 
jurisdiction under the rules of the House of Representatives or 
the Senate to report a bill to amend the provision of law under 
which the rule is issued.
    (2)(A) The Comptroller General shall provide a report on 
each major rule to the committees of jurisdiction [in each 
House of the Congress] by the end of 15 calendar days after the 
submission or publication date [as provided in section 
802(b)(2)]. The report of the Comptroller General shall include 
an assessment of the agency's compliance with procedural steps 
required by paragraph (1)(B) and an assessment of whether the 
major rule imposes any new limits or mandates on private-sector 
activity.
    (B) Federal agencies shall cooperate with the Comptroller 
General by providing information relevant to the Comptroller 
General's report under subparagraph (A).
    (3) A major rule relating to a report submitted under 
paragraph (1) shall take effect [on the latest of--
    [(A) the later of the date occurring 60 days after the date 
on which--
          [(i) the Congress receives the report submitted under 
        paragraph (1); or
          [(ii) the rule is published in the Federal Register, 
        if so published;
    [(B) if the Congress passes a joint resolution of 
disapproval described in section 802 relating to the rule, and 
the President signs a veto of such resolution, the earlier 
date--
          [(i) on which either House of Congress votes and 
        fails to override the veto of the President; or
          [(ii) occurring 30 session days after the date on 
        which the Congress received the veto and objections of 
        the President; or
    [(C) the date the rule would have otherwise taken effect, 
if not for this section (unless a joint resolution of 
disapproval under section 802 is enacted).] upon enactment of a 
joint resolution of approval described in section 802 or as 
provided for in the rule following enactment of a joint 
resolution of approval described in section 802, whichever is 
later.
    (4) [Except for a] A nonmajor rule[, a] rule shall take 
effect as [otherwise] provided by section 803[law] after 
submission to Congress under paragraph (1).
    (5) [Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the effective date of a 
rule shall not be delayed by operation of this chapter beyond 
the date on which either House of Congress votes to reject a 
joint resolution of disapproval under section 802.] If a joint 
resolution of approval relating to a major rule is not enacted 
within the period provided in subsection (b)(2), then a joint 
resolution of approval relating to the same rule may not be 
considered under this chapter in the same Congress by either 
House of Representatives or the Senate.
    (b)(1) A major rule shall not take effect [(or continue), 
if] unless the Congress enacts a joint resolution of 
[dis]approval[,] described under section 802[, of the rule].
    (2) [A rule that does not take effect (or does not 
continue) under paragraph (1) may not be reissued in 
substantially the same form, and a new rule that is 
substantially the same as such a rule may not be issued, unless 
the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law 
enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the 
original rule.] If a joint resolution described in subsection 
(a) is not enacted into law by the end of 70 session days or 
legislative days, as applicable, beginning on the date on which 
the report referred to in subsection (a)(1)(A) is received by 
Congress (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned 
for more than 3 days during a session of Congress), then the 
rule described in that resolution shall be deemed not to be 
approved and such rule shall not take effect.
    (c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section 
(except subject to paragraph (3)), a major rule [that would not 
take effect by reason of subsection (a)(3)] may take effect[,] 
for one 90-calendar-day period if the President makes a 
determination under paragraph (2) and submits written notice of 
such determination to the Congress.
    (2) Paragraph (1) applies to a determination made by the 
President by Executive order that the major rule should take 
effect because such rule is--
          (A) necessary because of an imminent threat to health 
        or safety or other emergency;
          (B) necessary for the enforcement of criminal laws;
          (C) necessary for national security; or
          (D) issued pursuant to any statute implementing an 
        international trade agreement.
    (3) An exercise by the President of the authority under 
this subsection shall have no effect on the procedures under 
section 802 [or the effect of a joint resolution of disapproval 
under this section].
    (d)(1) In addition to the opportunity for review otherwise 
provided under this chapter, in the case of any rule for which 
a report was submitted in accordance with subsection (a)(1)(A) 
during the period beginning on the date occurring--
          (A) in the case of the Senate, 60 session days, or
          (B) in the case of the House of Representatives, 60 
        legislative days, before the date the Congress is 
        scheduled to adjourn[s] a session of Congress through 
        the date on which the same or succeeding Congress first 
        convenes its next session, sections 802 and 803 shall 
        apply to such rule in the succeeding session of 
        Congress.
    (2)(A) In applying sections 802 and 803 for purposes of 
such additional review, a rule described under paragraph (1) 
shall be treated as though--
          (i) such rule were published in the Federal Register 
        [(as a rule that shall take effect)] on--
                  (I) in the case of the Senate, the 15th 
                session day[,]; or
                  (II) in the case of the House of 
                Representatives, the 15th legislative day, 
                after the succeeding session of Congress first 
                convenes; and
          (ii) a report on such rule were submitted to Congress 
        under subsection (a)(1) on such date.
    (B) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to affect 
the requirement under subsection (a)(1) that a report shall be 
submitted to Congress before a rule can take effect.
    (3) A rule described under paragraph (1) shall take effect 
as otherwise provided by law (including other subsections of 
this section).
    [(f) Any rule that takes effect and later is made of no 
force or effect by enactment of a joint resolution under 
section 802 shall be treated as though such rule had never 
taken effect.]
    [(g) If the Congress does not enact a joint resolution of 
disapproval under section 802 respecting a rule, no court or 
agency may infer any intent of the Congress from any action or 
inaction of the Congress with regard to such rule, related 
statute, or joint resolution of disapproval.]

SEC. 802. CONGRESSIONAL [REVIEW] APPROVAL PROCEDURE FOR MAJOR RULES

    (a)(1) For purposes of this section, the term ``joint 
resolution'' means only a joint resolution [introduced in the 
period beginning on the date on which the report referred to 
in] addressing a report classifying a rule as major pursuant to 
section 801(a)(1)(A)(iii) that--[is received by Congress and 
ending 60 days thereafter (excluding days either House of 
Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of 
Congress), the matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
follows: ``That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the 
___ relating to ___, and such rule shall have no force or 
effect.'' (The blank spaces being appropriately filled in).]
          (A) bears no preamble;
          (B) bears the following title (with blanks filled as 
        appropriate): ``Approving the rule submitted by ___ 
        relating to ___.'';
          (C) includes after its resolving clause only the 
        following (with blanks filled as appropriate): ``That 
        Congress approves the rule submitted by ___ relating to 
        ___.''; and
          (D) is introduced pursuant to paragraph (2).
    (2) After a House of Congress received a report classifying 
a rule as major pursuant to section 801(a)(1)(A)(iii), the 
majority leader of that House (or his or her respective 
designee) shall introduce (by request, if appropriate) a joint 
resolution described in paragraph (1)--
          (A) in the case of the House of Representatives, 
        within 3 legislative days; and
          (B) in the case of the Senate, within 3 session days.
    (3) A joint resolution described in paragraph (1) shall not 
be subject to amendment at any stage of proceeding.
    (b)[(1)] A joint resolution described in subsection (a) 
shall be referred [to the committees]in each House of Congress 
to the committees having[with] jurisdiction[.] over the 
provision of law under which the rule is issued.
    [(2) For purposes of this section, the term ``submission or 
publication date'' means the later of the date on which--
          [(A) the Congress receives the report submitted under 
        section 801(a)(1); or
          [(B) the rule is published in the Federal Register, 
        if so published.]
    (c) In the Senate, if the committee or committees to which 
[is referred]a joint resolution described in subsection (a) has 
been referred have not reported [such joint resolution (or an 
identical joint resolution)] it at the end of [20 calendar]15 
session days after [the submission or publication date defined 
under subsection (b)(2)] its introduction, such committee or 
committees [may] shall be automatically discharged from further 
consideration of [such joint] the resolution [upon a petition 
supported in writing by 30 Members of the Senate, and such 
joint resolution] and it shall be placed on the calendar. A 
vote on final passage of the resolution shall be taken on or 
before the close of the 15th session day after the resolution 
is reported by the committee or committees to which is was 
referred, or after such committee or committees have been 
discharged from further consideration of the resolution.
    (d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee or committees to 
which a joint resolution is referred [has] have reported, or 
when a committee or committees [is] are discharged (under 
subsection (c)) from further consideration of a joint 
resolution described in subsection (a), it is at any time 
thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the same 
effect has been disagreed to) for a motion to proceed to the 
consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order 
against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the 
joint resolution) are waived. The motion is not subject to 
amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to 
proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to 
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or 
disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to 
the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the 
joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the 
Senate until disposed of.
    (2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on 
all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, 
shall be limited to not more than [10] 2 hours, which shall be 
divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the 
joint resolution. A motion to further [to] limit debate is in 
order and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to 
postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other 
business, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not 
in order.
    (3) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (e) [In the Senate the procedure specified in subsection 
(c) or (d) shall not apply to the consideration of a joint 
resolution respecting a rule--
          [(1) after the expiration of the 60 session days 
        beginning with the applicable submission or publication 
        date, or
          [(2) if the report under section 801(a)(1)(A) was 
        submitted during the period referred to in section 
        801(d)(1), after the expiration of the 60 session days 
        beginning on the 15th session day after the succeeding 
        session of Congress first convenes.] In the House of 
        Representatives, if any committee to which a joint 
        resolution described in subsection (a) has been 
        referred has not reported it to the House at the end of 
        15 legislative days after its introduction, such 
        committee shall be discharged from further 
        consideration of the joint resolution, and it shall be 
        placed on the appropriate calendar. On the second and 
        fourth Thursdays of each month it shall be in order at 
        any time for the Speaker to recognize a Member who 
        favors passage of a joint resolution that has appeared 
        on the calendar for at least 5 legislative days to call 
        up that joint resolution for immediate consideration in 
        the House without intervention of any point of order. 
        When so called up a joint resolution shall be 
        considered as read and shall be debatable for 1 hour 
        equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an 
        opponent, and the previous question shall be considered 
        as ordered to its passage without intervening motion. 
        It shall not be in order to reconsider the vote on 
        passage. If a vote on final passage of the joint 
        resolution has not been taken by the third Thursday on 
        which the Speaker may recognize a Member under this 
        subsection, such vote shall be taken on that day.
    (f)(1) If, before [the passage by one House of] passing a 
joint resolution [of that House] described in subsection (a), 
[that] one House receives from the other [House] a joint 
resolution [described in subsection (a), then the following 
procedures shall apply:] having the same text, then--
      [(1)](A) The joint resolution of the other House shall 
not be referred to a committee[.] ; and
    [(2) With respect to a joint resolution described in 
subsection (a) of the House receiving the joint resolution--]
          [(A)](B) the procedure in [that] the receiving House 
        shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been 
        received from the other House[; but]
          [(B)] until the vote on [final] passage, [shall be 
        on] when the joint resolution [of] received from the 
        other House[.] shall supplant the joint resolution of 
        the receiving House.
    (2) This subsection shall not apply to the House of 
Representatives if the joint resolution received from the 
Senate is a revenue measure.
    (g) If either House has not taken a vote on final passage 
of the joint resolution by the last day of the period described 
in section 801(b)(2), then such vote shall be taken on the dat.
    [g](h) This section and section 803 [is] are enacted by 
Congress--
          (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 
        Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and 
        as such [it is] are deemed [a]to be part of the rules 
        of each House, respectively, but applicable only with 
        respect to the procedure to be followed in that House 
        in the case of a joint resolution described in 
        subsection (a), and it [supersedes] superseding other 
        rules only [to the extent that it is inconsistent with 
        such rules] where explicitly so; and
          (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right 
        of either House to change the rules (so far as they 
        [relating] relate to the procedure of that House) at 
        any time, in the same manner[,] and to the same extent 
        as in the case of any other rule of that House.

SEC. 803. [SPECIAL RULE ON STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND JUDICIAL 
                    DEADLINES] CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL FOR NONMAJOR 
                    RULES

    [(a) In the case of any deadline for, relating to, or 
involving any rule which does not take effect (or the 
effectiveness of which is terminated) because of enactment of a 
joint resolution under section 802, that deadline is extended 
until the date 1 year after the date of enactment of the joint 
resolution. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to 
affect a deadline merely by reason of the postponement of a 
rule's effective date under section 801(a).]
    (a) For purposes of this section, the term `joint 
resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced in the 
period beginning on the date on which the report referred to in 
section 801(a)(1)(A) is received by Congress and ending 60 days 
thereafter (excluding days either House of Congress is 
adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of Congress), 
the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 
`That Congress disapproves the nonmajor rule submitted by the 
__ relating to __, and such rule shall have no force or 
effect.' (The blank spaces being appropriately filled in).
    [(b) The term ``deadline'' means any date certain for 
fulfilling any obligation or exercising any authority 
established by or under any Federal statute or regulation, or 
by or under any court order implementing any Federal statute or 
regulation.]
    (b) A joint resolution described in subsection (a) shall be 
referred to the committees in each House of Congress with 
jurisdiction.
    (c) In the Senate, if the committee to which is referred a 
joint resolution described in subsection (a) has not reported 
such joint resolution (or an identical joint resolution) at the 
end of 15 session days after the date of introduction of the 
joint resolution, such committee may be discharged from further 
consideration of such joint resolution upon a petition 
supported in writing by 30 Members of the Senate, and such 
joint resolution shall be placed on the calendar.
    (d)(1) In the Senate, when the committee to which a joint 
resolution is referred has reported, or when a committee is 
discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of 
a joint resolution described in subsection (a), it is at any 
time thereafter in order (even though a previous motion to the 
same effect has been disagreed to) for a motion to proceed to 
the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of 
order against the joint resolution (and against consideration 
of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion is not subject 
to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to 
proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to 
reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or 
disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to 
the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the 
joint resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the 
Senate until disposed of.
    (2) In the Senate, debate on the joint resolution, and on 
all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, 
shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be 
divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the 
joint resolution. A motion to further limit debate is in order 
and not debatable. An amendment to, or a motion to postpone, or 
a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or 
a motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order.
    (3) In the Senate, immediately following the conclusion of 
the debate on a joint resolution described in subsection (a), 
and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if 
requested in accordance with the rules of the Senate, the vote 
on final passage of the joint resolution shall occur.
    (4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the 
application of the rules of the Senate to the procedure 
relating to a joint resolution described in subsection (a) 
shall be decided without debate.
    (e) In the Senate, the procedure specified in subsection 
(c) or (d) shall not apply to the consideration of a joint 
resolution respecting a nonmajor rule--
          (1) after the expiration of the 60 session days 
        beginning with the applicable submission or publication 
        date; or
          (2) if the report under section 801(a)(1)(A) was 
        submitted during the period referred to in section 
        801(d)(1), after the expiration of the 60 session days 
        beginning on the 15th session day after the succeeding 
        session of Congress first convenes.
    (f) If, before the passage by one House of a joint 
resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that 
House receives from the other House a joint resolution 
described in subsection (a), then the following procedures 
shall apply:
          (1) The joint resolution of the other House shall not 
        be referred to a committee.
          (2) With respect to a joint resolution described in 
        subsection (a) of the House receiving the joint 
        resolution--
                  (A) the procedure in that House shall be the 
                same as if no joint resolution had been 
                received from the other House; but
                  (B) the vote on final passage shall be on the 
                joint resolution of the other House.

SEC. 804. DEFINITIONS

    For purposes of this chapter[--]:
          (1) * * *
          (2) The term ``major rule'' means any rule, including 
        an interim final rule, that the Administrator of the 
        Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of the 
        Office of Management and Budget finds has resulted in 
        or is likely to result in--
                  (A) an annual effect on the economy of 
                $100,000,000 or more;
                  (B) a major increase in costs or prices for 
                consumers, individual industries, Federal, 
                State, or local government agencies, or 
                geographic regions; or
                  (C) significant adverse effects on 
                competition, employment, investment, 
                productivity, innovation, or on the ability of 
                United States-based enterprises to compete with 
                foreign-based enterprises in domestic and 
                export markets.
          [The term does not include any rule promulgated under 
        the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the amendments 
        made by that Act.]
          (3) The term ``nonmajor rule'' means any rule that is 
        not a major rule.
          [(3)] (4) The term ``rule'' has the meaning given 
        such term in section 551, except that such term does 
        not include--
                  (A) any rule of particular applicability, 
                including a rule that approves or prescribes 
                for the future rates, wages, prices, services, 
                or allowances therefore, corporate or financial 
                structures, reorganizations, mergers, or 
                acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices 
                or disclosures bearing on any of the foregoing;
                  (B) any rule relating to agency management or 
                personnel; or
                  (C) any rule of agency organization, 
                procedure, or practice that does not 
                substantially affect the rights or obligations 
                of non-agency parties.
          (5) The term ``submission or publication date'', 
        except as otherwise provided in this chapter, means--
                  (A) in the case of a major rule, the date on 
                which the Congress receives the report 
                submitted under section 801(a)(1); and
                  (B) in the case of a nonmajor rule, the later 
                of--
                          (i) the date on which the Congress 
                        receives the report submitted under 
                        section 801(a)(1); and
                          (ii) the date on which the nonmajor 
                        rule is published in the Federal 
                        Register, if so published.

SEC. 805. JUDICIAL REVIEW

    (a) No determination, finding, action, or omission under 
this chapter shall be subject to judicial review.
    (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a court may determine 
whether a Federal agency has completed the necessary 
requirements under this chapter for a rule to take effect.
    (c) The enactment of a joint resolution of approval under 
section 802 shall not be interpreted to serve as a grant or 
modification of statutory authority by Congress for the 
promulgation of a rule, shall not extinguish or affect any 
claim, whether substantive or procedural, against any alleged 
defect in a rule, and shall not form part of the record before 
the court in any judicial proceeding concerning a rule except 
for purposes of determining whether or not the rule is in 
effect.

[SEC. 806. APPLICABILITY; SEVERABILITY

    [(a) This chapter shall apply notwithstanding any other 
provision of law.
    [(b) If any provision of this chapter or the application of 
any provision of this chapter to any person or circumstance, is 
held invalid, the application of such provision to other 
persons or circumstances, and the remainder of this chapter, 
shall not be affected thereby.]

[SEC. 807.] SEC. 806. EXEMPTION FOR MONETARY POLICY

    Nothing in this chapter shall apply to rules that concern 
monetary policy proposed or implemented by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open 
Market Committee.

[SEC. 808.] SEC. 807. EFFECTIVE DATE OF CERTAIN RULES

    Notwithstanding section 801--
          (1) any rule that establishes, modifies, opens, 
        closes, or conducts a regulatory program for a 
        commercial, recreational, or subsistence activity 
        related to hunting, fishing, or camping[,]; or
          (2) any rule other than a major rule which an agency 
        for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and 
        a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rule 
        issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are 
        impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
        interest,
shall take effect at such time as the Federal agency 
promulgating the rule determines.