[Senate Report 115-151]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



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                                                     Calendar No. 207
115th Congress     }                        {                 Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session       }                        {                 115-151
======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018

                                _______
                                

               September 7, 2017.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 1761]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 1761) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
year 2018 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Community Management 
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System, and for other purposes, reports favorably 
thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    On June 12, 2017, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly 
disclosed that the President's aggregate request for the 
National Intelligence Program for Fiscal Year 2018 is $57.7 
billion. Other than for limited unclassified appropriations, 
primarily the Intelligence Community Management Account, the 
classified nature of United States intelligence activities 
precludes any further disclosure, including by the Committee, 
of the details of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, 
the Committee has prepared a classified annex to this report 
that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The 
classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by 
reference in the Intelligence Authorization Act (the ``Act'') 
and has the legal status of public law. The classified annex is 
made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives and to the President. 
It is also available for review by any Member of the Senate 
subject to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th 
Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2018 that is being reported by the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2018.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2018 are 
contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and that 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment 
of civilian personnel in Fiscal Year 2018 in excess of the 
number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three 
percent of the total limit applicable to each Intelligence 
Community (IC) element under Section 102, and ten percent of 
the number of civilian personnel authorized under such schedule 
for the purposes of contractor conversions. The DNI may do so 
only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
functions.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$550,200,000 for the Intelligence Community Management Account 
(ICMA) of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2018.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability Fund for Fiscal Year 2018.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 303. Modification of special pay authority for science, 
        technology, engineering, or mathematics positions and addition 
        of special pay authority for cyber positions

    Section 303 provides an increased yearly cap for Science, 
Technology, Engineering, or Mathematics (STEM) employee 
positions in the IC who perform critical cyber missions.

Section 304. Director of National Intelligence review of placement of 
        positions within the intelligence community on the Executive 
        Schedule

    Section 304 requires the DNI to conduct a review of the 
positions within the IC that may be appropriate for inclusion 
on the Executive Schedule, and the appropriate levels for 
inclusion.

Section 305. Modification of appointment of Chief Information Officer 
        of the Intelligence Community

    Section 305 changes the position of IC Chief Information 
Officer from being subject to presidential appointment to being 
subject to appointment by the DNI.

Section 306. Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk Management Task 
        Force

    Section 306 requires the DNI to establish a task force to 
standardize information sharing between the IC and the United 
States Government acquisition community with respect to supply 
chain and counterintelligence risks. Section 306 further 
provides requirements for membership, security clearances, and 
annual reports.

Section 307. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community auditing 
        authority

    Section 307 permits the IC IG to hire contractor or expert 
auditors to meet audit requirements, similar to other Federal 
IGs. Section 307 responds to the Committee's concerns that the 
IC Inspector General (IC IG) is at risk of failing to meet its 
legislative requirements due to its inability to hire qualified 
auditors by granting the IC IG independent hiring practices 
identical to other IGs.

Section 308. Inspectors General studies on classification

    Section 308 requires each designated IG to carry out and 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on 
the application of classification and handling markings on a 
representative sample of finished products, to include 
compartments. Section 308 also directs an analysis of 
compliance with declassification procedures and a review of the 
process for identifying topics of public or historical 
importance that merit prioritization for declassification 
review.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence


Section 401. Authority for the protection of current and former 
        employees of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Section 401 amends Title 50, section 3506, to provide 
protection for current and former ODNI personnel and designated 
immediate family members, if there is a national security 
threat that warrants such protection.

Section 402. Information sharing with State election officials

    Section 402 requires the DNI, within 30 days of enactment, 
to sponsor a security clearance for each eligible chief 
election official of a State, territory, or the District of 
Columbia (and up to one eligible designee), up to the top 
secret level. Section 402 also requires the DNI to share 
appropriate classified information-related threats to election 
systems and to the integrity of the election process with chief 
election officials and their designees who possess the 
aforementioned security clearances.

Section 403. Technical modification to the Executive Schedule

    Section 403 amends Title 50, section 5313, to add the 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center.

Section 404. Modification to the designation of the program manager-
        information sharing environment

    Section 404 changes the status of the Program Manager for 
the Information Sharing Environment from being subject to 
presidential appointment to being subject to appointment by the 
DNI.

                       Subtitle B--Other Elements


Section 411. Repeal of foreign language proficiency requirement for 
        certain senior level positions in the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    Section 411 repeals Title 50, section 3036(g), with 
conforming amendments to section 611 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487).

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements


Section 421. Designation of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the 
        Defense Security Service as an element of the intelligence 
        community

    Section 421 adds the Defense Security Service's (DSS's) 
Counterintelligence (CI) Directorate to the IC elements in 50 
U.S.C. 3003(4), and requires all IC requirements that apply to 
IC elements to apply to the DSS CI as of the date of enactment.

                TITLE V--SECURING ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

Section 501. Short title

    Section 501 provides that this title may be cited as the 
``Securing Energy Infrastructure Act of 2017.''

Section 502. Definitions

    Section 502 provides the relevant definitions as cited 
throughout this title.

Section 503. Pilot program for securing energy infrastructure

    Section 503 requires the Director of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy (hereinafter in 
this title, ``Director''), within 180 days of enactment, to 
establish a two-year control systems implementation pilot 
program within the National Labs. This pilot program will 
partner with covered entities in the energy sector to identify 
new security vulnerabilities, and for purposes of researching, 
developing, testing, and implementing technology platforms and 
standards in partnership with such entities.

Section 504. Working group to evaluate program standards and develop 
        strategy

    Section 504 requires the Director to establish a working 
group composed of identified private and public sector 
entities, to evaluate the technology platforms and standards 
for the pilot program specified in Section 503 and develop a 
national cyber-informed engineering strategy to isolate and 
defend covered entities from security vulnerabilities.

Section 505. Reports on the program

    Section 505 requires the Director within 180 days after the 
date on which funds are first disbursed to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, an interim 
report that describes the pilot program's results, provides a 
feasibility analysis, and describes the working group's 
evaluations. Section 505 further requires the Director, within 
two years of funding, to submit to the aforementioned 
committees a progress report on the pilot program specified in 
Section 503, an analysis of the feasibility of the methods 
studied, and a description of the working group's evaluation 
results.

Section 506. No new regulatory authority for Federal agencies

    Section 506 provides that nothing in this title permits the 
Director or the head of any other Federal agency to issue new 
regulations.

Section 507. Exemption from disclosure

    Section 507 provides that information shared by or with the 
Federal Government or a State, tribal, or local government 
under this title shall be deemed to be voluntarily shared and 
exempt from disclosure under relevant laws requiring such 
disclosure.

Section 508. Protection from liability

    Section 508 provides covered entities participating in the 
pilot program with protection from causes of action. Section 
508 further provides that covered entities cannot be subject to 
causes of action for refraining from participation.

Section 509. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 509 authorizes $10,000,000 to carry out the pilot 
program specified in Section 503, and $1,500,000 to carry out 
the working group and reporting provisions.

                  TITLE VI--REPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS

Section 601. Technical correction to Inspector General study

    Section 601 amends Title 50, section 11001(d), by replacing 
the IC IG's ``audit'' requirement for Inspectors General with 
employees having classified material access, with a ``review'' 
requirement.

Section 602. Governance for security clearance, suitability and fitness 
        for employment, and credentialing

    Section 602 establishes an interagency council comprised of 
representatives from the ODNI, Office of Management and Budget, 
Office of Personnel Management, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, and National Background Investigation Bureau, to 
govern decisions and processes related to security clearances, 
suitability and fitness for employment, and credentialing. 
Section 602 further establishes the DNI as the government's 
Security Executive Agent and the Director of the Officer of 
Personnel Management as the government's Suitability Executive 
Agent and the Credentialing Executive Agent, specifying roles 
and responsibilities for each.

Section 603. Process for security clearances

    Section 603 incorporates several provisions relating to the 
security clearance process. Section 603 requires the following 
reviews: of the alignment among the Standard Form 86 background 
investigation questionnaire, the Federal Investigative 
Standards, and the adjudicative guidelines contained in 
Security Executive Agent Directive 4 (``National Security 
Adjudicative Guidelines''), as well as their collective utility 
in anticipating future insider threats; of certain methods to 
improve the background investigation process; and of the 
utility of the timelines for processing security clearances, as 
contained in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004.
    Section 603 also directs the DNI, as the government's 
Security Executive Agent, to establish a policy on the issuance 
of interim security clearances; establish a policy for 
consistent treatment in the security clearance process between 
government and contractor personnel; issue a strategy and 
implementation plan for conducting periodic reinvestigations 
based on risk, not a specified time interval; issue a policy 
for the government's use of automated records checks conducted 
for prior employment purposes; and establish a policy and issue 
an implementation plan for sharing information between and 
among government agencies and industry related to security 
clearances, consistent with privacy concerns.

Section 604. Reports on the vulnerabilities equities policy and process 
        of the Federal Government

    Section 604 requires the head of each IC element to submit 
within 90 days of enactment to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report detailing the process and criteria the head 
of each IC element uses for determining to submit a 
vulnerability for review under the Federal Government's 
vulnerabilities equities policy and process. Section 604 
further requires the report to contain information about 
vulnerability disclosures to vendors, how many vulnerabilities 
have been patched, and when a patch or mitigation has been made 
publicly available.

Section 605. Bug bounty programs

    Section 605 directs the Under Secretary for Intelligence 
and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to submit 
to congressional leadership and the congressional intelligence 
committees a strategic plan to implement bug bounty programs at 
appropriate agencies and departments of the United States 
Government. Section 605 further requires the plan to include an 
assessment of the ``Hack the Pentagon'' pilot program and 
subsequent bug bounty programs. Section 605 also requires the 
plan to provide recommendations on the feasibility of 
initiating bug bounty programs across the United States 
Government.

Section 606. Report on cyber attacks by foreign governments against 
        United States election infrastructure

    Section 606 directs the Under Secretary for Intelligence 
and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security to submit 
to congressional leadership and the congressional intelligence 
committees a report on cyber attacks and attempted cyber 
attacks by foreign governments on United States election 
infrastructure, in connection with the 2016 Presidential 
election. Section 606 further requires this report to include 
identification of the States and localities affected and 
include efforts to attack voter registration databases, voting 
machines, voting-related computer networks, and the networks of 
secretaries of State and other election officials.

Section 607. Review of intelligence community's posture to collect 
        against and analyze Russian efforts to influence the 
        presidential election

    Section 607 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees within one year of enactment a report 
on the Director's review of the IC's posture to collect against 
and analyze Russian efforts to interfere with the 2016 United 
States presidential election. Section 607 further requires the 
review to include assessments of IC resources, information 
sharing, and legal authorities.

Section 608. Assessment of foreign intelligence threats to Federal 
        elections

    Section 608 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of the CIA, the Director of the NSA, the Director of 
the FBI, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of 
other relevant IC elements, to commence assessments of security 
vulnerabilities of State election systems one year before 
regularly scheduled Federal elections. Section 608 further 
requires the DNI to submit a report on such assessments to 
congressional leadership and to the congressional intelligence 
committees 180 days before regularly scheduled Federal 
elections, and an updated assessment 90 days before regularly 
scheduled Federal election.

Section 609. Strategy for countering Russian cyber threats to United 
        States elections

    Section 609 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of FBI, the 
Director of CIA, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the Secretary of the Treasury, to develop a whole-
of-government strategy for countering Russian cyber threats 
against United States electoral systems and processes. Section 
609 further requires this strategy to include input from 
solicited Secretaries of State and chief election officials. 
Section 609 requires the DNI and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to brief the congressional intelligence committees on 
the required strategy within 90 days of enactment.

Section 610. Limitation relating to establishment or support of cyber 
        security unit with the Government of Russia

    Section 610 prohibits the Federal Government from expending 
any funds to establish or support a cybersecurity unit or other 
cyber agreement that is jointly established or otherwise 
implemented by the United States Government and the Russian 
Government, unless the DNI submits a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees at least 30 days prior to 
any such agreement. The report shall include the agreement's 
purpose, intended shared intelligence, value to national 
security, counterintelligence concerns, and any measures taken 
to mitigate such concerns.

Section 611. Report on returning Russian compounds

    Section 611 requires the IC to produce, within 180 days of 
enactment of this Act, both classified and unclassified reports 
on the intelligence risks of returning the two diplomatic 
compounds--one in New York and one in Maryland--taken from 
Russia as a reprisal for Russian meddling in the 2016 United 
States presidential election. Section 611 also establishes an 
ongoing requirement for producing similar assessments for 
future assignment of diplomatic compounds within the United 
States.

Section 612. Intelligence community assessment on threat of Russian 
        money laundering to the United States

    Section 612 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees within 180 days of enactment an IC 
assessment on the threat of Russian money laundering to the 
United States. Section 612 requires the assessment to be based 
on all-source intelligence from both the IC and the Office of 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence of the Treasury Department 
and cover global nodes and entry points; vulnerabilities; 
connections between oligarchs, organized crime, and/or the 
Russian Government; counterintelligence threats to the United 
States; and challenges to United States Government efforts to 
enforce sanctions and combat organized crime.

Section 613. Notification of an active measures campaign

    Section 613 requires the DNI to notify the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional 
intelligence committees each time the DNI has determined there 
is credible information that a foreign power has, is, or will 
attempt to employ a covert influence or active measures 
campaign with regard to the modernization, employment, 
doctrine, or force posture of the nuclear deterrent or missile 
defense. Section 613 further requires that such notification 
must include information about the actions that the United 
States has taken to expose or halt such attempts.

Section 614. Notification of travel by accredited diplomatic and 
        consular personnel of the Russian Federation in the United 
        States

    Section 614 requires the Secretary of State, in executing 
the advance notification requirements of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to ensure the Russian 
Federation provides two business days of advance notice to the 
Secretary prior to Russian diplomatic or consular travel, and 
to ensure that the Secretary provides further notification of 
this travel within one hour to the DNI and the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Section 615. Modification of certain reporting requirement on travel of 
        foreign diplomats

    Section 615 amends a provision in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, to require reporting of 
``a best estimate'' of known or suspected violations of certain 
travel requirements by accredited diplomatic and consular 
personnel of the Russian Federation.

Section 616. Semiannual report on referrals to Department of Justice by 
        elements of the intelligence community regarding unauthorized 
        disclosure of classified information

    Section 616 requires the Assistant Attorney General of the 
Department of Justice, in consultation with the Director of the 
FBI, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
semiannual report on the status of IC referrals to the 
Department regarding unauthorized disclosures of classified 
information.

Section 617. Notifications on designation of an intelligence officer as 
        a persona non grata

    Section 617 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a notification within 30 days of an intelligence 
officer--either of the United States or of a foreign 
intelligence service stationed in the United States--being 
designated as a persona non grata. Section 617 further requires 
the notifications to include the basis for the designation and 
a justification for the expulsion.

Section 618. Biennial report on foreign investment risks

    Section 618 requires the DNI to establish an IC working 
group on foreign investment risks and prepare a biennial report 
to the congressional intelligence committees. Section 618 
further requires the report to include an identification, 
analysis, and explanation of national security vulnerabilities, 
foreign investment trends, foreign countries' strategies to 
exploit vulnerabilities, and market distortions caused by 
foreign countries.

Section 619. Report on surveillance by foreign governments against 
        United States telecommunications networks

    Section 619 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Director of the CIA, the Director of the NSA, the Director of 
the FBI, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees within 180 days of 
enactment a report on known attempts by foreign governments to 
exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities in United States 
telecommunications networks to target for surveillance United 
States persons, and any actions that the IC has taken to 
protect United States Government agencies and personnel from 
such surveillance.

Section 620. Reports on authorities of the Chief Intelligence Officer 
        of the Department of Homeland Security

    Section 620 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
Analysis, to submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report on the adequacy of the Under Secretary's 
authorities required as the Chief Intelligence Officer to 
organize the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise, and the 
legal and policy changes necessary to coordinate, organize, and 
lead Department of Homeland Security intelligence activities.

Section 621. Report on geospatial commercial activities for basic and 
        applied research and development

    Section 621 requires the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to submit, within 30 days of 
enactment, to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
armed services committees a report on the authorities that the 
Director deems necessary to conduct certain commercial 
activities to engage in specified basic and applied research, 
data transfers, and development projects. This report should 
address how the Director would use such authorities, consistent 
with applicable laws and procedures to protect sources and 
methods.

Section 622. Technical amendments related to the Department of Energy

    Section 622 provides technical corrections to certain 
provisions regarding the Department of Energy's Office of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence.

Section 623. Sense of Congress on WikiLeaks

    Section 623 provides a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and 
its senior leadership resemble a non-state hostile intelligence 
service, often abetted by state actors, and should be treated 
as such.

                           Committee Comments


Management of intelligence community workforce

    The Committee repeats direction from the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that IC elements should 
build, develop, and maintain a workforce appropriately balanced 
among its civilian, military, and contractor workforce sectors 
to meet the missions assigned to it in law and by the 
president. Starting in fiscal year 2019, the Committee will no 
longer authorize position ceiling levels in the annual Schedule 
of Authorizations.
    The bill, in Section 103, again includes authority for IC 
elements to adjust personnel ceilings by three percent, and by 
ten percent specifically for the purposes of contractor 
conversions. These flexibilities are temporary management tools 
to optimize the workforce this year that will cease in fiscal 
year 2019 when the IC can benefit from full implementation of 
the multi-sector workforce initiative.
    The Committee looks forward to working with the ODNI as it 
develops an implementation strategy and sets standards for 
workforce cost analysis tools.

Protection of the supply chain in intelligence community acquisition 
        decisions

    The Committee continues to have significant concerns about 
risks to the supply chain in IC acquisitions. The report to 
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 directed the DNI to review and consider changes to 
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 801 (``Acquisition'') to 
reflect issuance in 2013 of ICD 731 (``Supply Chain Risk 
Management'') and issues associated with cybersecurity. It 
specifically recommended the review examine whether to: expand 
risk management criteria in the acquisition process to include 
cyber and supply chain threats; require counterintelligence and 
security assessments as part of the acquisition and procurement 
process; propose and adopt new education requirements for 
acquisition professionals on cyber and supply chain threats; 
and factor in the cost of cyber and supply chain security. This 
review is due in November 2017, with a report on the process 
for updating ICD 801 due in December 2017.
    As part of this review, the Committee directs three other 
considerations to be addressed: changes in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation that may be necessary; how changes 
should apply to all acquisition programs; and how security 
risks must be addressed across development, procurement, and 
operational phases of acquisition. The Committee further 
directs the DNI to submit a plan to implement necessary changes 
within 60 days of completion of this review.

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use of VERA and VSIP 
        Authorities

    The Committee encourages the use by the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) of Voluntary Early 
Retirement Authority (VERA) and Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Program (VSIP) offers to meet its future goals of building a 
workforce more attuned to automation of data production, 
automation of analytic processes, and establishment of 
development and operations (``DevOps'') software development 
processes.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NGA to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees within 120 days of 
enactment of this Act on its plan for further use of VERA and 
VSIP incentives, to include how they can be used to develop an 
acquisition cadre skilled in ``DevOps'' software development 
processes. The report should specify metrics for retooling its 
workforce, including how it measures data literacy and 
computational skills in potential hires, and an accounting of 
the numbers of new hires who have met these higher standards.

Report on engagement of National Reconnaissance Office with university 
        community

    The Committee recognizes that the survivability and 
resiliency of United States satellites is critically important 
to the United States intelligence and defense communities. 
While the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) engages with the 
university community in support of basic research and 
developing an education workforce pipeline to help advance new 
technologies and produce skilled professionals, it can do more 
in this regard to focus on space survivability.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the NRO to report within 
120 days of enactment of this Act on NRO's current efforts and 
future strategies to engage with university partners that are 
strategically located, host secure information facilities, and 
offer a strong engineering curriculum, with a particular focus 
on space survivability and resiliency. This report should 
provide a summary of NRO's current and planned university 
engagement programs, levels of funding, and program research 
and workforce objectives and metrics. The report should also 
include an assessment of the strategic utility of chartering a 
University Affiliated Research Center (UARC) in this domain.

Clarification of oversight responsibilities

    The Committee reinforces the requirement for all IC 
agencies funded by the National Intelligence Program to respond 
in a full, complete, and timely manner to any request made by a 
member of the congressional intelligence committees. In 
addition, the Committee directs the DNI to issue guidelines 
within 90 days to ensure that this provision is carried out.

Clarification on cooperation with investigation on Russian influence in 
        the 2016 election

    The Committee reinforces the obligation for all IC agencies 
to cooperate in a full, complete, and timely manner with the 
Committee's investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 
Presidential election and all related inquiries being conducted 
by the Committee.

Supervisory feedback as part of continuous evaluation program

    The Committee directs the DNI to review the results of 
ongoing pilots regarding the use of supervisory feedback as 
part of the periodic reinvestigation and continuous evaluation 
process and report within 180 days of enactment of this Act on 
the establishment of a policy for its use across the IC.

National security threats to critical infrastructure

    The Committee is aware of significant threats to our 
critical infrastructure and industrial control systems posed by 
foreign adversaries. The sensitive nature of the information 
related to these threats make the role of the IC of vital 
importance to United States defensive efforts. The Committee 
has grave concerns that current IC resources dedicated to these 
threats and their analysis are neither sufficient nor closely 
coordinated. The Committee includes provisions within this 
legislation to address these concerns.

Inspector General of the Intelligence Community role and 
        responsibilities

    The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC IG) 
was established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010 to initiate and ``conduct independent reviews 
investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on programs 
and activities within the responsibility and authority of the 
Director of National Intelligence'' and to lead the IG 
community in its activities. The Committee is concerned that 
this intent is not fully exercised by the IC IG and reiterates 
the Congress's intent that it consider its role as an IG over 
all IC-wide activities in addition to the ODNI. To support this 
intent, the Committee has directed a number of requirements to 
strengthen the IC IG's role and expects full cooperation from 
all Offices of Inspector General across the IC.
    The Committee remains concerned about the level of 
protection afforded to whistleblowers within the IC and the 
level of insight congressional committees have into their 
disclosures. It is the Committee's expectation that all Offices 
of Inspector General across the IC will fully cooperate with 
the direction provided elsewhere in the bill to ensure both the 
Director of National Intelligence and the congressional 
committees have more complete awareness of the disclosures made 
to any IG about any National Intelligence Program funded 
activity.

Space launch facilities

    The Committee continues to believe it is critical to 
preserve a variety of launch range capabilities to support 
national security space missions, and encourages planned 
launches such as the U.S. Air Force Orbital/Sub-Orbital Program 
(OSP)-3 National Reconnaissance Office (NRO-111) mission, to be 
launched in 2018 on a Minotaur 1 from the Mid-Atlantic Regional 
Spaceport at Wallops Flight Facility. In the Fiscal Year 2017 
Intelligence Authorization Act, the Committee directed a brief 
from the ODNI, in consultation with the Department of Defense 
and the U.S. Air Force, on their plans to utilize state-owned 
and operated spaceports, which leverage non-federal public and 
private investments to bolster United States launch 
capabilities and provide access to mid-to-low or polar-to-high 
inclination orbits for national security missions.
    The Committee directs that the ODNI supplement this brief 
to consider how state investments in these spaceports may 
support infrastructure improvements, such as payload 
integration and launch capabilities, for national security 
launches.

                            Committee Action

    On July 27, 2017, a quorum being present, the Committee met 
to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Votes on amendments to committee bill, this report and the classified 
        annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman's bill, together with the classified annex, the 
base text for purposes of amendment.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc eight 
amendments to the classified annex, as sponsored by: (1) 
Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner, as modified by a 
second-degree amendment by Chairman Burr and Senator Cotton; 
(2) Chairman Burr and Vice Chairman Warner; (3) Chairman Burr 
and Vice Chairman Warner; (4) Vice Chairman Warner and Senator 
Manchin; (5) Senator Manchin, as modified by a second-degree 
amendment by Chairman Burr; (6) Senator Lankford, as modified 
by a second-degree amendment by Senator Lankford and Vice 
Chairman Warner; (7) Senator Rubio, as modified by a second-
degree amendment also by Senator Rubio; and (8) Senator Rubio, 
Senator Cornyn, and Senator Manchin.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted en bloc the following 
eleven amendments to the bill: (1) an amendment by Chairman 
Burr and Vice Chairman Warner to Section 505, regarding reports 
on an energy infrastructure pilot program; (2) an amendment by 
Vice Chairman Warner and Senator Heinrich, regarding Russia 
cyber threat strategy; (3) an amendment by Chairman Burr and 
Senator Rubio to Section 402, regarding information sharing 
with state election officials; (4) an amendment by Senator 
Collins, Senator Lankford, and Senator Manchin that requires 
the Department of Justice to report on Intelligence Community 
leaks; (5) an amendment by Senator Cotton that modifies a 
report requirement on certain Russia travel violations; (6) an 
amendment by Senator Heinrich, Senator King, and Senator Harris 
that requires reporting on the government's Vulnerabilities 
Equities Policy and Process; (7) an amendment by Senator 
Lankford to Section 608, regarding an assessment of foreign 
intelligence threats to federal elections; (8) an amendment by 
Senator Harris requiring an Intelligence Community review on 
Russian influence; (9) an amendment by Senator Wyden and 
Senator Manchin requiring a report on Russian money laundering; 
(10) an amendment by Senator Wyden prohibiting a United States-
Russia cyber unit; and (11) an amendment by Senator Wyden 
requiring a report on foreign government surveillance against 
United States telecommunications networks.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a second-degree 
amendment by Senator King to an amendment by Senator Wyden that 
would have stricken Section 623 of the bill. Section 623 
originally provided a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and its 
senior leadership constitute a non-state hostile intelligence 
service.
    By a vote of 13 ayes to 2 noes, the Committee adopted the 
amendment by Senator Wyden that would have stricken Section 623 
of the bill, as modified by the second-degree amendment by 
Senator King, to provide a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and 
its senior leadership resemble a non-state hostile intelligence 
service. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; 
Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator Lankford--
aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Vice Chairman 
Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator 
Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Manchin--aye; and 
Senator Harris--no.
    Senator Feinstein offered an amendment regarding civil 
injunction actions and an amendment to require reports on 
terrorist activities, both of which she subsequently withdrew.
    Senator Wyden offered an amendment regarding whistleblower 
protections for Intelligence Community contractors, which he 
subsequently withdrew.
    Senator Cotton offered three amendments, which he 
subsequently withdrew, as follows: (1) an amendment to require 
a declassification review of materials relating to the Iran 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; (2) an amendment to make a 
conforming edit to 18 U.S.C. 2709, to clarify that the 
government is permitted to obtain non-content electronic 
communications transactional records; and (3) an amendment to 
reauthorize Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.

Vote to report the committee bill

    The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a 
vote of 14 ayes and 1 no. The votes in person or by proxy were 
as follows: Chairman Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; Senator 
Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Blunt--aye; Senator 
Lankford--aye; Senator Cotton--aye; Senator Cornyn--aye; Vice 
Chairman Warner--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--
no; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Senator Manchin--
aye; and Senator Harris--aye.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee authorized the staff to 
make technical and conforming changes, following the completion 
of the mark-up.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

     Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also 
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On July 27, 
2017, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred 
in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

     In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR HARRIS

    I support the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's 
Fiscal Year 2018 Intelligence Authorization Act because it 
advances a number of important intelligence oversight goals 
ranging from transparency on cyber vulnerabilities to tracking 
foreign threats to our elections. Nevertheless, despite my 
overall support for the bill, it is not perfect.
    In particular, I have reservations about Section 623, which 
establishes a Sense of Congress that WikiLeaks and the senior 
leadership of WikiLeaks resemble a non-state hostile 
intelligence service. The Committee's bill offers no definition 
of ``non-state hostile intelligence service'' to clarify what 
this term is and is not. Section 623 also directs the United 
States to treat WikiLeaks as such a service, without offering 
further clarity.
    To be clear, I am no supporter of WikiLeaks, and believe 
that the organization and its leadership have done considerable 
harm to this country. This issue needs to be addressed. 
However, the ambiguity in the bill is dangerous because it 
fails to draw a bright line between WikiLeaks and legitimate 
journalistic organizations that play a vital role in our 
democracy.
    I supported efforts to remove this language in Committee 
and look forward to working with my colleagues as the bill 
proceeds to address my concerns.
                                                  Kamala D. Harris.

                    MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR WYDEN

    The Fiscal Year 2018 Intelligence Authorization bill 
includes three important amendments I offered.
    The first amendment requires that the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, produce a report on the threat to the United States 
from Russian money laundering. It has become apparent that 
following the trail of illicit Russian money is a central 
component of any counterintelligence investigation related to 
Russia. Russian money laundering also threatens the U.S. 
financial system as well as efforts to enforce sanctions and 
fight organized crime. This report will bring together the 
resources of the Intelligence Community and elements of the 
Treasury Department under the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence, such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN), so that the government and the Congress can 
understand the complex and hidden networks of shell companies 
and other money laundering instruments overseas and here in the 
United States.
    The second amendment prohibits the U.S.-Russia cyber 
security unit announced by the President on July 9, 2017, or 
any other U.S.-Russia cyber agreement, unless Congress has full 
information about what the administration intends. The 
President's statement that this unit will ensure that 
``election hacking, & many other negative things, will be 
guarded and safe'' raises numerous counterintelligence 
concerns, given Russia's hacking in connection with the 2016 
U.S. election. My amendment thus requires the DNI, at least 30 
days prior to any such agreement, to report on what 
intelligence will be shared with Russia, the 
counterintelligence concerns associated with any such 
agreement, and what will be done to mitigate those concerns.
    The third amendment requires a report on the threat that 
cyber security vulnerabilities in telecommunications networks, 
including Signaling System No. 7 (SS7), could result in foreign 
government surveillance of Americans, including U.S. government 
personnel. A Department of Homeland Security report from April 
highlighted the risks of SS7 vulnerabilities. My amendment will 
require the whole of the Intelligence Community to report on 
whether foreign government surveillance is occurring as a 
result of this known vulnerability, and what the IC is doing 
about it.
    One important reform lacking from the bill is whistleblower 
protections for Intelligence Community contractors, who are not 
afforded the protections provided either to Intelligence 
Community employees or to contractors outside the Intelligence 
Community. By addressing this gap, Congress potentially could 
save the taxpayers millions of dollars. Extending whistleblower 
protections to IC contractors also helps discourage leaks by 
granting potential leakers protected classified channels to 
express concerns. It is my intent to continue to work with 
colleagues to address this shortcoming in whistleblower 
protections in the near future.
    My opposition to the bill is based on a provision stating 
that it is the Sense of Congress ``that WikiLeaks and the 
senior leadership of WikiLeaks resemble a non-state hostile 
intelligence service often abetted by state actors and should 
be treated as such a service by the United States.'' My concern 
with this language does not relate to the actions of WikiLeaks, 
which, as I have stressed in the past, was part of a direct 
attack on our democracy. My concern is that the use of the 
novel phrase ``non-state hostile intelligence service'' may 
have legal, constitutional, and policy implications, 
particularly should it be applied to journalists inquiring 
about secrets. The language in the bill suggesting that the 
U.S. government has some unstated course of action against 
``non-state hostile intelligence services'' is equally 
troubling.
    The damage done by WikiLeaks to the United States is clear. 
But with any new challenge to our country, Congress ought not 
react in a manner that could have negative consequences, 
unforeseen or not, for our constitutional principles. The 
introduction of vague, undefined new categories of enemies 
constitutes such an ill-considered reaction.
                                                         Ron Wyden.

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