[House Report 115-858]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


115th Congress     }                                {          Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session        }                                {          115-858

======================================================================



 
                ANTI-TERRORISM CLARIFICATION ACT OF 2018

                                _______
                                

 July 23, 2018.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Goodlatte, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 5954]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 5954) to amend title 18, United States Code, to 
clarify the meaning of the terms ``act of war'' and ``blocked 
asset'', and for other purposes, having considered the same, 
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that 
the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     1
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     3
Hearings.........................................................     8
Committee Consideration..........................................     8
Committee Votes..................................................     8
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     8
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     8
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................     8
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................     8
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings..............................     8
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     9
Advisory on Earmarks.............................................     9
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     9
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    10

                             The Amendment

     The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 
2018''.

SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF THE TERM ``ACT OF WAR''.

  (a) In General.--Section 2331 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended--
          (1) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
          (2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
          (3) by adding at the end the following:
          ``(6) the term `military force' does not include any person 
        that--
                  ``(A) has been designated as a--
                          ``(i) foreign terrorist organization by the 
                        Secretary of State under section 219 of the 
                        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
                        1189); or
                          ``(ii) Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
                        (as such term is defined in section 594.310 of 
                        the Code of Federal Regulations) by the 
                        Secretary of State or the Secretary of the 
                        Treasury; or
                  ``(B) has been determined by the court to not be a 
                `military force'.''.
  (b) Application.--The amendments made by this section shall apply to 
any civil action pending on or commenced after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST TERRORISTS.

  (a) In General.--Section 2333 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting at the end following:
  ``(e) Use of Blocked Assets To Satisfy Judgments of U.S. Nationals.--
For purposes of section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 
(28 U.S.C. 1610 note), in any action in which a national of the United 
States has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party pursuant to 
this section, the term `blocked asset' shall include any asset of that 
terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or 
instrumentality of that party) seized or frozen by the United States 
under section 805(b) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act 
(21 U.S.C. 1904(b)).''.
  (b) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section shall apply 
to any judgment entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of 
this Act.

SEC. 4. CONSENT OF CERTAIN PARTIES TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION.

  (a) In General.--Section 2334 of title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
  ``(e) Consent of Certain Parties to Personal Jurisdiction.--
          ``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), for 
        purposes of any civil action under section 2333 of this title, 
        a defendant shall be deemed to have consented to personal 
        jurisdiction in such civil action if, regardless of the date of 
        the occurrence of the act of international terrorism upon which 
        such civil action was filed, the defendant--
                  ``(A) after the date that is 120 days after the date 
                of enactment of this subsection, accepts--
                          ``(i) any form of assistance, however 
                        provided, under chapter 4 of part II of the 
                        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 
                        et seq.); or
                          ``(ii) any form of assistance, however 
                        provided, under section 481 of the Foreign 
                        Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291) for 
                        international narcotics control and law 
                        enforcement; or
                  ``(B) in the case of a defendant benefiting from a 
                waiver or suspension of section 1003 of the Anti-
                Terrorism Act of 1987 (22 U.S.C. 5202) after the date 
                that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
                subsection--
                          ``(i) continues to maintain any office, 
                        headquarters, premises, or other facilities or 
                        establishments within the jurisdiction of the 
                        United States; or
                          ``(ii) establishes or procures any office, 
                        headquarters, premises, or other facilities or 
                        establishments within the jurisdiction of the 
                        United States.
          ``(2) Applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any 
        defendant who ceases to engage in the conduct described in 
        paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B) for 5 consecutive calendar 
        years.''.
  (b) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

                          Purpose and Summary

    The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 makes three 
needed improvements to the Antiterrorism Act of 1992 (ATA) to 
better ensure that victims of international terrorism can 
obtain justice in United States courts against those who 
commit, or conspire to commit, an act of international 
terrorism or who aid and abet international terrorist activity. 
The legislation: (1) clarifies ambiguities in the ATA's ``act 
of war'' exception that currently allows designated foreign 
terrorists and their supporters to avoid liability; (2) closes 
a loophole that currently prevents victims of narco-terrorism 
from enforcing their judgments against terrorist assets that 
have been blocked by the Treasury Department; and (3) addresses 
lower court decisions that have allowed entities that sponsor 
terrorist activity against U.S. nationals overseas to avoid the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.

                Background and Need for the Legislation


I. Background

    In 1992, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism Act's civil 
cause of action provision to help address international 
terrorist attacks that harm U.S. persons abroad by 
``provid[ing] the framework in our legal system for Americans 
to seek justice against those who defy all notions of morality 
and justice.''\1\ The ATA's civil liability provision is aimed 
at deterring support for terrorism, buttressing the country's 
counter-terrorism initiatives, and providing justice for 
victims of terrorist attacks. The provision grants U.S. 
nationals injured by acts of international terrorism a civil 
action for damages. Specifically, it provides that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\137 Cong. Rec. S1771-01 (1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley).

        [a]ny national of the United States injured in his or 
        her person, property, or business by reason of an act 
        of international terrorism, or his or her estate, 
        survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any 
        appropriate district court of the United States and 
        shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains 
        and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2333(a). The Antiterrorism Act (ATA) defines 
``international terrorism'' to include activities that: (A) ``involve 
violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of 
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would 
be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States or of any State''; (B) ``appear to be intended (i) to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect 
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping''; and (C) ``occur primarily outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in 
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they 
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their 
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2331(1).

    In passing the ATA's civil remedy, Congress recognized that 
``reluctant courts and . . . jurisdictional hurdles'' had often 
stymied the ability of victims of international terrorism to 
obtain redress for their injuries.\3\ Thus, the civil remedy 
was designed to ``remove the jurisdictional hurdles in the 
courts confronting victims'' of international terrorism\4\ and 
``fill the gap by providing the civil counterpart to'' the 
ATA's criminal penalties.\5\ In addition, the civil remedy 
provision was designed to ``put[] terrorists' assets at risk 
and deter[] them from using the U.S. financial system to hide 
and augment their wealth.''\6\ In short, by cutting terrorists' 
financial life-lines, the provision furthers the United States' 
longstanding efforts to reduce global terrorism and thus 
protect Americans here and abroad.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\See 136 Cong. Rec. S4568-01 (1990).
    \4\Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property & Judicial 
Administration of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 10 (1992) 
(``1992 Hearing'') (letter from Sen. Grassley).
    \5\136 Cong. Rec. at S14283 (statement of Sen. Grassley).
    \6\1992 Hearing at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department of Justice has recognized that the civil 
liability provision is ``an effective weapon in the battle 
against international terrorism'' because it ``discourage[s] 
those who would provide financing for this activity.''\7\ And 
the State Department has explained that the provision 
``discourage[s] sources of terrorist funding and hold[s] 
sponsors of terrorism accountable for their actions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance at 2, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. For 
Relief & Dev, No. 01-1969 (7th Cir. Nov. 14, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act

    The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act addresses three 
discrete problems that currently exist in the ATA: (1) 
ambiguities in the ATA's ``act of war'' exception that allow 
designated foreign terrorists and their supporters to avoid 
liability; (2) a loophole that prevents victims of narco-
terrorism from enforcing their judgments against terrorist 
assets that have been blocked by the Treasury Department under 
the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act; and (3) lower 
court decisions that have allowed entities that sponsor 
terrorist activity against U.S. nationals overseas to avoid the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
            A. ``Act of War'' Exception
    Defendants accused of aiding and abetting acts of 
international terrorism have been attempting to use the ATA's 
``act of war'' exception\8\ as a means of avoiding civil 
liability, even in cases in which the plaintiffs' injuries were 
caused by the actions of designated terrorist groups. For 
example, in Kaplan v. Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the defendant banks successfully argued that rocket 
attacks carried out by Hezbollah--a designated foreign 
terrorist organization--were acts of war and thus outside the 
scope of the ATA's civil liability provisions.\9\ The court 
agreed and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, finding that the 
attacks, carried out by a terrorist group against civilians, 
were acts of war. The ATA's ``act of war'' exception should not 
be a liability shield for those who aid or abet attacks carried 
out by designated terrorist organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2336(a).
    \9\961 F. Supp. 2d 185 (D.D.C. 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This legislation effectively amends the definition of ``act 
of war'' in the ATA\10\ to clarify that the act of war 
exception does not apply to any person that has been designated 
as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department or 
a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the Treasury or 
State Departments, or any person that has been determined by 
the court to not be a ``military force.'' Simply put, this 
definitional change means that a defendant would not be able to 
use the ATA's ``act of war'' defense if the terrorist act was 
carried out by a designated terrorist organization or by any 
other person the court determines is not a military force.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2331(4). This amendment to the ATA is carried 
out by adding a definition of ``military force'' to 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2331.
    \11\This third category--any person that has been determined by the 
court to not be a military force--is intended to preserve the courts' 
ability to make a determination as to whether a person in addition to 
an FTO or an SDGT is not a military force of any origin. In other 
words, this language was included to make clear a person in addition to 
an FTO or an SDGT may be found not to be a military force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This definitional change furthers Congress' original intent 
with regard to the act of war exception. Both the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees' reports concerning the ATA include 
section-by-section analyses of the statute. In discussing the 
``act of war'' exception, the House and Senate reports provide:

          This section excludes from the scope of any civil 
        action a claim brought on account of ``an act of war.'' 
        The intention of this provision is to bar actions for 
        injuries that result from military action by recognized 
        governments as opposed to terrorists, even though 
        governments also sometimes target civilian 
        populations.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\H.R. Rep. No. 102-1040 at 7 (1992); S. Rep. 102-342 at 46 
(1992) (emphasis added).

    The change is also consistent with the approach taken by 
several courts that have interpreted the exception.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\Stansell v. BGP, Inc., 2011 WL 1296881, at *11 (M.D.Fla. 2014) 
(``To find that a terrorist organization can be a military force under 
the ATA would defeat the purpose of the Act.''); Weiss v. Arab Bank, 
PLC, 2007 WL 4565060, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007) (``I find that a 
designated terrorist organization cannot constitute a `military force 
of any origin.'''); Morris v. Khadr, 415 F.Supp.2d 1323 (D.Utah 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            B. Judgments Against Narco-Terrorists
    Under statutes like the civil liability provision in the 
ATA, U.S. terrorism victims have successfully obtained 
judgments against terrorist parties that have caused them harm. 
However, after being awarded such judgments, terrorism victims 
have often faced practical and legal difficulties at the 
enforcement stage. Assets of terrorist parties may not be 
present in the United States and, to the extent they are 
present, they are often either well concealed or seized or 
frozen by the federal government.
    In 2002, in order to help lessen these enforcement burdens, 
Congress passed section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(TRIA), which authorizes execution or attachment in aid of 
execution in order to satisfy a terrorism judgment against a 
terrorist party from the blocked assets of that terrorist 
party. By permitting terrorism victims to attach blocked assets 
in order to satisfy their terrorism-based judgments, TRIA 
permits victims to bypass the usual requirement that a litigant 
first obtain a license from the United States Department of the 
Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in order to 
attach blocked assets.\14\ Section 201(a) of TRIA provides:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 515.201, 515.310 (CACR) 
(requiring a license for attachment); id. Sec. Sec. 535.201, 535.310 
(Iran Assets Control Regulations) (same); id. Sec. Sec. 594.201, 
594.312 (GTSR) (same).

          Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . , in 
        every case in which a person has obtained a judgment 
        against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act 
        of terrorism, or for which a terrorist party is not 
        immune under section 1605A or 1605(a)(7) (as such 
        section was in effect on January 27, 2008) of title 28, 
        the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including 
        the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of 
        that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or 
        attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such 
        judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for 
        which such terrorist party has been adjudged 
        liable.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), Pub. L. 107-297 201(a), 
Sec. 201, 116 Stat. 2337 (28 U.S.C. Sec. 1610 note).

    TRIA further provides that a ``blocked asset'' is any asset 
seized by the Executive Branch pursuant to either the Trading 
With the Enemy Act (TWEA)\16\ or the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\50 U.S.C. app. 1-44.
    \17\50 U.S.C. Sec. 1701-1708.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, under current law, victims of terrorism may satisfy a 
court-awarded judgment against a terrorist party using assets 
of that terrorist party (or an agency or instrumentality of 
that terrorist party) that the U.S. government has frozen 
pursuant to TWEA or IEEPA.\18\ However, assets frozen under the 
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act) are not 
currently available to terrorism victims. This leaves victims 
of narco-terrorism without a meaningful method of satisfying 
their ATA judgments. It makes little sense for our nation's 
counterterrorism laws to reach narco-terrorist organizations, 
like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), but 
then prevent victims from executing on such an organization's 
blocked assets merely because the U.S. government blocked those 
assets under the Kingpin Act instead of TWEA or IEEPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\See TRIA Sec. 201(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Antiterrorism Clarification Act amends the ATA to make 
clear that assets blocked under the Kingpin Act shall be 
available to victims of narco-terrorism who have obtained 
judgments against the responsible terrorist party.
            C. Personal Jurisdiction Over Overseas Terrorist Sponsors
    Congress passed the ATA to ``provide for Federal civil 
remedies for American victims of international terrorism'' and 
to ``remove[] the jurisdictional hurdles in the courts 
confronting victims. . . .''\19\ The ATA, in fact, was designed 
to ``provide[] extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist 
acts abroad against United States nationals.''\20\ Yet, recent 
federal court decisions have called into question the ATA's 
continued ability to bring terrorists or their abettors to 
justice in U.S. courts.\21\ Most recently, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in a case concerning American victims of 
Palestinian terrorism. The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari 
in Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization leaves in place 
a flawed Second Circuit decision that extends due process 
protections to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) and severely limits the 
extraterritorial scope of the ATA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\137 Cong. Rec. 6, 8143 (1991) (Statement of Sen. Grassley).
    \20\See Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1990) (Statement of Sen. Grassley).
    \21\See, e.g., Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 
F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016); Livnat v. Palestinian Authority, 851 F.3d 45 
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Carrying out or assisting an act of international terrorism 
that injures or kills American citizens abroad should be, in 
and of itself, sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in 
U.S. courts. But even more so, the purposeful availment by a 
defendant of certain benefits under U.S. law should constitute 
consent to jurisdiction in ATA claims in U.S. courts. No 
defendant should be able to accept U.S. foreign assistance 
while simultaneously dodging responsibility in U.S. courts for 
aiding or carrying out terrorist attacks that harm Americans.
    The Antiterrorism Clarification Act amends the jurisdiction 
and venue section of the ATA\22\ to make clear that defendants 
who take advantage of certain benefits provided by the U.S. 
government shall be deemed to have consented to personal 
jurisdiction. Specifically, a defendant will be deemed to have 
consented to personal jurisdiction in an ATA civil action if, 
after 120 days after the date of enactment of the bill, the 
defendant accepts U.S. assistance under certain provisions of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Alternatively, a defendant 
will be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction if 
such defendant continues to maintain any office, headquarters, 
premises, or other facilities within the U.S., or establishes 
or procures any office, headquarters, premises, or other 
facilities within the United States.\23\ If they continue to 
accept the covered benefits, they will subject themselves to 
personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts in ATA cases that are 
already pending or that may be filed in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2334.
    \23\This provision in the bill applies to the Palestine Liberation 
Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of 
those, or any agents thereof. See 22 U.S.C. Sec. 5202.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Accordingly, the consent provision provides affected 
persons with a reasonable and unambiguous choice: if you accept 
U.S. foreign assistance and enter our nation's borders, you 
must do so on the condition not to support or take part in acts 
of international terrorism and that you compensate your victims 
if you breach that promise. It is eminently reasonable to 
condition acceptance of U.S. foreign assistance and continued 
presence in the United States on consent to jurisdiction in 
cases in which a person's terrorist acts injure or kill U.S. 
nationals.\24\ This is particularly so with regard to the PLO 
and the PA, as Congress has repeatedly tied their continued 
receipt of these privileges to their adherence to their 
commitment to renounce terrorism. Moreover, the conditions the 
bill imposes, furthers a legitimate governmental purpose: to 
halt, deter, and disrupt international terrorism and to 
compensate U.S. victims of international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\The consent provision is clearly constitutional under both 
long-established precedents permitting deemed consent to personal 
jurisdiction and on the basis of express language in the statute 
alerting affected persons that by accepting U.S. foreign assistance or 
maintain or establishing a physical presence in the United States, they 
will be agreeing to submit to personal jurisdiction for cases under the 
ATA. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 638-39 (2d Cir. 
2016) (``state statute lack[ed] explicit reference to any 
jurisdictional implications''); accord Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 
A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016) (``Nothing in the registration statutes 
explicitly says that a foreign corporation registering thereby consents 
to the personal jurisdiction of this state.''); Segregated Account of 
Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 Wis.2d 528, 
552 (2017) (pointing to absence of ``express statutory language 
asserting general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on its 
appointment of an agent for service of process''); Aspen Am. Ins. v. 
Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440, 447 (Ill. 2017) (pointing 
to ``absence of any language'' in the statute).
    The provision also meets the standard for implied consent to the 
jurisdiction of a particular court. Such consent is implied in cases in 
which the litigant is aware of the right to refuse to consent and still 
proceeds voluntarily. See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 
S. Ct. 1932, 1948 (2015); Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003). 
Knowledge of our laws may fairly be charged to persons, like the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) when they ``chose to enter'' the United States. See Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984). Thus, if a defendant 
in an ATA case has voluntarily chosen to accept U.S. foreign assistance 
or voluntarily remain in the United States, they may fairly be deemed 
to consent to person jurisdiction in ATA cases. The Constitution does 
not bar giving a person who excludable from the United States fair 
warning that if it continues to accept U.S. foreign assistance or to 
maintain a physical presence in the United States on the condition that 
it refrain from engaging in or supporting international terrorism, it 
will be liable to U.S. victims in U.S. courts for breaching that 
condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                Hearings

    The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H.R. 
5954.

                        Committee Consideration

    On June 13, 2018, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill (H.R. 5954) favorably reported by voice vote, 
a quorum being present.

                            Committee Votes

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that no 
recorded votes occurred during the Committee's consideration of 
H.R. 5954.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of The House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

                        Committee Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee estimates that, 
based on informal discussions with the Congressional Budget 
Office, implementing this legislation would not affect direct 
spending or revenues. The Congressional Budget Office did not 
provide a cost estimate for the bill in time for inclusion in 
this report.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    No provision of H.R. 5954 establishes or reauthorizes a 
program of the Federal government known to be duplicative of 
another Federal program, a program that was included in any 
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress 
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program 
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of 
Federal Domestic Assistance.

                  Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings

    The Committee finds that H.R. 5954 contains no directed 
rule making within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 551.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 
5954 amends the Antiterrrorism Act of 1992 to clarify meaning 
of the terms ``act of war'' and ``blocked asset'' and to 
provide for consent to personal jurisdiction in certain 
circumstances.

                          Advisory on Earmarks

    In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 5954 does not contain any 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of rule XXI.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

    The following discussion describes the bill as reported by 
the Committee.
    Section 1. Short title. Section 1 sets forth the short 
title of the bill as the ``Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 
2018.''
    Sec. 2. Clarification of the Term ``Act of War.'' This 
section clarifies the meaning of the term ``act of war'' as it 
is defined in the ATA. Under current law, the term ``act of 
war'' is defined as ``any act occurring in the course of: (A) 
declared war; (B) armed conflict, whether or not war has been 
declared, between two or more nations; or (C) armed conflict 
between military forces of any origin.''\25\ The third 
category--armed conflict between military forces of any 
origin--has caused some level of confusion in its application 
by the courts, allowing designated terrorist entities and their 
supporters to avoid liability for terrorist attacks in some 
cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2331.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 2 removes any uncertainty regarding whether 
designated terrorist organizations can be considered a military 
force of any origin by clearly stating that the term ``military 
force'' does not include any person (as defined by the ATA)\26\ 
that has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization 
(FTO) under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1189 or as a specially designated 
global terrorist (SDGT) as such term is defined in section 
594.310 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations. In addition, 
the section makes clear that persons in addition to FTOs and 
SDGTs may also not constitute a ``military force'' if the court 
determines that such person is not a military force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2331(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sec. 3. Satisfaction of Judgments Against Terrorists. This 
section provides that in a civil action brought pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 2333 for which a U.S. national has received a 
judgment against a terrorist party, the assets of that 
terrorist party (including any agency or instrumentality of 
that party) that have been seized or frozen by the United 
States under section 805(b) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin 
Designation Act (21 U.S.C. Sec. 1904(b)) shall be considered 
``blocked assets'' for purposes of section 201 of the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) (28 U.S.C. Sec. 1610 note).
    This means that in ATA civil liability cases for which the 
plaintiff has received a judgment against a terrorist party, 
any assets of that terrorist party (including the assets of its 
agents and instrumentalities) that have been blocked under the 
Kingpin Act are subject to execution or attachment in aid of 
execution in order to satisfy the judgment to the extent of any 
compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been 
adjudged liable. This is already the case, under TRIA, for 
assets blocked pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act and 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
    Sec. 4. Consent of Certain Parties to Personal 
Jurisdiction. Section 4 provides that under certain 
circumstances defendants in ATA cases shall be deemed to have 
consented to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. This 
section amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2334 to provide that if an ATA 
defendant, 120 days after the date of enactment, accepts any 
form of assistance, however provided, under chapter 4 of part 
II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. Sec. 2346 
et seq.), section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. Sec. 2291) for international narcotics control and law 
enforcement, or chapter 9 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2349bb et seq.) that defendant 
shall be deemed to have consented to U.S. court jurisdiction in 
a case brought under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2333. In addition, consent 
to U.S. court jurisdiction shall be deemed to have occurred if 
120 days after the date of enactment of this Act an ATA civil 
defendant benefited from a waiver or suspension of section 1003 
of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (22 U.S.C. Sec. 5202) by 
continuing to maintain any office, headquarters, premises, or 
other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of 
the United States or by establishing or procuring any office, 
headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establishments 
within the jurisdiction of the United States.
    Because Section 4 is purely procedural and affects no 
substantive entitlement to relief, it takes effect on the date 
of enactment and will begin to apply in cases (including cases 
that are pending in the courts of the United States on the date 
of enactment) in which a defendant more than 120 days after the 
date of enactment receives the types of assistance, or takes 
advantage of a waiver, listed in that section.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

                      TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE




           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART I--CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 113B--TERRORISM

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Sec. 2331. Definitions

   As used in this chapter--
          (1) the term ``international terrorism'' means 
        activities that--
                  (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to 
                human life that are a violation of the criminal 
                laws of the United States or of any State, or 
                that would be a criminal violation if committed 
                within the jurisdiction of the United States or 
                of any State;
                  (B) appear to be intended--
                          (i) to intimidate or coerce a 
                        civilian population;
                          (ii) to influence the policy of a 
                        government by intimidation or coercion; 
                        or
                          (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
                        government by mass destruction, 
                        assassination, or kidnapping; and
                  (C) occur primarily outside the territorial 
                jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend 
                national boundaries in terms of the means by 
                which they are accomplished, the persons they 
                appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the 
                locale in which their perpetrators operate or 
                seek asylum;
          (2) the term ``national of the United States'' has 
        the meaning given such term in section 101(a)(22) of 
        the Immigration and Nationality Act;
          (3) the term ``person'' means any individual or 
        entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial 
        interest in property;
          (4) the term ``act of war'' means any act occurring 
        in the course of--
                  (A) declared war;
                  (B) armed conflict, whether or not war has 
                been declared, between two or more nations; or
                  (C) armed conflict between military forces of 
                any origin; [and]
          (5) the term ``domestic terrorism'' means activities 
        that--
                  (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that 
                are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
                United States or of any State;
                  (B) appear to be intended--
                          (i) to intimidate or coerce a 
                        civilian population;
                          (ii) to influence the policy of a 
                        government by intimidation or coercion; 
                        or
                          (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
                        government by mass destruction, 
                        assassination, or kidnapping; and
                  (C) occur primarily within the territorial 
                jurisdiction of the United States[.]; and
          (6) the term ``military force'' does not include any 
        person that--
                  (A) has been designated as a--
                          (i) foreign terrorist organization by 
                        the Secretary of State under section 
                        219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
                        Act (8 U.S.C. 1189); or
                          (ii) Specially Designated Global 
                        Terrorist (as such term is defined in 
                        section 594.310 of the Code of Federal 
                        Regulations) by the Secretary of State 
                        or the Secretary of the Treasury; or
                  (B) has been determined by the court to not 
                be a ``military force''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2333. Civil remedies

  (a) Action and Jurisdiction.--Any national of the United 
States injured in his or her person, property, or business by 
reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her 
estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any 
appropriate district court of the United States and shall 
recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost 
of the suit, including attorney's fees.
  (b) Estoppel Under United States Law.--A final judgment or 
decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal 
proceeding under section 1116, 1201, 1203, or 2332 of this 
title or section 46314, 46502, 46505, or 46506 of title 49 
shall estop the defendant from denying the essential 
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding under this section.
  (c) Estoppel Under Foreign Law.--A final judgment or decree 
rendered in favor of any foreign state in any criminal 
proceeding shall, to the extent that such judgment or decree 
may be accorded full faith and credit under the law of the 
United States, estop the defendant from denying the essential 
allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil 
proceeding under this section.
  (d) Liability.--
          (1) Definition.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``person'' has the meaning given the term in section 1 
        of title 1.
          (2) Liability.--In an action under subsection (a) for 
        an injury arising from an act of international 
        terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by an 
        organization that had been designated as a foreign 
        terrorist organization under section 219 of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), as of 
        the date on which such act of international terrorism 
        was committed, planned, or authorized, liability may be 
        asserted as to any person who aids and abets, by 
        knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who 
        conspires with the person who committed such an act of 
        international terrorism.
  (e) Use of Blocked Assets to Satisfy Judgments of U.S. 
Nationals.--For purposes of section 201 of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (28 U.S.C. 1610 note), in any action in 
which a national of the United States has obtained a judgment 
against a terrorist party pursuant to this section, the term 
``blocked asset'' shall include any asset of that terrorist 
party (including the blocked assets of any agency or 
instrumentality of that party) seized or frozen by the United 
States under section 805(b) of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin 
Designation Act (21 U.S.C. 1904(b)).

Sec. 2334. Jurisdiction and venue

  (a) General Venue.--Any civil action under section 2333 of 
this title against any person may be instituted in the district 
court of the United States for any district where any plaintiff 
resides or where any defendant resides or is served, or has an 
agent. Process in such a civil action may be served in any 
district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an 
agent.
  (b) Special Maritime or Territorial Jurisdiction.--If the 
actions giving rise to the claim occurred within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as 
defined in section 7 of this title, then any civil action under 
section 2333 of this title against any person may be instituted 
in the district court of the United States for any district in 
which any plaintiff resides or the defendant resides, is 
served, or has an agent.
  (c) Service on Witnesses.--A witness in a civil action 
brought under section 2333 of this title may be served in any 
other district where the defendant resides, is found, or has an 
agent.
  (d) Convenience of the Forum.--The district court shall not 
dismiss any action brought under section 2333 of this title on 
the grounds of the inconvenience or inappropriateness of the 
forum chosen, unless--
          (1) the action may be maintained in a foreign court 
        that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over 
        all the defendants;
          (2) that foreign court is significantly more 
        convenient and appropriate; and
          (3) that foreign court offers a remedy which is 
        substantially the same as the one available in the 
        courts of the United States.
  (e) Consent of Certain Parties to Personal Jurisdiction.--
          (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
        for purposes of any civil action under section 2333 of 
        this title, a defendant shall be deemed to have 
        consented to personal jurisdiction in such civil action 
        if, regardless of the date of the occurrence of the act 
        of international terrorism upon which such civil action 
        was filed, the defendant--
                  (A) after the date that is 120 days after the 
                date of enactment of this subsection, accepts--
                          (i) any form of assistance, however 
                        provided, under chapter 4 of part II of 
                        the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
                        U.S.C. 2346 et seq.); or
                          (ii) any form of assistance, however 
                        provided, under section 481 of the 
                        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
                        U.S.C. 2291) for international 
                        narcotics control and law enforcement; 
                        or
                  (B) in the case of a defendant benefiting 
                from a waiver or suspension of section 1003 of 
                the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (22 U.S.C. 5202) 
                after the date that is 120 days after the date 
                of enactment of this subsection--
                          (i) continues to maintain any office, 
                        headquarters, premises, or other 
                        facilities or establishments within the 
                        jurisdiction of the United States; or
                          (ii) establishes or procures any 
                        office, headquarters, premises, or 
                        other facilities or establishments 
                        within the jurisdiction of the United 
                        States.
          (2) Applicability.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to 
        any defendant who ceases to engage in the conduct 
        described in paragraphs (1)(A) and (1)(B) for 5 
        consecutive calendar years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                  [all]