[House Report 115-452]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



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115th Congress   }                                  {         Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session     }                                  {          115-452
======================================================================



 
        STRENGTHENING OVERSIGHT OF IRAN'S ACCESS TO FINANCE ACT

                                _______
                                

December 7, 2017.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Hensarling, from the Committee on Financial Services, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 4324]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred 
the bill (H.R. 4324) to require the Secretary of the Treasury 
to make certifications with respect to United States and 
foreign financial institutions' aircraft-related transactions 
involving Iran, and for other purposes, having considered the 
same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend 
that the bill as amended do pass.
    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Strengthening Oversight of Iran's 
Access to Finance Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

  The Congress finds the following:
          (1) Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 
        informally known as the Iran nuclear deal, the Obama 
        administration agreed to license the sale of commercial 
        passenger aircraft to Iran, the world's foremost state sponsor 
        of terrorism and a jurisdiction of primary money laundering 
        concern.
          (2) In April 2015, prior to the adoption of the JCPOA, 
        Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, in publicly advocating for 
        its provisions, stated: ``Make no mistake: deal or no deal, we 
        will continue to use all our available tools, including 
        sanctions, to counter Iran's menacing behavior. Iran knows that 
        our host of sanctions focused on its support for terrorism and 
        its violations of human rights are not, and have never been, up 
        for discussion.''.
          (3) In March 2016 remarks to the Carnegie Endowment for 
        International Peace, Secretary Lew, in reference to U.S. 
        commitments under the JCPOA, stated: ``While we have lifted the 
        nuclear sanctions, we continue to enforce sanctions directed at 
        support for terrorism and regional destabilization, and missile 
        and human rights violations.''.
          (4) In an April 2016 forum at the Council on Foreign 
        Relations, Secretary Lew stated that, under the JCPOA, the U.S. 
        committed to lifting its nuclear sanctions, ``but the U.S. 
        financial system is not open to Iran, and that is not something 
        that is going to change''.
          (5) In September 2016, the Department of the Treasury's 
        Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued licenses 
        permitting the export of up to 97 aircraft for use by Iran Air, 
        the Islamic Republic of Iran's flagship state-owned carrier. 
        These licenses included authorization for U.S. financial 
        institutions ``to engage in all transactions necessary to 
        provide financing or other financial services'' in order to 
        effectuate the sales. In November 2016, OFAC licensed an 
        additional 106 aircraft for purchase by Iran Air, which are 
        also eligible for financing authorized by OFAC.
          (6) The Department of the Treasury had sanctioned Iran Air in 
        2011 for its use of commercial passenger aircraft to transport 
        rockets, missiles, and other military cargo on behalf of the 
        Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran's Ministry of 
        Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, both of which had been 
        designated under Executive Order 13382 for weapons 
        proliferation-related activities. In October 2017, the IRGC 
        went on to be designated under Executive Order 13224 for its 
        support of the IRGC-Qods Force, which has provided support to 
        terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, and the Taliban.
          (7) Among Iran Air's sanctionable activities, the airline 
        delivered missile or rocket components to the Assad government 
        in Syria, which like Iran is classified as a state sponsor of 
        terrorism.
          (8) The Assad regime is responsible for a civil conflict that 
        has claimed an estimated 400,000 lives, including through the 
        government's deployment of chemical weapons and barrel bombs 
        against unarmed civilians and children.
          (9) Despite being delisted in 2016, Iran Air has continued to 
        fly known weapons resupply routes to government-controlled 
        areas of Syria. According to research by the Foundation for 
        Defense of Democracies, between Implementation Day of the JCPOA 
        on January 16, 2016, and May 4, 2017, Iran Air operated at 
        least 134 flights to Syria, which included stops in Abadan, 
        Iran, a suspected IRGC logistical hub for airlifts to the Assad 
        regime.
          (10) In November 2016 correspondence to the Chairman of the 
        House Committee on Financial Services, the Department of the 
        Treasury noted that the commitment to delist Iran Air under the 
        JCPOA ``does not affect our ability to designate, or re-
        designate, any Iranian airline that engages in sanctionable 
        activity. The United States retains the ability to designate 
        any individual or entity that engages in sanctionable 
        activities under our authorities targeting conduct outside the 
        scope of the JCPOA, including Iran's support for terrorism, 
        human rights abuses, ballistic missile program, and other 
        destabilizing activities in the region.''.
          (11) In April 2017, Iran announced a deal for Aseman Airlines 
        to purchase up to 60 commercial aircraft, a transaction that 
        would require authorization by OFAC. Aseman Airlines' chief 
        executive officer, Hossein Alaei, has for decades served as a 
        senior member of the IRGC.

SEC. 3. CERTIFICATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT-RELATED TRANSACTIONS BY UNITED 
                    STATES AND FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after authorizing a 
transaction by a United States or foreign financial institution in 
connection with the export or re-export of a commercial passenger 
aircraft to Iran (or, for an authorization made after January 16, 2016, 
but before the date of the enactment of this Act, not later than 60 
days after such date of enactment), and every 180 days thereafter for 
the duration of the authorization, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
submit the report described under subsection (b) to the appropriate 
congressional committees.
  (b) Report With Respect to Financial Institutions' Iran-related 
Transactions and Due Diligence.--With respect to a financial 
institution and a transaction described under subsection (a), a report 
is described under this subsection if it contains--
          (1) a list of financial institutions that, since January 16, 
        2016, have conducted transactions authorized by the Secretary 
        in connection with the export or re-export of commercial 
        passenger aircraft to Iran;
          (2) either--
                  (A) a certification that--
                          (i) the transaction does not pose a 
                        significant money laundering or terrorism 
                        financing risk to the United States financial 
                        system;
                          (ii) the transaction will not benefit an 
                        Iranian person that, since the date that is one 
                        year preceding the date of the certification--
                                  (I) has knowingly transported items 
                                used for the proliferation of weapons 
                                of mass destruction, including systems 
                                designed in whole or in part for the 
                                delivery of such weapons; or
                                  (II) has knowingly provided 
                                transportation services or material 
                                support for, or on behalf of, any 
                                person designated under Executive 
                                Orders 13224, 13382, or 13572; and
                          (iii) any financial institution described 
                        under subsection (b)(1) has had since the date 
                        such authorization was made, or, if the 
                        authorization is no longer in effect, had for 
                        the duration of such authorization, appropriate 
                        policies, procedures, and processes in place to 
                        avoid engaging in sanctionable activities that 
                        may result from the financial institutions' 
                        exposure to Iran; or
                  (B) a statement that the Secretary is unable to make 
                the certification described under subparagraph (A) and 
                a notice that the Secretary will, not later than 60 
                days after the date the determination is submitted to 
                the appropriate congressional committees, issue a 
                report on non-certification described under subsection 
                (c) to the appropriate congressional committees.
  (c) Report on Non-certification.--With respect to a financial 
institution and a transaction described under subsection (a), a report 
on non-certification is described under this subsection if it 
contains--
          (1) a detailed explanation for why the Secretary is unable to 
        make the certification described under subsection (b)(2);
          (2) a notification of whether the Secretary will--
                  (A) not amend the authorization of the transaction 
                with respect to a financial institution, 
                notwithstanding such non-certification;
                  (B) suspend the authorization until the Secretary is 
                able to make such certification;
                  (C) revoke the authorization; or
                  (D) otherwise amend the authorization; and
          (3) an explanation of the reasons for any action to be taken 
        described under paragraph (2).
  (d) Waiver.--The President may waive, on a case-by-case basis, the 
provisions of this Act for up to one year at a time upon certifying to 
the appropriate congressional committees that--
          (1) the Government of Iran has--
                  (A) made substantial progress towards combating money 
                laundering and terrorism financing risk emanating from 
                Iran; or
                  (B) has significantly reduced Iran's--
                          (i) destabilizing activities in the region; 
                        or
                          (ii) material support for terrorist groups; 
                        or
          (2) such waiver is important to the national security 
        interests of the United States, with an explanation of the 
        reasons therefor.
  (e) Termination.--This section shall cease to be effective on the 
date that is 30 days after the date on which the President certifies to 
the appropriate congressional committees that--
          (1)(A) the Secretary does not find, under section 5318A of 
        title 31, United States Code, that reasonable grounds exist for 
        concluding that Iran is a jurisdiction of primary money 
        laundering concern; and
          (B) Iran has ceased providing support for acts of 
        international terrorism; or
          (2) terminating the provisions of this section is vital to 
        the national security interests of the United States, with an 
        explanation of the reasons therefor.
  (f) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the committees 
        on Financial Services and Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the committees on Banking, Housing, and 
        Urban Affairs and Foreign Relations of the Senate.
          (2) Financial institution.--The term ``financial 
        institution'' means a United States financial institution or a 
        foreign financial institution.
          (3) Foreign financial institution.--The term ``foreign 
        financial institution'' has the meaning given that term under 
        section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations.
          (4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'', with respect to 
        conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has 
        actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the 
        circumstance, or the result.
          (5) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of 
        the Treasury.
          (6) United states financial institution.--The term ``United 
        States financial institution'' has the meaning given the term 
        ``U.S. financial institution'' under section 561.309 of title 
        31, Code of Federal Regulations.

                          PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

    On November 9, 2017, Representative Roger Williams 
introduced H.R. 4324, the ``Strengthening Oversight of Iran's 
Access to Finance Act''. H.R. 4324 requires the Secretary of 
the Treasury to provide Congress with a report on transactions 
authorized for financial institutions related to the export or 
re-export of aircraft to Iran.
    The legislation would also require that the report certify 
that authorized transactions would not benefit Iranian persons 
that have transported items for the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), or provided transportation services or 
material support for, or on behalf of, any person sanctioned 
for terrorism, WMD proliferation, or human rights abuses in 
Syria. The report would also certify that financial 
institutions that engage in aircraft finance for Iran have 
appropriate due diligence measures in place to avoid 
sanctionable activities.
    If the report cannot include these certifications, the 
legislation requires the Secretary of the Treasury to explain 
the reasons for non-certification, and notify Congress of 
changes, if any, that will be made to financial institutions' 
authorizations.
    H.R. 4324 further includes Presidential waiver authority to 
incentivize behavioral change in Iran, and to provide the 
administration with significant flexibility in order to 
safeguard U.S. national security.

                  BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

    Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 
Obama administration agreed to license the export of commercial 
passenger planes to Iran, though nearly all other existing 
trade restrictions with the country remain in place. When 
licensing the export of these aircraft, the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) may 
include authorization for U.S. financial institutions to 
undertake transactions necessary to effectuate the aircraft 
sales. Such authorizations could expose U.S. banks to Iran, 
which the U.S. Department of State has classified as the 
world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism.
    In 2016, OFAC licensed the export of more than 200 planes 
to Iran Air, the country's leading state-owned carrier. In 
2011, The Treasury Department sanctioned Iran Air for using its 
commercial passenger planes to transport rockets, missiles, and 
other military cargo on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed 
Forces Logistics. The Treasury Department determined that Iran 
Air's illicit activities included transporting weapons and 
related components to Syria, another state sponsor of terrorism 
and the site of a civil conflict that has claimed an estimated 
400,000 lives.
    In accordance with the JCPOA, the Obama administration 
lifted sanctions on Iran Air in January 2016; however, there is 
evidence that the carrier has continued its illicit behavior. 
According to April 2017 testimony before the Committee by Dr. 
Emanuele Ottolenghi, a senior fellow at the Foundation for 
Defense of Democracies, Iran Air operated at least 114 flights 
to Syria between January 16, 2016 (Implementation Day of the 
JCPOA) and March 30, 2017. These flights used known weapons 
resupply routes, including stopovers in Abadan, Iran, a 
suspected IRGC logistical hub that supports airlifts to the 
Assad regime. In communications with the Committee, Dr. 
Ottolenghi later confirmed that Iran Air had flown at least 134 
such flights between Implementation Day and May 4, 2017.
    As Dr. Ottolenghi stated during his testimony on April 4, 
2017:

          ``Based on publicly available open source 
        information, it is extremely likely that Iran Air is 
        still an active participant in the airlifts. This 
        conclusion is based on the following:
           There is no justification for frequent 
        commercial flights to Damascus; Syria is a war zone 
        with little tourism or commerce, yet it is served by an 
        average of 11 flights a week.
           Iran Air operates flight number 697 from 
        Tehran to Damascus twice a week. The flight cannot be 
        purchased on Iran Air's booking website or through 
        travel agencies, and the booking website does not 
        include Damascus among its destinations from Tehran's 
        international airport, where the flights originate.
           Iran Air flight 697 occasionally makes a 
        stopover in Abadan, a logistical hub for the Syria 
        airlifts regularly used by other airlines. This 
        diversion is inconsistent with international civil 
        aviation regulations and suggests that the airline is 
        trying to disguise its flight path.''

    In addition to Iran Air's suspected support for sanctioned 
entities and continued atrocities in Syria, Iran generally 
suffers from profound deficiencies in combatting money 
laundering and terrorist financing, which has led the Treasury 
Department to designate it a ``jurisdiction of primary money 
laundering concern,'' and the Financial Action Task Force to 
label it a ``high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdiction.''
    H.R. 4324 provides Congress with greater oversight over 
financial transactions that the Treasury Department authorizes 
with Iran. Given the risks that doing business with Iran poses, 
such oversight will help detail those risks for Congress and 
ensure that financial institutions are aware of the heightened 
due diligence they should exercise with respect to Iran.
    H.R. 4324 includes waiver and sunset provisions in order to 
give significant flexibility to the President to pursue U.S. 
foreign policy goals, and incentivizes Iran to rein in its 
support for terrorism, weapons proliferation, and regional 
destabilization.
    This legislation does not re-impose sanctions lifted under 
the JCPOA.

                                HEARINGS

    The Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade held a 
hearing titled ``Increasing the Effectiveness of Non-Nuclear 
Sanctions against Iran'' on April 4, 2017, which examined 
matters relating to H.R. 4324.

                        COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

    The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on 
November 14, 2017, and ordered H.R. 4324 to be reported 
favorably to the House without amendment by a recorded vote of 
38 yeas to 21 nays (record vote no. FC-97), a quorum being 
present.

                            COMMITTEE VOTES

    Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes 
on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. The 
sole recorded vote was on a motion by Chairman Hensarling to 
report the bill favorably to the House without amendment. The 
motion was agreed to by a recorded vote of 38 yeas to 21 nays 
(Record vote no. FC-97), a quorum being present.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of 
the Committee based on oversight activities under clause 
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, 
are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.

                    PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

    With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
bill contains no measure that authorizes funding, so no 
statement of general performance goals and objectives for which 
any measure authorizes funding is required.

   NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its 
own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement 
authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the 
cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional 
Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974.

                 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES

    Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate 
provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                  Washington, DC, December 4, 2017.
Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4324, 
Strengthening Oversight of Iran's Access to Finance Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew 
Pickford.
            Sincerely,
                                                Keith Hall,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 4324--Strengthening Oversight of Iran's Access to Finance Act

    H.R. 4324 would amend current law to require the Department 
of the Treasury to report to the Congress on the financing of 
aircraft purchases by the Republic of Iran. The bill would 
direct the Secretary of the Treasury to certify whether or not 
financial transactions to facilitate the export of aircraft to 
Iran involve activities that could be sanctioned under current 
law.
    If sufficient information is available to make that 
certification, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 4324 would 
have no significant cost to the federal government because it 
would not amend existing sanctions. However, CBO cannot 
determine whether the department would be able to make the 
required certification.
    Enacting the H.R. 4324 would not affect direct spending and 
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
    CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4324 would not increase 
net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four 
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028.
    H.R. 4324 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Matthew 
Pickford. This estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, 
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                       FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

    This information is provided in accordance with section 423 
of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.
    The Committee has determined that the bill does not contain 
Federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee has 
determined that the bill does not impose a Federal 
intergovernmental mandate on State, local, or tribal 
governments.

                      ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

    No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this 
legislation.

                  APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

    The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to 
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public 
services or accommodations within the meaning of the section 
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

                         EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

    With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed 
the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of 
the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the 
rule.

                    DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no 
provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes: (1) a 
program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of 
another Federal program; (2) a program included in any report 
from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant 
to section 21 of Public Law 111-139; or (3) a program related 
to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal 
Domestic Assistance, published pursuant to the Federal Program 
Information Act (Pub. L. No. 95-220, as amended by Pub. L. No. 
98-169).

                   DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULEMAKING

    Pursuant to section 3(i) of H. Res. 5, (115th Congress), 
the following statement is made concerning directed rule 
makings: The Committee estimates that the bill requires no 
directed rule makings within the meaning of such section.

             SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title

    This Section cites H.R. 4324 as the ``Strengthening 
Oversight of Iran's Access to Finance Act.''

Section 2. Findings

    Congressional findings make note of Iran's designation as 
the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism and a 
jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern. The section 
also documents the Obama administration's multiple reassurances 
that, under the Iran nuclear deal, the U.S. would continue to 
hold the country accountable for illicit non-nuclear 
activities, including support for terrorism, weapons 
proliferation, and regional destabilization. In addition, the 
findings underscore Iran Air's previous blacklisting for its 
support of the IRGC and Iranian defense ministry, as well as 
its continued flights to Syria using known weapons resupply 
routes.

Section 3. Certifications for aircraft-related transactions by United 
        States and Foreign Financial Institutions

    Not later than 30 days after authorizing a transaction by 
U.S. or foreign financial institutions in connection with the 
export or re-export of commercial aircraft to Iran, and every 
180 days thereafter, the Treasury Secretary shall report to the 
appropriate congressional committees (the Committees on 
Financial Services and Foreign Affairs of the House, and the 
Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Foreign 
Relations of the Senate) the following:
           A list of financial institutions that have 
        conducted such transactions since January 16, 2016; and
           A certification that
                    The authorized transaction does not pose a 
                significant money laundering or terrorism 
                financing risk to the U.S. financial system;
                    The authorized transaction does not benefit 
                an Iranian person that, in the year preceding 
                the certification, has knowingly transported 
                items used for the proliferation of weapons of 
                mass destruction, or has knowingly provided 
                transportation services or material support 
                for, or on behalf of, any person designated 
                under Executive Orders 13224 (relating to 
                support for terrorism), 13382 (relating to 
                weapons proliferation), or 13572 (relating to 
                human rights abuses and repression in Syria); 
                and
                    Any financial institution that has 
                conducted an authorized transaction has, for 
                the duration of the authorization, appropriate 
                policies and procedures in place to avoid 
                engaging in sanctionable activities that may 
                result from its exposure to Iran.
    For authorizations made between January 16, 2016 and 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary would have 60 days 
following enactment to submit a report, with subsequent reports 
issued every 180 days thereafter.
    Should the Secretary notify Congress that the certification 
described above cannot be made, the Secretary would have 60 
days to submit a report that includes:
           A detailed explanation for the Secretary's 
        inability to make the certification; and
           A notification as to whether the Secretary 
        will:
                    Not amend the authorization, despite the 
                non-certification;
                    Suspend the authorization until the 
                Secretary can make the authorization;
                    Revoke the authorization; or
                    Otherwise amend the authorization.
    Congress would be provided an explanation for any course of 
action the Secretary chooses to take.

Waiver

    The President may waive the Act's provisions for up to one 
year at a time upon certifying that the Government of Iran has:
           Made substantial progress towards combating 
        money laundering and terrorism financing risk emanating 
        from Iran; or
           Has significantly reduced Iran's 
        destabilizing activities in the region, or its material 
        support for terrorist groups.
    The President may also issue a waiver upon certifying to 
the appropriate congressional committees that it is important 
to the national security interests of the United States, with 
an explanation of the reasons therefor.

Termination

    Section 3 would cease to have effect 30 days after the 
President certifies that Iran is no longer a jurisdiction of 
primary money laundering concern and has ceased its support for 
international terrorism. Alternatively, the President could 
terminate this section's provisions by reporting to the 
appropriate congressional committees that a termination is 
vital to U.S. national security interests, with an explanation 
of the reasons therefor.
    Section 3 includes definitions for terms that are 
consistent with Iran-related sanctions language.

         CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

    H.R. 4324 does not repeal or amend any section of a 
statute. Therefore, the Office of Legislative Counsel did not 
prepare the report contemplated by Clause 3(e)(1)(B) of rule 
XIII of the House of Representatives.

                             MINORITY VIEWS

    Last month, President Trump--whose enmity for the Iran 
nuclear deal is well documented--refused to certify the 
national security value of the Iran accord, which then put it 
into the hands of Congress to fatally undermine the agreement 
by reintroducing some or all of the suspended sanctions, if it 
chose to do so within 60 days.
    H.R. 4324 would entangle the Administration with a new, 
unilateral certification requirement in order to carry out 
current U.S. obligations related to the sale and financing of 
commercial aircraft under the JCPOA, but then leave it up to 
the Administration to decide whether or not to pull the trigger 
on the nuclear deal if this certification cannot be made. This 
could set in motion a dynamic that causes the JCPOA to unravel 
because it would likely lead Iran to resume its nuclear 
activities just at a time when the U.S. already has its hands 
full with North Korea.
    Under the JCPOA, the United States is broadly committed to 
``allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and 
related parts and services to Iran.'' This involves not just 
licensing the sale of aircraft and related parts and services 
to Iran, but also those activities necessary to facilitate such 
sales, including the financing for such sales.
    The U.S. commitment is conditioned on ``licensed items and 
services [being] used exclusively for commercial passenger 
aviation.'' And yet, H.R. 4324 would impose extra conditions on 
the licensed sale of aircraft to Iran, including, for instance, 
the condition that the recipient airline has not used non-
licensed aircraft for purposes other than commercial passenger 
aviation. That is, the Administration would have to certify 
that Iran is not engaged in certain activity unrelated to 
Iran's nuclear conduct or to the use of licensed aircraft 
themselves. If the Secretary is unable to make such 
certification, then the Secretary must report to Congress to 
whether he intends to suspend, revoke, amend, or approve 
(``notwithstanding such non-certification'') any license 
facilitating the sale of commercial aircraft to Iran.
    As we have now seen, President Trump objects to the fact 
that his Administration has to take affirmative steps to keep 
the deal in place, and refused to do so in the case of the last 
recurring 90-day Congressional certification requirement. 
Proponents of this bill undoubtedly expect Trump will react the 
same way to these additional requirements, and block (by 
omission of action) the sale of commercial aircraft that is a 
key element of the deal.
    The sale of safe commercial planes to Iranian airlines 
allowed under the terms of the JCPOA will not appreciably 
increase Iran's military capability--meanwhile, it's clear that 
these sales get Iran to spend tens of billions of dollars on 
Western commercial aircraft and not missile development, 
militant salaries, and weapons. Directing Iran's spending away 
from these things is a plus for U.S. national security, as 
hawks who worried very much about an Iranian ``windfall'' 
should recognize.
    By seeking to render impermissible that which is expressly 
permitted pursuant to the JCPOA, the legislation would place in 
peril the U.S. commitment to permit the sale of commercial 
passenger aircraft to Iran, thereby placing the U.S. in non-
compliance with its obligations under the nuclear deal. We 
strongly oppose this legislation.
                                   Maxine Waters (CA).
                                   Michael E. Capuano.
                                   Stephen F. Lynch.
                                   Al Green (TX).
                                   Wm. Lacy Clay.
                                   Joyce Beatty.
                                   Daniel T. Kildee.
                                   Keith Ellison.
                                   Gregory W. Meeks.

                                  [all]