[House Report 115-139]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


115th Congress    }                                    {        Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session      }                                    {       115-139

======================================================================



 
                  GLOBAL CHILD PROTECTION ACT OF 2017

                                _______
                                

  May 22, 2017.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Goodlatte, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            DISSENTING VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 1862]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
bill (H.R. 1862) to amend title 18, United States Code, to 
expand the scope of certain definitions pertaining to unlawful 
sexual conduct, and for other purposes, having considered the 
same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and 
recommends that the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     3
Committee Consideration..........................................     3
Committee Votes..................................................     3
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     5
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................     5
Duplication of Federal Programs..................................     6
Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings..............................     6
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     6
Advisory on Earmarks.............................................     6
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     6
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............     7
Dissenting Views.................................................    13

                          Purpose and Summary

    The Global Child Protection Act, H.R. 1862, closes 
loopholes in the child exploitation statutes by expanding the 
conduct covered involving abuse occurring abroad and the 
offenses covered in the recidivist enhancement provisions for 
sex crimes against children. The purpose of the legislation is 
to ensure that predators do not escape culpability for offenses 
committed abroad by limiting their behavior to ``illicit sexual 
conduct'' rather than ``illicit sexual contact.'' The 
legislation is also intended to include additional conduct in 
the definition of ``Federal sex offense'' under the recidivist 
child sex offender provision. Currently, this enhancement does 
not include ``sexual contact'' with children, which appears to 
be no more than an oversight in original drafting.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    First, H.R. 1862 closes a loophole in the definition of 
``illicit sexual conduct'' as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2423(f), by adding ``illicit sexual contact'' to the 
definition.
    The phrase ``illicit sexual conduct'' is referenced in: 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 2423(b), which prohibits someone from traveling in 
interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of ``engaging in 
illicit sexual conduct''; 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2423(c), which 
prohibits U.S. citizens and permanent residents from traveling 
in foreign commerce and engaging in illicit sexual conduct; and 
18 U.S.C. Sec. 2423(d), which prohibits someone from arranging 
the travel of a person for the purpose of engaging in illicit 
sexual conduct.
    The definition of ``illicit sexual conduct'' currently 
includes ``sexual acts'' with persons under 18, as defined in 
18 U.S.C. Sec. 2246. However, the definition does not also 
encompass ``sexual contact'' as defined in Sec. 2246. This 
means that ``illicit sexual conduct'' includes situations where 
an adult defendant molests a child, but it does not include 
situations in which a child is caused to touch an adult 
defendant--for example, a scenario where a U.S. citizen travels 
abroad and forces a child to manually stimulate his genitals. 
This section closes this loophole by striking the reference to 
``sexual act'' and instead defines illicit sexual conduct to 
include any conduct that would violate any child exploitation 
statute in Chapter 109A of title 18.
    Second, H.R. 1862 closes a loophole by including sexual 
contact with children in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3559(e), a recidivist 
provision specifically addressing child predators. It also 
amends current law to add sexual abuse of children abroad as a 
predicate offense for an enhanced sentence under Sec. 3559(e).
    Section 3559(e)(1) currently provides that a ``person who 
is convicted of a Federal sex offense in which a minor is the 
victim shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if the person 
has a prior sex conviction in which a minor was the victim. . . 
.'' ``Federal sex offense'' is defined in section 
Sec. 3559(e)(2), which enumerates several sexual offense 
statutes. This reference as to what constitutes a ``Federal sex 
offense,'' however, does not include sexual contact with 
children under the age of 12, or aggravated sexual contact with 
children aged 12-15, because the definition of Federal sex 
offense in Sec. 3559(e)(2) refers only to Sec. 2244(a)(1) of 
the Abusive Sexual Contact statute (which covers forcible 
sexual contact or contact where victim is unconscious) and not 
Sec. 2244(a)(5) (which covers sexual contact where the victim 
is under 12, and aggravated sexual contact with children 
between 12 and 15).
    Thus, Sec. 3559 currently does not incorporate sexual 
contact with children under the age of 12 or aggravated sexual 
contact with children aged 12-15. It makes no sense that 
Sec. 3559(e), which is a recidivist provision specifically 
addressing sex offenders who prey upon children, would not 
reach all contact offenses against the youngest of children. 
This is especially so since federal law treats sexual contact 
with a child under the age of 12 or a child aged 12-15 under 
aggravating circumstances as a significantly more serious 
offense than sexual contact committed through force or threats 
or with an unconscious or impaired adult victim.
    Paradoxically, the omission of Sec. 2244(a)(5) in the 
definition of Federal sex offense means that a defendant who 
commits sexual contact with a victim aged 12-15 either through 
force or threats or when the victim is unconscious or impaired 
will have a qualifying predicate or prior conviction if he was 
charged under Sec. 2244(a)(1), but not if he were charged under 
Sec. 2244(a)(5). The only difference between the two charges is 
that the latter charge requires proof of the age of the victim 
and carries a higher penalty.
    There is no way to justify the inclusion of two sex 
offenses that carry penalties of up to 10 years in prison as 
predicate and qualifying convictions under Sec. 3559(e), but 
the exclusion of an offense that is specifically designed to 
protect children of especially tender years and that carries 
the maximum prison term available under the law. H.R. 1862 
closes this loophole by including Sec. 2244(a)(5) in the 
definition of ``Federal sex offense'' in Sec. 3559(e)(2).
    Finally, H.R. 1862 adds 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2423(c), which 
prohibits the sexual abuse of children abroad by U.S. citizens, 
as a predicate offense to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3559(e). As currently 
written, Sec. 2423(c) is the only criminal provision 
prohibiting the sexual abuse of children that is not referenced 
in Sec. 3559(e).
    Closing these technical loopholes is necessary to prevent 
dangerous predators from escaping liability altogether in 
circumstances in which they are engaging in certain uncovered 
conduct abroad and also to prevent recidivist offenders who 
have previously sexually abused a child from avoiding the 
sentencing enhancement provision due to mere technicalities.

                                Hearings

    The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on H.R. 
1862, but held a hearing on the subject of child exploitation 
generally on March 16, 2017.

                        Committee Consideration

    On April 5, 2017, the Committee met in open session and 
ordered the bill H.R. 1862 favorably reported, without 
amendment, by voice vote, a quorum being present.

                            Committee Votes

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's 
consideration of H.R. 1862.
    1. An Amendment, offered by Mr. Conyers to create a 
separate sentencing framework for recidivist penalties for 
those previously convicted of certain offenses that did not 
include mandatory minimum sentences. The amendment was defeated 
by a roll call vote of 2 to 14.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Ayes    Nays   Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Goodlatte (VA), Chairman...................              X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Jr. (WI)....................              X
Mr. Smith (TX).................................
Mr. Chabot (OH)................................
Mr. Issa (CA)..................................
Mr. King (IA)..................................
Mr. Franks (AZ)................................              X
Mr. Gohmert (TX)...............................              X
Mr. Jordan (OH)................................
Mr. Poe (TX)...................................              X
Mr. Chaffetz (UT)..............................              X
Mr. Marino (PA)................................              X
Mr. Gowdy (SC).................................              X
Mr. Labrador (ID)..............................
Mr. Farenthold (TX)............................
Mr. Collins (GA)...............................
Mr. DeSantis (FL)..............................
Mr. Buck (CO)..................................
Mr. Ratcliffe (TX).............................              X
Ms. Roby (AL)..................................              X
Mr. Gaetz (FL).................................              X
Mr. Johnson (LA)...............................              X
Mr. Biggs (AZ).................................              X
 
Mr. Conyers, Jr. (MI), Ranking Member..........      X
Mr. Nadler (NY)................................
Ms. Lofgren (CA)...............................
Ms. Jackson Lee (TX)...........................      X
Mr. Cohen (TN).................................
Mr. Johnson (GA)...............................
Mr. Deutch (FL)................................
Mr. Gutierrez (IL).............................
Ms. Bass (CA)..................................
Mr. Richmond (LA)..............................
Mr. Jeffries (NY)..............................
Mr. Cicilline (RI).............................
Mr. Swalwell (CA)..............................
Mr. Lieu (CA)..................................              X
Mr. Raskin (MD)................................
Ms. Jayapal (WA)...............................
Mr. Schneider (IL).............................
                                                ------------------------
    Total......................................      2      14   .......
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 1862, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, May 12, 2017.
Hon. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1862, the Global 
Child Protection Act of 2017.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz, who can be reached at 226-2860.
            Sincerely,
                                                        Keith Hall.
Enclosure
        cc: Honorable John Conyers Jr.
           Ranking Member



             H.R. 1862--Global Child Protection Act of 2017


As ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on April 5, 
                                  2017




    H.R. 1862 would broaden the coverage of current laws 
relating to unlawful sexual conduct with minors. As a result, 
the government might be able to pursue cases that it otherwise 
would not be able to prosecute. CBO expects that the bill would 
apply to a relatively small number of offenders, however, so 
any increase in costs for law enforcement, court proceedings, 
or prison operations would not be significant. Any such costs 
would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
    Enacting the bill could affect direct spending and 
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. Because 
those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 1862 could be subject 
to criminal fines, the federal government might collect 
additional fines if the legislation is enacted. Criminal fines 
are recorded as revenues, deposited in the Crime Victims Fund, 
and later spent without further appropriation action. CBO 
expects that any additional revenues and subsequent direct 
spending would not be significant because the legislation would 
probably affect only a small number of cases.
    CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 1862 would not increase 
net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four 
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028.
    H.R. 1862 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. 
The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    No provision of H.R. 1862 establishes or reauthorizes a 
program of the Federal government known to be duplicative of 
another Federal program, a program that was included in any 
report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress 
pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program 
related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of 
Federal Domestic Assistance.

                  Disclosure of Directed Rule Makings

    The Committee estimates that H.R. 1862 specifically directs 
to be completed no specific rule makings within the meaning of 
5 U.S.C. 551.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 
1862 closes loopholes in child exploitation laws by expanding 
conduct that constitutes criminal offenses committed abroad and 
expanding conduct that qualifies a predator for recidivist 
sentencing enhancement provisions.

                          Advisory on Earmarks

    In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 1862 does not contain any 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of Rule XXI.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

    Section 1. Short Title. This section cites the short title 
of the bill as the ``Global Child Protection Act of 2017.''
    Section 2. Expanding the Definition of Explicit Sexual 
Conduct. This section closes a loophole in the definition of 
``illicit sexual conduct'' as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2423(f), by 
adding ``illicit sexual contact'' to the definition. Section 
2423 of Chapter 109A covers sex offenses against minors 
committed abroad as well as arranging travel of a person to 
engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor. The bill expands 
the range of conduct covered to include ``illicit sexual 
contact,'' as opposed to merely ``illicit sexual conduct,'' 
which does not encompass behavior such as making a child touch 
an adult in a sexual manner.
    Section 3. Expanding the Definition of Federal Sex Offense. 
This section closes a loophole by including sexual contact with 
children (18 U.S.C. 2241(a)(5)) as a federal sex offense that 
would trigger the recidivist sentencing enhancements provided 
for in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3559(e), which is a recidivist provision 
for sex offenders who victimize minors. It also amends current 
law to add sexual abuse of children abroad (18 U.S.C. 2423(c)) 
as a predicate offense under Sec. 3559(e).

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

   In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART I--CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  CHAPTER 117--TRANSPORTATION FOR ILLEGAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY AND RELATED 
CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 2423. Transportation of minors

   (a) Transportation With Intent To Engage in Criminal Sexual 
Activity.--A person who knowingly transports an individual who 
has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign 
commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of 
the United States, with intent that the individual engage in 
prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person 
can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under 
this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
   (b) Travel With Intent To Engage in Illicit Sexual 
Conduct.--A person who travels in interstate commerce or 
travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or 
an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States 
who travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in 
any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
   (c) Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign Places.--
Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent 
residence who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either 
temporarily or permanently, in a foreign country, and engages 
in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or 
both.
   (d) Ancillary Offenses.--Whoever, for the purpose of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain, arranges, 
induces, procures, or facilitates the travel of a person 
knowing that such a person is traveling in interstate commerce 
or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit 
sexual conduct shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not 
more than 30 years, or both.
   (e) Attempt and Conspiracy.--Whoever attempts or conspires 
to violate subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) shall be punishable 
in the same manner as a completed violation of that subsection.
   (f) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``illicit 
sexual conduct'' means--
           (1) [a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with] 
        any conduct involving a person under 18 years of age 
        that would be in violation of chapter 109A [if the 
        sexual act] if the conduct occurred in the special 
        maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
        States;
           (2) any commercial sex act (as defined in section 
        1591) with a person under 18 years of age; or
           (3) production of child pornography (as defined in 
        section 2256(8)).
   (g) Defense.--In a prosecution under this section based on 
illicit sexual conduct as defined in subsection (f)(2), it is a 
defense, which the defendant must establish by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the defendant reasonably believed 
that the person with whom the defendant engaged in the 
commercial sex act had attained the age of 18 years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART II--CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 227--SENTENCES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER A--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. Sec. 3559. Sentencing classification of offenses

   (a) Classification.--An offense that is not specifically 
classified by a letter grade in the section defining it, is 
classified if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is--
           (1) life imprisonment, or if the maximum penalty is 
        death, as a Class A felony;
           (2) twenty-five years or more, as a Class B felony;
           (3) less than twenty-five years but ten or more 
        years, as a Class C felony;
           (4) less than ten years but five or more years, as a 
        Class D felony;
           (5) less than five years but more than one year, as 
        a Class E felony;
           (6) one year or less but more than six months, as a 
        Class A misdemeanor;
           (7) six months or less but more than thirty days, as 
        a Class B misdemeanor;
           (8) thirty days or less but more than five days, as 
        a Class C misdemeanor; or
           (9) five days or less, or if no imprisonment is 
        authorized, as an infraction.
   (b) Effect of Classification.--Except as provided in 
subsection (c), an offense classified under subsection (a) 
carries all the incidents assigned to the applicable letter 
designation, except that the maximum term of imprisonment is 
the term authorized by the law describing the offense.
   (c) Imprisonment of Certain Violent Felons.--
           (1) Mandatory life imprisonment.--Notwithstanding 
        any other provision of law, a person who is convicted 
        in a court of the United States of a serious violent 
        felony shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if--
                   (A) the person has been convicted (and those 
                convictions have become final) on separate 
                prior occasions in a court of the United States 
                or of a State of--
                           (i) 2 or more serious violent 
                        felonies; or
                           (ii) one or more serious violent 
                        felonies and one or more serious drug 
                        offenses; and
                   (B) each serious violent felony or serious 
                drug offense used as a basis for sentencing 
                under this subsection, other than the first, 
                was committed after the defendant's conviction 
                of the preceding serious violent felony or 
                serious drug offense.
           (2) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
                   (A) the term ``assault with intent to commit 
                rape'' means an offense that has as its 
                elements engaging in physical contact with 
                another person or using or brandishing a weapon 
                against another person with intent to commit 
                aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse (as 
                described in sections 2241 and 2242);
                   (B) the term ``arson'' means an offense that 
                has as its elements maliciously damaging or 
                destroying any building, inhabited structure, 
                vehicle, vessel, or real property by means of 
                fire or an explosive;
                   (C) the term ``extortion'' means an offense 
                that has as its elements the extraction of 
                anything of value from another person by 
                threatening or placing that person in fear of 
                injury to any person or kidnapping of any 
                person;
                   (D) the term ``firearms use'' means an 
                offense that has as its elements those 
                described in section 924(c) or 929(a), if the 
                firearm was brandished, discharged, or 
                otherwise used as a weapon and the crime of 
                violence or drug trafficking crime during and 
                relation to which the firearm was used was 
                subject to prosecution in a court of the United 
                States or a court of a State, or both;
                   (E) the term ``kidnapping'' means an offense 
                that has as its elements the abduction, 
                restraining, confining, or carrying away of 
                another person by force or threat of force;
                   (F) the term ``serious violent felony'' 
                means--
                           (i) a Federal or State offense, by 
                        whatever designation and wherever 
                        committed, consisting of murder (as 
                        described in section 1111); 
                        manslaughter other than involuntary 
                        manslaughter (as described in section 
                        1112); assault with intent to commit 
                        murder (as described in section 
                        113(a)); assault with intent to commit 
                        rape; aggravated sexual abuse and 
                        sexual abuse (as described in sections 
                        2241 and 2242); abusive sexual contact 
                        (as described in sections 
                        Sec. 2244(a)(1) and (a)(2)); 
                        kidnapping; aircraft piracy (as 
                        described in section 46502 of Title 
                        49); robbery (as described in section 
                        2111, 2113, or 2118); carjacking (as 
                        described in section 2119); extortion; 
                        arson; firearms use; firearms 
                        possession (as described in section 
                        924(c)); or attempt, conspiracy, or 
                        solicitation to commit any of the above 
                        offenses; and
                           (ii) any other offense punishable by 
                        a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 
                        years or more that has as an element 
                        the use, attempted use, or threatened 
                        use of physical force against the 
                        person of another or that, by its 
                        nature, involves a substantial risk 
                        that physical force against the person 
                        of another may be used in the course of 
                        committing the offense;
                   (G) the term ``State'' means a State of the 
                United States, the District of Columbia, and a 
                commonwealth, territory, or possession of the 
                United States; and
                   (H) the term ``serious drug offense'' 
                means--
                           (i) an offense that is punishable 
                        under section 401(b)(1)(A) or 408 of 
                        the Controlled Substances Act (21 
                        U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 848) or section 
                        1010(b)(1)(A) of the Controlled 
                        Substances Import and Export Act (21 
                        U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(A)); or
                           (ii) an offense under State law 
                        that, had the offense been prosecuted 
                        in a court of the United States, would 
                        have been punishable under section 
                        401(b)(1)(A) or 408 of the Controlled 
                        Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 
                        848) or section 1010(b)(1)(A) of the 
                        Controlled Substances Import and Export 
                        Act (21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(A)).
           (3) Nonqualifying felonies.--
                   (A) Robbery in certain cases.--Robbery, an 
                attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit 
                robbery; or an offense described in paragraph 
                (2)(F)(ii) shall not serve as a basis for 
                sentencing under this subsection if the 
                defendant establishes by clear and convincing 
                evidence that--
                           (i) no firearm or other dangerous 
                        weapon was used in the offense and no 
                        threat of use of a firearm or other 
                        dangerous weapon was involved in the 
                        offense; and
                           (ii) the offense did not result in 
                        death or serious bodily injury (as 
                        defined in section 1365) to any person.
                   (B) Arson in certain cases.--Arson shall not 
                serve as a basis for sentencing under this 
                subsection if the defendant establishes by 
                clear and convincing evidence that--
                           (i) the offense posed no threat to 
                        human life; and
                           (ii) the defendant reasonably 
                        believed the offense posed no threat to 
                        human life.
           (4) Information filed by United States Attorney.--
        The provisions of section 411(a) of the Controlled 
        Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 851(a)) shall apply to the 
        imposition of sentence under this subsection.
           (5) Rule of construction.--This subsection shall not 
        be construed to preclude imposition of the death 
        penalty.
           (6) Special provision for Indian country.--No person 
        subject to the criminal jurisdiction of an Indian 
        tribal government shall be subject to this subsection 
        for any offense for which Federal jurisdiction is 
        solely predicated on Indian country (as defined in 
        section 1151) and which occurs within the boundaries of 
        such Indian country unless the governing body of the 
        tribe has elected that this subsection have effect over 
        land and persons subject to the criminal jurisdiction 
        of the tribe.
           (7) Resentencing upon overturning of prior 
        conviction.--If the conviction for a serious violent 
        felony or serious drug offense that was a basis for 
        sentencing under this subsection is found, pursuant to 
        any appropriate State or Federal procedure, to be 
        unconstitutional or is vitiated on the explicit basis 
        of innocence, or if the convicted person is pardoned on 
        the explicit basis of innocence, the person serving a 
        sentence imposed under this subsection shall be 
        resentenced to any sentence that was available at the 
        time of the original sentencing.
   (d) Death or Imprisonment for Crimes AgainstChildren.--
           (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2) and 
        notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person 
        who is convicted of a Federal offense that is a serious 
        violent felony (as defined in subsection (c)) or a 
        violation of section 2422, 2423, or 2251 shall, unless 
        the sentence of death is imposed, be sentenced to 
        imprisonment for life, if--
                   (A) the victim of the offense has not 
                attained the age of 14 years;
                   (B) the victim dies as a result of the 
                offense; and
                   (C) the defendant, in the course of the 
                offense, engages in conduct described in 
                section 3591(a)(2).
           (2) Exception.--With respect to a person convicted 
        of a Federal offense described in paragraph (1), the 
        court may impose any lesser sentence that is authorized 
        by law to take into account any substantial assistance 
        provided by the defendant in the investigation or 
        prosecution of another person who has committed an 
        offense, in accordance with the Federal Sentencing 
        Guidelines and the policy statements of the Federal 
        Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(p) of 
        title 28, or for other good cause.
   (e) Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Repeated Sex Offenses 
Against Children.--
           (1) In general.--A person who is convicted of a 
        Federal sex offense in which a minor is the victim 
        shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if the person 
        has a prior sex conviction in which a minor was the 
        victim, unless the sentence of death is imposed.
           (2) Definitions.--For the purposes of this 
        subsection--
                   (A) the term ``Federal sex offense'' means 
                an offense under section 1591 (relating to sex 
                trafficking of children), 2241 (relating to 
                aggravated sexual abuse), 2242 (relating to 
                sexual abuse), Sec. 2244(a)(1) or 
                Sec. 2244(a)(5) (relating to abusive sexual 
                contact), 2245 (relating to sexual abuse 
                resulting in death), 2251 (relating to sexual 
                exploitation of children), 2251A (relating to 
                selling or buying of children), 2422(b) 
                (relating to coercion and enticement of a minor 
                [into prostitution]), [or] 2423(a) (relating to 
                transportation of minors) or 2423(c) (relating 
                to illicit sexual conduct) ;
                   (B) the term ``State sex offense'' means an 
                offense under State law that is punishable by 
                more than one year in prison and consists of 
                conduct that would be a Federal sex offense if, 
                to the extent or in the manner specified in the 
                applicable provision of this title--
                           (i) the offense involved interstate 
                        or foreign commerce, or the use of the 
                        mails; or
                           (ii) the conduct occurred in any 
                        commonwealth, territory, or possession 
                        of the United States, within the 
                        special maritime and territorial 
                        jurisdiction of the United States, in a 
                        Federal prison, on any land or building 
                        owned by, leased to, or otherwise used 
                        by or under the control of the 
                        Government of the United States, or in 
                        the Indian country (as defined in 
                        section 1151);
                   (C) the term ``prior sex conviction'' means 
                a conviction for which the sentence was imposed 
                before the conduct occurred constituting the 
                subsequent Federal sex offense, and which was 
                for a Federal sex offense or a State sex 
                offense;
                   (D) the term ``minor'' means an individual 
                who has not attained the age of 17 years; and
                   (E) the term ``State'' has the meaning given 
                that term in subsection (c)(2).
           (3) Nonqualifying Felonies.--An offense described in 
        section 2422(b) [or 2423(a)], 2423(a), or 2423(c) shall 
        not serve as a basis for sentencing under this 
        subsection if the defendant establishes by clear and 
        convincing evidence that--
                   (A) the sexual act or activity was 
                consensual and not for the purpose of 
                commercial or pecuniary gain;
                   (B) the sexual act or activity would not be 
                punishable by more than one year in prison 
                under the law of the State in which it 
                occurred; or
                   (C) no sexual act or activity occurred.
   (f) Mandatory Minimum Terms of Imprisonment for Violent 
Crimes Against Children.--A person who is convicted of a 
Federal offense that is a crime of violence against the person 
of an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years 
shall, unless a greater mandatory minimum sentence of 
imprisonment is otherwise provided by law and regardless of any 
maximum term of imprisonment otherwise provided for the 
offense--
           (1) if the crime of violence is murder, be 
        imprisoned for life or for any term of years not less 
        than 30, except that such person shall be punished by 
        death or life imprisonment if the circumstances satisfy 
        any of subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section 
        3591(a)(2) of this title;
           (2) if the crime of violence is kidnapping (as 
        defined in section 1201) or maiming (as defined in 
        section 114), be imprisoned for life or any term of 
        years not less than 25; and
           (3) if the crime of violence results in serious 
        bodily injury (as defined in section 1365), or if a 
        dangerous weapon was used during and in relation to the 
        crime of violence, be imprisoned for life or for any 
        term of years not less than 10.
   (g)(1) If a defendant who is convicted of a felony offense 
(other than offense of which an element is the false 
registration of a domain name) knowingly falsely registered a 
domain name and knowingly used that domain name in the course 
of that offense, the maximum imprisonment otherwise provided by 
law for that offense shall be doubled or increased by 7 years, 
whichever is less.
   (2) As used in this section--
           (A) the term ``falsely registers'' means registers 
        in a manner that prevents the effective identification 
        of or contact with the person who registers; and
           (B) the term ``domain name'' has the meaning given 
        that term is section 45 of the Act entitled ``An Act to 
        provide for the registration and protection of 
        trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the 
        provisions of certain international conventions, and 
        for other purposes'' approved July 5, 1946 (commonly 
        referred to as the ``Trademark Act of 1946'') (15 
        U.S.C. 1127).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                            Dissenting Views

                              INTRODUCTION

    H.R. 1862, the ``Global Child Protection Act of 2017,'' 
would expand the federal criminal code's definitions pertaining 
to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. Specifically, the bill 
would expand the definition of ``illicit sexual conduct'' as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2423(f)(1) and the definition of a 
``Federal sex offense'' as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3559(e). 
As a result of these expansions, more individuals would be 
subject to mandatory minimum sentences, specifically life 
imprisonment, which is the penalty for these recidivist 
offenses under current law. We have long-opposed the imposition 
of mandatory minimum sentences because of their extraordinary 
injustice, role in causing prison overcrowding, and the 
excessive costs to taxpayers they cause. Mandatory minimum 
sentences have had a particularly devastating impact on 
minority communities across our Nation. Given the fact that 
H.R. 1862 would subject more individuals to mandatory minimum 
sentences, we must respectfully dissent and urge our colleagues 
to oppose this legislation when it comes to the floor.

                       DESCRIPTION AND BACKGROUND

                              DESCRIPTION

    Section 2 of the bill expands the definition of ``illicit 
sexual conduct'' found in section 2423(f)(1) of title 18 of the 
United States Code, changing it from a sexual act with a minor 
as defined in section 2246 that would violate chapter 109A of 
title 18, to any conduct involving a minor that would violate 
chapter 109A. Section 3 expands the definition of a ``Federal 
sex offense'' to include violations of section Sec. 2244(a)(5) 
(sexual abuse of a minor between the ages 12 and 15) and 
section 2423(c) (relating to illicit sexual conduct in foreign 
places). Section 3 also provides that section 2423(c) will not 
serve as basis for a mandatory life sentence if evidence is 
provided as set forth in section Sec. 3559(e)(3).

                               BACKGROUND

    ``Illicit sexual conduct,'' as defined in section 
2423(f)\1\ of title 18 of the United States Code, includes any 
``sexual act'' with a minor, as defined in section 2246,\2\ but 
does not include ``sexual contact,'' which is also defined in 
section 2246.\3\ The phrase ``illicit sexual conduct'' is 
referenced in: section 2423(b), which prohibits travel in 
interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of ``engaging in 
illicit sexual conduct;'' section 2423(c), which prohibits U.S. 
citizens and permanent residents from traveling in foreign 
commerce and engaging in illicit sexual conduct; and section 
2423(d), which prohibits arranging travel for the purpose 
engaging in illicit sexual conduct. The acts prohibited in 
chapter 109A\4\ (Sexual Abuse) include sexual acts and sexual 
contact. H.R. 1862 would remove the reference to a ``sexual 
act'' and instead define ``illicit sexual conduct'' as any 
conduct that would violate chapter 109A, thereby significantly 
expanding the types of behavior that may be prosecuted under 
sections 2423(b), (c), and (d). These offenses are, however, 
not subject to mandatory minimum sentencing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2423 (2017) (transportation of minors).
    \2\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2426(2) (2017) defines ``sexual act'' as: contact 
between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for 
purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon 
penetration, however slight; contact between the mouth and the penis, 
the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; the penetration, 
however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or 
finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, 
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or the 
intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of 
another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent 
to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person.
    \3\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2426(3) (2017) defines ``sexual contact'' as the 
intentional touching, either directly or through the clothing, of the 
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person 
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or 
gratify the sexual desire of any person.
    \4\Offenses included in chapter 109A: section 2241 (Aggravated Sex 
Abuse); section 2242 (Sexual Abuse); section 2243 (Sexual Abuse of a 
Minor or Ward); section Sec. 2244 (Abusive Sexual Contact); and section 
2245 (Offenses Resulting in Death).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 3559(e) of title 18 provides that a ``person who is 
convicted of a Federal sex offense in which a minor is the 
victim shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if the person 
has a prior sex conviction in which a minor was the victim . . 
. .'' Currently, the term ``Federal sex offense'' is defined 
within the statute as an offense under sections: 1591 (relating 
to sex trafficking of children, 2241 (relating to aggravated 
sexual abuse), 2242 (relating to sexual abuse), 2244(a)(1) 
(relating to abusive sexual contact), 2245 (relating to sexual 
abuse resulting in death), 2251 (relating to sexual 
exploitation of children), 2251A (relating to selling or buying 
of children), 2422(b) (relating to coercion and enticement of a 
minor into prostitution), or 2423(a) (relating to 
transportation of minors). As ``Federal sex offense'' presently 
refers only to section 2244(a)(1), the term does not include 
sexual contact with children under the age of 12 or aggravated 
sexual contact with children who are 12 to 15 years old, both 
of which are found in section 2244(a)(5). This bill would amend 
section 3559(e) to include offenses under section 2244(a)(5) 
and section 2423(c).
    Section 2244\5\ sets forth criminal offenses involving 
sexual contact, instead of sexual acts, but references 
categories of crimes that are sexual acts defined in section 
2241. In particular, section 2244(a)(1) criminalizes sexual 
contact, involving conduct described in section 2241(a) and 
(b). Section 2244(a)(5) criminalizes sexual contact, involving 
conduct described in section 2241(c); section 2241(c) prohibits 
aggravated sexual abuse of children under the age 12 and 
children who are 12 to 15 years old.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2244 (2017) (Abusive Sexual Contact).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The only differences between the offenses in sections 
2244(a)(1) and (a)(5) are that the latter requires proof of the 
age of the victim and carries higher penalties. In fact, the 
penalty for section 2241(c) violations is significantly more 
severe than the penalties for sections 2241(a) and (b). Section 
2241(c) violations are punishable by a mandatory prison term of 
at least 30 years up to life for sexual acts and a maximum of 
life in prison for sexual contact. Violations of sections 
2241(a) and (b) are punishable by a maximum of life in prison 
for sexual acts and a maximum of ten years in prison for sexual 
contact; neither offense (section 2241(a) or (b)) is subject to 
mandatory minimum sentencing. As a result of the exclusion of 
section 2244(a)(5) offenses from the definition of ``Federal 
offense,'' the recidivist provision of section 3559(e) does not 
apply to offenders who commit sexual contact offenses against 
children under the age of 12 or children who are 12 to 15 years 
old.
    H.R. 1862 would add section 2244(a)(5) to section 3559(e), 
subjecting such offenders with prior sex convictions involving 
minor victims to mandatory sentences of life in prison. Section 
3559(e) would also be amended to include section 2423(c), which 
prohibits the sexual abuse of children abroad by U.S. citizens, 
as a predicate offense for recidivist treatment; section 
2423(c) would be added to the subsection outlining 
``nonqualifying felonies.'' Under section 3559(e)(3), an 
offense will not serve as a basis for the mandatory life 
sentence if the defendant establishes by clear and convincing 
evidence that the sexual act or activity was consensual and not 
for the purpose of commercial or pecuniary gain and the sexual 
act or activity would not be punishable by more than one year 
in prison under the law of the state in which it occurred; or 
no sexual act or activity occurred.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\18 U.S.C. Sec. 3559(e)(3) (2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                CONCERNS

    I. THE BILL WOULD SUBJECT MORE INDIVIDUALS TO THE IMPOSITION OF 
                      MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES

    Our concerns with this bill primarily stem from the 
expanded application of mandatory minimum sentences that would 
result from broadening the scope of individuals who would be 
subject to such penalties under the bill. H.R. 1862 amends 
section 3559(e) to include offenses under section 2244(a)(5) 
and section 2423(c) as predicates for recidivist treatment. 
While the predicate offenses would involve aggravated sexual 
abuse of children under the age of 12 and children who are 12 
to 15 years old and the sexual abuse of children abroad by U.S. 
citizens, this amendment would add new classes of offenders 
subject to mandatory sentences of life in prison.
    During the Committee's consideration of this bill, Ranking 
Member John Conyers, Jr. offered an amendment to address these 
concerns. Unfortunately, that amendment was defeated by a vote 
of 2 to 14. While we would prefer that mandatory minimum 
sentences be removed from federal law altogether, we believe 
the amendment offered by Ranking Member John Conyers, Jr. 
represented a reasonable compromise that would have addressed 
some of our concerns while not harming the goal of the bill.
    The amendment would have provided that, for the offenses 
that the bill would add as predicates for recidivist treatment, 
these offenses would not be subject to the mandatory life 
imprisonment, but instead would be subject only to the maximum 
of life in prison, based on judicial discretion. In making this 
change, the amendment would still allow judges to impose life 
sentences in appropriate cases, but judges would also have the 
discretion to impose sentences less than life in prison if 
deemed more appropriate under the circumstances. The amendment 
did not suggest that the conduct that the bill would subject to 
recidivist penalties is not deserving of additional punishment, 
but that mandatory minimums--of life imprisonment no less--are 
not the right way to impose sentences.

 II. H.R. 1862 WOULD ONLY EXACERBATE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY MANDATORY 
                           MINIMUM SENTENCES

    Congress should work to eliminate mandatory minimum 
sentences altogether, not expand them as would be the result 
under H.R. 1862. Mandatory minimum sentences are the wrong way 
to determine punishment. They not only lead to unjust outcomes 
for individuals, but also have serious systemic consequences by 
contributing to the problem of overincarceration. Since 
Congress enacted harsh mandatory minimums in the 1980s, the 
federal prison population has exploded by over 700% to more 
than 188,000 inmates today.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Historical 
Information, at http://www.bop.gov/about/history/ (last visited May 15, 
2017); U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Statistics: 
Offenses, at http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/
statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp. (Mar. 25, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, higher than warranted sentences resulting from 
mandatory minimum sentencing strain public finances. 
Expenditures for the federal Bureau of Prisons have risen to 
comprise approximately 25 percent of the total budget of the 
Department of Justice.\7\ Every dollar expended on lengthy 
mandatory minimum incarcerations is a dollar that cannot be 
spent on crime prevention, victim services, training, 
investigation, and prosecution. Absent smarter sentencing 
policies and reformation of mandatory minimum sentences, prison 
populations and their associated costs will continue to 
escalate. We need to take steps to ensure that sentences are 
appropriately severe, but are not set beyond levels that no 
longer serve legitimate criminal justice purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\The Charles Colson Task Force on Federal Corrections, 
Consequences of Growth in the Federal Prison Population (May 2015), 
available at http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/
52636/2000221-Consequences-of-Growth-in-the-Federal-Prison-
Population.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While long sentences may be appropriate under the facts of 
a particular violation of law, Congress cannot know the facts 
of every case in advance. Judges are in the best position to 
impose sentences that are appropriate for the facts and 
circumstances of each case. Even recognizing the seriousness of 
these offenses, removing mandatory minimums--while still 
permitting the lengthy statutory maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment--would provide the appropriate spectrum of 
sentences for culpability and proportionate punishment.

                               CONCLUSION

    Without question, crimes against children are particularly 
egregious. Congress must do everything it can to prevent these 
crimes and, when they do occur, hold offenders accountable. 
Expanding the scope of individuals subject to mandatory minimum 
sentences, however, is the wrong answer. Such offenders would 
still be subject to appropriately severe penalties if minimums 
were eliminated and judges imposed sentences based on the facts 
and circumstances of each case, up to the already-lengthy 
statutory maximum sentences. Unfortunately, H.R. 1862 fails to 
address this critical concern with respect to new classes of 
offenders who would be subject to punishment under the bill.
    Accordingly, we must oppose H.R. 1862 and we urge our 
colleagues to join us in opposition.

                                   Mr. Conyers, Jr.
                                   Ms. Jackson Lee.
                                   Mr. Johnson, Jr.
                                   Mr. Gutierrez.
                                   Ms. Bass.
                                   Mr. Richmond.
                                   Mr. Jeffries.

                                  [all]