FOMC POLICY RESPONSIBILITY ACT

DECEMBER 12, 2018.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. HENSARLING, from the Committee on Financial Services, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 4758]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 4758) to amend the Federal Reserve Act to require the Federal Open Market Committee to establish interest rates on balances maintained at a Federal Reserve Bank by depository institutions, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass.

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

On January 10, 2018, Representative Tenney introduced H.R. 4758, the “FOMC Policy Responsibility Act”, which amends Subparagraph (A) of section 19(b)(12) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 461(b)(12)(A)) to provide for the full Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), not just the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), to establish interest rates on balances maintained at a Federal Reserve Bank by depository institutions.

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Monetary policy independence is a cornerstone for price stability, and the opportunity it can create for every American to fully engage with our economy. But emergency measures that the Fed initiated in response to the 2007–09 financial crisis have, contrary to
clear legislative intent, become conventional. As Dr. Norbert Michel told the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, “Congress should hold the Fed accountable, and ensure that it no longer has the discretion to “manage” the economy however it sees fit through some vague macroeconomic mandate.” The Federal Reserve’s payment of above-market interest rates on balances that depository institutions maintain at their Federal Reserve Banks is just such a measure. It provides for excessive interest payments to the world’s largest depository institutions and continues to finance sizeable holdings of mortgage-backed-securities a decade out from the crisis.

To be sure, Congress’s authorization for Federal Reserve Banks to pay interest on reserves was intended to address the fact that banking under a Federal Reserve charter used to mean that required reserves earned zero interest. Instead of respecting this clear intent, the Federal Reserve Board stretched well beyond this statutory authority turn interest rates on reserves away from addressing an unnecessary cost for Federal Reserve membership into the Fed’s main monetary policy rate. Congress never intended this rate to play such a direct role in monetary policy. As George Selgin, Director, Center for Monetary and Financial Alternatives, Cato Institute, noted in his January 10, 2018 testimony H.R. 4758, “would correct the present, anomalous state of affairs, legally ensuring that monetary policy decisions rest with the FOMC, and not the Board.” Indeed, if Congress had any such intention, then the authorizing statute would have provided for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to establish rates of interest on reserve deposits. Instead, Congress explicitly gave the Board of Governors, not the FOMC, the sole responsibility to establish such rates.

Given that interest on reserves now regularly serves as a monetary policy rate, instead of a rate that simply addresses the opportunity cost of Federal Reserve membership, the Federal Reserve’s full monetary policy committee—the FOMC, not just the Board of Governors—should vote on that rate. As Alex Pollock from the R Street Institute noted in his January 10, 2018 testimony before the Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, “Since this interest rate has now become a key element of monetary policy, placing it with related monetary decisions is quite appropriate.” The Interest Rates on Balances Maintained at a Federal Reserve bank by Depository Institutions Established by the FOMC Policy Responsibility Act simply treats interest rates on reserves for what they have become—that is, monetary policy rates.

HEARINGS

The Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade held a hearing titled “A Further Examination of Federal Reserve Reform Proposals” to consider matters relating to H.R. 4758 on January 10, 2018.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on September 13, 2018, and ordered H.R. 4758 to be reported favorably to the House without amendment by voice vote, a quorum being present.
COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. A motion by Chairman Hensarling to report the bill favorably to the House was agreed to by a voice vote, a quorum being present.

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the Committee based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that H.R. 4758 will provide for more independent and better informed monetary policies.

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,

Hon. Jeb Hensarling,
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 4758, the FOMC Policy Responsibility Act.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Nathaniel Frentz.

Sincerely,

MARK P. HADLEY
(For Keith Hall, Director).

Enclosure.
H.R. 4758—FOMC Policy Responsibility Act

Under current law, Federal Reserve Banks are authorized to pay interest on balances held by or on behalf of depository institutions at Reserve Banks, subject to regulations of the Board of Governors. The central bank sets requirements on the minimum amount of reserves that must be held by a commercial bank. The Federal Reserve pays interest on those required reserves in order to offset the implicit tax that such requirements may otherwise impose on depository institutions. The Federal Reserve also pays interest on excess reserve balances as a principal tool of monetary policy, specifically to help control short term interest rates.

H.R. 4758 would amend the Federal Reserve Act to change the responsibility for setting the interest rate on reserve balances from the Board of Governors to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the seven members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; and four of the remaining eleven Reserve Bank presidents, who serve one-year terms on a rotating basis.

It is possible that the FOMC would choose different interest rates than those that the Board of Governors will choose under current law. CBO estimates, however, that the rates would not materially differ. The target range of interest rates is already set by the FOMC, and the interest rates set on reserve balances would be chosen to be consistent with those targets, whether the decision is made by the Board of Governors or the FOMC. As a result, CBO estimates implementing the bill would not affect the amount of interest paid on reserve balances or on the budget of the Federal Reserve System. CBO therefore estimates that the bill would not affect direct spending or revenues.

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 4758 would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2029.

H.R. 4758 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Nathaniel Frentz. The estimate was approved by John McClelland, Assistant Director for Tax Analysis.

Federal Mandates Statement

This information is provided in accordance with section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. The Committee has determined that the bill does not contain Federal mandates on the private sector. The Committee has determined that the bill does not impose a Federal intergovernmental mandate on State, local, or tribal governments.

Advisory Committee Statement

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation.
APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or accommodations within the meaning of the section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

With respect to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee has carefully reviewed the provisions of the bill and states that the provisions of the bill do not contain any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits within the meaning of the rule.

DUPICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(5) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee states that no provision of the bill establishes or reauthorizes: (1) a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program; (2) a program included in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111–139; or (3) a program related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, published pursuant to the Federal Program Information Act (Pub. L. No. 95–220, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98–169).

DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULEMAKING

Pursuant to section 3(i) of H. Res. 5, (115th Congress), the following statement is made concerning directed rule makings: The Committee estimates that the bill requires no directed rule makings within the meaning of such section.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title

This Section cites H.R. 4758 as the FOMC Policy Responsibility Act.

Section 2. Interest rates on balances maintained by depository institutions established by Federal Open Market Committee

This section provides for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), not just the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, to establish interest rates on balances maintained at a Federal Reserve Bank by depository institutions.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

FEDERAL RESERVE ACT

SEC. 19. (a) The Board is authorized for the purposes of this section to define the terms used in this section, to determine what shall be deemed a payment of interest, to determine what types of obligations, whether issued directly by a member bank or indirectly by an affiliate of a member bank or by other means, and regardless of the use of the proceeds, shall be deemed a deposit, and to prescribe such regulations as it may deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of this section and to prevent evasions thereof.

(b) RESERVE REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) DEFINITIONS.—The following definitions and rules apply to this subsection, subsection (c), section 11A, the first paragraph of section 13, and the second, thirteenth, and fourteenth paragraphs of section 16:

(A) The term “depository institution” means—

(i) any insured bank as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or any bank which is eligible to make application to become an insured bank under section 5 of such Act;

(ii) any mutual savings bank as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or any bank which is eligible to make application to become an insured bank under section 5 of such Act;

(iii) any savings bank as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or any bank which is eligible to make application to become an insured bank under section 5 of such Act;

(iv) any insured credit union as defined in section 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act or any credit union which is eligible to make application to become an insured credit union pursuant to section 201 of such Act;

(v) any member as defined in section 2 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act;

(vi) any savings association (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) which is an insured depository institution (as defined in such Act) or is eligible to apply to become an insured depository institution under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act; and

(vii) for the purpose of section 13 and the fourteenth paragraph of section 16, any association or entity which is wholly owned by or which consists only of institutions referred to in clauses (i) through (vi).

(B) The term “bank” means any insured or noninsured bank, as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act, other than a mutual savings bank or a savings bank as defined in such section.

(C) The term “transaction account” means a deposit or account on which the depositor or account holder is permitted to make withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instrument, payment orders of withdrawal, telephone transfers, or other similar items for the purpose of making payments or transfers to third persons or others. Such term includes demand deposits, negotiable order of withdrawal accounts, savings deposits subject to automatic transfers, and share draft accounts.

(D) The term “nonpersonal time deposits” means a transferable time deposit or account or a time deposit or account representing funds deposited to the credit of, or in which any beneficial interest is held by, a depositor who is not a natural person.

(E) The term “reservable liabilities” means transaction accounts, nonpersonal time deposits, and all net balances, loans, assets, and obligations which are, or may be, subject to reserve requirements under paragraph (5).

(F) In order to prevent evasions of the reserve requirements imposed by this subsection, after consultation with the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration Board, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is authorized to determine, by regulation or order, that an account or deposit is a transaction account if such account or deposit may be used to provide funds directly or indirectly for the purpose of making payments or transfers to third persons or others.

(2) RESERVE REQUIREMENTS.—(A) Each depository institution shall maintain reserves against its transaction accounts as the Board may prescribe by regulation solely for the purpose of implementing monetary policy—

(i) in a ratio of not greater than 3 percent (and which may be zero) for that portion of its total transaction accounts of $25,000,000 or less, subject to subparagraph (C); and

(ii) in the ratio of 12 per centum, or in such other ratio as the Board may prescribe not greater than 14 per centum (and which may be zero), for that portion of its total transaction accounts in excess of $25,000,000, subject to subparagraph (C).

(B) Each depository institution shall maintain reserves against its nonpersonal time deposits in the ratio of 3 per centum, or in such other ratio not greater than 9 per centum and not less than zero per centum as the Board may prescribe by regulation solely for the purpose of implementing monetary policy.

(C) Beginning in 1981, not later than December 31 of each year the Board shall issue a regulation increasing for the next succeeding calendar year the dollar amount which is contained in subparagraph (A) or which was last determined pursuant to this subparagraph for the purpose of such subparagraph, by an
amount obtained by multiplying such dollar amount by 80 per centum of the percentage increase in the total transaction accounts of all depository institutions. The increase in such transaction accounts shall be determined by subtracting the amount of such accounts on June 30 of the preceding calendar year from the amount of such accounts on June 30 of the calendar year involved. In the case of any such 12-month period in which there has been a decrease in the total transaction accounts of all depository institutions, the Board shall issue such a regulation decreasing for the next succeeding calendar year such dollar amount by an amount obtained by multiplying such dollar amount by 80 per centum of the percentage decrease in the total transaction accounts of all depository institutions. The decrease in such transaction accounts shall be determined by subtracting the amount of such accounts on June 30 of the calendar year involved from the amount of such accounts on June 30 of the previous calendar year.

(D) Any reserve requirement imposed under this subsection shall be uniformly applied to all transaction accounts at all depository institutions. Reserve requirements imposed under this subsection shall be uniformly applied to nonpersonal time deposits at all depository institutions, except that such requirements may vary by the maturity of such deposits.

(3) Waiver of Ratio Limits in Extraordinary Circumstances.—Upon a finding by at least 5 members of the Board that extraordinary circumstances require such action, the Board, after consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress, may impose, with respect to any liability of depository institutions, reserve requirements outside the limitations as to ratios and as to types of liabilities otherwise prescribed by paragraph (2) for a period not exceeding 180 days, and for further periods not exceeding 180 days each by affirmative action by at least 5 members of the Board in each instance. The Board shall promptly transmit to the Congress a report of any exercise of its authority under this paragraph and the reasons for such exercise of authority.

(4) Supplemental Reserves.—(A) The Board may, upon the affirmative vote of not less than 5 members, impose a supplemental reserve requirement on every depository institution of not more than 4 per centum of its total transaction accounts. Such supplemental reserve requirement may be imposed only if—

(i) the sole purpose of such requirement is to increase the amount of reserves maintained to a level essential for the conduct of monetary policy;

(ii) such requirement is not imposed for the purpose of reducing the cost burdens resulting from the imposition of the reserve requirements pursuant to paragraph (2);

(iii) such requirement is not imposed for the purpose of increasing the amount of balances needed for clearing purposes; and

(iv) on the date on which the supplemental reserve requirement is imposed, except as provided in paragraph (11), the total amount of reserves required pursuant to paragraph (2) is not less than the amount of reserves that
would be required if the initial ratios specified in paragraph (2) were in effect.

(B) The Board may require the supplemental reserve authorized under subparagraph (A) only after consultation with the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration Board. The Board shall promptly transmit to the Congress a report with respect to any exercise of its authority to require supplemental reserves under subparagraph (A) and such report shall state the basis for the determination to exercise such authority.

(C) If a supplemental reserve under subparagraph (A) has been required of depository institutions for a period of one year or more, the Board shall review and determine the need for continued maintenance of supplemental reserves and shall transmit annual reports to the Congress regarding the need, if any, for continuing the supplemental reserve.

(D) Any supplemental reserve imposed under subparagraph (A) shall terminate at the close of the first 90-day period after such requirement is imposed during which the average amount of reserves required under paragraph (2) are less than the amount of reserves which would be required during such period if the initial ratios specified in paragraph (2) were in effect.

(5) RESERVES RELATED TO FOREIGN OBLIGATIONS OR ASSETS.—Foreign branches, subsidiaries, and international banking facilities of nonmember depository institutions shall maintain reserves to the same extent required by the Board of foreign branches, subsidiaries, and international banking facilities of member banks. In addition to any reserves otherwise required to be maintained pursuant to this subsection, any depository institution shall maintain reserves in such ratios as the Board may prescribe against—

(A) net balances owed by domestic offices of such depository institution in the United States to its directly related foreign offices and to foreign offices of nonrelated depository institutions;

(B) loans to United States residents made by overseas offices of such depository institution if such depository institution has one or more offices in the United States; and

(C) assets (including participations) held by foreign offices of a depository institution in the United States which were acquired from its domestic offices.

(6) EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN DEPOSITS.—The requirements imposed under paragraph (2) shall not apply to deposits payable only outside the States of the United States and the District of Columbia, except that nothing in this subsection limits the authority of the Board to impose conditions and requirements on member banks under section 25 of this Act or the authority of the Board under section 7 of the International Banking Act of 1978.

(7) DISCOUNT AND BORROWING.—Any depository institution in which transaction accounts or nonpersonal time deposits are held shall be entitled to the same discount and borrowing privileges as member banks. In the administration of discount
and borrowing privileges, the Board and the Federal Reserve
banks shall take into consideration the special needs of savings
and other depository institutions for access to discount and
borrowing facilities consistent with their long-term asset port-
folios and the sensitivity of such institutions to trends in the
national money markets.

(8) TRANSITIONAL ADJUSTMENTS.—

(A) Any depository institution required to maintain re-
serves under this subsection which was engaged in busi-
ness on July 1, 1979, but was not a member of the Federal
Reserve System on or after that date, shall maintain re-
serves against its deposits during the first twelve-month
period following the effective date of this paragraph in
amounts equal to one-eighth of those otherwise required
by this subsection, during the second such twelve-month
period in amounts equal to one-fourth of those otherwise
required, during the third such twelve-month period in
amounts equal to three-eighths of those otherwise re-
quired, during the fourth twelve-month period in amounts
equal to one-half of those otherwise required, and during
the fifth twelve-month period in amounts equal to five-
eighths of those otherwise required, during the sixth
twelve-month period in amounts equal to three-fourths of
those otherwise required, and during the seventh twelve-
month period in amounts equal to seven-eighths of those
otherwise required. This subparagraph does not apply to
any category of deposits or accounts which are first author-
ized pursuant to Federal law in any State after April 1,
1980.

(B) With respect to any bank which was a member of the
Federal Reserve System during the entire period beginning
on July 1, 1979, and ending on the effective date of the
Monetary Control Act of 1980, the amount of required re-
serves imposed pursuant to this subsection on and after
the effective date of such Act that exceeds the amount of
reserves which would have been required of such bank if
the reserve ratios in effect during the reserve computation
period immediately preceding such effective date were ap-
plied may, at the discretion of the Board and in accordance
with such rules and regulations as it may adopt, be re-
duced by 75 per centum during the first year which begins
after such effective date, 50 per centum during the second
year, and 25 per centum during the third year.

(C)(i) With respect to any bank which is a member of the
Federal Reserve System on the effective date of the Monet-
ary Control Act of 1980, the amount of reserves which
would have been required of such bank if the reserve ra-
tios in effect during the reserve computation period imme-
diately preceding such effective date were applied that ex-
ceeds the amount of required reserves imposed pursuant to
this subsection shall, in accordance with such rules and
regulations as the Board may adopt, be reduced by 25 per
centum during the first year which begins after such effec-
tive date, 50 per centum during the second year, and 75
per centum during the third year.
(ii) If a bank becomes a member bank during the four-year period beginning on the effective date of the Monetary Control Act of 1980, and if the amount of reserves which would have been required of such bank, determined as if the reserve ratios in effect during the reserve computation period immediately preceding such effective date were applied, and as if such bank had been a member during such period, exceeds the amount of reserves required pursuant to this subsection, the amount of reserves required to be maintained by such bank beginning on the date on which such bank becomes a member of the Federal Reserve System shall be the amount of reserves which would have been required of such bank if it had been a member on the day before such effective date, except that the amount of such excess shall, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Board may adopt, be reduced by 25 per cent during the first year which begins after such effective date, 50 per cent during the second year, and 75 per cent during the third year.

(D)(i) Any bank which was a member bank on July 1, 1979, and which withdrew from membership in the Federal Reserve System during the period beginning on July 1, 1979, and ending on March 31, 1980, shall maintain reserves during the first twelve-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this clause in amounts equal to one-half of those otherwise required by this subsection, during the second such twelve-month period in amounts equal to two-thirds of those otherwise required, and during the third such twelve-month period in amounts equal to five-sixths of those otherwise required.

(ii) Any bank which withdraws from membership in the Federal Reserve System on or after the date of enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 shall maintain reserves in the same amount as member banks are required to maintain under this subsection, pursuant to subparagraphs (B) and (C)(i).  

(E) This subparagraph applies to any depository institution that, on August 1, 1978, (i) was engaged in business as a depository institution in a State outside the continental limits of the United States, and (ii) was not a member of the Federal Reserve System at any time on or after such date. Such a depository institution shall not be required to maintain reserves against such deposits held or maintained at its offices located in a State outside the continental limits of the United States until the first day of the sixth calendar year which begins after the effective date of the Monetary Control Act of 1980. Such a depository institution shall maintain reserves against such deposits during the sixth calendar year which begins after such effective date in an amount equal to one-eighth of that otherwise required by paragraph (2), during the seventh such year in an amount equal to one-fourth of that otherwise required, during the eighth such year in an amount equal to three-eighths of that otherwise required, during the ninth such year in an amount equal to one-half
of that otherwise required, during the tenth such year in an amount equal to five-eighths of that otherwise required, during the eleventh such year in an amount equal to three-fourths of that otherwise required, and during the twelfth such year in an amount equal to seven-eighths of that otherwise required.

(9) EXEMPTION.—This subsection shall not apply with respect to any financial institution which—
   (A) is organized solely to do business with other financial institutions;
   (B) is owned primarily by the financial institutions with which it does business; and
   (C) does not do business with the general public.

(10) WAIVERS.—In individual cases, where a Federal supervisory authority waives a liquidity requirement, or waives the penalty for failing to satisfy a liquidity requirement, the Board shall waive the reserve requirement, or waive the penalty for failing to satisfy a reserve requirement, imposed pursuant to this subsection for the depository institution involved when requested by the Federal supervisory authority involved.

(11) ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS.—(A)(i) Notwithstanding the reserve requirement ratios established under paragraphs (2) and (5) of this subsection, a reserve ratio of zero per centum shall apply to any combination of reservable liabilities, which do not exceed $2,000,000 (as adjusted under subparagraph (B)), of each depository institution.
   (ii) Each depository institution may designate, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Board shall prescribe, the types and amounts of reservable liabilities to which the reserve ratio of zero per centum shall apply, except that transaction accounts which are designated to be subject to a reserve ratio of zero per centum shall be accounts which would otherwise be subject to a reserve ratio of 3 per centum under paragraph (2).
   (iii) The Board shall minimize the reporting necessary to determine whether depository institutions have total reservable liabilities of less than $2,000,000 (as adjusted under subparagraph (B)). Consistent with the Board’s responsibility to monitor and control monetary and credit aggregates, depository institutions which have reserve requirements under this subsection equal to zero per centum shall be subject to less overall reporting requirements than depository institutions which have a reserve requirement under this subsection that exceeds zero per centum.
   (B)(i) Beginning in 1982, not later than December 31 of each year, the Board shall issue a regulation increasing for the next succeeding calendar year the dollar amount specified in subparagraph (A), as previously adjusted under this subparagraph, by an amount obtained by multiplying such dollar amount by 80 per centum of the percentage increase in the total reservable liabilities of all depository institutions.
   (ii) The increase in total reservable liabilities shall be determined by subtracting the amount of total reservable liabilities on June 30 of the preceding calendar year from the amount of total reservable liabilities on June 30 of the calendar year in-
volved. In the case of any such twelve-month period in which there has been a decrease in the total reservable liabilities of all depository institutions, no adjustment shall be made. A decrease in total reservable liabilities shall be determined by subtracting the amount of total reservable liabilities on June 30 of the calendar year involved from the amount of total reservable liabilities on June 30 of the previous calendar year.

(12) EARNINGS ON BALANCES.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Balances maintained at a Federal Reserve bank by or on behalf of a depository institution may receive earnings to be paid by the Federal Reserve bank at least once each calendar quarter, at a rate or rates established by the Federal Open Market Committee not to exceed the general level of short-term interest rates.

(B) REGULATIONS RELATING TO PAYMENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS.—The Board may prescribe regulations concerning—

(i) the payment of earnings in accordance with this paragraph;

(ii) the distribution of such earnings to the depository institutions which maintain balances at such banks, or on whose behalf such balances are maintained; and

(iii) the responsibilities of depository institutions, Federal Home Loan Banks, and the National Credit Union Administration Central Liquidity Facility with respect to the crediting and distribution of earnings attributable to balances maintained, in accordance with subsection (c)(1)(A), in a Federal Reserve bank by any such entity on behalf of depository institutions.

(C) DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS DEFINED.—For purposes of this paragraph, the term “depository institution”, in addition to the institutions described in paragraph (1)(A), includes any trust company, corporation organized under section 25A or having an agreement with the Board under section 25, or any branch or agency of a foreign bank (as defined in section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978).

(c)(1) Reserves held by a depository institution to meet the requirements imposed pursuant to subsection (b) shall, subject to such rules and regulations as the Board shall prescribe, be in the form of—

(A) balances maintained for such purposes by such depository institution in the Federal Reserve bank of which it is a member or at which it maintains an account, except that (i) the Board may, by regulation or order, permit depository institutions to maintain all or a portion of their required reserves in the form of vault cash, except that any portion so permitted shall be identical for all depository institutions, and (ii) vault cash may be used to satisfy any supplemental reserve requirement imposed pursuant to subsection (b)(4), except that all such vault cash shall be excluded from any computation of earnings pursuant to subsection (b); and

(B) balances maintained by a depository institution in a depository institution which maintains required reserve balances at a Federal Reserve bank, in a Federal Home Loan Bank, or
in the National Credit Union Administration Central Liquidity Facility, if such depository institution, Federal Home Loan Bank, or National Credit Union Administration Central Liquidity Facility maintains such funds in the form of balances in a Federal Reserve bank of which it is a member or at which it maintains an account. Balances received by a depository institution from a second depository institution and used to satisfy the reserve requirement imposed on such second depository institution by this section shall not be subject to the reserve requirements of this section imposed on such first depository institution, and shall not be subject to assessments or reserves imposed on such first depository institution pursuant to section 7 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1817), section 404 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1727), or section 202 of the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1782).

(2) The balances maintained to meet the reserve requirements of subsection (b) by a depository institution in a Federal Reserve bank or passed through a Federal Home Loan Bank or the National Credit Union Administration Central Liquidity Facility or another depository institution to a Federal Reserve bank may be used to satisfy liquidity requirements which may be imposed under other provisions of Federal or State law.

(d) No member bank shall act as the medium or agent of any nonbanking corporation, partnership, association, business trust, or individual in making loans on the security of stocks, bonds, and other investment securities to brokers or dealers in stocks, bonds, and other investment securities. Every violation of this provision by any member bank shall be punishable by a fine of not more than $100 per day during the continuance of such violation; and such fine may be collected, by suit or otherwise, by the Federal reserve bank of the district in which such member bank is located.

(e) No member bank shall keep on deposit with any depository institution which is not authorized to have access to Federal Reserve advances under section 10(b) of this Act a sum in excess of 10 per centum of its own paid-up capital and surplus. No member bank shall act as the medium or agent of a nonmember bank in applying for or receiving discounts from a Federal reserve bank under the provisions of this Act, except by permission of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

(f) The required balance carried by a member bank with a Federal reserve bank may, under the regulations and subject to such penalties as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, be checked against and withdrawn by such member bank for the purpose of meeting existing liabilities.

(g) In estimating the reserve balances required by this Act, member banks may deduct from the amount of their gross demand deposits the amounts of balances due from other banks (except Federal Reserve banks and foreign banks) and cash items in process of collection payable immediately upon presentation in the United States, within the meaning of these terms as defined by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

(h) National banks, or banks organized under local laws, located in a dependency or insular possession or any part of the United States outside the continental United States may remain non-
member banks, and shall in that event maintain reserves and comply with all the conditions now provided by law regulating them; or said banks may, with the consent of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, become member banks of any one of the reserve districts, and shall in that event take stock, maintain reserves, and be subject to all the other provisions of this Act.

(j) The Board may from time to time, after consulting with the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, prescribe rules governing the payment and advertisement of interest on deposits, including limitations on the rates of interest which may be paid by member banks on time and savings deposits. The Board may prescribe different rate limitations for different classes of deposits, for deposits of different amounts or with different maturities or subject to different conditions regarding withdrawal or repayment, according to the nature or location of member banks or their depositors, or according to such other reasonable bases as the Board may deem desirable in the public interest. No member bank shall pay any time deposit before its maturity except upon such conditions and in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the said Board, or waive any requirement of notice before payment of any savings deposit except as to all savings deposits having the same requirement: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any deposit which is payable only at an office of a member bank located outside of the States of the United States and the District of Columbia. During the period commencing on October 15, 1962, and ending on October 15, 1968, the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to the rate of interest which may be paid by member banks on time deposits of foreign governments, monetary and financial authorities of foreign governments when acting as such, or international financial institutions of which the United States is a member.

(k) No member bank or affiliate thereof, or any successor or assignee of such member bank or affiliate or any endorser, guarantor, or surety of such member bank or affiliate may plead, raise, or claim directly or by counterclaim, setoff, or otherwise, with respect to any deposit or obligation of such member bank or affiliate, any defense, right, or benefit under any provision of a statute or constitution of a State or of a territory of the United States, or of any law of the District of Columbia, regulating or limiting the rate of interest which may be charged, taken, received, or reserved, and any such provision is hereby preempted, and no civil or criminal penalty which would otherwise be applicable under such provision shall apply to such member bank or affiliate or to any other person.

(l) Civil Money Penalty.—

(1) First tier.—Any member bank which, and any institution-affiliated party (within the meaning of section 3(u) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) with respect to such member bank who, violates any provision of this section, or any regulation issued pursuant thereto, shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each day during which such violation continues.

(2) Second tier.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), any member bank which, and any institution-affiliated party (within the
meaning of section 3(u) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) with respect to such member bank who—

(A)(i) commits any violation described in paragraph (1);
(ii) recklessly engages in an unsafe or unsound practice in conducting the affairs of such member bank; or
(iii) breaches any fiduciary duty;
(B) which violation, practice, or breach—
(i) is part of a pattern of misconduct;
(ii) causes or is likely to cause more than a minimal loss to such member bank; or
(iii) results in pecuniary gain or other benefit to such party,
shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day during which such violation, practice, or breach continues.

(3) THIRD TIER.—Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), any member bank which, and any institution-affiliated party (within the meaning of section 3(u) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) with respect to such member bank who—

(A) knowingly—
(i) commits any violation described in paragraph (1);
(ii) engages in any unsafe or unsound practice in conducting the affairs of such member bank; or
(iii) breaches any fiduciary duty; and
(B) knowingly or recklessly causes a substantial loss to such member bank or a substantial pecuniary gain or other benefit to such party by reason of such violation, practice, or breach,
shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed the applicable maximum amount determined under paragraph (4) for each day during which such violation, practice, or breach continues.

(4) MAXIMUM AMOUNTS OF PENALTIES FOR ANY VIOLATION DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (3).—The maximum daily amount of any civil penalty which may be assessed pursuant to paragraph (3) for any violation, practice, or breach described in such paragraph is—

(A) in the case of any person other than a member bank, an amount not to exceed $1,000,000; and
(B) in the case of a member bank, an amount not to exceed the lesser of—
(i) $1,000,000; or
(ii) 1 percent of the total assets of such member bank.

(5) ASSESSMENT; ETC.—Any penalty imposed under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) may be assessed and collected by the Board in the manner provided in subparagraphs (E), (F), (G), and (I) of section 8(i)(2) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act for penalties imposed (under such section) and any such assessment shall be subject to the provisions of such section.

(6) HEARING.—The member bank or other person against whom any penalty is assessed under this subsection shall be afforded an agency hearing if such member bank or person
submits a request for such hearing within 20 days after the issuance of the notice of assessment. Section 8(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act shall apply to any proceeding under this subsection.

(7) DISBURSEMENT.—All penalties collected under authority of this subsection shall be deposited into the Treasury.

(8) VIOLATE DEFINED.—For purposes of this section, the term “violate” includes any action (alone or with another or others) for or toward causing, bringing about, participating in, counseling, or aiding or abetting a violation.

(9) REGULATIONS.—The Board shall prescribe regulations establishing such procedures as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.

(m) NOTICE UNDER THIS SECTION AFTER SEPARATION FROM SERVICE.—The resignation, termination of employment or participation, or separation of an institution-affiliated party (within the meaning of section 3(u) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) with respect to a member bank (including a separation caused by the closing of such a bank) shall not affect the jurisdiction and authority of the Board to issue any notice and proceed under this section against any such party, if such notice is served before the end of the 6-year period beginning on the date such party ceased to be such a party with respect to such bank (whether such date occurs before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this subsection).
MINORITY VIEWS

H.R. 4758 would transfer the authority to set interest paid on required and excess reserves from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (“Board of Governors” or “Board”) to the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC), in an apparent attempt to prevent the members of the Board of Governors from having too much influence over the conduct of monetary policy.1 The FOMC is comprised of the seven Board Governors, the New York Reserve Bank President and 4 of the remaining 11 Reserve Bank Presidents on a rotating basis.

Setting the interest paid on reserves is currently the main tool by which the Fed effectuates monetary policy. However, given the current environment of abundant bank reserves, the key monetary policy decision is now setting the target range for the federal funds rate. This is a decision that, is made collectively between the FOMC and the Board. The bill is premised on the idea that the Board, the members of which are Presidentially-appointed and Senate confirmed, has too much influence over the conduct of monetary policy because it has the authority to set interest on reserves. However, this is incorrect as different monetary policy functions are split between the Board and the FOMC and the decisions to set the federal funds rate and interest paid on reserves are not made in a vacuum. We also note that the Reserve Bank Presidents are appointed by Directors of the Reserve Banks, some of which are commercial banks. As a result, private bankers would have a much stronger voice to advocate for policy decisions that would directly benefit their bottom line.

Additionally, Republicans have put forward numerous other proposals to reform the Federal Reserve system that increase the power of the Reserve Banks and roll back constraints on the influence of commercial banks within the Federal Reserve System. In this light, transferring the power to set the level of interest paid on reserves to the FOMC is particularly imprudent.

For these reasons, we oppose H.R. 4758.

Maxine Waters.
Carolyn B. Maloney.
Nydia M. Velázquez.
Wm. Lacy Clay.
Michael E. Capuano.

1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/default.htm