[Senate Report 114-8]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


114th Congress 
 1st Session                     SENATE                          Report
                                                                  114-8
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                          COVERING THE PERIOD

                            JANUARY 3, 2013

                                   to

                            JANUARY 5, 2015


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



                 March 31, 2015.--Ordered to be printed
     Filed under authority of the order of the Senate of March 27 
                    (legislative day, March 26) 2015
                    
                    
                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                 RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman
              DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Vice Chairman
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
DANIEL COATS, Indiana                BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 MARK R. WARNER, Virginia
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
TOM COTTON, Arkansas

              Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
                 Harry Reid, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
                John McCain, Arizona, Ex Officio Member
               Jack Reed, Rhode Island, Ex Officio Member

             Chris Joyner, Jack Livingston, Staff Directors
                 David Grannis, Minority Staff Director
                     Desiree T. Sayle, Chief Clerk

During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:

                 DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
                SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
    Virginia                         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia             TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine

                 Harry Reid, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
              Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
                Carl Levin, Michigan, Ex Officio Member
              James M. Inhofe, Oklahoma, Ex Officio Member

                     David Grannis, Staff Director
   Martha Scott Poindexter, Jack Livingston, Minority Staff Directors
                     Desiree T. Sayle, Chief Clerk
                                PREFACE

    The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate 
this report on its activities from January 3, 2013, to January 
5, 2015. This report also includes references to activities 
underway at the conclusion of the 113th Congress that the 
Committee expects to continue into the future.
    Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th 
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of 
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the 
Intelligence Community (IC) of the United States. Most of the 
Committee's oversight work is conducted in secret and cannot be 
discussed publicly to protect sensitive IC sources and methods. 
Nevertheless, the Select Committee on Intelligence has 
submitted activities reports on a biennial basis since 1977 to 
provide the American public with information about its 
intelligence oversight activities. We submit this report to the 
Senate, in observance of this practice.
    We also take this opportunity to thank all of the members 
of the Committee in the 113th Congress. In particular, we take 
special note of those of our colleagues who have completed 
their service on the Committee. Senator Chambliss served on the 
Committee from the 108th Congress until he retired from the 
U.S. Senate at the end of the 113th Congress, which included 
his service as Vice Chairman during the 112th and 113th 
Congresses. Senator Coburn served on the Committee during the 
111th Congress and during the 113th Congress. He retired from 
the U.S. Senate at the end of the 113th Congress. Senator Levin 
served on the Committee from the 105th Congress until he 
retired from the U.S. Senate at the end of the 113th Congress. 
He served as a voting member during the 105th-109th Congresses 
and, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, served as an Ex Officio (non-voting) member of the 
Committee during the 110th-113th Congresses. Senator 
Rockefeller served on the Committee from the 107th Congress 
until he retired from the U.S. Senate at the end of the 113th 
Congress. He served as Vice Chairman during the 108th and 109th 
Congresses and as Chairman during the 110th Congress. Senator 
Udall served on the Committee during the 112th and 113th 
Congresses. Their tireless commitment to the important work of 
the Committee has helped to ensure a strong IC and a secure 
nation. We are grateful for their efforts.
    We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all 
members of the Committee's staff during the 113th Congress. 
Their vigilance and professionalism were essential to the 
Committee's fulfillment of its oversight obligations.
                                   Richard Burr,
                                           Chairman.
                                   Dianne Feinstein,
                                           Vice Chairman.
                                           
                                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Preface..........................................................   III
  I. Introduction.....................................................1
 II. Legislation......................................................2
      A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.....     2
      B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.....     3
      C. FISA Improvements Act of 2013...........................     5
      D. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014...........     6
III. Oversight Activities.............................................7
      A. Hearings................................................     7
          1. Worldwide Threat Hearings...........................     7
          2. Implementation of FISA Authorities..................     8
          3. Cybersecurity.......................................     9
          4. The Arab Spring and the Arab World..................     9
          5. Iraq/Syria..........................................     9
          6. Afghanistan/Pakistan................................     9
          7. Iran................................................    10
          8. China...............................................    10
      B. Inquiries and Reviews...................................    10
          1. GStudy of the Central Intelligence Agency's 
          Detention and Interrogation Program....................    10
          2. GReview of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities 
          in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012..............    12
          3. Intelligence Collection Review......................    12
      C. Intelligence Community Issues...........................    13
          1. ODNI Response to Insider Threats....................    13
          2. ODNI Strategic Human Capital Management.............    14
          3. GComptroller General Access to Intelligence 
          Community Information..................................    14
          4. National Security Threat Assessments................    15
          5. Intelligence Community Information Technology 
          Enterprise.............................................    15
          6. Role of the IC to Prevent Surprise for Policymakers.    15
          7. Security Clearance Reform...........................    16
          8. GDefense Clandestine Service and the Defense 
          Intelligence 
          Agency.................................................    16
          9. GOversight of the Intelligence Community's Financial 
          Intelligence Efforts...................................    16
         10. Oversight of Intelligence Community Counterterrorism 
          Efforts................................................    17
         11. Covert Action.......................................    17
         12. Impact of Sequester on the IC.......................    17
         13. Space Launch........................................    18
         14. GEOINT Commission...................................    18
         15. Over-Classification Reform..........................    18
      D. Audits..................................................    19
          1. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern........    19
          2. Inspectors General..................................    19
          3. Accounting Standards and Auditability...............    19
          4. Future Ground Architecture Study....................    19
          5. GIC IG, DOJ IG, and DHS IG Review of National 
          Counterterrorism and Intelligence Centers..............    20
 IV. Nominations.....................................................20
      A. John O. Brennan.........................................    20
      B. John P. Carlin..........................................    21
      C. Daniel B. Smith.........................................    21
      D. Caroline D. Krass.......................................    21
      E. Francis X. Taylor.......................................    22
      F. Nicholas J. Rasmussen...................................    22
  V. Support to the Senate...........................................22
 VI. Appendix........................................................23
      A. Summary of Committee Actions............................    23
          1. Number of meetings..................................    23
          2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee...    23
          3. Bills referred to the Committee.....................    23
          4. Committee publications..............................    23
VII. Additional Views................................................25
          1. Additional Views of Senator Ron Wyden...............    25
          
          
114th Congress          }                     {        Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session            }                     {         114-8
======================================================================
 
                          COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

                                _______
                                

                 March 31, 2015.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. Burr, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                            I. INTRODUCTION

    The activities of the Committee during the 113th Congress 
comprised passage of critical enabling legislation, 
confirmation of appointees to key intelligence leadership 
posts, conducting inquiries and reviews on the performance and 
activities of the Intelligence Community (IC), and fulfillment 
of many other oversight activities.
    As described in part II of this report, the Committee's 
paramount legislative priority in the 113th Congress was 
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Acts for Fiscal 
Years 2014 and 2015. The Committee has now enacted six 
consecutive intelligence authorization bills, following a lapse 
in the enactment of intelligence authorization bills for fiscal 
years 2006 through 2009.
    The Committee also dedicated considerable effort to 
improving the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA) and other laws pertinent to intelligence collection 
activities, as reflected by the Committee's passage of the FISA 
Improvements Act of 2013 (S. 1631).
    Through extensive hearings and discussions, the Committee 
also recognized the need to improve the sharing of information 
about cybersecurity threats by both the government and private 
sector. As a result, the Committee favorably reported out the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 (S. 2588).
    During the 113th Congress, the Committee routinely inquired 
into the IC's efforts to implement new information security 
measures aimed at mitigating the damaging revelations by former 
NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Notably, in the 113th Congress, 
the Committee completed comprehensive inquiries into, and 
published reports on, the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 
Program, and the terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in 
Benghazi, Libya, in September of 2012. Finally, by means of 
hearings, staff briefings, site visits, and other interactions 
with the IC, the Committee exercised oversight of the IC's 
performance relative to national security challenges in 
Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

                            II. LEGISLATION


         A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014

    In the 113th Congress, the Committee emphasized continued 
enactment of annual intelligence authorization acts.
    The Committee's budget monitors evaluated fiscal year 2014 
National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence 
Program (MIP) budget requests submitted by the President.
    The intelligence agencies covered by the annual budget 
reviews included the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency 
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the intelligence 
capabilities of the military services and the U.S. Coast Guard, 
as well as the intelligence-related components of the Federal 
Bureau of Intelligence (FBI), the Departments of State, 
Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security (DHS), and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).
    As part of its review, the Committee received testimony 
from senior IC officials in closed hearings. Additionally, 
Committee staff budget monitors evaluated detailed classified 
budget justifications submitted by the Executive Branch. Based 
on those reviews, the Committee prepared a classified annex to 
its annual authorization bill and report. This annex contained 
a classified schedule of authorizations and classified 
direction to IC elements.
    The Committee also reviewed the Administration's 
legislative proposals for the public part of the fiscal year 
2014 bill, which included new or amended legislative authority 
requested by the IC.
    The Committee completed work on an intelligence 
authorization bill for fiscal year 2014 on November 12, 2013, 
and subsequently reported a bill (S. 1681) and an accompanying 
report (S. Rpt. 113-120). The Committee then worked with the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other 
congressional committees on a final version of the legislation, 
in this case an amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 
1681. In addition, the Committee considered the views presented 
to it by members of the public. On June 11, 2014, the Senate 
passed by unanimous consent an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, offered by the Chairman and Vice Chairman. The 
provisions of the bill were explained in a statement by 
Chairman Feinstein subsequent to the bill's passage (160 Cong. 
Rec. S. 3656-3658). The House suspended the rules and passed S. 
1681 as amended by voice vote on June 24, 2014. It was signed 
into law on July 7, 2014 (Public Law 113-126).
    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 
authorized funding for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities across the U.S. Government and included a classified 
schedule of authorizations and classified annex. The Act 
contained a number of legislative provisions, including:
           A requirement for the general counsel of 
        each intelligence agency to notify the congressional 
        intelligence committees of any significant legal 
        interpretation of the Constitution or federal law 
        affecting intelligence activities conducted by the 
        agency, to include any significant interpretations 
        resulting from opinions of the Justice Department's 
        Office of Legal Counsel (OLC);
           A requirement for the Attorney General to 
        establish a process for the regular review for official 
        publication of significant OLC opinions that have been 
        provided to an element of the IC and to provide 
        Congress with any OLC opinion that would be made 
        public, but for its classification;
           Provisions that require Senate confirmation 
        for the directors and inspectors general of the NSA and 
        the NRO;
           Provisions that provide additional 
        whistleblower protections for IC personnel;
           Authority for the DNI to establish 
        ``functional managers'' for intelligence disciplines 
        that are performed by multiple agencies, including 
        signals intelligence, human intelligence and geospatial 
        intelligence;
           A requirement for intelligence contractors 
        to notify the government of any successful unauthorized 
        penetration of their computer networks;
           A provision making permanent a requirement, 
        previously set to sunset, to require government 
        officials to notify the congressional intelligence 
        committees of authorized disclosures of intelligence 
        information;
           A requirement for the President to prepare a 
        plan to respond to the unauthorized public disclosure 
        of any covert action;
           A requirement for a declassification review 
        of documents collected in Abbottabad, Pakistan, during 
        the mission that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011;
           A requirement that the ODNI, CIA, DIA, NGA, 
        NRO, and NSA undergo full financial audits, beginning 
        with each agency's fiscal year 2014 financial 
        statements;
           A requirement that the chief information 
        officers of each element of the IC conduct an inventory 
        of software licenses held by such element to achieve 
        economies of scale and cost savings in software 
        procurement and usage;
           A requirement that the DNI complete an 
        independent assessment of the available intelligence 
        supporting any determination by the Executive Branch 
        that an identified U.S. person is engaged in acts of 
        international terrorism against the U.S., sufficient to 
        satisfy the government's criteria for approving the use 
        of targeted lethal action;
           A provision reauthorizing through December 
        31, 2018, the Public Interest Declassification Board, 
        which was first established by Congress in 2000 to 
        promote public access to a thorough, accurate, and 
        reliable documentary record of significant U.S. 
        national security decisions and activities; and
           Provisions requiring the DNI to improve the 
        efficiency of security background investigations.

         B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015

    In early 2014, while finishing work on the fiscal year 2014 
legislation, the Committee also began its consideration of the 
President's requests for funding levels and legislative 
authority for fiscal year 2015. Again, the Committee's budget 
monitors evaluated the budget requests submitted by the 
Executive Branch. The Executive Branch did not submit 
legislative requests for fiscal year 2015. Committee staff held 
briefings at the Committee and on site at agencies, and the 
Committee conducted closed budget hearings.
    The Committee reported the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2015 (S. 2741) on July 31, 2014, together with 
an accompanying report (S. Rpt. 113-233). The House of 
Representatives had previously passed an Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 (H.R. 4681) on 
June 2, 2014. The Committee then worked with the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and other 
congressional committees on a final version of the legislation, 
in this case an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 
4681.
    On December 9, 2014, the Senate passed by unanimous consent 
an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the 
Chairman and Vice Chairman. The provisions of the bill were 
explained in a joint explanatory statement entered into the 
Congressional Record by Chairman Feinstein subsequent to the 
bill's passage (160 Cong. Rec. S. 6464-6465). The House 
suspended the rules and passed H.R. 4681 as amended on December 
10, 2014, by a vote of 325-100. It was signed into law on 
December 19, 2014 (Public Law 113-293).
    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 
authorized funding for fiscal year 2015 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities across the U.S. Government and 
included a classified schedule of authorizations and classified 
annex. The Act contained a number of legislative provisions, 
including:
           A provision mandating the issuance of new 
        regulations that require IC employees occupying 
        positions with access to particularly sensitive 
        information to regularly report any employment by, 
        representation of, or the provision of advice relating 
        to national security to, certain foreign and foreign-
        controlled entities for a two-year period after the 
        employee ceases employment with the IC element;
           A requirement for every intelligence agency 
        to adopt procedures to ensure that certain 
        communications incidentally acquired in the course of 
        intelligence activities conducted pursuant to Executive 
        Order 12333 are destroyed within five years, unless the 
        communications are affirmatively determined to 
        constitute foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, 
        or otherwise meet specific requirements for extended 
        retention;
           A requirement for the DNI to develop a 
        national intelligence strategy every four years to 
        guide how the IC will use its capabilities, personnel, 
        technologies, and partnerships to support U.S. national 
        interests;
           A requirement for the DNI to prepare a plan 
        for management of the elements of the IC that carry out 
        financial intelligence activities;
           A provision directing the DNI to submit to 
        the congressional intelligence committees a plan for 
        applying private sector best practices for monitoring 
        employees who hold certain positions within the IC;
           A requirement that the DNI report on the 
        status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce 
        administrative costs for the IC during the preceding 
        year;
           Two provisions mandating new security 
        requirements for U.S. diplomatic facilities in, or 
        adjacent to, the Russian Federation, including a 
        requirement to provide facilities for securing 
        classified information at such facilities and a 
        requirement to reduce the number of locally employed 
        staff at diplomatic facilities in the Russian 
        Federation; and
           A requirement for the DNI to report annually 
        to the congressional intelligence committees on 
        violations of law or executive order by IC personnel, 
        including violations of Executive Order 12333.

                    C. FISA Improvements Act of 2013

    The Committee, since its inception in 1976, has considered 
oversight of the Executive Branch's use of electronic 
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes to be one of its 
most important responsibilities. This oversight has covered 
collection activities conducted pursuant to FISA and collection 
activities that fall outside of FISA and are governed by 
Executive Order 12333. Since 2006, a central focus of that 
oversight has included the Executive Branch's use of Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 501 of FISA) to conduct 
bulk collection of ``call data records'' that contain metadata 
concerning domestic and international telephone calls, 
including the numbers dialed, as well as the time, date, and 
duration of the calls, but not the content of the calls. 
Similarly, the Committee has conducted oversight of the 
implementation of Section 702 of FISA, as established in the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which provided procedures for 
intelligence collection activities targeting non-U.S. persons 
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.
    Following the unprecedented leaks of classified 
information, primarily of information relating to the NSA, by 
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, key aspects of many of 
these collection activities have been declassified by the DNI. 
This prompted a series of Committee hearings and discussions 
over ways to add additional privacy protections and 
transparency measures to FISA operations, while preserving the 
operational effectiveness and flexibility of the programs.
    On October 31, 2013, the Committee reported the FISA 
Improvements Act of 2013 (S. 1631) and accompanying report (S. 
Rpt. 113-119). The bill included a series of measures that 
would have made improvements to FISA as well as other laws 
relating to intelligence activities carried out by the 
Executive Branch. The bill contained a number of legislative 
provisions, including:
           Measures to codify established privacy 
        protections for the bulk telephone metadata program 
        that have been provided under Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Court-approved minimization procedures or 
        Executive Branch policy and measures to enhance those 
        privacy protections, where appropriate, by placing 
        additional statutory limits on the telephone metadata 
        program that do not reduce its operational 
        effectiveness;
           Measures to increase transparency--to the 
        public and to the Congress--concerning the bulk 
        telephone metadata program, as well as other aspects of 
        FISA, where it is possible to do so without 
        compromising the efficacy of intelligence activities 
        undertaken pursuant to FISA;
           Provisions that require Senate confirmation 
        for the director and inspector general of the NSA;
           Authority for the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Court of Review to appoint amicus curiae 
        to assist the Court in the consideration of 
        applications that, in the opinion of the Court, present 
        a novel or significant interpretation of the law;
           Authority for the government to continue 
        collection for a 72-hour transitional period, when the 
        collection is directed against a non-U.S. person target 
        who travels into the United States while the target is 
        the subject of collection that was lawfully initiated 
        while the target was abroad; and
           Restrictions on the government's authority 
        to perform queries of communications acquired pursuant 
        to Section 702 of FISA that use a U.S. person's 
        selector only if the purpose of the query is to obtain 
        foreign intelligence information or information 
        necessary to understand foreign intelligence 
        information or to assess its importance.
    This legislation was not considered by the Senate in the 
114th Congress. A related measure, the USA FREEDOM Act, offered 
by Senator Leahy, was considered by the Senate but did not 
receive sufficient votes to invoke cloture.

            D. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014

    Over the last several years, the Committee has listened 
with increasing alarm to the testimony of senior intelligence 
officials about the growing cybersecurity threats to our 
nation. The Committee has seen the extensive damage caused to 
our national and economic security by the constant cyberattacks 
against American private and government entities. Beyond direct 
monetary losses, the continuing efforts of foreign actors to 
steal intelligence information and intellectual property has 
had far reaching impacts on the innovation upon which a robust 
economy and strong intelligence community and military relies. 
The Committee has heard testimony on the ability and intent of 
foreign actors to undertake disruptive and destructive 
cyberattacks. Also, open reporting about significant and 
concerning cyber incidents has alerted the public to the scope 
and the severity of these threats.
    Through extensive hearing and discussions, the Committee 
recognized the need to improve the sharing of information about 
cyber threats by both the private and public sector. On July 
10, 2014, the Committee reported the Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act of 2014 (S. 2588). The bill included a series of 
authorizations, procedures, and protections to improve the 
ability of the private sector and the government to share 
information and work together on cybersecurity threats, 
including:
           Requirements for procedures for the 
        government to increase sharing about cybersecurity 
        threats with the private sector, including increased 
        sharing of classified information and declassification 
        as appropriate;
           Authority for private entities to monitor 
        their own networks for cybersecurity threats, take 
        countermeasures on their networks for cybersecurity 
        purposes, and voluntarily share information about cyber 
        threats with each other and the government;
           Requirements for procedures to ensure 
        appropriate sharing of cyber threat indicators and 
        countermeasures within the government, establishment of 
        privacy guidelines, and the creation of a capability 
        and process at the Department of Homeland Security as 
        the primary means of receiving cyber threat indicators 
        and countermeasures;
           Limitations on the government's use of cyber 
        threat information to cybersecurity efforts, responding 
        to imminent threats to life, countering computer 
        crimes, and threats to minors;
           Provision of liability protection to private 
        entities that appropriately monitor their networks and 
        share cyber threat indicators and countermeasures; and
           Requirements for multiple levels of 
        oversight of the information sharing system by senior 
        government officials, inspectors general, the Privacy 
        and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, and the Congress.
    This legislation was not considered by the Senate in the 
114th Congress.

                       III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES


                              A. Hearings


1. Worldwide Threat Hearings

    Since 1994, the Committee has held annual open hearings to 
review the Intelligence Community's assessment of the current 
and projected national security threats to the United States. 
These ``Worldwide Threat'' hearings cover national security 
concerns in all geographic regions, as well as transnational 
threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction.
    On March 12, 2013, the Committee held an open Worldwide 
Threat hearing on the current and projected threats to the 
United States. The lead witness before the Committee was DNI 
James R. Clapper. He was joined at the witness table by John O. 
Brennan, Director of the CIA; Robert S. Mueller III, Director 
of the FBI; Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, Director of 
the DIA; Matthew Olsen, Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center; and Philip Goldberg, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. Director 
Clapper's unclassified prepared statement for the record is 
available in the Hearings section of the Committee's website 
and the record of the hearing is printed as S. Hrg. 113-89. A 
video recording of the full hearing can also be found on the 
Committee's website.
    At the hearing, Director Clapper identified sequestration 
as the topic foremost on the minds of IC leadership, adding 
that ``sequestration forces the Intelligence Community to 
reduce all intelligence activities and functions without regard 
to impact on our mission.'' He also asserted that in his almost 
50 years of work in the intelligence field, he could not 
``recall a period in which we've confronted a more diverse 
array of threats, crises, and challenges around the world . . . 
[making] sequestration even more incongruous.''
    Director Clapper also explained that the threats facing the 
United States are growing more interconnected and viral, and 
that ``[e]vents that at first seem local and irrelevant can 
quickly set off transnational disruptions that affect U.S. 
national interests.'' Director Clapper's identification of 
threat areas began with cyber. He warned that ``[i]ncreasingly, 
state and non-state actors are gaining and using cyber 
expertise . . . to achieve strategic objectives, by gathering 
sensitive information from public and private sector entities, 
controlling the content and flow of information, and 
challenging perceived adversaries in cyberspace.''
    On January 29, 2014, in the second session of the 113th 
Congress, the Committee again held an open Worldwide Threat 
hearing. Director Clapper presented an opening statement on 
behalf of the entire IC, and was joined at the witness table by 
John O. Brennan, Director of the CIA; James B. Comey, Director 
of the FBI; Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, Director of 
the DIA; and Matthew Olsen, Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center. Director Clapper's unclassified 
prepared statement for the record is available in the Hearings 
section of the Committee's website along with a video recording 
of the full hearing.
    Director Clapper highlighted a litany of crises and 
threats, including terrorism, with its ``loosely connected and 
now globally dispersed'' character; the sectarian war in Syria, 
and ``its attraction as a growing center of radical extremism 
and the potential threat this poses'' to the United States; the 
spillover conflict in neighboring Lebanon and Iraq; 
destabilizing population displacement in Jordan, Turkey, and 
Lebanon; the implications of the U.S. force drawdown in 
Afghanistan; Iraq's deteriorating internal security situation; 
the growth of foreign cyber capabilities; and a host of other 
state and non-state instability drivers such as transnational 
crime, resource scarcity, and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction.

2. Implementation of FISA Authorities

    During the 113th Congress, the Committee held hearings and 
conducted numerous staff briefings to review issues related to 
the implementation of surveillance provisions contained in 
FISA. These issues included implementation of Title VII 
authorities (Targeting Certain Persons Outside of the United 
States), as well as issues associated with the implementation 
of other provisions of FISA, such as Title I (Electronic 
Surveillance), Title III (Physical Searches), Title IV (Pen 
Registers and Trap and Trace Devices for Foreign Intelligence 
Purposes) and Title V (Access to Certain Business Records for 
Foreign Intelligence Purposes).
    In furtherance of its oversight responsibilities, the 
Committee also reviewed reporting required under provisions in 
FISA, including the annual and semi-annual reports from the 
Attorney General, the DNI, and relevant agency heads and 
inspectors general. Pursuant to Section 601(c) of FISA [50 
U.S.C. 1871(c)], the Committee obtained copies of classified 
decisions, orders, and opinions of the FISA Court that included 
``significant construction or interpretation of any 
provision,'' as well as the related pleadings, applications, 
and memoranda of law. The Committee routinely examined these 
documents, which were the subject of subsequent briefings and 
hearings involving Justice Department and IC officials.

3. Cybersecurity

    The Committee held six hearings on cybersecurity-related 
matters in the 113th Congress and passed the ``Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act of 2014.'' Additionally, the Committee 
and its staff met frequently with IC and other government 
officials, cybersecurity company representatives, and a wide 
variety of technical experts and stakeholders. Hearings, 
briefings, meetings, and other engagements provided the 
Committee with insight into the growing cybersecurity threats 
to our nation, including the rise of disruptive and destructive 
attacks. The complex and dynamic nature of cyberspace 
challenges had created an even greater need for the IC to find 
agile, innovative solutions. The increased focus on 
cybersecurity in the IC has led to increased investment and the 
need to adapt mission and business processes. The Committee has 
pressed the IC to increase the speed, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of its cybersecurity efforts.

4. The Arab Spring and the Arab World

    The 113th Congress coincided with the historic developments 
of the ``Arab Spring,'' which shook some key Arab nations to 
their foundations, challenging undemocratic regimes while also 
contributing to instability and violence in countries such as 
Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, with ongoing 
implications for U.S. interests and security. As a result, the 
Committee spent significant time in hearings, meetings, and 
briefings overseeing the IC's ability to support U.S. policy 
makers, as well as in debating the proper levels of IC effort. 
With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) and the surge of foreign fighters drawn to it, the 
Committee expects these subjects to remain of high priority in 
the 114th Congress.

5. Iraq/Syria

    The Committee held several hearings and briefings on the 
fighting in Syria and Iraq, and the regional instability caused 
by the expansion of terrorist groups such as ISIL. The 
Committee also reviewed the Administration's proposed 
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, which included funding for 
the Department of Defense to train and equip vetted elements of 
the Syrian armed opposition to counter terrorist threats. 
Additionally, the Committee closely examined the role of 
foreign fighters moving in and out of Syria and Iraq, and the 
potential terrorist threat posed by them to the United States 
and elsewhere.

6. Afghanistan/Pakistan

    The Committee's efforts in the 113th Congress focused on 
the IC's role in supporting U.S. policy objectives in 
Afghanistan and the region as the Administration aimed to 
complete its stated ``drawdown'' of forces by the end of 2014, 
a goal made uncertain throughout 2013 by the prolonged, 
contested Afghan presidential elections and the delayed 
implementation of the U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement. 
The Committee spent considerable time and effort conducting 
oversight on the significant intelligence issues related to 
these developments.
    Bilateral relations with Pakistan appeared to be improving, 
and the Committee received numerous briefings about the 
security environment in which this tentative improvement 
occurred, including on the ongoing implications of a terrorist 
safe haven in the tribal regions, the persistent threat of the 
Haqqani network, and the Pakistan military's Zarb-e-Azb 
campaign in North Waziristan.
    Throughout the 113th Congress, the Committee conducted 
hearings and received briefings on IC assessments regarding the 
strength and long-term viability of the Afghan insurgency, and 
the implications for long-term U.S. policy goals as the United 
States reached the end of combat operations in Afghanistan. As 
the Administration develops post-combat policies on 
Afghanistan, the Committee will continue to review the role of 
the IC in supporting these policies, and how the IC continues 
to function as the Afghan insurgency continues.

7. Iran

    The Committee held a number of hearings on Iran with the 
purpose of overseeing the IC's ability to collect intelligence 
and provide assessments to policymakers on Iran's intentions 
and evolving capabilities in several key areas, to include its 
nuclear program, role in the Middle East, support to terrorist 
groups, and other matters.

8. China

    The Committee held a hearing on China to evaluate the IC's 
collection posture and analysis capabilities in this regard. 
The Committee also received briefings and reports on China from 
the National Intelligence Council, CIA, the Defense Department, 
the State Department, and nongovernmental organizations. These 
activities supported oversight of the intelligence agencies and 
helped to inform the legislative debate over the appropriate 
U.S. policy toward China, particularly in light of the Obama 
Administration's ``strategic rebalance'' toward the Pacific 
region and ongoing territorial disputes in the East and South 
China Seas.

                        B. Inquiries and Reviews


1. Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and 
        Interrogation Program

    The Committee's Study of the CIA's Detention and 
Interrogation Program was an outgrowth of previous oversight 
activity by the Committee. In December 2007, after press 
accounts stated that the CIA had possessed and destroyed 
videotapes of the interrogations of CIA detainees, the 
Committee initiated a review of CIA operational documents 
related to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.
    On February 11, 2009, after the Committee was presented 
with a staff-prepared summary of the operational cables 
detailing the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim 
al-Nashiri, the Committee began considering a broader review of 
the CIA's detention and interrogation practices. On March 5, 
2009, by a vote of 14 to 1, the Committee approved the Terms of 
Reference for a broader study of the CIA's Detention and 
Interrogation Program. The Study proceeded in a bi-partisan 
manner until August 24, 2009, when Attorney General Holder 
decided to re-open the criminal inquiry related to the 
interrogation of certain detainees in the CIA's Detention and 
Interrogation Program. Shortly thereafter, the minority 
withdrew from active participation in the Study when it 
determined that the Attorney General's decision would preclude 
a comprehensive review of the Program, since many of the 
relevant witnesses would likely decline to be interviewed by 
the Committee.
    The Committee continued to devote considerable resources to 
completing the Study. The document production phase lasted more 
than three years, produced more than 6 million pages of 
material, and was completed in July 2012. The Study is based 
primarily on a review of these documents, which included cable 
traffic, reports, memoranda, intelligence products, records of 
interviews conducted of CIA personnel by the CIA's Office of 
the Inspector General and other CIA entities, as well as 
internal email and other communications. In addition to CIA 
materials, the Committee reviewed a smaller quantity of 
documents from other Executive Branch elements, as well as 
documents and information that had been provided separately to 
the Committee outside of the Committee's Study effort.
    On December 13, 2012, the Committee approved its Study on 
the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, by a vote of 9 
to 6. Vice Chairman Chambliss and Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, 
Blunt, and Rubio filed their minority views on February 15, 
2013, in which they presented the basis for their disagreement 
with the report and its conclusions. After the December 13, 
2012, approval, the Committee provided copies of the Study to 
the CIA, the White House, the Department of State, the Justice 
Department, and ODNI, with a request that the White House 
coordinate comments on the Study from all relevant Executive 
Branch agencies. The Committee requested the Administration's 
comments by February 15, 2013, and informed the Executive 
Branch that it would consider the comments and make appropriate 
updates to the Study, including correcting any factual errors. 
The Committee only received substantive comments from the CIA, 
which were provided on June 27, 2013.
    After the provision of the comments from the CIA, Committee 
held a series of staff meetings with the CIA on the Study. 
These meetings concluded in September 2013. Following these 
meetings and the receipt of minority views, the Committee 
revised the findings and conclusions and updated the Committee 
Study.
    The Committee Study of the CIA's Detention and 
Interrogation Program is a lengthy, highly detailed report 
exceeding 6,700 pages, including approximately 38,000 
footnotes. It is divided into the following three volumes:
    I. History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and 
Interrogation Program. This 1,539-page volume is divided 
chronologically into sections addressing the establishment, 
development, and evolution of the CIA's Detention and 
Interrogation Program. It includes an addendum on CIA 
Clandestine Detention Sites and the Arrangements Made with 
Foreign Entities in Relation to the CIA's Detention and 
Interrogation Program.
    II. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the 
Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. 
This 1,858-page volume addresses the intelligence the CIA 
attributed to CIA detainees and the use of the CIA's enhanced 
interrogation techniques, specifically focusing on CIA 
representations regarding the effectiveness of the CIA's 
enhanced interrogation techniques, as well as how the CIA's 
Detention and Interrogation Program was operated and managed. 
It includes sections on CIA representations to the media, the 
Justice Department, and the Congress.
    III. Detention and Interrogation of CIA Detainees. This 
2,855-page volume addresses the detention and interrogation of 
119 CIA detainees, from the program's authorization on 
September 17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to 
include information on their capture, detention, interrogation, 
and conditions of confinement. It also includes extensive 
information on the CIA's management, oversight, and day-to-day 
operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program.
    On April 3, 2014, by a bipartisan vote of 11-3, the 
Committee agreed to send the revised Findings and Conclusions, 
and the updated Executive Summary of the Committee Study, to 
the President for declassification and public release. On 
August 1, 2014, the CIA provided redacted versions of the 
submitted documents to the Committee. The Committee Chairman at 
the time, Senator Dianne Feinstein, then entered into a series 
of negotiations with the administration to reduce the number of 
redactions. On December 3, 2014, Chairman Feinstein and the 
Administration reached an agreement on redactions. On December 
9, 2014, a 683-page document, including the Executive Summary, 
the Findings and Conclusions, and Additional and Minority 
Views, was released publicly with redactions and is available 
on the Committee's website.

2. Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, 
        Libya, September 11-12, 2012

    In the 113th Congress, the Committee completed a bipartisan 
report on the September 11-12, 2012, attacks on U.S. diplomatic 
facilities in Benghazi, Libya. The Committee reviewed thousands 
of pages of intelligence reports and internal documents 
provided by the IC and the Departments of State and Defense, to 
understand fully the events surrounding this terrorist attack. 
The report was also based on dozens of committee hearings, 
briefings, and interviews, including with survivors of the 
attacks, between September 2012 and December 2013.
    The Committee's review found the attacks were preventable, 
based on extensive intelligence reporting on the terrorist 
activity in Libya--to include prior threats and attacks against 
Western targets--and given the known security shortfalls at the 
temporary U.S. Mission. The report, which includes classified 
and unclassified versions, included 18 recommendations designed 
to improve security of American diplomatic and intelligence 
facilities abroad. The unclassified final report is available 
on the Committee's website.

3. Intelligence Collection Review

    During the 113th Congress, the Committee initiated an in-
depth review of intelligence collection programs, entitled the 
``Comprehensive Review of Intelligence Community Collection 
Activities.'' The Committee assembled a staff team dedicated to 
this effort to identify, describe, and assess collection 
activities across the IC. The team analyzed the governance, 
cost-effectiveness, legal authorities, and cross-Community 
integration of U.S. intelligence collection activities.

                    C. Intelligence Community Issues


1. ODNI Response to Insider Threats

    The Committee continued its oversight of the ODNI's 
response to unauthorized disclosures of classified information. 
The unauthorized disclosures to the media, and potentially to 
foreign adversaries, by Edward Snowden, a contractor working at 
the NSA, highlight the threat posed by insiders entrusted with 
access to IC facilities and networks. Mr. Snowden's decision to 
disclose classified and sensitive information to the media will 
have ramifications for our national security for years to come.
    Initiatives have been underway for years to deal with such 
contingencies, most recently the President's National Insider 
Threat Policy, signed in November 2012. However, the Committee 
is concerned that this policy has not been fully implemented 
across the IC. Prior to Mr. Snowden's unauthorized disclosures, 
the Committee met with the newly created National Insider 
Threat Task Force to review its role in establishing 
government-wide minimum standards for deterring, detecting, and 
mitigating insider threats. Some examples of minimum standards 
issued by the Task Force include workforce threat awareness 
training and procedures for responding to insider threat 
concerns. The Committee remains concerned that many government 
agencies are in need of substantial improvements to ensure the 
security of sensitive information.
    Following the initial disclosures by Mr. Snowden in June 
2013, the Committee met with DNI Clapper to underscore the need 
for the Executive Branch to fully investigate the intelligence 
leaks, to review initiatives to reform the background 
investigation process, and to explore new approaches for 
deterring and detecting potentially damaging insider threats. 
As part of its review of the unauthorized disclosures, the 
Committee also met with the National Counterintelligence 
Executive (NCIX), Frank Montoya Jr., and his successor Bill 
Evanina, to assess the extent of the damage to national 
security. As part of the ODNI, the Office of the NCIX is also 
responsible for government-wide standards on security clearance 
practices, and the Committee staff met with the NCIX on 
numerous occasions to discuss the DNI's strategy for security 
clearance reform.
    Additionally, in an effort to modernize the security 
clearance background investigation process, the Committee 
undertook a review of continuous evaluation and automated 
record check programs, both within the U.S. Government and the 
private sector. As part of this effort, the Committee met with 
numerous private sector entities from various sectors to 
collect best practices related to hiring, background 
investigations, insider threat monitoring, ethics, and employee 
privacy.
    The Committee supports substantially enhancing and 
expediting efforts to deter the insider threat and believes 
doing so will require an integrated counterintelligence and 
security apparatus that spans the IC and the U.S. Government. 
Additionally, the Committee believes the IC's information 
technology modernization effort--the IC Information Technology 
Enterprise--must provide the infrastructure to detect insider 
threats earlier, more effectively, and more reliably. (See page 
24 for more information on the IC Information Technology 
Enterprise, otherwise known as ``IC ITE.'') Robust 
counterintelligence data and analytic tools to monitor, 
analyze, and audit personnel behavior will be critical to this 
endeavor. In the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014 and associated classified annex, the Committee recommended 
additional resources to help assure the IC meets this and other 
counterintelligence and security goals as soon as possible.

2. ODNI Strategic Human Capital Management

    The Committee spent considerable time reviewing the ODNI's 
strategic management of the IC workforce. The IC Chief Human 
Capital Officer (CHCO) is responsible for workforce planning, 
recruiting, career development, and many other IC-wide 
personnel matters. The Committee believes the role of the IC 
CHCO in managing the workforce will be vital as budget 
pressures increase across the government and IC leadership is 
required to strategically cut areas of declining utility. The 
Committee urged the ODNI to avoid policies that result in the 
loss of high-performing personnel and underscored the need for 
a proactive approach in recruiting, developing, and retaining a 
highly qualified workforce.
    Additionally, the Committee reviewed the ODNI's plan to 
expand the number of joint duty assignments available to its 
workforce with the goal of diversifying the backgrounds and 
experiences of IC personnel, and advance intelligence 
integration. The Committee also urged the ODNI to continue to 
provide information on its efforts to enhance workplace 
communication, ensure fair and open competition, and encourage 
employee engagement.
    Lastly, the Committee expressed concern that the ODNI had 
not issued a Strategic Human Capital Plan since 2006. Such a 
plan will be critical for building an effective IC-wide 
workforce in the years ahead to achieve the DNI's goal of an 
integrated enterprise. In September 2014, the ODNI released its 
``Human Capital Vision 2020.'' The Committee met with the IC 
CHCO to discuss the Vision and its goal of creating a 
performance-based culture that minimizes skills gaps and 
attracts and retains a diverse workforce. The classified annex 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 
required the DNI to provide an implementation plan for the 
Human Capital Vision.

3. Comptroller General Access to Intelligence Community Information

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
required the DNI, in consultation with the Comptroller General, 
to issue a written directive governing access of the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to certain information possessed by 
the IC. In response, in April 2011, the DNI issued Intelligence 
Community Directive (ICD) 114, which states that it is IC 
policy to cooperate with GAO audits and reviews to the fullest 
extent possible and make information available to appropriately 
cleared GAO personnel. During the 113th Congress the Committee 
continued to conduct oversight on ICD 114, meeting multiple 
times with ODNI and GAO officials to encourage open lines of 
communication and collaboration between the two entities to 
ensure accountability and appropriate levels of transparency 
and security for IC activities. Additionally, the classified 
annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014 directed the development of a specific GAO review to 
bolster intelligence oversight and reduce unnecessary 
fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.

4. National Security Threat Assessments

    The Committee has an interest in reviewing intelligence 
assessments prepared by the IC as part of the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process. During 
the 113th Congress, the Committee reached an agreement with the 
ODNI and the Senate Banking Committee regarding oversight of 
the CFIUS process. Under this agreement, upon completion of a 
review or investigation that concludes CFIUS action, or the 
announcement by the President of a decision, for a covered 
transaction, the DNI will alert the congressional intelligence 
committees to the availability of any National Security Threat 
Assessment (NSTA) completed by the IC. These alerts will occur 
on a biweekly basis, will be included in the ``National 
Intelligence Council Weekly,'' and shall include the title of 
the NSTA, foreign company host country, date of publication, 
and short summary. Further, the DNI shall provide a briefing on 
any NSTA and the NSTA itself upon request by the congressional 
intelligence committees.

5. Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE)

    The Committee continues to support the objectives of 
improved IC mission performance, enhanced security, and 
increased savings that underpin the effort to transform the 
IC's architecture, known as IC ITE. In addition to much-needed 
modernization and integration of both IT assets and business 
processes across the IC, IC ITE will enable several other 
initiatives for improved mission performance in the IC. The 
Committee held quarterly review sessions with the IC Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) and the CIOs of IC elements to 
discuss the design, development, adoption, and governance of IC 
ITE and its key components. The Committee also held several 
individual briefings and discussions with IC elements to review 
how the implementation of IC ITE would affect each element's IT 
posture, mission effectiveness, and workforce. In-depth 
briefings were also held with IC elements tasked by the IC CIO 
to provide IC community services as part of IC ITE. The 
classified annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2014 required the DNI create a governance and 
oversight model to provide the DNI and the Congress with the 
insight required to ensure IC ITE meets milestones for 
performance, cost, and schedule. The classified annex of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 required 
the CIA, DIA, NRO, NGA, and NSA to provide specific plans for 
adoption of IC ITE-compliant capabilities.

6. Role of the IC to Prevent Surprise for Policymakers

    The Committee has been concerned that the government was 
partly caught off guard by global events such as the Arab 
Spring, Russia's incursion into Crimea, and the ability of ISIL 
to quickly overrun a significant amount of territory in Iraq, 
to include the city of Mosul. The Committee believes the IC can 
improve in one of its core functions: warning policymakers of 
important shifts in social stability and the security 
environment. Specifically, during the 113th Congress the 
Committee spent considerable time reviewing IC ``warning'' 
offices and tradecraft requirements to employ analytic 
techniques to prevent surprise. The Committee directed the DNI 
to develop a plan for coordinating and improving the 
implementation of IC-wide adoption of alternative analysis 
methodologies. The latest effort in this vein, as described in 
the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy, is ``anticipatory 
intelligence.'' The Committee met with senior ODNI 
representatives several times to discuss various methodologies 
and analytic tools that underlie the IC's unique forecasting 
capability and the role ODNI will play in overseeing the IC-
wide adoption of anticipatory intelligence. The classified 
annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2015 required the DNI to develop a governance model to ensure 
effective implementation of anticipatory intelligence across 
the IC.

7. Security Clearance Reform

    The Committee strongly supported efforts to enhance and 
expedite initiatives to deter insider threats, including 
modernizing the security clearance background investigation 
process. As part of this effort, the Committee reviewed 
continuous evaluation and automated record check programs--both 
within the U.S. Government and the private sector--and met with 
private sector entities to collect best practices related to 
hiring, background investigations, insider threat monitoring, 
ethics, and privacy.

8. Defense Clandestine Service and the Defense Intelligence Agency

    The Committee continues to closely examine the 
implementation of the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) to 
ensure the intelligence needs of the Department of Defense are 
adequately addressed without unnecessary duplication of human 
intelligence collection elsewhere in the IC.
    In addition to oversight of the DCS, the Committee received 
regular briefings and reports pertinent to the DIA's 
performance in providing defense intelligence to our 
warfighters and national security leaders. The Committee 
focused on the areas of analysis, operations, science and 
technology, strategic intelligence, and crisis support, 
including intelligence support related to the campaign against 
ISIL, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, and the disposition of Syrian chemical 
weapons.

9. Oversight of the Intelligence Community's Financial Intelligence 
        Efforts

    Financial intelligence has emerged as a significant area of 
IC activity, aiming to ``follow the money'' of adversaries. It 
has proven to be a powerful tool confronting a range of 
challenging threats including terrorism, weapons proliferation, 
and narcotics trafficking. Effective financial intelligence can 
often require unique skill sets, and a number of IC elements 
have developed capabilities in this regard, including the DNI's 
establishment of a National Intelligence Manager for Threat 
Finance. The Committee will continue to review and assess 
financial intelligence to ensure that tradecraft is 
standardized and unnecessary duplication of effort is 
eliminated.

10. Oversight of Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Efforts

    During the 113th Congress, the Committee continued its 
oversight of the IC's role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 
The Committee continued its practice of conducting regularly 
scheduled meetings on this subject with IC personnel.
    The Committee also devoted significant time and attention 
to lethal operations against counterterrorism targets. As part 
of this continuing effort during the 113th Congress, the 
Committee staff held numerous in-depth oversight meetings with 
government officials to review operations, examine their 
effectiveness, verify the efforts made to avoid non-combatant 
deaths, and understand related intelligence collection and 
analysis. In addition, the Committee has worked with the 
Executive Branch to understand the legal basis for these 
operations.
    Additionally, the Committee has conducted oversight of the 
implementation of policies and practices in the area of 
interrogation, such as the operations of the High-Value 
Detainee Interrogation Group. It has also continued to examine 
counterterrorism relations between the IC and foreign liaison 
partners.

11. Covert Action

    The Committee continued to conduct vigorous oversight of 
covert action programs throughout the 113th Congress. The 
Committee's rules require the Committee's Staff Director to 
``ensure that covert action programs of the United States 
government receive appropriate consideration once a quarter.'' 
In accordance with this rule, the Committee receives a written 
report every quarter on each covert action that is being 
carried out under a presidential finding. Committee staff 
reviews these reports and meets with IC personnel to discuss 
their substance and pose additional questions. The Committee 
also holds periodic hearings and briefings on covert action 
programs, and receives written reviews of covert actions from 
the CIA Inspector General, which are often the basis for 
additional staff inquiries.
    Further, under the National Security Act, the DNI and the 
heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United 
States Government involved in a covert action are required to 
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and 
currently informed of all covert actions that are the 
responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or 
on behalf of any department or agency of the United States. 
Upon receiving such notifications, the Committee reviews the 
details of each and receives briefings to fully understand the 
issues.
    The Committee seeks to ensure that covert action programs 
are consistent with United States foreign policy goals, and are 
conducted in accordance with all applicable U.S. laws.

12. Impact of Sequester on the IC

    The government shutdown that took place October 1-16, 2013, 
when appropriations bills were not enacted, caused the IC to 
furlough 72 percent of its civilian workforce. This furlough 
had many deleterious effects, including on the IC's ability to 
properly cover important national security matters. The effects 
of the furlough were partially ameliorated by the Pay Our 
Military Act (Public Law 113-39), which exempted Department of 
Defense personnel. In addition, several IC elements were able 
over time to gradually reduce their furloughs given the 
mounting risks to Americans' safety and security. The Committee 
had a number of concerns with how the sequestration was managed 
in the IC including: (1) an apparent lack of preparation for 
how to implement Office of Management and Budget guidance for 
implementing a furlough; (2) wide disparities in how IC 
agencies' implemented furloughs, leaving gaps in important 
functions; and (3) the unavailability of IC element 
sequestration plans for Committee review until sequestration 
had been in effect for many days. The Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required the DNI, the 
Director of CIA, and the heads of the IC elements in the 
Department of Defense to provide the Committee with a plan for 
an orderly shutdown in the event of the future absence of 
appropriations.

13. Space Launch

    The Committee supports introduction of competition into the 
national security space sector, and held several briefings with 
the National Reconnaissance Office and the U.S. Air Force to 
promote a robust certification process for new entrants. In 
addition, the Committee is concerned with the government's 
reliance on a Russian-made engine on the launch vehicles that 
put national security space satellites into orbit. The 
Committee supports Air Force efforts to secure an alternative 
means of propulsion to launch U.S. satellites that does not 
present this risk.

14. GEOINT Commission

    In the 113th Congress, the Committee received testimony 
from the four commissioners named to the GEOINT Commission, 
which was chartered by the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2013. The Commission's report provided important 
analysis to help frame Committee decisions on the future of 
overhead architecture and is the subject of ongoing oversight 
and legislative interest of the Committee.

15. Over-Classification Reform

    The Committee continued its oversight of ODNI's efforts to 
improve the discoverability and sharing of information across 
the IC. Specifically, the Committee has been concerned about 
the IC's misapplication and overuse of the originator control 
marking (ORCON), which can impede the complete and timely 
dissemination of intelligence, as the agency that originates 
the information retains control over its dissemination. During 
the 113th Congress, Committee staff reviewed this matter and 
met with IC officials responsible for establishing the policies 
and procedures that govern classification and control markings, 
and for ensuring classified national intelligence is properly 
disseminated. Committee staff concluded that the use of the 
ORCON marking by certain IC elements had increased 
substantially, and that in some cases classification and 
control marking policies had been violated. The classified 
annex of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014 directed ODNI to adopt new policies ensuring the ORCON 
marking is used judiciously, so that classified national 
intelligence is disseminated appropriately and without undue 
delay or restriction. In response, ODNI promulgated new 
guidance to the IC, designed to facilitate dissemination of 
ORCON information to all intended consumers, including the 
Congressional Oversight Committees.

                               D. Audits


1. Whistleblowers and Matters of Urgent Concern

    The Committee annually receives hundreds of phone calls, 
facsimiles, mail, and email communications from self-identified 
whistleblowers on matters they believe to be of urgent concern. 
Committee staff reviewed and investigated these communications.

2. Inspectors General

    The Committee continued its strong relationship with, and 
oversight of, the Inspectors General of agencies in the IC. 
Regular oversight consisted of reviews of agency Semiannual 
Reports and Annual Work Plans.

3. Accounting Standards and Auditability

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 
required the CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA to produce auditable 
financial statements by March 1, 2005. This deadline was 
extended several times as the IC struggled to make progress 
over the last decade. Section 369 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed the DNI ``to 
develop a plan and schedule to achieve a full, unqualified 
audit of each element of the intelligence community not later 
than September 30, 2013.'' The Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011 stipulated that the DNI certify in writing 
that ``the heads of the CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, and ODNI are 
committed to achieving an unqualified, now unmodified, opinion 
on the financial statements of these agencies by an independent 
auditor within the timeframe of the Future Year Intelligence 
Plan for Fiscal Year 2011 [2016].''
    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 
required that the CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, NSA, and ODNI conduct 
full-scope audits of their financial statements beginning in 
fiscal year 2014. During the 113th Congress, the Committee held 
periodic briefings with the IC, to include Chief Financial 
Officers, Inspectors General, and other officials, to determine 
and assess progress made towards achieving financial 
auditability by 2016. The CIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA conducted 
audits of their fiscal year 2014 financial statements. The NRO 
received an unmodified opinion, and the CIA, NGA, and NSA 
received disclaimers of opinion. While the DIA and ODNI did not 
conduct an audit, both plan to do so in 2015. The Committee 
will continue to hold regular meetings with financial managers 
to measure the Community's progress on this issue until all 
agencies have received unmodified audit opinions. While a great 
deal of work remains, the Committee notes the significant 
efforts by the intelligence agencies involved and views the 
progress to date as a significant accomplishment.

4. Future Ground Architecture Study

    Committee staff conducted a ``deep-dive'' evaluation of two 
classified NRO ground programs. This oversight led to immediate 
and continued improvement to the entire ground architecture.

5. IC IG, DOJ IG, and DHS IG Review of National Counterterrorism and 
        Intelligence Centers

    The Committee, along with the Senate Judiciary Committee 
and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee requested that the Inspector General of the IC, and 
the Inspectors General of the Justice Department and the 
Department of Homeland Security, conduct a joint audit of the 
IC's National Counterterrorism and Intelligence Centers that 
have domestic roles and responsibilities. That audit is 
expected to conclude during the 114th Congress.

                            IV. NOMINATIONS

    During the 113th Congress, the Committee considered six 
nominations upon referral, five directly upon receipt of the 
nomination in the Senate, and one sequentially after referral 
to, and reporting by, another committee.
    The Committee held hearings for all six of the pending 
nominees and recommended to the Senate that it give its advice 
and consent to each of the pending nominations. The Senate 
confirmed all six of the individuals recommended by the 
Committee in the 113th Congress.
    Throughout the 113th Congress, Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of 
the 94th Congress, which had been added by S. Res. 445 of the 
108th Congress and was further augmented during the 109th 
Congress, governed referrals to the Committee. Section 17 was 
further amended in the 113th Congress, as regarding the 
confirmation of the Directors and Inspectors General at the NSA 
and NRO. As a result of S. Res. 445, all nominations to 
positions in the IC requiring the Senate's advice and consent 
are referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence, even when 
they are positions--such as the Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security--that are within departments that are 
primarily under the jurisdiction of other Senate committees.
    The following were the nominations referred to the 
Committee during the 113th Congress, listed in order of the 
date of the nomination:

    A. John O. Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

    On January 7, 2013, the President nominated John O. Brennan 
to be the Director of the CIA. At that time, Mr. Brennan was 
the Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism.
    After receiving Mr. Brennan's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on February 7, 2013. 
Mr. Brennan's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-31 and posted on the 
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on March 5, 2013, by a vote 
of 12-3. The Senate approved the nomination by a vote of 63-34 
on March 7, 2013.

  B. John P. Carlin, Assistant Attorney General for National Security

    On September 10, 2013, the President nominated John P. 
Carlin to be Assistant Attorney General for National Security 
at the Department of Justice. At that time, Mr. Carlin was the 
Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the 
Department of Justice.
    Mr. Carlin's nomination was first referred to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, which recommended confirmation on February 
6, 2014, at which point the nomination was sequentially 
referred to the SSCI. After receiving Mr. Carlin's responses to 
the Committee's standard questionnaire and responses to the 
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the 
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been 
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on February 
25, 2014. Mr. Carlin's testimony and his responses to the 
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions 
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-601 and posted on the 
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on March 4, 2014, by a voice 
vote. The Senate approved the nomination by a vote of 99-1 on 
April 1, 2014.

 C. Daniel B. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
                                Research

    On October 4, 2013, the President nominated Daniel B. Smith 
to be the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research at 
the Department of State. Mr. Smith had most recently served as 
the U.S. Ambassador to Greece from 2010 to 2013.
    After receiving Mr. Smith's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on December 17, 2013. 
Mr. Smith's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-606 and posted on the 
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on January 16, 2014, by a 
voice vote. The Senate approved the nomination by a vote of 98-
0 on February 12, 2014.

   D. Caroline D. Krass, General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 
                                 Agency

    On November 7, 2013, the President nominated Caroline D. 
Krass to be the General Counsel of the CIA. At that time, Ms. 
Krass was Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the 
Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice.
    After receiving Ms. Krass' responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about her understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which she had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on December 17, 2013. 
Ms. Krass' testimony and her responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-606 and posted on the 
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on March 4, 2014, by a vote 
of 13-2. The Senate approved the nomination by a vote of 95-4 
on March 13, 2014.

 E. Francis X. Taylor, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, 
                    Department of Homeland Security

    On February 12, 2014, the President nominated Francis X. 
Taylor to be the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 
at DHS. At that time, Mr. Taylor was President and CEO at 
FXTaylor Associates.
    After receiving Mr. Taylor's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on February 25, 2014. 
Mr. Taylor's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-607 and posted on the 
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on March 4, 2014, by a voice 
vote. The Senate approved the nomination by a voice vote on 
April 7, 2014.

  F. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism 
                                 Center

    On November 7, 2014, the President nominated Nicholas J. 
Rasmussen to be Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center. At that time, Mr. Rasmussen was Deputy Director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center.
    After receiving Mr. Rasmussen's responses to the 
Committee's standard questionnaire and responses to the 
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the 
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been 
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on November 
20, 2014. Mr. Rasmussen's testimony and his responses to the 
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions 
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 113-609 and posted on the 
Committee's website. Following the hearing, the Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on December 1, 2014, by a 
voice vote. The Senate approved the nomination by a voice vote 
on December 16, 2014.

                          V. SUPPORT TO SENATE

    Under Senate Resolution 400, which established the 
Committee in 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence has an 
important role in assuring that the IC provides ``informed and 
timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative 
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and 
vital interests of the Nation.'' The Committee fulfills this 
responsibility by providing access to IC information and 
officials to the U.S. Senate.
    The Committee facilitated access to intelligence 
information for members and staff outside the Committee by 
inviting them to participate in briefings and hearings on 
issues of shared jurisdiction or interest. The Committee also 
provided intelligence briefings by its professional staff to 
Members outside the Committee and assisted Members in resolving 
issues with intelligence agencies.

                              VI. APPENDIX


                    A. Summary of Committee Actions


1. Number of meetings

    During the 113th Congress, the Committee held a total of 
137 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and 
hearings, and numerous off-the-record briefings. These included 
two joint hearings with the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
one joint hearing with the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. There were 108 oversight hearings, including 
seven hearings on the IC budget and 12 on legislative matters, 
and six open confirmation hearings. Of these 108 hearings, 
eight were open to the public and 100 were closed to protect 
classified information pursuant to Senate rules. The Committee 
also held 31 on-the-record briefings and meetings, and four 
business meetings including mark-ups of legislation. 
Additionally, the Committee staff conducted seven on-the-record 
briefings and interviews and numerous off-the-record briefings.

2. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee

    S. Res. 50--An original resolution authorizing expenditures 
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
    S. Res. 470--An original resolution amending S. Res. 400 to 
clarify the responsibility of committees of the Senate in the 
provision of the advice and consent of the Senate to 
nominations to positions in the intelligence community.
    S. 1631--An original bill to consolidate the congressional 
oversight provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 and for other purposes.
    S. 1681--An original bill to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2014 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
    S. 2741--An original bill to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

3. Bills referred to the Committee

    S. 2439--NSA Internal Watchdog Act.
    S. Res. 281--A resolution expressing the sense of the 
United States Senate that President Obama should issue a 
statement regarding spying on His Holiness, Pope Francis.
    S. 1201--Protecting Americans from the Proliferation of 
Weapons to Terrorists Act of 2013.
    S. 1035--Targeted Strike Oversight Reform Act of 2013.
    H.R. 624--Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act

4. Committee publications

    Report 113-7--Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence covering the period January 5, 2011-January 3, 
2013.
    S. Prt. 113-7--Rules of Procedure (amended February 15, 
2011).
    S. Hrg. 113-31--Nomination of John O. Brennan to be 
Director, Central Intelligence Agency--February 7, 2013 and 
March 5, 2013.
    S. Hrg. 113-89--Current and Projected National Security 
Threats to the United States--March 12, 2013.
    Report 113-119--Report to accompany the FISA Improvements 
Act (S. 1631).
    Report 113-120--Report to accompany the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (S. 1681).
    Report 113-134--Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. 
Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, together 
with additional views--January 15, 2014.
    Report 113-233--Report to accompany the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (S. 2741).
    Report 113-288--Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program together with 
Foreword by Chairman Feinstein and Additional and Minority 
Views--December 9, 2014.

                         VII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS

1. Additional Views of Senator Ron Wyden
    This report notes that the Select Committee on Intelligence 
reported both the FISA Improvements Act of 2013 and the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 in the 113th 
Congress. The Committee was not unanimous on these bills, and I 
would not necessarily describe these bills or the 2013 
surveillance disclosures in the same terms that are used in 
this report. Rather than restate my views here, I would 
encourage anyone interested in the debate over these issues to 
read Senate Report 113-119 and the Senate Report accompanying 
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 for a fuller 
discussion of relevant issues.

                                                         Ron Wyden.

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