[Senate Report 114-36]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 68
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 114-36
____________________________________________________________
INSPECTOR GENERAL EMPOWERMENT
ACT OF 2015
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
to accompany
S. 579
TO AMEND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
TO STRENGTHEN THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
May 5, 2015.--Ordered to be printed
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
49-010 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Keith B. Ashdown, Staff Director
Christopher R. Hixon, Chief Counsel
Patrick J. Bailey, Chief Counsel for Governmental Affairs
Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Deputy Chief Counsel for Governmental Affairs
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Mary Beth Schultz, Minority Chief Counsel
Troy H. Cribb, Minority Chief Counsel for Governmental Affairs
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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Page
I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................1
III. Legislative History.............................................12
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis.....................................13
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact.................................17
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.......................17
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........19
Calendar No. 68
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
1st Session } { 114-36
===============================================================
INSPECTOR GENERAL EMPOWERMENT ACT OF 2015
_______
May 5, 2015.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 579]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 579) to amend the
Inspector General Act of 1978 to strengthen the independence of
the Inspectors General, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends that the
bill, as amended, do pass.
I. Purpose and Summary
The purpose of S. 579, the Inspector General Empowerment
Act of 2015, is to strengthen the independence of inspectors
general (IGs) and to provide them with the tools necessary to
root out waste, fraud and mismanagement within the federal
government. The bill would authorize IGs to write testimonial
subpoenas for federal government contractors, federal grant
recipients, and former federal employees, and perform computer
matching of agency data and seek Paperwork Reduction Act
approval without first going through the agency. The bill would
also improve the way misconduct by Office of Inspector General
(OIG) officials is investigated, and would promote more
transparency to the public and cooperation between the offices
and Congress.
II. Background and the Need for Legislation
The bipartisan Inspector General Act of 1978 (the IG Act)
created OIGs within federal agencies and entities.\1\ The IG
Act representated a significant reorganization of the way
federal agencies handled audit and investigative work to ensure
these responsibilities were prioritized,\2\ passed in response
to ``clear . . . fraud, abuse and waste in the operations of
Federal departments and agencies and in federally-funded
programs [that is] reaching epdemic proportions.''\3\
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\1\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1, et seq., (Public Law 95-452).
\2\S. Rept. 85-1071, Report of the Committee on Governmental
Affairs United States Senate to Accompany H.R. 8588, 7 (Aug. 8, 1878)
(``Passage of this legislation will upgrade the auditing and
investigative functions in the executive agencies by making it clear
that Congress takes the problem and responsibilities seriously.'').
\3\Id. at 4.
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Initially there were just twelve offices established, and
the number has since grown to seventy-two.\4\ The IG Act and
subsequent legislation created two types of inspectors general
(IGs): establishment IGs and designated Federal entity (DFE)
IGs.\5\ Establishment IGs are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.\6\ DFE IGs are appointed by the head
of the agency or entity.\7\
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\4\Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
The Inspectors General (July 14, 2014), available at https://
www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/IG_Authorities_Paper_-_Final_6-
11-14.pdf.
\5\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 3(a) and 8G(c).
\6\Id. at Sec. 3(a).
\7\Id. at Sec. 8G(c).
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The IG Act established OIGs to be:
independent and objective units--(I) to conduct and
supervise audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of [government] establishments
. . . (2) to provide leadership and coordination and
recommend policies for activities designed (A) to
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration of, and (B) to prevent and detect fraud
and abuse in, such programs and operations; and (3) to
provide a means for keeping the head of the
establishment and the Congress fully and currently
informed about problems and deficiencies relating to
the administration of such programs and operations and
the necessity for and progress of corrective action . .
. .\8\
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\8\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2; see also S. Rept. 85-1071 at 7, supra note
2 (``Above all, the Inspector and Auditors General created in this
legislation would have the requisite independence to do an effective
job. . . . [T]he audit and investigative functions should be assigned
to an individual whose independence is clear and whose responsibility
runs directly to the agency head and ultimately to the Congress.'').
IGs are statutorily guaranteed ``direct and prompt access''
to the agency head,\9\ access to all records available to their
agency,\10\ and are directed to keep both Congress and the
agency ``fully and currently informed.''\11\
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\9\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 6(a)(6).
\10\Id. at Sec. 6(a)(1).
\11\Id. at Sec. 4(a)(5).
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The value IGs add to the federal government cannot be
overstated. An IG works as the agency's watchdog. The amount
IGs can save the taxpayer in identifying and recovering
improper payments, ferreting out abusive or wasteful practices,
and identifying troubled programs is well-documented.\12\
Michael E. Horowitz, Chair of the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and IG of the
Department of Justice, has summed up OIGs' contribution as
follows:
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\12\See, e.g., U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, Improving the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and
Independence of Inspectors General (Feb. 24, 2015), available at http:/
/www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/improving-the-efficiency-effectiveness-
and-independence-of-inspectors-general (Steve A. Linick written
testimony: In FY 2014, State OIG ``identified $43.3 million in taxpayer
funds that could be put to better use,'' imposed or identified ``$75
million in fines, restitution, recoveries and other monetary results''
in addition to ``$1 billion in financial results from audit- or
inspection-related findings.''; Patrick P. O'Carroll, Jr. biography: In
FY 2014, at SSA: ``OIG's investigators reported over $552 million in
investigative accomplishments through SSA recoveries, restitution,
fines, settlements, judgments, and projected savings. In addition, the
OIG's auditors issued eighty-four reports with recommendations
identifying more than $5 billion in Federal funds that could be put to
better use, and over $1 billion in questioned costs. And the OIG's
attorneys reported over $21 million in civil monetary penalties and
assessments.'').
[I]n Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, the approximately 14,000
employees at the 72 federal Offices of Inspector
General conducted audits, inspections, evaluations, and
investigations resulting in the identification of
approximately $37 billion in potential cost savings and
approximately $14.8 billion from investigative
recoveries and receivables. In comparison, the
aggregate FY 2013 budget of the 72 federal OIGs was
approximately $2.5 billion, meaning that these
potential savings represent about a $21 return on every
dollar invested in the IGs.\13\
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\13\Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice, supra note 12.
Despite the clear existing statutory guarantees of IG
independence and complete access to documents needed to conduct
their audits, investigations, and other reviews, some
challenges persist that threaten IG independence and prevent
IGs from fully and effectively carrying out their missions. On
February 24, 2015, the Committee held a hearing titled,
Improving the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Independence of
Inspectors General. The Committee heard testimony from four
IGs: Department of Justice IG Michael E. Horowitz; Department
of State IG Steve A. Linick; Department of Homeland Security IG
John Roth; and Social Security Administration IG Patrick P.
O'Carroll, Jr.\14\ Each IG testified regarding the challenges
they face and the need for reform.\15\ Those challenges and
others are addressed by this bill, and discussed in more detail
below.
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\14\U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee, Improving the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Independence of
Inspectors General, supra note 12.
\15\Id.
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A. OIG INDEPENDENCE
The OIG must be independent from the agency it is mandated
to oversee. There are at least three ways that this principle
is threatened: the ability for the President and/or an agency
head to sideline an IG indefinitely and without notice to
Congress; instances of agencies delaying or obstructing
investigations; and IG vacancies.
1. The Administration's ability to sideline IGs
The power of the President or DFE to remove an IG threatens
the IG's independence at a very basic level. The IG Act
attempted to temper this power by adding procedural safeguards
meant to protect IGs from being removed for political or other
nefarious reasons.\16\ For establishment IGs, while the
President can remove the IG from office or transfer him or her
to another position within the agency, the President must
communicate the reasons for the action in writing to Congress
at least 30 days before the removal or transfer.\17\ Similarly,
in the case of DFE IGs, while the DFE can remove or transfer
the IG, it must provide notice and reasons for the actions in
writing to Congress.\18\
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\16\See S. Rep. No. 110-262 (2008) (notice provision added to
``allow for an appropriate dialogue with Congress in the event that the
planned transfer or removal is viewed as an inappropriate or
politically motivated attempt to terminate an effective Inspector
General'').
\17\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 3(b).
\18\Id. at Sec. 8G(e)(2).
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Another type of personnel action has the potential for
doing significant damage to OIG independence if abused: placing
an IG on indefinite paid or unpaid nonduty status (or
administrative leave, as it is sometimes referred to). This
type of action was not specifically addressed in the IG Act,
nor is it well-defined by other federal law.\19\ The use of
involuntary administrative leave as a substitute for removing a
federal employee can be problematic. When it involves an IG or
a senior IG official, however, the problem is all the more
troublesome: by indefinitely displacing an IG or a senior IG
official, the agency can undermine or intimidate the only
office expressly designed to oversee it.
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\19\Federal law does not explicictly authorize paid administrative
leave, Miller v. Dep't of Defense, 45 M.S.P.R. 263, 266 (1990), but the
agency can use it within its discretion and for short periods of time,
id.; see also To the Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission, 38 Comp.
Gen. 203 (1958).
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In one recent example, the National Archives and Records
Administration placed its IG, Paul Brachfeld, on paid
administrative leave in 2012 in response to allegations of
wrongdoing against him.\20\ The leave lasted for two years,
creating lengthy uncertainty within the OIG and coming at a
high cost to taxpayers: the agency paid $300,000 for the IG's
salary while he remained unable to work and another several
hundred thousand dollars on legal fees.\21\ The Committee
believes the delay was exacerbated by inadequate coordination
among investigative bodies and slow work by CIGIE's Integrity
Committee.
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\20\Report of Administrative Investigation for the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (Mar. 28, 2014),
available at http://www.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/
080514cc1.pdf.
\21\Id.; Letter from Charles E. Grassley, Darrell Issa, and Tom A.
Coburn to The Honorable David S. Ferriero, Feb. 21, 2014.
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To address this problem, the bill limits the instances in
which an IG can be placed on paid or unpaid nonduty status, and
provides that CIGIE--the body to which any complaints against
the IG will be referred--review the placement and determine
whether it is justified in lasting more than ten days. The bill
also includes clearer timelines for CIGIE to complete
investigations and procedures to improve coordination between
the Office of Special Counsel and CIGIE's Integrity Committee,
discussed below. These measures are intended to reduce
indefinite leave, to provide more stability for the OIGs, and
to reduce the incidence, or even the appearance, of
administrative leave being used to control an OIG's work. It
does not, however, limit or alter the President's or an
agency's ability to remove an IG from office.
2. Agency interference with investigations
The IG Act makes IG independence from the agency or DFE
paramount, and it is clear both in language and intent that IGs
should have unfettered access to the agency's documents for
purposes of carrying out their responsibilities under the Act.
IGs are authorized to access:
[A]ll records, reports, audits, reviews, documents,
papers, recommendations or other material available to
the applicable establishment which relates to programs
and operations with respect to which that Inspector
General has responsibilities under this Act.\22\
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\22\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 6(a)(1).
The Committee is aware that many IGs have at times
experienced difficulties accessing documents from their
respective agencies. In August 2014, forty-seven IGs signed a
letter to Congress highlighting the importance of timely and
complete access to agency records and detailing several
instances of agency interference.\23\ The letter cited specific
examples of restrictions on access to records faced by the IGs.
One such example was the difficulty Peace Corps Inspector
General Kathy Buller encountered trying to access records
related to her review of the Peace Corps' implementation of the
Katy Puzey Act.\24\ According to the letter from the forty-
seven IGs:
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\23\Letter from Michael G. Carroll, et al. to The Honorable Darrell
Issa, The Honorable Elijah Cummings, The Honorable Thomas R. Carper,
and The Honorable Tom Coburn, Aug. 5, 2014, available at http://
www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/issues/upload/
IG%20Access%20Letter%20to%20Congress%2008-05-2014.pdf.
\24\Id.; see also U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, Strengthening Agency Oversight:
Empowering the Inspectors General Community (Jan. 15, 2014), available
at http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/strengthening-agency-oversight-
empowering-inspectors-general-community/.
Other Inspectors General have, from time to time,
faced similar obstacles to their work, whether on a
claim that some other law or principle trumped the
clear mandate of the IG Act or by the agency's
imposition of unnecessarily burdensome administrative
conditions on access. Even when we are ultimately able
to resolve these issues with senior agency leadership,
the process is often lengthy, delays our work, and
diverts time and attention from substantive oversight
activities. This plainly is not what Congress intended
when it passed the IG Act.\25\
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\25\Letter from Michael G. Carroll, supra note 23.
Another example recently brought to the Congress's
attention is the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) delay
in producing records requested by IG Horowitz in four separate
reviews in 2015 alone--records substantially similar to those
that the FBI provided to the OIG on a routine basis prior to
2010.\26\
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\26\Letter from Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on
the Judiciary, to the Hon. James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (March 6, 2015); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on the Judiciary, Access to Justice?: Does DOJ's Office of the
Inspector General Have Access to Information Needed to Condcut Proper
Oversight? (Sep. 9, 2014), Attachment 2, at 2-3, available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/d2537da6-7f7f-4a32-b843-0366e2ee0403/
ig-horowitz-testimony-w-attachments-hjc-september-9-2014.pdf.
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Agency attempts to interfere with OIG investigations have
come in many forms, including delaying turning over the
documents for exorbitant amounts of time,\27\ and over-
classifying information or documents to avoid certain findings
in the investigation becoming public.\28\
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\27\Testimony of the Honorable Todd J. Zinser, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, United States
Senate, The Department of Commerce's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request,
26 (Feb. 26, 2015) (discussing IG access to Census Bureau documents);
Statement of Michael E. Horowtiz, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Justice, supra note 12 (FBI ``failed to provide the OIG with timely
acess to certain records regarding two whistleblower retaliation
investigations.'').
\28\Testimony of the Honorable Todd J. Zinser, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, United States
Senate, The Department of Commerce's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request,
27 (Feb. 26, 2015) (describing the IG's views that NOAA over-classified
certain documents); Statement of John Roth, Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security, supra note 12 (describing the IG's
views that the Transportation Security Administration unnecessarily
delayed removing a classified designation from a report that contained
no sensitive information).
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Attempts by agencies to block or delay IG access to
documents necessary for their statutorily mandated oversight is
unacceptable. The Committee agrees with the IGs that
``[r]efusing, restricting, or delaying an Inspector General's
access to documents leads to incomplete, inaccurate, or
significantly delayed findings or recommendations, which in
turn may prevent the agency from promptly correcting serious
problems and deprive Congress of timely information regarding
the agency's performance.''\29\ There does not appear to be any
additional language the Committee could supply to the IG Act to
make this clearer. Accordingly, the Committee reaffirms its
belief that IGs must be given prompt, unfettered access to
agency documents for purposes of carrying out their
responsibilities under the Act, and reaffirms its intent to
ensure agencies follow the law.
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\29\Letter from Michael G. Carroll, supra note 23.
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Furthermore, the Committee has been made aware of language
in Section 3(a) of the IG Act that, from time to time, is used
to suggest that the agency head has some ability to dictate,
influence, or control the work of OIGs.\30\ Courts have
disagreed with this interpretation,\31\ but nonetheless, the
existence of the language continues to be used by some
agencies, at least informally, to justify interfering with the
IG's work. Nothing in Section 3(a) should be construed to
suggest that agency heads exercise any influence, control, or
supervision of the IGs. To make this clear, the bill strikes
the ``supervision'' language from Section 3(a).
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\30\See 5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 3(a) (``Under the general supervision
of'' and ``subject to supervision by'').
\31\See, e.g., United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n v. Fed.
Labor Relations Auth., 25 F.3d 229, 235 (4th Cir. 1994).
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3. Addressing prolonged IG vacancies
IG vacancies are a significant concern to the Committee. As
of the submission date of this report, there are seven
vacancies of Presidentially-appointed IGs and two vacancies of
agency-appointed IGs, with only two nominations pending.\32\
Some of the vacancies have existed for extremely long periods
of time, despite Congress' pleas for the President to nominate
someone.\33\ For example, the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs OIG, which has faced many challenges in effectively
carrying out its missions, has worked without a permanent IG
since December, 2013.\34\ The Department of the Interior has
not had a permanent IG since February, 2009.\35\
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\32\Information provided to Committee staff by CIGIE, Apr. 8, 2015.
\33\Letter from Ron Johnson, Thomas R. Carper, and all other
Members of the Committee to President Barack H. Obama (Mar. 24, 2015);
Letter from Ron Johnson to President Barack H. Obama (Jan. 22, 2015);
Letter from Thomas R. Carper and Tom Coburn to President Barack Obama
(June 19, 2014); Letter from Thomas R. Carper, Ranking Member Tom
Coburn, and all other Members of the Committee to President Barack
Obama (Jan. 24, 2013).
\34\Information provided to Committee staff by CIGIE, Apr. 8, 2015.
\35\Id.
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The Committee believes the absence of permanent, Senate-
confirmed or agency-appointed IGs impedes the ability of these
offices to identify and expose waste, fraud, and abuse in the
federal government. In addition, acting IGs in these roles
create the potential for conflicts of interest, diminish
independent IG oversight, and cause instability for IG
offices.\36\
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\36\Letter from Ron Johnson, et al. to President Barack Obama (Mar.
24, 2015).
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This type of threat to IG independence was all too apparent
in the case of former Acting Inspector General of the
Department of Homeland Security, Charles Edwards. Mr. Edwards
was the Acting IG from 2011 through 2013.\37\ In 2014, the
Committee's Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight
found that Mr. Edwards ``jeopardized the independence of the
Office of Inspector General.\38\ The report noted that ``Mr.
Edwards openly sought a nomination for the Inspector General
position'' and that he ``directed reports to be altered or
delayed to accommodate senior DHS officials.''\39\
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\37\On July 21, 2011, the President nominated an IG for DHS but the
nomination was withdrawn on June 7, 2012. Congressional Record, p.
S4812, July 21, 2011 and Congressional Record, p. S3874, June 7, 2012.
\38\Investigation into Allegations of Misconduct by the Former
Acting and Deputy Inspector General of the Department of Homeland
Security, Staff Report of the Subcommittee on Finnacial and Contracting
Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 3
(Apr. 24, 2014).
\39\Id. at 3-4.
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Members' letters urging the President and his agency heads
to nominate IGs have gone unanswered and an unacceptable number
of IG positions remain vacant. Accordingly, this bill requires
the Comptroller General to study the number and duration of IG
vacancies, examine how these vacancies impact the OIG's ability
to carry out their statutorily-required mission, and recommend
ways to minimize the duration of vacancies.
B. OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO OIGS' WORK
Although IGs have the authority to investigate fraud,
waste, and abuse, they are sometimes prevented from fully and
effectively doing so.
1. Compelling testimony
One such impediment is OIGs' limited ability to compel
private citizens to speak to them during the course of an
investigation. Current federal employees are required to comply
with OIG investigations;\40\ private citizens can be compelled
to provide documents\41\ and can voluntarily speak with an OIG
(even under oath, if they so choose).\42\
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\40\See generally 5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 6(a). Agencies typically issue
directives to their employees or have regulations on this issue. See,
e.g., Department of Justice regulation 28 CFR 45.13 (``Department
employees have a duty to, and shall, cooperate fully with the Office of
the Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility, and
shall respond to questions posed during the course of an investigation
. . . . Refusal to cooperate could lead to disciplinary action.'').
\41\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 6(a)(4).
\42\Id. at Sec. 6(a)(5).
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The practical constraints this causes are clear: the OIG
may be hamstrung when investigating matters involving non-
Federal employees. Individuals such as federal contractors or
grant recipients may nonetheless benefit from the agency or
receive federal funds, but are not under the same obligations
to comply with the investigations as federal employees are. Nor
are federal employees who leave federal employment or resign in
the face of an allegation or investigation.
In his written submission to the Committee on February 24,
2015, Department of State IG Linick noted the vast amount of
money that the Department obligates every year on contracts and
grants (a total of $10.5 billion) that his office needs to
inspect to ensure proper management.\43\ In the course of these
inspections and investigations, individuals may need to be
interviewed who are not currently federal employees. IG Linick,
the other three IGs that testified, and CIGIE support giving
IGs limited authority to compel witness testimony through the
testimonial subpoena.\44\
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\43\Statement of Steve A. Linick, Inspector General, Department of
State, supra note 12.
\44\U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Improving the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Independence of
Inspectors General, supra note 12; see also Letter from Peggy E.
Gustafson to The Honorable Beth Cobert (Feb. 20, 2015), available at
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/committees/legislative/
CIGIE%20Legislation%20Priorities%20-%20114th%20Congress%20Letter.pdf.
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The bill provides this authority, limited by appropriate
oversight and procedure, and mindful of the concern that such
subpoenas not interfere with an ongoing matter being conducted
by the Department of Justice. The bill accomplishes this by
setting up a three-IG panel chosen by CIGIE to review a request
by an IG to issue a testimonial subpoena. If a majority of the
panel approves the subpoena, the request is then sent to the
Attorney General of the Department of Justice for review. The
Attorney General has ten days to object to issuance of the
testimonial subpoena if he determines it would interfere with
an ongoing matter. If CIGIE approves the issuance, and the
Attorney General does not object, the testimonial subpoena may
be issued and enforced in any appropriate United States
District Court. The bill also requires CIGIE to report to
Congress on the number of IG testimonial subpoenas issued each
year.
2. Federal laws that hamstring OIGs
OIGs are also sometimes deterred from certain
investigations and audits that could detect and prevent waste,
fraud, and abuse due to laws and government regulations that
have made it more difficult and time-consuming for OIGs to
access information, and which could also interfere with OIG
independence. The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act
(CMPPA) (5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(a)) and Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA) (44 Sec. U.S.C. 35) are two examples of laws that hamper
OIGs and infringe upon their independence. The CMPPA prevents
IGs from performing computer matching to compare Federal
records of one federal agency against other Federal and non-
Federal records without first getting approval from the IG's
agency. This not only hampers IGs' ability to investigate fraud
and perform audits, but also interferes with IGs' independence
since the agency can disapprove or restrict any request for
computer matching.\45\ Similarly, the Paperwork Reduction Act
prevents IGs from collecting information for an investigation
or audit without an often lengthy and burdensome approval
process through the IG's agency.\46\ The IG community has been
requesting these exemptions for many years, including a recent
request by the legislative committee of CIGIE.\47\
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\45\Statement of Patrick P. O'Carroll, Jr., Insepctor General,
Social Security Administration, supra note 12.
\46\Id.
\47\Letter from Peggy E. Gustafson to the Honorable Beth Cobert, 2-
4 (Feb. 20, 2015).
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Patrick O'Carroll, Jr., the IG for the Social Security
Administration (SSA), gave several examples of how the CMPPA
hampers IGs at a Committee hearing on February 24, 2015.\48\
For example, in 2010, SSA OIG matched Department of Labor data
against SSA data to identify Federal employees whose disability
insurance payments were calculated without regard to the fact
that they were at the same time receiving Federal Employees'
Compensation Act payments.\49\ The IG found 961 such
individuals, totaling overpayments of $43 million in just one
year.\50\ However, the SSA IG could not give this data to SSA
to recover or terminate benefits because the SSA IG did not
have a matching agreement, which would have taken over a year
to get from the agency.\51\ IG O'Carroll also spoke of similar
difficulties the PRA poses.\52\ To remove such obstacles, this
bill provides OIGs an exemption to the PRA, as well as an
exemption to the CMPPA for both the OIG and any agency with
whom the OIG is coordinating the match.
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\48\Statement of Patrick P. O'Carroll, Jr., Insepctor General,
Social Security Administration, supra note 12.
\49\Id.
\50\Id.
\51\Id.
\52\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. OVERSIGHT OF OIGS
1. Congress
IGs are statutorily required:
to keep . . . the Congress fully and currently
informed, by means of the reports required by section 5
and otherwise, concerning fraud and other serious
problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs and operations administered
or financed by such establishment, to recommend
corrective action concerning such problems, abuses, and
deficiencies, and to report on the progress made in
implementing such corrective action.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 4(a)(5).
Section 5 of the IG Act details the information that each
IG must supply on a semi-annual basis to Congress, the agency
head, and that should be made available to the public.\54\ This
Section generally includes summaries of the OIG's reports for
the previous six months, including recommendations made to the
agency and any matters referred to prosecutive authorities.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\Id. at Sec. 5. As the committees with oversight responsibility
of IGs, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in the
Senate and the Oversight and Governent Reform Committee in the House
receive these semi-annual reports from most OIGs.
\55\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the reporting requirements of Section 5, the
OIGs have for the last several years provided supplemental
semi-annual reports to some Members of Congress on the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary. These reports are not statutorily
required; they have been supplied pursuant to a 2010 request by
then-Ranking Members Tom Coburn and Charles E. Grassley.\56\ On
February 27, 2015, Chairman Ron Johnson and Chairman Charles E.
Grassley renewed the requests.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\Letter from Charles E. Grassley and Tom Coburn to The Honorable
Hubert T. Bell, et al. (Apr. 8, 2010).
\57\Letter from Ron Johnson and Charles E. Grassley to The
Honorable Hubert T. Bell, et al. (Feb. 27, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, the requested reports provide information
concerning: ``all closed investigations, evaluations, and
audits conducted by the IG offices that were not disclosed to
the public;'' unimplemented IG recommendations; reports not
responded to by the agency within 60 days; investigations
involving high-level employees engaged in misconduct but not
prosecuted; instances of agency whistleblower retaliation;
attempts by the agency to interfere with IG independence or
delay or resist access to documents; and reports not disclosed
to the public.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\Id.
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These semi-annual reports have been a significant source of
information to the Members, and help the committees ensure they
are supporting the IGs and performing effective oversight of
the executive branch. Because they are not statutorily
required, however, they have not necessarily been provided to
all appropriate Members and committees. The Committee believes
that the request for these letters should be codified as a
requirement to keep Congress better informed as well as to
support the community of IGs and empower their work. The bill,
therefore, would require the information requested to be
supplied to the appropriate committees of jurisdiction in the
Senate and House of Representatives, including Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs in the Senate and Oversight
and Government Reform in the House, in coordination with the
semi-annual reports already required under the IG Act.
Additionally, the semi-annual reports required by this bill
would be made available to any Member of Congress upon request.
2. The Public
Section 8M of the IG Act mandates that IGs post audits or
reports on their websites ``not later than 3 days after any
report or audit (or portion of any report or audit) is made
publicly available.''\59\ Despite this clear requirement, some
IGs argue that publication is required only after the report
has been made public through a FOIA request or other similar
means. In other words, some IGs act as though the default
position is one against publication, and publish on their
website only after the report has been made public through some
other means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 8M(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, prior to introduction of this bill, the OIG
for the Department of Veterans Affairs had 140 reports since
2006 that had not been made available to the public.\60\
Although the OIG defended its decision to withhold the findings
of those reports, it recently published seventeen of the
reports in the face of congressional pressure.\61\ Six of those
previously-undisclosed reports ``contain[ed] substantiated
allegations, including two involving veterans who were harmed
or died.''\62\ The OIG also conceded it has no standard for
deciding when to release reports to the public.\63\
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\60\Donovan Slack, VA watchdog stands by decision not to release
report, USA TODAY (Mar. 19, 2015), available at http://
www.usatoday.com/story/life/2015/03/19/va-watchdog-stands-by-decision-
not-to-release-report/25048581/. Official source?
\61\Id.
\62\Id.
\63\Donovan Slack, Congress grills VA watchdog on secret reports,
USA Today (Mar. 16, 2015), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2015/03/16/transparency-of-va-inspector-generals-office-
questioned/24859475/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bill would clarify that the three-day clock to release
IG reports to the public begins the moment the report or audit
is submitted in final form to the head of the Federal agency or
the head of the designated Federal entity, as applicable. Not
only would this ensure a uniform practice across agencies and
leave significantly less room for interpretation, but it would
protect an OIG from any potential pressure by an agency to
withhold publication of a report.\64\
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\64\Testimony of the Honorable Todd J. Zinser, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, United States
Senate, The Department of Commerce's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request,
27 (Feb. 26, 2015) (detailing a senior Commerce official's threat to
sue the IG for publicly releasing an investigative report).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Privacy Act, FOIA, and other laws may prohibit an IG
from publicly releasing a report or portions of the report, and
nothing in this bill would override those laws. However, it is
the express intent of this Committee that laws such as the
Privacy Act and FOIA, when applied to the publication of IG
reports, be construed in favor of public transparency. It
should be the default position of each OIG under the IG Act to
publicly release all reports unless otherwise prevented from
doing so by law.
3. CIGIE
In addition to Congressional oversight and public
accountability, OIGs are monitored by an independent council.
In 2008, the CIGIE was statutorily established to address IG
issues that span several agencies and work to increase the
professionalism of IGs, including a body to consider
allegations of misconduct against IGs or other top OIG
officials.\65\ The Chair of CIGIE, currently Department of
Justice IG Michael Horowitz, is selected to serve a two-year
term.\66\ CIGIE serves an important role in setting IG quality
standards and overseeing IG professionalism.\67\
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\65\The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, P.L. 110-409, 5
U.S.C. App. Sec. 11.
\66\Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
Mission, available at https://www.ignet.gov/content/mission-0, last
visited Feb. 19, 2015.
\67\5 U.S.C. App. Sec. 11(c)(2).
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Under the IG Act, CIGIE's Integrity Committee (IC), has the
responsibility to investigate allegations of misconduct by IGs
or OIG officials.\68\ The IC is made up of the Director of the
Office of Government Ethics, the Special Counsel of the Office
of Special Counsel, four IGs chosen by the Chairperson of
CIGIE, and chaired by an official of the FBI.\69\ Under current
rules and procedures, the IC conducts a threshold review of
allegations it receives and only goes on to conduct a full
investigation of those allegations deemed sufficiently serious
and credible to warrant it. The IC also has overlapping
jurisdiction with the Office of Special Counsel and sometimes
defers to the Office of Special Counsel to investigate first or
exclusively, but there are not clear guidelines for that
coordination. Although the IC has received an average of 28
allegations each year since Fiscal Year 2011, it has disposed
of most without a full investigation, having carried out an
average of six full investigations each year.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\Id. at Sec. 11(d)(4), (5).
\69\Id. at Sec. 11(d)(2).
\70\Letter from Timothy J. Delaney, Chairperson, CIGIE Integrity
Committee, to Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary
(Dec. 15, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where the IC does conduct its own, full investigation, it
does so without any specific deadlines. Committee Members and
others have expressed concern about the length of some IC
investigations.\71\ Another frequent complaint is that the
chairmanship of the IC is a largely administrative role that
has not been embraced by FBI and is better served by another
party.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\Id.
\72\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bill strengthens the IC investigation process without
being overly prescriptive. Among other changes, the bill alters
the IC's makeup to ensure a panel of committed, experienced
members, and puts time limits on each significant step in the
investigation to ensure the IC is moving efficiently toward
completing the investigation and keeping Congress apprised of
delays as well as informed of the results.
The bill also expands CIGIE's role as an oversight body by
authorizing it to receive, review, and mediate any disputes
submitted in writing to it by an OIG regarding an audit,
investigation, inspection, evaluation, or project that involves
the jurisdiction of more than one OIG and to keep the records
of the IC. Finally, the bill authorizes funding for CIGIE to
help ensure it has sufficient funds to comply with its new and
continuing authorities.
D. Conclusion
This bill seeks to address the aforementioned threats to
IGs' independence and ability to effectively perform their
mission to root out waste, fraud, and abuse in the federal
government. With these tools, the Committee believes IGs can be
even more effective in providing valuable insight and
recommendations to agencies and to Congress.
III. Legislative History
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) introduced S. 579 on
February 26, 2015 with Senators Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.) and
Ron Johnson (R-Wi.). The bill was referred to the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Senators Tammy
Baldwin (D-Wi.) and Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) joined as cosponsors on
March 4 and March 20, 2015, respectively.
The Committee considered S. 579 at a business meeting on
March 4, 2015. During the business meeting, five amendments
were offered. Senator Johnson, on behalf of himself and Senator
McCaskill, offered a substitute amendment that made technical
corrections to the bill and, at the request of the Intelligence
Community IG, provided a separate panel to review Intelligence
Community IG requests for testimonial subpoenas. The substitute
amendment was adopted by voice vote with Senators Johnson,
Portman, Lankford, Ayotte, Carper, Baldwin, Heitkamp and Peters
present.
Senator Johnson, for himself and Senator Baldwin, offered
an amendment to clarify that publication of IG reports must
occur within three days of it being submitted in final form to
the head of the agency or entity. The amendment was adopted by
voice vote with Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford, Ayotte,
Carper, Baldwin, Heitkamp, and Peters present.
Senator Johnson, on behalf of himself and Senator
McCaskill, introduced an amendment to modify the authorized
appropriations for CIGIE. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote with Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford, Ayotte, Carper,
Baldwin, Heitkamp, and Peters present.
Senator Lankford introduced an amendment on behalf of
Senator Sasse to expand the classes of individuals who can be
the subject of an IG testimonial subpoena to ensure that
individuals who benefit from contracting or grants with the
federal government must comply with IG investigations. The
amendment was adopted by voice vote with Senators Johnson,
Portman, Lankford, Ayotte, Carper, Baldwin, Heitkamp, and
Peters present.
Senator Baldwin, on behalf of herself and Senator Johnson,
introduced an amendment to require that all IG work products
making recommendations to the agency or entity are provided to
the agency or entity head, the appropriate congressional
committees, and posted on the OIG's website. The amendment was
adopted by voice vote with Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford,
Ayotte, Carper, McCaskill, Baldwin, Heitkamp, and Peters
present.
The Committee ordered the bill, as amended, reported
favorably by voice vote on March 4, 2015. Senators present for
the vote on the bill were Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford,
Ayotte, Carper, McCaskill, Baldwin, Heitkamp, and Peters.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported
Section 1. Short title; table of contents
This section provides the bill's short title, the
``Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2015,'' and a table of
contents.
Section 2. Nonduty status of Inspectors General; supervision
This section amends the header of the Inspector General Act
of 1978 Section 3 by striking the word ``supervision'' and
adding the term ``administrative leave'' to clarify the purpose
and effect of what follows.
It also removes from Section 3 references to Inspectors
General (IGs) being ``supervised'' by the agency. This change
is meant to enhance the independence of IGs and make clear that
nothing in Section 3(a) should be construed to suggest that
agency heads exercise any influence, control, or supervision of
the IGs.
New paragraph (2) to Section 3(b) adds language about how
and when the President can place an IG on paid or unpaid,
nonduty status. If the President places an IG on paid or
unpaid, nonduty status, he or she must notify Congress in
writing within 48 hours of doing so and include the reasons for
such action. Such action is limited to situations where the
continued presence in the workplace of the IG may pose a threat
to the employee or others; result in loss of or damage to
property of the Federal Government; or otherwise jeopardize
legitimate interests of the Federal Government. Moreover, the
President may not place an IG on paid or unpaid, nonduty status
for more than 10 days, unless he/she does so pursuant to a
written recommendation for more time by the Integrity Committee
of CIGIE and immediately notifies Congress of his/her action.
This section is constructed to ensure that indefinite paid or
unpaid administrative leave cannot be used to improperly impede
the independence of an OIG and as a way to avoid the statutory
removal process. The authorities in this new subsection are in
addition to any other personnel action authorized by law.
New paragraph (3) to section 8G(e) adds language about how
and when the head of a DFE can place an IG on paid or unpaid,
nonduty status. If the DFE head places an IG on paid or unpaid,
nonduty status, he or she must notify Congress in writing
within 48 hours of doing so and include the reasons for such
action. Such action is limited to situations where the
continued presence in the workplace of the IG may pose a threat
to the employee or others; result in loss of or damage to
property of the Federal Government; or otherwise jeopardize
legitimate interests of the Federal Government. Moreover, the
head of a designated Federal entity may not place an IG on paid
or unpaid, nonduty status for more than 10 days, unless he/she
does so pursuant to a written recommendation for more time by
the Integrity Committee of the CIGIE and immediately notifies
Congress of his/her action. This section is constructed to
ensure that indefinite paid or unpaid administrative leave
cannot be used to improperly impede the independence of an OIG
and as a way to avoid the statutory removal process. The
authorities in this new subsection are in addition to any other
personnel action authorized by law.
Section 3. Additional authority provisions for Inspectors General
Section 3(a) creates a new section of the Inspector General
Act. This new Section 6A authorizes IGs to require by subpoena
the attendance and testimony of certain witnesses, including a
current or former contractor (or subcontractor) with the
Federal Government, a current or former grantee (or subgrantee)
of the federal government, a current or former employee of the
aforementioned groups, and any former Federal employee that is
necessary in the performance of the functions assigned by the
Inspector General Act. The language identifying classes of
individuals who may be subject to a testimonial subpoena is
designed to encompass those individuals who are receiving--
either themselves or by virtue of their employment for a
company that receives--a benefit from contracting or accepting
a grant from the federal government.
To issue the subpoena, the IG shall submit a request for
approval of the subpoena to a review panel made up of 3 members
of CIGIE (designated by the CIGIE Chair). In the case of a
request by a member of the Intelligence Community, the panel
will be made up of 3 members of the Intelligence Community IGs
to address any security or other issues. The panel has ten days
to review the request and deny, approve, or ask for more time.
If the panel approves the subpoena, the IG then notifies the
Attorney General of his or her intent to issue a subpoena. The
Attorney General has ten days to approve or deny the request if
it would interfere with an ongoing matter. If the request is
approved or no response is given in ten days, the subpoena may
be issued.
This section mandates that CIGIE notify Congress in its
annual report of the number of times such a subpoena has been
issued.
Section (b) exempts IGs from the Computer Matching and
Privacy Protection Act (5 USC 552a(a)) and Paperwork Reduction
Act (44 USC 35) restrictions, and ensures that the Computer
Matching exemption does not impede the exemption the Health and
Human Services IG already has.
Section 4. Additional responsibilities and resources of the Council of
the Inspectors General on integrity and efficiency
This section offers numerous amendments to Section 11 of
the Inspector General Act of 1978.
It first clarifies the membership of CIGIE will include the
IG of the Intelligence Community, rather than the IG of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and also
requires that the annual report be sent to the appropriate
committees of jurisdiction in Congress, in addition to the
President.
New subparagraph (c)(1)(H) directs CIGIE to receive,
review, and mediate any disputes submitted in writing to it by
an Office of Inspector General (OIG) regarding an audit,
investigation, inspection, evaluation, or project that involves
the jurisdiction of more than one OIG.
This section also makes several amendments to CIGIE's
Integrity Committee. Section 11(d) is amended by changing the
membership of the Integrity Committee as follows: (1) the FBI
will serve on the Council, but will no longer chair the
committee; (2) the Special Counsel of the Office of Special
Counsel will no longer be a member of the committee; and (3)
the Director of the Office of Government Ethics can appoint a
designee. The subparagraph is further amended by providing that
the Integrity Committee will elect one of the IG members
appointed by the Chairperson to sit on the Integrity Committee
to serve as Chairperson of the Integrity Committee for a term
of two years.
The section amends Section 11(d)(5) to provide greater
structure for the Integrity Community's review of allegations
and to ensure investigation are timely and efficient. It first
requires that, when a complaint of wrongdoing against an IG or
other covered employee is received by the Integrity Committee,
it is reviewed within 7 days by a subset of the Integrity
Committee (a representative of the Department of Justice, a
representative of the Office of Special Counsel, and a
representative of the Integrity Committee) to determine which
of the members the complaint will be referred to. If the
complaint is referred to the Integrity Committee, the Integrity
Committee has 15 days to review and determine whether the
Chairperson of the IC will initiate an investigation. These
deadlines are not intended to hamstring the Integrity
Committee, but to ensure that investigations occur in a timely
fashion.
An amendment to Section 11(d)(6) makes it mandatory, rather
than discretionary, for the agency or department to provide
necessary resources to the Integrity Committee in the course of
its investigation.
Section 11(d)(7)(B) is amended by requiring that
investigations referred to the Integrity Committee be conducted
by OIGs of similar size to the one being investigated, unless
it involves an OIG with less than 50 employees. It also
mandates that the Integrity Committee rotate assignment of IGs
to investigate allegations and create procedures to avoid
conflicts of interests.
Section 11(d)(7)(C) is replaced with language that requires
the Chairperson to complete its investigation in 120 days. If
it cannot be completed in 120 days, the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee must notify the committees of jurisdiction
of the status of such investigation every 30 days until the
investigation is complete.
New Section 11(d)(7)(D) allows for concurrent
investigations by the Integrity Committee and the Department of
Justice or the Office of Special Counsel.
New Section 11(d)(7)(E) requires the Integrity Committee,
Department of Justice, and Office of Special Counsel to report
to Congress and the CIGIE Chair on the results of any
investigations under this section, and provides that any Member
of Congress can have access to the results, rather than just a
few committees.
Section 11(d)(10) allows any Member of Congress, rather
than just a few committees, to request and obtain from the
Integrity Committee more detailed information about specific
allegations.
The bill adds a new Section 11(d)(12) that permits the
Integrity Committee to receive, review, and refer allegations
of wrongdoing against the Special Counsel (defined under
section 1211(b) of title 5, United States Code) or Deputy
Special Counsel and provides for recusal of the Special Counsel
representative in certain situations. It also directs the
Chairperson of the Council to maintain records for the
Integrity Committee.
New subparagraph 11(e) provides authorized appropriations
for CIGIE from FY 2016-2021 to ensure CIGIE has sufficient
funds to comply with its new and continuing authorities.
Section 5. Reports and additional information
Section 5 requires supplemental reporting requirements
related to the work of IGs. First, this section tasks the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) with conducting a study
on the vacancies in the OIGs that includes the number of
prolonged vacancies; the extent to which the numbers have
changed over time; an evaluation of the impact of such
vacancies; and recommendations for minimizing vacancies. GAO
shall report to the appropriate committees of jurisdiction on
the study.
Next, this section tasks CIGIE with analyzing critical
issues involving the jurisdiction of more than one Federal
agency and reporting on this analysis to the appropriate
committees of jurisdiction.
Further, this section tasks OIGs with reporting every 6
months to the appropriate committees of jurisdiction (and
available by request for any Member of Congress) as follows:
(1) reports on the investigations conducted by their office
involving employees at GS-15 rate of pay and above where
misconduct was found but no prosecution resulted, including the
agency's handling and whether it was referred to the Department
of Justice; (2) reports that were authored by the OIG but not
made available to the public; (3) instances of whistleblower
retaliation at the agency; attempts by the agency to interfere
with the OIG's independence; and any work the OIG performed and
submitted for agency comment that was not returned to the OIG
within 60 days. This new requirement codifies the provision of
this information pursuant to requests that Senators Grassley,
Coburn, and Johnson have made to IGs in 2014 and 2015. This
information will help ensure Congress has the information it
needs to perform its oversight duties of federal agencies.
Finally, this section clarifies and standardizes the
procedures of OIGs for sending reports to the head of the
agency or entity, providing reports to Congress, and making
them public on the OIG's website. For all work products by IGs
that offer recommendations to the agency, the IG must provide
the work product to the head of the agency or federal entity,
the appropriate committees of congress, any individual or
entity that requested the work product, and, upon request, any
Member of Congress. All aforementioned work products, and more
broadly, all IG reports, must be published on the OIG's website
within three days of the report or work product being submitted
in its final form to the head of the agency or entity. There is
an exception for information that is specifically prohibited
from public disclosure by any other provisions of law to ensure
appropriate privacy protections.
Section 6. Technical and conforming amendments
Section 6(a) repeals previous laws for technical purposes.
Section 6(b) revises the Inspector General Act to
distinguish between designated Federal agencies and
nondesignated Federal agencies.
Section 6(c) makes a number of grammatical and spelling
corrections to the Inspector General Act of 1978.
V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact
Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs
on state, local, or tribal governments.
VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
March 17, 2015.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 579, the Inspector
General Empowerment Act of 2015.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Matthew
Pickford.
Sincerely,
Douglas W. Elmendorf.
Enclosure.
S. 579--Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2015
Summary: S. 579 would amend the Inspector General Act of
1978. Specifically, the legislation would authorize the
appropriation of $51 million over the 2016-2021 period for the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
(CIGIE). In addition, the bill would provide Inspectors General
(IGs) with additional investigative authorities and require IGs
and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to submit
additional reports to the Congress.
Based on information from selected IGs and assuming
appropriation of the authorized and necessary amounts, CBO
estimates that implementing S. 579 would cost $45 million over
the 2016-2020 period. Enacting the bill would not affect direct
spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do
not apply.
S. 579 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary effect of S. 579 is shown in the following table. The
costs of this legislation fall within all budget functions that
have funding for IGs.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-------------------------------------------------------
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2016-2020
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATIONa
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency:
Authorization Level................................. 8 8 8 9 9 42
Estimated Outlays................................... 6 8 8 9 9 40
Other Provisions:
Estimated Authorization Level....................... 2 1 1 1 * 5
Estimated Outlays................................... 2 1 1 1 * 5
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization Level................... 10 9 9 10 9 47
Estimated Authorization Level................... 8 9 9 10 9 45
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * = less than $500,000.
aS. 579 also would authorize the appropriation of $9 million in 2021.
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that S.
579 will be enacted before the end of 2015, that the authorized
and necessary amounts will be provided each year, and that
spending will follow historical patterns for federal salaries
and expenses.
The Inspector General Act of 1978 created independent
offices headed by inspectors general who are responsible for
conducting and supervising audits and investigations; promoting
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and preventing and
detecting fraud and abuse in government programs and
operations. IGs operate in more than 70 departments and larger
federal agencies. The federal government spends about $3
billion annually on IG activities.
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
S. 579 would authorize the appropriation of $51 million
over the 2016-2021 period for the CIGIE. The mission of the
council is to investigate allegations of misconduct against IGs
and to coordinate government activities to prevent fraud in
federal operations and programs. The CIGIE receives no specific
appropriation but is funded by transfers from the various IGs.
In fiscal year 2014, the CIGIE spent about $6 million. Based on
information from selected IGs and the CIGIE regarding their
current operations, and assuming the appropriation of the
specified amounts, CBO estimates that implementing this
provision would cost $40 million over the 2016-2020 period and
$11 million thereafter.
Other provisions
S. 579 would require IGs to submit to the Congress
additional reports on their activities. The bill also would
provide additional investigative authorities to all IGs, and it
would require GAO to submit a report to the Congress. Based on
information from IG offices, CBO estimates that implementing
those provisions would cost $5 million over the 2016-2020
period.
Pay-As-You-Go considerations: None.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 579
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state,
local, or tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Matthew Pickford;
Impact on state, local, and tribal governments: Jon Sperl;
Impact on the private-sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
S. 579 as reported are shown as follows (existing law proposed
to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in
italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is
shown in roman):
TITLE 5--APPENDIX
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
SEC. 3. APPOINTMENT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; [SUPERVISION;] REMOVAL;
ADMINISTRATIVE LEAVE; POLITICAL ACTIVITIES;
APPOINTMENT OF ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AUDITING AND ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INVESTIGATIONS
(a) There shall be at the head of each Office an Inspector
General who shall be appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, without regard to
political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and
demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial
analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or
investigations. Each Inspector General shall report to [and be
under the general supervision of] the head of the establishment
involved or, to the extent such authority is delegated, the
officer next in rank below such head, but shall not report to,
[or be subject to supervision by,] any other officer of such
establishment. Neither the head of the establishment nor the
officer next in rank below such head shall prevent or prohibit
the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any
[subpoena] subpoena during the course of any audit or
investigation.
(b) [An Inspector General]
(1) An Inspector General may be removed from office
by the President. If an Inspector General is removed
from office or is transferred to another position or
location within an establishment, the President shall
communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal
or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than
30 days before the removal or transfer. [Nothing in
this subsection shall prohibit a personnel action
otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or
removal.]
(2) An Inspector General may not be placed in a paid
or unpaid, nonduty status by the President--
(A) unless the President, not later than 48
hours after the President issues the directive
to place the Inspector General in such status,
communicates in writing to both Houses of
Congress the reasons for such action, which
shall be limited to evidence that the continued
presence in the workplace of the Inspector
General may--
(i) pose a threat to the employee or
others;
(ii) result in loss of or damage to
property of the Federal Government; or
(iii) otherwise jeopardize legitimate
interests of the Federal Government;
and
(B) for more than 10 days, unless the
Integrity Committee of the Council of the
Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency
submits to the President a written
recommendation for additional time, which is
acted upon by the President, and the decision
is communicated immediately to both Houses of
Congress.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a
personnel action otherwise authorized by law.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 4. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES; REPORT OF CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS TO
ATTORNEY GENERAL
(a) * * *
(b)(1) * * *
(2) For purposes of determining compliance with paragraph
(1)(A) with respect to whether internal quality controls are in
place and operating and whether established audit standards,
policies, and procedures are being followed by Offices of
Inspector General of establishments defined under section
12(2), Offices of Inspector General of designated Federal
entities defined under section [8F(a)(2)] 8G(a)(2), and any
audit office established within a Federal entity defined under
section [8F(a)(1)] 8G(a)(1), reviews shall be performed
exclusively by an audit entity in the Federal Government,
including the Government Accountability Office or the Office of
Inspector General of each establishment defined under section
12(2), or the Office of Inspector General of each designated
Federal entity defined under section [8F(a)(2)] 8G(a)(2).
* * * * * * *
(e)
(1) Whenever an Inspector General, in carrying out
the duties and responsibilities established under this
Act, issues a work product that makes a recommendation
or otherwise suggests corrective action, the Inspector
General shall--
(A) submit the work product to--
(i) the head of the establishment;
(ii) the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs and
the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate;
(iii) the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of
Representatives;
(iv) the congressional committees of
jurisdiction;
(v) if the work product was initiated
upon request by an individual or entity
other than the Inspector General, that
individual or entity; and
(vi) any Member of Congress upon
request; and
(B) not later than 3 days after the work
product is submitted in final form to the head
of the establishment, post the work product on
the website of the Office of Inspector General.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
authorize the public disclosure of information that is
specifically prohibited from disclosure by any other
provision of law.
SEC. 5. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS; TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS; AVAILABILITY TO
PUBLIC; IMMEDIATE REPORT ON SERIOUS OR FLAGRANT
PROBLEMS; DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION; DEFINITIONS
(a) * * *
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(13) the information described under section [05(b)]
804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement
Act of 1996;
(14) * * *
(15) a list of any outstanding recommendations from
any peer review conducted by another Office of
Inspector General that have not been fully implemented,
including a statement describing the status of the
implementation and why implementation is not complete;
[and]
(16) a list of any peer reviews conducted by the
Inspector General of another Office of the Inspector
General during the reporting period, including a list
of any outstanding recommendations made from any
previous peer review (including any peer review
conducted before the reporting period) that remain
outstanding or have not been fully implemented[.]; and
(17) a description of the use of subpoenas for the
attendance and testimony of certain witnesses under
section 6A.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 6. AUTHORITY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL; INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE FROM
FEDERAL AGENCIES; UNREASONABLE REFUSAL; OFFICE
SPACE AND EQUIPMENT
(a) * * *
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) to require by subpoena the production of all
information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data in any medium
(including electronically stored [information, as well
as any tangible thing)] information), as well as any
tangible thing and documentary evidence necessary in
the performance of the functions assigned by this Act,
which subpoena, in the case of contumacy or refusal to
obey, shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate
United States district court: Provided, That procedures
other than [subpenas] subpoenas shall be used by the
Inspector General to obtain documents and information
from Federal agencies;
* * * * * * *
(g)
(1) In this subsection, the terms `agency', `matching
program', `record', and `system of records' have the
meanings given those terms in section 552a(a) of title
5, United States Code.
(2) For purposes of section 552a of title 5, United
States Code, or any other provision of law, a
computerized comparison of 2 or more automated Federal
systems of records, or a computerized comparison of a
Federal system of records with other records or non-
Federal records, performed by an Inspector General or
by an agency in coordination with an Inspector General
in conducting an audit, investigation, inspection,
evaluation, or other review authorized under this Act
shall not be considered a matching program.
(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
impede the exercise by an Inspector General of any
matching program authority established under any other
provision of law.
(h) Subchapter I of chapter 35 of title 44, United States
Code, shall not apply to the collection of information during
the conduct of an audit, investigation, inspection, evaluation,
or other review conducted by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency or any Office of Inspector
General, including any Office of Special Inspector General.
SEC. 6A. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.
(a) Testimonial Subpoena Authority.--In addition to the
authority otherwise provided by this Act and in accordance with
the requirements of this section, each Inspector General, in
carrying out the provisions of this Act, is authorized to
require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of certain
witnesses, including a current or former contractor with the
Federal Government, a current or former subcontractor (at any
tier) of a contractor with the Federal Government, a current or
former grantee of the Federal Government, a current or former
subgrantee of a grantee of the Federal Government, a current or
former employee of such a contractor, subcontractor, grantee,
or subgrantee, and any former Federal employee (but not
including any Federal employee, who is otherwise obligated to
provide testimony and cooperate with the Inspector General),
necessary in the performance of the functions assigned by this
Act, which subpoena, in the case of contumacy or refusal to
obey, shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate United
States district court.
(b) Panel Review Before Issuance.--
(1) Approval Required.--Before the issuance of a
subpoena described in subsection (a), an Inspector
General shall submit a request for approval to issue a
subpoena by a majority of a panel (in this section
referred to as the `Subpoena Panel'), which shall be
comprised of--
(A) 3 members of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
as designated by the Chairperson of the Council
of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency; or
(B) in the case of a request by an Inspector
General from the Intelligence Community, the 3
members designated under subparagraph (A) shall
each by members of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency's Intelligence Community.
(2) Time to respond.--
(A) In general.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), not later than 10 days after
the date on which a request for approval to
issue a subpoena is submitted under paragraph
(1), the Subpoena Panel shall approve or deny
the request.
(B) Additional information for panel.--If the
Subpoena Panel determines that additional
information is necessary to approve or deny a
request for approval to issue a subpoena under
subparagraph (A), the Subpoena Panel shall, not
later than 20 days after the date on which the
request is submitted--
(i) request the additional
information; and
(ii) approve or deny the request.
(3) Denial by panel.--If a majority of the members of
the Subpoena Panel votes to deny a request for approval
to issue a subpoena under subparagraph (B)(ii), the
subpoena may not be issued.
(c) Notice to Attorney General.--
(1) In general.--If the Subpoena Panel approves a
request for approval to issue a subpoena under
subsection (b)(2), the Inspector General shall notify
the Attorney General that the Inspector General intends
to issue the subpoena.
(2) Decision of attorney general.--Not later than 10
days after the date on which the Attorney General is
notified under paragraph (1), the Attorney General
may--
(A) object to the issuance of the subpoena if
the subpoena will interfere with an ongoing
matter; or
(B) approve the issuance of the subpoena.
(3) Issuance of subpoena approved.--If the Attorney
General approves the issuance of the subpoena or does
not object to the issuance of the subpoena during the
10-day period described in paragraph (2), the Inspector
General may issue the subpoena.
(d) Inclusion in Annual Report.--Not later than 1 year
after the date of enactment of this section, and every year
thereafter, each Inspector General shall submit to the
Chairperson of the Council of the Inspectors General on
Integrity and Efficiency the number of times the Inspector
General issued a subpoena under this section, which shall be
included by the Chairperson in the annual report required under
section 11(b)(3)(B)(viii).
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect the exercise by an Inspector General of any
testimonial subpoena authority established under any other
provision of law.
SEC. 8D. SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
(a)
(1) Notwithstanding the last two sentences of section
3(a), the Inspector General of the Department of the
Treasury shall be under the authority, direction, and
control of the Secretary of the Treasury with respect
to audits or investigations, or the issuance of
[subpenas] subpoenas, which require access to sensitive
information concerning--
* * * * * * *
(2) With respect to the information described under
paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Treasury may
prohibit the Inspector General of the Department of the
Treasury from carrying out or completing any audit or
investigation, or from issuing any [subpena] subpoena,
after such Inspector General has decided to initiate,
carry out, or complete such audit or investigation or
to issue such [subpena] subpoena, if the Secretary
determines that such prohibition is necessary to
prevent the disclosure of any information described
under paragraph (1) or to prevent significant
impairment to the national interests of the United
States.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 8E. SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(a)
(1) Notwithstanding the last two sentences of section
3(a), the Inspector General shall be under the
authority, direction, and control of the Attorney
General with respect to audits or investigations, or
the issuance of [subpenas] subpoenas, which require
access to sensitive information concerning--
* * * * * * *
(2) With respect to the information described under
paragraph (1), the Attorney General may prohibit the
Inspector General from carrying out or completing any
audit or investigation, or from issuing any [subpena]
subpoena, after such Inspector General has decided to
initiate, carry out, or complete such audit or
investigation or to issue such [subpoena] subpoena, if
the Attorney General determines that such prohibition
is necessary to prevent the disclosure of any
information described under paragraph (1) or to prevent
the significant impairment to the national interests of
the United States.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 8G. REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL ENTITIES AND DESIGNATED FEDERAL
ENTITIES
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d)
(1) Each Inspector General shall report to and be
under the general supervision of the head of the
designated Federal entity, but shall not report to, or
be subject to supervision by, any other officer or
employee of such designated Federal entity. Except as
provided in paragraph (2), the head of the designated
Federal entity shall not prevent or prohibit the
Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing
any [subpoena] subpoena during the course of any audit
or investigation.
(2) * * *
(e)
(1) * * *
(2) If an Inspector General is removed from office or
is transferred to another position or location within a
designated Federal entity, the head of the designated
Federal entity shall communicate in writing the reasons
for any such removal or transfer to both Houses of
Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or
transfer. [Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a
personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other
than transfer or removal.]
(3) An Inspector General may not be placed in a paid
or unpaid, nonduty status by the head of a designated
Federal entity--
(A) unless the head of the designated Federal
entity, not later than 48 hours after the head
of the designated Federal entity issues the
directive to place the Inspector General in
such status, communicates in writing to both
Houses of Congress the reasons for such action,
which shall be limited to evidence that the
continued presence in the workplace of the
Inspector General may--
(i) pose a threat to the employee or
others;
(ii) result in loss of or damage to
property of the Federal Government; or
(iii) otherwise jeopardize legitimate
interests of the Federal Government;
and
(B) for more than 10 days, unless the
Integrity Committee of the Council of the
Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency
submits to the head of the designated Federal
entity a written recommendation for additional
time, which is acted upon by the head of the
designated Federal entity, and the decision is
communicated immediately to both Houses of
Congress.
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a
personnel action otherwise authorized by law.
(f) * * *
(g)
(1) Sections 4, 5, 6 (other than subsections (a)(7)
and (a)(8) thereof), 6A, and 7 of this Act shall apply
to each Inspector General and Office of Inspector
General of a designated Federal entity and such
sections shall be applied to each designated Federal
entity and head of the designated Federal entity (as
defined under subsection (a)) by substituting--
* * * * * * *
(3) Notwithstanding the last sentence of subsection
(d) of this section, the provisions of subsection (a)
of section [8C] 8D (other than the provisions of
subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (E) of subsection
(a)(1)) shall apply to the Inspector General of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in the same manner as such provisions
apply to the Inspector General of the Department of the
Treasury and the Secretary of the Treasury,
respectively.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 8M. INFORMATION ON WEBSITES OF OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL
(a) Direct Links to Inspectors General Offices.--
(1) In general.--[Each agency] Each Federal agency
and designated Federal entity shall establish and
maintain on the homepage of the website of [that
agency] that Federal agency or designated Federal
entity, a direct link to the website of the Office of
the Inspector General of [that agency] that Federal
agency or designated Federal entity.
(b) Requirements for Inspectors General Websites.--
(1) Posting of reports and audits.--The Inspector
General of each [agency] Federal agency and designated
Federal entity shall--
(A) not later than 3 days after any report or
audit (or portion of any report or audit) [is
made publicly available] is submitted in final
form to the head of the Federal agency or the
head of the designated Federal entity, as
applicable, post that report or audit (or
portion of that report or audit) on the website
of the Office of Inspector General; and
(B) * * *
(2) Reporting of fraud, waste, and abuse.--
(A) In general.--The Inspector General of
each [agency] Federal agency and designated
Federal entity shall establish and maintain a
direct link on the homepage of the website of
the Office of the Inspector General for
individuals to report fraud, waste, and abuse.
Individuals reporting fraud, waste, or abuse
using the direct link established under this
paragraph shall not be required to provide
personally identifying information relating to
that individual.
(B) Anonymity.--The Inspector General of each
[agency] Federal agency and designated Federal
entity shall not disclose the identity of any
individual making a report under this paragraph
without the consent of the individual unless
the Inspector General determines that such a
disclosure is unavoidable during the course of
the investigation.
(3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to authorize the public disclosure
of information that is prohibited from disclosure by
any other provision of law.
(c) Definitions.--In this section, the terms `designated
Federal entity' and `head of the designated Federal entity'
have the meanings given those terms in section 8G(a).
SEC. 11. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL ON
INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY
(a) * * *
(b) Membership.--
(1) * * *
(A) * * *
(B) The Inspectors General of the Office of
the [Director of National Intelligence]
Intelligence Community and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
(3) Functions of chairperson and executive
chairperson.--
(A) * * *
(B) Chairperson.--The Chairperson shall--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(viii) [prepare and transmit a report
annually on behalf of the Council to
the President on the activities of the
Council.] prepare and transmit an
annual report on behalf of the Council
on the activities of the Council to--
(I) the President;
(II) the appropriate
committees of jurisdiction of
the Senate and the House of
Representatives;
(III) the Committee on
Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the
Senate; and
(IV) the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform
of the House of
Representatives.
(c) Functions and Duties of Council.--
(1) In general.--* * *
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(G) make such reports to Congress as the
Chairperson determines are necessary or
appropriate; [and]
(H) receive, review, and mediate any disputes
submitted in writing to the Council by an
Office of Inspector General regarding an audit,
investigation, inspection, evaluation, or
project that involves the jurisdiction of more
than 1 Office of Inspector General; and
[(H)] (I) perform other duties within the
authority and jurisdiction of the Council, as
appropriate.
(2) * * *
(3) Additional administrative authorities.--
(A) * * *
(i) * * *
(ii) upon the authorization of the
Executive Chairperson, any [department,
agency, or entity of the executive
branch] Federal agency or designated
Federal entity (as defined in section
8G(a)) which has a member on the
Council shall fund or participate in
the funding of such activities.
* * * * * * *
(d) Integrity Committee.--
(1) * * *
(2) Membership.--[The Integrity Committee shall
consist of the following members:]
(A) In general.--The Integrity Committee
shall consist of the following members:
[(A)] (i) The official of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation serving on the Council[, who
shall serve as Chairperson of the Integrity
Committee, and maintain the records of the
Committee].
[(B)] (ii) Four Inspectors General described
in subparagraph (A) or (B) of subsection (b)(1)
appointed by the Chairperson of the Council,
representing both establishments and designated
Federal entities (as that term is defined in
section 8G(a)).
[(C) The Special Counsel of the Office of
Special Counsel.]
[(D)] (iii) The Director of the Office of
Government Ethics or the designee of the
Director.
(B) Chairperson.--
(i) In general.--The Integrity
Committee shall elect 1 of the
Inspectors General referred to in
subparagraph (A)(ii) to act as
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee.
(ii) Term.--The term of office of the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee
shall be 2 years.
* * * * * * *
(5) Review of allegations.--[The Integrity Committee
shall--]
(A) [review all allegations of wrongdoing the
Integrity Committee receives against an
Inspector General, or against a staff member of
an Office of Inspector General described under
paragraph (4)(C)] In general.--Not later than 7
calendar days after the date on which the
Integrity Committee receives an allegation of
wrongdoing against an Inspector General or
against a staff member of an Office of
Inspector General described under paragraph
(4)(C), the allegation of wrongdoing shall be
reviewed and referred to the Department of
Justice or the Office of Special Counsel for
investigation, or to the Integrity Committee
for review, as appropriate by,--
(i) a representative of the
Department of Justice, as designated by
the Attorney General;
(ii) a representative of the Office
of Special Counsel, as designated by
the Special Counsel;
(iii) a representative of the
Integrity Committee, as designated by
the Chairperson of the Integrity
Committee.
(B) [refer any allegation of wrongdoing to
the agency of the executive branch with
appropriate jurisdiction over the matter; and]
Referral to the chairperson.--Not later than 15
calendar days after the date on which an
allegation of wrongdoing is referred to the
Integrity Committee under subparagraph (A), the
Integrity Committee shall determine whether to
refer the allegation of wrongdoing to the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee to
initiate an investigation.
[(C) refer to the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee any allegation of
wrongdoing determined by the Integrity
Committee under subparagraph (A) to be
potentially meritorious that cannot be referred
to an agency under subparagraph (B).]
(6) Authority to investigate allegations.--
(A) Requirement.--The Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee shall cause a thorough and
timely investigation of each allegation
referred under [paragraph (5)(C)] paragraph
5(B) to be conducted in accordance with this
paragraph.
(B) Resources.--At the request of the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee, the
head of each agency or entity represented on
the Council--
(i) [may] shall provide resources
necessary to the Integrity Committee;
and
(ii) * * *
(7) Procedures for investigations.--
(A) * * *
(B) Additional policies and procedures.--
(i) Establishment.--* * *
(I) * * *
(II) * * *
(III) reporting the results
of an investigation; [and]
(IV) providing the person who
is the subject of an
investigation with an
opportunity to respond to any
Integrity Committee report[.];
(V) except as provided in
clause (ii), ensuring, to the
extent possible, that
investigations are conducted by
Offices of Inspector General of
similar size;
(VI) creating a process for
rotation of Inspectors General
assigned to investigate
allegations through the
Integrity Committee; and
(VII) creating procedures to
avoid conflicts of interest for
Integrity Committee
investigations.
(ii) Exception.--The requirement
under clause (i)(V) shall not apply to
any Office of Inspector General with
less than 50 employees who are
authorized to conduct audits or
investigations.
[(ii)] (iii) Submission to
congress.--The Council shall submit a
copy of the policies and procedures
established under clause (i) to the
congressional committees of
jurisdiction.
[(C) Reports.--
[(i) Potentially meritorious
allegations.--For allegations described
under paragraph (5)(C), the Chairperson
of the Integrity Committee shall make a
report containing the results of the
investigation of the Chairperson and
shall provide such report to members of
the Integrity Committee.
[(ii) Allegations of wrongdoing.--For
allegations referred to an agency under
paragraph (5)(B), the head of that
agency shall make a report containing
the results of the investigation and
shall provide such report to members of
the Integrity Committee.]
(C) Completion of investigation.-- If an
allegation of wrongdoing is referred to the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee under
paragraph (5)(B), the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee--
(i) shall complete the investigation
not later than 120 calendar days after
the date on which the Integrity
Committee made the referral;
(ii) if the investigation cannot be
completed within the 120-day period
described in clause (i), shall--
(I) promptly notify the
congressional committees
described in paragraph
(8)(A)(iii); and
(II) brief the congressional
committees described in
paragraph (8)(A)(iii) every 30
days until the investigation is
complete.
(D) Concurrent investigation.--If an
allegation of wrongdoing against an Inspector
General or a staff member of an Office of
Inspector General described under paragraph
(4)(C) is referred to the Department of Justice
or the Office of Special Counsel under
paragraph (5)(A), the Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee may conduct any related
investigation referred to the Chairperson under
paragraph (5)(B) concurrently with the
Department of Justice or the Office of Special
Counsel, as applicable.
(E) Reports.--
(i) Integrity committee
investigations.--For each investigation
of an allegation of wrongdoing referred
to the Chairperson of the Integrity
Committee under paragraph (5)(B), the
Chairperson of the Integrity Committee
shall submit to members of the
Integrity Committee and to the
Chairperson of the Council a report
containing the results of the
investigation.
(ii) Other investigations.--For each
allegation of wrongdoing referred to
the Department of Justice or the Office
of Special Counsel under paragraph
(5)(A), the Attorney General or the
Special Counsel, as appropriate, shall
submit to the Integrity Committee a
report containing the results of the
investigation.
(iii) Availability to congress.--Any
Member of Congress shall have access to
any report authored by the Integrity
Committee.
(8) Assessment and final disposition.--
(A) In general.--* * *
(i) * * *
(ii) * * *
[(iii) submit to the Committee on
Government Oversight and Reform of the
House of Representatives, the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate, and other
congressional committees of
jurisdiction an executive summary of
such report and recommendations within
30 days after the submission of such
report to the Executive Chairperson
under clause (ii).]
(iii) submit the report, with the
recommendations of the Integrity
Committee, to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate, the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform of the House of
Representatives, and other
congressional committees of
jurisdiction; and
(iv) following the submission of the
report under clause (iii) and upon
request by any Member of Congress,
submit the report, with the
recommendations of the Integrity
Committee, to that Member.
* * * * * * *
(9) Annual report.--* * *
(A) * * *
(B) The number of allegations referred to
[other agencies] the Department of Justice or
the Office of Special Counsel, including the
number of allegations referred for criminal
investigation.
* * * * * * *
(10) Requests for more information.--With respect to
paragraphs (8) and (9), the Council shall provide more
detailed information about specific allegations upon
request from [any of the following:
[(A) The chairperson or ranking member of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate.
[(B) The chairperson or ranking member of the
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of
the House of Representatives.
[(C) The chairperson or ranking member of the
congressional committees of jurisdiction.] any
Member of Congress.
(11) No right or benefit.--* * *
(12) Allegations of wrongdoing against special
counsel or deputy special counsel.--
(A) Special counsel defined.--In this
paragraph, the term `Special Counsel' means the
Special Counsel appointed under section 1211(b)
of title 5, United States Code.
(B) Authority of integrity committee.--
(i) In general.--An allegation of
wrongdoing against the Special Counsel
or the Deputy Special Counsel may be
received, reviewed, and referred for
investigation to the same extent and in
the same manner as in the case of an
allegation against an Inspector General
or against a staff member of an Office
of Inspector General described under
paragraph (4)(C), subject to the
requirement that the representative
designated by the Special Counsel under
paragraph (5)(A)(ii) shall recuse
himself or herself from the
consideration of any allegation brought
under this paragraph.
(ii) Coordination with existing
provisions of law.--This paragraph
shall not eliminate access to the Merit
Systems Protection Board for review
under section 7701 of title 5, United
States Code. To the extent that an
allegation brought under this paragraph
involves section 2302(b)(8) of such
title, a failure to obtain corrective
action within 120 days after the date
on which the allegation is received by
the Integrity Committee shall, for
purposes of section 1221 of such title,
be considered to satisfy section
1214(a)(3)(B) of such title.
(C) Regulations.--The Integrity Committee may
prescribe any rules or regulations necessary to
carry out this paragraph, subject to such
consultation or other requirements as may
otherwise apply.
(13) Committee records.--The Chairperson of the
Council shall maintain the records of the Integrity
Committee.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations for Council.--For the
purposes of carrying out this section, there are authorized to
be appropriated into the revolving fund described in subsection
(c)(3)(B), out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, the following sums:
(1) $7,500,000 for fiscal year 2016.
(2) $7,800,000 for fiscal year 2017.
(3) $8,100,000 for fiscal year 2018.
(4) $8,500,000 for fiscal year 2019.
(5) $8,900,000 for fiscal year 2020.
(6) $9,300,000 for fiscal year 2021.
[all]