[Senate Report 114-296]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      Calendar No. 552
114th Congress      }                                    {      Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session         }                                    {     114-296
_______________________________________________________________________

 


                   AMENDING THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT
    OF 2002 TO BUILD PARTNERSHIPS TO PREVENT VIOLENCE BY EXTREMISTS

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                              to accompany

                                S. 2522

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                 July 11, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
                                    ______

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

59-010                         WASHINGTON : 2016                 
       
       
       
       
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa                     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                  Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
         Elizabeth McWhorter, Senior Professional Staff Member
              Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
           John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
               Mary Beth Schultz, Minority Chief Counsel
       Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     

                                                      Calendar No. 552
114th Congress      }                                    {      Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session         }                                    {     114-296

======================================================================
 
  AMENDING THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO BUILD PARTNERSHIPS TO 
                     PREVENT VIOLENCE BY EXTREMISTS

                                _______
                                

                 July 11, 2016.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 2522]

    The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 2522) to amend the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to build partnerships to prevent 
violence by extremists, having considered the same, reports 
favorably thereon with an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................8
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................8
  V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................9
 VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.......................10
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........11

                         I. Purpose and Summary

    The purpose of S. 2522 is to establish the Office for 
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS or ``the Department''). The bill 
requires the DHS Secretary to designate, as head of the new 
office, an Assistant Secretary who will coordinate the 
Department's domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) 
efforts. The bill also facilitates oversight of the 
Department's CVE efforts by defining previously-ambiguous 
language and requiring the DHS Secretary to report to Congress 
on the Department's domestic CVE strategy and evaluation 
metrics.

              II. Background and the Need for Legislation

    As early as 2003, national security officials have 
differentiated between ``trying to stop terrorists'' and a 
``long-range plan'' to encourage locals to counter violent 
extremism.\1\ CVE involves building awareness, counter-
narrative measures, and interventions to prevent all forms of 
terrorism.\2\ CVE does not include ``disruptive actions which 
focus on stopping acts of terrorism by those who have already 
subscribed to violence.''\3\
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    \1\Memorandum from Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of 
Def., to Gen. Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Pete Pace, & Doug Feith 
2 (Oct. 16, 2003), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ jhtml/
jframe.html# http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/library/ policy/
dod/d20031016sdmemo.pdf.
    \2\Factsheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to 
Countering Violent Extremism, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ US%20 Government%20 Approach%20to%20CVE-
Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf (last visited June 29, 2016).
    \3\Id.
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    In September 2015, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson recognized 
domestic CVE as a key mission of the Department.\4\ He 
attributed the importance of this mission to a global terrorist 
threat, which he described to this Committee one month later as 
evolving to exploit the Internet to ``publicly recruit and 
inspire individuals to conduct attacks within their own 
homelands.''\5\ As a result, ``lone actors or insular groups--
often self-directed or inspired by overseas groups, like ISIS--
pose the most serious threat to carry out attacks here.''\6\
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    \4\Memorandum from Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dept of Homeland 
Sec., to DHS Senior Leadership 1 (Sept. 28, 2015), available at: 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
Secretary%20Johnson's%20Building%20Community%20Partnerships%20Memo_1.pdf

    \5\Id.; Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 10 (2015) (statement 
of Hon. Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec.) [hereinafter 
Threats to the Homeland].
    \6\Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act: The 
Balance between National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing 
before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of 
Matthew Olsen, Former Director of the National Counterterrorism 
Center), available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
05-10-16%20Olsen%20Testimony.pdf.
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    Hedieh Mirahmadi, President of the World Organization for 
Resource Development and Education (WORDE), testified before 
the Committee regarding the far-reaching, negative impacts 
these domestic terrorist attacks have on social cohesion:

          Domestic terror attacks are creating fault lines in 
        our societies that will only lead to more violence, if 
        they are not repaired. The separation of Muslims from 
        non-Muslims feeds into the bifurcated worldview of the 
        terrorists who say--it is us vs. them--the West against 
        Islam. A comprehensive prevention agenda therefore must 
        include programs that prevent that divide--so that 
        there is only an ``us'' against the terrorists.\7\
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    \7\Inside the Mind of ISIS: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of Hedieh 
Mirahmadi, President, World Org. for Res. Dev. & Edu. (WORDE)), 
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/ download/testimony-mirahmadi-
2016-01-20 [hereinafter Inside the Mind of ISIS].
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Building awareness

    As early as 2008, DHS pioneered Federal efforts to build 
community awareness of the terrorist threat and violent 
extremist recruitment.\8\ The next year, DHS started 
``developing case studies of homegrown violent extremists to 
identify indicators of radicalization.''\9\
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    \8\Communications between Dep't of Homeland Sec. staff and S. 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs Comm. staff (June 28, 2016).
    \9\Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing Before S. Comm. 
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 12-13 (2012) 
(citing Hon. Janet Napolitano's, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec., 
Responses to Questions for the Record on file with HSGAC staff) 
(explaining that by 2012, the Department had done over 75 case studies 
and assessments on homegrown violent extremist activities and potential 
material support activities in the United States--including an in-depth 
study that looks at common behaviors associated with 62 cases of Al 
Qaeda-inspired violent extremists) [hereinafter Homeland Threats and 
Agency Responses]; Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist 
Threat to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (citing Hon. Janet 
Napolitano's, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Responses to Questions 
for the Record on file with HSGAC staff) [hereinafter Nine Years After 
9/11].
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    The challenges facing domestic law enforcement include 
discerning when freedom of speech and expression cross into 
criminal activity; examining a broad pool of suspects and an 
evolving, decentralized threat; and trying to prevent a growing 
number of simple, opportunistic attacks.\10\ Domestic law 
enforcement strategies to prevent terrorism largely focus on 
stopping the operational aspects of violent terrorist 
plots.\11\ The problem with solely focusing on stopping 
terrorists operationally is that, as attacks increase in 
number, they are also increasingly difficult for domestic law 
enforcement to detect and disrupt.\12\
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    \10\Threats to the Homeland 10, 15, 25 (statement of Hon. Jeh 
Johnson, Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec., and Hon. James B. Comey, 
Director, FBI, Hon. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, NCTC); Naureen 
Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative: 
Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center 
on Global Counterterrorism 6 (Feb. 2013), http://globalcenter.org/ wp-
content/ uploads /2013/03/ Feb2013 _ CT_StratComm.pdf.
    \11\Jerome P. Bjelopera, Cong. Research Serv., R42553, Countering 
Violent Extremism in the United States 1 (2014).
    \12\Threats to the Homeland (statement of Hon. Jeh Johnson, 
Secretary, Dep't of Homeland Sec.).
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    From 2009 to 2015, 74 percent of terrorist attacks in the 
United States were conducted by lone wolves--individuals who 
carry out a terrorist attack entirely on their own.\13\ That 
total rose to 90 percent when counting incidents involving one 
or two perpetrators.\14\ As Peter Bergen, the Director of the 
New America Foundation's National Security Studies Program, 
told this Committee in November, ``every person who's been 
killed by a jihadi terrorist in this country since 9/11 has 
been killed by an American citizen or resident.''\15\
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    \13\Lone Wolf Report, Southern Poverty Law Center 4, 8-9 (Feb. 11, 
2015), available at https://www.splcenter.org/ sites/ default/ files/
d6_legacy_files/ downloads/ publication/ lone_wolf_special_report_0.pdf 
[hereinafter Lone Wolf Report]; Inside the Mind of ISIS 41-42 
(explaining social sciences research that associates lone wolves with a 
higher likelihood of mental illness).
    \14\Lone Wolf Report at 4, 8.
    \15\The Impact of ISIS on the Homeland and Refugee Resettlement: 
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th 
Cong. 113 (2015) (statement of Peter Bergen, Director, National 
Security Studies Program, New America Foundation).
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    Examples of recent terrorist attacks include those in 2009 
in Little Rock, Arkansas and Ft. Hood, Texas; the shooting at a 
Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin in 2012; the 2013 bombings 
at the Boston Marathon in Boston, Massachusetts and shootings 
in Chattanooga, Tennessee; shootings in Garland, Texas, 
Charleston, South Carolina, and San Bernardino, California in 
2015; and the attack in Orlando, Florida in 2016.\16\ Homegrown 
terrorist attacks involving self-radicalized individuals are 
not solely the result of ISIS or Al Qaeda-inspired extremism. 
For example, Dylann Roof, the suspect in the 2015 mass shooting 
in Charleston, South Carolina, appears to have become self-
radicalized according to the manifesto he published online.\17\ 
The Department's CVE partnerships are the result of broader 
government and civil society collaboration to better identify 
the radicalization retrospectively in each of these cases and 
prevent similar terrorist attacks.\18\
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    \16\See generally, The Ideology of ISIS: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016); 
Terrorism Gone Viral: Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond: Hearing 
Before H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Michael 
B. Steinbach, Assistant Director, FBI); The Rise of Radicalization: Is 
the U.S. Government Failing to Counter International and Domestic 
Terrorism?: Hearing Before H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 114th Cong. 20-21 
(2015) (statement of J. Richard Cohen, President, Southern Poverty Law 
Center) [hereinafter The Rise of Radicalization]; see also Lorenzo 
Vidino & Seamus Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa, The 
George Washington Univ., Program on Extremism 7 (Dec. 2015), https://
cchs.gwu.edu/sites/ cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ 
ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf; Deadly Attacks Since 9/11, 
International Security, http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/
deadly-attacks.html (last visited June 24, 2016).
    \17\The Rise of Radicalization at 20-21 (statement of J. Richard 
Cohen, President, Southern Poverty Law Center).
    \18\Michael J. Williams, Ph.D., John G. Horgan, Ph.D., & Williams 
P. Evans, Ph.D., Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, 
Muslim-Led CVE Program, National Criminal Justice Reference Service 8 
(June 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf.
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    In 2008, Committee staff published a report titled Violent 
Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist 
Threat warning about the increased frequency with which United 
States-based militants are active online.\19\ Eight years 
later, the Committee heard from experts that the Government 
needs to do more to teach parents about online threats their 
children face.\20\ To illustrate these threats, Hedieh 
Mirahmadi described a systemic problem of youth exposure to 
Internet predators, saying that ``many young people are either 
unaware or ignore the long-term consequences of inappropriate 
uses of social media and . . . run the risk of being recruited 
by an Internet predator--whether that's a pedophile or a 
terrorist.''\21\
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    \19\Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
110th Cong., Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the 
Homegrown Terrorist Threat, (Comm. Print, May 8, 2008), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/IslamistReport.pdf.
    \20\Inside the Mind of ISIS at 16, 67 (statements of Dr. Jessica 
Stern, Research Professor, Pardee School for Global Studies, Boston 
Uni., and Dr. Bernard Haykel, Director, The Institute of Transregional 
Studies, and Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton Univ.) 
(explaining that parents think kids are safe online and a description 
of ISIS luring kids from online discussions to play its own version of 
Grand Theft Auto the video game).
    \21\Id. at 5 (statement of Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Org. 
for Res. Dev. & Edu. (WORDE)), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/
testimony-mirahmadi-2016-01-20.
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Counter-narrative measures

    At the Committee's 2015 hearing on the use of social media 
by terrorists, Peter Bergen testified on the importance of 
amplifying a positive message rather than trying to attack or 
eliminate the negative message put forward by terrorist groups 
like ISIS.\22\ In 2016, further testimony before the Committee 
on the topic of messaging revealed that foreign fighters are 
often motivated to avenge the oppressed as a result of ISIS's 
focus on a narrative of victimization, humiliation, and 
ultimately, redemption.\23\ To address this, Dr. Jessica Stern, 
a Research Professor at Boston University's Pardee School of 
Global Studies, testified that any counter-narrative should 
offer vulnerable individuals ``another way to be heroes,'' and 
should avoid feeding a narrative of ISIS as the redeeming 
champion that defends humiliated victims.\24\
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    \22\Jihad 2.0: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 63 (2015) (statement of Peter Bergen, 
Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation) 
[hereinafter Jihad 2.0].
    \23\Inside the Mind of ISIS at 11, 15, 32 (statements of Dr. 
Jessica Stern, Research Professor, Pardee School for Global Studies, 
Boston Uni., and Dr. Bernard Haykel, Director, The Institute of 
Transregional Studies, and Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton 
Univ.).
    \24\Id. at 31-33 (statement of Dr. Jessica Stern, Research 
Professor, Pardee School for Global Studies, Boston U.).
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    Also at the Committee's social media hearing, Daveed 
Gartenstein-Ross, a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense 
of Democracies, testified that ``the interconnectivity of the 
Internet . . . suddenly makes someone who is alone a part of a 
group.''\25\ To counter the social appeal of terrorist 
narratives, the Department's CVE measures promote integrated 
and resilient communities that are aware of threats and better 
equipped to expose the lies and manipulations of a foreign 
terrorist organization that hopes to exploit vulnerable 
individuals for a narrow violent agenda.\26\ Dr. Healton, who 
previously served as President and Chief Executive Officer of 
Legacy, the leading Foundation dedicated to tobacco control, 
highlighted a successful example of youth changing behavior 
after a national campaign exposed how the tobacco industry was 
lying to its customers in a hearing on countering the demand 
for drugs.\27\ Dr. Healton testified that youth were energized 
by a grassroots campaign in the days before social media.\28\
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    \25\Jihad 2.0 at 31 (statement of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior 
Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies).
    \26\Factsheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to 
Countering Violent Extremism, DHS https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/US%20Government%20Approach%20to%20CVE-
Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf (last visited June 29, 2016).
    \27\America's Insatiable Demand For Drugs: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(statement of Cheryl Healton, Dean, New York University).
    \28\Id.
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Interventions

    In August 2011, the Administration released a strategy 
entitled ``Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 
Extremism in the United States.''\29\ The Administration 
describes this as both a strategy to ``prevent'' and a policy 
to ``counter'' violent extremism domestically.\30\ This 
strategy expresses a willingness to consider new and innovative 
preventive tools that can address the evolving nature of 
terrorism better than traditional Federal counterterrorism 
functions.\31\
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    \29\Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States (Aug. 3, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2011/08/03/empowering-local-partners-prevent-violent-extremism-united-
states.
    \30\Press Release: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (Feb 
18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-
sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism.
    \31\Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative: 
Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center 
on Global Counterterrorism 6 (Feb. 2013), http://globalcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013_CT_Strat&Comm.pdf.
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    However, the accompanying Strategic Implementation Plan 
(SIP) ensured that traditional national security or law 
enforcement agencies will lead the programs and activities 
outlined in the strategy.\32\ Moreover, the SIP ``does not 
outline mechanisms for law enforcement to refer radicalizing 
individuals for community intervention.''\33\ As such, the CVE 
strategy and SIP support training society to recognize 
radicalization, but offer no recommendations on how to cope 
with a radicalized individual unless that individual 
``mobilizes and becomes a terrorism suspect.''\34\
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    \32\Jerome P. Bjelopera, supra note 11, at 29.
    \33\ Id. at 17.
    \34\Id.
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    Moreover, according to a National Institute of Justice 
funded evaluation of a ``multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, 
Muslim-led CVE program,'' the Government CVE strategy of 
``centralized coordination and decentralized execution''\35\ 
has led to a grass-roots ``lack of basic awareness and 
information regarding appropriate responses to the warning 
signs of radicalization'' that impedes efforts to seek help 
``when an acquaintance, friend, or loved one appears to be on a 
path toward violent extremism.''\36\ This same evaluation, 
together with a separate study by the same researchers, made 
valuable findings that could help the Department ensure funding 
is awarded to the most effective community-led CVE programs 
possible. It found that peers are best positioned to notice 
radical changes in a friend's baseline behavior.\37\ While 
approaching a third-party goes against the grain, peers were 
willing to do so, but more likely to directly talk to a friend 
that showed signs of supporting violent extremism then to 
approach law enforcement.\38\
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    \35\Nine Years After 9/11 (statement of Michael E. Leiter, 
Director, National Counterterrorism Center).
    \36\Michael J. Williams, Ph.D., John G. Horgan, Ph.D., & Williams 
P. Evans, Ph.D., Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, 
Muslim-Led CVE Program, National Criminal Justice Reference Service 8-9 
(June 2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf.
    \37\Id. at 54.
    \38\Williams et al, The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for 
Countering Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-
Seeking, 8 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 
49-50 (2016), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/
19434472.2015.1101147.
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    Importantly, a CVE-engaged network of community, 
government, nonprofit, and religious community actors is 
critical to community-led interventions. That network 
necessarily includes law enforcement so that if, or when, the 
line to criminal activity is crossed, civilian service 
providers know who to call. For example, in a study of lone 
wolf terrorist attacks that occurred after the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, 76 percent of perpetrators broadcasted 
their intentions prior to an attack, often more than once.\39\ 
CVE engagements should inform communities that any such open 
threat of criminal intent should be referred to law 
enforcement. Law enforcement can build collaborative 
partnerships with communities by keeping them aware of local 
threats and educating civilians about the legal limitations of 
law enforcement interventions when no crime has been committed.
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    \39\Inside the Mind of ISIS at 2 (Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, 
World Org. for Res. Dev. & Edu. (WORDE)).
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Office of Partnerships Against Violent Extremism

    Until recently, DHS's CVE efforts were ``scattered across a 
number of components, lack[ed] specific goals, and [resulted 
in] tangible measures of success in pursuit of those 
goals.''\40\ In September 2015, Secretary Johnson announced the 
creation of the Office of Community Partnerships, which would 
serve as the Department's new CVE office.\41\ To reflect the 
Committee's agreement that the Department's CVE efforts should 
be coordinated in one office, and to codify the 
responsibilities of that office, S. 2522 creates the ``Office 
of Partnerships Against Violent Extremism'' (or the ``Office'') 
within DHS. The name of the office clarifies the shared mission 
of government and civilian CVE providers: to prevent harm by 
building social cohesion through the development of 
partnerships between different levels of the government and 
with community leaders, religious communities, civic groups, 
and non-profit organizations.
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    \40\Johnson supra note 4, at 1.
    \41\Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Sec., Secretary Jeh Johnson on 
DHS's New Office for Community Partnerships (Sept. 28, 2015), https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/28/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-
dhs%E2%80%99s-new-office-community-partnerships#.
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    Given the serious nature of the violent extremism threat to 
the homeland, the bill elevates the head of the Office to an 
Assistant Secretary position to help ensure that the position 
has appropriate stature and influence. In an effort to improve 
the transparency of the Department's CVE efforts, the Assistant 
Secretary will develop a strategy and annually report to 
Congress. Transparency is critical to building the trust 
necessary to accomplish the Office's stated purpose of 
partnering with communities to prevent violent extremism. In 
addition, the new Office will create a national digital 
engagement strategy, or a national campaign, to build awareness 
of threats among communities at risk and better equip them to 
expose the lies and manipulations of a foreign terrorist 
organization that hopes to exploit vulnerable individuals for a 
narrow violent agenda. This is a continuation of the 
Department's longstanding efforts to inform communities and 
state and local law enforcement on common behaviors that could 
indicate a developing terrorist attack.\42\
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    \42\Homeland Threats and Agency Responses (citing Hon. Janet 
Napolitano's, Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Sec., Responses to Questions 
for the Record on file with HSGAC staff); Understanding the Homeland 
Threat Landscape--Considerations for the 112th Congress: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Hon. 
Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Dept. of Homeland Sec.).
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    S. 2522 requires the new Office to issue a report that 
includes an evaluation of the use of Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) and State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) 
grants to support community-led CVE efforts and whether such 
grants are effectively used to counter violent extremism. It 
also prohibits the award of UASI or SHSP grants to any group 
that has funded domestic terrorism or international terrorism.
    The Office should develop Federal guidance to facilitate 
the creation of community-led intervention and prevention 
options, as well as build awareness of those options and the 
Federal support available. Based on recent lessons learned from 
current CVE programs, it should develop training curriculum 
that outlines how to approach a peer who might be radicalizing 
and develop guidance for when and how a peer should involve 
third parties.\43\
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    \43\Id.
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    This legislation prioritizes CVE partnerships with civil 
society groups and communities. It also codifies coordination 
with the Department's Office of Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties whenever the Department engages communities at risk 
for radicalization and recruitment for violent extremist 
activities to ensure that the Department's CVE activities fully 
respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all 
persons.
    As the Committee has learned, ``no family is immune from 
the radicalization threat.''\44\ Therefore, S. 2522 makes clear 
that communities at risk for radicalization shall not be 
defined or identified solely by the community's race, religious 
affinity, or ethnicity.
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    \44\Inside the Mind of ISIS (statements of Lorenzo Vidino, 
Director, Program on Extremism, The George Washington Univ., and Hedieh 
Mirahmadi, President, World Org. for Res. Dev. & Edu. (WORDE)) 
(explaining that approximately 40 percent of those arrested for ISIS-
related crimes in the United States were people who had not grown up 
practicing Islam, but who were converts); ISIS in America: From 
Retweets to Raqqa at 7 (explaining that 40 percent is a statistically 
significant number as it is nearly double the percentage within the 
broader American Muslim population).
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                        III. Legislative History

    Ranking Member Tom Carper introduced S. 2522 on February 9, 
2016, which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered S. 2522 at a 
business meeting on February 10, 2016.
    Chairman Ron Johnson offered one amendment in the nature of 
a substitute. The amendment makes technical changes, strikes 
language establishing a new CVE grant program, and requires an 
evaluation of the use and effectiveness of UASI and SHSP grants 
awarded to community-led CVE efforts. The substitute amendment 
also provides definitions for the terms ``Administrator,'' 
``Assistant Secretary,'' ``Domestic Terrorism; International 
Terrorism,'' and ``Radicalization.'' Finally, the substitute 
amendment prohibits the use of UASI or SHSP grants to support 
any group that has funded domestic terrorism or international 
terrorism.
    The Committee adopted the amendment and ordered the bill, 
as amended, reported favorably, both by voice vote. Senators 
present for both the vote on the amendment and the vote on the 
bill were: Johnson, McCain, Portman, Paul, Lankford, Ayotte, 
Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, 
Booker, and Peters.

        IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported


Section 1. Authorization of the Office for Partnerships Against Violent 
        Extremism of the Department of Homeland Security

    Subsection (a) of S. 2522 amends the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 and is divided into two further subsections.
    Subsection (a) (1) of S. 2522 amends Title XIII of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 by inserting a new section 802, 
which establishes the Office in DHS.
    The new section 802 is divided into seven subsections. 
These subsections establish the Office and its leadership, 
define the Office's responsibilities, require DHS to develop a 
strategy to counter violent extremism, and impose periodic 
reporting and review requirements upon the Office.
    Subsection (a) defines ``Administrator,'' ``Assistant 
Secretary,'' ``countering violent extremism,'' ``domestic 
terrorism,'' ``international terrorism,'' ``radicalization,'' 
and ``violent extremism.''
    Subsection (b) establishes the Office. Subsection (c) 
states that the Secretary shall designate an Assistant 
Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism who will 
report directly to the Secretary. Subsection (d) states that 
the Secretary shall designate a career Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism, and is 
authorized to assign or hire permanent staff to the Office.
    Subsection (e) describes the responsibilities of the 
Assistant Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism. 
These responsibilities include leading DHS CVE efforts to 
partner with communities and civil society groups; ensuring all 
such activities respect privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties; and assessing methods used by violent extremists to 
recruit persons and disseminate propaganda. The Office is also 
responsible for developing a digital engagement strategy; 
serving as the primary DHS coordinator with other Federal CVE 
efforts; providing CVE-relevant guidance to the Administrator 
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency regarding the use of 
UASI and SHSP grants; and expanding philanthropic support for 
domestic CVE efforts. The Office may not consider a community 
to be at risk for radicalization and recruitment solely on the 
basis of race, religious affiliation, or ethnicity.
    Subsection (f) requires the Secretary of DHS to submit, 
within 90 days of enactment, a comprehensive CVE strategy to 
the appropriate congressional committees. The strategy shall 
address DHS's community and digital engagement efforts; 
interagency cooperation; privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties protections; evaluation metrics; a violent extremism 
threat assessment; and CVE goals. The strategy shall facilitate 
oversight and transparency of DHS's research on violent 
extremism; relevant nondiscrimination policies; community 
engagement and partnerships; support for non-DHS partners; and 
the dissemination of training, resources, and threat 
assessments. Within 90 days of the submission of the strategy 
described above, the Secretary shall submit to the same 
committees an implementation plan with an integrated master 
schedule and cost estimate for included activities and 
programs.
    Subsection (g) requires the Assistant Secretary for 
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism to submit an annual 
report of the Department's and the Office's activities to 
counter violent extremism; a summary of civil rights and civil 
liberties protections; an evaluation of the use and 
effectiveness of UASI and SHSP grants to support efforts of 
local communities in the United States to counter violent 
extremism; and a description of how the Office has incorporated 
lessons learned. The first such annual report is due on April 
1, 2017.
    Subsection (h) requires the Office for Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties within DHS to conduct a review of the Office to 
ensure that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are 
respected. This review shall be made publicly available on the 
DHS website.
    Subsection (a)(2) of S. 2522 amends Title XX of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to prohibit using UASI and SHSP 
funds to support any organization or group which has knowingly 
or recklessly funded domestic terrorism or international 
terrorism.
    Subsection (b) of S. 2522 includes technical and conforming 
amendments to the table of contents of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002.
    Subsection (c) of S. 2522 sunsets Subsection (a) (1) of S. 
2522 and Subsection (b) of S. 2522.

                   V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has 
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined 
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning 
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional 
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs 
on state, local, or tribal governments.

             VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                                      May 17, 2016.
Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
        Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2522, a bill to 
amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to build partnerships 
to prevent violence by extremists.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Aurora 
Swanson.
            Sincerely,
                                                        Keith Hall.
    Enclosure.

S. 2522--A bill to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to build 
        partnerships to prevent violence by extremists

    S. 2522 would establish an Office for Partnership Against 
Violent Extremism within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to develop and implement a strategy to coordinate efforts 
throughout all levels of government and private industry to 
counter violent extremism. CBO estimates that implementing the 
legislation would have no significant effect on the federal 
budget over the 2017-2021 period because DHS is already 
performing those activities under current law.
    Enacting S. 2522 would not affect direct spending or 
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO 
also estimates that enacting the bill would not increase net 
direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four 
consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027.
    Under current law, DHS established the Office of Community 
Partnerships (OCP) in 2015 to counter violent extremism in 
communities throughout the United States. In fiscal year 2016, 
$3 million was provided for OCP and DHS expects to spend 
similar amounts ($3.5 million) each year thereafter for OCP's 
activities. Those activities (which are similar to provisions 
in the bill) include:
           Forming a task force to coordinate efforts 
        to counter violent extremism with federal and 
        nonfederal partners in communities throughout the 
        United States,
           Providing technical assistance and support 
        to communities to counter violent extremism, and
           Sharing information about the risks of 
        violent extremism in communities, and establishing 
        infrastructure to share lessons learned, best 
        practices, and feedback on the findings of the task 
        force.
    S. 2522 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Aurora Swanson. 
The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

       VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
S. 2522 as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is 
printed in italic, and existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

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TITLE VIII--COORDINATION WITH NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES; INSPECTOR GENERAL; 
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE; COAST GUARD; GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle A--Coordination with Non-Federal Entities

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 802. Office for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism.

SEC. 802. OFFICE FOR PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Administrator.--The term `Administrator' means 
        the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 
        Agency.
          (2) Assistant Secretary.--The term `Assistant 
        Secretary' means the Assistant Secretary for 
        Partnerships Against Violent Extremism designated under 
        subsection (c).
          (3) Countering violent extremism.--The term 
        `countering violent extremism' means proactive and 
        relevant actions to counter recruitment, 
        radicalization, and mobilization to violence and to 
        address the immediate factors that lead to violent 
        extremism and radicalization.
          (4) Domestic terrorism; international terrorism.--The 
        terms `domestic terrorism' and `international 
        terrorism' have the meanings given those terms in 
        section 2331 of title 18, United States Code.
          (5) Radicalization.--The term `radicalization' means 
        the process by which an individual chooses to 
        facilitate or commit domestic terrorism or 
        international terrorism.
          (6) Violent extremism.--The term `violent extremism' 
        means international or domestic terrorism.
    (b) Establishment.--There is in the Department an Office 
for Partnerships Against Violent Extremism.
    (c) Head of Office.--The Office for Partnerships Against 
Violent Extremism shall be headed by an Assistant Secretary for 
Partnerships Against Violent Extremism, who shall be designated 
by the Secretary and report directly to the Secretary.
    (d) Deputy Assistant Secretary; Assignment of Personnel.--
The Secretary shall--
          (1) designate a career Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
        Partnerships Against Violent Extremism; and
          (2) assign or hire, as appropriate, permanent staff 
        to the Office for Partnerships Against Violent 
        Extremism.
    (e) Responsibilities.--
          (1) In general.--The Assistant Secretary shall be 
        responsible for the following:
                  (A) Leading the efforts of the Department to 
                counter violent extremism across all the 
                components and offices of the Department that 
                conduct strategic and supportive efforts to 
                counter violent extremism. Such efforts shall 
                include the following:
                          (i) Partnering with communities to 
                        address vulnerabilities that can be 
                        exploited by violent extremists in the 
                        United States and explore potential 
                        remedies for Government and non-
                        government institutions.
                          (ii) Working with civil society 
                        groups and communities to counter 
                        violent extremist propaganda, 
                        messaging, or recruitment.
                          (iii) In coordination with the Office 
                        for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of 
                        the Department, managing the outreach 
                        and engagement efforts of the 
                        Department directed toward communities 
                        at risk for radicalization and 
                        recruitment for violent extremist 
                        activities.
                          (iv) Ensuring relevant information, 
                        research, and products inform efforts 
                        to counter violent extremism.
                          (v) Developing and maintaining 
                        Department-wide strategy, plans, 
                        policies, and programs to counter 
                        violent extremism. Such plans shall, at 
                        a minimum, address each of the 
                        following:
                                  (I) The Department's plan to 
                                leverage new and existing 
                                Internet and other technologies 
                                and social media platforms to 
                                improve non-government efforts 
                                to counter violent extremism, 
                                as well as the best practices 
                                and lessons learned from other 
                                Federal, State, local, tribal, 
                                territorial, and foreign 
                                partners engaged in similar 
                                counter-messaging efforts.
                                  (II) The Department's 
                                countering violent extremism-
                                related engagement efforts.
                                  (III) The use of cooperative 
                                agreements with State, local, 
                                tribal, territorial, and other 
                                Federal departments and 
                                agencies responsible for 
                                efforts relating to countering 
                                violent extremism.
                          (vi) Coordinating with the Office for 
                        Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the 
                        Department to ensure all of the 
                        activities of the Department related to 
                        countering violent extremism fully 
                        respect the privacy, civil rights, and 
                        civil liberties of all persons.
                          (vii) In coordination with the Under 
                        Secretary for Science and Technology 
                        and in consultation with the Under 
                        Secretary for Intelligence and 
                        Analysis, identifying and recommending 
                        new empirical research and analysis 
                        requirements to ensure the 
                        dissemination of information and 
                        methods for Federal, State, local, 
                        tribal, and territorial countering 
                        violent extremism practitioners, 
                        officials, law enforcement personnel, 
                        and non-governmental partners to 
                        utilize such research and analysis.
                          (viii) Assessing the methods used by 
                        violent extremists to disseminate 
                        propaganda and messaging to communities 
                        at risk for recruitment by violent 
                        extremists.
                  (B) Developing a digital engagement strategy 
                that expands the outreach efforts of the 
                Department to counter violent extremist 
                messaging by--
                          (i) exploring ways to utilize 
                        relevant Internet and other 
                        technologies and social media 
                        platforms; and
                          (ii) maximizing other resources 
                        available to the Department.
                  (C) Serving as the primary representative of 
                the Department in coordinating countering 
                violent extremism efforts with other Federal 
                departments and agencies and non-governmental 
                organizations.
                  (D) Serving as the primary Department-level 
                representative in coordinating with the 
                Department of State on international countering 
                violent extremism issues.
                  (E) In coordination with the Administrator, 
                providing guidance regarding the use of grants 
                made to State, local, and tribal governments 
                under sections 2003 and 2004 under the 
                allowable uses guidelines related to countering 
                violent extremism.
                  (F) Developing a plan to expand philanthropic 
                support for domestic efforts related to 
                countering violent extremism, including by 
                identifying viable community projects and needs 
                for possible philanthropic support.
          (2) Communities at risk.--For purposes of this 
        subsection, the term `communities at risk' shall not 
        include a community that is determined to be at risk 
        solely on the basis of race, religious affiliation, or 
        ethnicity.
    (f) Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in the United 
States.--
          (1) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
        of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall 
        submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on 
        the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on Homeland 
        Security of the House of Representatives, and the 
        Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
        Representatives a comprehensive Department strategy to 
        counter violent extremism in the United States.
          (2) Contents of strategy.--The strategy required 
        under paragraph (1) shall, at a minimum, address each 
        of the following:
                  (A) The Department's digital engagement 
                effort, including a plan to leverage new and 
                existing Internet, digital, and other 
                technologies and social media platforms to 
                counter violent extremism, as well as the best 
                practices and lessons learned from other 
                Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, 
                nongovernmental, and foreign partners engaged 
                in similar counter-messaging activities.
                  (B) The Department's countering violent 
                extremism-related engagement and outreach 
                activities.
                  (C) The use of cooperative agreements with 
                State, local, tribal, territorial, and other 
                Federal departments and agencies responsible 
                for activities relating to countering violent 
                extremism.
                  (D) Ensuring all activities related to 
                countering violent extremism adhere to relevant 
                Department and applicable Department of Justice 
                guidance regarding privacy, civil rights, and 
                civil liberties, including safeguards against 
                discrimination.
                  (E) The development of qualitative and 
                quantitative outcome-based metrics to evaluate 
                the Department's programs and policies to 
                counter violent extremism.
                  (F) An analysis of the homeland security risk 
                posed by violent extremism based on the threat 
                environment and empirical data assessing 
                terrorist activities and incidents, and violent 
                extremist propaganda, messaging, or 
                recruitment.
                  (G) Information on the Department's near-
                term, mid-term, and long-term risk-based goals 
                for countering violent extremism, reflecting 
                the risk analysis conducted under subparagraph 
                (F).
          (3) Strategic considerations.--In drafting the 
        strategy required under paragraph (1), the Secretary 
        shall consider including the following:
                  (A) Departmental efforts to undertake 
                research to improve the Department's 
                understanding of the risk of violent extremism 
                and to identify ways to improve countering 
                violent extremism activities and programs, 
                including outreach, training, and information 
                sharing programs.
                  (B) The Department's nondiscrimination 
                policies as they relate to countering violent 
                extremism.
                  (C) Departmental efforts to help promote 
                community engagement and partnerships to 
                counter violent extremism in furtherance of the 
                strategy.
                  (D) Departmental efforts to help increase 
                support for programs and initiatives to counter 
                violent extremism of other Federal, State, 
                local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, 
                and foreign partners that are in furtherance of 
                the strategy, and which adhere to all relevant 
                constitutional, legal, and privacy protections.
                  (E) Departmental efforts to disseminate to 
                local law enforcement agencies and the general 
                public information on resources, such as 
                training guidance, workshop reports, and the 
                violent extremist threat, through multiple 
                platforms, including the development of a 
                dedicated webpage, and information regarding 
                the effectiveness of those efforts.
                  (F) Departmental efforts to use cooperative 
                agreements with State, local, tribal, 
                territorial, and other Federal departments and 
                agencies responsible for efforts relating to 
                countering violent extremism, and information 
                regarding the effectiveness of those efforts.
                  (G) Information on oversight mechanisms and 
                protections to ensure that activities and 
                programs undertaken pursuant to the strategy 
                adhere to all relevant constitutional, legal, 
                and privacy protections.
                  (H) Departmental efforts to conduct oversight 
                of all countering violent extremism training 
                and training materials and other resources 
                developed or funded by the Department.
                  (I) Departmental efforts to foster 
                transparency by making, to the extent 
                practicable, all regulations, guidance, 
                documents, policies, and training materials 
                publicly available, including through any 
                webpage developed under subparagraph (E).
          (4) Strategic implementation plan.--
                  (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after 
                the date on which the Secretary submits the 
                strategy required under paragraph (1), the 
                Secretary shall submit to the Committee on 
                Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 
                the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of 
                the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security 
                of the House of Representatives, and the 
                Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives an implementation plan for each 
                of the components and offices of the Department 
                with responsibilities under the strategy.
                  (B) Contents.--The implementation plan 
                required under subparagraph (A) shall include 
                an integrated master schedule and cost estimate 
                for activities and programs contained in the 
                implementation plan, with specificity on how 
                each such activity and program aligns with 
                near-term, mid-term, and long-term goals 
                specified in the strategy required under 
                paragraph (1).
    (g) Annual Report.--Not later than April 1, 2017, and 
annually thereafter, the Assistant Secretary shall submit to 
Congress an annual report on the Office for Partnerships 
Against Violent Extremism, which shall include the following:
          (1) A description of the status of the programs and 
        policies of the Department for countering violent 
        extremism in the United States.
          (2) A description of the efforts of the Office for 
        Partnerships Against Violent Extremism to cooperate 
        with and provide assistance to other Federal 
        departments and agencies.
          (3) Qualitative and quantitative metrics for 
        evaluating the success of such programs and policies 
        and the steps taken to evaluate the success of such 
        programs and policies.
          (4) An accounting of--
                  (A) grants and cooperative agreements awarded 
                by the Department to counter violent extremism; 
                and
                  (B) all training specifically aimed at 
                countering violent extremism sponsored by the 
                Department.
          (5) An analysis of how the Department's activities to 
        counter violent extremism correspond and adapt to the 
        threat environment.
          (6) A summary of how civil rights and civil liberties 
        are protected in the Department's activities to counter 
        violent extremism.
          (7) An evaluation of the use of section 2003 and 
        section 2004 grants and cooperative agreements awarded 
        to support efforts of local communities in the United 
        States to counter violent extremism, including 
        information on the effectiveness of such grants and 
        cooperative agreements in countering violent extremism.
          (8) A description of how the Office for Partnerships 
        Against Violent Extremism incorporated lessons learned 
        from the countering violent extremism programs and 
        policies of foreign, State, local, tribal, and 
        territorial governments and stakeholder communities.
    (h) Annual Review.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of this section, and every year thereafter, the 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department 
shall--
          (1) conduct a review of the Office for Partnerships 
        Against Violent Extremism activities to ensure that all 
        of the activities of the Office related to countering 
        violent extremism respect the privacy, civil rights, 
        and civil liberties of all persons; and
          (2) make publicly available on the website of the 
        Department a report containing the results of the 
        review conducted under paragraph (1).; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XX--HOMELAND SECURITY GRANTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle A--Grants to States and High-Risk Urban Areas

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 2008. USE OF FUNDS.

    a) * * *
    (b) Limitations on Use of Funds.--
          (1) In general.--Funds provided under section 2003 or 
        2004 may not be used--
                  (A) To supplant State or local funds, except 
                that northing in this paragraph shall prohibit 
                the use of grant funds provided to a State or 
                high-risk urban area for otherwise permissible 
                uses under subsection (a) on the basis that a 
                State or high-risk urban area has previously 
                used State or local funds to support the same 
                or similar uses; [or]
                  (B) For any State or local government cost-
                sharing contribution[.];or
                  (C) to support any organization or group 
                which has knowingly or recklessly funded 
                domestic terrorism or international terrorism 
                (as those terms are defined in section 2331 of 
                title 18, United States Code) or organization 
                or group known to engage in or recruit to such 
                activities, as determined by the Assistant 
                Secretary for Partnerships Against Violent 
                Extremism in consultation with the 
                Administrator and the heads of other 
                appropriate Federal departments and agencies.

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