[Senate Report 114-250]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      Calendar No. 457
114th Congress    }                                       {     Report
                                 SENATE
                                                                 
 2d Session       }                                       {    114-250
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                                      

                   CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

                              ACT OF 2015

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                   COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

                          GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                              to accompany

                                S. 1846

          TO AMEND THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO SECURE
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST ELECTROMAGNETIC THREATS, AND FOR OTHER 
                                PURPOSES

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                  May 9, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
                                   ______

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

59-010                         WASHINGTON : 2016                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa                     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                  Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                Gabrielle D'Adamo Singer, Chief Counsel
             David S. Luckey, Director of Homeland Security
         Brooke N. Ericson, Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
              Jose J. Bautista, Professional Staff Member
              Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
           John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
               Mary Beth Schultz, Minority Chief Counsel
         Abigail A. Shenkle, Minority Professional Staff Member
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                                                      Calendar No. 457
114th Congress    }                                       {     Report
                                 SENATE
                                                                 
 2d Session       }                                       {    114-250

======================================================================



 
             CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT OF 2015

                                _______
                                

                  May 9, 2016.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Johnson, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
                    Affairs, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 1846]

    The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 1846) to amend the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to secure critical infrastructure 
against electromagnetic threats, and for other purposes, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose and Summary..............................................1
 II. Background and Need for the Legislation..........................2
III. Legislative History..............................................7
 IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................7
  V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................9
 VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................9
VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........10

                         I. Purpose and Summary

    The purpose of S. 1846, the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Act of 2015 (CIPA), is to require the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS, or the Department) to 
develop, regularly update, and submit to Congress a strategy to 
protect critical infrastructure against threats of geomagnetic 
disturbance (GMD) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and, to the 
extent practicable, to perform research and development and 
incident response planning to mitigate the consequences of 
threats of EMP and GMD.

              II. Background and the Need for Legislation

    Most of the nation's critical infrastructure depends on the 
electric grid to function, making the electric grid incredibly 
important to the nation's well-being, security, and economic 
progress. This massive distribution network is comprised of 
390,000 miles of transmission lines, $1 trillion in assets, and 
6,000 power plants.\1\ The expansiveness of the grid also 
creates a broad attack surface and multiple opportunities for 
threats and hazards to disrupt the flow of electricity to end-
users. Public utilities, economic production, and the health 
and well-being of Americans are impacted during significant 
disruptions to the electrical grid.\2\
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    \1\U.S. Dep't of Energy, Large Power Transformers and the U.S. 
Electric Grid 5 (2014) [hereinafter Large Power Transformers], 
available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/04/f15/
LPTStudyUpdate-040914.pdf.
    \2\See, e.g., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the 
United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical 
National Infrastructures (2008) [hereinafter EMP Commission Report], 
available at http://www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-
7MB.pdf.
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    GMDs generated by space weather and EMPs generated by the 
detonation of a nuclear weapon at high altitude are two 
separate threats that have the capability to severely disrupt 
the electric grid.\3\ Either event has the potential to disrupt 
Americans' continued access to electricity. According to 
Lloyd's of London, a severe GMD could leave tens of millions of 
people without power for months or years and potentially cause 
economic losses topping $2 trillion.\4\ Such an event is 
``almost inevitable in the future,'' according to the 
report.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\Lloyd's, Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid 
(2013) [hereinafter Solar Storm Risk], available at https://
www.lloyds.com/news-and-insight/risk-insight/library/natural-
environment/solar-storm; EMP Commission Report, supra note 2.
    \4\See id. 
    \5\Lloyd's, Solar Storm Risk, supra note 3, at 4.
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Defining the threats

    ``Space weather'' generally describes ``highly fluctuating 
magnetic fields and very energetic particles'' in 
interplanetary space that cause ``collective, often violent, 
changes in the space environment around Earth.''\6\ Also 
referred to as ``solar storms,''\7\ this activity is often 
generated by the Sun, which can eject plasma and magnetic 
particles that strike the Earth's atmosphere and can cause 
disturbances--known as geomagnetic disturbances, or GMDs--in 
the Earth's magnetic fields.\8\ The magnitude, speed, and 
trajectory of the ejection all play an important role in how 
strong the resulting GMD may be.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\Daniel N. Baker, Science, How to cope with space weather (Aug. 
30, 2002), available at http://science.sciencemag.org/content/297/5586/
1486.summary.
    \7\Dan Mcmorrow, MITRE Corp., Impacts of Severe Space Weather on 
the Electric Grid 23 (2011) [hereinafter Impacts of Severe Space 
Weather].
    \8\Space Weather Prediction Center, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, Geomagnetic Storms, http://
www.swpc.noaa.gov/phenomena/geomagnetic-storms.
    \9\Id.
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    Separately, a high-altitude nuclear explosion can create an 
EMP consisting of an ``intense steep-front, short-duration 
transient electromagnetic field, followed by a geomagnetic 
disturbance with tens of seconds of duration.''\10\ Like a 
radio wave, propagation of an EMP is dependent on its altitude 
and power--generally, an EMP detonated higher in the atmosphere 
will affect a wider area than one detonated closer to the 
surface of the planet.\11\ For example, an EMP resulting from 
the detonation of a nuclear weapon hundreds of miles above the 
United States could cover the entire contiguous United 
States.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\P.R. Barnes, et al., Oak Ridge Nat'l Laboratory, 
Electromagnetic Pulse Research on Electric Power Systems: Program 
Summary and Recommendations xv (1993), available at http://
web.ornl.gov/info/reports/1993/3445605662155.pdf [hereinafter Barnes 
Emp Report].
    \11\James Gilbert, et al., Metatech Corp., The Late-Time (E3) High-
Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power 
Grid 2-14 (2010) (prepared for Oak Ridge National Laboratory).
    \12\See Barnes EMP Report, supra note 10, at xv.
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Potential impact on transformers

    Like a GMD caused by a severe solar storm, a high-altitude 
nuclear explosion leading to an EMP could put the electric grid 
``out of service for periods measured in months to a year or 
more,'' according to the congressionally-chartered Commission 
to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic 
Pulse (EMP) Attack, or ``EMP Commission.''\13\ The same report 
states that widespread failure of large power transformers, or 
LPTs, could result.\14\
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    \13\EMP Commission Report, supra note 2, at passim.
    \14\Id. at 43.
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    High-altitude EMPs and high intensity GMDs both create 
``geomagnetically induced currents'' (GICs)\15\ on the Earth's 
surface that can lead to major current and voltage fluctuations 
in anything on the ground that conducts electricity.\16\ The 
effect is most notable in long conductors, especially long 
power lines and pipelines, since the induced current 
accumulates over the length of the conductor.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\James Gilbert, et al., Metatech Corp., The Late-Time (E3) High-
Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and Its Impact on the U.S. Power 
Grid 2-45 (2010) (prepared for Oak Ridge National Laboratory).
    \16\See Impacts of Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 13.
    \17\Id. at 39.
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    Because LPTs are found at the end of long, high-voltage 
transmission lines, they are susceptible to damage from the 
cumulative effect of current and voltage changes resulting from 
GICs.\18\ These transformers have a vital role in high-voltage 
transmission of electricity across the nation. They ``step 
up,'' or increase, the voltage of electricity entering 
transmission lines, which is more efficient for long distance 
transmission, and ``step down,'' or decrease, the voltage for 
distribution to end-users, who require lower voltages. 
Estimates indicate that there are at least 2,000 to 3,550 
extra-high-voltage LPTs across the United States.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\Id. at 42.
    \19\See Large Power Transformers, supra note 1, at 21; Impacts of 
Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 41.
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    Protecting LPTs from credible threats is important to 
maintaining the integrity and operation of the electric grid. 
Strong GICs can cause LPTs to melt and undergo other 
disruptions.\20\ Losing even one LPT can be very consequential, 
because replacing it is a major undertaking: LPTs can take over 
one year to build; weigh hundreds of tons; cost $2 million to 
$7.5 million each; and require solving major transportation 
issues to get into the right locations.\21\
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    \20\See Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-15-692T, Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary Observations on DHS Efforts to 
Address Electromagnetic Threats to the Electric Grid 6 (2015) 
[hereinafter Critical Infrastructure Protection], available at http://
gao.gov/assets/680/671554.pdf.
    \21\Large Power Transformers, supra note 1, at 7.
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    These transformers are largely unprotected from high-
impact, low-frequency threats, including severe electromagnetic 
threats, though some mitigation measures may exist.\22\ While 
there are several industry-driven efforts to maintain an 
inventory of spare transformers that can be utilized for 
recovery, such initiatives do not fully mitigate the impact of 
the threats to equipment. Challenges in delivering and 
installing LPTs, their cost, and the lack of spare transformers 
at all locations with active LPTs makes a spare transformer 
inventory less than ideal.\23\ Protecting these transformers 
and other assets before a major solar or EMP event is likely to 
be a more cost-effective approach than only planning for 
replacement.\24\
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    \22\Impacts of Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 2. See also 
North American Electric Reliability Corp. (NERC), High-Impact, Low-
Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System (2010), 
available at http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/Resources/Documents/
HILF%20Report.pdf; Peter Behr, Regulators Assess the Ultimate Blackout 
Threat, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2010/07/02/02climatewire-regulators-assess-the-ultimate-blackout-
thre-82657.html.
    \23\Industry initiatives include the Spare Transformer Equipment 
Program (STEP) operated by the Edison Electric Institute, and Grid 
Assurance, an entity created by several utilities for recovery and 
resiliency.
    \24\Impacts of Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Leaving the electrical grid and LPTs unprotected from high 
intensity GMD could threaten broad areas of the country. 
According to a study by a major insurer, a high intensity GMD 
event could have a total economic cost of $600 million to $1.6 
trillion due to damages inflicted on transformers.\25\ Between 
20 million and 40 million people could lose power for up to two 
years.\26\ Other predictions of the impact of high intensity 
GMD have been more severe.\27\ According to Joseph McClelland, 
Director of the Office of Energy Infrastructure Security at the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, who testified before the 
Committee on July 22, 2015, one Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
study concluded a 1-in-100-year GMD event could ``damage or 
destroy 300 high-voltage electric grid transformers, 
interrupting service to 130 million people, with some outages 
lasting for a period of years.''\28\
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    \25\Solar Storm Risk, supra note 3.
    \26\Id.
    \27\Impacts of Severe Space Weather, supra note 7, at 51.
    \28\Protecting the Electric Grid against the Potential Threats of 
Solar Weather and EMP: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 
& Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 12 (2015) (statement of Mr. Joseph 
McClelland) [hereinafter Protecting the Electric Grid].
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Historical experiences

    Major space weather events have occurred several times in 
recorded history. The largest recorded space weather event on 
Earth happened in 1859, largely before the electric grid or its 
mitigation measures existed, and when the planet's most 
extensive technology network was still the telegraph 
system.\29\ Known as the Carrington Event, the massive solar 
storm and the resulting GICs sparked telegraph wires, shocked 
operators, and knocked out telegraph operations throughout 
North America, Europe, and parts of Australia and Asia for two 
days.\30\ In 1989, another major solar storm caused the Hydro-
Quebec power grid to fail within two minutes.\31\ More than six 
million people lost power for nine hours, costing $13.2 
billion.\32\ Dr. Richard L. Garwin testified before the 
Committee: ``I emphasize that a once-per-century event might 
occur next week; it has a probability of 10 percent of 
occurring within the next 10 years.''\33\
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    \29\Solar Storm Risk, supra note 3.
    \30\Id.
    \31\Id.
    \32\Id.
    \33\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 27 (statement 
of Dr. Richard L. Garwin).
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    The world's experience with high-altitude EMP has been 
limited to several nuclear tests, such as those carried out by 
the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In 
one such test, known as Starfish Prime, the United States 
detonated a nuclear weapon 250 miles above the Pacific 
Ocean.\34\ Although 800 miles from the detonation, a series of 
streetlights failed in Oahu, Hawaii, as breakers tripped in the 
wake of power surges resulting from the blast's EMP.\35\
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    \34\Barnes EMP Report, supra note 10, at 1.
    \35\Id.
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    The Soviet Union carried out a similar test around the same 
time over Kazakhstan.\36\ The test caused the failure of a 500-
km-long communications line and its protective equipment.\37\ 
It also disrupted a 600-mile-long underground power line buried 
three feet underground and caused a fire in a city power 
generation facility.\38\
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    \36\Yousaf M. Butt, The EMP Threat: Fact, Fiction, and Response 
(Part 1), The Space Review (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://
www.thespacereview.com/article/1549/1.
    \37\Id.; V.N. Greetsai, et al., Response of long lines to nuclear 
high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), 40 IEEE Transactions on 
Electromagnetic Compatibility 348 (1998).
    \38\Butt, supra note 36.
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    More recently, experts have raised concerns, including at a 
Committee hearing in 2015, regarding North Korea and Iran, 
which have orbited satellites over the United States.\39\ 
According to former Director of Central Intelligence, James 
Woolsey, who testified at the July 22, 2015, hearing before the 
Committee, such satellites may be test runs for similar 
orbiters that could carry nuclear weapons and cause high-
altitude EMP over the United States in the future.\40\ Using a 
satellite to carry out an attack using high-altitude EMP ``is 
easier than launching a long-range missile at a target on the 
Earth,'' according to former Director Woolsey.\41\ However, a 
spokesman for the Missile Defense Agency of the Department of 
Defense has stated that interceptors used for missile defense 
are able to defeat nuclear weapons detonated in space equally 
as well as weapons aimed at ground targets.\42\
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    \39\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 72-73 
(statement of James Woolsey, former Director, Central Intelligence).
    \40\Id.; see also R. James Woolsey & Peter Vincent Pry, How North 
Korea Could Cripple the U.S., Wall St. J., May 21, 2013.
    \41\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 73 (statement 
of James Woolsey, former Director, Central Intelligence).
    \42\William J. Broad, Among Gingrich's Passions, A Doomsday Vision, 
N.Y. Times (Dec. 11, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
12/12/us/politics/gingrichs-electromagnetic-pulse-warning-has-
skeptics.html.
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    Industry groups emphasize the differences between the 
potential threats to the electric grid posed by EMP and GMD. 
Bridgette Bourge, Senior Principal with the National Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association, testified before the 
Committee that while low-level geomagnetic disturbances are 
experienced fairly frequently, ``a nuclear-induced EMP is 
considered an extremely low-likelihood, high-consequence 
event.''\43\ Additionally, according to Ms. Bourge's testimony 
before the Committee, given the relative frequency of low-level 
GMD events, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
has developed industry reliability standards to address the 
threat of geomagnetic disturbances to the electric grid, 
effective last year.\44\
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    \43\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 4 (written 
statement of Ms. Bridgette Bourge).
    \44\Id. at 4.
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Status of Federal action

    Recognizing the vulnerability of the grid, the EMP 
Commission made 15 recommendations to DHS and the Department of 
Energy that would improve the grid's resiliency.\45\ These 
recommendations include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\EMP Commission Report, supra note 2, at 55.
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           Understand system and network-level 
        vulnerabilities, including cascading effects;
           Evaluate and implement quick fixes;
           Develop national and regional restoration 
        plans;
           Extend black start capability;
           Prioritize and protect critical nodes; and
           Assure protection of high-value generation 
        and transmission assets.
    DHS is the Federal agency responsible for leading the 
Federal Government's efforts to protect and secure our nation's 
critical infrastructure across 16 sectors from a variety of 
threats and hazards, including cyber and physical.\46\
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    \46\Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) directs the 
Department to coordinate with ``sector-specific agencies'' to carry out 
activities to protect and secure critical infrastructure from all 
hazards. The Department of Energy is the sector-specific agency for the 
energy sector. See Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013); Exec. Order No. 
13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
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    According to GAO, DHS has undertaken several projects to 
address threats to the electric grid at large, but has not 
specifically addressed all of the Commission's 
recommendations.\47\ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
has also found that there is uncertainty within DHS about which 
office should have ownership of Departmental efforts to study 
EMP threats. Additionally, the National Protection and Programs 
Directorate, the office tasked by the Department with managing 
and addressing the risks of space weather threats, has not 
identified specific roles or activities it performs to address 
such threats.\48\ GAO states that neither DHS nor DOE has 
identified the most critical substations and transformers, a 
key responsibility under DHS's risk management framework.\49\ 
According to GAO, DHS also has not fully taken advantage of 
opportunities to work with stakeholders in understanding the 
nature of these threats and discuss research priorities.\50\ 
However, GAO also acknowledges that DHS ``does not have a 
statutory obligation to specifically address [the EMP 
Commission's] recommendations.''\51\
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    \47\Protecting the Electric Grid, supra note 28, at 23-24 
(statement of Christopher P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
    \48\Critical Infrastructure Protection, supra note 20 at 10.
    \49\Id. at 13.
    \50\Id. at 14.
    \51\Id. at 1.
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    The Critical Infrastructure Protection Act requires DHS to 
prepare a strategy to protect the nation's critical 
infrastructure against EMP and GMD, informed by an 
intelligence-based review and comparison of the risk and 
consequence of all hazards facing critical infrastructures. The 
bill also requires the Department to incorporate these threats 
in national planning frameworks and to carry out an educational 
campaign on these threats to the extent practicable. 
Additionally, the bill requires the Science and Technology 
Directorate of DHS to conduct research on mitigating the 
consequences of EMP and GMD, to the extent practicable.

                        III. Legislative History

    On October 30, 2013, Representative Trent Franks introduced 
H.R. 3410, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. The act 
passed the House of Representatives by voice vote on December 
1, 2014, but the Senate did not take up the Act during the 
113th Congress.
    In the 114th Congress, on February 25, 2015, Representative 
Franks introduced H.R. 1073, the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Act. The act passed the House of Representatives by 
voice vote on November 16, 2015.
    On July 22, 2015, the Committee held a hearing entitled 
Protecting the Electric Grid from the Potential Threats of 
Solar Storms and Electromagnetic Pulse to examine the nature 
and potential consequences of GMD and EMP to the nation's 
electric grid.
    On July 23, 2015, Chairman Ron Johnson introduced S. 1846, 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, with Senator Ted 
Cruz, and the bill was referred to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs. The Committee considered S. 
1846 at a business meeting held on July 29, 2015.
    At the business meeting, Senator Johnson offered one 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, which modified the 
original language to distinguish between GMD and EMP, and 
required DHS to incorporate intelligence-based analyses into 
its research and mitigation strategies. The Committee adopted 
the amendment and ordered the bill, as amended, reported 
favorably, both by voice vote. Senators present for both the 
vote on the amendment and the vote on the bill were: Johnson, 
Portman, Lankford, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, Baldwin, Heitkamp, and 
Peters.
    Consistent with the Committee's order on technical and 
conforming changes at the meeting, the Committee reports the 
bill with a technical amendment by mutual agreement of the full 
Committee majority and minority staff.

        IV. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill, as Reported


Section 1. Short title

    This section provides the bill's short title, the 
``Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015'' or ``CIPA.''

Section 2. EMP and GMD planning, research and development, and 
        protection and preparedness

    Subsection (a) of this section amends section 2 and 201 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, adds a new section 319 and 
section 526 to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and provides 
various implementation requirements for the new provisions.
    The amendments to section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, as provided in subsection (a), add definitions of EMP and 
GMD.
    The amendments to section 201 of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, as provided in subsection (a), require the Secretary 
to perform an intelligence-based review and comparison of the 
risk and consequence of threats and hazards, including GMD and 
EMP, to critical infrastructure and develop and submit to 
Congress a strategy to protect critical infrastructure from the 
potential threats of GMD and EMP. The strategy must be updated 
biennially.
    The Committee intends this strategy to focus particularly 
on critical infrastructures within the energy sector, including 
the electric grid and critical assets needed to ensure the 
grid's operation. The bill provides the Secretary latitude to 
incorporate the strategy into existing recommendations, 
provided that any resulting documents clearly address the 
requirements in this section. The strategy should be informed, 
to the extent practicable, by the findings of the intelligence-
based review of threat, risk and consequence facing critical 
infrastructures required by this section.
    The new section 319 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
as added by subsection (a) requires the Under Secretary for 
Science and Technology, to the extent practicable, to carry out 
research and development to evaluate risks to critical 
infrastructures from GMD and EMP, and identify opportunities 
for mitigation. The subsection prescribes the minimum scope of 
the research and development conducted under Section 319.
    The section requires the Under Secretary to consult with 
relevant Federal and industry stakeholders on the research 
required by this section. The Under Secretary should build upon 
existing Federal and nonfederal research, such as that 
performed or commissioned by the national laboratories and 
industry associations, to understand the risk posed by EMP and 
GMD threats relative to all other threats and hazards facing 
the grid. Research and development required by this section 
should evaluate and analyze a range of alternative approaches 
in order to improve the resilience of the electric grid. 
Incorporating real-world operational and cost data into this 
analysis would likely prove to be a valuable asset to research 
regarding the analysis of technology options for resiliency.
    The new section 526 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
as added by subsection (a), requires the Secretary, to the 
extent practicable, to create an incident annex or other 
response strategy that would guide the response to a major GMD 
or EMP event. The Secretary would have the authority to 
incorporate the annex or response strategy for GMD and EMP into 
an existing document. The new section 526 also requires the 
Secretary, to the extent practicable, to conduct outreach to 
educate owners and operators of critical infrastructure, 
emergency planners, and emergency response providers at all 
levels of government about the threats of GMD and EMP.
    The Committee intends the Secretary to incorporate into the 
response plan the results of the required research on the 
various restoration and recovery capabilities of critical 
infrastructure under several GMD and EMP scenarios.
    Subsection (b) of the bill includes technical and 
conforming amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
    Subsection (c) provides a one-year deadline for the 
Secretary to submit to Congress the strategy to protect and 
prepare critical infrastructure against the threats of EMP and 
GMD.
    Subsection (d) directs the Secretary to report to Congress 
on the progress made in addressing requirements in the bill, 
such as the requirements to conduct research and development to 
mitigate the consequences of threats of EMP and GMD, and 
outreach to emergency planners and emergency response providers 
regarding the threats of EMP and GMD. The report must include 
estimated completion dates for requirements not completed as of 
the report date.

Section 3. No regulatory authority

    Section 3 provides that the bill does not grant any 
regulatory authority.

Section 4. No new authorization of appropriations

    Section 4 clarifies that the bill provides no new 
authorization of appropriations and that the activities 
required by the bill must be carried out to the extent 
practicable using funds appropriated under existing 
authorizations.

                   V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule 
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has 
considered the regulatory impact of this bill and determined 
that the bill will have no regulatory impact within the meaning 
of the rules. The Committee agrees with the Congressional 
Budget Office's statement that the bill contains no 
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no costs 
on state, local, or tribal governments.

             VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

                                                   August 11, 2015.
Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1846, the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz.
            Sincerely,
                                                        Keith Hall.
    Enclosure.

S. 1846--Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015

    S. 1846 would require the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to undertake research and planning activities to mitigate 
the potential consequences of electromagnetic pulses and 
geomagnetic disturbances--resulting from either intentional 
acts or natural causes--on critical infrastructure, such as 
public utilities and national security assets. DHS is currently 
carrying out programs similar to those required by the bill, 
and CBO estimates that implementing S. 1846 would not 
significantly affect spending by the department. Because 
enacting the legislation would not affect direct spending or 
revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
    S. 1846 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and 
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal 
governments.
    On July 13, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 
1073, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, as ordered 
reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security on June 
25, 2015. The two bills are similar and CBO's estimates of the 
budgetary effects are the same.
    The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. 
The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Assistant Director 
for Budget Analysis.

       VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
S. 1846 as reported are shown as follows (existing law proposed 
to be omitted is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in 
italic, and existing law in which no change is proposed is 
shown in roman):

UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE 14--COAST GUARD

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART II--COAST GUARD RESERVE AND AUXILIARY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    CHAPTER 21--COAST GUARD RESERVE


                         Subchapter A--General


SEC. 701. ORGANIZATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 712. ACTIVE DUTY FOR EMERGENCY AUGMENTATION OF REGULAR FORCES

    (a) Notwithstanding another law, and for the emergency 
augmentation of the Regular Coast Guard forces during a, or to 
aid in prevention of an imminent, serious natural or manmade 
disaster, accident, catastrophe, act of terrorism (as defined 
in [section 2(16)] section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 (16))), or transportation security incident 
as defined in section 70101 of title 46, the Secretary may, 
without the consent of the member affected, order to active 
duty of not more than 60 days in any 4-month period and not 
more than 120 days in any 2-year period an organized training 
unit of the Coast Guard Ready Reserve, a member thereof, or a 
member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) * * *
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
is as follows:
     * * * * * * *

    TITLE III--SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Sec. 301. Under Secretary for Science and Technology
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 319. GMD and EMP mitigation research and development. 
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 526. National planning and education. 
     * * * * * * *

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act, the following definitions apply:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (7) EMP.--The term ``EMP'' means an electromagnetic 
        pulse caused by a nuclear device or nonnuclear device, 
        including such a pulse caused by an act of terrorism.
          [7] (8) * * *
          [8] (9) * * *
          (10) GMD.--The term ``GMD'' means a geomagnetic 
        disturbance caused by solar storms or other naturally 
        occurring phenomena. 
          [9] (11) * * *
          [10] (12) * * *
          [11] (13) * * *
          [12] (14) * * *
          [13] (15) * * *
          [14] (16) * * *
          [15] (17) * * *
          [16] (18) * * *
          [17] (19) * * *
          [18] (20) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

  Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; 
                         Access to Information

SEC. 201. INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

    (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d) Responsibilities of Secretary Relating to Intelligence 
and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.--The 
responsibilities of the Secretary relating to intelligence and 
analysis and infrastructure protection shall be as follows:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (1) * * *
          (26)(A) To conduct an intelligence-based review and 
        comparison of the risk and consequence of threats and 
        hazards, including GMD and EMP, facing critical 
        infrastructures, and prepare and submit to the 
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
        of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of 
        the House of Representatives--
                  (i) a recommended strategy to protect and 
                prepare the critical infrastructure of the 
                American homeland against threats of EMP and 
                GMD, including from acts of terrorism; and
                  (ii) not less frequently than every 2 years, 
                updates of the recommended strategy.
          (B) The recommended strategy under subparagraph (A) 
        shall--
                  (i) be based on findings of the research and 
                development conducted under section 319;
                  (ii) be developed in consultation with the 
                relevant Federal sector-specific agencies (as 
                defined under Presidential Policy Directive-21) 
                for critical infrastructures;
                  (iii) be developed in consultation with the 
                relevant sector coordinating councils for 
                critical infrastructures;
                  (iv) be informed, to the extent practicable, 
                by the findings of the intelligence-based 
                review and comparison of the risk and 
                consequence of threats and hazards, including 
                GMD and EMP, facing critical infrastructures 
                conducted under subparagraph (A); and
                  (v) be submitted in unclassified form, but 
                may include a classified annex.
          (C) The Secretary may, if appropriate, incorporate 
        the recommended strategy into a broader recommendation 
        developed by the Department to help protect and prepare 
        critical infrastructure from terrorism, cyber attacks, 
        and other threats and hazards if, as incorporated, the 
        recommended strategy complies with subparagraph (B).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 319. GMD AND EMP MITIGATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) In General.--In furtherance of domestic preparedness 
and response, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary 
for Science and Technology, and in consultation with other 
relevant executive agencies and relevant owners and operators 
of critical infrastructure, shall, to the extent practicable, 
conduct research and development to mitigate the consequences 
of threats of EMP and GMD.
    (b) Scope.--The scope of the research and development under 
subsection (a) shall include the following:
          (1) An objective scientific analysis--
                  (A) evaluating the risks to critical 
                infrastructures from a range of threats of EMP 
                and GMD; and
                  (B) which shall--
                          (i) be conducted in conjunction with 
                        the Office of Intelligence and 
                        Analysis; and
                          (ii) include a review and comparison 
                        of the range of threats and hazards 
                        facing critical infrastructure of the 
                        electric grid.
          (2) Determination of the critical utilities and 
        national security assets and infrastructures that are 
        at risk from threats of EMP and GMD.
          (3) An evaluation of emergency planning and response 
        technologies that would address the findings and 
        recommendations of experts, including those of the 
        Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States 
        from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, which shall include 
        a review of the feasibility of--
                  (A) rapidly isolating 1 or more portions of 
                the electrical grid from the main electrical 
                grid; and
                  (B) training utility and transmission 
                operators to deactivate transmission lines 
                within seconds of an event constituting a 
                threat of EMP or GMD.
          (4) An analysis of technology options that are 
        available to improve the resiliency of critical 
        infrastructure to threats of EMP and GMD, which shall 
        include an analysis of neutral current blocking devices 
        that may protect high-voltage transmission lines.
          (5) The restoration and recovery capabilities of 
        critical infrastructure under differing levels of 
        damage and disruption from various threats of EMP and 
        GMD, as informed by the objective scientific analysis 
        conducted under paragraph (1).
          (6) An analysis of the feasibility of a real-time 
        alert system to inform electric grid operators and 
        other stakeholders within milliseconds of a high-
        altitude nuclear explosion.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE IV--NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 501. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act, the following definitions apply:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (13) the term ``tribal government'' means the 
        government of any entity described in [section 
        2(11)(B)] section 2(13)(B); and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 526. NATIONAL PLANNING AND EDUCATION.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary shall, to the extent 
practicable--
          (1) develop an incident annex or similar response and 
        planning strategy that guides the response to a major 
        GMD or EMP event; and
          (2) conduct outreach to educate owners and operators 
        of critical infrastructure, emergency planners, and 
        emergency response providers at all levels of 
        government regarding threats of EMP and GMD.
    (b) Existing Annexes and Plans.--The incident annex or 
response and planning strategy developed under subsection 
(a)(1) may be incorporated into existing incident annexes or 
response plans.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                  [all]