[Senate Report 114-222]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Calendar No. 382
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 114-222
_______________________________________________________________________
AIRPORT SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT ACT
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
on
S. 2361
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
March 7, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-010 WASHINGTON : 2016
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
one hundred fourteenth congress
second session
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
TED CRUZ, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas ED MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DEAN HELLER, Nevada JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia
CORY GARDNER, Colorado GARY PETERS, Michigan
STEVE DAINES, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Christopher Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Clint Odom, Democratic General Counsel
Calendar No. 382
114th Congress } { Report
SENATE
2d Session } { 114-222
======================================================================
AIRPORT SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT ACT
_______
March 7, 2016.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Thune, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 2361]
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to
which was referred the bill (S. 2361) to enhance airport
security, and for other purposes, having considered the same,
reports favorably thereon with an amendment (in the nature of a
substitute) and recommends that the bill (as amended) do pass.
Purpose of the Bill
The purpose of S. 2361 is to improve oversight, vetting,
and credentialing of airport workers with access to the secure
area of an airport, and for other purposes.
Background and Needs
The need for enhanced oversight of airport workers with
access to secure areas stems from findings of recent security
gaps and a growing concern about aviation security in an
environment threatened by global terrorism. A number of airport
security vulnerabilities exposed within the last year,
including missing and improper use of Secure Identification
Display Area (SIDA) badges by airport and airline workers, a
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector
General (OIG) report finding that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) did not identify 73 airport workers with
potential links to terrorism due to gaps in current interagency
watchlisting policy, and the fact that the TSA does not
exercise an appropriately rigorous oversight plan related to
lost or missing SIDA badges, have made it clear that
enhancements to airport security are needed to ensure greater
public safety.
The Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight Act of 2015
builds upon the bipartisan TSA oversight efforts of the
Committee in 2015, including classified briefings and three
oversight letters to the TSA on the improper use of SIDA badges
and the TSA's access to the U.S. Government's consolidated
terrorism database, known as the Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE). Additionally, the bill would authorize
activities recommended by the Aviation Stakeholder Advisory
Committee (ASAC) for improving airport employee access
controls, which the TSA has been slow to implement in some
cases.
Summary of Provisions
S. 2361 would improve vetting, credentialing, and
inspections of airport workers with access to the SIDA of an
airport, and would increase TSA oversight responsibilities
regarding airport workers with missing SIDA credentials and
airports with chronic underperformance on badge accountability.
This bill also would require the TSA Administrator to conduct
an updated threat assessment regarding airport workers with
SIDA credentials and the security measures in place to address
resulting vulnerabilities in light of recent international
terrorist activity, to revise the rules on unescorted airport
access controls, to make the expiration date on each airport
credential issued to a non-United States citizen consistent
with such individual's immigration status, and to enhance the
eligibility requirements and disqualifying criminal offenses
for individuals seeking or having unescorted access to a SIDA
of an airport based on similar criteria utilized by U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and other DHS programs.
This bill also would improve airport worker vetting by
requiring the TSA Administrator to implement the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's (FBI) ``Rap Back'' service for recurrent
background checks of SIDA badge holders, and by requiring that
the TSA receive automated, real-time access to additional
terrorism-related information in the TIDE database. Under the
bill, airport operators also would be granted direct access to
the E-Verify program and the Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements (SAVE) automated system in order to determine the
eligibility based on immigration status of individuals seeking
unescorted access authority to a SIDA of an airport.
The bill also would require the TSA Administrator to
develop and implement airport access control performance
metrics and best practices, and expand the use of random
physical inspections of airport workers with SIDA access. The
TSA Administrator also would be directed to disseminate best
practices on airport worker screening based on a review of
airports that have implemented comprehensive screening, and
conduct red-team, covert testing of SIDA access controls.
The bill also would require the TSA Administrator to
conduct a comprehensive review of current security directives.
The purpose of this review would be to streamline, consolidate,
or revoke security directives to most efficiently maximize risk
reduction as necessary. One year after the date of enactment,
the Comptroller General of the United States would be required
to submit a report to Congress that assesses the progress made
by the TSA in implementing the oversight, credentialing,
vetting, and inspection requirements under the bill.
Legislative History
On December 7, 2015, S. 2361, the Airport Security
Enhancement and Oversight Act was introduced by Senators Thune,
Nelson, Ayotte, and Cantwell. The bill is also cosponsored by
Senators Johnson and Klobuchar. The bill is a complementary
proposal to H.R. 2750, the Improved Security Vetting for
Aviation Workers Act, and H.R. 3102, the Airport Access Control
Security Improvement Act, which passed the House of
Representatives by voice votes on July 27, 2015, and on October
6, 2015, respectively. H.R. 2750 was introduced by
Representatives Katko (R-NY), Rice (D-NY), McCaul (R-TX), and
Payne (D-NJ) in June 2015, and was ordered to be reported by
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives in July 2015. H.R. 3102 was introduced by
Representatives Katko (R-NY), Rice (D-NY), and McCaul (R-TX) in
July 2015, and was ordered to be reported by the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives in October
2015.
No Senate hearings were held on S. 2361 in the 114th
Congress. The Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate however held a hearing on March
17, 2015, entitled ``TSA Oversight and Examination of the
Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request,'' and received testimony from
Melvin Carraway, Acting Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security, which
responded to questions about SIDA badges. The Committee also
held a hearing on May 21, 2015, to consider the nomination of
Peter Neffenger to be the TSA Administrator, during which the
issue of misused SIDA badges was addressed. The Committee also
conducted oversight on missing SIDA badges and airport worker
vetting in the 114th Congress with a series of three letters
sent to the TSA Administrator by Chairman Thune, Ranking Member
Nelson, and other Committee members. The TSA's responses to
these letters indicated that the TSA does not maintain a list
of lost or missing SIDA badges, and that it rarely uses its
enforcement authority to fine airports that reach a certain
threshold of missing SIDA badges, prompting related provisions
in S. 2361.
In the House of Representatives in the 114th Congress, the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security of the Committee on
Homeland Security held a two-part hearing on airport access
control entitled, ``A Review of Access Control Measures at Our
Nation's Airports.'' At part I of the hearing on February 3,
2015, the subcommittee received testimony from Mark Hatfield,
Acting Deputy Administrator, TSA, DHS; Doug Perdue, Deputy
Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Department of Justice; Sharon L. Pinkerton,
Senior Vice President, Legislative and Regulatory Policy,
Airlines for America; and Miguel Southwell, General Manager,
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport.
At part II of the hearing on April 30, 2015, the
subcommittee received testimony from Melvin J. Carraway, Acting
Administrator, TSA, DHS; Jeanne M. Olivier, Assistant Director,
Aviation Security and Technology, Security Operations and
Programs Department, the Port Authority of New York & New
Jersey, testifying on behalf of the American Association of
Airport Executives; and Steven Grossman, Chief Executive
Officer/Executive Director, Jacksonville International Airport,
Jacksonville Aviation Authority, testifying on behalf of the
Airports Council International, North America.
On June 16, 2015, the subcommittee also held a hearing
entitled, ``How TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting,'' and
received testimony from John Roth, Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security; Stacey Fitzmaurice, Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
Transportation Security Administration, DHS; and Jennifer
Grover, Director, Transportation Security and Coast Guard
Issues, Homeland Security and Justice Team, Government
Accountability Office.
On December 9, 2015, the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation of the Senate met in open Executive Session
to consider S. 2361, and ordered the bill to be reported to the
Senate favorably, with a first degree amendment, by voice vote.
The first degree amendment, sponsored by Senators Nelson,
Blumenthal, and Booker, added language that would ensure there
exists or is developed a waiver process for airport workers for
denied SIDA credentials.
Estimated Costs
In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office:
S. 2361--Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight Act
S. 2361 would require the Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to undertake a
variety of activities to improve the effectiveness of processes
for screening, vetting, and credentialing personnel at
airports, particularly individuals with access to secure areas.
Such activities would include using risk-based models for
screening airport employees based on the level of security of
areas they access, reviewing procedures related to vetting
employees and auditing airports' issuance of credentials,
studying opportunities to enhance security of entry and exit
areas of secure areas of airports, and other security-related
and administrative activities. The bill also would direct the
agency to increase covert tests of security measures at secure
areas of airports and require a variety of studies and reports.
According to TSA, many of the requirements specified in S.
2361 are largely consistent with current administrative policy.
As a result, CBO estimates that any increased spending by TSA
to meet the bill's requirements would total less than $500,000;
any such spending would be subject to the availability of
appropriated funds. According to TSA, some of the analyses and
reports required by the bill could result in changes in
policies that, if implemented, might affect the agency's costs
in future years. Any such effects would depend on the outcome
of such analyses and are not reflected in this estimate.
Because enacting S. 2361 would not affect direct spending
or revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO
estimates that enacting S. 2361 would not increase net direct
spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive
10-year periods beginning in 2027.
S. 2361 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
S. 2361 contains provisions related to screening personnel
at airports that are similar to provisions in other bills for
which CBO has transmitted cost estimates. In all cases, our
estimates of budgetary effects of such provisions are the same.
In particular:
On July 24, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost
estimate for H.R. 2750, the Improved Security Vetting
for Aviation Workers Act of 2015, as ordered reported
by the House Committee on Homeland Security on June 25,
2015;
On November 4, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost
estimate for H.R. 3102, the Airport Access Control
Security Improvement Act of 2015, as passed by the
House of Representatives on October 6, 2015; and,
On November 4, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost
estimate for H.R. 3584, the Transportation Security
Administration Reform and Improvement Act of 2015, as
ordered reported by the House Committee on Homeland
Security on September 30, 2015.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Megan Carroll.
The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Regulatory Impact
In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the
legislation, as reported:
NUMBER OF PERSONS COVERED
The bill would cover foreign and domestic air carriers and
the approximately 440 U.S. airports which are currently subject
to TSA rules and regulations on SIDA access control. The bill
would also cover the tens of thousands of SIDA badge holders
that currently work at U.S. airports, as well as an even
greater number of total future SIDA badge applicants.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
The bill would not authorize new spending by the Federal
Government. Under the bill, the TSA Administrator would be
required to conduct two rulemakings subject to notice and
comment, which would update existing rules and regulations to
which airport operators and airlines are already subject.
Depending on the outcome of the TSA's rulemaking updates,
airport operators may be required to pay increased fines and
undergo additional audits if they report certain percentages of
missing SIDA badges. They also may be encouraged by the TSA to
issue temporary SIDA badges to airport workers under limited
circumstances. Airport operators may also be required develop a
waiver process for denied SIDA credentials if one does not
already exist. In addition, under a rule of construction in the
bill, the rulemaking update related to vetting cannot be
construed to affect existing airport worker vetting fees
imposed by the TSA. Finally, the requirement to streamline
security directives under the bill may result in economic
efficiencies to airport operators and air carriers.
PRIVACY
The bill would impact the personal privacy of individuals
who apply to receive and who already possess SIDA badges for
unescorted access to secure areas of airports. Specifically,
the bill would require the TSA Administrator to enhance the
criminal history background checks that SIDA badge applicants
must already undergo as part of the vetting process. The bill
also would subject SIDA badge applicants to additional checks
against terrorism and immigration status databases, and would
require all SIDA badge holders to undergo recurrent criminal
history background checks. The bill would subject SIDA badge
holders to expanded use of random physical inspections and
covert testing, which are existing practices.
PAPERWORK
The bill would not significantly increase paperwork
requirements for private individuals or businesses. The
enhanced regulatory requirements under the bill for oversight
of missing airport SIDA badges would be enforced using
information gained from existing audits and reporting
procedures. Additionally, the TSA would be required to track
and keep records on multiple years of airport audit data
related to missing SIDA badges for oversight purposes. The
updated vetting requirements under the bill would be
implemented using existing background check, certification, and
waiver processes. The bill also would require the Federal
Government to produce eight reports (one of which is an annual
report), one regular update to Congress, and a notification to
Congress triggered by certain occurrences.
Congressionally Directed Spending
In compliance with paragraph 4(b) of rule XLIV of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides that no
provisions contained in the bill, as reported, meet the
definition of congressionally directed spending items under the
rule.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short title.
This section would designate the short title of the bill as
the, ``Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight Act.''
Section 2. Findings.
This section would state findings of the Committee's
oversight efforts in the last year regarding recent lapses in
security at domestic airports, including improper use of SIDA
badges by airport and airline workers and a group of
contractors indicted for participating in a drug smuggling
ring. The findings also would highlight a DHS OIG report
finding that the TSA did not identify 73 airport workers with
potential links to terrorism due to gaps in current interagency
watchlisting policy. Noted also in this section would be the
finding that the TSA does not maintain a list of lost or
missing SIDA badges, and that it rarely uses its enforcement
authority to fine airports that reach a certain threshold of
missing SIDA badges.
Section 3. Definitions.
This section would provide relevant definitions of terms
used in the legislation.
Section 4. Threat assessment.
This section would instruct the TSA Administrator to update
an assessment to determine the level of risk posed to airport
security by workers with access to secure areas of domestic
airports in light of recent terrorist activity. Factors for the
TSA Administrator to consider would include domestic and
international intelligence, the recent security breaches at
domestic and international airports, and the recent security
improvements at domestic airports, including the implementation
of recommendations made by the ASAC. This section also would
require the TSA Administrator to report to Congress the results
of this assessment, as well as a report on the implementation
status of recent recommendations made by the ASAC to the TSA.
Finally, the TSA Administrator also would be required to report
to Congress with regular updates about the threat environment
as new information becomes available and as needed.
Section 5. Oversight.
This section would require the TSA Administrator to update,
in consultation with airport operators, the rules on unescorted
airport access controls issued by the Secretary of Homeland
Security. In updating these rules, the TSA Administrator would
have to consider increased fines and oversight for airport
operators that report missing more than five percent of
credentials for unescorted access to any SIDA of an airport,
and best practices for Category X airports (the largest
airports) that report missing three percent of credentials to
any SIDA of an airport. The TSA Administrator also would be
required to consider additional audits and status checks for
airport operators that report missing more than three percent
of credentials, as well as a review and analysis of the prior
five years of audits for those same airport operators to
improve accountability by airports and badge holders alike. The
Committee does not intend for the TSA Administrator to
retroactively request five years' worth of audit data from
airports upon the date of enactment; instead, the Committee
expects the TSA Administrator to implement this review and
analysis requirement as soon as the data can be practically
collected through existing airport audit procedures, and to
build the database going forward. Finally, in updating these
rules, the TSA Administrator would be required to consider
increased fines and direct enforcement requirements for airport
workers and their employers that fail to report within 24 hours
an employment termination or a missing credential, and
termination of any airport worker that fails to report in a
timely manner missing credentials.
This section also would allow the TSA Administrator to
encourage the issuance of free, one-time, 24-hour temporary
credentials for workers who have reported their credentials
missing but not permanently lost, stolen, or destroyed, in a
timely manner, much like a hold on a credit card, until the
badge is found and reactivated or the replacement of the
credential is necessary. This section also would require the
TSA Administrator to report to Congress each time an airport
operator reports missing more than three percent of credentials
at Category X airports and more than five percent of
credentials at all other airports, and to submit an annual
report on the number of violations and fines related to
unescorted access authority to the SIDA of an airport collected
in the preceding fiscal year.
Section 6. Credentials.
This section would require the TSA Administrator to issue
guidance to airport operators requiring that they place an
expiration date on each airport credential issued to a non-
United States citizen commensurate with the period of time
during which that non-United States citizen is lawfully
authorized to work in the United States. In addition, the TSA
Administrator would have to issue guidance for transportation
security inspectors to annually review the procedures of
airport operators for applicants seeking unescorted access
authority to any SIDA of airports. This guidance should include
a review of background check and employment authorization
documents.
Section 7. Vetting.
This section would require the TSA Administrator to update
and enhance, through a notice and comment rulemaking, the
eligibility requirements and disqualifying criminal offenses
for individuals seeking or having unescorted access to a SIDA
of an airport. In revising these regulations, the TSA
Administrator would have to consider adding to the list of
disqualifying criminal offenses the offenses and criteria used
by CBP and those used for the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (known as TWIC) for access to secure
areas, with the goal of streamlining and making consistent
similar airport worker requirements, where appropriate. This
section also would require the TSA Administrator to propose in
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking an extension of the look-back
period for disqualifying criminal offenses and other
disqualifying criteria from 10 to 15 years before the date of
an individual's application. The rulemaking also would require
an airport or aircraft operator to certify that there is a
specific need and that the individual understands the
requirements for possessing a SIDA badge for each individual
who receives unescorted access authority.
This section would require the TSA Administrator to ensure
that there exists or is developed a waiver process for
approving the issuance of credentials for SIDA access for
individuals who are denied a credential due to a criminal
history background check. As part of the rulemaking update, the
Committee expects the TSA Administrator to carefully weigh the
costs and administrative burdens associated with this
requirement. Consideration should be given to airport community
preferences to retain control of the waiver process and
employee group concerns about the lack of a centralized system.
The Committee does not intend to create a significant financial
burden associated with the development of such a waiver process
at airports where one does not currently exist.
In addition, this section would require the TSA
Administrator and the Director of the FBI to fully implement
the Rap Back service for recurrent vetting of individuals with
SIDA badges. As part of this program, the TSA Administrator
would be required to ensure that the TSA only receives status
notifications through the Rap Back service about disqualifying
criminal offenses in accordance with regulations, and that any
information received by the TSA through the Rap Back service is
provided directly and immediately to the relevant airport and
aircraft operators. The Secretary of Homeland Security also
would be required to authorize the TSA Administrator to receive
automated, real-time access to additional TIDE data and to
authorize each airport operator to have direct access to the E-
Verify program and the SAVE automated system to determine the
eligibility based on immigration status of individuals seeking
unescorted access authority to a SIDA of an airport.
Section 8. Metrics.
This section would require the TSA Administrator to develop
and implement performance metrics to measure the effectiveness
of security for secured areas of airports. The TSA
Administrator may consider such factors as adherence to access
point procedures, proper use of credentials, differences in
access point characteristics across the national airport
system, and other factors in developing these metrics. A report
by the Comptroller General on the impact of the new performance
metrics implemented in this section would be due to Congress
two years after the date of enactment.
Section 9. Inspections and assessments.
This section would instruct the TSA Administrator, in
consultation with ASAC, to develop best practices for
unescorted access security that use intelligence, scientific
algorithms, and risk-based factors, ensure integrity and
accountability, subject airport workers to random physical
security inspections, and appropriately manage the number of
SIDA access points to reduce unauthorized access to these
areas. This section also would require the TSA Administrator to
expand the use of transportation security officers and
inspectors to conduct enhanced, random, and unpredictable
physical inspections of airport workers in each SIDA of an
airport and at each SIDA access point. These inspections would
be designed to verify the credentials of airport workers,
determine whether airport workers possess prohibited items, and
to verify whether airport workers are following appropriate
procedures to access that SIDA of an airport. The Committee
intends for this provision to be consistent with the TSA's
increase in SIDA inspections under existing Playbook
operations, and intends not to put a significant resource
burden on the TSA to conduct all random physical inspections at
airports, an effort which shall remain primarily the
responsibility of airport operators. Additionally, this section
would require the TSA Administrator to conduct a review of
airports that have implemented comprehensive or additional
employee screening or perimeter security to improve airport
security and, upon completion of the review, to identify best
practices for additional access control and employee security
at airports and to disseminate the best practices identified to
airport operators. The TSA Administrator also would be
authorized in this section to conduct a pilot program at one or
more airports to test and validate the identified best
practices, as appropriate.
Section 10. Covert testing.
This section would instruct the TSA Administrator to
increase the use of red-team, covert testing of access controls
to any secure area of an airport, and instructs the DHS OIG to
conduct red-team covert testing of airport access controls to
the SIDA of airports. This section would require the TSA
Administrator to submit a report on the progress in expanding
the use of red-team, covert testing to Congress 90 days after
enactment, and the DHS OIG to submit a report on the
effectiveness of airport access controls to the SIDA of
airports 180 days after enactment.
Section 11. Security directives.
This section would require the TSA Administrator to begin,
and then annually conduct, in consultation with the appropriate
regulated entities, a comprehensive review of every current
security directive addressed to any regulated entity. This
review would be designed to determine whether the security
directives continue to be relevant, whether the security
directives should be streamlined or consolidated to most
efficiently maximize risk reduction, and to update,
consolidate, or revoke any security directive as necessary.
Going forward, the TSA Administrator would have to notify
Congress about the extent to which each security directive
issued responds to a specific threat or emergency situation,
and when it is anticipated that it will expire. The Committee
understands that the TSA must be able to act quickly to
effectively respond to security threats and situations.
Therefore, the Committee does not intend to impose on the TSA a
new standard for issuing security directives; it merely intends
to create a new requirement for notice to Congress.
Section 12. Implementation report.
This section would require the Comptroller General to
submit a report to Congress that assesses the progress made by
the TSA in implementing the oversight, credentialing, vetting,
and inspection requirements under this Act. The report would be
due one year after enactment.
Section 13. Miscellaneous amendments.
This section would include a technical amendment extending
the term of a member of ASAC beyond two years if the TSA
Administrator does not appoint a successor. Additionally, it
would include an amendment which requires the TSA Administrator
to respond with feedback each time the TSA receives a
recommendation from ASAC. The feedback also would be required
to include an action plan to implement any of the
recommendations with which the TSA Administrator concurs or a
justification for why any of the recommendations have been
rejected. This feedback would be due 90 days after the TSA
Administrator receives the recommendations transmitted by ASAC.
Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
material is printed in italic, existing law in which no change
is proposed is shown in roman):
TITLE 49. TRANSPORTATION
SUBTITLE VII. AVIATION PROGRAMS
PART A. AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY
SUBPART III. SAFETY
CHAPTER 449. SECURITY
SUBCHAPTER II. ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL
Sec. 44946. Aviation Security Advisory Committee
(a) Establishment.--The Assistant Secretary shall establish
within the Transportation Security Administration an aviation
security advisory committee.
(b) Duties.--
(1) In general.--The Assistant Secretary shall
consult the Advisory Committee, as appropriate, on
aviation security matters, including on the
development, refinement, and implementation of
policies, programs, rulemaking, and security directives
pertaining to aviation security, while adhering to
sensitive security guidelines.
(2) Recommendations.--
(A) In general.--The Advisory Committee shall
develop, at the request of the Assistant
Secretary, recommendations for improvements to
aviation security.
(B) Recommendations of subcommittees.--
Recommendations agreed upon by the
subcommittees established under this section
shall be approved by the Advisory Committee
before transmission to the Assistant Secretary.
(3) Periodic reports.--The Advisory Committee shall
periodically submit to the Assistant Secretary--
(A) reports on matters identified by the
Assistant Secretary; and
(B) reports on other matters identified by a
majority of the members of the Advisory
Committee.
(4) Annual report.--The Advisory Committee shall
submit to the Assistant Secretary an annual report
providing information on the activities, findings, and
recommendations of the Advisory Committee, including
its subcommittees, for the preceding year. Not later
than 6 months after the date that the Secretary
receives the annual report, the Secretary shall publish
a public version describing the Advisory Committee's
activities and such related matters as would be
informative to the public consistent with the policy of
section 552(b) of title 5.
[(5) Feedback.--Not later than 90 days after
receiving recommendations transmitted by the Advisory
Committee under paragraph (4), the Assistant Secretary
shall respond in writing to the Advisory Committee with
feedback on each of the recommendations, an action plan
to implement any of the recommendations with which the
Assistant Secretary concurs, and a justification for
why any of the recommendations have been rejected.]
(5) Feedback.--Not later than 90 days after receiving
recommendations transmitted by the Advisory Committee
under paragraph (2) or paragraph (4), the Assistant
Secretary shall respond in writing to the Advisory
Committee with feedback on each of the recommendations,
an action plan to implement any of the recommendations
with which the Assistant Secretary concurs, and a
justification for why any of the recommendations have
been rejected.
(6) Congressional notification.--Not later than 30
days after providing written feedback to the Advisory
Committee under paragraph (5), the Assistant Secretary
shall notify the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives on
such feedback, and provide a briefing upon request.
(7) Report to congress.--Prior to briefing the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of
the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of
the House of Representatives under paragraph (6), the
Assistant Secretary shall submit to such committees a
report containing information relating to the
recommendations transmitted by the Advisory Committee
in accordance with paragraph (4).
(c) Membership.--
(1) Appointment.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of enactment of the Aviation
Security Stakeholder Participation Act of 2014,
the Assistant Secretary shall appoint the
members of the Advisory Committee.
(B) Composition.--The membership of the
Advisory Committee shall consist of individuals
representing not more than 34 member
organizations. Each organization shall be
represented by 1 individual (or the
individual's designee).
(C) Representation.--The membership of the
Advisory Committee shall include
representatives of air carriers, all-cargo air
transportation, indirect air carriers, labor
organizations representing air carrier
employees, labor organizations representing
transportation security officers, aircraft
manufacturers, airport operators, airport
construction and maintenance contractors, labor
organizations representing employees of airport
construction and maintenance contractors,
general aviation, privacy organizations, the
travel industry, airport-based businesses
(including minority-owned small businesses),
businesses that conduct security screening
operations at airports, aeronautical repair
stations, passenger advocacy groups, the
aviation security technology industry
(including screening technology and
biometrics), victims of terrorist acts against
aviation, and law enforcement and security
experts.
(2) Term of office.--
[(A) Terms.--The term of each member of the
Advisory Committee shall be 2 years. A member
of the Advisory Committee may be reappointed.]
(A) Terms.--The term of each member of the
Advisory Committee shall be 2 years, but a
member may continue to serve until the
Assistant Secretary appoints a successor. A
member of the Advisory Committee may be
reappointed.
(B) Removal.--The Assistant Secretary may
review the participation of a member of the
Advisory Committee and remove such member for
cause at any time.
(3) Prohibition on compensation.--The members of the
Advisory Committee shall not receive pay, allowances,
or benefits from the Government by reason of their
service on the Advisory Committee.
(4) Meetings.--
(A) In general.--The Assistant Secretary
shall require the Advisory Committee to meet at
least semiannually and may convene additional
meetings as necessary.
(B) Public meetings.--At least 1 of the
meetings described in subparagraph (A) shall be
open to the public.
(C) Attendance.--The Advisory Committee shall
maintain a record of the persons present at
each meeting.
(5) Member access to sensitive security
information.--Not later than 60 days after the date of
a member's appointment, the Assistant Secretary shall
determine if there is cause for the member to be
restricted from possessing sensitive security
information. Without such cause, and upon the member
voluntarily signing a non-disclosure agreement, the
member may be granted access to sensitive security
information that is relevant to the member's advisory
duties. The member shall protect the sensitive security
information in accordance with part 1520 of title 49,
Code of Federal Regulations.
(6) Chairperson.--A stakeholder representative on the
Advisory Committee who is elected by the appointed
membership of the Advisory Committee shall chair the
Advisory Committee.
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