[House Report 114-848]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
House Calendar No. 163
114th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 114-848
_______________________________________________________________________
F I N A L R E P O R T
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
THE EVENTS SURROUNDING
THE 2012 TERRORIST
ATTACK IN BENGHAZI
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
December 7, 2016.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012 TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI
114th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 114-848
_______________________________________________________________________
F I N A L R E P O R T
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
THE EVENTS SURROUNDING
THE 2012 TERRORIST
ATTACK IN BENGHAZI
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
December 7, 2016.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
22-867 WASHINGTON : 2016
____________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
Internet:bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone:toll free (866)512-1800;DC area (202)512-1800
Fax:(202) 512-2104 Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington,DC 20402-001
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman
LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Ranking Member
PETER ROSKAM, Illinois ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas ADAM SCHIFF, California
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama LINDA SANCHEZ, California
SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
------------
This report is dedicated to the memory and service of Glen A. Doherty,
Sean P. Smith, J. Christopher Stevens, and Tyrone S. Woods
COMMITTEE STAFF
Philip G. Kiko, Staff Director & General Counsel
Christopher A. Donesa, Deputy Staff Director
Dana Chipman, Chief Counsel
Sarah Adams, Senior Advisor Sheria Clarke, Counsel
Sara Barrineau, Investigator Carlton Davis, Counsel
Brian Beattie, Professional Staff Mark Grider, Deputy General
Member Counsel
Kimberly Betz, Member Liaison & Sharon Jackson, Deputy Chief
Counsel Counsel
Rob Borden, Senior Advisor Craig Missakian, Deputy Chief
Luke Burke, Investigator/Detailee Counsel
J. Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel
Jamal D. Ware, Communications Director
Amanda Duvall, Deputy Communications Director
Matt Wolking, Press Secretary
Douglas Alexander, Printing Clerk Abigail Helvering, Staff Assistant
Anne Binsted, Finance and Personnel Pat Knudsen, Shared Employee
Administrator Paige Lueken, Executive Assistant
Frank Chang, Legal Intern Barbara McCaffrey, Documents Clerk
George Gerbo, Staff Assistant Elizabeth McWhorter, Security
Elizabeth Gorman, Professional Manager
Staff Member William Sacripanti, Staff
Clark Hedrick, Legal Intern Assistant
Elizabeth Starek, Staff Assistant
Sharon Utz, Professional Staff
Member
Minority Staff
Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Staff Director & General Counsel
Heather Sawyer, Chief Counsel
Dave Rapallo, Senior Advisor to the Ranking Member
Krista Boyd, Senior Counsel Laura Rauch, Senior Professional
Peter Kenny, Senior Counsel Staff Member
Ronak Desai, Counsel Daniel Rebnord, Professional Staff
Shannon Green, Counsel Member
Valerie Shen, Counsel Brent Woolfork, Professional Staff
Jennifer Werner, Communications
Director Member
Paul Bell, Deputy Communications Erin O'Brien, Investigator/
Director Detailee
Linda Cohen, Senior Professional Kendal Robinson, Investigator/
Staff Member Detailee
Mone Ross, Staff Assistant
Majority Interns
J. Michael Abler Clay Bryan
Jeff Beck Amanda Gonzalez
Courtney Ballenger Francesca Savoia
Michelle Bowling Ivy Wilborn
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding The
2012 Terrorist Attack
in Benghazi,
Washington, December 7, 2016.
Hon. Karen L. Haas,
Clerk, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. Haas:
Pursuant to H. Res. 567 of the 113th Congress and section
4(a) of H. Res. 5 of the 114th Congress, I hereby transmit the
attached report, ``Final Report of the Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi.''
Sincerely,
Trey Gowdy,
Chairman.
House Calendar No. 163
114th Congress } { Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session } { 114-848
======================================================================
FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012
TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI
_______
December 7, 2016.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
_______
Mr. Gowdy, from the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012
Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS
On July 8, 2016, the Select Committee on the Events
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, approved and
reported the following investigative report to the House,
pursuant to H. Res. 567 (113th Congress).
CONTENTS
Page
Illustrations.................................................... 3
Part I. Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi......... 9
Part II. Internal and Public Government Communications about the
Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi.................................. 133
Part III. Events Leading to the Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi.... 263
Part IV. Compliance with Congressional Investigations............ 353
Part V. Recommendations.......................................... 409
Additional Views of Rep. Jim Jordan and Rep. Mike Pompeo......... 415
Appendix A: Resolution Establishing the Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi....... 453
Appendix B: Significant Persons and Organizations................ 461
Appendix C: Questions for the President.......................... 467
Appendix D: Significant Events in Libya Prior to the Attacks..... 471
Appendix E: Security Incidents in Libya.......................... 475
Appendix F: Deterioration of Benghazi Mission Compound Security.. 531
Appendix G: Timelines of the Attacks............................. 559
Appendix H: The September 12 Situation Report and the President's
Daily Brief.................................................... 575
Appendix I: Witness Interview Summaries.......................... 587
Appendix J: Requests and Subpoenas for Documents................. 601
Appendix K: Analysis of Accountability Review Board, House Armed
Services Committee, and House Permanent Select Intelligence
Committee Reports.............................................. 617
Appendix L: Glen A. Doherty, Sean P. Smith, J. Christopher
Stevens, and Tyrone S. Woods................................... 643
Minority Views................................................... 645
ILLUSTRATIONS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
PART I:
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities
in Benghazi
``If you guys don't get here, we're all going to f---ing
die.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Testimony of GRS 4, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 33 (Mar. 1,
2016) [hereinafter GRS 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Diplomatic Security Agent in Benghazi
during the
attacks
``I'm in Benghazi this week, lurking about with my eyes ever-
peeled for RPG's hurtling towards my motorcade!''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to
personal account of Dominic A.G. Asquith, U.K. Ambassador to Libya
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:40 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05390150).
Ambassador Christopher Stevens, to the
U.K.
Ambassador on the morning of September
11, 2012
``We're under attack.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Testimony of Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya, U.S.
Dep't of State at 18 (Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2013
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Ambassador Christopher Stevens, on the
evening of
September 11, 2012
BACKGROUND: SEPTEMBER 2012 AND THE AMBASSADOR'S TRIP TO BENGHAZI
Stevens' Decision to Travel to Benghazi
J. Christopher Stevens, a highly and widely respected
diplomat, was sworn in as the United States Ambassador to Libya
on May 14, 2012.\4\ Thirteen months earlier in 2011, while
Libya was still in the throes of a civil war, Stevens
courageously arrived in Benghazi, Libya on a Greek cargo ship
to serve as the United States' Special Representative to the
Transitional National Council [TNC].\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Public Schedule [for the Secretary of State] for May 14, 2012
found at www.State.gov/pa/prs/appt/2012/05/14/189814.htm.
\5\U.S. Representative to TNC Stevens provides an update on Libya,
DIPNOTE, Aug. 3, 2011 found at https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2011/08/
03/us-representative-t-n-c-stevens-provides-
update-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens remained Special Representative to the TNC for more
than six months in 2011 and witnessed both the dictatorship of
Muammar Qadhafi topple and the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in
Tripoli, which had previously been evacuated at the beginning
of the Libyan revolution in February of 2011.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\A Guide to the U.S. History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and
Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: [State Department/Office of
the Historian] found at: https://history.state.gov/
countries/libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens left Benghazi in November of 2011, to return to the
United States, where he would be nominated and confirmed as
Ambassador to Libya the following May.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Biography of J. Christopher Stevens, Ambassador, Libya, found
at: https://state.gov/r/pa/ec/biog/193075.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens had a deep affection for the Libyan people in
general and the people of Benghazi in particular. He also knew
Libya as well as anyone in the U.S. Foreign Service. He would
soon learn much had changed in Libya from the time he left as
Special Representative in November of 2011 until the time he
returned as Ambassador in May of 2012.
The Benghazi Mission compound where Stevens lived for
several months in 2011 remained open while he was in the U.S.
awaiting confirmation as Ambassador. The Benghazi Mission
compound was protected by Diplomatic Security Agents and
staffed by a Principal Officer who provided political reporting
on the changes occurring in Benghazi as the country attempted
to recover after the revolution.
In August of 2012, three months after Stevens returned to
Libya as the newly confirmed Ambassador, the Principal Officer
in Benghazi was nearing the end of his assignment. There would
be a two-week gap between the Principal Officer's departure
date and the arrival of the next Principal Officer.\8\ No one
was scheduled to fill this vacancy until September 15, 2012, so
Ambassador Stevens chose to send Principal Officer 4, to cover
the vacancy during the first week in September.\9\ Stevens
chose himself to cover the second week.\10\ According to
Gregory N. Hicks, who as the Deputy Chief of Mission was second
in command at the time, Stevens ``very much wanted to get back
to Benghazi . . . he had not been able to go since his own
arrival in Tripoli'' in May of 2012.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 9 (``[Principal Officer 3] left
at the end of August, and the new Principal Officer was not arriving
until--scheduled to arrive until September 15th or thereabouts.'').
\9\See id. at 57 (``And so basically Chris announces at the meeting
that [Principal Officer 4] is going to go to Benghazi to cover the
first week in the gap, first week in September, and that he would cover
the second week.'').
\10\Id.
\11\Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The timing of Stevens' visit to Benghazi was important for
another reason as well. He was spearheading an effort to make
Benghazi a permanent post, Hicks testified:
One of the things he [Stevens] said to me was that, in
his exit interview with Secretary Clinton, she
expressed the hope that we could make the special
mission in Benghazi a permanent constituent post. And
Chris said that one of the first things he intended to
do after his arrival was develop a proposal to move
forward on that project.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Id. at 7.
A trip to Benghazi would allow Stevens to personally assess
the political and security situation and make a recommendation
regarding whether the U.S. should have a permanent presence
there. Discussions were already under way in Washington D.C. on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
how to fund a permanent post. Hicks stated:
[W]e are only a month from the end of the fiscal year,
so we have to get a [sic] or, we have to help
Washington, the executive director's office of the Near
East Bureau to put together a package to get it to [the
Undersecretary for Management] Pat Kennedy for a
decision by September 30th. Otherwise, we lose the
money. Because we had surplus money available from
Iraq--I can't remember, Iraq contingency fund I think--
that had been notified by Pat Kennedy for transfer from
Iraq--it wasn't going to get spent in Iraq, and so we
were going to spend it in Libya and in Benghazi. But we
had to get the justification forward to do that.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\Id. at 16-17.
While the end of the fiscal year funding deadline was
looming, the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge at the Embassy
in Tripoli was, nonetheless, concerned about Stevens' trip to
Benghazi. Although his first planned trip to Benghazi in the
beginning of August 2012 had to be canceled because of
security,\14\ Stevens was adamant, however, about going in
September.\15\ The Diplomatic Security Agent testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\See Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to
Libya, to Principal Officer 3, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Dep't of
State, (Aug. 2, 2012, 2:45 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390855).
\15\See Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 23, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 69-70 (Oct. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent
23 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Previous to this--to his decisions to going up there,
there was--we would meet weekly to discuss the security
situation in Libya. . . . [T]here was a specific
meeting regarding what was happening in Benghazi. In
that meeting, we reviewed incidents and probable
causes, what's initiating it. And a lot of discussion
was that it was the conflict or the incidents up there
were, you know, local population against local
population and that that they weren't specifically
targeting Americans . . . up there. I expressed my
concerns about the incidents that did involve us. And
the basic response was that they . . . were anomalies.
* * *
It was the persons attending the meeting. I believe it
was the Ambassador who actually said its anomalies; we
can't account for anomalies. And other members of the
group seemed to concur with that. And then this trip
was planned because there was a gap in principal
officer up there and the opening of the American
corner. . . . I knew he was bound and determined to go.
I've been wracking my memory trying to remember the
exact conversations I had with him on this. But I know
he knew I didn't--the idea of him traveling there. But
I knew he was determined to go. So doing everything I
can to make it as safe as possible, given my resources
and the environment--safety--compounds--both compounds,
all the Americans there.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\Id.
Not only was the looming funding deadline an impetus for
Stevens' trip, an upcoming trip by Hillary R. Clinton,
Secretary of State, in the fall of 2012 was also a motivating
factor for him to travel to Benghazi. The hope was to establish
a permanent consulate in Benghazi for the Secretary to present
to the Libyan government during her trip. Hicks discussed this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
with the Committee:
Q: Okay. We know that Ambassador Stevens went to
Benghazi on September 10th. Was there anything about
his trip to Benghazi in September of 2012 that was sort
of a precursor for the Secretary's trip?
A: Well, you know, when we have a visit by a major
political figure, like the Secretary of State, like the
President, you know, we try to make that visit
important publicly. And so we generally will create a
list of what we call deliverables, items of importance
to the bilateral relationship. So we hoped for the
Secretary to announce the opening of a permanent
consulate in Benghazi during her visit[.]
Q: Was there any reason that--was there anything
related to making Benghazi a permanent post that was
part of the purpose of Ambassador Stevens going to
Benghazi in September?
A: Oh, absolutely. And so again, we had begun the
process of developing a political rationale for having
a permanent post in Benghazi. I sent in that rationale
at the end of August to the executive director of the
NEA [Near Eastern Affairs] bureau. We had begun a
process of identifying locations and drawing plans for
such a post.
* * *
And we understood that the situation in eastern Libya
was unstable and we wanted to--and Chris Stevens wanted
to make sure that what we were doing was going--was the
right course of action. And he personally, because he
had the contacts in the region, because he had their
trust. He was the only person that we felt could go to
Benghazi and get a clear picture of the political
situation there and the security situation there as
well.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 50-51 (Apr. 14, 2016)
[hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
The Secretary was planning to travel to Libya in October of
2012.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Philippe Reines, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Public
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 12, 2012, 9:15 AM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0075710).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi: September 1-September 10, 2012
Security deficiencies plagued the Benghazi Mission compound
in the lead-up to September 2012. With the departure of the
Diplomatic Security Agent in charge at the end of August, only
two Diplomatic Security Agents remained to secure the
compound.\19\ A Diplomatic Security Agent from Tripoli was
routed to Benghazi to serve temporarily during the month of
September putting three agents on the ground as of September 1,
2012.\20\ None of the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi
had ever served at a high-threat post.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\See Email from Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 27, 2012
4:47 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05394203) (``Thanks for your
call and clarification that DS has had no volunteers for Benghazi for
the upcoming few months.'').
\20\See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 56.
\21\See id. at 14 (``Principal Officer 4 is chosen to be Acting
Principal Officer for the first week in September. And he goes to
Benghazi and is there with three Diplomatic Sec. special agents, all of
whom are brand new to the service and on temporary duty assignment.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Mission compound's contracted quick
reaction force, the February 17 Martyrs Brigade militia, which
provided interior armed security at the Benghazi Mission
compound, informed the Diplomatic Security Agents two days
before the Ambassador was scheduled to arrive it would no
longer provide off-compound security.\22\ This meant the three
Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground would have no security
support for any transport or for any meetings held off of the
compound during Stevens' visit. The Diplomatic Security Agents
attributed the change in policy to an inter-militia power
struggle.\23\ The next day, however, the Principal Officer in
Benghazi, joined a meeting with leading militia officials
during which time they told him they could no longer guarantee
the safety of the compound. The Principal Officer described the
meeting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 23 Testimony at 44-45.
\23\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3, Diplomatic Sec.
Service, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya (Sept. 8, 2012 9:29 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05396013).
[T]here was a--it was a growing and nascent group of
commanders who--militia commanders who were just
becoming kind of players on the security scene. And
some of the working assumptions were that they were
doing this mainly for personal profit; others for
religious and ideological reasons. It is trying to
understand motivations of groups of people who may or
may not become future leaders for the city of Benghazi
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
or the country of Libya.
So these folks were identified as people who fit that
billet, essentially, security official officials who
may or may not have aspirations for larger roles in
Benghazi.
* * *
Libya Shield was a brand new organization at that time
that was kind of emerging from the ranks of the
[Supreme Security Council] and from other official
organizations. They had numbers to them. What I
characterize in here was what was the most fascinating
part of the meeting to me. I was sitting with Wissam
bin Hamid and Jumaa and I forget his name al Gha'abi.
They were debating which militias they belonged to and
who was in control of them and what their ideology was
and what their ambitions were. And they weren't you
know, they disagreed on many of those things.
And one member was--one of the commanders was a member
of the other commander's brigade under that commander,
and that commander was a member of that commander's
brigade under that commander. So it was really
difficult to determine who was in charge, and I think
they right there in front of us were, you know, playing
that out, which is a great opportunity to really get a
sense of what's going on in the rest of the country.
* * *
Q: [I]t looks like it's the second to last sentence or
third to last sentence, it begins: They criticized the
[U.S. Government] for supporting National Forces
Alliance leader and prime minister candidate Mahmoud
Jibril. Do you recall what their criticism of the U.S.
Government was?
A: Yeah. So ``supporting'' is in quotations, right, and
which is a false accusation against the United States.
We don't support candidates in a foreign government's
internal domestic election. But the general perception,
because Mahmoud Jibril is an American citizen as well
as a Libyan, is that the United States Government was
backing him. He was a big political player, former
prime minister and someone who was gaining it seemed to
be at that time someone who may end up with another
very high ranking position in the Libyan Government.
That did not meet these particular militia commanders'
idea of a beneficial Libyan structure for them, and so
they were complaining about it.
Q: [Y]ou go on to write: If Jibril won, they said they
would not continue to guarantee security in Benghazi, a
critical function they asserted they were currently
providing. What was your understanding of what they
meant when they said they would not continue to
guarantee security in Benghazi?
A: Yeah, I did not take that as a threat against U.S.
interests, the U.S. compound, U.S. persons, or anything
else. I took that more as a general discussion of
Benghazi, the security situation in Benghazi is
generally deteriorating, if they at least their
assertion that the general condition in Benghazi would
deteriorate if they withdrew their security support.
Q: Did you understand what did they mean by withdrew
their security support?
A: Well, I mean, that's one of the questions I was
asking, right. What do you do? Who are you? Why are you
Libya 1? Why are you Libya 2? What's your role? How do
you fit into the security structure? And, as I said,
you know, they didn't really have a very good picture
of it themselves, so I couldn't come out with one.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\Testimony of Principal Officer 4, Foreign Service Officer, U.S.
Dep't of State, Tr. at 64-68 (May 8, 2015) (on file with the
Committee). See also, Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S.
Ambassador to Libya, to Principal Officer 4, Foreign Service Officer,
U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 10, 2012 1:51 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05395344).
The meeting underscored that the militias in Benghazi
controlled what little security environment existed there. Not
having off-compound support from a militia would significantly
threaten Stevens' safety.
Stevens' Trip to Benghazi: September 10, 2012
Stevens arrived by a commercial airplane in Benghazi on the
morning of September 10, 2012.\25\ Traveling with him were two
of the six Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to the Embassy
in Tripoli. Four Diplomatic Security Agents remained behind at
the Embassy along with four Department of Defense special
operators who had previously served as part of the Site
Security Team [SST].\26\ In addition, the special operators had
previously augmented security at the Benghazi Mission compound,
but they were no longer able to do so.\27\ Patrick F. Kennedy,
the Under Secretary for Management, State Department,
terminated the SST's responsibilities for the Embassy's
security in August of 2012.\28\ As a result, the SST was no
longer able to travel with Stevens or augment security in
Benghazi.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2, Tr. at 47 (Mar. 19, 2015)
[hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2].
\26\Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 12-14 (Apr. 11, 2013)
[hereinafter Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\27\Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 17.
\28\Id. at 20, 33-35; see also, Email from Patrick Kennedy, Under
Sec'y for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, to Robert Neller, Lieutenant
General, U.S. Dep't of Defense (July 15, 2012,) (on file with the
Committee SCB0076533).
\29\See Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 12-13.
The August 6th attack, or incident, if you will, AFRICOM
decided to draw down the SST team from 16 members to 6.
Chris concurred in that decision because he didn't really
feel like he had, you know, much leverage other than that.
And so [the Commander of the Site Security Team] and nine
other members of the team left he may have discussed this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in mid -August.
Full expectation was that when we, as the embassy, and
working with the Defense Attache, achieved the agreement of
the Libyan Government to proceed with the counterterrorism
mission under section 1208, and the training team was given
diplomatic immunity, they would return and begin the
training mission. So they left. So we have at the time,
then, six members of the SST left, divided in two different
locations, four and two. But they are still under AFRICOM
authority.
General Ham issued a letter after the negotiation in
Stuttgart over Eid al Fitr describing the relationship of
the SST to the embassy going forward. I honestly cannot
remember whether the contents of that letter are classified
or not. I know it was transmitted to us over classified
communications. But it was not Chief of Mission authority,
I can tell you that. They were not told that they were
under the authority of the Ambassador with respect to
security, although they were told to cooperate I believe it
told them to cooperate with the RSO for internal defense
matters, if I remember correctly.
In fact, during August 2012, the total number of State
Department security agents assigned to the Embassy in Tripoli
dropped from 34 individuals to six.\30\ Losing 28 security
agents reduced not only the security resources available to the
Embassy, but also those available to the Benghazi Mission
compound. With limited security agents in Tripoli, there were
no surplus security agents to send to augment security in
Benghazi--without leaving the Embassy in Tripoli at severe
risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\Id. at 13-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hicks described the impact of the reduction in personnel on
the overall security platform in Libya:
[W]hen I arrived on July 31st . . . we had the 16
members of the SST and we had about 14 or so State
security personnel, who were divided between either
special agents or MSD, members of the mobile security
detail teams.
Through August, the MSD personnel are withdrawn until,
by August 31st, . . . the security complement in Libya
at the time was: In Tripoli is an RSO plus 5 assistant
regional security officers protecting approximately 28
diplomatic personnel. And in Benghazi we have three DS
special agents protecting two State Department
personnel in our facilities.
So the answer to your question . . . we had nine people
to draw from when Chris decided you know, [Principal
Officer 4] is chosen to be Acting Principal Officer for
the first week in September. And he goes to Benghazi
and is there with three Diplomatic Security special
agents, all of whom are brand new to the service and on
temporary duty assignment.
So when Chris goes to Benghazi on the 10th of
September, [Diplomatic Security Agent 23], the RSO,
assigns two of our personnel in [Tripoli] to go with
him. [N]ow we have, on the morning of September 11th,
when [Principal Officer 4] flies back to Tripoli, we
now have five Diplomatic security special agents
protecting the Ambassador and Sean Smith. In Tripoli,
we have four we have a Regional Security Officer and
three Assistant Regional Security Officers to protect
28 diplomatic personnel.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Id.
Publicity about Stevens' trip to Benghazi was reportedly
limited. He previously told his staff and contacts on the
ground ``for security reasons we'll need to be careful about
limiting moves off-compound and scheduling as many meetings as
possible in the villa.''\32\ Stevens said he wanted to ``avoid
the RPG reception that the UK Amb[assador] got. . . .''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to
a Locally Employed Staff, U.S. Dep't of State, and Principal Officer 4,
U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 8, 2012, 4:37 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05390147).
\33\Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State, to J.
Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Aug. 1, 2012 10:49 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05390814).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon arriving in Benghazi on September 10, 2012, Stevens
received a security briefing at the nearby Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA] annex on the changing threat environment.\34\ Due
to the worsening security environment in Benghazi, the
Diplomatic Security Agents at the compound requested support
from the Annex's security team, the Global Response Staff
[GRS], to supplement Stevens' movements off-compound in
Benghazi.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 54.
\35\Id. at 59.
Q: You talked during the last hour about the
intelligence briefing that you provided to the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador the night before the attack.
What type of reaction did you get from the Ambassador
from your briefing?
A: He was interested. He took a lot of notes. It struck
me a little bit that he was surprised at how fast the
situation had deteriorated in eastern Libya.
Q: And what did he do to give you that impression that
he was surprised at how quickly----
A: He was called in to go to his next appointment
several times, and he refused to leave before we
finished.
Q: Okay, do you know who his next appointment was?
A: Yes.
Q: And what was that?
A: Benghazi City Council, I believe.
Q: Did the Ambassador ask any questions of you during
the briefing?
A: Yes, yeah, he asked a lot of questions.
Q: And what were his questions along the lines of if
you can recall?
A: Specifically about the extremist groups that
established presence in eastern Libya since the fall of
the regime.
Q: Okay, and do you recall at that time approximately
how many extremist groups there were that had
established a presence?
A: Several.
Q: Several?
A: Yes.
Q: Well, from what you can remember, what are the names
to the extent that you can remember?
A: Yes, AQIM; Al Qaeda; and Islamic Brethren; AQAP; Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; AQ Pakistan; EIJ,
Egyptian Islamic Jihad. By that time, Ansar al-Sharia
Derna had established a presence.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\Officer A, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 116-118. (Mar 2, 2016)
[hereinafter Officer A Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Later in the evening of September 10th, Stevens--with
Diplomatic Security Agents and GRS security--visited the
Benghazi Local Council. Media was present upon his arrival.\37\
One of the Diplomatic Security Agents testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 52.
Q: So, you knew prior to the council meeting that the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
press was going to show up?
A: Yes, and we tried to turn that off, but
unfortunately, we couldn't. They showed up, but we sent
them away.
Q: Okay. Were you surprised to learn that there would
be press at the council meeting?
A: I was.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\Id. at 52-53.
Stevens' visit to Benghazi therefore became public to the
extent it was not otherwise known.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens found the meeting with the Local Council fruitful,
but noted Council members seemed to feel slighted that no
sitting U.S. Ambassador had visited the city since the
revolution ended.\40\ This was a concern among the leaders in
Benghazi at the time, as they feared the Libyan Government's
control and power would remain in Tripoli as it had been during
the Qadhafi regime, thus marginalizing not just Benghazi, but
the whole of Eastern Libya. Stevens noted this concern in his
personal diary:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal
Diary, Unofficial Testimony prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al.
(Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, STATE-SCB0048881).
They're an impressive & sincere group of
professionals--proud of their service on committees,
all working as volunteers. Their main problem is a lack
of budget & authorities. Tripoli still runs the country
& its bureaucrats are an uneven quality. There was a
little sourness about why it has taken so long to get
to Benghazi, and about Ambassadors who came to talk but
don't do anything to follow up. But overall it was a
positive meeting.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\Id.
September 10 Phone Call on September 11 Preparedness
On September 10, 2012, the day Stevens arrived in Benghazi,
American military forces were reminded to ``do everything
possible to protect the American people, both at home and
abroad.''\42\ That day the President conducted a conference
call with key national security principals to discuss the steps
taken to protect U.S. persons and facilities abroad and force
protection. Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, one of the
conference call participants acknowledged they ``were already
tracking an inflammatory anti-Muslim video that was circulating
on the Internet and inciting anger across the Middle East
against the United States'' and that they ``braced for
demonstrations in Cairo and elsewhere across the region.''\43\
Due to the Arab Spring, it was a time of heightened concern for
that region in general. In particular, the discussion focused
on several areas including Cairo, Tripoli, Tunis, Khartoum, and
Sana'a, due to intelligence indicating potential demonstrations
could erupt in those areas.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\Readout of the President's Meeting with Senior Administration
Officials on Our Preparedness and Security Posture on the Eleventh
Anniversary of September 11th, dated Sept. 10, 2012.
\43\Leon E. Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War
and Peace 225 (2014).
\44\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the September 10 conference call with national
security principals and the President, the Defense Department
placed its forces on ``higher alert because of the potential
for what could happen.''\45\ Yet, the intelligence and the call
for a ``heightened alert'' did not cause any actual adjustment
in its posture for assets that could respond to a crisis in
North Africa.\46\ Some assets were in the middle of training
exercises, and others were in the middle of inspections. No
fighter jets or tankers were placed on a ``heightened alert''
status.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Id.
\46\Id. See also, letter from Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of Defense,
to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Select Committee on Benghazi, Apr. 8,
2015 (``However, it is worth noting that none of the military forces
listed above were placed on heightened alert ahead of the attacks on
Benghazi on September 11, 2012.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
Morning in Benghazi: ``Never Ending Security Threats''
The September 10 visit to Benghazi was Stevens' first since
becoming Ambassador, and the city had changed since his
departure in the fall of 2011.\47\ A growing extremist movement
had taken hold within the city limits and Stevens spent part of
September 10th being briefed on what was happening from a
security standpoint. One CIA officer described the declining
security environment in Benghazi at the time:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal
Diary, Unofficial Transcript prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al.
(Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048881).
It was a really unique and difficult environment to
operate in in eastern Libya. It was really a unique
environment. It's a country that we have not had--I
mean, as you know, it was a closed country and it was a
police state, and it's not like it's a country that we
had a ton of experience in how to operate in.
* * *
New groups are forming. New groups are dissolving.
Outside groups are interfering and starting to
establish presence. So it was an extremely dynamic and
fluid situation.
As I said, you know, we had the handicap of not having
good SIGINT coverage within the country. And that goes
back to the fact that Libya, in general, was a denied
area for a long, long time for us, and it's an area
that was very difficult to operate in.
Q: Now, [redacted text]. And I've noticed you've used
the same word three times, ``deteriorating.'' And one
would think that a post-revolutionary country probably
would be in not the greatest of positions to begin
with.
A: Right.
Q: And what you're saying is it deteriorated even from
that.
A: That's correct.
Q: And tell me why you have chosen to use that word and
what you mean by ``deteriorating''?
A: The level of armed conflict and fighting between the
various groups increased. The level of assassinations,
attacks on foreign entities increased. There were
entire towns, specifically Derna and around it, that
became very difficult to travel to; checkpoints that
were manned by individuals dressed in Afghan garb,
jihadi garb; a lot of evidence of foreign fighters
coming in from outside the country.
Specifically in June of 2012, right before the
elections, the Islamist militia had an overt show of
force, where they had a military parade roll in from
eastern Libya to downtown Benghazi. I mean, I guess it
was a message to the Libyan electorate that we are here
and we have a presence and we want to establish Islamic
State inside Libya and we want sharia to be the law of
the country. So there was, like, a lot of attempts to
intimidate the populace in Libya by these extremist
groups.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\Officer A Testimony at 147-49.
Security concerns and the anniversary of September 11 kept
Stevens on the Benghazi Mission compound for his day full of
meetings.
According to his prepared agenda Stevens had meetings with
the 17th February Brigade, the Arabian Gulf Oil Company, and
the head of the al-Marfa Shipping and Maritime Services
Company.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\Schedule for J. Christopher Stevens, Ambassador, Benghazi
Libya: September 10-14 (on file with the Committee, C05396585).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Early on the morning of September 11th, one of the
Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi was notified of an
individual dressed in a uniform typically worn by the local
police force conducting surveillance of the Mission.\50\ The
Diplomatic Security Agent in charge reported the incident to
the head security officer in country at the Embassy in Tripoli
and to staff at both the Benghazi Mission compound and the
Annex, including Stevens.\51\ The Diplomatic Security Agent
described the incident:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05271656).
\51\Id.; see also Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 104-105;
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 80.
We received word from our local guards that this
morning they observed a member of the police force
assigned to the Mission at a construction site across
the street from our main gate taking pictures of our
compound. I briefed the Ambo and provided him drafts of
letters notifying the [Libyan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs] and police. Will let you know any further
details.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\Email from a Diplomatic Sec. Agent (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:00 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05271656).
In Benghazi, the Supreme Security Council was the ``most
prominent'' official police force, ``assembled from former
members of the various militias as an interim security
measure.''\53\ It was ``designed to be an interim security
measure'' following the revolution but had not coalesced into
an established force and had little impact on the security
incidents in Benghazi.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\U.S. Dep't of State, Cable, The Guns of August: security in
eastern Libya (Aug. 8, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C055782149).
\54\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens' last meeting of the day was with the Turkish
Consul General. He escorted the Turkish diplomat to the front
gate of the compound that evening at 7:39 p.m. [1:39 p.m. in
Washington D.C.].\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi (on file with the
Committee, SCB0047843).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens' last entry in his personal journal, dated
September 11, 2012, read: ``Never ending security threats . . .
''\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Personal
Diary, Unofficial Transcript prepared by Patrick F. Kennedy, et al.
(Sept. 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048881).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Protest Begins at the U.S. Embassy in
Cairo, Egypt on September 11
In the hours preceding the attacks in Benghazi, a protest
of approximately 2,000 demonstrators assembled outside the U.S.
Embassy in Cairo, Egypt.\57\ Cairo is some 600 miles east of
Benghazi. Plans for a demonstration in Cairo first began to
coalesce in late August 2012 with the designated terrorist
organization, Jamaa Islamiya, calling upon its supporters to
protest the continued incarceration of its leader, Sheikh Omaar
abdel Rahman, also known as the ``Blind Sheik.''\58\ Rahman is
serving a life prison sentence for his role in the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing.\59\ Additionally, in the days preceding
the September 11 demonstration in Cairo, an Arabic version of a
trailer for a little known anti-Islamic film, produced in the
United States, was posted on YouTube.\60\ This trailer caught
the attention of Muslims in Egypt and calls were made on
television, in newspapers, and on social media, to protest the
denigration of the Muslim faith as depicted in the movie
trailer at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691)
(re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack).
\58\See Larry Bell, Muslim Brotherhood Fox Was Hired To Protect Our
Benghazi Consulate Henhouse, Forbes (Dec. 2, 2012), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/12/02/muslim-
brotherhood-fox-was-hired-to-protect-our-benghazi-consulate-henhouse-
interview.
\59\Id.
\60\The original trailer, in English, was posted in July 2012. See
Phil Willon and Rebecca Keegan, Timeline: ``Innocence of Muslims''
Unrest, LA Times (Sept. 13, 2012), http://
articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/12/entertainment/la-et-mn-antiislam-film-
sparks-violence-20120912.
\61\Nancy A. Youssef and Amina Ismail, Anti-U.S. outrage over video
began with Christian activist's phone call to a reporter, McClatchy
Newspapers (Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24737101.html; see also,
Email from State Department Press Office, U.S. Dep't of State, to State
Department Press Office, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 13, 2012 4:54 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05580045) (The film trailer ``had
actually been circulating at a relatively low level for some months out
there in cyberspace and that it only caught fire in the region on the
day or just before that day that we began to see these various
protests.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multiple agencies of the U.S. government were aware of the
impending demonstration in Egypt. The U.S. Embassy in Cairo
notified the State Department, coordinated with Egyptian
leaders, and ordered most of its personnel not to report to
work that day.\62\ The Department of Homeland Security issued
an intelligence report on September 10, 2012 advising that the
Cairo Embassy might be targeted as a means to call for the
release of the Blind Sheik as well as in response to an anti-
Islam film.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\See id. (``in the day or days prior to the protests that became
violent at our Embassy in Cairo, the film had been shown on Egyptian
television and was being quite heavily watched, and our social media
tracking indicated that . . . we expected it to be localized to
Egypt.'').
\63\Catherine Herridge, DHS report warned last week of call for
`burning the embassy down' in Cairo, Fox News, (Sept. 19, 2012), http:/
/www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/09/19/dhs-report-warned-last-week-call-
for-burning-embassy-down-in-cairo.print.html; see also Intel agencies
warned U.S. embassy in Egypt of possible violence over film, Al Arabiya
News (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/18/
238658.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after noon in Cairo [6 a.m. in Washington D.C.] on
September 11, 2012, the U.S. Embassy in Cairo posted a tweet
condemning those who would ``hurt the religious feelings of
Muslims.''\64\ A few hours later, demonstrators began gathering
outside the perimeter wall of the Embassy in Cairo.\65\ The
crowd of demonstrators grew to nearly 2,000 people.\66\ Armed
with spray paint, a handful of demonstrators scaled the walls,
tore down the American flag, ripped it to shreds, and replaced
it with a black militant Islamic flag.\67\ According to
Kennedy, there were no weapons shown or used during the protest
in Cairo.\68\ Within hours, the Egyptian police were able to
``move the protesters off the compound peacefully.''\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Wendy Sherman, Under Sec'y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 6:08 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05580024) (Subject: Today's Benghazi backgrounding points) (``The
statement was issued from Embassy Cairo just after noon Cairo time on
September 11, well before the incident at the Embassy.''); see also
Karen Yourish and David A. Fahrenthold, Timeline
on Libya and Egypt: Attacks and response, Wash. Post, (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/timeline-on-libya-
and-egypt-attacks-and-response/2012/09/12/85288638-fd03-11e1-a31e-
804fccb658f9_story.html?hpid=z1.
\65\Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691)
(re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack).
\66\Id.
\67\Id.
\68\Email from Legislative Mgmt. Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, to
H_Egypt, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05562234) (Subject: Write up of U/S Kennedy Call with Hill re Libya)
(``Attack in Cairo was a demonstration. There were no weapons shown or
used. A few cans of spray paint.'').
\69\Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390691)
(re: FOR SER INFO: More on Cairo Embassy Attack) (``Egyptian police did
finally move the protesters off the compound peacefully.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States Africa Command [AFRICOM] was the U.S
Combatant Command with responsibility for all of Africa, except
Egypt. Despite Egypt not being in its area of responsibility,
AFRICOM observed the Cairo protest throughout the day. Vice
Admiral Charles J. Leidig, the Deputy Commander for Military
Operations at AFRICOM, discussed AFRICOM's actions that day:
[W]e had been observing the events on that day in Cairo
and the protests, and we were concerned that those
protests would cause other protests throughout the
region, and particularly in North Africa. Even though
Egypt is not in our area of responsibility, it surely
has an affinity with the other countries that are in
Northern Africa. So we were watching that carefully.
So I actually recall staying at work until almost 1900
[7:00 p.m. in Libya] because we wanted to see if any
riots or protests would break out, and they didn't.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\Testimony of Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig, Deputy Commander
for Military Operations, U.S. Africa Command, Tr. at 25-26 (Mar. 20,
2014) [hereinafter Leidig 2014 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Despite the size of the crowd of demonstrators in Cairo and
the length of the demonstration, the protest in Cairo prompted
no change in force laydown for the forces that might respond to
unrest in North Africa. In other words, neither the President's
meeting with his Cabinet which included a discussion of the
anti-Muslim film nor the anniversary of September 11, 2001, nor
the demonstration in Cairo prompted any change in U.S. military
posture or asset readiness in the region.
The Anti-Muslim Film was a ``Nonevent'' in Libya
The protests in Cairo had little to no impact on the
Benghazi Mission compound or throughout Libya. While the anti-
Muslim film was one of the reasons protests were called for in
Egypt, it was virtually unknown in Libya. Hicks testified
regarding the reaction in Libya to the film:
Q: Was it your understanding that the Cairo protest had
been planned and called for?
A: I believe I understood that at the time.
Q: Okay. Had there been any similar protest in Libya
that were planned and called for prior to that day?
A: No there were not. And so we were interested in
monitoring all our contacts, and monitoring social
media, news outlets, to see if anything erupted in
Libya that was comparable to what was happening in
Cairo. And we wanted to do that, but we wanted to do
that as safely as possible.
* * *
Q: Okay. We have heard reports that the demonstrations
in Cairo were at least in part if not solely based on
some sort of video or film trailer that was out that
was demeaning to the Prophet Mohammed. Did you have
that understanding at the time?
A: Of the Cairo----
Q: Yes.
A: --demonstrations?
Q: Yes.
A: I think maybe I did. I'm not sure.
Q: . Were you monitoring within Libya for any type of
reaction to this film?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And how long had you been monitoring in Libya
for any type of reaction to this film?
A: I think we had begun monitoring since about
September 8th.
Q: Okay. And had you had any reaction or hits on your
monitoring?
A: Very few, if any.
Q: So it appeared to be a nonevent in the country of
Libya?
A: It was a nonevent in the country of Libya.
Q: Did you have any conversations with Ambassador
Stevens regarding the demonstrations in Cairo and the
actions that you were taking in response to that?
A: I had texted him and said, hey, are you watching TV?
Embassy Cairo is under attack.
* * *
Q: And did he respond?
A: He said, really? And I can't remember exactly what
he said, but anyway it was, what's going on? And I
said, the embassy's been breached, the flag's been
taken down, the black flag has been raised in its
place.
Q: Was that the sum total of your communication back
and forth.
A: That was the sum total of our communication.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 64-68.
One of the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi told the
Committee what happened after Stevens learned of the Cairo
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
protests:
Q: Did you hear at any point during the day at some
time about a protest in Cairo?
A: Yes. I can't remember exactly when, but I was made
aware of the protests in Cairo, and the Ambassador had
asked about it.
Q: And were you actually in a conversation with the
Ambassador?
A: I was in a conversation with the Ambassador when he
said, hey, something's going on in Cairo, and he asked
me if I would be able to find out something about it
for him.
Q: And were you able to?
A: I made some phone calls to the command center, in
D.C. but there was no other information that I received
other than that there was a protest, and they were
actually in the process of evaluating the
situation.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 82-83.
As in Tripoli, the agents in Benghazi monitored social
media for any planned or called-for demonstrations. On
September 11, there was no indication in Benghazi that any
protests over the film trailer were planned.\73\ With the film
being a virtual nonevent in Libya, the Diplomatic Security
Agents saw no reason to change their security posture that day.
One Diplomatic Security Agent recounted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\Email from Agent 5, Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State,
to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Sept. 11, 2012
1:39 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393199) (Subject: Daily
Security Update).
Q: And do you remember any conversations about whether
or not, because of what the Ambassador had been hearing
and asked you to follow-up on, or any other reasons, of
potentially changing anything about the security setup
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
for that evening?
A: No, no I--no, I can't think of any changes that we
talked about making or made based on that.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 84-85.
Evening in Benghazi
On the evening of September 11, 2012, there were a total of
seven U.S. personnel, including Stevens, on the ground at the
compound at the time of the attack.\75\ Sean P. Smith, who
prior to working for the State Department served in the United
States Air Force, was one of the U.S. personnel there. Smith
was serving as the Information Management Officer. He had been
in Benghazi on a temporary tour of duty from The Hague for 30
days. He arrived on September 1 and his role was to run the
administrative component of the Mission. The other five U.S.
personnel at the compound that evening included the two
Diplomatic Security Agents who travelled with Stevens from
Tripoli to Benghazi, and the three Diplomatic Security Agents
assigned to Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens' last event of the day was a meeting with the
Turkish Consul General, [redacted text]. The Consul General
departed at 7:39 p.m. local time, and four British security
team members departed at 8:27 p.m.\76\ No other visitors were
on the Mission compound that night. There was no evidence of
any group assembled outside the Mission compound gate: large,
small, peaceful or otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 1940 and
2027, respectively).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THERE WAS NO PROTEST
All five Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground that
night in Benghazi were consistent in their testimony--before
the attack began, there was no protest.
One agent testified:
Q: So the intelligence in and around Benghazi was that
there was no planned protest?
A: I did not hear of a planned protest, no.
Q: No one communicated that to you.
A: No, I did not hear that.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr.
at 50-51 (Mar. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another agent testified:
Q: Do you recall at any time during the day seeing any
type of crowd form outside of the mission compound.
A: Other than?
Q: Other than normal activity that would have occurred
in Benghazi, just people coming and going.
A: So other than the attack and the attackers, no.
Q: Okay. So there was no protest, to the best of your
knowledge, the day of the attack.
A: Not to my knowledge.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 123-124.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet another agent testified:
Q: From your perspective, had there been a protest?
A: No. There was nothing out there up until, well, up
until there was. I had been out of the gate at 8:30
that night. We had had personnel leaving the compound,
and they drove away from our compound and didn't report
anything, and I spoke with them subsequently, there was
nothing out there.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 31-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A fourth agent testified:
Q: Prior to the attack occurred [sic], did you hear
anything on the outside, such as chanting or any type
of sounds [that] would be a protest?
A: No, I never heard any sort of chanting or protest or
anything.
Q: Would it then be an accurate description to describe
the attack as a sort of stealth attack?
A: It was very sudden. As I had mentioned, conditions
immediately before the only warning that I had that
something was amiss was that--kind of that cry that I
heard at assault on the main gate.
Q: So it was very sudden. And the first attackers that
you saw enter, were they armed?
A: Yes.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr.
at 144 (Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fifth agent testified:
Q: If there had been something about a planned protest
in Benghazi, would that be the type of information that
you would have been interested in?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you recall any such information?
A: No.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr.
at 105 (Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
Hicks was asked ``if there was . . . a protest [outside the
facility], would that have been reported?''\82\ In his view:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 81.
[A]bsolutely, I mean, we're talking about both security
officers who know their trade, even though they are
brand new, and one of the finest political officers in
the history of the Foreign Service. You know, for there
to have been a demonstration on Chris Stevens' front
door and him not to have reported it is unbelievable.
And secondly, if he had reported it, he would have been
out the back door within minutes of any demonstration
appearing anywhere near that facility. And there was a
back gate to the facility, and, you know, it
worked.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\Id. at 81-82.
THE MISSION'S EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
The Mission's emergency action plan relied on the
Diplomatic Security Agents as well as the two contracted
internal security support entities: The Blue Mountain Guard
Force and the February 17 Martyrs Brigade. The Blue Mountain
Guard Force consisted of unarmed guards whose primary role was
static surveillance of the three entrance gates as well as the
interior of the compound. These guards had access to an alarm
should any danger present itself. According to one Diplomatic
Security Agent:
The primary purpose of a local guard force is to man
the perimeter and the gates in order to delay and deter
potential security risks and to afford us additional
notice . . . if there were to be a security risk. In
addition, they were in charge of access control, so
screening people as they were coming in the compound,
screening vehicles as there were coming in the
compound.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 16.
The February 17 Martyrs Brigade consisted of a rotating set
of three to four armed guards who lived on compound to operate
as a quick reaction force to respond to any security incidents
against the Mission. Their role was to augment security
provided by the Diplomatic Security Agents. In addition, the
February 17 Martyrs Brigade was supposed to send additional
armed guards if an event occurred at the Mission compound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to one Diplomatic Security Agent:
Q: And [how] did their role and responsibility differ
from the local guard force [Blue Mountain Group]?
A: Well, they were armed primarily. But really what we
counted on them to do was make a phone call to the 17th
February Martyrs Brigade so that we could receive
backup in case something happened.
Q: Okay. So you were aware that they had a larger
contingent of people that was to be available to----
A: Right. Right.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 22.
One Diplomatic Security Agent provided a description of the
emergency action plan at the compound and how the local guards
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
were expected to supplement this plan:
The reaction plan, whether it was something small on
the first or something larger ultimately on the 11th or
12th, and this is the plan that we actually followed,
but the reaction plan is to shelter in place. That you
would take the principal officers, you secure them in
Villa C. The agent or whoever was in the [Tactical
Operations Center] building would go operate the
communications and reach out to the security elements
that were supposed to react.
The security elements that were supposed to react
includes the local guard is supposed to just give us an
alert, a heads up of what's going on. The three to four
[February17 Martyrs Brigade] members that live on the
compound are supposed to take an active role in our
internal defense; additionally, the 20 person [February
17 Martyrs Brigade] with heavy weapons and heavy
vehicles 2 kilometers away that had responded in the
past and were expected to respond to any event that
necessitated them in the future. The security element
encompassing other Americans was part of the react plan
as well to support the [February 17 Martyrs Brigade]
elements that were going to come as well.
So we're talking almost 30 armed personnel where
arrangements were made for them to respond to our
location, and had done so in training and in actuality
in past events. So whether the attack had happened--
whether something had happened on the first, and it
didn't, although we had somebody armed armed personnel
on the roof all night, a rotating presence, or
something that did happen on the 11th or 12th, the
expectations were for these elements to respond as they
had done in the past.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 46-47 (for additional
details on the reaction plans); see also Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4
Testimony at 20 and 82, and Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 88 and
90.
The unarmed Blue Mountain Guard Force was fully staffed the
evening of September 11, 2012, with five guards. Two of those
guards were assigned to the main entrance of the Benghazi
Mission compound.\87\ Three of the four armed February 17
Martyrs Brigade guards were at the compound at the time of the
attack. One of the guards left early for a reported ``family
obligation'' with no replacement. The three remaining guards
were within the vicinity of the main gate just prior to the
attack.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\Letter from U.S. Dep't of State to Blue Mountain Group (Feb.
17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05395135) (Subject: Notice of
Contract Award Contract No. SAQMMA-12-C-0092 Local Guard Services
Benghazi, Libya).
\88\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALL IS QUIET AT THE FRONT GATE
The Diplomatic Security Agents at the compound did not
observe any activity at the main gate during the hour leading
up to the attack.\89\ The only movement of note was the arrival
of a local police vehicle at the main gate at approximately
9:02 p.m. [3:02 p.m. in Washington D.C.].\90\ According to one
of the Diplomatic Security Agents, the one security component
consistently lacking at the compound on a regular basis ``was
the police support on the exterior of the compound.''\91\ On
September 6, 2012, in the lead-up to Stevens' visit, the
Mission requested the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs
provide one vehicle at each gate of the Mission ``round the
clock (24 hours/day) from Sept 10, 2012 to September 15, 2012''
to supplement security during Stevens' visit.\92\ As the
morning began on September 11, no police vehicle was located at
any of the compound gates.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 127; see also Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 113-114; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at
85; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 36 (``We did have visibility
issues, especially at night with our CCTV system. For that reason one
of the efforts that I tried to lead was having the ESO, Engineering
Sec. Office, come out to install new CCTV cameras that we had received.
Unfortunately, it wasn't to be. They were scheduled to arrive I believe
the week after the attack.'').
\90\DVR: Footage of the Mission. (Sept. 11, 2012).
\91\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 109.
\92\U.S. Dep't of State, Diplomatic Note #59 prepared for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dir. of Gen.
Protocol Dep't Branch, Benghazi Office (Sept. 6, 2012) (on file with
the Committee, C05389670).
\93\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 7.
Q: Who was--what was your understanding of who the SSC
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
was?
A: The Supreme Security Council. I knew that it was a
pseudo militia/police force/military elements, of,
again, different militia groups.
Q: And do you know what the request had been for
increased security?
A: For at least two vehicles, I believe at each gate.
Q: And how--had that request been granted?
A: They told me the request went in. I don't know
specifics of whether it was granted. The first day
[September 10] I do remember two vehicles outside,
though.
Q: And did they express to you any concerns about the
status of their request, that it hadn't been granted
and that had caused concern for them?
A: That day, no, but the next day, there were--two
vehicles weren't on--on stations, at the mission, so
yeah, that was a concern.
Q: Okay. So that would have been on 9/11----
A: Yes.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\Id.
That evening, however, a vehicle arrived outside of the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission compound's front gate at 9:02 p.m.
WARNINGS AND INDICATORS PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS
Shortly before the attacks began, a [redacted text]
extremist indicated [redacted text] on their way to attack the
[Mission compound's front gate] in Benghazi.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee also found evidence that a former TNC
security official also claimed he attempted to pass threat
information directly to the CIA Benghazi Annex prior to the
attack. A few days after the attacks, on September 15, 2012,
the [redacted text]\96\ [redacted text]\97\ [redacted text]\98\
[redacted text] the former TNC official tried to relay the
information to the Director of the Libyan Intelligence Service
and his assistant, who were both out of the country. [Redacted
text].''\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\[Redacted text].
\97\Id.
\98\Id.
\99\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Redacted text], however--but what the Committee has
uncovered and verified--was the former TNC security official
also claimed he attempted to pass this threat information
directly to the CIA Benghazi Annex prior to the attack. This
claim was acknowledged by both the Chief of Base in Benghazi
and another CIA officer:\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\Officer A Testimony at 100; see also, Testimony of Chief of
Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 130 (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Chief of Base Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the attacks, [redacted text]\101\ [redacted
text]\102\ [redacted text].\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Officer A Testimony at 57, 59-60.
\102\Officer A Testimony at 85.
\103\See Officer A Testimony at 86. But see, Chief of Base
Testimony at 139 ([redacted text].'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Redacted text], the CIA was unable to confirm whether or
not the former TNC security official's claim is true. A
[redacted text]\104\ [redacted text]\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\Officer A Testimony at 63-64.
\105\Id. at 64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CIA also reviewed [redacted text]\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\Attestation regarding [redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A third person also claimed he tried to contact the U.S.
government prior to the attack. A Libyan Special Advisor on
Security ``claimed he had tried to warn the U.S. government of
the potential for an attack on the Consulate prior to the
attack taking place.''\107\ This individual ``left Libya
immediately after the attack'' and ``was afraid of potential
threats against him, based in part on his assumption that there
were documents in the Consulate likely found by the attackers,
that they might interpret as him sympathizing with the U.S.
Government.''\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\See Email to [Tripoli Station], Sept. 21, 2012 [REQUEST
1000790 to REQUEST 1000795].
\108\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE FIRST ATTACK ON THE BENGHAZI MISSION BEGINS
At 9:42 p.m., the Libyan police vehicle at the front gate
of the Benghazi Mission compound rapidly departed at the same
time attackers advanced toward the main entrance.\109\ Prior to
that, the Libyan police did not warn the Diplomatic Security
Agents at the compound, the unarmed Blue Mountain Guards, or
the armed February 17 Martyrs Brigade members of the surging
attackers or of their own departure.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 at 140 (``I can say within 30 seconds
to a minute, before the attack started the single police car that was
out there was a truck and it departed the scene.''); see also, DVR
Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:42 PM).
\110\Id. at 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the police vehicle fled, dozens of armed men rushed the
compound and an explosion occurred near the main gate.\111\ It
was the beginning of what would be not one, but several attacks
on the Benghazi Mission compound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 144. See also,
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 at 85-86; DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11,
2012, 2142.53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agents recalled first hearing
taunts and chants when the attackers rushed the compound and
then a loud explosion. They knew they were in imminent danger.
According to one Diplomatic Security Agent:
Q: And how did you find out about the attack?
A: I heard a loud explosion and chanting outside.
Q: When you say chanting, what would be----
A: Yelling, screaming.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 55.
Attackers quickly breached the main gate pouring onto the
compound.\113\ One Diplomatic Security Agent described his
reaction:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2143.50).
I see the men on the compound. I immediately picked up
the PA system, and I say, attention on compound,
attention on compound, this is not a drill. Repeat,
this is not a drill.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 137.
The Diplomatic Security Agent immediately activated the
alarm in accordance with the Compound's Emergency Action Plan
calling for shelter in place.\115\ He stated: ``The react plan
is exactly what happened: shelter in place, contact your
support elements, and wait for their arrival.''\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Id.
\116\Id. at 142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the alarm was sounding, two unarmed Blue Mountain Guards
fled through the main gate.\117\ Immediately upon the initial
breach of the main gate, the attackers were engaged briefly by
gunfire by one or more February 17 Martyrs Brigade guards.
According to one Diplomatic Security Agent, one of the guards
was shot during this engagement:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2142).
At least one of them got shot. One of the local guards
at least one, if not two, of the local guards were
shot, as well, in the process. It was as this group
moved from building to building and we sheltered per
our react plan.\118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147.
With minimal resistance at the main entrance, the attackers
quickly pushed onto the compound and cornered the armed
February 17 Martyrs Brigade guards inside their barracks and
set fire to the barracks.\119\ The guards incurred no
fatalities that evening. Besides the initial exchange of
gunfire at the main entrance, no additional gunfire was
directed toward the attackers on the compound prior to the end
of the first wave of attacks at the Benghazi Mission compound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the alarm was initiated, the Diplomatic Security
Agent in the Tactical Operations Center [TOC] immediately
called the GRS personnel at the Annex, located approximately
one mile from the Benghazi Mission compound.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\Id. at 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agents were able to establish an
open line of communication through a shared radio [redacted
text] with the Annex during the attack allowing the two
locations to have continuous communication.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, another Diplomatic Security Agent
relocated to the TOC and tried to call the 17th February guards
on the Mission compound for help.\122\ After this attempt
failed, the Diplomatic Security Agent called the Annex compound
and asked them to contact the headquarters of the February 17
Martyrs Brigade to request support.\123\ The Diplomatic
Security Agent also called the Libyan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for support.\124\ The agents in the TOC then notified
the lead security officer in Tripoli.\125\ One Diplomatic
Security Agent described their actions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 129.
\123\Id.
\124\Id. at 148; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141.
\125\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; see also, Email to
Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:07 AM).
(Subject: Re: Log of events on 9/11/12-9/12/12) (on file with the
Committee, SCB00472640).
So we are in the TOC office. The other agent and I
began to make our calls. I notify the second American
compound via radio. The other agent notifies the
February 17 Martyrs Brigade members. And then I
subsequently notify Tripoli, who subsequently notifies
D.C.; it is either State ops or the command center. We
basically have an open line via radio with the other
Americans at the second compound. And I keep Tripoli on
speakerphone almost the whole time as we are working
through and relaying what is going on.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 4 Testimony at 128-29.
Meanwhile, Stevens, Smith, and one Diplomatic Security
Agent retreated to the safe haven of Villa C, a dedicated area
within the Villa that was reinforced with a metal barred-
door.\127\ The Diplomatic Security Agent who was with Stevens
and Smith described what happened:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141; see also Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 114.
I remember hearing the chants. I mean, they were fairly
close already. I mean, yelling distance, which is
pretty close especially in a city setting. So my
impression is that I don't have much time. So I ran
right to my room, you know, put my helmet on, put my
vest on, grabbed my weapons, my additional weapons, and
I turned to lock the gate, and basically, it was a jail
cell door with three locks on it. I locked all three
locks. And at about that time Ambassador Stevens and
Sean Smith were coming out to their rooms. Sean Smith
was already, you know, donning his helmet and vest. I
guided them both into the safe haven, and set myself up
in the safe haven with--I was holding my M4.''\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 114.
Two other Diplomatic Security Agents attempted to ``go back
to Villa C to also provide protection for Stevens, but not to
shoot at this large group.''\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agents in Villa B attempted to go to Villa C, but they
were met with a very large hostile force of 7 to 10 attackers
with ``AKs and RPGs.''\130\ The two agents made the tactical
decision not to shoot at this large group because, ``if we
would have taken one of them out at the time, it could have
gone substantially worse.''\131\ The Agents believed the
attackers would have been ``out for blood'' and it would have
inflamed an already bad situation.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 58.
\131\Id.
\132\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of this concern, the agents chose to return to
Villa B, which also served as the cantina or cafeteria for the
Mission compound.\133\ After seeking refuge, one of the agents
in Villa B then contacted the TOC in Tripoli and the other
agent contacted the State Department's Diplomatic Security
Command Center [DSCC] in Washington D.C. at 9:49 p.m. Benghazi
time [3:49 p.m. in Washington, DC].\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\Id. at 141-142.
\134\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 86; see also, Email from
the Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. to the Special Assistants for the
Secretary, et al. (page 1) (Subject: Benghazi--Attack on Compound--
09112012) (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:34 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05578314).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unknown to the Diplomatic Security Agents on the Mission
compound, the attackers were a mix of local extremist groups,
including the Benghazi-based Ansar al-Sharia, al-Qaeda in the
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, and the Muhammad Jamal Network
out of Egypt. Members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-
Qaeda in Iraq and Abu Ubaydah Ibn Jarah Battalion also
participated.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\The Committee found no evidence of involvement by the Iranian
government, specifically the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force
(IRGC-QF) as has been reported. Email from the State Department
Operations Center (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:06 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05272001). At the time, there were two Ansar al-Sharia
(AAS) branches in Libya, the one in Benghazi that was involved in the
attack, and one in Darnah that was led by former Guantanamo detainee
Abu Sufyian bin Qumo. There is no evidence that Qumo had any direct
involvement in the attacks on the Mission or the Annex on 11 and 12
September 2012. See Terrorist Attack in Benghazi: The Secretary of
State's View, hearing before H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong.
35 (2013). The other Ansar al-Sharia, the Abu Ubaydah Ibn Jarah
Battalion, was led at the time by Ahmed Abu Khattalah, the lone person
charged in connection with the attack. NCTC: Libya: Terrorists and
Extremists Reportedly Associates with the Benghazi Attacks (Sept 9,
2013); NCTC Current: Libya: Update on Benghazi Suspects (Sept. 11,
2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated
with the Benghazi Attacks (Jan 28, 2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists
and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks (Feb 26,
2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated
with the Benghazi Attacks (Aug. 12, 2013); CIA WIRe: Libya: Terrorists
and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi Attacks (Sept.
9, 2013); CIA WIRe Libya: Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly
Associated with the Benghazi Attacks, (Mar. 24, 2014); CIA WIRe: Libya:
Terrorists and Extremists Reportedly Associated with the Benghazi
Attacks (July 24, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agent located in the safe haven
with Stevens and Smith described the weapons he saw during a
direct encounter with the attackers:
I could hear outside explosions, yelling, chanting,
screaming, gunfire, and I reported all of this on the
radio just saying, this is what my senses are telling
me. Then people started banging on the doors of the
building, so I reported that. Hey, there is banging on
the doors. They are trying to come in, you know, we
need immediate assistance. And there wasn't any
response on the radio. Shortly after that, to my
recollection, the doors were blown open. And about 70
individuals, you know, rushed into the building, all of
them carrying AK-47s, grenades, RPGs, you know, a
mixture throughout everyone.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 115.
The attackers were unable to gain access to the safe haven
because the access point had been fortified by the Diplomatic
Security Agent inside. Instead the attackers started a diesel
fire just outside the safe haven at approximately 10 p.m.\137\
At that time, the agents in the TOC reported to the Diplomatic
Security Command Center that Stevens and Smith were located in
the safe room.\138\ Meanwhile, notice of the attack was
disseminated in Washington D.C. at 4:05 p.m. [10:05 p.m. in
Benghazi] through an ``Ops Alert'' by the State Department
Operations Center, which notified senior Department officials,
the White House Situation Room, and others the Benghazi Mission
compound was under attack.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2202.07 and
2202.25, respectively).
\138\U.S. Dep't of State, DSCC's Timeline for Benghazi and Tripoli
Events [hereinafter DSCC Timeline] (on file with the Committee,
C05391498) (``Ambassador Stevens, who is currently in Benghazi, and for
[sic] COM personnel are in the compound safe room.'').
\139\Email from the State Department Operations Center (Sept. 11,
2012, 4:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05272001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As news of the attack spread in Washington D.C., Villa C,
the main diplomatic building, was quickly engrossed in flames
and heavy smoke.\140\ Within minutes, Diplomatic Security
Agents reported to the lead security agent in Tripoli that
contact with Stevens had been lost.\141\ A Diplomatic Security
Agent described what happened next inside the Villa:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2201-2207); see
also, Email to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 14,
2012, 8:07 AM). (Subject: Re: Log of events on 9/11/12-
9/12/12) (on file with the Committee, SCB00472640).
\141\Email to Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 14,
2012, 8:07 AM). (Subject: Re: Log of events on 9/11/12-9/12/12) (on
file with the Committee, SCB00472640).
And then slowly, people started to kind of trickle out.
And then the lights started to kind of dim. My initial
response or my initial thought was, well, they just
knocked out the generators. You know, we have regular
city power, but we also have backup generators. So
flickering would be a likely, you know, cause of this.
But in reality, it was smoke. And it took me about, you
know, 2 or 3 seconds after that to determine that it
was smoke. As soon as I realized it was smoke, I turned
to the Ambassador and Sean Smith and I said, we are
moving to the bathroom.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117.
As Villa C filled with smoke, the two Diplomatic Security
Agents in the TOC also realized it was on fire:\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 131-132.
Q: At what point did you notice that there was also--
buildings had been put on fire, and how did that come
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to your attention?
A: Well, as--it seemed like a long time. Of course, I
can't say exactly how much time elapsed between when we
began our call for help and to when help finally
arrived. I can't say certainly. But monitoring what was
going on on the ground via the security cameras, I
could see that Villa C--I could see flames starting to
lick out of the windows and black smoke started to pour
out of the windows, and that's when I became aware that
they were in very big trouble over there.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\Id.
The Diplomatic Security Agent inside Villa C with Stevens
and Smith attempted to lead them to the bathroom in the safe
haven.\145\ Once in the bathroom he realized Stevens and Smith
had not followed him. Due to the thick toxic smoke, he was
unable to see them and did not hear a response from them when
he called out.\146\ Because of the flames, the agent became
weak and overcome with smoke and heat. He left the bathroom and
crawled to his bedroom where he eventually escaped through a
window. After catching his breath, over and over again he
crawled back through the bedroom window of Villa C to search
for Stevens and Smith.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117.
\146\Id. at 114; see also, Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at
147; Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi, produced by the U.S.
Dep't of State (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0047845); Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 25-26.
\147\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 117-120.
The last time I went out, you know, I decided that if I
went back into the building that I wasn't going to come
back out. The smoke and the heat were way too powerful,
and way too strong, and it was extremely confusing
feeling my way in a smoke-filled building. And I didn't
want to get lost, and so I decided to climb up the
ladder to the roof. I climbed up the ladder, and pulled
up the ladder behind me and that's the moment that I
knew the Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith were
probably dead.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 121.
As the agent retreated to the rooftop of Villa C, he began
taking gunfire.\149\ At 10:14 p.m. [4:14 p.m. in Washington
D.C.], he reported to the agent located in the TOC that Stevens
and Smith were missing and unaccounted for.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\Id. at 122; see also, Comprehensive Timeline of Events--
Benghazi, produced by the U.S. Dep't of State (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012)
(on file with the Committee, SCB0047845).
\150\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some of the attackers were trying to break into Villa
C's safe haven, other attackers broke through Villa B's main
door.\151\ The attackers were unable to gain access to the
Diplomatic Security Agents and local guard seeking refuge in
the back because they had successfully barricaded the
doors.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 61-62.
\152\Id.
Q: So you said that the attackers who tried to come
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
into the room were unsuccessful?
A: Yes, they tried to breach it one time.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE MISSION CALLS THE ANNEX FOR SUPPORT
When the attack started at 9:42 p.m. [3:42 p.m. in
Washington D.C.], the Diplomatic Security Agent in the TOC
immediately called the Annex for backup.\154\ The agent
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 141.
Several requests were made. Unbeknownst to us at the
time, the situation outside our compound was hostile.
Apparently the militia that attacked us had set up
heavy gun trucks on all four corners of the block we
were on, had prohibited traffic from entering from any
location, and it was difficult for the reaction forces
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to get to us.
I can't tell you exactly when they arrived on compound.
It is my assessment that it was approximately an hour
and 5 minutes after. So if the attack started at 9:42,
I don't think we see them on compound until 10:00,
10:45, 10:50, something along those lines.
Now, it is my understanding that they fought their way
in, and they ultimately split up into two groups, one
of which literally fought their way in and climbed
blocks and blocks of 10 to 12 foot high concrete walls,
as well as the secondary group, who rallied with some
February 17 Martyrs Brigade elements to come in through
a different approach angle.
So it was not as if they literally could have just
walked across the street and walked in. The compound
was overtaken, it was overrun. And it is my
understanding it wasn't as simple as what it would have
seemed on the surface.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\Id. at 143-44.
Once the request for assistance was made to the Annex, the
security team there immediately began packing up and preparing
to respond.
The GRS Team Lead described what happened after the
Diplomatic Security Agent called and requested their help.
[A]pproximately 20 [minutes] to 10:00 [p.m.], I got a
cell phone call on my phone from one of the ARSOs,
State Department Regional Security Officers.
Give or take a few minutes or whatever it was, I'd get
that phone call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3], and
he's obviously a bit worked up, and he says: Hey, we're
under attack. And he tells me he's sitting in the TOC,
their Tactical Operations Center, which is a separate
building at the facility. And he says: I can see
approximately 20 guys have come through the front gate,
they are armed, and they are amassing on the soccer
field, which is, you know, just in front of their--one
of the living quarters buildings.
And I said: Okay. Gotcha. I said: Look, do me a favor,
before you hang up or before I lose you on the cell
phone network--we had previously given them one of our
secure [redacted text] radios. I said: Pick up that
radio in the TOC and just start giving me a play by
play, just keep transmitting, and you know, once you
get that radio, hang up the phone, and you know, we'll
deal with it.
So once he hung up, I called--I made a radio call to
all the guys, the GRS guys to return to the team room,
and then, you know, within a few minutes guys start
trickling in. Some guys kind of, you know--you know,
it's in the evening, so some guys in shorts and T-
shirt, other guys, you know, clearly just, you know,
thrown pants, T-shirt or whatever on, you know, just
asking: Hey, what's going on? Hey, I don't know. I
don't have a lot of specifics other than I just got a
call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3]. He said the
facility is under attack. So at that point, you know, I
don't need to tell anybody what to do. As the guys
trickle in, it's, you know, word of mouth, hey, start,
you know, gathering gear, start getting your kit, you
know, your helmet, night vision gear, ballistic armor,
you know, weapons, all that good stuff.
And you know, shortly thereafter, the deputy chief of
base walks in, and he says: Hey, what's going on. I
heard you say call the guys to the team room. I said:
Hey, Chief, not exactly sure, but the State facility, I
just got a call and they're under attack.
And he asked me, he said: Well, did you tell chief of
base yet?
I said: No, I'm just getting--he said: All right. Don't
worry about it. I'll go tell him.
So we continue to kit up. The guys, you know, are doing
their thing, start bringing our heavier weapons,
equipment out to the car. We get the linguist, kind of
get him--you know, get him some body armor, get him a
helmet, and you know, kind of give him a quick brief.
We kind of gravitate out to the vehicles.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\Testimony of GRS-Team Lead, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 20-23
(Apr. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Team Lead Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
Once the Chief of Base was alerted, he met with the Team
Lead and the Deputy Chief of Base to determine if they had
received any additional information about what was happening at
the Mission. The Chief of Base then began calling partner
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
militia organizations for assistance.
So he starts working phones. I can hear him. You know,
sometimes he's able to get through to people, and you
know, I remember one conversation where he's given a
quick data dump, and the guys says: All right. Hey, you
know, call me back in 2 minutes.
So when he hangs up, he says: Hey, while--you know, I
don't remember who he said it was, but while that
person is making some phone calls, I'm going to call,
you know, the other guy and just--you know, I said:
Hey, look, Chief, what we want is technicals. So what
we want is, you know, the trucks with bigger guns than
what we have because I don't know what we're going
into. So whether it be Dishka-type weapons or some type
of heavy machine gun mounted on a truck, that's what I
definitely want.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\Id. at 23-24.
While the Chief of Base was trying to generate assistance
for the Annex team, the team members finished loading up their
gear into two vehicles. The Team Lead was standing outside of
the vehicles while the Chief of Base contacted their partner
organizations. Meanwhile, the Annex team members became anxious
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to depart.
So while this is going on, one of my--like I said, the
guys there are pretty much just kind of wrapping up,
getting, you know, the ammo, and you know, first aid
kits, all that stuff, and then they're basically
standing by loading in front of the building. And one
of the officers, my officers comes out, and he says:
Hey, look, you know, we got to get going. We got to go.
We got to go.
I said: Yeah, I know that, but I don't know what we're
getting into, and the chief's trying to make some phone
calls. I want to get some technicals to go with us
because I don't know what we're--what we're going to
get into.
* * *
So he goes back into the car. Chief continues to, you
know, work the phones. He makes contact with maybe
another two or three guys, and then he circles back
with that first person he made the phone call to, and
the phone is shut off. And he tells me: Hey, it's not
going through. It's shut off. I said: All right. Can
you try the other guys back?
So he proceeds to, you know, try to make follow up
phone calls. You know, [one Team Member] pops out
again, and he's like, hey, we got to go, we got to go,
and at that point Chief is like, hey. Yeah, I know. I'm
just trying--like, hang on. I'm trying to make some--
we're trying to get the technicals. We're trying to,
you know, get you guys some weapons.
* * *
And then one of the other officers,[] came out. He's
like, hey, you know, what do we got? I said: Look,
Chief's trying to make phone calls. I really want to
get some technicals.
* * *
So at some point, you know, whatever, couple of
minutes, it becomes kind of clear that there's nothing
readily coming, or there's--like Chief isn't making
positive coms with anybody who's saying, hey, I've got,
you know, two, three, four, five technicals, they're
going to meet you at whatever location. That's not
happening. So I tell the chief, I say: Hey, Chief,
look, we're going.
And to be honest with you, I don't recall Chief saying
anything. Deputy chief, you know, kind of looks at me,
and he's like, well, he's like, you know, [GRS-Team
Lead], God speed, hopefully we'll see you guys back
here shortly.
So at that point, we roll out. I can tell you between,
you know, the time stamp on our CCTV, like I said
roughly, I think my phone call came at like 21:43,
depending on what timestamp you look at, we roll out at
like 22:04, so 21, 23, 24 minutes, whatever.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\Id. at 24-26.
The Chief of Base described his actions after he learned
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
about the attacks.
I was calling everybody I could think of. I think I
called the police, LIS, other militia groups that--we
were, you know, in an information-gathering mode, and
trying to see who might be able to respond quickly to
the Consulate, to the mission.
Q: How much success were you having in actually getting
through to people at the police, at Libyan intel with
other militias?
A: I didn't get through to Libyan intel, I don't think.
They weren't actually very helpful to us in Benghazi at
all.
Q: Okay.
A: But otherwise, I was getting through to the people.
Q: Okay. And what kind of response were you getting on
the other end?
A: Well, there was a lot of disbelief and confusion,
and trying to understand what was happening, what--
basically, it was, as what you might, expect when
something like that happens.\159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\Testimony of the Chief of Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
24-25 (Nov. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Base Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
Despite multiple attempts, the Chief of Base found his
phone calls unfruitful. He was unable to generate any
additional assistance from the partner organizations he called.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He described his conversations with the organizations.
A: Well, there was a lot of disbelief and confusion,
and trying to understand what was happening, what--
basically, it was, as you might, expect when something
like that happens.
Q: Did you hear anything that would give you any pause
or reason for concern?
A: Well, I was already concerned, to be honest with
you. I mean, you know, we could hear the gunfire. There
were even some tracer bullets flying overhead so we
were, again, I was trying to get as much information as
possible.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\Id. at 25.
The Chief of Base described what happened after the Annex
team members finished loading their gear and were ready to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
depart.
Q: So at some point, the GRS folks were kitted up, and
what happened at that point that you can recall? Do you
recall seeing them all kitted up?
A: I was standing right in the area that they were
getting their stuff. It took them, I would say, about
15 minutes to get ready. It was a very--to me, the time
passed by very quickly.
And people were going to CONEXes and getting ammunition
and water, and getting batteries and MPGs and such. At
one point, [the Team Lead] came to me, I would say
maybe 15 minutes into it and said that he wanted to see
if I could arrange a technical, or a gun truck, from
17th February. So I called back to 17th February and
was working on getting that gun truck. So I was in
contact with [the Team Lead].\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\Id. at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Well, their response was, okay, but I don't have one,
or it's going to be difficult. I have got to check. It
was--it was not like immediately we are going to be
able to--the person who I was talking to, who was one
of their commanders whose name I don't remember.
Q: And did you relay that back to [the Team Lead]?
A: Yes.
Q: What was his response?
A: That's when they left to go on the rescue.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\Id. at 29.
The Chief of Base was adamant that he never told the Annex
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
team members to ``stand down.''
You said that you let them go. Did you give them an
affirmative order for them to go?
A: I think I was working with [the Team Lead] the whole
time----
Q: Okay.
A: --in an effort to get them to get them gone, to have
them go. So whether or not I gave an affirmative order,
but I wanted them to go. They were cleared to go. And
they went.
Q: When you say they were cleared to go, is that you
giving the clearance?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you have any discussions--do you recall having
any discussions with the deputy chief of base about
allowing the guys to go?
A: I don't recall any. It was never--I never had any
doubt about the GRS people going to the State
Department compound. I had great concerns and great
worry about it but I did not, I did not tell anybody to
stand down.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\Id. at 31-32.
The Chief of Base acknowledged he may have told the team to
wait while he was attempting to secure additional resources for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
them.
I may have said wait because we were trying to get this
technical truck that the team lead wanted. But it wasn't 10
minutes, or 5 minutes. It was a short period of time. And the
only time I remember ever talking to [Annex team member] was
when he came up, and I said I'm trying to get a technical truck
for [the Team Lead]. There was nobody, myself or anybody else
in Benghazi, that did anything to hold up the GRS deploying.
The team lead was always cleared to go.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\Id. at 58-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He further added:
People were coming and going the entire time. But I did
not issue a stand-down order. And if there was a delay,
there was a very short delay, basically the team lead
we have to try to get this gun truck.
* * *
I was doing everything, and to my knowledge, everybody
on that base was doing everything. I think I carried an
ammo can at one time to get those guys out the door.
So it's, you know, our GRS folks were very brave that
night. But I, everything that I saw from during the
kitting up of the team, to their departure till their
return and heard in between, very much [the Team Lead]
was in charge of it. Listening to the radio, he was in
charge of it. So when [the Team Lead] was satisfied, I
think, that we weren't going to get the support that
we--that he wanted to get this gun truck to try to link
it up--although I think they did link up at some
point--that he left. He took the team and left.\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\Id. at 59-60.
One GRS agent did not recall the Chief of Base telling the
team to ``stand down'' but he did recall the Chief of Base
telling them to ``wait.''\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\Testimony of GRS 3, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 52 (May 29,
2015) [hereinafter GRS 3 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q: And what did you think when he told you to wait?
A: I believe at first I just said, okay, maybe he's
talking to somebody that can help, and, you know, I
respected the fact that he wanted us to wait and see if
he can gather additional fire power to help. At some
point, though, the wait was too long, and we decided,
you know, we couldn't wait any longer and we left. We
didn't know if that wait was going to be an indefinite
wait and you're-not-going wait or a real wait or--but
nothing was happening for several minutes.
And so we can hear the State Department's cries for
help on the radio, and we just reached a point where we
decided to leave on our own.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\Id. at 50.
The agent also acknowledged during the time the team was
``kitting up'' and after they loaded into the vehicles, the
Chief of Base and the Team Lead attempted to obtain additional
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
support from the Libyan partner organizations.
Q: When you said nothing happened--nothing was
happening for several minutes, you're referring to what
exactly? There were individuals on the phone?
A: Yes.
Q: So that was occurring, but for your purposes----
A: For our purposes, we were getting in and out of the
vehicles, ready to go. We were just waiting for someone
to say go. My understanding is they were trying to get
us to link up with 17 Feb or have 17 Feb go there
first, something to do with 17 Feb helping out. But
there was never a clear, definitive, this is what's
going on. Everything was chaotic. . . .\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\Id. at 50-51.
Another Annex Team Member also recalled that the team was
told to wait while the Chief of Base and the Team Lead were
making phone calls. This member testified that once the team
was ready to depart he approached the Chief of Base and the
Team Lead, who were both making phone calls at the time. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained what happened.
A: Yep. Grab my machine gun, grab my night vision, grab
my helmet and get back outside, and everybody else is
doing their job. Cars are already staged. Looked at Ty.
His car was up. He gave me a thumbs up. Had [GRS 3] and
[GRS 1] in the car. And I went up to our chief of base
and team leader, and they're standing in the courtyard,
and I said, hey, we're ready to go.
Q: Now the team leader at this point, you said you saw
him on the way into the team room. He was not geared
up. You saw him with his phone. You didn't see him on
the phone?
A: Not at first. When I came back out they were both on
their phones.
Q: Now, team leader and----
A: And [the Chief of Base] were both on their phones. I
looked at [the Chief of Base] and the team leader and
said, hey, we're ready to go. [The Chief of Base]
looked at the team leader, and he said tell these guys
they need to wait. The team leader looks at me and says
you guys need to wait. It's about 9:37. It's no more
than 5 minutes if that.
* * *
So at this point in time, the chief told the team
leader to wait.
Q: Team leader told you to wait?
A: Yes.
Q: All right. What did you do next?
A: Waited. Went back to the car and just radioed, hey,
we got to wait guys. Just because the guys needed to
know the information.
* * *
Q: All right. So you go back in the car. You're in the
second car, in the SUV. You're with [GRS 5], and go to
the radio and say we got to wait?
A: And everybody is pretty cool about it. Nobody is
getting upset.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\Testimony of GRS 4, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 26-29 (Mar. 1,
2016) [hereinafter GRS 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
The team member was able to see what the Chief of Base and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Team Lead were doing when he returned to the vehicle:
What I'm seeing, and I'm looking at [the Chief of Base
and the Team Lead] off and on and they're just talking
on their phones. And all I can see, as time goes on and
we start getting calls, from [Diplomatic Security Agent
3] on the radio, saying, hey, the Consulate has been
overrun. GRS, where the bleep are you? We do start
getting a little bit more agitated.\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\Id. at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The team member continued:
Q: All right. So you said you heard [Diplomatic
Security Agent 3] on the radio, and what did he say?
A: [Diplomatic Security Agent 3], and I can't recall
his exact words. It's been 3 years, but I can recall
the gist of it, and I can recall the emotions of it. It
was, GRS, where are you? Consulate's been overrun.
Where are you? Where are you? Get your asses over here.
We need your help. Where are you? Another 10 minutes go
by, and that's when I see [GRS 1] get out of his car.
He goes to the driver's side. And I have my door
closed, and I see him yelling at [the Chief of Base].
He's going like this. Now, I didn't hear it, but I
asked him after what he said to him. He was just there.
Him and [the Chief of Base] are jaw jacking.
He gets in the car. I said what's going on, dude? He
said he's telling us to stand down. Now [GRS 1] told me
that on the radio, but I said my vehicle was doors were
closed, armored vehicle, but I remember seeing him go
to the driver's side and just----
Q: So it was just you and [GRS 5] in your vehicle?
A: Yeah. And then I also reconfirmed that when I asked
[GRS 1] later. He wasn't happy.
* * *
We waited another 10 minutes, so it's been about 25
minutes.
Q: The first time you said you were ready to go in 5
minutes. Then you said there was 10 minutes. Then you
waited another 10 minutes?
A: Close to 25 minutes.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\Id. at 30-32.
Although this team member's testimony regarding the amount
of time that elapsed between the Mission's request for help and
the team's departure was consistent with the testimony of other
witnesses and the time indicated by the surveillance footage of
the Annex, his testimony about when the attack began, and thus
when the Mission called for help, differed. The witness, one of
the co-authors of the book ``13 Hours: The Inside Account of
What Really Happened in Benghazi,'' testified that the attack
began at 9:32 p.m., ten minutes earlier than other witnesses,
documents and the surveillance footage indicates. He was asked
why he believed the attack began at 9:32 p.m. and provided this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explanation:
A: I remember hearing a call on the radio that all GRS
needed to muster in the team room. I remember there was
not a sense of urgency in the voice. I remember looking
at my watch. I remember it saying 9:32. And I have said
that many times. I know it differs, but I know that's
what it said.
Q: So let me stop you there. I know you said it many
times. I've read that in the book. Everywhere else I've
seen it's 9:42. How do you account for the difference?
A: Differences of what people want to hear, want to
know. I was on the ground. I was looking. I was pissed
off because somebody was bothering me at 9:32 at night
because I wanted to go home.
Q: You were home.
A: I wanted to get the day over with. Nothing good
comes when you get bothered at night, especially if
you're in the military, and you're getting called by
your leadership at 9:00 at night, nothing good comes of
it. The difference, you'd have to ask the person that
says it's 9:42. I don't know. I didn't see anybody else
with me on that report there that night, though. We get
a call 30 seconds later, roughly.
* * *
Q: And I don't mean to pick apart your statement. So
the book I believe--let me just quote you from the
book. It says: At 9:02 p.m. an unexpected vehicle drove
down the gravel road outside the compound. And a little
bit later the SSC vehicle pulled away 40 minutes after
it arrived. A little while later. Almost the moment the
SSC pickup pulled away from the compound, shots and an
explosion rang out?
A: Sure. And what Mitchell was doing with that is he
was pulling stuff off the report. We had to get the
book cleared.
Q: Okay.
A: So if you read it, too, he also says that [GRS 4]
looked at his watch, and he has assured that it was
9:32 that he was called. So we're getting both what
other people were saying. That's what we were trying to
do, and [GRS 2] can help me out with the book here if I
get too far into it. But we're trying to show that
there are differences in what people saw. I know what I
saw. I'm not going to say what other people saw, and
what those other nine reports that went through, but I
know what I saw on my watch.\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\Id. at 22-24.
Another Annex Team member described his recollection of
what happened between the time the Mission called for help and
the Annex team departed. After the Team Lead told him the
Mission was under attack, he got dressed, packed his gear, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
loaded into a vehicle.
[I] Ran back in, told [Annex Team Member], we got all
of our clothes on, ran out of the team room, got the
big weapons . . . and we loaded up in the vehicles. It
was probably about 5 minutes or so after we learned of
the ongoing attack. And we're probably sitting there
for a little while. We're sitting in the car, you know,
just going over, double checking our weapons, double
checking our gear, you know, kind of saying, hey, you
know, what's going on, what's taking so long.
We're probably sitting there a good 15 minutes, and I
get out of the car. I have the Chief of Base, the
Deputy Chief of Base, and the team leader on the front
porch. They're all three on the phone doing something.
And I just say: Hey, you know, we've got to get over
there. We're losing the initiative. The Chief of Base
looks at me, he says: Stand down, you need to wait. You
need to come up with a plan.
And I say: No, it's too late to come up with a plan. We
need to get over in the area, get eyes on, and then we
can come up with a plan.
And that's kind of where I left it because they left it
at that, and I got back in the car.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\GRS 1 Testimony at 73.
The Annex Team Member's testimony was consistent with the
other witnesses that while the team was ``kitting up'' and
loading their gear into the vehicles, the Chief of Base and the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Team Lead were making phone calls.
Q: So you were the only one out of the lead vehicle.
And you got out of the vehicle and you said you saw the
chief of base, the deputy chief of base, and the team
lead. And where were they?
A: On the front porch of the building 3
* * *
Q: And what were each of them doing?
A: They were on the phone.
Q: Okay. They were all on the phone?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And you said that--I'm just paraphrasing:
We've got to get over there. We're losing the
initiative. Did you say that? Does that sound right?
A: Yes.
Q: And did you say that to anybody in particular or all
three of them?
A: Pretty much all three of them because I was looking
directly at them.
Q: Okay. And what was the response that you got from
all of them or any of them?
A: ``Stand down. You need to wait.'' That was from the
chief of base.
Q: Okay. Do you remember exactly what the chief--is
that a paraphrase? Did he use those exact words? Do you
remember?
A: He used those exact words.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\Id. at 78-79.
When asked why the team member had not disclosed the
``stand down'' order during previous testimony to Congress, he
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stated:
A: At the time, because a lot of it was that no--I
mean, I didn't know why the stand down order was given.
I mean, I guess [GRS team member] got told to wait, you
know, that's what he says. I just know when we got told
to stand down and when [the Team Lead] kind of gave the
brief of kind of like why we're told to stand down, it
was kind of understandable, you know.
But, yes, it shouldn't take you 23 minutes or 50
minutes to link up with the QRF, because even after we
left there was still no link up. There was no
communication between us and the 17 Feb. that I knew
of. Because when we rolled in, we didn't know who we
were going to be meeting.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\Id. at 80.
The team member believed that no matter what phrase the
Chief of Base conveyed that night to direct the team, they
would not have left unless they made the decision on their own
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to leave at the moment they did.
A: I mean, just like for the stand down. I don't think
it came from anywhere else but [the Chief of Base]. . .
.
So my biggest thing, I think, it was--I don't believe,
you know, stand down. I think it was just like a heat-
of-the-moment kind of thing. But to me, no matter what,
when he said stand down, or wait, or don't go,
whatever, he still--I believe if we didn't leave on our
own, we would have never left.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\Id. at 130-31.
The Deputy Chief of Base also described what happened
between the time the Annex was notified of the attack and the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
time the GRS Team departed.
I was sitting in my--I was sitting at my desk in the
SCIF and I was working on--I was working on a cable I
was writing regarding a meeting I had been to earlier
in the day with the chief of base, and I remember
looking at the clock that was in the lower corner of
the computer screen noting that--for some reason it
just stuck out--that it was 9:40 or 9:42. I remember
looking at the time. And the GRS team leader, [redacted
text], came in, and grabbed me and pulled me out into
the GRS room and said--said he had just received
communication from [Agent 3] at the special mission
that they had people inside the wire there. They had
people inside the compound. And he said: We are going
to go, we are going to go over there, you know, and get
those guys, get them out of there. And I said: Okay,
you know, got that, but we got to let the boss know
about this and he needs to make the call before we do
that. And he said, ``yeah.'' So I went back in.
I got the Chief of Base, brought the Chief of Base out
into the GRS team room where we were. The GRS team
leader advised the chief of base what the situation was
and said: We got to go get those guys. And the chief of
base responded, ``Absolutely.'' ``Absolutely.'' Not,
``I got to go call the chief of station.'' Not, ``I got
to go check with somebody in Washington.'' All he said
was, ``Absolutely.'' So I want to make that very clear
because I know there's conflicting accounts about that
discussion. There were three people in that discussion:
myself, the GRS team leader, and the chief of base. And
anybody writing any books or making movies, or whatever
else, I can tell you none of those guys were in the
room when that discussion occurred.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\Testimony of Deputy Chief of Base, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
101-02 (June 4, 2015) [hereinafter Deputy Chief of Base Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
The Deputy Chief of Base indicated the GRS team was loaded
and ready to depart approximately 10 minutes after the Team
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lead told them what was happening at the Mission.
So [the Team Lead] advised me that he had just gotten
the call from [Diplomatic Security Agent 3] and then
I--and then I told him, we got to, you know, we got to
check with the chief of base on this. And I went and
got him, and then we had that short discussion. And
then, shortly thereafter, he advised the GRS team
members to start gathering their equipment that they
were going over there.
* * *
And that took--that took about 10 minutes for them to
get everything together.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\Id. at 103.
The Deputy Chief of Base raised a concern with the Chief of
Base that they needed to attempt to confirm whether 17th
February or any other friendly militia was at the base or would
be arrive shortly in order to prevent that force from attacking
the GRS team or vice versa. The Deputy Chief noted because one
GRS team member was away from the base at the time, and the
remaining were preparing to go to the Mission compound, the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annex effectively was without any defensive capability.
But what happened was, I said to the chief of base:
Look it, you know, we got a real issue here with
potential green-on-blue because we were still operating
under the assumption that 17th February was going to
show up.
And, in fact, a bunch of them about did, although it
appears to be an uncoordinated response. They did, in
fact, show up. So you got to remember that these guys
that went over there, the GRS guys, the six of them,
[redacted text]. And I was really worried about that.
If the city is blowing up, I got to make sure we get
them back safely because what we were doing in making
this decision, again, which the chief of base made
instantly on the spot, without equivocation, was we
were giving up all of our shooters to go over there and
rescue the State Department people, as well as any QRF
capability we would have had to rescue the case officer
and the lone GRS guy [redacted text] if they got into
an in extremis situation.
Now, on top of that, what the GRS guys took with them
when they responded over there was every piece of heavy
automatic weapons, and every really solid defensive
weaponry capability that we had on the base. So while
the chief of base agreed to do this right away, this
was not a light--a decision taken lightly.
And, again, I feel like the narrative that I have seen
in public does not account for this and does not
account for the consideration that there was a green-
on-blue situation that could have wiped all of those
guys out. And then where would we have been? We
wouldn't have had the ability to do anything to help
the State Department people, and we wouldn't have had
the ability to evacuate ourselves or defend ourselves
if we came under attack.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\Id. at 104-05.
One GRS Agent explained it is not unusual for people to
have a different recollection of what happened during the time
the Diplomatic Security Agents called the Annex to request
help.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\GRS 4 Testimony at 95.
Q: Is it unusual in your perspective to have
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
individuals with different accounts?
A: It's not--of course it's not unusual to have people
have different accounts.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\Id.
The Annex Team departed at 10:05 p.m., twenty-three minutes
after the Diplomatic Security Agent at the Mission called and
asked for their help.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After departing the Annex, the Annex Team faced a roadblock
at the intersection of the main road leading to the Benghazi
Mission compound. A militia was blocking the most direct route
to the Mission compound. One GRS Team Member described what
they encountered:
When we arrived, to the corner of the street that leads
to the front gate, there was at least a couple vehicles
there and some Libyans standing around outside. We
slowly approached. We didn't know if they were friendly
or hostile. They didn't appear to be a threat to us.
They didn't raise their weapons at us, so we got out of
the vehicles.
And at that time, the interpreter and [the Team Lead],
I believe, started talking to somebody. We were
receiving ineffective, sporadic fire. We returned fire
and moved up the street. At that point, that's when our
group split up.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\GRS 3 Testimony at 53-54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Team Lead also described the roadblock:
Q: And describe what happened when you left the base?
A: So we roll out, and at this point there obviously
was no communication via telephone that's got us
anything. So my plan now is the route that we're going
to take to get to the mission facility, I know there's
two--three militia and/or proper Army compounds on the
way. So my intentions are to basically stop into one of
those facilities along the way, get the technicals that
we were trying to get for support, and then roll to the
mission facility.
So we come out to one of the main roads. One of the
gates, back gates to one of the militia compounds,
which is always sealed up and closed, is wide open, and
there's militia guys moving all over the place.
I look up the street, and there is--I can see, you
know, a bunch of other movement and what have you,
personnel, militia guys, whatever, and we have to go
north anyways, so I said: Hey, push on to, at that
corner, there is what used to be a Libyan National Army
base or compound right at the corner. I said: Hey,
we're going to go to that compound because that's the
direction we have to travel.
We get to that corner, and as I'm looking to pull in--
and there's guys, you know, standing out in front. And
as I'm looking there, and then I look at--essentially
the path of the travel is across the main intersection
and across the street, and generally speaking, where we
would--the access road to the State facility is kind of
up a couple of 100 yards or so on the right, and as I
look up, there is--I can see a couple of technicals and
a bunch of dismounted personnel with AKs or some type
of rifle on them.
So I said: All right. You know what, guys, we're
pushing to--through the intersection to that corner.
Because there was already some type of force where we
need to be, so I figured with the linguist there, roger
that, we can try to utilize these guys to assist
us.\184\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\GRS Team Lead Testimony at 32-34.
At the same time, the Diplomatic Security Agents at the
compound were working to clear it. After they cleared Villa B,
the Diplomatic Security Agents began searching Villa C, which
was still on fire, for Stevens and Smith.\185\ One Diplomatic
Security Agent described the smoke in Villa C as so thick it
prevented him ``from see[ing] your hand in front of your face.
There are no lights; the electricity [was] down.''\186\ Because
the toxic smoke and heat were so overwhelming, the Diplomatic
Security Agents retrieved gas masks, which were ineffective:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 98.
\186\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 150.
So I put the mask on. And we are being told repeatedly
through this whole time by the other Americans that are
there, ``There is no good air in there. The device that
you have does not provide air.'' I am aware of this.
All you are going to do is go in there and become a
victim, is what they are implying, which is
accurate.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\Id. at 155.
As the agents are making their second round of attempts in
and out of Villa C to locate Stevens, at 10:38 p.m. [4:38 p.m.
in Washington D.C.], a local force, arrived at the
Mission.\188\ A few minutes later, the Annex Team arrived on
the compound. After three of the Annex Team members cleared the
main road and the main gate they entered the compound.\189\ Two
minutes later, the Annex Team Lead and the CIA linguist arrived
through the main gate of the Mission.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi, produced by the
U.S. Dep't of State. (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the
committee, SCB0047843); see also, Video: DVR Footage of the Mission
(Sept. 11, 2012, 2239-2240).
\189\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2245).
\190\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2247).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the course of the next 20 minutes, members of the
Annex Team continued to clear portions of the compound while
other Annex Team members joined the Diplomatic Security Agents
in searching for Stevens and Smith.\191\ One of the Diplomatic
Security Agents described his attempts to find them:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 155.
One of my biggest concerns is one of us in this
recovery effort was going to go in there and become a
victim ourselves, requiring our elements to stay on the
X later, which is a bad situation. I would not want to
put our guys at risk, any greater risk, by having to
fish me out of that same situation where you are trying
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to pull somebody else out of.
So I go in there a fourth time. I got the mask on. I go
in as far as I have gone. I go directly in the safe
haven, and I stay there longer than I should. I am
stomping on the ground, I am feeling around, I am
yelling for the Ambassador. I got nothing. The only
and, again, the only guidance I had from the agent that
was in there at the time was that he had him in the
safe haven. I wasn't aware of any other location he may
have been at that point.
So I am in there, I don't know how long, a minute,
[two], I don't know. I couldn't tell you how long
exactly. But I start to feel the effects of oxygen
deprivation. You start feeling it in the back of your
head. Because I am just not getting air, because there
is no good air in there. So I start thinking about, you
know, putting our team in a worse position having to
come retrieve me. I back out.
So, as I come out, I am grabbed by the team leader of
the other Americans, who says, ``You guys need to'' . .
. ''get the fuck out of here.'' That is a quote.
And we pushed this off for the last 20 minutes,
basically, where they repeatedly told us, you need to
go, you need to go, and we have been adamant that we
need to stay and recover or locate the Ambassador and
Sean Smith. We have stayed up until this point.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\Id. at 155-156.
Diplomatic Security Agent 4 found Smith unresponsive inside
Villa C.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 136.
I go into the safe haven with the intention of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
recovering Smith and Stevens
Immediately upon entering the safe haven, it becomes
very clear to me that it would be a very--that would be
very difficult. The smoke is extremely thick and acrid.
From what I understand now, that was a result of the
accelerants used to start the fire. But open flame is
not so much an issue; it's the volume and the toxic
nature of the smoke that made it very difficult. Even
immediately entering the room, I became very
disoriented.
But using my internal map, my memory of the layout of
the safe-haven area, I make my way along the wall
searching and feeling my way. I make my way into the
safe-haven closet, the safe room, where, according to
our plan, everyone would've been staged. And I don't
find anybody there. I go and make sure that--I go and
work my way around the wall to the gate, the locked
gate of the safe haven itself. And I'm able to confirm
that the gate is still locked, it was locked by padlock
from the inside. So I can make the assumption that
nobody has entered the safe haven and nobody has left.
So that limits the search area.
So I continue to search. I just kind of follow along
the walls, calling out to the Ambassador and Smith and
doing my best to feel around for them.
Q: So, at this point, you have zero visual visibility
and you're feeling along the walls?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: And so did that mean that you were just necessarily
a little limited in the surface area you could cover in
terms of----
A: Right. Yeah. You're right; there was no visibility.
So I was just trying to feel with my limbs, my hands
and feet, and still maintain contract with the wall so
that I wouldn't lose myself. But, nevertheless, I
started to feel very disoriented myself. I started to
be worried that, you know, I was really craving oxygen
by that point, and I eventually found myself in the
bathroom. I broke a window out to try and ventilate the
space and to get some fresh air for myself. And I
cleared my head a little bit.
I was able to get lower to the ground, and then I
worked my way back out the way that I had come. And it
was at that point in the hallway that I came across the
body of Sean Smith. He was unresponsive. So I grabbed
him and dragged him back down the hallway to the safe-
haven window and then handed him off to the people
waiting outside. It was when we had him outside in the
clear air that--and we had a brief check of him, he
had--he was unresponsive, not breathing, no pulse, and
so felt that at that point he was already expired.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\Id. at 136-137.
At 11:01 p.m. [5:01 p.m. in Washington D.C.], Smith was
reported as killed in action.\195\ He was an only child, a
husband and father of two. He was posthumously awarded the
Thomas Jefferson Star for Foreign Service on May 3, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi, produced by the
U.S. Dep't of State. (Last Edit Nov. 1, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0047843).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Embassy Tripoli
At the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, the Deputy Chief of
Mission, the most senior member of the State Department team in
Tripoli, and the Chief of Station, the most senior member of
the CIA team in Libya, learned of the attack soon after it
began.\196\ At 9:45 p.m., three minutes after the attacks
began, the senior Diplomatic Security Agent notified Hicks of
the attack. After realizing he had a few missed calls on his
cell phone, Hicks attempted to redial the number and reached
Stevens:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\Hicks Apr. 2013 Testimony at 18.
I jumped up and reached into my phone at the same time
I tried to connect with John which I did not do, he ran
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
out immediately.
And I looked at my phone, and I saw two missed phone
calls, one from a number I did not recognize, and the
second from the Ambassador's telephone.
I punched the number that I did not recognize and
called it back, to call it back, and I got Chris on the
line. And he said, ``Greg, we are under attack.''\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\Id.
The line went dead. Hicks was unable to reach Stevens
again.
Individuals in the tactical operations center, the command
center at the Embassy in Tripoli, quickly alerted other
relevant Embassy staff when the attack was first reported.\198\
Within minutes, the individuals in Tripoli took quick and
decisive actions to execute two steps in response to the
attacks that night. First, they submitted a request to divert
an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset--
colloquially referred to as a ``drone''--flying over another
location in eastern Libya to Benghazi to provide tactical
awareness of the situation on the ground. Second, the Chief of
Station of the Annex in Tripoli prepared a rescue team, called
``Team Tripoli,'' to respond forthwith to the attacks in
Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\See Hicks Apr. 2016 Testimony at 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Team Tripoli Response
In Tripoli, when word of the attacks reached the Embassy
and the CIA Station, a team consisting of four Tripoli Station
GRS members, one of whom was Glen Doherty, two Defense
Department special operators, and a CIA linguist sprang into
action. Using their initiative coupled with previously
established contacts, in less than an hour, they managed to
assemble a response team and acquire an aircraft for transport.
The Chief of Station authorized this team, dubbed Team Tripoli,
to respond to the attacks in Benghazi:
[M]y specific direction to Team Tripoli was to provide
quick reaction force to shore up base and to assist the
[Benghazi Mission compound], the consulate there, and
in so doing render any assistance to the Ambassador. So
that was all kind of--they were a complementary set of
objectives.
One of the things, on a more tactical level, was the
entire GRS contingent in Benghazi, save one officer,
was forward deployed to the temporary mission facility.
So they were, in my opinion, very vulnerable.
At that time, I made the decision to deploy all except
one of our GRS officers to Benghazi. That gave me
certainly a sense of trepidation because that left us
vulnerable to any sort of attack or follow on things.
So that was part of my thought calculus doing that. I
didn't hesitate, but I certainly thought about that and
the ensuing consequences of leaving one GRS.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\Testimony of Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
112-13 (July 16, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Station Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
While the mission of Team Tripoli was supported by the
Department of State at Embassy Tripoli and supported by
AFRICOM, it was a mission orchestrated solely by the CIA Chief
of Station in Tripoli. As reported by one of the military
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
members of Team Tripoli to the Committee:
Q: Did AFRICOM headquarters or SOCAFRICA have any role
in planning your deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi?
A: No, sir.
* * *
Q: How about the Embassy itself there in Tripoli, were
they directing the deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi?
A: Not that I recall, sir.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\Testimony of Special Operator, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Tr. at
44-45 (Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Special Operator Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Fortuitously, earlier that day a CIA member of the team had
brokered an initial agreement with the owner of an aircraft to
charter the aircraft as needed.\201\ During the morning
meeting, the CIA officer had queried the operator of the
aircraft as to ``How fast can you respond?'' and the [redacted
text] owner replied, ``I am not sure; probably within 24
hours.''\202\ Because of this, Team Tripoli was able to quickly
secure the aircraft for transport from Tripoli to Benghazi that
night.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\Id. at 37.
\202\Id.
A: Called back again that night and said, ``We need you
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
right now,'' and he was there. He showed up.
Q: That was good timing, wasn't it?
A: It was good timing, sir, convenient.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Q: And how long did it take from the time that call was
made to the aircraft owner, what did he say about his
ability to take off from Tripoli to Benghazi? How long
a timeframe do you recall?
A: I don't remember what time he said, but I know we
had got there around 11:30 or midnight, but he was
ready to go when we had gotten there. And they actually
had expedited us through the airport. We didn't go
through any--the actual airport procedures. We had
weapons and ammo, obviously.
* * *
Q: And was there no limitation on daylight only flight
ops with this [redacted text], as I understand was the
limitation on the Libyan military C-130?
A: I don't think they could fly at night, but he could
because he was a privately owned company. The [redacted
text] was privately owned.
Q: But your understanding was, at least with respect to
the Libya C-130----
A: Daytime, sir.
Q: That was limited to daytime ops?
A: Yes, sir.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\Id. at 47-48.
At 12:30 a.m. [6:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.], the Team
Tripoli departed the Tripoli Mitiga Airport with four GRS
officers, including former U.S. Navy SEAL Glen A. Doherty, two
military personnel, and a CIA officer acting as a
linguist.\205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Timeline of the Department of
Defense Actions on September 11-12, 2012 (May 1, 2013) (on file with
the Committee) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline] (``A six-
man security team from U.S. Embassy Tripoli, including two DoD
personnel, departs for Benghazi''); see also, Special Operator
Testimony at 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Department is Alerted of the Attack
News of the attack traveled at varying speeds within the
Defense Department. AFRICOM was the first combatant command to
receive an alert about the attacks. By 4:32 p.m. in Washington
D.C. [10:32 p.m. in Benghazi], news of the attack reached the
Pentagon.
AFRICOM ALERTED OF THE ATTACK
Members within the AFRICOM command structure learned of the
attack just more than 30 minutes after it began. At AFRICOM
headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, Vice Admiral Charles J.
Leidig Jr., the second in command for military operations,
learned of the attack just over a half hour after it
began.\206\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\Leidig 2014 Testimony at 20.
The night of the attack, when I received the initial
report at my quarters that night that there had been--I
remember it exactly. I got a report at [10:15]. I tell
people I saw the same Indiglo watch, and I was asleep
in my bed. I went to bed, got up early, and it was my
routine. So at [10:15], I rolled over and got a report
that . . . the facility in Benghazi [had been overrun],
but that the Ambassador was in a safe room and was
safe. And that was the initial report I got at
[10:15].\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\Id.
Following notification, Admiral Leidig recalled his command
center staff and returned to work.\208\ Although the initial
reports he received were that Stevens had been secured in a
safe haven, he learned shortly upon returning to work that
Stevens was missing:\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\Id. at 26.
\209\Id.
When I got to the command center, the focus was on
where is the Ambassador and trying to locate him. At
that point I didn't know where the location that folks
had went to. I didn't know who they were. I would later
learn over the intervening hours that that was some
folks from [the annex] who had come to move State
Department personnel to the other facility. Again, it
was several hours before I knew what the facility was,
or the location, or where they were at. I just knew
that they had moved to another location, and the
reports we were getting from--most of our reporting at
that point were coming from the defense attache', our
defense attache' in Tripoli--was that they were safe,
and they were fine, and that they were at this other
facility. Our focus was trying to help gather
information to see if we could locate where the
Ambassador was.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\Id. at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PENTAGON ALERTED OF ATTACK
Almost an hour after the attacks started, at 4:32 p.m. in
Washington D.C. [10:32 p.m. in Benghazi], nearly the same time
the Diplomatic Security Agents and the Annex security team
members began clearing the Mission compound in Benghazi half a
world away, word of the attack finally reached the
Pentagon.\211\ Although the Embassy in Tripoli and the
Diplomatic Command Center at the State Department in Washington
received word almost immediately that the Benghazi Mission
compound was under attack, that notice did not make its way to
the National Military Command Center, the operations center at
the Pentagon, until 4:32 p.m. local time in Washington
D.C.\212\ Vice Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, the Director of Operations
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the attacks,
testified his staff immediately alerted him about the
attacks.\213\ His staff simultaneously contacted AFRICOM to
obtain additional information regarding the situation on the
ground, while he notified members of the Secretary of Defense's
staff.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\212\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline; see SCC Timeline (indicating
the Diplomatic Security Command Center received notification of the
attack at 3:49 PM EDT).
\213\Testimony of Vice Admiral Kurt Tidd, Assistant to the Chairman
of the J. Chiefs of Staff, Dir. for Operations (J3), U.S. Dep't of
Defense, Tr. at 8 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Tidd Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
\214\Id. at 8-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSETS IDENTIFIED TO DEPLOY
As officials in Washington D.C. began to react to the
attacks in Benghazi, it is important to describe and understand
the assets available to respond, the state of those assets, and
the military's policies and planning in force that applied to
the assets' use and deployment.
AFRICOM'S Posture and Force Laydown on September 11
In the days leading up to September 11, 2012, General
Carter F. Ham, the Commander of the United States Africa
Command [AFRICOM] conducted a ``deep dive'' into intelligence
reports to guide their decision regarding whether any
adjustment to the force posture needed to be made.\215\ Leidig
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\Leidig 2014 Testimony at 22.
[B]ased on General Ham's guidance, we actually did--we
had been--the military always does planning for
September 11th. We always know that there's a potential
for, you know, some sort of terrorist activity on
September 11th since its anniversary. General Ham had
actually directed in the days running up to it that we
do what we call a deep dive or a deep look at the
intelligence to see if there was anything to indicated
that there might be anything in our [area of
responsibility]. We found nothing in any intelligence
that would indicate that there was an attack or an
incident being planned by terrorists in our [area of
responsibility].\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\Id. at 22-23.
Although AFRICOM's area of responsibility consists of the
continent of Africa, with the exception of Egypt, its
headquarters are based in Stuttgart, Germany. With the
exception of a contingent stationed in Djibouti, a country on
the Horn of Africa approximately 2,000 miles from Libya,
AFRICOM did not have assigned forces.\217\ As a result, AFRICOM
had to use United States European Command troops, aircraft, and
bases in Europe including Ramstein, Germany; Sigonella and
Aviano, Italy; and Rota, Spain to respond to events occurring
on the African continent.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\Panetta Testimony at 13.
\218\Id. at 14-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Planned Assets
FAST PLATOONS
The assets AFRICOM would mostly likely call upon in
response to a crisis situation were the Fleet Antiterrorism
Security Team [FAST] platoons stationed in Rota, Spain. Those
platoons were required to be ready to deploy within a certain
time frame. FAST platoons, as of September 2012, were typically
used to reinforce embassy security and operated from a fixed
location within an embassy. FAST platoons did not deploy with
their own vehicles, so they were dependent on other means for
ground mobility. That reality made the FAST platoon less
capable to rapidly respond as a quick-reaction force. Moreover,
the FAST platoon's ability to move on a given timeline required
the allocation of aircraft for deployment in a timely manner.
At the time, FAST platoons did not have dedicated airlift.
This meant prior to being able to deploy, airlift would need to
arrive from some other location, most likely Ramstein, Germany,
to pick up the platoon for an onward deployment. The air base
in Ramstein, Germany housed C-130s, large transport airframes
that typically would be used to move the FAST platoons and
associated equipment. In the days leading up to the attack,
none of the C-130s in Ramstein were on any heightened alert. To
effectuate movement, the Commander of United States Air Forces
in Europe would need to take a series of steps to generate
aircraft and prepare an air crew for deployment.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\Testimony of General Philip G. Breedlove, Commander, U. S.
European Command, Tr. at 21-22 (Apr. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Breedlove
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMANDER'S IN EXTREMIS FORCE
Another asset AFRICOM could call upon when circumstances
warranted was the Commander's in Extremis Force [CIF] owned by
European Command; it is one of the most capable quick response
forces. General Ham described this force as ``the force of
first choice should there be an emergent situation.''\220\ It
is a special operations response team that offers capabilities
for emergency action in missions such as hostage rescue,
noncombatant evacuation when the security situation is
uncertain, or convoy security. The CIF can and does work with
the U.S.-based Special Operations Force that also ultimately
deployed the night of the attacks in Benghazi. Theoretically,
since any deployment from the U.S. to the Middle East or North
Africa will require significant time for the U.S.-based force
to reach its destination, the CIF provides a more responsive
capability when an emergency arises. It has dedicated aircraft
for transportation. The CIF is tasked to be airborne in a set
number of hours once alerted, and the military's air traffic
management system is supposed to provide two aircraft to ensure
the CIF is airborne on the specified timeline. Unlike other
assets deployed that night the CIF deploys with its own
vehicles giving it the ability to drive from an airfield where
deposited to a crisis site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\Testimony of General Carter F. Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa
Command.Tr. at 28 (June 8, 2016) [hereinafter Ham 2016 Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Typically stationed in Germany, in the days leading up to
September 11 the CIF was actually deployed to Croatia to
perform a joint exercise.\221\ This training exercise had been
planned for over a year.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\Testimony of Army Major General Michael S. Repass, Commander,
Special Operations Command Europe, Tr. at 18 (Apr. 15, 2016)
[hereinafter Repass Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\222\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.-BASED SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE
One other asset that can be used in events similar to the
attacks in Benghazi is a U.S.-based Special Operations Force
[U.S. SOF]. That force offers capabilities that complement and
expand upon the assets brought by the CIF.\223\ Secretary of
Defense Leon E. Panetta described the U.S. SOF as a ``hostage
rescue unit from our special operations team.''\224\ [redacted
text].\225\ By design, the CIF would typically be able to reach
an overseas target first, due to the distance required to
deploy from the U.S.\226\ If required, the CIF can assault a
target immediately. If time permits, the preferred option is to
hand the target over to the U.S. SOF, given its more robust
capabilities.\227\ Since the U.S. SOF deploys from the U.S.,
however, to respond to the attacks in Benghazi it must travel
much farther than the CIF and other assets closer to Libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\Id.
\224\Leon E. Panetta, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War
and Peace 225 (2014).
\225\Repass Testimony at 8.
\226\Id. at 8-9.
\227\Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Assets
F-16S AT AVIANO AIR BASE
Aviano Air Base--situated in Aviano, Italy, approximately
50 miles north of Venice--is home to the 31st Fighter Wing of
the United States Air Forces Europe. At the time of the attack,
two squadrons each consisting of 21 F-16s were stationed at
Aviano.\228\ No tankers to provide air refueling for these F-
16s were stationed at Aviano.\229\ The assigned tankers were
stationed in Mildenhall, England.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\Testimony of Brigadier General Scott Zobrist, Commander, 31st
Fighter Air Wing, U.S. Air Forces Europe, Tr. at 15 (Mar. 12, 2014)
[hereinafter Zobrist Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\229\Id. at 20.
\230\Id. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 11, 2012, the air squadrons in Aviano were not
on any heightened alert status, despite the call for a
``heightened alert'' during the President's call with Cabinet
members--an alert sequence that would require the pilots and
the aircraft to be ready in a short amount of time. Rather,
they were in a training posture.\231\ In fact, on that day, the
31st Fighter Wing was in the middle of a two-week inspection to
ensure the Fighter Wing met Air Force requirements.\232\ The
aircraft were in a ``true training configuration'' which meant
nothing was pre-loaded on the aircraft.\233\ This also meant
any live ordnances available at Aviano were not assembled,
thus, prior to loading onto an F-16, the bomb had to be put
together piece by piece.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\Id. at 25.
\232\Id. at 32.
\233\Id. at 36.
\234\Id. at 29-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the fact that none of the F-16s was on any
alert status but rather in a true training configuration on the
anniversary of September 11, the distance between Aviano and
Libya is approximately 1,000 miles or the equivalent of two-
hour's flight time.\235\ Because of that distance, an F-16
would have needed two air refuelings by the tankers that were
stationed nearly 700 miles away in Mildenhall, England, at the
time.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\Id. at 56.
\236\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These impediments to any fighter aircraft response from
Aviano to North Africa were well known prior to September 11.
Yet the alert posture of the aircraft at Aviano did not change
in advance of that date, nor did the alert posture change after
the protests in Cairo, Egypt.
General Ham testified he had not ordered any fighter
aircraft at Aviano to be placed on alert in the days leading up
to September 11 based on his assessment of the threat
intelligence and the probability the type of attacks that would
most likely occur would be small scale attacks.\237\ Because of
this, he believed if any attack were to occur, fighter aircraft
would not be the right tool to respond.\238\ Some other
military officials agreed with General Ham's assessment that
fighter aircraft would likely not be the right tool to respond
to potential events in North Africa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\Ham Testimony at 28.
\238\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT ``DRONES''
At the time of the attacks, the Air Force operated four
remotely-piloted aircraft--colloquially referred to as
``drones''--from a base in southern Europe, approximately four
hours from Benghazi. These drones were flown by a United States
Air Force squadron located in the continental United States,
and conducted missions over several countries including
Libya.\239\ None of the drones were armed, [redacted
text].\240\ A pilot operating a drone on the night of the
attack explained why:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\239\Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilot 1, U. S. Air
Force, Tr. at 10-11 (May 25, 2016) [hereinafter Drone Pilot 1
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\240\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q: Was the aircraft armed?
A: No, the aircraft did not have Hellfires on it.
Q: Could it have been armed?
A: I guess ``could'' is a very subjective term in this
case. So the aircraft had pylons which you could put
Hellfires on, yes.
Q: If it was capable of being armed. Why wasn't it
armed?
A: So as far as, like, the details of that decision,
they're above my level as to why that wasn't armed. But
from my understanding, the two reasons were--one is the
political environment between Libya, Italy, America,
and Europe was that we no longer needed missiles on our
aircraft in Libya because it had stabilized from the
Qadhafi regime, post-Qadhafi regime.
The second reason is, whenever we don't need missiles
on the aircraft, we want to pull them off as soon as we
can, because it provides an opportunity to put more gas
on board, and with more gas on board, we can fly longer
missions and we can provide more intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance to the Combined Air
Operations Center.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 24-25.
Armed drones had not been flown out of southern Europe
since the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Another pilot who
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
operated the drone that night added:
A: [W]e hadn't been armed in Libya since at some point
after the Qadhafi stuff had happened. So at some point
after that, it was--we knew we were no longer going to
be armed in that theater.
Q: How did you know that?
A: I don't remember who mentioned it, but I remember
hearing at some point that the--my understanding of it
was that the [government hosting the drone base] did
not want us flying an unmanned aircraft that was armed
over their country, so therefore they restricted us
from having armed unmanned aircraft.
Q: And did you ever hear anything like--was that
through your chain of command or that was a fellow
pilot?
A: My best guess would be that it was probably our
operations supervisor who basically runs the mass brief
at the beginning of each shift, you know, would have
just mentioned one day: Hey, due to, you know, the
[government hosting the drone base] not wanting us to
have armed unmanned aircraft over their country, we're
no longer going to be armed in Libya.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Pilot 2, U.S. Air
Force, Tr. at 15 (May 25, 2016) [hereinafter Drone Pilot 2 Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the pilots added:
To the best of my knowledge, that is my understanding
for what the trigger was for no longer arming the
remote-piloted aircraft flying over Libya, was the
takedown of Qadhafi.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\Id. at 27.
To utilize armed drones in a close air support environment,
such as in Benghazi, a pilot would typically receive targeting
instructions and clearance from a Joint Terminal Attack
Controller [JTAC] on the ground.\244\ One of the drone pilots
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\Id. at 25-26.
In a close air support environment, which is more akin
to what [Benghazi] would be, that's where we would
coordinate with a joint terminal attack controller,
JTAC, on the ground, and he would give us what is
called a nine-line in order to strike in that close air
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
support environment. And that would be the clearance.
And then the only other option would be to get a nine-
line, which is equivalent to a strike clearance, from
the actual Combined Air Operations Center via a chariot
directed straight from the Combined Forces Air
Component commander.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 23.
Although there were no JTAC's on the ground in Benghazi
that night, several of the GRS agents possessed the skillset
from their prior military experience.\246\ One agent testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\GRS 5 Testimony at 43-45; see also, Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at
67 (``there were no JTACs in all of Libya.'').
Q: And so how many of you had that, what [do] you call
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
it again? What did you call it again?
A: A nine line.
Q: Nine line?
A: Yes, sir. It's just calling for fire. Now they call
them JTACs. When most of us were in the military it
wasn't as specialized, but everyone on that team could
have called in, called for fire.
Q: Anybody----
A: On our team, yes.
Q: --could have called it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So how were you able to--I guess your capabilities--
I'm talking about you personally, you were able to
provide a nine line?
A: Sure.
Q: And how did you know how to do that?
A: From the military. From prior training in the
military.
Q: Okay. Would you have had any way to communicate with
the pilot if a pilot----
A: We could have, yes.
Q: All right. How could that have----
A: Through radio.
Q: Through radio. When you say we were all able to
provide precision fire, are you talking about the GRS
individuals?
A: Only the GRS individuals, yes.
Q: Okay. Do you know if everybody was able to do that
or----
A: Yes, I do.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\GRS 5 Testimony at 43-45.
When asked whether former military personnel were capable
of serving as a JTAC, one of the drone pilots acknowledged such
a person could possess the skills necessary to direct a
strike.\248\ According to the witness from his perspective, the
problem would be whether the military, without approval from
the President, would have the authority to launch a missile
toward a target at the direction of a skilled civilian.\249\
However, as the pilot pointed out, authority to strike without
a military JTAC on the ground could also have been provided by
the Combined Forces Air Component Commander.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\Drone Pilot 1 Testimony at 65-66.
\249\Id. This appears to be a concise statement from his
perspective of more complex legal and operational constraints.
\250\Id. at 30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The year before the attacks in Benghazi, the Defense
Department had operated drones over Libya during Operation
Odyssey Dawn, the U.S. led campaign against Qadhafi troops, and
Operation Unified Protector, the NATO mission against Qadhafi
troops. During both of those operations, the drones had been
used to launch missiles toward targets in Libya.\251\ During
these operations, the drones were pre-loaded with missiles
while stationed in southern Europe and always carried weapons
during missions over Libya. At some point after the fall of
Qadhafi, the drones operating over Libya no longer carried
missiles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\Testimony of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Sensor Operator, U. S.
Air Force, Tr. at 26 (June 9, 2016) [hereinafter Sensor Operator 1] (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the fall of Qadhafi, the Defense Department continued
to use drones and other ISR assets to gather intelligence
information in Libya, especially regarding the growing number
of Islamic extremist in country.
In August 2012, the Libyan government restricted the types
of missions that could be flown in Libyan air space, primarily
over Benghazi. General Ham explained:
Q: General, in the summer of 2012, August timeframe,
ISR missions over Benghazi and Tripoli were suspended
due to complaints from Libyans. I believe those ISR
assets were Predators and they were under your command.
Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And what do you recall about the suspension or the
complaints from the Libyans about those ISR assets
operating in Libya?
A: There were complaints by the Libyan Government to
the Embassy about overflights. [Redacted text].
Q: Did those complaints impact your ability to operate
those Predator assets at all during that time?
A: I do not recall the complaints about the unmanned
systems. I do recall complaints about the manned
systems. And the manned systems, we would have to very
carefully manage the time slots and when they could
fly.
Q: Were those P-3s?
A: Yes.
General Ham described his assessment of the Libyans's
request:
Sir, I think there were some honest Libyans who didn't
like the noise. I mean, they're just kind of a constant
buzz. They're low, and they're intrusive.
I think there were some Libyans who voiced concern to
their government about a foreign power being intrusive.
And I believe there were Islamic terrorist
organizations who were influencing members of the
Libyan Government, because they knew what those
aircraft were doing.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\Ham 2016 Testimony at 168.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSETS AT SOUDA BAY, CRETE
While conducting oversight in Souda Bay, Members of the
Committee received a briefing regarding special operations
aircraft that were stationed at Souda Bay on the night of the
attacks in Benghazi and could have been utilized in response to
the attacks. The Committee sought confirmation of this
information through interviews and requests for information
from the Defense Department. The Defense Department has not
denied the presence of these assets.
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN LIBYA
The only Defense Department asset in Libya not considered
that night were the military members of Team Tripoli. This was
true because the Secretary was not even aware of their presence
in Libya. At the time of his meeting with the President and for
a period subsequent to that, the Secretary was not informed
military personnel were making their way to Benghazi. In fact,
he did not learn of this until the next day.\253\ This means
the only U.S. military asset to actually reach Benghazi during
the attacks was an asset the Secretary did not know about, was
not told about by his subordinates, and did not learn about
until after the fact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\Panetta Testimony at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOREIGN EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM
The Foreign Emergency Support Team [FEST] is ``the U.S.
government's only interagency, on-call, short-notice team
poised to respond to terrorist incidents worldwide.''\254\
Consisting of representatives from the Defense Department and
other agencies, FEST deploys overseas at the request of the
Chief of Mission or the State Department, and can augment both
U.S. and host nation capabilities with specialized crisis
response expertise.\255\ Historically, it has deployed overseas
in response to attacks on U.S. interests. For example, in 2000,
after the USS Cole was attacked, a FEST team was deployed to
Aden, Yemen.\256\ Two years earlier, two FEST teams were
deployed to Kenya and Tanzania. FEST has also been deployed in
response to a hostage-taking crisis and abductions of
Americans.\257\ Typically, the State Department requests
deployment of the FEST in conjunction with the Joint Staff.
Once that decision is made, the FEST is capable of launching
within four hours.\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) found at www.state.gov/
j/ct/programs/fest/index.htm.
\255\See id.
\256\Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16664.htm.
\257\Id.
\258\Email from Mark I. Thompson (Sept. 11, 2012 9:58 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05562162) (``The team can launch within 4 hours of
Deputies Committee decision.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite all of these capabilities, the Secretary recalls no
discussion of a potential FEST deployment in response to the
Benghazi attacks.\259\ Mark I. Thompson, the person in charge
of the FEST, contacted Kennedy about deploying the FEST on the
night of the attacks. According to an email response sent to
Thompson that evening, Kennedy ``did not feel the dispatch of
such a team to Libya is the appropriate response to the current
situation.''\260\ Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Diplomatic Security, State Department also did not believe
the FEST was an appropriate asset to be deployed that evening.
Although in direct contrast to the State Department's own
description and the historical record of prior deployments of
the unit, Lamb described the FEST as ``primarily focus[ing] on
providing a strong communications package, policy experts, and
investigative abilities.''\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\Panetta Testimony at 182.
\260\Email to Mark I. Thompson (Sept. 11, 2012 10:43) (on file with
the Committee, C05562162).
\261\Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Diplomatic
Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 26 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb
testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
David H. Petraeus, Director, CIA, viewed the FEST as a
``support element for the conduct of an operation to do a
counter-terrorism or hostage rescue operation.''\262\ [Redacted
text].\263\ Yet with Stevens considered missing for hours in
Libya after the death of Smith, FEST expertise could have
augmented the capabilities of the U.S. Embassy in Libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\Petraeus Testimony at 49
\263\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tidd stated a FEST deployment was discussed briefly during
the 7:30 meeting with the White House, but dismissed.\264\
Kennedy and others at the State Department did not want to
deploy the FEST in response to the attacks in Benghazi. Tidd
indicated the State Department was concerned about putting
individuals in country who were not ``trigger pullers'' and
would potentially need rescuing.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\Tidd Testimony at 22.
\265\Id. at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Practical and Policy Implications Associated with Deploying Assets
Throughout the course of the investigation, Defense
Department witnesses provided insight into how various assets
might have been employed to respond to the events in Benghazi,
and the constraints--whether imposed by policy or imposed by
capability--of employing such assets.
TIME AND DISTANCE
Given that the attacks occurred in Libya, military
officials repeatedly emphasized any asset that would respond to
the events would be necessarily constrained by the ``tyranny of
time and distance.'' The CIF commander described the
difficulties of responding to events in Africa:
So a lot of people that deploy to Africa or work on
AFRICOM--work for AFRICOM--use the term ``tyranny of
distance'' because it takes so long to move what could
seemingly look like smaller distances. And there's not
a robust network of airfields and staging points that
there are, say, in a more developed area of the world,
like Europe. So Europe is a much smaller area, and
there's many developed airfields, fueling sites.
Whereas, when you have Africa, it's, relatively
speaking, much more undeveloped and exponentially times
larger; so you are limited in your ability to move
around with fuel, with time. And we call it the
``tyranny of distance'' because it's hard to get from
point A to point B, and it takes a while.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\Testimony of CIF Commander, Special Operations Command Europe,
Tr. at 98 (Aug. 26, 2015) [hereinafter CIF Commander Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
With respect to the response to Benghazi, the Secretary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained:
I knew it was going to take some time [to move an asset
into Libya], just because of the preparedness for the
units and then the time and distance involved. You
know, you've heard the term ``tyranny of time and
distance,'' and it's tough in this area.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\Panetta Testimony at 47.
Tidd discussed the challenges faced to move forces as
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
quickly as possible that night:
Q: Admiral, one of the lingering questions that we have
been trying to get a handle on is why it seemed to take
so long to get the response forces off the ground. The
FAST team was in Rota on a [specific] timeline. They
were ready to move prior to that. They sat on the
tarmac for about 6 hours before the planes got there.
A: That is because we had no alert aircraft in
Ramstein. So, literally, it was the middle of the night
there. And I don't know all of the exact actions that
they had to go to, but at Ramstein, they had to go and
generate the airplanes, get the air crews, wake them
up, brief them, tell them what we knew, and have the
planes ready to go. We did not have an alert posture
set for the aircraft.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\Tidd Testimony at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Everybody wanted them there instantaneously. And we
were getting a lot of questions . . . Are they mov[ing]
yet, are they moving yet? It was just taking a long
time.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\Id.
Dr. James Miller, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
at the time, provided a civilian's perspective on the
logistical challenges faced by the Defense Department that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
night in response to the attacks:
The logistical issues were the tyranny of distance and
time, first and foremost. So moving an asset from the
[U.S.], the longest move, moving the FAST team, getting
it prepared to deploy--the FAST teams, I should say,
both from Rota--and then the EUCOM [CIF].
So there is, first, the distance to be traveled, the
fact that it takes time. Second, they need time to spin
up. And I later became deeply familiar with the various
postures and so forth, but it is challenging to sustain
a very short timeline for an extended period of time.
And so each of the individual units we're talking about
had a specific timeline for readiness. My impression
was they were all working to shorten that timeline and
to get prepared and to deploy even more rapidly than
their timelines. But that I would consider a matter of
logistics as well.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\Testimony of Dr. James N. Miller, Under Sec'y of Defense for
Policy, Tr. at 71-72 (May 10, 2016) [hereinafter Miller Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Several witnesses also talked about the logistical
obstacles to deploying F-16s in response to the attacks in
Benghazi. Being able to deploy an aircraft and being able to
actually utilize an aircraft in response to the events are
separate questions. From the Defense Department's perspective,
even if a F-16 was activated quickly and was able to fly to
Benghazi before the final mortar attack, logistical constraints
would still have impacted the capability to actually utilize
the F-16s that night. Admiral James A. Winnefeld, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed those
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
constraints:
But let's say you could just snap your fingers and
there were F-16s suddenly over Benghazi immediately.
It's the middle of the night; there's no joint tactical
air controller on the ground. You don't even have any
communications with the people on the ground. You don't
even know where this is happening. If you're lucky and
you've got a latitude and a longitude to point your
systems at, you might be able to see the action going
on on the ground, if there was action going on on the
ground, but for most of the night there wasn't.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\Testimony of Vice Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Vice Chairman,
J. Chiefs of Staff, Tr. at 35-36 (Mar. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Winnefeld
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt, the Director of Operations
for AFRICOM also explained the logistical and policy
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
constraints of employing F-16s in response to the attack:
A: You still have 3 to 4 hours of the flight time to
get to, say, Benghazi. And then you need to spin up
tanker aircraft because it can't do a round trip
without them. And Admiral Leidig talked to General
Franklin on that, so there was nothing on strip alert
there in Aviano.
And tankers I believed were up in England, Mildenhall,
I believe.
* * *
Q: Were the F-16s--perhaps ``dismissed'' isn't the
right word, but--pick a better word if you have one--
but were they dismissed because of the [time it would
take to activate] issue, or were they dismissed because
there wasn't a viable mission for you to employ them?
A: I would almost say both reasons, because--yeah. So
we spin it up, what are we going to do with it? I mean,
you've got to put ordnance on it, you've got to refuel
it, you've got to brief a mission. We don't know what
the mission is. You know, this is an urban environment
so--and we don't have people on the ground that can
direct targeting. There were not tactical action
controllers in Benghazi, as far as I know.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\Testimony of Rear Admiral Richard B. Landolt, Dir. of
Operations for U.S. Africa Command, Tr. at 38 (May 5, 2016)
[hereinafter Landolt Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Even if F-16s were generated in a timely manner and were
able to arrive in Benghazi before the attacks ended, policy
restrictions would have impacted their utility that night. As
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winnefeld explained:
No Air Force or Navy pilot will ever drop a bomb into
an area where they are not certain who's there and
what's going on unless there's communications with
people on the ground and a JTAC or what we call a
forward air controller airborne.
So I mean, it was highly unlikely that we were going to
be able to make a difference, even if we could get
there in time with air power, so we chose not to do
it.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\Winnefeld Testimony at 36.
As mentioned previously, many of the GRS agents on the
ground had the JTAC capabilities from prior military
experience. Of course all of what is laid out above was well
known beforehand. There was nothing new about the time and
distance concerns in Africa or the positioning of U.S. assets
that might be called upon to respond.
Not only did the Defense Department know any response to
events in North Africa would be hampered by distance, the State
Department also knew the military had such concerns because
they were constantly reminded. Winnefeld testified he
repeatedly warned the State Department of this issue:
The tyranny of distance, in particularly North Africa,
as I'm sure you've probably seen a picture of the U.S.
imposed upon--you know, the entire continental U.S.
fits neatly into North Africa. It's a big place. We've
constantly reminded State while I was the Vice Chairman
and also, you know, National Security Council staff,
gently, politely, that if you're counting on reactive
forces from DOD to pull your fat out of the fire,
basically, when there's an event going on, you're
kidding yourselves. It's just too hard to get there.
Usually, an event is over fairly quickly, and even in
the best alert posture we can be in, it's going to be a
couple of hours, two or three hours, before we can be
someplace.
So what you should really be counting on is using these
forces to either preemptively reinforce an area, like
an embassy, or preemptively evacuate an area, like an
embassy. Don't count on us to drop in in the middle of
the night and stop a situation that's going on.
Now that won't prevent us from trying, certainly. If
there's an event in a place that--you know, like a
Benghazi and if we're postured in order to get there,
we'll certainly try, we'll always try, but I've made it
very clear to them--and they understand this--that they
need to be very careful in their risk assessments. And
it's a lot easier to reinforce and get out early than
it is to save something that's under fire. And that has
a lot to do not only with the tyranny of distance and
how long it takes to get there, but you know, it's not
easy to take a force and just drop it into the middle
of an unknown area at night, and it's even harder when
you're under fire. You know, V-22s don't like to fly
when they're under fire, that sort of thing. So we've
tried to make it very, very clear to [State], try,
please, please, to do good risk assessment and evacuate
or reinforce so that we don't have to rescue you in the
middle of a firefight.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\Winnefeld Testimony at 74-75.
The President's Directive and The Secretary's Order
Just minutes after word of the attack reached the
Secretary, he and General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, departed the Pentagon to attend a
previously scheduled 5:00 p.m. meeting at the White House with
President Obama and National Security Advisor Thomas E.
Donilon.\275\ The Secretary recalled two details about the
attack on the U.S. facility in Benghazi: a building was on fire
and Stevens was missing.\276\ As the Secretary and Dempsey
briefed the President on the evolving situation in Benghazi,
Libya, the Secretary recalled the following guidance:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\Panetta Testimony at 22.
\276\Id. at 22-23
The President made clear that we ought to use all of
the resources at our disposal to try to make sure we
did everything possible to try to save lives
there.\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\Id. at 24.
Immediately following the meeting with the President, at
roughly 6:00 p.m., the Secretary and Dempsey returned to the
Pentagon and convened a meeting that included Ham, who was in
Washington D.C. at the time, and relevant members of the
Secretary's staff and the Joint Staff.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\Id. at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the meeting, three distinct capabilities were
identified to deploy in response to the attacks in Benghazi:
two FAST platoons, the CIF, and the U.S. SOF, capable of
response to crises worldwide.\279\ Again, the Secretary was not
aware, and was not told, of any assets in Tripoli.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\Id. at 24-25
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Department provided copies of maps identifying
assets present in European Command, AFRICOM, and Central
Command's areas of responsibility on September 11, September
12, and September 13 to the Committee. The assets identified on
the maps were purportedly considered during this meeting,
although the Joint Staff at the time did not keep a daily
updated list of assets and their locations.\280\ During its
investigation, the Committee determined the maps failed to
include assets that actually were deployed in response to
Benghazi. For example, a C-17 medical airplane was deployed to
Tripoli on September 12 to evacuate the wounded, deceased, and
other American citizens. That asset was not identified on the
maps provided by the Defense Department to the Committee. Given
this discrepancy, the Committee requested it confirm whether
there were any additional assets not identified on the maps or
any assets withheld due to special access programs
restrictions. It did not respond to the Committee's request.
This failure to respond unnecessarily and unadvisedly leaves
questions the Defense Department can easily answer, and it is
in the public interest that it do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\See Winnefeld Testimony at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Secretary, within an hour of his return to
the Pentagon, he issued an order to deploy the identified
assets.\281\ The testimony of record is that the President's
direction that night was clear: use all of the resources
available to try to make sure we did everything possible to try
to save lives there.\282\ When asked whether he expected or
needed the President to later extrapolate, clarify, or reissue
that order, the Secretary said ``no.''\283\ The Secretary
insisted he understood the President's directive and no further
communication with the President was necessary. Nor did any
further communication with the President take place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\Panetta Testimony at 25-26.
\282\Id. at 23.
\283\Id. at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, the Secretary insists his own intentions and
actions that night, in the aftermath of the President's orders,
were also clear: deploy the identified assets immediately. The
Secretary said his orders were active tense. ``My orders were
to deploy those forces, period. . . . [I]t was very clear: They
are to deploy.''\284\ He did not order the preparation to
deploy or the planning to deploy or the contemplation of
deployment. His unequivocal testimony was that he ordered the
identified assets to ``deploy.''\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\Id. at 26.
\285\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By 7:00 p.m. in Washington [1:00 a.m. in Benghazi], nearly
three hours after the attacks began, the Secretary issued what
he believed, then and now, to be the only order needed to move
the FAST platoons, the CIF, and the U.S. SOF.\286\ Yet nearly
two more hours elapsed before the Secretary's orders were
relayed to those forces. Several more hours elapsed before any
of those forces moved. During those crucial hours between the
Secretary's order and the actual movement of forces, no one
stood watch to steer the Defense Department's bureaucratic
behemoth forward to ensure the Secretary's orders were carried
out with the urgency demanded by the lives at stake in
Benghazi. For much of the evening of September 11, principals
in Washington D.C. considered Stevens to be missing and
reliable information about his whereabouts was difficult to
come by. For those on the ground and in the fight in Libya, the
reality of a second American death was sinking in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\Id. at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SECOND ATTACK ON THE COMPOUND
Evacuation to Annex
In Benghazi, the Diplomatic Security Agents determined
Stevens would not have survived the fire in Villa C, and they
were now engaged in a recovery mission.\287\ According to
Diplomatic Security Agent 4, ``[W]e were unable to find
Stevens. I was very--at that point, I think it was decided that
this was probably a recovery mission. We were looking to
recover his body.''\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 137-138.
\288\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 11:10 p.m. [5:10 p.m. in Washington], an explosive
device detonated several meters inside the back gate, starting
the second wave of attacks at the Benghazi Mission
compound.\289\ Around the same time, the drone arrived on
station over the compound.\290\ GRS officers returned fire
after being fired on by the attackers, while the Diplomatic
Security Agents loaded their vehicle and departed the compound
under fire at 11:16 p.m. [5:16 p.m.].\291\ Prior to leaving the
compound, the Diplomatic Security Agents did not fire their
weapons during the attacks. As one Diplomatic Security Agent
explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2310).
\290\See U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline (``[At 11:10 PM EET t]he
diverted surveillance aircraft arrives on station over the Benghazi
facility.'').
\291\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11,
2012, 2210 to 2216).
I feel now, and I felt then at the time, that I had the
support. At that time there was no opportunity to
shoot. There was a situation, it was a moment where it
was myself and [another Diplomatic Security Agent], and
we were very close quarters with an overwhelming force
of armed combatants, and at that situation it would not
have been the smart thing, it would not have been the
tactical thing to fire your weapon at that time.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 2 Testimony at 156.
The Diplomatic Security Agents loaded Sean Smith's body in
their vehicle and departed the compound through the main gate.
One Diplomatic Security Agent described what they saw as they
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
exited the compound:
As we were turning left to go outside the compound, we
could see at the end of that access road a lot of cars
and lights and people milling about. I ascertained that
was probably a checkpoint or a blockade. And so we
turned around and went the other way. It was at that
point the attacking force kind of crossed paths with
us, had then they opened fire on our vehicle, and we
continued out.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 138.
Another Diplomatic Security Agent provided further detail
about the extensive attacks they encountered as they fled the
Mission compound.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 158-162; See also,
Comprehensive Timeline of Events--Benghazi, produced by the U.S. Dep't
of State. (Last Edit Nov 01, 2012) (State-SCB0047846).
The situation on the perimeter was getting
substantially worse. As we loaded into the vehicle, the
agent that had been taking in the most smoke that was
in the safe haven with the Ambassador ultimately ends
up being the one to drive. I still don't know why we
allowed him to do that. He did a great job. That
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
adrenaline kicked in.
As we pull out of the compound . . . we start taking
fire. So, as we suspected, the individuals that
attacked us, some of them had remained hidden in the
fruit grove on the compound and were waiting for a
situation to kill us.
So as soon as we got out of the way of the Libyans,
they started shooting the side of our armored vehicle,
on my side of the car actually. Ting ting, ting ting. I
don't know, maybe 10 rounds is what hit us on our left
side.
As we exit the compound, we turn right . . . There is a
large crowd, 40, 50, 60 people. We can't tell if they
are facing us, we can't tell if they are waiting for
us, we don't know. We get, I don't know, 20 or 30 yards
down this road; we see this crowd. We decide it is
something we would rather not encounter. We turn
around.
We go back close to the compound, and there is someone
we presume to be a 17 February member waiting off to
the side by the wall who is waving at us, ``Don't go
this way.'' That is enough for us to turn around. So we
turn around again back toward the crowd, the large
crowd that we don't know their intentions.
* * *
Okay. So we are heading back in the direction we
initially attempted to go. As we get about probably a
third to two thirds to halfway down this road, we
encounter an individual that is pulled off from a small
group of people at a compound. . . . This individual is
waving us into his compound as if to say, you know,
this is somewhere safe, come in and we will protect
you. We decide this is a terrible idea. We all advise
for the driver to just keep going.
The second we pull alongside of this individual he
raises an AK 47 and shoots at pointblank range,
literally pointblank, inches. His gunfire impacts the
entire right side of the vehicle. The ballistic glass
and the armor proofing works, just like it is supposed
to.
He shoots through all the way around the right side, up
in the back window, breaks through the exterior glass,
which is just factory glass, and impacts the ballistic
resistant glass on the inside, which holds.
* * *
So, at the same time this individual is shooting us
with his AK 47, I don't think it is him but another
member of his group throws two grenades under our
vehicle. I specify that they were grenades because they
went off immediately as opposed to being a fuse-lit
explosive like the gelatin bombs we discussed earlier.
Those would have taken a few seconds for the fuse to
burn out. We didn't realize it at the time, but two of
our tires had been blown out.
So, as we pass this gun, possibly a full magazine of
AK-47 fire at pointblank range and two grenades under
our vehicle, and we continue on. We didn't realize it
at the time, but two of our tires had been blown out.
We approach the intersection with the next major road,
where the large group was positioned, and, to our
relief, they are not even paying attention to what is
going on down the road. They have their backs to
us.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 158-163.
As the Diplomatic Security Agents drove away from the
Mission compound toward the Annex, they noticed they were being
followed.\296\ The individuals following the agents detoured to
a warehouse in the vicinity of the Annex near the parking area
where attackers later staged the first attack on the
Annex.\297\ One Diplomatic Security Agent described what
happened when the team arrived at the Annex:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\Id.
\297\Id. See also, Diplomatic Sec. Agent 1 Testimony at 74-75;
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 4 Testimony at 138; Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5
Testimony at 125.
Finally, we were able to turn, kind of get off the main
road there where it was a lot quieter, and then we made
our way to the Annex. Upon arrival at the Annex, you
know, we pulled in, and immediately people came out and
I parked the car, got out of the car, and you know,
their eyeballs were about the size of saucers, just
seeing the car, and seeing us. And immediately, they
brought me into kind of a, you know, the kitchen area,
which is where the med area was. And they just started
pumping me, you know, with fluids, just chugging water,
eating fruit, and my goal was just to get back up on my
feet, get back out and keep fighting.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 127.
The team of five Diplomatic Security Agents arrived with
Smith's body at the Annex at 11:23 p.m. [5:23 p.m. in
Washington].\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 2338).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Back at the Benghazi Mission compound, the GRS team were no
longer facing direct fire. The GRS departed through the
compound's main gate and followed a different route to ensure
no attackers were tailing them.\300\ They arrived at the Annex
approximately 20 minutes later and quickly took up fighting
positions on the roofs of the Annex buildings.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\Video: DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11, 2012, 2219).
\301\GRS 2 Testimony at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the agents and the GRS departed the compound, attacks
continued on the Mission compound with RPGs, small arms fire,
and unknown explosions.\302\ A mix of armed and unarmed
individuals re-entered the compound through the back gate and
subsequently looted the armored vehicles, removed paper and
gear from the TOC, reset fires, and stole an armored Land
Cruiser.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11,
2012, 2219).
\303\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the Mission (Sept. 11,
2012, 2219); see also Email to the DSCC Watch Team and the DSCC Mgmt.
Team (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:59 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409685).
The Twitter account with handle @hadeelaish belonged to Hadeel al-
Shalchi, a journalist for Reuters news.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The First Attack on the Annex
As the situation continued to unfold in Benghazi, the
Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground were periodically
reporting back to the tactical operations center in Tripoli
about the events on the ground. The Tripoli Chief of Station
discussed requests for a medical evacuation:
So the initial question that I asked for our GRS team
lead: Do they need a Medevac, and what Medevac
assistance do they need? At that time they didn't know,
so that was one of our communications to AFRICOM was to
put a warning order or we may be needing Medevac
assistance.
At that time also the location of--we had no
indication--our main priority was the personnel at
the--at the temporary mission facility and the
whereabouts of the Ambassador.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\Chief of Station Testimony at 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
A: I think there was a--and some of the decisions were
an ongoing conversation that I had with our rep in
Stuttgart was about do we need Medevac and where that
Medevac would go. So initially in that, when we were
still looking for the Ambassador and our team was at
the airport, they just got--I didn't say we wanted a
medical--a Medevac at that point because we didn't have
any--I did have conversations with the GRS team lead in
Benghazi: What is the status of your personnel? Do you
need Medevac? And that answer was no at that time, and
the Ambassador was unlocated.
But what played into some of my calculus at that time
was I didn't want to send a U.S. aircraft in Benghazi
and maybe have the same dynamic of getting off the
airport and not knowing what were going to be the
parameters of that situation.
So that was--and the Defense Attache was in that same
conversation with elements in AFRICOM.\305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\Id. at 109.
Just before 12:30 a.m. [6:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.],
individuals congregated and staged gun trucks at the far east
intersection near the Annex. It was unclear to the agents at
the Annex if these individuals were friend or foe. The GRS
agents on the roof asked Annex management whether they were
able to determine who was congregating outside of the
Annex.\306\ The next wave of attackers then used the east field
as cover and concealment to advance toward the Annex wall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\GRS 1 Testimony at 94.
[B]y that time, we had started to see people massing on
that east side parking lot and starting to utilize that
little house that had the family in it. They were
coming through that front door. They would disappear
where the front door was, and you could see them coming
out the back door, and that's when we're trying to get
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
our lights turned off, all the lights, get them off.
Q: So were there floodlights looking out or lighting
the base?
A: Both. We were trying to get the ones looking in. We
were trying to get those floodlights turned off. And
the ones looking out, let them stay on. In the
meantime, I'm calling on the radio going are we
expecting friendlies from chief of base and our team
leader. Are we expecting any friendlies? Are we
expecting any friendlies? And I'm getting, I don't
know, maybe, I don't know. In the meantime, they're
coming towards us, and I'm asking [redacted text], I
said do you see any weapons? Because we're not going to
shoot anybody unless we see a weapon. And you could
tell they're moving tactically. They're moving
sideways. They're playing hide and go seek. They don't
realize we have night vision. Eventually, I'm not going
to call that we got bad guys coming.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\GRS 4 Testimony at 106-107.
The first assault on the Annex itself began at 12:34 a.m.
[6:34 p.m in Washington D.C.], when attackers directed small
arms fire at the Annex hitting the northeast portion of the
property, where Annex Building 2 was located.\308\ An IED was
thrown over the wall near the Annex north recreation area in
the vicinity of a GRS officer on the ground.\309\ One GRS
officer described the beginning of the first attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0034).
\309\GRS 1 Testimony at 94. See also, Video: DVR Footage of the CIA
Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0036).
But then you could hear, like there's a mass of cars
that is forming. We're trying to figure out if it's 17
Feb. or if it was the police or who was it, you know.
Of course, we got nothing back from the TL or the Chief
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of Base.
But as I was walking the water back, something flew
over the wall, exploded about 15 feet or so away from
me. And at the same time, an RPG came up over the wall,
and that's when the first assault on our compound
happened.\310\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\GRS 1 Testimony at 94.
For the next 10 minutes, rounds of small arms fire, RPG
fire and IED explosions impacted the Annex near the northeast
corner.\311\ Concurrently, starting at 12:41 a.m. [6:41 p.m. in
Washington D.C.] the Annex took small arms fire and likely IED
attacks from the east wall also aimed at Annex Building 2.\312\
Over the next 10 minutes, there were attackers that were
visible along the east wall and an explosive impacted against
the east side of the Annex.\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from approximately 0034 to 0045).
\312\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0036 and
0041, respectively).
\313\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from approximately 0040 to 0052).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After being repelled from the first assault, attackers were
still visible in the east field at 12:59 a.m.; however, GRS
refused to fire on their location at this time because their
position was too close to a residence where a local family
lived including children.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\GRS 4 Testimony at 119-120.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Second Attack on the Annex
After being overwhelmed in the first attack, the attackers
regrouped with a more aggressive second attack. At 1:10 a.m.,
this second attack was directed at the Annex, with a RPG
striking Building 2.\315\ The second attack included even
heavier sustained fire and a larger number of attackers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0110).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the next five minutes, there was sustained and heavy
small arms fire from the east perimeter wall, small arms fire
from the northeast corner, RPG strikes from the east field, and
sustained fire.\316\ The attackers retreated after taking heavy
return fire from the Annex. One GRS agent described this
attack:\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from approximately 0110 to 0115).
\317\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from approximately 0110 to 0200).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q: Okay. So the second attack, what happened?
A: It was a lot more force, lasted probably twice as
long as the first one. I got a little bit of shrapnel
from something. I got a bunch of shrapnel from the
light. That was pretty much it. We just repelled that
one. And that was it until 5:15 when the mortars came
in.\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\GRS 1 Testimony at 97-98.
Local Libyans Find Stevens
Shortly before the second attack on the Annex began, at
approximately 1:00 a.m. [7:00 p.m. in Washington] local Libyans
found the remains of Stevens in a bedroom in the main
diplomatic building at the Benghazi Mission. One of the Libyans
asked a member of the Libyan Army to help pull Stevens out of
Villa C. A neighbor from a nearby compound who knew Stevens
interceded and transported Stevens to the hospital.
The Libyan Army officer who helped pull out Stevens'
remains kept the phone that had been with Stevens and began
calling the numbers listed in the phone to report that an
American was located at the hospital. These calls started
around 2:03 a.m [8:03 p.m. in Washington D.C.].\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\Officer A Testimony at 36-37.
I started receiving calls from somebody who claimed to
have the Ambassador's--well, he didn't know that it was
the Ambassador's phone, but he was calling from the
Ambassador's phone, claiming that, you know, he had
come in contact with some, what he suspected, Americans
and found their phone, and he wanted to return the
phone. So, at that point, I was also involved in trying
to find out about the Ambassador's fate at this point
and how this individual was in possession of his
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
telephone.
Q: All right. So you said you received a call from
somebody who allegedly had the Ambassador----
A: A Libyan, yes.
Q: Okay. And how did that person reach out to you? How
did they know to reach out to you?
A: He used the Ambassador's phone and dialed a phone
number that was stored on the phone. And that phone on
the other end belonged to one of the Diplomatic
Security----
* * *
So how did that first conversation go with the
individual on the other end of the line?
A: I tried to get as much information from him as
possible. Initially, he was coy, and he said several
Americans, and I said, okay, well, put them on the
phone. And he said, well, they're not around me right
now. And that was kind of odd. And I asked him if they
were injured or why can't you put them on the phone.
And eventually he said that, yeah, they are in the
hospital, and they cannot talk right now.\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\Id.
The Chief of Station described learning about Stevens'
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
location:
Q: So at some point in the evening you learned the
Ambassador is probably not being held hostage, is
probably deceased. Do you remember about when that was
and what--how you learned that?
A: I learned that--so I had two telephones for the two
different Libyan cellular services. So I learned that
from the Prime Minister's office representative who I
was in contact with. He previously said: Oh, we believe
the Ambassador is at a hospital, we believe he's
unconscious, we believe--you know, can I speak with
him? Oh, no. I'll try to get someone to speak with him.
That was that line.
And then I got indications from the Libyan intelligence
service, the President's office, and the charge or the
DCM at about the same time. We got indications at the
same time base was getting someone to go to identify a
person because we had a base officer in telephonic
communication with someone that had the Ambassador's
phone.
Q: Yeah.
A: So during that whole time we were--knew the
Ambassador's phone was located at that hospital. We had
people telling us the Ambassador's at that hospital. We
didn't know the status of the Ambassador, so--but all
of those things happened within a relatively narrow
timeframe.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\321\Chief of Station Testimony at 122.
Team Tripoli Arrives at Benghazi Airport
At 1:30 a.m. [7:30 p.m. in Washington D.C.], Glen Doherty
and the other members of Team Tripoli landed at the Benghazi
Benina International Airport.\322\ Meanwhile at the Annex,
there was a lull in the fighting.\323\ One of the Team Tripoli
members explained to the Committee the steps taken to obtain
transportation from the Benghazi airport to the Annex:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\323\Special Operator Testimony at 52-53. See also, Video: DVR
Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0158).
Q: Was anyone present from the Libyan armed forces or
local militia that you could liaison with upon arrival
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in Benghazi?
A: Not as soon as we landed sir.
Q: Okay. And you arrived at Benina airport?
A: We did.
Q: And what was the nature of activity going on at
Benina at 02 in the morning?
A: It was completely dead. We were the only plane that
had landed in quite some time, it looked like, and the
guard actually came out in his pajamas and asked us
what was going on.
Q: Okay. So there was no airport personnel. This was
not a 24/7 airport?
A: I don't think so, sir. It didn't appear to be. Only
one individual came out to meet us once we had landed,
and it was clear that he had been sleeping before
that.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\Special Operator Testimony at 52-53.
When Team Tripoli arrived at the airport, ``the Ambassador
was still missing.''\325\ While trying to secure transport at
the airport, Team Tripoli was receiving information Stevens was
located at a hospital in Benghazi. One Team Tripoli member
said, ``One of the local militia had told us that he--they
thought he was at the hospital. Reporting had indicated he was
at the hospital.''\326\ The Chief of Station added details
about their concern regarding the information they were
receiving:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\Id. at 55.
\326\Id. at 55-56.
That whole atmosphere of getting drawn into that
correspondence that our officer had with that
individual who had the Ambassador's phone had a lot of
the hallmarks of some type of entrapment. It wasn't
straight up. It didn't--it wasn't: We have the
Ambassador here, you want to come and get him. It was
much more convoluted than that. So we were very leery
of--that was just a very high security posture as we
were going through.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\Chief of Station Testimony at 125.
Based on their coordination and planning prior to leaving
Tripoli, the Team expected to be met at the airport by elements
of the Libyan Shield militia. When they arrived, however, no
one was present at the airport.\328\ One of the Team Tripoli
special operators described what they encountered:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\Special Operator Testimony at 52.
We didn't have a mode of transportation that was ours,
so we were depending on those local militias. So it
took us that long to find one that was capable of
taking us into town. Again, initially we were trying to
go to the hospital, which we were all being told, ``No,
we can't take you to the hospital. We can take you to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the annex.''
So that fight went on for a little while, with us
thinking that he could possibly be at the hospital
needing medical care. So we were pushing hard enough to
go there that it prolonged our time at the airport.
Then once we found out he was deceased, we had
obviously gave that up, and they had no problem taking
us to the annex.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\Id. at 58-59.
While at the airport, Team Tripoli was alerted that
Stevens' [redacted text] personal tracking device--was pinging
``within 25 meters of their current location on the
airfield.''\330\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\Request 1-004067 IntBook 6-044.
Q: Okay. So I want to direct your attention to the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
first page of exhibit 1, the last bullet?
A: Okay.
Q: It reads: ``Note: TF Green member informed [redacted
text] that the AMBOs [redacted text]''--does that mean
[personal tracking device]?
A: Correct.
Q: ``It was pinging, and its location was within 25
meters of their current location on the airfield.
Several militia members and vehicles were on the
airfield and vehicles at the time.'' So just to be
clear, how did you learn about that [personal tracking
device] pinging?
A: My TL told me at the time because when that militia
drove up, [redacted text] and I were unpacking gear,
and we were situating. And I was checking my gear and
that's when our TL came up and advised us what was
going on in reference to the ping.
Q: So the TF Green individual would have informed the
TL and he told you?
A: Could have been.
Q: What was your assessment at the time of the
significance of that attack?
A: That someone was near the Ambassador, or at least
recovered some of his gear or his phone or his
[personal tracking device] system. Somehow they had his
belongings.
Q: And they were standing very close to your team?
A: Correct.
* * *
Q: So obviously, you talked about how one of your
primary missions was to locate the Ambassador. And then
you learned while you were at the airport that the
Ambassador's [personal tracking device] is pinging
within 25 meters of your current location. Did you or
the other team members find that odd?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you elaborate on that?
A: It was unusual that somebody had some of the
Ambassador's belongings.
Q: Okay.
A: Especially his [personal tracking device]. I don't
know if it was his cell phone pinging, how they got the
ping, or his personal [tracking device], but it was odd
that they had some of his equipment.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\Testimony of GRS Tripoli, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 32-35
(June 23, 2015) [hereinafter GRS Tripoli Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
For the next three-plus hours after their arrival in
Benghazi, Team Tripoli attempted to secure transportation from
the airport to the hospital. Because Team Tripoli did not have
full awareness of the local militias operating in Benghazi, nor
relationships with local militias to contact for assistance,
they relied on a Libya Shield official in Tripoli to vet the
local militia elements that showed up at the airport offering
assistance. Much of their time at the airport was spent
identifying the ``least of several bad options'' as it related
to choosing a militia for transport.\332\ The Team's Tripoli
contact recommended seeking transport with another branch of
the Libya Shield, as the branch prearranged to transport them
never arrived.\333\ One Team Tripoli member stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\Special Operator Testimony at 56-57.
\333\Id. at 57.
Q: Did you have any sense during the 2 and-a-half hours
that you spent at Benina airport that you were being
prevented from departing the airport? Could you have
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
left at any time from 02 to 0430?
A: We didn't have a mode of transportation that was
ours, so we were depending on those local militias. So
it took us that long to find one that was capable of
taking us unto town. Again, initially we were trying to
go to the hospital, which we were all being told, ``No,
we can't take you to the hospital. We can take you to
the Annex.'' So that fight went on for a little while,
with us thinking that he [the Ambassador] could
possibly be at the hospital needing medical care. So we
were pushing hard enough to go there that it prolonged
our time at the airport. Then once we found out he was
deceased, we had obviously gave that up, and they had
no problem taking us to the Annex.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\Id. at 62-63.
The group that escorted Team Tripoli to the Annex was a
branch of Libya Shield operating that night under [redacted
text].\335\ According to a member of Team Tripoli, this was
their ``less bad'' option for transport that night given the
difficulty of trusting militias in a city where many have
Islamist leanings and an anti-Western sentiment after the
involvement of NATO in the Libya Revolution.\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\Id. at 55.
\336\Id.
Q: And how were you going to proceed? What was the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
nature of your transport from Benina to the Annex?
A: The Libya Shield commander had several gun trucks
that we were using, as well as some Land Cruisers, to
get us to the Annex.
Q: And this again, Libya Shield 2, the less bad element
of the militia?
A: Less bad, yes.\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\Id.
Team Tripoli left the airport at approximately 4:30
a.m.\338\ A team member provided the Committee the following
background information for their intended mission at the time,
as it had transitioned from locating and potentially rescuing
Stevens to an effort to start evacuating nonessential personnel
from Benghazi back to Tripoli.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\Id. at 51.
Q: [W]hat did you understand about your mission as you
were heading from Benina airport to the Annex? Was your
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mission then evacuation of nonessential personnel?
A: It was nonessential personnel only prior to the
mortar attack happening . . . we were going to take 14
personnel back with us to the airport, let the jet take
off, take them back to Tripoli. We were going to come
back to the Annex and help hold up with the GRS guys
until further notice . . . the majority of those people
[the GRS would have stayed there. Shooters, if you
will.\339\ . . . [W]e did not make the decisions for
that [airplane] to come back. We didn't know how long
we were going to have to stay at the Annex. We were
under the understanding they wanted to stay. They did
not want to leave. So we were just trying to get the
nonessential personnel out to get further direction
from Chief of Station back in Tripoli on what he wanted
them to do . . . I believe it was the Chief of Base
that wanted to keep some individuals there.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\Id. at 69-70.
\340\Id. at 70.
THE WHITE HOUSE CONVENES A MEETING
While Team Tripoli was urgently seeking transportation from
the Benghazi airport to either the hospital or the Annex, Denis
McDonough, the Deputy Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs convened a secure video teleconference meeting
at 7:30 p.m. in Washington with the State Department and the
Department of Defense.\341\ The State Department attendees
included: Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff; Jacob J. Sullivan,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Planning; Stephen D. Mull,
Executive Secretary; Wendy R. Sherman, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs; and Kennedy and the Secretary.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\See Email from Cheryl D. Mills to Beth E. Jones et al. (Sept.
11, 2012 7:03 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0066272) (``SVTC AT
7:30PM WITH WHITE HOUSE'').
\342\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Department was represented by Jeremy B. Bash,
Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, and Tidd.\343\ The
two representatives who normally would have participated in the
meeting--the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy--did not do so that
night.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the four hours since the initial attack on the Benghazi
Mission compound, the Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi,
with help from the team from the Annex, survived the initial
onslaught, located the remains of their fallen colleague Smith,
frantically searched for Stevens, escaped under heavy gunfire
from the Mission compound to the Annex, avoided an ambush along
the route, and arrived at the Annex only to withstand and repel
additional attacks there.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\Email to Victoria Nuland, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 5:32 PM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB0068365-67) (forwarding chain of emails
regarding updates on the events in Libya).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Team Tripoli, after learning of the attack in Benghazi,
quickly developed a plan to render assistance, secured private
aircraft in Tripoli, packed gear, planned a mission, flew from
Tripoli to Benghazi, and urgently negotiated with unknown
militias seeking transportation to either the hospital or the
Annex.
By stark contrast, in those same four hours, principals in
Washington had merely managed to identify forces that could
potentially deploy to Libya and convened a meeting to discuss
those forces.
Despite the Secretary of Defense's clear directive and his
intention that forces would move and move quickly, no forces
had yet moved. Over 13 hours after the attack began, the first
force--the farthest away--deployed. It would take nearly 18
hours for the FAST team to move, and over 20 hours from the
beginning of the attack before the CIF moved.
Forces are ``Spinning Up As We Speak.''
Moments before the White House meeting began, Bash emailed
several people including Mills and Sullivan, notifying them of
the assets the Secretary had ordered to respond to the attacks.
He wrote:
After Consulting with General Dempsey, General Ham and
the Joint Staff, we have identified the forces that
could move to Benghazi. They are spinning up as we
speak. They include a SOF element that was in Croatia
(which can fly to Suda [sic] Bay, Crete) and a Marine
FAST team out of Roda [sic], Spain.
Assuming Principals agree to deploy these elements, we
will ask State to secure the approval from host nation.
Please advise how you wish to convey that approval to
us. Burns/Nides/Sherman to Miller/Winnefeld would be my
recommended course.\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\345\Email from Jeremy Bash to Jacob J. Sullivan (Sept. 11, 2012
7:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, STATE-SCB0060705).
Even though the Secretary had already issued the order to
deploy the identified forces and testified he fully expected
his order was being carried out at the time, the plan was to
``work through this issue'' during the White House
meeting.\346\ As the Secretary reinforced: ``I had the
authority to deploy those forces. And I didn't have to ask
anyone's permission to get those forces into place.''\347\ The
Secretary further said his approach was ``we need to move them
and move them as fast as we can in order to respond. So I
wanted no interference with those orders to get them
deployed.''\348\ In fact, the Secretary added that during the
meeting at the Pentagon, his orders were simultaneously being
conveyed to those forces.\349\ He noted: ``[T]hese are elite
units, and the purpose of these units is to move when I give
the order to move, and that's what I expected.''\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. (Sept. 11,
2012 7:21 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075439).
\347\Panetta Testimony at 32.
\348\Id. at 33.
\349\Id. at 34.
\350\Id. at 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Curiously, the two members of the Defense Department Bash
identified in his ``spinning up'' email as the proper persons
to ``convey'' ``approval from the host nation''--Winnefeld and
Miller--were not part of the White House meeting. In fact,
Winnefeld was not even at the Pentagon. He had left to return
to his residence to host a dinner party for foreign dignitaries
and testified he received one update on the events during the
dinner. After the dinner concluded around 10 p.m., he went to
the secure communications facility in his home. An hour later,
the mortar attacks began. Likewise, Miller was not at the
Pentagon due to an unexpected family emergency. He asked Bash
to participate in the White House meeting in his stead.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\Miller Testimony at 63-64. Miller testified he attempted to
participate in the meeting from his home, but was unable to connect to
the call.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Purpose of Meeting
Despite the Secretary's expectation the assets he ordered
to deploy would move as fast as possible in order to respond,
the individuals who participated in the White House meeting,
nevertheless, felt the need to ``work through'' the assets the
Secretary had already ordered to deploy.\352\ At the time of
the White House meeting, the final decision about which assets
to deploy had apparently not been made, according to them,
despite the Secretary's recollection and testimony to the
contrary. Tidd testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. (Sept. 11,
2012 7:21 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075439).
Q: And at the time of the meeting, what was the status
of the assets that you all discussed? Were they
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
preparing to deploy?
A: They were alerted. The final decision had not yet
been made definitively, as I recall, but we came out of
that meeting basically: send everything.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\Tidd Testimony at 23-24; see also, Email from Jacob J.
Sullivan to Jeremy Bash, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 7:21 PM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0075439) (``We should work through this issue in that
venue.'').
Tidd described the purpose of the meeting convened by the
White House as an opportunity to share information across
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
agencies.
It was an information exchange to cross-level what does
everybody know, is there any new information. The
intelligence community was obviously providing
information on other things that were going on, other
locations that State was providing information on,
other embassies where they had concerns. FBI. It was a
general kind of a roundtable and round robin of
everybody going around and passing out what information
they had, what did they know. And then what were the
asks. And then an opportunity for us to be able to say
-- when we got to the military, we talked about these
are the type of forces that we can deploy, and here's
what we know, here's what we think, and here's what our
recommendations are.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\Tidd Testimony at 21-22.
Mills said essentially the same thing: ``[T]he [White House
meeting] was called because everyone was seeking both to
exchange information and figure out how to coordinate resources
to support our team.''\355\ Kennedy said this about the White
House meeting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\355\Mills Testimony at 47.
The [meeting] was mainly, to the best of my
recollection, simply a conforming of information, a
sharing of information. Make sure everybody had the
same understanding and everyone was doing whatever they
could in their lane of responsibility to proceed.\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Mgmt., State
Dep't, Tr. at 112 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He elaborated:
Conforming, conforming means, in effect, reconciling.
That I have heard this, you have heard that, what have
you heard? Trying to make sure that we all, meaning
across the entire U.S. Government, had the clearest
coherent understanding of what was going on in the fog
of war.\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\357\Id. at 155.
Winnefeld typically would have participated in the meeting
that night. However, after being notified of the attacks, he
departed the Pentagon that night to attend a dinner engagement.
Despite not participating in the discussion, Winnefeld
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained why the White House meeting would be called:
[W]henever something like this happens, whether it's a
hostage rescue, or you name it, particularly an
emergent event, there's always a [meeting] like this,
and there are a lot of really good points brought up by
interagency partners about considerations and--in
stream. They're very useful events, and we can very
quickly resolve questions, like, does anybody have any
objections if we sent forces into Tripoli? My
supposition here is that that was a very quickly
resolved; nobody has objections.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\Winnefeld Testimony at 80-81.
From the Defense Department's perspective, it was an
opportunity to notify the State Department and the White House
of the assets it could deploy in response to the attacks as
ordered by the Secretary and to seek concurrence.\359\
Winnefeld explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\See Email from Jeremy Bash to Jacob J. Sullivan (Sept. 11,
2012 7:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, STATE-SCB0060705).
[M]y sense is that the deputies sort of coordinated on
what DOD intended to do. So the Secretary has decided
he wanted to deploy the CIF and the [U.S. Based SOF]
and the FAST platoons. That was exposed to the deputies
in the deputies SVTC, and they all concurred with that.
. . .\360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\360\Winnefeld Testimony at 84. Winnefeld further explained that
had there been a disagreement ``the Secretary probably would have said:
Look, get them moving anyway. And then he would be on the phone with
the White House.'' Id. at 79-80.
Of course, Winnefeld did not participate in this particular
White House meeting. Witnesses who actually were present and
appeared before the Committee were surprisingly unable to
recall details regarding the various issues and discussions
during the White House meeting.
The Committee was, however, able to uncover several emails
from participants summarizing the meeting. In striking contrast
to the Secretary's testimony, one summary of the White House
Meeting listed the theme of the meeting, not as deploying
forces in an active tense, but as ``getting forces ready to
deploy'' in a future tense.\361\ Another summary described the
deployment of assets in response to Benghazi as ``likely'' and
``possibly'' that evening.\362\ According to these summaries,
the conclusion from the meeting was that forces were not going
to deploy ``until order comes, to go to either Tripoli or
Benghazi.''\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
\362\Email to Harold Hongju Koh, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05528017) (``There is likely to be a
deployment very quickly, possibly this evening.'').
\363\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But the Secretary was unequivocal the order had already
come: President Obama, as the Commander in Chief, said do
everything you can to help our people in Libya.\364\ As the
Secretary of Defense, he ordered assets to deploy--active tense
with no further explanation, amplification, or instruction
needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\Panetta Testimony at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The two-hour ``meeting''--in which neither the Commander in
Chief nor the Secretary of Defense participated--was in fact
much more detailed and involved than witnesses suggested and
presents a new perspective on what was happening and being
discussed in Washington D.C. even while an Ambassador was
missing and a second U.S. facility was under attack half a
world away.
Discussions During the 7:30 White House Meeting
DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE
The issue of securing host nation approval, the last aspect
of Bash's email, was discussed during the 7:30 White House
meeting. According to a write-up of notes taken by Mull, the
State Department emphasized any deployment of U.S. Forces into
Libya needed approval from the Government of Libya.
Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case
the crisis expands and a real threat materializes
against Embassy Tripoli. DOD will send the details to
U/S/Kennedy (i.e. plane numbers, troop numbers,
airfield support needs, etc.) for us to make request to
government of Libya (GOL).
* * *
Congressional angle: If any deployment is made,
Congress will need to be notified under the War Powers
Act . . . Libya must agree to any deployment.\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\365\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
On the ground in Tripoli, the Defense Attache had already
begun working to obtain flight clearances from the Libyan
government before the White House meeting even began.\366\
Initially, he notified the Libyan government of a potential
request for flight clearances as the night progressed.\367\
Because he had given advance notice to the Libyan government
that potential flight clearances would be needed, he fully
expected the Libyan government to approve any formal request
when it was made. He noted, however, that to submit a formal
request, specific information about the tail numbers, expected
arrival of the aircraft, the number of personnel, and types of
weapons had to be conveyed to the Libyan government.\368\ Not
only did a formal request have to be made, a representative of
the Libyan government had to be available to receive the
paperwork for that request. There was no Libyan representative
on duty overnight.\369\ As to when formal approval was
received, the Defense Attache testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\Testimony of Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't
of Defense, Tr. at 113-114 (Jan. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Defense Attache
2014 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\367\Id.
\368\Id.
\369\Id. at 114.
Q: Can you recall when the actual--the relevant
information that was needed, like tail numbers and
things, when was that transmitted to the Government of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Libya?
A: I don't. But I would also come back to the fact that
we had a green light from the Government of Libya to
bring it in. It was just a question of when we were
going to know the specific information that goes into a
standard flight clearance request. So it had to have
been, I would say, sometime midmorning to noon on the
12th. It could have been, I would say, sometime
midmorning to noon on the 12th. It could have been a
little bit after that.
Q: And that's when you received the relevant
information you need to pass on, or what happened?
A: Probably both. In the course of the morning, leading
up to the afternoon, we got the information we
required, and then we were able to subsequently
transmit it to the Libyans.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\Defense Attache Testimony at 159-160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CIVILIAN CLOTHES
A request for the FAST Platoon to wear civilian attire
appears to have generated from Kennedy during the White House
meeting.\371\ Kennedy, during his interview with the Committee,
was unable to recall when the discussion regarding civilian
attire was held that evening, but provided the following
information about the substance of the discussion:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\See Email from Benjamin I. Fishman, Nat'l Sec. Council (Sept.
11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB000029-30).
[Y]ou wanted to make sure that the steps we were taking
would enhance the security of our personnel, not
potentially diminish the security of our personnel. Our
personnel had been consolidated in Tripoli in one
location, and all of them were there with the
multiplied security forces of both the prime building
and the Annex building. And I recall this discussion,
generally speaking, and it was determined that the
delay was not going to be significant and it was better
to have the forces arrive in civilian clothes[.]\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\Kennedy Testimony at 173.
Tidd elaborated on the State Department's request for the
FAST platoon to arrive in Libya in civilian clothing. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Again, like I said, they wanted to minimize the
signature that looked like a big military invasion, a
big military arrival there. And the reason that I
remember the discussion was I had to go back and find
and make sure, as the FAST had moved out and was
waiting for lift, and the question that I had to go
back and ask AFRICOM was: in their rucksacks did they
have civilian clothes that they could put on, or was
this going to entail having to go back to their
barracks and draw that equipment. They had what they
needed, and so they didn't have to go anyplace.
At the [White House] meeting, I couldn't speak for
them. And I wanted to go back and verify that. Because
what I wanted to know is: is it more important to get
them there or to have the signature in civilian
clothes? As it turned out, it didn't matter, because
they had the civilian clothes with them already.\373\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\373\Tidd Testimony at 28.
Tidd did not agree that requiring the FAST platoon to wear
civilian clothes was a step that would enhance security.\374\
The Defense Department assessed the impact of the requirement
as quite the opposite: it created an increased risk to the FAST
platoon members as they traveled through Tripoli.\375\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\374\See State Dep't Email (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM) (on file with
the Committee, C05528017) (``[T]here was discussion of the option of
entering in plainclothes. . . .'').
\375\See id. (``[The Joint Chiefs of Staff] explained . . . that
the risks to the forces [] remaining in plainclothes increased as they
transited from point of entry to the relevant location of action'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summaries of the White House meeting did not, in fact,
highlight the potential security-enhancing benefit of the FAST
platoon wearing civilian clothes. Instead, the benefit of
having the FAST platoon wear civilian clothing was to cater to
unexpressed Libyan government concerns about military
appearances and to avoid ``any impression of a U.S. invasion of
Libya.''\376\ As Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy National Security
Advisor for Strategic Communications, stated in an email to his
colleague at the end of the meeting: ``[T]he time for being
overly sensitive to Libyan concerns about military appearances
seems to be over.''\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037) (``We made a request that any
deployments should be in plain clothes to avoid any impression of a
U.S. invasion of Libya.''); see also State Dep't Email (Sept. 11, 2012
10:40 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05528017) (``Apparently Pat K
expressed concern on the SVTC about Libyan reaction if uniformed US
forces arrived in country in military aircraft''); Email from Benjamin
I. Fishman (Sept. 11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB000029-30) (``I don't know why Pat Kennedy is so concerned about
what extra securit y [sic] folks are wearing. Does that come from Greg
[Hicks]? The time for being overly sensitive to Libyan concerns about
military appearances seems to be over.'').
\377\Email from Benjamin I. Fishman (Sept. 11, 2012 9:19 PM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB000029).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Plan from the Meeting
Although the Secretary told the Committee he fully expected
his order to deploy was the only step needed to move forces in
response to the attacks, records obtained by the Committee
reflect a different understanding by others on the night of the
attacks.
One email seems to indicate others may not have viewed the
order as being as clear and immediate as the Secretary
recalled. It read in relevant part:
Per Amb. Mull, ROUGH notes from the 1930 [7:30 p.m.]
EDT SVTC meeting:
Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case
the crisis expands and a real threat materializes
against Embassy Tripoli. DOD will send the details to
U/S Kennedy (i.e. plane numbers, troop numbers,
airfield support needs, etc.) for us to make requests
to government of Libya (GOL).\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
There were 10 Action items from the White House
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
meeting:
The first two action items in that email were redacted and
not provided to the Committee. The next three items read as
follows:
3) LFleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST): about
[redacted text] Marines, they need six hours to
prepare. They're currently at the Rota Air Base in
Spain and will wait to deploy. Will not deploy until
order comes to go to either Tripoli or Benghazi. We
made a request that any deployments should be in plain
clothes to avoid any impression of a U.S. invasion of
Libya.
4) LCongressional angle: If any deployment is made,
Congress would need to be notified under the War Powers
Act. Counselor Mills is working with L and H on this
and it may come through Ops. Libya must agree to any
deployment.
5) LEfforts are continuing to locate Ambassador
Stevens.
A/S Beth Jones will work to reach out to the hospital
to confirm the identity of the patient. . . .\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\Id.
Phrases such as ``getting forces ready to deploy'' and
forces ``will not deploy until order comes to go to either
Tripoli or Benghazi'' do not reflect an imminent deployment of
the assets as ordered by the Secretary and as he testified
before the Committee.
The declarative ``Libya must agree to any deployment'' is
also inconsistent with what the Secretary testified to and
similarly inconsistent with what the Secretary recalled
President Obama telling him. At no point, according the
Secretary of Defense, did a U.S. response to the attacks in
Benghazi hinge on Libya agreeing with the actions ordered.\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\Panetta Testimony at 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mull's summary of the White House meeting is, however, more
consistent with Tidd's recollection of the meeting.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\Email from State Dep't Operations Ctr. Watch Officer, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another email regarding the meeting with the White House
reads in relevant part:
All, I just got off a conference call with [State
Department employee] who reported on a [White House
meeting] this evening concerning the violence against
USG facilities and personnel in Libya and Egypt, of
which you likely have gotten separate notice.
S[ecretary Clinton], Pat K[ennedy], and Beth Jones
(possibly among others) attended for State. In short,
there was a significant attack in Benghazi on the US
consulate where the US Ambassador and 7 other USG
employees were present[.]
There is likely to be a deployment very quickly,
possibly this evening, of forces to assist in Libya.
Beth Jones is tasked with seeking consent of the GOL
asap for entry into the country. Options under
consideration for the deployment include: (1) a FAST
team; (2) a [U.S.-Based SOF] . . . ; and (3) a
Commander's Force. . . . DOD indicated they would
circulate additional information on the options/
decisions in the morning and we will need to be
prepared to do a quick War Powers assessment and
probably report by COB tomorrow.
* * *
Apparently Pat K[ennedy] expressed concern on the
[White House meeting] about Libyan reaction if
uniformed US forces arrived in country in military
aircraft; there was discussion of the option of
entering in plainclothes, which JCS explained was
possible but noted that the risks to the forces to
remaining in plainclothes increased as they transited
from point of entry to the relevant location of
action.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\382\State Dep't Email (Sept. 11, 2012 10:40 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05528017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another email framed the issue as follows:
4The U.S. military has begun notifying special units of
likely deployment, with ultimate disposition pending
State coordination with the Libyan government and final
approval by the White House.
State remains concerned that any U.S. military
intervention be fully coordinated with the Libyan
Government and convey Libyan concerns that [sic] about
U.S. military presence, to include concerns that
wheeled military vehicles should not be used and U.S.
Military Forces should consider deploying in civilian
attire.\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\Testimony of Jeremy Bash, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep't of
Defense, Tr. at 98-99 (Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Bash Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
The plan described in this email was later conveyed to the
Combatant Commands. While Bash's ``spinning up'' email
indicated these forces were prepared to go to Benghazi vice
Tripoli, it was clear by the end of the White House meeting
that no forces were going to Benghazi.\384\ It is worth noting
that while this meeting was ongoing and even after it ended,
Diplomatic Security Agents, the team from the Annex, and Team
Tripoli were under attack at the Annex and Stevens was still
missing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\Email from Jeremy Bash, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep't of Defense,
to Jacob Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy, U.S. Dep't of
State (Sept. 11, 2012 1919) (on file with the Committee: STATE-
SCB0060705).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These emails confirm the understanding among the
individuals participating in the White House meeting that
deployment to Benghazi was not imminent. As the Defense
Department timeline shows, none of the orders given to the
assets that night contained an order to deploy to
Benghazi.\385\ The FAST platoons were ordered to prepare to
deploy, not to deploy.\386\ The CIF and the U.S. based SOF were
ordered to deploy only to an intermediate staging base, not to
Benghazi or Tripoli.\387\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\385\See generally, U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\386\Id.
\387\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, once the decision to activate the U.S. based SOF
was made, the CIF was no longer an option to deploy to Libya as
its mission then became to prepare for the arrival of the U.S.
based Special Operations Force at the intermediate staging
base.
Once the forces were ready to deploy, a subsequent execute
order would then have to be given by the Secretary of Defense.
This is inconsistent with the Secretary's belief that no
further order was necessary from either the President or
himself.
Admiral Tidd had this to say about deploying a FAST Team to
Benghazi:
We were looking at two FAST teams, but it very, very
soon became evident that everybody was leaving
Benghazi. And so I don't remember if it was just before
the [White House meeting] or during the [meeting] or
just right after. By the time we came out of the
[meeting], it was pretty clear that nobody was going to
be left in Benghazi. And so the decision--I think, at
the [meeting], there was some discussion--but as I
recall, we weren't going to send them to Benghazi,
because everybody was going to be back in Tripoli by
the time we could actually get them there.
* * *
And I think even at this point we knew that everybody
had moved--they had moved from the temporary diplomatic
facility, they moved to the Annex, and they were moving
or going to be moving, if they had not already begun
moving, from the Annex to the airport, and would be
leaving at the airport as quickly as they could.
So it was pretty clear we weren't going to be able to
get anything into Benghazi before the last people left.
So, I don't think we ever went beyond the notion of
moving the FAST into--the FAST platoon into
Tripoli.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\Tidd Testimony at 25-27.
While it may have been ``pretty clear'' to Tidd that
``nobody was going to be left in Benghazi,'' it was not at all
clear to those in Benghazi who were manning a rooftop
exchanging gunfire with attackers.\389\ Furthermore, the
Diplomatic Security Agents and team from the Annex had to fight
their way even from the Benghazi Mission compound to the Annex
a short distance away while Team Tripoli had to negotiate with
unknown militias for transportation from the Benghazi airport
to the Annex. So, how the principals in Washington were certain
U.S. personnel in Benghazi were going to be leaving Benghazi
and how they were going to be leaving is itself unclear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\Id. at 25-27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is uncertainty attached to other statements made
during the White House meeting too:
``State remains concerned that any U.S. military
intervention be fully coordinated with the Libyan
Government and convey Libyan concerns that [sic] about
U.S. military presence, to include concerns that
wheeled military vehicles should not be used and U.S.
Military Forces should consider deploying in civilian
attire.''
``DOD indicated they would circulate additional
information on the options/decisions in the morning and
we will need to be prepared to do a quick War Powers
assessment and probably report by COB tomorrow.''
``Libya must agree to any deployment.''
``Overall theme: getting forces ready to deploy in case
the crisis expands and a real threat materializes
against Embassy Tripoli.''
This sentence is illuminating on a number of levels,
including: ``getting forces ready to deploy in case the crisis
expands'' begs the question of expanding how and where? At the
time of the White House meeting, Sean Smith was dead,
Ambassador Stevens was missing, and the remaining State
Department personnel had to be rescued by the Team from the
Annex while sustaining gunfire en route back to the Annex.
Moreover the second clause in that sentence references a ``real
threat'' materializing against ``Embassy Tripoli.'' The real
threat at the time was and remained in Benghazi.
Among the questions left even in the aftermath of
investigating what happened before, during and after the
attacks in Benghazi is how so many decision makers in
Washington and elsewhere were unaware of the Annex in Benghazi
and how the Washington decision-makers expected U.S. personnel
remaining in Benghazi to evacuate or defend themselves for a
prolonged period of time without assistance.
The Orders: Prepare to Deploy and Deploy to an ISB
At 8:39 p.m., more than five hours after the attacks in
Benghazi began and more than two hours after the Secretary gave
his order to deploy, the Pentagon finally transmitted orders to
the combatant commands regarding the FAST platoons, the CIF,
and the U.S. Based Special Operations Force.\390\ Specifically,
the FAST platoons were ordered to ``prepare to deploy.''\391\
The CIF and the U.S. Based Special Operations Force were
ordered to deploy to an intermediate staging base.\392\ No
asset was ordered to deploy to Benghazi.\393\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\Email from Tidd (Sept. 11, 2012 8:53PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB001376). See also, Letter from Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of
Defense, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Select Committee on Benghazi,
Apr. 8, 2015, providing an explanation regarding the unclassified
timeline:
Has the U.S Department of Defense identified any
information that would warrant any adjustments, correction
or modification to the unclassified timeline it provide to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress on November 9, 2012?
One Point of clarification: the unclassified timeline has
the SecDef Vocal Order (VOCO) for moving response forces at
0000-0200. This authorization was relayed and recorded at
0239 for FAST and CIF and at 0253 for [the U.S. SOF]. This
is not to imply that timing of the VOCO as reflected in the
unclassified timeline is inaccurate, but rather that
receipt of this vocal order at [sic] was at 0239 and 0253,
respectively.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\Id.
\392\Id.
\393\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tidd provided authorization for each of those forces to
move in an email transmitting the orders at 8:53 p.m. [2:53
a.m. in Benghazi]. The email reads in relevant part:
discussions at Deputies, and followed up between [the
Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the Chairman--
--
[The Secretary of Defense] has directed deployment of
the CIF to the [intermediate staging base] determined
most suitable by AFRICOM . . .
[The Secretary of Defense] has directed deployment of
the [U.S. Based Special Operations Force] to the same
[intermediate staging base] as the CIF.
[The Secretary of Defense] has directed FAST to make
all preps to deploy but hold departure until we are
sure we have clearance to land in Tripoli. We'll work
with State to nail that down, but intent is to get
security force augmentation into [Tripoli/Tripoli] (not
Benghazi, at least not initially) ASAP. Embassy making
efforts to move all [American citizens] from [Annex]
Compound Benghazi to Tripoli, possibly using same
[commercial] Air that 5-pax team arrived on.
* * *
Remember [the Secretary of Defense] holds final
approval to deploy FAST, pending receipt of Tripoli
country clearance. But the point is to get the Marines
on the ground securing the embassy in Tripoli as
rapidly as we can move them.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tidd testified about his email:
I'm looking at the timelines here, and I'm--I am
thinking that--that [Deputy Director for Operations]
had a conference call with the various watch centers of
the commands that are listed here as a result of the
decisions that came out of the [White House] meeting.
And so the things that you see upfront--the [Secretary
of Defense] [vocal order], the things to move, and then
also forwarded request for information from AFRICOM and
EUCOM for the following--I am guessing at this point
now, but I think this might have been in response to--I
gave him a verbal dump from the Deputies Committee
meeting. He had this conference call. This is a report
back with the information from the conference call. And
then I turned around and replied on top of that with
subsequent information that had been provided from
phone calls that I had had at the same time.\395\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\Tidd Testimony at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winnefeld also provided his understanding of Tidd's email:
All this is doing is reporting out what the Secretary
has directed to do. And [Tidd] would not put this out
unless the deputies had concurred with it. If the
deputies had not concurred with the SecDef deciding to
do these things, that would have been a big issue, but
it wasn't. The deputies obviously concurred, so [Tidd]
put it out: Hey, this is now official; Secretary says
do this.\396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\Winnefeld Testimony at 85. Winnefeld further explained that
had there been a disagreement ``the Secretary probably would have said:
Look, get them moving anyway. And then he would be on the phone with
the White house.'' Id. at 87.
It is unclear why concurrence from anyone attending the
White House meeting was needed. The National Command Authority,
the lawful source of military orders, consists of two people:
the President and the Secretary of Defense.\397\ Neither of
them attended that meeting. Both the President and Secretary
Panetta had already issued their orders. As the Secretary made
clear:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\See Panetta Testimony at 32. Panetta elaborated, ``My
directions were clear; those forces were to be deployed, period. . . .
So I wanted no interference with those orders to get them deployed.''
Id. at 33.
I had the authority to deploy those forces. And I
ordered those forces to be deployed. And I didn't have
to ask anybody's permission to get those forces in
place.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PREPARE TO DEPLOY
The orders issued to the forces that night were different
from the orders the Secretary gave earlier that evening. The
Secretary had this to say about the orders he issued that
night:
Q: I just want to make sure this portion of the record
is fair to you and that your testimony has the clarity
that I think it has, but I'm going to give you an
opportunity if I'm wrong.
You did not issue an order to prepare to deploy. You
issued an order to deploy.
A: That's correct.
Q: So no one would have been waiting on you to issue a
subsequent order?
A: That's correct.\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\Id. at 49.
Leidig described the difference between a ``prepare to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
deploy'' order and an ``execute'' order:
They are two very distinct orders in the military. The
first is prepare to deploy. And that's basically
guidance from my boss, in this case, the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman, that you have permission to
make every preparation necessary to execute this
mission. But you do not have permission to actually to
deploy them yet--you don't have permission to execute
the mission.\400\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\Leidig 2014 Testimony at 64-65.
In contrast, Miller testified his understanding was an
order to deploy has no operational distinction from an order to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
prepare to deploy:
The initial order was to deploy to forward basing in
order to be able to then refuel if necessary, prepare
to any additional degree necessary, which can largely
be done in flight for these forces, to the extent that
they weren't already as they got on the plane, and then
to deploy into Libya.
[T]he order could have come in one of two ways, and
it's a technical difference that in this instance and
in any other instance has no operational impact, one
form of the order says deploy to the intermediate
staging base and prepare to deploy into Libya, and that
additional authorization will be given prior to
deployment into Libya; a second says deploy to the
intermediate staging base and proceed to Libya unless
given direction not to do so.
I don't know which of those--I don't recall which of
those was in the order, but in any event, it's well
understood that no time should elapse awaiting. In
other words, if the form was to go to the ISB, go to
the intermediate staging base and then get additional
authority, it's incumbent on the commander to request
that authority well in advance of when the force would
be prepared to then deploy into Libya, and it's
incumbent on the Secretary of Defense and the team
supporting him to ensure that he makes a timely
decision so that there's not additional time added to
the timeline.\401\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\401\Miller Testimony at 80-81.
Bash considered the orders that night a distinction without
a difference because the intent of the Secretary was clear: the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
forces were to move.
This was a real-time, very fluid, very dynamic set of
meetings in which the Secretary, with his senior
military, uniformed military advisers, the Chairman,
the Vice, and the combatant commanders and others, were
making real-time decisions
So I just want to set that context, because I'm sure
some people could look at this and say: Why were these
words used or that discussion or this phrase used,
``prepare to deploy'' or ``deploy''? My recollection
was he was told of the situation, he was told about
which units could respond, and he said: Go get them, do
it, move.
Q: So there would've been no further order necessary
from him?
A: Correct.
Q: Wheels could have taken off and he would not have
had to say another single, solitary word?
A: Correct, and I believe that actually was the case.
Q: All right. So he never amplified, clarified,
withdrew, changed his instructions, which were deploy?
A: He did not.\402\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\402\Bash Testimony at 26-27.
Leidig, whom Ham described as his ``most trusted advisor''
and an ``extraordinarily competent officer,'' testified because
he was moving forces between two combatant commands' areas of
responsibility he needed to receive a subsequent ``execute''
order to move the FAST Platoon into Libya.\403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\See Ham Testimony at 51-52.
Q: At what point did you receive an order to execute?
At what point did you have the authority to launch
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
assets into Libya?
A: We were never given an execute order to move any
forces until we got to move in the C-17 to evacuate
folks out of Tripoli later that next morning. There was
never an execute order to move any forces from
Sigonella into Africa or from Rota into Africa until
later. So, I mean, we did get an order eventually to
move the FAST team into Tripoli to provide security,
but during that evening hour, that incident, there were
no execute orders to move forces into our AOR.
* * *
Q: You said that you were never given an execute order
until later. Who provides that execute order?
A: Execute order comes from the Secretary of Defense.
So we were not given an--there was an order given to
move forces to Sigonella. There was never an execute
order given to move those forces into Libya.
Q: And when you received the execute order later on to
deploy the forces into Libya, the FAST platoon into
Tripoli, and then the C-17 to evacuate the medically
injured, do you recall how that order was conveyed?
A: Do you mean, was it verbal, or was it in--usually in
every case--I don't know specifically for those, but
normally it's a VOCO, a vocal command, followed up by a
written command. And so, in that case, it was probably
both. It was probably a vocal command to get things
moving, followed by a written command----
Q: And do you----
A: --but I don't know for sure.
Q: And do you recall the timeframe for when you
received the vocal command to execute the movement of
the FAST platoon into Tripoli and the----
A: No, I don't recall. It's on the timeline.
Q: Do you recall if it was before or after the mortar
attacks occurred?
A: Oh, it was after.
Q: Okay. Thank you.
* * *
Q: And just to be clear for the record, prior to
receiving the vocal execute order, would you have----
A: Which vocal execute order?
Q: For either of the assets that were deployed into
Libya, the FAST platoon or the C-17, did you have the
authority to move those assets into Libya prior to
receiving that VOCO?
A: No. I wouldn't move those without a--without an
order from the Secretary or the Chairman. They're
moving across COCOM boundaries.
Q: Okay. Thank you.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\Testimony of Vice Admiral Charles J. Leidig, Deputy Commander
for Military Operations, US Africa Command, Tr. at 45-48 (Apr. 22,
2016) [hereinafter Leidig 2016 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
But see, Leidig 2016 Testimony at 48 (Q: There was some discussion
about the term ``prepare to deploy'' and an ``execute order,'' and I
just wanted to ask you a couple questions about that. Would a lack of
an execute order, or did a lack of an execute order on the night of the
attacks ever slow down your forces? A: No.).
Ham's recollection of the extent of the authority he had to
move forces that night differed from Leidig and differed from
the email Tidd sent to the combatant commands relaying the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary's order.
Q: Can you explain what he means by the [Secretary of
Defense] holding final approval to deploy FAST?
A: I think it means what it says. That is different
than my recollection. Again, my belief is the Secretary
had given authority to me to do that. So I think this
is the J3 issuing instructions, but my recollection is
different than what Vice Admiral Tidd has written here.
* * *
Yeah. Right. The last sentence there I think is the
important one.
* * *
A: ``But the point is to get the Marines on the ground
securing the embassy in Tripoli as rapidly as we can
move them.''
Q: Well, I think one thing that we would like to try to
kind of marry up is, even on the timeline, the orders
that were given to some of the--specifically the FAST
platoon was a prepare-to-deploy order. And there has
been testimony that a prepare-to-deploy order is
different from a deploy order. Perhaps you can provide
us what the distinction is and how that played out on
this night.
A: I can try to explain the distinction between the
two. A prepare-to-deploy order simply is notifying a
force that you must be prepared to deploy within a
specified timeframe, so that you have to adjust your
activities, whatever they may be, your personnel
posture, your readiness, your training, the prestaging
of equipment, depending on what the timeline is, so
that you are prepared to deploy on the designated
timeline. This is not an uncommon occurrence.
* * *
And a deploy order simply says, ``Go now,'' or whatever
the specified timeframe is. So it's prepare to deploy,
``I think I may need you, so I want you to be ready.''
A deploy order says, ``I do need you. Deploy.''
* * *
So the three units that were of highest importance to
me--the Commander's In-extremis Force, the Fleet
Antiterrorism Security Team, and the [U.S.-Based SOF]--
all already had prepared to--my understanding is all
had prepared to deploy. They were already on various
timelines to deploy. So that's what I believe their
status was.
And my belief is that--and my recollection differs a
bit from what Vice Admiral Tidd says--that when the
Secretary made his decisions, my understanding of that
was that the Secretary of Defense was transferring
operational control to me for those forces for their
deployment and employment.
Q: So if the Secretary of Defense's order was, in fact,
``prepare to deploy'' and not ``deploy,'' was there an
additional step needed to be--did the Secretary of
Defense have to do anything additional to deploy those
forces?
A: I don't know because I'm not familiar with the
specifics. Typically, in a prepare-to-deploy order,
there is a designated official who can order that unit
to deploy. It doesn't always have to go back to the
Secretary of Defense. It could be a combatant
commander, it could be the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, it could be a joint task force commander. But,
in this particular case, I'm just not familiar with the
specifics of the order.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\Ham Testimony at 133-136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPLOY TO AN ISB
The CIF, the force most capable of quickly responding to
the attacks in Benghazi, was ordered instead to go to an
intermediate staging base. Ham discussed this decision:
Q: Sir, given the fact that the CIF was on the
continent, per se, did you ever consider employing the
CIF for the hostage-rescue mission or the NEO by
sending them directly to either Benghazi or to Tripoli?
A: I don't recall specifically, but I feel confident in
saying that, as we weighed the options, the various
courses of action of how the Commander's In-extremis
Force might be employed, that there was some
consideration to, you know, do they go somewhere other
than the intermediate staging base. Should they go to
Benghazi? Should they go to Tripoli?
My recollection is that the situation was certainly
evolving. And, as previously discussed, my view was the
situation, after an initial spike, the fighting had
largely subsided, that Benghazi was probably not the
right place for them to go. Get them to the staging
base, where we now have many, many options.
One of the challenges, of course, is with a force like
the Commander's In-extremis Force, once you
operationally employ it someplace--so if you were to
deploy into any place and they're on the ground, you
now no longer have that force for other emergent
contingencies. So we're very careful about making a
decision as to where to go.
There are other complexities with inserting a force
into Benghazi, to be sure, but, for me, it was, where's
the best place for that force to be right now? And, in
my view, I believe that--you know, certainly supported
and with recommendations from the AFRICOM operations
and intelligence staff--that the best place for them
would be at the intermediate staging base so that they
would be well-postured for subsequent missions.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\Id. at 93-94.
Tidd testified one reason the CIF and the U.S. SOF were
ordered to an intermediate staging base and not to Libya
directly was due to concerns expressed by the State Department
regarding the number of military personnel that would arrive in
country.\407\ He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\Tidd Testimony at 24.
Q: Sir, was it your decision, then, to send them back
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to an ISB first?
A: Yes . . . State was very, very concerned about what
the footprint would look like in Tripoli. They didn't
want it to look like we were invading.
That was the gist or that was the genesis of the
discussion that occurred over whether or not when the
FAST arrives at the airport in Tripoli--because they
wanted to reinforce security at the embassy--but there
was concern that it not have this image of a big,
invading force.
And we knew that the FAST, when it arrived, did not
have its own mobility. The embassy was going to have to
provide trucks and vehicles to move them from the
airport to the embassy. And there was just concern of
parading a bunch of trucks or buses full of Marines in
uniform, what kind of image that would present,
recognizing it was going to be daylight when they
arrived.\408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\Id. at 22-23.
TEAM TRIPOLI NEGOTIATES TRANSPORTATION
Team Tripoli left the airport at approximately 4:30 a.m. A
team member provided the committee the following background
information for their intended mission at the time, as it had
transitioned from locating and potentially rescuing Stevens to
an effort to start evacuating nonessential personnel from
Benghazi back to Tripoli.
Q: What did you understand about your mission as you
were heading from Benina airport to the Annex? Was your
mission then evacuation of nonessential personnel?
A: It was nonessential personnel only prior to the
mortar attack happening . . . we were going to take 14
personnel back with us to the airport, let the jet take
off, take them back to Tripoli. We were going to come
back to the Annex and help hold up with the GRS guys
until further notice . . . the majority of those people
[the GRS] would have stayed there. Shooters, if you
will. . . . We did not make the decisions for that
[airplane] to come back. We didn't know how long we
were going to have to stay at the Annex. We were under
the understanding they wanted to stay. They did not
want to leave. So we were just trying to get the
nonessential personnel out to get further direction
from Chief of Station back in Tripoli on what he wanted
them to do . . . I believe it was the Chief of Base
that wanted to keep some individuals there.\409\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\409\Special Operators Testimony at 65.
FINAL STAGES OF THE ATTACK
Team Tripoli at the Annex
After Team Tripoli secured transportation, it arrived at
the Annex just after 5:05 a.m. Former U.S. Navy SEAL Glen A.
Doherty, one of the members of Team Tripoli, immediately joined
Tyrone S. Woods, Diplomatic Security Agent 4, and other GRS
agents on the rooftops of the Annex buildings. Within 10
minutes of the arrival of Team Tripoli, a new small arms attack
began. One member of Team Tripoli described the small arms
attack:
Once we had gotten to the annex, we called probably
three minutes out, and the GRS Team Lead was actually
out there to meet us with the gate open. We didn't take
any of the vehicles inside. We exited the vehicles and
walked inside.
We took the Libyan Shield commander inside with us so
his guys would stay there, ultimately. Went directly to
the main house where the TOC was. I think it was
Building Three. Team leader started talking to chief of
base, and I was talking to the [GRS Team Lead] on the
security situation, wounded personnel, what did he need
from us that he didn't have already, and how we could
help the security posture.
Shortly after us being there, we were all sitting
outside while we were talking about this on the front
patio of Building Three. We had some sporadic gunfire
over the top of Building Three, and immediately
following, the first mortar round hit. I believe it
went long, hit out in the road where our convoy had
been. The gate is obviously closed to the compound now.
Next one hit short just behind Building Three on the
wall towards the warehouse. The other three or four
mortars hit directly on top of Building Three.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\Id. at 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One GRS agent described the mortar attack:
It was about 5:30 in the morning--the sun was just
coming up--because me and Tyrone had been talking
about, you know, if they're going to attack us, it's
going to happen here shortly because usually the time
to attack is right before the sun comes up. About that
time, [Doherty] came up on the roof after the guys from
Tripoli had came in. I never met [Doherty]. He walks
over to Tyrone and says hi to Tyrone. They had worked
together on the teams. Tyrone introduced him to me,
said that he was a sniper.
I told him: Well, that's good. I hope we don't need
you, but it will be great having another rifle up here.
He had turned to walk away, and it was about that time
that there was an explosion against the back wall, and
there was a mortar that hit the top of the back wall,
which from our building was maybe 8 or 10 yards from
the building.
[Agent 4] was in the corner where the ladder was at. Me
and Tyrone were in the opposite corner facing out
towards what we call Zombieland, and when that hit,
small arms fire started coming from that direction, and
Tyrone opened up with a machine gun. I started shooting
with my assault rifle. I heard [Agent 4] yell out that
he was hit.
I kind of glanced over. I saw his shadow sitting
because the wall at the top of our building was about 3
feet tall, so there was a box that you had to step on
to get up on to the ladder. So he was--I saw his image
or the silhouette of him sitting on that box, and he
was holding his head. What went through my mind is that
he's breathing, so his heart is beating . . .
We're shooting. I kneel down to change magazines. As I
come back up after changing magazines, the first mortar
hits the top of the roof, hits almost directly into the
wall, where the roof and the arc of the parapet or wall
comes up, right into the corner of that. When that hit,
it blew me back a little bit, knocked me back. I kind
of caught myself. I saw Tyrone go down. . . . The
mortar hit on my right.
As I come up, I bring my arm up to grab my gun, and
from about here down, it was kind of hanging off at a
90 degree angle. I continued to try to grab my gun.
Another mortar hit, and I kind of glanced over my right
shoulder, and I saw [Doherty] go straight down. . . .
As I tried to keep firing, my weapon is pretty much
inoperable. I can't grab it with my hand. The third
mortar hits and peppers me again with shrapnel. The
best way I can describe it is it felt like I got stung
by a thousand bees. At that point, I figured I might
better get to cover because if another one comes, I'll
be lucky if I survive that.
I kind of dove down to the wall, . . . and everything
had went quiet. I kind of sat up and thought I was
bleeding out because everything was wet around me. I
realized that it was water because it was cold, and
there was a water tank right there beside us that had
gotten perforated. I don't know what the timeframe was.
I pulled out a tourniquet, and I was trying to get the
tourniquet on. . . . At that point, I saw [GRS 1] come
up over top of the roof, which I didn't know it then--I
saw a shadow come up, and at that point, he had at
first put two tourniquets on [Agent 4]; one on his leg,
one on his arm. Then he come over to me, and he was
sitting there. He told me to quit messing with my arm
because I was trying to put it back in place. He
grabbed my tourniquet, put it on, stood me up, and
asked if I could walk myself over to the ladder so he
could tend to Tyrone and [Doherty], and I said, yeah.
He had called for help on the radio, that we had
wounded up there. By the time I got over to the ladder,
there was three guys that had come up on the roof. I
remember one later to find out it was one of the TF or
the task force guys. He asked me if I could get off the
roof.
I said, ``Yeah, I'm going to have to'' because I knew
they had to tend to the guys up there. So I kind of put
myself up on the parapet, hooked my good arm around the
ladder, and kind of scooted myself over. I ended up
climbing down the ladder.
I come around past the swimming pool to the front, and
that's when I ran into [GRS Tripoli]. [GRS Tripoli]
walked me in, laid me down in the building, building 3,
and he went back--I think at that time, he went back
out to help up top. Everybody inside was just kind of
looking at me. I told them somebody needs to cut my
clothes off because I know I'm bleeding from other
spots. [redacted text] case officer I was with earlier
that night, [redacted text], asked me where the shears
were. [redacted text] to cut my clothes off with.
[redacted text] got those, come back, cut my clothes
off. I wasn't bleeding profusely from anything else; I
just had a bunch of little holes in me that were kind
of oozing blood. And later they came down. I think [GRS
Tripoli] came in and gave me an IV. They finally got
[Diplomatic Security Agent 4] off, and that was pretty
much the night there.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\GRS 2 Testimony at 57.
As GRS agents on Building 3 fired back in response to the
new attack, a well-aimed mortar attack commenced on the Annex
mortally wounding Woods and Doherty and severely wounding
another GRS agent and one Diplomatic Security Agent.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0517.40).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In total, six 81-millimeter mortars assaulted the
Annex.\413\ Three mortars, including the first one, landed near
the north perimeter wall. Three additional mortars landed on
the roof of Building 3 within one minute at 5:18 a.m. Overall,
the six mortar attacks were launched within 1 minute and 13
seconds.\414\ A member of Team Tripoli testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\Special Operator Testimony at 61.
\414\Committee analysis of DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11,
2012, from 0517 to 0519).
Once the mortar round--the first mortar round hit
outside the gate where the convoy was, we saw the
vehicles driving away, the gun trucks that were out
there driving away.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\Special Operator Testimony at 66.
Libya Shield sub-commander, [redacted text], who was left
behind during the mortar strike suggested, that attackers were
well-aware that Team Tripoli was held up at the Benghazi
airport while seeking transport and that the attackers may have
planned an ambush that coincided with the arrival of the Team
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tripoli members at the Annex:
``It began to rain down on us. I really believe that
this attack was planned. The accuracy with which the
mortars hit us was too good for any regular
revolutionaries.''\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\Libya Rescue Squad Ran Into Fierce, Accurate Ambush, Reuters
(Sept. 12, 2012; 17:11), http://www.reuters.com/article/libya-
ambassador-battle-idAFL5E8KCMYB20120912.
One witness told the Committee Libya Shield departed the
Annex when the mortar strike began at the direction of an
individual who was standing next to Abu Khattala during the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
attacks. He recounted what happened during the mortar attack:
Q: When Team Tripoli arrived, were you outside? Were
you inside?
A: No, when they arrived, I was outside.
Q: You were outside. Okay. And did you go inside at any
point after they arrived?
A: Yes. Luckily we went inside, because then the
mortars landed.
* * *
Q: Did anybody from the Libyan Shield militia go inside
as well?
A: Yes.
Q: All right. And can you explain the situation?
A: When the Tripoli team arrived, they brought with
them a commander of that force that escorted them from
the airport to the Annex.
Q: Okay. And he ended up going inside one of the
villas?
A: Yes.
* * *
I asked him to shut off his phone and stop talking on
the phone after the mortar--especially specifically
after the mortar landed.
* * *
He was talking to his force and wondering why they left
him behind and informed them that we had just got hit
with mortars, and he was trying to find out why they
left him behind.\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\Officer A Testimony at 118.
The witness stated the Commander of the force was frantic
and was ``surprised that the attack took place when he thought
that his force outside was securing the perimeter.''\418\ He
testified about the Commander's actions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\Id.
When he came inside, he was under the impression that
the force that he brought with him, the commander that
he left behind and his forces will secure the area. But
when he called them on the phone, he realized they had
departed the area. And he asked them, why did you
depart the area? And they said that the commander of
the militia, Wissam bin Hamid, gave them orders to
return to their base on the other side of town. And he
asked them, why are you going back to the base and
leaving me behind? And they told him that, oh, we are
going to get more weapons and more additional
forces.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\419\Id.
Wissam bin Hamid was standing with Abu Khattala during the
attack[.]\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One GRS member of Team Tripoli provided his assessment of
the mortar attacks in an after-action interview conducted by
the CIA. The GRS member was:
100% confident that the enemy was waiting for the QRF
to arrive at the Annex so they could hit them upon
arrival. Communication was given to local militias and
police upon the arrival of the QRF team to Benghazi
airport. Many Libyan militia members and police knew of
the QRF team's arrival and movement to the annex.
He [was] confident it was a well-trained mortar team
that hit the compound.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\CIA Document 1-004067 at 71.
A military member of Team Tripoli described his assessment
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of the mortar attacks that evening:
Q: And so what's your opinion on the skill of those who
were actually employing the mortars that evening in the
attack on the Benghazi Annex?
A: I would say personally that it was probably a
skilled mortar team. It's not easy. And you, being a
trained mortar man, know how hard that would be to
shoot inside the city and get something on the target
within two shots. That's difficult. I would say they
were definitely a trained mortar team or had been
trained to do something similar to that . . . I was
kind of surprised. I had not heard of or seen anybody
or talked to anyone that had been trained on mortars at
all [during my time in Tripoli]. So it was
unusual.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\Special Operator Testimony at 82-83.
The mortar attack was reported at 5:32 a.m. and a medical
evacuation was requested.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\423\DSCC Timeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One CIA agent discussed his actions:
A: [M]inutes later is when we got attacked by the first
few mortars.
Q: And you were in the SCIF when the mortar attack
happened?
A: The initial, correct, yes, sir.
Q: Well, actually I was trying to go to the bathroom;
so I put my gear back on, and we were all stacked at
the front door, myself, the team leader, the two DOD
personnel, and there were several more volleys of
impacts on the building, mortar fire. And I heard small
arms going out from our team, and then small arms
coming in on our building. And as soon as it subsided,
I asked for [GRS Agent] because . . . he had [s]ome of
my gear . . . and that's when he didn't answer up. And
that's when one of the other GRS personnel said they
were all down on the roof. So as soon as it subsided,
we made our way to the roof.
Q: Okay, and then what actions did you take at that
point?
A: I came around a few seconds after the main element .
. . so I stepped back . . . and that's when I was met
halfway down the ladder by the GRS operator [GRS 2].
And I put my light on him because I heard a funny
noise, and it was obvious that he was severely injured.
And that's when he came down on top of me. I noticed he
was severely wounded, bleeding a lot and everything
like that.
* * *
Well, they actually put bathroom tile outside there,
and so it was real slick. He ended up falling on top of
me, and I ended up hyperextending my leg to the rear.
So now I'm injured, so I drug him out because we
started getting hit by small arms fire. So I dragged
him around the corner. I started putting a tourniquet
on his arm. He was bleeding from his left arm. He had a
hole in his neck, and he had a hole in his chest.
So I put tourniquets on his arm and started patching up
with the help of others from the shrapnel wounds. And
it seemed like seconds later when I heard somebody say
[GRS Tripoli] I have another one for you. That's when
the second State Department guy, [Agent 4] . . . came
down. And I pushed [GRS 2] up on to the couch, and
that's when [Agent 4] was there.
* * *
So I readjusted the tourniquet on his right leg, put
another one on his right leg, and ended up putting a
tourniquet on his left arm and packing his neck with
combat gauze to help stop the bleeding. I ended up
starting an IV on him. And then I went back to [GRS 2],
put an IV in him. That's one of the State Department
personnel--I don't know who it was--had morphine, and I
made the call to give [Agent 4] morphine because he was
in so much pain he started pawing at the tourniquets
and the gauzes, some of the dressings I put on. And
that seemed like seconds.
During this process is when [redacted text] asked me to
. . . contact Tripoli and give them a SITREP. That's
when I called Tripoli . . . [and] asked them for blood
for [Agent 4] because I didn't think he was going to
make it much longer.
* * *
We had two severely injured, so I asked for blood,
because I thought our plane, the one we rented, had
taken off already. . . . And then, right after that, I
went back in, made sure both patients were stable, and
I worked on [Agent 4] more. I started another IV
because he had sucked that one down so fast. And that's
when I went outside, and the sun was actually up. I
know it doesn't sound significant, but it was to me
because I really felt with the sun up, it would give us
time, room to breath, because hopefully it would drive
away the attackers.
I was still handling care of the patients . . . And I
was in the back of the truck with the wounded GRS guy
because I had no--there was no more room to sit inside
a vehicle, so we put a stretcher in the back of a small
truck. I jumped in the back with him and held on to
him, and we drove out the gate; and that's when we were
met by several gun trucks and militia that were there
to escort us. And we drove out, and it looked to be
several militias or several different groups because it
looked like they were trying to determine which way
they were going to go to the airport.
So there was a few minutes delay there before we
actually started to drive towards the airport. And
that's when we made it back to the airport. And I
loaded on a plane with the nonessential personnel, and
the two wounded, and made it back to Tripoli where we
landed in Tripoli because the hospital was close to the
Tripoli airport.
* * *
I gave [Agent 4] another morphine on the plane. I
adjusted [GRS 2] bandage. And then when I was moving
[Agent 4] off the plane--we were bring him off without
the stretcher because the stretcher was so big and the
plane was so small--he stopped breathing, so I had to
give him CPR. Got him back breathing, and that's when
the State Department nurse met me on the plane. . . .
And then we loaded them on to an ambulance, and at that
point, the ambulance took them to Afia Hospital in
Tripoli. And I went back in a Suburban with all the
other State Department personnel and gear. And that was
it. I received a call from the flight medic from
Ramstein, the military airlift, and I went over the
view of what I did and what I gave them as far as
tourniquets, morphine, and IV bags, how much, and the
times and stuff. And that was it in reference to my
medical service.
Q: You said they asked if the patients were capable of
going directly to Germany. Was that the request?
A: I believe, yeah. And I said, no, they need to go to
the hospital now. This is when I just got [Agent 4]
breathing again. But I made the suggestion, you know, I
remember they said can they wait for the Ramstein bird.
And I was like no, because I really think [the agent]
was going to die any minute.
Q: We're coming close to the end of our hour. This is
the last question. Setting modesty aside, do you
believe that [the agent] or [GRS 2] would have survived
to make it to Tripoli without your intervention?
A: No.\424\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\Officer A Testimony at 37-46.
At the Time of the Mortar Attacks,
No Asset was rn route to Libya
At 11:45 p.m. in Washington [5:45 a.m. in Benghazi], Denis
R. McDonough sent an email to Sullivan, Sherman, Rhodes, Bash,
Winnefeld, and other high level representatives of the
Executive Branch with the subject line, ``Quick level set
before we head into tomorrow AM SVTC.''\425\ McDonough wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\Email from Denis R. McDonough to Wendy R. Sherman, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012 11:45 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562167).
The situation in Benghazi remains fluid. Amb. Chris
Stevens remains unaccounted for; one State Department
officer is confirmed dead (next of kin notification is
complete); five State Department officers are accounted
for and at another USG compound in Benghazi, which had
been taking fire earlier in the evening (until at least
2030 EDT). . . . Five DOD personnel arrived in Benghazi
about an hour ago from Tripoli to reinforce security
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
there.
On our people in Libya, the Joint Staff is deploying
three sets of teams into the region appropriate to the
mission(s).
* * *
And on getting the video(s) in question taken down, I
reached [out] to YouTube to ask them to take down two
videos: one that was not developed by Pastor Jones but
which he is promoting, and another--of him burning the
Prophet in effigy--that he did film. Sec. Panetta has
also reached out to Pastor Jones to ask him to pull
down his video, knowing that even if YouTube takes the
video down, Pastor Jones can put it up somewhere else.
. . .\426\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\Id.
This McDonough email was sent more than six hours after
President Obama and the Secretary first met to discuss the
initial attack in Benghazi, more than six hours after the
Commander in Chief said to do everything possible to help our
people, more than five hours after the Secretary of Defense
issued an order to deploy elements--active tense--and more than
four hours after the Secretary's Chief of Staff sent an email
saying elements were ``spinning up.'' McDonough writes: ``[T]he
Joint Staff is deploying three sets of teams into the region
appropriate to the mission(s).''\427\ This ``deploying'' was
supposed to occur hours earlier at the order of the Secretary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\Email from Denis R. McDonough, Dep. Nat'l Sec. Advisor, Nat'l
Sec. Council, to Wendy R. Sherman, Under Sec'y for Political Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 11:45 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05562167).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, McDonough references ``five DOD personnel arrived
in Benghazi about an hour ago from Tripoli to reinforce
security there.''\428\ This reference to DOD personnel is
noteworthy because this ``asset'' or ``element'' was not even
on the list of ``assets'' and ``elements'' provided to the
Secretary of Defense. As discussed above, these individuals
went to Benghazi from Tripoli at the direction of the Chief of
Station in Libya, not at the order of anyone in Washington,
D.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By this time, both McDonough and the Secretary of Defense
had made calls to have the YouTube video removed from the
internet.\429\ Yet, none of the forces the Secretary ordered to
deploy had actually moved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moments after McDonough sent this email, word of the mortar
attacks on the Annex would make its way through the State
Department, the White House, and the Defense Department.
At 1:40 a.m. in Washington, the assets the Secretary
ordered to deploy more than six hours earlier had still not
deployed, though Libya had finally given approval for assets to
fly into Tripoli.\430\ At that time, Winnefeld emailed
McDonough and others relaying to them diplomatic clearance had
been obtained from Libya allowing the FAST platoon to fly into
Tripoli.\431\ Of course, all State and CIA personnel had
already evacuated the Annex in Benghazi, and the first aircraft
evacuating the American personnel was preparing to depart for
Tripoli within minutes. Winnefeld wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\Email from James A. Winnefeld, Jr., Vice Chairman, J. Chiefs
of Staff, U.S. Dep't of Defense, to Benjamin J. Rhodes, Dep. Nat'l Sec.
Advisor, White House, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012 1:40 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05562167).
\431\Id.
Two C-130s will move to Rota then Tripoli. One departs
at 0600z, the other at 0700z. 3+40 transit time to
Rota, 1 hour load time. Estimated arrival at Tripoli is
1300z. We now have country clearances for Spain and
Libya. Working to expedite movement (for example,
faster load time than one hour), but not sure we can go
faster now that aircrews are on the ramp.\432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\Id.
Winnefeld's email meant this: Now that host nation approval
had been obtained, the transport aircraft would depart Ramstein
Air Base in Germany in 20 minutes to pick up the FAST team that
was waiting in Rota, Spain.
Evacuation to Benghazi Airport
After the lethal mortar strikes, the team at the Annex was
determined to evacuate all personnel. A member of Team Tripoli
testified:
We decided that the situation we had was untenable to
stay at the compound. We didn't have enough shooters
and there were too many wounded, and we were definitely
going to lose our State Department wounded if we had
stayed there much longer. So we were pushing to get out
as fast as we could.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\Special Operator Testimony at 68.
A key issue remained in that, ``There was no security
vehicle, no gun trucks that would help us get to the airport.
And we determined we could probably not make it with the
vehicles we had inside the compound.''\434\ At 6:16 a.m., a 50-
vehicle motorcade arrived at the Annex to provide transport
support by the Libyan Military Intelligence. The motorcade
included technical, pick-up trucks retrofitted with mounted
machine gun-like weapons.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\Special Operator Testimony at 69.
\435\DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0616); LMI
insignia is printed on vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The forces that arrived at the Annex shortly after the
mortar attacks were able to transport all State Department and
CIA personnel safely to the airport. The forces, known as
Libyan Military Intelligence, arrived with 50 heavily-armed
security vehicles.\436\ Libyan Military Intelligence was not
part of the Libyan government, nor affiliated with any of the
militias the CIA or State Department had developed a
relationship with during the prior 18 months since the Libyan
revolution took place.\437\ Instead, Libya Military
Intelligence--whom the CIA did not even know existed until the
night of the attacks--were comprised of former military
officers under the Qadhafi regime who had gone into hiding in
fear of being assassinated, and wanted to keep their presence
in Benghazi as quiet as possible so as to not attract attention
from the militias in control of Benghazi.\438\ In other words,
some of the very individuals the United States had helped
remove from power during the Libyan revolution were the only
Libyans that came to the assistance of the United States on the
night of the Benghazi attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\TRIPOLI 27900, Sept. 19, 2012 [REQUEST 1-002982 to REQUEST 1-
002991].
\437\Officer A Testimony at 71.
\438\Id. at 71-72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reason Libyan Military Intelligence was able to rescue
the Americans from the CIA base after the mortar attacks--
likely saving over two dozen lives--was due solely to the
extraordinary efforts of Officer A, [redacted text] stationed
in Benghazi. Officer A, [redacted text], spent a lot of time on
the night of the attacks trying to secure help. In the early
morning hours of September 12, a commander in the February 17
militia told Officer A that February 17 would be unable to
protect the Base and that they were leaving.\439\ This
commander referred Officer A to the National Police, who the
commander said was taking over their duties. Officer A
described the National Police as ``next to helpless.''\440\ An
officer in the National Police told Officer A ``There's nothing
I can do. . . . I cannot continue to secure the perimeter [of
the Base].''\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\Id. at 19-20.
\440\Id. at 20.
\441\Id.
After some convincing by Officer A, the police officer
referred Officer A to a colonel in Libyan Military
Intelligence.\442\ Officer A had never spoken to this
individual before, nor was he even aware of Libyan Military
Intelligence. Officer A first had a conversation with this
individual around 4:30 am, and testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\Id. at 23-24.
And I immediately made contact with this commander. He
asked how he could help, and I told him, again, our
general location, and I said, you know, we need you to
come and secure this area. He had an idea, at that
point, of events happening in that part of the city,
and he told me that he would need to put a big force
together, he cannot just come with one of his--I mean,
like, two or three vehicles, that he would need to put
a large force together and for me to give him some time
to put that force together.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\443\Id. at 24.
Immediately after the mortar attacks, Officer A called the
colonel back and said, ``[We] now really need you to come
here.''\444\ Within minutes, the 50-truck force from Libyan
Military Intelligence arrived and all American personnel safely
evacuated to the airport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\Id. at 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The group that ultimately came to the rescue of and
facilitated the evacuation of the Americans in Benghazi was not
the Libyan Government the State Department had worked
tirelessly to appease; nor was it the February 17 Martyrs
Brigade, recommended by the Libyan Government and contractually
obligated to provide security to the Mission Compound. Instead,
the group that came to rescue the Americans that night, the
Libyan Military Intelligence, was a group most U.S. Government
personnel did not even know existed. This group, ironically,
had close ties to the former Qadhafi regime--the very regime
the United States had helped remove from power. It was also
this group, not groups previously given credit by previous
investigations, that came to the rescue of the Americans in
those early morning hours --likely saving dozens of lives as a
result.
It was the hard work and ingenuity of a single CIA case
officer that located and developed this evacuation lead--a
witness no other committee of Congress interviewed and a
witness the CIA was reluctant to allow the Committee to
interview.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\445\Id. at 25-28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the ``assurance'' some principals in Washington had
that U.S. personnel in Benghazi were evacuating earlier, it was
not until the rescuing convoy actually arrived to at the Annex
that the evacuation of all U.S. personnel was fully understood
by those on the ground in Benghazi.
Officer A described what happened after the Libyan Military
Intelligence arrived: ``We lined up the trucks in order of
movement. And then everybody that was a non-shooter was in an
up-armored vehicle, and all the shooters were in thin-skinned
vehicles to be able to shoot out of their cars.''\446\ After
loading into the available vehicles at the Annex, at 6:34 a.m.
the majority of Annex personnel and all the Diplomatic Security
Agents evacuated in the LMI motorcade.\447\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\Special Operators Testimony at 71.
\447\DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0634).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few minutes later, two GRS and two CIA Staff officers
evacuated the Annex alone in a Toyota pick-up truck after an
attempted destruction of the CIA equipment.\448\ One CIA
personnel described the actions he took to destroy sensitive
equipment:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\448\Video: DVR Footage of the CIA Annex (Sept. 11, 2012, 0637).
Q: So you said the last four folks there was yourself,
[GRS 5], it was the chief of base, it was the GRS team
lead. Did you see any type of interaction between the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRS team lead and the chief of base, any argument?
A: No, and actually I felt bad because once the stuff
detonated--whew.
* * *
A: You know, I looked down and I was kneeling in a
bunch of blood. I jumped in the truck, and the chief
didn't say a word, you know, but I was pretty happy,
you know, because the device went off and smoke was
already billowing out of the office. The door was
jammed open, and so I was pretty thrilled about that,
you know, and then I jumped in and said, let's go, you
know. And of course, the chief knew that [Woods] is
dead, and anyway, it is--I felt bad about that. And
then we took off and caught up with the rest of the
convoy.\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\Testimony of [redacted text], Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 61-
64 (Jun 19, 2015) [hereinafter [redacted text] Testimony] (on file with
the Committee).
AMERICANS IN BENGHAZI EVACUATE
Evacuation to Tripoli
The survivors and four Diplomatic Security Agents departed
at 7:31 a.m. local and landed in Tripoli at 8:38 p.m.
local.\450\ The same private aircraft secured by Team Tripoli
to come to the aid of those being attacked in Benghazi was the
aircraft used to evacuate the first wave of Americans from
Benghazi to Tripoli.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\See, U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 8:25 a.m. GRS and one Agent 3 received the body of
Stevens from individuals delegated by the Libyan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.\451\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3 Testimony at 170-172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second aircraft, a C-130 provided by the Libyan Air
Force, departed with the remaining security officers and the
remains of Stevens, Smith, Woods, and Doherty at 9:54 a.m. and
arrived in Tripoli at 11:33 a.m.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline (estimating the times of
arrival and departure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evacuation to Germany
At 2:15 p.m. on September 12, a C-17 departed Germany en
route to Tripoli to evacuate the Americans.\453\ This departure
occurred over eight hours after the 6:05 a.m. AFRICOM order to
deploy the C-17 for use as part of the Medevac (medical
evacuation).\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\453\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\454\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 7:17 p.m. the C-17 departed Tripoli returning to
Ramstein, Germany with the Benghazi-based U.S. personnel, non-
essential U.S. Embassy State Department personnel and the
remains of the fallen and arrived at 10:19p.m.\455\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOUR DIED. OTHER LIVES UNDOUBTEDLY SAVED
The initiative shown during the attacks by those on the
ground in Benghazi and Tripoli not only embodied the service
and sacrifice of those in military and the Foreign Service but
undoubtedly saved the lives of other Americans.
The Diplomatic Security Agents followed their training and
responded appropriately after the Mission compound was
attacked. The Diplomatic Security Agents showed heroism in
their efforts to protect Sean Smith and Chris Stevens and to
enter a burning building in search of their missing colleagues.
Team Annex moved quickly and decisively to help fellow
Americans at the Mission compound. Their actions during the
night/early morning hours provided not only much needed
intelligence about what was happening on the ground but also
helped secure their State Department colleagues and saved the
lives of fellow Americans.
Likewise, Team Tripoli, which included military personnel
based at the Tripoli Annex, acted with purpose, precision and
ingenuity that night. The Secretary and the Joint Staff did not
know those personnel were in Tripoli, much less were they
considered as one of the potential assets to respond to the
events in Benghazi. In fact, they represent the only military
``asset'' to reach Benghazi during the attacks. They deployed
themselves because fellow Americans needed them.
The creativity, valor and selfless sacrifice of the
Diplomatic Security Agents, the team from the Benghazi Annex
and Team Tripoli stand in some contrast to the discussions held
during the White House meeting occurring at roughly the same
time, half a world away, in the safe confines of the U.S.
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE ATTACK WAS INSUFFICIENT
When the attacks in Benghazi began, the Defense Department
was unprepared to respond. Despite there being a missing U.S.
Ambassador, its response--from the start of the attack at 9:42
p.m. in Libya, to the amount of time it took for the forces to
actually deploy late the next morning in Libya--at best
illustrates a rusty bureaucratic process not in keeping with
the gravity and urgency of the events happening on the ground.
The decisions made earlier in the year by senior State
Department officials to maintain a presence in Benghazi without
adequate security forces and an inadequately fortified Mission
compound contributed to what amounted to a worst case scenario
of circumstances that would test the military's preparedness
and ability to respond. Nevertheless, the Defense Department
did not pass the test. Whether this failure is shouldered by it
alone, or rests in part on decisions made by the State
Department in Washington D.C. or with the White House who
presided over a two hour meeting where half of the action items
related to an anti-Muslim video wholly unconnected to the
attacks, is one of the lingering questions about Benghazi.
To muster forces actually capable of responding to the
second lethal attack in Benghazi, the Defense Department needed
to overcome the ``tyranny of distance.'' From the moment the
first attack occurred, the clock began to tick, and with each
passing hour, the need to immediately deploy forces became more
crucial. Any forces deployed by AFRICOM faced two inherent
challenges.
First, AFRICOM did not have a significant number of
assigned forces. It had a standing arrangement with EUCOM to
enable it to have access to EUCOM forces when a contingency
arose. In essence, AFRICOM had to ask for help, creating
another level of bureaucracy that ultimately played out in the
orders to deploy forces.
Second, since any force AFRICOM would use in response to
the attack were EUCOM assets, those forces would deploy from
bases in Europe, not Northern Africa. In fact, elements of the
forces that were ordered to deploy, although based in southern
Europe, needed C-130s or other transport aircraft to fly from
central Europe to their location to transport them on to Libya.
Of course, these challenges were known well in advance and
came as no surprise. Whereas the facts and circumstances
surrounding security related events in North Africa may change,
the map and the time it takes to respond to the geographic
challenges does not.
Whether any of this was taken into account when no change
in force posture was ordered on September 10 following the
meeting with the President or on September 11 as the situation
in Cairo unfolded is unclear. What is clear is the Secretary of
Defense testified he was clear on both what the President
ordered and what he ordered subsequent to the initial attack.
Yet, no asset was ever ordered to respond to Benghazi and the
decisions made--and not made--coupled with a lack of urgency in
Washington D.C. delayed the response even, in some instances,
with an Ambassador missing.
The Forces did not Meet Timelines
ISSUES WITH FAST DEPLOYMENT
One of the FAST platoons ordered to deploy by the Secretary
arrived in Tripoli at 8:56 p.m. local time [2:56 p.m. in
Washington D.C.] the evening of September 12, nearly 24 hours
after the attacks began.\456\ As military witnesses have
posited on many occasions, the mission of a FAST Platoon is not
hostage rescue but to ``put that layer of steel around a
critical infrastructure of the United States to say to our
enemy, `Don't mess [with us].'''\457\ Nevertheless, the timing
of the FAST Platoon's arrival is problematic. When the
Secretary identified a FAST Platoon as an asset to deploy and
said ``go,'' one U.S. facility in Libya had already been
attacked, Sean Smith had been killed, Chris Stevens was
missing, and the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli was facing threats of
another attack. The fact that nearly 24 hours elapsed until
those forces actually arrived in Tripoli to reinforce the
security there belies the expectations of the American people
that the U.S. Military can and will move expeditiously. The
Secretary said this on the time it took for forces to arrive in
Libya:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline.
\457\Testimony of FAST Platoon Commander, U.S. Marines, Tr. at 35
(Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter FAST Commander Testimony] (on file with
the Committee).
Q: Mr. Secretary, did you know it was going to take 23
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
hours to get the first assets in country?
A: No.
Q: So what did you expect it was going to take?
A: I knew it was going to take some time, just because
of the preparedness for the units and then the time and
distance involved. You know, you've heard the term
``tyranny of time and distance,'' and it's tough in
this area.
* * *
But I didn't--and I assumed these units moved as
quickly as possible and that, you know, we can get them
in place as quickly as possible, recognizing that there
is a time element that's involved. And, you know, I
understand the time element involved here just because
of the nature of moving the military.
I mean, as Secretary, I used to sit down with
deployment orders all the time of units. And you go
through a whole series of discussions about, you know,
units that have to be deployed. And, normally, the
timeframe to get these units deployed--it takes time.
It takes time to put them on a plane. It takes time for
them to locate, I understand that. But when you're
dealing with the kind of elite units we're talking
about here, my expectation is that they move as fast as
they can.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\458\Panetta Testimony at 47-48.
The Commander of the FAST Platoon testified he first became
aware of the attack on the Mission compound in Benghazi through
reports on Fox News.\459\ At the time, the FAST Platoon was
stationed in Rota, Spain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\459\FAST Commander Testimony at 26.
So, that evening, I recall I was actually talking to my
dad on Skype, watching the Armed Forces Network news
channel, which rotates through news affiliates, and I
think it was Fox News that night. And all of a sudden
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
we see a consulate building on fire.
As soon as I hung up with him, I got on the phone with
my commanding officer, and we had a short talk. . . .
And he said something more or less in the lines of,
``Make sure you do your laundry and you got enough
soap.''
A couple of hours later, he was calling me, telling me
he was going to go down to the commander of CTF 68, who
is the higher headquarters of FAST Company Europe, and
that I needed to start getting my Marines together.
This was around midnight [local time in Rota, Spain],
so it would be on September 12.
Around midnight is when my platoon sergeant and I
initiated the recall.
* * *
Q: Let's back up a little bit. In terms of the Rota
Naval Station, were there any air assets typically
stationed at Rota?
A: No, sir. No. What we always planned upon is
primarily aircraft coming from Ramstein, because that's
where the preponderance of Air Force C-130s
were[.]\460\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\Id. at 27.
Almost three hours after the FAST Platoon Commander
initiated the recall order, which required his Marines to
return to base, he received official notification at 2:39 a.m.
[8:39 p.m. in Washington D.C.] the platoon was activated and he
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
was to prepared to deploy.
Q: When did you receive VOCO [vocal order] or a warning
order that the FAST platoon was going to be mobilized?
A: Around 0230 is when we got the official
notification. So that was our official [redacted]. We
already had some lead-in to it, obviously.
* * *
Q: --was it at 0239? Does that sound familiar?
A: Yes, sir.
* * *
Q: What were your specific orders at that time?
A: Prepare my platoon to deploy to Libya. We didn't
know where exactly we were going, but we knew through
open media sources of what was going on on the deck.
At that time, we started to make contact with the
embassy to gain S[ituational] A[wareness] of what was
happening and what our potential mission would be.\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\461\Id. at 31-32.
Three hours after he received official notification, at
5:45 a.m. local time [11:45 p.m. in Washington D.C.], the FAST
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander's platoon was prepped and ready to deploy.
Q: When was your platoon packed out and ready to get on
a plane?
A: I believe it was around 0545. I know it was before
6.
Q: Obviously your company commander is aware of that.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did they notify anybody up the food chain that at
0545 you're ready to go?
A: Yes, sir.\462\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\FAST Commander Testimony at 40.
Yet, another six hours would elapse before C-130s arrived
in Spain to transport the FAST Platoon to Libya. General Philip
Breedlove, the Commander of the United States Air Forces in
Europe, which is the component command which owned the C-130s
used to transport the FAST Platoon, told the Committee he began
generating C-130s on his own initiative after learning about
the attacks in Benghazi.\463\ Breedlove said repeatedly his C-
130s were ready to deploy before he received official
notification of deployment.\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\463\Breedlove Testimony at 21.
\464\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The C-130s arrived six hours later, and the FAST Platoon
loaded its gear within an hour.\465\ Yet, another three hours
would elapse before the FAST Platoon departed for Libya.\466\
The FAST Platoon commander explained the cause of the delay:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\465\FAST Commander Testimony at 39-41.
\466\Id. at 41.
A: After we were loaded, which was around [1:00 p.m.
local time], so about an hour after the C-130s were
there, we still did not lift off until [4:00 p.m. local
time] was when the first aircraft took off.
* * *
Q: Why was there another delay to get off the ground?
A: So we were told multiple times to change what we
were wearing, to change from cammies into civilian
attire, civilian attire into cammies, cammies into
civilian attire.
There was also some talk of whether or not we could
carry our personal weapons. I was basically holding
hard and fast to the point where we were carrying our
personal weapons. Like, we've got a very violent thing
going on the ground where we're going, so we're going
to be carrying something that can protect ourselves.
But as far as what the Marines were wearing, that
continually changed, and we had to make those changes
inside of the aircraft.\467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\Id. at 40-41.
In fact, the FAST Platoon commander testified that during
the course of three hours, he and his Marines changed in and
out of their uniforms four times. Ham was not aware the FAST
Platoon had been directed to change out of their uniforms until
after the fact.\468\ When asked whether he had any explanation
for why it took so long for the FAST Platoon to arrive in
Tripoli, he replied, ``I do not.''\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\468\Ham Testimony at 90.
\469\Id. at 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Dempsey told the U.S. Senate that once forces
began moving, ``nothing stopped us, nothing slowed us,'' it
appears the U.S. Military's response that night was delayed--
because it started too late.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\Department of Defense's Response to the Attack on U.S.
Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and the Findings of Its Internal Review
Following the Attack, Hearing before the S. Comm. on Armed Services,
113th Cong. 66 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diplomatic Clearance
On the ground in Tripoli, the Defense Attache had already
begun working to obtain flight clearances from the Libyan
government before the White House meeting began.\471\
Initially, he notified the Libyan government of a potential
request for flight clearances as the night progressed.\472\
Because he had given advance notice to the Libyan government
potential flight clearances would be needed, he fully expected
the Libyan government to approve any formal request when it was
made. He noted, however, that to submit a formal request,
specific information about the tail numbers, expected arrival
of the aircraft, the number of personnel, and types of weapons
had to be conveyed to the Libyan government.\473\ Not only did
a formal request have to be made, a representative of the
Libyan government had to be available to receive the paperwork
for the request. There was no Libyan representative on duty
overnight.\474\ As to when formal approval was received, the
Defense Attache testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\471\Defense Attache 2014 Testimony at 113-114.
\472\Id.
\473\Id.
\474\Id.
Q: Can you recall when the actual--the relevant
information that was needed, like tail numbers and
things, when was that transmitted to the Government of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Libya?
A: I don't. But I would also come back to the fact that
we had a green light from the Government of Libya to
bring it in. It was just a question of when we were
going to know the specific information that goes into a
standard flight clearance request. So it had to have
been, I would say, sometime midmorning to noon on the
12th. It could have been, I would say, sometime
midmorning to noon on the 12th. It could have been a
little bit after that.
Q: And that's when you received the relevant
information you need to pass on, or what happened?
A: Probably both. In the course of the morning, leading
up to the afternoon, we got the information we
required, and then we were able to subsequently
transmit it to the Libyans.\475\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\475\Id. at 159-160.
An email from Winnefeld corroborates the Defense Attache's
recollection that the final relevant information needed to
obtain host nation approval was received sometime mid-morning
on September 12. In Washington, at 1:40 a.m. [7:40 a.m. in
Libya] on September 12, Winnefeld wrote, ``Understand we now
have dip clearance for the FAST platoon in Tripoli.''\476\ At
least six hours had transpired between the time the Secretary
ordered the deployment of forces and the Libyan Government
approved deployment of those forces into Libya. Prior to this
approval, no forces had begun moving.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\476\Email from Admiral James Winnefeld, Jr., Vice Chairman of the
J. Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Dep't of Defense, to Denis R. McDonough,
Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor, White House, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012 1:19 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05562167).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winnefeld did not believe the timing of host nation
approval from the Government of Libya prevented forces from
moving.\477\ Rather, from his perspective, what most impacted
the ability of the forces to move was the availability of
airlifts coming from Ramstein, Germany.\478\ Notably, Winnefeld
stated one lesson learned that night was the need to ``synch
up'' force deployment timelines with airlift availability
timelines.\479\ Nevertheless, the question still remains if the
request for host nation approval from Libya was merely pro
forma and did not delay deployment of forces, why did the
forces not move until approval was obtained?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\Winnefeld Testimony at 51.
\478\Id. at 90.
\479\Id. at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROBLEMS WITH CIF DEPLOYMENT
Twenty-two hours after the initial attack in Benghazi
began, the CIF landed at the intermediate staging base in
Sigonella, Italy.\480\ On the night of the attacks, the CIF was
located in Croatia participating in a training exercise. The
CIF Commander provided the following information about his
instructions that night:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\480\See U.S. Dep't of Defense Timeline (``[At 7:57 PM EET t]he
EUCOM special operations force, and associated equipment, arrives at an
intermediate staging base in southern Europe'').
A: The initial guidance was--I can't recall if someone
said prepare to deploy or you will deploy. The
notification we just operate under at all times, if
you're notified, we are operating under the premise
that we are going to deploy. But no one ever
specifically said you would; or that, we would. And as
the situation progressed from initial notification
around 02, through the early morning hours and
throughout the next day, there were various updates
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
along that timeline
Q: And as the night progressed and the morning
developed, at what point were you told you will deploy
and this is the N Hour? At what point do you recall
receiving an N Hour notification? Or did you receive
one?
A: I can't recall the official N Hour notification that
was set for official purposes. From my purview, when
someone told me, that is when I started working off it
at the tactical level so that we are prepared.
So, from my recollection, it was in the middle of the
night, but I can't recall when the official N Hour was
set.\481\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\481\CIF Commander Testimony at 58-59. Some forces that are
required to move within a pre-determined timeframe operate with a
notification hour or ``N-hour.'' The N-hour is the established time
that essentially starts the clock ticking for when the forces are
required to be airborne.
Notably, as he and his team were preparing after receiving
their orders, the CIF Commander was receiving updates from his
chain of command but never received any information about what
was happening on the ground until he received word Ambassador
Stevens had been killed.\482\ Despite the updates he was
receiving, he was never told State Department personnel had
evacuated to the Annex or even that the Annex had been struck
by mortars and two more Americans were killed.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\482\Id. at 63, 65.
\483\Id. at 65-66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CIF faced several obstacles that slowed its ability to
deploy. First, before they could execute, they had to have a
fork-lift brought in from Zadar, Croatia, which was
approximately 180 miles away from their current location.\484\
Once the forklift arrived, the CIF was able to load their
pallets of gear and ammunition, then make the two-hour journey
to Zagreb International Airport, where they would await their
follow-on transportation.\485\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\General Repass Testimony at 54.
\485\Id. at 54-55
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these logistical obstacles, the CIF was packed and
ready to go at approximately 7:00 a.m. local time [1:00 a.m. in
Washington D.C.]. Yet, it was nearly another three hours until
it was airborne. The CIF Commander described the delay:
A: So in terms of the air, my recollection, I did not--
I was waiting on the aircraft. I wasn't involved in the
planning of the aircraft, is the best way to describe
it. So I don't recall the N Hour sequence for the air
movement. It was--for us, we packed up every quickly
and then we were waiting at the airfield.
And my comms--I packed up my comms and everything. So
once we were sitting at the airfield about seven
o'clock in the morning on September 12th, I had limited
communications with what was going on. I was just
waiting for the aircraft to show up.\486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\486\CIF Commander Testimony at 76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
A: But none of us knew--we weren't aware of the
aircraft deploying time. On that set N Hour to move
aircraft, I don't recall what that was.
Q: Do you recall any efforts to try to coordinate back
with SOECUER headquarters to say, ``Hey, is there an N
Hour Sequence in effect?
Were you tracking an N Hour sequence of any type or was
it more of a deliberate deployment sequence?
A: I was tracking--for me, as a ground assault force,
the second I heard what was going on, that was kind of
what I was tracking. And we moved as quickly as we
could. And once we found out that the crisis was not
what it was originally articulated in terms of a U.S.
Ambassador or any Am[erican] cit[izen] missing, and
that he was killed and nobody was--that crisis was no
longer occurring as originally discussed, then it
became deliberative.
So from my perspective, at that point the crisis was no
longer ongoing and it was more of a deliberate process.
So the N Hour sequence, I hate to use the term
irrelevant, but I didn't know what my mission was going
to be if there wasn't a crisis that we were prone to
look at.\487\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\487\Id. at 77-78.
In support of its training exercise, the CIF's two C-130
aircraft were located in Croatia.\488\ Based on reports
regarding the attack in Benghazi, and well before receiving an
order to deploy, at approximately midnight local time [6:00
p.m. in Washington D.C.] the commander of the aircraft placed
his pilots and air crews in ``crew rest'' in anticipation of a
potential mission.\489\ ``Crew rest'' is typically a 12-hour
period in which the pilots and air crew rest prior to engaging
in a mission. The 12-hour period can be waived to eight hours
(or more in exigent circumstances). General Repass, the SOCEUR
Commander, waived the crew rest to eight hours in order to
facilitate the CIFs movement to the intermediate staging base
at Sigonella, Italy.\490\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\488\Repass Testimony at page 29.
\489\Id. at 49.
\490\Id. at 62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once he received word of Stevens's death, the CIF Commander
testified the mission transitioned from a crisis action
planning event to a deliberate planning event.\491\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\491\CIF Commander Testimony at 69.
Q: Why did it transition from a crisis action planning
event to a deliberate planning event? What was the
nature of what his death generated in terms of your
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
planning sequence?
A: From my recollection--and I wasn't in constant
communications about all of that; I just remember
hearing that he was killed, and there were no reports
of any other missing American citizens or any life,
limb, or eyesight threats to American personnel in the
original crisis point. Once we heard of that, and then
from that point we knew we were going to an ISB, for
sure. So there is no longer an in extremis, as we call
it, crisis, and personnel are safe, for a matter of
speaking, it became a much more deliberate planning
cycle.\492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\492\Id. at 69-70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
I was waiting for orders, to be honest with you, from
that point forward, outside of deploying. I knew I was
going to deploy. Aside from that, the scope of that
deployment in terms of a mission statement, was still
unknown.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\Id. at 71.
Once the U.S. based Special Operations Force was activated,
the CIF--the closest military asset capable of quickly
deploying to Benghazi--transitioned to a supporting role to
help facilitate whatever mission was to be assigned to SOF
forces.\494\ As such, the CIF's primary responsibility was then
to simply get to the intermediate staging base prior to the
U.S. based Special Operations Force and assist them as
required.\495\ The CIF was essentially relegated to being an
enabler of the U.S. based SOF, unless they were subsequently
tasked otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\Repass Testimony at page 60.
\495\Id. at 70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ham disagreed that the CIF's sole role became to prepare
for the U.S.-based Special Operations Force. He testified:
Q: Did you anticipate as you did your planning that the
Commander's In-extremis Force was going to be relegated
to being nothing more than enablers for the National
Mission Force?
A: In my view, that's an incorrect characterization of
the Commander's In-extremis Force.
* * *
Q: [W]hat would be a more accurate characterization?
A: Mr. Chairman, in my view, the Commander's In-
extremis Force, again, these are specially trained,
equipped, prepared forces that can, as the name
implies, conduct missions in extremis. [Redacted text]
[Redacted text] but they can, in fact, accomplish that
mission.
And, Mr. Chairman, they do, in fact, have a mission to
receive and prepare for arrival of the National Mission
Force, but, in my view, their mission is much broader
than just that.
Q: I think the tension that we're trying--particularly
those of us who have never served before--the tension
we're trying to reconcile is, when General Repass
testified--and he did a fantastic job, but one of the
impressions we were all left with based on his
testimony was, once the [U.S. SOF] was deployed, the
CIF's role then became to go to the ISB and await the
[U.S. SOF], which, in effect, took them out of the
realm of other assets that could deploy otherwise. That
is a fair characterization of his testimony.
And I'm just wondering whether or not you agree that,
once both of those assets are put in place--the [U.S.
SOF], it's headed, it's got a longer travel time than
the CIF--that the CIF's job was to go to the ISB and
await the [U.S. SOF]?
A: Mr. Chairman, I would say that that was one of their
missions, certainly, to facilitate the arrival and the
staging of the [U.S. SOF]. But, in my mind, that was an
operational force that was available to me, a highly
capable special operations force that was
available.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\496\Ham Testimony at 91-92.
Even still, Ham believed the CIF's failure to meet its
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
timeline was not justified and was inexcusable:
Though I know now in hindsight that had the CIF made
its timelines, they would not have been in position to
affect the outcome as things eventually played out on
the ground, the reality is, they should have made their
timelines. And that's--there's no excuse for that. They
should have made their timelines. They should have been
postured for subsequent use. As it turns out, they
would not have been needed, but we didn't know that at
the time. So that, as I look back on this, the
disappointment of the Commander's In-extremis Force not
meeting its timeline is, to me, significant, and I
believe the steps taken by the command and by the
Department of Defense after that have addressed that
situation.\497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\Id. at 108.
The Secretary had this to say about the CIF's deployment
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
timeline:
Q: Well that same unit then had to wait for aircraft
till about if you look at the timeline here, 10:21 a.m.
So that N-hour that was set at 11 o'clock east coast
time on the night of the 11th, it was not until 11
hours later that EUCOM CIF was actually transported
down to Sigonella from Croatia.
Does that timeframe seem reasonable to you, given what
you thought might be occurring in the region?
A: I think it's a legitimate area to ask why did it
take that long.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\498\Panetta Testimony at 176-177.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROBLEMS WITH US SOF DEPLOYMENT
The U.S. SOF force is required to deploy within a specific
number of hours after the order to deploy is given. As
reflected in the Defense Department's timeline and after-action
reviews, it actually took a significant amount of additional
time to launch the U.S. SOF. Even given this delay, the U.S.
SOF Force, which deployed from the United States, arrived at
the staging base in southern Europe only an hour and a half
after the CIF arrived.
By the time CIF and the U.S. SOF Force landed at Sigonella,
the crisis in Benghazi had ended. In fact, the units arrived in
Sigonella nearly 12 hours after all U.S. personnel had
evacuated from Benghazi. The assets ultimately deployed by the
Defense Department in response to the Benghazi attacks were not
positioned to arrive prior to the final lethal attack on the
Annex. The fact that this is true does not mitigate the
question of why the world's most powerful military was not
positioned to respond or why the urgency and ingenuity
displayed by team members at the Annex and Team Tripoli was
seemingly not shared by all decision makers in Washington.
What was disturbing from the evidence the Committee found
was that at the time of the final lethal attack at the Annex,
no asset ordered deployed by the Secretary had even left the
ground. Not a single asset had launched, save the military
personnel from Tripoli who did so on their own accord and whose
presence no one in Washington seemed aware of when discussing
which assets to deploy. Nothing was on its way to Benghazi as a
result of the Secretary's initial order to deploy.
More than 12 hours had passed since the first attack
happened at the Mission compound, resulting in the death of
Sean Smith (which was known) and Ambassador Stevens (which was
not then known), yet in that time, the greatest military on
earth was unable to launch one single asset toward the sound of
the guns.
The CIF's response timeline and the U.S. SOF's timeline
exposed flaws in a process designed to ensure that when a
crisis erupts, the military's decision and deployment cycles
will prove adequate to the challenge being confronted.
The U.S. Government's Response Lacked a Sense of Urgency
Perhaps given the timing of the 7:30 p.m. meeting with the
White House on September 11, shortly after all surviving State
Department personnel had evacuated from the Mission compound to
the Annex, there may have been a sense the worst of the attack
was over. Indeed, Winnefeld stated when he was first briefed
around 4:30 p.m. about the events in Benghazi, he recalled
being told there had been an attack and the attack was
over.\499\ The job left to be done was no longer a hostage
rescue situation but was, at best, recovering Stevens from a
hospital and, at worst, recovering Stevens's remains.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\Winnefeld Testimony at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This sense, in fact, was false and should have been viewed
as limited, if not false, at the time. As the participants of
the White House meeting would soon learn, events were
continuing to unfold on the ground in Benghazi. Those leaving
the Benghazi Mission compound were attacked and ambushed en
route to the Annex and once the Diplomatic Security Agents and
Team Annex arrived at the Annex the attacks continued.
Moreover, preparing for what could theoretically happen in
Tripoli, or other cities and facilities was understandable.
However, the lack of urgency in responding to what was actually
happening on the ground in Benghazi is difficult to reconcile.
Some may seek to argue a transferred focus onto Tripoli may
explain why such topics as military attire, vehicles, and
country clearances--topics that may seem irrelevant in a crisis
situation--found their way into the discussions, and why other
topics, such as deployment of the FEST, received short shrift.
This belies the reality that--even as Bash indicated the assets
were ``spinning up'' and the ensuing meeting took place--
Ambassador Stevens was missing in Benghazi. There is no
evidence news of his death had reached Washington D.C. Indeed,
news of his death could not have reached Washington D.C.
because it was not known at the time. So, pivoting toward a
Tripoli security analysis and the possibilities of unrest and
violence there is hard to reconcile with the reality of what
had happened in Benghazi, what was currently happening in
Benghazi, and tragically what was soon to happen in Benghazi.
With the storming of the compound in Benghazi, the killing
of Smith, and Stevens missing, discussing the nature of the
vehicles to be used and the clothing to be worn by those
seeking to provide aid seemed to place a disproportionate
emphasis on how the Libyan government might respond. After all,
the Libyan government was supposed to play an active role in
preventing the attack in the first instance and certainly in
responding afterward.
In addition, a fair review of read-outs and summaries of
the White House meeting suggest the focus had already moved
away from responding to Benghazi and toward responding to
Tripoli and the broader region. Expressing concern about how
forces might be received in Tripoli seems difficult to
reconcile with an actively hostile security situation ongoing
in Benghazi.
The U.S. Government's Response Lacked Leadership
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT THOUGHT STATE WAS EVACUATING THE AMERICANS IN
BENGHAZI
The response to the attacks suffered from confusion and
misinformation circulating between the agencies underscoring
that no one effectively took charge of the U.S. Government's
response the night and early morning of September 11-12. From
the Defense Department's perspective, when the orders were
issued, the plan on the ground was for the people in Benghazi,
with the assistance from Team Tripoli, to make their way back
to Tripoli. It would provide assets to augment the security in
Tripoli where needed, and provide evacuation of the wounded and
deceased. Several witnesses indicated that despite the
Secretary's orders, the plan was not to insert any asset into
Benghazi; their understanding was that assets needed to be sent
to Tripoli to augment security at the Embassy, and that the
State Department was working to move the State personnel from
Benghazi to Tripoli.
Tidd confirmed this understanding of the response plan
following the 7:30 meeting with the White House:
By the time we came out of the [White House meeting],
it was pretty clear that nobody was going to be left in
Benghazi. And so the decision--I think at the [White
House meeting] there was some discussion--but as I
recall, we weren't going to send them to Benghazi,
because everybody was going to be back in Tripoli by
the time we could actually get them there.\500\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\500\Tidd Testimony at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He further added:
On the evening, at the time that all of this was
transpiring, our mindset, our sense was that everything
was going to Tripoli, that no one was left--or no one
would be left in Benghazi. So that--that's--that was
the mindset that we had.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\501\Id. at 47.
Even the diplomatic security timeline of events reflected
this was the plan as understood by individuals on the ground in
Libya. At approximately 10:15 p.m. in Washington D.C., the
Diplomatic Security Command Center received a call from the CIA
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annex in Tripoli relaying the following information:
The Response Team has been on the ground for
approximately 60 minutes. They are waiting for to [sic]
escort them to the [redacted] annex.
* * *
Once the six-member Response Team arrives they will
have non-essential employees and the remains of Sean P.
Smith depart.\502\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\DSCC Timeline.
Word of the plan to evacuate the individuals from Benghazi
seemed to spread throughout the State Department. Susan E.
Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., received an
email update on the events of the evening which read:
``Apparently the Department is considering an ordered departure
of some personnel from both Tripoli and Benghazi.''\503\ One
member of Team Tripoli also testified the plan, as he
understood it, was to evacuate all non-essential personnel to
Tripoli.\504\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\503\Email from Senior Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative
to the U.N., to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012 10:37 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0051700).
\504\Special Operator Testimony at 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet several other witnesses believed a very different plan
was in place: No one was evacuating until Stevens was
found.\505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\505\See DSCC Timeline (``[At 11:13 PM EDT] response team has
arrived at the [redacted] Annex. Station is telling him all DS staff
told to evacuate. [Redacted] has 3 people willing to stay behind.
Director Bultrowicz stated no, DS will not evacuate all members due to
the outstanding issue of the Ambassador.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Department was working off of the premise
everyone in Benghazi was being evacuated, others were clear
that no one was leaving, and even State Department senior
officials did not authorize the Diplomatic Security Agents to
evacuate until Stevens was found. The Committee was also struck
by the sheer number of government officials involved in the
decision making the evening/early morning hours of September
11-12, who did not even know there was a separate U.S. facility
in Benghazi referred to as the ``Annex'' or where the Annex
was.
The first time it is clear all agencies understood the
people in Benghazi were evacuating to Tripoli was after the
final, lethal mortar attack at 11:15 p.m. in Washington D.C.,
[5:15 a.m. in Benghazi]--and over seven hours after the initial
attack.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\See Email from Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the U.S.
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Denis R. McDonough, Deputy
Nat'l Sec. Advisor, White House (Sept. 12, 2012 12:12 AM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0051706) (``we're pulling everyone out of Benghazi
[starting shortly]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of clarity on evacuation versus location of the
missing Ambassador was not the only example of conflicting and
confusing directives during the attacks and aftermath in
Benghazi.
The issue of military attire versus civilian clothes
illustrated no one seemed to be taking charge and making final
decisions. After the State Department request at the 7:30 p.m.
White House meeting, the Defense Department began working the
issue. Documents from the Defense Department show, and the FAST
Platoon Commander testified it was well into the next afternoon
on September 12th before the final decision was made. He
testified further the Marines changed in and out of uniform and
civilian clothes several times because the orders kept
changing.
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DID NOT ANTICIPATE
ADDITIONAL ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI
Several Defense Department witnesses testified that
following the attack at the Benghazi Mission compound, they did
not anticipate any additional attacks. Landolt explained:
But you also have to remember that the first firefight
was around midnight. We didn't anticipate a second one
at 5:00 in the morning.
* * *
Q: In terms of, though, after the first attack, was
there a sense that perhaps this thing had passed and
the dust had settled and---
A: There was that sense.
Q: Talk about that a little more. Was there a general
agreement amongst yourself and General Ham and Admiral
Leidig of that, well, we got through this thing with
minimal damage? Or what was the process? What was the
thought?
A: Yeah, there was a sense that we needed more
information, that it looked like the initial attack had
ended. We had the one dead body on our hands, but we
still had a missing Ambassador. And then the Embassy,
through the DAT, was telling us that they were able to
get a plane and they were going to fly people over. So
I thought, okay, well, that will give us better
situational awareness. So there was that lull where,
Okay, let's wait and see what happens here.\507\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\507\Landolt Testimony at 33-34.
Although the Defense Department did not anticipate an
additional attack, the people on the ground in Benghazi most
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
assuredly did. One GRS agent on the ground testified:
Q: Was there a sense from you that something was
building to something larger later in the evening?
A: Yes. And what we were worried about was an even
larger force with gun-mounted weapons, which are much
larger, overtaking the compound.
Q: Okay. But in terms of individuals with small arms,
that's something that you guys had sufficiently handled
and were able to continue handling based on your
defensive posture at the base?
A: Right, but there was a limit to it. Like it's not
something that we could have done for days. I mean, we
were able to do it for as long as we could, but it
wasn't--there had to be something else.
Q: Okay. Was there ever a sense throughout the evening
that the attacks were over and there was sort of a
calmness----
A: Absolutely not.
Q: --around the base?
A: No. There were lulls, which are normal, but no, none
of us, and when I say ``us,'' the team, none of us
thought it was over, no.\508\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\508\GRS 5 Testimony at 65-66.
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S FOCUS SHIFTED
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FROM BENGHAZI TO THE REGION
The Defense Department's lack of comprehension of the
events taking place in Benghazi, coupled with the emphasis on
resolving potentially extraneous policy matters, hampered the
administration's subsequent plan to respond to those events and
dictated the urgency with which forces moved that night. As the
CIF commander testified, their movements that night
transitioned from crisis action to deliberate planning.\509\
Winnefeld explained why:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\509\CIF Commander Testimony at 69.
I think there are a number of factors in play. One, it
wasn't a matter of not having enough urgency, I think
it was more a matter of posture, coupled with the fact
the focus was on regional challenges, not on something
additional was going to happen in Benghazi later that
night. And so when there was not the perception of an
immediate threat right there . . . people are going to
operate safely.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\510\Winnefeld Testimony at 39-40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
And remember, the reason we were moving the CIF, we
were moving it to, what, Sigonella. . . . It was not
because they were going to Benghazi.
* * *
We were worried about the copycat attacks elsewhere in
the region. And so I think they were more in a--it
wasn't a lack of urgency, but it was--you know, they
keep safety in mind. It was, okay, there could be a
copycat attack; we need to reposture ourselves in
theater. Let's do it, but let's not kill ourselves
doing it.
You know, in 20/20 hindsight, if anybody had known
there was going to be a second attack and that
potentially the CIF could end up going there, maybe
they would have asked that question that you're asking.
But again, their mindset was we're moving the CIF to
Sigonella because something else could happen in the
region.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\Id. at 30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE LACKED URGENCY
Finally, the coordination for and deployment of the assets
identified and ordered deployed by the Secretary lacked any
real sense of urgency.
The Defense Department knew of the initial attack in
Benghazi, which killed Sean P. Smith, less than an hour after
the attack began.
Two hours after this initial attack began, the Secretary
had met with the President and been given all of the authority
he believed he needed to ``use all of the resources at our
disposal to try to make sure we did everything possible to try
to save lives there.''\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\512\Panetta Testimony at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three hours after the initial attack began, Bash emailed
senior leaders at the State Department to inform them of the
assets that could be deployed in response to the attack.
Five hours after the initial attack began, formal
authorization to deploy the assets was issued.
Instead of setting the N hour at the time the Secretary of
Defense gave his order before Bash's email, or even setting the
N hour at the time orders were issued to the forces at 8:39
p.m., the Joint Staff coordinated with the U.S. SOF force to
ask, ``What would you like to set as N hour?''\513\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\Email from Vice Admiral Kurt Tidd, Dir. of Operations, J.
Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Dep't of Defense, to Deputy Dir. of Operations,
et al. (Sept. 11, 2012 8:53PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB001376).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the urgency of the Secretary's intended deployment of
these units and particularly in light of what was continuing to
happen in Benghazi, this cannot be justified, particularly
since it was already known the likelihood of further unrest in
the region was significant.
N hour was ultimately set at 11:00 p.m.--more than seven
hours after the attacks in Benghazi began, more than four hours
after the Secretary gave the order to deploy the forces, and
more than two hours after that order was finally relayed to the
forces. Though, Petraeus quipped to the Committee, ``N hour has
nothing to do with this whatsoever, with great respect. That is
completely irrelevant[,]'' the setting of the N hour was
symptomatic of a larger lack of urgency in responding to the
situation on the ground.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\514\Testimony of General David A. Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel.
Agency, Tr. at 16 (Mar. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Petraeus Testimony 2]
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost six hours after first learning of the initial attack
on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, no asset had been deployed to
Benghazi or Tripoli. Moreover, no asset ordered by the
Secretary was even moving toward Benghazi or Tripoli aside from
military personnel in Tripoli who mustered the ingenuity,
courage, and resolve to ferry themselves toward danger. At the
White House, McDonough knew at 11:45 p.m. the situation in
Benghazi remained ``fluid,'' Stevens was still ``unaccounted
for,'' and one State Department officer had been killed. He
included this in his 11:45 p.m. email on September 11.
Despite the fact that more than six hours had lapsed
between the time the first attack was known and the time of
this email, McDonough was still speaking of assets
``deploying'' rather than assets deployed. If there is evidence
McDonough placed calls or sent emails inquiring about the
status of the deployment, the White House has not shared that
evidence with the Committee. Rather, what was learned is
McDonough made mention of calling ``YouTube'' to request the
taking down of two videos, and he references having had the
Secretary call ``Pastor Jones to ask him to pull down his
video.'' Why McDonough had time to concern himself with ``You
Tube'' videos while an Ambassador was missing and unaccounted
for remains unclear. And why the Secretary of Defense was used
to call ``You Tube'' and a ``pastor'' about a video--that had
not and would not be linked to the attacks in Benghazi--rather
than inquiring about the status of the asset deployment he
ordered five hours earlier is also unclear.
What is clear is the United States Government sent
personnel into a dangerous post-revolution environment in
Benghazi, Libya. Those sent displayed heroism and valor. They
also displayed a sense of urgency in discharging the mission
assigned to them. Chris Stevens had the urgency to travel to
Benghazi because decisions needed to be made before the end of
the fiscal year. Chris Stevens felt the urgency to assign
himself to cover a one-week gap in the Principal Officer
position in Benghazi.
Those Americans assigned to work at a nearby Annex had the
sense of urgency to fight their way onto the Benghazi Mission
compound because a sister U.S. agency was under attack.
Diplomatic Security Agents had the urgency to return time and
time again into a burning building in search of Smith and
Stevens. Diplomatic Security Agents and the team from the Annex
no doubt felt the urgency when they fought their way from the
compound to the Annex overcoming point-blank machine gun fire
and grenade attacks.
Team Tripoli sensed the urgency of what was happening in
Benghazi and negotiated for private aircraft to race toward the
danger in defense of fellow Americans. Tyrone S. Woods and Glen
A. Doherty felt the urgency of defending a second U.S. facility
against a series of coordinated attacks before ultimately being
killed by precision mortar attacks.
There was life and death urgency felt in Libya with split-
second decisions being made: Do I fire on this crowd or not? Do
we fire in the direction of a residence or not? Do we return to
a smoke and fire engulfed building yet again in search of
fallen colleagues? Do we go to the hospital to find Stevens or
to the Annex? How do we fly from Tripoli to Benghazi?
If that same degree of urgency was felt among the decision
makers in Washington it is not reflected in the time within
which decisions were made nor in the topics being debated in
and around the deployment.
The ``tyranny of time and distance'' may well explain why
no U.S. military asset--save the bravery of the men serving in
Tripoli--made it to Benghazi. It does not explain why no asset
was even headed toward Benghazi. The ``tyranny of time and
distance'' does not explain why Washington D.C. leaders were
preoccupied with ancillary issues when they were responsible
for sending our fellow Americans into harm's way in the first
instance.
Half of the action items that emerged from the White House
meeting convened in response to the killing of an American
Foreign Service officer and an attack on an American diplomatic
facility related to a video. Half. There is more of a record of
phone calls from White House officials to ``YouTube'' and a
virtually anonymous ``pastor'' than there were calls imploring
the Defense Department to move with greater urgency. The
preoccupation the administration felt with safeguarding the
feelings of the Libyan government and dealing with an anti-
Muslim video (which video prompted no change in force posture
or readiness even after protests erupted in Cairo) is a
foreshadowing of what would become an administration wide
effort to conflate that same video with the attacks in
Benghazi.
PART II:
Internal and Public Government
Communications about the Terrorist
Attacks in Benghazi
``Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al Queda-
like
[sic] group.''
The Secretary of State to her daughter,
September 11,
2012\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Chelsea Clinton (``Diane Reynolds'') (Sept. 11,
2012, 11:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05795467).
``We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with the
film. It was a planned attack--not a protest.''
Summary of a statement by the Secretary
of State
to the Egyptian Prime Minister,
September 12, 2012\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Email from U.S. Dep't of State, to S_CallNotes, (Sept. 12, 2012,
7:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561911).
``To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet
video,
and not a broader failure of policy.''
Benjamin J. Rhodes, defining one of the
goals of Am-
bassador Susan E. Rice's appearances on
the Sun-
day news programs following the
Benghazi attacks,
September 14, 2012\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Email from Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for
Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec. Council, to Dagoberto Vega, Special
Ass't to the President and Dir. of Broadcast Media, White House, et al.
(Sept. 14, 2012, 8:09 PM) [hereinafter Rhodes Memo] (on file with the
Committee, C05415285).
``I gave Hillary a hug and shook her hand, and she said we are
going to have the filmmaker arrested who was responsible for
the death of my son.''
Diary entry of Charles Woods, father of
Tyrone Woods,
September 14, 2012\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Fox News Insider, Father of Benghazi Victim Reveals Journal
Entry Documenting Meeting With Hillary, YouTube (Jan. 13, 2016), http:/
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMx0huMabos.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Security Environment
The attacks in Benghazi did not occur in a vacuum. They
took place amidst a severely deteriorating security situation
in eastern Libya--a permissive environment where extremist
organizations were infiltrating the region, setting up camps,
and carrying out attacks against Western targets.\5\ In June
2012, State Department security officials were discussing ``an
active terrorist cell in Benghazi'' that was ``planning and
implementing attack operations against western interests
including the U.S. Mission in Benghazi[.]''\6\ That same month
another security official in Libya reported to Washington about
the ``increase in extremist activity'' and described his ``fear
that we have passed a threshold where we will see more
targeting, attacks, and incidents involving western
targets.''\7\ The official cited a series of recent attacks and
noted that a source had warned of a ``group attack'' on an
American facility.\8\ He specifically mentioned ``[t]argeting
[and] attacks by extremist groups particularly in the eastern
portion of Libya,'' where Benghazi is located.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\This deteriorating security environment is discussed in detail
in Section III of the report.
\6\Memorandum from James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir. of the Near East
Asia Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, to Charlene Lamb,
Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State (June 15,
2012) (on file with the Committee, C05578316).
\7\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25, U.S. Dep't of State (June 14, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05388987).
\8\Id.
\9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the months leading up to September 11, 2012, several
major security incidents had taken place in Benghazi against
Western targets, including:
LApril 2, 2012: Attack on a United Kingdom [UK]
armored vehicle;
LApril 6, 2012: Improvised Explosive Device [IED]
attack on the State Department facility in Benghazi;
LApril 10, 2012: IED attack on the motorcade of
the United Nations Envoy;
LApril 27, 2012: IED attack on a courthouse in
Benghazi;
LMay 22, 2012: Rocket Propelled Grenade [RPG]
attack on the International Committee for the Red Cross [ICRC]
facility in Benghazi;
LJune 6, 2012: IED attack on the State Department
facility in Benghazi;
LJune 11, 2012: RPG attack on the UK Ambassador's
motorcade;
LJune 12, 2012: RPG attack on the ICRC;
LJuly 29, 2012: IED found at Tibesti Hotel; and
LAugust 5, 2012: Attack on the ICRC facility.
The threat environment in Benghazi was so severe that on
September 11, 2012, on the anniversary of September 11, one
Diplomatic Security agent in Benghazi feared an attack that
night and was not planning on going to sleep. He testified:
You know, I wasn't going to go to sleep that night. I
was probably going to stay up throughout the night just
because, one, it's September 11, you know, and what was
happening in Egypt. So if anything was to happen, it
would happen late at night, early morning. So I wasn't
going to go to bed. I believe [Agent 2] was along the
same mindset, but we hadn't ratified whether, yes, this
is what we are doing. It was just people are going to
stay up. I had taken my weapon and ammunition and put
it in my room. [Agent 2] had done the same thing. And I
believe they had--[Agent 5] had his weapon with him as
well in his room.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 1 [Agent 1], Diplomatic
Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 49-50 (Mar. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter Agent 1 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Sean P. Smith, the Information Management Officer at the
Benghazi Mission compound, also feared an attack, telling a
community of online gamers shortly before the attack:
``[A]ssuming we don't die tonight. We saw one of our `police'
that guard the compound taking pictures.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Matt Smith, Ex-SEALs, Online Gaming Maven among Benghazi Dead,
CNN (Sept. 13, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/us/
benghazi-victims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was against this backdrop that the September 11, 2012
attacks against U.S. facilities in Benghazi took place.
THE PROTESTS IN CAIRO
In Cairo, Egypt earlier that day, approximately 2,000
protestors demonstrated outside the U.S. Embassy--a protest
that began in the middle of the day.\12\ A handful of
protestors scaled the embassy wall, tore down the American
flag, and sprayed graffiti inside the compound.\13\ Some
protestors were eventually removed by Egyptian police. No
Americans were injured or killed in the event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\See, e.g., Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.,
et al., (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05390691).
\13\See, e.g., id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Cairo, protests had been planned for days in advance on
social media as a result of a video posted on YouTube about the
prophet Muhammad.\14\ On September 10, 2012, the CIA warned of
social media chatter calling for a demonstration in front of
the Embassy in Cairo,\15\ and Americans at the Embassy were
sent home early due to the impending protests.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Sara Lynch and Oren Dorell, Deadly embassy attacks were days in
the making, USA Today, (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:36 PM), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012/09/12/libyan-
officials-us-ambassador-killed-in-attack/57752828/1.
\15\See, e.g., email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Erin Pelton, Dir. of Commc'cs and Spokesperson, U.S.
Mission to the U.N. (Sept. 15, 2012, 7:18 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05622933).
\16\Egypt Protesters Scale U.S. Embassy Wall, Take Flag, CBS/AP
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-
protesters-scale-us-embassy-wall-take-flag.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the attacks in Benghazi occurred later on the same
day, they had little else in common with the Cairo protests.
Significant differences included:
LIn Cairo, plans for the protest appeared on
social media well before the actual demonstration.\17\ In
Benghazi the attacks occurred without warnings on social
media;\18\
\17\Sara Lynch and Oren Dorell, Deadly embassy attacks were days in
the making, USA Today, Sept. 16, 2012.
\18\See, e.g., Testimony of Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel.
Ageny, Tr. at 42-45, July 16, 2015 [hereinafter Tripoli COS Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
LIn Cairo, protestors did not brandish or use
weapons.\19\ In Benghazi, attackers were armed with assault
weapons, rocket propelled grenades, and sophisticated
mortars;\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\See, e.g., Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the
U.N. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) [hereinafter 7:55 P.M. Rice Email] (on
file with Committee, C053906910).
\20\See, e.g., Benghazi Accountability Review Board at 4, U.S.
Dep't of State [hereinafter Benghazi ARB].
LIn Cairo, protestors spray painted walls and did
other minor damage.\21\ In Benghazi, the attackers burned down
buildings and pounded U.S. facilities with mortars and machine
gun fire;\22\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\7:55 P.M. Rice Email, supra note 19.
\22\Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 4.
LIn Cairo, the protest was confined to a single
location.\23\ In Benghazi, the attacks spanned nearly eight
hours over two different locations.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\See, e.g., 7:55 P.M. Rice Email, supra note 19.
\24\Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 4.
Diplomatic Security personnel in Washington D.C. recognized
differences as well. At 5:13 p.m. on September 11, 2012 James
Bacigalupo, Regional Director for Diplomatic Security, Near
Eastern Affairs Bureau, State Department, notified all regional
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
security officers:
Within the last few hours we have had one demonstration
in which protestors infiltrated the perimeter of the
compound in Cairo and an armed attack on our compound
in Benghazi. Both are currently on-going and may be in
response to the release of an anti-Islamic documentary
and upcoming demonstration by Terry Jones this
evening.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Email from James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir. of the Near East
Asia Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, to DS-IP-NEA-RSO
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048896).
The differences also were noted by senior State Department
officials as well. Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, State
Department, sent an email at 6:09 p.m. that included Jacob J.
Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy
Planning, State Department, and Patrick F. Kennedy, Under
Secretary for Management, State Department, among others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuland wrote:
[Please] put out as two separate statements to bullpen,
asap. On record, me.
We can confirm that our office in Benghazi, Libya has
been attacked by a group of militants. We are working
with the Libyans now to try to restore security.
In Cairo, we can confirm that Egyptian police have now
removed the demonstrators who had entered our Embassy
grounds earlier.
For [press] guidance, if pressed whether we see a
connection between these two.
We have no information regarding a connection between
these incidents.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\Email from Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State,
to Elizabeth Dibble, Deputy Ass't Sec'y in the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 6:09 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05578255).
WHAT BENGHAZI REPORTED DURING THE ATTACKS
All five Diplomatic Security agents at the Benghazi Mission
spoke with the Diplomatic Security Command Center while the
attacks were ongoing. Agent 5, the Diplomatic Security agent
who was with Smith and Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher
Stevens during the attack, recounted his story:
Okay, so the evening started with [Agent 4], [Agent 2]
and I sitting at a table near the pool at the end of
the night. Ambassador Stevens had come by and said, I'm
going to bed. Sean Smith said the same thing and went,
you know, went inside the villa, and we were just
sitting out kind of relaxing at the end of the night.
While we were talking, I started hearing some kind of
chanting, I thought it was. So I told the others, you
know, I told the other two, hang on. Just listen for a
minute. And what we heard was chanting. And it was my
impression that it was coming closer. You know, so
immediately when I realized, you know, that this is a
potential security incident, or a potential something,
I said, you know, get your gear, right now. I ran into
Villa C where the Ambassador and Sean Smith were and
the other two ran in a different direction.
I remember hearing the chants. I mean, they were fairly
close already. I mean, yelling distance, which is
pretty close especially in a city setting. So my
impression is that I don't have much time. So I ran
right to my room, you know, put my helmet on, put my
vest on, grabbed my weapons, my additional weapons, and
I turned to lock the gate, and basically, it was a jail
cell door with three locks on it. I locked all three
locks.
And at about that time, Ambassador Stevens and Sean
Smith were coming out of their rooms. Sean Smith was
already, you know, donning his helmet and vest. I
guided them both into the safe haven, and I set myself
up in the safe haven with--I was holding my M4. I had a
pistol, a radio, a shotgun, and when we were, you know,
when we were in there, I radioed the other guy, hey, we
are all in the safe haven.
I could hear outside explosions, yelling, chanting,
screaming, gunfire, and I reported all of this on the
radio just saying, this is what my senses are telling
me. Then people started banging on the doors of the
building, so I reported that. Hey, there is banging on
the doors. They are trying to come in, you know, we
need immediate assistance. And there wasn't any
response on the radio. Shortly after that, to my
recollection, the doors were blown open. And about 70
individuals, you know, rushed into the building, all of
them carrying AK-47s, grenades, RPGs, you know, a
mixture throughout everyone. Different--there were a
couple of different assault rifles.
And with the number of individuals that came into the
building versus me, I chose just to stay in the shadow
that I was in. So I was partially in the safe haven,
partially outside the safe haven. This area was, you
know, there was a big shadow where I was sitting, and
my view through the jail cell door was into the common
area. So I could see where everybody was going, and
they began breaking everything. I could just hear glass
breaking. I could hear stuff being thrown around. I
could hear furniture being moved.
If I may just back up a little bit. When we made it
into the safe haven, I handed my cell phone to the
Ambassador. I said, call everybody on my cell phone.
Call everybody that you know that can help us. At one
point, I handed Sean Smith the shotgun, but just like
me and everybody else that was in the safe haven, we
were scared. But as a security professional with my
military training and my agent training, I'm trained to
remain more calm than a non-security professional.
So I took the weapon back from him seeing that he was
visibly shaken. And I just waited to see what was
unfolding. I was on the radio the whole time updating,
you know, whispering. Turned the volume way down, you
know, hey guys, they are in the building. Shortly after
that, two individuals came up to the jail cell door and
took out their AK-47s, and they are beating on the jail
cell door. They also had grenades on them. And I
thought they were going to take the grenades off and
pit them on the locks and blow the locks.
So I tuned to the Ambassador, and said, you know, if
they take their grenades off the door and put them on
the locks, I'm going to start shooting. And when I go
down, pick up the gun, and keep fighting. Thankfully,
they didn't put the grenades on the locks. And they
just kind of turned away, and walked to a different,
you know, part of the house that I couldn't really see.
And then slowly, people started to kind of trickle out.
And then the lights started to kind of dim. My initial
response or my initial thought was, well, they just
knocked out the generators. You know, we have regular
city power but we also have backup generators. So
flickering would be a likely, you know, cause of this.
But in reality, it was smoke. And it took me about, you
know, two or three seconds after that to determine that
it was smoke.
As soon as I realized it was smoke, I turned to the
Ambassador and Sean Smith and said, we are moving to
the bathroom. And at that time, grabbed the Ambassador,
Sean Smith was right behind him and we started crawling
towards the bathroom. It's about a three- to four--
meter crawl. And it only took seconds for us to reach--
to reach the hallway that the bathroom was in. But by
that time--seconds later, the smoke had already filled
the entire room and I began basically army crawling
like on my belly, and breathing though my hands like
this, the last, you know, centimeter of air that was
left.
And as soon as it became that thick, no light was
visible from the lights that were fully on. The sounds
were, you know, crackling and breaking of things from
heat. And so to lead them to the bathroom, I was
saying, Come on guys, follow me. And I was slapping my
hands on the floor, or you know, hitting stuff with my
hands if I felt anything. Like come on, you guys,
follow me. Come on. We are going to the bathroom.
So I make it to the bathroom and nobody follows me in.
The whole time I was slapping and saying, come on,
follow me. My intention of going to the bathroom is
because if we made it to the bathroom, I know there is
a window that we can open. So what we would do is go
into the bathroom, close the door, wet towels on the
floor and open the window. And we could last, you know
probably much longer in the bathroom than anywhere else
in the house.
But because nobody followed me in, I wasn't going to
close the door. So thinking about how I can better the
situation, I open the window. And I thought that that
could you know, provide some, you know, the lights in
the bathroom. I could provide some light, or I could
provide, you know, someplace with air and they could
see that. But by opening the window, I stood up to open
the window, and I thought my face was on fire. And I
opened the window anyway and it just became a chimney
and all the smoke started, you know, pouring out of the
window and being sucked in my direction.
Because at that point that--I started to pass out. I
could feel myself becoming weak and just overcome with
smoke and heat. So I got back on the floor, took off my
M4, because crawling with a slung weapon is extremely
difficult. It was getting hung up on things, and I
didn't want to be stuck in that building because of my
M4. So I threw it in the bathroom, just left it there
and started crawling towards my bedroom. And when I
decided to do that, I was very clear to anybody else
who could hear me, I'm moving to my bedroom. Come on
guys, I'm moving to my bedroom. The whole time I'm
hitting the floor, slapping, yelling. Come on, guys.
Come on, you can do it. Let's go. Let's go. We are
moving to my bedroom.
So I crawled to my bedroom. And as soon as I passed the
threshold to my bedroom, you know, I had seconds left
of life, essentially. And so I quickly went over to my
window and started to crank open the metal shutters,
but I was cranking the wrong way. So I had to turn back
and crank it the other way. Then I had to open up the
glass window, and then I had to pull a pin and push out
this big metal gate. And as soon as I did that, I
collapsed on to my little patio area.
And around the patio area was, you know, maybe a 2\1/
2\-foot tall cinderblock wall. And as soon as I went
out there, I just started taking fire immediately. I
remember hearing explosions, which I equate to
grenades. I remember feeling the cement exploding and
hitting me in the face. And I remember the sounds. So
after catching my breath, I jumped back into the
building and I searched for the Ambassador and Sean
Smith. I went as far as my threshold, and reached out
into the--into the area we had just come from to see if
I could feel anybody. But the smoke and heat were so
intense that, I mean, the smoke was coming in though my
eyes, even though they were closed. It was coming in
through my nose. And I stayed in there until I could--
physically couldn't do it any more.
When I was in the Navy, they engrain in you, 110
percent. And most people don't think you can do 110
percent, but it's part of my character. I do 110
percent and I stayed in there until--until I physically
could not and mentally could not stay in there any
longer.
I went back out of the building, caught my breath on
the patio again, immediately taking rounds, the same
stuff, whizzing, you know, jumped back into the
building, and I had intentions--you know, I was just
thinking of any way that I could possibly signal them
or let them know where I was besides yelling and
slapping and hitting stuff.
And I remembered that I had a lamp in my room, and I
went over to my lamp and I turned on my lamp, thinking
that they could see it in the smoke. But it didn't turn
on. And so I held it up to my eye to see if it was
working, and I remember seeing a very faint glow when
it was this close. I remember feeling the heat of the
lamp, and I could just barely see the actual light from
it.
That's how thick the smoke was. And I went back to my
threshold, searched around, still yelling, still
saying, ``Come on guys,'' you know, to my bedroom. No
response. Nothing. I went back out and caught my breath
again, still taking rounds. And I went back in one or
two more times to try and find them, and I couldn't.
The last time I went out, you know, I decided that if I
went back into the building that I wasn't going to come
back out. The smoke and heat were way too powerful, and
way too strong, and it was extremely confusing feeling
my way in a smoke-filled building. And I didn't want to
get lost, and so I decided to climb up the ladder up to
the roof.
I climbed up the ladder, and pulled up the ladder
behind me and that's the moment that I knew that
Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith were probably dead.
Immediately, upon getting up to the roof, I started
radioing for my colleagues, you know, telling them the
situation, you know, telling them my situation, you
know, I am exhausted. I am completely exhausted. I gave
everything I had. And I'm still thinking of ways to
help, still thinking of ways to get the guys out.
So I remember that we have a skylight in the top of the
building, and so I, you know, we had a little stash of
gear up on the roof. So I went over and I grabbed an M4
magazine and I climbed up on to this little platform
which is near the window. But it's protected by these
metal bars. And I couldn't break the window. But I
remember yelling and hitting it as hard as I possibly
could.
The bad guys saw me up there, started shooting at me
again. I remember seeing tracer fire right over my
head. I remember hearing the whizzing of the rounds
going past me. And so I climbed, you know, back down
off the ledge and just got on the radio. ``Hey, guys,
I'm on a frying pan. This thing is hot. The smoke is
coming out of the building and going right on to the
roof. If I pick my head up I'm getting shot at, and I
can't--I can't do this forever.''
Finally, over the radio, [Agent 4] says, ``[Agent 5],
we are coming to get you.'' You know, at that time a
couple of seconds were gone, and he was like, ``Hang
on. Hang on. We are coming to get you'' I don't know
how long I was up on the roof, but for me it was a
while.
Finally, the other guys came over in a fully-armored
vehicle and parked right at the base of kind of my
location and set up a small perimeter, called me down
off the roof. I climbed down and they were all amazed
to see me still alive. Just my condition was, you know,
my face was black. My eyeballs were black. My nose was
black. Everything I had was black. But as a security
professional, I said, ``Give me a gun.'' [Agent 2] gave
me a 9-millimeter pistol which I was a little unhappy
about, but I took it anyway and stood--stood a position
on the outside.
And [Agent 4]--[Agent 4] and [Agent 1] tried to go
inside the building and find them, but shortly after
that, their report was way too hot, way too smokey. You
know, we are going to get lost in there. Somebody is
going to die if we keep this up.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 5 [Agent 5], Diplomatic
Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 123 (Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter
Agent 5 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Agent 3, Diplomatic Security agent in charge at the
Benghazi Mission compound, testified he was in constant contact
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
with the Diplomatic Security Command Center:
I was in the best position to see the attacks happen,
unfold. I was in the TOC [Tactical Operations Center]
at the special mission compound. I manned the cameras.
You guys have seen the video. Any time you see the
camera moving, that's me. Subsequently, I was also in a
position to review the cameras and be aware of all the
situational awareness at the second compound, all of
which I have shared. Much of the attack was passed in
real-time through my phone to DS command center.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 3 [Agent 3], Diplomatic
Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 77 (Oct. 8, 2013) [hereinafter
Agent 3 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agent 3 also testified about what he saw:
It was 9:42 at night, and I was wrapping up work and
had some emails. My shift should have been done three
or four hours earlier. I'm in the TOC office in the TOC
building. I hear several, three to four, gunshots and
an explosion that seemed substantially closer than what
I heard earlier, which was the fireworks. The fireworks
I kind of expected to happen every night at about 9:30
give or take. Initially I thought they were just a
little bit late.
So I get up. I go to the window, which is actually
covered by two bookcases and has sandbags on the
outside, so not to see anything, but actually to hear a
little better I go to the window. I think I heard the
shots or explosions first and then something more
subsequent than that, either an additional explosion or
additional gunfire, that sounded very close. I turn. I
glance maybe a second, probably less, at the
surveillance camera monitors and see a large group of
personnel coming on. They're already on the compound,
effectively in the middle of compound C. Right where
this small roundabout is, there's a camera on a pole
there. And I saw a large group. My original assessment
was 16 to 20 armed men, a couple of them with
banners[.]\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\Id. at 135-136.
Agent 3 testified this information was being relayed back
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to the Diplomatic Security Command Center [DSCC]:
We are relaying what is going on via the cameras, where
slowly the barrack buildings [Villa C], which is one of
the villas on the compound on the map, is set on fire,
and then slowly those forces migrate over to our side,
where they pin us in, basically, in both of our
locations, in Villa B and the TOC building, where they
proceed to gain entry into Villa B and attempt to kick
the door in to the TOC building for 10 to 15 minutes. .
. . [t]he situation on the ground was rough out there.
There was heavy weapons. Some guys have grenades that
have already gone off. Everybody is armed with either a
pistol or a long gun. Somebody shows up at some point
with, like, a bazooka. So it is tough.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\Id. at 145-146.
Diplomatic Security Agent 1 called the DSCC when attackers
were attempting to break into the room where he and another
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
agent had barricaded themselves. He testified:
Q: You mentioned earlier that you used your BlackBerry
to call the DS Command Center. When did you first call
the DS Command Center during this sequence of events?
A: So before they breached, when they made the first
attempt, the first attempt they didn't breach into the
room yet. But it was imminent that they were going to
breach and they were going to come in. So at that point
we bunkered in and started to proceed making calls. So
[Agent 2] was calling Tripoli and I called the Command
Center. I believe it was 18 minutes after the
attack.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Agent 1 Testimony at 62.
Diplomatic Security Agent 2 also spoke with the DSCC during
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the attacks. He testified:
I stayed on the roof of that building for the majority
of the night. I made several phone calls back and forth
to the DS Command Center in D.C. relaying information.
I also made phone calls to one of the Ambassador's
contacts to try to get some atmospherics about what was
going on in the rest of the city, should we need to do
a ground evac.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Testimony of [Agent 2], Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 100 (Mar. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Agent 2 Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Agent 2 told the Committee he was providing ``general
situational awareness'' to the DSCC so they could ``make
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
accurate decisions.'' He testified:
A: Yeah. He wanted to know the status of the
accountability of the Americans who were on post,
specifically the Ambassador, what information we had.
There were also additional reports coming in that the
Ambassador might have been at a hospital in a burn unit
and we were trying to verify the validity of those
claims. And then just general situational awareness for
the Command Center in D.C.
Q: So your sense of kind of your--what you were doing
there was kind of giving an ongoing as things were
unfolding so that they would have the information to
help assess how to continue responding?
A: Yes. My intent was to provide them the information
that I had so they had timely information so they could
make accurate decisions.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\Id. at 102.
Diplomatic Security Agent 4 testified it was his job to
``immediately'' contact the DSCC in the event of an attack.\34\
He testified about the beginning of the attack:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent 4 [Agent 4], Diplomatic
Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 85 (Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Agent 4 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Q: Would it be then an accurate description to describe
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the attack as sort of a stealth attack?
A: It was very sudden. As I had mentioned, the only
warning that I had that something was amiss was that--
kind of that cry that I heard at the main gate. So it
was very sudden.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\Id. at 144.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agent 4 also testified of the attack:
A: No, I never told them that there was a protest.
Q: Was it your assessment that there was a protest?
A: No.
Q: Do you believe there was a protest?
A: I don't.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\Id. at 155.
At the Diplomatic Security Command Center, Charlene R.
Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs,
State Department, was monitoring the situation in real time and
was aware of the reports coming in from the agents under attack
in Benghazi. She testified she was in ``constant contact'' with
the agents on the ground and had an ``almost full-time
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
connection'' to them:
A: I was in my office, and I received a phone call, I
don't remember if it was directly from the command
center or if it was from the desk officer, but I
received a phone call that notified me that there was a
problem.
Q: And that's what they said, it was a problem? Did
they elaborate? Did they tell you anything more?
A: They said that they had the RSO on the phone and
that the compound was under attack. And I didn't ask
any more questions. I believe I notified Scott
Bultrowicz, [Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Diplomatic Security, State Department] and we both went
down to the command center.
* * *
Q: And so once you learned of the attack, then what did
you do?
A: I had a liaison officer that worked for me who had
employees that worked in the Annex there, so I
immediately called him on my way down to the command
center and asked him to join me in the command center.
And when we went in there, we initially tried to assess
the situation the best we could, and then we started
working on trying to identify security assets who could
help them with the situation that was unfolding.
Q: And what assets would those have been?
A: Assets that were at the Annex facility. We made
phone calls to Stuttgart, to AFRICOM [United States
Africa Command] and EUCOM [United States Europe
Command] to see if they had any assets in theater that
were nearby that could possibly be drawn on for
additional support.
Q: And did you discuss those assets and deployment with
PDAS [Principal Desputy Assistant Secretary] Bultrowicz
or Under Secretary Kennedy?
A: Yes. PDAS Scott Bultrowicz was in the room, he was
on the phone with Pat Kennedy and Eric Boswell, and he
was relaying information. As we were getting
information in, he would relay it to them----
* * *
Q: And was the DS command center your only source of
information that night or were you in constant contact
with the Annex as well via your liaison?
A: Yes. My liaison had constant contact with the Annex.
We had almost full-time connection to the DS agents
that were on the ground, and then we were--you know,
towards the end, we were getting information off of
Twitter and public media. So those were our primary
sources of information.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y for Diplomatic
Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 14-16 (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter
Lamb Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
A senior watch officer at the DSCC described the events as
``a full on attack against our compound.''\38\ The same
individual also said there was ``zip, nothing nada'' when asked
if there was any rioting in Benghazi reported prior to the
attack.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 27, U.S. Dep't of State, to
svcSMARTCrossLow (Sept. 12 2012, 10:20 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05389586).
\39\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 27, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept.
18, 2012, 1:16 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05390678).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 6:34 p.m. on September 11, 2012, the DSCC sent a
``terrorism event information'' to the Office of the
Secretary.\40\ The update noted that ``host nation militia
forces have responded to the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi'' and
``were engaged with the attackers.''\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to S_SpecialAssistants (Sept.
11, 2012, 6:34 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05578699).
\41\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lamb testified information received by the DSCC--directly
from all of the agents on the ground--was relayed to
Kennedy.\42\ None of the Diplomatic Security agents on the
ground reported anything about a protest in Benghazi. None of
the Diplomatic Security agents on the ground reported anything
about a video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\Lamb Testimony at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy testified that he passed on information from the
DSCC directly to Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton:
I stayed in my office, except for the SVTC [Secure
Video Teleconference] the chairman referred to,
monitoring my telephone, monitoring my emails, and
making telephone calls or coordinating activities as
were required. . . . I went up several times to brief
the Secretary on the latest information that I was
receiving from Diplomatic Security, which was receiving
it from the ground.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Mgmt., U.S.
Dep't of State, Tr. at 119 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
KNOWLEDGE BY SENIOR STATE
DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
At 4:06 p.m. in Washington D.C. on September 11, 2012, 24
minutes after the attacks began in Benghazi, the State
Department Operations Center issued a widely disseminated email
to Department officials, including the Office of the Secretary,
indicating an attack was occurring. With the subject ``U.S.
Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi Under Attack,'' the email
stated:
The Regional Security Officer reports the diplomatic
mission is under attack. Embassy Tripoli reports
approximately 20 armed people fired shots; explosions
have been heard as well. Ambassador Stevens, who is
currently in Benghazi, and four COM [Chief of Mission]
personnel are in the compound safe haven. The 17th of
February militia is providing security support.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\Email from [email protected] to S_Special Assistants, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 4:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05272001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forty eight minutes later, a 4:54 p.m. update email stated:
Embassy Tripoli reports the firing at the U.S.
Diplomatic Mission in Benghazi has stopped and the
compound has been cleared. A response team is on site
attempting to locate COM personnel.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Email from [email protected] to S_SpecialAssistants, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 4:54 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05272001).
A 6:07 p.m. update email with the subject ``Ansar al-Sharia
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Claims Responsibility for Benghazi Attack'' stated:
Embassy Tripoli reports the group claimed
responsibility on Facebook and Twitter and has called
for attack on Embassy Tripoli.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\Email from [email protected] to S_SpecialAssistants, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 6:07 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05272001).
Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission in Tripoli, was
the United States' highest ranking official in Tripoli at the
time of the attacks in Benghazi. Hicks testified that he talked
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
with Ambassador Stevens moments after the attack started:
A: I punched the number that I did not recognize and
called it back, to call it back, and I got Chris on the
line. And he said, ``Greg, we are under attack.'' And I
am walking outside, trying to get outside, because we
have notoriously bad cell phone connectivity at our
residence, and usually it's better outside. So I say,
my response is, ``Okay,'' and I am about to say
something else, and the line clicks.
I try to reach him back on the--I begin walking
immediately to our tactical operations center, because
I knew that everybody would be gathering there, and I
could then also summon everybody that needed to be at
the--to begin the process of responding. And I am
trying to call back on those numbers to reconnect, and
not getting--either not getting a signal or not getting
a response.
Q: And did you ever make a connection with the
Ambassador again?
A: No. I never did.
Q: That was the last you spoke to him?
A: That was the last I spoke to him.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 18-19 (Apr. 11, 2013)
[hereinafter Hicks Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Hicks also testified that Stevens would have reported a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
protest had one occurred prior to the attack:
Absolutely, I mean, we're talking about both security
officers who know their trade, even though they are
brand new, and one of the finest political officers in
the history of the Foreign Service. You know, for there
to have been a demonstration on Chris Stevens' front
door and him not to have reported it is unbelievable.
And secondly, if he had reported it, he would have been
out the back door within minutes of any demonstration
appearing anywhere near that facility. And there was a
back gate to the facility, and, you know, it
worked.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\Id. at 81-82.
Throughout the course of the evening, Hicks was on the
phone with Elizabeth Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary of
State, Near Eastern Affairs, State Department,who was in
Washington D.C. at the time, updating her about the events on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the ground in Benghazi. Jones testified:
I sat down and called Greg Hicks and said, Tell me what
is going on. I have this report from my special
assistant, from the op[erations] center; what's going
on? He said, I talked to Chris 20 minutes ago. Chris
called me. He said, We're under attack.
I said, What do you mean we're under attack? He said
there are people firing guns at us, firing weapons,
firing at us. And I said, Where is Chris?
He said--he said that the RSO [Regional Security
Officer] told him that they had taken--that Chris had
said, We're going to the safe haven, and the regional
security officer in Tripoli have reported, yes, the
security officers in Benghazi had taken the ambassador
to the safe haven.
I said, Okay. You talked to him 20 minutes ago. Call
him again. He said, I've been trying. He doesn't answer
the phone.
I asked, Who else was in the--in the building, where
was Chris exactly, who else was in the building. He
explained that Sean Smith was, that's the communicator,
that there were three RSOs there and that they would--
they were moving the two to the safe haven and that the
others were trying to protect the building.
I immediately notified by email as many people as I
could think of off the top of my head on the Seventh
Floor [senior State Department leaders], that I had
spoken to Greg, that this is what the situation was,
that--that I would continue to stay in touch with him.
In the meantime, I had a secure call from my CIA
counterpart saying the same thing, We're hearing that
Benghazi is under attack. I said, Is your annex under
attack, which I knew to be a few minutes away.
He said, No. And I continued to be in touch with him,
the--my CIA colleague and my staff. I decided to not
work out of my office initially but work closer to
where the secure phone is, which is on the other end of
the suite and stayed in very close touch with Greg
essentially all night long till the next morning.
The--what I did in the second phone call, I believe it
was with Greg, I said, Okay. Who are you talking to in
the Libyan government?
He said, I've talked to--I've forgotten, the chief of
staff of various of the senior people.
I said, Talk to the President, talk to the Prime
Minister, don't just stay with the chief of staff. Talk
to the senior people yourself and ask them for help.
Tell them they've got to get their people up there,
not--get their people up there to go over to the
compound to render assistance to get the--get the
attackers out of there, and I kept asking, Have you
heard from Chris? Have you heard from Chris?
No, we can't find him. No, he's not--no, he's not
answering. That was the first. And I don't remember the
timeline anymore. It seemed like forever, but it
probably w[as]n't that long.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\Testimony of Elizabeth Jones, Acting Ass't Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 39-40 (July 11, 2013) [hereinafter Jones Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Jones testified that she spoke with Hicks throughout the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
evening, almost every ten minutes:
Q: Okay. As the night wore on, was the phone just
essentially left almost in permanent communication with
Tripoli?
A: Yes.
Q: I mean, do you have that capability that you have an
open line that just essentially stays open, or is
this--or calling every 5 or 10 minutes? I'm just
curious how that works.
A: Yeah. No, that's a good question. I didn't have an
open line.
We did two things. I stayed in my office with my front
office team and with my staff assistants and with--
Agent 1 was there. We, at the same time, started a task
force in the Operations Center, so the Libya desk
officers were up there helping manage some of the more
routine issues, getting the evacuation going, working
with EX [logistics] on those kinds of issues and sort
of doing the--helping us with the nuts and bolts on
implementing the things that we were deciding that we
needed to do.
Because DS kept the open--Diplomatic Secretary kept an
open line--actually, I don't know that it was an open
line. They had communication directly with the RSO. I
basically worked primarily with Greg Hicks on his cell
phone because that worked better in terms of Embassy
communications and I could reach him wherever he was--
wherever he was in the compound when he was moving
around. So I communicated by my office manager dialing
him directly on his cell phone.
So it was not an open line, but it was--I don't know
that we talked every 10 minutes, but it seemed like it
was every 10 minutes. It was close to that.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\Id. at 79-80.
After some of Jones' discussions with Hicks, an assistant
from the Office of the Secretary drafted emails about Jones'
conversations with Hicks. These emails were disseminated to
senior officials within the State Department, including
Sullivan, Nuland, and William J. Burns, the Deputy Secretary of
State.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\See, e.g., Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Victoria J.
Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:32
PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 4:49 p.m., just over an hour after the attacks began, an
assistant in the Office of the Secretary wrote:
Beth Jones just spoke with DCM Tripoli Greg Hicks, who
advised a Libyan militia (we now know this is the 17th
Feb brigade, as requested by Emb[assy] office) is
responding to the attack on the diplomatic mission in
Benghazi. The QRF [Quick Reaction Force] is in the
compound, engaging the attackers, taking fire, and
working its way through the compound to get to the
villa, where Ambassador Stevens is in safe haven for
extraction. The ARSO [Assistant Regional Security
Officer] is also there in the compound. Greg spoke with
Amb Stevens by phone 20 minutes before my call (which
was about ten minutes ago). Greg will talk to the Prime
Minister's Chief of Staff, and then speak with the
Foreign Minister . . . Embassy is sending medical
assistance to Benghazi to be on stand-by. More updates
to follow.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to William J. Burns, Deputy
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 4:49 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05391036).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At 5:13 p.m. a new email was sent to the group. It stated:
Just spoke again with Greg Hicks, who confirmed the
party includes Ambassador Stevens plus three, not plus
four. Hicks has been in contact twice with the Libyan
President's office and twice with the Libyan PM's
[Prime Minister's] office; their offices assured him
they are fully engaged and consider themselves personal
friends of Ambassador Stevens. Hicks has been
coordinating with the [CIA] who has learned from the
QRF about the status of the compound--currently they
are clearing the compound and working to access the
party. I also urged Libyan Ambassador to the U.S.
Aujali to engage on this immediately at the highest
level.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy
Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036).
An email at 5:32 p.m., the first in the chain sent to
Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, State Department,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
stated:
The fighting has stopped, DCM Greg Hicks just confirmed
to me. He also confirmed one fatality: Sean Smith--a
TDY'er from The Hague--has died. His body has been
recovered. The five ARSO's are accounted for, but
they're still trying to find the Ambassador. The
Principal Officer's residence is still on fire with
toxic smoke. I have spoken to A/S [Assistant Secretary]
Gordon and Liz Dibble is contacting the Charge at The
Hague, [redacted text], to inform them.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of
Staff & Counselor to the U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, et
al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05391036).
A 5:55 p.m. email to the same chain sent by an assistant in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Office of the Secretary stated:
I just spoke again to Greg Hicks, who himself spoke
again to the offices of the Libyan President and Prime
Minister, asking them to provide firefighting equipment
to the Benghazi compound. He said the PD shop at
Embassy Tripoli has found postings on Facebook
indicating that the ``Tripoli Council'' plans to carry
out an attack on Embassy Tripoli. He said he was
promised increased police protection but it had not yet
materialized.
Greg said his team reports that the extremist group
Ansar Al Sharia has taken credit for the attack in
Benghazi. He heard reports that the February 17 Brigade
is currently engaged in a running battle with Ansar Al
Sharia; he asked the offices of the President and PM to
pursue Ansar al Sharia.
On working to locate Ambassador Stevens, the RSO team
and militia are still on compound, which is 50 acres--
Greg expressed the hope that Ambassador Stevens is in
hiding somewhere on the compound. The PO's residence is
still on fire.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Victoria J. Nuland,
Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 5:55PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05391036).
These emails consistently used the term ``attack.'' None of
these emails mentioned anything about a protest. None of these
emails mentioned anything about a video.
Hicks also spoke directly with the Secretary while the
attacks were still ongoing. He testified:
A: No. I really didn't get--you know, about 2:00 a.m.
[8:00 p.m. in Washington D.C.], the Secretary called--
--
Q: Okay.
A: --along with--her senior staff was on the----
Q: Okay. Do you recall who was on that call?
A: It was Wendy Sherman, Cheryl Mills, Steve Mull, Beth
Jones, Liz--I am not sure whether Liz Dibble was on the
phone or not at that time. I know Beth Jones was. Jake
Sullivan.
And so I briefed her on what was going on, talked about
the situation. And at 2:00 a.m., of course, Chris
[Stevens] is in the hospital, although the Libyan
Government will not confirm that he's in the hospital.
All they will tell us is he's in a safe place, or they
will imply that he's with us at the [Annex] facility,
which, of course, we have to feed back to them and say,
no, we don't know where he is. It is a constant
conversation, and I'm still talking to the same people.
The Vice Minister of the Interior chimes in sometime
before midnight. And I'm pressing him to get their
firefighters to the building to put the fire out,
assuming that if they go to put the fire out, that they
will send some security people with the firefighters to
protect the firefighters. We tried everything that we
could.
So we brief her on what's going on. She asks, How can
we help? And I said, Well, we could use some
reinforcements. And we have--we know we have wounded.
And----
Q: What was the answer?
A: The answer was that the FAST team in Rota was being
mobilized to come to Tripoli, and there would be a
medevac flight coming down to pick up wounded.
And then we discussed also whether we were going to--
they asked me if we were going to stay in the
residential compound. And I said, no, we needed to
consolidate our facilities here, because we basically
sent everybody we have to protect us to Tripoli to
rescue them.
Q: To?
A: To Benghazi. Sorry. Benghazi. Apologies. And they
said, good.
Q: And how long does that call last?
A: Ten minutes.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\Hicks Testimony at 32-34.
None of the information coming directly from the agents on
the ground in Benghazi during the attacks mentioned anything
about a video or a protest. These first-hand accounts made
their way to the Office of the Secretary through multiple
channels quickly: through the Diplomatic Security Command
Center; through the State Department Operations Center; through
emails recounting Jones' phone calls with Hicks; through
Kennedy, who briefed the Secretary directly; and through Hicks
himself during a phone call with the Secretary.
THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT
The principal public statement from the U.S. government the
night of the Benghazi attacks, September 11, 2012, came from
the Secretary of State and was issued at 10:08 p.m. It stated
in full:
Statement on the Attack in Benghazi
I condemn in the strongest terms the attack on our
mission in Benghazi today. As we work to secure our
personnel and facilities, we have confirmed that one of
our State Department officers was killed. We are
heartbroken by this terrible loss. Our thoughts and
prayers are with his family and those who have suffered
in this attack.
This evening, I called Libyan President Magariaf to
coordinate additional support to protect Americans in
Libya. President Magariaf expressed his condemnation
and condolences and pledged his government's full
cooperation.
Some have sought to justify this vicious behavior as a
response to inflammatory material posted on the
Internet. The United States deplores any intentional
effort to denigrate the religious beliefs of others.
Our commitment to religious tolerance goes back to the
very beginning of our nation. But let me be clear:
There is never any justification for violent acts of
this kind.
In light of the events of today, the United States
government is working with partner countries around the
world to protect our personnel, our missions, and
American citizens worldwide.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Statement on the Attack in
Benghazi (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197628.htm [hereinafter September 11
Statement].
The decision for the Secretary to issue the statement
appears to have been made earlier that evening during a 7:30
p.m. secure video teleconference [SVTC], a meeting hosted by
the White House, that included senior officials from the State
Department, Intelligence Community, and Defense Department to
discuss the events unfolding in Benghazi.
Rough notes from the White House meeting describe ten
specific action items. One of these action items stated:
The Secretary will issue a statement tonight condemning
the attacks and stating an official American was
killed. . . . S may issue another statement to distance
the United States from the Pastor Jones video.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\Email from Watch Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, to
P_StaffAssistants & D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:46 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05562037).
The Secretary did not, however, issue two statements that
evening. She issued one. And that single statement condemned
the attack, stated an American was killed, and distanced the
United States from an internet video. In doing so, the
statement--specifically the language ``[s]ome have sought to
justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory
material posted on the Internet''--appeared to connect, or at
least conflate, the attacks in Benghazi with the video.\59\
This connection between the attacks and the video continued for
over a week, leading the public to believe that a video-
inspired protest led to the attacks that killed Ambassador
Chris Stevens and Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\September 11 Statement, supra note 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 7:30 p.m. White House meeting was convened to discuss
the Benghazi attacks and included the Secretary of State and
other high level officials from the State Department, Defense
Department, and White House. The meeting, however, contained a
great deal of discussion regarding the video. Matt Olsen,
Director, National Counterterrorism Center, was a participant
in the meeting. He testified:
Q: Was there any discussion of sort of the video and
Benghazi being linked on the call?
A: I don't remember specifically, you know, how we
talked about it. I'm sure that we did, right, because
we were--the fact is that it came--the discussion of
taking the video down was part of our conversation in
this call that was really focused on what was going on
in Benghazi.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\Testimony of Matthew Olsen, Dir., Nat'l Counterterrorism
Center, Tr. at 17-18 (Feb. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Olsen Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Olsen also said:
And in my own mind, at the time, I recall linking the
two, you know, that this--we were thinking about what
had happened in Cairo, we were thinking, okay, now this
seems to be happening in Benghazi, and we're worried
about other, obviously, other diplomatic posts in the
Middle East and North Africa.
On that particular issue, one thing that I recall in
thinking, again, sort of preparing for coming here,
sort of trying to recollect as much as possible, one of
the issues that Denis [McDonough] asked me--and I think
Nick Rasmussen, my deputy, was there as well--was to
see if we could work with--if we could contact Google
to talk with them about enforcing their terms of
service, which was the way that we often thought about
offensive or problematic content.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\Id. at 18.
Five of the ten action items from the rough notes of the
7:30 p.m. meeting reference the video--including an item
mentioning Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense, and Martin E.
Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reaching out to
``Pastor Jones'' directly.\62\ For nearly two years the White
House had been issuing public statements in the wake of actions
committed by ``Pastor Jones,''\63\ although no connection at
the time linked ``Pastor Jones'' or the video to the Benghazi
attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\Email from Watch Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, to
P_StaffAssistants and D(N)_StaffAssistants (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05562037).
\63\See, e.g., Krissah Thompson and Tara Bahrampour, Obama renews
call for religious tolerance after Koran-burning canceled, Wash. Post,
Sept. 10, 2012 (``Obama denied that his administration's forceful
intervention--Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates made a personal appeal
to the Gainesville pastor, the Rev. Terry Jones--had unnecessarily
drawn attention to the pastor's plans.''); and Obama criticizes Quran
burning, Afghan attacks, NBC News, April 2, 2011, www.nbcnews.com/id/
42396945/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/obama-criticizes-quran-
burning-afghan-attacks/#.V1oSrvkjrJaR (``At least 10 people have been
killed and 83 injured in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar,
officials said on Saturday, on a second day of violent protests over
the actions of extremist Christian preacher Terry Jones . . . `No
religion tolerates the slaughter and beheading of innocent people, and
there is no justification for such a dishonorable and deplorable act,'
Obama said.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Avril Haines, Deputy Counsel to the President for National
Security Affairs, held a conference call after the 7:30 p.m.
meeting. Rough notes from the call stated:
There is likely to be a statement from S[ecretary
Clinton] this evening addressing the violence and
distancing the USG [United States government] from the
videos that are believed to have instigated it (at
least in part); while no one is sure of the cause,
exactly, there is reportedly a new Terry Jones video
threatening to burn Korans and a second film that
includes a number of insulting statement about
Mohamed.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\Email from Attorney, U.S. Dep't of State, to Harold Koh, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 10:40 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05528017).
The fact the 7:30 p.m. White House meeting, which took
place while Ambassador Stevens was considered missing and
before Tyrone S. Woods and Glen A. Doherty were killed, was
about the attacks in Benghazi but much of the conversation
focused on the video is surprising given no direct link or
solid evidence existed connecting the attacks in Benghazi and
the video at the time the White House meeting took place. The
State Department senior officials at the White House meeting
had access to eyewitness accounts to the attack in real time.
The Diplomatic Security Command Center was in direct contact
with the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground in Benghazi
and sent out multiple updates about the situation, including a
``Terrorism Event Notification.''\65\ The State Department
Watch Center had also notified Sullivan and Mills that it was
setting up a direct telephone line to Benghazi.\66\ There was
no mention of the video from the agents on the ground. Hicks--
one of the last people to talk to Stevens before he died--said
there was virtually no discussion about the video in Libya
leading up to the attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\Email from DS Command Center to DSCC_C DS Seniors, DSCC_E TIA/
PII, DSCC_E TIA/ITA, and DS-IP (Sept. 12, 2012, 5:05 AM) (on file with
the Committee, C05389586).
\66\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy
Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 4:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561866).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That did not, however, deter participants at theWhite House
meeting--led by Denis McDonough, Deputy National Security
Advisor to the President--from extensively discussing the
video.
As a result of the White House meeting, the Secretary of
State issued a statement about the attacks later that evening.
Rather than relaying known facts from those experiencing the
attacks firsthand, however, the Secretary's statement created a
narrative tying the events in Benghazi to the video, despite a
dearth of actual evidence. This was done by mentioning the
video and the attacks in the same sentence: ``Some have sought
to justify this vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory
material posted on the Internet.''\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sullivan testified about the decision to include that
sentence in the statement:
Q: Do you recall whose idea it was to include that
sentence?
A: I believe that it was my idea to include that
sentence. It was either mine or Toria's [State
Department spokesperson] or a combination of the two of
us, but I thought it was important to include that
sentence.
Q: And why is that?
A: Well there are two aspects to this. One was we
didn't know the motivation of the actual attackers of
Benghazi, so I didn't want to say they did it because
of the video, and so I chose the words very carefully
to say that some have sought to justify it on that
basis.
But I thought it was really important for us to be able
to express our views on the video and to say there is
never any justification for violent acts of this kind,
as well as to say we deplore efforts to denigrate the
religious beliefs of others because I was deeply
concerned that we could potentially face attacks on our
embassies elsewhere. And, unfortunately, that's exactly
what happened.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\Testimony of Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 220 (Jan. 12, 2016)
[hereinafter Sullivan Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Sullivan did not say why it would not have been equally or
even more important to denounce the video when it began
circulating in the Middle East days earlier, or after the
protests in Cairo where the link to the video was clear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sullivan testified:
I thought very hard about exactly how to formulate
this. I didn't want to say the attackers did this
because of the video. That's why I chose to use the
phrase ``justify,'' because I just wanted to talk more
generally about people who might justify the attack on
the basis of the video. Who would those people be? They
would be the kind of people that would go try to gin up
protests elsewhere, whether in Benghazi again or in
Tripoli or anywhere else around the region.
And my first concern in getting this out was to do
everything we could do to try to prevent further
violence from happening. And I really thought it was
important for the Secretary to get on the record on
this issue. And in the days that followed, I thought it
was important for her to continue getting on the record
on this issue, especially as we dealt with these
assaults on our embassies across the region.
So I thought hard about this paragraph. I thought hard
about making sure we formulated it in a way that was
accurate to say that just some had sought to justify
it. Obviously, we have all seen a lot of public
reporting linking things as well. So this, to me, was
an important paragraph to include in this
statement.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\Id. at 221.
Sullivan apparently did not engage in nearly as much
thought about the video when it first appeared online, or even
when the U.S. Embassy was breached by protestors in Cairo
earlier on September 11, 2012. Where there was a known
connection to the video, Sullivan was silent. Where the video
was not connected by even a scintilla of reliable evidence at
the time, Sullivan thought it important enough to include.
Dan Schwerin, Speechwriter, Department of State, helped
draft the statement that went out that evening. Schwerin told
the Committee the statement was intended to speak to a global
audience. He testified:
Q: You talked about speaking to a global audience. What
did you mean by that?
A: I mean any time the Secretary of State speaks, the
world is listening. We had--it was a period of unrest
across the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond;
specifically, in the Muslim world, which was a source
of concern; and how to lower that temperature and speak
to that situation was an important issue.
Q: Was that focused on the video?
A: The video was the source of that unrest across the
world in that period. And so, you know, lowering the
temperature of that situation was one of our goals.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\Testimony of Daniel B. Schwerin, Staff Assistant and
Speechwriter, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 21 (Oct. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Schwerin Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
While protests around the Middle East flared up in the
following days, at the time of the Benghazi attacks the protest
in Cairo represented the only instance of unrest.
Megan Rooney, Speechwriter, Department of State, also
worked on the statement and told the Committee that it was a
``commonsense conclusion'' that the video somehow sparked what
happened in Benghazi, because it had done so in Cairo. She
testified:
Q: Right. As you sit here today, do you recall anything
generally about the conversation specific to the video
that night?
A: No. Only that we thought it belonged in the
statement.
Q: Do you recall why you thought it belonged in the
statement?
* * *
A: . . . I believed that it played a role in sparking
the events of that night. And that any sort of
conversation about what had happened, and what has to
happen now would have to be taken into account in some
way.
Q: Okay, just so I understand, it was your view that
night that the video should be referred to in the
statement because in your mind, the video had played
some role in the attack in Benghazi?
A: Yeah, in sparking them or triggering them or
motivating some of the people that night. Yeah, yes.
Q: And so you were kind of going back to your point
about one of the goals for this speech was to explain
to the American people what had happened. For that
reason you wanted to refer to the video. Is that fair?
A: Yeah. I would say that's fair.
Q: And as best you can, could you just tell us what you
based that conclusion on, or that opinion that the
video somehow sparked what occurred in Benghazi?
A: Well, at the time it seems like the commonsense
conclusion. You know, there was this incident happening
in the same--not far from Benghazi, just a few
countries to the--well, shoot, one country to the east.
God, I'm failing on the geography--a nearby country,
Cairo, Egypt, on the same day there was this protest
that seemed--that was similarly targeting an American
facility that similarly had our facility breached in
this alarming way. And that seemed to be very clearly
connected to this video since, again, I believe that
not long before that protest broke out, the video had
been broadcast on Egyptian news. So, you know, I was
learning about what was happening in Egypt, and oh,
look, the same day, something is happening at an
American facility not far from there. . . .\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\Testimony of Megan E. Rooney, Policy Advisor and Speechwriter,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 48-51 (Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Rooney
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
The gist is: a statement connecting the video with the
Benghazi attacks was included by a speechwriter because the
``thought''--half a world away--was that ``commonsense''
dictated it. But that same commonsense would not dictate
listening to and following the real time information being
provided by eyewitnesses who survived the initial attack and
were preparing for subsequent attacks.
Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor to the
President for Strategic Communications, spoke with Sullivan
about the statement before it was released. Rhodes testified
the sentence ``Some have sought to justify this vicious
behavior as a response to inflammatory material posted on the
Internet'' was not about Benghazi but served to respond ``to
the general events taking place in the region as a whole.''\72\
He also said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\Testimony of Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for
Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec. Council, Tr. at 50-51 (Feb. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter Rhodes Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
A: Again, our concern--one of our concerns was that we
saw efforts to utilize the video to incite protests,
including the type of violent protests that we saw in
Cairo. And so I recall that we wanted to have messaging
in the statement that sought to reduce tensions
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
associated with the video.
Q: So was this sentence not meant to convey anything
regarding Benghazi and Libya?
A: No, I don't believe so.
Q: You don't think--this sentence was not about Libya
in any way, shape, or form?
A: Again, I believe that it was intended to address the
broader context in the region.
Q: So that's what has me wondering. Then was there
vicious behavior in other places that day?
A: Yes. Certainly in Cairo.
Q: But no--I mean, Pat Kennedy described Cairo as spray
paint and rocks. Obviously, Benghazi was much
different. So you're saying that vicious behavior
applies to Cairo but doesn't apply to Benghazi?
A: Again, I think it applies generally to the fact that
we had indications that there were individuals who
might seek to use this video to justify violence?
Q: I'm asking about the two terms: vicious behavior.
You said this sentence doesn't apply to Libya in a
general sense or Benghazi in a specific sense, but does
apply to other events in the region; namely, Cairo. Is
that accurate?
A: Again, this is taking place in the context where we
have a protest that turned violent at our Embassy in
Cairo, and we have the attacks in Benghazi. The
situation is fluid. There are indications that we are
getting from the State Department that there are other
actors who are seeking to incite people related to this
video. And so one of the objectives in our messaging
was to have a statement that, again, sought to minimize
our association with this video.
Q: And I understand you conveyed that is one of your
objectives, but I'm specifically, again, just for the
record, asking that sentence you said does not apply,
is not meant in any way to convey anything about Libya,
it's about Cairo and the rest of the region.
A: Again, it's not intended to assign responsibility
for what happened in Benghazi. It's meant to describe
the context of what happened, what's happening in the
region.
Q: You mentioned context a couple of times here. When I
look at context, I look at this document. The heading
is ``Statement on the Attack in Benghazi.'' Paragraph
one: I condemn in the strongest way the attack on our
mission in Benghazi. We are securing personnel and
facilities. One of our officers was killed in Benghazi.
Next paragraph: I have talked to the Libyan President.
So everything in this document is about Libya and
Benghazi except you're saying this sentence doesn't
apply to Libya and Benghazi.
A: Again, as I look at this statement, my recollection
is one of the objectives was to convey that we were
doing everything we could to secure our diplomats in
facilities around the world. If you look, for example,
at the last sentence of the statement, it's intended to
be about that general principle that we will work with
partner countries around the world to protect our
personnel, our missions, and our American citizens.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\Id. at 61-64.
Moreover, at Rhodes' direction, the Secretary's statement
was the only statement issued on behalf of the United States
government that night.\74\ This put additional emphasis on its
contents. Rhodes told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\See Email from Benjamin Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for
Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec. Council, to Steven Warren, Spokesman,
U.S. Dep't of Defense, et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:53 PM) (on file with
the Committee, C05562046) (``[L]et the State Department' statement be
our [USG] comment for the night.'').
A: You know, I recall telling my staff that that would
be our comment for the night. So the people who work
for me in the NSC press office, you know, everybody was
being asked to respond to inquiries, and I remember
determining that, you know, we would just have that one
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
statement be our comment for the night.
Q: What was the thinking behind that, have that one
statement coming from the State Department be the sole
statement from the U.S. Government?
A: Again, my recollection is that this was an attack
that had targeted our Ambassador, that it was
appropriate for the Secretary of State to be speaking
for the U.S. Government given that this had happened to
people who worked in her department, and again, that
made them the appropriate agency to issue a
comment.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Rhodes Testimony at 15.
The Secretary's private comments, however, were different
than her public comments. In a phone call with Libyan President
Mohammed el-Magariaf at approximately 6:00 p.m. in Washington
D.C., the Secretary did not mention the video nor did she
connect the video with the attacks. A summary of the phone call
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
is below:
Secretary Clinton: Mr. President.
Libyan General National Congress President Magarif:
Your Excellency.
S: I appreciate you taking my call at this late hour.
M: No problem. It's my duty.
S: As you know, our diplomatic mission in Benghazi was
attacked earlier this evening. We need your immediate
help, as one of our diplomats was killed and our
Ambassador, who you know, is missing. We have asked for
the Libyan government to provide additional security to
the compound immediately as there is a gun battle
ongoing, which I understand Ansar al Sharia is claiming
responsibility for. We also need to provide additional
capacity for firefighting as there are reports that the
principle officers residence has been bombed or set on
fire. We believe that it is important for your
government, as well as ours, to condemn this attack in
the strongest possible terms and promise these
criminals will be brought to justice. I also need you
to help us secure our mission in Tripoli. We have
serious threats on social media sites, like Facebook,
and it is important that your government take all
possible measures, in an urgent manner, to secure our
facilities. We need you to have people who you are
confident in, who will follow your direction, and that
your government trusts to secure our compounds.
M: Please accept my condolences for the death of the
American at the compound and our sincere apologies for
what has happened. We promise to find the criminals and
bring them to justice. We will do our utmost to protect
American buildings and every American citizen in Libya.
We were just in the midst of an emergency meeting with
the Prime Minister and all of his deputies to address
this situation.
S: If there is anything that you need or that I can do
please do not hesitate to call me at any time, day or
night.
M: Thank you.
S: Thank you.
M: Good Night.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 11, 2012,
11:34 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561906).
In her call with the Libyan President, the Secretary
mentioned a number of key facts not included in her public
statement: that Stevens was still missing at the time;\77\ that
the extremist organization Ansar al Sharia had taken credit for
the attacks;\78\ that the compound may have been bombed and set
on fire;\79\ and that the administration intended to bring the
perpetrators to justice.\80\ Significantly, she also did not
mention the video she referred to in her public statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\Id. (``[O]ur Ambassador, who you know, is missing.'').
\78\Id. (``I understand Ansar al Sharia is claiming
responsibility[.]'').
\79\Id. (``[T]he principle officers residence has been bombed or
set on fire.'').
\80\Id. (``[I]t is important for your government, as well as ours,
to condemn this attack in the strongest possible terms and promise
these criminals will be brought to justice.'').
The Secretary also sent a private email to her daughter
that evening about an hour after her public statement. The
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
email said:
Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al
Queda-like [sic] group: The Ambassador, whom I
handpicked and a young communications officer on
temporary duty w a wife and two very young children.
Very hard day and I fear more of the same tomorrow.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Chelsea Clinton (``Diane Reynolds'') (Sept. 11,
2012, 11:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05795467).
In that email, the Secretary states two individuals had
been killed ``by an Al Queda-like [sic] group.''\82\ This key
fact had been omitted from the Secretary's public statement. In
sharing this fact with her daughter, the Secretary acknowledged
the attack--with a link to al-Qaeda--was in fact terrorism. In
omitting this fact from her public statement, however, the
Secretary sent a very different message to the public--a
message that suggested a protest over the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was not until ten days later the Secretary told the
American people the events in Benghazi were terrorist
attacks.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\Glenn Kessler, From video to terrorist attack: a definitive
timeline of administration statements on the Libya attack, Wash. Post
(Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/
post/from-video-to-terrorist-attack-a-definitive-timeline-of-
administration-
statements-on-the-libya-attack/2012/09/26/86105782-0826-11e2-afff-
d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE DAY AFTER THE ATTACKS
The day after the attacks was a day of mourning for the
families of the four Americans who lost their lives--Ambassador
J. Christopher Stevens, Sean P. Smith, Tyrone S. Woods, and
Glen A. Doherty. It was also a time of mourning and reflection
for America. However, the day after the attacks also saw a
marked difference in information shared by the administration
with the American people compared with information shared by
the administration privately.
Public Statements Conflated the Video and the Attacks
The following day brought additional press inquiries and
additional statements. After the Secretary's statement on the
evening of September 11, two more Americans, Tyrone Woods and
Glen Doherty, died in Benghazi as a result of the mortar
attacks on the Annex.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\Scott Neuman, U.S. Ambassador To Libya, Three Other Americans
Killed in Benghazi Attack, NPR (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:45 AM), http://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/09/12/160992840/u-s-ambassador-to-
libya-three-other-americans-killed-in-benghazi-attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration needed to act quickly to ensure each
agency was on the same page about how to message the attacks.
At 8:14 a.m. the morning after the attacks, Bernadette Meehan,
Deputy Spokesperson, National Security Council, sent an email
to nearly two dozen people from the White House, Defense
Department, State Department, and intelligence community
stating:
Both the President and Secretary Clinton released
statements this morning. Both are pasted below. Please
refer to those for any comments for the time being. To
ensure we are all in sync on messaging for the rest of
the day, Ben Rhodes will host a conference call for USG
communicators on this chain at 9:15 ET today. . . .\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Deputy Spokesperson, Nat'l
Sec. Council, to Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for
Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec. Council, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:14
AM) (emphasis original) (on file with the Committee, SCB000897).
Rhodes responded, stating simply ``If possible, let's do
this at 9 to get a little ahead of potential statements by
S[ecretary Clinton] and POTUS [the President] later this
morning.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Ms. Meehan, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012,
8:31 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB000897).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The message emanating from the White House the morning
after the attacks--similar to the message delivered by the U.S.
government the night before through the Secretary's statement--
was that the video and the attack on U.S. facilities in
Benghazi would be mentioned in the same breath.\87\ This
therefore served the purpose of continuing to connect the two
issues. As a result, this created confusion among the American
public and the press as to whether or not these two events were
directly related.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi (Sept.
12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/
statement-president-attack-benghazi (``While the United States rejects
efforts to denigrate the religious beliefs of others, we must all
unequivocally oppose the kind of senseless violence that took the lives
of these public servants.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the President's statement announcing the deaths of four
Americans, he referred to ``efforts to denigrate the religious
beliefs of others''--i.e. the video--and the ``senseless
violence that took the lives of these public servants''--i.e.
the Benghazi attacks--in the same sentence.\88\ The statement,
titled ``Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi''
read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Remarks by the President on the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya
(Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/
12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya.
I strongly condemn the outrageous attack on our
diplomatic facility in Benghazi, which took the lives
of four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens.
Right now, the American people have the families of
those we lost in our thoughts and prayers. They
exemplified America's commitment to freedom, justice,
and partnership with nations and people around the
globe, and stand in stark contrast to those who
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
callously took their lives.
I have directed my Administration to provide all
necessary resources to support the security of our
personnel in Libya, and to increase security at our
diplomatic posts around the globe. While the United
States rejects efforts to denigrate the religious
beliefs of others, we must all unequivocally oppose the
kind of senseless violence that took the lives of these
public servants.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\Id.
Later that morning the President addressed the Nation in a
televised address from the Rose Garden about the attacks. The
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President said in part:
Yesterday, four of these extraordinary Americans were
killed in an attack on our diplomatic post in Benghazi.
Among those killed was our Ambassador, Chris Stevens,
as well as Foreign Service Officer Sean Smith. We are
still notifying the families of the others who were
killed. And today, the American people stand united in
holding the families of the four Americans in our
thoughts and in our prayers.
The United States condemns in the strongest terms this
outrageous and shocking attack. We're working with the
government of Libya to secure our diplomats. I've also
directed my administration to increase our security at
diplomatic posts around the world. And make no mistake,
we will work with the Libyan government to bring to
justice the killers who attacked our people.
Since our founding, the United States has been a nation
that respects all faiths. We reject all efforts to
denigrate the religious beliefs of others. But there is
absolutely no justification to this type of senseless
violence. None. The world must stand together to
unequivocally reject these brutal acts.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Statement by the President on the Attack in Benghazi (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/statement-
president-attack-benghazi.
In the speech about the attacks, drafted by Rhodes and
similar to the President's statement about the attacks earlier
in the morning, the President refers to ``efforts to denigrate
the religious beliefs of others''\91\--i.e. the video. These
comments, in a public address, gave a strong and continually
reinforced impression to the public: the video was somehow
linked to the attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary also made remarks about the attacks on the
morning of September 12, 2012. She said in part:
We are working to determine the precise motivations and
methods of those who carried out this assault. Some
have sought to justify this vicious behavior, along
with the protest that took place at our Embassy in
Cairo yesterday, as a response to inflammatory material
posted on the internet. America's commitment to
religious tolerance goes back to the very beginning of
our nation. But let me be clear--there is no
justification for this, none. Violence like this is no
way to honor religion or faith. And as long as there
are those who would take innocent life in the name of
God, the world will never know a true and lasting
peace.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\Secretary Clinton Delivers Remarks on the Deaths of U.S.
Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, DIPNOTE (Sept. 12, 2012), https://
blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/09/12/secretary-clinton-delivers-
remarks-deaths-us-personnel-benghazi-libya.
Rooney, who helped draft the speech, told the Committee it
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
was geared towards the American people:
We knew basically a few things that we wanted to
accomplish. If indeed some people had died, we knew
that we wanted to give her some material that she could
say about them, so she could say gracious things about
them, which we knew she would have wanted to do. We
knew that we would want to give her some sort of a--
something that she could say that would summarize what
had happened, anticipating that, you know, if Americans
were waking up and turning on their TV in the morning
and their Secretary of State was standing there, that
they would--one of the questions on their mind would be
what, what happened. We wanted to be able to give her
some language that would at least begin to answer
that.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\Rooney Testimony at 35-36.
The fact the speech served in part to answer a question on
the minds of many Americans--``what happened''--is interesting
because Rooney never talked with anybody in the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs (NEA) while she was drafting the speech. The
individuals in NEA had been on the phone all night with State
Department personnel in Benghazi receiving real-time updates
about what was transpiring.\94\ Rooney testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\Jones Testimony at 79-80.
Q: Did you speak to anybody in the NEA bureau about
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
what had happened in the attacks?
A: I don't recall speaking to anyone in the NEA bureau.
Q: Is that something you would have done? I mean, you
talked earlier about the process. If you're writing a
speech about China, you go to----
A: Right.
Q: --the China experts and ask them. I mean, did that
happen that night with regard to Libya?
A: No, I don't think so. I don't recall any
conversation with anyone from--no.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\Rooney Testimony at 39.
Instead, the only actual description in the statement of
what had occurred in Benghazi was a late addition to the speech
from Sullivan. Schwerin, who also worked on the speech,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained:
A: He said, you know, we have to keep making edits. He
didn't tell me the substance of the conversations he
had had, just that there were more edits to make.
Q: Okay. What kind of edits?
A: I can't, you know, all these years later, tell you
which sentences we changed, but the only thing that I
remember is, I think the formulation ``heavily-armed
militants'' we added that morning in his office. But I
could not beyond that give you chapter and verse about
what we changed.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\Schwerin Testimony at 36.
The public statements by the President and Secretary of
State did not call the events in Benghazi a terrorist attack.
The President also conducted an interview with Steve Kroft
of 60 Minutes that same morning. Kroft began the interview by
asking the President about the attack and the President's
reluctance to call the attack a terrorist attack in his earlier
Rose Garden remarks. Again, the President did not call what had
transpired in Benghazi a terrorist attack:
Q: Mr. President, this morning you went out of your way
to avoid the use of the word ``terrorism'' in
connection with the Libya attack.
A: Right.
Q: Do you believe that this was a terrorist attack?
A: Well, it's too early to know exactly how this came
about, what group was involved, but obviously it was an
attack on Americans. And we are going to be working
with the Libyan government to make sure that we bring
these folks to justice, one way or the other.
Q: This has been described as a mob action, but there
are reports that they were very heavily armed with
grenades. That doesn't sound like your normal
demonstration.
A: As I said, we're still investigating exactly what
happened. I don't want to jump the gun on this. But
you're right that this is not a situation that was
exactly the same as what happened in Egypt, and my
suspicion is, is that there are folks involved in this
who were looking to target Americans from the
start.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\See Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat'l Sec.
Council, to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, Dep't of State, & Patrick
H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 13, 2012, 9:17
AM) (on file with the Committee, C05527907) (Attaching transcript of
the Interview of the President by Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes).
Later in the interview, the President raised the issue of
the video while referring to the Benghazi attacks, implying the
film was an ``excuse for violence against Americans'' and
conflating the two issues.\98\ The President said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\Id.
And I do have to say that, more broadly, we believe in
the First Amendment. It is one of the hallmarks of our
Constitution that I'm sworn to uphold. And so we are
always going to uphold the rights for individuals to
speak their mind. On the other hand, this film is not
representative of who we are and our values, and I
think it's important for us to communicate that. That's
never an excuse for violence against Americans[.]\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\Id.
Private Statements Tell a Different Story
While administration officials may have been in sync with
their public messaging regarding the Benghazi attacks on
September 12, the messages shared privately told a completely
different story.
Minutes before the President delivered his speech in the
Rose Garden, Sullivan wrote in an email to Rhodes and others:
There was not really much violence in Egypt. And we are
not saying that the violence in Libya erupted ``over
inflammatory videos.''\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Senior Dir. for Commc'cs
and Public Diplomacy, Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Dep't of State, et
al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 10:30 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05578214).
Sullivan's private acknowledgement differs notably from the
consistent public remarks connecting the video and the attacks
in both the President's and the Secretary's statements that
day.
On September 12, 2012, the President made separate phone
calls to Libya President Mohamad Magariaf and Egyptian
President Mohamed Morsi. In his phone call with the Egyptian
President, the President ``said that he rejects efforts to
denigrate Islam, but underscored there is never any
justification for violence against innocents and acts that
endanger American personnel and facilities.''\101\ This is a
reference to the video, which was the cause of the protest
against the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Readout of the President's Call with Egyptian President Morsi (Sept.
13, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/13/
readout-president-s-call-egyptian-president-morsi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his phone call with the Libyan President, the President
said the two countries ``must work together to do whatever is
necessary to identify the perpetrators of this attack and bring
them to justice.''\102\ Notably, however, President Obama did
not make a reference to the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Readout of the President's Call with Libyan President Magariaf (Sept.
13, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/13/
readout-president-s-call-libyan-president-magariaf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary also had a phone call with an Egyptian
leader, Prime Minister Hisham Kandil, on the afternoon of
September 12. According to the call notes, the Secretary told
the Prime Minister the following:
We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do with
the film. It was a planned attack--not a protest. . . .
Your [sic] not kidding. Based on the information we saw
today we believe the group that claimed responsibility
for this was affiliated with al-Qaeda.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\Email from U.S. Dep't of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 12, 2012,
7:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561911).
Not only did the Secretary tell the Prime Minister ``the
attack in Libya had nothing to do with the film,'' she
strengthened the statement by prefacing it with ``we
know.''\104\ Such a definitive declaration made privately to
another world leader stands in stark contrast to her speech
earlier in the day to the American people where she mentioned
the attack--``this vicious behavior''--in the same breath as
the video--``inflammatory material posted on the
internet.''\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\Id.
\105\Though some may claim that ``vicious behavior'' also occurred
in Cairo, in the Secretary's September 12 speech she specifically
separates the ``vicious behavior'' from what transpired in Cairo by
saying ``this vicious behavior, along with the protest that took place
at our Embassy in Cairo yesterday . . .'' Secretary Clinton Delivers
Remarks on the Deaths of U.S. Personnel in Benghazi, Libya, DIPNOTE
(Sept. 12, 2012), https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2012/09/12/
secretary-clinton-delivers-remarks-deaths-us-personnel-benghazi-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy was also emphatic in privately conveying that no
protests had occurred prior to the attack. In a separate,
private briefing to congressional staff Kennedy was
specifically asked whether this was ``an attack under the cover
of a protest.''\106\ Kennedy, who oversaw the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and had ready access to real-time
information from the Diplomatic Security agents on the ground
in Benghazi, replied ``[n]o this was a direct breaching
attack.''\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\Email from Legislative Management Officer for Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept. 12, 2012, 7:55
PM) (on file with the Committee, C05580110).
\107\Email from Legislative Management Officer, U.S. Dep't of
State, to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept 12, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05562234).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy's assertions also aligned with the intelligence
product, the Executive Update, produced by the CIA analysts
earlier that day and shared with senior administration
officials. That piece stated ``the presence of armed assailants
from the outset suggests this was an intentional assault and
not the escalation of a peaceful protest.''\108\ This piece--
which was part of the President's Daily Brief and likely
discussed with the President's Chief of Staff on September 13,
2012--is discussed at length in Appendix H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\Middle East and North Africa Situation Report, Sept. 12, 2012,
0700 EDT (on file with CIA, REQUEST 17-0345 to REQUEST 0346).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whether or not a protest occurred prior to the attack was a
significant fact at the time because the absence of a protest
would clearly distinguish what happened in Benghazi from what
transpired in Cairo. If it therefore became clear no protests
occurred in Benghazi over the video, then the administration
would therefore no longer be able to connect the two events in
statements about Benghazi.
Privately, Kennedy did not hesitate to explain no protests
had occurred prior to the attack.\109\ Publicly, however, it
took the administration more than two weeks to do so.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\See Email to H_Egypt, et al. (Sept 12, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05562234) (answering question about whether the
attack was under the cover of a protest, Kennedy responded ``[n]o this
was a direct breaching attack.'').
\110\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intel., Statement
by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on the
intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate in
Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/96-press-
releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-
on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEPTEMBER 13 INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
On September 11 and September 12, public comments by
administration officials had relied mainly on press reports and
eyewitness accounts. On September 13 the Central Intelligence
Agency [CIA] published its first intelligence assessment
exclusively regarding the Benghazi attacks. This assessment,
known as a WIRe [World Intelligence Review] was the key
intelligence piece produced by CIA analysts immediately
following the Benghazi attacks. It was titled ``Libya:
Government Poorly Positioned To Address Attacks.''\111\ As both
Michael J Morell, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA)--an
office of [redacted text] analysts focused on terrorism
issues--acknowledge, this was the first time the analysts had
coordinated a piece about the Benghazi attacks among the entire
intelligence community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Government Poorly Positioned to
Address Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 13, 2012 [hereinafter
September 13 WIRe] (on file with CIA, REQUEST 17-0067 to REQUEST 17-
0070).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OTA Director described the purposes of this piece to
the Committee:
This is something that by this point we would have been
writing on a regular basis trying to sort out. . . .
[T]o have done a WIRe would've been really the first
time where we said we're going to stand back, we're
going to really make sure this was fully IC
coordinated. We're going to work through this and say
this is a more formal look. So I don't believe it was
tasked so much as it was time for us to really take a
full look at where we were.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\Testimony of Dir. of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent.
Intel. Agency, Tr. at 105 (Nov. 13, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
Additionally, this particular piece was also included as
part of the President's Daily Brief [PDB].
Morell explained:
Q: So the PDB staff would have edited this particular
WIRe?
A: Yes, because it was a PDB.
Q: This particular WIRe was a PDB?
A: Yes.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\Testimony of Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency,
Tr. at 39-41 (Sept. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Morell Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
As a PDB, this piece received wide distribution throughout
the intelligence community. As Morell notes in his book, this
piece ``would be published and shown to senior policy-makers
and to Congress on the morning of September 13.''\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\Michael Morell, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight
Against Terrorism--From al Qa'ida to ISIS 217 (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This September 13 piece was the pivotal piece coming from
the intelligence community for several reasons. One, it was the
first time the analysts had taken a step back to assess what
had actually occurred in Benghazi; two, this piece was widely
distributed across the U.S. government;\115\ and three, Morell
viewed this piece as the ``assessment'' of the analysts when he
edited the talking points for the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence two days later.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Id.
\116\Morell Testimony at 135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the September 13 piece being heavily vetted, going
through the PDB process, and being widely distributed, the
piece was rife with errors as the analysts themselves would
later acknowledge. There were improper footnotes, poor and
confusing phrasing, and most importantly, headlines that were
not supported by any text. The result was a very poorly written
piece containing inaccurate information that was relied on by
those analyzing, discussing, and messaging the Benghazi
attacks.
The focus of the September 13 piece was twofold: the
ability of the Libyan government to respond to the attacks, and
the fact extremists had participated in the attacks. A timeline
of the attacks and the sequence of events leading up to the
attacks were not discussed in the piece. Whether or not a
protest occurred prior to the attacks was not a focal point of
the piece, nor was it an issue the analysts found to be
particularly germane. As the manager of the analysts who wrote
the piece testified:
A: We weren't particularly concerned, worried about, or
thinking about protests when we wrote this.
Q: That was the next question I was going to ask you.
Yeah.
A: I want to make that very, very clear. Because in CTC
[Counterterrorism Center] when something like this
happens, we look at who do we think did it and are they
about to do it again and is there anything we can do to
stop it.
So we did not think the question of protests was
particularly germane to answering that question. In
fact, it was fully probably a week. And we had several
conversations among ourselves and even with more senior
people in the DI [Directorate of Analysis] about, why
in the hell would everybody care about protests?
We just--we weren't tracking on it because it wasn't
germane to what we were trying to do, which it doesn't
really excuse our sloppy work, particularly in that
paragraph here. I mean the ticks are the ticks. They
are based on reporting. But our assessment was just
imprecisely written. We weren't careful enough about
it.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\Testimony of [redacted text] Team Chief, Ofice of Terrorism
Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at 52-53 (Feb. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter [redacted text] Team Chief Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
The fact the piece was not focused on protests--nor did the
analysts find the issue of protests germane--is ironic given
this piece has received so much attention by Morell and others
as supporting evidence that the analysts did in fact believe a
protest had occurred.\118\ That is because this is the only
intelligence assessment written by the CIA that can support the
analytic line that a protest had occurred prior to the
attacks.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\Morell Testimony at 50.
\119\The CIA notes that a September 15 WIRe ``includes reporting
that `members of an AAS-affiliated group stated that they took
advantage of a planned demonstration . . .''' However, citing a report
is different than crafting an assessment. A report is just that, a
report--citing information from somebody else. An assessment, however,
is the collective thoughts of analysts after synthesizing multiple
pieces of intelligence to reach an analytic conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, it was put in the intelligence piece by accident--
a mistake that was not caught during what was supposed to be a
rigorous and airtight editing process.
In his book, Morell says ``[t]he September 13 piece--the
first piece to go beyond a simple factual update--said four
things. First, that the assault on the [Benghazi Mission
compound] had been a spontaneous event that evolved from a
protest outside the [Benghazi Mission compound].''\120\ Except
Morell is wrong. The piece did not say this at all. In fact,
the exact language of the piece reads: ``We assess the attacks
on Tuesday against the US Consulate in Benghazi began
spontaneously following the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo
and evolved into a direct assault against the Consulate and a
separate US facility in the city.''\121\ In his book, Morell
alters the plain language of this piece, ``began spontaneously
following protests at the US Embassy in Cairo,'' with the
wording in his book, ``a spontaneous event that evolved from a
protest outside the [Benghazi Mission compound].''\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\Morell, supra note 114, at 218.
\121\Id. at 218.
\122\Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the first page of the September 13 piece, titled
``Libya: Government Poorly Positioned To Address Attacks,''
there is a single mention of ``the early stages of the
protest'' buried in one of the bullet points.\123\ The Director
of the Office of Terrorism Analysis acknowledged the supporting
evidence for this statement was incorrect. She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Government Poorly Positioned to
Address Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 13, 2012 [hereinafter
September 13 WIRe] (on file with CIA, REQUEST 17-0067 to REQUEST 17-
0070).
Q: ``I'm sorry. In the early stages of the protest''--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
so a direct reference to a protest----
A: Yes.
Q: ``Benghazi's top Ministry of Interior official
personally ordered the withdrawal of Libyan Security
Forces protecting the consulate saying he believed the
action would avoid violence, according to the press
reporting.''
A: Correct.
Q: And we talked about that earlier.
A: Yes.
Q: Just really quickly, flip back to footnote 16, can
you read the date on footnote 16? What's the date of
that?
A: That is 2012/09/04, so that would obviously be
wrong.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\OTA Dir. Testimony at 128.
The article cited to support the mention of a protest in
this instance was titled ``Libyan Parliament Speaker, Interior
Minister Discuss Country's Security'' and was from Doha Libya
TV in Arabic from September 4, 2012.\125\ In other words, the
analysts used an article from September 4, 2012--a full week
before the lethal attacks--to support the premise that a
protest had occurred just prior to the attack on September 11.
A simple source check by the reader--or during any of the
multiple levels of allegedly ``rigorous'' editing--would have
caught the blatantly obvious error of relying on a news article
from September 4 to support an event that occurred on September
11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet it was not this mention of a protest in the piece that
caught Morell's attention. Rather, it was a headline on the
following page titled ``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi
Protests.'' This page was a text box, which the OTA Director
described as:
So a text box is material that we believe is related to
the storyline, to the analytic--to the arc of the story
but is something that we kind of separate out, because
sometimes it doesn't flow from the analytic argument
but it's information we think is important to include.
So think of it as an adjunct to the piece.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\OTA Dir. Testimony at 109.
While the title of this text box was ``Extremists
Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,'' nothing in the actual text
box supports that title.\127\ The summary paragraph in the text
box, through which the rest of the text box would flow, read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123, at 2.
We assess the attacks on Tuesday against the US
Consulate in Benghazi began spontaneously following the
protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a
direct assault against the Consulate and a separate US
facility in the city. Extremists with ties to al-Qa-ida
were involved in the attacks, according to signals
intelligence.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\Id.
There is no mention--or even hint--of any protest in
Benghazi in that paragraph or in any other text in the text
box. Rather, the only mention of a protest relates to what had
transpired in Cairo.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After a discussion of this document during their interviews
with the Committee, both Morell and the OTA Director
acknowledged this fact. Morell testified:
Q: I'm trying to tie it all back to the headline----
A: Yep.
Q: --``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,''
I'm having a hard time understanding how that headline
is supported by the evidence.
A: Right.
Q: So far, nothing in the actual text of the WIRe
supports that, and so now we're looking at each
footnote, footnote 29--source note 29, we've looked at
the New York Times article, the body of the article
doesn't support that, just the headline, and now we're
looking at source note 30, ``according to [redacted
text].'' You know, where in here does it support that
but for collateral, is my question to you.
A: And so--look, I don't know the answer to your
question, right, why they wrote it the way they
did.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\Morell Testimony at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OTA Director testified:
Q: Okay. Let's look at the first bullet point. . . .
That's a lengthy sentence.
A: Not good trade craft. We try and make them shorter.
Q: Is there anything in that sentence or that bullet
point that denotes that there was a protest in Benghazi
that you can see?
A: ``After hearing how protesters breached the''--so,
no, not in Benghazi.
Q: Not in Benghazi, okay.
Let's look at the next tick. . . .
Is there anything in that tick that mentions a protest
in Benghazi?
A: No.
Q: All right. Let's look at the third tick. . . . Is
there anything in that tick that mentions a protest in
Benghazi?
A: No.
Q: And then I'm just going to read the last paragraph
here. . . .
Is there anything in that paragraph that mentions the
protest in Benghazi?
A: No.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\OTA Dir. Testimony at 110-12.
The OTA Director also told the Committee the text box in
the September 13 intelligence piece was not supposed to be
about whether or not protests had occurred in Benghazi prior to
the attack.\132\ Instead, it was supposed to focus on the
involvement of extremists in the attacks. That was the point
the analysts were trying to drive--extremists, not protests.
This was true of the headline of the text box, too. The key
word in that headline, according to the OTA Director, was
``extremists,'' not ``protests.'' She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\Id. at 112-13.
Q: So the headline for this text box, ``Extremists
Capitalized on Benghazi Protests,'' do you see any
supporting evidence in the five paragraphs I've just
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
read that support that headline?
A: So the headline--and I admit that in retrospect, if
I could go back and change this headline, I would.
Because the headline, it was more meant to be about
the, we know extremists were involved and less about
whether or not there were protests.
So if you look at this idea that the first, the topic
sentence that talks--so, sorry, the second sentence,
where the bullets are then following immediately after,
about extremists with the ties to Al Qaeda were
involved. We then go on in the first bullet to talk
about we know that there was, you know [redacted text].
That bullet was to not only talk about AQIM but to also
talk a little bit about motivation.
The second bullet that talks about, you know, again,
extremists, as we were calling at that point, Ansar al-
Sharia in Benghazi claimed responsibility, and also
talked about the timing that this was spontaneous,
[redacted text]. So, again, this idea of preplanning,
timing, and those involved.
And the third bullet was, I think, meant to illustrate
that this was a series that the extremists were
involved at various points that was an opportunistic
attack sequence, as we talk about. They took advantage
of opportunities to attack U.S. facilities at various
points throughout the night.
So are those things directly supporting in the way we
would like the title of this? No. Was it meant--and as
I said, so if I could take back that title, I would.
Q: Sure. ``Extremists'' is the key word in the title?
A: Yes, not the protests.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\Id. at 112-13.
She later called the title of the text box the
``unfortunate title,''\134\ and, as the head of the Office of
Terrorism Analysis, ultimately took responsibility for it.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\Id. at 135.
\135\Id. at 112-113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While there may have been no text in the text box to
support the title, as it turns out, the title was intended to
be something different. According to the manager of the
analysts who wrote the piece, the title of the text box was
supposed to be ``Extremists Capitalized on Cairo
Protests.''\136\ That small but vital difference--from Cairo to
Benghazi--had major implications in how people in the
administration were able to message the attacks, and was used
as support in the days and weeks after this piece was published
for the claim that protests had occurred prior to the Benghazi
attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 49, 136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even worse, this mistake was not caught until more than a
week later, when the analysts were updating their assessment.
The manager of the analysts who wrote the piece testified:
Q: The title here: ``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi
Protests.'' So we talked to [the OTA Director] about
this. She called it an unfortunate title?
A: It was a--we made a mistake.
Q: Okay. So when you say ``we made a mistake,'' I mean,
where--how would that have been----
A: So, God, how do I begin?
* * *
A: . . . So ``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi
Protests.'' Benghazi was supposed to be Cairo. So----
Q: Okay.
A: But let me explain that. So--and, frankly, it's a
mistake that we didn't even notice until we published
the WIRe on the 24th, where I was talking to a senior
person as he was reviewing it, and he was looking back
and asking, I thought: Oh, my God, we were talking
about Cairo.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\Id. at 48-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
She also testified:
Q: So I guess this is why I'm a little confused is you
say in the title Benghazi should have been Cairo?
A: The title probably should have read something like
extremists motivated to attack in Benghazi because of
protests in Cairo.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\Id. at 54.
In the end, Morell conceded the obvious--this piece could
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
have been written better. He testified:
Right. And if you want to get a bottom line from me,
from me, I don't think this was as well done as it
could have been for a lot of reasons. I have reasons
beyond yours as to why I don't think this is as well
done as it could be, and you're pointing out some
additional ones. So I don't think it is as well done as
it could have been.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\Morell Testimony at 56.
In addition to this piece being poorly written--
conveniently, in a way relied on by senior administration
officials with respect to a key point--it also contained
sourcing inaccuracies. One of these was described above. The
lack of attention paid to sourcing has implications on future
pieces shared with the President and other senior executive
branch officials.\140\ From papers in high school, theses in
college, law review articles to scientific research, assertions
made are expected to be properly documented with sources to
support them. Yet when it comes to CIA analysts and pieces they
write for the President, for some reason these footnotes do not
receive the scrutiny they deserve. Morell explains:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\Id.
A: So context number two, right, is that analysts don't
spend a lot of time making sure that these footnotes
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
match. Okay. They just don't. They just don't.
Q: Is that a problem?
A: It certainly is when you have a situation like this.
Q: I'm a lawyer. I mean, if you're writing a Law Review
article, those things are going to be footnoted to
death.
A: Is it a problem? Yes. Is it a problem? Yes. So those
are the few pieces of context, right, is they believed
is what they believed, right? They had a set of--they
believed they had a set of information, a set of data
points that took them there. Third, I think you've got
to be a little bit careful going through this sentence
by sentence and source by source, because analysts
aren't as careful as they need to be.
Q: Why aren't they as careful as they need to be? If
you're producing a piece for the [President], shouldn't
every sentence have a valid source note?
A: Yes, absolutely. You're absolutely right. I couldn't
agree with you more.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\Id. at 52-53.
The OTA Director also acknowledged there is not enough
emphasis on making sure the footnotes, known inside the CIA as
source attributions, are accurate--especially for pieces that
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
become PDBs. She testified:
A: The editing process would have differed for a PDB in
that it would have also gone through an additional
layer of review or several additional layers of review.
So a WIRe ceases, the review ceases pretty much after
the office director, as I said, except for some
technical edits.
A PDB, our process is more--there are additional levels
that include a review within the organization we call
PASS. There's also then the DA [Directorate of
Analysis] front office would have reviewed a PDB, and
then it would also have gone to ODNI [Office of the
Director of National Intelligence].
* * *
Q: Okay. So there are more senior analysts that would
review a PDB?
A: Yes.
Q: Does it undergo a certain extra level of rigor for
attributing sources and making sure everything lines up
properly?
A: Attributing sources, not necessarily.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\OTA Dir. Testimony at 106-08.
Despite these myriad errors--the inaccurate title, the
faulty sourcing, the lack of evidence in the text to support a
headline--Morell and others have used this piece, and the title
of the text box specifically, as the ``assessment'' of the
analysts to buttress their statements that protests in Benghazi
had occurred prior to the attacks.\143\ In fact, the title
``Extremists Capitalized on Benghazi Protests'' alone does
count as an ``assessment'' by the analysts. As the manager of
the analysts testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\See e.g. Morell Testimony at 50.
A: And our assessment--again, it's embarrassing, it's
poorly done--was that they had--really the title as it
stood was what our assessment was, but we didn't
explain it well--that they capitalized on these
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
protests in Benghazi.
Q: Okay. So your title is what the assessment was, but
that's not supported--and this is my analysis--not
supported, Benghazi protests, by anything underneath--
--
A: That's true.
Q: --in the ticks. Okay. So is that actually an
assessment, extremists capitalized on Benghazi
protests, or is the assessment sort of the body under
here, the paragraph, the three ticks, and then the
final paragraph?
A: Well, it's all assessment. It's just sloppily done.
Q: Okay. So extremists capitalized on Benghazi
protests, even though there's no supporting evidence
for that statement in this box----
A: Yeah. Like I said, we weren't thinking about the
protests or we would have been, frankly, far more
careful about how we couched them.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 55.
In other words, the title of the text box itself was an
assessment by the analysts. That title was inaccurate. That
title was an accident and was supposed to be something else
entirely, but nobody caught it. The analysts were not even
focused on the issue of protests. Yet it was that title the
administration could point to--and ultimately relied upon--to
say the analysts had assessed that protests had occurred prior
to the Benghazi attacks. That title is the only analytic piece
fully vetted by the intelligence community prior to Morell's
editing of the talking points and the appearance on the Sunday
talk shows by Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, where she said protests had occurred in
Benghazi.
Nevertheless, despite the incorrect title and numerous
other faults with the September 13 piece, there is still no
assessment by the analysts that tied what transpired in
Benghazi to the internet video. Even among the legion of
mistakes made, the piece did not authoritatively connect
Benghazi with protests or an internet video.
THE CONFLATION CONTINUES
While the inaccurate and poorly written CIA analysis on
September 13 gave an opening for administration officials to
claim protests had occurred prior to the Benghazi attack, the
public connection and conflation by administration officials
between Benghazi and the video continued. This occurred despite
any assessment by the CIA analysts of the video playing a role
in the Benghazi attacks.
During her remarks at the opening plenary of the U.S.-
Morocco strategic dialogue on September 13, 2012, the Secretary
of State said there is ``no justification, none at all, for
responding to this video with violence. We condemn the violence
that has resulted in the strongest terms.''\145\ These comments
were similar to prior public comments she had made regarding
the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks at the Opening Plenary of the U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue
(Sept.13, 2012), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/
2012/09/197711.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A draft of the Secretary's comments, however, shows an
attempt to draw a stronger link between Benghazi and the
video--something unsupportable by the intelligence at the time,
and not part of the CIA's assessment--than she stated publicly.
A draft of the Secretary's speech states: ``But as I said
yesterday, there is no justification--none--for responding to
an Internet video with murder. We condemn the violence that has
resulted in the strongest terms.''\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Daniel B. Schwerin,
Speechwriter, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept. 13, 2012, 9:22 AM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB00100122).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This subtle change from the draft to her speech--from
``murder'' to ``violence''--is important. While some violence
had occurred at other United States diplomatic facilities
across the Arab World such as Cairo, murder had only occurred
at one: Benghazi.\147\ By changing that one word, from
``murder'' to ``violence,'' the Secretary did not draw an
irrebuttable, direct link between the video and Benghazi--a
link she had told the Egyptian Prime Minister she knew did not
exist\148\--but instead continued to indirectly connect and
conflate the two events to the American public, thus allowing
her to claim she did not make a direct public connection
between the video and the Benghazi attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\Benghazi was the only U.S. facility during this time period
where terrorists killed an American government official.
\148\See Email from U.S. Dep't of State to S_CallNotes (Sept. 12,
2012, 7:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561911) (attaching notes
from phone call with Egyptian Prime Minister).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That same day, Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Secretary of State
for Management and Resources, had a meeting with the new
Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. According to a summary of that
meeting, ``Nides said he understood the difference between the
targeted attack in Libya and the way the protest escalated in
Egypt.''\149\ While this message was shared privately by the
Deputy Secretary of State to the Egyptian Ambassador two days
after the attacks, it was not until two weeks later that the
administration finally shared this message publicly with the
American people.\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\Email from Operations Center, U.S. Dep't of State to Prem G.
Kumar, Dir. for Israeli and Palestinian Affairs, White House (Sept. 13,
2012, 12:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562242).
\150\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel.,
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on
the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/96-press-
releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-
on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a press briefing later in the day on September 13,
Nuland openly talked about the video while discussing the
Benghazi attacks.\151\ At the briefing, she was asked whether
any of the information she provided during the background
briefing the day before had changed; said she did not have
anything significantly different than what she had said
privately on background.\152\ Yet when asked about the Benghazi
attack, she answered the question, then pivoted to talking
about the video:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 13, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197729.htm.
\152\Id.
Q: Toria, can you tell us whether there's been any
progress towards determining whether the Benghazi
attack was purely spontaneous or was premeditated by
militants, and also whether there's been any further
determination about the extent to which the Cairo,
Benghazi, and now Yemen attacks were related in some
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
way other than just theme?
A: Well, as we said yesterday when we were on
background, we are very cautious about drawing any
conclusions with regard to who the perpetrators were,
what their motivations were, whether it was
premeditated, whether they had any external contacts,
whether there was any link, until we have a chance to
investigate along with the Libyans. So I know that's
going to be frustrating for you, but we really want to
make sure that we do this right and we don't jump to
conclusions.
That said, obviously, there are plenty of people around
the region citing this disgusting video as something
that has been motivating. As the Secretary said this
morning, while we as Americans, of course, respect free
speech, respect free expression, there is never an
excuse for it to become violent.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\Id.
While the question addresses Cairo, Benghazi, and Yemen,
Nuland does not differentiate among the three events and
instead notes ``there are plenty of people around the region
citing this disgusting video as something that has been
motivating.''\154\ Nuland's failure to separate what transpired
in Benghazi from what transpired in Cairo on the same day and
Yemen one day later resulted in an administration official
connecting again, publicly, Benghazi with the other two
events--and thus Benghazi with the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two days after the attacks ended, September 14, Jay Carney,
Press Secretary, White House, held a press briefing at the
White House. Reporters pressed on whether the administration
believed the events in Benghazi were a reaction to the video:
A: Jake, let's be clear, these protests were in
reaction to a video that had spread to the region----
Q: At Benghazi? What happened at Benghazi----
A: We certainly don't know. We don't know otherwise. We
have no information to suggest that it was a preplanned
attack. The unrest we've seen around the region has
been in reaction to a video that Muslims, many Muslims
find offensive. And while the violence is reprehensible
and unjustified, it is not a reaction to the 9/11
anniversary that we know of, or to U.S. policy.
Q: But the group around the Benghazi post was well
armed. It was a well-coordinated attack. Do you think
it was a spontaneous protest against a movie?
A: Look, this is obviously under investigation, and I
don't have----
Q: But your operating assumption is that that was in
response to the video, in Benghazi? I just want to
clear that up. That's the framework? That's the
operating assumption?
A: Look, it's not an assumption----
Q: Because there are administration officials who
don't--who dispute that, who say that it looks like
this was something other than a protest.
A: I think there has been news reports on this, Jake,
even in the press, which some of it has been
speculative. What I'm telling you is this is under
investigation. The unrest around the region has been in
response to this video. We do not, at this moment, have
information to suggest or to tell you that would
indicate that any of this unrest was preplanned.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Office of the
Press Secretary, The White House (Sept. 14, 2012), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/press-briefing-press-
secretary-jay-carney-9142012.
In his response to a question about what happened at
Benghazi, Carney switches gears to talking about the general
unrest in the region as a whole--which was a result of the
video. Carney does not distinguish the events in Benghazi from
the events around the rest of the region thus connecting and
conflating the two issues and again giving the impression that
what happened in Benghazi happened as a result of the video.
Carney is also asked twice whether or not a protest had
occurred in Benghazi. Similar to his comments about the video,
Carney talks about unrest in the region as a whole, conflating
protests and Benghazi, and failing to distinguish Benghazi from
what had transpired elsewhere in the region.
Despite these public comments by senior administration
officials, those on the ground in Libya knew otherwise. That
same morning a public information officer from the Embassy in
Tripoli sent an email to colleagues in Tripoli and at the State
Department headquarters in Washington D.C. regarding
``messaging on the attacks in Libya.''\156\ The email said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\Email from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, to
Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept 14, 2012, 6:43 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05396788).
Colleagues, I . . . want to share with all of you, our
view at Embassy Tripoli that we must be cautious in our
local messaging with regard to the inflammatory film
trailer, adapting it to Libyan conditions. Our
monitoring of the Libyan media and conversations with
Libyans suggests that the film is not as explosive of
an issue here as it appears to be in other countries in
the region. The overwhelming majority of the FB
[Facebook] comments and tweets we're [sic] received
from Libyans since the Ambassador's death have
expressed deep sympathy, sorrow, and regret. They have
expressed anger at the attackers, and emphasized that
this attack does not represent Libyans or Islam.
Relatively few have even mentioned the inflammatory
video. So if we post messaging about the video
specifically, we may draw unwanted attention to it. And
it is becoming increasingly clear that the series of
events in Benghazi was much more terrorist attack than
a protest which escalated into violence. It is our
opinion that in our messaging, we want to distinguish,
not conflate, the events in other countries with this
well-planned attack by militant extremists. I have
discussed this with Charge Hicks and shares PAS's
view.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\Id.
The purpose of this email was to discuss messaging to the
Libyan people--similar to the part of the Secretary's September
11 statement where her aides noted she wanted to speak to the
region to ``lower the temperature.''\158\ What is significant
about this email, however, is that in discussing messaging to
the Libyans, the video is not emphasized at all--in fact the
messaging on the ground in Libya sought to distinguish what
happened from other countries.\159\ This again contrasts with
the statements of senior administration officials, speaking to
the American people, who consistently connect the video and
Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\Schwerin Testimony at 17.
\159\Email from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, to
Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Sept 14, 2012, 6:43 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05396788).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE TALKING POINTS
The talking points provided by the CIA to the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence [HPSCI] on September
15, 2012 were flawed. The individual who made the most
substantial changes to those talking points was Michael
Morell.\160\ While much has been written about these talking
points and the flawed process undertaken to create them, this
section focuses on what specific information Morell had at his
disposal when he made the changes to the talking points, how
this information affected his editing of the talking points,
and subsequent portrayal of the talking points by others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\White House e-mails on 2012 attacks in Benghazi, Libya,
Washington Post, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/white-
house-e-mails-on-2012-attacks-in-benghazi-libya/157.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information from Tripoli
While the September 13 WIRe represented an ``assessment''
that CIA analysts believed a protest had occurred prior to the
Benghazi attack, CIA case officers and security personnel in
Libya knew that was not the case. For the first two days after
the attacks, the Chief of Station in Tripoli had been
debriefing eyewitnesses to find out what happened and worked
with his CIA counterparts--who had been in Benghazi--to contact
their sources and collect as much information as possible about
the attacks.\161\ The Chief of Station knew no protests or
demonstrations occurred prior to the attack. None of the
eyewitnesses he spoke with mentioned anything about
protests.\162\ The Chief of Station testified he first learned
that Washington D.C. created a narrative that protests had
occurred around September 13 or 14:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\Testimony of Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency,
Tr. at 129-31, 189 (July, 16, 2015) [hereinafter Chief of Station
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\162\Id. at 122-123.
Q: I guess the first question would be, when did you
first become aware that there was a belief back in
Washington that the Benghazi attack was carried out
without a significant degree of preplanning, and that
the attack had somehow evolved from a demonstration at
the consulate, or perhaps used a demonstration as
cover? About three things there, but when did you first
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
become aware of those misconceptions?
A: I want to say it was when--probably the 13th or 14th
we were asked to coordinate on that first intelligence
report that came out.
Q: Sure.
A: We provided our edits or our contributions to that.
They weren't incorporated or included.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\Id. at 178.
This was just the first time--in what would become a
pattern--of analysts and others at CIA headquarters relying on
accounts from the press and other sources over that of
America's highest ranking intelligence officer in Libya.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\The CIA told the Committee this part of the report ``suggests
the intelligence community had no information on which to base our
initial assessment that a protest preceded the attacks on the State
compound. To the contrary, a significant body of information available
immediately following the attacks indicated that there was a protest.''
This ``significant body of information,'' however, was almost
exclusively press reporting, and with one exception, this information
was not cited in either the September 13 or September 15 WIRe pieces.
On September 16, 2012, at the direction of Michael Morell, the CIA
analysts finally tackled the issue of protests head-on. They wrote:
``We have contradictory reporting about whether nonviolent
demonstrations occurred prior to the attack on the US Consulate. The
Station's assessment that there were no peaceful protests on the day of
the attack is in contrast to other reports that peaceful protests
preceded the violent assault.'' As supporting evidence for this
paragraph the analysts used only public news articles from the
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and National Public Radio--all of
which were at least three days old--in addition to articles by Al
Jazirah and the Guardian of London. They did not cite any intelligence
reports, instead relying on the Internet.
The earliest evidence the Committee has seen where the
Chief of Station told CIA headquarters a protest did not occur
in Benghazi came early in the morning on Friday September 14,
2012.\165\ A Worldwide Unrest Update sent to Morell's
assistants and chief of staff said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\Email from [EA to DDCIA] to DIR-EAs, (Sept. 14, 2012, 8:27 AM)
(on file with the CIA, REQUEST 1-001673 to 1-001674).
Tripoli: COS [Chief of Station] passed the following
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
update being formulated by NE [Near East] now.
1. LFighters were trained, not an undisciplined
militia. State compound was an assult/probe [sic] vice
flash mob. This is based on the observations of CIA
officers who were in the fight assessing the fighting
method of the attackers.
2. LMultiple militias and fluid political dynamics in
Benghazi. Central government not able to project
influence/power.
3. LMortar attack was precise on base location. Per
JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] operation on
the gorund [sic] one short, one long, two direct hits.
Their assessment this was a well-trained group--not
militia rabble. JSOC officer is training the Libyan
Special Forces and noted that they are not as capable
of precision mortar fire as was witness [sic] on 12
September.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\Id.
Morell explained the purpose of these Worldwide Unrest
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Updates:
When the unrest began across the Muslim world as a
result of the video, there was unrest, there were
protests, the administration was deeply concerned about
the prospect--possibility prospect of violence against
U.S. facilities and U.S. persons. We were having daily
deputies meetings to discuss the safety of Americans
and the safety of U.S. facilities overseas, two a day
deputies meetings, one in the morning and one at night.
One of the things the director and I did--and I don't
know which one of us in particular did--one of us asked
[redacted text] where there was unrest as a result of
the video to do a daily update, right? This is the
daily update from Tripoli for that day in response to
that request.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\Morell Testimony at 111.
In other words, the daily updates were done for Morell,
sent to his Executive Assistants, and written for his
consumption. Despite this, Morell assumed the analysts received
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
these updates as well. He testified:
Q: Did this actually go to the analysts?
A: I assume so. I assume so.
Q: Okay. Why would you assume it went to the analyst if
it was created for you?
A: Because I believe all the updates--the updates were
shared. I mean, that's something we can check, okay,
something we can check.
Q: So you believe that this worldwide unrest update was
shared with you?
A: Absolutely. And something you can ask [the OTA
Director].\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\Id. at 114-15.
The Committee asked the OTA Director, if she received this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
document. She was not aware they did. She testified:
At the time, I was not aware. I have since become
aware. I believe this was part of the daily email that
was being done at the behest of DD/CIA.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\OTA Dir. Testimony at 130.
The manager of the analysts who conducted the analysis also
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
does not remember seeing this email. She testified:
Q: Is this something that would have made it to your
desk or your analysts' desks?
A: Not this email. . . .
Q: Okay. Under Tripoli it says ``COS [Chief of Station]
passed the following update being formulated by NE
now.'' And then there are seven, I guess, individual
updates. Those seven updates in this format, is that
something that would have been passed to your team?
A: No, I've never seen this.
Q: Okay. I'm just trying to understand----
A: Well, let me say, I don't remember seeing it. And I
don't know that my team would have passed it. I do know
[Chief of Station] was unhappy with our call on
protests because----\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 61-62.
When asked about this specific Worldwide Unrest Update from
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Chief of Station, Morell responded:
A: So, look, the point is--the point is--the point is
there is a flood of information coming in, right, and
it's not my job as the deputy director of CIA to assess
all this stuff. Right?
Q: Right.
A: It's the job of the analyst. So I'm looking at it
from the perspective of, geez, is there anything here
that's going to lead me to raise questions with the
analyst?
Q: Okay. And was there anything in this particular
email, the worldwide unrest update that caused you to
raise questions with the analyst?
A: So this is not the--this is not from the 14th. So,
no.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\Morell Testimony at 117-18.
As noted earlier, the email was sent at 8:27 a.m. on
September 14, 2012. It is unclear why Morell did not
acknowledge this fact.
That afternoon, the Chief of Station also wrote an email
directly to one of the analysts in the Office of Terrorism
Analysis.\172\ That email, in response to a request to
coordinate on talking points for a phone call for David
Petraeus, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on the Libya
attack, said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\Email from Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, to
[Office of Terrorism Analysis Analyst] (Sept. 14, 2012, 4:05 PM) (on
file with the CIA, REQUEST 15-0005).
We are verifying some of the events that took place in
fornt [sic] of the State department facility with some
of the embassy personnel. The RSO [Regional Security
Officer] noted that he was not aware of a protest in
front of the consulate (the DOS [Department of State]
facility where the Ambo and the ARSO's were staying.
(could it have been the AAmerican [sic] corner?) We
will be talking to the lead [redacted text] who was in
Benghazi to obtain additional background. I also do not
agree with the assessment that the attack was
opportunistic [sic] in origin. The GRS Agents and xx
operators on the scene noted that the fighters were
moving and shooting in a fashion that indicated
training--and set them apart for the militias fighters
typically found in Benghazi. Perhaps most compelling
point was the comment by the [redacted text] who noted
the percise [sic] and timing of mortar fire--one short,
one long two direct hits. He noted that the Libyan
special forces are unable to use mortars so effectively
and that U.S. forces mortar company would be hard
pressed to repeat the same performace [sic] as he
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
witnessed in Benghazi.
I am basing my assessment mostly on the data from the
guys on the ground (not all source) and dealing with
Libyan contacts. Thanks for letting [sic] have an
opportunity to co[o]rd[inate].\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\Id.
The Chief of Station noted he was relying on information
from ``guys on the ground'' and ``Libyan contacts.''\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though this email was written to an analyst, the
analysts sent it up the chain. The manager of the analysts
testified:
Q: Okay. So this email is from chief of station to her.
Do you recall whether or not she forwarded this to you
or disseminated this----
A: Oh yeah. She forwarded it. Everything from the
[Chief of Station] I saw.
Q: So when you received this email, is this something
you would have pushed up the chain?
A: Oh, yeah. Chief of Station, you know, disagreeing
with something is no small thing. I mean, the chiefs of
station are not required for coordination. But we
absolutely, and especially NCTC [National
Counterterrorism Center], take into account what they
have to say.
Q: All right. So you sounded confident that you pushed
this up the chain. I guess my question----
A: I don't remember doing it, but, I mean, I would
have.
Q: Okay. And you would have sent that to?
A: [OTA Director].
Q: [OTA Director]. Okay.
A: And my boss, my----
Q: Okay. And you don't know whether or not [the OTA
Director] would have sent it on further?
A: I'm sure [the OTA Director] would have sent it on
further. But I don't--well, I say that. I can't be sure
what any other person does. But [the OTA Director] has
excellent judgment and a whole ton of bureaucratic
savvy. So----\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 68-69.
The Chief of Station believes the email made its way up to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell. He testified:
Q: Do you know how high up the contents of your email
outlining your inform[ation] made it? Beyond the person
at CT that was coordinating it, do you have any idea?
Did it make it to Mr. Morell, for example?
A: I believe it made it to Mr. Morell.
Q: Okay.
A: Because this is one of the responses. The reason why
I say that----
Q: Yeah.
A: --it went--this was a response. He was aware of our
view that either--so I have all--I don't have any
reason to doubt it didn't make it to him.
Q: Yeah.
A: And his questions to us were consistent that he got
this specific information or something like it.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\Chief of Station Testimony at 208-09.
Morell, however, testified he does not remember receiving
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
this email. He told the committee:
Q: Okay. You don't believe this is something that you
have ever seen?
A: Not that I remember.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\Morell Testimony at 119.
Drafting the Talking Points
Petraeus testified the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence [HPSCI] did not ask for unclassified talking
points when he met with them on September 14, 2012, but rather
he offered to provide them to the Committee. Petraeus
testified:
A: Yeah. The Ranking Member asked: What can we say
about this publicly? And so I said: Okay, we'll come up
with something for you. And, frankly, the thinking was
we could do something very quickly, give it to him, he
could have it that afternoon, and he could know what he
could and could not say.
Q: So your expectations were this was something that
would be done internally at the CIA and knocked out
quickly and sent over in the afternoon?
A: Yeah, yeah. And, obviously, that would be
inappropriate in the end because it would need to be
sent through the intelligence community, so it had to
be an IC. And then, of course, since it's now going to
be used publicly, then the respective public affairs
offices of various organizations get involved. And then
since it has overall government implications, then you
end up having to get State and FBI. There's security
concerns and a variety of other issues that start to
get factored in. So it became quite an involved process
in the end.
Q: But what was your understanding of how the process
would evolve when the tasking was first issued by
HPSCI?
A: I'm not sure I had a very clear--yeah, staff come up
with some talking points.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\Testimony of David Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
50-51 (Mar. 19, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
The OTA Director accompanied Petraeus to the HPSCI meeting,
and upon returning to her office, drafted an initial set of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
talking points. She testified:
So as I said, the coffee was that morning. I
immediately came back. And knowing the sense of urgency
that the Members had, I took that as my, you know, top
task was to get them talking points because they had
all said they were going to be going out and speaking
to the media and to constituents and they wanted to
know what they could say.
So I put together the talking points. And I wanted them
to be reflective of what the Members, of course, had
just heard. Thinking back on this now, I think part of
this is I definitely had in my mind that the Members
had heard a fuller explanation from the director, but
that this was my attempt to try and say of what they
had heard what could they say in an unclassified
setting.
So I drafted these talking points immediately after
that. And then at 11:15, so it was pretty quickly, then
circulated them to make sure that everyone agreed with
both the content and that they were unclassified.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\OTA Dir. Testimony at 194-95.
The first draft of the talking points contained six bullet
points. Nowhere in any of these six bullet points is a mention
of demonstrations or protests in Benghazi. The OTA Director
acknowledged that these six bullet points were factually
accurate--both at the time they were crafted and today.\180\
The first bullet point was pulled almost verbatim from the
September 13 WIRe, published the day before.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\OTA Dir. Testimony at 197.
\181\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123. The September 13 WIRe said
``We assess the attacks on Tuesday against the US Consulate in Benghazi
began spontaneously following the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo
and evolved into a direct assault against the Consulate and a separate
US facility in the city.'' The first bullet point stated ``We believe
based on currently available information that the attacks in Benghazi
were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo
and evolved into a direct assault against the US Consulate and
subsequently its annex.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bullet points were:
LWe believe based on currently available
information that the attacks in Benghazi were spontaneously
inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved
into a direct assault against the US Consulate and subsequently
its annex. This assessment may change as additional information
is collected and analyzed and currently available information
continues to be evaluated.
LThe crowd almost certainly was a mix of
individuals from across many sectors of Libyan society. That
being said, we do know that Islamic extremists with ties to al-
Qa'ida participated in the attack.
LInitial press reporting linked the attack to
Ansar al-Sharia. The group has since released a statement that
the its [sic] leadership did not order the attacks, but did not
deny that some of its members were involved. Ansar al-Sharia's
facebook page aims to spread sharia in Libya and emphasizes the
need for jihad to counter what it views as false
interpretations of Islam, according to an open source study.
LThe wide availability of weapons and experienced
fighters in Libya almost certainly contributed to the lethality
of the attacks.
LSince April, there have been at least five other
attacks against foreign interests in Benghazi by unidentified
assailants, including the June attack against the British
Ambassador's convoy. We cannot rule out that individuals had
previously surveilled the US facilities, also contributing to
the efficacy of the attacks.
LWe are working with Libyan authorities and
intelligence partners in an effort to help bring to justice
those responsible for the deaths of US citizens.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%
20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016).
The OTA Director sent these six talking points out for
coordination with other offices within the CIA at 11:15
a.m.\183\ A member of the National Clandestine Service--the
operators who work on the ground, as opposed to the analysts
who sit at headquarters--asked: ``Second tick says we know
extremists with ties to AQ participated in the attack, which
implies complicity in the deaths of the American officers. Do
we know this?''\184\ The OTA Director responds and says ``Good
point that it could be interpreted this way--perhaps better
stated that we know they participated in the protests. We do
not know who was responsible for the deaths.''\185\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\See Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near
East Division, et al.] (Sept. 14, 2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA,
REQUEST17-0443 to REQUEST 17-0449) (sending talking points to multiple
offices within the CIA).
\184\Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near
East Division, et al.] (Sept. 14, 2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA,
REQUEST 17-0443 to REQUEST 17-0449) (emphasis original).
\185\Email from Dir., Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel.
Agency, to [National Clandestine Service Officer] (Sept. 14, 2012, 3:19
PM) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 17-0443 to REQUEST 17-0449)
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that no protests had occurred in Benghazi prior to
the attack, this change had the effect of transforming the
second bullet point from being accurate to being inaccurate.
The OTA Director testified:
Q: Sure. So I guess the way I read it is, you're trying
to appease legal, which is always a challenge, by
saying that--you wanted to back off the fact you know
they participated in the attack because you don't want
to interfere and potentially jeopardize the
investigation, showing complicity to the attacks. So
you altered it to we know they participated in protests
at the time you believe they were protests.
A: Correct.
Q: But you didn't know for a fact that they [Islamic
extremists with ties to al-Qa'ida] participated in the
protests. You just knew that they were there.
A: Right.
Q: So the change went from being accurate to being
inaccurate?
A: Correct.
Q: Okay and is that something you did solely on your
own?
A: Yes.\186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\OTA Dir. Testimony at 205-06.
In a subsequent email, the word ``protests'' was changed to
``violent demonstrations'' in that same bullet point.\187\
Those changes made it all the way through to the final version
of the talking points, surviving the extensive deletions made
near the end of this process by Morell.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\See Email from [National Clandestine Service Officer] to [Near
East Division, et al.] (Sept. 14, 2012, 2:52 PM) (on file with the CIA,
REQUEST 17-0443 to REQUEST 17-0449).
\188\See Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%
20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after this change was made, a meeting took place to
discuss the talking points. The CIA's ``Lessons Learned'' after
action review described this meeting:
At some point between 4-5 p.m., a group of officers
from OCA [Office of Congressional Affairs] and OPA
[Office of Public Affairs] met in OPA spaces to discuss
the talking points. Those officers included C [Chief]/
OCA, COS [Chief of Staff]/OCA, D [Director]/OPA, the
Chief of OPA's Media Relations Branch and two OPA
spokespersons. Their efforts, over a period of
approximately 30 minutes, culminated in a revised
version of the talking points that was sent to CIA/COS
and the DDCIA's [Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Agency] office by OPA at 4:42 p.m.
Participants in this group editing session agree that
they did not have a complete picture of intelligence
regarding the events in Benghazi to guide them. Group
members were working under tremendous time pressure.
All agree that they were focused on several important
considerations, including ensuring that the talking
points contained no information that could compromise
sources and methods, and that nothing was said that
could compromise the then-nascent FBI investigation by
prematurely attributing responsibility for the attacks
on any one person or group.
The group had access to an e-mail from NCS [National
Clandestine Service] noting that the original talking
points statement that ``we do know that Islamic
extremists participated in the attack'' implied
complicity in the deaths of American officers. The
original drafter of the talking points agreed that we
did not know who was responsible for the deaths and
suggested that the language be changed to say ``we know
that they participated in the protests.'' While the
editing group did not make this change, ``attacks'' in
the second bullet was changed to ``violent
demonstration,'' effectively accomplishing the same
purpose.
In addition, the word ``attacks'' in the first bullet
of the talking points was changed to
``demonstrations.'' The group also deleted reference in
the second bullet to al-Qa'ida. The reasons underlying
both changes are not clear, and participants in the
editing session have incomplete recollections regarding
the decision. Some have suggested that they believed
the sentence was somewhat awkward and illogical as
written, making reference to ``attacks'' ``evolving
into an assault,'' with ``attacks'' and ``assault''
seeming to be synonyms. In addition to these changes,
the group added two sentences about CIA product
discussing threats, a statement noting that the
investigation was ongoing, and several non-substantive
word changes.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\Letter from Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency,
to Sen. Richard M. Burr, S. Select Comm. on Intel., Lessons Learned
From Formulation of Unclassified Talking Points re the Events in
Benghazi, 11-12 September 2012 [hereinafter Lessons Learned] (Aug. 6,
2013) (on file with the Committee), at 4-5.
The meeting did not include the OTA Director, the drafter
of the original talking points, or any substantive experts on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi. The OTA Director testified:
Q: So how did we go from ``attacks'' in bullet point
one at 3:33 to ``demonstrations'' in bullet point one
at 4:42?
A: At some point in this process this entered into--it
became opaque to me. At some point in this process, as
I----
Q: I'm sorry. Were you comfortable with it occur[ing]
that way given the fact that you were tasked with----
A: I didn't know it was occurring. So when I say it was
opaque to me, I did not know this was happening.
At some point in this process, as I know you have seen
from all this, there is a group from OPA, our Office of
Public Affairs, our Office of Congressional Affairs,
and others, took the talking points and made changes to
them. And I was not consulted on those changes. So I
cannot tell you how some of these changes took place. I
was not involved. I was not consulted beforehand.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\OTA Dir. Testimony at 209-10.
That change in the first bullet point--from ``attacks'' to
``demonstrations''--also survived Morell's extensive edits and
was in the final version of the talking points.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\See Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%
20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last visited May 17, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Around this same time, Morell first learned about the
existence of the talking points. He testified:
So there was a weekly meeting on Syria, followed by our
three-times-a-week meeting on counterterrorism. In
between those two meetings, the director's chief of
staff walked up to me in the director's conference room
and said, here, you need to see these. You need to be
aware of this, you need to get involved in this. I
said, what's this? And he explained the origin of the
talking points and he explained kind of where they were
in the process. I skimmed the talking points, and I
immediately reacted to the warning language [language
indicating that five prior attacks had ococurred in
Benghazi against foreign interests]. . . .
So I say to my EA [Executive Assistant], where is this
in the process? And he said, it's being coordinated. I
say, okay, I will deal with it in the morning.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\Morell Testimony at 124-25.
Morell testified he did not edit the talking points that
evening, nor did he speak with anybody about them.\193\
Instead, Morell edited them by himself the next morning,
Saturday, September 15. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\Id. at 128-29.
So I come in the next morning and my--and the next
morning, by the way, is a deputies meeting at eight.
Family day at CIA--once a year you allow families to
come on the compound, walk around, visit offices, et
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cetera, et cetera--is at nine.
And first thing my EA tells me is that Denis McDonough,
then the deputy National Security Advisor, wants to
talk about--wants to talk about the talking points in
the deputies meeting, and I say, okay. I have a
conversation with General Petraeus about the talking
points, and [Petraeus' Chief of Staff] was there, and I
believe he would--if he were here, he would agree with
what I'm about ready to tell you, that I told Director
Petraeus that the talking points were stuck, that the
State Department was objecting to the warning language,
and I told him that I agreed that the warning language
should be taken out, and the Director didn't say a word
to me. He didn't tell me that he was going to put it
in, he didn't say, keep--keep the warning language in
there, I think it's really important. He didn't say
anything.
We do our family day stuff, which includes literally
hundreds of people coming through my office and shaking
hands with me, and the whole time I'm thinking these
talking points are sitting on my desk, actually my EA's
desk.
So when the family thing is done, I go and edit the
talking points and I literally edit them in 5, 10
minutes and I fly through them. And as you know, I made
a bunch of changes, and the most significant of which
is taking out the warning language. So that's kind of
the--that's kind of the story there.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\Id. at 126-28.
New Information on September 15
When Morell edited the talking points on the morning of
September 15, new information was fresh in his mind regarding
the Benghazi attacks. That morning saw additional information
written about Benghazi. A New York Times article was published
that morning written by Peter Baker. It read in part:
According to a guard at the compound, the attack began
at about 9:30 p.m., without advance warning or any
peaceful protest. ``I started hearing, `God is great!
God is great!''' one guard said. ``I thought to myself,
maybe it is a passing funeral.'' (All the guards spoke
on the condition of anonymity for their safety)
``Attack, attack,'' the guard said as he heard an
American calling over his walkie-talkie as the chants
came closer. Suddenly, there came a barrage of gunfire,
explosions, and rocket-propelled grenades.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\Peter Baker, et al., Diplomats' Bodies Return to U.S., and
Libyan Guards Recount Deadly Riot, N.Y. Times (Sept. 15, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/15/world/middleeast/
ambassadors-body-back-in-us-libya-guards-recount-riot.html?_r=0.
The Chief of Station found this article compelling. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q: They told them attack or they told them fire, so I
mean--I don't know if you knew that at the time, but I
mean, in reading this, it seems like some of the folks
being interviewed here only know things that someone
who was there would know. Did you read this----
A: Oh yeah, I found this compelling.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\Chief of Station Testimony at 218.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell, however, did not. He testified:
Q: Are you familiar with Peter Baker at all?
A: Yes, I believe I have met him.
* * *
Q: Okay. All right. Your assessment of the New York
Times as a media organization?
A: My assessment of The New York Times is that, like
any media organization, it gets a lot of things wrong.
And my assessment of The New York Times is that its
reporting and editorials are fairly biased, in my
view.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\Morell Testimony at 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell then said:
Q: So the same paragraph we were talking about on page
two, here is the New York Times citing one guard from
the consulate. I mean, how would you assess that in
terms of credibility from what the guard said reported
in The New York Times article?
A: How would I assess it?
Q: How would you assess it?
A: Michael Morell?
Q: Yes.
A: I wouldn't give it great credibility.
Q: Okay.
A: Right? I mean, it's a data point. It's a data point.
It's one guard. You don't know who it is. You don't
know the conditions under which he was talking. I mean,
it's a data point. I wouldn't discount it totally, but
I wouldn't say this is absolute fact.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\Id. at 109.
The CIA analysts published another WIRe that morning,
September 15, with a new assessment.\199\ This piece, co-
written with the National Counterterrorism Center, had two main
focuses: the extremists who participated in the Benghazi
attacks, and Libyan authorities placing a high priority on
tracking down the perpetrators of the attack.\200\ Similar to
the September 13 WIRe two days earlier, the notion of a protest
and the discussion of a video were not central--or even minor--
focuses of the piece.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Variety of Extremists Participated
in Benghazi Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 15, 2012 (on file
with CIA, REQUEST 17-0262 to REQUEST 17-0265).
\200\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first paragraph of the September 15 WIRe contains the
sentence ``The level of planning and exact sequence of events
leading to the attack remain intelligence gaps.''\201\ This
indicates the analysts did not know definitively what had
transpired prior to the attacks--perhaps whether or not
protests in Benghazi had occurred, or the motivation or level
of planning for the attacks--and signaled to the reader that
information still needed to be gleaned about these events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell also reviewed an email from the Chief of Station on
the morning of September 15. That email stated in part:
INTEL: Station notes the following information from the
past 24hrs, which strengthen Station's assessment that
the attacks were not/not spontaneous and not/not an
escalation of protests. Press reports noted that at the
time of the attack, circa 2130 local, guards posted at
the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi and Libyans residing in
the vicinity reported the absence of protests at the
consulate and specific that the attack began without
warning. A CIA officer on the scene noted that at
approximately 2200 [10:00 p.m.], there was no sign of a
protest at the Consulate. Libya General National
Congress (GNC) President Magaryaf stated in an
interview that the attacks were planned in advance by
experienced individuals, most likely al-Qa'ida (AQ) and
not former regime elements (FRE).\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\Email from Tripoli Chief of Station, Cent. Intel. Agency, to
[Morell Assistant] (Sept. 15, 2012) (on file with the CIA, REQUEST 15-
0011 to REQUEST 15-0022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell testified about receiving this email:
I go through it, I read this, right, and the line in
there about, we don't think this was a protest, right,
jumps out at me. Why did it jump out at me? Because the
analysts believed there was a protest. So here I have
my analysts saying there was a protest, and I've got my
Chief of Station, a guy I've got a lot of confidence
in, right, telling me there was no protest.
The other thing that jumped out at me were that the
reasons he gave . . . why he thinks there was no
protest, the first is that there were press reports
saying no protest, but what goes through my mind,
right, is, look, I know that there's press reports that
say there were protests. Okay? . . .
And then the next reason he gives is that a CIA officer
on the scene noted that at approximately 2200, there
was no sign of a protest at the consulate. And what
goes through my mind then is, well, you know what,
that's--2200 is 20 minutes after the attack started,
right? Maybe everybody dispersed by then. What I react
to now is that they didn't get there at 2200. They got
to the corner, they got to the corner of the street
that the TMF [Benghazi Mission compound] was on at
about 10 minutes after 10:00. They didn't even--they
didn't get to the TM--to the front of the TMF itself
until 2240, an hour after the attack started. So not
compelling at all, right?\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\Morell Testimony at 146-47.
Morell also compared the language in this email from the
Chief of Station to the language in the email the Chief of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Station sent the day before.
Q: So [the September 15 email] is stronger than the
assessment given by the Chief of Station a day earlier?
A: I certainly remember it that way.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\Id. at 150.
Morell likely reviewed another piece of intelligence the
morning of September 15 titled ``Observations from the 11-12
September, 2012 Attacks Against the U.S. Consulate and a
Separate Facility in Benghazi, Libya.''\205\ Morell received
this piece of intelligence in an email at 8:50 a.m. and
testified that he ``almost certainly would not have not read an
email from the chief of staff [of the CIA].''\206\ This email
also noted there were ``no signs of a protest'' at 10:00 p.m.
in Benghazi--less than 20 minutes after the attacks began--
according to a CIA officer at the scene.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\Email from Chief of Staff to Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, to
Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Sept. 15, 2012)
[hereinafter Dir. COS Email] (on file with the CIA, (REQUEST 1-002167).
\206\Morell Testimony at 144.
\207\Dir. COS Email, supra note 205.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was with this information fresh in his mind--the two
September 15 emails and the September 15 WIRe--along with the
September 13 WIRe and the September 14 email from the Chief of
Station, that Morell edited the talking points. At the time he
edited the talking points, he had seen at least two reports
from the Chief of Station--and possibly more--indicating, in
increasingly forceful language, that no protests had taken
place. The analysts had not seen these emails. Morell therefore
was the only person who had both the analytic assessments about
Benghazi in addition to multiple emails from the Chief of
Station--somebody Morell had worked closely with during the
Arab Spring and recognized as an ``outstanding intelligence
officer.''\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\Morell Testimony at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was incumbent on Morell to take all of this information
at his disposal into account when he edited the talking points.
Morell, a former intelligence analyst who rose through the
ranks analyzing disparate information and formulating
assessments, disagreed. He testified:
A: It's not my job, it's not my job to be the analyst,
right? It's not my job to take all this information and
come to an analytic conclusion. That's the job of the
analysts. So when I--look, and had I done that, had I
played analyst, right, and started editing the talking
points and started changing them to reflect what the
COS said, the analysts would have protested, because
they--at that moment, they still believed that there
had been a protest. So for me to take it out because
the COS said there wasn't one would have gotten a
reaction from the analysts. They would have seen me as
politicizing analysis, all right?
Q: How would that have politicized the analysis, the
fact that you're----
A: They would have seen it that way.
Q: But you're taking judgments from somebody that you
had worked with very closely, somebody that you had
deemed an exemplary intelligence officer.
A: Look, managers at CIA don't do analysis. When they
are perceived to be doing the analysis, the analysts go
nuts, right? Bob Gates was accused of that, other
senior officials at CIA have been accused of that.
Analysts go nuts when they think that managers are
doing the analysis themselves, particularly when they
disagree with the analysis. So the last thing I was
going to do was change the analysts' analysis,
right?\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\Id. at 152-53.
Morell was not, however, creating an analytic assessment.
Morell was editing talking points that would be used for public
consumption. The process--and the product--is an inherently
different one from internal CIA processes for formulating
assessments. The analysts were not involved in the talking
points process--only managers were.\210\ The analysts did not
have the same emails Morell did from the Chief of Station--only
Morell had those.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\See, e.g., email from Dir., Office of Terrorism Analysis,
Cent. Intel. Agency, to [NE Division] (Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with
the CIA, REQUEST 17-0443 to 17-0444).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Talking points--something the CIA rarely produces--are
different from analytic assessments, which the CIA produces
every day. Petraeus acknowledged this when he testified:
I mean, that was where finally once it--this was not--
certainly no longer a CIA document. It wasn't even an
intelligence community document, although that rightly
should have been, and that's why it went to the IC
referral process, but then, of course, you know, it's
going to be interagency and not everyone has got a hand
in this.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\Testimony of David Petraeus, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. at
62 (Jan. 6, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
The talking points were understood to be viewed as
representative of an authoritative analytical assessment. As
shown, however, this was not the case--no analysts worked on
these talking points, as they were created and edited only by
senior CIA managers and other senior officials in the
administration. The distinction was never manifested on the
document or otherwise made known to those relying on, or making
representations based on, the talking points.
No process was in place to create the talking points, and
no analysis was required to create them. The only expectation
was to produce accurate information to Congress for them to
share with the American people. That being the case, Morell--
the only person with the complete universe of information at
his disposal--could have edited the talking points to reflect
the most up-to-date information--or at the very least to caveat
the talking points with a reflection that different views
existed. Morell did neither of these things.
Panetta--whom Morell worked for when Panetta was Director
of the CIA--understands this concept well. He told the
Committee:
The last lesson I would tell you is don't use talking
points that don't include language that makes very
clear that the matter is under investigation and that
these results are only preliminary. As former chief of
staff, I've seen talking points, and I can understand
how trouble can result as a result of that. I used to
review those before anybody got a hold of them to make
sure that they reflected what we wanted to inform the
American people about, because the last thing you want
to do is to mislead the American people.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\Testimony of Leon Panetta, Sec'y of Defense, U.S. Dep't of
Defense, Tr. at 107 (Jan. 8, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SUNDAY TALK SHOWS
Perhaps as much as any other subject surrounding Benghazi,
the appearance by Ambassador Rice on five Sunday morning talk
shows following the attacks has been the most politically
charged. After all, it was the fallout from her appearances
that ultimately caused her to withdraw her name as a
candidate--perhaps the leading candidate--to be the next
Secretary of State.\213\ Yet little is known about why she was
selected by the administration to represent the United States
government on the shows, what she did to prepare for those talk
shows, what materials she reviewed, who she spoke with to learn
information about the attacks, and most significantly why she
said what she said.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\Karen DeYoung & Anne Gearan, Susan Rice withdraws as candidate
for secretary of state, Wash. Post (Dec. 13, 2012), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/susan-rice-withdraws-as-
candidate-for-secretary-of-state/2012/12/13/17ad344e-4567-11e2-8e70-
e1993528222d_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was not until two days before the shows, on Friday,
September 14, when Rice learned she would be appearing on
behalf of the administration.\214\ She was the administration's
third choice to appear on the shows--the first being the
Secretary of State and the second being Tom Donilon, National
Security Advisor to the President.\215\ Rhodes was the White
House official responsible for reaching out to Rice and asking
her to appear. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\Testimony of Susan E. Rice, former U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., Tr. at 30 (Feb. 2, 2016) [hereinafter Rice Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
\215\See Rhodes Testimony at 65-66 (stating Sec'y Clinton and Tom
Donilon were first and second choices to appear).
A: I recall reaching out to Secretary Clinton first.
* * *
Q: Did you get an affirmative ``no'' or did you just
not hear back?
A: I don't remember hearing back.
Q: Did you call again and redouble your ask or did you
move on to your second draft choice?
A: I believe I moved on because I knew that she, again,
does not regularly appear on Sunday shows. So I don't
remember thinking that it was likely that she would
want to appear.
Q: And who else would you have asked after Secretary
Clinton?
A: I remember asking Tom Donilon, the National Security
Advisor.
Q: And what was his response?
A: He did not want to appear. And he too very rarely
appeared on the Sunday shows.
Q: All right. Who was number three?
A: I believe it was Susan Rice, is my
recollection.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\Rhodes Testimony at 65-66.
Although Rhodes testified the Secretary ``does not
regularly appear on Sunday shows,'' she had in fact appeared on
multiple shows on two separate occasions within a seven month
period to discuss Libya. On March 27, 2011--barely a week after
the United States supported the UN in imposing a no fly zone
over Libya and authorizing all means necessary to protect
civilians--the Secretary appeared on Meet the Press, Face the
Nation, and This Week, to talk about the U.S. intervention in
Libya, which was being promoted as a civilian protection and
humanitarian mission.\217\ Seven months later--in the immediate
wake of Qadhafi's death--she appeared on Meet the Press, This
Week, State of the Union, and FoxNews Sunday to talk about
Qadhafi's death and the path forward in Libya.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\Meet the Press transcript for March 27, 2011, NBC News (Mar.
27, 2011), http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/42275424/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/meet-press-
transcript-march/#.VzoK0_
krJaQ; Face the Nation March 27, 2011 Transcript, CBS News (Mar. 27,
2011), http://www.
cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/FTN_032711.pdf;`This Week' Transcript: Hillary
Clinton, Robert Gates and Donald Rumsfeld, ABC News (Mar. 27, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-
transcript-hillary-clinton-robert-gates-donald-rumsfeld/
story?id=13232096.
\218\Meet the Press transcript for October 23, 2011, NBC (Oct. 23,
2011), http://www.
nbcnews.com/id/45000791/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/meet-press-
transcript-october/#.V1cU1
9UrJaQ., Clinton Warns Iran: U.S. Committed to Iraq, ABC's This Week
(Oct. 23, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/interview-
hillary-clinton-14796369; State of the Union with Candy Crowley, CNN
(Oct. 23, 2011), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1110/23/
sotu.01.html., and Clinton Talks Iraq, Libya; Sen. Graham Challenges
GOP Candidates; Bachmann Focused on Iowa, FOX News Sunday (Oct. 23,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/on-
air/fox-news-sunday-chris-wallace/2011/10/23/clinton-talks-iraq-libya-
sen-graham-challenges-gop-candidates-bachmann-focused-iowa#p//v/
1234077958001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mills testified the decision not to appear on the Sunday
shows was the Secretary's:
Q: Since the Secretary didn't appear, who made the
decision that she wasn't going to appear?
A: Well, she would always decide what she would do, if
she was going to go on a show or not go on a show.
Q: Okay. Were there recommendations that she took from
you and others, such as Philippe Reines, Jake Sullivan,
others?
A: No. Candidly, the Secretary was so focused on what
had happened to our team and what was happening in the
region that I don't know that there was a moment's
thought about it. She didn't often go on the shows. And
she was, understandably, very concerned about how we
support our teams and the losses that we had
incurred.\219\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\Testimony of Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the U.S. Sec'y
of State, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 123 (Sept. 3, 2015) [hereinafter
Mills Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
When Rhodes learned the Secretary would not represent the
administration on the talk shows, he then asked Donilon to
appear.\220\ He also declined.\221\ Rice--Rhodes' third choice
for the task--accepted.\222\ In doing so, the administration
selected someone to talk to the American people about the
Benghazi attacks who was neither involved in the security of
any U.S. facilities in Benghazi nor involved in any way with
the operational response to the attacks. In fact, the
administration selected an individual who did not even know
there was a CIA presence in Benghazi, let alone the fact that
two Americans had died there.\223\ She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\Rhodes Testimony at 66.
\221\Id.
\222\Id.
\223\Rice Testimony at 107-08.
Q: Did you learn between September 11 and September 16
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that were was a CIA presence in Benghazi?
A: I think--no. I think I learned subsequently.
* * *
Q: So nobody told you between the dates of September 11
and September 16 that two of the four Americans who
were killed who were providing security actually worked
for the CIA and not the State Department?
A: Not that I recall.
Q: All right.
Q: And you learned that subsequently?
A: To the best of my recollection, I learned it
subsequently.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\224\Id.
In selecting Rice to appear on the Sunday talk shows,
Rhodes chose an individual with limited knowledge of, and
presumably limited participation in, the administration's
reponse to the Benghazi attacks. Instead, while the attacks
were happening, Rice was receiving--apparently in response to
an email chain about the attack on the Benghazi Mission
compound--a detailed update from staff about the number of
retweets her Twitter account had generated.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\See Email to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 7:43 P.M.) (on file with the Committee, C05561948)
(``Today, you tweeted 7 times on the anniversary of the September 11
attacks, generating more than 600 retweets. By this measure, your
twitter account had a big day--your second or third biggest since the
start of the summer--and your volunteering pics got a few nice
responses . . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How Rice Prepped for the Shows
On Friday, September 14, 2012, the Secretary's calendar
included a meeting with Rice.\226\ Both Rice and Mills
testified they believed that meeting took place, even though
neither had a specific recollection of it.\227\ That Friday
meeting was a standing meeting between the Secretary and Rice
that would take place when Rice was in Washington.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\Email from Special Ass't to the Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State (Sept. 14, 2012, 7:29 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0045306-SCB0045307).
\227\Rice Testimony at 28; Mills Testimony at 138.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite having no specific recollection of the meeting,
Rice is confident she did not discuss the Sunday shows with the
Secretary at the meeting.\228\ This is because Rice first
learned of her possible appearance on the Sunday shows in the
early afternoon of September 14, after the scheduled meeting.
She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\Rice Testimony at 28.
I received a phone call as I was in my car on my way to
Andrews for the ceremony receiving our fallen
colleagues. And in that phone call from Ben [Rhodes], I
was asked whether it would be possible, if Secretary
Clinton were unable to appear on the shows, if I could
appear on the shows. It was a contingency question at
the time. And I said that, you know, I had other plans
for the weekend and that it would not be my preference
but if they needed me and there was not an alternative
that I would be willing to do it.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\Rice Testimony at 26.
Both the Secretary and Rice attended the return of remains
ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base that afternoon, and later
that day, Friday September 14, Rhodes called Rice back to
inform her she needed to do the Sunday shows.\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Rice did not begin preparing for the shows until
the following day, Saturday September 15. Her staff, led by
Erin Pelton, Communications Director and Spokesperson, prepared
a book of briefing materials for Rice.\231\ Rice testified she
began reviewing these briefing materials on Saturday:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\Testimony of Erin Pelton, Dir. of Commc'cs and Spokesperson,
U.S. Mission to the U.N., Tr. at 44 (Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Pelton
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Q: So let's go forward to--did you do anything after
speaking to Mr. Rhodes on Friday night to begin
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
preparing?
A: No.
Q: What did you do the next morning to begin preparing?
A: I reviewed briefing materials.
Q: What briefing materials? Would that just be the same
daily briefing materials that you received in the
ordinary course, or was this different material?
A: It was both. I received my daily intelligence
briefing on Saturday morning, and I also began
reviewing a briefing book that had been prepared by my
staff for--in preparation for the Sunday shows.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\Rice Testimony at 31.
These briefing materials contained little to no information
about the Benghazi attacks. Pelton testified that in gathering
briefing materials for the Sunday shows she explicitly did not
focus on Benghazi, anticipating materials pertaining to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi would come at a later time. She said:
Q: In your list of areas where you were attempting to
collect the latest information, you left Benghazi out.
Was that intentional, or were you just giving me some
examples?
A: I don't recall preparing information about Benghazi.
What I do recall is understanding that we would have
access to talking points that would be provided by the
intelligence community that were unclassified and
consistent with our latest understanding of what had
transpired in Benghazi.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\Pelton Testimony at 45.
Pelton also testified she believed she would be receiving
talking points regarding Benghazi that would not require her to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
seek out briefing materials about Benghazi on her own:
Well, I recall that in the process of preparing
Ambassador Rice between Friday and Saturday, September
14th and 15th, that I was not focused on Benghazi
because I was going to receive talking points that were
appropriate for public use by the intelligence
community. I don't remember how I came to know that I
was going to get those materials.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\Id.
While Pelton did not include any information specific to
Benghazi in the briefing book, Rice recalled other material
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that was in the briefing book. She testified:
Q: As best you can, do you recall what was in that
briefing book that your staff provided?
A: I recall it included statements that other senior
administration officials had made, including the
President and the Secretary. I recall it including
background Q&A and top-line themes covering the wide
range of issues that we anticipated would come up on
the shows: the protests that occurred all around the
world that week; obviously, also what happened in
Benghazi.
And, also, because it was one week before the opening
of the U.N. General Assembly in New York and Iran was
expected to be a prominent issue, and Prime Minister
Netanyahu's visit also a prominent issue, I recall
preparing for that discussion as well.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\Rice Testimony at 33.
The ``background Q&A'' and ``top line themes'' came from
Rhodes.\236\ Pelton testified about how this information came
about:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\Rhodes Memo, supra note 3.
A: I don't recall all the specifics of our conversation
[with Ben Rhodes]. However, I do recall at one point
asking him to provide, for lack of a better term, a
memo regarding the objectives of the Sunday show
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
appearances.
Q: How did he respond to you?
A: He said he would write it.
Q: And did he eventually deliver that to you?
A: Yes.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\Pelton Testimony at 42.
Rhodes delivered this memo at 8:09 p.m. on the evening of
September 14 in an email with the subject ``RE: PREP CALL with
Susan: Saturday at 4:00 pm ET.''\238\ The memo contained four
bullet points under ``Goals,'' six bullet points under ``Top-
lines,'' and contained five questions and suggested answers
regarding the Arab Spring, protests, and Benghazi, and an
additional four questions and suggested answers regarding
Israel and Iran.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\Rhodes Memo, supra note 3.
\239\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The four bullet points under the ``Goals'' section of the
memo were the following:
To convey that the United States is doing everything
that we can to protect our people and facilities
abroad;
To underscore that these protests are rooted in an
Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy;
To show that we will be resolute in bringing people who
harm Americans to justice, and standing steadfast
through these protests;
To reinforce the President and Administration's
strength and steadiness in dealing with difficult
challenges.\240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\Id.
The second point was one of the most explicit directions
from a senior administration official about the intent of the
adminstration's communications strategy. The Chairman had the
following exchange with Rhodes about these bullet points during
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhodes' testimony to the Committee:
Q: How about number two? They are not numbered, but
let's just go second bullet, okay? ``To underscore that
these protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not
a broader failure of policy.'' What policy were you
worried about being considered a failure?
A: My recollection over the course of that week is that
we were getting questions about whether this
represented a failure of our policy in the Middle East
and in response to the Arab Spring.
Q: And you wanted to underscore the point that it
wasn't any of that, it was just a video.
A: We were anticipating getting those questions, and we
wanted to convey that, again, the protests were rooted
in this video.
Q: Were there other options other than just those two,
a wholesale failure of the administration's policy or
an Internet video? Was there something else? Those are
your only two options?
A: Again, my recollection is that this reflects the way
in which we were getting questions over the course of
the week is it's a failure of policy. And we were at
the same time seeking to deal with the ongoing fallout
from the video. So those were the factors in play.
Q: I'm with you on wanting to explain to folks that it
wasn't a failure of policy. You essentially gave
yourself two choices: an Internet video or a broader
failure of policy. And my question is, were those your
only two options?
A: Again, that's what I recall being the subject of
discussion over the course of that week in terms of the
questions we were being asked.
Q: Well, with respect to Benghazi, it certainly would
have--it's possible that it was not just those two
options, right?
A: I'm not sure I understand the question.
Q: With respect to what happened in Benghazi, you're
not limiting us to just those two options, right, a
failure of policy or an Internet video?
A: Again, I believe in this specific bullet I'm
referring to the ongoing protests that are taking place
across the Middle East which were very much still going
forward on that Friday.
Q: Right. But you agree--you knew Benghazi was going to
come up when Ambassador Rice was going on the five
Sunday talk shows?
A: Yes.
Q: We haven't had an ambassador killed since when?
A: It had been a long time. I don't remember
specifically.
Q: So you knew that that was coming up?
A: I knew that was going to be one of the topics.
Q: Right. And your third bullet, which isn't numbered,
but it's number three, ``To show that we will be
resolute in bringing people who harm Americans to
justice.'' Can you think of a country where Americans
were harmed other than Libya that she might have been
asked about?
A: That would principally, I believe, refer to Libya.
Q: Okay. So you concede that the third item does apply
to Libya. Let's go back to the second one. How about
the second one? Are we to have drawn a contrast between
the second bullet and the third bullet, or are they all
interrelated?
A: Again, my recollection is she is going on to talk
about several different issues: the attacks in
Benghazi, the ongoing protests that were taking place
across the Middle East, and issues related to Iran and
Israel. And so these points refer to different elements
of the topic.
Q: Well, at the time, what did you think was the
impetus for the attack in Benghazi?
A: I did not have a judgment of my own at the time. I
was going to rely on the information provided by the
intelligence community.
Q: Did the intelligence community mention an Internet
video to you?
A: The intelligence community at this point had
suggested that it was an event that was motivated in
part by the protests in Cairo.
Q: That was a great answer to a question I didn't ask.
Did they mention the video?
A: No, what I'm saying is, my recollection is they at
that point had said that insofar as there was any
connection it was more to the events in Cairo being a
motivating factor for individuals.
Q: Right. So you are preparing the Ambassador to go on
five Sunday talk shows to talk about what you know is
going to involve Benghazi and you don't want her to be
stuck with the option of a failure of your policy. So
you give the option of the Internet video. And my
question is, who in the intelligence community told you
that the attacks in Benghazi were linked to the video?
A: Again, I prepared these points on a Friday in which
there were violent protests across the Middle East
because of the video, a violent breach of our facility
in Tunis, a violent breach of our facility at Khartoum,
violence against an American restaurant in Lebanon, at
the very least. So I very much was focused on the fact
that there were ongoing protests, and one of the
subjects that she was going to be asked about were
those protests. So insofar as I'm referring to protests
in the video, I'm referring to the many protests that
were continuing to take place over the course of that
week in response to the video.
Q: So is it your testimony that the second bullet and
the third bullet are totally unrelated?
A: They're referring to different elements of what
she's going to have to talk about on the Sunday shows.
Q: So bullet number two was not about Libya or Benghazi
at all.
A: It was not intended to assign responsibility for
Benghazi.
Q: But yet you jump in the very next bullet to those
who harm Americans. Can you see how someone reading
that memo might be vexed?
A: Well, again, these are several statements of
principle up top that I think speak to, again, all--in
different parts of the issues that she is going to have
to address. And then you can see in the actual contents
how we intended to respond to those individual
questions and instances.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\Rhodes Testimony at 75-80.
The fact Rhodes concedes the third bullet point references
Libya is important. The bullet point immediately prior
references the video, allowing for easy connection and
conflation of the video and the Benghazi attacks.\242\ This
occurred in public statements by the administration prior to
Rhodes' memo, and, having seen this memo, Rice appeared to
again connect the video and Benghazi the next day when she
appeared on the talk shows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\Rhodes Memo, supra note 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While this connection between the two events may have
favored a particular narrative, even Rhodes admitted that he
was not aware of any intelligence that existed to directly link
the video to the attacks. He testified:
A: And, again, my recollection of any connection to the
video was indirect through the fact that the protests
in Cairo may have been a motivating factor for the
events in Benghazi.
Q: Okay. So just to be clear, so there was no direct
connection made between the video and the attacks in
Benghazi from the intelligence community that you're
aware of at that time?
A: That's my recollection. I recall that there were
public reports of protests that were--that would have
been included in, you know, the information we were
receiving.
Q: But you certainly weren't relying on those public
reports, were you?
A: We were relying on the intelligence community's
assessment, and the intelligence community's assessment
was that these were events that were motivated in part
by the protests in Cairo.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\Rhodes Testimony at 106-07.
At 4:00 p.m. on Saturday September 15, 2012, a conference
call was convened with Rice to discuss her appearance on the
Sunday shows the following morning.\244\ Rice participated in
this conference call from Columbus, Ohio, where she was
spending the day.\245\ Rexon Ryu, Deputy to the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, State Department,
testified there were no State Department people on the call:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\Rhodes Memo, supra note 3.
\245\Rice Testimony at 38.
Q: Okay. Do you recall--so you said Ben Rhodes. Were
there any individuals, other than the USUN individual,
were there any other people from the State Department
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that participated in that call?
A: There were no State Department people.
Q: Do you recall if there were additional individuals
from the White House that participated?
A: Yes, there were.\246\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\Testimony of Rexon Y. Ryu, Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to
the U.N., Tr. at 83 (Aug. 25, 2015) (on file with the Committee)
[hereinafter Ryu Testimony].
Rice testified David Plouffe, Senior Advisor to the
President, was on the call.\247\ Plouffe had previously served
as the campaign manager for the President's 2008 presidential
campaign.\248\ While Rhodes testified Plouffe would
``normally'' appear on the Sunday show prep calls,\249\ Rice
testified she did not recall him being on prior calls and did
not understand why he was on the call in this instance.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\Rice Testimony at 39.
\248\Wash. Speakers Bureau, https://www.washingtonspeakers.com/
speakers/biography.cfm?
SpeakerID=6495.
\249\Rhodes Testimony at 111.
\250\Rice Testimony at 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No witness interviewed by the Committee was able to
specifically identify State Department individuals on the call
aside from Rice's staff.\251\ In addition, nobody from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], Department of Defense,
or Central Intelligence Agency participated in the call, which
apparently consisted of just a small circle of Rice's advisors
and communications staffers from the White House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\See, e.g. Ryu Testimony at 73-74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time of her appearance on the talk shows, it had
been announced the FBI would take the lead on the investigation
into finding out what had occurred.\252\ The Department of
Defense, along with White House operators, had been involved in
sending troops towards Libya while the attacks were ongoing,
and analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency had taken the
lead on post-attack analysis of intelligence. The State
Department had its compound in Benghazi attacked and, as such,
it was the principal source of information from eyewitnesses to
the attack. The fact that no individuals from either the
Defense Department or White House operators participated in the
Saturday prep call therefore limited the information pertaining
to Benghazi provided to Rice. Moreover, it does not appear Rice
sought out any information about the attacks or worked to
ensure that she had a full understanding of the events outside
of the talking points she was provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\U.S. launching apparent terrorist hunt in Libya, CBS News
(Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-launching-apparent-
terrorist-hunt-in-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, multiple witnesses testified Benghazi was
barely mentioned on the prep call. This inattention is
consistent with the lack of information pertaining to Benghazi
in the briefing materials. Instead, Rhodes commented on the
call that the CIA was preparing unclassified talking points
pertaining to Benghazi, with the understanding that the talking
points would be shared with Rice when they were completed.\253\
Rice testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\Rice Testimony at 39-40; Rhodes Testimony at 76-78.
A: I don't recall us talking about the CIA talking
points. I recall being reminded that they were
forthcoming and that we would be relying on them
because they had been prepared for Members of Congress
and they were our best distillation of what we knew at
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the time.
Q: Okay. Who told you that?
A: I'm not certain, but I believe it was Ben. And so we
didn't talk about Benghazi, in fact, on the phone call,
as I remember. We just said that those were the points.
Q: Let's go into that a little bit more. If I
understood you correctly, you said during this prep
call for the Sunday talk shows you did not talk about
the attacks in Benghazi at all. Is that correct?
A: In any depth. I don't have any recollection of
talking about them in any depth.\254\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\Rice Testimony at 42.
Rice also testified it was her understanding these talking
points would be vetted and cleared by the CIA--in other words,
manifesting the subtext the talking points represented an
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
authoritative product.
A: As I said, to the best of my recollection, it was
Mr. Rhodes on the phone.
Q: And to the best of your recollection, what did he--
how did he characterize the CIA talking points?
A: As being carefully vetted and cleared, drafted by
the CIA, and provided--produced for the purpose of
being provided to Members of Congress and, thus, what
we would also utilize.
Q: So, as far as you were concerned or as far as you
understood, the CIA talking points represented the best
information about the attacks in Benghazi at the time.
A: Yes. That's how I--that's what I understood them to
be, and that's, in fact, what I knew them to be,
because they mirrored very precisely the intelligence
that I had also received.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\255\Rice Testimony at 45-46.
No CIA witness the Committee interviewed had any knowledge
the HPSCI talking points were going to be shared with Rice to
be used on the Sunday talk shows.
As discussed above, Rice, the individual selected by the
White House to represent the administration on the Sunday talk
shows following the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens--the
first U.S. Ambassador to be killed in the field since 1979--
Sean Smith, Glen Doherty, and Tyrone Woods, was not a central
figure in the creation or management of the Benghazi compound,
or in the government's response to the attacks. She was unaware
at the time the CIA had a presence there and essentially relied
on just three bullet points of material--that none of the
authors of the bullet points knew would be provided to her--to
discuss the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk shows.
Rice took umbrage when she was confronted with the
suggestion that her role was to simply parrot the talking
points provided to her, testifying:
A: Sir, as I said earlier, I did not have any knowledge
of how these talking points were edited.
* * *
Q: I understand. So you were just the spokesman. You
had been given something, and they told you: Go on out
there and do your duty and repeat what you were
provided.
A: No sir. I was also a member of the President's
Cabinet and the National Security Council. I was a
recipient of the most refined intelligence products.
And I satisfied myself that what I had been asked to
say in the unclassified points were consistent with
what I had received in intelligence channels.
Otherwise, I wouldn't have said it.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\Rice Testimony at 157.
While Rice is mostly correct in noting the unclassified
talking points were consistent with what she had received
through intelligence channels, there was one major difference,
as discussed above. What Rice received through intelligence
channels said ``The currently available information suggests
that the attacks in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by
protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct
assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi and
subsequently its annex.''\257\ Yet the unclassified talking
points said ``The currently available information suggests that
the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by
protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct
assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi and
subsequently its annex.''\258\ That change--from ``attacks'' to
``demonstrations''--significantly altered the meaning of the
entire sentence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123 (emphasis added).
\258\Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (emphasis
added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In her interview before the Committee, Rice maintained the
claim that the talking points were similar to the analysis. In
fact she had reviewed the two documents side by side ``very
recently.''\259\ She testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\Rice Testimony at 50.
Q: And do you know how closely those products mirrored
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that bullet point?
A: Virtually identical but not verbatim.
Q: Okay. And do you know, if it was not verbatim, what
the differences were between what you read----
A: I can't tell you precisely, but if you--I do recall
looking at them side-by-side and being comfortable that
they were--well, at the time, I didn't look at them
side-by-side, but I knew from having seen intelligence
as early as that previous morning, Saturday morning,
that this was very consistent with our latest
information.
Q: And you have since looked at them side-by-side?
A: Yes.
Q: And you're still comfortable that what was in the
intelligence is virtually identical to what's in that
bullet point?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you recall how recently you looked at them
side-by-side?
A: Very recently.
* * *
Q: Sure. My question is you said that you looked at
them recently side-by-side, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you were comfortable that what was in the
finished intelligence is reflected here in this bullet
point.
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And did you recognize any differences between,
looking at them side-by-side, what you saw in the
intelligence versus what's in the bullet point?
A: Okay. So let me be precise. What's in this bullet
point closely mirrored a similar paragraph in the
finished intelligence product that I received at the
same time. I'm not saying this is the sum total of what
I saw.
Q: Sure. And you say it closely resembled or closely
mirrored. My question is, what are the differences
between what you reviewed and what's in here?
A: I don't recall any substantive differences.
Q: And you looked at this recently?
A: Yes.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\Id. at 49-51.
Despite the precision by Rice and the fact she had compared
the documents side by side very recently, ``attacks'' and
``demonstrations'' are fundamentally different words with
fundamentally different meanings. The specific language Rice
received through intelligence channels relating to the attacks
here was accurate, and what she read from the talking points
based on demonstrations was not. The fact she testified she did
not recall any substantive differences does not mean no
substantive differences existed.
What Rice Said on the Shows
Despite Rice's limited knowledge about the Benghazi attacks
when she appeared on the Sunday talk shows, some of her
comments were conclusory, some were based neither in evidence
nor fact, and some went well beyond what even the flawed
talking points indicated. Two months after she appeared on the
talk shows, she stated publicly:
When discussing the attacks against our facilities in
Benghazi, I relied solely and squarely on the
information provided to me by the intelligence
community. I made clear that the information was
preliminary and that our investigations would give us
the definitive answers. Everyone, particularly the
intelligence community, has worked in good faith to
provide the best assessment based on the information
available. You know the FBI and the State Department's
Accountability Review Board are conducting
investigations as we speak, and they will look into all
aspects of this heinous terrorist attack to provide
what will become the definitive accounting of what
occurred.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims Were Based
On Information From Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/165686269/susan-rice-says-
benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence.
A close examination of what Rice actually did say on each
of the Sunday morning shows, however, along with the
Committee's interview with her, demonstrates she in fact went
well beyond ``solely and squarely'' relying on the information
provided to her by the intelligence community.\262\ In
addition, several aspects of her Benghazi remarks--conflating
the video with the attack, the status of the FBI investigation,
the number of attackers, and the amount of security present at
the State Department compound, to name a few--drifted even
farther from the information provided to her by the
intelligence community. An analysis of some of Rice's comments
is below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\Id. (``When discussing the attacks against our facilities in
Benghazi, I relied solely and squarely on the information provided to
me by the intelligence community.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FACE THE NATION
Face the Nation was unlike the other four shows in that
Libyan President Mohamed el-Magariaf appeared on the show
immediately prior to Rice. During his interview with Bob
Schieffer, Face the Nation host, el-Magariaf, who hailed from
Benghazi, attended university there, and had deep ties to the
city, said there was ``no doubt'' the attacks were preplanned.
El-Magariaf said of the attack:
Q: Was this a long-planned attack, as far as you know?
Or what--what do you know about that?
A: The way these perpetrators acted and moved, I think
we--and they're choosing the specific date for this so-
called demonstration, I think we have no--this leaves
us with no doubt that this was preplanned, determined--
predetermined.
Q: And you believe that this was the work of al-Qaeda
and you believe that it was led by foreigners. Is
that--is that what you are telling us?
A: It was planned--definitely, it was planned by
foreigners, by people who--who entered the country a
few months ago, and they were planning this criminal
act since their--since their arrival.
Schieffer also asked President el-Magariaf about the FBI
traveling to Benghazi to investigate the attacks:
Q: Will it be safe for the FBI investigators from the
United States to come in, are you advising them to stay
away for a while?
A: Maybe it is better for them to stay for a--for a
little while? For a little while, but until we--we--
we--we do what we--we have to do ourselves. But, again,
we'll be in need for--for their presence to help in
further investigation. And, I mean any hasty action
will--I think is not welcomed.
Rice appeared immediately after President el-Magariaf on
the show. She testified to the Committee she heard el-Magariaf
say the attacks were preplanned, and even though his comments
did not align with the talking points she was given, she was
unconcerned. She testified:
Q: My question was, how did you react to that?
A: I was surprised.
Q: And what did you do? Were you concerned that he may
have known something that you did not know?
A: I didn't know what he knew. I knew what we knew and
what the intelligence community's current best
assessment was. And so it was my responsibility to
faithfully relay that and not make something up on the
fly based on what he said.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\Rice Testimony at 147.
When asked about President el-Magariaf's comments by
Schieffer, though, Rice actually disagreed with him. She
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
responded:
Q: But you do not agree with him that this was
something that had been plotted out several months ago?
A: We do not--we do not have information at present
that leads us to conclude that this was premeditated or
preplanned.
Q: Do you agree or disagree with him that al-Qaeda had
some part in this?
A: Well, we'll have to find that out. I mean I think
it's clear that there were extremist elements that
joined in and escalated the violence. Whether they were
al-Qaeda affiliates, whether they were Libyan-based
extremists or al-Qaeda itself I think is one of the
things we'll have to determine.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\``Face the Nation'' transcripts, September 16, 2012: Libyan
Pres. Magariaf, Amb. Rice and Sen. McCain, CBS News (Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-
transcripts-september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-
mccain.
Notwithstanding intelligence Rice had seen indicating that
al-Qaeda extremists were involved in the attacks\265\--and that
the first draft of the HPSCI talking points also noted this
fact\266\--the fallout of Rice's disagreement with President
el-Magariaf was large. According to Hicks, the top American
official in Libya at the time, Rice's comments prevented the
FBI from going to Benghazi for a number of weeks. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123; Rice Testimony at 42.
\266\Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last
visited May 17, 2016).
Q: Do you think those statements had an effect going
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
forward? What difference did those statements make?
A: I think that they affected cooperation with the
Libyans. I mean, I have heard from a friend who had
dinner with President Magariaf in New York City that he
was still angry at Ambassador Rice well after the
incident.
You know, the Libyan Government doesn't have a deep
bench. President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime
Minister, Minister. After that, nah, not much there.
Some ministries, yeah, you can go--it goes three deep,
it goes down three layers. Most ministries it's just
the Minister. So if the President of the country isn't
behind something, it's going to be pretty hard to make
it happen.
And I firmly believe that the reason it took us so long
to get the FBI to Benghazi is because of those Sunday
talk shows. And, you know, frankly, we never, ever had
official approval from the Libyan Government to send
the FBI to Benghazi. We stitched together a series of
lower-level agreements to support from relevant groups,
and we sat around in the meeting and we said, well,
guys, this is as good as it gets in Libya. And we
looked at the legat [legal attache] and said, call it
in, this is your shot. Call it in to D.C. and see if
they're ready--if they're willing to send a team. And
that's how--that's how the FBI got to Benghazi.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\Hicks Testimony at 232.
In her interview with Bob Schieffer, Rice also discussed
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the FBI investigation. She said:
Q: Madam Ambassador, he says this is something that has
been in the planning stages for months. I understand
you have been saying that you think it was spontaneous?
Are we not on the same page here?
A: Bob, let me tell you what we understand to be the
assessment at present. First of all, very importantly,
as you discussed with the President, there is an
investigation that the United States government will
launch led by the FBI, that has begun and----
Q: (overlapping) But they are not there.
A: They are not on the ground yet, but they have
already begun looking at all sorts of evidence of--of
various sorts already available to them and to us. And
they will get on the ground and continue the
investigation. So we'll want to see the results of that
investigation to draw any definitive conclusions. But
based on the best information we have to date, what our
assessment is as of the present is in fact what began
spontaneously in Benghazi as a reaction to what had
transpired some hours earlier in Cairo where, of
course, as you know, there was a violent protest
outside of our embassy----
In her comments Rice states the FBI has ``already begun
looking at all sorts of evidence.''\268\ Yet nobody from the
FBI or Justice Department was on the preparation call with her
the day before the shows, and she did not know what evidence
the FBI had already ``begun'' reviewing, despite her claim that
the FBI was doing so. In addition, she did not rely on the
HPSCI talking points here when discussing the FBI
investigation, as the talking points indicated only ``the
investigation is ongoing;''\269\ earlier she claimed she had
solely relied on those points when talking about Benghazi.\270\
The Chairman had the following exchange with her about this
topic:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\``Face the Nation'' transcripts, September 16, 2012: Libyan
Pres. Magariaf, Amb. Rice and Sen. McCain, CBS News (Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-
transcripts-september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-
mccain.
\269\Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf (last
visited May 17, 2016).
\270\See, e.g., Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims
Were Based On Information From Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/165686269/susan-rice-
says-benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence.
Q: If you go back when the issue was first broached.
``Well, Bob, let me tell you what we understand to be
the assessment at present. First of all, very
importantly, as you discussed with the president, there
is an investigation that the United States government
will launch, led by the FBI that has begun.'' Then your
next comment is, ``They are not on the ground yet but
they have already begun looking at all sorts of
evidence.'' What were they looking at that you knew
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
about?
A: I didn't know specifically what evidence, but I knew
that the investigation had begun and that they would do
as they customarily do, try to gather as much evidence
as possible.
Q: They do customarily try to do that; you are correct.
But your statement was, ``They have already begun
looking at all sorts of evidence.'' Who told you that?
A: I don't recall exactly who told me that.
Q: Do you know when you would have been told that?
A: I don't know exactly when but sometime between
September 11th and September 16th.
Q: And there was no one from law enforcement on the 4
p.m. call?
A: No, not to my knowledge.
Q: Do you recall talking to anyone with the Bureau
[FBI] before you went on the Sunday morning talk shows?
A: No.
Q: Well, this is what I'm trying to reconcile. If you
didn't talk to anyone with the FBI, who would have told
you that they had all sorts of evidence?
A: I didn't say they had--``they have begun looking at
all sorts of evidence.'' I was aware, as a senior U.S.
policymaker, that we had announced there was an FBI
investigation already underway and that that
investigation would involve gathering and looking at
all sorts of evidence.
Q: All right. But you go on to say ``already available
to them and to us.'' What evidence was already
available to you?
A: To me personally, none.
Q: Then why would you have said ``available to them and
to us''?
A: I meant to the administration.
Q: Do you know what was available to the
administration?
A: Not precisely at this point.
Q: Not at this point or not at the point that you----
A: At the time.
Q: You did not know at the time what evidence was
available to the administration.
A: That's correct.
Q: Then why would you say ``already available to them
and to us''?
A: Because I knew that we had already begun the process
of gathering information, both from an intelligence
side as well as from the law enforcement side.
Q: All right. I'm with you on the intelligence side,
but this--but I can't find an interview that you
conducted where you did not use ``the FBI.'' And what
I'm trying to understand is what was the source of your
information from the FBI.
A: I didn't have any specific information from the FBI.
I was aware of and what I was trying to convey is that
the FBI was in the process of beginning its
investigation.
Q: So if you were to say they already had begun looking
at all sorts of evidence of various sorts already
available to them and to us, in fact, you were not
available--you were not aware of what evidence they
had.
A: I knew they were looking at intelligence among other
sources of evidence.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\Rice Testimony at 96-98.
Rice used the imprimatur of the FBI as a highly respected
law enforcement agency and then conflated the fact they had
begun an investigation with her statement the Bureau was
``already looking at all sorts of evidence.'' In reality, Rice
had no idea what the FBI was doing and where the investigation
stood. The FBI would ultimately secure possession of the
surveillance video from cameras on the Benghazi compound over a
week later, but that video was not yet available to the
Bureau--or the U.S. government--and once it became available,
it impeached many aspects of the administration's initial
assessment about the attacks.
Other evidence available to the Bureau at the time of
Rice's Sunday morning talk show appearances would have included
eyewitness accounts from both State Department and CIA
witnesses who survived the attacks. The administration either
did not avail itself of these eyewitness accounts or completely
ignored what these witnesses had to say. These accounts would
contradict most of the administration's initial public
statements about both the existence of a protest and a link
between the attacks in Benghazi and an internet video.
Rice invoked the name of a premiere law enforcement agency,
indicated all sorts of evidence was available to them and then
proceeded to recite talking points that would later be utterly
impeached by the information that was gathered by the Bureau.
Currently, the FBI's investigative position is reflected in
both the charging instrument in U.S. v. Ahmed Abu Khattalah as
well as various pre-trial motions. Instead of validating Rice's
comments, the FBI's current assessment of what happened in
Benghazi is closer to being the opposite of what Rice described
on national television.
When discussing the spontaneity of the attack, Rice also
used definitive language about what had transpired. Such
definitive language was not consistent with the HPSCI talking
points. She had the following exchange with the Chairman about
that comment:
Q: ``Our best current assessment, based on the
information that we have at present, is that, in fact,
what this began as, it was a spontaneous''--what did
you mean by ``in fact''?
A: What I meant was that what we understood to be the
case at the time was as I described. It was
spontaneous, not premeditated, et cetera.
Q: But why would you use the--why would you use the
phrase ``in fact''? Ranking Member Schiff took great
pains to talk about all the qualifying language that
you used. ``In fact'' strikes me as being more
definitive than qualifying language.
A: Given all the qualifiers that I put in here, I was
not trying to convey that what I was saying was the
last and final word on this.
Q: Okay. What does the word ``premeditated'' mean to
you?
A: It means that whoever was involved had planned in
advance to do what they did.
Q: How much planning would need to have taken place for
it to qualify as premeditated or preplanned?
A: I don't have a clear answer to that.
Q: Well, you specifically said it was not preplanned
and not premeditated. So I'm trying to get an
understanding of how short a period of time something
would need to be planned to not be preplanned or
premeditated. What time period?
A: I don't have a definitive answer to that question.
What I was trying to do, sir, is to convey, consistent
with the talking points that this was, to the best of
our understanding, a spontaneous reaction. And, to me,
the antithesis of ``spontaneous'' is ``preplanned or
premeditated.'' I was trying to say the same thing in a
slightly different way.\272\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\Id. at 101-102.
It is unclear why Rice used such definitive language when
the talking points she reviewed and relied on did not use
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
similarly strong language.
THIS WEEK WITH GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS
It was during her appearance on This Week when Rice made
the clearest link between the video and the Benghazi attacks.
She said:
Q: It just seems that the U.S. government is powerless
as this--as this maelstrom erupts.
A: It's actually the opposite. First of all, let's be
clear about what transpired here. What happened this
week in Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the
region . . .
Q: Tunisia, Khartoum . . .
A: . . .was a result--a direct result of a heinous and
offensive video that was widely disseminated, that the
U.S. government had nothing to do with, which we have
made clear is reprehensible and disgusting. We have
also been very clear in saying that there is no excuse
for violence, there is--that we have condemned it in
the strongest possible terms.
But let's look at what's happened. It's quite the
opposite of being impotent. We have worked with the
governments in Egypt. President Obama picked up the
phone and talked to President Morsi in Egypt. And as
soon as he did that, the security provided to our
personnel in our embassies dramatically increased.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\`This Week' Transcript: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Susan Rice, ABC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
week-transcript-us-ambassador-united-nations-susan-rice/
story?id=17240933.
In her comments, Rice stated ``what happened this week in
Cairo, in Benghazi, in many other parts of the region . . . was
a result--a direct result--of a heinous and video that was
widely disseminated.''\274\ Nowhere in the HPSCI talking
points--which Rice said she relied on ``solely and squarely''--
is there a mention of a direct link to the video. In fact,
there is no mention of a link to a video at all, and the
Committee is not aware of any mention of a direct link to the
video in any intelligence Rice reviewed prior to her appearance
on This Week. In mentioning a direct link to the video, Rice
strayed far beyond her talking points and provided incorrect
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice told the Committee she was not trying to use the
talking points here, and may have misspoke. She testified:
Q: Okay. We will go through those transcripts. But to
the extent you were linking Benghazi and suggesting
that there were protests there, your statement--and
tell me if you disagree with this--your statement that
what occurred in Benghazi was a result, and then for
emphasis you say ``a direct result,'' of the heinous
and offensive video.'' I mean, do you believe that you
went a little bit beyond what was in the talking points
in making that statement?
A: I wasn't even trying to utilize the talking points
here. I was talking about what had happened around the
world. That's what I meant to be focused on.
Q: So when you included Benghazi, did you--was that--
did you misspeak?
A: Quite possibly.
Q: Because you would agree that, at the time you made
this statement on Mr. Tapper's show, the information
you had did not--did not state that there was a direct
connection between the video and what occurred in
Benghazi.
A: That's right. And that's why I was, I think, more
precise in the other transcripts.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\Rice Testimony at 115-16.
Rice later testified that she was ``very careful'' to link
the video to what happened in Cairo. Despite her comments on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Week, Rice told the Committee:
What I can say is that I--we have been through this,
but I was very careful to link the video to what
happened in Cairo and to other posts around the world.
I did not say that the attack on Benghazi was directly
caused by the video.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\Id. at 166.
Morell, a career CIA analyst who rose through the ranks to
become Deputy Director and Acting Director, disagrees with
Rice's analysis of her own comments. Morell said that a ``good
bit of what she said was consistent with the CIA points, but
she also said that the video had led to the protests in
Benghazi. Why she said this I do not know. It is a question
that only she can answer.''\277\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\Morell, supra note 114, at 228-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice also stated on This Week that there was a
``substantial'' security presence at the United States
``consulate'' in Benghazi. She said:
Q: Why was there such a security breakdown? Why was
there not better security at the compound in Benghazi?
Why were there not U.S. Marines at the embassy in
Tripoli?
A: Well, first of all, we had a substantial security
presence with our personnel . . .
Q: Not substantial enough, though, right?
A: . . . with our personnel and the consulate in
Benghazi. Tragically, two of the four Americans who
were killed were there providing security. That was
their function. And indeed, there were many other
colleagues who were doing the same with them.
It obviously didn't prove sufficient to the--the nature
of the attack and sufficient in that--in that moment.
And that's why, obviously, we have reinforced our
remaining presence in Tripoli and why the president has
very--been very clear that in Libya and throughout the
region we are going to call on the governments, first
of all, to assume their responsibilities to protect our
facilities and our personnel, and we're reinforcing our
facilities and our--our embassies where possible...
The State Department facility in Benghazi was not a
consulate. The talking points provided to Rice about Benghazi
did not mention anything about a consulate. In fact, the term
``consulate'' was specifically edited out of the talking points
for accuracy before they were provided to Rice. A consulate is
formally notified to the host government--something the
Benghazi diplomatic post was not--and provides certain services
to citizens.
As a former Assistant Secretary of State, Rice knew there
was a difference between a consulate and diplomatic post. She
testified to the Committee that she may have misspoke on this
point and, with a statement of fact, acknowledged the
difference:
Q: So, following along, top of page 4, you say, ``With
our personnel and the consulate in Benghazi.'' Was
there a consulate in Benghazi?
A: It was a diplomatic post.
Q: Why did you say ``consulate'' if there was no
consulate in Benghazi?
A: I may have misspoke.
Q: Okay. Is there a difference between a consulate and
a diplomatic post?
A: Yes, in fact, there is.\278\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\Rice Testimony at 106.
In addition, the mention of a consulate may imply to some a
stronger fortification than a diplomatic post, perhaps
indicating an additional amount of security. While a
``substantial security presence'' is the point Rice was
attempting to convey--and as the Accountability Review Board
made clear--the security presence at the State Department
facility in Benghazi was nowhere near substantial.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\Benghazi ARB, supra note 20, at 31-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell wrote in his book the ``harder statement'' for Rice
to explain is why she ``said that there was a `substantial
security presence' in Benghazi, as that point was not in either
CIA or the White House talking points.''\280\ Rice explained to
the Committee about what she meant when she said there was a
substantial security presence:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\Morell, supra note 114, at 229.
Q: What did you mean, you said, ``We had a substantial
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
security presence with our personnel''?
A: I meant what I just said.
Q: What does a substantial security presence mean to
you?
A: It means significant, more than one, more than two,
more than three.
Q: Did you have any indication of how many security
personnel were actually with the State Department in
Benghazi?
A: Did I have any indication?
Q: Did you have any indication at the time you made the
comments how many State Department personnel, security
personnel, were in Benghazi?
A: I knew we had a Diplomatic Security presence.
Q: Okay.
A: I knew we had contractors.
Q: Okay.
A: I knew that two of the people who had been killed
were there in a security capacity.
Q: Okay. But in terms of ``substantial security
presence,'' to you that means more than one individual?
A: It means--it can--certainly means more than one. But
it doesn't mean--I wasn't trying to say it means 10, it
means 20, it means 50. It was substantial.
Q: Is ``substantial security presence'' more than one?
Is that--in all situations, does a substantial security
presence mean more than one, or are you referring
specifically to Benghazi in this case?
A: I was referring to Benghazi.
Q: Okay.
A: But I was also making the point, as you'll see
subsequently, that it obviously didn't prove sufficient
to the attack.
Q: Okay. So I just want to make sure I'm clear.
``Substantial security presence,'' in your mind, can
mean two individuals.
A: I didn't say that.
Q: You said more than one.
A: I said more than one, more than two--we can keep
going. I didn't mean to imply.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\Rice Testimony at 103-05.
Rice was mistaken again in stating there were State
Department security contractors in Benghazi. The security
contractors who died in the Benghazi attacks worked for the
CIA--and their job was to protect the CIA facility in Benghazi,
not the State Department facility. Rice, whether intentionally
or negligently, presented misleading information about the size
of the security presence at the State Department facility in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi.
FOX NEWS SUNDAY
Rice also characterized the level of security in Benghazi
on Fox News Sunday--something that was not in her talking
points. She said:
Q: All right. And the last question, terror cells in
Benghazi had carried out five attacks since April,
including one at the same consulate, a bombing at the
same consulate in June. Should U.S. security have been
tighter at that consulate given the history of terror
activity in Benghazi?
A: Well, we obviously did have a strong security
presence. And, unfortunately, two of the four Americans
who died in Benghazi were there to provide security.
But it wasn't sufficient in the circumstances to
prevent the overrun of the consulate. This is among the
things that will be looked at as the investigation
unfolds and it's also why----
Q: Is there any feeling that it should have been
stronger beforehand?
A: It's also why we increased our presence, our
security presence in Tripoli in the aftermath of this,
as well as in other parts of the world. I can't judge
that, Chris. I'm--we have to see what the assessment
reveals. But, obviously, there was a significant
security presence defending our consulate and our other
facility in Benghazi and that did not prove sufficient
to the moment.\282\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\282\Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-
wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-
against-americans-middle-east#p//v/1843960658001.
When asked about the use of the word ``strong'' versus
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``substantial,'' as she said on This Week, Rice responded:
Q: Okay. Just a couple more questions about your
interview with Mr. Wallace. Your next response: ``Well,
we obviously did have a strong security presence.''
What did you mean when you said ``strong security
presence''?
A: I think we had this exchange over another adjective
I used.
Q: That was ``substantial.'' I'm asking you about
``strong.''
A: The same answer applies.
Q: Same answer? Okay. So more than one?
A: That wasn't my prior answer.\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\Rice Testimony at 125.
In her appearance on Fox News Sunday¸ Rice noted
``two of the four Americans who died in Benghazi were there to
provide security. But it wasn't sufficient in the circumstances
to prevent the overrun of the consulate.''\284\ This statement
implies the two security officers who died were tasked with
protecting the State Department facility. They were not; their
job was solely to protect the CIA facility and CIA personnel.
In reality the two she referenced--Glen Doherty and Tyrone
Woods--were killed because the inadequate security at the State
Department facility in Benghazi was not sufficient to repel the
initial attack thus necessitating aid from CIA contractors at
the Annex in Benghazi and from Tripoli.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-
wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-
against-americans-middle-east#p//v/1843960658001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the case of Glen Doherty, not only was he not in
Benghazi to provide security for the Benghazi Mission compound,
he was not in Benghazi at all--at least initially. He left
Tripoli to respond to the attacks in Benghazi precisely because
State Department security proved inadequate. And neither
Doherty nor Tyrone Woods were killed in the ``overrun of the
consulate.'' As noted above, there was no ``consulate'' in
Benghazi and the Benghazi Mission compound was ``overrun''
hours before Doherty and Woods were killed.
Rice's appearance on Fox News Sunday is also where she was
imprecise--again--in discussing the FBI investigation.
Specifically, she said:
Q: Let's talk about the attack on the U.S. consulate in
Benghazi this week that killed four Americans,
including Ambassador Chris Stevens. The top Libyan
official says that the attack on Tuesday was, quote,
his words ''preplanned.'' Al Qaeda says the operation
was revenge for our killing a top Al Qaeda leader. What
do we know?
A: Well, first of all, Chris, we are obviously
investigating this very closely. The FBI has a lead in
this investigation. The information, the best
information and the best assessment we have today is
that in fact this was not a preplanned, premeditated
attack. That what happened initially was that it was a
spontaneous reaction to what had just transpired in
Cairo as a consequence of the video. People gathered
outside the embassy and then it grew very violent and
those with extremist ties joined the fray and came with
heavy weapons, which unfortunately are quite common in
post-revolutionary Libya and that then spun out of
control.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\Id.
Significantly, Rice noted the ``FBI has a lead in this
investigation.''\286\ This critical distinction may have
incorrectly implied to some the FBI was making significant
progress in the nascent investigation. The Chairman had the
following exchange with Rice about this topic:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\Id.
Q: On one of the occasions, you said--this is to Chris
Wallace--``The FBI has a lead in this investigation.''
How would you have learned that if you had not talked
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to the FBI?
A: Because I was aware, as a senior policymaker, that
the FBI has a lead role in conducting investigations in
this circumstance and others like it.
Q: But there's a tremendous difference between the FBI
has ``the lead'' and the FBI has ``a lead.'' ``A lead''
is a law enforcement term that we have a suspect, we
have a lead.
A: No, no, no. Excuse me. That was not what I was
trying to say. I was saying they had the lead, as in
the leadership role, not a lead on a suspect in the
investigation.
Q: All right. So at least with respect to that
transcript, you intended the article ``the'' instead of
the article ``a'' to modify the lead. You were not
suggesting that they had a lead but that they were
taking the lead in the investigation.
A: That's what I meant.
Q: Okay. All right.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\287\Rice Testimony at 95.
In her interview with the Committee, Rice said that in the
future, perhaps a ``no comment'' regarding an FBI investigation
would be more appropriate. She had the following exchange with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Chairman:
Q: I guess this is what I am getting at, just from a
broader perspective. We all hear, whether it's Attorney
General Holder, Attorney General Lynch, really anybody
in the criminal justice realm just doesn't comment on
ongoing investigations. They don't make comments and
use qualifying predicates. They just say: Look, I don't
know. And I am not going to answer your question until
the investigation is complete. Why not respond that way
when you were asked on the Sunday morning talk shows?
A: Sir, I wasn't trying to qualify or characterize the
investigation. I was trying to indicate that there was
an investigation, that it was going to be thorough, and
that it would reveal the best information as to what
had transpired.
Q: I am not challenging that. I am just saying instead
of saying, ``Our best assessment at this time is that
it was not premeditated, not preplanned, that it was
spontaneous,'' one out of five references to the video,
why not just say, ``The investigation has just begun;
we don't know; and I am not going to guess''?
A: Because our intelligence community, in response to a
request from HPSCI, had provided talking points along
the lines that we have discussed multiple times now.
And those talking points, which you and your colleagues
would have gone out with, were more detailed than
simply saying, ``I don't know.''
Q: Right. But you and I both know in hindsight that the
talking points, at least to some degree, were wrong. So
I guess the lesson moving forward is maybe we should
just say, ``It's an ongoing investigation, and I am not
going to comment on it.''
A: Maybe we should.\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\Id. at 146-147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice also said the following on Fox News Sunday:
But we don't see at this point signs this was a
coordinated plan, premeditated attack. Obviously, we
will wait for the results of the investigation and we
don't want to jump to conclusions before then. But I do
think it's important for the American people to know
our best current assessment.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-
wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-
against-americans-middle-east#p//v/1843960658001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice testified to the Committee about these comments:
Q: But when you said, ``We don't see at this point
signs,'' did you mean to say that there were no signs,
or did you mean to say that there was no conclusion
that it was a coordinated, premeditated attack?
A: I didn't purport to draw any final conclusions at
any point during these interviews. I was very careful
to underscore that I was providing the current best
information and that information could change.\290\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\Rice Testimony at 125.
Rather than noting that no final conclusions had been drawn
by the intelligence community about premeditation, however,
Rice instead chose to state there were ``no signs'' at all of
any premeditation.\291\ In this regard she not only went beyond
the talking points she was provided, but she was also
incorrect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\See Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-wallace/2012/09/16/amb-
susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-against-americans-middle-
east#p//v/1843960658001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, multiple signs existed at the time she appeared on
Fox News Sunday that the attack may have been premeditated.
[redacted text]\292\ Another piece of intelligence from
September 13 indicated that an attack was imminent--mere
minutes away--and known by multiple parties.\293\ Rice could
have made her point by simply saying ``our current assessment
is that the attack was neither coordinated nor premeditated.''
Instead, she chose to go a step further and, inaccurately,
state ``we don't at this point see signs this was a coordinated
plan.''\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\[Redacted text].
\293\[Redacted text].
\294\Amb. Susan Rice, Rep. Mike Rogers discuss violence against
Americans in the Middle East, Fox News Sunday (Sept. 16, 2012), http://
www.foxnews.com/on-air/fox-news-sunday-chris-
wallace/2012/09/16/amb-susan-rice-rep-mike-rogers-discuss-violence-
against-americans-middle-east#p//v/1843960658001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEET THE PRESS
Rice's comments on Meet the Press are perhaps the most
egregious diversion from the talking points provided to her
about Benghazi. She said:
Well, let us--let me tell you the--the best information
we have at present. First of all, there's an FBI
investigation which is ongoing. And we look to that
investigation to give us the definitive word as to what
transpired. But putting together the best information
that we have available to us today, our current
assessment is that what happened in Benghazi was in
fact initially a spontaneous reaction to what had just
transpired hours before in Cairo, almost a copycat of--
of the demonstrations against our facility in Cairo,
which were prompted, of course, by the video. What we
think then transpired in Benghazi is that opportunistic
extremist elements came to the consulate as this was
unfolding. They came with heavy weapons which
unfortunately are readily available in post-
revolutionary Libya. And it escalated into a much more
violent episode. Obviously, that's--that's our best
judgment now. We'll await the results of the
investigation. And the president has been very clear--
we'll work with the Libyan authorities to bring those
responsible to justice.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice,
Keith Ellison, Peter King, Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea
Mitchell, NBC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahu-
susan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-
andrea-mitchell/#.Vzozl_krJaQ.
At the time of her appearance, Rice should have known what
transpired in Benghazi was not a ``copycat'' of what had
transpired in Cairo. On September 11, the day of the Cairo
demonstrations and Benghazi attacks, she received frequent
email updates about both events.\296\ Additionally, Rice
received daily intelligence briefings from the CIA, and she
received a briefing each day from September 12 to September 15.
Out of scores and scores of intelligence products pertaining to
Benghazi provided to the Committee, not a single one said what
transpired in Benghazi was ``almost a copycat of'' what
transpired in Cairo.\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\See, e.g., Email from U.S. Dep't of State, to Susan E. Rice,
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05390691); Email from Senior Advisor to the U.S.
Permanent Representative to the U.N., U.S. Mission to the U.N., to
Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al. (Sept. 11, 2012,
6:41 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05561948); and Email from Senior
Advisor to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., U.S. Mission
to the U.N., to Susan E. Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., et al.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 11:53 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0051721).
\297\Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice,
Keith Ellison, Peter King, Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea
Mitchell, NBC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahu-
susan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-
andrea-mitchell/#.Vzozl_
krJaQ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice acknowledges that nowhere in the talking points was
information indicating the Benghazi attack was a copycat of the
Cairo protest. She testified:
Q: Now, you would agree with me that nowhere in the CIA
talking points does it describe what occurred in
Benghazi and what occurred in Cairo as almost a copycat
of each other? You would agree with me on that?
A: I would agree with you on that.
Q: So would you also agree with me that describing what
occurred in Benghazi as almost a copycat of Cairo was
really overstating what was known at the time and
certainly overstating what was in the talking points?
A: I don't know that it was overstating or even
misstating. But I would agree that the word ``copycat''
does not appear in the talking points.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\Rice Testimony at 129-130.
In a later portion of her Meet the Press appearance, Rice
connected the video with the Benghazi attacks, as she had with
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
other appearances on the talk shows. She said:
Q: The president and the secretary of state have talked
about a mob mentality. That's my words, not their
words, but they talked about the--the tyranny of mobs
operating in this part of the world. Here's the
reality, if you look at foreign aid--U.S. direct
foreign aid to the two countries involved here, in
Libya and Egypt, this is what you'd see: two hundred
million since 2011 to Libya, over a billion a year to
Egypt and yet Americans are seeing these kinds of
protests and attacks on our own diplomats. Would--what
do you say to members of congress who are now weighing
whether to suspend our aid to these countries if this
is the response that America gets?
A: Well, first of all, David, let's put this in
perspective. As I said, this is a response to a--a very
offensive video. It's not the first time that American
facilities have come under attack in the Middle East,
going back to 1982 in--in Beirut, going back to the
Khobar Towers in--in Saudi Arabia, or even the attack
on our embassy in 2008 in Yemen.
Q: Or Iran in 1979.
A: This has--this has happened in the past, but there--
and so I don't think that--that we should misunderstand
what this is. The reason we provide aid in Egypt and in
Libya is because it serves American interests because
the relationships . . .\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\Meet the Press September 16: Benjamin Netanyahu, Susan Rice,
Keith Ellison, Peter King, Bob Woodward, Jeffrey Goldberg, Andrea
Mitchell, NBC News (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
49051097/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/t/september-benjamin-netanyahu-
susan-rice-keith-ellison-peter-king-bob-woodward-jeffrey-goldberg-
andrea-mitchell/#.Vzozl_krJaQ.
In this part of the conversation, David Gregory, Meet the
Press moderator, and Rice are discussing foreign aid to both
Egypt and Libya. Gregory mentions both countries twice in the
lead-in to his question. Rice responds and says to ``put this
in perspective . . . this is a response to a--a very offensive
video. It's not the first time American facilities have come
under attack in the Middle East . . .''\300\ She does not
distinguish what happened in Libya to what happened in Egypt in
her response, and ties the video to both incidents. After a
brief interjection by Gregory, Rice mentions providing aid to
both Libya and Egypt.\301\ Nowhere in Rice's comments is Libya
distinguished from Egypt, indicating she did not intend for her
comment about the video to apply to just Egypt, but rather both
countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\Id.
\301\See Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF THE UNION
On State of the Union, Rice spoke of the number of
attackers at the Benghazi Mission compound. Nowhere in the
talking points--on which she said she solely and squarely
relied--is there any mention of the number of protesters. Rice
said:
Q: But this was sort of a reset, was it not? It was
supposed to be a reset of U.S.-Muslim relations?
A: And indeed, in fact, there had been substantial
improvements. I have been to Libya and walked the
streets of Benghazi myself. And despite what we saw in
that horrific incident where some mob was hijacked
ultimately by a handful of extremists, the United
States is extremely popular in Libya and the outpouring
of sympathy and support for Ambassador Stevens and his
colleagues from the government, from people is evidence
of that . . .\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\State of the Union with Candy Crowley Interview with Susan
Rice, CNN (Sept. 16, 2012), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
1209/16/sotu.01.html.
In her interview with the Committee, Rice acknowledged this
information was not in the talking points and was unsure where
she got the information about the number of attackers. She
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q: Now, you respond, ``And indeed, in fact, there had
been substantial improvements. I have been to Libya and
walked the streets of Benghazi myself. And despite what
we saw in that horrific incident where some mob was
hijacked ultimately by a handful of extremists, the
United States is extremely popular in Libya and the
outpouring of sympathy and support for Ambassador
Stevens and his colleagues from the government, from
people is evidence of that.''
Where did you get the fact that there was a handful of
extremists that had hijacked what occurred in Benghazi?
I mean, our understanding, even at the time, the
information was that there were 20 attackers. That
went--that number went to 50-plus, and then it went to
over 100. Where did you get the number ``a handful,''
which, in my mind anyway, is about five?
A: I don't recall exactly where I got that from.
Q: It's not in the talking points, certainly.
A: Talking points say that ``the demonstrations in
Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at
the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct
assault against the diplomatic post in Benghazi and
subsequently its annex. There are indications that
extremists participated in the violent
demonstrations.''
Q: That's correct. But nowhere in what you just read
does the CIA or the intelligence community attribute a
number to the number of extremists that took place in--
took part in the attacks, correct?
A: Not in these talking points.
Q: Okay. Do you believe that you received that
information from another source?
A: I don't recall.
Q: But you do believe somebody told you that?
A: I don't recall exactly how I acquired that
information.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\303\Rice Testimony at 121-22.
Conveying a ``handful'' of individuals hijacked a mob had
significant implications. By claiming only a handful of
individuals, rather than a larger amount, were involved in the
attack, Rice may have conveyed to the audience a sense that
only a very small number of people were angry enough to attack
the U.S. facility. Had Rice said more than a ``handful'' of
people attacked the compound--which video evidence shows to be
the case--she may have conveyed more widespread problems in
Libya, potentially raising the very policy questions Rhodes
strove so specifically to avoid in his September 14 briefing
memo.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\See Rhodes Memo, supra note 3 (``[T]hese protests are rooted
in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Rice was on message in the following clause of the
sentence--``the United States is extremely popular in Libya,''
indicating a successful Libya policy--unfortunately, the United
States evacuated its embassy in Tripoli in July 2014 and today
does not have an official diplomatic presence in Libya.
REACTIONS TO THE SUNDAY SHOWS
The reaction to Rice's comments on the Sunday talk shows
was as divided as it was quick. Many felt Rice presented
information not based in fact, while others believed she simply
stuck assiduously to the talking points she had been given.
``Off The Reservation on Five Networks!''
Even though the Secretary did not appear on the Sunday talk
shows, she monitored what Rice said on those shows. As the
transcript for each show became available late Sunday morning
into early Sunday afternoon, Sullivan sent a copy of the
transcript to the Secretary with an accompanying note. The
first transcript he sent her was from This Week. Sullivan
wrote:
Here is Susan on this week. She wasn't asked about
whether we had any intel. But she did make clear our
view that this started spontaneously and then evolved.
The only troubling sentence relates to the
investigation, specifically: ``And we'll see when the
investigation unfolds whether what was--what transpired
in Benghazi might have unfolded differently in
different circumstances.'' But she got pushed there.
Waiting on other transcripts.\305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y
of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 12:22 PM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0045373).
This note from Sullivan is interesting for two reasons.
First, he writes that Rice makes clear their ``view that this
started spontaneously and then evolved.''\306\ Second, Sullivan
expresses concern regarding Rice's comment on the
investigation, where she said ``[a]nd we'll see when the
investigation unfolds whether what was--what transpired in
Benghazi might have unfolded differently in different
circumstances.''\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\Id.
\307\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fact that Benghazi may have transpired differently--and
not spontaneously as a result of Cairo, as intelligence
indicated to be the case--contained serious policy
implications. If Benghazi started spontaneously and then
evolved--as Sullivan seemed to indicate he and the Secretary
believed--that would indicate a similarity with other areas in
the Middle East, where protests had transpired as a result of
the offensive video. If, on the other hand, Benghazi transpired
differently--as a premeditated terrorist attack, for instance--
such a scenario would call into question whether the United
States was defeating terrorism, and would raise doubts about
the government's policy towards Libya specifically, and perhaps
the Middle East generally. The fact Rice raised this as a
possibility appeared to be unsettling to Sullivan.
Sullivan later passed on the transcript to State of the
Union with an accompanying note saying ``Nothing to this
one.''\308\ Sullivan also forwarded the transcript for Meet the
Press, with an accompanying note simply saying ``[g]ood.''\309\
Just three minutes later, the Secretary responded and said
``[p]ls remind Panetta NOT to mention Tunisia--in fact no
specifics preferable.''\310\ This may have been in response to
the Meet the Press transcript, where moderator Gregory
mentioned the evacuation of all but emergency personnel from
diplomatic missions in Tunisia and Sudan, and that the
Secretary of Defense has deployed forces to several areas to
protect U.S. personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y
of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:38 PM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0045387).
\309\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y
of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:36 PM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0045390).
\310\Email from Sec'y Clinton to Mr. Sullivan (Sept. 16, 2012, 2:39
PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045390).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost immediately after Rice's appearance on the shows,
Pelton highlighted conflicting statements between Rice and
Libya President el-Magariaf. At 9:41a.m. on Sunday, September
16, 2012 she wrote to Rhodes and others on the White House
communications team:
They open w Libyan President who says no doubt attack
preplanned/predetermined. Says planned by foreigners.
Says maybe better for FBI to stay away a little while
though they need their help w investigation. She said
in all other shows that no evidence this was
premeditated, as we discussed. Just fyi.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\Email from Erin Pelton, Dir. of Commc'cs and Spokesperson,
U.S. Mission to the U.N., to Dagoberto Vega, Special Ass't to the
President and Dir. of Broadcast Media, White House, and Benjamin J.
Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Sec. Advisor for Strategic Commc'cs, Nat'l Sec.
Council (Sept. 16, 2012, 9:41 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05622905).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pelton testified as to why she sent this email:
Q: Do you recall having drafted this email?
A: Yes.
Q: And what was the--why did you write this email?
A: I wrote this email to alert Ben that what the Libyan
President had said on CBS was inconsistent with what
Ambassador Rice had said on the other shows that we had
already taped.
Q: Did that inconsistency concern you?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: Because what Ambassador Rice said reflected the best
information that we had at the time.\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\Pelton Testimony at 114-15.
This email reflects the shortcomings of Rice's preparation
for the Sunday shows, which was reflected in some of her
comments. As described above, on her Saturday prep call were
people from her office and the White House messaging team. No
subject matter experts about Benghazi were on the call nor was
anybody from the intelligence community. Pelton wrote ``no
evidence this was premeditated, as we discussed''\313\--likely
indicating a discussion of this topic on the phone call the day
before. This is a significant difference from simply saying
``the current assessment does not indicate that this was
premeditated.'' In fact, as noted above, [redacted text]
intelligence existed at that point indicating the attack may
have in fact been premeditated.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\313\Email from Ms. Pelton to Mr. Vega and Mr. Rhodes (Sept. 16,
2012, 9:41 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05622905).
\314\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rice's comments on the Sunday talk shows were met with
shock and disbelief by those closest to the facts of the
situation. Subject matter experts with direct knowledge of the
attacks expressed immediate concern about what Rice had said on
the shows--and potential fallout as a result. Hicks--possibly
the last person to talk with Stevens, and the highest ranking
U.S. official in Libya on Sunday September 16, 2012--said he
was not asked for any information in advance of Rice's
appearance on the show. He testified:
Q: You became the charge on----
A: September 12th, 3 a.m.
Q: And you are the senior U.S. official, senior
diplomat in country starting September 12th. And you've
testified you had constant contact with Washington. So,
are you--as I understand what you are saying, before
the Sunday show--series of appearances on the Sunday
shows, you were not part of the preparation and
planning?
A: That's correct. I was not.
Q: You didn't get a chance to review talking points?
A: No, I did not.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\Hicks Testimony at 281.
Hicks also testified about Rice's appearance on Face the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nation:
So Magariaf, at great personal risk to himself, goes to
Benghazi to initiate an investigation and lend his own
personal gravitas. Remember he's from the Benghazi area
himself. So he goes to lend his own personal gravitas
and reputation to an investigation of what happens. And
he gets on--and he is on these programs speaking from
Benghazi, and he says this was an attack by Islamic
extremists, possibly with terrorist links. He describes
what happens. He tells the truth of what happened. And
so, you know, Ambassador Rice says what she says,
contradicting what the President of Libya says from
Benghazi.
There's a cardinal rule of diplomacy that we learn in
our orientation class, and that rule is never
inadvertently insult your interlocutor. The net impact
of what has transpired is the spokesperson of the most
powerful country in the world has basically said that
the President of Libya is either a liar or doesn't know
what he's talking about.
The impact of that is immeasurable. Magariaf has just
lost face in front of not only his own people, but the
world. And, you know, my jaw hit the floor as I watched
this. I've never been--I have been a professional
diplomat for 22 years. I have never been as embarrassed
in my life, in my career as on that day. There have
been other times when I've been embarrassed, but that's
the most embarrassing moment of my career.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\Id. at 83-84.
Other subject matter experts within the State Department
also recognized problems with what Rice said on the talk shows.
State Department employees in Washington D.C. who had spoken
with those on the ground in Libya after the attack were
universal in their condemnation of Rice's statements. The
Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
State Department, wrote: ``I think Rice was off the reservation
on this one.''\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\Email from Senior Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Senior Advisor and Spokesperson,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Deputy Dir. for
the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State & Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:16 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Deputy Director, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, responded:
``Off the reservation on five networks!''\318\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text]
& [redacted text] (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:18 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Bureau of
Near East Affairs, State Department, wrote: ``Yup. Luckily
there's enough in her language to fudge exactly what she said/
meant.''\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\319\Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text]
& [redacted text] (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:17 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He also wrote: ``WH [White House] very worried about the
politics. This was all their doing.''\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\Email from [redacted text] to [redacted text], [redacted text]
& [redacted text] (Sept. 17, 2012, 2:19 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Snipe may not have known exactly what ``worried'' the
White House, he had extensive experience at the State
Department, and had been in contact with the Embassy in
Tripoli. Contrary to what Rice said on the talk shows, he did
not believe any protests or demonstrations had occurred prior
to the attacks. He testified:
Q: And then you made a statement that, you know, based
on your training and experience, essentially you had
never seen anyone bring an RPG to a protest.
A: I mean----
Q: Or that would be unusual.
A: I think what I said was ``bringing an RPG to a
spontaneous protest.'' I mean, I've been to Yemen
before, and, I mean, knives, AK-47s, RPGs. I mean, that
place is armed to the teeth, and I think people bring
an RPG to the toilet sometimes. But when I said that, I
was suggesting that, if you were spontaneously
protesting, an RPG might necessarily not be the first
thing you grab next to your car keys.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\321\Testimony of Deputy Dir. for the Office of Press and Public
Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at
96-97 (Oct. 9, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
The Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, State
Department, was surprised of the connection made to the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
She testified:
Q: Do you recall having any discussions with NEA about
the substance of what was said on the talk shows and
whether there was an agreement or disagreement with
what was conveyed?
A: Yes, ma'am. I recall that I was a little bit
surprised. The description of what was said--and,
again, I didn't watch the program myself--it just
sounded more definitive of what potentially had
happened. But, again, I didn't watch the show myself,
and I didn't read the full transcript. I was too busy
that day to do that.
Q: When you say you're a bit surprised, what were you
surprised regarding?
A: I was surprised in the way that they were described
in the press clips, that there was an indication that
there was some connection to the anti-Muslim video of
concern that had been circulating online, that there
was some connection to that. In the press clips that I
read, I remember seeing, like--okay.
Q: And I think, before, you just said that that was a
pretty definitive statement.
A: In the way that I saw it excerpted in the press
clips, it seemed like the connection had been made to
the video more definitively.\322\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\Testimony of Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. 33-34 (Dec. 17, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
Diplomatic Security Agent 30, Diplomatic Security Command
Center, State Department, was in the Diplomatic Security
Command Center while the attacks transpired and aware of real-
time information coming straight from Benghazi during the
attack was asked if there was any rioting in Benghazi reported
prior to the attack. His response was: ``Zip, nothing
nada.''\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\323\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 30 (Sept. 18, 2012, 1:16 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05390678).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Circling the Wagons
While many lower- and mid-level State Department employees
in contact with the Embassy in Tripoli believed Rice went too
far on the talk shows, senior officials at the State Department
and White House did not appear to share that sentiment.
Instead, these senior officials appeared concerned more about
supporting Rice's statements and ensuring any future statements
on the attacks were disciplined than ensuring they were
reflective of what had actually transpired.
The day after Rice's appearance, The Deputy Director,
Office of Maghreb Affairs, sent an email summarizing a meeting
with McDonough. She wrote:
DNSA McDonough apparently told the SVTS [Secure Video
Teleconference] group today that everyone was required
to ``shut their pieholes'' about the Benghazi attack in
light of the FBI investigation, due to start
tomorrow.''\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\Email from Deputy Dir. for Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, to James N. Miller, Under Sec'y of Defense for Policy, U.S.
Dep't of Defense (Sept. 17, 2012, 6:52 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05580200).
McDonough's comments about the FBI investigation starting
the following day stand in stark contrast with Rice's
statements the day before that the FBI had already begun
collecting ``all sorts of evidence'' in their investigation and
had ``a lead.'' In addition, McDonough's remark about not
commenting in light of the FBI investigation directly address
the issue that Sullivan raised with the Secretary the day
before--the troubling sentence by Rice that the FBI
investigation could uncover ``Benghazi might have unfolded
differently in different circumstances'' from other protests
across the Middle East.\325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\Email from Mr. Sullivan to Sec'y Clinton (Sept. 16, 2012,
12:22 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045373).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That same day, during her daily press briefing, Nuland was
asked by reporters to comment on the Benghazi attacks even
though there was an FBI investigation. Nuland attempted to
address the dichotomy between her refusal to talk about
Benghazi and Rice's willingness to do so on the Sunday shows.
Nuland said:
Q: Toria, in Friday's briefing, Friday evening, you
essentially stated that all questions concerning any
aspect of the Benghazi attack--the circumstances
surrounding it, the outcome of it, et cetera--would
henceforth be directed by you to the FBI since it's
their investigation.
And yet, on five Sunday shows yesterday, Ambassador
Rice, who works for the same agency as you, was giving
the latest U.S. assessment of how this event unfolded,
specifically by saying we don't believe it was
premeditated or preplanned, and by saying that those
with heavy arms and so forth showed up, in essence, as
she put it, to hijack an ongoing demonstration.
So my first question for you is: Given that Ambassador
Rice is out there talking publicly about it and not
referring Bob Schieffer and Chris Wallace and the rest
to the FBI, may we consider that we can again begin
asking you questions at this podium about the
circumstances of the attack? If it's fair for the
Ambassador to discuss it, it should be fair in this
room, correct?
A: Well, let me start by reminding you that Ambassador
Rice outranks me, as does my own boss, so she is often
at liberty to say more than I am. And I guess that's
going to continue to be the case.
What I will say, though, is that Ambassador Rice, in
her comments on every network over the weekend, was
very clear, very precise, about what our initial
assessment of what happened is. And this was not just
her assessment. It was also an assessment that you've
heard in comments coming from the intelligence
community, in comments coming from the White House. I
don't have anything to give you beyond that.
She also made clear, as I had on Friday, that there is
an ongoing FBI investigation. So frankly, I'm not sure
that it's useful to go beyond that. I'm not capable of
going beyond that, and we'll have to just see what the
FBI investigation brings us.
Q: You would acknowledge, however, that the account of
the events, the preliminary account of the events that
Ambassador Rice offered, diverges starkly from the
account offered by the Libyan President, correct?
A: Well, we've heard a number of different things from
Libya. I would simply say that what--the comments that
Ambassador Rice made accurately reflect our
government's initial assessment.\326\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\326\Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 17, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197821.htm [hereinafter Nuland Sept.
17 Briefing].
Nuland also addressed a question as to whether or not
protests had occurred outside the Benghazi compound. Her on-
the-record response, in the wake of Rice's talk show
appearances, was markedly different from what she told
reporters in an off-the-record briefing back on September 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuland said:
Q: And one last question, if I might, because
Ambassador Rice spoke to this. She suggested that there
had been an ongoing demonstration outside the Consulate
or in the proximity of the Consulate in Benghazi that
was, in essence, hijacked by more militant elements who
came armed to the affair. I just want to nail this down
with you. You are--you stand by this notion that there
was, in fact, an ongoing demonstration?
A: I'd simply say that I don't have any information
beyond what Ambassador Rice shared with you and that
her assessment does reflect our initial assessment as a
government.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\327\Id.
Nuland, similar to the President in his 60 Minutes
interview five days prior, also refused to directly label what
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
had occurred as a terrorist act. She said:
Q: Simply on the basis of what Ambassador Rice has
publicly disclosed, does the United States Government
regard what happened in Benghazi as an act of terror?
A: Again, I'm not going to put labels on this until we
have a complete investigation, okay?
Q: You don't--so you don't regard it as an act of
terrorism?
A: I don't think we know enough. I don't think we know
enough. And we're going to continue to assess. She gave
our preliminary assessment. We're going to have a full
investigation now, and then we'll be in a better
position to put labels on things, okay?\328\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\Id.
Even the CIA appeared to take part in the effort to bolster
Rice's statements. Five days after the attack, a September 17,
2012 email exchange between officials at the White House, State
Department, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
[ODNI], and the CIA took place to craft a written response to
questions posed by Fox News reporter Catherine Herridge about
Rice's statements the day before. The first draft of the
response, which appears to have come from the CIA's Office of
Public Affairs, makes a number of misstatements--chiefly one in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the first paragraph:
Off the record, I reviewed the timeline of what is
known now, of course realizing that there will be
interviews of witnesses, people on the ground etc. . .
. to get the down to the minute details. Like you, we
have the attack kicking off reportedly after 9:30 PM
with small crowds gathering during that 9:00-10:00 PM
hour. It's pretty clear, as we discussed, that there
had been smaller protests during the day, nothing along
the scale of what we saw in Cairo or later on in the
week, but protests nonetheless.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\Email from Media Spokesperson, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Tommy
Vietor, Nat'l Sec. Spokesperson, Nat'l Sec. Council (Sept. 17, 2012,
4:01 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05562137).
It is unclear what information, if any, the CIA public
affairs officer relied on to claim ``it's pretty clear . . .
that there had been smaller protests during the day''\330\--no
CIA intelligence product provided to the Committee contained
any such information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seven days after the attacks, on September 18, 2012, Meehan
sent an email to Patrick Ventrell, Director, Office of Press
Relations, State Department and Nuland about message
discipline. Her email said:
Focus today on reiterating that our initial assessment
stands, and was based on information available. Keeping
hard line about now waiting for the investigation to
run its course; we will of course provide info as it
comes to light. No discrepancy between what Rice said
and what State and WH said early on regarding
preplanned attack.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat'l Sec.
Council, to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State &
Patrick H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 18, 2012,
11:03 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05561843).
Nuland appears to have followed that guidance. In her daily
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
press briefing later that day, Nuland said:
Q: Any more information on the investigation, on the
timeline? There continues to be some question about
whether the protests had all but dissipated before the
attack in Benghazi began, or whether or not the protest
was robust and ongoing and this attack at least used it
for cover. And there also continue to be, frankly, some
apparent differences between the characterization here
that it was a coordinated attack and Ambassador Rice's
assertion that it basically kind of grew out of the
protest.
A: Well, on your last point, I spoke to this
extensively yesterday, making clear that Ambassador
Rice was speaking on behalf of the government with
regard to our initial assessments. I don't have any
more details beyond those that we've already shared,
and I don't expect to because I think all of the
information is going to go to the FBI for their
investigation, and when they're completed, then we'll
have more information.
Q: The idea that it grew--that the protest may have
been used as cover, can you say whether or not the
protest had basically dissipated when the attacks
began?
A: I personally have no more information than what I've
given you, and I don't think that we as a government
will be talking about these details until the FBI has
completed its investigation so that we don't prejudice
it.\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Bureau
of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 18, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/09/197912.htm#LIBYA.
Carney also held a press briefing on September 18. During
that briefing, he was asked about the conflict between Libyan
officials and the administration as to what transpired in
Benghazi--a conflict on full display on Face the Nation when
Rice contradicted the Libyan President. Carney, like Rice on
the talk shows, also connected the protests and violence across
the region with the Benghazi attacks, linking the video to both
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
events. He said:
Q: I wanted to go back to the conflict between--the
conflicting reports I guess between the administration
and Libyan officials over what happened. On Friday, you
seemed to cite that the videos were definitely part of
it, but I get the sense that you're backing away from
that a little bit today. Is there something that you've
learned since?
A: No, no. I think what I am making clear and what
Ambassador Rice made clear on Sunday is that reaction
to the video was the precipitating factor in protests
in violence across the region. And what I'm also saying
is that we have--we made that assessment based on the
evidence that we have, and that includes all the
evidence that we have at this time.
I am not, unlike some others, going to prejudge the outcome
of an investigation and categorically assert one way or the
other what the motivations are or what happened exactly until
that investigation is complete. And there are a lot of
suppositions based on the number of weapons and other things
about what really happened in Benghazi and I'd rather wait, and
the President would rather wait, for that investigation to be
completed.
Q: So you're not ruling out that----
A: Of course not. I'm not ruling out--if more
information comes to light, that will obviously be a
part of the investigation and we'll make it available
when appropriate. But at this time, as Ambassador Rice
said and as I said, our understanding and our belief
based on the information we have is it was the video
that caused the unrest in Cairo, and the video and the
unrest in Cairo that helped--that precipitated some of
the unrest in Benghazi and elsewhere. What other
factors were involved is a matter of
investigation.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, The White House
(Sept. 18, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/
18/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-9182012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eight days after the attacks, on September 19, 2012, the
Special Assistant to the Spokesperson, State Department, sent
Nuland an email, possibly in response to a press inquiry,
regarding Rice's statements regarding security personnel on the
Sunday shows. He wrote:
This is the only piece I can find that could possibly
be construed as the two security officials being there
w/responsibility to protect the mission compound vice
the annex. From the FOX News Sunday interview . .
.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\Email from Special Ass't to the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept.
19, 2012, 5:20 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0052773).
Also on September 19, 2012, Sullivan drafted an ``ALDAC''--
a worldwide cable to all U.S. embassies--approved by the
Secretary in which guidance was given on ``outreach and
messaging'' about the widespread violence in the Middle
East.\335\ The cable continued to connect the attacks with the
video:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\335\Email from Special Ass't to the Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to SWO-Cables (Sept. 19, 2012,
7:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0052812-SCB0052813).
Since September 11, 2012, there have been widespread
protests and violence against U.S. and some other
diplomatic posts across the Muslim world. The proximate
cause of the violence was the release by individuals in
the United States of the video trailer for a film that
many Muslims find offensive. Diplomatic compounds have
been breached in several countries including Libya,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. In Benghazi, Libya four
U.S. personnel were killed in the violence[.]\336\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\336\Id.
Even as late as September 20, 2012, Nuland was still
supporting the claims made by Rice on the talk shows. When
reporter Jennifer Rubin asked Nuland to comment on a CBS news
report that ``there was NO protest outside Libya embassy,''
Nuland responded, ``Off: this does not square with our
info.''\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Jennifer Rubin (``J Rubin'') (Sept. 20, 2012, 9:59 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05412001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the week following her appearances on the Sunday talk
shows, Rice remained publicly silent about her comments.
Privately, however, she was ``constantly interested'' in new
information about the attacks. She testified:
Q: Did you have any conversations with anybody, either
on the night of September 16th or at any day thereafter
up to the point where you learned there were no
protests in Benghazi, on the issue of whether or not
President Magarief was correct or whether or not you
were correct in saying that the attack was spontaneous?
A: I don't recall specific conversations, but I recall
being constantly interested in understanding our
evolving best assessment, with a mind to caring about
its inconsistency with what I was--with what I said on
the 16th.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\Rice Testimony at 149.
The absence of protests prior to the Benghazi attacks,
however, remained a troubling issue for the administration. It
was only a matter of time before this fact became widely known
and disseminated publicly. Despite the best efforts by
administration spokespersons to publicly support Rice's
comments, however, the truth ultimately emerged to show much of
what she said on the talk shows was incorrect.
THE SHIFT
A week after the Benghazi attacks, administration officials
began telling the public yet a different story. It started with
Matthew G. Olsen, the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
Matt Olsen's Testimony on September 19
On September 19, 2012, testifying before the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Olsen
firmly stated that what happened in Benghazi was in fact a
terrorist attack. Olsen also testified that individuals
affiliated with al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda's affiliates may have been
involved in the attack. Olsen said:
Q: So, let me begin by asking you whether you would say
that Ambassador Stevens and the three other Americans
died as a result of a terrorist attack.
A: Certainly on that particular question, I would say
yes, they were killed in the course of a terrorist
attack on our embassy.
Q: Right. And do we have reason to believe at this
point that that terrorist attack was preplanned for
September 11th or did the terrorists who were obviously
planning it because it certainly seemed to be a
coordinated terrorist attack just seize the moment of
the demonstrations or protests against the film to
carry out a terrorist attack?
A: A more complicated question, and one, Mr. Chairman,
that we are spending a great deal of time looking at
even as we speak. And it's a--it's a--obviously, an
investigation here is ongoing and facts are being
developed continually. The best information we have
now, the facts that we have now indicate that this was
an opportunistic attack on our embassy. The attack
began and evolved and escalated over several hours at
our embassy--our diplomatic post in Benghazi. It
evolved and escalated over several hours.
It appears that individuals who were certainly well-
armed seized on the opportunity presented as the events
unfolded that evening and into the--into the morning
hours of September 12th. We do know that a number of
militants in the area, as I mentioned, are well-armed
and maintain those arms. What we don't have at this
point is specific intelligence that there was a
significant advanced planning or coordination for this
attack.
Again, we're still developing facts and still looking
for any indications of substantial advanced planning;
we just haven't seen that at this point. So, I think
that's the most I would say at this point. I do want to
emphasize that there is a classified briefing for all
of Congress that will take place tomorrow.
Q: We'll be there. Let me come back to what you said--
that there was evidence or intelligence that, as you
indicated broadly a moment ago, that in eastern Libya,
in the Benghazi area, there were a number of militant
or violent extremist groups. Do we have any idea at
this point who was responsible among those groups for
the attack on the consulate?
A: This is the most important question that we're
considering.
Q: Right.
A: We are focused on who was responsible for this
attack. At this point, I would say is that a number of
different elements appear to have been involved in the
attack, including individuals connected to militant
groups that are prevalent in eastern Libya,
particularly in the Benghazi area, as well. We are
looking at indications that individuals involved in the
attack may have had connections to al-Qaeda or al-
Qaeda's affiliates; in particular, al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb.
Q: Right. So that question has not been determined
yet--whether it was a militant--or a Libyan group or a
group associated with al-Qaeda influence from abroad.
A: That's right. And I would--I would add that what--
the picture that is emerging is one where a number of
different individuals were involved, so it's not
necessarily an either/or proposition.
Q: OK. OK, good, well----
A: Again, as you know, the FBI is leading the
investigation and that's ongoing.\339\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\Homeland Threats and Agency Responses: Hearing before the S.
Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 112th Cong.
(2012) (statement of Matthew Olsen, Dir., Nat'l Counterterrorism
Center).
Olsen's testimony that what had transpired in Benghazi was
a terrorist attack and that there may be links to al-Qaeda was
the first time an administration official had stated either of
those facts publicly. He said the attacks were
``opportunistic'' and did not mention anything about a video.
Olsen responded to Chairman Joseph I. Lieberman's questions
directly, concisely, confidently, and factually. He did not
couch his language, speculate, or go beyond the facts he knew.
Additionally, what he said was accurate. Such fact-centered
testimony stands in stark contrast to Rice's appearances on the
talk shows.
Olsen told the Committee he wanted to talk about the
connection to al-Qaeda at the Senate hearing; a possible al-
Qaeda connection was a large factor in the post-attack analysis
occurring within the intelligence community--a fact the IC had
known for nearly a week.\340\ Olsen testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\340\Olsen Testimony at 55-57 (discussing how long and from what
sources intelligence community knew of al-Qaeda connection).
But my thought at the time was this is not overly
sensitive, and it is the kind of information that I was
concerned, if we didn't--if I didn't say this in
response to a question about who was responsible for
this attack, it would be an omission that would be
glaring in the--you know, as, on, Congress Members,
themselves, were aware of this, right? Some of them
serving on HPSCI or SSCI may well have seen the
reporting. So it seemed to me the right thing to do to
avoid being, you know, viewed as not being as
forthcoming as I could be, even if it went beyond what
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
had been publicly stated.
So that was my thinking at the time, why I thought that
that was an important point to make and why I actually
focused on it in advance of the hearings, so that folks
would know that I was going to say it.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\Id. at 57-58.
Olsen knew at the time the administration had yet to
publicly tie al-Qaeda to the Benghazi attacks. As such, he
directed his head of legislative affairs to alert other
Executive Branch agencies that he would likely make the
connection at the hearing.\342\ Meehan emailed Nuland about
this possibility on the morning of the hearing. In an email
with the subject ``Change of Language per the call''--perhaps
an indication of coordination between how the White House and
State Department were going to respond to press inquiries that
day about Benghazi--Meehan wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\342\Id. at 53-54.
I am rushing to Jay's prep, and will circle up with the
broader group after. But wanted to flag that Matt Olsen
from NCTC will be on the Hill this morning . . . Wanted
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to flag that IF ASKED, Matt will use the line:
There are indications some of the extremists involved
in the attack may be linked to al-Qa'ida or its
affiliates, but this assessment may change as
additional information is collected and analyzed. In
eastern Libya there are numerous armed groups, some of
whom have al-Qa'ida sympathies.
Flagging because it is an unclass session, so if he
makes that statement, word will likely leak, and it is
the first time someone from the USG will be saying that
there might be a link to al-Qaeda. Ben and I discussed,
and agreed that we refer questions to people involved
in the investigation, note the investigation is still
underway and no definitive conclusions yet, and if
pressed, can point out there is no discrepancy with our
original assessment because we always said our original
assessment was based on info available at the time and
that the investigation would provide further detail.
Hopefully won't come up, but wanted to flag just in
case.\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\Email from Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State, &
Patrick H. Ventrell, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 19, 2012,
10:22 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05561987).
In her email, Meehan mentions a conversation with Rhodes
and notes that ``if pressed, can point out there is no
discrepancy with our original assessment because we always said
our original assessment was based on info available at the time
and that the investigation would provide further detail.''\344\
What Meehan does not say is that the link to al-Qaeda was
actually cited in the intelligence community's original
assessment.\345\ That was not new information, as Olsen
acknowledged.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\Id.
\345\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123.
\346\Olsen Testimony at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, Meehan's email--reflecting other public
statements by administration officials up to that point--noted
she and Rhodes ``agreed that we refer questions to people
involved in the investigation.'' Olsen told the Committee the
investigation did not in fact prohibit him from talking about
what had been learned up to that point. He testified:
Q: Was there anything about the FBI investigation that
prohibited you from either, A, saying it was a
terrorist attack, or, B, drawing a link to AQIM?
A: No, nothing that I--no, I don't--certainly not the
question of whether it was a terrorist attack or the
way I phrased the answer to the question on who was
responsible--on the connections to--you know, potential
connections to terrorist groups.
Q: So if nothing about the ongoing investigation
prohibited you from saying that, then why would others
refer to the ongoing investigation when asked those
very same questions?
A: --You know, I, obviously, don't know exactly why others.
I do think there's a range of reasonable, you know, approaches
to this question. In other words, I don't think there is one
right approach.\347\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\347\Id. at 60.
Olsen also testified his background as a prosecutor helps
him create a fact-centered approach to sharing information. He
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
said:
Q: Sure. As a prosecutor, the facts are very important
to you. A fact is a fact, and you're going to share
what that fact may be--is that fair to say?--as opposed
to being concerned about public relations, in lack of a
better phrase, or the impression people might get?
A: That's basically right, and that's sort of--that is
the approach of being a prosecutor in terms of reliance
on facts. I'm not--I shouldn't, you know, lead you to
believe that I'm completely oblivious to----
Q: Of course
A: --the public impression that you can leave and the
importance that that has too.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\348\Id. at 61-62
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though Olsen wanted to state publicly that al-Qaeda
sympathizers may have been involved in the attack, he did not
plan on saying definitively that it was a terrorist attack.
While Olsen knew from the outset it was a terrorist attack--
``all of those factors, you know, made it so that it was, to
me, there was not really a question of whether it was a
terrorist attack''\349\--he testified he had not given it a
great deal of thought, but when asked directly by Lieberman,
the logical response was to acknowledge that it was a terrorist
attack.\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\Id. at 100.
\350\Id. at 50-51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Olsen recognized almost immediately after the hearing he
may have made news with what he had said with respect to the
events being a terrorist attack. He told the Committee he wrote
an email to the White House alerting them of what he had said.
Olsen testified:
Q: So what were the repercussions of you saying it was
a terrorist attack?
A: So one of the things I did afterwards was I wrote an
email to both John Brennan and Denis McDonough--you
know, Denis was the Deputy National Security Advisor
and John was--John Brennan was the counterterrorism
advisor--and explained to them--you know, I said
something like, ``I made some news today with my
testimony. Here is why I testified that this was a
terrorist attack,'' was my thought process. And they
wrote back to me, saying, ``You did the right thing,''
essentially, in emails that day. You know, ``Understand
you made the right points,'' or something like that.
But again, look, I was aware, again, in a way I hadn't
really been before that what I was testifying to was
potentially newsworthy, and, in fact, it was. So that's
why I thought both let my press person think about what
we need to do, ask him to think about what we may need
to do, and then also, myself, reach out to John Brennan
and Denis McDonough.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\Id. at 71-72.
Private reaction from senior officials at the State
Department regarding Olsen's testimony, however, appeared less
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
supportive. Nuland wrote to Sullivan, Mills, and Kennedy:
Fysa, and for Jake's drafting exercise; NCTC also
called it a terrorist attack today: I had demurred on
that as had Jay, pending investigation.\352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\Email from Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of Policy
Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the
U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, & Patrick F. Kennedy, Under
Sec'y for Management, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 19, 2012, 2:45 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05561975).
Sullivan called the White House to inform them he was
unaware Olsen was going to testify it was a terrorist attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meehan testified:
Q: Do you recall generally having any conversations
with [Jake Sullivan] that week? Or in the immediate
aftermath of the attack, that general period of
September 2012?
A: I do recall having one phone conversation with him.
I don't know whether it's in the scope of the 4 to 5
days that we're discussing.
Q: Okay. What was discussed in that conversation?
A: He raised that he had been unaware before Matt Olsen
testified on the Hill, that Matt Olsen was going to
make a link publicly to Al Qaeda in reference to the
Benghazi attack.
Q: Why did he raise that issue with you?
A: I can't say why I was the individual that he called.
I don't know.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\Testimony of Bernadette M. Meehan, Spokesperson, Nat'l Sec.
Council, Tr. at 28-29 (Dec. 16, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
Even the Secretary expressed surprise at Olsen's testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Olsen testified:
Q: Yeah. Did anybody express to you that they were
disappointed in what you said, they were perplexed by
what you said, that what you said may have thrown a
message off kilter?
* * *
A: . . . But, you know, to your question I did hear at
one point--and I don't remember exactly when--from
Director Clapper that he'd heard from Secretary
Clinton, you know, of some surprise about me saying
that it was a terrorist attack. And he basically said--
you know, I remember thinking he basically said, you
know, ``We're saying what we see,'' something like
that.
But I remember hearing from him. He told me directly--I
think we were either in a car or getting ready to get
in his car to come downtown--that he'd gotten a call or
had heard from Secretary Clinton about surprise that
one of his guys was talking about this being a
terrorist attack.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\Olsen Testimony at 82-83.
The day after Olsen's testimony, September 20, 2012, the
President participated in a town hall with Univision at the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
University of Miami. The President had the following exchange:
Q: We have reports that the White House said today that
the attacks in Libya were a terrorist attack. Do you
have information indicating that it was Iran, or al-
Qaeda was behind organizing the protests?
A: Well, we're still doing an investigation, and there
are going to be different circumstances in different
countries. And so I don't want to speak to something
until we have all the information. What we do know is
that the natural protests that arose because of the
outrage over the video were used as an excuse by
extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S.
interests----
Q: Al-Qaeda?
A: Well, we don't know yet. And so we're going to
continue to investigate this. We've insisted on, and
have received so far full cooperation from countries
like Egypt and Libya and Tunisia in not only protecting
our diplomatic posts, but also to make sure that we
discover who, in fact, is trying to take advantage of
this. . . .\355\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\355\Remarks by the President at Univision Town Hall with Jorge
Ramos and Maria Elena Salinas, Miami, FL, Sept. 20, 2012.
The President said the government wanted to ``discover who,
in fact, is trying to take advantage of this.'' It is unclear
if ``this'' is a reference to the video, protests, or something
else. However, no assessment from the CIA ever stated anybody
was ``trying to take advantage'' of the video, or even that
there was a direct link between the video and the Benghazi
attacks.
The President also stated, in response to a question that
mentioned only Libya, the ``natural protests that arose because
of the outrage over the video were used as an excuse by
extremists to see if they can also directly harm U.S.
interests--.'' This statement was made two days after the U.S.
government obtained access to the video footage from the
Benghazi Mission compound, which did not show a protest outside
the Benghazi Mission compound prior to the beginning of the
attacks.
When asked if al-Qaeda was involved, the President
responded ``we don't know yet.'' The day before, however, Olsen
testified under oath before Congress the government was
``looking at indiciations that individuals involved in the
attack may have had connections to al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda's
affiliates; in particular, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.''
Two days after Olsen's testimony, on September 21, 2012,
the Secretary said for the first time publicly that what
happened in Benghazi was a ``terrorist attack.''\356\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks with Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar before Their
Meeting (Sept.25, 2012), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/198060.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Four days later, on September 25, 2012, the President said,
during remarks to the United Nations General Assembly: ``There
are no words that excuse the killing of innocents. There's no
video that justifies an attack on an embassy.''\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\357\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
Remarks by the President to the UN General Assembly (Sept. 13, 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/25/remarks-
president-un-general-assembly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was not until the following day--a full week after Olsen
made his comments and fifteen days after the attacks began--
Carney finally acknowledged the President's position was that a
terrorist attack occurred. Carney said:
Q: Can I ask one more--are criticizing the President
for not classifying what happened in Benghazi as a
terrorist attack, going as far as you did or the NCTC
director. Can you respond to that and explain why that
is?
A: The President spoke eloquently I believe about the
attack that took the lives of four Americans at the
United Nations General Assembly, and I think made very
clear that it is wholly unacceptable to respond to a
video, no matter how offensive, with violence, and it
is wholly unacceptable, regardless of the reason, to
attack embassies or diplomatic facilities and to kill
diplomatic personnel.
The President--our position is, as reflected by the
NCTC director, that it was a terrorist attack. It is, I
think by definition, a terrorist attack when there is a
prolonged assault on an embassy with weapons.
The broader questions here about who participated, what
led to the attack on the facility in Benghazi--all
those questions are under investigation at two levels,
by the FBI and by the Accountability Review Board
established by Secretary Clinton to look at issues of
security in Benghazi and security at other diplomatic
facilities.
So, let's be clear, it was a terrorist attack and it
was an inexcusable attack.\358\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney Aboard Air Force
One en route Ohio, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House
(Sept. 26, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/
26/press-gaggle-press-secretary-jay-carney-aboard-air-force-one-en-
route-oh.
September 24 Intelligence Assessment
Two days before Carney finally acknowledged publicly that
Benghazi was a terrorist attack, on September 24, 2012, the CIA
published its new ``assessment'' about the Benghazi attacks,
formally changing their old assessment which had been in place
since September 13. In the September 24 piece, which was
produced jointly with the National Counterterrorism Center, the
analysts wrote ``We now assess, based on new reporting, that
the assault was deliberate and organized. Our most credible
information indicates that there was not a protest ongoing at
the time of the attack as first reported.''\359\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\Cent. Intel. Agency, Libya: Updated Assessment of Benghazi
Attacks, World Intelligence Review, Sept. 24, 2012 (on file with CIA,
IntBook29-076 to IntBook29-079).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The supporting intelligence used in this piece to support
the new assessment was threefold. The first piece of
intelligence was from September 19, 2012 and noted that
attackers used fixed firing positions, capture or kill teams,
and blockades to impede the escape of US personnel,'' [redacted
text]\360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\360\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second piece of intelligence [redacted text] suggesting
``the attack was put together at least several hours ahead of
time.''\361\ Although this piece of intelligence was available
as early as September 15--one day before Rice went on the
Sunday talk shows and nine days before the analysts published
their updated assessment--an internal CIA after action review
noted that this piece of intelligence was ``not viewed as
credible enough'' at the time to outweigh other reporting, such
as news reports.\362\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\Id.
\362\Intelligence Note, Memorandum for Acting Dir., Cent. Intel.
Agency, Jan. 4, 2013 [hereinafter Analytic Line Review] (on file with
CIA, REQUEST 17-0049 to REQUEST 17-0063).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third piece of intelligence [redacted text] noted
simply that the attackers ``also employed effective mortar fire
against the Embassy annex later in the night after US return
fire repulsed their initial ground assault.''\363\ This piece
of intelligence was formally available to analysts as early as
September 14, and informally available to them as early as
September 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, perhaps the most credible--and definitive--
piece of intelligence indicating no protest had occurred prior
to the Benghazi attacks was the video footage from the closed
circuit televisions at the Special Mission Compound in
Benghazi. The CIA had access to analysis of this footage by the
Libyan Intelligence Service as early as September 18, 2012, and
those in the CIA who saw the video on that date concluded
immediately no protest occurred prior to the attacks. This
intelligence was not cited in the update assessment.
The manager of the analysts testified the analysts began
working on the piece before September 18. Given that fact--and
that the information cited in the updated assessment as
rationale for changing the assessment was available on
September 14, September 15, and September 19--why did it take
the CIA until September 24 to publish the piece?
The answer appears to be the piece was held up in
interagency coordination. The analysts did not want an
interagency partner to file a formal dissent. The manager of
the analysts testified:
And, frankly, the WIRe that ran on the 24th actually
got held up for 2 days in Coordination, trying to
convince people in the IC [Intelligence Community], who
hadn't seen this video yet because it wasn't back in
country, that there were no protests.\364\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 75-77, 92-95.
Other interagency partners--specifically the State
Department--did not trust the Libyan government's assessment of
the video, even though CIA officials in Tripoli had seen the
actual video footage and concurred with the assessment.\365\
This distrust held up interagency coordination of the piece for
several days. It was not until September 24 when the actual
video footage arrived at CIA headquarters, allowing for
dissemination to other interagency partners.\366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\365\Id. at 75-77.
\366\[Redacted text].
September 28 ODNI Statement
On September 28, 2012, Shawn Turner, Director of Public
Affairs, Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
released a statement on the intelligence related to the
Benghazi terrorist attacks. That statement read in full:
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on U.S.
personnel and facilities in Benghazi, Libya, the
Intelligence Community launched a comprehensive effort
to determine the circumstances surrounding the assault
and to identify the perpetrators. We also reviewed all
available intelligence to determine if there might be
follow-on attacks against our people or facilities in
Libya or elsewhere in the world.
As the Intelligence Community collects and analyzes
more information related to the attack, our
understanding of the event continues to evolve. In the
immediate aftermath, there was information that led us
to assess that the attack began spontaneously following
protests earlier that day at our embassy in Cairo. We
provided that initial assessment to Executive Branch
officials and members of Congress, who used that
information to discuss the attack publicly and provide
updates as they became available. Throughout our
investigation we continued to emphasize that
information gathered was preliminary and evolving.
As we learned more about the attack, we revised our
initial assessment to reflect new information
indicating that it was a deliberate and organized
terrorist attack carried out by extremists. It remains
unclear if any group or person exercised overall
command and control of the attack, and if extremist
group leaders directed their members to participate.
However, we do assess that some of those involved were
linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al-
Qa'ida. We continue to make progress, but there remain
many unanswered questions. As more information becomes
available our analysis will continue to evolve and we
will obtain a more complete understanding of the
circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack.
We continue to support the ongoing FBI investigation
and the State Department review of the Benghazi
terrorist attack, providing the full capabilities and
resources of the Intelligence Community to those
efforts. We also will continue to meet our
responsibility to keep Congress fully and currently
informed. For its part, the Intelligence Community will
continue to follow the information about the tragic
events in Benghazi wherever it leads. The President
demands and expects that we will do this, as do
Congress and the American people. As the Intelligence
Community, we owe nothing less than our best efforts in
this regard, especially to the families of the four
courageous Americans who lost their lives at Benghazi
in service of their country.\367\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\367\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel.,
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on
the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-
releases/96-press-releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-
of-public-affairs-on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
Even though the issue of protests was heavily debated in
the public at the time, the statement does not specifically
address whether or not a protest occurred prior to the
attacks--doing so would have undercut Rice's statements on the
talk shows twelve days before. In addition, the issue of
protests was not an ``analytical focal point''\368\ for the
intelligence community and was more of a ``subsidiary issue''
to them.\369\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\368\Olsen Testimony at 119.
\369\Olsen Testimony at 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather, the statement only mentions it was a ``deliberate
and organized terrorist attack''\370\--still leaving open the
possibility protests may have occurred. The statement did not
mention anything about the internet video, let alone any
connection between the video and Benghazi attacks. The
statement, issued by the intelligence community and not the
White House or State Department, did not connect the two
events.\371\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel.,
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on
the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-
releases/96-press-releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-
of-public-affairs-on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
\371\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As public statements tend to be, this statement was
carefully worded. It notes only the initial intelligence
community assessment that it ``began spontaneously following
protests earlier that day at our embassy in Cairo.''\372\ This
wording can be directly tied to language in the September 13
WIRe.\373\ The statement does not say, however, the
intelligence community ever assessed that protests or
demonstrations had occurred prior to the Benghazi attacks--
something repeatedly mentioned by Rice on the talk shows. That
is because, aside from the errant title in the September 13
WIRe, the intelligence community never formally coordinated
such an assessment in writing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\Id.
\373\September 13 WIRe, supra note 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The statement also says ``[a]s we learned more about the
attack, we revised our initial assessment to reflect new
information indicating that it was a deliberate and organized
terrorist attack carried out by extremists. . . . we do assess
that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated
with, or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.''\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\374\Press Release, Office of the Dir. of National Intel.,
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on
the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate
in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/
newsroom/press-releases/96-press-
releases-2012/731-statement-by-the-odni-s-director-of-public-affairs-
on-
intelligence-related-to-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-in-
benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given that the intelligence leading to the new assessment
was more than a week old, and in some cases even older, why,
then, did ODNI wait until September 28, 2012 to issue this
statement? The answer lies in emails between senior
administration officials.
The genesis for ODNI's statement occurred the day before as
a result of a press report. The article, published on September
27, 2012 said the following:
URGENT: U.S. intelligence officials knew from Day One
that the assault on the U.S. Consulate in Libya was a
terrorist attack and suspect Al Qaeda-tied elements
were involved, sources told Fox News--though it took
the administration a week to acknowledge it.
The account conflicts with claims on the Sunday after
the attack by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Susan Rice that the administration believed the strike
was a ``spontaneous'' event triggered by protests in
Egypt over an anti-Islam film.
Sources said the administration internally labeled the
attack terrorism from the first day to enable a certain
type of policy response and that officials were looking
for one specific suspect.
In addition, sources confirm that FBI agents have not
yet arrived in Benghazi in the aftermath of the
attack.\375\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\Email from Peter Velz, Media Monitor, White House, to DL-WHO-
Press, et al. (Sept. 27, 2012, 10:15 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05415305).
Upon seeing the article that morning, McDonough forwarded
it to Robert Cardillo, Deputy Director, Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, Morell, and John Brennan,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Counterterrorism Advisor to the President. McDonough wrote:
Hey, guys,
This is the third report making this assertion. Is this
correct?
Thanks,
Denis\376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\Email from Mr.McDonough, to Mr. Cardillo and Mr. Morell (Sept.
27, 2012, 10:57 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305).
Cardillo responded, including Olsen and Nick Rasmussen,
Deputy Director, National Counterterrorism Center. Cardillo
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
wrote:
I am fairly sure the answer is `no.' And I've asked
Matt and Nick to lay out on a timeline the evolution of
our IC assessments from 12 September on. They're on cc
so I'll ask when that can be ready. Robert.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\377\Email from Mr. Cardillo to Mr. McDonough, et al. (Sept. 27,
2012, 11:23 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305).
It is unclear which assertion McDonough and Cardillo were
referring to, although Olsen told the Committee he believed
from the beginning the assault on the U.S. facilities in
Benghazi was a terrorist attack,\378\ and Morell testified that
``[i]n the minds of the [CIA] analysts from the get-go, this
was a terrorist attack, and I think that is reflected in what
they wrote.''\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\Olsen Testimony at 100.
\379\Morell Testimony at 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Olsen responded to the email, writing:
All-
As Robert suggests, I think the best way to approach
this is to review and memorialize exactly what we were
saying from the onset of the attack going forward.
We've got a chronological catalog of all finished
intelligence on the attack. And we'll put together
today a time line summary that sets forth all key
points and analytic judgments as they developed from 9/
11 through the present. Nick and I will get started on
the time line right away.
--Matt\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\Email from Mr. Olsen to Mr. Cardillo, et al. (Sept. 27, 2012,
12:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05415305).
That evening, Cardillo responded. He sent his response to
the group, but also included Turner and Rexon Ryu. Cardillo
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
wrote:
NCTC has already made great progress in documenting the
chronology of what we knew and what we published. My
reading of that draft is that we can easily debunk Fox
and refute the hits on Susan's statements on Sunday, 16
Sep. As I read the laydown, her comments were
consistent with our intel assessment at that time. . .
.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\Email from Mr. Cardillo to Mr. Olsen, Mr. McDonough, & Mr.
Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:47 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05415305).
McDonough responded to the email, and included Rhodes in
the email chain. In his response, McDonough included another
article from ABC News. The title of the ABC News article was
``Some Administration Officials Were Concerned About Initial
White House Push Blaming Benghazi Attack on Mob, Video'' and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
read, in part:
Even before Defense Secretary Leon Panetta contradicted
the initial story about the attack on the U.S.
consulate in Benghazi, Libya, today, Obama
administration officials told ABC News they were
concerned after the White House began pushing the line
that the attack was spontaneous and not the work of
terrorists. . . . Panetta today said that the attack
that killed four Americans on the anniversary of 9/11
was not only carried out by terrorists--it was pre-
meditated. . . .
The White House first suggested the attack was
spontaneous--the result of an anti-Muslim video that
incited mobs throughout the region. . . .
But sources told ABC News that intelligence officials
on the ground immediately suspected the attack was not
tied to the movie at all. . . .
As of Thursday afternoon, officials from the Obama
administration were not even 100 percent certain that
the protest of the anti-Muslim film in Benghazi
occurred outside the U.S. diplomatic post.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\382\Email from Mr. McDonough to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr.
Rhodes, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:49 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
McDonough wrote of this article, ``The piece immediately
below led ABC World News Tonight today. It is really
galling.''\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhodes responded three minutes later. He wrote:
I believe that we need something tomorrow. There is a
narrative that is being aggressively pushed that the
White House and Susan Rice deliberately misrepresented
facts, which is being confirmed by anonymous
intelligence sources and administration officials. In
the absence of an affirmative statement that this has
been an evolving set of facts guided by our increasing
understanding of what took place, that narrative will
only harden further. Already, it is a bell that is
going to be very difficult to unring.\384\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. McDonough, Mr. Olsen, Mr.
Cardillo, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:52 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
In essence, Rhodes wanted to put out a statement not for
the reason of informing the public about the updated
intelligence assessment relating to the attacks, but to refute
allegations Rice and the White House ``deliberately
misrepresented facts.''\385\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\385\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. McDonough, Mr. Cardillo, Mr.
Olsen, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:56 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhodes emailed the group again less than twenty minutes
later, stating:
Again, I believe we have a very credible case that all
we have done is follow the facts and inform people of
those facts, while prioritizing the need for
investigations to run their course. However, that case
is being lost amidst the leaks of information (correct
and incorrect) and uninformed assertions coming from a
variety of places.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\386\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. McDonough, Mr.
Olsen, and Mr. Morell (Sept. 27, 2012, 8:15 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
Two things about Rhodes' response are noteworthy. One, he
acknowledges some of the leaks are ``correct,'' although he
does not identify which ones; and two, he writes ``I believe we
have a very credible case that all we have done is follow the
facts.''\387\ ``Credible case'' is hardly a definitive, full-
throated defense of the administration's handling of the public
explanation for the attacks in Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\387\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following morning Olsen emailed the group that he had
provided a draft statement to Turner for eventual release.
Rhodes responded, writing:
Thank you for working this, as the most important thing
is having a public baseline--informed by the facts--
that we can all point to. We are well synched up with
Shawn Turner as well.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr.
McDonough, Mr. Morell (Sept. 28, 2012, 10:43 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
Rhodes testified to the Committee about his recollection of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
this statement:
Well, my recollection is that there was an interest in
providing a statement that clarified our understanding
and the evolution of our understanding of the events in
Benghazi that that statement was to be prepared by the
intelligence community. I work with them in my
coordinating role as they were preparing that
statement.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\Rhodes Testimony at 137.
Rhodes' email that they are ``synched up'' with
Turner,\390\ and his testimony that he was in his
``coordinating role'' as the statement was prepared,\391\
serves as a reminder the White House played a central role in
the drafting of this statement--a statement that, by Rhodes'
own admission, served not to inform the public but rather to
push back against a narrative that the White House and Rice
deliberately misrepresented facts. The statement itself,
however, according to Olsen, was ``speaking on behalf of the
intelligence community at that point and not really beyond
that.''\392\ The White House's involvement in the creation of
the statement--through McDonough, Brennan, and Rhodes--
continues to raise questions as to who ultimately controlled
the message regarding Benghazi coming out of not just the
intelligence community but the executive branch as a whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\Email from Mr. Rhodes to Mr. Cardillo, Mr. Olsen, Mr.
McDonough, Mr. Morell (Sept. 28, 2012, 10:43 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05415305).
\391\Rhodes Testimony at 137.
\392\Olsen Testimony at 117.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE LANDSCAPE
The political import of the attacks on the presidential
campaign of 2012 is not a subject of the committee's
investigation. Nevertheless, the House of Representatives did
direct the Committee to investigate and study ``internal and
public executive branch communications about the
attacks.''\393\ It would be naive to assume this or any
administration's public statements about a significant foreign
policy event would be made without full awareness of the
political effect of those statements. It is necessary to place
the attacks and the administration's statements about them in
context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\H. Res. 567 113th Congress Section 3(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Benghazi terrorist attacks occurred not only on the
anniversary of the Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks but also in
the middle of the 2012 presidential campaign. The first
presidential debate was 22 days away and the election was 56
days away. The killing of a U.S. Ambassador in the line of
duty--which had not occurred in 33 years--and three other
Americans would inevitably become an issue in the campaign and
even be discussed at the presidential debate on October 16,
2012.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, Comm'n on Presidential
Debates (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-
16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidential-debate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to the attacks, the President and the Secretary of
State took credit for the Administration's record in the war on
terror, the perceived success of the intervention in Libya, and
the toppling of its dictator, Muammar Qadhafi.\395\ Nearly four
years had passed without a significant incident at home or
abroad, and killing Osama bin Laden represented an historic
victory.\396\ The President pointed to these successes in his
campaign, including in a speech five days prior to the attacks:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Obama makes war policy an election
strength, CNN (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/24/politics/
obama-foreign-policy.
\396\Id.
In a world of new threats and new challenges, you can
choose leadership that has been tested and proven. Four
years ago, I promised to end the war in Iraq: We did. I
promised to refocus on the terrorists who actually
attacked us on 9/11. We have. We've blunted the
Taliban's momentum in Afghanistan, and in 2014, our
longest war will be over. A new tower rises above the
New York skyline, al-Qaeda is on the path to defeat,
and Osama bin Laden is dead.\397\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\President Barack Obama, Speech at 2012 Democratic National
Convention (Sept. 6, 2012).
The Benghazi attacks could certainly affect public
perception of the administration's record in the war on terror
and the narrative of success in Libya. Almost immediately, the
press began asking questions about whether Benghazi represented
a failure of the President's policies. In a press conference
the day after the attacks, a reporter asked Carney directly:
``Jay, is the U.S. doing something wrong policy-wise in Libya
that brings this [the attack] on? Or is the policy fine, it's
just this particular event?''\398\ One publication summed up
the situation by saying, ``with the American Presidential
election only two months away, the murder of four Americans
serving their government overseas could be a game changer so
far as Mr. Obama's re-election prospects are concerned.''\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jay Carney en route Las Vegas,
NV, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Sept. 12, 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/press-gaggle-
press-secretary-jay-carney-en-route-las-vegas-nv-9122012.
\399\Con Coughlin, The Murder of the US Ambassador to Libya is a
Wake-up Call for Obama, The Daily Telegraph (Sept. 12, 2012), http://
blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100180611/murder-of-us-
ambassador-is-a-wake-up-call-for-obama.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The attacks remained an issue throughout the campaign
including at the second presidential debate where former
Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney used the attacks to question
the administration's Middle East policy generally:
And this [the Benghazi attacks] calls into question the
president's whole policy in the Middle East. Look
what's happening in Syria, in Egypt, now in Libya.
Consider the distance between ourselves and--and
Israel, the president said that--that he was going to
put daylight between us and Israel.
We have Iran four years closer to a nuclear bomb.
Syria--Syria's not just a tragedy of 30,000 civilians
being killed by a military, but also a strategic--
strategically significant player for America.
The president's policies throughout the Middle East
began with an apology tour and--and--and pursue a
strategy of leading from behind, and this strategy is
unraveling before our very eyes.\400\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, Commission on Presidential
Debates (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-
16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidential-debate
Shortly after this statement, the candidates and the
moderator debated whether the President called the Benghazi
attacks a terrorist attack from day one.\401\ The President's
Rose Garden remarks were not his only public comments about the
attacks on September 12. The President also taped a 60 Minutes
interview the same day, which aired on September 23.\402\
During the interview the President said it was ``too early to
tell'' when asked about his Rose Garden remarks and whether the
attacks were terrorism.\403\ The question and the President's
answer were not included in the broadcast version because the
interview was edited.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\401\October 16, 2012 Debate Transcript, Comm'n on Presidential
Debates (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-
16-2012-the-second-obama-romney-presidential-debate; Press Release, The
White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on
the Deaths of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-
deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya.
\402\Dylan Byers & MacKenzie Weinger, CBS under fire for withhold
Obama's Benghazi remarks, Politico (Nov. 5, 2012), http://
www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/11/cbs-under-fire-for-withholding-
obamas-benghazi-remarks-148513.
\403\Id.
\404\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three days after the second debate, CBS posted additional
portions of the 60 Minutes transcript from the interview with
the President on September 12, 2012.\405\ The portion of the
President refusing to call it a terrorist attack was still
absent. It was not until November 6, 2012, two days before the
election, when CBS finally posted publicly for the first time
the entire transcript of the President's interview on September
12, 2012.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\Id.
\406\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President of CBS News at the time, David Rhodes, is the
brother of Ben Rhodes, who helped prepare the President for the
second debate.\407\ While Ben Rhodes denied to the Committee he
talked with anybody at CBS prior to the September 23, 2012,
airing of the President's interview, he did not know whether
others in the White House did. Rhodes also did not testify as
to whether or not he spoke with anybody at CBS after September
23, 2012, regarding the posting of the transcript to CBS'
website. He testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\Helene Cooper, Obama's Prep Session Goal: Don't Repeat
Mistakes of Last Debate, N.Y. Times (Oct. 14, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/politics/a-serious-debate-prep-
session-for-obama.html?_r=0.
Q: And you may recall there was some bit of controversy
over the interview that was actually aired by CBS
because it did not include a portion of the President's
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
remarks. Do you remember that?
A: I have a recollection that there was some
controversy about that, yes.
Q: Did you or anybody else on your staff have any
conversations with CBS about that 60 Minutes interview?
A: I did not excuse me, what's the in what time period
are you talking about?
Q: Prior to it airing?
A: I did not have any conversations with CBS after the
interview taped prior to it aired.
Q: Did anybody on your staff?
A: Generally, when we have interviews like that with
the President, the contacts with the network are
handled by the White House press in the communications
office, not the NSC.
Q: Do you know if any of those communications actually
occurred?
A: I don't know.\408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\Rhodes Testimony at 118-19.
On October 1, 2012, the Secretary of State forwarded a
Salon article titled ``GOP's October Surprise?'' which alleged
Romney planned to attack the President as weak on
terrorism.\409\ Sidney Blumenthal emailed the article to the
Secretary and took credit for it getting it ``done and
published.''\410\ The Secretary forwarded the email to Sullivan
with the instruction, ``Be sure Ben knows they need to be ready
for this line of attack.'' Sullivan responded: ``Will
do.''\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\409\Craig Unger, GOP's October surprise?, Salon (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/10/01/gops_october_surprise.
\410\See Email from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary R. Clinton
(``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 1, 2012, 9:30 AM)
(on file with the Committee, SCB0045545) (``Got done and published.'').
\411\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir.
of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''),
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 1, 2012, 3:37 PM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0045545).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House told the Committee they would not allow the
Committee to ask about this email during the Committee's
interview with Rhodes, citing executive privilege and noting
that preparing for a debate was a ``core executive
function.''\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\Phone Call between Office of White House Counsel and Committee
Staff (Jan. 30, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIXING INTELLIGENCE WITH POLITICS
In the months after the Benghazi attacks, politics
continued to play a role in assigning blame for what had
occurred and who said what. In addition to the usual politics
of Republicans and Democrats lobbing accusations at one
another, however, a different, quieter, type of politics was
taking place regarding Benghazi: internal politics. At the
center of it all was Morell.
The Setup
On November 27, 2012, amid speculation the President would
nominate her to become the next Secretary of State, Rice
traveled to Capitol Hill to meet with three Senators to discuss
her September 16 appearances on the Sunday talk shows.\413\
Accompanying Rice to that meeting was Morell, who was at the
time Acting Director of the CIA. Morell described why he
attended the meeting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\Ed O'Keefe, Susan Rice, CIA director meet with GOP critics on
Libya, Wash. Post (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/11/27/susan-rice-cia-
director-meet-with-gop-critics-on-libya.
Q: Can you just generally describe what the purpose of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that meeting was?
A: Yes. So I got a phone call from Denis McDonough, who
was then the deputy national security advisor. He told
me that--of course I knew from the media that Susan was
under attack for what she had said on the Sunday shows.
He told me that Susan wanted to go to the Hill and have
conversations with her critics. He told me that the
President wanted me to go along with her. He made very
clear to me that my job in going along with her was to
talk about the classified analysis, to talk about the
talking points, and importantly, to show, to actually
show the Senators the consistency between the talking
points and the classified analysis. That's what he told
me my job was. And I said yes and I went.\414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\Morell Testimony at 202-203.
Morell agreed to the President's request and attended the
meeting with Rice. In his book, however, Morell wrote: ``In
retrospect, attending the meeting was a mistake. The meeting
was inherently political, and by attending, I inserted myself
into a political issue . . . That is not where an intelligence
officer should be.''\415\ Morell told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\Morell, supra note 114, at 235.
Q: Did you think your presence there was requested to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
insulate or protect Susan Rice in any way?
A: I think my--I think my presence there was to show
that what she said, right, about Benghazi was
consistent, right, at least the protest, spontaneity
part, right, was consistent with what the analysts
really believed.
Q: I guess what I'm trying to get at it, do you think
in any way--I mean you're a career analyst, you're
known or so I've heard you're known around the
community as a very straight shooting, as a straight
shooter, you call it like you see it. So the fact that
you were accompanying her--did you know if the
Secretary of State at that point had announced that she
was going to step down? Do you know if Susan Rice at
that point----
A: Yes, I believe so, right? I believe that was the
whole point--in fact, that is what Denis said, right,
her possible nomination to be Secretary of State was at
risk, absolutely.
Q: --So it was a very inherently political meeting----
A: Yes, it was.
Q: --that you were inserting yourself or that you had
been asked to--it was a very inherently political
meeting that you had been asked to attend.
A: Yes. But, again, I didn't realize it at the time. I
really didn't. I didn't know I was walking myself into
this political setting.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\Morell Testimony at 205-206.
In addition to explaining to the Senators how Rice's
comments on the Sunday shows aligned with the intelligence at
the time, Morell's attendance at the meeting served another
purpose--it kept him at the forefront of the controversy
surrounding the Benghazi talking points. While Rice was the
administration's representative on the Sunday talk shows,
Morell was the individual who edited the CIA talking points
Rice says she relied on.\417\ Having public criticism targeted
towards Morell, a career intelligence official, instead of
Rice, a political appointee in a politically charged
environment, could be beneficial for a potential Secretary of
State nominee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\See, e.g., HPSCI White Paper Talking Points for Use with the
Media at 63 (Sept. 14, 2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/701145/white-house-e-mails-on-benghazi-talking-points.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Execution
In late 2012, Morell directed two internal CIA reviews take
place regarding the talking points. One review, called the
Analytic Line Review, went through each piece of CIA analysis
after the Benghazi attacks to determine how strong the
supporting evidence was for each of the analytic
assessments.\418\ The second review was about ``Lessons
Learned'' from the internal process of creating the talking
points for HPSCI.\419\Morell wanted to send these two internal
reviews to Congress.\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\Analytic Line Review, supra note 362.
\419\Lessons Learned, supra note 189.
\420\Morell Testimony at 208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell sent only the Analytic Line Review to Congress,
which was completed in January 2013. The White House would not
allow him to send the other document--containing drafts of the
talking points and the process through which they were
drafted--to Congress, ``citing executive privilege.''\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 19, 2013, Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, testified before
HPSCI.\422\ At the hearing, Litt provided the HPSCI Members two
packages of documents: one was a small package that contained
each draft version of the talking points, showing which changes
had been made from draft to draft; the other was a large
package of roughly 100 pages that contained interagency emails
regarding the drafting of the talking points. These documents
were shared with the HPSCI Members, yet Litt claimed they were
so sensitive that he took them back at the end of the
briefing;\423\ Members therefore would be unable to keep the
documents or make any copies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\Briefing--The Hon. Robert S. Litt (Benghazi Documents),
Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th
Cong. (2013).
\423\Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two months later, on May 15, 2013, however, everything
changed. The White House decided to release 100 pages of emails
related to the talking points.\424\ These were the same emails
Litt had provided to HPSCI two months prior yet took back at
the end of the hearing. In conjunction with the release, the
White House asked Morell to brief the press on the evolution of
the talking points. Just as he had when he accompanied Rice to
the November 2012 meeting, Morell complied.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\Jake Tapper, et al., White House releases Benghazi e-mails,
CNN (May 16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/15/politics/benghazi-
emails.
\425\Morell, supra note 114, at 207.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell talked to the Committee about the White House's
decision to release these emails:
Q: And so the fact that you were forbidden from sharing
an assessment with Congress over the possibility of
executive privilege and then all of a sudden the
documents were released publicly, did that seem to you
to be a pretty large turnaround?
A: So, you know, I don't remember, I simply don't
remember why, you know, why the shift, right, why all
of a sudden the administration decided to release these
publicly. I don't remember being part of those
discussions. I don't recall being part of those
discussions. So I don't know why they decided all of a
sudden to do it.
Q: Do you think it might have been politically
beneficial for them to all of a sudden release those
documents?
A: I think--I think--I'm speculating, now, okay, so
speculating--I think that the criticism kept going up
and up. The different theories about what was going on
kept on expanding right, and the White House wanted to
put that to rest by putting it all out there. That's my
guess.
Q: Did they put it all out there when they released
those talking points?
A: Not in my view.
Q: Can you elaborate on that?
A: Sure. So 2014, mid-2014, I open the newspaper and I
see Ben Rhodes' talking points from the 15th of
September, right, designed to prep Susan Rice for her
Sunday shows. And I say to myself, I have not seen
these things before. When I saw them in the media in
mid-2014 it was the first time I ever saw them.\426\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\Id. at 208-09.
The decision by the White House to release the talking
points pertaining to HPSCI and not the talking points drafted
by Rhodes had one major effect: it kept the spotlight on
Morell--who became front and center of this release by briefing
the press at the request of the White House--the CIA, and their
role in shaping the talking points. It also kept the spotlight
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
away from others. Morell acknowledged this in his testimony:
Q: And you said you feel that they should have been
released with the package of the CIA talking points.
What are the implications that they were not released
with the talking points, the package, and they're
coming out a year later? What does that mean?
A: I don't know, right, I don't know, the
counterfactual is hard to think through. I believe--I'm
speculating now, okay--I believe there would have been
less attention on CIA and more attention on the White
House.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\Id. at 217.
Around the same time, Morell lobbied the White House to
release video footage of the attack from the State Department
compound in Benghazi. Morell, aware of the public debate over
whether or not protests had occurred prior to attack, wanted
the footage released to provide transparency to the American
people so they could judge for themselves what had transpired
and quell the political firestorm. After all, it was after a
description of this video footage was shared with the CIA that
CIA personnel began to definitively conclude no protest had
occurred.\428\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\Email from [Tripoli [redacted text]] to [Near East Division]
(Sept. 18, 2012, 1:14 PM) (``I know that we all agree as time has
passed the pieces are starting to unravel particularly where there was
protests earlier that day--I think we can officially say now that there
were none.'') (on file with CIA, REQUEST 1-002940 to REQUEST 1-002943).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to Morell, James Clapper, Director, Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, also wanted the
surveillance tapes to be made public. The White House refused,
however, and to this day, the tapes remain classified. Morell
told the Committee:
Q: So you had seen the videos of the TMF, you had seen
NCTC analysis of the videos. Did you want those videos
to be released as well?
A: I did, I did.
Q: And was there anybody who agreed with you that those
videos should be declassified and released?
A: Yes, the DNI agreed with me.
Q: The DNI. When you say DNI, you're talking about DNI
Clapper?
A: Yes.
Q: Were those videos released?
A: No.
Q: Why did you want those videos released?
A: Because look, my view, not only strongly today
because of all of this, but even at the time, my view
is when there's--when there are questions about--when
there are questions about what was done on a particular
issue, particularly when there's questions of
impropriety, the best thing to do is to get everything
out, the best thing to do is to get all the information
you can out. Let the American people see it all and let
the American people decide.
You know, I thought the video--the NCTC analysis told
the story of what actually happened that night and I
thought the American people deserved to see it.
Q: And who prevented the video from being publicly
released?
A: The White House--the White House never responded to
the DNI and my repeated suggestions that it be
released.
Q: So you were acting director of the CIA at the time?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: And Mr. Clapper was the director for national
intelligence. And you two repeatedly pushed the White
House to release this video?
A: Yes.
Q: And they did not.
A: Correct.
Q: And instead they released the package, so to speak,
they released the package----
A: I don't remember the timing of our suggestion,
right? But, yes, you're absolutely right.
Q: So they released the package and at the time they
released the package they did not release [the Ben
Rhodes talking points], which is----
A: The video.
Q: They did not release the video.
A: And they did not release [the Ben Rhodes talking
points].\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\Morell Testimony at 210-11.
The Fallout
On April 17, 2014, the Rhodes talking points--which, in
addition to the talking points provided to HPSCI and edited by
Morell, were used by Rice to prepare for the Sunday talk
shows--were released to Congress.\430\ Later that month, the
talking points became publicized for the first time.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\Letter from Thomas B. Gibbons, Acting Ass't Sec'y of
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Rep. Darrell Issa,
Chairman, House Committee on Oversight and Gov. Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives (May 20, 2013) (on file with the Committee).
\431\Press Release, Judicial Watch, Benghazi Documents Point to
White House on Misleading Talking Points (Apr. 29, 2014), http://
www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-
benghazi-documents-point-white-house-misleading-talking-points.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Around the time of the November 27, 2012 meeting between
Rice and the three Senators, Lieberman said of Ambassador Rice:
I asked if she was briefed by the White House, the
campaign, or the political operation, and she said she
had seen no message points from the White House.''\432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\Ed O'Keefe, Susan Rice, CIA director meet with GOP critics on
Libya, Wash. Post (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/2chambers/wp/2012/11/27/susan-rice-cia-
director-meet-with-gop-critics-on-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above, Rice testified she only relied on the
talking points provided to HPSCI when discussing Benghazi on
the talk shows.\433\ Rhodes, however, conceded the third bullet
point in his talking points--``to show the U.S. would be
resolute in bringing to justice people who harm Americans, and
standing steadfast through these protests''--applied only to
Libya.\434\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\Krishnadev Calamur, Susan Rice Says Benghazi Claims Were Based
On Information From Intelligence, NPR (Nov. 21, 2012), http://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/11/21/165686269/susan-rice-says-
benghazi-claims-were-based-on-information-from-intelligence.
\434\Rhodes Testimony at 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell said he first learned about Rhodes' talking points
when he opened the newspaper. Morell, an intelligence officer
for over three decades, also believed the talking points
related to Benghazi. He told the Committee:
Q: Okay. So let me take that first statement. You
thought that these were related to Benghazi. I'm just
reading through it here on the first page, I don't see
Benghazi listed. Why do you think that they were
related to Benghazi?
A: Two reasons. One is Benghazi was what was on
everyone's mind at the time. Benghazi had just
happened, right, the previous Tuesday. This was the
following Sunday, right, it was the kind of top-of-the-
list issue. And two, the--there is a tick in here--let
me find it--so the third tick under ``goals,'' third
tick under ``goals'' says: ``To show that we will be
resolute in bringing people to harm Americans to
justice.'' That only happened in one place.
Q: And that was in Benghazi?
A: Yes.\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\Morell Testimony at 216-217.
After learning of the existence of these talking points,
Morell became bothered that Rhodes, a member of the National
Security Council staff, had drafted what Morell viewed as a
political document. Morell believes there should be a bright
line between national security and politics, and he views the
talking points drafted by Rhodes crossed that line. Morell
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q: Aside from the release of these talking points and
the release of the package, is there anything in, at
least under the goals and the top-lines, is there
anything about this document that makes you
uncomfortable as a CIA officer and career analyst?
A: Yeah. So, as you know, I'm on the record on this, so
the second goal, the second goal bothers me in two
ways. The first way it bothers me is that it has a
feeling of being political. It has a feeling of being
political, right? Blame it on this, not on that, right?
Just that concept of blame it on this and blame it on
that, not don't blame it on that, has a feeling of
being political to me.
Q: Ben Rhodes worked at the White House?
A: Yes.
Q: So what's the problem if he writes something that--
--
A: Because Ben is on the National Security Council
staff, right, and I believe, right, and there might be
different views out there, but I believe, as a 33-year
national security professional, that there should be a
very, very sharp line between national security and
politics. And I know that's not always the case, but
that's what I believe, right? And I believe that that
line was crossed here. That is a personal opinion,
right?
The second thing, right, the second thing I don't like
about that is the line, ``not a broader failure of
policy.'' The President himself is on the record as
saying that he has deep regrets about Libya. We all
have deep regrets about Libya. And I talked earlier
about the regrets that I have about what the
intelligence community should have written prior to the
intervention. There are policymakers have regrets about
what we did and didn't do in Libya, right, and the loss
of stability there.
And so, you know, I don't think ``and not a broader
failure of policy'' is correct as it relates to
Benghazi, as it relates to Libya. You can have a debate
about the rest of the region, but as it relates to
Libya and Benghazi I don't think that's right.\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\Id. at 218-19.
When asked about his central role in all of these events--
the meeting with Rice at the White House's request, briefing
the press at the White House's request after the release of the
drafts of the HPSCI talking points, and being in the dark for
nearly two years about the Rhodes talking points--Morell
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
Q: So we talked earlier about the meeting you had with
Senators McCain, Graham, Ayotte. We talked about how
the--at Denis McDonough's request, perhaps the
President's request, we talked about how you briefed
media members when the package was released. You have
been beaten up for a year and you briefed media members
at the request of the White House, is what I believe
you said. Did you feel in any way used by the White
House when you discovered that these talking points
also existed and you were completely kept in the dark
until the public found out about them?
A: Look, I wish I would have known about them, okay, I
wish I would have known about them.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\Id. at 222-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE FBI INVESTIGATION
Throughout the days and weeks after the attacks in
Benghazi, administration officials used the pending FBI
investigation as both a sword and a shield. When convenient,
officials such as Rice and Carney made reference to the
FBI.\438\ When inconvenient, administration officials cited the
ongoing FBI investigation as the reason they could not discuss
certain matters.\439\ On at least one occasion, an
administration official cited the FBI investigation as evidence
of a fact even though the FBI investigation had hardly begun.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\See, e.g., ``Face the Nation'' transcripts, September 16,
2012: Libyan Pres. Magariaf, Amb. Rice and Sen. McCain, CBS News (Sept.
16, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation-transcripts-
september-16-2012-libyan-pres-magariaf-amb-rice-and-sen-mccain (``. . .
there is an investigation that the United States government will launch
led by the FBI, that has begun and . . . they have already begun
looking at all sorts of evidence of--of various sorts already available
to them and to us.''), and Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay
Carney, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (Sept. 18,
2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/18/press-
briefing-secretary-jay-carney-9182012 (``There is an ongoing
investigation. The FBI is investigating. And that investigation will
follow the facts wherever they lead.'').
\439\See, e.g., Nuland Sept. 17 Briefing, supra note 326.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is worth nothing Ahmed Abu Khatallah was arrested in
June 2014.\440\ To date, he has still not been brought to
trial. It was 23 months after his arrest that the Justice
Department announced the Department would not seek the death
penalty for Khatallah.\441\ The Justice Department has,
however, made certain legal filings wherein the government's
theory of the case--hence its understanding of provable facts--
is on public display.\442\ The FBI investigation that
administration officials claimed would definitively answer
questions that emerged in the days and weeks after the attacks
is still ``ongoing''--two years after a single suspect was
arrested and nearly four years after Ambassador Chris Stevens,
Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty were killed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\Karen DeYoung, et al., U.S. captured Benghazi suspect in
secret raid, Wash. Post (June 17, 2014).
\441\Spencer Hsu, U.S. will not seek death penalty for accused
ringleader in Benghazi attacks, Wash. Post (May 10, 2016).
\442\Gov't's Motion for Pretrial Detention at 5-9, U.S. v.
Khatallah (E.D. Va July 1, 2014).
PART III:
Events Leading to the Benghazi Attacks
``Probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was
the
right thing to do in intervening in Libya.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\President Obama: Libya aftermath `worst mistake' of presidency,
BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
36013703.
The President, on what constituted the
biggest mis-
take of his Presidency, April 10, 2016
``When Qaddafi is himself removed, you should of course make a
public statement before the cameras wherever you are . . . You
must establish yourself in the historical record . . . The most
important phrase is `successful strategy.'''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Email from Sidney Blumenthal (``Sid'') to Hillary R. Clinton
(``H'') (Aug. 22, 2011, 11:25 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0051597).
Sidney Blumenthal to the Secretary of
State, August
22, 2011
``We came, we saw, he died.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Corbett Daly, Clinton on Qaddafi: ``We came, we saw, he died,''
CBS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-on-
qaddafi-we-came-we-saw-he-died.
The Secretary of State after the death
of Muammar
Qadhafi, October 20, 2011
``The American people and the U.S. Congress will be understand-
ably irritated if a revolution that the United States supported
ends
up spewing hatred or advocating violence against the United
States.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\See Email from Policy Planning staff, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Jake Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 29
2011, 5:01 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0060926-30) (attaching
Note for the Secretary re: U.S. Interests in post-Qadhafi Libya).
Jake Sullivan, August 29, 2011 Note for
the Secretary,
U.S. Interests in post-Qadhafi Libya
Introduction
John Christopher Stevens arrived in Benghazi, Libya on
April 5, 2011, in the midst of a civil war. Stevens traveled to
Benghazi from Malta by Greek cargo ship with $60,000 in
currency and an eight-member Diplomatic Security protective
detail. Also in the group was a junior reporting officer tasked
with conducting political reporting, and two members of the
Disaster Assistance Response Team from the United States Agency
for International Development. Stevens' only instruction was to
begin establishing contact with Libyan opposition forces
seeking to overthrow the government of the Colonel Muammar
Qadhafi. There was no military support for Stevens' arrival
because of President Barack H. Obama's ``no boots on the
ground'' policy, no protocol and no precedent to guide his
activities, and no physical facility to house him and his team.
Stevens' operation had an undefined diplomatic status and
duration, and no authorized set of contacts to work with. He
was asked to do a difficult job in a dangerous environment, and
he courageously accepted the call.
Although the civil war ended in August 2011 with the fall
of Tripoli, Libya was not officially liberated until October
23, 2011, after the death of Qadhafi.\5\ Even then the security
environment remained hazardous. In December 2011, the State
Department's own threat rating system considered Libya a grave
risk to American diplomats.\6\ The situation deteriorated from
there. In Benghazi alone, more than 60 major security incidents
took place between January 1, 2012 and September 10, 2012. More
than half of those security incidents occurred after April 6,
2012, the date of the first IED attack on the Benghazi Mission
compound.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\Press Statement, Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State, Liberation of Libya (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175999.htm.
\6\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent
10 (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:03 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05388931)
(discussing ``US Mission Benghazi threat levels''); see also U.S. Gov't
Accountability Off., GAO-14-655, Diplomatic Security: Overseas
Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to Gaps in Security-Related
Activities, Standards, and Policies (2014), available at http://
www.gao.gov/products.
\7\See Security Incidents in Benghazi, Libya from June 1, 2011 to
Aug. 20, 2012 (on file with the Committee); see also Benghazi Spot
Report, EAC and Significant Event Timeline (DS/IP/RD) (on file with the
Committee, C05394332).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As conditions worsened, the Benghazi Mission labored under
an unusual, if not unprecedented, set of circumstances and
conditions:
LFrom the beginning, senior Obama Administration
officials were divided about what degree of commitment to make
in Libya. A principal objective was to limit military
engagement: the administration's ``no boots on the ground''
policy prevailed throughout the Benghazi Mission's existence in
Libya. Apart from ``no boots on the ground,'' U.S. policy
remained indefinite and undefined throughout Stevens' tenure in
Benghazi.
LAfter the Qadhafi regime fell, the administration
sought to maintain a ``light footprint'' in the country,
determined to avoid an extended state-building engagement.
LBecause the Benghazi Mission existed in a state
of diplomatic uncertainty--never having a clearly defined
status--it was not required to meet security standards
applicable to permanent U.S. embassies.
LBenghazi had no clear lines of authority to
either Tripoli or Washington D.C. This delayed responses to
Mission requests for physical security measures and personnel.
LSenior officials in Washington D.C. did not heed
intelligence detailing the rise of extremists groups in
Benghazi and eastern Libya prior to September 11, 2012.
In an April 10, 2016 interview, the President called
``failing to prepare for the aftermath of the ousting of . . .
Muammar Gaddafi . . . the worst mistake of his presidency.''\8\
Expressing regret over ``failing to plan for the day after,''
the President called Libya a ``mess.''\9\ This section
describes the events, decisions, and non-decisions that led to
the terrorist attacks which killed Chris Stevens, Sean Smith,
Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\President Obama: Libya aftermath `worst mistake' of presidency,
BBC News (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
36013703.
\9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
STEPS TOWARD U.S. INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
February-March 2011: Early Debates and Decisions
The United States' intervention in Libya took root during
the Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests and
revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa occurring in
late 2010 and early 2011.\10\ The protests, inspired by
Tunisians, followed in Egypt and reached Yemen in late January
of 2011.\11\ Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was
removed on January 14, 2011, following a month of protests.\12\
In February 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
resigned.\13\ Four days later, on February 15, 2011, Libyans
staged their first demonstration in Benghazi.\14\ It evolved
into an armed conflict two days later, as loyalists of Qadhafi
attempted to quell the protests.\15\ A civil war then erupted.
As Joan A. Polaschik, then Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S.
Embassy in Tripoli, described: ``On Friday, in Tripoli, things
started to get a little tense, sporadic gunfire. Then Saturday
night, sustained gunfire, so we started having emergency action
committee meetings that Sunday at the Embassy to talk about
what our response should be.''\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Testimony of Benjamin I. Fishman, Director for North Africa and
Jordan, National Sec. Staff, Tr. at 15-16 (Jan. 12, 2016) [hereinafter
Fishman Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\11\Id. at 14; see generally, The Arab Spring: A Year of
Revolution, NPR (Dec. 18, 2011, 9:24 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/
17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution.
\12\Id.
\13\Id.
\14\Id.
\15\See Testimony of Joan A. Polaschik, U.S. Deputy Chief of
Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 18 (Aug. 12, 2015)
[hereinafter Polaschik Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (``Well,
the uprising really started on February 17 in Benghazi. I believe it
was a Thursday.'').
\16\Id. at 18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President publicly addressed the conditions in Libya on
February 23, 2011, stating: ``Secretary Clinton and I just
concluded a meeting that focused on the ongoing situation in
Libya. Over the last few days, my national security team has
been working around the clock to monitor the situation there
and to coordinate with our international partners about a way
forward.''\17\ He called the violence ``outrageous'' and
``unacceptable,'' asserted the protection of American citizens
was his highest priority, and added: ``I have also asked my
administration to prepare the full range of options that we
have to respond to this crisis.''\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\Jesse Lee, President Obama Speaks on the Turmoil in Libya:
``This Violence Must Stop,'' white house blog (Feb. 23, 2011), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/23/president-obama-speaks-turmoil-
libya-violence-must-stop (providing full transcript of the President's
remarks).
\18\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. suspended operations at the Embassy in Tripoli,
Libya on February 25, 2011.\19\ The suspension of operations
and evacuation were important for reasons beyond the safety of
the embassy personnel. Polaschik testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't
of State & Janet A. Sanderson, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, The Suspension of United
States Embassy Operations in Libya, U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 25,
2011),
http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2011/157173.htm. Jake Sullivan
indicated in an August 21, 2011 email to Cheryl Mills and Victoria
Nuland ``February 26--HRC directs efforts to evacuate all U.S. embassy
personnel from Tripoli and orders the closing of the embassy,'' but
this date appears to be contradicted by the Department's public
statement the previous day. See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of
Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of
Staff and Counselor to the U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State,
and Victoria J. Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 21,
2011, 07:39 PM) [hereinafter Tick Tock on Libya Email] (on file with
the Committee, SCB0045101).
I was very clear with the people on those policy
planning discussions that I felt very strongly that the
administration could not change its policy toward
Qadhafi until we got all of the U.S. employees out
safely because we did not have appropriate security at
our Embassy in Tripoli. It met none of our State
Department security standards.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\Polaschik Testimony at 19. The U.S. Government did not sever
diplomatic ties with Libya. Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State
for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State & Janet A. Sanderson, Deputy Ass't Sec'y
of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, The Suspension of United
States Embassy Operations in Libya, Dep't of State (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/m/rls/
remarks/2011/157173.htm. Rather, Ambassador Cretz and his staff worked
from Washington, D.C. on Libyan matters. Polaschik Testimony at 20-21.
The same day, the President issued an Executive Order
freezing the property in the United States of Qadhafi, his
family members, and senior officials of the Libyan
Government.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\Exec. Order No. 13566, 76 Fed. Reg. 11315 (Feb. 25, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 26, 2011, the international community responded
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, deploring
``gross and systematic violations of human rights'' and
demanding an end to the violence.\22\ The resolution also
imposed an arms embargo and travel restrictions, froze the
assets of Qadhafi and his inner circle, and referred the matter
to the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\S.C. Res. 1970, para. 1 (Feb. 26, 2011),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970
(2011).
\23\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton made calls to foreign
leaders to garner support for the resolution.\24\ She took an
active role in mobilizing forces against the Qadhafi regime.
Her staff described the efforts as ``instrumental in securing
the authorization, building the coalition, and tightening the
noose around Qadhafi and his regime.''\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\Tick Tock on Libya Email, supra note 19.
\25\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unofficial Commentary and Advice
During this period, the Secretary received extensive and
regular communications from Sidney S. Blumenthal. Blumenthal
frequently offered commentary about developments in Libya (as
well as more general commentary about other matters)--passing
on self-styled ``intelligence reports'' prepared by Tyler S.
Drumheller, a former official at the Central Intelligence
Agency\26\--and recommending various courses of U.S. action.
Although Blumenthal had been rejected by the White House for
employment at the Department of State, and admittedly had no
knowledge about Libya,\27\ Secretary Clinton responded to his
emails and in some cases forwarded them to her top policy aides
and career foreign service officers in the Department for their
reaction and comment. The Secretary described Blumenthal's
emails as ``unsolicited.''\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\Testimony of Sidney S. Blumenthal, Tr. at 67-68 (June 16, 2015)
[hereinafter Blumenthal Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\27\Id. at 99.
\28\Daniel Drezner, ``The Unbearable Lightness of Hillary Clinton's
Management Style,'' the Washington Post (May 20, 2015),
www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/20/the-unbearable-
lightness -of-hillary-clintons-management-style.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 21, 2011, two days prior to the President's
first public remarks on the matter,\29\ Blumenthal suggested
the U.S. ``might consider advancing [a no-fly zone]
tomorrow.''\30\ The Secretary forwarded the email to her Deputy
Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning, Jacob J.
Sullivan, and asked: ``What do you think of this idea?''\31\
Sullivan replied: ``[H]onestly, we actually don't know what is
happening from the air right now. As we gain more facts, we can
consider.''\32\ In response, the Secretary reflected on what
Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, noted publicly more than a week later, asking Sullivan:
``I've heard contradictory reports as to whether or not there
are planes flying and firing on crowds. What is the evidence
that they are?''\33\ The Secretary responded to Blumenthal:
``We are looking at that for Security Council, which remains
reluctant to `interfere' in the internal affairs of a country.
Stay tuned!''\34\ When the U.N. resolution was ultimately
introduced two weeks later, the U.S. strongly advocated for
passage of the no-fly zone.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\Jesse Lee, President Obama Speaks on the Turmoil in Libya:
``This Violence Must Stop,'' white house blog (Feb. 23, 2011), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/02/23/president-obama-speaks-turmoil-
libya-violence-must-stop (providing full transcript of the President's
remarks).
\30\Email from Sidney S. Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') to Hillary R.
Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 21, 2011,
10:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078044).
\31\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (Feb. 21, 2011, 10:42 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0078044).
\32\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
State (Feb. 22, 2011, 4:59 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0078044).
\33\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (Feb. 22, 2011, 6:34 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0078044).
\34\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 22, 2011, 6:09 AM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0078042).
\35\See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to ``jake.sullivan[REDACTED]'' (Mar. 16, 2011, 9:29AM)
(on file with the Committee, SCB0075861) (``We are going to be actively
engaged in New York today in discussions about the best course of
action for the international community to take, including through the
UN Security Council.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 25, 2011, Blumenthal suggested other means of
pressuring the Libyan leadership:
Depending on the state of play within the U.N. Security
Council, it might be useful to think about generating a
statement from the UNSC that any officer or government
official in the chain of command in Libya who is
involved in deploying or using WMD would be subject to
war crimes and crimes against humanity prosecution.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\Email from Sidney S. Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') to Hillary R.
Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 25, 2011,
7:16 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078066).
The Secretary forwarded the suggestion to Sullivan, asking:
``What about including this in UNSCR?''\37\ The following day,
Blumenthal sent the Secretary another unofficial
``intelligence'' report that began with a note: ``This report
is in part a response to your questions. There will be further
information coming in the next day.''\38\ The Secretary
forwarded the information to Sullivan with the request not to
``share until we can talk.''\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (Feb. 26, 2011, 11:34 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0078066).
\38\Email from Sidney S. Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') to Hillary R.
Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 26, 2011,
10:58) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078104).
\39\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning (Mar. 2,
2011, 7:18 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078121).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a later email, Blumenthal suggested: ``Someone should
contact Mahmod Jipreel [Mahmoud Jibril]. He is balanced, level-
headed and understands the situation well.''\40\ The Secretary
forwarded the note to Sullivan, indicating she thought ``we''
were reaching out to the individuals Blumenthal had
suggested.\41\ Even though Jibril was on the list Blumenthal
sent earlier, Sullivan responded: ``I don't know about this
Jipreel fellow.''\42\ It was the ``hastily scheduled'' and
``behind closed doors'' meeting between the Secretary and
Jibril in Paris just one week later\43\ that helped prompt the
Secretary to become a leading advocate for Libyan
intervention.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\Email from Sidney S. Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') to Hillary R.
Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 7, 2011,
10:29 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078150-0078153).
\41\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (Mar. 7, 2011, 7:17 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0087150-0078153).
\42\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
State (Mar. 7, 2011, 7:22 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0077210).
\43\Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Meets in Paris With Libyan Rebel
Leader, N.Y. Times (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/
world/africa/15clinton.html.
\44\Joby Warrick, Hillary's war: How conviction replaced skepticism
in Libya intervention, Wash. Post (Oct. 30, 2011), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hillarys-war-how-
conviction-replaced-skepticism-in-libya-intervention/2011/10/28/
gIQAhGS7WM_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Libya Options''
On March 8, 2011, Sullivan sent an email titled ``Libya
Options'' to senior State Department officials.\45\ In the
email, he described the Department's ``preferred end-state in
Libya, at the most basic level.''\46\ The email spelled out
five ``successively more intrusive'' strategic frameworks
outlining various options against Qadhafi:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to James B. Steinberg, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, et al. (Mar. 8, 2011, 8:13 PM) [hereinafter Libya
Options Email](on file with the Committee, C05886430).
\46\Id.
1. LProvide material support to the Libyan opposition
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
but take no direct offensive action;
2. LProvide material support to the Libyan opposition
and take only that direct action which is nonlethal and
designed to shape the theater rather than take the
fight to Qadhafi;
3. LAll options consistent with broad regional support
and a clear legal basis;
4. LOffensive aerial options but no ground troops; and
5. LWhatever necessary to remove Qadhafi.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\Id. A sixth option presented ``focusing not on actions against
Qadhafi but on a negotiated solution'' was to ``Leverage a stalemate
into some kind of negotiated solution, or at least a process.'' Id.
In addition, Sullivan identified a number of immediate
goals to be accomplished through intervention, something he
noted was sent over to the National Security Staff. The
immediate goal listed first was ``to avoid a failed state,
particularly one in which al-Qaeda and other extremists might
take safe haven.''\48\ Another immediate goal was ``[w]e seek
the prevention of an exodus of Libyans.''\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\Id.
\49\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department and other top officials expressed
concern about the options, especially establishing a no-fly
zone without military intervention.\50\ For example, the
Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, the National Security
Advisor, Thomas E. Donilon, and others ``opposed military
action, contending the United States had no clear national
interests at stake and that operations could last far longer
and cost more lives than anyone anticipated.''\51\ A senior
State Department official warned he did not ``think that we've
ever established a NFZ [no fly zone] anywhere where we didn't
ultimately have to go in militarily and stay for a long time
(Iraq, Bosnia, implicitly Afghanistan, Kosovo).''\52\ The
official suggested a better option would be to stand by, ``not
get pulled into more Middle East wars,'' and gain a ``better
sense of what post use-of-force end state looks like.''\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\See id. (sent from Philip H. Gordon on Mar. 9, 2011, 9:37 AM)
(Philip Gordon stating ``would also point out I don't think we've ever
established a NFZ anywhere where we didn't go have to go in militarily
and stay for a long time (Iraq, Bosnia, implicitly Afghanistan,
Kosovo).'').
\51\Kevin Sullivan, A Tough Call on Libya That Still Haunts, Wash.
Post (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/02/
03/a-tough-call-on-libya-that-still-haunts.
\52\Libya Options Emails, supra note 45 (Sent from Philip H. Gordon
on Mar. 9, 2011, 9:37 AM) (Philip Gordon stating ``would also point out
I don't think we've ever established a NFZ anywhere where we didn't go
have to go in militarily and stay for a long time (Iraq, Bosnia,
implicitly Afghanistan, Kosovo).'').
\53\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President convened a meeting with his National Security
Council to discuss the situation. Ultimately, he sided with the
Secretary of State, who favored some level of intervention.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to ``jake.sullivan[REDACTED]'' (Mar. 16, 2011, 9:29AM)
(on file with the Committee, SCB0075861) (``Last night, the President
led a meeting with his national security team on the situation in Libya
and the way forward.''); see also Kevin Sullivan, A Tough Call on Libya
That Still Haunts, Wash. Post (Feb. 3, 2016), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2016/02/03/a-tough-call-on-libya-
that-still-haunts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior officials still cited complications. State
Department policymakers did not see the question as simply one
of how to ``pressure and isolate Qadhafi.''\55\ Philip H.
Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, framed the situation as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Email from Special Ass't to Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of
State (Mar. 28, 2011, 8:13 PM) [hereinafter Libya Q & A for S London
Trip 32811] (on file with the Committee, SCB0075863-0075871).
As I noted, it seems to me fundamental [sic] initial
decision for us is which is greater strategic priority:
a) avoiding getting pulled into Libyan conflict and
owning it; or b) bringing about quick end of Qaddafy
regime. So far we have rightly sought to achieve both
of these objectives at the same time but with each
passing day, as regime gets upper hand, it is forcing
us to choose between them. As Jim [Deputy Secretary of
State James B. Steinberg] pointed out it is always
possible that developments on the ground force you
later on to abandon such a first principle (as in
Kosovo when two months of ineffective air strikes led
us to reconsider the determination not to use ground
forces) but knowing the objective in advance would help
guide the operational decisions in the meantime. If
it's a) we need to be ultra-cautious about steps
designed to make it look like we are doing something
but will not prove decisive (NFZ); and if it's b) we
need to understand the risks and costs of establishing
that as a redline.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\Libya Options Emails, supra note 45 (Sent from Philip H. Gordon
on Mar. 9, 2011, 9:37 AM).
Sullivan concurred, saying: ``[W]e have not already
embraced objective (b)'' and further responded: ``I agree with
you about the fundamental initial decision, although I don't
think it's as simple as (a) or (b). It will inevitably be a
calibration between the two. I agree with Jim that we can get
drawn in some but not all the way, as long as we have a strong
theory of the case to rest on.''\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Id. (Sent from Jacob J. Sullivan on Mar. 9, 2011, 10:33 AM)
(emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing U.S. Policy
A week later, on March 17, 2011, the United Nations
Security Council adopted Security Council Resolution 1973,
demanding an immediate ceasefire and authorizing member states
to ``take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack,'' specifically
including a no fly zone.\58\ On March 18, 2011, the President
announced: ``If Qaddafi does not comply with the resolution,
the international community will impose consequences, and the
resolution will be enforced through military action.''\59\ He
emphasized: ``I also want to be clear about what we will not be
doing. The United States is not going to deploy ground troops
into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a
well-defined goal--specifically, the protection of civilians in
Libya.''\60\ The President added: ``Our focus has been clear:
protecting innocent civilians within Libya, and holding the
Qadhafi regime accountable.''\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\S.C. Res. 1973, para. 4 (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.un.org/
press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#
Resolution.
\59\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
The White House, Remarks by the President on the Situation in Libya
(Mar. 18, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/
18/remarks-president-situation-libya.
\60\Id.
\61\Id. President Obama further detailed what specific steps he
believed Qadhafi needed to meet to comply with the resolution:
The resolution that passed lays out very clear conditions
that must be met. The United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Arab states agree that a cease-fire must be
implemented immediately. That means all attacks against
civilians must stop. Qaddafi must stop his troops from
advancing on Benghazi, pull them back from Ajdabiya,
Misrata, and Zawiya, and establish water, electricity and
gas supplies to all areas. Humanitarian assistance must be
allowed to reach the people of Libya. Let me be clear,
these terms are not negotiable.
To implement this policy, the President announced he had
``directed Secretary Gates and our military to coordinate their
planning, and tomorrow Secretary Clinton will travel to Paris
for a meeting with our European allies and Arab partners about
the enforcement of Resolution 1973.''\62\ The next day, March
19, 2011, ``U.S. military forces commenced operations to assist
an international effort authorized by the United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council . . . to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe
and address the threat posed to international peace and
security by the crisis in Libya.''\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\Id. Secretary Clinton's staff later noted that, surrounding
these events, Secretary Clinton ``participates in a series of high-
level video and teleconferences. . . . She is a leading voice for
strong UNSC action and a NATO civilian protection mission.'' Tick Tock
on Libya Email, supra note 19.
\63\Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate Regarding
the Commencement of Operations in Libya (Mar.
21, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/
letter-president-regarding-
commencement-operations-libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two days later, on March 21, 2011, the President formally
notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate of these operations.\64\ In
his letter, the President stated the nature and purpose of
these operations as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\Id.
As part of the multilateral response authorized under
U.N. Security Council resolution 1973, U.S. military
forces, under the command of Commander, U.S. Africa
Command, began a series of strikes against air defense
systems and military airfields for the purposes of
preparing a no-fly zone. These strikes will be limited
in their nature, duration and scope. Their purpose is
to support an international coalition as it takes all
necessary measures to enforce the terms of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1973. These limited U.S.
actions will set the stage for further action by other
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
coalition partners.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973
authorized Member States, under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, to take all necessary measures to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of
attack in Libya, including the establishment and
enforcement of a ``no-fly zone'' in the airspace of
Libya. United States military efforts are discrete and
focused on employing unique U.S. military capabilities
to set the conditions for our European allies and Arab
partners to carry out the measures authorized by the
U.N. Security Council Resolution. . . .
The United States has not deployed ground forces into
Libya. United States forces are conducting a limited
and well-defined mission in support of international
efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian
disaster. Accordingly, U.S. forces have targeted the
Qadhafi regime's air defense systems, command and
control structures, and other capabilities of Qadhafi's
armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian
populated areas. We will seek a rapid, but responsible,
transition of operations to coalition, regional, or
international organizations that are postured to
continue activities as may be necessary to realize the
objectives of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970
and 1973.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\Id.
While the President described the goal of the intervention
in Libya as ``well-defined'' in his March 18, 2011 public
remarks, the formal notification of the ensuing military
operation to Congress left uncertainty and ambiguity in the
eyes of some U.S. decision-makers. Speaker John A. Boehner
responded to the President by letter two days later on March
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
23, 2011, writing:
It is my hope that you will provide the American people
and Congress a clear and robust assessment of the
scope, objective, and purpose of our mission in Libya
and how it will be achieved. Here are some of the
questions I believe must be answered:
A United Nations Security Council resolution does not
substitute for a U.S. political and military strategy.
You have stated that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi must
go, consistent with U.S. policy goals. But the U.N.
resolution the U.S. helped develop and signed onto
makes clear that regime change is not part of this
mission. In light of this contradiction, is it an
acceptable outcome for Qadhafi to remain in power after
the military effort concludes in Libya? If not, how
will he be removed from power? Why would the U.S.
commit American resources to enforcing a U.N.
resolution that is inconsistent with our stated policy
goals and national interests? . . .
You have said that the support of the international
community was critical to your decision to strike
Libya. But, like many Americans, it appears many of our
coalition partners are themselves unclear on the policy
goals of this mission. If the coalition dissolves or
partners continue to disengage, will the American
military take on an increased role? Will we disengage?
Since the stated U.S. policy goal is removing Qadhafi
from power, do you have an engagement strategy for the
opposition forces? If the strife in Libya becomes a
protracted conflict, what are your Administration's
objectives for engaging with opposition forces, and
what standards must a new regime meet to be recognized
by our government? . . .
Because of the conflicting messages from the
Administration and our coalition partners, there is a
lack of clarity over the objectives of this mission,
what our national security interests are, and how it
fits into our overarching policy for the Middle East.
The American people deserve answers to these questions.
And all of these concerns point to a fundamental
question: what is your benchmark for success in
Libya?\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\Letter from John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to Barack H. Obama, U.S. President (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://www.speaker.gov/UploadedFiles/POTUSLetter_032311.pdf. (also
asking three specific questions relating to the military operation and
its cost).
Selecting Chris Stevens
Notwithstanding the State Department's decision to suspend
operations at its Embassy in Tripoli and its efforts underway
through the United Nations to impose a no fly zone,\67\
discussions were immediately under way between the White House
and the Secretary and her advisors to return to Libya--
specifically to Benghazi.\68\ These discussions included
sending a ``diplomatic representative'' to serve as a liaison
with the Transitional National Council [TNC], an opposition
group headquartered in Benghazi hoping to emerge as the new
Libyan government.\69\ Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, told the Committee
``the TNC had asked in the meetings with Hillary Clinton for
representation to be able to work directly on a continuing
basis with the U.S. Government, which is why a decision was
made to send a representative to Benghazi.''\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't
of State & Janet A. Sanderson, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, The Suspension of United
States Embassy Operations in Libya, DEP'T OF STATE (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2011/157173.htm. Jake Sullivan
indicated in an August 21, 2011 email to Cheryl Mills and Victoria
Nuland ``February 26--HRC directs efforts to evacuate all U.S. embassy
personnel from Tripoli and orders the closing of the embassy.'' This
date appears to be contradicted by the Department's public statement
the previous day. See Email from Jake Sullivan, Dir. Policy Planning,
U.S. Dep't of State to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State and Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S.
State Dep't (Aug. 21, 2011, 07:39 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0051146). See Email from Phillip H. Gordon to James B. Steinberg, et
al. (Mar. 23, 2011, 6:55 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0045016)
(``We are putting together S conference call with Juppe, Davutoglu and
Hague tomorrow. Here is the outcome I think the call should seek to
meet everybody's redlines.
[Redacted text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\See Email from Donald Steinberg, U.S. Agency on Int'l
Development, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt.,
U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 30, 2011, 10:12 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0095926) (``As you know, we're under instructions from
NSS and State to get our DART staff into Benghazi so we can begin our
humanitarian assessments of needs and infrastructure.'').
\69\See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State (Mar. 13, 2011, 10:55 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0045011) (``They urged us to find some kind of language that would
suggest moving in that direction, and I noted our decisions to suspend
the operations of the Libyan Embassy, have S meet with Mahmoud Jabril
of the Council and send a diplomatic representative to Benghazi.'').
\70\Testimony of Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 24-25 (Dec. 8,
2015) [hereinafter Feltman Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary selected J. Christopher Stevens, a widely and
highly respected career Foreign Service officer, to serve as
the representative to the TNC.\71\ Stevens previously served as
Deputy Chief of Mission, the Embassy's number two post, in
Tripoli from 2007 through 2009.\72\ The Secretary told the
Committee: ``[w]hen the revolution broke out in Libya, we named
Chris as our envoy to the opposition.''\73\ ``I was the one who
asked Chris to go to Libya as our envoy.''\74\ The Secretary
told the Committee that Stevens ``was one of our Nation's most
accomplished diplomats.''\75\ Stevens had been a member of the
U.S. Foreign Service since 1991. He had previously served
overseas as Deputy Principal Officer and Section Chief in
Jerusalem; Political Officer in Damascus; Consular/Political
Officer in Cairo; and Consular/Economic Officer in Riyadh. In
Washington he had served as Director of the Office of
Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs; a Pearson Fellow
with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Richard
G. Lugar; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs at the State Department; and Iran desk
officer and staff assistant in the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\See Benghazi: The Attacks and the Lessons Learned Before the S.
Comm. on the Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of the
Hon. Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State); Terrorist Attack in Benghazi:
The Secretary of State's View Before the H. Comm. on the Foreign
Affairs, 113th Cong. 7-8 (2013) (statement of the Hon. Hillary R.
Clinton, Sec'y of State).
\72\J. Christopher Stevens Bio, Econ. Policy J. (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/09/j-christopher-stephens-
bio.html (last visited June 7, 2016).
\73\Testimony of Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 20 (Oct. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Clinton Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
\74\Id. 21.
\75\Id. 20.
\76\J. Christopher Stevens Bio, Econ. Policy J. (Sept. 12, 2012),
http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2012/09/j-christopher-stephens-
bio.html (last visited June 7, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While attending the March 14, 2011 G8 foreign ministers
meeting in Paris to discuss the Libyan crisis, \77\ the
Secretary arranged to have a separate meeting with Jibril, the
leader of the Transitional National Council.\78\ She asked that
Stevens be rerouted to join her and Ambassador Gene A. Cretz,
the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, for the meeting with Jibril.\79\
As a result of the meeting with Jibril, the Secretary was
convinced the United States should support the TNC in its
efforts to become the new Libyan government.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\The G8 is comprised of eight of the world's major
industrialized countries.
\78\See Email from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to J. Christopher
Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional National Council (Mar. 11, 2011,
9:20 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0076601) (discussing Sec'y
Clinton's meeting with Mr. Jibril in Paris).
\79\Id.; see also Email from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of
State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Huma
Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State (Mar. 13, 2011, 10:02) (on file with the Committee, SCB0076612)
(communicating that Feltman had been asked to redirect Ambassador
Stevens to Paris).
\80\See Email from Jacob Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to himself on a personal email account (Mar. 16, 2011,
9:29 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075861).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The decision to send a representative to the TNC was seen
as both practical and symbolic. Ambassador Cretz explained the
rationale for having a presence in Benghazi, telling the
Committee ``the center of the revolution was in Benghazi. It
was the place that the opposition . . . had centered around as
its, in effect `capital.'''\81\ He testified several other
coalition partners established envoys in Benghazi and ``so it
was only natural'' the U.S. have a presence there as well since
the United States had a stake in the outcome of the Libyan
revolution.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\Testimony of Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Tr. at 32
(Jul. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Cretz Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
\82\Id. at 32-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delay
The administration then made plans to send Stevens to
Benghazi. Following the Secretary's March 14, 2011 meeting in
Paris with Jibril, Stevens did not return to the United States
but remained in Europe to plan his entry into Libya.\83\ He
traveled to Stuttgart, Germany to meet with General Carter F.
Ham, commander of the United States Africa Command [AFRICOM],
to discuss the trip into Libya, including any potential rescue
operations.\84\ Stevens discussed travelling to Benghazi on a
``helicopter to a coalition naval vessel that can go close to
shore,'' and then ``zodiac transport from ship to shore'' for
``day trips only, returning to the naval vessel to RON [rest
overnight].''\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\Email from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to J. Christopher StevensJ.
Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional National Council (Mar.
11, 2011, 9:20 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0076601) (``I know
you have your travel accommodations set for Rome. But S staff would
like you to join the Secretary and Gene Cretz for a mtg in Paris with
Mahmoud Jabril.''). Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec.
Serv., U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 13 (February 10, 2015)[hereinafter
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony] (on file with the Committee)
(``[W]hen I left Washington, I went to Rome. And in Rome, I was met by
the Envoy, Chris Stevens.'').
\84\Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt.,
U.S. Dep't of State to Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in
Libya, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Mar. 24, 2011, 9:55 AM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0095893-98) (discussing Stevens' plan).
\85\Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Lee Lohman, Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, and Post Mgmt. Officer, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 23, 2011, 5:14 PM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0091885).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to Stevens' activities, the Secretary and her
advisors were coordinating with United States Agency for
International Development's [USAID] Disaster Assistance
Response Team to travel into Benghazi to assess firsthand the
extent of the humanitarian crisis.\86\ On March 15, 2011,
however, USAID ``pulled the plug'' because of security
concerns.\87\ That same day, Stevens' mission to Benghazi
expanded:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to William J. Burns, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State (Mar. 6, 2011, 3:48 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0095837-0095838) (discussing coordination with USAID and the
situation in region).
\87\See Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, to Eric J. Boswell, Ass't Sec'y of State,
Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Mar. 15, 2011,
1:59 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0095877-0095879).
The latest . . . is now that 12-13 people are going
into Libya near Benghazi. It's John C. Stevens (lead),
a JO (no name) who is fluent in Arabic, 10 DS agents
(protective detail) and they are working on getting a
Management Officer to go to do the admin/accounting
work. There are at least 2 DOD military elements going
along (SOC Forward types i.e. Special Forces). . . .
Given how this has grown from our earlier discussions,
I think $60,000 is needed rather than the $25,000 we
initially thought. They are talking about this trip
being up to 30 days.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\See Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 15, 2011, 8:02 PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0098178-0098179).
While Stevens was still in Europe coordinating his entry,
the National Security Council ordered him to deploy ``as soon
as possible.''\89\ For the next week, the State Department and
AFRICOM engaged in extensive planning to enter Benghazi using
the military to augment the State Department Diplomatic
Security Agents.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\See Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in
Libya, U.S. Dep't of State, to Lee Lohman, Ex. Dir. Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, and Post Mgmt. Officer, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 23, 2011, 5:14 PM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB0091885). See also Email from Special
Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S Dep't of State, to Thomas R. Nides,
Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:47 PM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB0075262).
\90\See Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in
Libya, U.S. Dep't of State, to Ronald L. Schlicher, et al. (Mar. 24,
2011, 9:40 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0095893-94) (``Per
Chris' emails, he would travel into Benghazi via zodiac or helicopter.
All mil assets would be US, including comms and medic. Seals would
participate in civilian dress--an initiative that could prove
problematic with the TNC. Travel would be day trips. RON on the US
naval vessel.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within a matter of days, Stevens' team expanded again.\91\
Senior State Department officials made the decision to add two
USAID workers, consistent with Secretary Clinton's goal that
the U.S. be seen as ``visibly engaged on the humanitarian
side.''\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\Email from Janet A. Sanderson, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of
State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 26, 2011, 12:02 PM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0094603) (``Pat, AID Administrator talked to
Bill Burns last night and requested Stevens Mission include one or two
DART team reps.'').
\92\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to William J. Burns, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State (Mar. 6, 2011, 3:48 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0095837-0095838).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After weeks of planning, the Administration's no boots on
the ground policy kept military assistance from accompanying
Stevens to Benghazi.\93\ On March 30, 2011, Kennedy informed
other senior State Department leaders: ``After over a week of
joint planning . . . Mullen has decided that the `no boots on
the ground in Libya' policy precludes DOD assisting us in
getting Stevens into Libya.''\94\ Specifically, Admiral Mullen
deemed the use of military assets--even in civilian dress--to
be in violation of the President's directive, and therefore
forbade their use to get Stevens into Benghazi and assist in
his protection there.\95\ With no military assets to assist,
Stevens ``found a way to get himself there on a Greek cargo
ship, just like a 19th-century American envoy.''\96\
Accompanying Stevens on the ferry to Benghazi was a junior
reporting officer, two members of USAID's Disaster Assistance
Response Team, and eight Diplomatic Security Agents.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt.,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning,
U.S. Dep't of State, and Joseph E. Macmanus, Exec. Ass't, Office of the
Sec'y (Mar. 30, 2011, 12:50 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0071180).
\94\Id.
\95\Id.
\96\Clinton Testimony at 20-21.
\97\See Email to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 30, 2011, 7:38 PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0095929) (attaching Benghazi Party OPLAN at SCB0095929-
35).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SETTING UP OPERATIONS IN BENGHAZI
When Stevens arrived in Benghazi, he was authorized to stay
for up to 30 days, security permitting.\98\ His job was to
``begin gathering information and meeting those Libyans who
were rising up against the murderous dictator Qadhafi.''\99\
This was all the instruction he was given. ``There was no
protocol for how to move forward,'' the Secretary said. ``No
past precedent to follow. No list of important figures to look
out for. Chris had to work from scratch to identify the key
players on the ground and carve out his own set of rules for
working with the opposition.''\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\Id.
\99\Clinton Testimony at 20; see also Email from Special Ass't,
Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:38 PM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0061086) (``Chris explained his mission, making
it clear that he would like to meet all members of the TNC and as many
local council members as possible to understand the extent of the TNC's
support.'').
\100\Remarks, Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, Prepared Remarks: Secretary Clinton Remarks at Swearing-In
Ceremony for Chris Stevens, Ambassador to Libya (May 14, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/05/197696.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens' early days and months in Benghazi were consumed by
ongoing, concurrent concerns: contending with severe civil
unrest; establishing a Mission compound; and meeting with
officials from the Libyan insurgency and other nations. Stevens
was expected to accomplish all of this with an uncertain
diplomatic status.
The Tibesti Hotel
The lead Diplomatic Security Agent who traveled with
Stevens into Benghazi testified: ``[W]e tried to put a plan
together as best we could. We didn't even know where we were
going to set up once we arrived. Once we arrived, we looked at
a couple locations. But prior to going there, it was somewhat
fluid because it was just the unknown.''\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After spending the first night on board the Greek cargo
ship, the Aegean Pearl, and evaluating different locations,
Stevens decided to stay at the Tibesti Hotel.\102\ While State
Department security rules do not apply to hotels,\103\ the
Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground sought out locations
with security advantages. The Tibesti Hotel had limited
setback\104\ and ``rudimentary barriers to control
access.''\105\ ``[T]here was [also] an attempt to provide
perimeter security, but it wasn't very robust.''\106\ The lead
Diplomatic Security Agent described the decision-making
process:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\Id. at 31, 49.
\103\See Testimony of Gentry O. Smith, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau
of Diplomatic Sec., Countermeasures, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 14-15
(Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Smith Testimony] (on file with the
Committee) (``There would not be any security standards for a hotel,
but security recommendations that are made during times that we're in a
hotel, a solid core door, just basic things that you would expect from
even being in the States, solid core door, viewfinder, very good
locking equipment on the door; in situations such as being overseas, to
look for hotels where there would be a security presence from either
the host country or that the hotel provide its own security and what
are the security procedures that are followed at that hotel for its
guests.'').
\104\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 32.
\105\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 36 (Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 7 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\106\Id.
We went to see where the British were at, and they were
kind of at a guest conference type center. It wasn't
really big, but it was moderate sized, maybe two or
three stories, had a compound. It was down along the
water, so we ruled that place out.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He also testified:
[W]e went to one other hotel where there were some
other journalists were staying. I don't recall the name
of it, but it was a little bit smaller. It was right up
against the highway. So we decided and it was a little
bit closer to where the U.K. facility was, but we
decided that wasn't really a good place for us. And
then we went to the Tibesti and looked at that. At the
time, there were some advantages for us to be
there.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\Id. at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
There were a lot of journalists there that would make
it easier for--[sic] and others staying there that
would make it easier for Mr. Stevens to communicate
with these people without us having to make unnecessary
movements all the time. And there was a little bit of
security at that hotel, very minimal. There was a
presence.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\Id. at 32-33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
He also testified:
There wasn't a formalized police--I mean, there was
probably somebody that called himself a police chief.
And then you had the military--somewhat of a military
presence, you know--that really wasn't focused on
anything to do with our security. They had, you know,
they were trying to fight the war. Then you had
February 17, a militia that assisted us a little
bit.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\Id. at 33.
Notwithstanding the minimal security advantages over other
hotels, Stevens and the Diplomatic Security Agents remained
concerned about the security vulnerabilities of the Tibesti
Hotel.
CIVIL WAR AND UNREST
Five days after Stevens arrived in Benghazi, he and his
group were nearly forced to leave. Qadhafi's forces had
regrouped around the city of Ajdabiya, approximately 100 miles
south of Benghazi.\111\ Stevens and the lead Diplomatic
Security Agent, were concerned about the security in Benghazi
if Qadhafi took Ajdabiya.\112\ When asked why they did not
depart Benghazi, the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge of the
Mission told the Committee: ``[W]e reexamined the issues, and
at that time, we weren't worried about what was happening in
Benghazi. We were worried about the forces coming forward. So
they must have stopped.''\113\ Concerns about Stevens and his
team's security reached the Secretary.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\See Email from Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to
Jeffery D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Apr. 10, 2011, 6:06 AM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0095985) (``It appears that qadhafi forces are
at the eastern and western gate of adjdabiyah and that there is a real
possibility of the city falling.''); see also Rob Crilly, Libya: rebels
flee stronghold of Ajdabiya as Gaddafi closes net, Telegraph (Mar. 15,
2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/
libya/8383872/Libya-rebels-flee-stronghold-of-Ajdabiya-as-Gaddafi-
closes-net.html.
\112\See Email from Patrick Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, to James Steinberg, Deputy Sec'y of State,
U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Apr. 10, 2011) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0095985).
\113\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 99; see also Email from
Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of
State, to Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S.
Dep't of State (Apr. 10, 2011, 2:06 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0095970) (showing email exchange at the time).
\114\Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (April 10, 2011, 10:14 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045049)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, the security situation in Benghazi remained
precarious. On April 15, 2011, the Mission held an emergency
action committee [EAC] meeting ``to address several security
issues that occurred or reported during the past 12 hours. The
meeting was called by Stevens and was attended by all members
of the Benghazi Mission.''\115\ An emergency action committee
meeting is called ``when there is an emergency or security
incident, the committee will convene and discuss the incident
as well as steps forward either to mitigate the incident or
resolve the incident.''\116\ Charlene Lamb, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Diplomatic Security, International Programs,
described EACs to the Committee: ``They're usually chaired by
the deputy chief of Mission. Sometimes they're chaired and/or
attended by the Ambassador. And then the core members, at a
minimum, the core members of your post security envelope and
intelligence if they are present.''\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. (Apr. 15, 2011, 5:54
PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396062).
\116\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 50 (Apr. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 8 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\117\Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of
Diplomatic Sec., Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 174 (Jan.
7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The April 15, 2011 EAC highlighted three discreet incidents
including: (1) military grade explosives were found with the
Tibesti Hotel as the identified target; (2) two explosives were
detonated outside the El Fadeel Hotel--the hotel used by the
U.N. and UK; and (3) a large fire and pillar of smoke was seen
emanating near the Hotel Uzo--the hotel occupied by many
international journalists.\118\ The EAC determined it would
work with the Transitional National Council to focus on
security.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\See Email to DSCC_C DS Seniors (Apr. 15, 2011, 5:54 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05396062).
\119\See Email to DSCC_C DS Seniors (Apr. 15, 2011, 5:54 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05396062).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 10 days later, on April 24, 2011, Stevens again
considered whether it was safe enough to stay at the hotel. He
informed State Department senior officials the Tibesti Hotel
might not be safe enough in the long run and alternative
facilities might be needed for a longer term stay.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\See Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S.
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''),
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Apr. 24, 2011, 10:25 AM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0045054) (forwarding email communicating
Benghazi security update, hotels being targeted, cell arrested,
increased security being sought, and may need to move out of hotel to
villa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground protecting
Stevens and his team members described a high-risk security
environment. The Agents spoke of explosions occurring near and
around the Tibesti Hotel.\121\ They described constant gunfire,
including ``a small-caliber round [that] came through the
dining room where [Stevens] and the Swedish Consul were having
dinner'' and ``a round that went through the window of our
command post room in the hotel.''\122\ One Diplomatic Security
Agent testified the car bomb explosions ``reminded me of what I
experienced in Kabul or Iraq. . . .''\123\ Unlike Kabul or
Iraq, however, there was no U.S. military presence in Libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 39-42.
\122\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 42. (Feb. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 9 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\123\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security would remain tenuous through the summer. On June
10, 2011, a credible threat to the Tibesti Hotel forced Stevens
and his team out of the hotel and to a more secure
location.\124\ In late July 2011, a leading opposition figure,
General Abdul Fatah Younis--a former Qadhafi loyalist who
defected earlier in 2011 to join the opposition--was
assassinated in Benghazi.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\See Email from Special Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State (June 10, 2011, 6:58 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0074991) (discussing relocation from Tibesti Hotel); see also Email
from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State,
to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State
(June 10, 2011, 4:01 PM)(on file with the Committee, SCB0045085).
\125\See Email to Benghazi Update (July 31, 2011, 10:35 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05394875) (communicating reports of General
Yunus' death).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENGHAZI MISSION: SUMMER 2011
Despite the unrest and security concerns in April 2011,
senior leaders at the State Department were discussing
continuing Stevens' diplomatic operation beyond the initial 30
days and into the summer of 2011. On April 14, 2011, a report
was filed with Thomas Nides, the Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources:
NEA will be drafting a paper for Steinberg, which
essentially will ask for an expanded scope of work for
Stevens--which will allow him to stay in Libya for
longer than (90 days or more). Once NEA has some policy
guidance about what Stevens should be seeking to
accomplish in Libya, it will devise a plan for a new
footprint on the ground--this will require needed
resources and could shift the mission from an envoy
situation to a more permanent presence. We will need to
watch this closely and I've flagged for P and D(S)
staff that you and Pat should be included in these
discussions.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\Email from Special Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State (Apr. 14, 2011, 6:48 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0075032). P is the designation for the Bureau of Political Affairs.
D(S) is the designation for the Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Feltman explained to the Committee:
It was more fluid . . . but it was certainly the idea
was to be there more than a day or a week. The idea was
to be there for long enough that we would have the type
of insights into TNC thinking that you can't get from a
single meeting, that we would have the type of access
to other decisionmakers in the TNC that you can't have
when you only are meeting with one or two persons. We
needed somebody who could better understand what was
happening, what was motivating the leadership of the
TNC, what were they thinking. So the idea was not that
this would necessarily be years and years and years but
certainly more than a few weeks.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\Feltman Testimony at 42:
Q: Okay. And then when you either prior to your trip or
during your trip in May of 2011, were there discussions
about continuing the presence in Benghazi for an indefinite
period of time, maybe not years but at least the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
foreseeable future?
A: Yes, there were. And the discussions were, what's the
appropriate when I was there, part of our discussions were,
what's the appropriate platform for maintaining a presence
for that period in Benghazi?
Q: And by ``platform,'' do you mean number of personnel?
A: Number of personnel, communications, location. You know,
at the time we were in a hotel
Q: The Tibesti Hotel?
A: The Tibesti Hotel. And so the discussion had already
started about what were the alternatives to being in a
place like that.
Q: Okay. And had there been some review of compounds and
villas at that time?
A: Yes, it had started, and it was very difficult because
there were not that many places available or appropriate.
Id. at 43.
See also Email from Special Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State (May 5, 2011, 7:00 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0061070)
(``NEA sees Benghazi turning into an eventual EBO--and all that entails
on resources, DS, OBO, and Interagency discussion.'' (emphasis in
original)).
By the end of April 2011, the diplomatic team had increased
to 17 Americans consisting of ``Stevens, one reporting/public
diplomacy officer, one Information Management Officer who is
also doing Management work, four USAID officers, and ten
Diplomatic Security special Agents who comprise the protective
detail for the mission.''\128\ By the end of June 2011,
security threats had forced Stevens and his team to relocate.
The space constraints in the new locations forced the number of
personnel in Benghazi to drop to nine, including five
Diplomatic Security Agents.\129\ Staffing remained unchanged
throughout the summer.\130\ William V. Roebuck, the Director of
the Office of Maghreb Affairs, told Stevens:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Sec'y of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Patrick F.
Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (June 10,
2011) [hereinafter June 10, 2011 Action Memo for Under Secretary
Kennedy] (on file with the Committee, C05578649).
\129\See Email from Special Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S
Dep't of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State (June 21, 2011, 8:12 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0061058) (discussing staffing concerns and issues).
\130\See id. (discussing staffing concerns and issues).
Other principals like Deputy Secretary Nides are
operating under (and accept) the assumption that the
mission will bulk back up to 17 as housing stabilizes
and the security conditions permit. . . . I have the
strong sense in any case that there would be little
appetite for capping the mission at 9 people, given the
equities the interagency has in the previously higher
staffing figure.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\Email from William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to J. Christopher
Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat'l Council (June 21, 2011, 12:08
PM) (on file with the Committee, C05409676).
Notwithstanding the security threats and decreased staff,
Stevens and his team faced increasing demands. According to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polaschik, who served in Benghazi in May 2011:
Certainly, when I was there, I was working from, you
know, 8 in the morning till midnight. And there were
two reporting officers there.
Just in terms of sustainability and getting the work
done, 8 in the morning until midnight is never a good
recipe, and, also, when you're trying to make sure that
people are at a heightened state of alert that's
appropriate for a very fluid security environment.
So it wasn't a decision to say, oh, we need a long term
presence. It was a decision that we don't have the
resources in place to get the work done that needs to
get done.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\Polaschik Testimony at 130.
Move to Mission Compound
With Washington's interest in extending Stevens' stay, he
and his team searched for a new location--a challenging process
in the middle of a civil war. The Post Management Officer for
Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, State Department,
testified: ``Finding a place that met our security needs, where
the rent was not completely outrageous due to the fact that we
were in a war zone, that had required ingress and egress that
met what security wanted . . . were all significant issues that
had to be overcome.''\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\Testimony of Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 79 (July 23, 2015)
[hereinafter Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
[T]he traditional . . . real estate agent just didn't
exist . . . there were other channels of information
that we would leverage to help us identify what we were
looking for. Because that was really the issue, was not
a property per se, but a property that we had special
considerations for.''\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 95.
These difficulties were further complicated by Stevens'
team's inability to find a ``landlord that would be willing to
cooperate with us and our specific needs. . . .''\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Stevens and his team searched for new property, they
temporarily collocated with other U.S. personnel on the ground
in Benghazi. Space constraints precluded maintaining this
arrangement for the long term.\136\ On June 21, 2011, Stevens
and his team moved to another interim site, while they narrowed
their search for a suitable longer term location.\137\ They
found a facility that had previously served as a ``man camp''
for personnel working for the oil industry but had been
abandoned at the start of the civil war.\138\ The lead
Diplomatic Security Agent at the time described the advantages
of the camp:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\See Email from Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Special Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
State (June 13, 2011, 1:13 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0061059-
0061060).
\137\Email from Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (June 20, 2011, 9:04 AM) (on file
with the Committee, C05393024) (``We are treating the interim villa as
hotel space--only 30-60 days while we wait for the upgrades to the
Villa Compound to come online.''); see also Email from Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 7 (June 17, 2011, 6:19 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05408710) (``We hope to have the `interim' villa by next tuesday
[sic].'').
\138\Testimony of Physical Sec. Specialist, Bureau of Diplomatic
Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 9 (Apr. 6, 2016) [hereinafter
Physical Sec. Specialist Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
[I]t had an established perimeter. That perimeter also
gave us setback from the road, setback being one of the
critical elements that we were looking for given that
issues that we had at the Tibesti Hotel with the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explosion.
It also was a hardened building. In other words, the
mason area was significant enough that it would likely
withstand rounds dropping down from the sky or,
depending on the trajectory of a particular round, it
provided it afforded us additional protection because
of the construction of that particular villa.
It allowed us to control our access onto the compound.
That was one of the big problems with the hotel, was we
didn't know who was coming and going. It was an active,
operating hotel. And so they were there to make money,
not to control the access necessarily for the
Americans.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 93-94.
Notwithstanding the search for a secure location,
traditional security standards did not apply in Benghazi at the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
time. The physical security specialist in Benghazi testified:
Q: You were advised that OSPB standards did not apply
to Benghazi. Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And when they didn't apply to Benghazi, did that
mean the city at large or did that mean a specific
facility?
A: That meant for our facility.
Q: Okay. But the facility at that point in time was
what?
A: The facility that we were going to occupy as the
platform was going to be the man camp.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\Physical Sec. Specialist Testimony at 87-88.
Federal regulation and State Department rules set out the
security standards United States facilities located abroad are
required to meet to keep Americans safe.\141\ Senior State
Department officials, nevertheless, made the decision to
exclude ``temporary facilities,'' such as Benghazi, from these
security rules.\142\ Kennedy attempted to justify this
exclusion:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\See Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of
1999, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 4865 (2012); and see also, U.S. Dep't of State, 12
FAH-6 H-511.1-511.6, Overseas Security Policy Board Approved Policies
and Standards for All Posts; U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-14-
655, Diplomatic Facility Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater
Risks Due to Gap in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and
Policies (2014).
\142\See Testimony of Eric Boswell, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of
Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, before the H. Comm. On Oversight
and Gov't Reform,, Tr. at 65-66 (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter Boswell
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
When we go into one of these temporary facilities, we
take the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB)
standards--OSPB is how we refer to them--we take the
OSPB standards as our goals . . . We treat the
temporary facilities as if we were heading towards
interim by using the OSPB standards as our goal.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 193 (Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter
Kennedy Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
In addition to the OSPB security standards, the Secure
Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act (SECCA),
the applicable federal security law, provides among
other things a diplomatic facility ensure: (1) all US
Government personnel are located together in the new
diplomatic facility; and (2) the diplomatic facility is
located ``not less than 100 feet from the perimeter of
the property on which the facility is situated.''\144\
With regard to Benghazi, however, the State Department
Office of the Legal Adviser determined: [T]his facility
would not fit within the definition of a `diplomatic
facility' under SECCA, which defines the term as an
office that (1) is officially notified to the host
government as diplomatic/consular premises or (2)
houses USG personnel with an official status recognized
by the host government. If the facility will not be
notified to the host government then it will not be
considered inviolable, and our personnel will not have
any official status, then the facility would not meet
the definition of a diplomatic facility under the
statute.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\See Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of
1999, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 4865 (2012).
\145\Email (June 20, 2011, 11:30 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05396431).
Without official security standards in place, Stevens and
the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground worked with the
landlord of the ``man camp'' to identify field expedient
measures to improve the physical security of the camp. The
needed security measures were contracted out to an individual
situated in Benghazi.\146\ The physical security specialist on
site wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\Email from Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs,
Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 1, 2011, 11:08 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05393020).
The DS/PSP [physical security programs] funded PSD
upgrade contract that was signed . . . was for $75,000
with a specific scope of work to be performed,
fabricate two . . . vehicle gates, fabricate concrete
jersey type barriers, string barbed wire and fabricate
two vehicle drop arm barriers.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\Id.
Concerns about the owner's title and relationship to the
Qadhafi regime forced Stevens and his team to abruptly drop the
``man camp'' from consideration as a housing facility. With no
alternative, Stevens and his team remained at the interim
facility, also known as Villa A.\148\ Within days of the
decision to remain in Villa A, a neighboring property, Villa B,
was acquired.\149\ The physical security specialist in Benghazi
at the time described the sequence of events: ``That facility
fell through on a Thursday, and on the Friday, Stevens sat down
with the Villa A landlord, who brought along the owner of Villa
B. Stevens especially liked Villa B and said he wanted A and B
together.''\150\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\See Email from Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec.
Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, to Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 25 & James Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of
Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 13, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, C05411579) (``[T]he decision was made to stay put when Villa
B became an option and we stopped looking at the other properties.'');
see also Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent (July 04, 2011, 3:59 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05394858) (``We are currently referring to
our current residence as Villa A and the neighboring property as Villa
B.'').
\149\See Email from Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec.
Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't, to Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 24, et al. (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:52 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05411579).
\150\Summary of group interview with Physical Security Specialist
and others (on file with the Committee, SCB0046921-0046923).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The decision made by Washington to exempt the proposed
``man camp'' site from the official security standards also
applied to the Mission compound.\151\ The same physical
security specialist in Benghazi explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\See Physical Sec. Specialist Testimony at 134.
Q: . . . you were told that OSPB standards and SECCA
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
did not apply to the man camp; am I correct?
A: Did not apply.
Q: Did not apply.
So was that analysis then sort of used as it relates to
the villa compound?
A: It carried over.
Q: Carried over. So basically and correct me if I'm
misstating this but the thought would be that
exceptions and waivers to OSPB and SECCA do not apply
in Benghazi, generally?
A: When I was there, that's the
Q: Is that a fair characterization?
A: That's the guidance that I was given at that
time.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\Id.
This decision to exclude the Mission compound in Benghazi
from official security standards and rules was never formally
communicated to the Diplomatic Security Agents who volunteered
to serve in Benghazi. One Diplomatic Security Agent told the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee:
I was starting to understand then and what I learned
later, that if you are a diplomatic facility within the
State Department, you have physical security
requirements that are in the FAM, the Foreign Affairs
Manual. And it is a very detailed, large set of rules
that you have to follow to operate a diplomatic
facility. It requires you to have physical security
standards that are typically going to be expensive and
will take time to do.
If you are in a non-diplomatic facility, there are no
security standards.
They don't exist.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\Testimony Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S.
Dep't of State, Tr. at 28 (Apr. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 10 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
The Committee also learned ``Villas A and B owners were
adamant about their residential properties not be[ing] altered
by our then short term presence without their explicit
approvals being obtained in advance.'' To assuage the landlords
concerns, security improvements to Villas A and B were
minimal.\154\ According to the physical security specialist:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\Email from Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs,
Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 and
James Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S.
Dep't of State (Feb. 13, 2012, 7:52 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05411579).
[M]inor security improvements were discussed and
authorized for B only, open a hole in the perimeter
wall between Villa's [sic] A & B wide enough for a
roadway, install several window grills on the small
Villa B office annex and reposition several large
manufacturing machines on the Villa B property to block
the vehicle gates because all Mission vehicle activity
was to be conducted from Villa A. The owners [sic]
representative walked the property with us several
times and he agreed to implement these minor security
improvements as part of his fiduciary management
responsibilities and dismissed other recommendations
such as installing razor ribbon on existing perimeter
walls were [sic] needed, installing shatter resistant
window film and installing vehicle drop arm barriers.
Post used available FAV SUV's with maintenance issues
(no working A/C) to block the Villa A vehicle gates.
There was no PSD/PCB trip report prepared upon return
because conditions on the ground were changing on a
near daily basis and were discussed on conference calls
and/or in email correspondence with concerned offices
within WDC as to what Post was proposing and what was
being considered an approved for the leased
properties.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\Id.
Villa C, another residence, was acquired shortly after the
residences located in Villas A and B. Although no security
assessment was conducted on Villa C at the time, one of the
Diplomatic Security Agents assessed ``[n]o upgrades are needed
for Villas A & C.''\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to Physical Sec. Specialist,
Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State,
and Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State (Aug. 1, 2011, 6:32 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05393020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Stevens and his team finalized the acquisition of all
three Villas in late July 2011, a Diplomatic Security Agent on
the ground outlined to Washington D.C. a number of ``security-
related items,'' needed to better protect the new
compound:\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to DS-IP-NEA (July 21, 2011,
3:22 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396529).
More agents required: Between the three compounds,
we're looking at roughly 15 acres of property to
secure. This will require additional SAs [special
agents] (up to five more) by early to mid-August. For
REACT purposes, teams of agents will reside on all
three compounds. Once resources permit, RSO [regional
security officer] TOC [technical operations center]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
will be staffed 24/7.
LGF [local guard force]: per the contract already in
place with AQM, we'll have 11 unarmed guard positions
(all 24/7). This includes a Shift Supervisor and 10
guard posts. Tripoli LGF commander will oversee day-to-
day operations. LGF will be in place prior to
occupancy. Guard Orders in draft--pending.
Access control policy (drafted and approved by Envoy):
Except for select VIPs, visitors will park outside the
compound and enter on foot. Visitor/vehicles will be
screened by LGF. Visitors/deliveries will be channeled
to one access control point; remaining vehicle gates
will be blocked using armored vehicles or similar.
Compound Security/Internal Defense Plan: will
incorporate DS [diplomatic security] agents, LGF, and
TNC [Transitional National Council] armed guards.
Designation of safe havens within each residential and
office structure.
Installation of TSS equipment/arrival of TDY install
team--TBD.
Relocation of RSO TOC from Villa A (current location)
to Villa B office building.
Request for additional TNC armed guards.\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to DS-IP-NEA (July 21, 2011,
3:22 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396529).
The email introduces several specific elements related to
security that later become significant. Already occupying Villa
A, Stevens and his team took occupancy of Villas B and C on
August 1, 2011.\159\ On August 3, 2011, leases for all three
villas were executed, forming what would become known as the
Benghazi Mission compound.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to DS-IP-NEA (July 21,
2011, 3:22 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396529) (mentioning that
``[b]arring any issues, occupancy of villa B&C could be as early as
Aug. 1.''); see also Lease Agreement between [REDACTED] and the United
States of America, STS-800-11-L-009 (Aug, 3, 2011) (on file with the
Committee, C05394161) (showing term of lease beginning Aug. 1).
\160\Id.; see also Letter (July 28, 2011) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0047437-42) (authorizing three leases in Benghazi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground described their
impressions of the compound:
When I arrived on the compound, it was 13 acres I
remember this pretty vividly 13 acres. We occupied
three dormitories, I will say. We named them Villa A,
B, and C. There was a building that we considered as,
you know it was referred to by, you know, us and the
other folks there as the tactical operations center,
also as the office.
And then we had another outlying building on the 13
acre compound, which really was three separate, you
know, residences, which housed the quick reaction
forces I've described before, the 17th February guys,
who also lived on compound with us.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 18 (Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic
Sec. Agent 12 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
[I]t was not like the other compounds that I had seen.
It appeared to be more of a low profile building, lower
footprint than your typical embassy or consulate. It
didn't have the signs up saying ``U.S. Embassy'' or
``Consulate.'' It didn't have some of the physical
security features you would typically see at an embassy
or consulate, such as Delta barriers or chicane. There
wasn't the host nation police presence, the military
presence that you would find at your typical embassy or
consulate. So my impression was, it was a lower or a
lower profile mission.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony at 41.
Less than three weeks after leases were signed for the new
Mission compound, Tripoli fell to opposition forces.\163\ Soon
after the fall of Tripoli, elements of the TNC moved from
Benghazi to Tripoli.\164\ Less than eight weeks after the
Mission moved into its new compound, Embassy Tripoli
reopened.\165\ At that time, Stevens requested his role as
representative to the TNC conclude on or about October 6,
2011.\166\ He was asked to remain in Benghazi until the TNC's
relocation was complete later that fall.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\See Email from U.S. Embassy Tripoli to Gene A. Cretz, U.S.
Ambassador to Libya (Sept. 7, 2011, 12:53 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05390164) (``. . . the TNC effectively took control of
Tripoli in mid-August and has begun to establish its presence and
authority in the city.'').
\164\See id. (``Approximately half of the TNC's executive cabinet .
. . is currently in Tripoli, joined by 15 of the TNC's 42 council
members.'').
\165\Id.
\166\Email from William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Raymond D.
Maxwell, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State, and Elizabeth L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Ass't Sec'y of
State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 20,
2011, 8:20 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05389443) (``I am
forwarding this to socialize Chris' thoughts on the future of the
Benghazi Mission, in light of our Embassy in Tripoli. He would like to
conclude his service o/a October 6 and return to Washington.'').
\167\Email from Elizabeth L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Ass't Sec'y
of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Sate, to
Raymond D. Maxwell, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State, William Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, and Lee Lohman,
Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, et al.
(Sept. 20, 2011, 6:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05389443) (``I
raised with Jeff [Feltman]. He thinks Chris needs to stay in Benghazi
until Jalil has relocated more or less permanently to Tripoli. He also
thinks we should not rush to shut down the operation there.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uncertain Diplomatic Status
Stevens' Mission in Benghazi fell outside the normal realm,
even extending to questions about its diplomatic status.\168\
Typically, a Mission and its staff are notified to the host
nation under which they receive the full privileges and
immunities afforded under international conventions.\169\ At
the time Stevens and his team went into Benghazi to coordinate
with the emerging Transitional National Council,\170\ however,
the U.S. had not severed formal diplomatic relations with the
Qadhafi regime.\171\ Gene A. Cretz remained the Ambassador to
Libya, and he and a select number of his team were serving ``in
exile'' in Washington D.C.\172\ Feltman explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\See Email from Senior Desk Officer for Libya, Office of
Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat'l Council
(``stevens chris'') (July 27, 2011, 9:22 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05561961) (attaching draft staffing paper discussion of the
role of the Mission); see also Email from Senior Desk Office for Libya,
Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State, to U.S. Embassy Tripoli, (Sept. 7, 2011, 1:02 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05390164).
\169\See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
\170\Email from Special Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't
of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0061086)
(``Chris explained his mission, making it clear that he would like to
meet all members of the TNC and as many local council members as
possible to understand the extent of the TNC's support.'').
\171\See Feltman Testimony at 27.
\172\See Cretz Testimony at 36.
Again, the overall goal was to try to limit the need
for a military solution, to focus on a political
solution, and convince Qadhafi that his time was over.
So you close down the Embassy in Tripoli of course, we
closed it down earlier for security reasons but you
have no representation in Tripoli, but suddenly you
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
have somebody in Benghazi.
You know, psychologically, did this have an impact on
Qadhafi's thinking to realize that the U.K., the U.S.,
France, Italy, whole lists of countries no longer had
representation in Tripoli, but they had representation
in Benghazi.
Now, the TNC, as I said, wasn't a government at the
time. You know, there's certain attributes that a
government has that we didn't think they had achieved
those attributes yet. They very much wanted to be
recognized as the legitimate government of Libya, and
I'm not sure that any country actually recognized them
within that period as legitimate government. I don't
think they did. But it was important to show who which
Libyans did the U.S. think were appropriate
interlocutors at the time.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\Feltman Testimony at 27-28.
Keeping Washington Informed
While contending with the civil unrest and seeking a
location to house his diplomatic mission, Stevens set out to
meet with leaders of the fledgling TNC.\174\ He also met with
other nations on the ground and leading rebel forces.\175\
Throughout his time in Benghazi in 2011 Stevens kept Washington
informed of the ongoing developments. For example, on April 10,
2011, he reported to Washington:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\See Email from Special Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S
Dep't of State, to Thomas Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State (Apr. 5, 2011, 5:38 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0061086)
(``Chris explained his mission, making it clear that he would like to
meet all members of the TNC and as many local council members as
possible to understand the extent of the TNC's support.'').
\175\See Email to SES-O_SWO; Tripoli Cooperation, SES-O (Apr. 10,
2011, 6:10 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075057).
The situation in Ajadbiyah has worsened to the point
where Stevens is considering departing Benghazi. The
envoy's delegation is currently doing a phased checkout
(paying the hotel bills, moving some items to the boat
etc.). He will monitor the situation to see if it
deteriorates further, but no decision has been made on
departure. He will wait 2-3 more hours and then revisit
the decision on departure.
* * *
The Brits report Qadhafi's forces are moving from Sirte
to Brega, which they interpret as preparation for
another assault on Ajadbiyah today.
He plans to discuss the situation further with the
Brits, Turks, and the TNC to see if this is an
irreversible situation. Departure would send a
significant political signal, and would be interpreted
as the U.S. losing confidence in the TNC.
Initial message to the TNC would frame the departure as
due to security grounds and as a temporary measure
only.
Polaschik said she would discuss these developments
with Ambassador Cretz.
If the group departs, the contract for the boat
stipulates they return to Greece. One scenario could be
the group stages elsewhere for a few days.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\176\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 25, 2011, Stevens reported the following:
Political/economic developments:
The TNC [Transitional National Council]: This week the
Council will focus on strengthening its executive arm,
the ``Crisis Management Committee,'' by appointing
coordinators (i.e. ministers) for defense, interior,
and justice. They will also encourage the head of the
Committee Dr. Mahmoud Jabril to remain in Benghazi and
focus on managing the affairs of eastern Libya. He has
been criticized for spending too much time abroad.
Libyan Broadcasting: A number of Libyan contacts told
us that Libyan State Television was disrupted in the
early morning hours, possibly due to NATO airstrikes.
Later in the day, however broadcasting resumed.
Air bridge?[sic] The United Nations Humanitarian Air
Service (UNHAS) is expected to begin regular passenger
service in/out of Benghazi in the next week or so.
Details, including its route, are being worked out. The
flights would be available on a sign up basis to
humanitarian and donor staff (UN, NGOs, and donor
Missions).
New passport and visa procedures: the TNC issued a
press release from Colonel Saad Najm, the head of the
immigration office, describing how the historically
burdensome passport process will be eased. Colonel Najm
said that his office would suspend issuing entry visas
until the TNC could better secure the land and sea
ports, and said that journalists crossing into Libya
over land from Egypt will need to apply for visas at
the border town of Msaed and have letters of
endorsement from TNC media committee.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\Email from Staff Ass't, Office of the U.S. Sec'y of State,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, et al. (Apr. 25, 2011, 4:33 PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0083338).
In addition, Stevens reported back to the State Department
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
on the security environment in Benghazi.
Security situation:
Benghazi: TNC member confirmed reports we received
yesterday that TNC security forces had uncovered a cell
of Libyans sent from Egypt to disrupt life in Benghazi
by attacking hotels and even schools (schools have been
closed since the mid-March attacks by loyalist forces).
[The TNC Member] said that Qadhafi relative Ahmed
Qadhafadam who moved to Cairo after the revolution
began was behind the effort. [The TNC Member] said he
gave interviews to Egyptian TV channels last night
complaining about this problem and calling on Egyptian
authorities to stop it. According to press reports, TNC
Chairman Abd al-Jalal asked Egyptian authorities to
halt Qadhafadam's efforts to raise funds to use against
the rebels.\178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\Id.
On August 22, 2011, Stevens filed a report on the fall of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tripoli:
TNC caretaker cabinet/members were up until 4am
following events in Tripoli and discussing plans for
the coming days. Tarhouni said the TNC has been in
constant communication with its people in Tripoli,
including both fighters and those entrusted with
implementing the stabilization plans. Rebels in
Tripoli, in coordination with the TNC, have begun to
set up checkpoints inside the city and guard public
buildings.
TNC chairman Abd al Jalil and PM Jabril made statements
to the media last night, urging people to refrain from
revenge attacks and destruction of public buildings.
There has so far been `no bloodbath' or serious
looting.
The capture of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Mohamed at-
Qadhafi is significant. The TNC, including Abd al-Jalil
himself, intervened with rebels surrounding Mohamed's
house to ensure that they didn't harm him. They
understood that it would be harmful to the revolution
and the TNC if he were killed. These events were
captured live by Al Jazeera in interviews with Mohamed.
Both brothers are in rebel custody (at this time, it is
unclear to us exactly who is holding them, however).
Per Tarhouni, the next steps are: 1) find Muammar
Qadhafi; 2) issue a statement announcing the end of the
Qadhafi regime and the start of the interim period
under the TNC (TNC staff have begun drafting this
statement already); 3) insure the delivery of essential
services and commodities (esp. addressing the acute
shortages of fuel, children's milk, and medication for
blood pressure and diabetes); and 4) move the TNC to
Tripoli.
Regarding the move to Tripoli, Tarhouni said security
arrangements would need to be made before they could
send the TNC leadership to the capital. We have heard
from another contact that some TNC members are already
making plans to fly to Misurata and the Western
Mountains, possibly as early as today, and from there
drive to Tripoli.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\Email to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, et al. (Aug. 22, 2011, 6:54 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045093).
As Stevens filed his reports, State Department personnel
continued to monitor.\180\ The Post Management Officer, who
handled logistics for Stevens' mission, told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\See Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 115.
In the initial insertion period, we were speaking to
the team on the ground on a regular basis, and we would
say we will touch base with you again in X number of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
hours and have another phone call.
I don't know when we shifted to a regular schedule
versus when we were just saying, okay, we've heard from
you now. Okay. Let's talk again in 6 hours once things
have gone on. We'll give you 8 hours and let you sleep,
and then we'll talk to you again, kind of thing.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\Id. at 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polaschik reported:
I saw my role as his [Stevens] backstop, because having
been in a situation where the security environment was
very fluid, and having limited resources, knowing that
their communications setup was less than ideal as they
were getting started, I thought it was very important
for him to have a single point of contact that he could
reach out to that could then communicate information,
requests, et cetera; and also I personally felt very
invested in what was happening, and I wanted to be
there for him.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\Polaschik Testimony at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Later in her testimony, Polaschik said:
Quite early on, it looked as if Chris and team had just
arrived. There was a moment when it looked like a city
called Ajdabiya was about to fall to Qadhafi forces. I
remember it was a Saturday, and I was on a conference
call, and I remember talking to Chris and saying, are
you sure you should stay? Because my perspective is
very much with the events in Tripoli when we were
evacuating fresh in my mind, things can change on a
moment's notice; I would feel much better if he would
get out now.
And Chris had, I think, a different tolerance for risk
than I did. And he felt that the conditions on the
ground were such that it was okay to stay. And, again,
these were conference calls that involved a variety of
actors in the State Department. I believe Op Center was
on it and was probably documenting the call as well. So
that was one instance.
But in terms of the overall what is our future, I don't
remember the specifics, but I do remember an overall
very strong impression from Chris that he felt it was
important to stay, and the conditions were such that
they should.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\Id. at 30.
Recognition of the TNC
The discussion in the summer among senior officials in
Washington also turned toward supporting the TNC to an even
greater degree.\184\ The first step in supporting the emerging
council was determining when and how to recognize them. Stevens
reported to Washington earlier in June ``substantial pockets of
people in Benghazi and Eastern Libya . . . are questioning the
TNC's legitimacy.''\185\ At the behest of the Secretary, the
United States took the unprecedented step of formally
recognizing the Transitional National Government on July 15,
2011,\186\ terming it the ``legitimate representative of the
Libya People,''\187\ but not the legitimate government of
Libya.\188\ Fishman explained the difference:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\See Fishman Testimony at 22 (``[D]uring the intervention, we
were trying, as mandated by the Security Council, to protect the
civilian population of the Libyan people, and once their regime was
collapsed, we were trying to, as we saw it, help the Libyans stabilize
their country and support the interim authorities to do that.'').
\185\See Email from Special Ass't, Office of Deputy Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State (June 7, 2011, 7:38 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0074994) (discussing the TNC's legitimacy).
\186\Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State,
Remarks on Libya and Syria (July 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/07/168656.htm.
\187\Fishman Testimony at 32.
\188\Id. at 33-34.
A: That was how we could recognize the Libyan
authorities as the legitimate representative of the
Libyan people, which would in essence, derecognize the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qadhafi regime as the Government of Libya.
Q: But did you draw a distinction between recognizing
them as the representative of the Libyan people and
recognizing them as the legitimate Libyan Government?
A: I believe so, because they didn't have a government
at the time.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\Id. at 60.
Notwithstanding the United States' decision to recognize
the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan People,
the State Department made clear ``it did not intend to
establish a formal diplomatic Mission in Benghazi.''\190\ State
Department officials were worried:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\See Email from Senior Desk Officer to Libya, Office of Maghreb
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to J.
Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional Nat'l Council (``stevens
chris'') (July 27, 2011, 9:22 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05390164) (attaching draft staffing paper).
[E]stablishment of a formal diplomatic mission in
Benghazi would undermine this commitment [to a unified,
free Libya with Tripoli as its capital] and send the
wrong political message. Establishment of a formal
diplomatic mission in Benghazi also would set off a
chain of complex legal and administrative requirements
that do not make sense for what is intended to be a
short-term presence.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\Email from William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Joan A.
Polaschik State, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep't of State
(July 18, 2011, 8:17 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05579345).
While formally recognizing the Benghazi diplomatic mission
may have created issues for Washington, especially if the
mission were considered ``short term,'' there was a benefit to
the TNC: the release of previously frozen funds to them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fishman told the Committee:
Well, it led to this complicated process that allowed
us to unfreeze some assets because the Central Bank and
other financial institutions . . . still had their
assets frozen\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\Fishman Testimony at 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
[B]y recognizing the NTC [sic], as subsequently other
countries did or previously and subsequently other
countries did, we [the United States] were able to
engage in the process where we were ultimately able to
create a temporary funding mechanism where we could
release some assets . . . to help defray their cost of
running Benghazi.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\Id. at 33.
Private business also stood to gain from the unfreezing of
Libyan assets. One such business was Osprey Global Solutions in
which Sidney Blumenthal had a financial interest.\194\
According to Osprey's Chief Operating Officer, the plan was for
the United States to unfreeze the frozen Libyan assets.\195\
These assets could then be used by the new Libyan government to
fund humanitarian assistance,\196\ an idea proposed by the
Secretary herself.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\Blumenthal Testimony at 44.
\195\Id. at 113.
\196\See Osprey Global Solutions, Capabilities Brief: Libya
Citizens & LSM Initiatives, Osprey Global Solutions, at 71 [hereinafter
Osprey Brief] (on file with Committee) (``Citizens Initiative: Phase
2--Frozen Libyan--USA Funds'').
\197\Scott Shane & Jo Becker, A New Libya, With `Very Little Time
Left,' N.Y. Times, (Feb. 27, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/libya-isis-hillary-
clinton.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to internal company documents, Osprey identified
a 300-foot hospital vessel--including a crematorium.\198\
Osprey provided to the Libyans details about this hospital
ship, even down to the number of physicians on board (16),
nurses (40), custodial and kitchen staff (18). Osprey also
provided hard figures on how much it would cost to procure the
ship, maintain the ship, and acquire medical equipment.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\Osprey Brief, supra note 196, at 31-35 (presenting the
``Citizens Initiative: Phase 1--Multi-Purpose Hospital Ship'').
\199\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 14, 2011--the day before the United States
officially recognized the TNC as the legitimate representative
of the Libyan people--Blumenthal emailed the Secretary
twice.\200\ One email contained the subject ``H: IMPORTANT FOR
YOUR MEETING. Sid.''\201\ The other email contained the subject
``Re: H: Pls call before you leave for Turkey. Important re
your trip. Sid.''\202\ That email contained the note ``read the
memo I sent you. Here it is again.''\203\ The contents of both
emails are identical:--Blumenthal described Osprey and the
funding issues associated with his venture. The emails read:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\Email from Sidney Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') to Hillary R.
Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (July 14, 2011,
10:38 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078451); Email from Sidney
Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (July 14, 2011, 7:03 PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0078453).
\201\Email from Sidney Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') to Hillary R.
Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (July 14, 2011,
10:38 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078451).
\202\Email from Sidney Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') to Hillary R.
Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (July 14, 2011,
7:03 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078453).
\203\Id.
You should be aware that there is a good chance at the
contact meeting in Turkey the TNC ambassador to the
UAE, a man you have not yet met, whose name is Dr.
Neydah, may tell you the TNC has reached an agreement
with a US company. The company is a new one, Osprey,
headed by former General David Grange, former head of
Delta Force. Osprey will provide field medical help,
military training, organize supplies, and logistics to
the TNC. They are trainers and organizers, not
fighters. Grange can train their forces and he has
drawn up a plan for taking Tripoli similar to the plan
he helped develop that was used by the first wave of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Forces in the capture of Baghdad.
This is a private contract. It does not involve NATO.
It puts Americans in a central role without being
direct battle combatants. The TNC wants to demonstrate
that they are pro-US. They see this as a significant
way to do that. They are enthusiastic about this
arrangement. They have held meetings with Grange in
Geneva and Dubai this week, Tuesday and Wednesday, that
concluded late last night (Wednesday). They have
developed a good relationship. This is the group the
TNC wants to work with. As I understand it, they are
still working out funding, which is related to the
overall TNC funding problems.
Grange is very low key, wishes to avoid publicity and
work quietly, unlike other publicity hungry firms.
Grange is under the radar.
Tyler, Cody and I acted as honest brokers, putting this
arrangement together through a series of connections,
linking the Libyans to Osprey and keeping it moving.
The strategic imperative: Expecting Gaddafi to fall on
his own or through a deus ex machina devolves the
entire equation to wishful thinking. The TNC has been
unable to train and organize its forces. The NATO air
campaign cannot take ground. The TNC, whose leaders
have been given to flights of fancy that Qaddafi will
fall tomorrow or the day after, have come to the
conclusion that they must organize their forces and
that they must score a military victory of their own
over Qaddafi that is not dependent solely on NATO in
order to give them legitimacy.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\Id.
Upon receiving these emails, the Secretary forwarded one to
Sullivan and said ``Pls read and discuss w me at hotel.
Thx.''\205\ She also responded to Blumenthal. First she wrote:
``I just landed and will call shortly.''\206\ She followed
with: ``Got it. Will followup tomorrow. Anything else to
convey?''\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (July 14, 2011, 6:47 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0078451).
\206\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Sidney Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') (July 14, 2011,
6:31 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078454).
\207\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Sidney Blumenthal (``sbwhoeop'') (July 14, 2011,
7:37 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078453).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following day, the United States formally recognized
the TNC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people,
allowing the TNC to access $30 billion in Libyan assets held in
the United States.\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\Sebnem Arsu & Steven Erlanger, Libyan Rebels Get Formal
Backing, and $30 Billion, N.Y. Times (July 15, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/world/africa/16libya.html?_r=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 24, 2011, Osprey and the TNC entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding that read, in part:
Per meetings held 13 July and 20 Aug 2011 in Dubai with
Dr. Aref Aly Nayed and in Amman on 23 and 24 August
with Mohammad Kikhia, this agreement is entered into
this 24th day of August 2011 between the National
Transitional Council of Libya (hereinafter referred to
as ``NTC''), now recognized by the United States
Government of America as the legitimate and sole
government of the Republic of Libya (ROL), and Osprey
Global Solutions, LLC . . . The specific tasks--Scope
of Work (SOW) the NTC desires to retain Osprey to
perform include but are not limited to . . . Provide
ship-to-shore (maritime) logistical support, advanced
field hospital services and mobile command and control
. . .\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\Osprey Global Solutions, Memorandum of Understanding (Aug. 24,
2011) (on file with Committee).
The total cost in the Memorandum for the first year of
Osprey's services--to include the ``multi-purpose 302' ship''--
was $114 million.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The head of Osprey, General David L. Grange, also wrote
Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs, regarding the hospital ship.\211\ In the letter Mr.
Grange wrote Osprey was prepared to provide the following
services:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\Letter from David L. Grange to Andrew J. Shapiro, Asst. Sec'y
for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 4, 2012) (on
file with Committee).
Provide ship-to-shore (maritime) medical and logistical
support, advanced field hospital services and mobile
command and control; this would include the immediate
deployment of a hospital ship equipped with rotary wing
assets . . .\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\Id.
Ultimately the National Security Council rejected the
hospital ship proposal.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\Scott Shane & Jo Becker, A New Libya, With `Very Little Time
Left,' N.Y. Times, (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/
us/politics/libya-isis-hillary-clinton.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior Official Travel to Libya
Despite the tenuous security environment in the summer of
2011, senior officials from Washington D.C., including Feltman,
William Roebuck, Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, and Fishman, traveled
to Benghazi.\214\ Feltman wrote to the Secretary during his
August 2011 trip to Benghazi:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 21, 2011, 9:26 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045090-92) (Ms. Abedin forwarding Mr. Feltman's message
to Sec'y Clinton).
I have joined our representative, Chris Stevens, in
meetings with a large number of representatives from
the TNC, civil society, UN organizations and NGOs, and
diplomatic corps. While we had no idea our trip would
correspond with the significant military advances in
the east and start the coordinated Tripoli uprising
dubbed ``Operation Mermaid Dawn,'' the timing gave us
the opportunity to note the contrast between the
relative bureaucratic quiet here compared to the hyped-
up activity in western Libya.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\Id.
He also described the impact the assassination of General
Younis, commander of the rebel forces, had on the security
environment in Benghazi.\216\ He spoke of the ``two realities
of Libyan life that TNC officials had previously tried to
downplay: tribes and militia . . . On reigning [sic] in the
militia we heard no good answers.''\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\General Younis, a former Libyan interior minister under
Qadhafi, defected to the rebel side when the revolution began and
became the commander-in-chief of the rebel forces in Libya.
\217\Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 21, 2011, 9:26 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045090-92).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was also during this trip to Benghazi Feltman discussed
with Stevens the future of the Benghazi Mission:
During the August trip, Chris and I talked about,
frankly, our shared view that we needed to maintain a
longer presence in Benghazi than the fall of Tripoli
might otherwise suggest. I was in Benghazi when the
battle for Tripoli began, and it was clear that this
time, it was inevitable that Qadhafi was leaving
Tripoli even though he wasn't, of course, found and
killed until later.
And so Chris and I did talk in that August trip about
the fact that both of us believed that we needed to
maintain some kind of presence in Benghazi for the
foreseeable future. We didn't talk about how long, but
given the history of Libya, given the history of the
revolution, given the need for Benghazi to remain
supportive of whatever government took form in Tripoli,
we thought it was politically extremely important that
we maintain some kind of presence in Benghazi beyond
the fall of Tripoli.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\See Feltman Testimony at 44-45.
THE FALL OF QADHAFI
With NATO airstrikes providing cover, by August 2011, the
Libyan opposition was finally able to push back against
Qadhafi's forces.\219\ On August 21, 2011, rebels advanced into
Tripoli.\220\ The next morning, Stevens provided an update to
the senior leaders at the State Department on the events in
Tripoli and the TNC's urgent request for ``essential . . .
commodities.''\221\ Stevens described the events unfolding and
made the following request:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\See John F. Burns, NATO Bombs Tripoli in Heaviest Strikes Yet,
N.Y. Times (May 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/
africa/24libya.html.
\220\Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Jubilant Rebels Control
Much of Tripoli, N.Y. Times (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/22/world/africa/22libya.html.
\221\Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:07 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045093) (forwarding update from Stevens in Benghazi).
Request for assistance: Tarhouni who also holds US
citizenship said items listed above (gas, diesel, baby
milk, and medicine) are urgently needed in Tripoli and
recommend that USG ship items directly to Zawiya's Port
and publicize such assistance as soon as feasible (in
coordination with the TNC). He said this would bring
the US even more goodwill than it has already earned
here.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\Id.
The Secretary responded to her staff five minutes later
asking: ``Can we arrange shipments of what's requested?''\223\
Sullivan replied seven minutes later saying the NSS and
Department of Defense were already pursuing the effort.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:11 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045095).
\224\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to U.S. Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State & Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:17 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045097).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary also told her inner circle she wanted to do a
press event as it would be ``[g]ood to remind ourselves and the
rest of the world that this couldn't have happened [without]
us''\225\ and ``would be a great [opportunity] to describe all
we've been doing . . .''\226\ She and her staff discussed her
traveling to Martha's Vineyard to be seen with the President
celebrating their Libyan success.\227\ Her top policy director
commented: ``It will show potus [President of the United
States] not on vacation. He's huddling with you. This must be a
political boost, right?'' \228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor to U.S.
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State & Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of
Staff to U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:32
AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078489)
\226\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Cheryl D. Mills & Huma Abedin
(Aug. 22, 2011, 7:16 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078489).
\227\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan & Huma Abedin (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:09
AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0078489).
\228\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan to Hillary R. Clinton (``H''),
Cheryl D. Mills & Huma Abedin (Aug. 22, 2011, 7:27 AM) (on file with
the Committee, SCB0078489).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At about the same time, Blumenthal wrote:
First, brava! This is a historic moment and you will be
credited for realizing it.
When Qaddafi himself is finally removed, you should of
course make a public statement before the cameras
wherever you are, even in the driveway of your vacation
house. You must go on camera. You must establish
yourself in the historical record at this moment.
The most important phrase is `successful
strategy.'\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\Email from Sidney Blumenthal (``Sid'') to Hillary R. Clinton
(``H'') (Aug. 22, 2011, 11:25 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0051597).
Later in the message, Blumenthal wrote: ``Be aware that
some may attempt to justify the flamingly stupid
`leading from behind' phrase, junior types on the NSC
imagining their cleverness.''\230\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\Id. The phrase ``leading from behind'' came from a remark by
an Obama advisor quoted in a May 2, 2011 article by Ryan Lizza in The
New Yorker. Ryan Lizza, Leading from Behind, NYT (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/leading-from-behind.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary forwarded this message to Sullivan:
Pls read below. Sid makes a good case for what I should
say but it's premised on being said after Q dies which
will make it more dramatic. That's my hesitancy since
I'm not sure how many chances I'll get.\231\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\Email from Hillary R. Clinton (``H''), Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (Aug. 22, 2011, 3:46 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0051597).
Sullivan had already developed a detailed timeline of
events and actions to demonstrate the Secretary's ``leadership/
ownership/stewardship of this country's Libya policy from start
to finish.''\232\ He wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\Tick Tock on Libya Email, supra note 19 (from Jacob J.
Sullivan to Cheryl D. Mills & Victoria Nuland, forwarded to Sec'y
Clinton, Aug. 22, 2011, 12:37 PM).
HRC has been a critical voice on Libya in
administration deliberations, at NATO, and in contact
group meetings--as well as the public face of the U.S.
effort in Libya. She was instrumental in securing the
authorization, building the coalition, and tightening
the noose around Qadhafi and his regime.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\Id.
Limiting the Future U.S. Role
With the rebels capturing Tripoli in August 2011 and
Qadhafi nowhere to be found, the TNC started to shift its
leaders and headquarters to Tripoli.\234\ As the situation in
Libya appeared to stabilize, there was corresponding interest
throughout the State Department and the administration to shift
the focus back to Tripoli and reopen the U.S. Embassy in
Tripoli as soon as possible.\235\ Sullivan asked: ``[W]hat's it
gonna take to get a team on the ground in Tripoli?''\236\ His
colleague wrote back: ``Exception to the BOG [boots on the
ground] for Explosive Ordnance Detection and Marine FAST [Fleet
Anti-terrorism security team.] An Ambassador to Libya who
actually wants to go. Locking Pat Kennedy in a closet for long
enough to actually take some real risks.''\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\See Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to
Transitional Nat'l Council, to Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of
State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, et al.
(Aug. 23, 2011, 11:29 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB00100119)
(discussing TNC plans to relocate to Tripoli); see also Exec.
Secretariat, Operations Ctr., Situation Report No. 14, Libya Task Force
TFLY03 (Sept. 4, 2011, 4:00 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0074167) (``The TNC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs will move from
Benghazi to Tripoli September 4 and will be housed in the Qadhafi-era
MFA building.'').
\235\See Email from Lee Lohman, Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Patrick Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State
for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 2, 2011) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0096224) (``Jeff send [sic] an email from Paris yesterday
expressing frustration that we don't have a presence in Tripoli.'').
\236\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (Aug. 30, 2011, 4:47 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0060918).
\237\Email to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, (Aug. 30, 2011, 4:50 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0060918).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As events unfolded in Tripoli, senior policy makers within
the State Department discussed their goals for Libya,
including: 1) bring the Lockerbie bomber to justice; and 2)
recover the costs incurred in providing military and
humanitarian aid to Libya; 3) recover and improve the position
of U.S. Energy firms in Libya.\238\ The fourth and final goal
was to counter Islamist extremists, noting that there was a
need to ``avoid allowing the most extreme and certainly violent
Islamist groups to use the new Libyan government and civil
society as a platform. The American people and the U.S.
Congress will be understandably irritated if a revolution that
the United States supported ends up spewing hatred or
advocating violence against the United States.''\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\See Email to Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (Aug. 29 2011, 5:01 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0060926-30) (attaching Note for the Secretary re: U.S. Interests in
post-Qadhafi Libya).
\239\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These policy goals did not address how the U.S. government
would assist Libya in transitioning to a functioning government
post-Qadhafi.\240\ Nor did they discuss any role the Mission in
Benghazi might play in these efforts.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\Id. The lack of post-Qadhafi planning is consistent with the
President's recent statement that his biggest foreign policy failure
was not properly planning for post-Qadhafi Libya. The lack of planning
is also in stark contrasts with statements by the Secretary that they
did plan for post-Qadhafi Libya but it was ``obstruction'' by the
Libyan people to the United States' efforts that led to the failed
state of Libya today. Barack Obama Says Libya Was `Worst Mistake of His
Presidency, Guardian (Apr. 11, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/apr/12/
barack-obama-says-libya-was-worst-mistake-of-his-presidency.
\241\See Email to Jacob Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State (Aug. 29 2011, 5:01 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0060926-30) (attaching Note for the Secretary re: U.S. Interests in
post-Qadhafi Libya).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens wanted to maintain a presence in Benghazi for the
short term, writing on September 6, 2011: ``As the Dept stands
up a Mission in Tripoli, the question arises as to how long to
keep Mission Benghazi operating. I believe it would be prudent
to maintain a small State-run presence here for at least 6
months.''\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional
Nat'l Council, to Deputy Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State et al. (Sept. 6, 2011, 9:01 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05389443).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polaschik also saw the benefits of maintaining a short-term
presence in Benghazi. She testified:
Qadhafi had just fled Tripoli. He was still on the
loose, on the lam. We were not yet back in Tripoli. It
wasn't clear if or when the leadership of the
transitional office or Council would transition from
Benghazi to Tripoli, if they all would, what would be
there. And given the critical role that Benghazi had
played in the start of the revolution and the
execution, so to speak, of the revolution and the
leadership, of course it made sense to have a presence
there for another 6 months.''\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\Polaschik Testimony at 160.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
She elaborated:
[S]ome officials from the Transitional National Council
were beginning to shift to Tripoli. Others were still
there, so it was clear that there was going to be a
period in which the political leadership of a free
Libya, . . . the post-Qadhafi government was going to
be in a variety of places; so we needed to make sure
that we had the ability to touch them in both places,
and from my perspective, it made a lot of sense to keep
Chris there.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\Id. at 39-40.
The Post Management Officer for Libya testified closing the
Mission was also an option: ``In official conversations, as we
met to discuss options related to the Benghazi footprint that
was always one of the items that was out there as a potential
decision point. As we were looking at security and others
things, closure was always an option.''\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 174.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Later in September 2011, Sullivan, Feltman, and William B.
Taylor, the newly appointed head of the Middle East Transitions
office, prepared a note for the Deputy Secretaries advocating
U.S. involvement in Libya be significantly scaled back.\246\
Outlining the level of priority Libya now had within the State
Department, they wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\Note from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir., of Policy Planning, U.S.
Dep't of State, et al. to William J. Burns, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State, and Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State (Sept. 28, 2011) (on file with the Committee, SCB0090954-59),
(discussing parameters for U.S. engagement in post-Qadhafi Libya).
[P]ost-conflict stabilization in Libya, while clearly a
worthy undertaking at the right level of investment,
cannot be counted as one of our highest priorities.
Strategically for us, Libya does not loom as large as
Egypt and Syria.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\Id.
They cautioned: ``We should not allow the momentum of our
involvement to date in the Libyan revolution to determine our
strategy for longer-term assistance.'' \248\ They emphasized
``[t]his means that, for the United States, Libya must not
become a state-building exercise.''\249\ They defined the
circumstances under which the U.S. should, or should not,
intercede, and argued the U.S. should only assist when 1) the
U.S. had a ``unique'' ability to provide a particular service;
2) the U.S. has a proven track record of success and Congress
will provide funds; and 3) Libyans expressly request the U.S.
to do so, ``[e]ven if we feel the Libyan government or its
people are making a mistake in not seeking our help. . .
.''\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\Id.
\249\Id.
\250\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to these State Department officials, the highest
priorities in Libya were to ``secure weapons''; ensure an
``effective democratic transition''; prevent ``violent
extremists'' from ``seizing control''; and ``ensuring a level-
playing field for U.S. businesses.''\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medium priority goals were reconciling former regime
elements into Libyan society and ``create a judicial
system.''\252\ The lowest priority, according to these policy
makers was to support a ``broad program of economic
reconstruction and diversification'' and ensure the Libyans
have the ``ability to maintain delivery of basic
services.''\253\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\Id.
\253\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The sentiment of the memorandum was clear: Once the civil
war was over and Qadhafi was removed from power, the United
States would move on.\254\ The broad policies outlined by the
senior State Department officials stood in direct contrast with
what the State Department's own experts on the ground in Libya
knew was needed to support the country moving forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\254\See id. (``The Administration has a primary interest in
ensuring that others--the Libyans, the UN, the EU, and NGOs--take
overall responsibility for post-conflict stabilization.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his interview with the Committee, Cretz described what
he saw, knew, and believed needed to be done to stabilize
Libya:
Q: . . . what was your sense of what challenges? [sic]
A: Well, number one, you know, Qadhafi ruled for 40
years and didn't allow the emergence of any institution
that could rival his power and the influence of he and
his small clique over the people and government of
Libya, so consequently, after the fall, there really
was nothing there. There was no institutions, you know,
ministries. They never operated as a real government
because Qadhafi ruled the roost.
So my concerns were, number one that we needed to find
a way to help them build their infrastructure in terms
of developing independent and capable institutions. My
second concern was that there had to be a way to end
the strife among the militias and that involved getting
a strong and capable central government.
We had to deal with, you know, making sure that the oil
resource, which was really the only resource that they
depended on, was developed in a reasonable way and that
the proceeds made their way back to the to the people
of Libya. We had to ensure that there was a capable
military, a capable counterintelligence, a
counterterrorism capability as well.
So these were all kind of concerns that I had
mentioned. The borders were porous. There had to be
some kind of way to establish a border regime. There
was a continuing threat of weapons, which had been
collected by the Qadhafi regime and then loose, you
know, basically spread throughout the country and began
to be making their way through the region in Africa, et
cetera, so that had to be a way to get control of that,
so there were a lot of problems in the post Qadhafi
era.
* * *
Q: And with regard to the U.S., United States'
engagement, involvement, and to the extent you can
recall, would you have recommended that the U.S. become
more engaged, less engaged? I know that you've already
said that you did not recommend that we leave
altogether, but do you have a sense of whether you felt
it was important for us to increase our engagement as
opposed to decrease our engagement?
A: Well, I think it was critical that the United States
continue to play a vital role. I mean, given our past
history, given what we did on the intervention, and
given the fact that there was a real affection for the
United States in the country in the aftermath of what
we had done along with the French and British and
others to overthrow Qadhafi, and I would have liked to
have seen a more robust program.
But the truth of the matter was that when you don't
have a functioning government, how do you provide
resources to that government when there's no absorptive
capacity? So this is the main problem that we ran into
in the post war situation. You know, I can't say that
there was a huge appetite in Washington to put hundreds
of millions of dollars into Libya, but I can say there
was an interest in ensuring, you know, our role there,
ensuring that this evolving nation developed in a
democratic tradition. But the truth is that there was
no absorptive capacity to receive assistance and to
help develop the nation along that way.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\255\Cretz Testimony at 145-47.
Embassy Tripoli Reopens: Impact on Benghazi Mission
As senior State Department officials were discussing their
goals for Libya, nearly seven months after its personnel were
evacuated and one month after the fall of Tripoli, the U.S.
Embassy in Tripoli raised the American flag and restarted
operations.\256\ Cretz returned to Tripoli as Ambassador.\257\
The precarious security environment in Libya precipitated the
need for 16 Security Support Team [SST] members from the
Defense Department, eighteen members of the State Department's
own highly trained mobile security team, in addition to a
temporary duty Diplomatic Security team, to protect the
Ambassador and embassy personnel.\258\ The Administration's
policy of no boots on the ground once again shaped the type of
military assistance that would be provided, with the Defense
Department and the State Department going to great lengths to
ensure the administration's policy was not violated. The
Executive Secretariats for both the Defense Department and
State Department exchanged communications outlining the
diplomatic capacity in which the Defense Department SST
security team members would serve, which included wearing
civilian clothes so as not to offend the Libyans.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\Polaschik Testimony at 12-15:
[When ``] the Embassy evacuated to Washington, . . . we
worked sort of in Embassy in exile . . . In August 2011,
our official status as Embassy Tripoli expired because the
State Department had run the course of the 180 days of
evacuation status for Embassy Tripoli, so we created a new
entity that we called the Libya cell. And the purpose of
the Libya cell was to either staff the Mission in Benghazi
if the situation continued and we needed to have our only
representation in country in Benghazi because Qadhafi was
still in Tripoli, or the Libya cell would serve as the
nucleus of the group that would go back into Tripoli to
reopen the Embassy.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\U.S. ambassador Gene Cretz returns to Libya, USA Today (Sept.
21, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-09-21/
us-reopens-libya-embassy/50491638/1.
\258\Cretz Testimony at 89-91.
\259\See Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, to Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y,
Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, (Sept.
6, 2011) (on file with the Committee, SCB0096343); see also Email from
Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State
to Denis R. McDonough, Deputy Dir., Nat'l Sec. Council (Sept. 6, 2011,
12:32 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0096350) (``I have confirmed
. . . [Special Air Services] folks in Tripoli supporting the restart of
their Embassy, in civilian clothes. Have also reconfirmed with NEA that
civilian clothes [and thus SOF] is the way we have to go.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increased security was important as fighting in Libya
continued. Cretz described to the Committee:
[I]n general, Tripoli was still in the throes--in
September of 2011 was still in the throes of civil war.
Tripoli had fell--had fallen. But there were still
active pockets of resistance throughout the country
from Qadhafi loyalists.
The country had also begun to break down in
anticipation of a victory over Qadhafi into the
militias that, in fact, were fighting Qadhafi. The war
against Qadhafi was not by a unified opposition army.
It was made up of a militia. The jihadists had a
militia. The people from Zintan had a militia. The
people from Misrata had a militia. So in anticipation
of the final victory, they were, in effect, fighting it
out.
In a sense, a lot of what we see today in Libya, they
were fighting it out for a foothold to make sure that
they got a piece of the pie--a piece of the power pie
once things settled down.
So the situation in Tripoli was very unsettled.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\Cretz Testimony at 83.
With Embassy Tripoli officially reopened, and Benghazi's
future less than certain, Stevens asked the State Department to
conclude his Mission on October 6, 2011, but he was asked to
remain until Jibril, the interim Prime Minister, completed his
relocation from Benghazi to Tripoli.\261\ Feltman described his
ongoing conversations with Stevens about Benghazi's future:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\See Email from Elizabeth L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Ass't
Sec'y of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Raymond D. Maxwell, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Lee Lohman, Ex. Dir., Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State et al. (Sept. 20, 2011, 6:38
PM) (on file with the Committee, C05389443) (discussing reasons for
Special Rep. Stevens to remain in Benghazi).
The normal response would be once the government's in
Tripoli . . . , then you close down Benghazi. That
would be sort of a normal response given the budget
climate, given all the other complications. And so
Chris and I would talk about did we really think this
was essential. Why did we think it was essential. And
it had to do with, again, the fact that Libya had been
essentially a divided country before, where Benghazi
had been neglected, oppressed even by Qadhafi, but yet
Benghazi was where this uprising had begun. It was
where the Libyan revolution had begun, so it was
important that Benghazi feel part of this process. We
felt that having a small diplomatic presence in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi it would not be the Embassy.
Clearly the Embassy would be accredited to the
government in Tripoli but that that would keep our
presence as well as the presence of others, because we
were not the only ones looking at this, as well as the
presence of others, would keep Benghazi as part of the
political equation. Because if you didn't have Benghazi
feeling invested in what was happening in Tripoli, you
had the risks of the country splitting again, is what
we clearly thought.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\Feltman Testimony at 58.
Feltman further testified why the State Department did not
make the Benghazi Mission official, especially when operations
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
resumed in Tripoli:
So what we were trying to what Chris and I were trying
to figure out was, how could we make a compelling
enough argument that in the zero sum game that we have
in terms of our budget and our resources, that we could
find enough resources to keep Benghazi operating
through the critical transition period? . . .
[T]he type of budget support out of Congress we would
need. This is a time when the U.S. reduces diplomatic
presences, doesn't expand them.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\Id. at 46-47.
Discussions also ensued over how to bring the personnel in
Benghazi under the diplomatic umbrella of the Embassy in
Tripoli without triggering formal recognition of the Benghazi
office.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\See Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 131:
At some point in the fall of 2011, we exchanged diplomatic
notes with the new Government of Libya in whatever form
that happened to be, and with the return of Ambassador
Cretz, a Special Representative was not needed at that
point, because we had our accredited Ambassador in Tripoli.
So at that point, I believe, it when the term `Special
Representative' ceased to be used, but again, I don't have
specific recollection of the timeline.
Polaschik was aware of this issue and wanted to ensure that
all personnel in Benghazi had the protections of the privileges
and immunities accorded by the Vienna Convention.\265\ Listing
personnel in Benghazi as a separate office was rejected,
however, as ``[t]he reference to the establishment of an office
in Benghazi may raise congressional notification issues. . .
.''\266\ Earlier in the year, Kennedy, determined congressional
notification was not needed because ``the Hill knows we are
there.''\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\See Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in
Libya, U.S. Dep't of State, to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, and Senior Desk Officer for
Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 17,
2011, 10:09 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05528533) (discussing
listing Benghazi team on diplomatic list).
\266\Email to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Nov. 9, 2011, 5:23 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05528533).
\267\Email (May 18, 2011, 1:13 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05391797).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ultimately, it was decided to submit ``one dip[lomatic]
list for Tripoli, but noting on it that certain staff members
will be performing their duties on a TDY basis in Benghazi.''
\268\ Thus, without formally notifying the new Libyan
government of the Benghazi Mission, the personnel in Benghazi
received diplomatic immunity only because the State Department
told the Libyan government the personnel in Benghazi were
actually assigned to Tripoli.\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\Email from Deputy Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, and Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy
Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep't of State (Nov. 9, 2011, 7:08 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05528533).
\269\Id. (``[C]ertain staff members will be performing their duties
on a TDY basis in Benghazi.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi's Future
Senior officials in Washington discussed several options
for Benghazi's future operations. Stevens proposed two options
to State Department officials in early September 2011 to
continue the Mission:
Slimmed down compound: Principal Office (FS-02 level)
MGT/IRM and possibly one USAID/OTI officer (if they get
requested funding). 4 DS. 1 admin LES [locally employed
staff] plus guardforce.
Consolidated to Villa A (combine lodging/offices; beds
for 7 plus 2 TDY [temporary duty] in living room; also
possible to rent a small 1 bedroom house attached to
Villa A belonging to same owner)
Duration: through September 30, 2012 (3 months beyond
projected TNC elections)
Purpose: provide platform for POL/ECON [political/
economic] reporting; PD and OTI programming;
PM/Conventional Weapons collection effort in east;
commercial outreach.
Other Benghazi Missions: UNSMIL [United Nations Special
Mission in Libya], EU and UK intend to maintain small
branch offices for the next 6 months-one year. Italians
and Turks have consulates.
Virtual presence: End all 3 compound leases. Zero full-
time State Department staff. Use hotels (as Spanish,
Greek and foreign NGOs have been doing). Possibly leave
FAV in Benghazi [redacted text] to support TDY travel
in eastern Libya.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to Transitional
Nat'l Council, to William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Gene A. Cretz,
U.S. Ambassador to Libya, and Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of
Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 31, 2011, 3:08 PM) (on file
with the Committee, C05394929).
Feltman described the discussions to the Committee ``[t]hey
[sic] were ongoing discussions . . . because we needed to
muster our arguments. We needed to muster our rationale. We
needed to feel confident ourselves that this was the right
thing to do before we would propose something that was going to
be, you know, financially difficult.''\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\Feltman Testimony at 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Post Management Officer for Libya further explained to
the Committee closing the mission was an option. ``In official
conversations, as we met to discuss options related to the
Benghazi footprint that was always one of the items that was
out there as a potential decision point. As we were looking at
security and other things, closure was always an option.''\272\
In September 2011, Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor,
State Department, was likely briefed on a plan that would have
closed Benghazi in January 2012.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 174.
\273\See Memorandum to Cheryl D. Mills on Update on Tripoli
Operations (Sept. 14, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05578323)
(discussing plans for activities in Benghazi through January 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From a security standpoint, Eric Boswell, Assistant
Secretary, Diplomatic Security, State Department, explained:
Benghazi was originally envisaged at [sic] a short term
thing. Our expectation in DS was that we were going to
support Chris Stevens' effort for 60 days, 90 days, and
that once an embassy was reestablished in Tripoli, if
that was the outcome of the civil war, once the--well,
if the right side one [sic] in Tripoli, once an embassy
was to be reestablished, we anticipated that Benghazi
would go out of business.
The Embassy was reestablished in September, but the NEA
Bureau asked us to keep a little presence in Benghazi,
so a little longer a little longer. [sic] It was really
quite incremental. A little longer, a little
longer.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\Testimony of Eric J. Boswell, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of
Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, before H. Comm. on Oversight &
Gov't Reform, Tr. at 17 (July 9, 2013) [hereinafter Boswell Testimony]
(on file with the Select Committee on Benghazi).
Benghazi's uncertain future impacted Stevens and his team.
The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in the fall of 2011
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
[W]e were still in this situation where we didn't know
how long Benghazi was going to be. Tripoli was kicking
off. And so there was a lot of interest in supporting
that. So we were trying to figure out--or headquarters
was trying to figure out where to prioritize our
deficiencies, if you want to call it that. So no one
knows.
I mean, we were planning for the worst, phasing people
out and trying to figure out how best to support the
mission there. If I remember correctly, with the
Embassy being opened--it opened towards the latter part
of my tenure there. So the Envoy lost his, quote-
unquote, status because there was now an Ambassador in
country. . . . I think they were going to bring in a
political officer, probably my rank. I'm pretty sure he
was my rank. He was going to be the foothold there in
Benghazi for the short term, but no one knew how
long.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 33-34 (May 21, 2015) [hereinafter
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 13 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
While Stevens and his team waited to learn their status,
security resources to the Mission decreased.\276\ Stevens
called an EAC meeting in October 2011 to evaluate the Mission's
security posture after the fall of Sirte, Qadhafi's
birthplace.\277\ Stevens and the Diplomatic Security Agents
were concerned about the ``recent reduction in DS manpower (the
departure of several Agents in past week who ha[d] not . . .
been backfilled).''\278\ Another EAC was held three days later
to discuss ``the current situation in Benghazi and to address
possible developments . . . that may arise in the next 24
hours.''\279\ A little more than a week later, a member of the
February 17 Martyrs Brigade [February 17] who worked on the
Mission compound came under attack on his way home.\280\ That
incident occurred approximately 500 meters from the
compound.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\Id. at 33.
\277\Email to Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. (Oct. 17, 2011, 12:18
PM) (on file with the Committee, C05389778).
\278\Id.
\279\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 13 to NEA-MAG-DL et al. (Oct.
20, 2011, 1:52 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05395038).
\280\Email from [REDACTED] (Benghazi) to `Spot Reports,' et al.
(Nov. 1, 2011, 4:49 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05272056).
\281\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qadhafi's Death
With the future of a U.S. diplomatic presence in Benghazi
being debated and discussed, the Secretary traveled to Tripoli,
Libya on October 18, 2011.\282\ During her day trip there, she
met with members of the TNC, went to Tripoli University to meet
with students, visited the medical center and the U.S. Embassy,
and gave several speeches.\283\ She did not visit Benghazi even
though Stevens was still there. She did ``not recall'' speaking
with Stevens during her trip to Libya.\284\ Asked whether she
discussed the future of the Mission there, Feltman, who
traveled with the Secretary, told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\282\Steven Lee Myers, In Tripoli, Clinton Pledges U.S. to a `Free
Libya,' N.Y. Times (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/
world/africa/clinton-in-libya-to-meet-leaders-and-offer-aid-
package.html.
\283\Id.
\284\Clinton Testimony at 155-56.
If there were, it was quite light and in passage. She
had a very, very busy schedule going to see a variety
of Libyan officials, meeting with representatives of
Libyan civil society, delivering a speech. It was a
jam-packed day and it wasn't the type of quiet time to
have sort of policy discussions like that.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\Feltman Testimony at 85.
Two days later, on October 20, 2011, Qadhafi was captured
and killed attempting to escape from his hometown of Sirte. The
TNC ``declared the liberation of Libya'' and the revolutionary
war officially ended on October 23, 2011.\286\ The NATO-led
military action, Operation Unified Protector, formally ended a
week later.\287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\See NTC declares 'Liberation of Libya,' Al Jazeera (Oct. 24,
2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/10/
201110235316778897.html; see also Press Release, The White House Office
of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Declaration
of Liberation in Libya (Oct. 23, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/10/23/statement-president-declaration-liberation-
libya (``On behalf of the American people, I congratulate the people of
Libya on today's historic declaration of liberation. After four decades
of brutal dictatorship and eight months of deadly conflict, the Libyan
people can now celebrate their freedom and the beginning of a new era
of promise.'').
\287\NATO ends Libya mission, CNN (Nov. 3, 2011), http://
www.cnn.com/2011/10/31/world/
Africa/libya-nato-mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When informed of Qadhafi's death, the Secretary said: ``We
came, we saw, he died.''\288\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\Corbett Daly, Clinton on Qaddafi: ``We came, we saw, he
died,'' CBS News (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clinton-
on-qaddafi-we-came-we-saw-he-died.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approximately a month after Qadhafi's death, Susan Rice,
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
also traveled to Libya, including Benghazi.\289\ Despite
``walk[ing] the streets of Benghazi,'' Rice would not comment
to the Committee on whether she visited the Mission compound in
Benghazi.\290\ Less than a month later, in December 2011, Leon
Panetta, the Secretary of Defense, traveled to Libya.\291\
Because of security concerns, Panetta's time in Libya was brief
and did not include a trip to Benghazi.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\Press Release, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Remarks by Ambassador
Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N., Following Sec. Council
Consultations on Libya (Nov. 28, 2011), http://
iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2011/11/
20111129113633su0.6971203.html?distid=ucs#axzz48qWq65Vj.
\290\Testimony of Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Rep. to the U.N.,
Tr. at 134 (Feb. 2, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
\291\Defense chief Panetta visits Libya, USA Today (Dec. 17, 2011),
http://usatoday30.usa
today.com/news/world/story/2011-12-17/panetta-libya/52019842/1.
\292\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FURTHER EXTENDING THE MISSION
With Embassy Tripoli officially up and running, and the
return of Cretz to Libya, Stevens departed Benghazi in late
November 2011.\293\ Before he left, however, he was asked to
return as Ambassador. Cretz was informed of this change as
well.\294\ According to Polaschik: ``[I]t's very inappropriate
for someone sitting in country to be working in country. I
mean, it's an unusual situation. In order to be nominated and
get through the congressional confirmation process, I think it
was better for him [Stevens] to be here [in Washington].''\295\
Stevens would remain outside of Libya from November 2011 until
May 26, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\See Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Rep. to
Transitional Nat'l Council, to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Nov. 10, 2011, 10:39 AM) (on
file with the Committee, SCB0079464) (``I'll check in with you all
myself when I'm back in [Washington D.C.] the week of Nov 21.'').
\294\See Email from Gene A. Cretz, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to
Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor to the U.S. Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 21, 2011, 4:50 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045106).
\295\Polaschik Testimony at 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Remains Unstable
Security continued to be unstable in December 2011. The
Security Environment Threat List [SETL] rating for Libya was
critical for political violence and high for terrorism and
crime.\296\ SETL ratings are essential State Department tools
in determining the countermeasures a facility must put in place
to mitigate a threat.\297\ A critical rating is the most
serious rating--indicating there is a grave impact to
diplomats.\298\ A high rating indicates there is a serious
impact on American diplomats.\299\ In late December 2011, right
before holidays, there was open source reporting about a threat
to western embassies located in Benghazi during Christmas and
New Year's Eve in 2011.\300\ The Mission held an EAC led by the
new Principal Officer to discuss its security posture in light
of the threat and the overall security environment and to
discuss the need for additional security resources.\301\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent
10 (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:03 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05388931).
\297\See Alex Tiersky & Susan B. Epstein, Cong. Research Serv.,
RL42834, Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad:
Background and Policy Issues 6 (2014).
\298\Id.
\299\Id.
\300\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 to Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 25 (Dec. 21, 2011, 8:50 EST) (on file with the Committee,
C05396082) (discussing reporting of threat to U.S. compound in
Benghazi).
\301\See Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep't of State, to Joan A.
Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep't of State, et
al. (Dec. 23, 2011, 7:34 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05392213)
(Distributing notes from EAC).).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The incoming Diplomatic Security Agent in charge described
the Mission compound when he arrived to the facility in late
November 2011.\302\ He told the Committee: ``While I was in
Benghazi . . . the compound was woefully inadequate in terms of
physical security. There were a whole number of things that we
didn't have, and a lot of things that we did have were
completely insufficient.''\303\He observed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony at 19.
\303\Id.
[O]ur perimeter security is nonexistent, we have walls
with lattices that somebody can shoot through; we have
walls with footholds people can climb over; we have a 4
foot wall back here; we have no lighting. So all these
physical security standards, especially around the
perimeter of the building were completely insufficient,
and we needed large amounts of money and this was going
to take time, it was going to be expensive, but we
needed this desperately to make this place safe.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\304\Id. at 25-26.
With normal security standards not applicable in Benghazi
and a decreasing number of Diplomatic Security Agents on the
ground, the incoming Diplomatic Security Agents were forced to
request the most rudimentary measures to improve security on
the compound.\305\ The Diplomatic Security Agent on the ground
told the Committee: ``[O]nce I became RSO, I started a flurry
of requests asking for physical security upgrades.''\306\ He
further stated: ``I put together a list of, call it a dozen
requests in terms of guard platforms, sandbags, sent that out
initially in kind of an informal email, because we didn't have
any ability to send cables.''\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\See Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, U.S. Dep't of State,
Tr. at 26 (Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 12
Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (``[W]e identified some--you
know, identified a contractor to come in and cut those window grilles
off and then replace them with a system that was very, very, you know,
rudimentary, but it worked.'').
\306\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony at 19.
\307\Id. at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, on December 21, 2011, the Mission requested
funding from Washington for 17 jersey barriers to serve as
anti-ram barriers.\308\ The barriers were on sale from the
British who were closing their compound in Benghazi and moving
their operations back to their Embassy in Tripoli.\309\ A day
later, the agent made another request for ``some escape hatches
in the iron window bars on the villas.''\310\ That same day,
the Diplomatic Security Agent's request was expanded to
include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 to Physical Sec.
Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S.
Dep't (Dec. 21, 2011, 12:27 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05396085).
\309\Id.
\310\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 to Physical Sec.
Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S.
Dep't (Dec. 22, 2011, 6:09 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05388920).
[A]dditional security measures that are desperately
needed (lighting for areas of the compound that are
completely dark, sandbags, platforms that we can place
against the perimeter walls so we can see over them--we
have significant blind spots in our video camera
coverage, a guard shack for outside of the main
entrance, etc).\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 to Physical Sec.
Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S.
Dep't (Dec. 22, 2011, 7:19 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05388920).
As Benghazi was requesting additional security measures,
the Mission was experiencing significant shortages in
Diplomatic Security Agents. A Diplomatic Security Agent on the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ground at the time described his concern to the Committee:
It was down to two agents, myself and one other agent.
And as I was getting ready to depart, we were going to
go to one agent. And if the staffing pattern remained
the way it was, with our expected incoming agents, we
were going to go down to zero agents. And that would
have been around January 4th or 5th or so, we would go
down to zero agents.\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony at 45-46.
These requests for security resources and personnel
continued into the winter, spring, and summer of 2012.
The Extension Memorandum
When Stevens left Benghazi for the U.S. in November 2011,
Washington still had not made a decision on the Mission's
future. A few weeks after he left Libya to return to the United
States, Stevens asked the Principal Officer who replaced him in
Benghazi about the status of the Mission, writing: ``Also, just
curious what you guys decided to do re: future of the
compound.''\313\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\313\Email from J. Christopher Stevens to Principal Officer 1, U.S.
Dep't of State (Dec. 15, 2011, 1:14 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0079324).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussions about Benghazi's diplomatic future culminated
in the Near Eastern Bureau's decision to request an extension
of the Mission for one year.\314\ This required the approval of
Kennedy, and the Near Eastern Bureau prepared an extension
memorandum for his approval.\315\ The Post Management Officer
for Libya, of the logistics arm of the Near Eastern Affairs
Bureau, explained the purpose of the memo:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\314\See Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State to Patrick F.
Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 27,
2011) [hereinafter Dec. 27, 2011 Action Memo for Under Secretary
Kennedy] (on file with the Committee, C05261557) (recommending approval
of continued U.S. presence in Benghazi through the end of calendar year
2012).
\315\Id.
[I]ts purpose is to establish the policy priority, that
this is what we are going to be doing, and this is what
we--we need to make it happen. So this memo says that
the presence is approved, and that some of these issues
were dealt with to deal with the change in the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
presence.
Without specific budgets dedicated to these facilities
and to this process, there needed to be some sort of
mandate to declare this is what we are doing, so that
then, the relevant functional bureaus and regional
bureau could then say, hey, we have this approval I am
waving my document we have this approval, we need to
find money to make this happen.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya Testimony at 65-66.
On December 27, 2011, Feltman forwarded the final Action
Memorandum to Kennedy requesting approval to extend the
Benghazi Mission until the end of 2012.\317\ Feltman described
the memorandum as reflecting ``discussions with my bosses at
the State Department about why Chris Stevens and I both thought
that we needed to maintain a presence in Benghazi. . . . I was
confident that we had done our best to build the consensus that
would lead to a yes.''\318\ When asked whether the Secretary
was aware of the discussion about Benghazi's future, Feltman
testified he ``had ready access to the secretary. I don't think
that anything that I would have put in any of these memos would
have surprised her just because of the sort of ongoing
discussion we had about the Arab Spring.''\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\See Feltman Testimony at 98.
\318\Id. at 100-01.
\319\Id. at 101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Secretary told the Committee:
There were certainly meetings in which I was advised
about the process being undertaken as to determine
whether Benghazi should be extended. So, yes, I was
aware of the process that was ongoing, and I was kept
up to date about it.\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\320\Clinton Testimony at 160.
In his Action Memorandum, Feltman laid out the policy
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reasons to remain in Libya:
A continued presence in Benghazi will emphasize U.S.
interest in the eastern part of Libya. Many Libyans
have said the U.S. presence in Benghazi has a salutary,
calming effect on easterners who are fearful that the
new focus on Tripoli could once again lead to their
neglect and exclusion from reconstruction and wealth
distribution and strongly favor a permanent U.S.
presence in the form of a full consulate. They feel the
United States will help ensure they are dealt with
fairly. TNC officials have said some government
agencies may shift their headquarters to Benghazi (such
as the National Oil Company). Other government agencies
and corporations already have their headquarters in
Benghazi and will likely remain there for the
foreseeable future. The team will be able to monitor
political trends (Islamists, tribes, political parties,
militias) and public sentiment regarding the ``new
Libya,'' as well as report on the critical period
leading up to and through Libya's first post-Qadhafi
elections. Programmatic benefits to a continued U.S.
presence in Benghazi include building on USAID/OTI's
programs to strengthen civil society groups, media
training, and capacity building in municipal councils.
We should continue to engage with the populace,
particularly with the large population of Libyan youth,
an important and receptive audience with high
expectations for the post-revolution period.\321\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\321\Dec. 27, 2011 Action Memo for Under Secretary Kennedy, supra
note 311.
On January 5, 2012, Kennedy approved the memorandum.\322\
He explained to the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\322\See Id. (signature date stamped); see also Post Mgmt. Officer
for Libya Transcript at 178 (``[`January 5th, 2012'] would indicate
that that's the day that action was taken on the memo.'').
This document is essentially in a prime part and a
secondary part. The prime part is that I am authorizing
us committing to extend the lease on this facility
through the end of calendar year 2012. And I am doing
that because they have made representations to me that
the facility is needed. My conversations with others of
my peers indicated that no decision had yet been made
about whether to make this operation permanent,
continue at interim or close it. . . . And, then
secondly, it also sets a ceiling on the number of
personnel that will be assigned.''\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\323\Kennedy Testimony at 333-334.
Excluded from the discussions to extend the Benghazi
mission for another year were senior officials from the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security.
Boswell explained he was not involved, nor consulted, in
the extension memorandum:
When the memo came up regarding the--a memo from
Assistant Secretary Feltman to Under Secretary Kennedy
asking for the extension of the Benghazi mission for
another year and asking the Under Secretary to make a
couple of decisions about that, one, the overall
decision to approve or disapprove, but also a second
decision about what kind of property to maintain, I did
not see that memo. That memo never got to me. It went
up, I gather, on the 23rd of December. It was signed
off on by various parts of Diplomatic Security,
including--the right parts of Diplomatic Security,
including the Countermeasures Directorate. It was
cleared by--as I found out in retrospect, it was--after
the fact, it was cleared by my Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Countermeasures who was acting for Scott
Bultrowicz.\324\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\Boswell Testimony at 17.
Gentry O. Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic
Security, Countermeasures, confirmed to the Committee he
cleared the extension memorandum on behalf of Diplomatic
Security. He also confirmed he cleared the memorandum with the
comment, ``this operation continues to be an unfunded mandate
and a drain on personnel resources.''\325\ When asked to
explain his comment, Smith testified ``it didn't come from
Countermeasures, it would not have been solely for physical
security. So I would say that it was broader for the operations
in Benghazi.''\326\ He further stated; ``The other seniors
would have seen the memo as well and had an opportunity to
comment based on its accuracy and maybe providing information
for the document itself.''\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\325\Email to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 23, 2011, 3:27 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05578953).
\326\Smith Testimony at 75.
\327\Id. at 73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charlene Lamb told the Committee ``I did not see it [the
memorandum] until after the event in Benghazi.''\328\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\Lamb Testimony at 221.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Purpose of Mission in 2012: Symbolic Nature of
U.S. Presence in Benghazi
With Embassy Tripoli reopened and Stevens back in
Washington D.C. awaiting confirmation to become Ambassador to
Libya, the Benghazi Mission continued its work through a series
of ``Principal Officers.''\329\ The Principal Officers met with
leaders of the local council, militia heads, foreign diplomats
located in Benghazi, heads of businesses and non-governmental
organizations, and regular Libyans.\330\ The Principal Officers
reported to Washington D.C. their impressions of Benghazi and
the state of eastern Libya.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\See Dec. 27, 2011 Action Memo for Under Secretary Kennedy,
supra note 311 (discussing staffing of Benghazi Mission).
\330\See id. (discussing programmatic benefits of continued
Benghazi Mission).
\331\See id. (discussing the effect of ongoing Benghazi Mission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Mission continued to operate, it operated much
differently than in 2011. As explained by Polaschik:
A: Traditionally [Special Envoys] have been based in
Washington, but I know in recent years there has been a
special envoy presence in Jerusalem that reports to the
Secretary of State. So it's not unprecedented to have
special envoy missions.
That said, it is unusual to have a totally separate
office in a country in which there is no other
consulate or presence. So it was a bit of an odd duck.
Let's say it doesn't fit the unusual [sic] State
Department pattern, and it's something that as DCM, I
struggled with a bit, not in the early days, because it
was just a different operation, I think, while Chris
was there. Because of his stature, because of his
experience, because of his reach back into the State
Department, I think he had the ability to get resources
and attention in a way that the people who followed him
did not.
I was able as DCM to have a good working relationship
with Chris and all of his successors just because we
made it work. But I did not--you know, in another
country, if there's a consulate per se, the principal
officer or the consul general reports to the DCM, and
the DCM has oversight for operations and hiring and
resources and all of those issues. As DCM in Tripoli, I
did not have that.
Q: Once Chris Stevens left in November of 2011 and was
replaced by a series of principal officers, did that
change then?
A: The formal relationship?
Q: In that principal officers then became more routine
and report to you, and then you reported out to
Washington?
A: No. There was never a decision or a procedure put in
place to have the Mission in Benghazi report to the
Embassy in Tripoli. It was still something that was
reporting directly to Washington, staffed by
Washington. I had no say in the staffing decisions,
resourced by Washington, et cetera.
I played a supporting role. To the extent that I could,
I made sure that I coordinated very regularly with the
principal officers; and whenever they needed help on
anything, I jumped in.\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\Polaschik Testimony at 44-45.
Security Problems Continue
The security environment also became a factor in the
Principal Officer's ability to meet reporting responsibilities.
As early as December 2011 and throughout 2012, the Mission was
forced to go on lockdown because of the lack of security
personnel. This impacted the ability of the Principal Officers
to do their jobs. For example, on December 15, 2011, the
Principal Officer at the time recommended halting future non-
security temporary duty assignments because of the lack of DS
Agents on the ground.\333\ In January 2012, the Principal
Officer reiterated his concerns ``the mission will be hard-
pressed to support TDY'ers (much less higher-level visitors and
out-of-town travel) unless we have better staffing. On that
basis, we won't be fulfilling what I understand our mission to
be.''\334\ Later, in February 2012, the incoming Principal
Officer expressed similar concerns: ``we will be all but
restricted to compound for the vital February 12-18 timeframe.
This will effectively leave us unable to do any outreach to
Libyan nationals during the week and we will be extremely
limited in the ability to obtain any useful information for
reporting.''\335\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\Email from Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep't of State, to Post
Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State (Dec. 15, 2011, 1:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0079324-
25).
\334\Email from Principal Officer 1, U. S. Dep't of State, to
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 (Jan. 13, 2012, 2:44 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05393569).
\335\Email from Principal Officer 5, U.S. Dep't of State, to U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, et al. (Feb 11, 2012, 5:29 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05409829).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 11, 2012, the lead Diplomatic Security Agent at
Embassy Tripoli, informed Benghazi ``substantive reporting''
was not the Mission's purpose.\336\ In an email to the
diplomatic security agent in Benghazi, the Diplomatic Security
Agent wrote: ``[U]nfortunately, nobody has advised the PO that
Benghazi is there to support [redacted text] operations, not
conduct substantive reporting.''\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\336\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent
12 (Feb. 11, 2012, 10:41 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05411292).
\337\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These concerns were expressed throughout 2012. Cretz told
the Committee:
The various officers that were there felt that they
from time to time didn't that the Mission was not
necessarily well staffed enough for them to be able to
go out and do their reporting on a regular and
aggressive basis.
* * *
I recall discussions with one or two of them at various
times that said that, because of the requirement to
protect the facility that it was difficult for them to
go out because it required a certain level of
accompaniment around the city.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\Cretz Testimony at 88-89.
During this time, the Mission evaluated and communicated to
Washington D.C. the severity of the security environment. The
Mission held more than a dozen EAC meetings to evaluate the
security environment; review tripwires and determine if any had
been crossed; and to identify any necessary to steps to
mitigate the threats.\339\ The Mission communicated the
outcomes of the EACs to Washington D.C. but senior officials
did not respond. The Secretary told the Committee: ``There are
millions of them, as you point out. They are sorted through and
directed to the appropriate personnel. Very few of them ever
come to my attention. None of them with respect to security
regarding Benghazi did.''\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\See Benghazi Spot Report, EAC and Significant Event Timeline
(DS/IP/RD) (on file with the Committee, C05394332).
\340\Clinton Testimony at 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other State Department officers offered similar
explanations. Kennedy told the Committee:
The State Department gets thousands of cables a day.
and some of them are brought to my attention, depending
upon the nature. An example would be brought up
potentially by one of my subordinate units, it might be
brought up by a regional functional bureau that has an
interest in the subject matter.\341\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\Kennedy Testimony at 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boswell testified:
I think we followed the Libya situation very closely.
Keep in mind, however, that it's a big world out there,
and we have 180 posts and some extremely high threat
ones, so we spend a lot of time concentrating on the
high threat ones. I would say Libya was one of them,
but not the only one. There is Iraq, there's
Afghanistan, there's Lebanon, there's Yemen, there's
Pakistan, and all of those at one time or another were
flashing pretty bright.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\342\Boswell Testimony at 18-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lamb told the Committee:
The RSO [Regional Security Officer] and the Ambassador
are ultimately responsible for security at post. It is
very unfortunate and sad at this point that Ambassador
Stevens was a victim, but that is where ultimate
responsibility lies. And it's up to headquarters to
provide resources when post asks for them, and it's
also up to Washington to make sure that we don't have,
you know, waste, fraud, and abuse of our resources,
because we're covering the entire world as well. So
it's you know, when you say who should be accountable,
accountable for what?\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\Lamb Testimony at 254.
The U.S.' uncertain and shifting commitment in Libya
affected the administration's responses to security threats
there. For instance, as detailed in Appendix F, an extensive
set of security rules for permanent U.S. diplomatic facilities
around the world did not apply to the temporary Benghazi
Mission. The lack of security standards made Benghazi an
anomaly among U.S. facilities located in Arab Spring countries,
such as Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt. As one Diplomatic Security
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agent put it:
[I]f you are a diplomatic facility within the State
Department, you have physical security requirements
that are in the FAM, the Foreign Affairs Manual. And it
is a very detailed, large set of rules that you have to
follow to operate a diplomatic facility. It requires
you to have physical security standards that are
typically going to be expensive and will take time to
do.
If you are in a non-diplomatic facility, there are no
security standards. They don't exist.
So it's all or nothing.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 10 Testimony at 28.
Requests for Additional Security Measures
Without security standards in place to guide them,
Diplomatic Security Agents were forced to make ad hoc requests
for basic security measures. On January 2, 2012, the Benghazi
Mission sent an Action Memorandum to Washington D.C. outlining
field expedient security measures needed to secure the
compound.\345\ The request included 17 jersey barriers, 500
sandbags, seven observation platforms, four guard posts,
additional lighting, and egress locks on window bars.\346\ In
addition, the Action Memorandum notified Washington D.C. that
additional requests would be forthcoming as well as a request
for a physical security specialist to help scope the security
needs of the modified compound.\347\ The security request was
made again on January 5, 2012 and this time included a request
for two drop arm barriers and measures to reinforce the
perimeter wall, including concrete and barbed wire.\348\
Funding for sandbags, lighting, door upgrades and drop arm
barriers was approved on January 26, 2012.\349\ On the other
hand, the request for observation platforms, guard booths, and
escape hatches went unaddressed--as did the request for the
help of a physical security specialist.\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\345\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 14 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent
25 (Jan. 2, 2012, 5:41 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05579142)
(attaching ``an Action Memo'').
\346\Id.
\347\See id. (``Once a decision has been made on the size and
location of Mission Benghazi's compound--perhaps as soon as the coming
week--RSO Benghazi will request additional security upgrade requests in
support of that shift, and may request a TDY by a facility security
expert to help scope them.'').
\348\Email from Mgmt. Officer/Information Mgmt. Officer, U.S. Dep't
of State, to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep't of State,
Libya Mgmt. Issues (Jan. 5, 2012, 1:43 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0049988).
\349\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 15 (Jan. 26, 2012, 3:59 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05412127) (notifying that funding for some security measures had been
obtained).
\350\See id. (noting that Action Memorandum items 3, 6, 8, and 9
had been funded, but not addressing the funding for other items).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 13, 2012, the Benghazi Mission asked Washington
D.C. to reconsider those measures previously requested but not
funded.\351\ In addition, the Mission made new requests to
better secure the compound, including concertina wire, screens
to obscure the compound, improvements to the perimeter wall,
and . . . film for the compound windows.\352\ The Mission also
reiterated its request for the help of a temporary duty
physical security specialist in Washington D.C. to help scope
needed upgrades.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 12 to Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 25 & James Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic
Sec., U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 13, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05394247).
\352\Id.
\353\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding for guard booths was approved on February 23,
2012.\354\ A critical request that went unaddressed until early
March was a proposal to strengthen the compound's perimeter
wall.\355\ Modifications to the wall were not completed until
May 21, 2012, almost six weeks after the first Improvised
Explosive Device [IED] attack on the Benghazi Mission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\See Email to Physical Sec. Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs,
Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't (Feb. 23, 2012, 8:22 AM) (on file
with the Committee, C05394287) (``I just found a clause in our funding
matrix that gives us the ability to support his request. There was
early on talk about guard towers which we cannot support, however small
booths to keep them out of the weather can be supported by our
office.'').
\355\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 12 to Physical Sec.
Specialist, Physical Sec. Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S.
Dep't, and Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 (Mar. 1, 2012, 4:59 AM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0049970) (``The current perimeter wall, which
was inherited in the leasing agreement, is in poor condition . . .'');
Email from Physical Sec. Specialist (Mar. 1, 2012, 9:12 AM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0049971) (recommending funding for a temporary
fence).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requests for Additional Diplomatic Security Personnel
In addition to the requests for physical security measures,
the Benghazi Mission made constant requests for Diplomatic
Security Agents. Concerns about Diplomatic Security Agent
staffing shortages in late 2011 and early 2012 precipitated the
preparation of an Action Memorandum for Lamb's approval.\356\
On January 10, 2012, an Action Memorandum described the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security's responsibilities under the December
27, 2011 extension memorandum to provide five Diplomatic
Security Agents for Benghazi and recognized the Diplomatic
Security's inability to ``identify, seek necessary approvals
and obtain the required visa approvals for this many Agents on
a continuing basis.''\357\ The January 10, 2012 Action
Memorandum requested Lamb approve efforts to ``request
assistance from Domestic Operations, so that personnel can be
selected and directed from the Field Offices by the DS Command
Center as well as authorize funding for five, 45 day ARSO TDYs
in Benghazi from Feb.1 through September 30 at a total
estimated cost of $283,050.''\358\ The January 10, 2012 Action
Memorandum was never approved by Lamb.\359\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Principal Officer 1,
U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 13, 2012, 10:05 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05411094) (``We have submitted an Action Memorandum that if
approved should significantly improve our ability to identify and
obtain approvals for staffing Benghazi.'').
\357\Memorandum from Jim Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of
Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, to DAS Charlene Lamb, Bureau of
Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Jan.
10, 2012 Action Memo] (on file with the Committee, C05578986); see also
Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep't
of State (Jan. 13, 2012, 10:05 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05411094) (``We have submitted an Action Memorandum that if approved
should significantly improve our ability to identify and obtain
approvals for staffing Benghazi.''); Email from J. Christopher Stevens,
U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 (June 5, 2012,
10:55 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409979) (``We'd feel much
safer if we could keep two MSD teams with us through this period to
provide QRF for our staff and PD for me and the DCM and any VIP
visitors.'').
\358\Jan. 10, 2012 Action Memo, supra note 357; see Email from J.
Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to Diplomatic Sec. Agent
7 (June 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409979)
(Requesting increased security).
\359\See Testimony of James Bacigalupo, Special Agent in Charge/
Regional Sec. Officer, Regional Sec. Office before the H. Comm. On
Oversight and Gov't Reform, Tr. at 17-18 (Sept. 4, 2012) (on file with
the Committee) (Discussing the Jan. 10 Action Memo).
A: I believe it was January, maybe December/January
timeframe we had talked about it in the office, and I think
I was out on leave because my deputy I had seen a document
that my deputy had sent up to Director Lamb, to DAS Lamb
requesting we use the system that they use domestically to
direct a certain number of agents from the field offices
for assignments. We use that on protection. And we sent the
memo up suggesting maybe we could use this mechanism for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
overseas.
Q: Specifically for Libya or
A: It was specifically for Libya.
Q: And do you know what happened to that memo?
A: It was never signed off on.
On March 28, 2012, the Embassy in Tripoli made a request on
behalf of Benghazi for ``five TDY DS agents for 45-60 day
rotations in Benghazi.''\360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\360\See U.S. Dep't of State, Cable, Request for DS TDY and FTE
Support (Mar. 28, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB004625). But
see U.S. Dep't of State Cable, Tripoli--Request for DS TDY and FTE
Support (Apr. 19, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0046263)
(denying request).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further Erosion of Security in 2012
As the requests for measures and personnel continued, the
security environment in Benghazi continued to deteriorate in
2012, with the incidents and attacks increasing in volume and
in intensity particularly against westerners.
One event occurred in March 2012:
Mission personnel were detained at a vehicle checkpoint
in the town of Rajma, approximately 15 km southeast of
Benghazi International Airport. U.S. Mission Benghazi
RSO personnel were there to conduct a site survey near
the town of Rajma. Benghazi personnel were detained by
17th February Martyrs Brigade militia members, had
their identification temporarily confiscated, and were
escorted back to Benghazi to a militia base.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\Email from Spot Reports to DS Command, et al. (Mar. 15, 2012,
9:24 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393455).
The situation was eventually resolved and the personnel
released.\362\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\362\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 2, 2012, four days before the first IED attack on
the Mission compound, the Mission reported:
British Diplomatic Mission FAV [fully armored vehicle]
was attacked by a mob of demonstrators. The vehicle was
damaged but the occupants escaped injury. The
demonstrators who numbered between one hundred (100)
and two hundred (200) were members of the Traffic
Police Force known as ``Murur.''\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 16 to DS-IP-NEA, Principal
Officer 2, U.S. Dep't of State, and Diplomatic Sec. Agent 17 (Apr. 2,
2012, 4:17 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048091).
On April 6, 2012, the Mission suffered its first IED attack
when an IED was thrown over the perimeter wall.\364\ According
to the spot report: ``at approximately 2250 hours (GMT+2), the
U.S. Diplomatic Mission Benghazi, Libya Compound came under
attack. An IED was thrown over the perimeter walls and exploded
within the compound grounds. No one was injured and damage was
not visible.''\365\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 16 to DS-IP-NEA (Apr. 6,
2012, 7:11 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048088).
\365\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One Diplomatic Security Agent was on the ground at the time
of the IED attack.
Four days later, on April 10, 2012, the Mission reported
``an IED was thrown at a four (4) vehicle convoy carrying the
United Nations Special Representative to Libya, Ian Martin. No
one was hurt in the explosion and no one has taken
responsibility for the attack.''\366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 16 to DS-IP-NEA (Apr. 10,
2012, 1:12 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048085).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The March 28, 2012 request for five Diplomatic Security
Agents was rejected less than two weeks after the first IED
attack on the Mission.\367\ In denying the request on April 19,
2012, Washington D.C. responded:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\367\See U.S. Dep't of State, Cable, Tripoli--Request for DS TDY
and FTE Support (Apr. 19, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0046263).
DS will continue to provide DS agent support in
Benghazi. DS/IP recommends that post continues [sic]
its efforts to hire LES drivers for Benghazi to enable
the DS TDYers to solely perform their protective
security function. DS/IP also recommends a joint
assessment of the number of DS agents requested for
Benghazi to include input from RSO Tripoli, TDY RSO
Benghazi, and DS/IP in an effort to develop a way
forward.\368\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\368\Id.
On May 22, 2012 ``a rocket propelled grenade hit the
offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross.''\369\
The International Committee of the Red Cross offices were
approximately one kilometer from the Mission compound in
Benghazi.\370\ Less than a week after the attack on the
International Committee for the Red Cross, a Facebook post
appeared threatening ``to send a message to the
Americans.''\371\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\369\Email from OpsNewsTicker to NEWS-Libya (May 22, 2012, 9:06 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05392368).
\370\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Command Ctr. to DSCC E TIA/PII,
DSCC E TIA/ITA & DS-IP-NEA (May 28, 2012, 5:08 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05391864).
\371\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 18 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent
17 et al. (May 28, 2012, 5:36 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05392202).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Stevens Becomes Ambassador
The U.S. Senate received the President's nomination of J.
Christopher Stevens to be Ambassador of Libya on January 24,
2012. The Senate confirmed his nomination by voice vote on
March 29, 2012.\372\ Stevens was sworn in by the Secretary of
State on May 14, 2012.\373\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\John Christopher Stephens Nomination, PN1233, 112th Congress
(Mar. 29, 2012) https://www.congress.gov/nomination/112th-congress/1233
(confirmed on voice vote).
\373\See Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S Dep't of State,
Prepared Remarks at Swearing In Ceremony for Chris Stevens, Ambassador
to Libya (May 14, 2012), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/05/197696.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While in Washington D.C., Stevens met with various
individuals including former State Department employee and
author Ethan Chorin. Mr. Chorin told the Committee he discussed
Benghazi with Stevens in March 2012:
he [Stevens] said . . . essentially, Benghazi was not
only the epicenter of the revolution, but a long-
neglected part of the Libyan polity, and that the,
essentially--what I got from him was that he was
concerned that all of the attention was moving where--
all of those factors that you mentioned, militarily,
security-wise, medical, to the epicenter activities
moving to Tripoli. And I believe what his point was,
that he was afraid that the situation in Benghazi could
degenerate as a result of that relative shift of the
tension.
And we both agreed that Benghazi was particularly
important for one, the threat of potential future
spread of extremist activity, as well as the fact that,
you know, many of Libya's thinkers, intellectuals, you
know, people with high levels of education, also came
from Benghazi, and that there was a sort of an,
essentially, again, without putting words into his
mouth, that Benghazi would be critical to future, to
Libya's future health as a unified state.
* * *
I mean, it was widely known, or believed at the time
that either Ansar al-Sharia, or one of its affiliates
was responsible for, or had some connection to the
death of the assassination of Abdul Fatah Younis. I
should actually correct that by saying that it wasn't--
it was an Islamist faction that that event was
attributed to. But that's the background to our
conversation. So there was no explicit mentioning in
the Washington conversation about specific names of
individuals or groups, but it was clear that that was
part of what he was concerned about.
* * *
He did say that he was very concerned that we were at a
turning point, and that things could go badly
quickly.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\374\Testimony of Ethan D. Chorin, Tr. at 15-18 (Mar. 11, 2016)
[hereinafter Chorin Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Cretz, whose service concluded on May 15, 2012,
communicated his concerns about the negative trends occurring
in Benghazi prior to his departure and the need to maintain
Department of Defense assets in Libya.\375\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\Cretz Testimony at 89-90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a classified cable sent on his last day, Cretz warned:
Nothing threatens the success of the Libyan revolution
more than the growing AQIM [al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb] links in Libya and the renewed activism of
indigenous groups formerly repressed by Qadhafi. AQIM's
ability to move senior leaders in and out of Libya and
to base them there for months at a time points to the
real possibility that parts of Libya-particularly the
eastern areas around Derna, which have historically
been the source of Libya's homegrown extremist--could
turn into a safehaven for terrorists. While we have
done some lifting with PM ElKeib to educate the new
government of the risks, the Libyans are not fully on
board with our concerns. We need to push more
vigorously to convince them of the need to actively
work with us to build the appropriate intelligence
bodies.\376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\376\Email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission to
Libya, U.S. Dep't of State, to SES-O; SWO-Cables; Dibble, Elizabeth;
Maxwell, Raymond; NEA-MAG-DL; Burns, William; Sherman, Wendy; Nides,
Thomas; Sullivan, Jacob; Feltman, Jeffrey (May 15, 2012, 10:26 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05395496).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cretz further told the Committee:
[T]hose events in Benghazi in the spring of 2012 . . .
it was a disturbing trend because, in Tripoli, we did
not I did not see a piece of intelligence. I did not
see any indication that the violence that was taking
place was other than the product of the rival militias
or whatever fighting it out for their piece of the pie.
We never had any intelligence report, as I recollect,
that specifically targeted U.S. or Western interests in
Tripoli. Benghazi began to look like there was
something going on there that was disturbing.
* * *
Well, my view was and I expressed this to General Ham
and others, who was the head of AFRICOM at the time was
that my belief was that we needed them, especially in
Tripoli, because of the ongoing strife and, also,
because the elections were going to be held in June.
And I think our general sense was that this was going
to be a time a real problematic time period because it
was the first election and for some of the reasons I
went over before: first election, a lot at stake.
So I felt that, in order again, for us to be able to do
the job that we needed to do to get out and to reassure
people that we were there to in case we were going to
bring in observers or something with the elections,
that an SST component would be very, very important for
us to maintain up until that time.
* * *
[T]here was a medical component. We had a Navy doctor
for a period of time. They brought special skills. For
example, we had a bomb that was a 10,000 pound bomb
that was in the middle of the Benghazi compound where
Qadhafi used to live and kids were playing on it every
day.
And I worked with our one of our SST people, and they
had a bomb defusing expert. So we were able to work out
a plan whereby we defused that bomb. So that kind of
skill, the normal kind of skill I think that most DS
agents wouldn't possess, counter maybe counterterrorism
skills.
I can't describe the level above which our--because our
DS agents were very, very capable. But these guys just
brought kind of a special force kind of set of skills
to the game.\377\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\377\Cretz Testimony at 86, 90-91.
Stevens returned to Tripoli, Libya as Ambassador on May 26,
2012, presenting his credentials to Libyan Foreign Minister
Ashour Bin Khyal on May 27, 2012.\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya,
to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 (June 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05409979); see Email to Post Mgmt. Officer for Libya, et
al. (May 30, 2012, 11:20 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0080338)
(regarding the arrival of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens); Email to
SES-O, SWO Cables, NEA-MAG-DL (May 28, 2012, 2:18 PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0079242) (regarding Tripoli Situation Report).
June 2012
Less than ten days after Stevens' return to Libya and a
week after the Facebook threat, the Benghazi Mission compound
came under attack for the second time in less than two
months.\379\ On June 6, 2012, the Mission reported back to
Washington D.C.:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\Id.; Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 18 to Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 17, et al. (May 28, 2012, 5:36 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05392202).
Approximately, one hour ago (3:30am) an IED exploded
next to the front gate. Video camera footage shows a 4-
door white pick-up truck in front of the gate, and
local guards report seeing a man in `Islamic' dress
placing the IED at what appears to be the base of
perimeter wall. The local guards sounded the duck and
cover drill after seeing the man and smelling smoke.
Approximately 5-6 minutes later the device exploded,
creating a large hole in the perimeter wall. No one was
injured and all personnel are accounted for.\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\Email from Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep't of State, to J.
Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, Joan A. Polaschik,
Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of
Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State
(June 6, 2012, 4:49 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393187).
A day before the second IED attack on the Mission, Stevens
requested the State Department's own highly trained mobile
security deployment (MSD) team remain in Tripoli through the
end of the summer.\381\ More resources in Tripoli meant
possibly more available resources to augment security in
Benghazi. On the same day Benghazi was attacked for a second
time, the Diplomatic Security Agent, who was the head of the
MSD division, denied Stevens' request to keep the State
Department's highly trained security personnel stating:
``Unfortunately, MSD cannot support the request . . . we have
two emerging requirements similar to Tripoli that requires the
whole of our office essentially.''\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya,
to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 (June 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05409979).
\382\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 to J. Christopher Stevens,
U.S. Ambassador to Libya (June 6, 2012, 3:00 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05409979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Five days later, an RPG attack was launched on the United
Kingdom Ambassador's motorcade injuring two individuals.\383\
According to the Mission, ``the UK Ambassador's motorcade was
attacked with an RPG and small arms fire in Benghazi,
approximately three kilometers away from the US Mission.''\384\
Concern was expressed the RPG attack was actually directed
toward the U.S. Mission. Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Programs suggested to her colleagues and
supervisors ``it raises the question were they targeting the
Brits or us and/or did we just lucky [sic] on this one?''\385\
Polaschik told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\See Testimony of Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at
U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't of State, before H. Comm. on Gov't
Oversight & Reform, Tr. 50 (Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Hicks
Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (discussing the attack).
\384\Email from Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of
Diplomatic Sec., Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Eric J.
Boswell, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., U.S. Dep't of
State, et al. (June 11, 2012, 11:09 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05394418).
\385\Id.
I personally was very concerned that it might not have
been targeted at the British Ambassador, but could have
been targeted at us, given the location where it had
occurred and given that we had been storing the British
embassy's vehicles on our compound. But it was unclear.
It was very murky, difficult to determine exactly who
was targeted.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\386\Polaschik Testimony at 82-83.
The pattern of violence--particularly against westerners
raised some concern in Washington. On June 11, 2012, the Near
Eastern Affairs regional bureau expressed concern about the
security situation in Benghazi to Stevens--suggesting even a
pause in staffing.\387\ Stevens agreed, indicating it would
allow ``our RSO team time in Benghazi (perhaps reduced in
number) to continue to assess the threat environment and
consider ways to mitigate.''\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\387\See Email from William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S.
Ambassador to Libya (June 11, 2012, 5:11 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05391335) (``I'm getting quite concerned about the security
situation for our folks in Benghazi . . . We are at a(possible) [sic]
natural break . . .'').
\388\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya,
to William v. Roebuck, Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (June 12, 2012, 10:52 AM) (on file
with the Committee, C05409960).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 12, 2012, Scott Bultrowicz, the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security, opined after the
attack on the UK ambassador's motorcade ``this along with last
week's incident is troubling.''\389\ Lamb acknowledged:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\Email from Scott P. Bultrowicz, Principal Deputy Ass't Sec'y
of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., to Charlene R. Lamb, Deputy Ass't
Sec'y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of State
(June 11, 2012, 1:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05388866).
We are not staffed or resourced adequately to protect
our people in that type of environment. We are a soft
target against resources available to the bad guys
there. Not to mention there is no continuity because we
do everything there with TDY personnel. The cost to
continue to do business there may become more
challenging.\390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\Email from Ms. Lamb to Mr. Bultrowicz (June 11, 2012, 4:16 PM)
(on file with the Committee. C05388866).
On June 14, 2012, the Benghazi Mission held an Emergency
Action Committee meeting to discuss the series of attacks and
request additional DS staff.\391\ The Diplomatic Security Agent
in Benghazi wrote to Washington D.C. expressing concern about
the intensity and frequency of attacks: ``Recent attacks have
intensified in frequency with the active targeting of
diplomatic personnel (e.g. the IED attack on the U.S. compound,
the complex attack on the U.K. motorcade, and a recent rally by
heavily armed Islamist militia members).''\392\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 19 to Diplomatic Sec.
Agent 25, James P. Bacigalupo, Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic
Sec., U.S. Dep't of State, and Diplomatic Sec. Agent (June 14, 2012,
11:40 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05388987) (summarizing staffing
needs in light of prevailing security environment).
\392\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That very day the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in
Tripoli underscored the concern raised by Benghazi stating ``I
fear that we have passed a threshold where we will see more
targeting, attacks, and incidents involving western
targets.''\393\ He went on to list five major security
incidents in and around Benghazi, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 24 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent
25 (June 14, 2012, 1:56 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05388987).
06/12/2012--0350 hrs--RPG attack on the International
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) compound in Misrata;
06/11/2012--Attack on UK Ambassador's convoy--Benghazi;
06/08/2012 2345 hrs--Sabha--Two hand grenades targeted
at marked UK vehicles outside of Sabha hotel. One
detonated, damaged three tires and an oil pump. The
second grenade failed to detonate;
06/06/2012--U.S. Mission Benghazi was targeted by an
IED which detonated causing damage to the exterior wall
of the compound. The Imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdul
Rahman Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack;
05/22/2012--International Committee of the Red Cross
building attacked by RPG--in Benghazi. The Imprisoned
Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman Brigades claimed
responsibility on 27 May. The brigade accused the ICRC
of attempting to convert internally displaced members
of the Tawergha ethnic minority to Christianity. It
called for the NGO to close its offices; and declared
Libya to be an Islamic state. It warned that the
Americans would be targeted next.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\Id.
No additional resources were provided by Washington D.C. to
fortify the compound after the first two attacks. No additional
personnel were sent to secure the facility despite repeated
requests of the security experts on the ground. In fact, the
only inquiry from senior State Department officials about the
trending violence against westerners was from Victoria Nuland,
State Department Spokesperson, asking Stevens how to publicly
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
message the incidents. Nuland wrote:
I know you have your hands full but we'd like your
advice about our public messaging on the spate of
violence in Libya over the past ten days.
Should we now move to something a bit sharper than
calling on all sides to work it out? What cd/wd we say
about whether the incidents are linked, why they are
going after NGO and Western targets now, impact on
electoral environment etc. . . .\395\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\Email from Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Dep't of State,
to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya (June 13, 2012,
3:42 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0079249).
This exchange is noteworthy. Stevens' expertise was being
sought on the messaging of violence in Libya as opposed to his
expertise being sought on how best to protect against that
violence. Moreover, while the Secretary and others were quick
to praise Stevens and his dedication to Libya, they were also
quick to note ``[h]e [Stevens] definitely understood the risks.
Yes.''\396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\Clinton Testimony at 151.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saying Stevens ``understood'' the risks without also
acknowledging he repeatedly tried to guard against and defend
against those risks is unfortunate. Yes, it is clear Stevens
knew the risks associated with his service in Libya from the
moment he landed in Benghazi in 2011 on a chartered Greek boat
until his final phone call to Gregory Hicks saying ``we're
under attack.'' Washington D.C. dismissed Stevens' multiple
requests for additional security personnel, while also asking
for help in messaging the very violence he was seeking security
from.
Libyan Elections
On July 7, 2012, the first post-revolution democratic
elections in Libya occurred, largely without incident.\397\
Being in Benghazi during the first national elections was a
priority for State Department officials. Feltman told the
Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\See Jomana Karadsheh, Liberal coalition makes strides in
historic Libyan election, CNN (July 18, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/
07/17/world/africa/libya-election.
Libya is a big country. If we only had a diplomatic
presence in Tripoli during those elections, I think we
would have gotten a very distorted view of [sic] I was
already gone from the State Department at this point,
but I think it would have been a very distorted view if
you are only reporting what's happening in Tripoli
during something as critical as the first elections
after Qadhafi's fall.\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\398\Feltman Testimony at 64-65.
The Principal Officer in Benghazi at the time described the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
environment in Benghazi leading up to the elections:
A: Broadly, the elections were the principal focus of
attention. There was an international presence there,
not just in Benghazi but across the country as these
were nationwide elections. It was the object of great
public focus. In the immediate run up to the election,
there were a number of incidents. On election day
itself, I was one of the international observers at
polling stations in and around Benghazi.
Q: When you said there were a number of incidents
leading up to the election day, can you elaborate
further on those?
A: There were reports of attempts to ensure that
polling stations did not open, for example. There were
reports of attempts to interfere with ballots or ballot
boxes, for example.
Q: Were these interferences by one particular
organization, or were there multiple organizations
involved in these events?
A: There were various allegations as to responsibility
for the events. The prevailing theory at that time was
that these were the efforts of separatist elements. I
did not personally witness any of these events. I want
to emphasize that these were largely based on reports
in the media or elsewhere, and that in my contacts on
election day, I did not see any effort to impede voters
or to otherwise interfere in the process.
Q: Okay. And following the election, what was the
environment like, within the in the timeframe of a week
after the election, what was the environment in
Benghazi, Libya, like?
A: There was euphoria, frankly, among most of the
Libyans with whom I spoke. They felt that the elections
had been successful in terms of their conduct. They
thought that this demonstrated Libya's ability to clear
a very important hurdle. They felt that the election
results themselves represented a consensus for moderate
government. And the majority of my Libyan contacts then
identified the formulation of a constitution as the
next hurdle.\399\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\Testimony of Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at
14-15 (Mar. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Principal Officer 3 Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Making Benghazi a Permanent Presence
As he was awaiting ambassadorial confirmation and re-
deployment to Libya, Stevens had lunch with Gregory N. Hicks,
who had been selected to replace Polaschik as the Deputy Chief
of Mission for Embassy Tripoli.\400\ They met in Washington
D.C. to discuss their upcoming work together in Libya.\401\
Part of their discussion centered on the future of operations
in Benghazi. Hicks described their conversation as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\400\Hicks Testimony at 7-8.
\401\Id. at 7.
I met with Chris, Ambassador Stevens--I may refer to
him as Chris, and if I say Chris, that's who I am
referring to after his confirmation. And he was, of
course, very excited. And we talked about our plans for
moving forward, you know, particularly our hope that we
could normalize the Mission and bring families back to,
you know, to Tripoli in the summer of actually, this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
coming summer, 2013.
One of the things he said to me was that, in his exit
interview with Secretary Clinton, she expressed the
hope that we could make the special Mission in Benghazi
a permanent constituent post. And Chris said that one
of the first things he intended to do after his arrival
was develop a proposal to move forward on that
project.\402\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\402\Id.
Hicks testified that shortly after he arrived in Libya on
July 31, 2012, he asked Stevens about the progress of making
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi permanent. He put it as follows:
Timing was important in this, because we knew that in
that particular fiscal year, which was I think 2012,
fiscal year 2012, ending September 30th of 2012, we
would probably be able to have the resources to do it.
We could obligate the money to do that.
When I arrived on July 31st, I was surprised that the
cable had not gone to Washington at that time. And I
asked Chris about it, and he said just that things had
been much busier than he expected.
And I basically said, well, we will you know, a friend
of mine, a longtime friend of mine, at the time was
principal officer in Benghazi. . . . [O]ne of the
finest professional officers I know in the Foreign
Service. And I told Chris that I would work with [him]
to get the project started.\403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\Id. at 7-8.
Hicks also described discussions about the Secretary
traveling back to Libya, perhaps in October 2012.\404\ Emails
indicate senior State Department officials, including Mills,
Sullivan, and Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff, were
preparing for a trip by the Secretary to Libya in October
2012.\405\ Hicks testified he and Stevens wanted to have a
``deliverable'' for the Secretary for her trip to Libya, and
that ``deliverable'' would be making the Mission in Benghazi a
permanent Consulate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\Id. at 15.
\405\Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff to the U.S.
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Philippe I. Reines, Deputy
Ass't Sec'y, Communications, U.S. Dep't of State, Cheryl D. Mills,
Chief of Staff and Counselor to the U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State
(Sept. 12, 2012, 9:15 AM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0051754)
(``Tomorrow is also our first trip meeting for the libya oct trip which
we need to discuss.''); Email from Huma Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff
to the U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, to William Burns,
Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:21 PM)
(on file with the Committee, SCB0070473) (``Before our Libya tragedy,
we were also considering stops in Libya and Jordan. Given the recent
developments, what's your sense about the wisdom of her going to the
middle east?'').
And I believe I transmitted the policy justification to
Washington on August 31st. You know, we are only a
month from the end of the fiscal year, so we have to
get a [sic] or, we have to help Washington, the
executive director's office of the Near Eastern Affairs
Bureau to put together a package to get it to Pat
Kennedy for a decision by September 30th. Otherwise, we
lose the money.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\Hicks Testimony at 16-17.
August 2012
In August 2012--roughly a month before the Benghazi
attacks--security on the ground worsened significantly. After a
temporary lull around the election, violence escalated. As the
security environment deteriorated, security personnel declined.
On July 9, 2012, Embassy Tripoli submitted another staffing
request on behalf of the Embassy and Benghazi to Washington.
Benghazi requested at least one permanently assigned Diplomatic
Security Agent from Tripoli be assigned to Benghazi, as well as
for Washington to send a minimum of three temporary duty
Diplomatic Security agents. The Diplomatic Security Agent in
charge in Benghazi at the time explained his reasoning for the
Benghazi staffing request:\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 21, Diplomatic Sec. Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 78-79 (May 19, 2015) [hereinafter
Diplomatic Sec. Agent 21 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
With all the security situation on the ground going on
and putting everything in place, and all the transition
taking place in regards to American personnel leaving
and coming in, and after discussion with the RSO and
chief of Mission, this was a cable suggesting at that
time this is what we need to maintain operations in the
best safe manner as soon as possible. We wrote this
cable on July 9, prior to the Ambassador leaving for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi.
At that time, MSD personnel were, [sic] when we started
off with two teams; now there was less teams on the
ground. Actually, I don't believe there was any MSD
team on the ground. There was just TDYers and two
permanent ARSOs on the ground. This is in July. I'm
sorry. I'm confused on the dates. Not September. This
is July 9. So, at this time, we had another ARSO on the
ground that was permanent and myself and the RSO. . . .
* * *
So we wrote this in July because all these elements
were leaving. MSD was leaving. The SST team was
leaving, or they were going to change their Mission
from being in the Embassy to being outside of the
Embassy so they could train the Libyan government
military. So we came up with this as a suggestion, for
example, in line 4, or paragraph 4, under the current
arrangement, and this was the main one, 34 U.S.
security personnel, the 16 SSTs, the 11 MSD, the 2 RSOs
and 3 TDY RSOs, that was the number that we had there,
and it was going to drawn [sic] down to 27. And we
said: Wait, we're basically losing people. We need
people, specifically because security is not in the
best position now.
We requested weapons permits and weapons for the local
ambassador bodyguard detail, and funding for security.
Yes, and this was the cable that we sent out in
concurrence with the Ambassador? [sic]\408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\Id.
No response was received. Lamb attempted to explain the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lack of response to the Committee.
So when I read this cable in this format, . . . wrote
it as a reporting cable in paragraph format, and it's
very hard to line everything up by the needs. So I
asked the desk officer to have his [sic] . . . at the
time was the person working with . . . [sic] for them
to get on a conference call and to go through this
cable, paragraph by paragraph, line by line, and to
switch this into the format that shows how many people
do you need for which activities, to support VIP
visits, movement security, static security, a quick
reaction force. Just tell me exactly what you need and
then the numbers will pop out the other side showing
what you need.
And they sat down and they did this. And all of that
was compiled into the response that unfortunately never
went out. But my guidance to them was before that cable
went up to Scott Bultrowicz and Eric Boswell, I wanted
it to be pre approved at post, because I didn't want to
dictate to post their staffing needs, I wanted to
support them. But in this format, it was not clear
exact because they were coming up on the 1 year
transition when everybody was going to leave post and
the new team was going to come in, so I wanted it to be
laid out, very clear, the current operating support
that was being provided for security.\409\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\409\Lamb Testimony at 245-46.
Kennedy explained his involvement in the July 9, 2012
staffing cable and the decision to terminate the Department of
Defense's Security Support Team (SST) protective
responsibilities in Tripoli. He told the Committee: ``I
consulted, as I said earlier, with the subject matter experts
in this field, and after consulting with them, I responded no,
we would not be asking for another extension.''\410\ This is a
much different description of Kennedy's involvement than what
Cheryl Mills described to the Committee. She described the
Under Secretary as the person ``who managed security related
issues.''\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\Kennedy Testimony at 46.
\411\Testimony of Cheryl D. Mills. Chief of Staff & Counselor to
the U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 72 (Sept. 2, 2015)
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beginning in August, the number of security personnel in
Embassy Tripoli was 34. Throughout August, security personnel
left Embassy Tripoli. By the end of August, the number of
security personnel at Embassy Tripoli dropped to six, excluding
four members of the Defense Department's SST who were no longer
able to serve in an official protective capacity but were on
site.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\See U.S. Embassy--Tripoli, Libya, Cable (July 9, 2012) (on
file with the Committee, SCB0049439-41) (discussing emerging threats in
Benghazi) (requesting staffing changes).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stevens initially planned to travel to Benghazi in early
August. He cancelled the trip ``primarily for Ramadan/security
reasons.''\413\ On August 5, 2012, the International Committee
for the Red Cross [ICRC] suffered its fifth attack in less than
3 months.\414\ As a result, the ICRC suspended its operations
in Benghazi and Misrata.\415\ On August 8, 2012, the Benghazi
Mission reported the changing security environment and the
anti-western sentiment back to Washington D.C.\416\ In
particular, the report described:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya,
to Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 2, 2012, 2:45 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05390855).
\414\See Email from OpsNewTicker to NEWS-Mahogany State Department
(Aug. 5, 2012, 3:27 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05397147).
\415\See id. (``ICRC suspends work in Misrata, Benghazi after
attack (Reuters)'').
\416\See U.S. Embassy--Tripoli, Libya, Cable (Aug. 8, 2012) (on
file with the Committee, C05262779) (discussing emerging threats in
Benghazi).
Since the eve of the elections, Benghazi has moved from
trepidation to euphoria and back as a series of violent
incidents has dominated the political landscape during
the Ramadan holiday. These incidents have varied widely
in motivation and severity. There have been abductions
and assassinations, but there have also been false
alarms and outright fabrications.\417\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\Id.
With the violence continuing to escalate, the Benghazi
Mission held an Emergency Action Committee meeting a week later
to review the Mission's tripwires, the lack of host nation
support, and the overall security environment.\418\
Participating in the EAC were the Principal Officer, the
Diplomatic Security Agent, and other U.S. government personnel
on the ground in Benghazi.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony at 50.
\419\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge explained to the
Committee his concerns with the security environment:
I had tried to get a contact within the Libyan security
apparatus that I could liaise with, which is typical
for RSOs wherever they're posted around the world, and
I had been unable to do that. I had requested police
presence through a diplomatic note, but that had gone
unanswered. I was resorting to, you know, flagging
police cars down and talking to them to try and get
them to stay, and that didn't seem to work.
There wasn't any sort of information sharing, which is
typical, or at least in my experience has been typical,
at other embassies or consulates. Where, you know, we
provide law enforcement security information to the
host nation, they would then, in return, supply us
information.
And then just the incident the fact [sic] that the
prior incident we had with the gelatina or alleged
gelatina bomb at the Mission had not been resolved, and
it did not appear that local law enforcement was
actively pursuing investigation of that, as well as
their inability to pursue the possible hostile
surveillance incident that was outside our south gate.
All those things I just mentioned led me to believe
that they didn't have the ability/desire to prevent/
mitigate threats.\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\Id. at 59-60.
He explained the steps the Benghazi Mission took after the
EAC ``as far as physical security . . . for instance, erect[ed]
a, sort of, makeshift chicane outside the north gates or at
least the main gate. [redacted text].''\421\ One additional
outcome of the EAC, the Diplomatic Security Agent described to
the Committee, was a response tactic called suspended
operations.\422\ Under suspended operations, all movements
would be curtailed and post would conduct business from inside
the compound only.\423\ The new status was created because
personnel at the Benghazi Mission were already reduced to such
levels that authorized and ordered departures were not
applicable.\424\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\Id. at 60-61.
\422\Id. at 89.
\423\Id. at 90:
``It wasn't new and novel in that I think it was . . .
explained to me they had done something similar to this, I
believe when they had the previous gelatina bomb incident
at the front gate and they had labeled it as suspended
operations, but, no, in my training and experience, I had
not seen a suspended operations category before. . . . I
had been to places where we had done lockdown, so to speak,
for a set period of time, and this seems like a logical
outflow of that idea.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\Cable, U.S. Embassy--Tripoli, Libya (Aug, 16, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05261905).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Benghazi Mission followed the EAC meeting with a cable
back to Washington D.C. a day later.\425\ The cable described
1) the deteriorating security situation; 2) the departure of
organizations such as International Committee on the Red Cross
and a U.S. contractor; 3) the increase in hostile militias; 4)
the lack of host nation support; and 5) the revisions made to
the Mission's tripwires.\426\ The cable also put Washington on
notice a request for additional security measures would be sent
through Embassy Tripoli. The request was made to Embassy
Tripoli on August 23, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\425\Id.
\426\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A day after the EAC cable was sent to Washington D.C., the
Secretary received an update on the security situation in
Libya.\427\ The Secretary's Information Memorandum described
``an upward trend in violence--primarily but not exclusively in
the east--since May,'' and included a list of incidents such as
the June 6 attack on the Mission, and the August 6 carjacking
of American personnel.'' \428\ It noted ``foreign residents of
Benghazi have expressed concern about the risks living and
working there.''\429\ Finally, the memorandum noted ``there is
no coordinated organization behind the incidents.''\430\ Absent
from the Secretary's Information Memorandum was any discussion
about the U.S. facilities in Libya and their security posture,
or of potential resources and personnel needed in light of the
deteriorating security environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\427\See Information Memorandum from Beth Jones, Acting Ass't Sec'y
of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State to
Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. State Dep't (Aug. 17, 2012)
(on file with the Committee, C05390124) (briefing Sec'y Clinton on the
security situation in Libya).
\428\Id.
\429\Id.
\430\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same day the Information Memorandum describing the
security situation in Libya was sent to the Secretary, an
Action Memorandum was also sent seeking her approval to
designate Libya as an eligible country to receive funding from
the Global Security Contingency Fund.\431\ The Secretary
approved this designation and the release of $20 million to
support Libya's security sector on August 23, 2012.\432\ The
Global Security Contingency Fund is a joint fund between the
State Department and DOD authorized by Congress to help
fledgling countries ``overcome emergent challenges through
security and justice sector assistance to partner countries.
State must fund 20 percent of each project. . . . The
assistance proposed here [for Libya] is for the security
sector. Congressional notification will be required before
funds are transferred to GSCF and before initiating any
activity.''\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\431\See Memorandum from Thomas R. Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State (Aug. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Aug 17, 2012 Action Memo for the
Secretary] (on file with the Committee, SCB0086134-36).
\432\Id.
\433\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 2 weeks after the Mission's EAC--on August 27,
2012--the U.S. issued a travel alert for Americans traveling to
from and in Libya.\434\ Two days later, the Libyan government
issued a ```state of maximum alert as from today and until
further notice' in the eastern city of Benghazi.''\435\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\Travel Warning--Libya, U.S. State Dep't (Aug. 27, 2012) (on
file with the Committee, C05261911).
\435\Email to Gregory N. Hicks, et al. (Aug. 30, 2011, 1:59 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05397292).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In his handover notes to his successor, the outgoing
Principal Officer stated ``we are treading water here. . . . We
are, for example, on the fourth visit from an Embassy
electrician of my brief tenure because we continue to repair
rather than replace equipment.''\436\ Similarly, in handoff
notes to the incoming Diplomatic Security Agent, the departing
Agent wrote about the dangerous environment in Benghazi,
stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 29, 2012, 6:01 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05390852).
there is nothing traditional about this post. Operating
in a high threat environment where kidnappings,
assassinations and bombings are weekly, if not daily
occurrences, post enjoys neither the resources nor the
host nation security support one would find at a
similarly rated post. DS agents, for all intent
purposes, are on their own.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 3
(August 27, 2012, 11:49 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05396772-73).
The only inquiry produced to the Committee from the Office
of the Secretary to Stevens in August was an August 5, 2012
email from Sullivan asking: ``What is the story here?''\438\
regarding another RPG attack on the International Committee of
the Red Cross.\439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\See Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Dir. of Policy Planning,
U.S. Dep't of State, to J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to
Libya (Aug. 5, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05397147).
\439\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HOST NATION SECURITY:
FEBRUARY 17 AND LOCAL GUARD FORCE
At the time Stevens entered Libya in April 2011, there was
no recognized government to provide security as required by
international conventions.\440\ The Diplomatic Security Agent
in charge of the initial entry into Benghazi described the lack
of security resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, arts. 22, 29,
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227.
There wasn't a formalized police I mean, there was
probably somebody that called himself a police chief.
And then you had the military somewhat of a military
presence, you know, that really wasn't focused on
anything to do with our security. They had, you know,
they were trying to fight the war. Then you had
February 17, a militia that assisted us a little
bit.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\441\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 33.
February 17 Martyrs Brigade
The February 17 Martyrs Brigade [February 17] was one of
the largest militias operating in Benghazi and Eastern
Libya.\442\ February 17 was instrumental in the success of the
opposition forces, which eventually overthrew Qadhafi.\443\ The
emerging TNC recognized February 17 as a quasi- host nation
security force--endorsing their efforts to perform basic
security functions typically performed by law enforcement.\444\
For example, the TNC used February 17 to provide security at
the Tibesti Hotel where westerners, non-government
organizations, and journalists stayed.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\See Max Fisher, Libyan Militia's Failed Security at Benghazi,
Wash. Post (Nov. 12, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2012/11/02/libyan-militias-failed-security-at-benghazi/
(``[T]he February 17 Brigade `eastern Libya's most potent armed force,'
noting that it `nominally' reports to the Libyan defense ministry. The
command link between Tripoli's senior leaders and on-the-ground
militias has proven weak, but the central government still relies
heavily on them.'' (quoting a New York Times report)).
\443\See id. (``[T]he central government still relies heavily on
them.'').
\444\See id.
\445\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 37 (``The security
posture there was they had 17th February Brigade militia personnel that
were assigned to the hotel.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The TNC recommended to Stevens and his team in April 2011
the Mission deal with February 17.\446\ Despite being the
alleged lead armed presence in Benghazi,\447\ Diplomatic
Security Agents found February 17 to be undisciplined and
unskilled.\448\ The Diplomatic Security Agent in charge told
the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 34.
\447\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 38-39.
\448\See Diplomatic Sec. Agent 6 Testimony at 35.
[T]hey were very undisciplined. You know, people over
there, a lot of them were not familiar with weapons,
you know, because they weren't allowed to have weapons
during Qadhafi's rule. So we never could really count
on them for much because they just didn't have
training. They were undisciplined. We just tried to see
if we could get them to post at a couple of locations
around the hotel at the entrance and in the parking
lot, and to be around at night also in the parking
lot.\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\Id.
According to one of the Diplomatic Security Agents in
charge, Stevens and his team relied on February 17 at the
Tibesti Hotel ``only in a case where we specifically needed
their help.''\450\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 7 Testimony at 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the Mission moved out of the Hotel, February 17 was
retained to provide an additional armed security presence to
Mission's protective detail.\451\ According to the Libya Desk
Officer in Washington D.C., February 17 ``would assist . . .
with our movements as well. So they would be in the vehicles,
help . . . get through checkpoints, allow us to get VIP access
to certain locations through their very status as 17th of
February Martyrs Brigade, which held in high regard in
Benghazi, after the fighting.''\452\ The February 17 members
who lived on the Mission compound received an initial stipend
of $27/day for their services in addition to housing on the
compound.\453\ The stipend was increased to $35 in June
2012.\454\ In addition to the February 17 members on the
Mission compound, a larger contingent of February 17 members
lived in ``close proximity to the compound'' and provided a
potential additional response force.\455\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent to DS-IP-NEA (July 21,
2011, 3:22 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396529) (``[W]e
currently have three guards on duty. Ideally, we get two per compound.
. . .'').
\452\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25, Diplomatic Sec. Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of State, before the H. Comm. On Oversight and Gov't Reform,
Tr. at 88 (Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\453\Email to Diplomatic Sec. Agent 19 (June 28, 2012, 1:38 PM) (on
file with the Committee, C05389864); see also Email (Aug. 9, 2011,
12:41 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396529) (discussing
compensation for guards on the compound).
\454\See Email (June 28, 2012, 1:38 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05389864) (``FPD approves the increase in stipend payments
[from $27 to $35 per day].'').
\455\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Charlene Lamb, Deputy
Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of
State (June 11, 2012, 1:25 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0050094-
95).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the number of Diplomatic Security Agents dropped, the
need for the February 17 members increased. The Diplomatic
Security Agent in charge testified: ``we only had three
[February 17] at the time. So I was trying to befriend them,
trying to get more activity, more interest, additional bodies,
because three bodies on 24/7 is [sic] long days, long
weeks.''\456\ Eventually, another guard was added.\457\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 13 Testimony at 44.
\457\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Charlene Lamb,
Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int'l Programs, U.S.
Dep't of State (June 11, 2012, 1:25 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0050094-95) (``Currently we have three High Threat Trained TDY DS
Agents on the ground and one TDY SST person.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 17 maintained between three and four guards on the
compound throughout 2012. They performed drills with the
Diplomatic Security Agents and the local guard force and ``all
plans to defend the compound rely on heavily on both the
immediate QRF [quick reaction force] support and the support of
their militia colleagues.''\458\ February 17 members played
critical roles during the first two attacks on the compound. At
the time of the first IED attack on April 6, 2012, February 17
members supported the sole Diplomatic Security Agent on the
ground. The Diplomatic Security Agent described February 17's
role to the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\458\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 19 (June 17, 2012, 8:12 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05389864).
I also called our QRF, basically reacted them. We had a
plan: On a situation like that, they would take up
positions throughout the compound. One of the positions
would be outside of our building. As I stepped outside,
one of the QRF members was already out there waiting
for me. This is possibly, I don't know, 3 minutes after
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the bombing.
At some point, the guard finally activated the alarm.
Our guard force had a push button alarm; in case of any
attack, they would activate it. As I step outside, the
QRF member is there. We cleared our way to the TOC.
Went inside the TOC. I turn off the alarm, and I use
our camera system to view or to try to determine if
there was any other people, any other attackers in the
compound. That took approximately 3, 4 minutes.
I did not see anybody in our camera system. There are
some blind spots, but we did have a pretty good system
throughout the compound. I thought that with that, I
would be able to determine something, something
blatant, something that would really stand out.
Afterwards, I stepped outside of the TOC. I had two QRF
members with me, and we commenced on clearing the
compound.
While we were doing that, I heard two shots. It sounded
to me like rifle fire, something bigger than an M4,
which is what I had. So I thought initially that it was
shooting in the compound. One of the QRF members
received, if I am not mistaken, a call that told him
that a third QRF member was outside and had detained
someone.\459\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\459\Testimony of Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv.,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 34-35 (Apr. 13, 2015) (on file with the
Committee).
At the time of the second IED attack on June 6, 2012,
February 17 provided support to the three Diplomatic Security
Agents on the ground. One of the Diplomatic Security Agents on
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the ground during that attack testified:
[t]he February 17th Martyrs Brigade showed up in a
matter of minutes. Then from there we set up a
perimeter outside on the street. As we had this large
hole in our wall, we wanted to push our security
perimeter back even further. We set up the large hole I
mean set up the perimeter, sorry; and then from there,
once that perimeter was set up, I went with one of our
QRF guys [redacted text]. And we went there and secured
the rest of the compound.
As there was a security incident at the front of our
compound, we had lost attention and lost visibility on
other aspects of our compound. So, before we decided to
let the principal officer out of the safe haven and
call the all clear, we went through, me with my M4, him
with his AK 47, and we just moved through the compound
making sure nobody else had entered and there were no
other devices. After that was done, we called the all
clear.\460\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\Testimony Diplomatic Sec. Agent, Diplomatic Sec. Serv., U.S.
Dep't of State, Tr. at 50-61 (Mar. 24, 2015) (on file with the
Committee).
Following the June attack, the Diplomatic Security Agents
on the ground wanted to increase the number of quick reaction
force on the compound. However, February 17 declined expressing
``concern with showing active open support for the American's
[sic] in Benghazi.''\461\ Beginning in August, the Diplomatic
Security Agent in charge expressed concerns about the
trustworthiness of those February 17 on the compound. He told
the Committee ``I think we, or at least I assumed that he was
sharing information with Brigade about what he was doing on the
compound and what we were doing.''\462\ Days later, the
Principal Officer at the time expressed concerns about February
17 to Stevens and suggested moving more to a ``government-
government relationship.''\463\ Stevens responded ``we should
be in line with the GOL policy/law on this. What do the local
police and SSC leadership recommend.''\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\461\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 19 (June 17, 2012, 8:12 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05389864).
\462\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony at 26.
\463\Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State, to J.
Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, & Gregory Hicks, Deputy
Chief of Mission to Libya (Aug. 12, 2012, 5:56 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05411463) (asking if ``it is the right signal to send to
have a contract with a militia rather than a more usual arrangement
with local authorities (the SSC? The Army?) to provide our security?
Should we try to readjust to a government-government relationship given
the political transition.'').
\464\Email from J. Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya,
to Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State, & Gregory N. Hicks, Deputy
Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 12, 2012, 1:05 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05390836).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two days before the Stevens' trip to Benghazi in September
2012 the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground were informed
February 17 members on the compound would no longer support the
Benghazi Mission's off-compound movements--unless the Mission
was willing to increase their stipend.\465\ In discussing the
situation with Embassy Tripoli, one of the Diplomatic Security
Agents described the move as ``part of a power struggle between
the government and brigades over security functions in
Benghazi.''\466\ Nevertheless, the Diplomatic Security Agent
expressed concern about the Benghazi Mission's ability to move
throughout the city and easily gain access to the VIP areas of
the airport.\467\ The issue remained unresolved at the time
Stevens traveled to Benghazi, with the Diplomatic Security
Agents using other U.S. government personnel on the ground in
Benghazi to support Stevens' off compound movements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\465\See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 5 to Regional Sec.
Officer (Sept. 9, 2012, 11:31 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05396013).
\466\Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 (Sept. 8, 2012, 9:29 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05396013).
\467\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local Guard Force
In addition to the armed presence provided by February 17,
Benghazi relied on an unarmed local guard force [LGF] to
protect the compound. The local guards were stationed 24/7
around the perimeter of the compound as an ``outer ring . . .
to give a perception of security.''\468\ ``Local guards
provide[d] access control essentially for visitors as well as
us moving on and off the compound, and they also serve as the
first line of defense in the event of an attack or some other
sort of security incident would happened on the premise.''\469\
In particular,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\468\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 13 Testimony at 51.
\469\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 8 Testimony at 15.
they are checking badges, they are checking license
plates, that sort of thing. They'll often itemize--the
vehicles to make sure there aren't explosives in the
vehicles. If something were to happen, for instance, a
mob or bomb or some sort of scenario like that, they
have the IDNS pendants, which sound our alarm, and then
they also have radios so they are instructed to call
out a certain thing, DS agents, to alert us what type
of attack it is and where they are.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\470\Id. at 15-16.
The LGF consisted of 20-25 local guards who rotated in
shifts of five to staff unarmed guard posts around the
compound.\471\ A Guard Force commander oversaw the performance
of the guard members who participated in drills and other
security operations led by the Diplomatic Security Agents and
those February 17 on compound. After the second attack on the
compound in June 2012, the Benghazi Mission temporarily
increased the number of local guards stationed around the
compound at night to eight.\472\ On September 11, 2012, there
were five local guard force members on duty.\473\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\471\See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 19 to Agent 21 (June
7, 2012, 8:08 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393670).
\472\See Email from Diplomatic Sec. Agent 25 to Charlene Lamb,
Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Int'l Programs, U.S.
Dep't of State (June 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0050094-
95).
\473\See FN 83, Part I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AN `INTELLIGENCE FAILURE'
Intelligence Community Reporting on
Deteriorating Environment
As security in Benghazi and Libya deteriorated throughout
2012, the intelligence community's reporting on the burgeoning
terrorist environment and the inability of Libyan leaders to
curtail the terrorists activities increased in volume and
became more alarming and specific in content. As the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence told Congress, ``[T]he IC
[intelligence community] monitored extremist activities . . .
and published more than 300 disseminated intelligence reports
and finished analytic assessments--for a range of policy
makers, the military, and operators--related to Western
interests in the region between 1 February and 10 September
[2012].''\474\ Recipients of these intelligence reports
included senior government officials such as the Secretary of
State, who was briefed daily on the intelligence being
collected and reported regarding Benghazi and Libya. The
Secretary testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\474\Benghazi Intelligence Review: Office of the Director of Nat'l
Intel., Oct. 22, 2012.
Every morning when I arrived at the State Department,
usually between 8:00 and 8:30, I had a personal one on
one briefing from the representative of the Central
Intelligence Agency, who shared with me the highest
level of classified information that I was to be aware
of on a daily basis. I then had a meeting with the top
officials of the State Department every day that I was
in town. That's where a lot of information, including
threats and attacks on our facilities, was shared. I
also had a weekly meeting every Monday with all of the
officials, the Assistant Secretaries and others, so
that I could be brought up to date on any issue that
they were concerned about. During the day, I received
hundreds of pages of memos, many of them classified,
some of them so top secret that they were brought to my
office in a locked briefcase that I had to read and
immediately return to the courier. And I was constantly
at the White House in the Situation Room meeting with
the National Security Advisor and others.\475\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\475\Clinton Testimony at 49.
Kennedy, who was responsible for the security of diplomatic
facilities overseas, testified he also received daily
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
intelligence briefings.
A: I received a notebook every morning.
Q: And that is a compilation of what?
A: Compilation of intelligence material from throughout
the intelligence community, as well as from the State
Department's own Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Q: As you sit here today, do you recall receiving
anything that week that related to the attacks in
Benghazi?
A: I don't recall anything specific, but I also am sure
that there was something in one of the reports from one
of the agencies about Libya.\476\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\476\Kennedy Testimony at 121.
The reports and assessments issued by the intelligence
community painted Libya as a country descending into chaos as
2012 wore on. As early as February 2012, ``[T]he Community was
noting disturbing trends regarding the ability of Islamic
extremists to exploit the security situation in Libya.''\477\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\Benghazi Intelligence Review: Office of the Dir. of Nat'l
Intel., Oct. 22, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 23, 2012, the Defense Intelligence Agency
reported:
[Redacted text].\478\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\478\Libya: AQIM's Persistent Efforts, J. Chiefs of Staff, J.
Intel., Feb. 23, 2012.
The same day, the Central Intelligence Agency issued a
report titled [redacted text]\479\ [redacted text]\480\
[redacted text].\481\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\479\[Redacted text].
\480\[Redacted text].
\481\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A week later, on February 29, 2012, the Central
Intelligence Agency published an assessment titled ``Extremist
Progress Toward a Safe Haven in Libya.'' The assessment noted
``[t]he progress of two decentralized, al-Qa'ida--aligned
groups in Libya and their ability to operate with relative ease
throughout many areas of the country suggest Libya is emerging
as a terrorist safe haven.''\482\ The Central Intelligence
Agency assessed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\482\Extremist Progress Toward a Safe Haven in Libya, Cent. Intel.
Agency, Feb. 29, 2012.
[T]he decimation of national-level security agencies--
which during the Qadhafi regime made Libya a hostile
environment for extremists--have allowed al-Qa'ida--
associated extremists, including previously Pakistan-
based al-Qa'ida members and al-Qa'ida members and al
Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to
procure weapons and develop networks in line with the
goals al Qa'ida senior leaders to establish a permanent
presence in Libya.\483\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\483\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
AQIM's ability to procure a stable supply of newer,
more reliable Libyan arms will almost certainly enhance
AQIM's ability to counter regional security services
and conduct high-profile attacks against local or
Western interests.\484\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\Id. at 2.
By mid-March 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency reported
[redacted text]\485\ [redacted text].\486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\485\[Redacted text].
\486\[Redacted text].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 21, 2012 the Defense Intelligence Agency published
a report titled [redacted text]. It stated:
[Redacted text] that these trends and current security
situation, if unchecked, will allow al-Qaida and
affiliated groups to establish a safehaven within a
year.\487\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\487\Terrorists Using Local Camps and Militias for Future
Operations, Defense Intel. Agency, Mar. 21, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Intelligence Agency further stated:
[Redacted text] that militia groups with al-Qaida
connections will increasingly adopt an anti-western
ideology in the next few months [redacted text] that
while theses terrorist-aligned militias remain
decentralized and possess disparate goals, al-Qaida and
AQIM will be unable to unite them and harness their
potential in the next few months.\488\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\488\Id.
Less than three weeks after the Defense Intelligence
Agency's report on the potential for attacks against Western
targets, the State Department compound in Benghazi was attacked
by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). An IED was thrown over
the compound's perimeter wall. At the time, only one State
Department Diplomatic Security Agent was at the Mission
compound.
Less than a week after the first attack on the State
Department compound, the Central Intelligence Agency published
an intelligence piece titled ``Libya as an emerging destination
for foreign fighter training.''\489\ The same day, the Defense
Intelligence Agency issued an intelligence piece reporting
``al-Qaeda and al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) are expanding their contacts with political figures,
terrorists, and militia groups in Libya.''\490\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\489\Libya: Emerging Destination for Foreign Fighter Training,
Cent. Intel. Agency, Apr. 12, 2012.
\490\Terrorism, Libya: Terrorists Seeking Expanded Influence,
Activity, Defense Intel. Agency, Apr. 12, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICOM issued its own assessment a week later, reporting
[redacted text]\491\ That same day AFRICOM issued its
assessment the U.S. was a target in Libya, the State Department
denied Benghazi's request to have five Diplomatic Security
Agents deployed in order to better secure the Mission's
compound.\492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\491\J2 Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Libya: Al-Qaeda
Intent to Target U.S. Aircraft in Libya, U.S. Africa Command, Apr. 19,
2012.
\492\U.S. Dep't of State, Cable, Tripoli-Request for DS TDY and FTE
(Apr. 19, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Army's National Ground Intelligence Center issued
an intelligence piece on the 17 February Brigade.\493\ At the
time, members of February 17 were housed on the State
Department's compound in order to augment the State
Department's security personnel at the Mission compound, and a
larger contingent of February 17 members resided near the State
Department compound. In its assessment, the National Ground
Intelligence Center reported:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\493\Libya: 17 February Brigade, U.S. Army Nat'l Ground Intel.
Ctr., Apr. 25, 2012.
[Redacted text].\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\Id.
Two days later, the CIA assessed ``[K]ey militia blocs will
most likely remain reluctant to give up their organizational
autonomy because of fear of local rivals, distrust of the
Transitional National Council, and competition for leadership
of newly formed government institutions.''\495\ The report
further noted: ``[T]he continued existence of dozens of
autonomous militias could undermine Libya's transition by
engaging in violence, seizing national infrastructure,
subverting election procedures or using coercion to influence
the political process.''\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\495\Libya: Continued Militia Autonomy Jeopardizing Transition,
Cent. Intel. Agency, Apr. 27, 2012.
\496\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the deteriorating security environment accelerated in
late spring 2012, AFRICOM reported on the security vacuum
created by the Transitional National Council's inability to
reign in the competing militias. AFRICOM assessed ``Al-Qaida
and its affiliates will attempt to capitalize on the turmoil in
Libya to garner recruits, mobilize popular Western support, and
establish an operational presence in Libya to threaten U.S. and
Western interests in the Region.''\497\ AFRICOM further
reported [redacted text].''\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\J2 Network Analysis of Extremists Operating in Libya, U.S.
Africa Command, May 16, 2012.
\498\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 22, 2012, the CIA reported ``the eastern city of
Darnha, a religiously conservative and historically
marginalized areas that was a disproportionate source of Libyan
freedom fighters during the Iraq war, is the center of
extremist activity in Libya, in part [redacted text].''\499\
Darnah was located approximately 180 miles from Benghazi. Also
on May 22, 2012 the International Committee for the Red Cross
(ICRC) was attacked in Benghazi by a rocket propelled grenade
(RPG), the first of five attacks that would occur against the
ICRC in and around Benghazi during the summer 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\Libya: Weak Security Allowing Al-Qa'ida Associates To Become
Entrenched, Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, May 22,
2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On May 30, 2012, in an assessment titled ``Terrorism: AQ
Bolstering Presence and Influence in Libya,'' the Defense
Intelligence Agency stated [redacted text]\500\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\500\Terrorism: AQ Bolstering Presence and Influence in Libya,
Defense Intel. Agency, May 30, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 6, 2012, less than a week after the Defense
Intelligence Agency's reported on al-Qaeda-associated groups
planning to launch near term attacks, the State Department
compound in Benghazi was attacked again by an IED for the
second time in less than two months. According to the Defense
Intelligence Agency, [redacted text]\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\501\Brief Notes, Terrorism, Defense Intel. Agency, June 6, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 11, 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency assessed
the ``rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms attack in
Benghazi . . . on the British Ambassador's convoy--the third
attack on a Western diplomatic target that week--highlights the
vulnerability of Western interests posed by the permissive
security environment in Libya.''\502\ Some within the State
Department felt the Benghazi Mission compound was the intended
target.\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\Libya: Attack on British Diplomatic Convoy Underscores Risks
to Western Interests, Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel.
Agency, June 11, 2012.
\503\Polaschik Testimony at 84-85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increased number of attacks against Western targets in
May and June 2012 led the Defense Intelligence Agency to
``assess with high confidence growing ties between al-Qaida
regional nodes and Libya-based terrorists will increase the
terrorists' capabilities. We expect if the current security
vacuum persists, attacks against U.S. and Western interests in
Libya (including operations in Tripoli) will increase in number
and lethality.''\504\ On June 12, 2012 a Defense Intelligence
Agency assessment titled ``Terrorism, Libya: Terrorists Now
Targeting U.S. and Western Interests'' stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\504\Terrorism, Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western
Interests, Defense Intel. Report, June 12, 2012.
[Redacted text].\505\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\505\Id.
A June 18, 2012 Defense Intelligence Agency report titled
``Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Haven in Libya'' assessed:
[Redacted text].\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\Terrorism: Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorist Safe
Haven in Libya, Defense Intel. Agency, June 18, 2012.
A June 18, 2012 CIA report issued the same day gave a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
broader assessment of the variables that would:
most likely . . . affect the first stage of Libya's
transition and the runup to the planned July 2012
National Assembly election. . . . [T]hese variables can
be summed into two drivers: the level of effectiveness
of the interim government and militias' cooperation
with the interim government. Wildcards, including
possible attacks by former Libyan leader Muammar al-
Qadhafi loyalists or al-Qa'ida-affiliated extremists
could also impact events.\507\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\507\First Stage of Libya's Transition: Key Drivers and Potential
Outcomes, Directorate of Intel., Cent. Intel. Agency, June 18, 2012.
The CIA assessment further provided ``an attack on interim
government officials or infrastructure by loyalists of former
Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and his family or al-Qa'ida-
associated extremists could undercut the transition's progress
depending on the scope. [Redacted text] on the near-term
intentions and capabilities of these groups.''\508\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\508\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 26, 2012 the Central Intelligence Agency reported:
repeated clashes in the past few months underscores the
interim government's weak nationwide presence and
crisis management capabilities, almost certainly
tarnishing public perceptions of its authority and
highlighting the many security challenges that will
face Libya's post-election government. . . . The
government's attempts to stop recurring internal
violence often rely on the intervention of local actors
whose efforts help stabilize the situation but leave
the underlying causes unresolved. The Transitional
National Council (TNC) has made little progress toward
implementing national reconciliation measures aimed at
addressing fissures stemming from last year's conflict
and Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's 42 years in
power.\509\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\509\Libya: Recurring Internal Violence Highlights Security
Challenges Facing Successor Government, Office of Middle East and North
Africa Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, June 26, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Central Intelligence Agency's assessment further noted:
[G]overnment still possesses few cohesive and
professional Army and police units because many
militias are reluctant to disarm, and its nascent
security bodies lack the leadership and organizational
capacity to rapidly integrate thousands of poorly
disciplined fighters. Many militias that have received
official sanction to act as security units almost
certainly remain at best loosely controlled by national
leaders.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\510\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Intelligence Agency reported the same day:
if the current security vacuum persists, attacks
against US and Western interests in Libya will increase
in number and lethality. While specific targets of
future terrorist attacks are unknown, the DoD presence
at US diplomatic facilities and DoD Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets operating in
Libyan airspace may be considered as potential targets.
According to AFRICOM's JPERSTAT, as of 21 June 12, . .
. [t]he Terrorism Threat Level in Libya is
SIGNIFICANT.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\Id.
In addition to both the Central Intelligence Agency's and
the Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment, AFRICOM issued
its own assessment of the security environment in Libya,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reporting:
[Redacted text].\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\512\J-2 Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Theater Analysis
Report, U.S. Africa Command, June 26, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICOM further assessed:
[Redacted text].
* * *
[Redacted text].\513\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By July 3, 2012, AFRICOM had assessed:
[Redacted text].\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\514\J-2 Intelligence and Knowledge Development Theater Analysis
Report, North Africa: Growing Threat from Al-Qaeda Affiliated
Extremists to Western Interests, U.S. Africa Command, July 3, 2012.
AFRICOM further pointed to Libya as a [redacted text]\515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\515\Id.
In addition to the threats associated with the formal
al-Qaida affiliates, there is a growing threat to
Libya-based Western interests from individuals inspired
by al-Qaida's ideology with limited or no direction
from the organization itself. These individuals or
cells are the most likely to conduct attacks, however
they are more likely to be unsophisticated or disrupted
by local authorities.\516\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\516\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICOM emphasized:
[N]o single group likely conducted the series of anti-
Western attacks in Libya since 22 May 2012. On 12 June
2012, individuals attacked the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) office in Misrata, wounding the
landowner's son and seriously damaging the building. On
11 June 2012, rocket propelled grenades (RPG) fired
from an elevated position attack a three-vehicle convoy
carrying the British Ambassador to Libya. Two
passengers in the lead vehicle were injured. On 6 June,
a crude improvised explosive device (IED) detonated
adjacent to the main gate of the U.S. Mission Benghazi
compound, causing no casualties and minor damage to the
compound's wall. The `Brigades of Captive Umar Abd-al-
Rahman' claimed responsibility for a 22 May rocket-
propelled grenade attack on the Benghazi office of the
ICRC and the 6 June attack on the U.S. Mission
Benghazi.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\517\Id.
On July 6, 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency issued its
own assessment that al-Qaeda was establishing a sanctuary in
Libya. In particular, the report assessed ``Eastern Libya,
particularly the city of Darnah, provides extremists with the
space to plot and train operatives.''\518\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\518\Libya: Al-Qa'ida Establishing Sanctuary, Cent. Intel. Agency,
July 6, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report further pointed out [redacted text]\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\519\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Defense Intelligence Agency was reporting:
[Redacted text] conflict zones or instability provide
venues for reengagement [redacted text].\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\520\[Redacted text] Defense Intel. Agency, July 19, 2012.
In fact, Abu Sufian bin Qumu, a former Guantanamo Bay
detainee who was released back to Libya in 2007, became
the ``leader of the Ansar Al-Sharia in the city of
Darnah.''\521\ According to the same report, ``Qumu
trained in 1993 at one of Osama bin Laden's terrorist
camps in Afghanistan and later worked for a bin Laden
company in Sudan, where the al-Qaeda leader lived for
three years.''\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\521\Adam Goldman, Former Guantanamo detainee implicated in
Benghazi attack, Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 2014.
\522\Id.
It was widely reported ``[M]ilitiamen under the command
of Abu Sufian bin Qumu . . . participated in the attack
that killed U.S. Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and
three other Americans.''\523\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\523\Id.
On July 25, 2012, AFRICOM reported on the spate of attacks
on Westerners in eastern Libya. AFRICOM assessed [redacted
text].''\524\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\524\J2--Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Theater In-Brief,
U.S. Africa Command, July 25, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 1, 2012, AFRICOM assessed, ``Benghazi's level of
violence has escalated following the 7 July 2012 elections;
extremists with unknown affiliations are likely targeting
foreign and government interests following Islamist groups'
poor showing in the elections. Degraded security, which follows
recent efforts to establish a regular police force in Benghazi,
is also likely a factor.''\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\525\J2--Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Theater In-Brief,
U.S. Africa Command, Aug. 1, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same day, the Central Intelligence Agency issued its
assessment of an attack on the Libyan military intelligence
agency headquartered in Benghazi. The Central Intelligence
Agency reported:
[T]he attack yesterday against the Libyan military
intelligence headquarters in Benghazi underscores how
unidentified assailants are exploiting the permissive
security environment to conduct surveillance and
attacks. . . . We do not know who was responsible for
the strike, and most of the recent attacks do not
appear to be linked.\526\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\526\Libya: Recent Attacks Highlight Persistent Threats in Eastern
Libya, Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Aug. 1, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The assessment restated:
[Redacted text].\527\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\527\Id.
On August 15, 2012, AFRICOM reported the ``threat from
extremist groups in Libya remains significant to Western
interests.''\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\528\J2-Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Theater In-Brief,
U.S. Africa Command, Aug. 15, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 19, 2012 the Defense Intelligence Agency reported
[redacted text].''\529\ The Defense Intelligence Agency
assessed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\529\Libya: Terrorists to Increase Strength During Next Six Months,
Defense Intel. Agency, Aug.19, 2012.
[Redacted text].\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\530\Id.
On August 23, 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency
published an assessment finding ``Al-Qa'ida-affiliated groups
and Libyan militias with extremist ties increasingly are
exploiting the permissive security environment in Libya--
particularly in the east--to establish training camps,
providing these groups with controlled areas in which to
improve their operational capabilities.''\531\ The Central
Intelligence Agency's assessment noted again ``the
proliferation of training camps in eastern Libya is likely to
continue unabated absent significant improvements in the
technical capabilities, source networks, and infrastructure
[redacted text].''\532\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\531\Libya: Proliferation of Training Camps Aiding Extremist
Networks, Office of Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Aug. 23,
2012.
\532\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 27, 2012 the Central Intelligence Agency was
reporting:
Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is
weaving itself into a variety of Libyan extremist
circles almost certainly to encourage neighboring
extremists to work in concert toward shared goals and
increase its influence there. We assess [redacted
text], that AQIM seeks a durable presence in Libya
because it views itself as the natural jihadist leader
for North Africa [redacted text].\533\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\533\Terrorism: AQIM Growing Diverse Network in Libya, Office of
Terrorism Analysis, Cent. Intel. Agency, Aug. 27, 2012.
On August 29, 2012, the Central Intelligence Agency painted
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Libya as a country in chaos, reporting:
[A]ttacks by disparate individuals and groups since
April against foreign and government targets in Libya
underscore Tripoli's inability to prevent and respond
to assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings. This
violence highlights the magnitude of reform challenges
facing the new government. [redacted text].\534\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\534\Libya: Struggling to Create Effective Domestic Security
Systems, Office of Middle East and North Africa Analysis, Cent. Intel.
Agency, Aug. 29, 2012.
On September 5, 2012, AFRICOM reported ``Libya-based
extremists continue to fuel regional terror groups' operations
outside the country through training, recruitment, and
facilitation. Libya-based extremists, most notably al-Qa'ida
and its adherents, will continue efforts to establish
themselves in Libya, taking advantage of the chaotic security
environment. Unimpeded these groups may become capable of
planning and launching terrorist attacks abroad.''\535\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\535\J2-Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Libya: Extremism in
Libya, Past, Present, and Future, U.S. Africa Command, Sept. 5, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFRICOM further highlighted a [redacted text]\536\ ``The
report stated the best case scenario in Libya was a 'Divided
al-Qaida Organization.'"\537\ ``AFRICOM assessed 'this scenario
is likely only if the Western-backed Libyan government is able
to effectively disarm extremist militias and exercise control
over the majority of Libyan territory.'"\538\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\536\Id.
\537\Id.
\538\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The intelligence community's assessment depicted Libya,
eastern Libya, and Benghazi as emerging terrorists' strongholds
posing a threat to Western interests. Even with two IED attacks
on the State Department's compound, senior government officials
believed more intelligence was needed before any step could be
taken to strengthen security at the United States facilities in
Benghazi.
The Secretary told the Committee although she was fully
briefed and aware of the dangers in Libya ``there was no
actionable intelligence on September 11 or even before that
date about any kind of planned attack on our compound in
Benghazi.''\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\539\Clinton Testimony at 41-42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy told the Committee ``with additional information,
we would have known--we would have known more, we would have
executed a different security program, because the risks would
have been pegged at a higher level.''\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\540\Kennedy Testimony at 169-170.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not clear what additional intelligence would have
satisfied either Kennedy or the Secretary in understanding the
Benghazi Mission compound was at risk--short of an attack. The
intelligence on which Kennedy and the Secretary were briefed
daily was clear and pointed--Al Qa'ida, al Qa'ida like groups,
and other regional extremists took refuge in the security
vacuum created by the Libya government and its inability to
take command of the security situation.
It is these same groups that were responsible for the spate
of attacks against Western interests throughout the spring and
summer of 2012. Yet, the risks to the State Department compound
in Benghazi were never mitigated. They were only exacerbated by
the fact senior officials within the State Department failed to
prepare for a worst case scenario in Benghazi. The Benghazi
Mission compound not only lacked the resources to ensure the
facility physically was secure but failed to ensure enough
security personnel were on the ground to carry out the security
program.
The volume of intelligence regarding extremist activities
in eastern Libya in the spring and summer of 2012, in addition
to the spate of attacks by these groups against Western
interests in Benghazi, was substantial. This intelligence was
provided regularly--if not daily--to Kennedy, the Secretary,
and others who made decisions with respect to Libya policy and
the security of the Benghazi Mission compound and should have
manifested substantial risk that could readily have been
inferred.
Although this intelligence was available, the analysis was
not directed to potential direct threats to U.S. personnel in
Libya or Benghazi or the potential consequences of having that
many extremists in Libya with respect to U.S. interests.
PRE-ATTACK WARNING
In his interview with the Committee, Panetta bluntly stated
his view ``an intelligence failure'' occurred with respect to
Benghazi.\541\ Former CIA Deputy Director Michael J. Morell
also acknowledged multiple times an intelligence failure did in
fact occur in this respect prior to the Benghazi attacks.\542\
This was not necessarily the result of one or two specific
instances of inaction, but instead reflected a general lack of
planning for a post-Qaddafi environment that began with the
U.S. intervention in Libya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\541\Testimony of Leon E. Panetta, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of
Def., Tr. at 111 (Jan. 8, 2016) [hereinafter Panetta Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
\542\Morell Testimony at 82-83; Morell Testimony at 211-212; Morell
Testimony at 277.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the fall of Qadhafi, both the NATO Secretary General
and the President explained that democracy-building efforts
would be up to the Libyans\543\--justified by language in
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, prohibiting
the presence of an ``occupying force'' in Libya.\544\ NATO
declared it was concluding the operation ``in a considered and
controlled manner,'' yet acknowledged ``they [Libyans] still
have a lot of work to do--to build a new Libya, based on
reconciliation, human rights, and the rule of law.''\545\ NATO
demonstrated a hands-off approach to post-conflict
stabilization, leaving Libyans to sort out post-conflict
stabilization.\546\ At the same time, the President praised the
alliance on its successes in Libya, but stated the TNC, the
nominally sovereign governing authority of the new Libya, would
manage Libya's post-conflict governance and democracy-building
effort.\547\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\543\Although Tom Donilon set up a post-Qadhafi task force to
handle issues relating to post-conflict strategy, the group became
entrenched with managing the intervention and unable to devote time to
extensive stabilization planning. It did produce plans in conjunction
with a Libyan reconstruction team, but it was unclear to what extent
the plans were used. See Christopher S.Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi at:
Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention 143-44. (2014)
[hereinafter Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi].
\544\Id. at 60; see also Aaron David Miller, Obama's 21st Century
War, Foreign Policy (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/04/05/obamas_21st_century_war.
\545\Press Release, NATO, NATO Sec'y Gen. Statement on the End of
Libya Mission (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
news_80052.htm.
\546\Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, supra note 522, at 164-68.
\547\Lucy Madison, Obama Congratulates Libya on Liberation, CBS
News (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-congratulates-
libya-on-liberation. Despite the fact that the Administration justified
the intervention under the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect,
advocates for this approach such as Samantha Power, Secretary Clinton,
and Susan Rice failed to act on rhetoric from those who helped write
the U.N.'s 2001 Responsibility to Protect Report. Authors of the report
emphasized that the doctrine embraced the ``responsibility to
rebuild.'' See Jayshree Bajoria & Robert McMahon, The Dilemma of
Humanitarian Intervention, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations
(June 12, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemma-
humanitarian-intervention/p16524.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The TNC proved unable to exercise meaningful control over
the country.\548\ After the conflict, Libya faced a growing
number of kata'ibas--armed rebel groups not connected with
rebels in Benghazi.\549\ The rise of these groups distorted
efforts to govern from Benghazi, and led to factions within the
nation's leadership as a whole.\550\ With tens of thousands of
Libyans dead and hundreds of thousands displaced,\551\ the
country needed new a constitution, civil, social, and political
institutions, economic management, and management of its oil
wealth.\552\ As NATO and its partners left Libya, some
questioned whether the destruction in Libya would translate
into compromising regional security.\553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\548\See, e.g., Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, supra note 522, at 183;
William Maclean, If Libyan Rebels Win, Can They Rule?, Reuters, (Aug.
21, 2011, available at), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/08/21/
idINIndia-58891320110821 (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); Jason Pack &
Haley Cook, Beyond Tripoli's Grasp, Majalla, (Oct. 3, 2013, available
at), http://www.majalla.com/eng/2013/10/article55245761 (last visited
Feb. 18, 2016).
\549\Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, supra note 522, at 94-95, 183.
After the conflict, the State Department was more concerned with
Security Council politics in the debate on how to respond to the war
than transferring frozen Qaddafi regime funds to the TNC for post-
conflict stabilization. See id. at 164.
\550\Id.; e.g., Armed Groups in Libya: Typology & Roles, Small Arms
Survey, Research Notes (June 2012), available at
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/
SAS-Research-Note-18.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
\551\Biggest Success? NATO Proud of Libya Op Which Killed
Thousands, RT (Oct. 28, 2011), http://rt.com/news/nato-libya-operation-
success-999/(last visited Feb. 18, 2016) [hereinafter NATO Proud of
Libya Op]; Max Boot, Libya's problems are far from over, L.A. Times
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/24/opinion/la-oe-
boot-libya-20110824.
\552\Jayshree Bajoria, The Perils of Libyan Nation Building, World
Post, (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jayshree-bajoria/
the-perils-of-libyan-nati_b_846080.html.
\553\NATO Proud of Libya Op, supra note 529.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Obama Administration opted to forego the use of
military forces to stabilize a post-civil war Libya--an
approach described by former Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan
as exercising ``bad judgment.''\554\ The State Department
exercised its own version of a light footprint, ``expeditionary
diplomacy,'' in an attempt to quickly normalize its presence in
a country with institutions devastated by more than 40 years of
dictatorship, regional strife, and war.\555\ The administration
also chose to forego post-war planning.\556\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\554\Mike Krever, West Should Have Put Boots on the Ground in
Libya, Says Former Prime Minister, CNN (Mar. 25, 2014), http://
amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/25/west-should-have-put-boots-on-the-
ground-in-libya-says-former-prime-minister. See also Raphael Cohen &
Gabriel Scheinmann, Lessons from Libya: America Can't Lead From Behind,
Time (Feb. 15, 2014), http://ideas.time.com/2014/02/15/lessons-from-
libya-america-cant-lead-from-behind/; Stanley Kurtz, Assessing Libya,
Nat'l Review Online (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/275181/assessing-libya-stanley-kurtz.
\555\Fred Burton & Samuel Katz, 40 Minutes in Benghazi, Vanity
Fair, (Aug. 2013), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2013/08/Benghazi-
book-fred-burton-samuel-m-katz.
\556\Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, supra note 522, at 143-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the aftermath of a multilateral intervention, Libya has
erupted into chaos, with both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant using Libya as a safehaven.\557\ While the
Secretary of State testified, without specifics, there were a
``number of documents'' prepared regarding planning for a post-
Qadhafi Libya,\558\ Morell said otherwise:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\557\Pamela Engel, How one major failure allowed ISIS to exploit
the chaos in its newest hotspot, Business Insider (Jan. 27, 2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-libya-rise-2016-1.
\558\The U.S. House Select Committee on Benghazi, Hearing 4--Part
1: Testimony from Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton--10/22/2015
(EventID=104082), YouTube (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ABFWjZxCAAg; The U.S. House Select Committee on Benghazi,
Hearing 4--Part 2: Testimony from Former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton--
10/22/2015 (EventID=104082), YouTube (Oct. 22, 2015), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=0hvl1LpZp3Q [collectively hereinafter Benghazi
Hearing 4].
One of the problems was not going into it with a very
detailed plan for how you were going to maintain
stability . . . We never really had a conversation
around the table about `what's going to happen, how's
it going to look?' The intelligence community never
wrote that paper . . . That conversation was not as
rich and rigorous as it should have been.\559\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\559\Michael Hirsh, `Here's What I Really Worry About,' Politico
(May 11, 2015), http://www.pollitico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/
Michael-Morell-interview-cia-impending-terror-attack-
117821#ixzz4BHB4izvu.
That view is supported by Anne Marie Slaughter, former
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Director of Policy Planning, State Department, when she wrote:
It is so much easier to pound our chests and declare
that the United States bestrides the world like a
colossus and should be able to dictate any outcome it
wants. That is no longer true, if it ever were. We
found that out the hard way by . . . toppling a
government in Libya without any idea of what might come
next.\560\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\560\Anne Marie Slaughter, War with Iran is the only alternative to
a deal, USA Today (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
opinion/2015/08/20/bombing-iran-only-alternative-deal-column/31940869/
(emphasis added).
Morell told the Committee Libya was unique among countries
involved in the Arab Spring because it was the only place where
the United States made a choice to push the Arab Spring
forward.\561\ As a result, according to Morell, the
intelligence community should have furnished the President a
plan projecting likely conditions in Libya after the fall of
Qadhafi.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\561\Morell Testimony at 82.
\562\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morell attributes the failure to provide predictive
intelligence to multiple parties across the spectrum: the
intelligence analysts, the leadership of the intelligence
community, and even the decisionmakers--including the President
and the Secretary of State--for not asking those questions and
fostering a conversation about what would need to be done to
maintain stability in a post-Qadhafi Libya.\563\ The Secretary
pushed back on this point when she testified: ``[W]e can do all
the planning we want in Washington, but it's very important to
ask the Libyans both what they want and what they expect from
us, and so we had an ongoing dialogue that lasted over many
months.''\564\ Her testimony, however, referred to the events
after Qadhafi fell, (for example, Nides visited Libya in
January 2012, nearly a year after the initial U.S.
intervention) and not prior to the U.S. intervention.\565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\563\Id. at 83.
\564\Clinton Testimony at 177.
\565\See Request for SST Extension from U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Libya, to Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 12, 2012, 11:58 PM)
(on file with the Committee, SCB0049743-48).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In describing this intelligence failure, Morell described
to the Committee an additional ``intelligence analytic
issue.''\566\ He noted that in authoritarian societies, such as
Qadhafi-era Libya, the personality of the leader is
``everything,'' personal relationships with individuals in the
rest of the government are ``everything,'' and institutions in
that government are all personality-based.\567\ The
institutions themselves are empty without the leadership, and
when the leader goes away, the institutions simply break
down.\568\ Morell contended the Intelligence Community did not
fully appreciate these factors in the case of Libya.\569\
Instead, as he noted, the U.S. instead viewed itself as a
``beacon of democracy'' without understanding what was next:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\566\Morell Testimony at 277.
\567\Id.
\568\Id.
\569\Id.
It's ingrained in us, this desire to spread democracy
to the rest of the world. I think people's weaknesses
flow from their strengths, in organizations and
countries. One of our strengths is seeing ourselves as
a beacon for democracy. It becomes a weakness when we
try to impose it on societies that aren't ready for it.
I think of Iraq, Gaza, Afghanistan and Libya. I think
it's probably both a failure of intelligence and a
failure of policy, in two different
administrations.\570\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\570\Here's What I really Worry About, supra note [559] (emphasis
added).
While the CIA took this dangerous security environment
seriously--they sent out a physical security specialist to
review its compound in Benghazi and apply immediate upgrades--
this analysis all occurred too late to enact meaningful change
inside Libya and prevent this threat from emerging and
eventually establishing a stranglehold on the country. No
predictive analysis occurred within the intelligence community
on the front end of the U.S. intervention regarding what might
occur if Qadhafi were to lose power. No assessment was made
that a power void may be exploited by al Qa'ida and other
extremist organizations, and it was this front-end intelligence
failure that contributed to the Benghazi attacks.
An additional critical question is why the United States
did not have a specific, tactical warning about the attack.
Morell addressed this issue when he spoke of what he calls
``battlefield intelligence'':
. . . so that you're picking up everything, from a
signals perspective and from a humint [human
intelligence] perspective. I think the only way to have
avoided Benghazi is to have that kind of intelligence
footprint over the top of them . . . the real lesson
about Benghazi is how do we protect American diplomats,
how do we protect American intelligence officers, how
do we protect American servicemen and women overseas
moving forward, in what is a very, very dangerous
world.\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\571\Counterterrorism Efforts, C-Span (May 18, 2015), http://www.c-
span.org/video/?326104-1/former-cia-deputy-director-michael-morell-
counterterrorism-efforts&start=1060.
Secretary Leon Panetta, himself a former Director of the
CIA, also testified about the failure in Benghazi to have the
kind of intelligence that would have tipped off U.S. personnel
about a specific attack.\572\ Panetta labeled this the ``most
important missing element'' regarding Benghazi,\573\ and said
it should be the first lesson learned about the attacks--
improving the intelligence to make sure our personnel are aware
there is going to be an imminent attack.\574\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\572\See Panetta Testimony at 119-20.
\573\Id. at 71-72.
\574\Id. at 119-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This issue is discussed further in the classified annex to
the report, as well as addressing the question of why U.S.
government officials did not have what proved to be sufficient,
specific, tactical warning about the Benghazi attacks.
The day before the Benghazi attacks, the President convened
a phone call with senior administration officials concerning
America's preparedness and security posture on the anniversary
of the September 11, 2001 attacks.\575\ A readout of the
meeting notes the ``[p]rincipals discussed specific measures we
are taking in the Homeland to prevent 9/11 related attacks as
well as steps taken to protect U.S. persons and facilities
abroad, as well as force protection.''\576\ Panetta testified
there was concern on the call about the anti-Muslim video that
was coming out, and there was a specific discussion regarding
Tripoli, among other cities in the region.\577\ Given the lack
of any pre-attack force movement toward North Africa and the
Middle East in the wake of the call--especially given the
concerns about the video and the forewarning regarding protests
in Cairo\578\--there appeared to be no indications an attack in
Benghazi, or anywhere else in the region, was anticipated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\575\Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary,
The White House, Readout of the President's Meeting with Senior
Administration Officials on Our Preparedness and
Security Posture on the Eleventh Anniversary of September 11th (Sept.
10, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/10/
readout-president-s-meeting-senior-
administration-officials-our-prepared.
\576\Id.
\577\Panetta Testimony at 10.
\578\Id. at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, on the morning of September 11, one of the
local guards at the TMF witnessed a man, believed to be a
police officer, in the second story of a building across the
street looking into the State Department facility and taking
photographs.\579\ Stevens was briefed about the incident,\580\
and Sean Smith referenced the incident just hours before the
attacks began on an online gaming site.\581\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\579\Diplomatic Sec. Agent 5 Testimony at 93.
\580\Email from Assistant Regional Sec. Officer (Sept. 11, 2012,
5:00 pm) (on file with the Committee, C05271656).
\581\The posting by Sean Smith read, ``Assuming we don't die
tonight. We saw one of our `police' that guard the compound taking
pictures.'' See, e.g., Lindsay Wise, Libya attack victim: `assuming we
don't die tonight . . . ,' Seattle Times, Sept. 13, 2012.
PART IV:
Compliance with Congressional Investigations
``But now that I am the secretary and I am responsible to you
and the Congress, I can promise you that if you're not getting
something that you have evidence of or you think you ought to
be getting, we'll work with you. And I will appoint somebody to
work directly with you starting tomorrow . . . To have a review
of anything you don't think you [have] gotten that you're
supposed to get. Let's get this done with, folks.''
Secretary of State John F. Kerry (April
2013--one
year before the creation of the Select
Committee on
complying with congressional questions
about the
Benghazi attacks.)
``This is the most transparent administration in history.''
President Barack Obama (February 2013)
``Four Americans lost their lives in Benghazi, and this White
House has gone to extraordinary lengths to mislead, obstruct,
and obscure what actually took place.''
Speaker John A. Boehner (May 2014--
after the White
House failed to produce Benjamin J.
Rhodes' memo
to Congress.)
``I want the public to see my email.''
Secretary Hillary R. Clinton (March
2015--after
published reports her emails and other
public records
were returned to the State Department
18 months
after she left office.)
COMPLIANCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Introduction
Congress's authority to oversee and investigate the
Executive Branch is a necessary component of legislative powers
and to maintain the constitutional balance of powers between
the branches. As the Supreme Court held in 1927: ``[T]he power
of inquiry--with process to enforce it--is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.''\1\
Similarly, the Supreme Court held: ``The power of the Congress
to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative
process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries
concerning the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
\2\Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When needed information cannot easily be obtained--or if
government agencies resist--Congress has legitimate cause to
compel responses:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change, and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information--which not
infrequently is true--recourse must be had to others
who do possess it. Experience has taught that mere
requests for such information often are unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete, so some means of
compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175.
These principles of congressional oversight have been
severely tested during the Committee's investigation. The
administration's frequently stated pledge to comply with ``all
legitimate oversight requests'' is often a hollow prelude
followed by delay or refusal to respond to legitimate
inquiries. Other congressional committees have reported similar
delay and obstruction.\4\ The administration's resistance to
this Committee has been especially troubling. The families of
the four Americans murdered in Benghazi and the American public
deserve to hear the whole truth in a timely fashion. The same
government that asked J. Christopher Stevens, Sean P. Smith,
Glen A. Doherty and Tyrone S. Woods to serve selflessly and
sacrificially delayed and obstructed an investigation into what
happened in Benghazi before, during, and after their deaths.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/02/09/obama-
administration-least-transparent-epa-state-doj-clinton-benghazi-column/
80050428.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The discussion below details the Select Committee's two-
year battle to obtain documents and access to witnesses
necessary to understand what happened in Benghazi. The
administration's intentional failure to cooperate with this and
other congressional investigations warrants changes in
congressional rules and amendments to law in order to ensure
the Executive Branch cooperates with congressional
investigations and the American people know what their
government does on their behalf and with their money.
The House of Representatives established the Committee in
large part because of this administration's delay and
obstruction of prior congressional investigations.\5\ The House
specifically directed the Committee to examine ``executive
branch activities and efforts to comply with Congressional
inquiries'' into the Benghazi terrorist attacks and to
recommend ways to improve Executive Branch compliance with
congressional oversight.\6\ The detailed nature of this section
is intended to reflect the breadth of the Committee's
investigation and the lengths to which the administration went
to delay and obstruct the investigation. It also provides a
factual record so readers can judge for themselves the
responsiveness of Executive Branch agencies and how this lack
of responsiveness not only thwarted efforts to find facts but
also contributed to the time it took to acquire those facts
ultimately uncovered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\Eli Lake, Clinton Can Thank Obama for Her Benghazi Headache,
Bloomberg (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-
10-06/clinton-can-thank-obama-for-her-benghazi-headache.
\6\See H. Res. 567, 113th Cong., Sec. 3(a)(6) and (7) (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building the Committee's Record
The discovery and production of all relevant, material
documents--and other tangible evidentiary items--is an
essential foundation for substantive hearings, public and
private, as well as constructive witness interviews. Examining
witnesses without knowledge of and access to all relevant
information is unproductive, time consuming, and inefficient.
The logical chronology of serious investigations is to gather
physical evidence and documents prior to questioning witnesses.
Not only do the documents serve as a source and foundation for
the subsequent interview, they also provide witnesses with the
information needed to refresh recollections or put testimony in
perspective. Serious investigators understand the logical
chronology of access and interview. Regrettably, so too do
those seeking to undermine investigations.
REVIEW OF EXISTING DOCUMENTS
When established in May 2014, the Committee--consistent
with the directive in H. Res. 567--sought to obtain all
relevant documents from the five House committees previously
investigating the terrorist attacks on U.S. facilities in
Benghazi.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\See id. Sec. 5(a) (``Any committee of the House of
Representatives having custody of records in any form relating to the
matters described in section 3 shall transfer such records to the
Select Committee within 14 days of the adoption of this resolution.
Such records shall become the records of the Select Committee.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While previous committees of Congress did investigate
certain aspects of Benghazi, no committee investigated all
aspects of Benghazi. The House Armed Services Committee focused
on Defense Department matters and relied almost exclusively on
briefings and public hearings. The Armed Services Committee did
not investigate State Department issues, intelligence community
issues or White House involvement in the drafting and editing
of the public responses after the attacks. The House Permanent
Intelligence Committee focused on intelligence issues and did
not investigate Defense or State Department issues.
Additionally, the Intelligence Committee interviewed some
witnesses in groups, which is generally disfavored as an
investigatory tool.
The Accountability Review Board [ARB] was a State
Department investigative entity which did not have jurisdiction
over the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency
[CIA], or the White House. In addition, there is no transcript
from any interview conducted by the ARB, making it impossible
to know which questions were asked, of whom, and what the
precise responses were. The absence of transcripts requires the
reader to simply take the word of those drafting the report.
The failure to honor congressional requests for information
and the silo effect of committees being confined to certain
jurisdictional lanes is what prompted John A. Boehner, Speaker
of the House, and ultimately the House of Representatives, to
form a select committee with broad investigatory authority
across all jurisdictions and across all facets of what happened
in Benghazi before, during and after the deadly attacks.
The Select Committee's broader jurisdiction is reflected in
the fact this Committee interviewed 107 witnesses, 81 of whom
had not been questioned previously by any committee of
Congress. These witnesses came from all parts of government,
including the White House, the CIA and Defense and State
Departments. It is reflected in the more than 75,000 pages of
new documents to which no other committee of Congress had
access. In addition, the Committee's investigation discovered
emails not previously uncovered from senior government
officials including the emails of Stevens and of Hillary R.
Clinton, the Secretary of State, and her senior staff.
When the Committee came into existence in May 2014, it
accessed approximately 50,000 pages of reports, interview
transcripts, depositions, hearing transcripts, memoranda,
classified and unclassified documents, and other information
not cited or used by the standing committees in their
investigations.\8\ The Committee reviewed and evaluated the
documents page by page.\9\ This review took place from July
2014 to October 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\Chairman Trey Gowdy, Interim Progress Update, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi 3 (May 8, 2015), http://benghazi.house.gov/sites/
republicans.benghazi.house.gov/files/Interim%20Progress
%20Update%2005-08-15.pdf. [hereinafter Interim Progress Update].
\9\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among these materials--many of which were duplicates--were
25,000 pages so heavily redacted as to be useless to
investigators.\10\ This prompted the Committee to ask the State
Department to reproduce the material in less-redacted form.\11\
The resulting document productions were delivered in two
installments--November 24, 2014, and December 9, 2014.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Id.
\11\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for Legis.
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with the
Committee).
\12\Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Nov. 24, 2014) (on file with the Committee); Letter
from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for Legis. Affairs,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi (Dec. 9, 2014) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INITIAL DOCUMENT REQUESTS TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES
The Committee also sought information through the pending
document requests of previous committees. The State Department
had yet to comply with two outstanding congressional subpoenas
issued in 2013--one subpoena dealt specifically with ARB
documents.\13\ The other subpoena dealt with documents
previously reviewed by congressional investigators but
possession of the documents remained with the State Department
limiting full and useful access to the information.\14\ These
subpoenas were and remained legally binding on the State
Department and did not need to be reissued at that time.\15\
Since those existing subpoenas remained valid, the Committee
gave them priority.\16\ The State Department produced 15,000
pages of new documents to the Committee on August 11, 2014.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\Subpoena issued by H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform to John
F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 1, 2013)
[hereinafter OGR Document subpoena] (seeking approximately 25,000 pages
of documents referenced in Assistant Sec'y Thomas Gibbons' March 29,
2013 letter).
\14\Subpoena issued by H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform to John
F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 1, 2013)
[hereinafter OGR ARB Subpoena] (seeking documents related to State
Dep't's ARB findings regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding
the attacks in Benghazi).
\15\Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at 4.
\16\Id.
\17\Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Aug. 11, 2014) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A review of these 15,000 pages of emails and documents,
coupled with the 25,000 pages of less-redacted text, revealed
significant gaps in the information needed to determine what
happened in Libya before, during and after the attacks that led
to the murder of four Americans. For instance, this production
contained few emails between and among the State Department's
senior staff. The email traffic did not reflect roles played in
the decision-making process as it related to the U.S.'s
intervention into Libya in 2011, the Special Mission to
Benghazi in April 2011, the extension of the Benghazi Mission
into 2012, the night and early morning hours of September 11-
12, 2012, and the post-attack period. Moreover, there were
significant gaps in information that could be filled only by
interviewing eyewitnesses and other individuals on the ground
in Benghazi as well as witnesses who were in Washington DC in
the days and months leading up to the attacks on September 11-
12, 2012.
On November 18, 2014, the Committee sought specific
documents and communications relating to Benghazi and Libya for
11 top State Department officials, including the Secretary and
her senior staff.\18\ The Committee also requested to interview
more than 20 State Department witnesses, all of whom spent time
on the ground in Benghazi, including four diplomatic security
agents who survived the September 11-12 attacks.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, (Nov. 18, 2014)
(on file with Committee).
\19\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Dec.
4, 2014) (on file with the Committee) (The first of two similarly cited
letters requesting interviews of four agents serving in Benghazi the
night of the attacks); see also Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't
of State (Dec. 4, 2014) (on file with the Committee) (The second of two
similarly cited letters requesting interviews of eighteen agents and
principal officers who served in Benghazi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee sent information requests in the fall of 2014
to the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.\20\ In December 2014, the Committee sent
information requests to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
[FBI] and the White House.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Nov. 19, 2014)
(on file with the Committee); Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Michael S. Rogers, Dir., Nat'l Sec. Agency
(Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the Committee); Letter from Trey Gowdy,
Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to David R. Shedd, acting Dir.,
Def. Intel. Agency (Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the Committee); Letter
from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to James R.
Clapper, Dir., Nat'l Intel. (Nov. 19, 2014) (on file with the
Committee).
\21\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to James B. Comey, Jr., Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation
(Dec. 4, 2014) (on file with the Committee); Letter from Trey Gowdy,
Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Denis R. McDonough, White
House Chief of Staff (Dec. 29, 2014) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee issued three additional subpoenas to the
State Department (detailed below) and made nine individual
document requests.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (July
31, 2015) (on file with Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee document requests resulted in approximately
75,420 pages of new material:
LThe State Department produced approximately
71,640 pages of documents not previously provided to Congress.
LThe CIA produced 300 pages of new intelligence
analyses.
LThe White House produced 1,450 pages of emails.
LSidney S. Blumenthal produced 179 pages of
emails.
LThe FBI produced 200 pages of documents.
LThe Defense Department produced 900 pages of
documents.
LThe National Security Agency produced 750 pages
of documents.
It is important to rebut a frequent talking point. The
number of documents produced is in isolation meaningless
without knowing the relevance of the documents actually
produced and the number of relevant documents not produced. An
agency that compliments itself on the number of pages provided
to investigators when it alone knows the number of relevant
pages withheld is engaged in propaganda, not transparency.
MEETINGS, BRIEFINGS, AND PUBLIC HEARINGS
The Committee's first priority was to hear from the
families of the four murdered Americans in the Benghazi
attacks.\23\ These meetings offered the families an opportunity
to be heard, to pose questions and concerns to the Committee,
and to provide their insights. The Chairman also requested
briefings from agencies to discuss survivorship benefits to
ensure the families received the benefits to which they were
entitled.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at 3.
\24\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
and Elijah E. Cummings, Ranking Member, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to
John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State and John O. Brennan,
Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (October 8, 2014) (on file with the
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee held more than two dozen classified and
unclassified briefings with Executive Branch agencies.\25\ For
example, the Committee met with the State Department to
evaluate the events prior to and during the September 11-12,
2012, attacks, including viewing video footage of the
attacks.\26\ The Committee also met with the Justice Department
and the FBI on the capture of Ahmed Abu Khatalla and to view
additional footage of the attacks.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Id.
\26\Id.
\27\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee held only four public hearings.\28\ The first
and second public hearings--on September 17, 2014, and December
1, 2014--examined the State Department's efforts to protect
U.S. facilities and personnel currently serving abroad.\29\
Immediately following a significant event resulting in serious
injury or loss of life, the State Department is required by law
to convene an ARB to investigate and make findings and
recommendations to protect against similar occurrences in the
future.\30\ Consequently, the Committee's first hearing focused
on the State Department's implementation of the ARB's
recommendations as well as those recommendations issued by the
Independent Panel on Best Practices. The Independent Panel
consisted of independent experts who were asked to evaluate the
State Department's security platforms in high-risk, high-threat
posts.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, https://benghazi.house.gov/
hearings (last visited May 10, 2016).
\29\Hearing 1 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 113th
Congress (2014), Hearing 2 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
113th Congress (2014).
\30\See 22 U.S.C. Sec. 4831 (2005).
\31\Independent Panel on Best Practices, Dep't of State, 1 (Aug.
29, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee's second public hearing also allowed the
Committee to examine the shortcomings identified by the State
Department's Office of the Inspector General [OIG] and the
Department's efforts to remedy these deficiencies.\32\ The
OIG's first report, issued in September 2013, contained 20
formal and eight informal recommendations.\33\ The OIG
conducted a compliance follow-up review from January 15 through
March 18, 2015,\34\ and in August 2015 reissued one
recommendation to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the
Overseas Buildings Operations.\35\ The OIG called on the State
Department to ``develop minimum security standards that must be
met prior to occupying facilities located in designated high
risk, high threat locations and include these minimum standards
for occupancy in the Foreign Affairs Handbook.''\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Id.
\33\See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of State, Special
Review of the Accountability Review Board Process: Report No. ISP-I-13-
44A, 39-42 (Sept. 2013), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/214907.pdf.
\34\See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of State, Compliance
Followup Review of the Special Review of the Accountability Review
Board Process: Report No. ISP-C-15-33, 39-42 (Aug. 2015), https://
oig.state.gov/system/files/isp-c-15-33.pdf.
\35\Id.
\36\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The third public hearing on January 27, 2015, was necessary
because of continuing compliance problems with Executive Branch
entities.\37\ The Committee's authorizing resolution directed
it to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\See Hearing 3 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 114th
Congress,(2015).
``[c]onduct a full and complete investigation and study
and issue a final report of its findings to the House
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
regarding:
Lexecutive branch activities and efforts to
comply with Congressional inquiries into the attacks .
. .\38\ [and]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\H. Res. 567, 113th Cong., Sec. 3(a)(6) (2014).
Lrecommendations for improving executive
branch cooperation and compliance with congressional
oversight and investigations . . .''\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\Id. Sec. 3(a)(7).
The administration attempted to the narrow the Committee's
investigation and repeatedly asked it to prioritize discovery
requests.\40\ While the Committee refused to narrow its
investigation--the scope of which was mandated by the House of
Representatives--the Committee did accommodate the
administration's requests to prioritize. This accommodation
resulted in the administration disregarding discovery requests
that were not prioritized and accusing the Committee of being
preoccupied with the witnesses and documents that were
prioritized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\Meeting between H. Select Comm. on Benghazi staff and U.S.
Dep't of State representatives (February 27, 2015). See also, email
from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Director and Gen. Counsel, H. Select Comm.
on Benghazi, to Julia Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State, Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (March 23, 2015, 6:50 PM) (on file with
the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee's fourth public hearing was held on October
22, 2015, to receive testimony of the Secretary, a necessary
fact witness who oversaw the State Department before, during,
and after the Benghazi terrorist attacks.\41\ The Secretary had
yet to be examined by any investigative panel or congressional
committee with access to her emails and other relevant
information.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\Hearing 4 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 114th
Congress (2015).
\42\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP (Mar. 19,
2015) (on file with the Committee). It is important to note that the
Committee offered to take Secretary Clinton's testimony in an interview
setting. The former Secretary elected to provide her testimony to the
Committee in a public setting. See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi to David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams &
Connolly LLP (Mar. 31, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee's preference for private interviews over
public hearings has been questioned. Interviews are a more
efficient and effective means of discovery. Interviews allow
witnesses to be questioned in depth by a highly prepared member
or staff person. In a hearing, every member of a committee is
recognized--usually for five minutes--a procedure which
precludes in-depth focused questioning. Interviews also allow
the Committee to safeguard the privacy of witnesses who may
fear retaliation for cooperating or whose work requires
anonymity, such as intelligence community operatives.
Both witnesses and members of Congress conduct themselves
differently in interviews than when in the public glare of a
hearing. Neither have an incentive to play to the cameras.
Witnesses have no incentive to run out the clock as long-winded
evasive answers merely extend the length of the interview.
Likewise, Members have no need to interrupt witnesses to try to
ask all their questions in five minutes. Perhaps more
importantly, political posturing, self-serving speeches, and
theatrics serve no purpose in a closed interview and, as a
result, the questioning in interviews tends to be far more
effective at discovering information than at public hearings.
For these reasons, nearly all Executive Branch investigations
are conducted in private and without arbitrary time
constraints. This is no less true in a Legislative Branch
investigation, yet the manner in which the media portrays these
investigations is starkly different.
No witness interviewed by the Committee complained of poor
treatment or a lack of professionalism during these interviews.
In fact, witnesses who had no incentive to compliment the
Committee did just that, such as Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of
Staff and Counselor, State Department, and Huma M. Abedin,
Deputy Chief of Staff, State Department.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\Michael S. Schmidt, Cheryl Mills, Advisor to Hillary Clinton,
Testifies on Benghazi and Email Practices, NY Times (September 3,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/hillary-clinton-email-
benghazi.html?_r=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of State
Notwithstanding the productions eventually made, the State
Department's compliance posture toward the Committee was poor.
The Department failed to comply in full with the nine document
requests and three subpoenas.\44\ Instead, Department officials
deflected and delayed their responses, engaged in a pattern of
obstruction, and furnished productions and witness interviews
slowly--significantly impeding the Committee's investigation
and development of a complete record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\Letter to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State,
to Trey Gowdy, Chmn., H. Select Comm. On Benghazi (July 31, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
RESPONSE TO SUBPOENAS FOR DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD
As described earlier, two subpoenas issued by Congress to
the State Department in 2013 had yet to be satisfied when the
Select Committee was formed.\45\ One of these subpoenas dealt
specifically with documents pertaining to the ARB.\46\ Though
Congress had been asking for the documents for almost two
years, the State Department failed to produce a single
document. The Committee emphasized the importance of these
documents by reissuing a new subpoena for the 114th Congress.
Immediately following the January 27, 2015 compliance hearing,
the Committee issued a new subpoena for documents reviewed by
the ARB.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at 4.
\46\OGR ARB Subpoena, supra note 14.
\47\Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to John F.
Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 29, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department's first production to the Committee
consisted of a four-page interview summary for a witness who
was scheduled to appear before the Committee the following
day.\48\ The State Department maintained this posture over the
next several weeks with one or two ARB summaries, totaling 38
pages, provided less than a week before the Committee's
interviews.\49\ It was not until April 15, 2015, the State
Department produced approximately 1,700 pages of documents.\50\
On April 24, 2015, the Department produced another
approximately 2,600 pages of documents.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Feb. 13, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\49\See Comm. Internal Memorandum on State Dep't Records
Production.
\50\See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Apr. 15, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\51\See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Apr. 24, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It remains unclear whether production for the January 28,
2015 subpoena is complete. Notwithstanding the more than 4,300
pages produced to the Committee, previous statements made by
the State Department to Congress revealed the ARB reviewed
``approximately 7,000 State Department documents, numbering
thousands of pages.''\52\ Moreover, the State Department
withheld a number of documents from the Committee based on
``executive branch confidentiality interests,'' an
administration-constructed privilege not recognized by the
Constitution.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\See Letter from the Thomas B, Gibbons, acting Assistant Sec'y
of Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Darrell E. Issa, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform (Aug. 23, 2013) (on file with H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi).
\53\See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Apr. 24, 2015).
REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS OF THE SECRETARY AND OTHER SENIOR STATE
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
While the State Department produced 15,000 pages of new
documents to the Committee on August 11, 2014, there were
significant and material omissions. This production contained
few emails sent to or received by the State Department's senior
staff. In fact, the production included only eight emails sent
or received by the Secretary from two email addresses:
``[email protected]'' and ``H.'' This was the first time
the State Department produced emails from the Secretary. It was
also the first time the Committee became aware the Secretary
used a private email account to conduct State Department
business during her tenure. The Committee was not informed at
the time, or at any time until immediately before media
reporting, of the extent to which the Secretary relied on
private email and a private server to conduct State Department
business, or the ongoing discussion between the State
Department and the Secretary and her representatives regarding
the return of records.
For example, at the time the State Department produced
these 15,000 pages of documents, which included these eight
emails and pledged a ``new relationship with the Committee,''
it was known within the State Department that the Secretary's
email records were not on site.\54\ The Chief Records Officer
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\Testimony of William Fischer, Chief Records Officer, U.S. Dep't
of State, Tr. at 66 (June 30, 2015) [hereinafter Fischer Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Q: One of the things that we wanted to talk with you
about was when you first became knowledgeable or aware
that all or part of Secretary Clinton's records were
not on premises with the State Department. And can you
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
tell us when that was?
A: The end of July 2014.
Q: And how did you become aware that some of her
records were not on premises?
A: I was getting ready to enter my new position and one
of my colleagues mentioned that in FOIA [Freedom of
Information Act] litigation the issue had come up, but
I had no idea about the full circumstances.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Id.
Unknown to the Committee and the public, the State
Department and the Secretary were taking remedial action to
recover her emails from her private server because of the
Committee's investigation.\56\ According to the State
Department's own Inspector General:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\July 2, 2014 meeting between Comm. Staff Director Philip G.
Kiko and State Dep't Chief of Staff David E. Wade.
[i]n May 2014, the Department undertook efforts to
recover potential Federal records from Secretary
Clinton. Thereafter, in July 2014, senior officials met
with former members of Secretary Clinton's immediate
staff, who were then acting as Secretary Clinton's
representatives. At the meeting, her representative
indicated that her practice of using a personal account
was based on Secretary Powell's similar use, but
Department staff instructed Clinton's representatives
to provide the Department with any Federal records
transmitted through her personal system. On August 22,
2014, Secretary Clinton's former Chief of Staff and
then-representative advised Department leadership that
hard copies of Secretary Clinton emails containing
responsive information would be provided but that,
given the volume of emails, it would take some time to
produce.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Office of the Inspector General, ``Office of the Sec'y:
Evaluation of Email Records Management and Cybersecurity
Requirements,'' at 17-18, footnote 75, (May 26, 2016) (on file with the
Committee).
In July 2014, Mills contacted Platte River Networks, the
company contracted to maintain the Secretary's server, to
request the Secretary's emails be pulled and sent to her
overnight.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\Carol D. Leonning and Rosalind S. Helderman, State Department's
Account of email requirements differs from Clinton's, Washington Post
(September 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/state-
departments-account-of-e-mail-request-differs-from-
clintons/2015/09/22/54cd66bc-5ed9-11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html
(``He [Senator Johnson] cited a July 23, 2014, email in which employees
at Platte River Networks, the private company that was then maintaining
her server, discussed sending copies of Clinton's emails overnight to
Cheryl Mills, a long-time Clinton advisor.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee did not publicize the existence of the eight
emails identified from the Secretary's private email account,
for myriad reasons. The Committee believed these eight emails
might represent the beginning of a full production. There also
existed the possibility of an explanation other than what was
eventually learned. These eight emails could have reflected the
Secretary's episodic use of personal email, as other
administration officials had done,\59\ and a more complete
production of state.gov emails could be forthcoming. Of course,
while the Committee did not have access to all salient facts in
the summer of 2014, the State Department did. The State
Department knew then it did not have possession of her public
records as these records were not turned over at the end of the
Secretary's tenure. The State Department knew then it was in no
position to comply with congressional inquiries or FOIA
requests related to the Secretary's emails because it did not
have custody or access to the full public record. According to
a recent report by the State Department's own Inspector
General:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\See, e.g., Letter from Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov't Reform, to Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S.
Dep't of State (Dec. 13, 2012) (on file with the Committee).
In early June 2013, Department staff participating in
the review of potential material for production to
congressional committees examining the September 2012
Benghazi attack discovered emails sent by the former
Policy Planning Director via his Department email
account to a personal email address associated with
Secretary Clinton. In ensuing weeks, partly as a result
of the staff's discovery, Department senior officials
discussed the Department's obligations under the
Federal Records Act in the context of personal email
accounts. As discussed earlier in this report, laws and
regulations did not prohibit employees from using their
personal email accounts for the conduct of official
Department business. However, email messages regarding
official business sent to or from a personal email
account fell within the scope of the Federal Records
Act if their contents met the Act's definition of a
record. OIG found that the Department took no action to
notify NARA [National Archives and Records
Administration] of a potential loss of records at any
point in time.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\``Office of the Sec'y: Evaluation of Email Records Management
and Cybersecurity Requirements,'' supra note 69 at 17-18.
At the time the Committee was formed in May 2014, the State
Department was already actively seeking the return of the
former Secretary's emails.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee moved forward by issuing its November 18,
2014 document request to the State Department to obtain a
clearer understanding of the role the Secretary and her senior
staff played prior to, during, and after the terrorist
attacks.\62\ The Committee made clear the Secretary and her
senior staff's documents and emails were necessary to
facilitate her testimony before the Committee.\63\ The decision
to focus on obtaining these documents was the direct result of
the Committee Minority's repeated request to move up the
Secretary's appearance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Nov.
18, 2014) (on file with the Committee). It is also important to note
that this letter was accompanied by instructions typically found in
subpoenas describing in greater detail the documents and communications
sought and the definitions to be applied to the instructions. See id.
\63\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Very senior officials are traditionally interviewed last
rather than first so the questions can be informed by as much
information as possible. This is standard operating procedure
in Executive Branch investigations. The Committee Minority
expressly asked that the Secretary's appearance be moved up in
the order of witness interviews and pledged in the process to
help secure all relevant emails and documents in order to make
that a reality. If there is any evidence Minority Committee
members attempted to secure access to relevant documents or
facilitate the production of documents, the Committee is not
aware of it. Instead, the Committee Minority enjoyed the best
of all worlds: complain about the Secretary not being
interviewed while relying on the State Department to delay,
obstruct, and withhold production of the very documents needed
to facilitate the interview.
The State Department did not disclose the fact that it did
not have possession of the Secretary's emails, nor that it had
been working with the Secretary for the previous seven months
to secure their return. The Committee also asked the Secretary
for documents and emails. On December 2, 2014, the Committee
wrote David E. Kendall, the Secretary's attorney, requesting
all of the Secretary's emails related to Benghazi and Libya
from her private email account.\64\ Knowing the actions already
taken by his law firm and Mills to identify and return the
former Secretary's emails to the State Department, Kendall did
not respond until December 29, at which time he referred the
Committee back to the State Department.\65\ Kendall stated
``[the State Department] is in a position to produce any
responsive emails.''\66\ This ``who's on first'' routine
orchestrated between the Secretary's private counsel and the
State Department, which is ostensibly an apolitical
governmental diplomatic entity, is shameful. It was not merely
Congress and the people it represents who were misled and
manipulated, the State Department and the Secretary's email
arrangement undoubtedly delayed access to information on what
happened to four brave Americans in Benghazi and the
government's response before, during and after the attacks. The
manner in which the Secretary communicated during her tenure,
the manner in which those records were housed during and after
her tenure and the manner in which the public record was self-
scrutinized and self-selected makes it impossible to ever
represent to the families of those killed in Benghazi that the
record is whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP (Dec. 2, 2014)
(on file with the Committee).
\65\Letter from David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly
LLP to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Dec. 29,
2014) (on file with the Committee).
\66\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notwithstanding the Committee's December 2, 2014 request to
Kendall, Mills informed the State Department within a matter of
days that she was producing 55,000 pages of the Secretary's
emails from her personal account.\67\ On December 5, 2014,
Mills wrote the State Department that the emails were being
produced to help the Department ``meet its requirements under
the Federal Records Act.''\68\ Mills' letter did not disclose
that all of the Secretary's work was conducted on a private
email account and server. The letter did not disclose the form
in which the 55,000 pages of emails were being produced. It did
not disclose how the emails were being delivered to the State
Department. The Committee would later learn that, on the same
day Mills sent her letter to the State Department, a State
Department records official was directed by his supervisor to
pick up and transport hard copies of the Secretary's emails
from Kendall's law firm, Williams and Connolly in Washington
DC, back to the State Department.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\See Letter from Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff to the Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State, to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State
for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 5, 2014) (on file with the
Committee).
\68\See Id.
\69\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite receiving the Secretary's emails on December 5,
2014, the State Department failed to produce any document to
the Committee until February 13, 2015.\70\ The Department also
resisted scheduling witness interviews in December 2014 and
January 2015. The Department's compliance posture resulted in
the Committee's third public hearing, held on January 27, 2015.
The State Department did not, however, produce a witness of
sufficient seniority to make commitments on behalf of the
Department.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\Id. See also, Letter from Julia Frifield, Ass't Secretary of
State, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy,
Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, (February 13, 2015) (on file
with the Committee).
\71\See Hearing 3 Before the H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, 114th
Congress (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, the State Department did not respond to the
Committee's November 18, 2014 document request until February
13, 2015. At the time, the State Department produced
approximately 847 pages of the Secretary's emails in paper
copies. The State Department still refused to disclose
important, relevant facts such as: the Secretary's emails were
not on the State Department's network; the Secretary did not
provide electronic copies of her emails; and the Secretary's
attorneys--not the State Department--determined which emails
would be returned to the Department.
It was not until February 27, 2015, the State Department
disclosed to the Committee these facts, days before The New
York Times would disclose the circumstances.\72\ Even then, the
State Department failed to disclose the fact that the Secretary
used a private server. The Committee learned this fact through
subsequent press reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\Michael S. Schmidt, Hillary Clinton Used Personal Email Account
at State Dept., Possibly Breaking Rules, N.Y. Times (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/politics/hillary-clintons-use-of-
private-email-at-state-department-raises-flags.html?_r=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once the Committee learned the State Department had been
complicit in the non-production of the Secretary's emails, it
issued two preservation letters; one was issued to the
Secretary\73\ and the other to Web.com,\74\ the registrar of
the domain name [email protected]. This was necessary to
ensure relevant information in the parties' possession was
preserved. The letters requested the Secretary and Web.com:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly LLP
(Mar. 3, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\74\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to Dan Brown, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Web.com (Mar.
3, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
1. LPreserve all email, electronic documents and date
(``electronic records'') created since January 1, 2009,
that can be reasonably anticipated to be the subject to
a request for production by the Committee. For the
purpose of this request, ``preserve'' means taking
reasonable steps to prevent the partial or full
destruction, alteration, testing, deletion, shredding,
incineration, wiping, relocation, migration, theft or
mutation of electronic records, as well as negligent or
intentional handling that would make such records
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
incomplete or inaccessible;
2. LExercise reasonable efforts to identify and notify
former employees and contractors who may have access to
such electronic records that they are to be preserved;
and
3. LIf it is the routine practice of any employee or
contractor to destroy or otherwise alter such
electronic records, either: halt such practices or
arrange for the preservation of complete and accurate
duplicates or copies of such records, suitable for
production if requested.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\See Chairman Gowdy's letters, supra notes 73 and 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE SECRETARY IS SUBPOENAED
On March 4, 2015, a day after the Committee issued two
preservation letters, the Committee issued two additional
subpoenas. The first compelled production from the Secretary of
any documents and communications responsive to the November 18,
2014 letter still in her possession.\76\ The Secretary, through
her attorney, Kendall, responded to the Committee's subpoena on
March 27, 2015. In his letter, Kendall informed the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Hillary R.
Clinton, former Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 4, 2015).
With respect to any emails from Secretary Clinton's
`[email protected]' account, I respond by
stating that, for the reasons set forth below, the
Department of State--which has already produced
approximately 300 documents in response to an earlier
request seeking documents on essentially the same
subject matters--is uniquely positioned to make
available any documents responsive to your requests.
\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\Letter from David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly
LLP to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Mar. 27,
2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kendall further told the Committee:
Secretary Clinton is not in a position to produce any
of those emails to the Committee in response to the
subpoena without approval from the State Department,
which could come only following a review process. On
March 23, 2015, I received a letter from Under
Secretary of State for Management (attached hereto)
confirming direction from the National Archives and
Records Administration that while Secretary Clinton and
her counsel are permitted to retain a copy of her work-
related emails, those emails should not be released to
any third parties without authorization by the State
Department. . . . Thus, while the Secretary has
maintained and preserved copies of the emails provided
to the State Department, she is not in a position to
make any production that may be called for by the
subpoena.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\Id.
The State Department was unmoved by the location of public
records during the Secretary's tenure or for nearly two years
thereafter until the Committee insisted on their production.
The State Department then orchestrated a sophomoric scheme of
letters to have these records returned to the State Department.
Once this was accomplished, the State Department, previously
uninterested in the location, security or fullness of this
public record, jealously guarded--indeed prevented--the
production of the Secretary's records to Congress.
The State Department made two productions subsequent to
February 13, 2015. The Committee received 105 email exchanges
from the State Department on June 25, 2015. This production is
significant because it was made only after a non-government
witness provided 179 additional pages of email exchanges with
the Secretary on June 12, 2015. 59 of the emails produced by
the non-government witness had never been provided by the State
Department to the Committee despite the fact these emails were
clearly responsive to previous requests and fully within the
jurisdiction of the Committee. Moreover, the State Department
did not have in its possession, in full or in part, 15 email
exchanges produced by the non-government witness--calling into
question the completeness of their records from the
Secretary.\79\ This means that not only was the State
Department refusing to produce emails from the Secretary that
were unquestionably relevant to this Committee's investigation,
it also laid bare the Secretary's assurance that all public
records had been returned to the State Department. Neither of
those assertions was true.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\Letter from Julia Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State, Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm.
on Benghazi (June 25, 2015) (``In a limited number of circumstances, we
did not locate in the tens of thousands of pages of email provided by
Secretary Clinton the content of a handful of communications that Mr.
Blumenthal produced.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department made its third production to the
Committee--1,899 pages of the Secretary's emails--on September
25, 2015. In its letter accompanying the emails, the State
Department noted ``it had re-reviewed Secretary Clinton's 2011-
2012 emails and today is providing materials in advance of the
Secretary's appearance before the Committee on October 22,
2015.''\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\See Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Sept. 25, 2015) (on record with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee's interest in the Secretary's emails is
limited to their relevance in the investigation of the Benghazi
attacks. Her exclusive use of non-official email and a private
server for all official communications may raise concerns
beyond the scope of this Committee's purview related to Federal
records and transparency laws and national security concerns,
but jurisdiction for those matters lies either with the
Inspector General, the courts, other committees of Congress, or
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department.
Simply put, the Committee has an obligation to seek and
acquire all relevant information consistent with its
jurisdiction. Part of securing that relevant information
involved accessing public records, regardless of where and by
whom those records were held.
On January 8, 2016, the Department notified the Committee
of yet more responsive documents located in the Office of the
Secretary.\81\ These documents had been ``overlooked'' by the
State Department.\82\ On February 26, 2016--20 months after the
Committee was formed--the State Department produced
approximately 1,650 additional responsive documents.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\Email from Eric Schneider, U.S. Dep't of State, to Dana
Chipman, Chief Counsel, Sel. Comm. On Benghazi (January 8, 2016,) (on
file with the Committee).
\82\Id.
\83\See Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Feb. 26, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The odyssey that became the Secretary's email arrangement
was fully the result of decisions she made in concert with
others at the State Department. Had she used state.gov or
employed a method of preserving public records other than
simply hiring private legal counsel to store, vet, and disclose
these public records, this would never have become an issue for
the Committee. The Committee knew in the summer 2014 the
Secretary used private email to conduct at least some official
business and never disclosed this fact publicly. The
Committee's interest was in accessing the relevant and
responsive material needed to accomplish the job it was
assigned to do. Moreover, of the more than 100 witnesses the
Committee interviewed only one was exclusively connected with
her method of producing and preserving emails--Bryan Pagliano,
a Special Advisor to the State Department. Pagliano's interview
was short when he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Pagilano was an important witness who could
have spoken to the fullness of the Committee's record. The
Secretary's server was reportedly down during two key time
periods identified during the Committee's investigation--August
2011 and October 2012.
On April 8, 2016, the Committee received another production
of approximately 1,150 pages of emails from Sean Smith's email
account as well as emails sent to and from senior leaders
stored in the Office of the Secretary. On May 5, 2016, the
Committee received yet again another production from the State
Department of approximately 405 pages of documents from the
Office of the Secretary.
Subpoena for 7th Floor Principals' Documents and
Communications
The second subpoena issued in the aftermath of the
disclosure of the Secretary's email arrangement was issued on
March 4, 2015, and sought documents and communications from the
remaining ten senior staff officials identified in the
Committee's November 18, 2014 letter. More than three months
after the Committee first issued its request for these
documents, the State Department had yet to produce a single
document.\84\ A day after issuing this subpoena, the Committee
learned the State Department did not start archiving emails of
its senior officials until February 2015.\85\ The Committee
later learned Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for
Management, State Department, wrote to several senior officials
identified in the Committee's March 4, 2015 subpoena seeking
the return of all work related emails conducted on private
accounts.\86\ The State Department also kept this second
Kennedy letter a secret.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John F.
Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 4, 2015).
\85\See Lauren French, Gowdy: Not backing off subpoena of Clinton
emails, Politico (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/
house-committee-benghazi-clinton-email-subpoena-115795.
\86\See Letters from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, to Huma Abedin, William J. Burns, Jeffrey
D. Feltman, Cheryl Mills, Thomas Nides, Philippe Reines, Susan E. Rice,
Jacob J. Sullivan (March 11, 2015).
\87\Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John F.
Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 5, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notwithstanding the specificity and clarity of the
documents and communications sought by the March 4, 2015
subpoena, the State Department protested the breadth of the
Committee's request.\88\ To help set priorities, the Committee
offered guidance to State Department officials, at their
request. For example, on March 23, 2015, the Committee
identified four individuals and four discrete timeframes to
which the Department could focus its initial efforts.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\Email from Philip Kiko, Staff Director, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to Julia Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State for Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (March 23, 2015, 6:50 PM) (``let me
reiterate that the subpoena is clear as to what communications and
documents the Committee is seeking'').
\89\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 22, 2015, the Committee again provided guidance
outlining a production plan complete with specific individuals
and discrete timeframes for the State Department.\90\ No
documents were produced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\Email from Philip Kiko, Staff Director, to Julia Frifield,
Ass't Sec'y of State for Legislative Affairs (April 22, 2015, 1:03 PM).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is worth reiterating that what may appear, at first
blush, to be a lack of competence on behalf of the State
Department now appears fully intentional and coordinated.
Delaying the production of documents sought by letter, informal
request, or subpoena has decided political advantages for those
opposing the investigation and those in control of the
necessary documents and witness access. Asking the Committee
for ``priorities'' or date and time restrictions is calculated
to reduce the scope of the investigation--the very thing
Committee Minority members asked for in the fall of 2014--and
causes the investigation to be drawn out needlessly.
This is an overtly political calculation and has become the
typical playbook for an administration that once praised itself
for its ``transparency.''
In an effort to speed the production of documents, the
Committee worked to advance the State Department's $2.4 million
reprograming request made to the Committees on Appropriations
of both the House and the Senate to create a `document review
unit' to help facilitate the production of documents relevant
to the Committee's investigation.\91\ The Committee was
informed 12 full-time employees would be assigned to the
`document review unit,' as well as new technology, to respond
to congressional requests. The Committee was told its requests
would be the `document review unit's' highest priority.\92\ To
the contrary, after the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations approved the Department's reprogramming request,
State Department staff did nothing to expedite Committee
requests for documents.\93\ State Department officials would
not disclose how the reprograming request was being
implemented, how many employees were assigned to the unit, or
whether these individuals were also assigned to respond to FOIA
requests. Nor would the officials describe how document
requests would be produced with the new technology.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\James Rosen, Documents show State Dep't missed target date for
special Benghazi unit, Fox News, May 6, 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/
politics/2016/05/06/documents-show-state-department-missed-target-date-
for-special-benghazi-unit.html.
\92\Phone call between Philip Kiko, Staff Director, H. Select Comm.
on Benghazi, and Julia Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State (May 2015).
\93\Memorandum from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter June 2 Staff Memo] (on file with
the Committee) (summarizing the members meeting with State Dep't Chief
of Staff Jon Finer).
\94\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IMPASSE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT
On May 22, 2015, more than two months after the March 4,
2015 subpoena, the State Department finally produced
approximately 1,200 pages of emails to and from Mills. The
documents in this production, however, covered less than a
quarter of the timeframes sought and contained less than one-
tenth of the contents sought in the subpoena. Furthermore, the
State Department withheld documents, telling the Committee ``a
small number of documents implicate important Executive Branch
institutional interests and are therefore not included in this
production.''\95\ The State Department's continued refusal to
produce relevant documents delayed the Committee's interview
schedule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State for Leg.
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm.
on Benghazi (May 22, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like other investigations, the Committee planned to
interview senior level officials within the State Department
before interviewing the Secretary. Consequently, delaying
document productions for these senior officials in turn delayed
the interviews of the same senior officials, which in turn
delayed the interview of the Secretary. It is readily apparent
this was by design and presented the Committee with a `Catch-
22': either interview senior State Department officials,
including the Secretary, without the benefit of the documents
needed for a constructive conversation, or postpone those
interviews pending document production and be criticized for
taking too long.
Recognizing neither public reproach nor the Committee's
support for the State Department's reprogramming request would
compel the Department to action, the Committee had few
alternatives--other than contempt of Congress (dependent on
Executive Branch enforcement) or time-consuming litigation. On
June 2, 2015, the Committee met with Jonathan Finer, Chief of
Staff and Director of Policy Planning, State Department, to
discuss the impasse.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\See June 2 Staff Memo, supra note 93.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With Finer, the Committee made it clear it was necessary to
review documents prior to moving forward with interviews.\97\
The Committee members personally emphasized to Finer the emails
from a number of former senior State Department officials were
necessary to have constructive conversations with
witnesses.\98\ The delays in producing documents thus delayed
interviews.\99\ While Finer would not agree to a production
schedule, he did agree the State Department would make a
substantial production within 30 days.\100\ The meeting and
agreement were memorialized in a subsequent communication sent
to Finer.\101\ In its letter, the Committee defined
``substantial'' as ``producing,'' within 30 days, ``all
documents and emails . . . described in phase one in our April
22, 2015 communication.''\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\Id.
\98\Id.
\99\Id.
\100\See id.
\101\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to Jonathan Finer, Chief of Staff & Dir. of Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't
of State (June 4, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\102\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``substantial production'' of documents never
materialized, further delaying the interview schedule. Instead,
on June 30, 2015, the State Department produced 3,600 pages of
emails, more than 2,000 pages of which were press clippings
available chiefly on the internet.\103\ The production also
focused almost exclusively on two individuals for one month
after the terrorist attacks, with a scattering of documents
from other timeframes.\104\ Moreover, the State Department
continued its pattern of withholding documents based on what it
described as ``Executive Branch institutional interests.''\105\
No other productions arrived for almost another month. On July
29, 2015, the State Department produced approximately 8,000
pages of documents, many of which were press clippings or
duplicate emails.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (July 10, 2015)
(on file with the Committee) (``While the meeting may have motivated
the Dep't to produce roughly 3,600 pages of documents on June 30, 2015,
more than 2,000 of those pages--representing nearly 57 percent were
nothing more than basic press clippings. . . .'').
\104\Id.
\105\Letter from Julia Frifield, Ass't Sec'y for Leg. Affairs, to
Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 30, 2015) (on
file with the Committee) (``In addition, a small number of documents
implicate important Executive Branch institutional interests and
therefore are not included in this production.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OTHER DOCUMENT REQUESTS MADE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT
In addition to seeking enforcement of the March 4, 2015
subpoena, the Committee issued a number of additional requests
for information from the State Department. On June 12, 2015,
the Committee sought the remaining ARB documents.\106\ The
Committee requested a list of all documents being withheld and
the justification for withholding.\107\ The Committee also
sought 11 discrete items referenced in the ARB documents.\108\
The Committee requested a response by July 8, 2015. Roughly
seven months later, on February 25, 2016, the Committee
received a four-page document responsive to the June 12, 2015
request.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (June 12, 2015)
(on file with the Committee).
\107\Id.
\108\Id.
\109\Interview with [Agent 17], Accountability Review Bd. (Oct. 30,
2012) (on file with the committee State-SCB0098607).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 6, 2015, the Committee wrote the State Department
seeking an update on compliance with the March 4, 2015
subpoena. No response was received.
On July 10, 2015, the Committee wrote the Department again
expressing concern with the anemic productions made and the
Department's lack of candor with regard to the private email
use of former senior officials.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (July 10, 2015)
(on file with the Committee) (one of two similarly cited letters).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee followed this letter with an email
highlighting the State Department's inaction in five areas:
1. Lscheduling of interviews;
2. Lproducing private emails relating to the
Committee's jurisdiction sent or received by former
senior officials;
3. Lan accounting of the missing documents, including
those withheld for executive branch confidentiality
interests;
4. Lproducing the remaining aspects of phase one of the
March 4, 2015 subpoena; and
5. Lfailing to acknowledge the receipt of the previous
letters.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\See Email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Julia Frifield, Catherine Duval, and
Austin Evers, (July 14, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (Regarding
compliance and requests).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JULY 31, 2015 DEMAND LETTER
The State Department's untenable posture, coupled with an
abject lack of meaningful response to the Committee's
outstanding subpoenas and requests, led to a demand letter on
July 31, 2015.\112\ The letter was a precursor to contempt of
Congress action, and reflected the Committee's serious belief
the State Department was intentionally impeding the
investigation's progress.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (July 31, 2015)
(on file with Committee).
\113\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee outlined the pattern of concealment and delay
employed by the State Department.\114\ The Committee noted the
State Department's actions with regard to the Committee's
questions about production of the Secretary's emails.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\Id.
\115\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee eventually received, in several tranches,
document productions subsequent to the July 31, 2015 demand
letter. Documents responsive to the March 4 subpoena were
produced on August 21 and August 28, 2015; September 18, 2015;
October 5, 9, and 15, 2015; November 6 and 24, 2015; December
31, 2015; January 21, 2016; February 26, 2016; April 8, 2016;
and May 5, 2016. In addition, the Committee received throughout
the fall of 2015 and the early winter of 2016 approximately
9,000 pages of emails from Stevens' email never before
produced.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\See infra Appendix J for a complete listing of requests and
subpoenas for documents as well as productions received pursuant to
request or subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee never received full productions of emails
from the accounts of Under Secretary Wendy R. Sherman, Deputy
Secretary William J. Burns, or Assistant Secretary Jeffrey D.
Feltman--all of whom were listed in the November 18, 2014
document request and the March 4, 2015 subpoena. The State
Department never produced all relevant documents reviewed by
the Accountability Review Board.\117\ Finally, the State
Department still has not fully complied with the August 5, 2015
subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\Letter from the Thomas B. Gibbons, acting Assistant Sec'y of
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform (Aug. 23, 2013) (on file with the
Committee) (stating the ARB reviewed approximately 7,000 documents
totaling thousands of pages).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department also withheld documents citing
``important Executive Branch institutional interests'' or
``important Executive Branch confidentiality interests'' on
four separate occasions.\118\ The Committee repeatedly sought
additional information on the withheld documents, including the
nature and number of documents withheld and the basis in law
for withholding them. On June 12, 2015, July 8, 2015, and July
31, 2015, the Committee wrote the State Department seeking
additional information. The Committee also met with State
Department representatives to discuss the status of the June
12, 2015, July 8, 2015, and July 31, 2015 requests multiple
times, including as late as June 2016. To date, the State
Department has yet to account for the withheld documents. The
State Department's refusal to provide the Committee with
information by which to make reasonable judgements regarding
the Department's decisions to withhold documents from Congress
and, ultimately, from the American people is yet another
example of the Department's pattern of concealment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\See letters from Julia Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State for
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi (February 13, 2015, April 24, 2015, May 22,
2015, and June 30, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WITNESSES
The Committee interviewed 57 witnesses from the State
Department, 50 who had never been interviewed by Congress,
including four senior leaders, three Ambassadors, 19 Diplomatic
Security agents, four principal officers, and 20 State
Department personnel.
On December 4, 2014, the Committee requested the State
Department make available for transcribed interviews the
eyewitnesses to the attack: the Diplomatic Security agents
deployed to Benghazi and the Principal Officers responsible for
political reporting. The State Department resisted scheduling
interviews for nearly two months. It was not until January 27,
2015 and the threat of subpoenas the State Department began to
contact the individuals sought by the Committee.
The Committee sought the testimony of senior State
Department officials including those who were not interviewed
by the ARB. This included Mills, Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy
Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Planning, and Huma
Abedin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. While the
Committee sought to schedule these interviews in May 2015, the
State Department's failure to produce relevant documents
delayed these interviews until early September 2015. The delay
in scheduling these interviews in turn necessarily delayed the
Secretary's testimony.
The Committee interviewed senior leaders within the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security and the regional Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs--the two bureaus with oversight responsibility for
security, personnel and policy in Benghazi. The Committee
interviewed Kennedy who oversees the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, in addition to the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for
Countermeasures and International Programs, Gentry O. Smith and
Charlene R. Lamb. The Committee interviewed Jeffrey D. Feltman,
Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, State Department;
Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador to Libya; and Gregory N. Hicks,
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.
Finally, the Committee interviewed those individuals who
served as Libya desk officers and were responsible for
addressing the day-to-day needs of the Benghazi Mission,
including physical security, policy decisions, and logistics
relating to Benghazi, Libya.
The Department of Defense
The Defense Department was initially cooperative but this
cooperation dissipated during the course of the Committee's
investigation culminating in a factually deficient letter from
a political appointee deliberately mischaracterizing efforts to
obtain access to witnesses.
The witnesses produced by the Defense Department, both
active duty and retired, were cooperative and provided
significant new material to the Committee. Identifying those
witnesses, locating those witnesses, scheduling their
appearances before the Committee and responding to subsequent
Committee requests generated by these documents and witness
interviews became mired in coordinated partisan responses from
a Defense Department political appointee.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec'y of Def. for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (April 28, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOCUMENTS
As required by the resolution creating the Select
Committee, the House Armed Services Committee provided records
in July 2014. Following a review of the information provided by
the Armed Services Committee, the Select Committee submitted
requests to the Defense Department on April 8, 2015 seeking
documents and records not previously provided to the Armed
Services Committee.\120\ The Select Committee's document
request consisted of 12 categories, including a copy of the
video of the attack in Benghazi, un-redacted copies of
documents provided pursuant to a court order in litigation
under FOIA, and copies of the force laydown for U.S. Africa,
Europe, and Central combatant commands on September 10, 11, and
12, 2012.\121\ The Select Committee also requested assistance
in answering 27 questions regarding actions taken by the
Defense Department immediately prior to, during, and
immediately after the attacks.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Apr. 8, 2015)
(on file with the Committee) (first of three similarly cited letters);
Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to
Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Apr. 8, 2015) (on
file with the Committee) (second of three similarly cited letters);
Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to
Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Apr. 8, 2015) (on
file with the Committee) (third of three similarly cited letters).
\121\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. (Apr. 8, 2015)
(on file with the Committee) (one of three similarly cited letters).
\122\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 27, 2015, the Defense Department responded to the
Committee's request providing copies of the force laydown from
the respective combatant commands and indicating it would
provide ``responsive documents not previously provided on a
rolling basis'' to the Committee.\123\ On May 21, 2015, the
Defense Department provided 175 pages of classified documents,
as well as 551 pages of un-redacted documents provided pursuant
to a court order under FOIA litigation.\124\ The Defense
Department declined to provide 36 pages that ``contain[ed]
intelligence community or potential target information.''\125\
It also declined to provide one page ``due to confidentiality
concerns associated with executive branch deliberations.''\126\
At the time of the Defense Department's letter, Committee staff
had received briefings on and reviewed the drone footage on two
occasions.\127\ The Defense Department did not indicate whether
it would provide a copy of that footage to the Committee. As to
five of the Committee's requests, it indicated its review was
ongoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\Letter from Michael J. Stella, acting Assistant Sec'y of Def.,
U.S. Dep't of Def., to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi (Apr. 24, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\124\Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec'y of Def. for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (May 21, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\125\Id.
\126\Id.
\127\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 28, 2015, the Committee received the Defense
Department's classified response to the Committee's 27
questions.\128\ Over the following months, the Defense
Department provided briefings to the Committee and made
witnesses available. It did not, however, furnish any
additional documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\See Letter from Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of
Def., to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (July 28,
2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 5, 2016, Committee staff met with Defense
Department staff regarding the outstanding document
requests.\129\ During this meeting the Committee requested an
updated list of all air assets situated in the Africa and
Europe combatant commands' areas of responsibility, and whether
any assets had not been disclosed due to special access
programs. The Committee also requested documents referring or
relating to communications the Defense Department may have had
with any foreign militaries concerning coordination or
assistance in response to the attacks and any photographs taken
by Defense Department personnel during a trip to Benghazi in
October 2012.\130\ The Committee also renewed its request for a
copy of the video feed from the night of the attack.\131\ The
Defense Department failed to respond to the Committee's
request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\See Email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi, to William Hudson, Dir. of Cong.
Investigations, Dep't of Def. (Feb. 5, 2016, 17:19 EST) (on file with
the Committee).
\130\See id.
\131\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In total, the Defense Department provided nearly 900 pages
of additional documents not previously provided to Congress.
WITNESSES
The Committee interviewed 24 witnesses from the Defense
Department. Of these witnesses, 17 had never been interviewed
by Congress regarding the attacks in Benghazi.
Initially, the Defense Department identified and scheduled
witnesses at the Committee's request. For example on July 22,
2015, the Committee requested the Defense Department make
available the Commander of the Commander's In-Extremis Force
[CIF] on September 11, 2012.\132\ The Committee had been unable
to identify this individual and four other individuals by name,
but provided details of their position during the relevant
time-frame.\133\ The Defense Department identified the five
individuals and scheduled their interviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to Ashton B. Carter, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def. (July 22, 2015)
(on file with the Committee).
\133\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the initial five witnesses were interviewed and the
Committee reviewed the documents provided by Defense
Department, the Committee requested an additional eight
witnesses on February 5, 2016. The Committee also requested an
interview with the individual who served as the pilot for the
aircraft that transported the CIF.\134\ On February 26, 2016,
the Committee requested the Defense Department make the
individuals who piloted the drone on September 11-12, 2012 that
flew over Benghazi and Tripoli available for interviews.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\Email from Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to William Hudson, Dir. of Cong. Investigations, U.S. Dep't
of Def. (Feb. 9, 2016, 1:32 PM) (on file with the Committee).
\135\Email from Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to William Hudson, Dir. of Cong. Investigations, U.S. Dep't
of Def. (Feb. 26, 2016, 17:00 EST) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee reiterated both of these requests on March 9,
2016 and March 24, 2016.\136\ The Defense Department indicated
it was experiencing difficulty in tracking down records which
could identify the individuals who piloted the aircraft and had
not made progress in meeting the Committee's requests.
Consequently, on March 31, 2016, the Committee met with
Elizabeth L. George, Deputy General Counsel, Legislation,
Defense Legal Services Agency, Defense Department, regarding
the outstanding requests. The Defense Department was informed
the Committee would issue subpoenas should the Defense
Department not provide the names of the pilots
immediately.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\See Email from Mac. Tolar, Senior Counsel, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to William Hudson, Dir. of Cong. Investigations, U.S. Dep't
of Def. (Mar. 9, 2016, 12:23 EST) (on file with the Committee)
(reiterating interview request); See also Email from Mac Tolar, Senior
Counsel to Mr. Hudson (Mar. 24, 2016, 16:56) (on file with the
Committee) (reiterating interview request).
\137\Email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Stephen Hedger, Assistant Sec'y of Def.
for Legis. Affairs (Mar. 25, 2016, 11:37 AM) (on file with the
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the next several weeks, Committee staff sought
continued cooperation from the Defense Department. However, on
April 28, 2016, Stephen Hedger, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs sent an inaccurate and
misleading letter to the Chairman regarding the Committee's
requests.\138\ Not surprisingly, that letter was leaked to the
press the following day and was on the Committee Minority's
website. Among many of the inaccuracies, the letter stated the
Defense Department had expended ``significant resources'' to
locate an individual the Committee had requested to interview
who was identified as ``John from Iowa'' and who had called in
to The Sean Hannity Show radio program in May 2013. During the
call, the individual identified himself as one of the sensor
operators of a drone that flew over Benghazi during the
attacks. The Committee requested to interview this person
during the meeting on March 31. As of the date of Hedger's
letter, the Defense Department had failed to provide the names
of all the pilots and sensor operators, including ``John from
Iowa'' that had operated the drone on the September 11 and
September 12, 2012. Finally, almost a month after Hedger's
letter, the Defense Department provided all names of both the
pilots and the sensor operators.\139\ The Committee benefited
from hearing the testimony of the witnesses. These individuals
were able to provide the Committee first-hand accounts of their
mission that night, the capabilities of the drone, what
information was being relayed up the chain of command, and the
information they were focused on gathering. The video feed from
those drones provided one point of reference for the Committee
during its investigation. The witnesses provided another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec'y of Def. for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (April 28, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
\139\See Email from Mac Tolar, Senior Counsel, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (May 20, 2016, 11:47 EST) (on file with the
Committee) (indicating receipt of all relevant names).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite Hedger's complaint that the Department had expended
``significant resources'' to identify ``John from Iowa'' to
``no avail,'' the Department had actually identified ``John
from Iowa'' within hours of his call in 2013, and had
reprimanded him for his actions.\140\ Because of Hedger's
representation that ``significant resources'' had been used to
find this witness, the Committee issued a subpoena to Hedger to
explain what resources had actually been used, and why the
Defense Department was unable to respond to a Congressional
request in a timely manner.\141\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\Testimony of Sensor Operator 1, Tr. at 16-17, June 9, 2016
[hereinafter Sensor Operator 1 Transcript] (on file with the
Committee). See also, Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec'y of
Def. for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Def., to Trey Gowdy, Chairman,
H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (April 28, 2016) (on file with the
Committee).
\141\Subpoena to Stephen C. Hedger, Assistant Sec'y of Def. for
Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Def., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June
15, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] ultimately provided a
significant volume of material and witnesses to the Committee,
including SameTime messages not previously or generally made
available to Congress. Nevertheless, the Committee's work was
unnecessarily delayed with respect to documents, witnesses, and
other basic requests.
READ-AND-RETURN DOCUMENTS
When the House of Representatives passed the resolution
creating the Committee, it required that ``[a]ny committee of
the House of Representatives having custody of records in any
form relating to [the Benghazi attacks] shall transfer such
records to the Select Committee within 14 days of the adoption
of this resolution. Such records shall become the records of
the Select Committee.''\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\H. Res. 567, 113th Cong., Sec. 5(a) (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of the resolution, the Chairman of the
Intelligence Committee wrote to John O. Brennan, Director, CIA,
noting the Intelligence Committee had possession but not
custody of records provided by the CIA on a read-and-return
basis. Therefore, the Chairman of the Intel. Comm. believed he
did not have the authority to transfer these records to the
Committee as otherwise required by the resolution. The
Chairman, nonetheless, asked the CIA to make these records
available to the Select Committee.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\Letter from Mike Rogers, Chairman, H. Perm. Select Comm. on
Intel., to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (May 8, 2014) (on
file with the Committee).
This transmittal is intended to facilitate the CIA's
ability to respond to any future requests for these
materials from the new Select Committee. I expect you
will maintain these materials at CIA Headquarters in a
manner such that they could be easily and promptly
provided to the Select Committee.\144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\Id.
In July of 2014, the Intelligence Committee provided its
records to this Committee, including more than 400 pieces of
intelligence relating to Benghazi and Libya from 2012, and
other reports and correspondence. After acquiring the requisite
security clearances and reviewing these documents, on November
19, 2014 the Committee asked that it be able to review the
read-and-return records the Intelligence Committee had given
back to the CIA.\145\ The CIA responded, noting it was
``working to try to set up a time next week when we could make
the materials available.''\146\ The CIA did not make the
materials available the following week.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\See Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs,
Cent. Intel. Agency, to Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi (Nov. 19, 2014, 14:23 EST) (on file with the
Committee).
\146\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On December 8, 2014, the Committee reiterated its
request.\147\ The CIA responded: ``we are in the process of
organizing and page numbering the documents so that they are
ready for your team to review. I'll check in with the folks who
are working on that to see if we can make it all available next
week.''\148\ This hardly squared with what the Intelligence
Committee Chairman requested of the CIA.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\Email from Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi, to Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency (Dec. 8, 2014, 13:57 EST) (on file with the Committee).
\148\Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Dec. 8, 2014, 15:10 EST) (on file with the
Committee).
\149\Letter from Mike Rogers, Chairman, H. Perm. Select Comm. on
Intel., to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (May 8, 2014) (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee made a third request, on December 11, 2014,
to review these documents.\150\ The CIA's Office of
Congressional Affairs responded on December 15, 2014, noting
they would ``reach out'' to the Committee staff that would be
reviewing the documents.\151\ The CIA never contacted the
Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\Email from Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi to Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:47 EST) (on file with the Committee).
\151\Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency to Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm.
on Benghazi (Dec. 15, 2014, 10:33 EST) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee made a fourth request on January 8,
2015.\152\ On January 12, 2015, the CIA responded noting they
``have this request as a priority action. We are currently
processing the documents. . . . We hope to have them ready for
you in a couple of weeks.''\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\Email from Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi, to Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency (Jan. 8, 2015, 11:19 EST) (on file with the Committee).
\153\Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Christopher Donesa, Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi (Jan. 12, 2015, 15:55 EST) (on file with the
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was not until the Committee's January 27, 2015 public
compliance hearing with Neil L. Higgins, Director of
Congressional Affairs, CIA, that the CIA finally granted the
Committee access to these documents.\154\ This was nearly three
months after the Committee first requested access to these
documents--documents the CIA had already produced to the
Intelligence Committee and had been set aside specifically for
this Committee's access.\155\ Having to schedule and conduct
public hearings on matters of compliance with requests for
clearly relevant documents is a waste of time and resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at 5.
\155\Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In finally gaining access to these documents, the Committee
discovered the records consisted of more than 4,000 pages of
emails.\156\ The CIA had never indicated they were withholding
such a large volume of material from the Committee. Reviewing
this material necessitated the redirection of Committee time.
The CIA, however, would only allow four Committee staff to
review these records during normal business hours at CIA
Headquarters in McLean, Virginia. These restrictions
unnecessarily limited the Committee's access to the materials
and significantly and unnecessarily increased the time needed
to review the documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the CIA would not allow Committee staff to
retain notes made while reviewing these documents, or even take
notes back to Committee offices to discuss with Committee
members.\157\ The CIA required Committee staff to keep their
notes locked in a safe at CIA headquarters.\158\ The CIA
eventually offered to allow Committee staff to take their notes
back to Committee offices--but only if CIA staff first reviewed
those notes and applied various redactions to them.\159\ This
demand raised serious separation of powers concerns and would
have compromised the investigation to allow the subject of an
investigation to review and redact the notes of its
investigator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\Email from Mary K. E. Maples, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Dana K. Chipman, Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi et al. (Apr. 17, 2015, 9:16 EST) (on file with the Committee).
\158\Id.
\159\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CIA placed none of these onerous and punitive
restrictions on the Intelligence Committee's access to these
same materials, which the CIA provided to it to keep in its own
offices at the Capitol.
NEW DOCUMENT REQUESTS
After a review of the more than 4,000 pages of `read and
return' documents at the CIA, the Committee issued a new
document request to the CIA on April 28, 2015.\160\ This
request was for 26 specific categories of information to help
the Committee better understand the CIA's activities in
Benghazi, its response to the attacks, and the analytic
processes undertaken in the wake of the attacks.\161\ This
document request included SameTime messages, emails,
operational cables, and intelligence reports.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Apr. 28, 2015) (on file
with the Committee).
\161\Id.
\162\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CIA resisted this request. In a May 15, 2015 telephone
call with the Committee Chairman, David S. Cohen, the Deputy
Director of the CIA, expressed concern ``with both the breadth
and some of the types of documents requested,'' and claimed
``fulfilling the request could take many months of work.''\163\
Additional meetings between the Committee and the CIA took
place to discuss the request, and it was not until July 8,
2015, two-and-a-half months after the Committee's document
request, that the CIA produced additional documents pursuant to
this request.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\See Email from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Dana K. Chipman, Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi (May 15, 2015, 10:23 EST) (on file with the Committee).
\164\Memorandum from Dir., Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent. Intel.
Agency, to Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Dir., H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, July 8, 2016 (on file with Cent. Intel. Agency, REQUEST 15-
001 to REQUEST 15-0004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The results of the document production were underwhelming.
The CIA delivered only a smattering of material from four
general categories. One of the documents was a critical email
the CIA had previously withheld from the Committee even though
it had been shared with the Intelligence Committee.\165\ This
document changed the Committee's understanding of what
information was shared with Washington from Tripoli in the wake
of the attacks--crucial for understanding how the CIA created
its post attack analysis. The document production also
consisted of cables shared with the Intelligence Committee but
not given to this Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\Email from employee, Cent. Intel. Agency, to Cent. Intel.
Agency (Sept. 14, 2012 4:05 PM) (on file with the Committee, REQUEST
15-0005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of this insufficient document production and the
withholding of clearly relevant information, on August 7, 2015,
the Committee issued a subpoena to the CIA.\166\ This subpoena
was straightforward and asked for six specific sets of
documents. These documents included specific intelligence
assessments written by CIA analysts in the wake of the
attacks.\167\ The subpoena demanded the production of
``supporting material'' for these assessments.\168\ Up to that
point the CIA had refused to produce that material, in addition
to refusing to produce the assessments with accompanying
footnotes. It therefore was impossible for the Committee to
understand what material the analysts used to form the basis
for their subsequent assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John O.
Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, (Aug. 7, 2015).
\167\Id.
\168\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The subpoena also demanded production of additional
documents relating to the unclassified talking points requested
by the Intelligence Committee on September 14, 2012.\169\
Previously, the CIA had refused to produce any additional
documents relating to the talking points not already in the
public domain, claiming it was the responsibility of the Office
of Director for National Intelligence to produce documents,
even though the documents in question were all internal to the
CIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The subpoena also demanded production of SameTime messages
from individuals within certain offices in the CIA.\170\ Prior
witness testimony revealed CIA employees relied heavily on
SameTime messages the night of the attacks and in the immediate
aftermath, as these were more efficient than typing
emails.\171\ Simply reviewing the emails previously produced by
the CIA, therefore, would not tell the full story of what
happened the night and early morning hours of the attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\Id.
\171\See, e.g., Testimony of employee, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. 97-
100 (July, 16, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 28, 2015, the CIA responded to the subpoena.\172\
The CIA produced in full the specific intelligence assessments
with supporting material.\173\ The CIA also produced additional
material relating to the Intelligence Committee talking points,
but objected to producing SameTime messages, arguing that the
CIA ``does not produce SameTime messages to Congress because
doing so would have serious negative consequences on CIA's
work.''\174\ This is a striking assertion. To suggest the
entity that both created and funds the CIA and must provide
oversight for myriad reasons cannot have access at some level
to the work done by the CIA is staggeringly arrogant. In
reality these SameTime messages were both highly relevant and
highly probative and fundamentally changed the Committee's
understanding of information previously provided to the
Committee. This is precisely why Congress must be able to
access this information and precisely why the CIA was so
resistant to providing it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\Letter from Rachel Carlson Lieber, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Dana K. Chipman, Chief Counsel, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\173\Id.
\174\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A review of the documents ultimately produced by the CIA
and subsequent witness interviews necessitated additional
document requests to the CIA. The Committee first attempted to
request these documents informally. The CIA did not produce
them. As a result, on January 13, 2016, the Committee sent a
letter to the CIA formally requesting additional
documents.\175\ This request included two specific operational
cables referenced repeatedly during witness interviews, an
additional piece of intelligence analysis from after the
attacks, and information regarding intelligence given to senior
policymakers\176\--the subject of a previous formal request
from the Committee to the CIA.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 13, 2016) (on file
with Committee).
\176\Id.
\177\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Nov. 4, 2015) (on file
with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CIA ignored this request. As a result, the Committee
issued a second subpoena on January 20, 2016.\178\ This
subpoena demanded the production of the two specific
operational cables in addition to information regarding
intelligence given to senior policymakers.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\Subpoena issued by H. Select Comm. on Benghazi to John O.
Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, (Aug. 7, 2015).
\179\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 9, 2016--after months of the Committee applying
pressure to produce documents and the possibility John O.
Brennan, Director, CIA could be held in contempt of Congress
for withholding documents--the CIA finally relented.\180\ The
CIA agreed to produce SameTime messages to the Committee and
came to an agreement on access to the two specific operational
cables.\181\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\Letter from John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, to
Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Feb. 9, 2016) (on
file with the Committee).
\181\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the CIA claimed the SameTime messages would not
change the Committee's understanding of the facts of Benghazi,
some of the contents of these messages were quite valuable. As
a result of the delays--the Agency took more than nine months
to fulfill the Committee's request--the Committee lost an
opportunity to question some witnesses specifically about these
messages. In addition, some of the messages implicated agencies
outside the CIA and did in fact change the Committee's
understanding of certain facts--something the CIA, with its
stove-piped view of the Benghazi landscape, likely would not
have known.
WITNESSES
The Committee interviewed 19 CIA witnesses during the
course of its investigation. The Committee understood these
witnesses needed flexibility and, in some cases, anonymity. The
Committee delayed important interviews to ensure personnel
would not take time away from mission-critical duties overseas.
On one occasion, the Committee participated in a secure video
teleconference with a witness overseas, and on another occasion
the Committee waited until a witness was between tours of duty
so the interview would not interfere with intelligence
activities. The Committee also provided copies of interview
transcripts to the CIA so they could have them in their offices
rather than reviewing them in the Committee offices.
Although the Committee never issued subpoenas to any CIA
witnesses, and all appeared voluntarily, the CIA initially
refused to produce some witnesses--including the manager of the
analysts. Instead, the CIA produced the former head of the
Office of Terrorism Analysis, who was unable to answer granular
questions about how the analytic assessments were drafted and
what specific intelligence the analysts relied on.\182\
Outstanding questions remained after that interview, and it was
apparent the Committee needed to speak to the first-line
manager of the analysts. The CIA refused to produce this
witness, dubbing the individual a ``junior analyst'' despite a
decade of experience at the CIA.\183\ Only after the Committee
proposed issuing a subpoena for the witness's deposition did
the CIA agree to produce the person voluntarily for an
interview.\184\ This witness proved highly probative, which
regrettably, may be why the CIA was reluctant to allow the
interview in the first instance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\See Testimony of employee, Cent. Intel. Agency, Tr. 43, 46
(Nov. 13, 2015)] (on file with the Committee).
\183\Email from Rachel Carlson Lieber, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Jan. 7, 2016, 10:23 EST)
(on file with the Committee).
\184\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 13, 2016)
(on file with Committee) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A similar situation occurred involving a senior employee in
Benghazi. The CIA initially refused to produce this individual,
who, given his portfolio in Benghazi, was the only person who
could speak to a number of different topics and allegations.
After the CIA agreed to produce him for an interview, the CIA
kept pushing the date of the interview further into the future.
Not until the Chairman issued a subpoena and was preparing to
serve it did the CIA set a date for this individual's
interview. This witness also provided highly probative
testimony calling into question previous conclusions drawn by
other committees of Congress and fundamentally reshaping the
Committee's understanding of critical factors.
The Committee is also aware of concerns regarding the
accuracy of certain specific witness testimony before the House
Intelligence Committee. The Committee carefully reviewed
relevant testimony and information and questioned witnesses
about this testimony, but was unable to definitively resolve
the issue.
DISPARATE TREATMENT
While the Committee spent months trying to acquire new
documents from the CIA, the Committee Minority members had no
such difficulty. One day before the Committee's first interview
with a CIA witness, the CIA emailed the Committee alerting it
that ``[i]n response to a request for specific cables from the
minority, we have added three documents'' to the documents at
the CIA available for review.\185\ Neither Committee Minority
members nor the CIA informed the Committee such a request had
been made until the CIA obligingly fulfilled it. In contrast,
the CIA refused to produce two specific cables requested by the
Committee until a subpoena was issued.\186\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\Email from Mary K. E. Maple, Office of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Heather Sawyer, Minority Chief Counsel, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi et al (April 22, 2015, 9:19 EST) (on file with the
Committee).
\186\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 13,
2016); Email from Rachel Carlson Lieber, Deputy General Counsel, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Jan. 18, 2016), and
Subpoena to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency, H. Select Comm.
on Benghazi, (Jan. 20, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Again on October 17, 2015--just five days before the
Committee's hearing with the Secretary--an email was sent on
behalf of Committee Minority members to Higgins seeking
information regarding a classification issue.\187\ The CIA
responded 42 minutes later--on a Saturday night.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\Email from Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Dir., H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs,
Cent. Intel. Agency (Oct. 17, 2015, 19:02 EST) (on file with the
Committee).
\188\Email from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Dir., H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi (Oct. 17, 2015, 19:44 EST) (on file with the
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two days later Committee Minority members asked the CIA to
review seven transcript excerpts from two witness interviews
for classification review.\189\ The CIA completed these reviews
and returned the transcripts in just 40 hours.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\Email from Heather Sawyer, Minority Chief Counsel, H. Select
Comm. on Benghazi, to Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency (Oct. 19, 2015, 20:47 EST) (on file with the Committee).
\190\Email from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Dir., H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi (Oct. 17, 2015, 19:44 EST) (on file with the
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the Committee asked the CIA to conduct a
classification review of witness transcripts, however, the CIA
refused. As the Chairman noted in a letter to Brennan on
January 13, 2016:
The Agency has indicated it will not conduct a
classification review of transcripts of previous
Committee interviews but has provided no reason why it
is unable to perform this review, which must be
performed by the Executive Branch. The refusal to
conduct this review threatens to significantly impact
both the timelines and constitutional independence of
the Committee's final report, as well as the ability of
the American people to review transcripts of
unclassified interviews. This matter must be resolved
promptly to enable the Committee to undertake the
process of preparing its final report \191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John O. Brennan, Dir., Cent. Intel. Agency (Jan. 13, 2016) (on file
with Committee).
The CIA responded to this letter on March 22, 2016--more
than two months later--following a meeting on the topic between
the Committee and the CIA. In its response, the CIA said a
classification review of the transcripts would be ``lengthy and
laborious.''\192\ The CIA also reiterated its view the
Committee should share its report in advance with the CIA,
something the CIA noted was ``critically important.''\193\ This
delayed the Committee's final report because the Committee
cannot release information without having it cleared for
classification purposes and the Executive Branch solely
conducts this review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\Email from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi (Mar. 22, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
\193\Id. The CIA acknowledged in a March 4, 2016 meeting that it
had simply ``assumed'' the Committee would do this, without ever once
asking with the Committee. This mistaken assumption perhaps contributed
to the CIA's hardened posture in refusing to review witness transcripts
for classification and sensitivity purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House
DOCUMENTS
The Committee sent a document request to the White House on
December 29, 2014.\194\ While this was not the first time
Congress had asked the White House for information regarding
Benghazi,\195\ it did mark the first time Congress asked the
White House for documents. The request consisted of 12
categories, including documents regarding the U.S.'s continued
presence in Libya, the response to the attacks, the YouTube
video, the Intelligence Committee talking points, and the
administration's explanation of the attacks.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\194\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to Denis R. McDonough, White House Chief of Staff (Dec. 29, 2014) (on
file with the Committee).
\195\See, e.g., Letter from Buck McKeon, Chairman, H. Armed Servs.
Comm., et al., to the President (Oct. 19, 2012) (on file with the
Committee); and Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov't Reform, and Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
Nat'l Sec., to the President (Oct. 19, 2012) (on file with the
Committee).
\196\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to Denis R. McDonough, White House Chief of Staff (Dec. 29, 2014) (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On January 23, 2015, the White House objected to some
Committee requests, but did commit to ``be in a position to
begin sharing documents by the end of February.'' \197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel, to Trey
Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Jan. 23, 2015) (on file
with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 27, 2015, White House staff met with Committee
staff to discuss the requests. At the meeting the White House
produced 266 pages of emails to and from White House staff
related to Benghazi--the first emails and documents produced to
Congress by the White House about Benghazi.\198\ These emails,
however, were heavily redacted. As a result, the White House
and Committee reached an agreement regarding redactions, and on
March 16, 2015, the White House produced these documents with
the redactions removed.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\Letter from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to
Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Feb. 27, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
\199\Letter from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to
Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Mar. 16, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 23, 2015, the Committee Chairman wrote to the
White House again,\200\ giving priority to specific categories
of documents from the Committee's December 29, 2014
request.\201\ As a result, the White House made additional
document productions on May 11, 2015;\202\ June 19, 2015;\203\
and July 17, 2015.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel (Apr. 23, 2015) (on file with
the Committee).
\201\Id.
\202\See Letter from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House Counsel,
to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (May 11, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
\203\See Letter from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House Counsel,
to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 19, 2015)
(on file with the Committee).
\204\See Letter from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House Counsel,
to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (July 17, 2015)
(on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 7, 2015, the Chairman wrote a third time to the
White House\205\ addressing documents responsive to the
Committee's December 29, 2014 request which were being withheld
by the White House.\206\ Subsequently, the White House produced
additional documents on August 28, 2015.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel (Aug. 7, 2015) (on file with
the Committee).
\206\Id.
\207\See Letter from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House Counsel,
to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Aug. 28, 2015)
(on file with the Committee)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 9, 2015, White House staff met with Committee
staff and made progress on satisfying the Committee's requests
for information.\208\ The White House briefed the Committee on
a specific request, and a path forward was set to identify
remaining documents addressing specific categories of
information important to the Committee. Additional meetings
were held in a classified setting, on October 5, 2015;\209\
October 27, 2015;\210\ and November 12, 2015.\211\ Each meeting
was accompanied by a document production from the White House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\See Email from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy Counsel, White House
Office of the Chief Counsel, to Dana K. Chipman, Chief Counsel, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi et al (Sept. 10, 2015, 14:53 EST) (on file
with the Committee).
\209\Letter from from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House
Counsel, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Oct. 5,
2015) (on file with the Committee).
\210\Letter from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to
Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Oct. 27, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
\211\Letter from Jennifer O'Connor, Deputy White House Counsel, to
Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Nov. 12, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In total, the White House made nine productions of
documents to the Committee. To be clear the White House did not
provide all of the information the Committee requested but the
Committee was granted access to information no other
congressional committee accessed.
WITNESSES
The Committee interviewed four witnesses from the White
House. On January 21, 2016, three senior White House officials,
W. Neil Eggleston, Counsel to the President; Nicholas L.
McQuaid, Deputy Counsel to the President; and Donald C. Sisson,
Special Assistant to the President; flew to Charlotte, North
Carolina, to meet with the Chairman and discuss details
regarding these witness interviews.\212\ The White House and
the Committee honored the confidentiality of the meeting and
the discussions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\Press Briefing by Press Sec'y Josh Earnest, Office of the
Press Sec'y, The White House (Mar. 18, 2016), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/press-briefing-press-
secretary-josh-earnest-3182016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Susan E. Rice, National Security Advisor, and Benjamin J.
Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic
Communications, then testified before the Committee.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\See Testimony of Susan E. Rice, former U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., Tr. (Feb. 2, 2016) (on file with the Committee); Testimony of
Benjamin J. Rhodes, Deputy Nat'l Security Advisor for Strategic
Communications, Nat'l Security Council, Tr. at 50-51 (Feb. 2, 2016) (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACCESS TO COMPARTMENTED PROGRAMS
Over the course of nearly a dozen interviews with the State
Department, the Defense Department, and CIA personnel,
witnesses consistently refused to answer questions related to
certain allegations with respect to U.S. activities in Libya
even though the House specifically gave the Committee access to
materials relating to intelligence sources and methods.\214\
Most of these questions related in some way to allegations
regarding weapons.\215\ These refusals meant significant
questions raised in public relating to Benghazi could not be
answered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\H. Res. 567, 113th Cong., Sec. 4(a) (2014).
\215\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel (Mar. 16, 2016) (on file with
the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the meeting between the Chairman and the White House in
Charlotte, N.C., in January 2016, the Chairman told Eggleston
the Committee would need to review any and all relevant special
access programs that might relate to U.S. government activities
in Libya. On March 16, 2016, the Committee formalized its
request for this access in a letter to Eggleston:
With this letter, I am also including a classified
attachment detailing specific testimony received by the
Committee establishing the need to further clarify what
specific activities the U.S. government may have
conducted, and/or authorized, in Libya in 2011 and
2012. . . . You are in a unique position to help us
make sure the record is complete. In order to
accomplish this, however, the Committee requires your
assistance. I therefore write to formally request
access to all special access programs regarding U.S.
activities in Libya in 2011-2012.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\Id.
The letter contained a classified attachment detailing
specific testimony from senior and line personnel from the
State Department, CIA, and the Defense Department, all of whom
did not respond fully to questions from the Committee during
their interviews due to access issues. Some of the testimony
provided raised substantial further questions in light of the
record available to the Committee. The administration
ultimately did not provide the requested access.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\Letter from Neal L. Higgins, Dir. of Cong. Affairs, Cent.
Intel. Agency, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi
(April 28, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
QUESTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT
In the summer of 2014, the Chairman first discussed sending
questions to the President with Eggleston. In the January 2016
meeting, the Chairman again raised with Eggleston the
possibility of sending questions to the President. The Chairman
offered Eggleston the opportunity to review and comment on the
questions in advance as well as to provide the documentary
basis behind each question.
Despite this offer by the Chairman, in the three months
following that meeting, the White House repeatedly rebuffed
offers from the Committee to meet and discuss the questions. On
June 7, 2016, the Chairman sent to Eggleston a list of 15
questions for the President regarding the Benghazi
attacks.\218\ None of these questions had ever been directly
addressed by the White House publicly, and for most of the
questions the President is the only person able to answer the
question. The full text of the letter with the questions is
reproduced in Appendix C of this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel (June 7, 2016) (Reproduced in
Appendix C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 25, 2016, Eggleston responded that he had advised
the President not to answer the Chairman's questions.
Specifically, Eggleston noted ``implications'' for the
constitutional separation of powers and wrote ``if the
President were to answer your questions, his response would
suggest that Congress has the unilateral power to demand
answers from the President about his official acts.''\219\
Eggleston did not explain how voluntary responses would suggest
that Congress could compel answers nor did he mention prior
interviews--such as on 60 Minutes on September 12, 2012, and on
Univision on September 20, 2012--where the President discussed
the Benghazi attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel to Trey
Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 25, 2016) (on file
with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMPLIANCE WITH RECORD-KEEPING LAWS AND REGULATIONS
The Federal Records Act
The Federal Records Act [FRA] ``governs the collection,
retention, preservation, and possible destruction of federal
agency records'' by Federal agencies. \220\ Federal records
include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\Wendy Ginsberg, Cong. Research Serv., R43072, Common Questions
About Federal Records and Related Agency Requirements 2 (2015), https:/
/www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43072.pdf (citing 44 U.S.C., Chapters 21,
29, 31, and 33).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[A]ll books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable
materials, or other documentary materials, regardless of
physical form or characteristics, made or received by a federal
agency under federal law or in connection with the transaction
of public business and preserved or appropriate for
preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as
evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
proceedings, operations or other activities of the government
or because of informational value of the date within them.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\44 U.S.C. Sec. 3301 (2012). Conversely, non-record materials
are broken down into three categories: (1) library and museum material
(2) extra copies of documents; and (3) stocks of publications and
processed documents--such as catalogs, trade journals, and other
publications that are received from other government agencies,
commercial firms, or private institutions. 36 C.F.R. Sec. 1222.14
(2009). The FRA was most recently amended in 2014 to address:
``[T]he rapid migration over the last several decades
toward electronic communication and recordkeeping, federal
recordkeeping laws are still focused on the media in which
a record is preserved, not the information that constitutes
the record itself. To correct this flaw, this legislation
will shift the onus of recordkeeping onto the record and
not the media it is contained in as a way to better enable
NARA, and other agencies, to handle growing amounts of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
electronic communication.''
H. Rep. No. 113-127, at 5 (2013). That amendment was introduced by
Ranking Member Cummings (D-MD). H.R. 1233, 113th Cong. (2013).
The FRA requires each agency head to ``make and preserve
records.''\222\ Each agency head must ``establish and maintain
an active, continuing program for the economical and efficient
management of the records of the agency'' including ``effective
controls over the creation and over the maintenance and use of
records in the conduct of current business.''\223\
Additionally, each agency head ``shall establish safeguards
against the removal or loss of records.''\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\44 U.S.C. Sec. 3101 (2012).
\223\44 U.S.C. Sec. 3102 (2012).
\224\44 U.S.C. Sec. 3105 (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The details of implementing an agency's record management
program are set out in Federal regulations. Agencies must
maintain ``adequate documentation of agency business'' that
``[m]ake possible a proper scrutiny by Congress.''\225\ The
regulations require ``[a]gencies that allow employees to send
and receive official electronic mail messages using a system
not operated by the agency must ensure that federal records
sent or received on such systems are preserved in the
appropriate agency recordkeeping system.''\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\36 C.F.R. Sec. 1222.22 (c) (2015).
\226\36 C.F.R. Sec. 1236.22 (b) (2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department's own records management policies
reinforce the statutory and regulatory requirements. According
to the Foreign Affairs Manual: ``[T]he Secretary is required to
establish a Records and Information Life Cycle Management
Program in accordance with the Federal Records Act.''\227\
Objectives of the program include fulfilling official requests
from Congress,\228\ as well as ensuring ``[t]he recording of
activities of officials of the Department should be complete to
the extent necessary to . . . [m]ake possible a proper scrutiny
by Congress and duly authorized agencies of the Government of
the manner in which the functions of the Department have been
discharged.''\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\227\5 FAM 414.1 (2015).
\228\5 FAM 414.3-1(8) (2015).
\229\5 FAM 422.2(3) (2015) (emphasis added); see also 5 FAM 443.1
(establishing principles governing email communications) and 5 FAM
754(h) (requiring users to review 5 FAM 443 for responsibilities for
handling email correspondence).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The State Department's Record Keeping
The Committee first became aware of the Secretary's use of
a non-official email account for at least some official
business on August 11, 2014, when the State Department produced
to the Committee eight emails to or from the Secretary.\230\
These emails indicated the Secretary used a private email
account to communicate about official government business.\231\
Well before the State Department made this production of eight
emails, it was abundantly clear the State Department knew the
complete universe of responsive documents and emails was not
housed or situated on State Department servers.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\See August 11, 2014 document production from the State Dep't
which included eight emails sent to or received by the Secretary.
\231\See id. Some of the emails were identified by the address with
domain name ``@clintonemail.com.'' Other emails were designated simply
as ``H.''
\232\See Fischer Testimony at 66, in relevant part:
Q: Okay. One of the things that we wanted to talk with you
about was when you first became knowledgeable or aware that
all or part of Secretary Clinton's records were not on
premises with the State Dep't. And can you tell us when
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that was?
A: The end of July 2014.
The State Department was aware--as early as June 2013--of
the Secretary's use of personal email for official business and
the detrimental effect on responses to Congress and obligations
under the Federal Records Act, yet the Department said
nothing.\233\ The State Department was actively retrieving the
Secretary's official emails in May 2014--the same time the
Committee was formed--still the Department said nothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\``Office of the Sec'y: Evaluation of Email Records Management
and Cybersecurity Requirements,'' supra note 69 at 17-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seventeen days after producing eight of the Secretary's
emails, the State Department, through Kennedy, issued a
memorandum to State Department principals reiterating the
obligation that departing senior staff have to ensure the
timely return of records, including email.\234\ Specifically,
Kennedy's memorandum referenced a ``policy in place since 2009
. . . to capture electronically email accounts of the senior
officials listed in Tab 1 as they depart their
positions.''\235\ The memorandum attached the relevant Foreign
Affairs Manual provisions including those related to email
records.\236\ During questioning by the Chairman, Kennedy
testified about the memorandum:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\See Memorandum from ``M--Patrick F. Kennedy'' to 7th Floor
Principals 1 (Aug. 28, 2014) (on file with the Committee).
\235\See id. at 3.
\236\See id.
Q: On August the 28th, you issued a memo to a whole
host of people, subject: ``Senior Officials' Records
Management Responsibilities.'' I want to make sure he
gets a copy of that so he's looking at the same thing
I'm looking at. And we can mark it as committee exhibit
13 here. Does that look familiar? I'm not going to go
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
through the whole thing with you. I just want to. . . .
A: Yes, sir, this is familiar. This is something that
we did in response to a NARA program that we call
journaling but NARA's official name is Capstone.
Q: And what prompted you to promulgate this memo?
A: NARA's program.
Q: I thought you and I had established that NARA rule
had taken place the fall of 2013.
A: The journaling effort, Mr. Chairman, I cannot
remember the exact date and how my people had worked
this through. But the request to journal these records
is something that I'm just reading this now to see if
anything else reminds me. Chairman, if I am slow, I am
slow. But I have
Q: Having spent the day with you, you will never
convince me that you are slow. You will never convince
me of that. If you would look at page 3 for me, kind of
in the middle, it's a bullet that starts, ``As a
general matter.''
A: Yes.
Q: ``As a general matter.'' I'll let you read the rest
of that. You can read it for the record whenever you
feel comfortable.
A: Yes, sir, I am ready.
Q: Will you read that for us, for the court reporter?
A: ``As a general matter, to ensure a complete record
of their activities, senior officials should not use
their private email accounts for (e.g., Gmail) for
official businesses. If a senior official uses his or
her private email account for the conduct of official
business, she or he must ensure that records pertaining
to official business that are sent from or received on
such email account are captured and maintained. The
best way to ensure this is to forward incoming e mails
received on a private account to the senior official's
State account and copy ongoing messages to their State
account.''\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 259-61 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter
Kennedy Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Less than six weeks later, Kennedy sent another State
Department announcement restating the obligations of employees
to preserve records.\238\ Less than 10 days later, on October
28, 2014, Kennedy sent a letter to four former Secretaries of
State. That letter sought the return of Federal records, ``such
as an email sent or received on a personal email account while
serving as Secretary.''\239\ The letter emphasized that
``diverse Department records are subject to various disposition
schedules with most Secretary of State records retained
permanently,'' a fact that was confirmed in the Committee's
interview with William Fischer, Chief Records Officer, State
Department.\240\ Because of a typographical error, the State
Department did not send the letter to Mills until November 12,
2014.\241\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\See Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., Dep't
Notice 2014_10_115: A Message from Under Sec'y for Management Patrick
F. Kennedy regarding State Dep't Records Responsibilities and Policy,
U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.archives.gov/press/
press-releases/2015/pdf/attachment2-department-notice.pdf; Patrick F.
Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., Cable to Field: State Dep't
Records Responsibilities and Policy, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 30,
2014), https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2015/pdf/
attachment3-cable-to-the-field.pdf.
\239\See Letter from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State, to former Sec'ys Madeline Albright, Colin
Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton. (Oct. 28, 2014) (on file
with the Committee). It's important to note that because of a drafting
error, Cheryl D. Mills letter was sent on November 12, 2014. See Letter
from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of
State, to Cheryl D. Mills. (Nov. 12, 2014) (on file with the
Committee).
\240\See Fischer Testimony, supra note 54, at 32-33.
\241\See Letter from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for
Mgmt., U.S Dep't of State to Cheryl D. Mills. (Nov. 12, 2014) (on file
with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to a Committee member, Kennedy told the
Committee:
A: Yes, sir. This was in response to a National
Archives and Records Administration new policy that
they had put out.
Q: Uh-huh. And the letter came from you?
A: The letter came from me, yes, sir.
Q: And
A: It went to the representatives of I believe it was
four previous Secretaries of State.
Q: Why did it go to the representatives?
A: That was just a decision that we would write the
representatives because it would more likely get the
kind of attention, immediate attention, if we sent it
to the representatives. And I personally knew all the
representatives of Secretary Powell on forward. And so
I would write them because I would make sure that they
would take it would not get lost, potentially, in the
junk mail category.
Q: Okay. And just give me in your words, so I don't
have to reread and go through this letter in your
words, what were you trying to accomplish exactly with
this letter? What were you concerned about?
A: We wanted to make sure that we had in our possession
any Federal record that had been created during their
tenure that we might not have in our possession.
Q: Uh-huh.
Q: And what prompted you to write the letter when you
wrote it?
A: It was basically the NARA, the NARA.
Q: Rule?
A: The NARA rule.
Q: And when was the NARA rule promulgated, do you
recall?
A: I believe that it was in late 2013.
Q: If it was late 2013, why did you wait until late
2014 to write the letter?
A: Because this is when I received it, sir.
Q: When you received what?
A: When my staff called this to my attention.
Q: Can you see how the timeline might appear to have
been influenced by other factors? Are you at least open
to the optics of a congressional committee continuing
to ask for her emails, and none are forthcoming, and
the State Department says not one word about not having
her record?
And I will say again for the record, for the court
reporter, because this may be a new court reporter. The
person that's currently assigned to aid Congress in
collection of records, Mr. Snyder, could not be more
professional and easy to work with and fair. And if
it's no, it's no, and if it's yes, it's yes, but at
least we have an answer. Previous to Mr. Snyder, it was
not that way.
So we ask, and we hear crickets. And then we see these
letters from you to all the way back to John Jay and
Alexander Hamilton saying, can you please produce
records. And the rule was promulgated a year before you
sent the letter, Ambassador.
A: Mr. Chairman, I absolutely understand your concerns
and absolutely agree that your request for records rang
some bells in the State Department. Absolutely.
Q: That's what I'm getting at.
A: But, you know, if we wanted to hide something, I
would have never sent this letter.
Q: Well, there are two ways to look at that. You sent
the letter to more than just the Secretary, which was a
very good way to deflect attention onto other
Secretaries of State, even though the ones that you
[sic] some of the ones you dealt with in the past never
sent you an email. Now, the letter does say records and
not just emails, I will grant you that.
A: That is correct, sir.
Q: But it is curious why you would wait years and years
and years to make sure the public record is complete.
Meanwhile, you're getting FOIA requests and
congressional inquiries and a host of other things. And
yet you wait until our committee is in the throes of
asking for her emails for this letter to be sent.
Can you see how that would look suspicious?
A: I can see how it looks suspicious, but, Mr.
Chairman, I acted after discussion with my colleagues.
You know, you called something to our attention, and we
thought, ``We could have a problem here.'' We are now
in the email era at the State Department. And the email
era of the State Department, access to the Internet, et
cetera, et cetera, essentially goes back only to let's
see goes back to about late 19----
Q: Whenever Al Gore invented it. All right. I'm going
to turn it back over to Jim.
A: So that we went back to the period of time before
Secretaries of State who were, in the opinion of myself
and others in the State Department, in the Internet
email era. And so we went to those four Secretaries of
State----
Q: I'm with you.
A: --to make sure that we had your concerns. We also
had the NARA concerns. And it seemed to be a rational
decision to reach out across the board, because it was
only going back
Q: But you would concede you had been getting FOIA
requests and you had gotten other congressional
inquiries, none of which prompted you to write this
letter.
A: This is the first time it had been brought to my
attention.
Q: And you've said `brought to your attention.' Who
specifically brought this to your attention?
A: I don't remember. I think it was some combination of
our records officers and the Bureau of Legislative
Affairs.
Q: All right. You wrote Ms. Mills, among others.
A: Yes.
Q: Did you have any conversations, correspondence,
emails, face to face meetings with Ms. Mills prior to
sending this letter?
A: Not on this subject.
Q: So, out of the cold blue air, you sent Ms. Mills a
letter saying, essentially, `Send Secretary Clinton's
emails back to the State Department,' no warning?
A: I also sent Peggy Sefarino, who was going I wrote
who I regarded to be the senior staff officers for four
Q: And you're saying Ms. Mills had no notice that this
letter was coming.
A: I did not call her and tell her it was coming, sir.
And I am unaware of anyone else who may have called
her.
Q: Did you meet with her and tell her it was coming?
A: No, sir, I did not.
Q: The other three designees for the three previous
Secretaries of State, did you communicate with them in
any fashion prior to them receiving the letter on
behalf of the Secretary of State?
A: No, sir, I did not.
Q: And just to be clear, with your question from
Chairman Gowdy, you said you did have conversations
with Cheryl Mills prior to this letter being sent?
A: Not about this topic, sir. Every once in a while, I
would see Cheryl Mills at a social function. I think I
even had lunch with her once, discussing old business
not related to Secretary I had worked with Cheryl Mills
for 4 years.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\Kennedy Testimony at 252-57.
Less than five weeks after receipt of Kennedy's letter,
Mills wrote back to the State Department indicating she was
making 55,000 pages of emails sent or received on the
Secretary's private email account available to the State
Department.\243\ The emails were not enclosed with the letter.
The Committee would learn later State Department officials were
sent to pick up the emails at the law firm of the Secretary's
attorney, Williams and Connolly.\244\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\Letter from Cheryl D. Mills to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y
of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 5, 2014) (on file with
the Committee).
\244\See Fischer Testimony, supra note 54, at 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In her December 5, 2014 letter to Kennedy, Mills stated:
Like Secretaries of State before her, Secretary Clinton
at times used her own electronic mail account when
engaging with other officials. On matters pertaining to
the conduct of government business, it was her practice
to use the officials' government electronic mail
accounts. Accordingly, to the extent the Department
retains records of government electronic mail accounts,
it already has records of her electronic mail during
her tenure preserved within the Department's record
keeping systems.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\Letter from Cheryl D. Mills to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y
of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 5, 2014) (on file with
the Committee).
Notably, this was the first time the phrase ``it was her
practice to use the officials' government electronic emails
accounts'' was used.\246\ Mills further explained in her letter
``to the extent the Department retains records of government
electronic mail accounts, it already has records of her
electronic mail during her tenure preserved within the
Department's record keeping systems.''\247\ Mills letter did
not address how emails sent both to and from a personal email
account would be captured for federal records purposes.\248\ In
fact it would be difficult to provide to such an explanation
since the Committee's investigation uncovered work-related
emails that were sent to and from personal email accounts that
were never produced to the State Department.\249\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\Id.
\247\Id.
\248\Id.
\249\Letter from Julia Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State for Leg.
Affairs, State Dep't, to Trey Gowdy, Chmn., H. Select Comm. on Benghazi
(June 25, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (``In a limited number of
circumstances, we did not locate in the tens of thousands of pages of
emails provided by Secretary Clinton the content of a handful of
communications that Mr. Blumenthal provided. Those communications . . .
are documents Bates-numbered in Blumenthal products. . . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Collectively, the statements above served as an attempt to
shift the burden of the Secretary's recordkeeping
responsibilities to other government officials and the State
Department.\250\ This was apparent in further statements
consistently made by the Secretary speculating that ``the State
Department had between 90-95 percent of all the ones that were
work related. They were already on the system.''\251\ Not only
could the State Department not confirm the percentage provided
by the Secretary it did not know where the percentage she used
originated.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\250\See id.
\251\Testimony of Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 280 (Oct. 22, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\252\See id. at 323 where Chairman Gowdy states ``when I asked the
State Department about ten days ago, what is the source of that figure,
they shrugged their shoulders.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On March 9, 2015, the Secretary revealed her attorneys
deleted emails they deemed ``personal'' before turning over her
``work-
related'' emails.\253\ Neither the State Department nor the
Committee could verify no work-related emails were deleted by
the Secretary's attorneys or that all of her emails related to
Benghazi and Libya were actually produced to the Committee.
Concerned about the completeness of the record, the Chairman
requested, on March 19, 2015 and again on March 31, 2015, that
the Secretary make the email server available to a neutral
third party for inspection and review.\254\ The requests were
rejected.\255\ The Committee's concern was confirmed on June
12, 2015 when a non-government witness produced approximately
150 emails and memos sent to or received by the Secretary.
\256\ Approximately 89 of these emails had never been produced
to the Committee. The State Department could not locate 15 of
them either in full or part.\257\ This is significant for at
least two reasons. First, it confirms suspicions the State
Department failed to produce relevant, probative information to
the Committee until confronted with the reality the Committee
had accessed the information through separate channels. In
other words, the State Department denied until they were
caught. Secondly, this undermines the argument of the Secretary
that all of her work-related emails were produced to the State
Department. Clearly, these 15 emails are work related and
equally clearly they were not produced to the State Department.
What remains unknown is whether these emails were lost while
housed on the Secretary's private server or whether the
Secretary's attorneys screened these emails out when they self-
selected which records would be deemed official and which would
be deemed personal. Regardless, relevant and probative
information the public was entitled to review as public records
was withheld.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\Zeke J. Miller, Transcript: Everything Hillary Clinton Said on
the Email Controversy, Time (Mar. 10, 2015), http://time.com/3739541/
transcript-hillary-clinton-email-press-conference/.
\254\See Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on
Benghazi, to David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly (Mar.
19, 2015) (on file with the Committee) (``[F]ormally requesting
Secretary Clinton make her server available to a neutral, detached and
independent third party for immediate inspection and review.''); see
also Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi, to
David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams & Connolly (Mar. 31, 2015)
(``[W]e . . . urge the Secretary to reconsider her position and allow a
neutral, detached, and independent arbiter ensure the public record is
complete and all materials relevant to the Committee's work have been
provided to the Committee.'').
\255\See Letter from David E. Kendall, Of Counsel, Williams &
Connolly, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (Mar.
27, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\256\See Letter from James M. Cole, Partner, Sidley Austin, to Trey
Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 12, 2015) (enclosing
production of documents related to Mr. Cole's client, Sidney S.
Blumenthal).
\257\See Letter from Julia E. Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of State
for Legis. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi (June 25, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fact the Secretary used and maintained a private email
account and server for all of her work-related emails prevented
the State Department from executing its responsibilities under
the FRA and the implementing regulations and policies.
The use of private email for official business was not
confined to the Secretary. As noted previously, the Committee
also discovered that Mills, Abedin, and Sullivan all made use
of private email for official business. Compounding the problem
of recovering these records, the State Department did not
archive emails sent to or from senior staff in the Secretary's
office during the Secretary's tenure.\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\See Lauren French, Gowdy: Not backing off subpoena of Clinton
emails, Politico (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/
house-committee-benghazi-clinton-
email-subpoena-115795.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beginning in early March 2015, the Committee sought
additional information on the Department's records management
activities. The Committee requested briefings on the State
Department's record keeping activities as it related to both
the Secretary and her senior staff. On March 17, 2015, the
Committee met with representatives from the National Archives
and Records Administration to better understand their role in
the State Department's record keeping practices. On April 10,
2015, the Committee met with Katie Stana, Deputy Director of
the Executive Secretariat, State Department, to understand the
recordkeeping apparatus in place for the Office of the
Secretary.\259\ In addition, the Committee interviewed John
Bentel, Director of the Office of Information Resource
Management for the Executive Secretariat, to understand the
technology and systems the Secretary and other senior officials
used. When asked about the Secretary's exclusive use of private
email and server, the Director testified he became aware when
it came out in the papers.\260\ He further testified he did not
know whether the State Department's general counsel was
consulted.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\April 10, 2015 meeting between State Dep't officials and Comm.
staff.
\260\Testimony of John Bentel, Director, Executive Secretariat,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 37 (June 30, 2015)(on file with the Comm.).
\261\Bentel Testimony at 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee sought to better understand the State
Department's record keeping practices, including additional
information on compliance with existing Federal regulations and
State Department policy on April 18, 2015.\262\ In particular,
the Committee requested the State Department respond to 27
questions raised regarding the Secretary's email usage. The
Committee emphasized the importance in getting answers to the
questions by including them as part of the July 31, 2015 demand
letter to Kerry.\263\ When asked about the status of a State
Department response, the State Department indicated the OIG
would respond to the questions.\264\ In a January 14, 2016
meeting, the OIG revealed it had not seen the questions until
the week of January 5, 2016, contrary to the assertions made by
State Department officials. In fact, the OIG suggested at the
meeting the Committee would be best served by asking the State
Department to respond to the questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\Email from Philip G. Kiko, Staff Dir. and Gen. Counsel, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi, to Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec'y for Legis.
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Apr. 18, 2015, 3:39 PM).
\263\Letter from Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
to John F. Kerry, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (July 31, 2015)
(on file with Comm.).
\264\See conversations between State Dep't personnel and Comm.
staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The questions were subsequently posed to Kennedy on
February 3, 2016, who was surprised by the questions. Kennedy
testified, when asked about the volume of emails produced to
the State Department: ``[a]gain, I don't remember when I
learned for [sic] it, and that is not, as I said, this is not a
subject I prepared for, for this interview.''\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\Kennedy Testimony at 211.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee's experiences with the State Department's
records management and retention practices are consistent with
findings by the OIG. It should be noted the position of
Inspector General [IG] was vacant during the Secretary's entire
tenure forcing the OIG to operate without a permanent IG and
often without an acting IG.\266\ A permanent IG may have had
the independence and standing to intervene on these records
issues sooner. In September 2012, the OIG found that State
Department's Office of Information Program Services, the office
responsible for records management practices: ``do[es] not meet
statutory and regulatory requirements.\267\ Although the office
develops policy and issues guidance, it does not ensure proper
implementation, monitor performance or enforce
compliance.''\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\Byron Tau & Peter Nicholas, State Dep't Lacked Top Watchdog
During Hillary Clinton Tenure, Wall St. J. (Mar. 24, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/state-department-lacked-top-watchdog-during-
hillary-clinton-tenure-1427239813.
\267\Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of State,Inspection of
Bureau of Administration, Global Information Services, Office of
Information Programs and Services: Report No. ISP-I-12-54, 1 (Sept.
2012), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/199774.pdf.
\268\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite an upgrade in 2009 to spur the preservation of
emails as official records, the OIG found in March 2015:
State Department employees have not received adequate
training or guidance on their responsibilities for
using the system to preserve `record emails.' In 2011,
employees created 61,156 record emails out of more than
a billion emails sent. Employees created 41,749 in
2013. . . . Some employees do not create record emails
because they do not want to make the email available in
searches. . . .\269\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of State, Review of
State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset and Record Email: Report
No. ISP-I-15-15, 1 (Mar. 2015), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/isp-
i-15-15.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its May 2016 report, the OIG found:
The Federal Records Act requires appropriate management
and preservation of Federal Government records,
regardless of physical form or characteristics, that
document the organization, functions, policies,
decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of an
agency. For the last two decades, both Department of
State (Department) policy and Federal regulations have
explicitly stated that emails may qualify as Federal
records.
As is the case throughout the Federal Government,
management weaknesses at the Department have
contributed to the loss or removal of email records,
particularly records created by the Office of the
Secretary. These weaknesses include a limited ability
to retrieve email records, inaccessibility of
electronic files, failure to comply with requirements
for departing employees, and a general lack of
oversight.
OIG's ability to evaluate the Office of the Secretary's
compliance with policies regarding records preservation
and use of non-Departmental communications systems was,
at times, hampered by these weaknesses. However, based
on its review of records, questionnaires, and
interviews, OIG determined that email usage and
preservation practices varied across the tenures of the
five most recent Secretaries and that, accordingly,
compliance with statutory, regulatory, and internal
requirements varied as well.
OIG also examined Department cybersecurity regulations
and policies that apply to the use of non-Departmental
systems to conduct official business. Although there
were few such requirements 20 years ago, over time the
Department has implemented numerous policies directing
the use of authorized systems for day-to-day
operations. In assessing these policies, OIG examined
the facts and circumstances surrounding three cases
where individuals exclusively used non-Departmental
systems to conduct official business.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\``Office of the Sec'y: Evaluation of Email Records Management
and Cybersecurity Requirements,'' supra note 69 at Introduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The necessity and importance of Congress's oversight
authority is obvious. Given the administration's lack of
responsiveness in most regards and slow and uneven
responsiveness in all regards, the Committee makes the
recommendations below.
Restoring the Congressional Contempt Power
RECOMMENDATIONS
LHouse and Senate rules should be amended to provide
for mandatory reductions in appropriations to the salaries of
federal officials held in contempt of Congress.
LThe criminal contempt statute should be amended to
require the appointment of a special counsel to handle criminal
contempt proceedings upon the certification of a contempt
citation against an Executive Branch official by the House or
Senate.
LExpedited procedures for the civil enforcement of
congressional subpoenas should be enacted to provide timely
judicial resolution of disputes.
ANALYSIS
As the Chairman noted in the May 8, 2015 Interim Progress
Update:
Compelling compliance with subpoenas requires either
the cooperation of the Executive Branch--particularly
the United States Attorney--the very entity from which
we seek the information and an unlikely ally, or
pursuing document production from the Executive Branch
via civil contempt, a laborious, slow process and
counterproductive to the goal of an expeditious
investigation.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\Interim Progress Update, supra note 8, at iii.
This remark concisely describes the dilemma all
congressional committees face when demanding information from
the Executive Branch. This state of affairs also results, in
part, from Congress's failure to adapt the law and its own
internal rules to changed circumstances. The recommendations
above would restore to Congress an effective and useful ability
to compel compliance from the Executive Branch.
Contempt of Congress has long been recognized as a
necessary and inherent component of the legislative power.\272\
Without the power to find individuals in contempt, Congress
would have no means by which to command compliance with its
subpoenas and punish obstruction.\273\ For much of our history,
Congress wielded the power to enforce a finding of contempt by
imprisoning noncompliant individuals--often referred to as the
``inherent'' contempt power.\274\ Congress last used this power
in 1935.\275\ It has been called ``unseemly'' and few would
advocate a return to the practice in the current hyper-partisan
political environment where even the issuing of subpoenas draws
howls of protest.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\E.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228-29 (1821) (holding
that the House has the inherent power to punish a private citizen for
contempt).
\273\Id.
\274\See id.
\275\See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
\276\See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 78
(D.D.C. 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress first enacted criminal contempt procedures in 1857
as an alternative to its inherent power to imprison.\277\ Under
the criminal contempt statute, the House or Senate may cite an
individual for contempt of Congress and certify the citation to
the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia whose ``duty''
it is to present the contempt citation to a grand jury.\278\
Criminal contempt is punishable by a fine of up to $100,000 and
up to one year in prison.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 192, 194.
\278\2 U.S.C. Sec. 194.
\279\2 U.S.C. Sec. 192, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3571 (regarding the
maximum fine).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The criminal contempt statute was, in practice, the sole
enforcement mechanism for Congress after 1935 and was used or
threatened with some frequency against senior Executive Branch
officials beginning in 1975.\280\ Invoking the criminal
contempt statute generally resulted in full or substantial
compliance with subpoenas.\281\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\280\Morton Rosenberg, When Congress Comes Calling: A Primer on the
Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry, The
Const. Project 16 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/WhenCongressComesCalling.pdf.
\281\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During recent administrations, the threat of criminal
contempt has been insufficient to compel Executive Branch
compliance. A recent opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel
within the Justice Department likely ended any remaining
usefulness the criminal contempt statute had in compelling
compliance by Executive Branch officials. In June 2014, the
Office of Legal Counsel advised the U.S. Attorney for D.C. that
the U.S. Attorney retains prosecutorial discretion not to
present a criminal contempt citation to a grand jury despite a
statutory ``duty'' to present.\282\ In other words, U.S.
Attorneys must substitute their judgment for the judgment of
the House or Senate of the United States.\283\ While the merits
of the Office of Legal Counsel opinion are open to debate, as a
practical political matter it is unlikely future
administrations would reverse an opinion so obviously favorable
to their interests. As a result, an Executive Branch official
appointed by the President has discretion whether to hold
another Executive Branch official--likely appointed by the same
President--accountable for failing to comply with a
congressional subpoena.\284\ The conflict is obvious and
impossible to avoid. Regardless of the merits of a U.S.
Attorney's decision not to present a congressional contempt
citation to a grand jury, the decision will be colored by that
conflict of interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\282\Letter from Karl R. Thompson, Acting Ass't Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, to Ronald C. Machen, Jr.,
U.S. Attorney for D.C. (June 16, 2014).
\283\See id.
\284\See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of the deficiencies of the inherent power and
criminal enforcement of contempt, Congress has turned to civil
enforcement of its subpoenas with mixed success. While civil
enforcement has led to the testimony of officials\285\ and the
production of a privilege log and substantial numbers of
previously withheld documents,\286\ Congress must accept very
lengthy delays in order to pursue this enforcement option. In
its investigation of `Operation Fast and Furious,' the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman filed a
civil action against the Justice Department in August 2012 to
compel the production of documents.\287\ Three and a half years
later, in January 2016, a Federal district court judge ordered
the Justice Department to produce withheld documents,\288\ and
in April 2016, the Justice Department finally produced the
documents to Congress.\289\ An enforcement tool requiring three
and a half years simply to get a district court order is
unacceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 108
(D.D.C. 2008) (ordering Miers to testify before and produce requested
materials to Congress).
\286\See Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform v. Lynch, No. 12-1332
(ABJ), 2016 WL 225675, at *16 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2016) (granting the
Comm.'s motion to compel the Justice Dep't to produce documents).
\287\Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, House
Asks Federal Court to Rule Against Attorney General's Stonewalling in
Fast and Furious (Aug. 13, 2012), https://oversight.house.gov/release/
house-asks-federal-court-to-rule-against-attorney-generals-
stonewalling-in-fast-and-furious.
\288\Lynch, 2016 WL 225675, at 16.
\289\Press Release, H Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, Chaffetz
Statement on Fast and Furious (Apr. 8, 2016), https://
oversight.house.gov/release/chaffetz-statement-fast-furious-
documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Congress retains its constitutional authority to hold
recalcitrant witnesses in contempt of Congress, this authority
no longer compels prompt, if any, compliance. All three
enforcement mechanisms--inherent powers, criminal charges and
civil enforcement--have questionable usefulness today and are
largely dependent upon other branches of government agreeing
with or pursuing the cause and remedy. The administration's
obstruction of congressional oversight is the inevitable and
predictable result. The three recommendations above would
restore Congress's ability to enforce its subpoenas through its
inherent constitutional authority, through criminal law and
through civil enforcement.
Restoring Congress's inherent powers to enforce its
subpoena must be the first priority. It is the only mechanism
solely within Congress's discretion. The inherent power can be
restored through simple rules changes in the House. The House
should change its rules to allow a point of order against any
appropriations measure, including conference reports, and
continuing resolutions, that would fund the salary of a Federal
official held in contempt of Congress.\290\ The House should
establish a high bar for waiving the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\For example, House Rules prohibit the inclusion of provisions
changing existing law in a general appropriations bill and such
provisions may be objected to and ruled out of order. See Rules of the
H. of Representatives, Rule XXI, cl. 2(b) (114th Cong.). A similar rule
could be applied to any provision appropriating funds that would go to
the salary of a Federal official held in contempt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress could provide for nearly automatic sanctions
against officials held in contempt of Congress, if it included
triggering language in an appropriations statute. Under section
713 of the Financial Services and General Government
Appropriations Act of 2012, no appropriation in any bill is
available to pay the salary of a Federal official who prevents
another Federal official from communicating directly with
Congress.\291\ This rider, which is continued every year, was
the subject of a recent ruling by the Government Accountability
Office holding that two officials of the Housing and Urban
Development Department violated section 713 and that these
officials should be required to pay back wages earned while
they were in violation.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\Pub. L. No. 112-74, Sec. 713, 125 Stat. 928, 931 (2012).
\292\Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev.--Application of Section 713 of
the Fin. Servs. and Gen. Gov't Appropriations Act, 2012
(Reconsideration), B-325124.2, 2016 WL 1319698 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 5,
2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A rider similar to section 713 could be included in annual
appropriations disallowing the use of any appropriation to pay
the salary of a Federal official held in contempt of Congress.
Such an approach would trigger immediate and automatic
sanctions when an official was held in contempt by Congress.
Because the inherent power can be exercised at Congress's
sole discretion, the House should establish procedures to
ensure the legitimacy of actions pursuant to the power. These
procedures should provide for the transparent consideration of
timely objections to congressional subpoenas, should require
the production of a privilege log, and should require the
appearance of the responsible Federal official at a hearing
held to consider objections to the subpoena.
As noted above, criminal contempt proceedings against
Executive Branch officials are subject to the discretion of the
U.S. Attorney for D.C., and raise significant conflict of
interest concerns. The Justice Department already has
regulations in place for appointing a special counsel in
situations presenting a conflict of interest.\293\ The criminal
contempt statute should be amended to require the appointment
of special counsel pursuant to the Justice Department's own
regulations whenever the House or Senate presents a criminal
contempt citation against an Executive Branch official. This
amendment would provide Congress some assurance prosecutorial
discretion in contempt matters would be exercised without the
appearance of a conflict of interest and should put
recalcitrant Federal officials on notice they cannot assume a
political ally will ignore a criminal contempt citation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\293\See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 600 (2015) (establishing grounds for
appointing a special counsel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the House has increasingly resorted to civil
enforcement of its subpoenas. While this mechanism has resulted
in substantial compliance, it has also resulted in lengthy
delays. This delay is often an unacceptable tradeoff. To
increase the usefulness of civil enforcement, the House should
consider a bill to require a three-judge panel in civil
enforcement actions related to congressional subpoenas with
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the three-judge panel.
This would ensure more timely resolution of these actions. An
investigation delayed by years of legal deliberations does not
allow Congress to make timely legislative decisions.
These three recommendations each have limitations and
drawbacks, but together they would provide Congress with a far
more robust ability to compel cooperation than it has today. It
is not acceptable for Congress to simply acquiesce to Executive
Branch obstruction. It is Congress' constitutional
responsibility to create, fund, and oversee Executive Branch
agencies. Congress cannot effectively uphold its
responsibilities under the Constitution without the power to
ensure compliance with requests for information and witnesses.
Classification Determinations
RECOMMENDATION
LAgencies should make express classification
determinations with respect to documents and materials provided
to congressional oversight committees in accordance with
relevant laws and Executive Orders.
ANALYSIS
The Committee encountered significant practical delays and
obstacles to its work arising from the need to quickly develop
institutional capabilities to properly handle, work with, and
protect classified information. While these difficulties to
some degree are inherent in the rapid establishment of a new
Committee with jurisdiction for national security matters, the
Executive Branch exacerbated these challenges with its repeated
efforts to declare certain material should be ``treated as
classified'' even though it had not actually made any
administrative determination the material in question met the
standards necessary to designate it as classified or followed
the process set out and required by Executive Order and
relevant regulation to actually designate the material as
classified.\294\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Legislative Branch recognizes the role of the Executive
Branch, in accordance with authorities provided under the
Constitution and by Congress itself, to determine whether and
how national security information should be classified and
follows such determinations. Absent an express determination by
the Executive Branch or other indication or awareness material
is derived from properly classified information, Congress must
treat information as unclassified to further the goal of
congressional oversight and the responsibilities of the House
to the public.\295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\295\See, e.g., Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Sec'y of
State for Legis. Affairs, Dep't of State, to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H.
Select Comm. on Benghazi (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter Frifield
Transmittal Letter] (on file with the Comm.). Use of the ``Sensitive
but Unclassified'' designation differs from the broader phenomenon
described here--which is not even founded in administrative practice--
but strongly illustrates the nature of the problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the course of this investigation, Executive Branch
agencies regularly acted in a manner inconsistent with both
principles by providing information (both documents and
interviews) to the Committee with the request the Committee
treat it as classified,\296\ even though it had not made any
actual determination with respect to the classification of any
of the material under the relevant authorities and
procedures.\297\ Although such requests may be considered in
the context of efforts to facilitate Committee access to the
material, there is no legal, administrative, or procedural
foundation for such a request. National security information
should either be properly classified in accordance with clearly
stated procedures or treated as unclassified. There is no
cognizable middle ground.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\296\As one example, in a September 25, 2015 letter to the Comm.
transmitting emails from the Sec'y, the Dep't stated ``these documents
should be handled differently from prior productions'' even though they
had not actually been determined to be classified and review was
ongoing. It requested informally for other documents--which had not
been properly classified--to be treated as classified. Id. Similarly,
the Department asked for certain interviews to be conducted in a
classified environment even though the anticipated subject matter had
previously been unclassified.
\297\Exec. Order No. 13526, for example, expressly provides:
``Information may be originally classified under the terms of this
order only if all of the following conditions are met.'' The stated
conditions include specific procedures for identifying and marking
classified information ``in a manner that is immediately apparent.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sensitive information can be protected without resort to
such arbitrary treatment, as it has been under the Committee's
voluntary agreement with the State Department to protect
certain types of personal and operational information. The
unfounded efforts of the Executive Branch to create new
categories of information control posed significant obstacles
to the Committee's work--both in handling and using the
material and in presenting it to the American people. It is
important to note the question here is not alleged ``over-
classification,'' but rather failure of the Executive Branch to
properly classify the information in question at all. The
former is a subjective assessment of whether material should be
classified and how. The latter represents attempts by the
Executive Branch to control information without following the
relevant law or procedure to classify it or, even worse, to
control information that doesn't fit within its lawful
classification authorities at all. Further, Executive Order
13526 clearly provides material cannot be classified to
``conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative
error'' or ``prevent embarrassment to a person, organization,
or agency.''\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, Sec. Sec. 1.7(1),
(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improving Oversight and Investigations within the House
RECOMMENDATIONS
LThe House should amend its rules to authorize all
committees to take depositions.
LThe House should amend its rules to require
committees to establish oversight subcommittees.
ANALYSIS
Congressional depositions allow Members and staff, as
authorized by a committee, to interview witnesses under oath
and, if necessary compel interview testimony by subpoena.\299\
The ability to interview witnesses in private allows committees
to gather information confidentially and in more depth than is
possible under the five-minute rule governing committee
hearings.\300\ This ability is often critical to conducting an
effective and thorough investigation.\301\ Committees rely on
voluntary interviews to gather information and conduct
investigations. If a witness refuses to be interviewed or if
the witness's employer--often the Executive Branch--refuses to
allow the interview, however, most House committees have no
recourse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\Morton Rosenberg, When Congress Comes Calling: A Primer on the
Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry, THE
CONST. PROJECT 11 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/07/WhenCongressComesCalling.pdf.
\300\Id.
\301\E.g. This committee conducted 107 interviews in the course of
its investigation. Interviews frequently lasted over three hours. This
number of witnesses and depth of questioning would be nearly impossible
in a hearing setting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the beginning of the 110th Congress, the Majority, the
House, controlled by a Democratic majority, amended its rules
to authorize the taking of depositions by members and staff of
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.\302\ Prior to
the 110th Congress, depositions had been authorized by the
House only for specific investigations.\303\ This standing
deposition authority applied only to the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform. In the current Congress, the House
authorized the taking of depositions by four additional
committees.\304\ The authority was initially limited to 2015
but was extended to 2016 after its successful implementation in
2015.\305\ Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on Science,
Space and Technology, noted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\302\H. Res. 6, 110th Congress Sec. 502 (2007).
\303\Rosenberg, supra note 299, at 11, 82. See, e.g., H. Res. 507,
105th Congress (1998) (Providing deposition authority to the Comm. on
Education and Workforce for an investigation relating to the
International Brotherhood of the Teamsters).
\304\H. Res. 5, 114th Congress Sec. 3 (b) (2015) (The Comms. on
Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Science, Space and Technology,
and Ways and Means).
\305\H. Res. 579, 114th Congress (2016).
During this session there are numerous instances of the
Committee obtaining documents and voluntary interviews
because of its deposition authority. In fact, as the
following examples show, many key interviews and
documents would likely not have been obtained without
the Committee's ability to compel on-the-record
interviews in a private setting.\306\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\306\162 Cong. Rec. H41 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2016) (letter submitted
for the record Rep. Smith).
Jeb Hensarling, Chairman, Committee on Financial Services,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
similarly noted:
Deposition authority continues to be critical to the
Committee's oversight of an Administration that has
been markedly indifferent to the Committee's subpoenas
and voluntary information requests.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\307\162 Cong. Rec. H39 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2016) (letter submitted
for the record Rep. Hensarling).
Given the successful implementation of deposition authority
in the 114th Congress to four additional committees, the House
should amend its rules to extend the authority to all of its
committees.
The small size of committee staffs in comparison to the
Federal agencies they oversee necessarily limits the ability of
committees to oversee the agencies within their jurisdictions.
In addition, committees are already busy wrestling with major
reauthorizations and reform plans. As a result, committees
sometimes struggle to devote sufficient resources to oversight.
House Rule X, clause 2(b)(2) requires standing authorizing
committees with more than 20 members to either establish an
oversight subcommittee or to require its subcommittees to
conduct oversight.\308\ As all House subcommittees have an
obligation to conduct oversight within their assigned
jurisdictions, this rule is little more than an exhortation to
establish an oversight subcommittee. Of the 15 committees to
which the rule applies, six did not establish oversight
subcommittees in the 114th Congress.\309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\Rules of the H. of Representatives, Rule X, cl. 2(b)(2) (114th
Cong.).
\309\H. Comm. on Agric., H. Comm. on Educ. & Workforce, H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, H. Comm. on Judiciary, H. Comm. on Small Bus., and H.
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some committees, such as the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, have a decades-long record of active oversight,\310\
not every committee in the House has acted accordingly. An
oversight subcommittee ensures that at least one subcommittee
chair and the staff of that subcommittee will be singularly
focused on oversight of the agencies and programs within the
full committee's jurisdiction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\See, e.g., Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory
Enforcement: A Review of EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement, 18 Envtl.
L. 683, 706 n. 57 (1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reforming Record-Keeping Laws
RECOMMENDATION
LCongress should consider strengthening enforcement
authorities and penalties under the Federal Records Act related
to the use of non-official email accounts and non-official
file-hosting services for official purposes.
ANALYSIS
The State Department's failure to adhere to Federal law and
its own policies governing record management significantly
impeded the committee's investigation.\311\ Even more
important, these failures delayed the flow of information to
the families and loved ones of those killed and injured in
Libya and delayed that information being made available to the
public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\311\See supra discussions regarding State Department's record-
keeping at 54-66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These failures are not indigenous to this Committee and
will be familiar to congressional investigators of the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services,\312\ the Environmental
Protection Agency,\313\ the Internal Revenue Service\314\ and
the Energy Department.\315\ The destruction of records, use of
private email and email aliases, and failure to retain records
has impeded multiple congressional investigations over the
years. These concerns reach back to prior administrations as
well. This is not a political issue; it is a legal,
constitutional, and branch equity issue. In 2007, the
Secretary--then Senator--denounced ``secret White House email
accounts'' after senior White House officials were found to
have conducted some official business over political email
accounts.\316\ In this Committee's investigation, the
Secretary's unusual email arrangement, her senior staff's use
of non-official email accounts, and the State Department's own
lack of fidelity to the record maintenance rules, all delayed
and in some instances prevented the Committee from accessing
official records necessary to conduct a thorough investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\Majority Staff of H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, Behind
the Curtain of the Healthcare.gov Rollout, 113th Cong. 1, 17 (Sept. 17,
2014), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Healthcare-gov-Report-Final-9-17-14.pdf.
\313\Letter from the members of H. Comm. on Science, Space, and
Tech. to Lisa Jackson, Adm'r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 23, 2013),
https://science.house.gov/news/letters/committee-letter-epa-
administrator-jackson-re-alias-emails-january-23-2013.
\314\See Letter from members of H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't
Reform to President Barack Obama (July 27, 2015), https://
oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/2015-07-27-
UPDATED-JC-to-Obama-WH-Koskinen-Resignation.compressed.pdf.
\315\Press Release, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, Oversight
Comm. Presses Energy Sec'y on False Denials, Improper Use of Non-
official Email Accounts in Solyndra Loan Program (Aug. 15, 2012),
https://oversight.house.gov/release/oversight-committee-presses-energy-
secretary-on-false-denials-improper-use-of-non-official-email-accounts-
in-solyndra-loan-program.
\316\Blake Neff, VIDEO: In 2007, Hillary Said Secret Emails
`Shredded' the Constitution, Daily Caller (Mar. 4, 2015), http://
dailycaller.com/2015/03/04/video-in-2007-hillary-said-secret-emails-
shredded-the-constitution.
PART V:
Recommendations
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi
Recommendation: The Executive Branch should provide for a
central planning and coordination mechanism (likely within an
existing entity) for interagency threat assessment and tracking
for ``force protection'' of U.S. facilities abroad as well as
planning, operations, and response to potential attacks.
The coordinating organization should provide for:
LA clear designation of ``who is in charge'' of
managing and following up on response in emergent situations as
well as the roles and responsibilities of involved departments
and agencies.
LClear and prompt timeline milestones for
resolution of policy issues potentially impacting response to
emergent situations.
LClear and real-time identification of all
potential U.S. Government assets potentially positioned to
respond to emergent threats.
LA mechanism for prompt consideration of potential
waivers to existing policy or other constraints potentially
limiting immediate response to an emergent situation.
LJoint training exercises with all agencies
present in high threat foreign locations as well as with the
host nation's external quick reaction force for emergency and
exfiltration plans.
LInteroperability and improved communication
during contingencies. As one example, on the ground security
personnel need to be able to communicate directly with
operational military personnel in a crisis to coordinate
surveillance and response.
LRelevant agencies (including the State
Department, combatant commands, and the Central Intelligence
Agency) need to be involved in each agency's emergency action
plans to ensure situational awareness as well as that each
agency's facilities, capabilities and response role is known.
Where capability on the ground is insufficient and the Defense
Department cannot respond immediately, the State Department and
other agencies can adjust their respective plans to allow
backup local or regional resources to be identified ahead of
time.
LAgencies on the ground need to plan for standby
military support before a crisis in high threat environments,
including where feasible support from U.S. allies. In addition,
the coordinating body should provide for a specific mechanism
to know and understand assets and capabilities actually
available at any given time.
As an example, a Commander's in Extremis Force has now been
stood up in Africa, but additional assets available for
contingency in high threat environments as well as response
times and capabilities should be known to relevant agencies as
part of emergency planning. If U.S. resources are not available
because of distance, the lack of assets for immediate response
should be incorporated in emergency planning with an
anticipated timeline for response.
Recommendation: Diplomatic Security personnel and or
Security Protection Specialists should maintain a state of
readiness to counter potential attacks at all times in high
threat environments.
LAgents should be armed or have ready access to
defensive weapons at all times.
LAdditionally, Diplomatic Security Agents and
Security Protection Specialists should maintain a 24-hour armed
quick reaction force [QRF] capability in all high threat
environments manned using internal resources when available.
LWhen sufficient internal resources are not
available, staffing for a QRF should be clearly coordinated in
advance with potential responders. Planning should also provide
for support and a definitive timeframe for response from other
U.S. government resources such as Mobile Security Detachments,
Site Security Teams or Fleet Antiterrorism Support Teams
[FAST]. When U.S. government assets are not available, planning
should consider whether contractors might provide enhanced
capability.
Recommendation: Operational planners should carefully
review whether a heightened posture is warranted on
anniversaries of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or
other politically significant dates such as Inauguration Day in
light of available analysis and threat intelligence.
Recommendation: Military planners should review current and
future operational planning to prevent recurrence of specific
operational issues identified in the response to the Benghazi
attacks. These include:
LEnsure that aircraft aligned with response forces
maintain the ability to meet specified timelines contained in
the relevant concept plans or operations plans.
LEnsure adequate--and actionable--planning and
resources for lift and mobility capabilities necessary for
response.
LEnhance the capability of Marine FAST to conduct
full-scope combat operations.
LMaintain a minimum anticipated timeline to
respond to any terrorist attack in the Middle East, North
Africa, or Central Asia.
Recommendation: The Committee supports funding the State
Department's Foreign Affairs Security Training Center as the
Department needs a dedicated training facility. The Department
also should ensure its personnel satisfactorily complete
requisite courses. A security professional should never go to a
warzone or high threat environment feeling unprepared to defend
themselves and their principal officer.
Internal and Public Government Communications About the Terrorist
Attacks in Benghazi
Recommendation: The drafting and editing of talking points
and other political communications for policymakers is not an
intelligence function. Intelligence agencies and officials
should not be drawn into the creating or editing of talking
points and other political or policy communications.
LFurther, intelligence analysts should generally
not produce products other than analytical products adhering to
proper analytical tradecraft. Other officials--such as
legislative or public affairs, non-analyst management, and
White House Staff--should not be involved in the production of
any product to be used or represented as the product of
analytical tradecraft. Each stream of material must be kept
separate and independent.
LFurther, when communicating with the public,
senior executive branch officials and spokespersons should
carefully distinguish analysis of intelligence and other
agencies from policy judgments, ``spin,'' opinion and
interpretations extrapolated from intelligence analysis by
White House staff, political appointees, or senior officials
outside the Intelligence Community. Such materials may be
derived from properly produced analytical material when
distinguished in this manner.
Recommendation: An additional step of quality control
should be instituted in the review process for analytic
products to ensure analytical products accurately reflect the
views of analysts consistent with proper analytical tradecraft
or are otherwise properly caveated.
LFurther, where senior analysts responsible for
briefing the President substitute their judgment for the
consensus views of line analysts in the President's Daily
Brief, the material should be appropriately caveated and
accompanied by the consensus view of line analysts.
LFurther, a formal mechanism should be put into
place to memorialize irregularities arising from significant
analytical disagreements or tradecraft deviations, including
notification to the Congressional intelligence committees.
Recommendation: Claims in analytic products should be
supported by substantial evidence, and analysts should clearly
understand and place sourcing into context. Open source
material should continue to play an appropriate role. However,
where analytic products and addressing emergent situations are
predominantly based on open source materials, they should be
clearly noted as such. As a corollary, while crisis reporting
may require flexibility in sourcing and analysis, emergent
reporting known to be uncertain or developing should be
properly disclosed and caveated.
Recommendation: Law governing Accountability Review Boards
[ARBs] should be amended to limit the influence of the
Secretary of State and offices with potential conflicts of
interest in the selection of members and to provide for broader
distribution and reporting to Congress with respect to ARB
reports or significant findings therein. More specifically:
LMembers of ARBs should be appointed in a manner
that ensures an independent and objective review of incidents
implicating potential accountability.
LThe scope of review for ARBs should include all
relevant, non-policy conduct of all personnel potentially
involved in incidents, including senior officials.
LARBs should be independent of outside influence
up to the point of making recommendations.
LARB proceedings should be conducted in a manner
to ensure appropriate recordkeeping of evidence and support for
findings and recommendations.
LIf deciding officials disagree with
recommendations of ARBs, require them to memorialize reasons in
writing.
LAll ARB reports or in exceptionally sensitive
circumstances significant findings of ARB reports should be
provided to Congress.
LARB reports should presumptively be produced in
an unclassified format, and wherever possible a version
outlining core findings and issues unrelated to personnel
actions should be made public.
LA clear mechanism should be developed to separate
personnel accountability from ``lessons learned'' and general
corrective actions following attacks.
LWithin the State Department, coordination,
oversight and support to an ARB should be provided by a
secretariat or other office independent from the secretariats
most likely to be reviewed during an ARB proceeding.
Recommendation: For an ARB review, the State Department
must affirmatively search for all relevant records, including
archived records and records of senior leaders.
Recommendation: The ARB implementing statute should be
amended to allow an assessment of personnel failures not rising
to the level of a ``breach of duty.''
Recommendation: Relevant Executive Branch agencies should
consider and develop an appropriate long-term framework to
provide for appropriate survivor benefits to the families of
Americans killed in the line of duty in response to issues
identified in the aftermath of the Benghazi attack.
Recommendation: Family members of Americans killed in the
line of duty should have a central liaison in Departments and
agencies where one does not already exist. Such liaisons should
be expressly chartered and empowered to act as advocates for
family members in--resolving or explaining benefits issues, and
providing as much information as possible (including specific
information on request) sought by family members. Where
classification issues exist, Departments and agencies should
consider providing limited security clearances regarding
relevant information pertaining to the fate of family members.
Events Leading to the Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi
Recommendation: The Executive Branch should provide
Congress with a clear statement of intentions, rationale, plan
and strategy (including objectives, contemplated method of
execution, and contemplated completion strategy) when entering
into major new overseas engagements. Such a statement should
also state contemplated results and potential consequences of
major initiatives.
Recommendation: No facility shall remain in an unofficial
status for more than 180 days without the express and direct
approval of the Secretary of State.
Recommendation: The State Department should comply with the
requirements of the Overseas Security Protection Board and the
standards provided for in the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act for all premises/facilities occupied for
more than 30 days, whether official or unofficial.
Recommendation: The State Department should identify a
specific funding source for immediate security upgrades for
posts in high threat areas.
Recommendation: The Intelligence Community and the State
Department should specifically recognize and improve collection
of intelligence related to civilian ``force protection'' issues
at facilities abroad, particularly with respect to high threat
posts.
LThis process should include more express
recognition and prioritization of collection requirements with
respect to threat warning and response within the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework.
LThis process should include more express
coordination and integration with strategic and tactical force
protection collection and analysis already conducted by Defense
Intelligence Agency and other military intelligence agencies.
Compliance with Congressional Investigations
Recommendation: House and Senate rules should be amended to
provide for mandatory reductions in appropriations to the
salaries of federal officials held in contempt of Congress.
Recommendation: The criminal contempt statute should be
amended to require the appointment of a special counsel to
handle criminal contempt proceedings upon the certification of
a contempt citation against an Executive Branch official by the
House or Senate.
Recommendation: Expedited procedures for the civil
enforcement of congressional subpoenas should be enacted to
provide timely judicial resolution of disputes.
Recommendation: Agencies seeking to control public
dissemination of information provided to Congress should make
express classification determinations with respect to documents
and materials provided to congressional oversight committees in
accordance with relevant laws and Executive Orders.
Recommendation: The House should amend its rules to
authorize all committees to take depositions.
Recommendation: The House should amend its rules to require
committees to establish oversight subcommittees.
Recommendation: Congress should consider strengthening
enforcement authorities and penalties under the Federal Records
Act related to the use of non-official email accounts and non-
official file-hosting services for official purposes.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
I. The First Victim of War is Truth: The administration misled the
public about the events in Benghazi
Officials at the State Department, including Secretary
Clinton, learned almost in real time that the attack in
Benghazi was a terrorist attack. With the presidential election
just 56 days away, rather than tell the American people the
truth and increase the risk of losing an election, the
administration told one story privately and a different story
publicly. They publicly blamed the deaths on a video-inspired
protest they knew had never occurred.
II. Last Clear Chance: Security in Benghazi was woefully inadequate and
Secretary Clinton failed to lead
The State Department has many posts but Libya and Benghazi
were different. After Qhaddafi, the U.S. knew that we could not
count on host nation security in a country where militias held
significant power. The American people expect that when the
government sends our representatives into such dangerous places
they receive adequate protection. Secretary Clinton paid
special attention to Libya. She sent Ambassador Stevens there.
Yet, in August 2012, she missed the last, clear chance to
protect her people.
III. Failure of Will: America did not move heaven and earth to rescue
our people
The American people expect their government to make every
effort to help those we put in harm's way when they find
themselves in trouble. The U.S. military never sent assets to
help rescue those fighting in Benghazi and never made it into
Libya with personnel during the attack. And, contrary to the
administration's claim that it could not have landed in
Benghazi in time to help, the administration never directed men
or machines into Benghazi.
IV. Justice Denied: The administration broke its promise to bring the
terrorists to justice
After the attacks, President Obama promised ``justice will
be done.'' There is no doubt our nation can make good on that
commitment. Yet, almost four years later, only one of the
terrorists has been captured and brought to the United States
to face criminal charges. Even that terrorist will not receive
the full measure of justice after the administration chose not
to seek the death penalty. The American people are owed an
explanation.
V. Unanswered Questions: The administration did not cooperate with the
investigation
Despite its claims, we saw no evidence that the
administration held a sincere interest in helping the Committee
find the truth about Benghazi. There is a time for politics and
a time to set politics aside. A national tragedy is one of
those times when as a nation we should join together to find
the truth. That did not happen here. So while the investigation
uncovered new information, we nonetheless end the Committee's
investigation without many of the facts, especially those
involving the President and the White House, we were chartered
to obtain.
INTRODUCTION
Yet tonight, we take comfort in knowing
that the tide of war is receding.
Barack Obama
President of the United States\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Way
Forward in Afghanistan (June 22, 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan.
The writer F. Scott Fitzgerald once observed, ``Show me a
hero and I will write you a tragedy.'' The September 11, 2012
Benghazi attack showed America not one but many heroes--among
them Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Tyrone Woods, Sean Smith,
and Glen Doherty. The story of Benghazi is their tragic story--
which ultimately is the story of four deaths that never should
have happened. America owes its people--especially those that
work to advance our interests and the interests of freedom
around the world--its utmost protection. We failed those
Americans in Benghazi.
This is not only the tragic story of two men who died
trying to bring freedom to the people of a foreign nation and
two others who died trying to save them. It is also the story
of a State Department seemingly more concerned with politics
and Secretary Clinton's legacy than with protecting its people
in Benghazi. It is the story of how the best military in the
world never reached Benghazi with men or machines, leaving
fellow Americans to fight, and die, alone. And it is the story
of an administration so focused on the next election that it
lost sight of its duty to tell the American people the truth
about what had happened that night.
For the men on the ground in Benghazi, the terrorist attack
began at 9:42 p.m. and the threat continued for hours until the
planes carrying them and the bodies of the four murdered
Americans left Benghazi. For the terrorists the attack was also
continuous. It was a plan executed in multiple phases that
began at the State facility. It continued when the terrorists
ambushed the Americans en route to the Annex. The attack
continued with multiple assaults on the Annex culminating with
deadly mortar fire. According to the Department of Justice, the
mission was willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated--a
coordinated assault aimed at killing or kidnapping America's
ambassador.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\See United States v. Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah, No. 14-CR-
00141 (D.D.C filed Oct. 14, 2014), Indictment at 6, (hereafter
``Khatallah Indictment'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those in Washington decided that once the initial attack at
the State compound had ended and our men moved to the Annex,
the enemy had retreated as well. For those fighting for their
lives in Benghazi that night, however, it was one long battle
for survival. But the terrorists did not retreat. This view
from Washington that the fight had ended is a lapse in judgment
that may well haunt our nation for years to come. At the same
time Secretary Clinton appears to have concluded that the
attack was over, the men on the ground knew better.\3\ In the
end, two men died from smoke inhalation at the State
Department's compound during an initial attack involving dozens
of extremists. Two more died from mortar fire at the end of a
continuous, hours-long siege by approximately a hundred heavily
armed and highly trained fighters at the CIA Annex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\During her testimony before the Committee Secretary Clinton
testified, ``We knew that the attack was over. We knew that our
diplomatic security team had to evacuate from the compound to the CIA
annex, and we were in a frantic search to find Ambassador Stevens.''
Hearing 4 Before the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the
2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State) (emphasis added). Secretary
Clinton's certainty about the attack contrasts with the view of those
on the ground, where one of our men described the situation after
arriving at the Annex, ``everybody takes a position to support what we
have in store, which we don't know what it is at this point. We are not
sure. We don't know if the fight is over or if it is going to be
longer.'' Transcript of Deposition of DS Agent #3 before Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 164 (emphasis added) (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet, beyond those basic facts other important questions
required answers:
LWhy were diplomats stationed in Benghazi in the
first place and, more importantly, why did they stay as it
became more and more dangerous?
LWhy did the State Department ignore multiple
requests for help from the team in Benghazi, leaving them to
fend for themselves in a facility that was no match for a well-
organized assault?
LWhy did the U.S. military do almost nothing to
help and why did it take them so long to arrive in Libya and
never prepare assets to arrive in Benghazi?
LWhy did the administration mislead the American
people about the nature and cause of the attack?
LWhy, now almost four years later, has only one of
the dozens of terrorists who murdered four of our countrymen
faced American justice?
Our Democrat committee colleagues suggest all questions
about Benghazi have already been asked and answered by earlier
congressional investigations and the State Department's
Accountability Review Board. While we recognize the
contributions some of those other investigations made to our
understanding of Benghazi, the questions above and other
questions remained, both in our minds and in the minds of many
Americans.
We had a duty to seek the entire truth. If we learned
nothing new, we would be the first to admit it--and the time
and resources devoted would have amounted to a small price to
pay to close this chapter once and for all. Yet, our confidence
grew that there was more to be learned even as the
administration stonewalled at virtually every turn. Our
confidence grew even more with each new revelation including
the revelation of Secretary Clinton's unprecedented and
exclusive use of a private e-mail account and server.
Unfortunately, the administration's efforts to impede the
investigation succeeded, at least in part. The White House in
particular left large holes in the investigation by denying the
Committee access to documents and witnesses--often hiding
behind vague notions of ``important and longstanding
institutional interests of the Executive Branch.''\4\ And so
the Committee ended its work without having spoken to anyone in
the White House Situation Room that night. Nor did we receive
all email communication between White House staffers concerning
the attack--all off limits to Congress according to White House
lawyers. Compounding the problem, the White House refused to
identify any of the documents it had withheld. If the
administration had a sincere interest in cooperating with the
Committee's investigation, as it stated repeatedly, we saw no
real evidence of it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Letter from W. Neil Eggleston, White House Counsel, to Rep. Trey
Gowdy, Chairman, Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012
Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (``the Committee'') (Jan. 23, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And so we leave the Committee much the same way we joined
it--knowing that Congress and the American people did not get
every relevant fact from this administration. Nevertheless, we
did learn more. Much more.
Most significantly, the administration consistently blamed
flawed information from the U.S. Intelligence Community,
primarily the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for its public
misstatements about Benghazi--with the President, Secretary
Clinton, Ambassador Rice, and others blaming a video-inspired
protest that had never taken place in Benghazi.\5\ But flawed
intelligence is no excuse for officials who knew better, and we
now know that key leaders did. Secretary Clinton in particular
learned quickly that Benghazi amounted to an organized
terrorist attack, not a spontaneous demonstration turned
violent. Yet, Secretary Clinton and the administration told one
story privately--that Benghazi was a terrorist attack--and told
another story publicly--blaming a video-inspired protest. The
misleading public statements led concerned State Department
staffers to describe Ambassador Rice as ``off the reservation''
and another to add the ``[White House was] very worried about
the politics.''\6\ A national tragedy, however, is not a time
for politics; it is a time to set politics aside and do one's
duty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\For example, the report issued by the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence concluded that ``Ambassador Rice's September
16 public statements about the existence of a protest, as well as some
of the underlying intelligence reports, proved to be inaccurate.'' See
Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in
Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012 (report by Chm. Rogers and
Ranking Member Ruppersberger, Members, H. Perm. Select Comm. on Intel.)
(Comm. Print 2014).
\6\E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, State
Dep't, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau to various (Sept. 17, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also learned that by September 11, 2012 the security
situation in Benghazi had deteriorated significantly. Months
before the attack one State Department diplomatic security
agent viewed the situation as a ``suicide mission'' where
``there was a very good chance that everyone was going to
die.''\7\ Yet, the facility remained open--even as other
countries and organizations departed. And yet no one could give
a satisfactory explanation for why the State Department
remained. While we may never know for certain exactly why the
State Department left Benghazi open in the face of such
dangerous conditions, the most plausible answer is troubling.
Secretary Clinton pushed for the U.S. to intervene in Libya,
which at the time represented one of her signature
achievements. To leave Benghazi would have been viewed as her
failure and prompted unwelcome scrutiny of her choices. But
when faced with a dire situation in Libya, Secretary Clinton
had an obligation to act. And she had a clear chance to do so
in August 2012 when presented with the facts in a memo from
Assistant Secretary Beth Jones that painted a bleak picture of
conditions in Libya. Yet, she failed to lead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Transcript of Interview of DS Agent #10 at 22 (on file with the
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we learned troubling new details about the
government's military response to the attack. Until now the
administration has led us to believe the military did not have
assets--men or machines--close enough or ready enough to arrive
in Benghazi in time to save lives. As one earlier committee put
it, ``given their location and readiness status it was not
possible to dispatch armed aircraft before survivors left
Benghazi.''\8\ The first asset to arrive in Libya--a Marine
``FAST'' platoon--did not arrive until nearly 24 hours after
the attack began. What is troubling is that the administration
never set in motion a plan to go to Benghazi in the first
place. It is one thing to try and fail; it is yet another not
to try at all. In the end, the administration did not move
heaven and earth to help our people in Benghazi, as Americans
would expect. The contrast between the heroic actions taken in
Benghazi and the inaction in Washington--highlights the
failure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\Staff of H. Armed Services Comm., 113th Cong., Majority Interim
Report: Benghazi Investigation Update (Comm. Print 2014) at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2011, the President boasted that ``[w]ithout putting a
single U.S. service member on the ground, we achieved our
objectives [in Libya.]''\9\ With parts of Libya now terrorist
safe havens, it is difficult not to look back on that claim and
the claim ``the tide of war was receding'' as little more than
wishful thinking. The same wishful thinking may have also
influenced decisions the administration made in Libya and set
the background against which four Americans died. Yet, wishes
are no match for facts--nor the basis for a sound foreign
policy. The facts remain and the tide of war goes in and out.
And it was still rising in Libya in September 2012 as Secretary
Clinton and the President stood idle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\See Press Release, Barack Obama, President of the United States,
Remarks by the President on the Death of Muammar Qaddafi (Oct. 20,
2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/20/remarks-
president-death-muammar-qaddafi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What follows are the views of two members of this
Committee. We choose to add these additional views not to
question the Committee's full report. Rather, we write
separately to highlight those facts and conclusions uncovered
by our investigation that we consider most important to a full
understanding of the tragedy that is Benghazi.
I. The First Casualty of War Is Truth: How the administration misled
the public about the Benghazi attack
Was it because of a protest? Or was it because of guys
out for a walk one night and decided they would go kill
some Americans? What difference at this point does it
make?
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Benghazi: The Attacks and the Lessons Learned Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. at 28 (2013) (testimony of
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State), http://www.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/1301/23/se.01.html). Oddly, even well after the fact
Secretary Clinton continues the false narrative by leaving out of her
answer any reference to it having been a planned terrorist attack.
The statement that begins this section--the first casualty of war
is truth--is typically attributed to the late California Senator Hiram
Johnson (1866-1945), albeit in a slightly different form.
It began the night of September 11, 2012 and continued for
nearly two weeks after. The administration made statements
about Benghazi that led the public to believe the attack began
spontaneously as a protest over an anti-Islamic video
circulating on the Internet. It was, they said, the same video
that had sparked demonstrations in Cairo earlier that day. The
first statement came from Secretary Clinton. More would follow,
from the President, from Ambassador Rice, and from others. Each
seemed to blame the murders on a video and a protest.
Yet, in truth, no protest had occurred in Benghazi that
night. And even today no clear link between the video and the
attack exists. In fact, in the criminal indictment against
Ahmed Salim Faraj Abu Khatallah (hereafter ``Abu Khatallah'')--
the only person prosecuted thus far for taking part in the
attack--the government does not mention the video or a protest.
Rather, it blames the attack on revenge for U.S. intelligence
collection efforts in the area--a far different explanation
than America received in the immediate aftermath of the
attack.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\See Khatallah Indictment at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Did the administration mislead the public because it
worried a terrorist attack might affect the upcoming election?
Or did it simply rely on flawed and changing information from
the U.S. Intelligence Community as the administration has
maintained? Some critics may say the question alone is evidence
of the Committee's alleged partisan agenda. Others may defend
the misstatements as little more than election-year ``spin''--
something for which the public might fault both parties.
For her part, Secretary Clinton simply dismissed the
issue--``at this point, what difference does it make?''--in her
now famous exchange with Senator Johnson. Yet, the truth is
always important. It is especially so during times when we as a
nation must face a crisis--and mourn one--together and to learn
from it. Instead of sharing that truth, the administration
concealed it. And in doing so it misled the American people for
political gain. When that happens, whether by Republicans or
Democrats, it does, should, and always will make a difference.
A. 56 DAYS
The terrorist attack in Benghazi came during a critical
time for the President. He faced an increasingly difficult re-
election bid as polls showed his lead over Republican
presidential nominee Mitt Romney narrowing. The President had
few clear successes to highlight from his first term and the
economy had yet to recover fully. The political landscape left
little room for error--or bad news.
If one bright spot existed in the President's record,
nearly four years in office had passed without a significant
terrorist incident at home or abroad and killing Osama bin
Laden represented an important accomplishment--one the
President and his team trumpeted often.\12\ As Vice President
Biden put it just days before the attack, ``Osama bin Laden is
dead, and General Motors is alive.'' It was a powerful
political argument, but the tide of war continued to roll in.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\For example, just 5 days before the attack, the President in
his nationally-televised speech said the following about the war on
terror:
In a world of new threats and new challenges, you can
choose leadership that has been tested and proven. Four
years ago I promised to end the war in Iraq. We did. I
promised to refocus on the terrorists who actually attacked
us on 9/11, and we have. We've blunted the Taliban's
momentum in Afghanistan, and in 2014, our longest war will
be over. A new tower rises above the New York skyline, al-
Qaeda is on the path to defeat, and Osama bin Laden is
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dead.
President Barack Obama, Speech to Democratic National Convention (Sept.
6, 2012) (emphasis added), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/06/160713941/
transcript-president-obamas-convention-
speech).
September 11, 2012 threatened to take the President's
national security argument away. The Romney campaign and others
seized on the attack as evidence of a failed policy and
criticized the administration's seeming refusal to call the
attackers terrorists. To many, Benghazi represented a potential
October surprise that could impact the President's re-election
bid.\13\ As one publication put it, ``with the American
Presidential election only two months away, the murder of four
American diplomats could be a game changer so far as Mr.
Obama's re-election prospects are concerned.''\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\See, e.g., Craig Unger, GOP's October Surprise? Source reveals
``Jimmy Carter Strategy'' to make Obama Seem weak on defense in
campaign's final month, Salon (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.salon.com/
2012/10/01/gops_october _surprise/.
\14\Con Coughlin, The murder of the US ambassador to Libya is a
wake-up call for Obama, The Telegraph, (Sept. 12, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President had a political problem. And his advisors saw
it immediately. In fact, the election entered the discussion
before the attack even ended. Sometime before 10:35 p.m. on the
night of September 11, 2012, Victoria Nuland, the State
Department's spokesperson, sent an email to two other high
level Clinton aides, Jacob Sullivan and Phillipe Reines:
This is what Ben [Rhodes] was talking about.
``I'm outraged by the attacks on American diplomatic
missions in Libya and Egypt and by the death of an
American consulate worker in Benghazi. It's disgraceful
that the Obama Administration's first response was not
to condemn attacks on our diplomatic missions, but to
sympathize with those who waged the attacks.--Mitt
Romney''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\E-mail from Victoria Nuland, State Dep't Spokesperson, to Jacob
Sullivan, State Dep't Deputy Chief of Staff and Phillipe Reines, State
Dep't Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications (Sept. 11, 2012)
(emphasis added) (on file with the Committee, C05412104).
The ``Ben'' in Nuland's email was Benjamin Rhodes, the
White House National Security Council's Deputy National
Security Adviser for Strategic Communications and one of the
President's top aides. The ``this'' was the accompanying
``Tweet'' issued from the Romney campaign attacking the
administration's handling of the situation. In short, the
national security crisis turned into a political problem almost
immediately.
And so on this highly charged political stage--just 56 days
before the presidential election--events forced the
administration to make a choice about what to tell the American
people: Tell the truth that heavily armed terrorists had killed
one American and possibly kidnapped a second--and increase the
risk of losing the election. Say we do not know what happened.
Or blame a video-inspired protest by tying Benghazi to what had
occurred earlier in the day in Cairo. The administration chose
the third, a statement with the least factual support but that
would help the most politically.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\When asked on the night of the attack whether he knew ``of any
connection between what had occurred in Cairo and what had occurred in
Benghazi,'' Rhodes testified, ``I did not, other than the fact that
both events took place in proximity to one another.'' See Transcript of
Interview of Benjamin Rhodes, Deputy National Security Advisor for
Strategic Communications, White House National Security Council at 13
(Feb. 2, 2016) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the attack loomed largest, and most immediately, for
the President and his reelection bid, he was not alone in
having a choice to make--or with something to lose. Secretary
Clinton would have seen her reputation and legacy--and possibly
2016 election prospects--tied to what had just occurred in
Benghazi as well.
Secretary Clinton was the administration's chief proponent
of U.S. Libya policy and pushed for the President to join the
NATO coalition to topple Qhaddafi. According to then-Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates, who opposed intervention, others who
pushed to intervene--including Ambassador Rice and Ben Rhodes--
are the same people who later worked to mislead the public
about the attack.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\Robert F. Gates, Duty 518 (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While that effort succeeded and Qhaddafi is gone, most now
agree that the Libya intervention failed, in large part because
of inadequate planning for a post-Qhaddafi Libya. As former
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said later, the
administration was ``playing it by ear'' after Qhaddafi's
fall.\18\ So instead of a burgeoning democracy growing from the
Arab Spring, we now have a terrorist safe haven growing in its
place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Nancy A. Youssef, Hillary's Libya Post-War Plan was ``Play It
by Ear,'' Gates Says, (Oct. 20, 2015, 8:00 p.m.), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/10/20/hillary-s-libya-post-war-
plan-was-play-it-by-ear-gates-says.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Clinton rarely mentions Libya now. Yet, early on
her advisors pointed to Qhaddafi's ouster and her role as a
historic foreign policy success. In August 2011, Secretary
Clinton's Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy Jacob
Sullivan described her role as no less than the ``leadership/
ownership/stewardship of this country's Libya policy from start
to finish'' and that she was ``instrumental in securing the
authorization, building the coalition, and tightening the noose
around Qadhafi and his regime.''\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\E-mail from Jacob Sullivan to Cheryl Mills, State Dep't Chief
of Staff (Aug. 21, 2011) (on file with the Committee, SCB0075905).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Clinton's longtime friend and advisor Sidney
Blumenthal described the success in even loftier terms:
First, brava! This is a historic moment and you will be
credited for realizing it.
When Qaddafi himself is finally removed, you should of
course make a public statement before the cameras
wherever you are, even in the driveway of your vacation
house. You must go on camera. You must establish
yourself in the historical record at this moment.
The most important phrase is: ``successful strategy.''
* * *
Then you can say whatever on future policy--but only
after asserting the historic success and explaining the
reasons why.
This is a very big moment historically and for you.
History will tell your part in it. You are vindicated.
But don't wait, help Clio now.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\E-mail from Sidney Blumenthal to Hillary Rodham Clinton (Aug.
22, 2011) (emphasis added) (as we now know and as Secretary Gates has
pointed, out the day after Qhaddafi fell called for far more planning
than ``whatever'') (on file with the Committee, BLU-094).
It is too soon to know how Clio--the goddess of history--
will ultimately treat Secretary Clinton's push to intervene in
Libya. What we do know is that when given a chance to tell the
truth to the American people, she did the opposite. It began at
10:08 p.m. in Washington on the night of the murders--before
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the attack had even ended.
B. OUT OF THE FOG: TELLING ONE STORY PRIVATELY
AND ANOTHER STORY PUBLICLY
Some blame the ``fog of war'' for the administration's
misstatements about Benghazi. While it is true officials in
Washington did not have all the facts, the President, Secretary
Clinton, and other senior leaders had enough information to
conclude almost immediately that Benghazi and Cairo were very
different. Benghazi was a terrorist attack and Cairo a large
protest that had been publicized in advance on social media and
that the State Department prepared for and expected.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\See Transcript of Press Conference, Statement of Victoria
Nuland, State Dep't Spokesperson (Sept. 17, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, C05394583).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The information the President, Secretary Clinton, and other
senior leaders had included detailed information about the
sophisticated nature of the attack, the weapons used, the
complexity of the attack, and the hours-long duration of the
siege that spanned two locations. For example, one State
Department official was told that night by a witness in
Benghazi that the attackers who fired the mortar launcher had
significant training and were ``not just persons off the street
lobbing in mortars.''\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\Transcript of Interview of Charlene Lamb, Assistant Sec'y of
State for Diplomatic Security for International Programs at 46-47 (Jan.
7, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significantly, the information known in Washington included
reports from a number of eye witnesses on the ground in
Benghazi--often in near real time--who remained in almost
constant contact with officials in Washington during the
attack. None of those eye witnesses mentioned a protest or the
video.
One of those witnesses saw the attack begin in real time
while watching the Benghazi compound's security monitors inside
the facility's tactical operations center. Up to that point, no
protests had occurred and all was calm. When asked later about
whether a protest had occurred, he said, ``No. There was
nothing out there up until, well, up until there was. I had
been out of the gate at 8:30 that night. We had had personnel
leaving the compound, and they drove away from our compound and
didn't report anything, and I spoke with them subsequently,
there was nothing out there.''\23\ That same witness updated
officials in Washington every 15 to 30 minutes throughout the
night--giving the State Department virtually a front row seat
to the attack.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\Transcript of Deposition of DS Agent #3 before House Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform at 231 (Oct. 8, 2013) (on file with the
Committee).
\24\Id. at 165. At approximately 4:38 p.m. the State Dep't
Operations Center appears to have set up a direct line to Benghazi. See
E-mail to Jacob Sullivan, Cheryl Mills, and Secretary Clinton's
Executive Assistant (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05561866).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, Gregory Hicks, who
was in Tripoli at the time of the attack, spoke to Ambassador
Stevens last. As terrorists swarmed the Benghazi compound,
Ambassador Stevens managed to call Hicks and said, simply,
``Greg, we are under attack.''\25\ No mention of a protest. No
mention of the video. Hicks relayed this same information to
Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs (``NEA'')
Beth Jones\26\ and also spoke to Secretary Clinton and other
top State Department officials that night.\27\ When asked later
whether he would have expected Ambassador Stevens and the
security officers in Benghazi to report a protest if it had
occurred, Hicks said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Transcript of Interview of Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge of
Mission in Libya before H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform at
18 (Apr. 11, 2013).
\26\Transcript of Interview of Beth Jones, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs before House Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform at 38-39 (July 11, 2013) (``He said . . . Greg Hicks
has called. Ambassador Stevens is in Benghazi. He called and said,
`We're under attack.''').
\27\See Dep't of State, Watch Log, Operations Center (Sept. 11,
2012) (showing call at 7:05 p.m. between Hicks and Secretary Clinton,
Deputy Secretary Thomas Nides, Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy, Under
Secretary Wendy Sherman, Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills, Deputy Chief of
Staff and Director Jacob Sullivan, Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, and
Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Beth Jones (on file
with the Committee, C05872462).
Absolutely, I mean, we're talking about both security
officers who know their trade, even though they are
brand new, and one of the finest political officers in
the history of the Foreign Service. You know, for there
to have been a demonstration on Chris Stevens' front
door and him not to have reported it is unbelievable.
And secondly, if he had reported it, he would have been
out the back door within minutes of any demonstration
appearing anywhere near that facility. And there was a
back gate to the facility, and, you know, it
worked.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\Transcript of Interview of Gregory Hicks before H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform at 81-82 (emphasis added) (on file with
the Committee).
Days later, one member of the State Department's Diplomatic
Security Command Center on duty the night of the attack was
asked by a colleague whether a protest had been reported prior
to the attack. His response left little doubt: ``Zip, nothing
nada.''\29\ That same person in a ``Terrorism Event
Notification'' emailed out the morning of September 12, 2012
described the event just as clearly: ``It was a full on attack
against our compound in Benghazi.''\30\ Again, no mention of a
protest. No mention of the video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\E-mail from DS Agent #30 to DS Agent (Sept. 18, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05390678).
\30\E-mail from DS Agent #30 to various (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05389586)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of the information coming into the State Department
that night and in the days that followed from the witnesses
pointed to a terrorist attack. There is no evidence that any of
the accounts blamed a video-inspired protest or, in fact, any
protest at all. Moreover, this attack did not occur in a
vacuum. Rather, it came toward the end--not the beginning--of a
long list of terrorist and other violence aimed at the U.S. and
other interests in Libya and Benghazi--a history of violence
well known to senior State Department officials.
Officials also recognized very quickly the differences
between what had occurred in Cairo in response to the video and
what occurred in Benghazi. As one official put it the night of
the attack, ``We can confirm that our office in Benghazi, Libya
has been attacked by a group of militants [and] [i]n Cairo, we
can confirm that Egyptian police have now removed the
demonstrators. . . .''\31\ That line between Benghazi and
Cairo, however, would soon be blurred and then erased
completely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\E-mail from Victoria Nuland, State Dep't Spokesperson to Jacob
Sullivan, Patrick Kennedy, Patrick Ventrell, Bernadette Meehan,
National Security Council, Assistant Press Secretary (Sept. 11, 2012)
(on file with the Committee, SCB000471).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notwithstanding clear evidence of a terrorist attack in
Benghazi, Secretary Clinton began to connect Cairo and Benghazi
in the public's mind almost immediately even as she and others
admitted privately the two were unrelated. It began at 10:08
p.m. on the night of the attack--before the attack had even
ended--with Secretary Clinton's statement condemning the
attack. Other statements would follow as well that week. As
shown in the following timeline of administration statements,
the administration told two different stories, one publicly
that connected the attack to the video and protests in Cairo
and another privately that recognized it was a terrorist
attack.
C. PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE TIMELINE
9/11--Public Statements
Secretary Clinton's 10:08 p.m. Statement on the Attack in
Benghazi:
``I condemn in the strongest terms the attack on our mission in
Benghazi today. * * * Some have sought to justify this vicious
behavior as a response to inflammatory material posted on the
Internet.''\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State,
Statement on the Attack in Benghazi (Sept. 11, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197628.htm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/11--Private Statements
Secretary Clinton's Call Sheet for call with President
of Libya Mohammed al Magariaf at 6:49 p.m.:
Under heading Purpose of Call'' notes that ``Secretary
should urge Mr. Magariaf to respond urgently to the
attack against the U.S. Mission Benghazi, and security
threats against U.S. Embassy Tripoli.'' No mention of a
protest or video.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\See The Secretary's Call Sheet for Libyan General National
Congress President Mohammed al Magariaf (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with
the Committee, C05580497).
Summary of Call between Secretary Clinton and President
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Magariaf:
``[O]ur diplomatic mission was attacked[.] . . .
[T]here is a gun battle ongoing, which I understand
Ansar as-Sharia [sic] is claiming responsibility
for.''\34\ No mention of protest or video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\Notes of Secretary Clinton's Call with Mohammed al Magariaf
(Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05561906).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Clinton's E-mail to daughter at 11:23 p.m.:
``Two of our officers were killed in Benghazi by an Al
Queda- like [sic] group[.]''\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\E-mail from Hillary Rodham Clinton to ``Diane Reynolds'' (Sept.
11, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05794191).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/12--Public Statements
Secretary Clinton's Remarks on the Deaths of American Personnel
in Benghazi, Libya morning of September 12, 2012:
``We are working to determine the precise motivations and
methods of those who carried out this assault. Some have sought
to justify this vicious behavior, along with the protest that
took place at our Embassy in Cairo yesterday, as a response to
inflammatory material posted on the internet.''\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, Remarks on the Deaths
of American Personnel in Benghazi, Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197654.htm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/12--Private Statements
Summary of Discussion between Acting Assistant
Secretary Beth Jones and Libyan Ambassador Aujali at
9:45 a.m.:
``I told him that the group that conducted the
attacks--Ansar Al Sharia--is affiliated with Islamic
extremists.''\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\See E-mail to Victoria Nuland, Deputy Secretary William Burns,
Wendy Sherman, Jacob Sullivan, Patrick Kennedy, Cheryl Mills, and
others (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05391027).
Jacob Sullivan in e-mail to embassy in Kabul,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan:
``There was not really violence in Egypt [and] ``we are
not saying that the violence in Libya erupted `over
inflammatory videos.'''\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\E-mail from Jacob Sullivan to Benjamin Rhodes and others
(Sept.12, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0066195).
Secretary Clinton's Statements to Egyptian Prime
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minister Kandil at 3:04 p.m.:
``We know that the attack in Libya had nothing to do
with the film. It was a planned attack--not a protest.
. . . Based on the information we saw today we believe
the group that claimed responsibility for this was
affiliated with al-Qaeda.''\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\Notes of Secretary Clinton's Call with Egyptian Prime Minister
Hesham Kandil (Sept. 11, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with the
Committee, C05561911).
Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy to congressional staff
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
briefing:
When asked whether ``this [was] an attack under the
cover of a protest'' Kennedy said, ``No the attack was
a direct breaching attack.'' More to the point, he was
then asked whether ``we believe [this was] coordinated
with [the] Cairo [protests] to which Kennedy responded,
``Attack in Cairo was a demonstration. There were no
weapons shown or used. A few cans of spray paint.''\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\E-mail from Joy E. Drucker to various (Sept. 13, 2012)
(forwarding notes from call between Patrick Kennedy and congressional
staff that began at 6:30 p.m. September 12, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, C05580110).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/13--Public Statements
Secretary Clinton's Morocco Remarks:
``I also want to take a moment to address the video circulating
on the Internet that has led to these protests in a number of
countries. * * *
To us, to me personally, this video is disgusting and
reprehensible. It appears to have a deeply cynical purpose: to
denigrate a great religion and to provoke rage. But as I said
yesterday, there is no justification, none at all, for
responding to this video with violence.
* * *
Violence, we believe, has no place in religion and is no way to
honor religion. Islam, like other religions, respects the
fundamental dignity of human beings, and it is a violation of
that fundamental dignity to wage attacks on innocents. As long
as there are those who are willing to shed blood and take
innocent life in the name of God, the world will never know a
true and lasting peace. It is especially wrong for violence to
be directed against diplomatic missions. . . .
* * *
I wanted to begin with this statement, because, as our Moroccan
friends and all of you know, this has been a difficult week at
the State Department. I very much appreciate, Minister, the
condolences your government expressed to our Embassy in Rabat.
And even though that tragedy happened far away in Benghazi, we
found a reminder of the deep bounds that connect Morocco to the
United States.''\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State, Remarks at Opening
Plenary of the United States-Morocco Strategic Dialogue Washington,
D.C. Wednesday, September 13, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/
20092013clinton/rm/2012/09/197711.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/13--Private Statements
Summary of call between State Department Deputy
Secretary Thomas Nides and Egyptian ambassador to U.S.:
``Nides said he understood the difference between the
targeted attack in Libya and the way the protest
escalated in Egypt.''\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\E-mail from State Dep't Operations Officer to State Dep't
Official (Sept. 13, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05562242).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/14--Public Statements
White House Spokesman Jay Carney during press conference
answering question about Benghazi:
``We have no information to suggest that it was a preplanned
attack. The unrest we've seen around the region has been in
reaction to a video that Muslims, many Muslims find offensive.
And while the violence is reprehensible and unjustified, it is
not a reaction to the 9/11 anniversary that we know of, or to
U.S. policy.''\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\Transcript of White House Press Conference, Jay Carney, White
House Spokesperson (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/09/14/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-
9142012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E-mail from White House Advisor Benjamin Rhodes:
Under heading ``Goals'' he wrote ``To underscore that these
protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader
failure of policy[.]''\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\E-mail, Benjamin Rhodes to David Plouffe, White House Political
Advisor, Jay Carney, White House Spokesperson, Erin Pelton, aide to
Amb. Susan Rice, and others (Sept. 14, 2012 at 8:09 p.m.) (on file with
the Committee, C05415285).
Return of remains ceremony statement to father of Tyrone Woods
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
recorded in diary:
``I gave Hillary a hug and shook her hand, and she said we are
going to have the filmmaker arrested who was responsible for
the death of my son.''\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\See Fox News Insider, Father of Benghazi Victim Reveals Journal
Entry Documenting Meeting With Hillary, YouTube (Jan. 13, 2016), http:/
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMx0huMabos.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Return of remains ceremony statement to mother of Sean Smith:
``We were nose-to-nose at the coffin ceremony. She told me it
was the fault of the video. I said `are you sure?' She says
`yes, that's what it was . . . it was the video.'''\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\See Fox Business, Benghazi Victim's Mom: Hillary Needs to Tell
Me the Truth! (Mar. 10, 2016) (available here http://
www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/03/10/benghazi-victims-mom-
hillary-needs-to-tell-me-truth.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/14--Private Statements
E-mail from State Department press officer in embassy
in Tripoli, Libya:
``Colleagues, I mentioned to Andy this morning, and
want to share with all of you, our view at Embassy
Tripoli that we must be cautious in our local messaging
with regard to the inflammatory film trailer, adapting
it to Libyan conditions. . . . Relatively few [Facebook
comments and tweets] have even mentioned the
inflammatory video. So if we post messaging about the
video specifically, we may draw unwanted attention to
it. And it is becoming increasingly clear that the
series of events in Benghazi was much more terrorist
attack than a protest which escalated into violence. It
is our opinion that in our messaging, we want to
distinguish, not conflate, the events in other
countries with this well-planned attack by militant
extremists. I have discussed this with Charge Hicks and
he shares PAS's view.''\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs
Bureau, NEA-Libya Desk, Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge of Libya
Mission, and others (Sept. 14, 2012 at 6:43 p.m.) (on file with the
Committee, C05396788).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/15--Public Statements
President's Weekly Address titled ``Carrying on the Work of Our
Fallen Heroes'' muddles Benghazi and protests in other
countries:
``This tragic attack takes place at a time of turmoil and
protest in many different countries. I have made it clear that
the United States has a profound respect for people of all
faiths. We stand for religious freedom. And we reject the
denigration of any religion--including Islam.''\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\Barack Obama, President of the United States, Weekly Address:
Carrying on the Work of Our Fallen Heroes (Sept. 15, 2012), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/15/weekly-address-carrying-
work-our-fallen-heroes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/15--Private Statements
Secretary Clinton's call with Prime Minister-Elect of
Libya:
Makes no mention of either a protest or the video.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\E-mail from State Dep't officer to S_CallNotes (Sept. 15, 2012)
(notes of call between Secretary Clinton and Libyan Prime Minister-
elect Abu Shagur) (on file with the Committee, C05561908).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/16--Public Statements
Ambassador Rice on Fox News With Chris Wallace
``But we don't see at this point signs this was a coordinated
plan, premeditated attack.''\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice on Fox News Sunday
with Chris Wallace (Sept. 16, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/16--Private Statements
Excerpt from Embassy Tripoli Media Report September 16,
2012
``[T]here is evidence that suggests that the second
confrontation at the UM mission's safe house could not
have happened without insider knowledge or some degree
of organization. This goes against statements that the
attacks were not carried out by a single group but by
an angry multitude protesting[.]''\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern Affairs
Bureau, Senior Libyan Desk Officer, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, and
others (Sept. 16, 2012) (attacking Tripoli Media Report for Sept. 16,
2012) (on file with the Committee, C05396830).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/17--Public Statements
Excerpt from State Department Daily Press Briefing:
``Ambassador Rice, in her comments on every network over the
weekend, was very clear, very precise, about what our initial
assessment of what happened is. . . . I don't have anything to
give you beyond that.''\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\State Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing--September 17, 2012,
Victoria Nuland, State Dep't Spokesperson, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2012/09/197821.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/17--Private Statements
Excerpt from e-mail discussion between members of NEA
press office about what to say about attack:
NEA Press Officer Suggested the following language:
``The currently available information suggests the
demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired
by the protests of the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved
into a direct assault[.]''
Senior Libya Desk Officer, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau
responding to suggested language:
``I really hope this was revised. I don't think we
should go on the record on this.''\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\See E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications,
NEA to Spokesperson, NEA, Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA, Deputy
Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, NEA (Sept 17, 2012) (emphasis
added) (on file with the Committee, C05580618).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/18--Public Statements
Excerpt from White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay
Carney:
. . . I would point you to what Ambassador Rice said and others
have said about what we know thus far about the video and its
influence on the protests that occurred in Cairo, in Benghazi
and elsewhere.''
9/18--Private Statements
Deputy Director of CIA Michael Morell in written
statement to House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence:
``The critically important point is that the analysts
considered this a terrorist attack from the very
beginning.''\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\Michael Morell, Former Acting Director and Deputy Director of
the CIA, Written Statement for the Record before the H. Perm. Select
Comm. on Intel. (April 2, 2014).
E-mail exchange between State Department security
officers commenting on news article titled ``White
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
House sees no sign Libya attack premeditated'':
DS Agent #30: ``Can you believe this?''
DS Agent: ``Was there any rioting in Benghazi reported
prior to the attack?''
DS Agent #30: ``Zip, nothing nada''\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\E-mail from DS Agent #30 to DS Agent (Sept. 18, 2012) (on file
with the Committee, C05389586).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9/19--Public Statements
From ``ALDAC''_a worldwide cable_from Secretary Clinton to all
U.S. Embassies drafted by Deputy Chief of Staff Jacob Sullivan:
``Since September 11, 2012, there have been widespread protests
and violence against U.S. and some other diplomatic posts
across the Muslim world. The proximate cause of the violence
was the release by individuals in the United States of the
video trailer for a film that many Muslims find offensive.
Diplomatic compounds have been breached in several countries
including Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. In Benghazi, Libya
four U.S. personnel were killed in the violence[.]''\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\E-mail from Sullivan Assistant to various (attaching
``Immediate ALDAC for transmission'' drafted by J Sullivan 9/19/2012
noting approval by ``S: The Secretary'') (Sept. 2012) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0052811) (emphasis added).
The administration, including Secretary Clinton, knew that
Benghazi was a terrorist attack--from witness accounts, from
their understanding of the history of violence in Benghazi, and
from the nature of the well-planned, complex attack. Yet, they
led the public to believe the video and a protest were to blame
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in Benghazi.
9/20--Public Statements
Excerpt from interview of the President on Univision Town Hall:
In response to the question, ``We have reports that the White
House said today that the attacks in Libya were a terrorist
attack. Do you have information indicating that it was Iran, or
al-Qaeda was behind organizing the protests?'' the President
answered, ``[W]e're still doing an investigation[.] . . . What
we do know is that the natural protests that arose because of
the outrage over the video were used as an excuse by extremists
to see if they can also directly harm U.S. interests[.]''\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Press Release, Remarks by the President at Univision Town Hall
with Jorge Ramos and Maria Elena Salinas (Sept. 20, 2012), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/20/
remarks-president-univision-town-hall-jorge-ramos-and-maria-elena-
salina (emphasis added).
Secretary Clinton has since blamed her statements on
changing information received from U.S. intelligence reports.
She and others have claimed that the 10:08 p.m. statement was
not meant to ascribe a motive to the attack. Yet, Sullivan knew
the morning of September 12th--based on the press release from
the embassy in Kabul--that people had heard it exactly that
way. Moreover, whether or not the intelligence information
changed, Secretary Clinton's public and private statements
remained consistent--publicly tying Benghazi and Cairo together
and privately recognizing the violence in Benghazi was a
terrorist attack with nothing to do with a protest or video.
Moreover, to the extent any intelligence analysis
incorrectly reported on a protest or a video in connection with
Benghazi, Secretary Clinton and other State officials, who knew
better, simply ignored them. As just one example, in her
conversation September 15, 2012 with the president of Libya,
Secretary Clinton made no mention of anything in the CIA
talking points that administration officials later claimed were
the best assessment available at the time, and those talking
points made no mention of a video in connection with Benghazi.
In short, Secretary Clinton and the administration knew better
than to rely on flawed intelligence reports. Intelligence
assessments may have changed. News reports may have changed.
But the eye witness accounts remained the same--and not one
said a protest had occurred. Yet, once Secretary Clinton and
Ben Rhodes set the message, the truth became an afterthought.
D. AMBASSADOR RICE FACES THE NATION
On September 16, 2012, Ambassador Susan Rice appeared on
five Sunday talk shows and blamed Benghazi on the video. She
took the brunt of the criticism for doing so when it finally
became public that no protest had occurred. It is now clear,
however, that connecting the video to Benghazi started far
sooner. It began with Secretary Clinton's 10:08 p.m. statement
the night of the attack. Rice, however, compounded the
deception. And while Secretary Clinton and others blurred the
line between Cairo and Benghazi, Ambassador Rice erased it
completely.
Ambassador Rice now claims that she did not blame the video
for what occurred in Benghazi. The plain wording of what she
said, however, refutes her testimony to the Committee. She also
claims that she simply relied on the flawed CIA talking points.
But even a casual reading of those talking points shows that
she went far beyond what the CIA prepared--in a way that helped
the President politically.
The original draft of the CIA talking points included key
information that would have at a minimum pointed to the
possibility of a planned terrorist attack. For example, the
initial draft referred to knowing that ``Islamic extremists
with ties to al-Qa'ida'' had taken part in the attack, that
``there had been at least five other attacks'' previously, and
that they could not rule out that ``individuals had previously
surveilled the U.S. facilities.''\58\ By the final draft,
however, officials had stripped out all of that and other
information. It then read simply:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\See Talking Points Timeline, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Benghazi%20Talking%20Points%20Timeline.pdf.
The currently available information suggests that the
demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired
by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and
evolved into a direct assault against the U.S.
diplomatic post and subsequently its annex. There are
indications that extremists participated in the violent
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
demonstrations.
This assessment may change as additional information is
collected and analyzed and currently available
information continues to be evaluated.
The investigation is ongoing, and the U.S. Government
is working w/Libyan authorities to help bring to
justice those responsible for the deaths of U.S.
citizens.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\Id.
The talking points in their final form make no mention of
the video. Nevertheless, and with no discernable basis for
doing so, Ambassador Rice drew that inaccurate connection. On
Meet the Press she said ``putting together the best information
we have available to us today our current assessment is that
what happened in Benghazi was in fact initially a spontaneous
reaction to what had just transpired hours before in Cairo,
almost a copycat of--of the demonstrations against our facility
in Cairo, which were prompted, of course, by the video.''\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\Transcript of Interview, Amb. Susan Rice on Meet the Press
(Sept. 16, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The statement Rice made was false. The ``best information''
available at the time--from the witnesses on the ground--
pointed directly to a pre-planned, complex terrorist attack.
Many within the State Department came to that conclusion
quickly as well. For example, a Senior Advisor for Strategic
Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, ``My opinion, that
night, was simply that this was a terrorist attack.''\61\
Likewise, Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones testified
that ``there was discussion about was it a demonstration, was
it an attack? And I knew very well that the Embassy [in
Tripoli] believed it to be an attack. I believed it to be an
attack.''\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\Transcript of Interview of Senior Advisor for Strategic
Communications, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau at 89 (July 29, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
\62\Transcript of Interview of Acting Assistant Sec'y of State NEA
Beth Jones before H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform at 138-
139 (July 11, 2013) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No one--and certainly not the CIA or the broader U.S.
Intelligence Community--had described Benghazi as a copycat of
Cairo. In fact, knowing what they knew at the time it is hard
to imagine how the two events could have been more different.
On the very night of the attack, Ambassador Rice herself
received an e-mail that described the Cairo protests as ``2000
protestors in total. 20 got to the top of the wall, 10 got
inside the perimeter--they tore down the flag and sprayed
graffiti inside the compound. They went after employee cars as
well.''\63\ No one used or showed a weapon in Cairo and no
American was hurt. In short, Benghazi was not ``almost a
copycat'' of what occurred in Cairo and Ambassador Rice knew
it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\E-mail from a State Dep't Senior Policy Advisor to Amb. Susan
Rice and others (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05390691).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambassador Rice's ``copycat'' claim was particularly
troubling in light of the fact that the President said
virtually the opposite just days earlier. In an interview with
Steve Kroft of 60 Minutes on September 12, 2012 he was asked,
``This has been described as a mob action, but there are
reports that they were very heavily armed with grenades. That
doesn't sound like your normal demonstration.''\64\ To which
the President responded, ``As I said, we're still investigating
exactly what happened. I don't want to jump the gun on this.
But you're right that this is not a situation that was exactly
the same as what happened in Egypt, and my suspicion is, is
that there are folks involved in this who were looking to
target Americans from the start.''\65\ It is troubling that
this portion of the President's answer was deleted from the
show that aired on September 23, 2012 and was not made public
until just days before the election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\Internal Transcript, Interview of the President by Steve Kroft,
60 Minutes at 2 (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05527907).
\65\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, on CNN's State of the Union Ambassador Rice,
almost indignant, insisted ``[f]irst of all, let's be clear
about what transpired here. What happened this week in Cairo,
in Benghazi, in many parts of the region . . . was a result--a
direct result of a heinous and offensive video that was widely
disseminated.''\66\ Again, nowhere in the talking points did
the U.S. Intelligence Community blame the video for what
occurred in Benghazi let alone describe it as a ``direct
result'' of the video. When confronted with this, Ambassador
Rice seemed to deny the meaning of the very words she used,
claiming that she did not ``intend[] to include[] Benghazi in
that statement[.]''\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\Transcript of Interview, Amb. Susan Rice on CNN State of the
Union (Sept. 16, 2012).
\67\Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice at 102 (February 2,
2016), (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor did Ambassador Rice--or anyone else from the
administration--tell the full story. In fact, they only told
the half that helped politically. For example, the
administration claimed publicly there was no ``actionable
intelligence'' prior to the attack--suggesting the attack was
spontaneous.\68\ However, it failed to disclose that at the
time significant gaps existed in U.S. intelligence collection
in Libya that made it virtually impossible to have picked up
such warnings in the first place. It also failed to highlight
the casing incident that had occurred the morning of the attack
just outside the Benghazi compound.\69\ The administration also
failed to disclose the long history of terrorist violence in
Benghazi--information that would have placed the Benghazi
attack into its proper context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\See US `had no actionable intelligence' over Benghazi attack,
The Telegraph (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/africa andindianocean/libya/9597738/US-had-no-actionable-
intelligence-over-Benghazi-attack.html.
\69\See E-mail from Assistant Regional Security Officer (Sept. 11,
2012) (``We received word from our local guards that this morning they
observed a member of the police force assigned to the [Benghazi]
Mission at a construction site across the street from our main gate
taking pictures of our compound. I briefed the [Ambassador.]) (on file
with the Committee, C05271656).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor did Ambassador Rice show any sincere interest in
finding all of the facts--or as she put it--the best
information available before going on the Sunday talk shows. In
fact, her preparation session the day before, which included
Benjamin Rhodes and White House political adviser David
Plouffe--appeared to spend very little time on Benghazi at
all.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\See Transcript of Interview of Amb. Susan Rice at 39 (February
2, 2016) (Rice testified ``I don't recall us talking about the CIA
talking points'' and ``we didn't talk about Benghazi, in fact, on the
phone call, as I remember'') (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Monday, September 17, 2012, some State Department
officials reacted with shock to Ambassador Rice's claims.
Specifically, the Department's NEA Bureau press department--the
experts on Libya--reacted with disbelief. The discussion began
with NEA's Senior Libyan Desk Officer reacting to draft press
guidance that quoted the CIA talking points by saying, ``I
really hope this was revised. I don't think we should go on the
record on this.''\71\ This led to the Deputy Director, Office
of Maghreb Affairs, NEA saying, ``Not sure we want to be so
definitive[,]''\72\ which led to the following e-mail exchange:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\E-mail from Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA to NEA Press Officer
(Sept 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee: Doc# C05580617).
\72\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NEA Spokesperson:
The horse has left the barn on this, don't you think?
Rice was on FIVE Sunday Morning shows yesterday saying
this. Tough to walk back.
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA:
[Nuland] planned on walking it back just a bit, though.
Senior Libyan Desk Officer, NEA:
I think Rice was off the reservation on this one.
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA:
Yup. Luckily there's enough in her language to fudge
exactly what she said/meant.
NEA Spokesperson:
Off the reservation on five networks!
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA:
[White House] very worried about the politics. This was
all their doing.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\E-mail from Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, NEA to
Spokesperson, NEA, Senior Libyan Desk Offier, NEA, Deputy Director,
Office of Maghreb Affairs, NEA (Sept 17, 2012) (emphasis added) (on
file with the Committee, C05580618).
Although these individuals may not have seen the CIA
talking points prior to Rice's appearances, they did know what
had occurred in Benghazi based on their vantage point that
night.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\See, e.g., Transcript of Interview of Senior Advisor for
Strategic Communications, NEA at 89 (``Q: So let me make sure I'm
clear. So your opinion on the night of the attack, when you were at the
State Department, your opinion was that it was a terrorist attack? A:
Correct.'') (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The exchange also highlights another important issue.
Toward the end of the exchange the NEA Senior Advisor for
Strategic Communications describes it as ``luck'' that
Ambassador Rice had said enough to ``fudge'' what she meant. A
national crisis is no time to fudge the truth; it is a time to
find it and to tell it. But what we found here is just the
opposite. And for those who appear to have known the truth--
such as Secretary Clinton--the American people waited in vain
for them to correct Ambassador Rice's misleading public
statements.
Possibly most troubling is the evidence suggesting the
State Department may have changed its public statements to
match Rice's claims. Specifically, on September 17, 2012, a
State Department Press Officer in the NEA Bureau circulated a
document entitled ``NEA Press Guidance Libya: Update on
Investigation on Attack in Benghazi,''\75\ a document intended
as guidance for public comments about the attack. In the
original draft it said that ``we have not seen any signs that
the attack . . . in Benghazi was other than premeditated or
coordinated.'' In a later draft, however, ``other than
premeditated or coordinated'' morphed into ``other than
spontaneous.'' The document produced by the State Department to
the Committee still contained the insertion (in bold) and
deletions (in bold strikethrough) under the heading ``Key
Points'':
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\See E-mail from NEA press officer to Bernadette Meehan and
others (Sept. 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05578291).
We will continue to wait for the findings of the
ongoing FBI investigation before reaching a final
conclusion, but at this preliminary stage, time, we
have not yet seen any signs that the attack on our
consulate in Benghazi was other than spontaneous.
premeditated. coordinated.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\Id.
No one asked about it could explain the change. The
change--from the truth to a known false statement--is
troubling.
Secretary Clinton and others in the State Department
clearly knew the truth about Benghazi almost immediately. Yet
they only shared that information with others privately,
including with Secretary Clinton's daughter. Publicly they told
a very different story--one in line with Ben Rhodes's
instruction to blame the video and not a failure of the
President's policy. In doing so, the President and Secretary
Clinton put politics ahead of the truth. The four victims
deserved better. And the American people deserved better.
II. Last Clear Chance
In August 2012 it did not take an expert to see that the
State Department facility in Benghazi should have been closed
if additional security was not to be provided. The location and
the risk demanded Secretary Clinton's attention. The Benghazi
facility was wholly unique and there is no evidence that
Secretary Clinton asked her experts--let alone Ambassador
Stevens who she personally chose for the position--the hard
questions. The robust host-nation security forces that the
United States takes for granted in other countries did not
exist in Libya. Rather, competing militias--some friendly, some
not--filled the vacuum left by 40-plus years of Qhaddafi's
rule. And escalating violence against the U.S. compound and
others in Libya--230 incidents since June 2011 alone--made a
terrorist attack all but inevitable. These were the facts known
in August 2012. And in August 2012 Secretary Clinton had the
last, clear chance to provide adequate protection or, failing
that, to close the facility and pull our people out. She did
neither.
A. THE ``WILD EAST'': POST-QHADDAFI BENGHAZI
I told him that this was a suicide mission; that there
was a very good chance that everybody here was going to
die; that there was absolutely no ability here to
prevent an attack whatever. * * [H]hesaid, ``everybody
back here in D.C. knows that people are going to die in
Benghazi, and nobody cares and nobody is going to care
until somebody does die.''
State Diplomatic Security Agent #10\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\Transcript of Interview of DS Agent #10 at 22-23 (April 2,
2015) (recounting conversation with DS Agent #25 who was the desk
officer for diplomatic security in the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau).
According to the Diplomatic security agent quoted above, he
had this exchange with the State Department's desk officer for
diplomatic security in the region that covered Libya, shortly
after he arrived in Benghazi on temporary assignment as the
regional security officer. The conversation did not occur days
before the attack. It did not occur a month before the attack.
Rather, he gave the warning nearly nine months before September
11, 2012 shortly after he arrived in Benghazi. Nor was his the
only warning.
In June 2012, a second Benghazi security official reported
on the ``increase in extremist activity'' in Benghazi and
described his ``fear that we have passed a threshold where we
will see more targeting, attacks, and incidents involving
western [sic] targets.''\78\ The official also listed a series
of very recent attacks and noted that a source had warned of a
``group attack'' on an American facility.\79\ He specifically
mentioned ``[t]argeting [and] attacks by extremist groups
particularly in the eastern portion of Libya[.]''\80\ These
warnings contained troubling information about possible
terrorists trying to learn information about U.S.
facilities.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\E-mail from DS Agent #24 to DS Agent #25 (June 14, 2012) (on
file with the Committee, C05388987).
\79\Id.
\80\Id.
\81\Id. (``LES bodyguard assigned to the Ambassador's Protection
Detail informed the RSO that he was asked about specific security
questions concerning the embassy by an individual that he believed was
an extremist.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The list of incidents in Benghazi that were reported back
to Washington was long. And it told a compelling story of a
city on the brink. To anyone aware of the conditions, it was
not a matter of ``if'' but rather ``when'' a terrorist attack
on the U.S. compound would occur. The list ran the gamut from
minor to major incidents, including a rocket attack on the
British ambassador's convoy that prompted withdrawal of British
personnel from the city. The incidents included:
LApril 10, 2012 explosive device hits U.N. convoy
in Benghazi\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\E-mail from Diplomatic Security Agent 16 to DS-IP-NEA (Apr. 10,
2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048085).
LMay 22, 2012 rocket propelled grenade attack on
the International Red Cross facility, which included a warning
that ``Americans would be targeted next''\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\E-mail from OpsNewsTicker to NEWS-Libya (May 22, 2012, 9:06 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05392368).
LJune 6, 2012 attack on U.S. mission in
Benghazi\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\E-mail from Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep't of State, to John
C. Stevens, U.S. Ambas-sador to Libya, Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief
of Mission in Libya, William V. Roe-buck, Dir. Office of Maghreb
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (June 6,
2012, 4:49 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393187).
LJune 18, 2012 armed attackers storm Tunisian
Consulate\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\See Mohamed al-Tommy and Hadeel al-Shalchi, Gunmen Attack
Tunisian Consulate in Benghazi, Reuters (Jun. 18, 2012, 19:03), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-gunmen-tunisia-idUSBRE85H1V620120618
LJune 11, 2012 rocket attack on the British
ambassador\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\Memo from Regional Director, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau,
Diplomatic Security at 44 (June 15, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0048161).
LJuly 27, 2012 attempted bomb attack on Tibesti
Hotel in Benghazi, the hotel used by the State Department
during Revolution\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\See Blast and Jailbreak Rock Libya's Benghazi, AlJazeera (Aug.
1, 2012) (available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/08/
201281818 48269 995.html).
LJuly 31, 2012 seven Iranian-citizen International
Committee of the Red Crescent workers abducted\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\Iran Red Crescent Team 'Kidnapped' in Libya, AlJazeera (Jul.
31, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/07/
201273120552473238.html.
LAugust 20, 2012 small bomb thrown at Egyptian
diplomat's vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\See Steven Sotloff, The Bomb Attacks in Libya: Are Gaddafi
Loyalists Behind Them?, Time (Aug. 24, 2012), http://world.time.com/
2012/08/24/the-bomb-attacks-in-libya-are-gaddafi-loyalists-behind-
them/.
Without this background one could, in theory, jump to the
mistaken conclusion that the terrorist attack in Benghazi and
the protests in Cairo were connected in time and in cause. But
the State Department and the NEA Bureau in particular knew this
history all too well. For those people, it was against this
backdrop that they quickly saw Benghazi for what it was: a
terrorist attack, not a protest.
Nor did this escalation in violence escape the notice of
American policy makers or the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Intelligence analysts produced numerous reports on the growing
terrorist threat centered in Benghazi--yet the State Department
did nothing. Again, why? And so even though the security
problems in Benghazi appear to have been well known to State
Department officials at the time, no one acted in any
meaningful way to protect the Benghazi facility let alone to
get the people out. The question remained: Why?
Although the agent's warning quoted at the section heading
could not have been clearer, it was ignored even as the
situation in Benghazi went from bad to worse. The situation
became so grave that it prompted one State Department official
to dub Benghazi the ``wild east.'' Sadly, the humor
foreshadowed the horror to come as he made this statement in an
e-mail sent to Ambassador Stevens just hours before his
death.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\E-mail from Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy Libya to Amb.
Christopher Stevens (Sept. 11, 2012) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some blame the deplorable security conditions in Benghazi
on the facility's ``made up'' State Department designation. To
them, the fact the Department labeled the facility
``temporary'' excused shortcomings in the compound's physical
security. A ``temporary'' designation enabled the facility to
skirt a host of written internal security requirements that
applied to more permanent locations. We also learned it was an
improvised designation not used at any of the State
Department's other 275 facilities around the world.\91\ The
requirements this designation avoided cover everything from
setbacks to perimeter wall heights to razor wire placement.
Standards that, had the State Department complied with them,
would have given the Benghazi staff a fighting chance that
night.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\This is the number of facilities identified by Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security Gregory Starr in his testimony before
the Committee in 2014. Transcript of Hearing 1 H. Sel. Comm. on
Benghazi Testimony of Gregory Starr at 97 (Sept. 17, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In trying to excuse the security conditions in Benghazi,
some have argued that it would have been impossible to comply
with the State Department's internal requirements in Benghazi.
That may be true, but it is also irrelevant. The suggestion
that a facility's label should dictate whether men and women
have adequate security of course makes no sense.
It makes no sense because it ignores a critical requirement
applicable to all facilities regardless of whether it will
stand for a day, a year, or a decade. The facility's label did
not trump commonsense. Nor did it blind officials to the deadly
attack that to trained professionals appears to have been all
but inevitable, as the security agent quoted above observed
months before. In other words, the State Department cannot hide
behind its regulations. It had an obligation to act yet did far
too little to secure the facility. The question, again, was
why?
The same question came from the former Ambassador to Yemen,
who the day after the attack observed:
People are bound to ask how we can send unarmed
civilian diplomats to conduct [U.S. government]
business into a region with no local security forces to
rely on, only a handful of lightly armed [diplomatic
security] agents serving as close protection team, and
a couple dozen local militiamen of questionable
pedigree with AK-47's providing perimeter security.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\E-mail from former ambassador to Yemen to Beth Jones, Acting
Assistant Secretary for NEA (Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the
Committee, C05391021).
It was a question that the ambassador himself could not
even answer: ``I would suggest that we begin to think now of
how we explain/justify our presence in these non-permissive
environments.\93\ To most Americans, the time to think about
justifying a presence in Benghazi and other dangerous places
should have come before, not after, Americans have died.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So the question remained, what was so important in Benghazi
that it meant risking the lives of Americans in what many
appeared to view as a suicide mission? It is true that American
diplomats cannot hide inside bunkers. That we can never
eliminate all risk in diplomacy. That Benghazi was the seat of
the revolution and home to important anti-regime leaders. And
that the United States was not alone in seeing a good reason to
be there, as other Western countries had done the same. Yet,
other Western countries left and the U.S. stayed. So while all
this may be true, it still begs the essential question: Why
Benghazi? The answer that best fits is politics.
B. PUTTING POLITICS AHEAD OF PEOPLE: FAILING TO CLOSE THE BENGHAZI
COMPOUND
It remains unclear why a State Department presence in
Benghazi was so important. What is clear, however, is keeping a
facility open there was important to Secretary Clinton. In
addition, on this matter, many questions remain and much
classified information was withheld from the Committee.
In his interview with Secretary Clinton prior to
confirmation as ambassador to Libya, Secretary Clinton told
Ambassador Stevens that she hoped that Benghazi would become a
permanent post. In late July 2012, Ambassador Stevens discussed
the issue with his Deputy Chief of Mission Gregory Hicks.
According to Mr. Hicks, during their discussion Ambassador
Stevens said that Secretary Clinton might travel to Libya
again, possibly in October,\94\ and that Stevens wanted to have
a ``deliverable'' for her trip. That ``deliverable'' was to
make the mission in Benghazi permanent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\Transcript of Testimony of Gregory Hicks, Deputy in Charge of
Mission Embassy Libya, before H. Comm. on Government Reform and
Oversight at 15 (April 11, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
No matter how important a presence in Benghazi was--to
Secretary Clinton, to the State Department, to the United
States--it should have become very clear that the risks of
staying without more security outweighed any possible benefit.
On August 17, 2012, Secretary Clinton received a document
titled ``Information Memo for the Secretary.'' The memo did not
pull punches. Under the somewhat benign heading ``Uptick in
Violence, Primarily in Eastern Libya'' it said, ``Since May,
there has been a spike in violent incidents, including
bombings, abductions, assassinations, and car-jackings.''\95\
The memo, from Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
Affairs Beth Jones, is quoted at length here:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\Information Memo for the Secretary from Acting Assistant
Secretary Beth Jones, NEA (Aug. 17, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05390124).
L``While unpredictable security conditions
restrict the movement of U.S. government personnel, they have
not limited our assistance work.''\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\Id.
L``The attachment lists the major events, which
include a June 6 bombing at the U.S. Mission in Benghazi and an
August 6 attempted car-jacking of embassy personnel in
Tripoli.''\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\Id.
L``Recently, foreign residents of Benghazi have
expressed concern about the risks of living and working
there.''\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\Id.
L``In response to five attacks since May, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) withdrew its
personnel from Benghazi and Misrata in early August[.] The ICRC
country director believes international organizations in Libya
have underestimated the recent rise in violence out of a shared
sense of optimism.''\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\Id.
L``The variety of the violence points to the
overall lack of effective security institutions, particularly
in the east.''\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\Id.
L``The distance from the already weak central
security services, feelings of marginalization from the central
government, and a history of lslamist extremism in some eastern
towns all seem to contribute to a permissive environment where
disparate motivations for violence have found fertile ground in
which to germinate. The national Supreme Security Council--a
post-revolutionary coalition of militia elements cobbled into a
single force and designed to provide interim security in
Benghazi--has had limited success as a stabilizing
force.''\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Id.
L``The government seems largely unable to gather
intelligence in advance of attacks and central security
services appear intimidated by the local militias, in some
cases tacitly ceding their authority. Some actors see the weak
response from the government and feel they can act with
increasing impunity. The sense of lawlessness encourages
spoilers, predators, and other disruptive players to escalate
their actions.''\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\Id.
L``Benghazi was once palpably safer than Tripoli
[but] . . . lawlessness is increasing. . . . Despite the
urgency, however, the government's response is likely to
continue to be hesitant and tentative[.]''\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\Id.
L``Despite the worrisome aspects of this increase
in violence, there is no coordinated organization behind the
incidents. . . . Nonetheless, the likelihood of more widespread
violence is strong if Libya's political leaders are unable to
demobalize [sic] militias and strengthen the government's
security institutions.''\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\Id.
Despite the colorless bureaucratic language, the Beth Jones
memo nevertheless painted a harrowing picture of conditions in
the eastern part of Libya where Benghazi is located. Many of
the words truly jump at the reader-- ``urgency,''
``lawlessness,'' ``unpredictable,'' ``lack of effective
security,'' ``limited success,'' ``widespread violence,'' ``act
with increasing impunity.'' The list of specific incidents
attached to the memo brought that picture into even starker
relief.
When Secretary Clinton was asked about the Beth Jones memo
during her Committee interview she deflected, ``Well, I think
that, again, there was no recommendation based on any of the
assessments, not from our State Department experts, not from
the intelligence community, that we should abandon either
Benghazi or Tripoli.''\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\Transcript of Hearing 4 before the Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (hereafter
referred to as ``the Committee''), 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the beginning and possibly into the summer of 2012, the
situation in Benghazi may have represented one that called out
for State Department security experts or the Intelligence
Community to speak up. But by August 17, 2012, it had become a
situation that now demanded leadership by the Secretary of
State herself--leadership that did not sit back and wait for a
recommendation.
Just as she had shown--in the words of Jacob Sullivan--
``leadership/ownership/stewardship'' on the decision to go into
Libya, it was now time for her to show that same leadership and
upgrade the facility or get our people out--even if it meant
criticism from those who opposed the intervention in the first
place. She had the last, clear chance to order an immediate
closure of the Benghazi facility yet did nothing, and four
Americans died.
During her testimony before the Committee, Secretary
Clinton almost scolded the Republican members:
You know, I would imagine I've thought more about what
happened than all of you put together. I've lost more
sleep than all of you put together. I have been racking
my brain about what more could have been done or should
have been done.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\Transcript of Hearing 4 before the Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (hereafter
referred to as ``the Committee''), 114th Cong. (2015) (testimony of
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec'y of State).
For one that had spent so much time thinking about what
happened, it seems that the answer should have been obvious.
III. Military Response: Could we have done more?
I just say, do it. Take the hill. They take the hill.
Leon Panetta
Secretary of Defense\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec'y of Defense at
57 (Jan. 8, 2016).
The U.S. military never reached Benghazi. Not only did it
not get to Benghazi, it did not get to Libya during the 7-plus
hours of the ongoing attack. The only support unit that did
arrive in Tripoli--the Marine ``Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support
Team'' or ``FAST'' team--was anything but fast, and arrived in
Libya nearly 24 hours after the attack had begun and 16-plus
hours after the attack ended. In fact, it did not take off
until almost 12 hours after the attack ended. Why? Although a
Department of Defense drone circled overhead in Benghazi during
much of the attack, the military never sent an armed drone that
could possibly have changed the course of events during the
hours-long siege, especially as terrorists pounded the Annex
with mortar fire. An armed drone never came. Why?
Like many Americans, the picture we saw of what happened in
Benghazi clashed with our experience and expectations. The
brave men and women who serve this country are the greatest
fighting force on earth with a capability second to none. We as
Americans have grown to expect these men and women to do the
near impossible. And time and again they not only meet our
expectations, they surpass them. In fact, we saw examples of
exactly that heroism on the ground in Benghazi that night.
Our brave soldiers were ready, willing, and able to fight
for their fellow countrymen but leaders in Washington held them
back. If they had been given the chance they would have, we
have no doubt, as Secretary Panetta said, ``taken that hill.''
In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary of Defense
Panetta said that at about 6:00 p.m. on September 11th after
meeting with the President, he ordered three assets to deploy:
one Marine Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team or ``FAST'' team,
one Commanders In Extremis Force or ``CIF,'' and one hostage
rescue team based in the United States. He was clear: ``My
orders were to deploy those forces, period.''\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec'y of Defense at
24 (Jan. 8, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After his meeting with the President, which lasted less
than 30 minutes, Secretary Panetta had no further contact with
the President that night.\109\ None. It is hard to accept that
the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense had no
further contact during the entire unfolding crisis. Possibly
just as startling is that Secretary Panetta and Secretary
Clinton did not speak at all\110\ and Secretary Clinton did not
speak to the President until approximately 10:30 p.m., over six
hours after the terrorist attack began and approximately five
hours after a U.S. ambassador went missing.\111\ Secretary
Clinton spoke to CIA Director David Petraeus at approximately
5:38 p.m. but not again that night.\112\ The meeting (denoted
``M'') and calls (denoted ``C''), or lack thereof, between the
four principals--President Obama, Secretary Clinton, Secretary
Panetta, and Director Petraeus--looked like this:\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\Transcript of Interview of Leon Panetta, Sec'y of Defense at
42 (Jan. 8, 2016).
\110\Id. at 48.
\111\See Dep't of State, Watch Log, Operations Center (Sept. 11,
2012) (on file with the Committee, C05872462).
\112\Id.
\113\All times Eastern.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We cannot help but contrast the picture painted by the
above with the all hands on deck depicted in the now-famous
photo of the President, Secretary Clinton, Defense Secretary
Gates, Director of National Intelligence Clapper, and other
officials huddled in the Situation Room during the Osama bin
Laden raid. Benghazi should have merited the same level of
attention and urgency.
Until now, the public has been told that the military could
not have reached Benghazi in time to help--either with jet
planes, armed drones, or personnel. Had we seen aircraft in the
air flying toward Benghazi--flying toward the sound of gunfire
as the military often says--only to be recalled mid-flight
after hearing that the Americans had left Benghazi safely, we
may have been willing to accept that explanation. But the
fighter planes and armed drones never left the ground. And, as
the chart below shows, the transport planes carrying the FAST,
CIF, and hostage rescue team did not leave until hours after
the attack was over.
The attack began at 9:42 p.m. in Benghazi, 3:42 p.m. in
Washington. It does not appear that Secretary Panetta heard
about the attack until sometime after 4:32 p.m. when the
National Military Command Center was notified and he did not
discuss the matter with the President until approximately 5:00
p.m. From 3:42 p.m. until approximately 10:00 a.m. the next
day--nearly 18 hours--no manned U.S. military plane flew on a
mission toward Libya. When the first plane did take off with a
Marine FAST platoon it did not take off until hours after the
attack ended and flew to an intermediate country. The timeline
of significant events compared to when the military assets took
off and arrived included the following:\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\All times shown are Eastern time, which is 6 hours behind
local time in Benghazi.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
We are now convinced, contrary to the administration's
public claim that the military did not have time to get to
Benghazi, that the administration never launched men or
machines to help directly in the fight. That is very different
from what we have been told to date. And the evidence is
compelling.
For example, FAST platoons, as of September 2012, were
typically used to reinforce embassy security and operated from
a fixed location within an embassy. FAST platoons did not
deploy with their own vehicles, so they were dependent on other
means for ground mobility. In other words, the FAST team was
not sent to help in the fight at the CIA Annex. The question
then became what was sent. And the answer appears to be
nothing. None of the three assets that Secretary Panetta
ordered to deploy were intended to join the fight against
terrorists at the Annex.
An asset that could have made a difference would have been
armed drones. And as the Committee learned, it would have been
relatively fast and easy to arm a drone. To date, however, the
Committee has not received a detailed inventory of all armed
drone assets available that night from the Department of
Defense. While we understand that because of time and distance
armed drones may not have arrived in time that does not alter
the fact that we did not try.
The military has failed to provide a clear, specific
inventory of every armed aircraft--whether manned or unmanned--
that could have flown to Benghazi during the 7-plus hours from
the beginning of the attack to the mortar rounds hitting the
CIA Annex. Instead, the military has insisted that the
Committee simply accept the word of senior military officers,
some without firsthand knowledge of the events, as an adequate
substitute for actual eye witnesses.
One of the clearest examples of the Department of Defense's
attempt to impede the investigation involved one of its
legislative affairs officers, Stephen C. Hedger. Mr. Hedger,
appearing to work hand-in-hand with the minority members, wrote
a stinging letter to the Committee attacking it on multiple
fronts--attacks that quickly found their way into a Democrat
press release. The letter even went so far as to imply that the
Committee's investigative requests had somehow impaired our
national defense.
The most troubling aspect of the letter was the criticism
that the Committee had asked for witnesses that ``seem
unnecessary even for a comprehensive investigation[.]'' While
it is rare for the subject of an investigation to decide which
witnesses are relevant, the Department of Defense felt
otherwise. One of the supposedly ``unnecessary'' witnesses was
known to the Committee only as ``John from Iowa''--the
pseudonym he used when he called into a talk show to discuss
the attack. He had operated the video and other sensors on a
Predator drone that circled over Benghazi the night of the
attack. Given his bird's eye view, the Committee believed he
could provide valuable insight into what the Department of
Defense knew and therefore could have, and possibly should
have, done to help that night.
Mr. Hedger responded to the request with what bordered on
sarcasm--describing the Committee's request as one ``to
interview an individual identified as `John from Iowa' who
described himself as a Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) camera
operator on a talk radio show, where he described what he
allegedly saw in the video feed from the night of the attack.''
In short, Mr. Hedger made the request sound like the Committee
was chasing crackpots. To drive the point home he then added,
``The Department has expended significant resources to locate
anyone who might match the description of this person, to no
avail.''\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Letter from Stephen C. Hedger, Dep't of Defense, Office of
Legislative Affairs to the Hon. Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Sel. Comm. on
the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi (Apr. 28,
2016) (emphasis added) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As it turns out, Mr. Hedger's claim was completely false
according to information provided by the witness himself, who
the Department of Defense eventually produced. Mr. Hedger's
false and misleading claim, was one of the more troubling
examples of the Department of Defense's failure to cooperate
fully, although not the only one.
What has also emerged is a picture of the State Department
eating up valuable time by insisting that certain elements of
the U.S. military respond to Libya in civilian clothes and that
it not use vehicles with United States markings. Both
restrictions appear to have been concessions to the Libyan
government that did not want an identifiable U.S. military
presence on the streets of Libya. We will never know exactly
how long these conditions delayed the military response but
that they were even a part of the discussion is troubling.
And at the same time the State Department appeared to waste
time on what our soldiers would wear, it also appeared to waste
time and focus on the YouTube video that the administration
would later blame, falsely, for the attack. It has emerged that
during an emergency call at 7:30 p.m. on the night of the
attack involving Secretary Clinton and other high-level
officials from the Department of Defense, State Department, and
CIA that a full five of the eleven action items from the
meeting related to the video.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\See E-mail from State Dep't Operations to various (Sept. 11,
2012) (on file with the Committee, C05562037).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One such item had Secretary Panetta calling Pastor Terry
Jones to ask him to take down the video. At this critical
moment, with lives at risk in Benghazi and military assets
sitting idle, it is difficult to imagine a worse use of the
Defense Secretary's time than to call Pastor Jones about a
video having nothing to do with the attack. Rather than
diverting the Secretary of Defense's attention, every effort
should have been made to marshal assets that could have gone to
Benghazi.
We cannot say whether the military could have saved lives
in Benghazi. We can say with certainty that our nation's
leaders did not move heaven and earth to send military help
with the urgency that those Americans deserved. We will never
know if a more vigorous, comprehensive, and urgent response
could have saved lives.
IV. Justice Denied
We will not waver in our commitment to see that justice
is done for this terrible act. And make no mistake,
justice will be done.
Barack Obama
President of the United States\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Deaths
of U.S. Embassy Staff in Libya (Sept. 12, 2012), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-
deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya.
The President made this promise the day after the attack.
Secretary Clinton did much the same. In January 2015, White
House Counsel W. Neil Eggleston said something very similar in
a letter to the Committee where he claimed ``[t]he
Administration's focus since the attacks has been . . . an
unwavering commitment to bring to justice those responsible for
harming Americans[.]''\118\ The words of the President and his
lawyer were resolute and they were strong. But in the end they
were just that, words.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\Letter from W. Neil Eggleston to Hon. Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H.
Sel. Comm. on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in
Benghazi (Jan. 23, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost four years have passed since four Americans were
killed by radical Islamic terrorists in Benghazi. As of the
writing of this report, only one man--Ahmed Abu Khatallah--has
been indicted and brought to the United States to face
charges.\119\ To the Committee's knowledge, no others have been
taken into U.S. custody, let alone arrested and prosecuted.
Secretary Clinton said, almost two years after the murders,
``there's a lot we don't know about what happened in
Benghazi.'' That may be true, but the United States does know
the identity of many of the attackers. Yet, the resources
devoted to bring them to justice have proven inadequate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\It is worth noting that Abu Khatallah's capture demonstrated
the capacity of the United States to execute a complex mission in a
hostile place to bring a terrorist to justice. It is equally certain
that the Obama administration's decision to treat Abu Khatallah and
other terrorists as ordinary criminals--affording them the full panoply
of legal protections available under U.S. law--has made it harder to
capture Abu Khatallah's co-conspirators. That is because the decision
denies our Intelligence Community the time and tools necessary to
develop facts that might help to apprehend the others responsible. That
may, in turn, explain, why dozens and dozens of Abu Khatallah's co-
conspirators remain at large.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Obama also claimed that Khattallah ``will now
face the full weight of the American justice system.'' To us,
that means facing the full measure of punishment for killing
four Americans. Yet, the administration has chosen--for reasons
it refused to provide Congress--not to seek the death penalty
in this case.
And so as we near the fourth anniversary of the attack, the
American people, at a minimum, are owed an explanation for the
administration's failure to bring more of those responsible to
justice.
V. Notes on the Investigation
For the past two years the Committee pressed for full and
complete answers to the important questions left in Benghazi's
wake. The American people--and especially the families of the
victims and those injured--deserved nothing less.
We approached the investigation believing facts were
nonpartisan. We knew some hoped the investigation would expose
Secretary Clinton and President Obama for serious wrongdoing.
Still others hoped, and in fact decided, that the investigation
would find nothing--and they did their best to tarnish the
Committee's reputation in case something damaging did emerge.
But we suspected the vast majority of Americans simply wanted
the truth, whatever it may look like, to come out in full.
We had hoped that Democrats on the Committee would join
this effort as full partners and that the administration would
cooperate with our work. That Republicans and Democrats would
feel the weight of history, and the loss of four fellow
Americans, and set aside partisan differences in favor of a
joint search for the truth. If that had happened, it would not
have been without precedent as we saw during the 9/11
Commission investigation. Yet, Minority Leader Pelosi set the
tone early, even before the first witness was sworn in, and
made clear that a truly bipartisan effort would never happen:
Our nation deserves better than yet another deeply
partisan and political review. It is disappointing that
Republicans blocked a proposal offered by Democrats on
the House floor today to ensure that this committee is
truly bipartisan and fair--a proposal that would have
allowed Democrats a real and equal voice on the
committee, including on the issuance of subpoenas, the
manner in which witnesses would be questioned and
deposed, and the specific protocols governing how
documents and other information would be obtained,
used, and potentially released by the committee.
It is clear that House Republicans will do anything to
divert attention away from their failed leadership and
do-nothing record. As they work to feed the most
conspiracy-obsessed elements of their base, millions of
Americans are languishing thanks to Republicans'
refusal to act on the urgent business before our
nation: renewing emergency unemployment insurance,
raising the minimum wage, and creating jobs.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\Nancy Pelosi, House Democratic Leader, Pelosi Statement on
House Vote on Select Committee on Benghazi (May 8, 2014), http://
www.democraticleader.gov/newsroom/pelosi-statement-house-vote-select-
committee-benghazi/.
It bears mentioning that the Democrats on the Committee
could have asked for witnesses or documents but in the end
asked for one witness and a handful of documents. In other
words, we offered them the ``real and equal voice on the
committee'' that Minority Leader Pelosi demanded, but they fell
silent when it came time to do the work.
The Democrats on the Committee did not, however, fall
completely silent. When they were not attacking the
Republicans, they paid lip service to the notion of a
bipartisan investigation. Ranking Member Cummings called for
just that type of investigation during the first hearing,
invoking the same slogan that Minority Leader Pelosi used and,
of course, that President Obama had used before her: ``Too
often over the past two years, the congressional investigation
into what happened in Benghazi has devolved into unseemly
partisanship. We are better than that.'' In fact, we are
better. But in the end they were just words.
The Democrats on the committee, showed little interest in
seeking the truth and routinely turned the investigation into
political theater. We had hoped for more from members that
included two former criminal prosecutors. Instead, the
Democrats and their staff spent the bulk of their time trying
to discredit the Republican-led committee and leveling baseless
personal attacks. The attacks were often ugly, always without
merit, and unfailingly partisan and did nothing to advance the
cause of finding the full and complete truth about Benghazi.
VI. Conclusion
In the end, the administration's efforts to impede the
investigation succeeded, but only in part. The minority
members' and their staff's efforts to impede the investigation
succeeded also, but again only in part. And although we
answered many questions, we could not do so completely. What we
did find was a tragic failure of leadership--in the run up to
the attack and the night of--and an administration that, so
blinded by politics and its desire to win an election,
disregarded a basic duty of government: Tell the people the
truth. And for those reasons Benghazi is, and always will be,
an American tragedy.
Mr. Jordan.
Mr. Pompeo.
APPENDIX A:
Resolution Establishing the
Select Committee on the Events
Surrounding the 2012
Terrorist Attack in Benghazi
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
APPENDIX B:
Significant Persons and Organizations
Persons
Abedin, Huma--Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for the
Secretary of State, Department of State
Bargathi, Abdul Salam--Leader of the Preventative Security
Brigade, childhood friend of Abu Khattala
Bash, Jeremy--Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense
Blumenthal, Sidney--Friend and Confidant of Secretary Hillary
R. Clinton
Boswell, Eric--Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic
Security/Director of the Office of Foreign Missions,
Department of State
Breedlove, Philip M.--General, United States Air Force;
Commander of the U.S. Air Forces Europe/U.S. Air Forces
Africa, Department of Defense
Brennan, John Owen--Deputy National Security Advisor for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, and Assistant to
the President, White House
Bukatef, Fawzi--Leader of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade, the
group that housed a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) at the
Benghazi Mission compound
Bultrowicz, Scott--Director, Diplomatic Security Service and
Principal Deputy Secretary of State, Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, Department of State
Burns, William--Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State
Carney, Jay--Press Secretary, White House
Chorin, Ethan--Author and Chief Executive Officer, Perim
Associates
Clapper, James R.--Lieutenant General, Director, Office of
National Intelligence
Clinton, Hillary R.--Secretary of State (January 2009 until
February 2013), Department of State
Cretz, Gene Allan--Ambassador to Libya (December 2008 until May
2012), Department of State
Dempsey, Martin E.--General, United States Army; Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (October 2011 until September
2015), Department of Defense
Dibble, Elizabeth--Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
DiCarlo, Rosemary--Deputy Permanent Representative (to Susan
Rice), then the Permanent Representative to the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations, Department of State
Doherty, Glen Anthony--Contractor, Global Response Staff (GRS),
Central Intelligence Agency
Donilon, Thomas E.--National Security Advisor to the President,
White House
Duval, Catherine--Senior Advisor, Bureau of Legislative
Affairs, Department of State
Evers, Austin--Advisor, Bureau of Legislative Affairs,
Department of State
Feltman, Jeffrey--Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs (until May 2012), Department of State
Fishman, Benjamin--Member of the National Security Council,
White House
Flynn, Michael--Lieutenant General, United States Army;
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department of
Defense
Frifield, Julia--Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative
Affairs, Department of State
Gharabi, Mohammad--Leader of the Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade
Gibbons, Thomas B.--Acting Assistant Secretary of Legislative
Affairs, Department of State
Gordon, Philip--Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian
Affairs Department of State
Ham, Carter--General, United States Army; Commander of U.S.
Africa Command, Department of Defense
Hamid, Wissam bin--Commander, Libya Shield Brigade
Hicks, Gregory--Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya, Department of
State
Jones, Elizabeth--Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Kelly, John--General, United States Army; Senior Military
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Department of
Defense
Kelly, Thomas--Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs, Department of State
Kennedy, Patrick F.--Under Secretary for Management, Department
of State
Kerry, John--Secretary of State (February 2013 to present),
Department of State
Khattala, Ahmed Abu--Founded Obeida Ibn al-Jarra Militia, in
U.S. custody for his suspected involvement in the Benghazi
attacks
Koh, Harold--Legal Advisor, Department of State
Lamb, Charlene--Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
Department of State
Landolt, Richard B.--Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Director
of Operations and Cyber, U.S. Africa Command, Department of
Defense
Leidig, Jr., Charles J.--Vice Admiral, United States Navy;
Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations, U.S.
Africa Command, Department of Defense
Litt, Robert S.--General Counsel, Office of the Director of
National Intelligence
Lohman, Lee--Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs/Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs,
Department of State
Losey, Brian--Rear Admiral, United States Navy; Commander of
Special Operations Command (SOC) Africa, Department of
Defense
Macmanus, Joseph--Executive Assistant to the Secretary of
State, Office of the Secretary, Department of State (from
May 2012 until November 2012)
Magariaf, Mohamad Yousef--President, General National Congress
of Libya
Maxwell, Raymond--Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department
of State
McDonough, Denis--Deputy National Security Advisor, White House
Meehan, Bernadette--Assistant Press Secretary for the National
Security Council, White House
Mills, Cheryl D.--Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Secretary
of State, Department of State
Mordente, Patrick--General, United States Air Force; Director
of Operations (J3) for the U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM), Department of Defense
Morell, Michael--Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Mull, Stephen--Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary
of State, Department of State
Mullen, Michael--Admiral, United States Navy; Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff/Vice Chairman, Benghazi
Accountability Review Board
Nides, Thomas--Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
Resources, Department of State
Nuland, Victoria J.--Spokesperson, Department of State
Obeidi, Fathi--Lieutenant commander in a branch of Libyan
Shield/Commander of Special Operations for Libya Shield
Olsen, Matthew--Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Pagliano, Bryan--Special Advisor, Bureau of Information
Resource Management, Department of State
Panetta, Leon--Secretary of Defense (July 2011 until February
2013), Department of Defense
Pelton, Erin--Communications Director and Spokesperson for
Ambassador Susan Rice, Department of State
Petraeus, David--Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Pickering, Thomas R.--Chairman, Benghazi Accountability Review
Board
Polaschik, Joan--Deputy Chief of Mission for Tripoli, Libya
(2009 until June 2012), Department of State
Reines, Philippe--Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs, Department of State
Repass, Michael S.--Major General, United States Army;
Commander, Special Operations Command (SOC) Europe,
Department of Defense
Rhodes, Benjamin--Assistant to the President and Deputy
National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and
Speechwriting, White House
Rice, Susan E.--U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Department of State
Roebuck, William--Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Ryu, Rexon--Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations, Department of State
Sanderson, Janet--Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
Affairs, Department of State
Shapiro, Andrew--Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
Military Affairs, Department of State
Sherman, Wendy--Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Department of State
Smith, Gentry--Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Countermeasures, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department
of State
Smith, Sean--Information Management Officer, Department of
State
Starr, Gregory--Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic
Security (November 2013 to present), Department of State
Steinberg, James--Deputy Secretary of State, Department of
State
Stevens, John Christopher--U.S. Representative to the Libyan
Transitional National Council/Ambassador to Libya (May 2012
until September 2012), Department of State
Sullivan, Jacob J.--Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of
Policy Planning, Department of State
Taylor, William--Special Coordinator for Middle Eastern
Transitions, Department of State
Thompson, Mark--Deputy Coordinator, Operations Directorate,
Bureau of Counterterrorism, Department of State
Tidd, Kurt--Vice Admiral, United States Navy; Director of
Operations (J3) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department
of Defense
Ventrell, Patrick--Acting Deputy Spokesperson, Department of
State
Winnefeld, Jr., James--Admiral, United States Navy; Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of
Defense
Woods, Tyrone Snowden--Contractor, Global Response Staff (GRS),
Central Intelligence Agency
Zeya, Uzra--Chief of Staff to Deputy Secretary Burns,
Department of State/ Executive Secretary, Benghazi
Accountability Review Board
Entities
al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)-al-Qa'ida affiliate
al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-al-Qa'ida affiliate
Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi (AAS-B)--Previously led by the now-
deceased Mohammed Ali al-Zahawi, now officially designated
as a foreign terror organization
Ansar al-Sharia-Darnah (AAS-D)--Darnah branch of AAS headed by
former Guantanamo detainee Abu Sufyan bin Qumo
Blue Mountain Group (BMG)--British company providing unarmed
guards used for static security at the Mission
Blue Mountain Libya--Libyan Partner of BMG, signed joint
venture with BMG
February 17 Martyrs Brigade--The purported largest militia
group in Benghazi, headed by Fawzi Bukatef. The group
supplied a four man team of local militiamen to serve as
the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) at the Benghazi Mission
Libyan Air Force--The entity that provided the C-130 that
evacuated the second set of Americans from Benghazi (this
included the uninjured CIA Protective officer, one DS
agent, and the remains of the four deceased)
Libya Shield--An umbrella organization of militias to support
Libyan Army initiatives throughout the country, the
separate Libya Shields were not always cohesive and not all
worked in the best interests of the Libyan Army and Libyan
government writ-large
Libyan Military Intelligence--The group that helped Americans
evacuate from the Annex to the Benghazi airport after the
mortar attacks early on September 12th
Mohammad Jamal Network--Group leadership historically
affiliated with al-Qa'ida Senior Leader Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri; other affiliations to AQIM and AQAP
Obeida Ibn al-Jarra Militia--Islamist militia led by Ahmed Abu
Khattala, a breakaway faction from Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi
(AAS-B)
Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade--A small militia that also operated
under the Libya Shield umbrella; at the time of the
attacks, the militia was in possession of kidnapped Iranian
hostages
Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman Brigades--Islamist militia based in
Benghazi, Libya
Supreme Security Council--A quasi-government organization
involved in security and policing matters in Benghazi, now
defunct
APPENDIX C:
Questions for the President
June 7, 2016
W. Neil Eggleston
Counsel to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Neil:
Shortly after the formation of the Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi,
Libya, you and I spoke on the phone. During that conversation I
informed you the Committee would not compel an interview with
the President and the Committee was familiar with and would
respect the Executive Privilege attached to certain
communications with the President. I also told you the
Committee would send written questions to the President at the
culmination of our investigation. I assured you these questions
would not be publicized at the time they were sent and
furthermore the questions would be limited to information that
could not be obtained from other sources.
At our meeting in Charlotte, N.C. in January of 2016, I further
offered to show you the questions in advance and provide the
underlying testimony that gave rise to the question. In other
words, each of these questions has an evidentiary basis rooted
in either documents or other testimony, and I was willing to
show you the questions and the foundation for the questions.
While I would have been pleased to meet with you again, the
reality is we would have gone over the same ground previously
visited. The Executive Branch would, perhaps, argue sending
questions to the President is ``unprecedented'' and would
create a ``constitutional crisis.'' The Legislative Branch
would argue several prior Committee Chairmen sent an extensive
set of questions to the President regarding Benghazi, the
President has answered media inquiries about Benghazi without a
``constitutional crisis,'' and the President is uniquely
situated to answer these questions. In fact, he is the only
person who can answer some of these questions.
As such, below are fifteen questions for the President
regarding the Benghazi attacks. Thank you in advance for a
reply to these questions no later than June 17, 2016.
Sincerely,
/s/
Trey Gowdy
Chairman
Begin attachment
Questions for the President
1. LThe White House issued a readout of your meeting with
senior administration officials on September 10, 2012,
indicating ``specific measures'' had been taken to ``prevent 9/
11 related attacks.'' What were these specific measures, and
how did these specific measures differ from specific measures
taken on prior anniversaries of September 11?
2. LWhen did you first learn a U.S. facility in Benghazi,
Libya, had been attacked? What were you told, and by whom? Were
you informed Sean Smith had been killed during the initial
attack?
3. LWhat orders or direction, if any, did you give to
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta upon learning of the initial
attack? Did you or anyone at your direction ever modify,
withdraw, alter, or amplify the initial orders or direction you
gave to Secretary Panetta?
4. LWhat were you told about Department of Defense assets in
the region that could respond specifically to Benghazi? Did you
ask for or receive a list of military or paramilitary assets in
the region that could respond to Benghazi during the pendency
of the attacks?
5. LWere you subsequently kept informed about the initial
attack, subsequent attacks, and/or efforts to either send
military assistance or evacuate U.S. personnel? By whom?
6. LWhen did you learn Ambassador Christopher Stevens was
missing, and who informed you? Were you kept informed on
efforts to locate Ambassador Stevens, and if so, by whom? When
did you learn Ambassador Stevens was dead, and who informed
you?
7. L[Classified]
8. LWere you aware that prior to any military asset moving to
respond to the attacks the State Department expressed concerns
to the White House about the number of military assets going
into Libya?
9. LWhen did you learn of a mortar attack that killed Tyrone
Woods and Glen Doherty? Who informed you?
10. LWere you aware of any efforts by White House and
Department of Defense officials during the evening of September
11, 2012, and into the early morning hours of September 12,
2012, to reach out to YouTube and Terry Jones regarding an
anti-Muslim video? What specifically connected the attacks in
Benghazi to this anti-Muslim [sic] video, and why weren't these
efforts made after the protests in Cairo, Egypt?
11. LWhen did you learn individuals associated with terrorist
organizations participated in the attack on the U.S. facilities
in Benghazi, Libya?
12. LDid you receive the President's Daily Brief (PDB) on
September 12, 2012 and September 13, 2012? If so, who provided
you with the PDB?
13. LHave you ever viewed surveillance footage from the cameras
(or other sources) located at the U.S. facilities in Benghazi
depicting the attacks? Will you declassify this footage so the
American people can see for themselves what transpired?
14. LDid you authorize a covert action or covert operation to
provide lethal assistance to Libyan rebels?
15. L[Classified]
APPENDIX D:
Significant Events in Libya
Prior to the Attacks
February 22, 2011--Embassy Tripoli is evacuated because of
emerging civil war.
On or around March 11, 2011--Decision made to send a
representative to Benghazi to liaise with the emerging
transitional national council [TNC]. Hillary R. Clinton,
Secretary of State, asks J. Christopher Stevens to serve as
Representative to the TNC.
April 5, 2011--Stevens enters Benghazi and stays at the Tibesti
Hotel.
April 10, 2011--Stevens and team contemplate leaving Benghazi
because of security concerns.
June 10, 2011--Stevens and team leave Tibesti Hotel and stay
temporarily with other U.S. government personnel in
Benghazi.
June 21, 2011--Stevens and team relocate to an interim facility
later known as Villa A.
July 15, 2011--U.S. recognizes the TNC as the ``Legitimate
Representative of the Libyan People.''
August 3, 2011--Stevens and team sign leases for Villas A, B,
and C.
August 21, 2011--Tripoli falls.
August 22, 2011--The Secretary takes credit for events in
Tripoli.
August 30, 2011--The Secretary's staff want team in Tripoli as
soon as possible.
September 22, 2011--The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli reopens and
Gene A.Cretz resumes position as U.S. Ambassador to Libya.
October 18, 2011--The Secretary travels to Tripoli but not
Benghazi.
October 20, 2011--Muammar Qadhafi executed.
October 23, 2011--Libya officially liberated.
On or around November 20, 2011--Stevens leaves Benghazi.
November 21, 2011--First principal officer arrives in Benghazi
to replace Stevens.
December 27, 2011--Extension Memorandum drafted by the Bureau
of Near East Affairs sent to Patrick F. Kennedy, Under
Secretary for Management, State Department, outlining
continued operations in Benghazi. The memorandum was
approved on January 5, 2012.
December 2011--Diplomatic Security agent staffing concerns in
Benghazi.
February 2012--Life Services contract cancelled in Benghazi.
February 2012--Local Guard Force service contract awarded to
Blue Mountain Group.
March 28, 2012--U.S. Embassy in Tripoli requests additional
staff including five Diplomatic Security agents for
Benghazi Mission compound.
April 2, 2012--Attack on United Kingdom [UK] armored vehicle.
April 6, 2012--First improvised explosive device [IED] attack
on the Benghazi Mission compound.
April 10, 2012--IED attack on the motorcade of the United
Nations Special Envoy.
April 19, 2012--Washington, D.C., denies request for five
Diplomatic Security agents to be assigned to Benghazi
Mission compound.
May 14, 2012--Stevens sworn in as Ambassador to Libya.
May 22, 2012--Rocket propelled grenade [RPG] attack on
International Committee of the Red Cross
May 26, 2012--Stevens returns to Libya.
May 28, 2012--Threat to Benghazi Mission compound posted on
Facebook.
June 2012--Blue Mountain Group issues with Libyan partner.
June 5, 2012--Stevens requests State Department mobile security
deployment [MSD] team remain in Tripoli.
June 6, 2012--Stevens requests MSD team.
June 6, 2012--Second IED attack on the Benghazi Mission
compound.
June 11, 2012--RPG attack on UK Ambassador motorcade
June 14, 2012--Emergency Action Committee [EAC] held in
Benghazi.
June 15, 2012--U.S. Embassy in Tripoli again requests five
Diplomatic Security agents for Benghazi Mission compound.
Washington, D.C., never responds.
July 7, 2012--First national democratic elections held in
Libya.
July 9, 2012--U.S. Embassy in Tripoli requests to either
maintain or replace departing U.S. security personnel with
high threat trained Diplomatic Security agents. The Embassy
tells Washington, D.C., if you send three agents to the
Benghazi Mission compound the Embassy will also send a
regional security office. Washington, D.C., never responds
to the request.
August 5, 2012--International Committee of the Red Cross
attacked for fifth time shutting down Red Cross operations
in both Benghazi and Misrata, Libya.
August 15, 2012--Benghazi holds EAC on deteriorating security
situation and requests ability to collocate with other U.S.
government personnel.
August 27, 2012--U.S. issues travel alert for Libya.
August 29, 2012--State of Maximum Alert issued for Benghazi.
Alert suspended on September 2.
August 30, 2012--Both the Principal Officer and Diplomatic
Security agent in charge depart Benghazi. There is a gap in
coverage by the Principal Officer until September 15, 2012.
Also, no Diplomatic Security agents volunteered to secure
the compound during fall 2012. The Benghazi Mission
compound was down to two Diplomatic Security agents. An
agent is rerouted from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli to the
Benghazi Mission compound bringing the number to 3.
August 30, 2012--U.S. Embassy in Tripoli sends one Diplomatic
Security agent to ensure three agents are assigned to the
Benghazi Mission compound.
On or around August 30, 2012--Stevens sends Political/Economic
Officer, U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, State Department, to
Benghazi Mission compound to cover reporting the first week
in September. Stevens himself will cover duties beginning
on September 10, 2012.
September 6, 2012--Benghazi Mission compound requests presence
of Supreme Security Council police from September 10-15.
September 8, 2012--February 17 Martyrs Brigade tells Diplomatic
Security agents it will no longer support off-compound
moves.
September 8, 2012--Principal Officer holds meeting with local
militia and is told they cannot guarantee the safety of the
Benghazi Mission compound.
September 10, 2011--Stevens arrives with two Diplomatic
Security agents.
September 11, 2012--The attacks begin.
APPENDIX E:
Security Incidents In Libya
From the outset, the security environment in Benghazi was
precarious. Stevens' mission to Benghazi began in the midst of
a civil war--with Benghazi serving as the home to the
opposition and rebel forces. Notwithstanding the civil war's
end in August 2011 with the fall of Tripoli and later Libya's
liberation on October 23, 2011, the security environment in
Libya, including Benghazi, remained tenuous. At the time the
Benghazi mission was extended in December 2011, the State
Department's own threat rating system considered Libya to be a
grave risk to American diplomats. The security environment only
deteriorated from there. The Diplomatic Security agents on the
ground tracked the security incidents in Libya between 2011 and
2012. Documents prepared by the agents tracking security
incidents are included below.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
APPENDIX F:
Deterioration of Mission
Compound Security
Overview
The decision by State Department senior officials to leave
the Benghazi Mission in an undefined status left it without
typical security measures and a dedicated funding stream that
would otherwise apply to official overseas posts. Benghazi's
security posture was further eroded by other factors such as
constant equipment failures and insufficient quantities of
personal protection equipment. Furthermore, notwithstanding the
insufficient number of Diplomatic Security Agents sent to
Benghazi, intervening factors such as problems with the Libyan
visa system further limited the number of Diplomatic Security
Agents deployed to Benghazi.
Funding Issues
The Benghazi Mission's requests for even the most basic
security measures were impacted by the lack of dedicated
funding made available by the State Department. Senior
officials within the State Department were well aware of the
funding implications associated with continuing the Benghazi
Mission into 2012. Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, testified:
What we were trying to . . . figure out was, how could
we make a compelling enough argument that in the zero
sum game that we have in terms of our budget and our
resources, that we could find enough resources to keep
Benghazi operating through the critical transition
period? [sic]\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Testimony of Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 47 (Aug. 8, 2015)
[hereinafter Feltman Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Patrick F. Kennedy, the Under Secretary of State for
Management, testified: ``OBO has the funding authority . . .
for our permanent facilities. . . . It [funding authority for
temporary facilities] ranges between the regional bureau in
which the facility is located or the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security.''\2\ To that end, there was awareness at the senior
level that the Benghazi Mission's limited duration prevented it
from receiving any type of dedicated funding for its physical
security needs from the State Department's Overseas Building
Office [OBO], the office responsible for funding security
measures.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Management,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 18 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\3\Summary of group interview with Physical Security Specialist and
others (on file with the Committee, SCB0046921) (``OBO is precluded
from funding upgrades to short term leases, so it did not fund upgrades
in Benghazi.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum, approved by
Kennedy, outlining the future operations of the Benghazi
Mission for another year would have been an appropriate place
to address the funding limitations within the OBO; and to
designate a funding source to ensure the Benghazi Mission's
security needs were met in 2012.\4\ The Action Memorandum's
failure to address the issue forced nontraditional funding
sources to be identified, with quick turnaround, in order to
respond to Benghazi Mission's basic security needs.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Patrick F. Kennedy,
Under Sec'y for Management, U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 27, 2011) (on
file with the Committee, C05261557).
\5\Summary of group interview with Physical Security Specialist and
others (on file with the Committee, SCB0046922) (``nontraditional DS
funding was identified for Benghazi.''). See also Testimony of
Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 80 (April 2, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent
10 Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (``In terms of funding
issues for programmatic stuff and security upgrades, . . . you're not
going to get the money because Pat Kennedy hasn't given you guys any
money. So there's no money at all that exists for the security budget
for Benghazi. Every single penny you get we have to take from some
other operational budget from some other office somewhere.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gentry O. Smith, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Countermeasures, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, testified
funding was never an issue for physical security.\6\
Nevertheless, on January 12, 2012, the physical security desk
officer was informed ``OBO/SM . . . advised . . . they cannot
provide the funding'' for the security requests.\7\ As a
result, the State Department's physical security specialist was
forced to locate other offices within the Department to find
the funds the Benghazi Mission needed.\8\ On February 15, 2012,
the physical security desk officer explained to the Benghazi
Mission ``how the funding process normally works . . . with
short term leases in place at Benghazi, OBO/SM cannot get
involved due to OBO policy . . . funding security upgrades
would have to be identified from other sources (DS).''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\Testimony of Gentry O. Smith, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State,
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Countermeasures, U.S. Dep't of State,
Tr. at 76 (Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Smith Testimony] (on file with
the Committee);
Q: Let me ask you this. As the DAS for Countermeasures,
were you concerned about the ability to fund sufficiently
the physical security measures needed to secure the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
facility?
A: It had not become an issue for me yet at that time,
based on, as we spoke of in the first hour, the sources
that were providing funds for the operation, particularly
from the physical security side. You had Physical Security
Programs, you had International Programs, you had OBO, and
then you had the regional bureau as well.
Q: You said it had not been a concern at that time. Did it
ever, did funding for physical security upgrades ever
become an issue for you or a concern of yours?
A: No.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Email from Physical Security Specialist, Physical Security
Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 12,
2012 6:29 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05397166).
\8\Id.
\9\Email from Physical Security Specialist, Physical Security
Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Diplomatic Security Agent 24, U.S. Dep't of State, et al. (Feb. 15,
2012 2:39 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0048394).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground described the
impact the lack of funding had on the Mission.
I was told that the only way that we can get you
security upgrades is if they basically don't cost
anything and we can, sort of, you know, steal a couple
bucks here and there from other pots of money, that
there is no budget for Benghazi.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Diplomatic Security Agent 10 Testimony at 27.
If we had the money at post and if I had the money at
post, you know, if I was able to spend the money you
know, I'm an official for the U.S. Government. I'm
entrusted with a lot as a DS agent. You know, I wanted
the ability to go ahead and perform work, pay for that
work, and then on the back end be able to tell people,
`This is what I spent it for,' and be able to you know,
justify it that way, because it just made sense in my
mind. Not necessarily I don't know if that's the
appropriate way to do it, but for me, that was some of
my frustration.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security
Service, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 24 (Apr. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
Diplomatic Security Agent 12 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Further complicating the funding issue was the fact that
Benghazi was a cash economy. Diplomatic Security Agents on the
ground told the Committee ``it was a cash economy at the time,
so that money had to get to us before we could identify
contractors and work to be under way.''\12\ Yet, even getting
the money to Libya was a problem. State Department officials
indicated: ``[s]ince it [Benghazi] was not a post, it had no
formal designation in Department systems, and no electronic way
to get the fund transfers.''\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Id. at 21.
\13\Summary of group interview with Physical Security Specialist
and others (on file with the Committee, SCB0046921).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical Equipment
The security challenges at the Mission compound were not
limited to the rudimentary security measures that were being
requested by the Diplomatic Security Agents or the challenges
with funding the requests. The Benghazi Mission was constantly
requesting assistance with routine items such as door locks,
monitors, batteries, radios, and cameras.\14\ More often than
not the Benghazi Mission sought help fixing constant equipment
malfunctions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 29, 2012, 6:01 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05390852).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The challenges with finding, installing, and fixing the
equipment were exacerbated by the fact it could not be done
locally.\15\ The Benghazi Mission was dependent on ``the Cairo
engineering center . . . [which had] responsibility for US
Missions in Libya.''\16\ When the U.S. Embassy in Cairo was not
available, other embassies, such as Frankfurt, ``augment[ed]
the Cairo team.''\17\ Thus, notwithstanding the logistics of
getting into Benghazi, the Benghazi Mission was subject to the
U.S. Embassy in Cairo's schedule as well as that of other
embassies. For example, in early January 2012, Benghazi Mission
personnel requested the assistance of the Electrical Security
Officer [ESO] in Cairo to, among other things, help
decommission Villa A and install equipment in Villas B and
C.\18\ The ESO could not travel to Benghazi until February 26,
2012 to assist with the requests.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security
Service, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 46 (Mar. 12, 2015) [Hereinafter
Diplomatic Security Agent 15 Testimony] (on file with the Committee)
(``I was asking for things that were not just readily available in
Benghazi. And it wasn't I could go to the drop arm store. There wasn't
one. So they would have to be locally procured and then put
together.'').
\16\Email from Regional Dir. for Security Engineering, Cairo,
Egypt, U.S. Dep't of State, to Travel Specialist, Cairo, Egypt, U.S.
Dep't of State, and Security Engineering Officer, U.S. Dep't of State
(Jun. 11, 2012 12:00 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05392482).
\17\Id.
\18\Email from Information Management Officer, U.S. Dep't of State,
to Diplomatic Security Agent 15 (Jan. 11, 2012, 10:28 AM) (on file with
the Committee, C05392732).
\19\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 15 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 24 (Jan. 31, 2012 7:32AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05410045).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compounding the equipment challenges was the Benghazi
Mission's constant need for technical assistance throughout
2012. For example, in early February 2012, the Benghazi Mission
sought help from the Radio Program Branch in Cairo for new
radio equipment because ``DS [Diplomatic Security] Washington
has requested that the majority of radio equipment initially
brought into Benghazi now must be returned.''\20\ This was
preceded by a request for, among other things, replacing the
radio antenna and repeater.\21\ This was followed by a request
in late February 2012 to help again with radio repeaters. The
Benghazi Mission wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\Email from Information Management Officer, U.S. Dep't of State
(Feb. 1, 2012 4:08 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05395451).
\21\See id.
[T]he government authority in Libya responsible for
allocating/assigning radio frequencies has declined our
current frequencies in use and has provided us with an
``acceptable'' frequency range for use. As a result, we
need to replace the current radio repeaters at site
(Benghazi and Tripoli) with repeaters that will
accommodate the frequencies that the Libyan government
has agreed to let us use.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\Email to Deputy Ex. Dir., Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State (Feb. 21, 2012 2:09 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05393043).
In late April 2012, after the first improvised explosive
device [IED] attack on the perimeter wall at the Mission
compound, Benghazi had problems with much of its security
equipment, including: the loud speaker, the itemizer, walk-
through metal detector, and camera 1.\23\ In addition to fixing
the malfunctioning equipment, the Mission sought help procuring
additional equipment to strengthen the security on the compound
such as a camera to screen the C-gate; monitors in [quick
reaction force] QRF bungalow, and locks for doors. Finally, the
Benghazi Mission needed help relocating its lighting around the
perimeter.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 17 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 24 (Apr. 21, 2012 10:20 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05409948).
\24\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2012, the second IED attack on the Mission compound
damaged not only the perimeter wall but also cameras and the
secondary metal detector. The Benghazi Mission sought help from
the U.S. Embassy in Cairo to fix the damage but also sought
help with the installation of additional cameras to strengthen
security.\25\ Three weeks later, power surges in Benghazi
damaged the ``voltage regulator and 220-110V transformer,''
shutting all of the Benghazi Mission's technical equipment down
and necessitating the need for technical help from Cairo
again.\26\ Because the U.S Embassy in Cairo couldn't make the
trip, the post in Frankfurt Germany sent personnel and
equipment to make the necessary repairs.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 19 to Security Engineering
Officer, U.S. Dep't of State (Jun. 6, 2012, 5:07 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05392482).
\26\Id.
\27\Email from Information Management Officer, U.S. Dep't of State,
to Security Engineering Officer, U.S. Dep't of State (Jun. 25, 2012,
9:23 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05392482).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Later, in August 2012, the Benghazi Mission sought the
assistance of Cairo to fix additional malfunctioning equipment,
including: seeking a new Immediate Distress Notification System
[IDNS], old pendants for the current IDNS system, camera and
monitors for its technical operations center and Villa Safe
Haven, additional cameras with visibility outside the compound
walls, upgraded critical cameras for night vision, louder IDNS
system and a hardened [technical operations center] TOC
door.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 26 to Security Engineering
Officer, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 6, 2012 2:58 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05390265).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The constant malfunctions frustrated personnel on the
ground.\29\ In his turnover notes, the departing principal
officer in Benghazi told his replacement: ``[t]he tendency has
been to conduct triage in the interim. We are, for example, on
the fourth visit from an Embassy electrician of my brief tenure
because we continue to repair rather than replace
equipment.''\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\See email from Principal Officer 3, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Principal Officer 4, U.S. Dep't of State (Aug. 29, 2012 6:01 AM) (on
file with the Committee, C05390852).
\30\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 23, 2012, the Benghazi Mission requested
additional technical equipment to help secure the compound. The
request included an expert to analyze the loss of exterior
lighting, new IDNS panel and pendants, weapons cabinet, better
personal tracking device software, disintegrator if post
increases its footprint, belt-fed crew-served weapon with bi-
pod, CS gas canisters, badging machine, computer program to
make access requests and computer at the guard house to view
the approved access requests, an additional itemizer and an
alarm system for the office villa.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 8 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 23 (Aug. 23, 2012 2:44 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05390126-C05390127).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Protective Equipment
The Benghazi Mission was constantly securing adequate
supplies of protective equipment for personnel in 2012. For
example, on January 24, 2012, the lead Diplomatic Security
Agent on the ground requested additional helmets, vests and
[e]scape hoods after an insufficient number were sent to the
Benghazi Mission.\32\ The U.S. Embassy in Tripoli acknowledged
it mixed up the Benghazi Mission's request for the
equipment.\33\ In sending the protective equipment to Benghazi,
the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli stated: ``It's not exactly what you
asked for but is what we could get together to get up to
you.''\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 15 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 25 (Jan. 24, 2012 9:38PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05393735).
\33\Email to Diplomatic Security Agent 15 (Jan. 29, 2012 1:56 PM)
(on file with the Committee, C05412863).
\34\Id. (``It is not exactly what you asked for but is what we
could get together to get up to you. We believe the original order that
was made is mixed in with the commo [sic] equipment that needs to get
up to you. We'll have to open the crates to see if your original order
is included.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In early February 2012, the Benghazi Mission requested
ballistic vests, ballistic plates, complete personal medical
kit, radio wires with pig tail, low profile holster, magazine
pouches, low profile chest vest, individual GPS, flashlight,
strobe, multi-tool, camel pak hydration system, and go
bags.\35\ With one Diplomatic Security Agent arriving without
luggage and protective equipment in Benghazi, the Mission was
concerned future Diplomatic Security Agents would also arrive
without their personal protective gear. Further prompting the
request was an incident that occurred on the compound while the
Diplomatic Security Agent was without [his] equipment.\36\ To
ensure this didn't happen again, the Benghazi Mission sought to
have additional equipment at the ready.\37\ The equipment was
not sent until March 2012.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 12 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 25 (Feb. 5, 2012 6:42 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05394222).
\36\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Feb. 14, 2012, 8:54
AM) (on file with the Committee, C05393444).
\37\See Id.
\38\Email to Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Mar. 5, 2012 11:27 AM)
(on file with the Committee, C05393444).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional requests for personal protection equipment were
made on June 24, 2012, three weeks after the second attack on
the facility. The request first went to Washington D.C. and
then to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli for a response.\39\ The
Embassy in Tripoli responded it had some items but that the
others ``will have to be post procured.''\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 19 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 24 (Jun. 24, 2012 11:28 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05411697).
\40\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 24 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 19, (Jun. 24, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05411697).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Staffing and the Mission
In addition to physical security, the Benghazi Mission's
security deficiencies extended to State Department's
unwillingness to commit the number of personnel needed to
adequately secure the compound and personnel. The December 27,
2011 Action Memorandum authorized five Diplomatic Security
Agents to serve at the Benghazi Mission compound.\41\ It was
the expectation of those personnel on the ground that five
Diplomatic Security Agents would be deployed to secure the
compound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Libya Desk Officer,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 17 (Aug. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Diplomatic
Security Agent 25 Testimony] (on file with the Committee) (``[A]t the
time it was Acting Regional Director . . . to come to that number. I
don't know specifically what was his thinking on the matter, but I know
in the summer of 2011 they were down to five agents for several months,
so that was the in Benghazi that was the lowest number that was on the
ground in Benghazi that I'm aware of at that time timeframe prior to
December of 2012.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet Benghazi ``achieved a level of five DS Agents (not
counting Defense Department provided temporary duty [TDY] Site
Security Team personnel sent by the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli)
for only 23 days between January 1 and September 9, 2012.''\42\
Efforts to secure five Diplomatic Security Agents were either
ignored or dismissed. As a result, the Benghazi Mission did not
have five Diplomatic Security Agents on the Mission compound
during the first IED attack on April 6, 2012. The Benghazi
Mission did not have five Diplomatic Security Agents on the
compound during the second IED attack. The Benghazi Mission did
not have five Diplomatic Security Agents at the time Ambassador
Stevens arrived at the Mission compound on September 10, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\See Department of State, Accountability Review Board for
Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012, at 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROTECTIVE DETAIL--OFFICE OF DIGNITARY PROTECTION
Because of the Defense Department's ``no boots on the
ground'' policy, military security assets were only available
in emergency circumstances.\43\ Hence, only State Department
Diplomatic Security Agents traveled with J. Christopher
Stevens, U.S. Representative to the Transitional National
Council [TNC] and his team into Benghazi. The Diplomatic
Security Agents accompanying Stevens and his team needed
certain skills for the Benghazi Mission in order to conduct
``protective security functions.''\44\ The Diplomatic Security
Agent in charge of Stevens' protective detail described the
qualifications of his team.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\Benghazi Party Ops Plan (March 30, 2011)(on file with the
Committee, SCB0095930)(``DOD provide QRF for security and medical
extraction'').
\44\See Action Memorandum For DSS Director Jeffrey W. Culver (June
30, 2011)(on file with the Committee, C05579256).
A: I think it was pretty much people were selected
because of their skill sets. You know, they spent, they
spent time to make sure they had the right team makeup.
And, for example, my shift leader . . . , he had, I
would estimate he had been on Diplomatic Security for
eight years. He had some advanced training on a mobile
training team where they it's a tactical team that the
State Department has. He was on that team, and they
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
trained for like nine months.
Q: Is that known as the MSD [mobile security
deployment]?
A: MSD.
Q: Okay.
A: And anybody else on the team either had prior
military experience, which I think all but two had
prior military experience, and they had all gone
through the State Department's high threat training.
Q: Okay.
A: As I recall.
Q: Okay. And you had too?
A: Yes.
Q: To your knowledge, was that a requirement that
everyone have this high threat tactical course prior to
going?
A: I think that was a requirement as far as the boss'
thought when they were trying to put the team together,
you know, that they wanted people to have that
experience.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security
Service, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 20 (Feb. 10, 2015) [hereinafter
Diplomatic Security Agent 6 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Two additional Diplomatic Security Agents traveled to
Benghazi in late April 2011 to augment the Stevens' protective
detail. The two additional Diplomatic Security Agents brought
the total number of Agents to ten.\46\ The Diplomatic Security
Agents assigned to the Stevens' protective detail served in
temporary capacities contingent on the Mission's duration.\47\
When senior State Department officials made the decision to
extend Stevens' Mission in Benghazi beyond the initial 30-day
mark, the next Diplomatic Security Agent team rotated in for
another 30-45 days.\48\ The incoming Diplomatic Security Agent
in charge described the process: ``The first team that went in,
the Dignitary Protection team that went in, it was a 30-day
Mission, and they were in need of an agent in charge to go in
and take over from that agent in charge and to continue on the
Mission.''\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\See Memorandum from Exec. Dir., NEA-SCA/EX, to Patrick F.
Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Apr. 15,
2011) (on file with the Committee, C05390734); see also email from
SMART Core (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:17 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05390733).
\47\See Diplomatic Security Agent 6 Testimony at 14 (``I was on a
60 day TDY, but I think I spent less than 45 days in Benghazi because I
know I did. I spent 30 some days in Benghazi because it took time for
us to get there.''). See also, Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent,
Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 25 (Feb. 26,
2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic Security Agent 7 Testimony] (on file with
the Committee) (``[T]he first team that went in, the Dignitary
Protection team that went in, it was a thirty day Mission.'').
\48\Diplomatic Security Agent 7 Testimony at 26 (``I would say that
when they recognized that the Mission was viable and that they were
going to continue it, they started to look for a replacement knowing
that the agreement was that the agent in charge was going to do 30
days. So then they thought, okay, now we need to find somebody to
continue on.'').
\49\Id. at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The number of Diplomatic Security Agents dropped from ten
to five when Stevens and his team were forced to leave the
Tibesti Hotel and find other accommodations. When Stevens and
his team relocated to Villas A, B, and C in early August 2011,
additional Diplomatic Security Agents were needed again to
secure the 13 acre compound. The Diplomatic Security Agent in
charge informed Washington D.C.:
[m]ore agents required: Between the three compounds,
we're looking at roughly 15 acres of property to
secure. This will require additional SAs (up to five
more) by early to mid-August. For REACT purposes, teams
of agents will reside on all three compounds. Once
resources permit, RSO TOC will be staffed 24/7.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\Email Diplomatic Security Agent to DS-IP-NEA (Jul. 21, 2011,
3:22 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05396529).
By mid-September, the Mission had increased back to ``10
bodies [DS agents] on compound.''\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security
Service, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 24 (May 21, 2015) [hereinafter
Diplomatic Security Agent 13 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
SHIFT IN SECURITY POSTURE FROM A PROTECTIVE DETAIL TO
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A QUASI-RSO PROGRAM
By mid-September 2011, efforts were also under way to
restart operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Predictably,
resources and personnel shifted away from the Mission in
Benghazi back to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.\52\ This
precipitated a number of conversations about the Benghazi
Mission's future. At the time the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli
restarted operations, the Benghazi Mission's security posture
changed from that of a protective detail to a regional security
officer [RSO] program, a program similar to those implemented
in embassies and official posts located abroad.\53\ Unlike the
protective detail that focused primarily on the security of
Stevens and his team using U.S. security assets, the new
security posture would be overseen by a rotation of volunteer
Diplomatic Security Agents. In addition, the Benghazi Mission
focused more on employing host nation support for security,
including using the February 17 Martyrs Brigade as a QRF team
and employing an unarmed local guard force [LGF]. The
Diplomatic Security Agent in charge in September described his
response when learning about the change in security:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\See email from Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in
Libya, U.S. Dep't of State, to John C. Stevens, U.S. Representative to
Transitional National Council, William V. Roebuck, Dir. Office of
Maghreb Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
Post Management Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
(Sept. 18, 2011, 11:54 AM)(on file with the Committee,
C05395962)(stating ``and when can we get . . . here'').
\53\Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 18.
When I got solicited to go out, I was supposed to be
the agent in charge of this detail. So I assumed as you
know, you don't want to do that too often that the 10
would be part of my bodyguard staff and that's all I
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
would have to deal with.
So when I got close to the drop date or the day I
arrived, they basically said, ``We don't know how long
we're going to be here. So we're going to make you the
RSO, and we're going to make your number two the AIC,''
at which time I tried to get back on the airplane.
But, nonetheless, it was myself and my number two. Rank
wise, he was senior. He did more of the movement
portion with Ambassador Stevens, but I did the overall
security aspects of the job, access control and all the
policy crap.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\Diplomatic Security Agent 13 Testimony at 28-29.
When asked to describe the caliber of host nation support
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
available, he told the Committee:
[W]e were a quasi RSO office at best, so meaning
Benghazi was unique in the fact that Benghazi really
didn't know who they were either. . . . They were still
jockeying to figure out who was going to be in power
and who wasn't.
So, normally speaking, you would have already known
that when you go into an environment. If you were going
to establish yourself or an embassy, you'd already know
who your minister of security is or who your DOD
counterparts would be.
There it was a little different because you had
different I'll say tribal, for lack of a better term.
But you had different groups there and sects that you
were trying to figure out who were friendly and who
weren't.
And, I mean, for all intents and purposes, we thought
everybody was friendly at that time. But, from my
perspective, we didn't want to befriend one group
versus somebody else without you know, we didn't want
to cause an international incident.
At the time, 17 Feb. had already stepped up and said
that they were going to be the point people for
diplomatic interests or security purposes under this
function.
So my interest while I was there was trying to plus
that contingent up because knowing they only had a
local guard force contingent of 10 people or 12 or
whatever it was, unarmed and poorly equipped and poorly
trained, I wanted at least some firepower. At least I
could put them to at least have a presence.
But we only had three at the time. So I was trying to
befriend them, trying to get more activity, more
interest, additional bodies, because three bodies on
24/7 is long days, long weeks.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Id. at 43-44.
The change in security posture together with the reopening
of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli left the Diplomatic Security
Agents on the ground uncertain about their future in Benghazi
and their ability to do their jobs. The Diplomatic Security
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agent in charge in September testified:
As we downsized to a lesser number, it's more difficult
to run, keep up with the off tempo. That's where the 10
bodies kind of helped because, with additional bodies
there, I could farm them out to support USAID interests
or the MANPAD guy or . . . and what have you. But as
you start reducing those resources, then you have to
prioritize your Missions.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\Id. at 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
[W]e were still in this situation where we didn't know
how long Benghazi was going to be. Tripoli was kicking
off. And so there was a lot of interest in supporting
that. So we were trying to figure out or headquarters
was trying to figure out where to prioritize our
deficiencies, if you want to call it that. So no one
knows.
I mean, we were planning for the worst, phasing people
out and trying to figure out how best to support the
Mission there. If I remember correctly, with the
Embassy being opened it opened towards the latter part
of my tenure there. So the Envoy lost his, quote
unquote, status because there was now an Ambassador in
country. . . . I think they were going to bring in a
political officer, probably my rank. I'm pretty sure he
was my rank. He was going to be the foothold there in
Benghazi for the short term, but no one knew how
long.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Id. at 33-34.
As Stevens closed out his time in Benghazi, the number of
Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to secure the Benghazi
Mission continued to decrease. By the end of October 2011 the
number of Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to secure the
Benghazi Mission decreased to six.\58\ By the end of November
2011, as Stevens' was departing, the number of Diplomatic
Security Agents assigned to the Benghazi Mission was expected
to drop to three.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\See id. at 72. See also Memorandum from Regional Director,
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep't of State, to Charlene Lamb,
Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int'l
Programs, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with the
Committee, C05391928).
\59\Memorandum from Regional Director, Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, U.S. Dep't of State to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of
State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of
State (Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05391928).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Diplomatic Security personnel responsible for staffing
overseas posts including Benghazi recognized early on the
problems associated with finding Diplomatic Security Agents
available to serve in Benghazi. With a protective detail, the
Diplomatic Security Command Center could direct Diplomatic
Security Agents to serve on a temporary basis. Under a RSO
program, temporary duty positions were filled by
volunteers.\60\ The desk officer in charge of staffing in
Benghazi testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\Id.
The Mission in . . . September, October, the Mission in
Benghazi changed essentially from a protection Mission,
which was run by our dignitary protection unit here in
Washington, to a more traditional RSO program
management position, which pushed it back into DS/IP's,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
my office's realm.
So at that time the mechanism to get agents changed,
they have a task oriented system, we have a it's hard
to describe, but it's a system where basically we get
volunteers to go. It's usually the high threat posts.
And our system is, generally we cover traditionally we
cover one RSO position like over a summer transition or
during a break. It was very difficult for us to get the
type of numbers on kind of a continuous basis through
the volunteer system.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 18-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
Typically we just cover the gaps, but we did do
occasionally we would do particularly in the beginning
of Arab spring, it was very busy, and we had to find
TDY support. But generally it wasn't near that number.
It was never near that number. And it was for a much
shorter timeframe, usually only one or two 60 to 30 day
deployments for agents.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\Id.
To address the emerging issue, the desk officer drafted an
Action Memorandum for the approval of Charlene Lamb, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for International Programs in the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security.\63\ The October 24, 2011 Action
Memorandum described the emerging problems associated with
identifying enough volunteer Diplomatic Security Agents to
serve 30-45 day rotations in Benghazi on a consistent basis and
identified solutions including deploying Diplomatic Security
Agents through the Diplomatic Security Command Center as had
been done previously.\64\ When asked by the Committee whether
the October 24, 2011 Action Memorandum was approved, Lamb
testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\Memorandum from Regional Dir., Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
U.S. Dep't of State, to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State,
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of State
(Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with the Committee, C05391928).
\64\Id.
I had actually requested that they draft this memo
because it's very easy for people to take for granted
when there's a need for TDY people, they don't take the
budget into consideration. And when we don't have full
time positions authorized, this TDY money is coming out
of the international program's budget. And at $9,000
per agent for 45 days on a continual basis for a year,
this money adds up very, very quickly and depletes the
budget that I have for worldwide TDY assignments. So I
wanted this to be documented and I wanted to be able to
forward this forward and to go to the DS budget people
to make sure that we had appropriate funding, and that
they knew we were going to need additional funding,
should this TDY status continue for a long period of
time.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 77-78
(Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Lamb Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
I'll be honest, there were so many operational things
going on, my intent with this memo was to get this into
the hands of the budget people and to have the budget
people work together to come up with a solution to get
the money that was needed.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\Id. at 92.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
We never ran we never ran out of money to the point
where we said, okay, we can't send anybody else,
there's no more money. We never went anti deficient
with funding. So the Department, collectively, between
DS, financial personnel, and the Department, we were
always funded for these types of posts.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\Id. at 92-93.
When asked by the Committee directly whether funding was
approved for five, 45-day assistant regional security officer
[ARSO] TDYs in Benghazi, Lamb testified: ``yes.''\68\ However,
the October 24, 2011 Action Memorandum, which outlined proposed
solutions including funding for five Diplomatic Security
Agents, was never signed.\69\ The desk officer testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\Id at 93.
Q: But, specifically, this request for $47,000, do you
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
recall whether that was approved?
A: Yes.
Q: That was approved?
A: It would yes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\Memorandum from Regional Dir., Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
U. S. Dep't of State, to Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 24,
2011) (on file with the Committee, C05391928).
A: I identified the problem immediately because you can
see the staffing chart as was coming down. So when I
took over the program in October, I immediately had
conversations with my direct supervisors, and we
generated an action memorandum with numerous
recommendations on how we thought or I thought we could
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
alleviate this problem.
Q: And was this just specifically focused on Benghazi
or
A: I believe it was Libya centric----
Q: Libya.
A: But I can't remember if it was Benghazi specific.
Q: And do you recall the timeframe that that actual
memorandum circulated?
A: The date was mid to late October of 2011.
Q: And was that ever signed?
A: It was approved by my immediate supervisors.
Q: Did that help alleviate the concerns?
A:LIt was not approved through their superiors, so it
never
Q: So where did it stop?
A: It stopped, as far as I know, at the I don't know
where it went. I know it went up to the Deputy
Director/DAS level. Which one of them looked at it or
which one didn't, I don't know.
Q: Did you ever understand why it didn't get approved
at that level?
A: No, I did not.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 20.
Lamb informed the Committee that Kennedy was aware of the
funding issues associated with staffing the Mission in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi.
Q: So is it fair to say that Pat Kennedy was aware of
the funding issues that were associated with the TDYs
in Benghazi?
A: It would he, during his regular staff meetings when
we discussed all of the Tripoli and Benghazi issues, he
was aware, and he had financial people there from his
staff that reported to him directly.
Q: So he was shifting resources as it relates to . . .
A: If it was necessary, he would not hesitate to do
that.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\Lamb Testimony at 89.
STAFFING SHORTAGES--DECEMBER 27 ACTION MEMORANDUM:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FUTURE OF BENGHAZI OPERATIONS
By December 2011, Diplomatic Security Agent staffing in
Benghazi was a problem. Two Diplomatic Security Agents secured
the 13 acre compound in mid-December. Without reinforcements
from Washington D.C. there was every expectation it would drop
to one and then to zero in January.\72\ One of the Diplomatic
Security Agents on the ground expressed his concerns:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\Diplomatic Security Agent 10 Testimony at 41-42.
It was down to two agents, myself and one other agent.
And as I was getting ready to depart, we were going to
go to one agent. And if the staffing pattern remained
the way it was, with our expected incoming agents, we
were going to go down to zero agents. And that would
have been around January 4th or 5th or so, we would go
down to zero agents.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\Id.
The principal officer who replaced Stevens also alerted
Washington D.C. about the impact of the shortages in Diplomatic
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Agents in December 2011. He wrote:
[o]n a much more serious matter, something I flagged
for Bill [Roebuck] yesterday on the phone, but pledged
to send the details. We're going to be short on the RSO
end of things from December 19 through the end of the
year. During that period, we will be down to just 2 A/
RSOs or the practical equivalent thereof. . . .
What this all means is that all non-DS TDYs to Benghazi
should be discouraged through the end of the year for
sure (and we're still pretty limited the first week of
January as the new folks get spun up), as even the
basic movements are going to overextend us. . . .
We are a little too close to being down to a single
agent here if arrival dates (or visa issuance?) slips
to the right . . . and if we're going to need to extend
anyone here (one of whom has already done so), we need
to get that sorted out sooner rather than later. Also,
it's a little curious to hear about DS intensions to
staff Benghazi with a RSO and 4 A/RSOs, while at this
rate, we won't hit that target during my first two
months here.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\Email from Principal Officer 1, U.S. Dep't of State, to Post
Management Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State (Dec. 15, 2011, 1:11 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05391603).
At the time Benghazi Mission was experiencing shortages in
Diplomatic Security Agents, the December 27, 2011 Action
Memorandum was being circulated for approval. The Action
Memorandum acknowledged ``Diplomatic Security's current
presence consists of two Special Agents, with an additional
three slots currently unfilled'' and attributed the unfilled
slots ``to budget constraints and the reduced footprint.''\75\
The Action Memorandum authorized a ``full complement of five
Special Agents.''\76\ Kennedy provided a different
interpretation to the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Action Memorandum from Jeffrey Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Patrick F.
Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 27, 2011) (on
file with the Committee, C05261557).
\76\See id. See also Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 17
(``at the time it was Action Regional Director to come to that number.
I don't know specifically what his thinking on the matter, but I know
in the summer of 2011 they were down to five agents for several months,
so that was the--in Benghazi--that was the lowest number that was on
the ground that I'm aware of at that time timeframe prior to December
of 2012 [sic].'').
It says eight U.S. direct hire employees and two slots
for political military and USAID. So that's 8, plus 2
is 10, of which 5 are substantive or management and 5
are Diplomatic Security. So you have five to protect
five.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\Kennedy Testimony at 301.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
How many people the Near East Bureau, looking at what
was going on, how many people the Near East Bureau
ultimately decided to deploy, kind of a cost benefit
analysis. How much activity are they going to do? How
much reporting do they want to do? That's a call made
by the Near East Bureau. My point is that you judge the
number of Diplomatic Security on two factors. It's the
facility and the number of sorties that you need to
make out into the city.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\Id. at 302.
Lamb described Diplomatic Security's responsibilities to
provide five Diplomatic Security Agents in Benghazi as ``kind
of the cap of what the bureau was asking . . . Kennedy to
approve. What they're saying is, at the most, we're not going
to exceed this staffing level in Benghazi.''\79\ Others such as
the Diplomatic Security Agents on the ground and the principal
officers they were protecting saw Diplomatic Security's
staffing obligations as five Diplomatic Security Agents for
Benghazi.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\Lamb Testimony at 224.
\80\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 15 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 12 (Jan. 27, 2012, 11:10 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05411094). (``U/S Kennedy stated there should be 5 agents here and I
agree.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though the effect of budget constraints on Diplomatic
Security Agents assigned to the Benghazi Mission was known well
before the decision to extend the Benghazi Mission, the
December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum was silent on a funding
solution.\81\ The Bureau of Diplomatic Security cleared the
December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum with the ``comment that
this operation continues to be an unfunded mandate and a drain
on personnel resources.''\82\ Neither Gentry O. Smith, Deputy
Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of Diplomatic Sec., Countermeasures, U.S.
Dep't of State, whose office was responsible for ensuring
security standards and adequate physical security measures were
in place at the Benghazi Mission and who cleared the Action
Memorandum for Diplomatic Security, nor Lamb whose office was
responsible for staffing, had any recollection of why the
comment was made.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\Action Memorandum from Jeffrey Feltman, Ass't Sec'y of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Patrick F.
Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Mgmt., U.S. Dep't of State (Dec. 27, 2011) (on
file with the Committee, C05261557).
\82\Email from Special Ass't to the Ass't Sec'y for Diplomatic
Security, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep't of State, to Post
Management Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State
(Dec. 23, 2011, 3:27 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05578953).
\83\Lamb Transcript at 221 (``I did not see [the Action Memorandum]
until after the event in Benghazi.''). See also Gentry O. Smith at 75
(Feb. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Smith Testimony] (on file with the
Committee) (``[I]t didn't come from Countermeasures, it would not have
been solely for physical security.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENTS
Concerns about Diplomatic Security Agent staffing shortages
going into 2012 precipitated another Action Memorandum for
Lamb's approval.\84\ The January 10, 2012 Action Memorandum
highlighted Diplomatic Security's responsibilities under the
December 27, 2011 Action Memorandum to provide five Diplomatic
Security Agents for Benghazi and recognized the Offices'
inability to ``identify, seek necessary approvals and obtain
the required visa approvals for this many agents on a
continuing basis.''\85\ The January 10, 2012 Action Memorandum
requested Lamb approve efforts to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 to Principal Officer 1,
U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 13, 2012, 10:05 PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05411094) (``We have submitted an Action Memorandum that if
approved should significantly improve our ability to identify and
obtain approvals for staffing Benghazi.''); Action Memorandum for DAS
Charlene Lamb (January 10, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05578986).
\85\Id.
request assistance from Domestic Operations, so that
personnel can be selected and directed from the Field
Offices by the DS Command Center as well as authorize
funding for five, 45 day ARSO [assistant regional
security officer] TDYs [temporary duty] in Benghazi
from Feb.1 through September 30 at a total estimated
cost of $283,050.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\Id.
The January 10, 2012 Action Memorandum was never
approved.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\See Testimony of James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir., Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 17-18 (Sept. 4, 2013)
(on file with the Committee).
A: I believe it was January, maybe December/January
timeframe we had talked about it in the office, and I think
I was out on leave because my deputy I had seen a document
that my deputy had sent up to Director Lamb, to DAS Lamb
requesting we use the system that they use domestically to
direct a certain number of agents from the field offices
for assignments. We use that on protection. And we sent the
memo up suggesting maybe we could use this mechanism for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
overseas.
Q: Specifically for Libya or----
A: It was specifically for Libya.
Q: And do you know what happened to that memo?
A: It was never signed off on.
Without a mechanism to identify a constant pool of
Diplomatic Security Agents to serve in Benghazi, the Mission
continued to experience shortages. The principal officers on
the ground expressed concern back to Washington D.C. about the
impact the Diplomatic Security Agent staffing shortages was
having on the security of the compound, in addition to their
reporting obligations.\88\ Moreover, the principal officers
were concerned about the vulnerabilities created by the
shortages in relation to the overall security environment in
Benghazi. For example, the principal officer was concerned only
two Diplomatic Security Agents were scheduled to be at the
compound during the upcoming February 17th anniversary.\89\
With no option available within Diplomatic Security, members of
the Defense Department's SST who were currently deployed to the
U.S. Embassy in Tripoli offered to travel to Benghazi to
address the Diplomatic Security Agent shortage.\90\ SST agents
deployed to the Benghazi Mission compound on three more
occasions: March 27-30, 2012, April 12-27, 2012, after the
first attack, and June 9-23, 2012, after the second attack.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\See email from Principal Officer 5, U.S. Dep't of State, to
U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, et al. (Feb. 11, 2012, 5:29 PM) (on file with
the Committee, C05409829). See also email from Principal Officer 1 to
Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:38 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05411094).
\89\See id.
\90\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 24 to Joan Polaschik,
Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya, U.S. Dep't of State (Feb. 6, 2012,
11:05 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05411434) (``From DS HQ (DAS
Lamb and MSD Director) has indicated, they are not in favor of pulling
MSD out of Tripoli to support from Benghazi and from what I understand
they are keeping the staffing in Benghazi at 3-4 agents. DS HQ
continues to complain about Benghazi being an unfunded mandate and
there are no agents or funds to support it, so I doubt anything is
going to change unless the status of Benghazi is formalized. SST has
indicated that they would be willing to support.'').
\91\See Benghazi DS and SST TDY staffing for Jan. 2012-September 11
(on file with the Committee, C0539433).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 16, 2012, Joan Polaschik, the Deputy Chief of
Mission in Libya, met with Lamb to discuss among other things
the staffing issues in Benghazi. According to personnel in the
meeting:
Joan essentially briefed Charlene on the situation in
Tripoli, primarily because that's where Joan was
currently serving. They then discuss Benghazi some. And
Joan was primarily seeking to get clarity from Charlene
on DS' plan moving forward for security in both Tripoli
and Benghazi.
During the meeting, there was what appeared to be a
different policy set forward by Charlene about our
security posture in Benghazi that advocated for local
hire drivers and only one armed DS officer per vehicle
with some reference to maybe in the future, once people
had the foreign affairs counter threat training, some
individuals could potentially self-drive. That seemed
very different from what the previous stated policy of
having two DS in any vehicle leaving the compound in
Benghazi. It seemed a significant difference in policy,
which raised alarm bells.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\Testimony of Post Management Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 165-166 (Jul. 23, 2015)
[hereinafter Post Management Officer Testimony] (on file with the
Committee).
The policy change made by Lamb to cap the number of
Diplomatic Security Agents assigned to the Benghazi Mission at
three was confirmed by the desk officer responsible for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
staffing in Benghazi.
A: In mid-February, in conversations with DAS Lamb, it
became quite she made it quite apparent that she wanted
three agents on the ground in Benghazi. From that time
on, I was attempting to get three agents into Benghazi
at all times.
Q: How did you I mean, you said she made it clear. How
did that become clear to you that was her position?
A: I don't specifically remember. I believe the on or
about February 16th we were preparing for DCM from
Tripoli to come in for a meeting on security related
issues, and at that time I specifically recall the
conversation about the number of agents in Benghazi. So
that's the last thing I can recall specifically?
Q: Can you elaborate on that conversation?
A: Certainly. While discussing RSO staffing in Libya,
the topic came up in Benghazi, and DAS Lamb became
aware of the fact that two of the agents were
essentially excuse me their primary duty was driving
the movement team vehicle. And traditionally overseas
posts, the vast majority of them, their drivers are
provided by the post. They're locally engaged staff
drivers. So she wanted to alleviate that program or
that duty, so to speak, in her mind. That was one of
the factors. There could have been more. That was the
factors that she made known to me and my superiors.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 23-24.
The policy change was not communicated to the Diplomatic
Security Agents on the ground or other State Department
personnel who nonetheless believed five Diplomatic Security
Agents were needed to adequately secure the Benghazi Mission.
For example, the lead Diplomatic Security Agent in Benghazi at
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the time wrote:
I've enjoyed four agents for six days now and it's been
a treat to allow agents to properly turnover programs
with one another. We'll be back down to three tomorrow
and then 2 on March 21 . . . Having been here for six
weeks now, I've had to deal with two Principal Officers
who expect five DS agents to accommodate their travel,
maintain the security integrity (and programs) on the
compound.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 12 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 25 (March 14, 2012, 11:02 PM)(on file with the Committee,
C05411904).
Further to same, on March 28, 2012, Embassy Tripoli made a
request on behalf of Benghazi for ``five TDY Diplomatic
Security agents for 45-60 day rotations in Benghazi.''
Advocating for the Benghazi Mission, Gene A. Cretz, U.S.
Ambassador to Libya, wrote in his cable to Washington D.C:\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\U.S. Dep't of State, Cable, Request for DS TDY and FTE Support
(March 28, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB004625-27).
This number is required to ensure that we have an
appropriate USDH [direct hire] presence to protect our
COMSEC; support the two long term USDH TDYers, and
support an increasing number of program/assistance
TDY's from both Tripoli and Washington. The number of
TDY'ers in Benghazi is expected to increase in the run
up to the elections. Embassy Tripoli is in the process
of recruiting four LES drivers and an RSO LES SPSS,
which will support operations in Benghazi. Post also
plans to deploy a TDY RSO from Tripoli once expanded
permanent staffing is established and stabilized. Once
these positions are filled; Post anticipates requiring
fewer TDY DS agents to support Benghazi. Although an
LGF contractor has begun operations in Benghazi,
initial discussions regarding contractor-provided armed
close protection/movement support does not appear
viable based on complications regarding GOL firearms
permits. Currently, the LGF contractor is able to
obtain only short term (48-72 hr) firearms permits for
specific VIP visits.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VISAS
At the time the March 28, 2012 staffing request was sent to
Washington D.C., the number of Diplomatic Security Agents at
the compound dropped to two.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 12 to Diplomatic
Security Agent 25 (Mar. 21, 2012, 8:03 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0049976) (``[W]e are down to 2 agents in Benghazi which stifles
movements and puts [us] in bad shape on compound.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notwithstanding Lamb's decision to limit the number of
Diplomatic Security Agents serving at the Benghazi Mission to
three, those Diplomatic Security Agents who were available to
deploy were prevented from traveling because they could not get
visas from the Libyan Government.\98\ Thus, the pool of
Diplomatic Security Agents available to serve was further
limited. The desk officer in charge of staffing in Benghazi
described the problem with the Libyan visa system:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 to Post Management
Officer for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
et al. (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:09 PM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0049977) (``I just went to the Libyan Embassy and was told that
their `system' was down. They could not check the status of currently
approved visas nor do anything having to do with visas. When asked when
the system may be back up, the clerk told me that there was no way of
telling when (or if) it will be up at any point in the future. `It is
being worked on' is what I was told.'').
When they first initiated it, it was a surprise to us,
we weren't aware it was going to happen. So basically
you went from airport visas where you just kind of show
up and was having to see if you had the right passport
and you get stamped. And then you go to a visa process
where they weren't quite ready yet, this end in at the
Embassy to issue visas. So it was very confusing. They
didn't have their process down. The bureaucracy wasn't
working too well in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
we call it the MFA, and back here in Washington. And
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that was in the December 2011 timeframe.
That kind of got sorted out in the early January 2012
timeframe and it did that way the process at least, it
would take 2 or 3 weeks, but as long as we know the
process, we can usually work around it.
And then it collapsed again in that end of March/April
timeframe, and that one was pretty significant. That
one was much longer, and it was difficult, and they
were essentially, to my knowledge, they were changing
from a they were using stamps before. This is probably
too much detail for you guys, but and then they went to
foils, and they didn't have the foils, so they had to
get the foils, no one had the foils. I mean, it was
convoluted. . . .
It actually got longer after the foil issue was
resolved. So it was probably it usually took me about 6
weeks to get from identified to out there, and 4 weeks
of that would be about for the visa process. I tried to
get the visas in 1 month before the departure date, and
that was standard until basically 9/11.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 34-35.
The visa delays prevented two Diplomatic Security Agents
from traveling to the Benghazi Mission in late March and early
April.\100\ As a result, only one Diplomatic Security Agent was
on the compound at the time of the first IED attack.\101\ On
April 6, 2012, an ``IED was thrown over the perimeter wall at
1650 EDT/2250 Benghazi.''\102\ The single Diplomatic Security
Agent described the sequence of events to the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 (Apr. 7, 2012,
2:56 PM) (on file with the Committee, C05392858).
\101\See Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 24 to Principal
Officer 2, U.S. Dep't of State, and Deputy Dir. Office of Maghreb
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Apr. 7,
2012, 9:10 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409502).
\102\Email (Apr. 6, 2012, 8:28 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05409502).
Shortly after I went inside, I know the principal
officer and the IMO had already retired. I was sitting
there, and I just turned on the TV, and I heard a very
loud explosion. And, as I told you before, you heard
explosions throughout, but you would know by the force
of this explosion, not only the noise but also the way
it rocked the building, I knew that it was inside the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
compound.
At that point, I was sitting in the living room. I had
my weapons with me. I did not have my vest. I ran into
my bedroom, grabbed my vest. I spoke to the IMO and to
the principal officer. I instructed them to allow me
out, lock themselves lock the door and lock themselves
in the safe haven. I had an extra pistol and an extra
shotgun. I left it there for them. I left two radios.
One that is communication for them and me and
communications for them and the Annex building. I told
them that I would be [in] constant contact with them on
the radio or on the phone; if they did not hear from
me, then to contact the Annex building for assistance.
I also called our QRF [quick reaction force], basically
reacted them. We had a plan: On a situation like that,
they would take up positions throughout the compound.
One of the positions would be outside of our building.
As I stepped outside, one of the QRF members was
already out there waiting for me. This is possibly, I
don't know, 3 minutes after the bombing.
At some point, the guard finally activated the alarm.
Our guard force had a push button alarm; in case of any
attack, they would activate it. As I step outside, the
QRF member is there. We cleared our way to the TOC.
Went inside the TOC [technical operations center]. I
turn off the alarm, and I use our camera system to view
or to try to determine if there was any other people,
any other attackers in the compound. That took
approximately 3, 4 minutes.
I did not see anybody in our camera system. There are
some blind spots, but we did have a pretty good system
throughout the compound. I thought that with that, I
would be able to determine something, something
blatant, something that would really stand out.
Afterwards, I stepped outside of the TOC. I had two QRF
members with me, and we commenced on clearing the
compound.
While we were doing that, I heard two shots. It sounded
to me like rifle fire, something bigger than an M4,
which is what I had. So I thought initially that it was
shooting in the compound. One of the QRF members
received, if I am not mistaken, a call that told him
that a third QRF member was outside and had detained
someone.
* * *
There was a third QRF member, [redacted text], who was
outside of the compound and had detained two Libyan
nationals. Eventually I found out that he's the one who
fired the two shots. It is common; it is standard
operating procedure for Libyans to shoot warning shots,
and that is what he did.
So we were clearing the compound when I learned that he
was outside and he was possibly engaged with the
attackers. I kept one of the QRF members guarding the
entry to our house. I communicated with the principal
officer that everything was still okay; we are still
clearing. I went outside, and [redacted text] had two
people on the ground.
Shortly afterwards, reinforcements from the 17th
February Militia arrived. They took them away. I
requested from the militia to provide a security ring
outside of the compound. I made contact with the Annex
building. And I asked them to hold off on sending
reinforcements to prevent a blue on blue situation the
Militia did not know who they were; they did not know
who the Militia were but to be on standby in case we
needed additional assistance.
At that time, all QRF members and myself cleared the
whole compound. It took us several hours to do so. We
did not find evidence of any other intruders,
attackers, enemy on the grounds. I went back inside,
and I briefed the principal officer as to what had
taken place. She and I then commenced our notifications
to D.C. and our report writing.\103\
\103\Testimony of Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security
Service, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr.at 30-32 (April 13, 2015) [hereinafter
Diplomatic Security Agent 16 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
The principal officer in Benghazi expressed concern to the
lead Diplomatic Security Agent in Tripoli ``had the attack been
even slightly less amateur, I don't know what we would have
done.''\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\See Email from Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Diplomatic Security Agent 24 and Deputy Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (April 7, 2012,
3:25 AM) (on file with the Committee, C05409502).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than two weeks after the first IED attack on the
Benghazi Mission compound occurred, Washington D.C. rejected
the March 28, 2012 request to deploy five Diplomatic Security
Agents to Benghazi.\105\ In denying the request, Washington
D.C. stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\U.S. Dep't of State, Cable--Tripoli, Request for DS TDY and
FTE Support (April 19, 2012)(on file with the Committee, SCB0046263).
DS will continue to provide DS agent support in
Benghazi. DS/IP recommends that post continues its
efforts to hire LES drivers for Benghazi to enable the
DS TDYers to solely perform their protective security
function. DS/IP also recommends a joint assessment of
the number of DS agents requested for Benghazi to
include input from RSO Tripoli, TDY RSO Benghazi, and
DS/IP in an effort to develop a way forward.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\See id.
Throughout the remainder of spring 2012, the number of
Diplomatic Security Agents deployed to the compound never
exceeded three.\107\ Half the time, there were only two
Diplomatic Security Agents.\108\ During this time, the security
environment in Benghazi started to deteriorate. Less than one
week before Stevens returned to Tripoli as the Ambassador in
May 2012, a rocket propelled grenade [RPG] attack occurred on
the International Committee of the Red Cross.\109\ The
International Committee of the Red Cross was located
approximately one kilometer from the Benghazi Mission. A
``vague Facebook post claiming responsibility for the RPG
attack'' also indicated it was ``preparing to send a message to
the Americans.''\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\See Benghazi DS and SST TDY staffing for Jan. 2012-September
11 (on file with the Committee, C0539433).
\108\See id.
\109\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 24 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 25 (June 14, 2012, 1:56 PM)(on file with the Committee,
C05391830).
\110\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 18 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 17 (May 28, 2012, 5:36 AM) (on file with the Committee,
C05392202).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 6, 2012, a week after the threat to the Mission
compound, the Benghazi Mission was attacked for a second time.
An IED along the Benghazi Mission's perimeter wall--blowing a
hole ``6 feet by 4 feet,'' large enough for an individual to
walk through.\111\ At the time of the second IED attack, three
Diplomatic Security Agents were on the ground. A Diplomatic
Security Agent on the ground at the time described the attack
to the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\Testimony of Principal Officer 2, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at
109 (Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Principal Officer 2 Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
Around 3:00 in the morning, give or take 20, 30
minutes, the imminent danger and notification system
alarm went off, affectionately called the duck and
cover alarm. That woke all of us up. I got up. I put on
my armor, grabbed my weapon, got dressed of course, and
then went outside to find out what was going on. I go
outside, and I see a bunch of our I see our local Guard
Force members around the front of the gate making,
gesturing with their hands, you know, towards their
nose. I did not speak Arabic. At the time they did not
speak English, so, that's how we communicated. I
believe at the time during that shift there was one
person that didn't speak English. So, you know, I
started smelling; then I had this distinct smell, not
like something burning, but some kind of chemical burn,
whatever. Come to find out, you know, 5 minutes later
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that it's a fuse.
But at that point so I asked everyone to start backing
away from the wall. Then as I back away, that's when
the bomb detonates.
From there it knocked me down. Ears were ringing. I get
up with the local guards. We run back. There are some
sandbags right there at the corner. Get behind those
sandbags, point my M4 at the hole in the wall and wait
for any follow up attack that may occur. And that was
the
And no follow up attack did occur, so after that the
February 17th Martyrs Brigade showed up in a matter of
minutes. Then from there we set up a perimeter outside
on the street. As we had this large hole in our wall,
we wanted to push our security perimeter back even
further. We set up the large hole I mean set up the
perimeter, sorry; and then from there, once that
perimeter was set up, I went with one of our QRF guys
[redacted text] And we went there and secured the rest
of the compound.
As there was a security incident at the front of our
compound, we had lost attention and lost visibility on
other aspects of our compound. So, before we decided to
let the principal officer out of the safe haven and
call the all clear, we went through, me with my M4, him
with his AK-47, and we just moved through the compound
making sure nobody else had entered and there were no
other devices. After that was done, we called the all
clear.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security Service, U.S.
Dep't of State, at 59-61 (Mar. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Diplomatic
Security Agent 22 Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Two days after the second attack on the compound the number
of Diplomatic Security Agents dropped to two.\113\ Five days
later, on June 11, 2012, an RPG attack was launched on the UK
Ambassador's motorcade. Some speculated the RPG was directed
toward the Mission given the proximity of the attack to the
Mission Compound. Polaschik testified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 25 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 21 (Jun. 7, 2012, 3:03 PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05391125).
A: There were two main reasons. One was the physical
location of the attack. It occurred, I believe, on
Venezia Street, which is right by our compound. And it
was actually, as I understood it, not having been there
at the time of the attack, close by our rear exit from
our compound. And, also, given the fact that we had
been storing British armored vehicles on our compound,
again, if someone had been watching, you know, did they
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
know for sure whether that was British or American.
Also, around the same time, a figure named Abu Yahya is
it Abu Yahya al Libi? a senior Al Qaeda operative, had
been killed, I believe, in either Pakistan or
Afghanistan. So I was----
Q: By the U.S. Government?
A: Correct.
Q: In a drone strike or something like that?
A: Correct. In some U.S. operations. So, given that he
was a Libyan, I was concerned whether or not there
could have been some retaliatory action taken by Al
Qaeda, you know, for that act. So it was murky. There
were a lot of things that were unclear, but I was
concerned that there could have been links to the U.S.
Government.
Q: At that time, in June of 2012, the Brits were
storing their vehicles and their weapons on the U.S.
compound, the Benghazi compound; is that correct?
A: Correct.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\Testimony of Joan Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 95-96 (Aug. 12, 2015) [hereinafter
Polaschik Transcript] (on file with the Committee).
In fact, between the first attack on the Benghazi Mission
on April 6 and June 2012, there were more than 21 separate
incidents in Benghazi.\115\ While a member of the Defense
Department's SST was temporarily diverted to bolster security
after the series of attacks against the Mission compound and
U.K. Ambassador's motorcade, Diplomatic Security Agent staffing
never increased to five.\116\ The sequence of attacks raised
enough concern in Washington D.C., for Lamb to acknowledge to
her supervisors there were not enough resources diverted to
Benghazi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\Security Incidents in Benghazi, Libya, from June 1, 2011- Aug.
20, 2012 (on file with the Committee); see also Benghazi Spot Report,
EAC and Significant Event Timeline (DS/IP/RD) (on file with the
Committee, C05394332).
\116\See Benghazi DS and SST TDY staffing for Jan. 2012-September
11 (on file with the Committee, C0539433).
We are not staffed or resourced adequately to protect
our people in that type of environment. We are a soft
target against resources available to the bad guys
there. Not to mention there is no continuity because we
do everything there with TDY personnel. The cost to
continue to do business there may become more
challenging.\117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\Email from Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Scott
Bultrowicz, Principal Deputy Sec'y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, U.S. Dep't of State (Jun. 11, 2012, 4:16 PM) (on file with
the Committee, C05388866).
Washington D.C. did nothing to provide additional resources
or personnel. For example, a day before the second IED attack
on the Mission compound, Stevens requested the support of the
State Department's highly trained mobile security deployment
team to remain in Tripoli through the end of the summer.\118\
More resources in Tripoli meant possibly more available
resources at the Benghazi Mission. However, on the day of the
second IED attack against the Benghazi Mission on June 6, 2012
the request was denied.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\Email from John C. Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya, to
Diplomatic Security Agent 7 (Jun. 5, 2012, 10:55 AM) (on file with the
Committee, C05409979).
\119\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 7 to John C. Stevens,
U.S. Ambassador to Libya (Jun. 6, 2012, 3:00PM) (on file with the
Committee, C05409979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 14, 2012, eight days after the second IED attack on
the compound, the Diplomatic Security Agent in charge sent a
staffing request to Diplomatic Security requesting ``five DS
agents be deployed to secure the facility, with a MSD team on
standby.''\120\ One day later, on June 15, 2012, an Action
Memorandum requesting five additional staff for Benghazi was
directed to Lamb for approval.\121\ The Action Memorandum
described ``the uncertainty of the security situation in
Benghazi and the fact that their appears to be an active
terrorist cell in Benghazi, Libya planning and implementing
attack operations against western interests including the U.S.
Mission in Benghazi.''\122\ No response was ever received.\123\
The desk officer responsible for staffing in Benghazi described
his role in developing the Action Memorandum.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\Email from Diplomatic Security Agent 19 to Diplomatic Security
Agent 25, James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir., Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, U.S. Dep't of State (Jun. 14, 2012, 11:40 AM) (on file with
the Committee, C05393692).
\121\Memorandum from James Bacigalupo, Regional Dir., Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, U.S. Dep't of State, to Charlene Lamb, Deputy
Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Int'l Programs, U.S. Dep't
of State, (Jun. 15, 2012) (on file with the Committee, C05578316).
\122\Id.
\123\Diplomatic Security Agent 25 Testimony at 42-43.
\124\Id.
A: The RSO in Benghazi also requested and received
additional local guard support, which was the Blue
Mountain Group. So they had additional guards on at
night. And then the RSO in Benghazi, they requested me
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
for additional staffing, RSO staffing, agents staffing.
Q: How did that request come in?
A: I believe we definitely talked on the phone and then
he sent an email to follow up with that. But first we
spoke on the phone and then we sent an email.
Q: And what was the number requested or----
A: Sure.
Q: How did that proceed when that after that request
came in?
A: Certainly. The number he requested at the time was I
think he said five agents, and he specified a timeframe
through the election period, which was going to be
probably in a month, so on or about I think it was
earlier scheduled it was early July, so roughly about a
month, and then he recommended having four agents
remain at the compound.
Q: Based on your experience, just from a personal
perspective, did you support that number or support
that assessment?
A: Yes. Not only did I support it, I sent it to the RSO
for clearance as well, which he supported fully, and I
drafted an action memorandum stating the RSO's request.
Q: And what happened to that action memorandum?
A: It was approved by my direct supervisors, and then
it was upstairs for a while. And we didn't hear
anything. We felt it urgent enough, my supervisor
scheduled a meeting with DAS Lamb, and in the meeting
with DAS Lamb, essentially the long and short of it,
the memo was denied for additional resources, personnel
wise.
Q: Can you walk us through that in a little more
detail? How long was it upstairs? So your immediate
supervisor, that would be Mr. Bacigalupo?
A: At that time it was James Bacigalupo, correct.
Q: So he approved this action memorandum, and then it
would go to Charlene Lamb. Is that correct?
A: It went to I know it was in I don't know where it
went in between. Probably to her staff assistants or
the deputy prior to her. But it definitely made it to
her because that's who we had the meeting with.
Q: And how long was it up there before the meeting?
A: I think the memo actually didn't get sent up until
after the incident with the UK protective detail, so it
was probably mid-June, June 15th, I believe, the date
on the memo. So I think it was late that week. Maybe
June 18th. I can't recall it specifically.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\Id.
Concerned about the impending loss of security personnel
and the deteriorating security environment in Tripoli and in
Benghazi, the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli sent a staffing request
to Washington D.C.\126\ The July 9, 2012 staffing request
included a request for a minimum of four additional Diplomatic
Security Agents for the Benghazi Mission--which would be
comprised of at least one permanently assigned Diplomatic
Security Agent from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, as well as a
minimum of three temporary duty Diplomatic Security Agents
identified by Washington D.C. The Diplomatic Security Agent in
charge in Benghazi in July explained his reasoning for the
request.\127\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\U.S. Dep't of State, Cable, Request for Extension of TDY
Security Personnel (July 9, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
SCB0049439).
\127\Testimony Diplomatic Security Agent, Diplomatic Security
Service, U.S. Dep't of State, at 78-79 (May 19, 2015) (on file with the
Committee).
With all the security situation on the ground going on
and putting everything in place, and all the transition
taking place in regards to American personnel leaving
and coming in, and after discussion with the RSO and
chief of Mission, this was a cable suggesting at that
time this is what we need to maintain operations in the
best safe manner as soon as possible. We wrote this
cable on July 9, prior to the Ambassador leaving for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi.
At that time, MSD personnel were, when we started off
with two teams; now there was less teams on the ground.
Actually, I don't believe there was any MSD team on the
ground. There was just TDYers and two permanent ARSOs
on the ground. This is in July. I'm sorry. I'm confused
on the dates. Not September. This is July 9. So, at
this time, we had another ARSO on the ground that was
permanent and myself and the RSO.
* * *
So we wrote this in July because all these elements
were leaving. MSD was leaving. The SST team was
leaving, or they were going to change their Mission
from being in the Embassy to being outside of the
Embassy so they could train the Libyan government
military. So we came up with this as a suggestion, for
example, in line 4, or paragraph 4, under the current
arrangement, and this was the main one, 34 U.S.
security personnel, the 16 SSTs, the 11 MSD, the 2 RSOs
and 3 TDY RSOs, that was the number that we had there,
and it was going to drawn down to 27. And we said:
Wait, we're basically losing people. We need people,
specifically because security is not in the best
position now.
We requested weapons permits and weapons for the local
ambassador bodyguard detail, and funding for security.
Yes, and this was the cable that we sent out in
concurrence with the Ambassador?\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\Id. at 79.
Again, going based on the numbers of agents that were
going to Benghazi while we were averaging one, two, or
three, and we never actually had five, we're
suggesting: Hey, international programs, how about you
making sure that we always have three, and we're going
to put a permanent RSO on the ground, and that would
give us at least four if you cannot provide us with
enough TDYers to do the job. That's basically why we
went with that number. It was an average of the amount
of agents that we had at any time at that post.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\Id. at 80.
No response was received. Lamb explained the lack of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
response to the Committee:
So when I read this cable in this format, [redacted
text] wrote it as a reporting cable in paragraph
format, and it's very hard to line everything up by the
needs. So I asked the desk officer to have his . . . at
the time was the person working with [redacted text]
for them to get on a conference call and to go through
this cable, paragraph by paragraph, line by line, and
to switch this into the format that shows how many
people do you need for which activities, to support VIP
visits, movement security, static security, a quick
reaction force. Just tell me exactly what you need and
then the numbers will pop out the other side showing
what you need.
And they sat down and they did this. And all of that
was compiled into the response that unfortunately never
went out. But my guidance to them was before that cable
went up to Scott Bultrowicz and Eric Boswell, I wanted
it to be pre approved at post, because I didn't want to
dictate to post their staffing needs, I wanted to
support them. But in this format, it was not clear
exact because they were coming up on the 1 year
transition when everybody was going to leave post and
the new team was going to come in, so I wanted it to be
laid out, very clear, the current operating support
that was being provided for security.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\Lamb Testimony at 245-246.
She further explained: ``And just because it didn't get
sent out with a cable number on it, I am testifying to you that
everything in that cable was followed through and carried
out.''\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\Id. at 248.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy explained his involvement in the July 9, 2012
staffing cable and the decision to terminate the Defense
Department's SST protective responsibilities at the U.S.
Embassy in Tripoli. He testified to the Committee: ``I
consulted, as I said earlier, with the subject matter experts
in this field, and after consulting with them, I responded no,
we would not be asking for another extension.''\132\ This is a
much different description of Kennedy's involvement than what
Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Secretary
of State, described to the Committee. She described the Under
Secretary as the person ``who managed security related
issues.''\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\Kennedy Testimony at 46.
\133\Testimony of Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor to the
U.S. Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 72 (Sept. 2, 2015) (on
file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional resources were never sent to Tripoli or
Benghazi, despite the requests of the security professionals on
the ground. Beginning in August, the number of security
personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli was 34. By the end of
August, the number of security personnel at Embassy Tripoli
dropped to six Diplomatic Security Agents.\134\ In Benghazi,
the number of Diplomatic Security Agents continued to
fluctuate. By August, the desk officer responsible for staffing
in Benghazi conveyed to the Regional Bureau ``DS has had no
volunteers for Benghazi for the upcoming few months . . . DS's
plan is to maintain 3 DS staff in Benghazi at all times by
drawing on Tripoli's resources.''\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\Testimony of Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission at U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 13-14 (Apr. 11, 2013, U.S.
House Committee on Oversight and Gov't Reform) (on file with the
Committee); see also Cable from Embassy Tripoli to U.S. Dep't of State
(Jul. 9, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0049439).
\135\Email from Deputy Dir. Office of Maghreb Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State (Aug. 27, 2012, 4:47PM) (on file with the Committee,
C05394203).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On September 1, 2012, a Diplomatic Security Agent, who was
originally scheduled to serve at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli,
arrived at the Benghazi Mission to serve as the Diplomatic
Security Agent in charge. With the addition from Tripoli in
early September 2012, three Diplomatic Security Agents secured
the Benghazi compound, including on the morning of September
10, 2012 prior to Stevens' arrival.
APPENDIX G:
Timeline of Significant Events
During the Attacks
Tuesday, September 11, 2012\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Eastern Daylight Time (Washington, DC) and Eastern European Time
(Benghazi) are used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EDT/EET
3:42 pm/9:42 pm--First attack on the Benghazi Mission compound
begins.
4:21 pm/10:21 pm--The White House Situation Room convenes a
meeting.
4:32 pm/10:32 pm--The National Military Command Center [NMCC]
at the Pentagon is notified of the attacks.
5:00 pm/11:00 pm--Secretary of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin E. Dempsey,
meet with the President at the White House.
5:10 pm/11:10 pm--The first Drone arrives in Benghazi.
5:23 pm/11:23 pm--All State Department personnel evacuate to
the Benghazi CIA Annex. Ambassador Christopher Stevens is
unaccounted for.
5:38 pm/11:38 pm--The Secretary of State calls David H.
Petraeus, Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
6:00 pm/12:00 am--The Secretary of Defense convenes a meeting
at the Pentagon.
6:49 pm/12:49 am--The Secretary of State calls the Libyan
President.
6:58 pm/12:58 am--Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Tripoli, reports another mob gathering at Annex.
7:05 pm/1:05 am--The Secretary of State holds a conference call
with Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff, State Department,
Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, State
Department, Gregory Hicks, Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya,
Stephen Mull, Executive Secretariat, State Department,
Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary for Management and
Resources, Jacob Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy
and Director, Office of Policy Planning.
7:19 pm/1:19 am--Jeremy Bash, Chief of Staff, Department of
Defense emails potential response forces to Jacob Sullivan,
Cheryl Mills, and others.
7:30 pm/1:30 am--Team Tripoli arrives at the airport in
Benghazi.
7:30 pm/1:30 am--The White House convenes a meeting via secured
teleconference video with representatives from the State
Department, the Defense Department, and the intelligence
community on the U.S. response to the attacks in Benghazi.
7:40 pm/1:40 am--The Embassy in Tripoli receives a call from a
missing Diplomatic Security Agent phone about an American
at the hospital.
8:30 pm/2:30 am--NMCC holds a conference call with AFRICOM,
EUCOM, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM and the four services about the
military response to Benghazi.
8:39 pm/2:39 am--The NMCC conveys authorization to the FAST to
prepare to deploy and the CIF to move to an intermediate
staging base.
8:53pm/2:53 am--The NMCC conveys formal authorization to deploy
the U.S. Based Special Operations Force to an intermediate
staging base.
9:57 pm/3:57 am--Bash emails Sullivan and asks, ``Any word from
the hospital?''
10:27 pm/4:27 am--The President calls the Secretary of State.
10:34 pm/4:34 am--The Diplomatic Security Command Center at the
State Department issues an update that Libyans have
confirmed Stevens is in a hospital and has been killed.
10:39 pm/4:39 am--Kennedy sends a photo of Stevens from Twitter
to Mills.
11:00 pm/5:00 am--The established N-hour.
11:05 pm/5:05 am--Team Tripoli arrives at the Annex in
Benghazi.
11:17 pm/5:17 am--The first mortar hits the Annex in Benghazi.
11:38 pm/5:38 am--The Secretary of State emails: ``Cheryl told
me the Libyans confirmed his death.''
11:41 pm/5:41 am--Diplomatic Security Command Center reports
mortar fire at the annex and new injuries to the American
personnel.
11:45 pm/5:45 am--A McDonough email notes the Secretary of
Defense called Pastor Jones.
Wednesday, September 12, 2012
12:05 am/6:05 am--AFRICOM orders a C-17 aircraft to prepare to
deploy to Libya.
12:12 am/6:12 am--Mills informs McDonough ``we're pulling
everyone out of Benghazi.''
1:00 am/7:00 am--The CIF is ready to deploy
1:19 am/7:19 am--Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, emails we ``now have dip clearance
for FAST platoon to Tripoli . . .''
1:31 am/7:31 am--The first plane leaves from the Benghazi
airport with the survivors en route to Tripoli.
1:40 am/7:40 am--Winnefeld sends another email: ``first
airplane departs Ramstein at 0600z [2:00 am/8:00 am]''
2:25 am/8:25 am--Steven's death is confirmed when the security
officers from CIA and the State Department receives his
body.
4:00 am/10:00 am--The second plane provided by the Libyan Air
Force departs with all remaining U.S. personnel in Benghazi
for Tripoli.
6:00 am/12:00 pm--A C-130 aircraft arrives at Rota Spain to
transport the FAST to Tripoli.
7:00 am/1:00 pm--The FAST completes loading the C-130
aircraft and is ready to depart.
8:15 am/2:15 pm--The C-17 aircraft departs Germany to Tripoli
to evacuate Americans.
10:00 am/4:00 pm--The FAST departs Rota Spain en route to
Tripoli.
10:00 am/4:00 pm--The CIF's C-130 aircrafts arrive at the
airport.
11:00 am/5:00 pm--The CIF departs en route to the
intermediate staging base.
2:00 pm/8:00 pm--CIF arrives at an intermediate staging base.
2:56 pm/8:56 pm--FAST platoon arrives in Tripoli.
3:28 pm/9:28 pm--The Special Operations Force deployed from the
U.S. arrives at the intermediate staging base.
4:19 pm/10:19 pm--The C-17 aircraft with Americans evacuated
from Tripoli arrives in Germany.
The following timeline, the ``Comprehensive Timeline of
Events--Benghazi,'' provides further detail about the events
that occurred during the attack. This is a timeline of events
compiled by the State Department using information obtained
from the DVR footage of the Benghazi Mission compound and the
Annex, as well as interviews, and logs maintained at the
Tactical Operations Center at the Embassy in Tripoli and at the
Diplomatic Security Command Center.
The Committee makes this timeline available to the public
with the following corrections:
LTime stamp 0503.00: The ``unidentified LN
Motorcade'' was not February 17 Martyrs Brigade. It was the
Libya Shield.
LTime stamp 0614.00: The motorcade that arrived
was the Libyan Military Intelligence.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The following timeline, the ``Timeline of Department of
Defense Actions September 11-12, 2012,'' provides further
detail about the Defense Department actions that occurred
during the attack. This is a timeline of events compiled by the
Defense Department. The timeline does not disclose when the
forces were ready to deploy or when those forces actually
moved.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
APPENDIX H:
The September 12 Situation Report
and the President's Daily Brief
The very first written piece produced by CIA analysts
regarding the Benghazi attacks was an overnight Situation
Report written very early in the morning on September 12, 2012.
This piece included the line ``the presence of armed assailants
from the outset suggests this was an intentional assault and
not the escalation of a peaceful protest.'' While that line was
correct--the attacks were an intentional assault and not the
escalation of a peaceful protest--Michael Morell, Deputy
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, noted it was a ``crucial
error that [came] back to haunt [the CIA].''\1\ This was an
error, according to Morell, because that line was not written
by analysts but rather a ``senior editor'' who ``believed there
needed to be some sort of bottom line'' in the piece.\2\ Morell
labeled it a ``bureaucratic screw-up'' and claims that since
similar language did not appear in the CIA assessment the
following day, September 13, it was evidence to critics that
``the intelligence community was politicizing the
analysis.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Michael Morell, The Great War Of Our Time: The CIA's Fight
Against Terrorism--From Al-Qa'ida to ISIS 217 (2015) [hereinafter
Morell].
\2\Testimony of Michael Morell, Deputy Dir., Central Intelligence
Agency, Tr. at 25 (Sept. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Morell Testimony] (on
file with the Committee).
\3\Morell, supra note 1, at 218.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though Morell learned this information second-hand\4\ and
put it in his book, the Select Committee spoke directly to
individuals with first-hand accounting of the events. In
reality, the ``senior editor'' was the Executive Coordinator of
the Presidential Daily Brief; she included the language about
the intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful
protest; and this ``bureaucratic screw-up'' resulted in this
individual taking the piece to the White House, presenting it
to Jacob Lew, Chief of Staff to the President, and delivering
it to an usher to give to the President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Morell Testimony at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insertion of the Language
The Executive Coordinator described to the Committee when
she first saw the September 12 update:
A: So the analysts came in to brief me--I don't
remember what time that was, but my guess is probably
somewhere between 3 and 4. And the piece that he gave
to me was much longer than this.
And we had a difference of opinion on one piece of the
intelligence. He believed that this was a spontaneous
event and was not open to the idea that it wasn't a
spontaneous event. And I disagreed because, you know, I
had 20 years of Army experience. You know, this is the
military person in me. And I said, I just can't buy
that something that's, you know, this coordinated, this
organized, and this sophisticated was something that
they just, you know, did on, you know, the spur of the
moment. I said, we have to consider the fact that that
might not be the case.
He had a lot of good arguments. You know, it was the
anniversary of 9/11, there was the video in Cairo,
there were a number of other things happening that, you
know, would seem to suggest that it was spontaneous.
But just being military and seeing, you know, what we
were seeing in the traffic, I was like, I don't think
that this is--I don't think we can discount the
possibility that this was a, you know, coordinated,
organized, preplanned attack.
Q: When you say when you were seeing what you were
seeing in the traffic, what does that mean?
A: So the things they were talking about, how organized
that it was, in the press reporting. There was a lot of
press that was coming back and talking about, you know,
like, how they were breaching and, you know, like, how
it was sort of phased, right? It was coming across to
me, reading, you know, the open press at the time, that
this was a phased attack. And I would be very surprised
if a phased attack was something that was just, all of
a sudden, you know, ``Hey, guess what? Let's go have an
attack today because these other things are
happening.'' I don't think that--that just didn't make
sense to me.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\Testimony of the President's Daily Briefer, Office of Dir. of
Nat'l Intelligence, Tr. at 24-26 (Apr. 29, 2016) [hereinafter PDB
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
While the analyst believed it was a spontaneous event,
given her experience the Executive Coordinator believed the
piece needed to leave open the possibility that something else
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
occurred other than a spontaneous event. She testified:
Q: You said there was a disagreement between you and
the analyst. A piece came in; it was lengthy. You
wanted to cut it down because that's what you normally
do. Can you describe a little bit more about the
disagreement that you had?
A: Well, that was really it. Like, he was pretty
convinced that this was a spontaneous attack, that it
was, you know, as a result of this confluence of
events--the 9/11 anniversary, the video being released,
the protest in Cairo. [redacted text].
And, to me, that wasn't enough. I was like--like I
said, just my gut feeling. I said, we need to leave the
door open for the possibility that it might not have
been spontaneous.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\Id. at 28.
The manager of the analysts testified that her analysts did
not agree with this approach and that the disagreement with the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Coordinator became hostile:
The POTUS coordinator, according to my two analysts,
who I trust and continue to trust, was that they got
into an argument, which is highly unusual, with the
POTUS coordinator, that was actually quite hostile. And
she insisted that based on her personal experience of
15 or however many years as a captain in the Air
National Guard, that there was no way that was true.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Testimony of [redacted text] Team Chief, Office of Terrorism
Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, Tr. at 32 (Feb. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter [redacted text] Team Chief Testimony].
According to the manager of the analysts, none of her
analysts believed the sentence regarding an intentional assault
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
should have been included. The manager testified:
A: And so the POTUS coordinator inserted this sentence
because she felt strongly that it was an intentional
assault against our consulate.
Q: And----
A: But there was no--nothing to base that on, no
reporting.
Q: And that view is the view of that single editor. Is
that right?
A: Yes.
Q: Was there anyone--any of the analysts on your team
that thought that sentence should have been included?
A: No.
Q: And the reason your team and your analysts felt so
strongly was because there was no reporting to support
that. Is that correct?
A: Correct. We just--you can't make a call without an
evidentiary base to support it.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\Id. at 100-101.
However, without solid evidence pointing in either
direction--spontaneous or not--the Executive Coordinator was
sure to be careful with her language. She merely wanted to
leave open the possibility that it was an intentional assault
and the language she chose reflected that possibility--not a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion. She told the Committee:
Q: --your choice of the word ``suggests,'' is that to
couch it----
A: Yes.
Q: --to say that this may have happened, as opposed to
it definitively happened?
A: Correct.
Q: Okay. And was that a deliberate ----
A: It was leaving the door open that this is what it
suggests, but that doesn't mean this is what it is.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\PDB Testimony at 37.
The analysts and the Executive Coordinator were not able to
reach a consensus on the language in the piece. The analysts,
who went up to the 7th Floor of the CIA headquarters to brief
the Executive Coordinator on the piece, returned to their
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
desks. The Executive Coordinator testified:
Q: Okay. And was there a resolution between you and
him----
A: Not really.
Q: --on how to proceed?
A: No.
Q: No. Okay. So how did your conversation or
interactions with him end?
A: I told him I would think about, you know, what he
had said. And I said, you know, I will to talk to
somebody.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\Id. at 29.
The Executive Coordinator, however, did not make the
decision to include the language of an intentional assault on
her own, and she did not do it in a vacuum based solely on her
experience. Members of her staff, which numbered roughly 15,
talked with individuals outside CIA headquarters about what was
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
going on. She told the Committee:
Q: In terms of picking up the phone and calling anybody
outside of the building, is that something you did to
acquire information?
A: We did. Yes.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Id. at 26.
She also discussed the matter with another analyst who had
expertise in regional issues. The Executive Coordinator
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
testified:
We had--I was very lucky because we had another--we had
a MENA analyst that was a PDB briefer. She was the, I
want to say, the SecDef briefer. And so I went over and
I talked to her and I said, ``Hey, this is what the
analyst says. Here's my opinion. You know, what are
your thoughts, having covered this area, you know,
pretty extensively in your career?'' And she agreed
with me.
We discussed it, we had a conversation about it and--
you know. And so I made the decision to change the
wording to make sure that we at least addressed the
possibility that this was a planned attack.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Id. at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
She also testified:
A: There was a lot of discourse about this at the PDB.
I mean, the other PDB briefers and I, that's the only
resource I have at the time. And I never would make an
assessment all on my own and just be like, this is it.
I mean, we would do----
Q: I understand.
A: We talk about it, we're sounding boards for each
other. So there was a lot of discussion. And, yes, I'm
sure that the supervisor of the young man who wrote
this, we had that conversation. Like, are you sure that
this is what you want to say. And yes, when I wrote
this, I didn't feel like I was saying you're wrong and
I'm right. All I was trying to do was say, look, we
need to leave the door open in case this is not a
spontaneous attack. We want to be able to wait until
there's more information, and so that's why I use the
word ``suggests.'' I didn't say this is an intentional
assault. It suggests that it is.
The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the
Executive Coordinator, however, concedes that the Executive
Coordinator was right with her analysis. She testified:
Q: And she was right?
A: In the event, yes, she was right.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\Testimony of Dir. of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, Central
Intelligence Agency, Tr. at 23 (Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter OTA
Director Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Similarly, Michael Morell concedes the sentence was
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
accurate. He testified:
Q: So the sentence ended up being accurate?
A: Yeah. Absolutely.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Morell Testimony at 25.
The President's Daily Brief
When the Executive Coordinator finished inserting the
accurate sentence regarding the ``intentional assault and not
the escalation of a peaceful protest'' into the September 12
piece, she put it into the ``book'' she prepared each day for
the President and his Chief of Staff.\15\ This ``book'' is
otherwise known as the President's Daily Brief, or the PDB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\PDB Testimony at 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Normally, upon completion of the PDB, the Executive
Coordinator would travel to the White House, brief the Chief of
Staff, and if the President required a briefing, she would
brief the President. She testified:
So during the weeks that I produced the PDB, I would
produce it, and then they would drive me to the White
House, and I would produce--or I would brief Jack Lew
first, who was the Chief of Staff. And if the President
required a brief during that day or chose to take a
brief, then I would give him a brief, and if not, then
his briefer--then the DNI would brief him.
When we were on travel, I always briefed the President.
That was my responsibility whenever we would fly.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\Id. at 6.
On September 12, 2012, the morning after the Benghazi
attacks, the Executive Coordinator--the individual presenting
the President with his Presidential Daily Brief--traveled to
the White House. That day, however, she did not present the PDB
to the President.\17\ Instead, she gave it to an usher. She
testified she presented the PDB--with the accurate sentence
regarding the ``intentional assault and not the escalation of a
peaceful protest''--to Lew:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\Id. at 41.
A: So it depends. If we're traveling, then I present it
to the President personally. And if he has questions--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
usually the only questions he usually asks----
Lawyer. We're not going to talk about what the
President said or your conversations with him.
A: Okay. So if we're in town and we're not traveling
then I bring it to the White House, and I personally
brief Jack Lew. And I hand the President's book to the
usher, and the usher presents it to the President.
Q: So normally in Washington, when you're here in town,
you're not sitting across from the President, him
looking at the book, and he may be asking you
questions?
A: No.
Q: How did it happen on the 12th that day?
A: I was here. So we were not traveling yet. We were in
D.C. So I would have--I had a driver, and the driver
drives me to the White House. I drop off the book first
with the usher and then I go down and I brief Jack Lew.
Q: Okay. And what time was that on the 12th?
A: So we always arrive by 7:00, and so it would've been
around 7:00. I mean, I'm assuming around 7:00.
Q: So that day at 7:00, the booklet that has been put
together, you take it to the White House, you visit
with Jack Lew and then someone walked it into----
A: No. First we give the brief to the usher. So my
driver drops me off at the front gate. I go through----
Q: You actually physically hand the document--or the
material.
A: Yeah, I physically hand the material to the usher
and then I walk back down with my briefcase and go see
Jack Lew and wait for him and then I brief him.
Q: Okay. And with Mr. Lew, did you talk about this
SITREP?
Lawyer: We're not going to discuss what specific
information was provided to any White House staff in
any PDB.
Q: But you did talk with Mr. Lew that day?
A: I did.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Id. at 66-67.
Fallout
Morell labeled the insertion of the language by the
Executive Coordinator a ``bureaucratic screw-up.'' This
language made it into a piece that was put in the President's
Daily Brief, which was briefed to Lew, and possibly shared with
the President. Such a ``bureaucratic screw-up,'' therefore, has
far reaching implications if it occurs with any regularity.
Michael Morell told the Committee that what occurred was a
``big no-no.'' He testified:
She was, I'm told, a long-time military analyst with
some expertise in military matters, no expertise in
North Africa and no expertise in this particular
incident. She added that, right? That's a no-no, that's
a no-no in the review process business.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\Morell Testimony at 25.
The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the
Executive Coordinator called what occurred an analytic
``cardinal sin.'' She testified:
What she did was, frankly, in the analytic world, kind of a
cardinal sin. I mean, the job of the POTUS coordinator--so we
had the two analysts stay overnight. Their job is to copy edit
these things and make sure that if there is some analysis in
there, that the evidentiary techs sort of hang together; that
it actually makes sense because it does go to the--it's a big
deal. I mean, it goes to very senior policymakers. So----\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The OTA Director also said that what occurred was a
problem:
Q: Okay. Is that a problem that the senior DNI editor
had the final sign-off on this as opposed to the
analysts, and that person is inserting something in
there that the analysts adamantly disagree with?
A: In my personal view, yes.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\OTA Director Testimony at 43.
Despite this ``bureaucratic screw-up''--which occurred in
relation to the Benghazi attacks, one of the few, if only,
times in history outside scrutiny has ever been applied to the
PDB process--Morell and others at the CIA told the Committee
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
this occurs infrequently. Morell testified:
Q: So from my perspective, I'm very new to this arena,
it seems like it's a problem that you have these
rigorous processes in place, and on this particular
occasion a piece is going before the President and
somebody inserts a sentence that substantively changes
the meaning of a bullet point without any additional
review by the analysts who wrote the piece.
A: Yes. You're absolutely right.
Q: That's a problem in your eyes as well?
A: Yes.
Q: And how often does something like that occur?
A: Not very. You know, in my experience, once or twice
a year.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\Morell Testimony at 25-26.
The manager of the analysts who disagreed with the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Coordinator testified:
Q: Is that something that in your 8 years prior you had
ever seen or heard of happening?
A: No.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 30-31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
She also testified:
A: Oh, I'm sure I did, yeah. I mean, it was unheard of
and it hasn't happened since.
Q: Okay.
A: It's a big deal.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\[Redacted text] Team Chief Testimony at 35-36.
Morell, himself once the head of the PDB staff, told the
Committee how he would have responded if a senior editor had
made such a substantive edit over the objections of the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
analysts:
A: And this--you know, I ran--I've ran the PDB staff,
right, as part of the jobs I had. I would have
reprimanded, orally reprimanded, not in a formal sense,
right----
Q: Sure.
A: --called this person in my office and said, you
know, what happened? And if it turned out to be exactly
what I just explained to you, I would have said, don't
ever do that again.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Morell Testimony at 26.
Morell also suggested how to ensure such a ``bureaucratic
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
screw-up'' doesn't happen in the future. He told the Committee:
Q: Is there any way to prevent these types of
insertions by senior reviewers in the future?
A: Well, I said, it doesn't happen very often, right.
Q: But it happened in this case, though.
A: So it's not a huge problem, right, it doesn't happen
very often. The way you prevent it is twofold, right?
You make it very clear when somebody shows up to the
PDB staff what their responsibilities are and what
their responsibilities are not, you're not the analyst.
And, two, when something--when something does happen,
even something very minor, right, you make it very
clear then that they overstepped their bounds. That's
how you prevent it.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\Id. at 27.
The Executive Coordinator, however, has a different point
of view than Morell, the OTA Director, and the manager of the
analysts. She did not view this as a ``bureaucratic screw-up''
at all, but rather exactly the job she was supposed to be
doing. She acknowledged the disagreement with the analysts the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
night of the Benghazi attacks, testifying:
Q: Okay. And I know we talked about it, but how
unusual, I guess, was this disagreement, this type of
disagreement?
A: It was pretty unusual. Most of the time, we were
able to, you know, just sort of agree on language, and
they'll gave you a face like, ``Okay,'' they'll roll
their eyes, they'll be like, ``All right, you know,
that's not as strong of language as I would like.''
But, you know, a lot of times, you know, we soften the
language because we just don't know for sure. So, you
know, we'll change from, you know, ``believe with high
confidence'' to--I'm like, do you really believe with
high confidence, or do you really think that's maybe
medium confidence?
And I sort of saw my role as, you know, like, a mentor
because I'd been in intelligence for 20 years. So a lot
of times, you know, I would tell the analysts, you
know, this is good tradecraft, but it will be better
analysis if you take into consideration these things
which you may or may not have considered.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\PDB Testimony at 38.
However, the fact that she inserted language into the piece
was not a ``no-no'' or a ``cardinal sin,'' but rather something
that was ultimately her decision, not the analysts'. This
directly contradicts what Morell said about the Executive
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coordinator overstepping her bounds. She testified:
But I do know that, you know, when I talked to [senior
CIA official], you know, in the interview process and
also, you know, subsequent to that, he basically said
that you're the PDB briefer, you are the last, you
know, line of defense and, you know, it's your call. So
if there's something in there that, you know, bothers
you, you know, coordinate it out, and then if you can't
come to an agreement, it's your, you know,
responsibility. So I did not take that lightly.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\Id. at 31.
Since it was a responsibility she did not take lightly, she
only modified such language when there was ample evidence to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
support it. She told the Committee:
But yes. I mean, we don't--I rarely ever--in fact, I
can't remember any time that I've ever made, you know,
a call just based on press reporting, so I'm sure there
was other intelligence.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\Id. at 26.
Perhaps as a result of the direction she was given during
her interview, the Executive Coordinator experienced no fallout
or reprimand as a result of her actions the night of the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benghazi attacks. She testified:
Q: Okay. Were you told by anybody never to do that
again?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Were you told by anybody that what you did was
a big no-no?
A: No.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\Id. at 44.
As a matter of fact, she and her PDB colleagues agreed that
her actions--inserting the language about the intentional
assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest--were the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
right call. She testified:
Q: Okay. So you said you have a roundtable. I mean, who
is comprised, just roughly, of that roundtable?
A: So it's all the PDB briefers. Some weren't there
because a lot of times their principals, like, keep
them there or, you know, they don't get back in time.
But also it's whoever--it'll be either [CIA individual]
or [State Department individual] or [DIA individual]
that's leading it.
Q: So I just want to make sure I understand your
testimony correctly. You were told by someone at the
roundtable that the analysts were upset, but you say
that's too harsh a word----
A: Yeah.
Q: --for lack of a better word.
A: I can't think of a better--it was somewhere in
between, like, upset and----
Q: Sure. Sure.
A: Yeah.
Q: There was discussion. It seemed to be--the consensus
was that it was the right call.
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. The consensus by those at the roundtable.
A: At the roundtable, yes.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Id. at 43-44.
One of the briefers at the roundtable was an analyst who
came from the Middle East and North African desk at the CIA,
and was a colleague of the analysts who disagreed with the
Executive Coordinator the night of the attack.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Id. at 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The testimony received by the Committee on this topic
presents a dichotomy between two parties. On the one hand, CIA
personnel present a picture that what occurred was a major
error and breach of protocol. On the other hand, the Executive
Coordinator, who works for ODNI, testified she was told when
she took the job that she had the final call on language in
analytic pieces, though changing substantive language was
something exercised judiciously. Since the Benghazi attacks,
the analysts have been instructed to stay with the PDB editors
until the final piece is with the ODNI official.\33\ Given how
the situation unfolded early in the morning of September 12,
2012, it is unclear how this new guidance would have altered
that particular outcome.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\OTA Director Testimony at 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two of the first pieces produced by the CIA analysts in the
wake of the Benghazi attacks contained errors either in process
or substance. Both of these pieces became part of the
President's Daily Brief. While the Committee only examined
intelligence pieces regarding the Benghazi attacks, discovering
errors in two pieces--on successive days, on one single topic--
that became part of the President's Daily Brief is extremely
problematic for what should be an airtight process. Whether
these errors are simply a coincidence or part of a larger
systemic issue is unknown. The September 12 piece, along with
the egregious editing and sourcing errors surrounding the
September 13 WIRe, discussed in detail above, raise major
analytic tradecraft issues that require serious examination but
are beyond the purview of this Committee.
APPENDIX I:
Witnesses Interviewed by the Committee
State Department Officials
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENTS
Of the more than 50 agents who served temporary assignments
of approximately 30-45 days in Benghazi, 19 were
interviewed.\1\ Of this 19, four were agents who survived the
attacks on September 11, 2012, and who had not been previously
interviewed by any committee of Congress. The fifth survivor
had been interviewed previously by the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Out of security and privacy concerns, the Committee has not used
the names of certain executive employees, and has, instead, used the
person's title or some other descriptor to identify the person. For
example, given security concerns facing Diplomatic Security agents who
serve around the world--often in dangerous places--the Committee
assigned numbers to these agents. Throughout the report, and in this
appendix, the Committee listed the person's title or position held
during the relevant time period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The five agents from Diplomatic Security who were in
Benghazi on the night of the attacks deserve the enduring
gratitude of all Americans for their heroic efforts on the
night of the attacks. The Committee commends their dedication
to their country, the selflessness shown to their colleagues,
and the bravery and astuteness they demonstrated during the
attacks.
Fifteen other agents interviewed by the Select Committee
served in Benghazi between April 2011 and September 2012. Each
agent served at different times and therefore was able to
provide the Committee with insight on the continuing spectrum
of security challenges faced in Benghazi during the 18 months
the United States maintained a presence. The Committee notes
that these agents, as well as those not interviewed, served in
Benghazi under difficult circumstances. Their ability to
protect U.S. government personnel under such circumstances is a
testament to the commitment each has to this country and to
their colleagues. They all deserve our thanks.
Apart from those who served in Benghazi, the Committee
interviewed other agents and employees of the Diplomatic
Security Service. One agent was in the Diplomatic Security
Command Center on the day of the attacks. Another agent
coordinated staffing assignments for Benghazi, among other
things. The Committee interviewed the former Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International Programs who was involved in
staffing the Benghazi Mission. The Committee also interviewed
two persons who dealt with the physical security of the
facilities, one was a physical security specialist and the
other was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Countermeasures in
2011-2012.
Attack Survivors
Diplomatic Security Agent #3--Interviewed by the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on October 8,
2013: The fifth agent present in Benghazi on September 11,
2012. This Special Agent joined Diplomatic Security in 2009 and
his first permanent or long-term overseas assignment was as an
Assistant Regional Security Officer to Embassy Tripoli. He
arrived in Tripoli in June 2012 and on August 30, 2012, was
sent to Benghazi to be the head agent, or Acting Regional
Security Officer.
Diplomatic Security Agent #1--March 6, 2015: Joined Diplomatic
Security as a Special Agent in 2011 after eight years in the
U.S. military, where he specialized in explosives disposal.
Arrived in Tripoli in mid-August 2012 for a 60 day assignment.
Traveled with Stevens and another agent to Benghazi on
September 10, 2012.
Diplomatic Security Agent #4--March 16, 2015: Joined Diplomatic
Security as a Special Agent in 2010 after serving approximately
five years in the Army. He arrived in Benghazi in early to mid-
August for a temporary assignment. He was on the roof at the
Annex as the attacks continued and was severely injured by
mortar fire.
Diplomatic Security Agent #2--March 19, 2015: Joined Diplomatic
Security as a Special Agent in 2011 following seven-and-a-half
years in the Army. Arrived in Tripoli in early August for a
temporary assignment. Traveled with the Ambassador and another
agent to Benghazi on September 10, 2012.
Diplomatic Security Agent #5--April 1, 2015: Joined Diplomatic
Security as a Special Agent in 2011 following five years with
the Navy, where he specialized in search and rescue operations.
Arrived in Benghazi in early August for a temporary assignment.
Secured the Ambassador and Sean Smith in the makeshift safe
haven when the attacks began.
Other Agents Assigned in Benghazi
Diplomatic Security Agent #6--February 10, 2015: Headed the
protective detail for Stevens when Stevens first went into
Benghazi in April 2011. The agent met up with Stevens in Europe
in mid-March and then traveled to Benghazi in early April and
remained there until early May 2011.
Diplomatic Security Agent #9--February 12, 2015: Along with
another agent, was sent to join the initial protective detail
approximately two weeks after Stevens and his team arrived in
Benghazi, bringing the number of agents in Stevens's protective
detail up to 10.
Diplomatic Security Agent #27--February 19, 2015: Was the
second agent sent to join the initial protective detail
approximately two weeks after Stevens team arrived in Benghazi,
bringing the number of agents in Steven's protective detail up
to 10.
Diplomatic Security Agent #18--February 24, 2015: Joined
Diplomatic Security in 1999 following ten years of prior
military service. This agent was sent to Benghazi in late
October 2011 for approximately 55 days to be the lead security
agent.
Diplomatic Security Agent #7--February 26, 2015: A Special
Agent since 1986, and in 2011 was the Director of the State
Department's specialized tactical unit in Diplomatic Security,
known as Mobile Security Deployment. This agent went to
Benghazi in early May 2011 to take over as head of Stevens'
protective detail, replacing the initial agent-in-charge. He
was in Benghazi when the initial search for a State Department
diplomatic and housing compound began.
Diplomatic Security Agent #15--March 12, 2015: Joined
Diplomatic Security in 2001 and went to Benghazi in early
January 2012 until mid-February. This agent was in Benghazi for
the first anniversary of the revolution.
Diplomatic Security Agent #22--March 24, 2015: A Special Agent
since 2012, he was in Benghazi from late May through the end of
July 2012. He was present for the second attack against the
compound wall, the attack against the British Ambassador, and
the Libyan elections.
Diplomatic Security Agent #10--April 2, 2015: A Special Agent
since 2009, this agent went to Benghazi for six weeks from late
November 2011 through the end of the year. Before he left,
there was a real concern that no agents would be in Benghazi in
early January.
Diplomatic Security Agent #12--April 9, 2015: A Special Agent
since 2006 following service in the Marine Corps. This agent
was temporarily assigned in Benghazi from early February
through March 2012.
Diplomatic Security Agent #16--April 13, 2015: Joined the
Diplomatic Security Service in 2011 following both service in
the Marine Corp and as a Special Agent with other federal law
enforcement agencies. This agent was temporarily assigned to
Benghazi from early March through mid-April 2012.
Diplomatic Security Agent #8--April 15, 2015: Special Agent
with the Diplomatic Security who was in Benghazi from the end
of July 2012 to the end of August 2012 as the Acting Regional
Security Officer or lead agent.
Diplomatic Security Agent #21--May 19, 2015: A Special Agent
with Diplomatic Security since 2003, was permanently assigned
to Tripoli in summer 2012. In August 2012, he covered Benghazi
for a short period of time and was back in Tripoli on the night
of the attack.
Diplomatic Security Agent #13--May 21, 2015: A Special Agent
since 1999 with former Marine Security Guard experience, was
temporarily assigned to Benghazi from mid-September 2011 to
late October. Initially he had 10 agents in his detail to
protect Stevens and his staff.
Diplomatic Security Agent #17--August 21, 2015: A Special Agent
since 1997, she was assigned to Benghazi as the lead agent from
early April to the end of May 2012.
Diplomatic Security Agent #29--April 28, 2016: This agent was
part of the initial eight-member protective detail for Stevens,
arriving in Benghazi on April 5, 2011.
Headquarter Special Agents
Lamb, Charlene--January 7, 2016: Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Programs, Diplomatic Security. The International
Programs section manages programs and policies that protect the
Department of State's missions and personnel overseas.
Smith, Gentry--February 25, 2016: Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Countermeasures, Diplomatic Security. The Countermeasures
section is responsible for all the physical and technical
security requirements for all U.S. diplomatic missions, both
domestic and overseas, as well as manages the diplomatic
courier operations for the State Department.
Physical Security Specialist--April 6, 2016: A Special Agent
with Diplomatic Security until retirement in 2001, he returned
to Diplomatic Security as a contractor working as a physical
security specialist with agents assigned overseas, including
Libya, on implementing physical security projects.
Diplomatic Security Agent #30--August 19, 2015: A Special Agent
with Diplomatic Security since 2001, was assigned to the
Diplomatic Security Command Center [DSCC] from 2011 through
2013 as the senior watch officer. The DSCC operates around the
clock to monitor and report threat information concerning all
U.S. diplomatic facilities worldwide.
PRINCIPAL OFFICERS WHO SERVED IN BENGHAZI
Following the departure of Stevens from Benghazi in late
November 2011, the State Department sent a series of Foreign
Service officers to Benghazi to conduct outreach with the rebel
leaders and report on the political, economic and security
situation in the eastern portion of Libya. The Committee
interviewed four of the six individuals who served as the
``Principal Officer'' in Benghazi. Three who served the longest
periods of time, ranging from 60-100 days, were interviewed.
The fourth interviewed was in Benghazi for 13 days in early
September 2012, and returned to Tripoli before the attacks.
Principal Officer #1--March 3, 2015: A Foreign Service officer
since 1998, who was temporarily assigned to Benghazi from
November 2011 to February 2012. Principal Officer #1 was the
first principal officer assigned following the departure of
Stevens from Benghazi.
Principal Officer #2--March 13, 2015: A Foreign Service officer
since 2003 who was temporarily assigned to Benghazi from early
March to mid-June 2012. This officer was present when an
explosive was detonated at the compound wall and when there was
an assassination attempt made against the British Ambassador.
At times, the officer was protected by a single Diplomatic
Security agent.
Principal Officer #3--March 26, 2015: A Foreign Service officer
since 1991, he temporarily served as the Principal Officer in
Benghazi from July through August 2012. He was present for the
Libyan elections and then witnessed and reported on the
declining security environment in Benghazi that followed.
Principal Officer #4--May 8, 2015: A Foreign Service officer
since 2002, he went to Tripoli in June 2012 on a permanent
assignment to be the political reporting officer. He served as
the Principal Officer in Benghazi from September 1 through
September 10, 2012, departing Benghazi on the morning of
September 11. He returned to Tripoli and was present in the
operations center during the attacks and following the attacks,
met with the surviving agents.
EMBASSY TRIPOLI
Cretz, Gene--July 31, 2015: Ambassador to Libya from December
2008 through May 2012. Returned to Washington, D.C., in
December 2010 due to personal security concerns and returned to
Libya in September 2011.
Polaschik, Joan--August 12, 2015: Deputy Chief of Mission for
Libya from 2009 through mid-June 2012. With the departure of
Ambassador Cretz in December 2010, she was the highest ranking
Foreign Service officer in Libya, known as the Charge
d'Affaires or Charge.
Hicks, Gregory--April 14, 2016: Deputy Chief of Mission for
Libya, arriving in Libya on July 31, 2012.
``MAIN STATE'' OFFICIALS
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Feltman, Jeffrey--December 8, 2015: Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs from August 2009 until his
retirement in May 2012. In February 2008, he was appointed the
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs and as of December 2008, served concurrently as
Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau.
Maxwell, Raymond--March 8, 2016: Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs, Office of the Maghreb Affairs.
The Maghreb Affairs Office, known as NEA/MAG, covers foreign
policy issues for the North Africa countries of Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.
Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Near Eastern
Affairs Bureau--December 17, 2015: A Foreign Service officer
since 1999, served as the Deputy Director for the Office of
Maghreb Affairs within the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, known
as NEA/MAG, from 2011 to 2013. NEA/MAG was responsible for
oversight and coordination of diplomatic activities of the U.S.
Government within the countries in the region.
Senior Libyan Desk Officer, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Near
Eastern Affairs Bureau--November 18, 2015: A career Foreign
Service officer, served as the Senior Libya Desk officer in the
Office of the Maghreb Affairs within the Near Eastern Affairs
Bureau, known as NEA/MAG, from 2011 to 2014. NEA/MAG was
responsible for diplomatic policy issues arising in the North
Africa countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.
Spokesperson, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau--October 9, 2015: A
career Foreign Service officer who served as the spokesperson
for the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau from 2011 to 2013.
Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications, Near Eastern
Affairs Bureau--July 29, 2015: A career Foreign Service officer
who, in 2012, served as deputy spokesperson for the Near
Eastern Affairs Bureau and then transitioned in the Bureau to
be the Senior Advisor for Strategic Communications.
Post Management Officer for Libya--July 23, 2015: From 2010
through June 2012, was the Post Management Officer or
logistical officer for Libya within the Executive Office in the
Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, known as NEA/SCA/EX. From 2011
through June 2012, this officer focused nearly exclusively on
Libya matters. The Post Management Officer reports to the
Executive Director or ``EX'' who is charged with overseeing all
administrative and management activities for the bureau and for
Foreign Service posts in the region and develops and executes
programs for the bureau in support of substantive policy
decisions.
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
DiCarlo, Rosemary--August 11, 2015: From 2008 until retirement
in September 2014, held various positions for the State
Department at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. The U.S.
Mission to the United Nations [USUN] serves as the United
States' delegation to the United Nations. At the time of the
Benghazi attack, was the Deputy Permanent Representative (to
Susan Rice), then the Permanent Representative to the USUN.
Ryu, Rexon--August 25, 2015: Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations, Susan Rice, and directed the Ambassador's
Washington office at the State Department.
Pelton, Erin--February 11, 2016: At the time of the Benghazi
attacks, was the communications director and spokesperson for
the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, where
she had been in that position less than two months. Immediately
prior to this position, was director of communications and
assistant press secretary for the National Security Council at
the White House.
Speechwriters
Dan Schwerin--October 9, 2015: Speechwriter for the Secretary
of State between 2009 and early 2013.
Megan Rooney--October 9, 2015: Speechwriter for the Secretary
of State between 2009 and early 2013.
Records Management
Agency Records Officer--June 30, 2015: At the time of the
interview was the Division Chief of the Records and Archives
Management Division and was the designated agency records
officer for the Department of State.
Director, Information Resource Management, Executive
Secretariat, Office of the Secretary--June 30, 2015: Until his
retirement in November 2012, was the Director of the Office of
Information Resource Management within the Office of the
Secretary's Executive Secretariat, where he oversaw the
information technology division exclusively used by the Office
of the Secretary and senior leaders within the State
Department.
Pagliano, Bryan--September 5, 2015: From May 2009 to February
2013, was a special advisor within the information technology
section known as the Information Resource Management Bureau for
bureaus and offices other than the Office of the Secretary. He
continued to work as a contractor for the State Department
until March 2016.
CONTRACTORS
Sterling Contractor #1--February 26, 2016: Worked for Sterling
International (now Sterling Global Operations) in Libya on a
weapons removal and abatement program for the State Department.
Was in Benghazi on the night of the attacks.
Sterling Contractor #2--March 31, 2016: Worked for Sterling
International (now Sterling Global Operations) in Libya on a
weapons removal and abatement program for the State Department.
Was in Benghazi on the night of the attacks.
Locally Employed Staff--March 22, 2016: Was a contract employee
in Benghazi, Libya for the State Department.
OTHER
Contracting Official--August 27, 2015: A procurement and
contracting specialist at the State Department, who in May 2012
began supporting Diplomatic Services and local guard programs.
This official was involved in management of the contract with
Blue Mountain Group for local guard service in Benghazi.
Managing Director, Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and
Innovation--March 4, 2016: Since 1997, has been with the Office
of Management, Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, an office
that works directly for the Under Secretary for Management.
Since 1999, has been assigned the duty of managing the
Accountability Review Board [ARB] process. This official has
worked on 11 ARBs, including the Benghazi ARB.
SENIOR LEADERS
Mills, Cheryl--September 3, 2015: Chief of Staff and Counselor
to the Secretary of State from May 2009 until February 2013.
Sullivan, Jacob--September 4, 2015: Served as Deputy Chief of
Staff for Policy for the Secretary of State beginning in
January 2009 and also served as the Director of Policy Planning
beginning in February 2011. He left the State Department and
both positions in February 2013.
Abedin, Huma--October 16, 2015: Served as Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations for the Secretary of State from January 2009
through February 2013.
Nides, Thomas--December 16, 2015: Joined the State Department
in January 2011 to serve as the Deputy Secretary for Management
and Resources, a position he held until February 2013. Similar
to a chief operating officer, the Deputy Secretary for
Management and Resources has overall responsibility for
resource allocation and management activities at the State
Department.
Rice, Susan--February 2, 2016: From January 2009 until July
2013, served as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations and a member of the President's Cabinet. The U.S.
Mission to the United Nations serves as the United States'
delegation to the United Nations.
Kennedy, Patrick--February 3, 2016: Has been the Under
Secretary for Management since 2007 and has been a career
Foreign Service officer since 1973. The Under Secretary for
Management is responsible for finances, budgets and
contracting, resources (both personnel and facilities),
logistics, and security for Department of State overseas and
domestic operations.
OTHER COMMITTEES' ACTIVITIES
The Select Committee also had available transcripts of
hearings, briefings, and interviews from other committees,
including interview transcripts from:
Bacigalupo, James--Regional Director, Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Boswell, Eric--Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic
Security
Bultrowicz, Scott--Director, Diplomatic Security Service and
Principal Deputy Secretary of State for the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security
Dibble, Elizabeth--Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs
Diplomatic Security Agent #3--Special Agent, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and Regional Security Officer in Benghazi,
Libya
Diplomatic Security Agent #19--Special Agent, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security who served temporarily in Benghazi
Diplomatic Security Agent #23--Special Agent, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and Regional Security Officer in Tripoli,
Libya on the night of the attacks
Diplomatic Security Agent #24--Special Agent, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and former Regional Security Officer in
Tripoli, Libya
Diplomatic Security Agent #25--Special Agent, Bureau of
Diplomatic Security and Libya Desk Officer, International
Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Hicks, Gregory--former Deputy Chief of Mission, Libya
Jones, Elizabeth--Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs
Lamb, Charlene--Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Programs, Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Lohman, Lee--Executive Director, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Maxwell, Raymond--Deputy Assistant Secretary for Maghreb
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Mullen, Michael (Adm.)--Vice Chairman, Benghazi Accountability
Review Board
Nuland, Victoria--Spokesperson, Department of State
Pickering, Thomas--Chairman, Benghazi Accountability Review
Board
Roebuck, William--Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs
Special Assistant to Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy
Sullivan, Jacob--Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Director,
Office of Policy Planning
Intelligence Community Officials
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--to be inserted following
classification review
Headquarters
Petraeus, David--January 6, 2016, and March 19, 2016: Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency from September 2011 to
November 2012. At the time of the attacks, the CIA had
personnel in Benghazi and Tripoli. The CIA's Annex facility in
Benghazi was attacked on September 11-12, 2012, following the
attack on the State Department facility.
Morell, Michael--September 28, 2015: Joined the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1980 and was its Deputy Director from
May 2010 to August 2013. At the time of the attacks, the CIA
had personnel in Benghazi and Tripoli. The CIA's Annex facility
in Benghazi was attacked on September 11-12, 2012, following
the attack on the State Department facility. Deputy Director
Morell edited the highly criticized talking points that were
developed after the attacks.
Director, Office of Terrorism Analysis--November 13, 2015: The
Office of Terrorism Analysis, part of the CIA's
Counterterrorism Center, develops and disseminates analytical
pieces regarding known and suspected terrorist acts and actors.
OTA developed and disseminated analytical reports immediately
after the Benghazi attacks.
Chief of Operations, Near East Division--December 10, 2015:
Head of the CIA's headquarter coordination and support office
for operations in the Middle East and Africa, which included
Libya.
Team Chief, Office of Terrorism Analysis--February 10, 2016:
Leader of the team that produced analytical pieces. Was
involved in the Benghazi post-attack analytical reporting.
Benghazi
GRS #1--May 22, 2015: A member of the Global Response Staff
[GRS] who responded to the State Department facility when it
was attacked and was present when the Annex facility was
attacked.
GRS #2--May 27, 2015: A member of the GRS who was present when
the Annex facility was attacked.
GRS #3--May 29, 2015: A member of the GRS who responded to the
State Department facility when it was attacked and was present
when the Annex facility was attacked.
GRS #4--March 1, 2016: A member of the GRS who responded to the
State Department facility when it was attacked and was present
when the Annex facility was attacked.
GRS #5--May 24, 2016: A member of the GRS who responded to the
State Department facility when it was attacked and was present
when the Annex facility was attacked.
GRS-Team Lead--April 19, 2016: The leader of the Benghazi
Global Response Staff [GRS] who responded to the State
Department facility when it was attacked and was present when
the Annex facility was attacked.
Chief of Base--November 19, 2015: The head of the U.S.-based
intelligence group at Benghazi Base who was present for the
attacks on September 11-12, 2012.
Deputy Chief of Base--June 4, 2015: The second-in-command of
the U.S.-based intelligence group at Benghazi Base and was
present for the attacks on September 11-12, 2012.
Officer A--March 2, 2016: Part of the U.S.-based intelligence
group at Benghazi Base and was present for the attacks on
September 11-12, 2012.
Officer B--April 23, 2015: Part of the U.S.-based intelligence
group at Benghazi Base but who had traveled from Benghazi on
the morning of September 11, 2012.
Officer C--June 19, 2015: Part of the U.S.-based intelligence
group at Benghazi Base and was present for the attacks on
September 11-12, 2012.
Tripoli
GRS Tripoli--June 23, 2015: A member of the Tripoli-based
Global Response Staff (GRS) who became part of Team Tripoli and
responded to Benghazi when the State Department facility
attacked and was present when the Annex Base in Benghazi was
attacked.
Chief of Station--July 16, 2015: A Chief of Station is the lead
CIA official stationed in a foreign country and is responsible
for the U.S.-based intelligence group.
Other
CIA Official--June 2, 2015: In September 2012, this official
was serving in Europe on the night of the attacks and played a
role in responding to the attacks.
The Select Committee also had available to review
information from the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence including transcripts of hearings, briefings, and
interviews of agency heads, senior officials and other
individuals from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, National
Counterterrorism Center, Department of State, Department of
Defense, National Security Agency, and Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Olsen, Matthew--February 16, 2016: Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from August 2011 through July
2014. A part of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, NCTC oversees analysts from other federal
agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, and the Department of
Defense to collect, analyze and disseminate counterterrorism
threat information and intelligence.
ODNI Analyst--April 29, 2016: Was involved in the production of
the first analytical piece generated in the wake of the
Benghazi attacks.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Flynn, Michael (Lt. Gen)--September 29, 2015: Served as the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency at the time of the
attack. Provided information on the intelligence picture before
and after the attack.
Tripoli Analyst--November 10, 2015: An analyst with the Defense
Intelligence Agency who was assigned in Tripoli and present in
Tripoli during the attacks and was involved in intelligence
collection and reporting in Libya.
Department of Defense
Panetta, Leon--January 8, 2016: Served as the Secretary of
Defense at the time of the attacks. He provided information on
the President's direction to him, which forces he ordered to
deploy, and when he gave the order to deploy those forces.
Bash, Jeremy--January 13, 2016: Served as Chief of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense and was a liaison between the Defense
Department and the State Department. He provided information
about which forces were identified to be deployed on the night
of the attack. He also participated in a meeting with the White
House and the State Department on the evening of September 11.
Breedlove, Philip M. (Gen.)--April 7, 2016: Served as the
Commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe at the time
of the attacks. He provided information regarding the available
transport aircraft on the night of the attack, when those
aircraft were ordered to deploy, and when those aircraft
deployed.
Ham, Carter (Gen.)--June 8, 2016: Served as Commander for
Military Operations United States Africa Command [AFRICOM] at
the time of the attacks. He provided insight into the decisions
made at the Pentagon and AFRICOM regarding the attacks.
Kelly, John (Gen.)--March 23, 2016: At the time of the attacks,
served as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense. Provided information regarding meetings and decisions
made at the Pentagon in response to the attack.
Landolt, Richard B. (Rear Adm.)--May 5, 2016: Served as
Director of Operations and Cyber, United States Africa Command
(AFRICOM) at the time of the attacks. He provided information
regarding meetings and decisions made at AFRICOM.
Leidig, Jr., Charles J. (Vice Adm.)--April 22, 2016: At the
time of the attacks, served as Deputy Commander for Military
Operations United States Africa Command [AFRICOM]. He provided
information regarding meetings and decisions made at AFRICOM.
Losey, Brian (Rear Adm.)--June 16, 2016: Served as Commander,
Special Operations Command-Africa in September 2012. He
provided information regarding meetings and decisions made at
SOC-AF.
Miller, James (Ph.D.)--May 10, 2016: At the time of the
attacks, served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, a
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters of
national security and defense policy.
Mordente, Patrick (Gen.)--April 28, 2016: Served as Deputy
Director of Operations and Plans at TRANSCOM in September 2012.
He provided information regarding the C-17 aircraft that
evacuated the wounded and deceased from Tripoli.
Repass, Michael S. (Maj. Gen.)--April 15, 2016: Served as the
Commander of Special Operations Command Europe at the time of
the attack. He provided information regarding when the
Commander's in-Extremis Force [CIF] was ordered to deploy, when
it deployed, and any delays in deploying the CIF.
Tidd, Kurt (Adm.)--April 4, 2016: Served as the Director of
Operations (J3) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Provided
information regarding when the forces were ordered to deploy,
who set the N-hour for those forces, and any issues he was made
aware of regarding those forces deploying. N-hour specifies a
time that commences formal notification to a rapid response
unit and requires deployment within a specified time.
Winnefeld, Jr., James (Adm.)--March 3, 2016: Served as the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the
attack. He provided information regarding the Pentagon's
response to the attack.
CIF Commander--August 26, 2015: The Commander's in-Extremis
Force [CIF] is at a Combatant Commander's disposal for rapid
deployment. The CIF Commander provided information about when
his team received their orders, when they were ready to deploy,
and when they left Croatia for Libya.
C-17 Pilot--March 16, 2016: Piloted the C-17 aircraft that was
deployed from Ramstein Airbase to Tripoli, Libya to evacuate US
personnel. He provided information regarding when he received
his orders, and when he deployed.
Defense Attache--June 17, 2016: Served as Defense Attache, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Libya, in September 2012.
Drone Pilot #1--May 25, 2016: This remotely piloted aircraft
pilot operated a remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as a
drone, over Benghazi during the attacks.
Drone Pilot #2--May 25, 2016: This remotely piloted aircraft
pilot operated a remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as a
drone, over Benghazi during the attacks.
FAST Commander--September 2, 2015: The Marine Corps' Fleet
Antiterrorism Security Team [FAST] is a special operations team
on standby to respond to US government interests and to
temporarily augment existing security. The FAST Commander was
in charge of the FAST Team ordered to deploy to Tripoli. He
provided information about when his team received their orders,
when they were ready to deploy, and when they actually
deployed.
Sensor Operator #1--June 9, 2016: Operated the sensor controls
on a remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as a drone,
flown over Benghazi during the attacks.
Sensor Operator #2--June 9, 2016: Operated the sensor controls
on a remotely piloted aircraft, commonly known as a drone,
flown over Benghazi during the attacks.
DOD Special Operator--September 22, 2015: One of two Special
Forces operators who responded as part of Team Tripoli to
Benghazi as the attacks occurred and were present at the
Benghazi Base when the mortar attacks occurred.
The Select Committee also had available to it transcripts
of hearings, briefings, and interviews from other committees,
including interview transcripts from:
Ham, Carter (Gen.)--Commander for Military Operations, United
States Africa Command [AFRICOM]
Landolt, Richard B. (Rear Adm.)--Director of Operations and
Cyber, AFRICOM
Leidig, Jr, Charles J. (Vice Adm.)--former Deputy to the
Commander for Military Operations, AFRICOM
Losey, Brian (Rear Adm.)--former Commander, Special Operations
Command--Africa [SOCAFRICA]
Tidd, Kurt (Vice Adm.)--Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Zobrist, Scott (Brig. Gen.)--Wing Commander, 31st Fighter Wing,
Aviano Air Base, Italy
White House
Fishman, Benjamin--January 12, 2016: A staff member of the
National Security Council who, beginning in April 2011, handled
Libya matters and who continuously coordinated with the State
Department, including Envoy/Ambassador Stevens, and other
executive branch agencies regarding Libya.
Meehan, Bernadette--December 18, 2015: Deputy Spokesperson for
the National Security Council (NSC) at the White House at the
time of the attack. A Foreign Service Officer with the State
Department since 2004, was detailed, meaning on loan to, the
National Security Council (NSC) as of July 2012.
Rhodes, Benjamin--February 2, 2016: Assistant to the President
and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic
Communications and Speechwriting.
Other
Blumenthal, Sidney--June 16, 2015: Longtime friend and
confidant of Hillary R. Clinton. Blumenthal sent her numerous
``intelligence reports'' and other advice on Libya.
Chorin, Ethan--March 10, 2016: Co-director of a non-profit
organization that envisioned building relationships between
U.S. medical centers and Benghazi medical centers who was in
Benghazi at the time of the attack. He was to meet with
Ambassador Stevens on September 12, 2012. He is also a former
State Department Foreign Service Officer who had been assigned
to Libya in 2004-2006 and is an author on books and articles on
Libya.
APPENDIX J:
Requests and Subpoenas for Documents
State Department
September 20, 2012--Letter from the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform [OGR] to Hillary R. Clinton,
Secretary of State, requesting seven categories of documents
pertaining to the Benghazi attacks: 1) Benghazi security
situation; 2) threat assessment for US personnel; 3)
preliminary attack site exploitation; 4) pre-attack warnings;
5) evidence supporting or contradicting Rice statement blaming
video; 6) evidence supporting or contradicting Magariaf's
statement that attacks were premeditated; 7) attack
information.
The State Department provided OGR eight batches of documents
totaling 25,000 pages on a ``read and return'' basis. OGR was
allowed to review the documents, but custody and control of the
documents, which were returned to the Department at the end of
each day, was retained by the Department.
----------
December 13, 2012--Letter from OGR to the Secretary requesting
information on, among other things, whether the Secretary used
personal email for official business.
The State Department's written response on March 27, 2013, did
respond to the question regarding the Secretary's use of
personal email for official business.
----------
August 1, 2013--Subpoena from OGR to State Department for
records previously produced on a `read and return'' basis. The
subpoena required copies of these documents previously provided
on a ``read and return'' basis.
----------
The State Department produced 25,000 pages of heavily redacted
documents to OGR, with the last installment being produced on
April 17, 2014.
----------
August 11, 2014--Letter from the State Department to the
Committee accompanying the production of approximately 15,000
pages of documents never before produced to Congress. This
production included eight emails sent to or from ``H'' or
HDR22@
clintonemail.com. This production also excluded documents
involving purported ``institutional interests.''
According to the State Department, this production fulfilled
compliance with OGR's September 20, 2012, request and OGR's
August 1, 2013, subpoena for ``reading room'' records. However,
as the Committee later determined, responsive records of senior
leaders were not included in any production, revealing notable
gaps in the records of the Secretary of State and other senior
leaders.
----------
September 30, 2014--Letter to the State Department formalizing
prior informal requests for lesser redacted versions of
documents provided to OGR only on a ``read and return'' basis.
The letter also requests production of any Administrative
Review Board [ARB] documents requested by Congress.
----------
November 18, 2014--Letter to the State Department requiring
production of the records of the Secretary and ten senior
leaders. The specific request was for ``any and all documents
and communications referring or relating to policies,
decisions, or activities regarding: (1) security of the United
States facility in Benghazi that was attacked on 9.11.2012 (the
``Special Mission''); (2) the State Department's decision to
open or maintain the Special Mission; (3) the attacks on the
Special Mission on 9.11.2012; or (4) weapons located or found
in, imported or brought into, and/or exported or removed from
Libya, authored by, sent to, or received by [one of the named
individuals].''
The State Department produced only 847 pages of the former
Secretary of State's emails and other documents before
subpoenas were issued on March 4, 2015, commanding production
of these records. Following the issuance of the subpoena,
additional records were produced. In all, the Committee
received just over 42,000 pages of documents to and from the
Secretary of State and senior leaders. However, not all records
were produced.
----------
November 24, 2014--Letter from the State Department
accompanying the production of the first set of less-redacted
``reading room'' documents.
----------
December 2, 2014--Letter to David Kendall, attorney for the
Secretary, requesting production of official documents in her
custody.
In response, on December 29, 2014, Kendall informed the
Committee that the Secretary returned records to the State
Department and the State Department would be providing any
relevant records to the Committee. The Secretary produced no
records to the Committee.
----------
December 4, 2014--Letter to the State Department requesting
interviews of four agents who survived the attacks in Benghazi
and who have not been previously interviewed by a congressional
committee.
It took the State Department until March-April 2015 to schedule
interviews for these agents.
----------
December 4, 2014--Letter to the State Department requesting
interviews of 18 agents and four principal officers who served
in Benghazi before the attacks.
The State Department did not begin to schedule interviews until
February 2015.
----------
December 9, 2014--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of the second and final set of less-redacted
``reading room'' documents previously reviewed by the OGR.
The total of the two productions was approximately 25,000 pages
of documents.
----------
December 17, 2014--Letter from the State Department
acknowledging receipt of document and interview requests and
requesting that the Committee prioritize its requests.
----------
December 29, 2014--Letter from the Secretary (via attorney)
stating the State Department, not the Secretary, will comply
with Committee's December 2, 2014, request for any official
records personally retained by the Secretary.
----------
January 28, 2015--Subpoena for ARB documents with cover letter.
Note: The Committee subpoena was identical to an OGR subpoena
previously issued on August 1, 2013.
The request was fulfilled according to the State Department by
production of documents on April 15 and 24, 2015, of
approximately 4,300 pages. However, the Committee sent a letter
to the State Department on June 12, 2015, regarding various
missing documents. A missing four-page interview report was
subsequently delivered on February 25, 2016. The State
Department previously claimed the ARB had reviewed over 7000
documents totaling thousands of pages.
----------
February 13, 2015--Letter from the State Department
accompanying the production of 895 pages of emails and
documents, including approximately 847 pages of emails to and
from the former Secretary of State; approximately four pages
relating to the January 28, 2015, subpoena, and approximately
43 pages of documents omitted from previous productions.
----------
March 3, 2015--Letters sent from the Committee to registrar of
domain name and internet service provider used by the Secretary
ordering the preservation of relevant records.
----------
March 4, 2015--Subpoena from the Committee to the State
Department for records of ten senior officials for documents
referring or relating to: (1) Libya; (2) Libyan weapons
programs; (3) Benghazi attacks; (4) post-attack statements for
years 2011-2012.
The State Department produced records of senior leaders,
however, the production did not include records for all ten
senior leaders named in the subpoena and the prior request.
Moreover, the productions covered only discrete time frames,
not the two-year time period called for by the requests.
Additionally, the State Department affirmatively stated it was
withholding relevant documents that pertained to ``executive
interests.''
Approximately 39,875 documents were produced on these dates:
May 22, 2015
June 30, 2015
July 28, 2015
Aug. 21, 2015
Aug. 28, 2015
Sept. 3, 2015
Sept. 18 2015
Oct. 5, 2015
Oct. 9, 2015
Oct. 15 2015
Nov. 6, 2015
Nov. 24, 2015
Dec. 31, 2015
Jan. 21, 2016
Feb. 26, 2016
April 8, 2016
1,199 pages
3,636 pages
8,254 pages
7,452 pages
4,703 pages
110 pages
1,090 pages
193 pages
3,456 pages
122 pages
812 pages
2,789 pages
2,448 pages
886 pages
1,650 pages
1,075 pages
----------
March 4, 2015--Subpoena from the Committee to the Secretary
(via her personal attorney) for documents referring or relating
to: (1) Libya; (2) Libyan weapons programs; (3) Benghazi
attacks; (4) post-attack statements for years 2011-2012.
Notwithstanding the State Department's claim that it had
produced all relevant records and ``erred on side of
inclusion'' when it produced 847 pages of records on February
13, 2015, additional productions of official records of the
former Secretary of State were produced by the State
Department:
June 10, 2015
June 25, 2015
Sept. 25, 2015
1 page
105 pages
1,899 pages
----------
March 26, 2015--Letter to the State Department reiterating
demand for ARB documents; reiterating demand for records of
senior leaders; and outlining State Department's hindrance of
Committee's efforts to obtain additional information and
answers to basic questions on records management. A briefing on
records management is requested within two weeks.
----------
March 27, 2015--Letter from the Secretary's attorney regarding
purported inability to comply with subpoena. Enclosed was a
letter from Under Secretary for Management Patrick Kennedy sent
on March 23, 2015, to the Secretary affirming any official
records belong to the State Department. Letter also contains a
disclosure that all information during the requested time
period on the Secretary's server had been deleted.
----------
April 15, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
the first production of ARB records consisting of approximately
1758 pages of documents.
This production was in response to January 28, 2015, subpoena
from the Committee and its predecessor subpoena issued by the
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on August 1,
2013.
----------
April 24, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of a second set of ARB records consisting of
approximately 2,523 pages. The letter explains that, in the
view of the State Department, this completes compliance with
ARB subpoena(s).
The two productions of documents totaling just over 4,300 pages
conflicts with a letter from the State Department to the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee stating that the ARB
reviewed over 7000 documents totaling thousands of pages. Upon
review of the documents provided to the Committee, a letter was
sent June 12, 2015, outlining missing documents and requesting
additional productions. However, only one missing interview
summary consisting of four pages was produced ten months later
on February 25, 2016.
----------
May 11, 2015--Letter from the Committee to the State Department
requesting interviews with head of information technology for
the Executive Secretariat during 2011-2012 and with the Agency
Records Officer within next ten days.
These two interviews were ultimately conducted on June 30,
2015, more than a month later.
----------
May 14, 2015--Letter to the State Department that the
Department's lack of production of relevant documents is the
reason the Committee will be unable to interview the Secretary
in a timely manner.
----------
May 15, 2015--Letter from the State Department in response to
the Committee's May 14, 2015, letter, detailing compliance to
date and incorrectly asserts that the Committee narrowed the
subpoena's demand.
----------
May 19, 2015--Letter to Sidney Blumenthal requesting records
regarding Libya and the State Department from September 11-30,
2012.
Superseded by the Committee request on May 29, 2015, for a
larger time frame.
----------
May 19, 2015--Letters to Cheryl Mills, Jacob Sullivan, Philippe
Reines, Susan Rice, Huma Abedin (via her attorney) & Caitlin
Klevorick for records related to Libya and the State Department
from September 11-30, 2012.
Superseded by the Committee request on May 29, 2015, for larger
time frame.
For the initial limited time frame, on July 2, 2015, Cheryl
Mills produced 30 pages and Jacob Sullivan produced 38 pages to
the State Department for review by the State Department before
production to the Committee.
----------
May 22, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 1,199 pages of Cheryl Mills emails
and documents.
----------
May 29, 2015--Supplemental letter to Sidney Blumenthal via his
attorney for records sent to the executive branch from 2011 to
2012.
On June 12, 2015, 179 pages of documents were produced to the
Committee.
----------
June 1, 2015--Supplemental letter to Huma Abedin via attorney
for records from 2011 to 2012.
On July 9, 2015, Huma Abedin via her attorney notifies the
Committee that 338 pages were sent by Abedin to the State
Department for further review and for compliance with the
requests of the Committee.
----------
June 2, 2015--Committee Member meeting with Jon Finer, Chief of
Staff, State Department to discuss lack of document production
by the State Department. Additional request made of the State
Department for all emails/records of Ambassador Stevens for
2011-2012 as well as for emails of Sean Smith.
Ambassador Stevens records were produced on the dates listed
below in the approximate number of pages listed below:
Oct. 5, 2015
Oct. 9, 2015
Oct. 16, 2015
Oct. 20, 2015
Oct. 21, 2015
Nov. 6, 2015
Nov. 24, 2015
1,370 pages
1,828 pages
2,587 pages
1,296 pages
866 pages
344 pages
647 pages
------------------------------
Total pages:
8,939
By agreement, a select portion of Sean Smith records were
reviewed and approximately 175 pages were produced on April 8,
2016.
----------
June 4, 2015--Letter to the State Department confirming an
agreement reached that the State Department would substantially
comply with outstanding requests. Substantial compliance
defined as completion of the first phase of production of
senior leader records within 30 days.
----------
June 9, 2015--Supplemental letters sent to Cheryl Mills, Jacob
Sullivan, Philippe Reines via attorneys to produce records
related to Libya from 2011 and 2012.
----------
June 10, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of one email, initially discovered in the production
of Cheryl Mills records but was not in the production of
Secretary Clinton's records. The State Department acknowledged
the email was previously produced by the Secretary to the State
Department but omitted from prior production to the Committee.
----------
June 12, 2015--Sidney Blumenthal via his attorney produces
approximately 179 pages of email exchanges with the Secretary
regarding Libya.
Of the 81 email exchanges produced, 59 were email exchanges not
contained in prior production of Secretary Clinton's emails by
the State Department in February 2015.
----------
June 12, 2015--Letter from the Committee to the State
Department detailing documents missing from the ARB
productions. The letter provides list of additional discrete
documents needed. The letter further requests a privilege or
Vaughn index detailing documents withheld and precise reasons
for not producing relevant records.
The only additional record produced was a four (4) page
interview summary. The privilege log was never produced.
----------
June 19, 2015--Email from the Committee to the State Department
requesting explanation and production of documents provided by
Sidney Blumenthal that were not among documents in the State
Department's production on February 13, 2015, of Secretary
Clinton's records.
State Department produced an additional 105 pages of records in
response to this inquiry but acknowledged it was unable to
locate 15 email exchanges between the former Secretary and Mr.
Blumenthal that Mr. Blumenthal produced to the Committee.
----------
June 25, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 105 additional Secretary Clinton
email exchanges with Sidney Blumenthal regarding Libya. The
letter further discloses, however, the State Department was
unable to locate nine entire exchanges between Secretary
Clinton and Sidney Blumenthal and was unable to locate an
additional six email exchanges where significant portions were
omitted.
----------
June 30, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
the production of approximately 3,636 pages of emails to and
from Jacob Sullivan, Cheryl Mills, and Susan Rice.
More than half of production consisted of press clippings. The
remaining substantive emails were primarily for one month time
frame, September 11, 2012, to October 12, 2012.
----------
July 2, 2015--Letters from the personal attorney for Mills and
Jacob regarding production of documents to the State Department
for limited time period of September 11-30, 2012, recounting
that 30 pages for Mills and 38 pages for Sullivan were returned
to the State Department. Acknowledges that a further production
to be done by July 27, 2015, for larger time frame in the
second request from the Committee.
----------
July 6, 2015--Email exchange between the Committee and the
State Department outlining several issues: 1) request for
production of letters sent by Kennedy to senior officials
seeking return of official records retained in personal email
accounts; and 2) inquiry as to an expected production of the
first phase of documents of senior leaders.
Response from the State Department received the next day, July
7, 2015, summarily stating the State Department is working on
all requests.
No response to the request for the letters from Kennedy to
senior leaders until a subpoena was issued on August 5, 2015,
for these records. The records were produced on August 6, 2015.
----------
July 8, 2015--Letter from the Committee to the State Department
regarding documents intentionally withheld from the Committee.
The letter requests a privilege log or ``Vaughn Index''
outlining details of ``Executive Branch confidentiality
interest'' for withheld documents from productions made on
April 24, 2015, May 22, 2015, and June 30, 2015.
Despite repeated assurances that summary was being prepared
detailing the documents withheld and the precise reason for
withholding, no summary was ever received.
----------
July 9, 2015--Letter from attorney for Huma Abedin regarding
338 pages of documents pertaining to Libya produced by her to
the State Department for further review by the State Department
for production to the Committee.
----------
July 10, 2015--Letter from the Committee to the State
Department seeking information regarding allegations of
retaliation against a whistleblower.
Letter received on October 9, 2015, in response.
----------
July 27, 2015--Letter from the State Department regarding a
scheduled July 29, 2015, hearing on State Department document
production and promising ``meaningful production of several
thousand pages to the Committee.
----------
July 28, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 8,254 pages of documents of senior
leaders.
----------
August 5, 2015--Subpoena issued to the State Department seeking
the March 11, 2015, letter from Kennedy to the ten senior
officials identified in the Committee's March 4, 2015, subpoena
and the emails submitted to the State Department as a result of
the March 11, 2015, letter from the State Department to the
senior officials.
These items were previously requested by letter on July 6,
2015, but request was ignored. Production of the letter from
Kennedy subsequently occurred on August 7, 2015, following
issuance of the subpoena. Official records found in the
personal email accounts of Sullivan and Mills subsequently
produced to the Committee.
----------
August 7, 2015--Production of correspondence between Kennedy
and former senior leaders requesting return of official records
maintained on personal email accounts.
----------
August 21, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 7,452 pages of documents of senior
leaders.
----------
August 28, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 4,703 pages of senior leaders
records including a classified portion.
----------
September 3, 2015--Letter from the State Department
accompanying production of approximately 110 pages of emails
from Sullivan from his personal email account.
----------
September 18, 2015--Letter from the State Department
accompanying production of approximately 1,090 pages of emails
from senior leaders.
----------
September 22, 2015--Email to the State Department outlining
documents needed prior to October 22, 2015, hearing.
----------
September 25, 2015--Letter from the State Department
accompanying production of approximately 1,899 pages of emails
from the Secretary.
----------
October 5, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 1,563 pages of documents, including
approximately 1,370 pages of Stevens emails and approximately
193 pages of documents from senior leaders.
----------
October 9, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 3,456 pages, including emails from
the personal email accounts of Mills, Sullivan, and Abedin
regarding Libya and additionally approximately 1,828 pages of
Stevens emails.
----------
October 15, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 122 pages of Abedin emails.
----------
October 16, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 2,587 pages of Stevens emails.
----------
October 20, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 1296 pages of Stevens emails.
----------
October 21, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 866 pages of Stevens emails.
----------
November 6, 2015--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 344 pages of Stevens emails and
approximately 812 pages of Kennedy emails.
----------
November 24, 2015--Letter from the State Department
accompanying production of approximately 647 pages of
Ambassador Stevens emails and approximately 2789 pages of Under
Secretary Kennedy emails.
----------
December 31, 2015--Letter from the State Department
accompanying production of approximately 2448 pages of Under
Secretary Kennedy emails/documents.
----------
January 21, 2016--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 866 pages of Under Secretary
Kennedy emails.
----------
February 25, 2016--Letter from the State Department
accompanying production of approximately 4 pages consisting of
one missing ARB interview summary.
----------
February 26, 2016--Letter from the State Department
accompanying production of approximately 1,640 pages of
documents of former Secretary Clinton and emails from senior
leaders, recently discovered from the Office of the Secretary.
----------
February 26, 2016--Letter from the State Department
accompanying production of approximately ten pages of emails of
Cheryl Mills previously withheld from the Committee.
----------
April 8, 2016--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 1,146 pages of documents of former
Secretary Clinton and emails from senior leaders, recently
discovered from the Office of the Secretary.
----------
May 5, 2016--Letter from the State Department accompanying
production of approximately 405 pages of documents recently
discovered from the Office of the Secretary.
Department of Defense
April 8, 2015--Letter to the Defense Department requesting
briefings on Operation Jukebox Lotus, Operation Oaken Lotus,
Defense Department personnel's 1208 mission in Libya, EUCOM/
AFRICOM's Commander's in-Extremis Force [CIF], and others.
----------
April 8, 2015--Letter requesting answers to 20 questions (57
subparts) pertaining to 1) heightened alert/deployment status
for various U.S. military forces or assets; 2) commands or
orders, given, rescinded, or status and manner of compliance.
----------
April 8, 2015--Letter to the Defense Department requesting
production of: 1) Defense Department documents/communications
relating to the Benghazi attack; 2) After-action reports on the
attack; 3) documents sent to Defense Department (excluding DIA)
relating to the attack; 4) documents relating to orders or
commands given to defend against the attacks or rescue
Americans in Benghazi; 5) documents relating to the preparation
to respond to such orders or commands; 6) documents relating to
the recission or cancellation of such orders or commands; 7)
copy of the Predator video on the night of the attack; 8)
documents relating to the Annex attack; 9) unredacted versions
of the 486 pages of AFRICOM-related documents produced to
Judicial Watch; 10) AFRICOM AOR Force Laydown slides; 11) EUCOM
AOR Force Laydown slides; 12) CENTCOM AOR Force Laydown slides.
----------
April 27, 2015--Letter from the Defense Department in response
to the three April 8, 2015, letters stating the Defense
Department will schedule briefings requested; will answer
questions posed; and will provide documents requested. Defense
Department included one slide in response to items 10, 11, 12
of document request.
----------
May 21, 2015--Letter from the Defense Department on status of
document request and production of 726 pages of documents,
including: 1) Defense Department documents/communications
relating to the Benghazi attack are pending production; 2) 175
pages produced on the after-action reports on the attack; 3)
documents sent to the Defense Department (excluding DIA)
relating to the attack has been referred to DIA for production;
4) documents relating to orders or commands given to defend
against the attacks or rescue Americans in Benghazi is pending
production; 5) documents relating to the preparation to respond
to such orders or commands is pending production; 6) documents
relating to the rescission or cancellation of such orders or
commands is pending production; 7) a copy of the Predator video
on the night of the attack was made available for staff review;
8) documents relating to the Annex attack is pending
production; 9) 551 pages (which includes some withheld pages)
but includes unredacted versions of the 486 pages of AFRICOM-
related documents produced to Judicial Watch; 10) AFRICOM AOR
Force Laydown slides have been previously provided; 11) EUCOM
AOR Force Laydown slides have been previously provided; 12)
CENTCOM AOR Force Laydown slides have been previously provided.
----------
July 28, 2015--Written answers received to questions in letter
sent January 7, 2016, pertaining to 1) heightened alert/
deployment status for various U.S. military forces or assets;
and 2) commands or orders, given, rescinded, or status and
manner of compliance.
----------
January 7, 2016--Letter from Defense Department accompanying
the production of 61 pages in response to the Committee's April
24, 2015, request. Letter notes that another 54 pages of
relevant documents have been withheld based on an assertion of
``longstanding Executive Branch interests.''
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
November 19, 2014--Letter to NSA Director requesting production
of all finished intelligence analysis products regarding Libya.
----------
April 28, 2015--Letter to NSA Director requesting specific
documents, including: certain NSA reports, Critical
Intelligence Communications (CRITIC) messages, attack-related
documents, NSA collection requirements for Libya, NSA
activities related to the NIPF.
----------
May 11, 2015--Letter from NSA acknowledging receipt of April
28, 2015, letter.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
November 19, 2014--Letter to DIA Director requesting production
of all finished intelligence analysis products regarding Libya.
----------
April 23, 2015--Letter to DIA Director requesting production
of: 1) ``DCTC's Benghazi Binder'' containing timeline of
terrorist events and acts against western interests; 2) DCTC's
DIA intelligence reports on the attacks; 3) photos/videos of
Benghazi mission/annex and related document; 4) analysis of
social media covering Benghazi; 5) documents relating to video-
conferences in September 2012 pertaining to Libya; 6)
documents/communications regarding responsibility for the
Benghazi attack; 7) documents and communications regarding the
Benghazi attacks sent to or from the White House Situation
Room, the National Military Command Center, or the Defense
Intelligence Operations Coordination Center.
----------
May 8, 2015--Letter from DIA accompanying production of a
binder of materials in response to the April 23, 2015, request.
The letter notes that some documents still in clearance
process.
Central Intelligence Agency
November 19, 2014--Letter from the Committee requesting ``all
finished intelligence analysis products regarding Libya''
issued between 9/11/2012 and 12/31/2012.
----------
April 28, 2015--Letter from the Committee requesting production
of the following documents or communications, including
reports, cables, emails, and instant messages, relating to the
Benghazi attacks: 1) to or from Tripoli Station; 2) between
Tripoli Station and the State Department; 3) to or from
Benghazi Base; 4) to or from Director Petraeus or his immediate
staff; 5) to or from Deputy Director Morell or his immediate
staff; 6) to or from CIA Operations Center.
The letter also requested production of documents or
communications relating to: 7) development of a 9/13/2012 WIRe
article; 8) development of a 9/15/2012 WIRe article; 9) CIA's
strategic priorities in Libya; 10) security situation in
Benghazi; 11) vulnerability assessments of Benghazi Base; 12)
CIA personnel and AFRICOM; 13) eyewitness accounts of the
attack; 14) final report produced and referenced in 1-001405;
15) Team A/Team B analysis of the attacks; 16-19) specific
document requests; 20) February 17 Martyrs Brigade; 21)
unclassified HPSCI talking points; 22) cables regarding the
Benghazi attacks; 23) Tripoli Station SIGINT strategy; 24)
Ambassador Stevens Benghazi trip; 25) FBI trips to Benghazi
following the attacks; and 26) cables requested by Secretary
Clinton or Chief of Staff Cheryl Mills.
----------
August 7, 2015--Subpoena to CIA for document production of: 1)
Same Time (instant) messages relating to the Benghazi attacks
sent to or from a) Director, b) Deputy Director, c) OTA, d)
Ops/NE division, d) MENA, e) Tripoli Station; 2) unclassified
HPSCI talking points; 3) development of a 9/13/2012 WIRe
article; 4) development of a 9/15/2012 WIRe article; 5)
development of a 9/12/2012 MENA Situation Report; 6)
development of a 9/12/2012 Libya Spot Commentary.
----------
November 4, 2015--Letter from the Committee requesting
production of a ``list of all intelligence products from the
BIR [Benghazi Intelligence Review] that were included in the
PDB [President's Daily Brief] between February 2012 and
November 2012.''
----------
January 13, 2016--Letter from the Committee outlining areas of
noncompliance: 1) Same Time Chats (instant messaging) requested
in the August 7, 2015, subpoena; 2) outstanding document
requests from the August 7, 2015, subpoena, including, a)
initial analysis of the attacks, b) critical cable written in
the aftermath of the attacks, c) intelligence regarding the
deteriorating security situation in Benghazi, d) specific cable
reflecting calls made on the night of the attack and related
records; 3) refusal to certify compliance with talking points
request; 4) outstanding witness interview requests (4
referenced); 5) access to information about certain CIA
activities; and 6) classification review of interview
transcripts.
White House
December 29, 2014--Letter from the Committee to White House
Chief of Staff requesting 12 categories of documents pertaining
to Libya and the Benghazi attacks, specifically documents
pertaining to: 1) Libya policy; 2) attack response; 3) the
President's actions and communications; 4) identities and
content of communications of others with President about
attacks; 5) identities and content of communications of White
House staff about attacks; 6) persons present in White House
Situation Room on September 11-12, 2012; 7) movement logs,
photographs, etc. of President on evening of September 11,
2012; 8) drafts, notes, revisions to President's Rose Garden
remarks made on 9/12/2012; 9) documents pertaining to public
response/messaging about the attacks; 10) documents pertaining
to protests at U.S. overseas facilities; 11) documents
pertaining to the video, Innocence of Muslims; 12) documents
related to the President's meeting on September 10, 2012, with
Senior Administration Officials in preparation for the 9/11
anniversary.
----------
January 23, 2015--Letter from White House stating that other
Executive Branch agencies are in best position to respond to
document requests. The letter further complains that request is
broader than the Committee's mandate. The letter outlines how
the requests intrude ``on longstanding Executive Branch
confidentiality and other institutional interests.'' The letter
asserts the White House will begin producing documents by
February and welcomes further discussion on how to narrow the
requests made.
----------
February 27, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the
production of approximately 266 pages of documents responsive
to the December 29, 2014, request.
----------
March 17, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the
re-production of approximately 266 pages of documents with
lesser redactions.
----------
April 23, 2015--Letter in response to White House position on
scope of mandate of the Committee and the Committee requests,
including that the White House cannot rely on productions by
other agencies to fulfill its obligation to respond to a
congressional request; disagrees with the narrow interpretation
of scope of the Committee's mandate; and requests that future
productions give priority to certain areas (Items 1, 2, 8, 9,
10, 11 from December 29, 2014, letter) and further give
priority to certain specific time frames.
----------
May 11, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the re-
production of approximately 203 pages of documents.
----------
May 19, 2015--Letter from the Committee requesting production
of any email communications to or from a personal address
regarding Libya from National Security Advisor Susan Rice.
----------
June 19, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the re-
production of approximately 266 pages of documents responsive
to requests.
----------
July 17, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the re-
production of approximately 340 pages of documents responsive
to requests.
----------
August 7, 2015--Letter to White House resetting priorities:
compliance has not been achieved notwithstanding lapse of 7
months; many documents produced have been publically available
press clippings; and the White House needs to identify what
documents will be produced and what documents it will refuse to
produce and the precise legal basis for non-production.
----------
August 28, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the
re-production of approximately 247 pages of documents
responsive to requests.
----------
October 5, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the
re-production of approximately 34 pages of documents responsive
to requests.
Meeting/briefing between the Committee staff and White House
counsel staff regarding production of documents.
----------
October 27, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the
re-production of approximately 47 pages of documents responsive
to requests.
----------
November 12, 2015--Letter from the White House accompanying the
re-production of approximately 48 pages of documents responsive
to requests.
----------
March 16, 2016--Letter formally requesting ``access to all
special access programs regarding U.S. activities in Libya''
specifically in reference to ``weapons trafficking, weapons
diversion, and the monitoring of weapons transfers.''
White House forwarded the letter to the Central Intelligence
Agency for response. Response received on April 28, 2016.
APPENDIX K:
Analysis of Accountability Review Board,
House Armed Services Committee and
House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee Reports
Was the Accountability Review Board Independent
and Comprehensive?
INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 2012, the Secretary of State announced the
formation of a panel known as the Benghazi Accountability
Review Board [ARB].\1\ The five member ARB was charged with
examining ``the circumstances surrounding the deaths of
personnel assigned in support of the U.S. Government Mission to
Libya in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11, 2012.''\2\ Federal
law and State Department procedures outline the process for
convening and conducting an ARB investigation--a process
typically overseen by career personnel.\3\ Notwithstanding the
processes already in place, the Secretary's senior staff
oversaw the Benghazi ARB process from start to finish. The
senior staff's participation ranged from selecting the ARB
members to shaping the ARB's outcome by editing the draft final
report. The decisions to deviate from longstanding processes
raise questions about the ARB's independence, thoroughness, and
therefore the fullness of their findings of accountability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Convening of an Accountability Review Board, 77 Fed. Reg. 60741
(Oct. 4, 2012), Pub. Notice 8052.
\2\Id.
\3\22 U.S.C. Sec. 4831 et seq. and 12 FAM 030.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BACKGROUND
Accountability Review Boards are designed to play a
critical role in ensuring the State Department learns from past
incidents so as to ensure future security and safety related
incidents can be prevented. According to the State Department,
the ``ARB process is a mechanism to foster more effective
security of U.S. missions and personnel abroad by ensuring a
thorough and independent review of security-related
incidents.''\4\ Through its investigations and recommendations,
the Board seeks to determine accountability and promote and
encourage improved security.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Id.
\5\12 FAM 013. Objective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By law, Accountability Review Boards are charged with
examining five aspects of an incident, including:
1. LThe extent to which the incident or incidents with
respect to which the Board was convened was security
related;
2. LWhether the security systems and security
procedures at that mission were adequate;
3. LWhether the security systems and security
procedures were properly implemented;
4. LThe impact of intelligence and information
availability; and
5. LSuch other facts and circumstances, which may be
relevant to the appropriate security management of
United States missions abroad.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\22 U.S.C. Sec. 4834(a).
Prior to 1986, no formal mechanisms were in place to
examine, review, and make recommendations after significant
incidents involving State Department facilities of personnel.
Following several attacks against U.S. missions in the 1980s,
the State Department created an independent review panel to
examine the incidents. The Advisory Panel on Overseas Security,
chaired by Admiral Bobby Inman, issued its report in 1985.
Concerned that the State Department did not consistently
examine serious and significant incidents as did other federal
agencies, the Panel recommended the ``Secretary of State [be
required] to convene a Board of Inquiry with powers of
establishing accountability in all cases involving terrorism or
security related attacks that result in significant damage and/
or casualties to United States personnel or property.''\7\ The
Advisory Panel's recommendation to establish the Accountability
Review Board was adopted by the State Department and later
incorporated in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas
Security, Accountability and Acceptance of Risk, 1 (1985) http://
www.fas.org/irp/threat/inman [hereinafter Inman Report].
\8\22 U.S.C. Sec. 4831 through 4835.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 1986, nineteen (19) ARBs have been convened to review
the most significant attacks against U.S. diplomatic personnel
or facilities.\9\ The findings and recommendations of each ARB
investigation are in effect cumulative. Cheryl Mills, Chief of
Staff and Counselor to the Secretary of State, explained to the
Committee, ``ARBs . . . have an enduring life, meaning that the
learnings that came from those ARBs should be acted on and
implemented.''\10\ Two significant ARBs convened subsequent to
1986 were those formed in the aftermath of the August 7, 1998,
dual terrorist attacks in the east African cities of Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\OIG Special Review of the Accountability Review Process, ISP-I-
13-44A, 10 (September 2013) (``Within the 14-year period covered by
this review [1998-2012], a significant number of security-related
incidents, more than 222 in all, were not subject to [ARB]
consideration.''), found at https://oig.state.gov/system/files/
214907.pdf.
\10\Testimony of Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 269 (Sep. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Mills Testimony] (on file
with the Committee) (``It was my impression that ARBs are supposed to
have an enduring life, meaning that the learnings that came from those
ARBs should be acted on and implemented'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speaking on behalf of both East African ARB panels, ARB
Chairman William Crowe wrote former Secretary of State Madeline
Albright expressing concern about the Department's commitment
to security:\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\Letter from Admiral William J. Crowe, to Madeline Albright,
Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 8, 1999) (on file with the
Committee).
[H]ow similar the lessons were to those drawn by the
Inman Commission over 14 years ago. What is most
troubling is the failure of the U.S. government to take
the necessary steps to prevent such tragedies through
an unwillingness to give sustained priority and funding
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to security improvements.
We are advancing a number of recommendations that deal
with the handling of terrorist threats and attacks, the
review and revision of standards and procedures to
improve security readiness and crisis management, the
size and composition of our missions, and the need to
have adequate and sustained funding for safe buildings
and security programs in the future. We recognize that
the Department of State and other U.S. government
agencies are already making adjustments and taking
measures to enhance the protection of our personnel and
facilities abroad. It is clear, however, that much more
needs to be done.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\Id.
Two recommendations identified by the East African ARBs
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
were directed specifically to the Secretary of State:
Recommendation #4: The Secretary of State should
personally review the security situation of embassy
chanceries and other official premises, closing those
which are highly vulnerable and threatened but for
which adequate security enhancements cannot be
provided, and seek new secure premises for permanent
use, or temporary occupancy, pending construction of
new buildings.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\Report to the Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of
State In Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability
Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 14 (April 1999), http://fas.org/irp/
threat/arb/
accountability_report.html.
Recommendation #13: First and foremost, the Secretary
of State should take a personal and active role in
carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the
security of U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad. It is
essential to convey to the entire Department that
security is one of the highest priorities. In the
process, the Secretary should reexamine the present
organizational structure with the objective of
clarifying responsibilities, encouraging better
coordination, and assuring that a single high-ranking
officer is accountable for all security matters and has
the authority necessary to coordinate on the
Secretary's behalf such activities within the
Department of State and with all foreign affairs USG
agencies.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\Id. at 29-30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENGHAZI ARB
Decision to Convene an Accountability Review Board Panel
The Secretary convened the Benghazi ARB on the
recommendation of the State Department's permanent coordinating
committee [PCC], a seven member committee with convening
authority.\15\ State Department procedures provide ``the ARB/
PCC will, as quickly as possible after an incident occurs,
review the available facts and recommend to the Secretary to
convene or not convene a board.''\16\ The Managing Director for
the State Department's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing
and Innovation [M/PRI] and the Chair of the ARB/PCC, explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\12 FAM 032.
\16\12 FAM 032.1.
[W]e put together . . . some facts as we know it, about
the incident. We tell our director. He contacts the
legal adviser, who is not a voting member but is there
to provide advice to the PCC, and Diplomatic Security
and the regional bureau. And we say hey, this looks to
us like it meets the criteria, I'm going to call the
PCC together. And it's the chairman's right to assemble
this group.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\Testimony of the Managing Director, Office of Management
Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 20
(Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter M/PRI Managing Director Testimony] (on file
with the Committee).
After the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facility on
September 11, 2012, the ARB/PCC did not meet in person but
discussed the situation by email.\18\ The Managing Director of
M/PRI explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\Email from the M/PRI Managing Director, U.S. Dep't of State to
Eric Boswell, Ass't Sec'y of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S.
Dep't of State, Beth Jones, Acting Ass't Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, et. al (Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with the Committee, SCB0049611)
(``The Under Secretary from Management asked M/PRI to get the ARB/PCC
together today to provide a recommendation to the Secretary as to
whether to convene an ARB in response to the September 11, 2012 attack
in Benghazi, Libya. Due to conflicting schedules we are conducting the
vote via email.'').
A virtual meeting, we do that on incidents that we
think do not need the PCC to meet. That is our standard
operating procedure. But since this was well known by
everyone in the Department, we felt comfortable in
doing it electronically.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\M/PRI Managing Director Testimony at 24.
The PCC agreed an ARB should be convened and made the
recommendation to the Secretary on September 19, 2012.\20\ In
making the recommendation, the PCC noted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\Memorandum from M/PRI Managing Director, U.S. Dep't of State,
to the Sec'y of State, (Sept.19, 2012) (on file with the Committee,
C05456350) (``The Permanent Coordinating Committee (PCC) on
Accountability Review Boards (ARB) was asked on September 19, 2012 to
examine the recent incident, and has recommended that you convene an
ARB to examine this incident.'').
Should you agree to this recommendation, we will
prepare the appropriate appointment letters for the
Chair and proposed members of the ARB, the letters to
the Congress and notifications to the public via the
Federal Register announcing your decision.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\Id.
The Secretary approved the PCC's recommendation to convene
the ARB the same day.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Selection of the ARB Panel
``The law requires four nominees [to be selected] by the
Secretary of State and one nominee by now the Director of
National Intelligence.''\23\ State Department procedures
outline the process for selecting State Department
representatives to the Board once a decision to convene an ARB
has been made. The procedures specify ``[i]f the ARB PCC
recommends that the Secretary convene a board, it will forward
a list of potential board members to the Secretary for
approval.'' However, the Benghazi ARB/PCC did not prepare a
list of prospective board members, nor did it share a list of
candidates with the Secretary as required by State Department
procedures.\24\ The Managing Director who also served as the
ARB/PCC Chair, explained to the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\Testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Management,
U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 278 (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Kennedy
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
\24\M/PRI Managing Director Testimony at 29 (A list of potential
board members was not forwarded to the Secretary for approval).
Q: Did you put together a list of names to recommend to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
be members of the ARB?
A: I don't believe I did.
Q: Okay. Why not?
A: Well, because they went for option two and did more
of the celebrity approach as I would say. As I
mentioned earlier, they got Ambassador Pickering, who I
consider to be in that category as Ambassador Crowe,
for when he was chosen for Nairobi Dar.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\Id. at 27.
The PCC did not prepare or send a list of prospective
members to the Secretary because the senior staff were already
in the process of identifying panelists to serve.
As Mills told the Committee, ``I worked with Under
Secretary Kennedy and Deputy Secretary William Burns in
identifying who might be talent that could actually serve in
this role.''\26\ Talent would later be defined as individuals
who would understand the Secretary's narrative of expiditionary
diplomacy. On September 15, 2012, William Burns, Deputy
Secretary of State, recommended Ambassador Pickering to the
ARB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\Mills Testimony at 137.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an email to Mills, Burns wrote:
On arb, I'd suggest Pickering in addition to Armitage.
They're both very experienced and fair minded and
understand entirely demands of expeditionary
diplomacy.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\Email from William Burns, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep't of State (Sep.
15, 2012, 1:09 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0057846).
On September 18, 2012, Burns informed Mills and Patrick
Kennedy, Under Secretary of State for Management, that ``Tom
Pickering is willing to chair. . . . He liked very much the
idea of including Mike Mullen.''\28\ Admiral Michael Mullen
retired as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 1,
2011.\29\ At the time they served on the Benghazi ARB, both
Mullen and Pickering were also members of the Secretary's
Foreign Affairs Policy Advisory Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of
Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to William Burns, Deputy Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 18, 2012, 9:35 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0057775).
\29\Biography of Admiral Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy (Jul. 12, 2013),
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=11.
The Foreign Affairs Policy Board was launched in
December 2011 to provide the Secretary of State, the
Deputy Secretaries of State, and the Director of Policy
Planning with independent, informed advice and opinion
concerning matters of U.S. foreign policy. The Board
serves in a solely advisory capacity, with an agenda
shaped by the questions and concerns of the Secretary.
Its discussions focus on assessing global threats and
opportunities; identifying trends that implicate core
national security interests; providing recommendations
with respect to tools and capacities of the civilian
foreign affairs agencies; defining priorities and
strategic frameworks for U.S. foreign policy; and
performing any other research and analysis of topics
raised by the Secretary of State, the Deputy
Secretaries, and the Director of Policy Planning.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\Foreign Affairs Policy Board, U.S. Dep't of State, http://
www.state.gov/s/p/fapb/.
The Foreign Affairs Policy Advisory Board's formation
occurred contemporaneously with the decision to extend the
operations in Benghazi as well as the restart of operations in
Tripoli.
Mills explained her communications with ARB panelists
Mullen and Catherine Bertini:
I reached out to, I believe Admiral Mullen myself. . .
. And, I reached out to, I believe, Cathy Bertini, who
had been recommended to us by the Under Secretary of
Management.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\Mills Testimony at 138.
Kennedy described his role in the selection of the ARB
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
panel members to the Committee:
I had met Catherine Bertini when I was one of the
alternate representatives to the United Nations and she
was at the United Nations as the she was I think at
that point the senior American serving in the United
Nations Headquarters Secretariat. So I worked with her
on a professional basis because I was representing the
United States and she was a senior official within the
United Nations. I did not recommend her for the
position.
I provided one name, Richard Shinnick. That was the
only name that I was solicited and asked to provide a
suggestion for, in effect, a type of expertise.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\Kennedy Testimony at 265.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kennedy explained further:
A: As I said earlier, I was asked only to make one
recommendation name somebody who was not in the State
Department but knew a lot about Secretary of excuse me
Department of State construction activities. So I made
one recommendation and I made no recommendations for
any of the other four.
I was advised, because I also head the unit that publishes
the names in the Federal Register, I was advised that the
selections were Pickering, Mullen, Turner, I think it was,
Bertini and Shinnick.
Q: And so did Cheryl Mills ask you for that, or did
Jake Sullivan? Or who asked you for----
A: Cheryl Mills asked me for the name of someone who
knew about State Department facilities management and
construction.
Q: And did she share with you who the other members who
she was thinking about
A: No.
Q: appointing?
A: No. I was informed who the selections were.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\Id. at 278.
On September 28, 2012, Mills shared with Kennedy, Stephen
Mull, the Executive Secretariat, Uzra Zeya, the ARB executive
secretary, and Burns about Catherine Bertini agreement to
participate as an ARB member.\34\ Within hours of Bertini's
acceptance, Kennedy shared with Mills and Mull the additional
news: ``Dick Shinnick has accepted as the fifth member of the
panel.''\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\Email from Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Stephen Mull, Executive Secretary, Office of the
Secretariat, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 28, 2012, 2:37 PM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0057607) (``Catherine Bertini agreed to serve on
the ARB panel today''). See also Email from Cheryl Mills, Chief of
Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep't of State, to Catherine Bertini,
Accountability Review Board Member (Sept. 28, 2012, 2:28AM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0054582) (``[I]f you could tomorrow, I would
welcome connecting with you.'' From Bertini ``Thank you for reaching
out to me. I am pleased to say Yes to your request and I very much look
forward to contributing to the work of the panel on this critically
important issue'').
\35\Id. (``Dick Shinnick has accepted as the fifth member of the
Panel'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Intelligence Community recommended Hugh Turner, a
former CIA deputy director, to serve as the intelligence
Community's representative.\36\ Burns spoke early on with
Michel Morrell, Deputy Director of the CIA, and Robert
Cardillo, Deputy Director of ODNI about their choice of
representatives on the ARB panel--reporting back to the Mills
and Kennedy ``they will coordinate on a nominee.''\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\Mills Testimony at 138.
\37\Email from Jacob J. Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Dir. of
Policy Planning, U.S. Dep't of State, to William Burns, Deputy Sec'y of
State, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 18, 2012, 9:35 AM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0057775) (containing exchange from William Burns to
Cheryl Mills and Patrick Kennedy).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As panelists confirmed their participation on the ARB,
Mills shared the information with the Secretary. For example,
within minutes after sharing the news about Catherine Bertini
with the senior staff, Mills also relayed the news to the
Secretary.\38\ Mills explained to the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\Email from Cheryl Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S.
Dep't of State, to H (Sept. 28, 2012, 2:46 PM) (Subject: FYI) (on filed
with the Committee, SCB0045509).
We certainly apprised her that it looked like we had a team
of five that represented a balance of those who understood
diplomacy, who understand national security, who understood
what it meant to operate in environments that were insecure,
and that we thought the balance of who we had identified met
that criteria.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\Mills Testimony at 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARB Executive Secretary
The senior staff's involvement in the ARB process also
extended to selecting the Executive Secretary to the ARB.
According to the State Department's regulations, the Executive
Secretary to the ARB is considered to be part of the ARB staff
and ``serves to coordinate and facilitate the work of that
Board.''\40\ On September 25, 2012, the Managing Director wrote
Mull and his Deputy:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\12 FAM 032.3b.
I would appreciate knowing how this ARB is going to
work since it is not going in the normal way. Can we
talk this morning or tomorrow morning about the roles
and responsibilities?\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\Email from Managing Director, Office of Management Policy,
Rightsizing and Innovation to Stephen Mull, Exec. Sec'y, Office of the
Secretariat, U.S. Dep't of State (Sept. 25, 2012, 7:58 AM) (on file
with the Committee, SCB0093148).
The Managing Director explained to the Committee: ``I was a
little bit concerned about being behind the tide.''\42\ ``I was
hungry for information myself.''\43\ She described her normal
responsibilities with regard to selecting the Executive
Secretary to the ARB:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\M/PRI Managing Director Testimony at 32.
\43\Id. at 33.
A: [W]hat I normally do is go to our H.R. Bureau and
see who is available at the senior ranks to take on a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function such as this.
Q: And what does the Executive Secretary to the ARB do?
A: They arrange the meetings. They make sure that the
board has access to the Department for interviews and,
you know, because usually these people are removed from
the Department, you know, they're retirees, they're
unfamiliar with the Department's ways. So in sitting in
on the interviews, the exec sec would know who they
should contact next, who this leads them to in a
bureau. So they act, as I call it, the bridge from the
ARB to the building.
Q: And in the 10 prior ARBs that you had been involved
in, as the ARB officer, had you made the selection of
the executive secretary?
A: I wouldn't say made the selection. I nominated
people in the past, sure.
Q: And had they been selected then?
A: Yes, normally.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\Id.
On September 21, 2012, Mull informed Burns about Mills'
decision to select Burns' Chief of Staff for the position of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Secretary to the ARB. He wrote to Burns:
Hi Bill, Cheryl [Mills] asked me to talk to Uzra about
the possibility of her serving as Exec Sec for the ARB
through the end of November. She seemed very reluctant,
but Cheryl agreed that Uzra had all the right
qualities. Uzra asked to hold off giving a decision
until she talked to you, so she'll be seeking you out
on this today.
Steve Mills recounted a different version of events to the
Committee:\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\Email from Stephen Mull, Exec. Sec'y, Office of the
Secretariat, U.S. Dep't of State, to William Burns, Deputy Sec'y, U.S.
Dep't of State (Sept. 21, 2012, 8:45 AM) (Subject: re: Uzra/ARB) (on
file with the Committee, SCB0057773).
She [Uzra] was recommended by Deputy Secretary Burns.
She had been his chief of staff. She also, I thought
was a good recommendation in the sense that Deputy
Secretary Burns is well-respected and well-regarded in
the building. He's the most senior foreign service
officer. And she, in being his chief of staff, when she
reached out to people, when she did that, people
responded.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\Mills Testimony at 194.
On September 22, 2012, Burns conveyed Uzra Zeya's decision
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to serve as Executive Secretary to Mills stating:
Hi,
Uzra has agreed to serve as Exec Secretary of ARB.
She'll call Steve to let him know.
We talked at length about this, and she is comfortable
with decision, for all the right reasons. She'll do a
great job.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\Email from William Burns, Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep't of State
(Sept. 22, 2012, 1:37 PM) (on file with the Committee, SCB0057772).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Documents Reviewed By the ARB
The ARB panel's primary sources of information were
documents and witness interviews.\48\ Documents were collected
from State Department personnel with ``information relevant to
the Board's examination of these incidents.''\49\ Even before
the ARB was convened, the Bureau of Legislative Affairs, with
oversight from Mills, put in place a system to transmit, store,
and review documents relevant to the myriad requests for
information, including Congress, Freedom of Information [FOIA],
and the ARB.\50\ The Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, described the process
for submitting documents:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\Testimony of Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Chairman, Benghazi
Accountability Review Board, before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't
Reform, Tr. at 52 (Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Pickering Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
\49\Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y of State for Mgmt., Department
Notice, Convening of Accountability Review Board to Examine the
Circumstances Surrounding the Deaths in Benghazi, Libya on September
11, 2012. U.S. Dep't of State (on file with the Committee, SCB0050689).
\50\Testimony of the Deputy Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Tr. at 112 (Dec.
17, 2015) [hereinafter NEA Deputy Director Testimony] (on file with the
Committee). See also Mills Testimony at 150 (``I had been managing, as
you know, our response effort and collaborating with our leadership
team on Benghazi in particular.'').
A: There was a request to produce documents . . . I
think that we were given, you know, kind of the general
search terms to look for and scan in our computer and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
files.
Q: So you eventually, did you produce a PST file, or
did you produce hard copies in response to that
request?
A: We produced hardcopies in response to that request.
Q: So you physically would have identified the
documents that were responsive, printed them out from
your computer, and then handed that stack over to
somebody?
A: That's what I recall.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\NEA Deputy Director Testimony at 105.
The Deputy Director further elaborated on her role and the
role of other individuals within the State Department in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reviewing and identifying relevant documents:
A: I received a call from our Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary [Elizabeth Dibble] in NEA. It was
Columbus Day weekend. I recall it because I changed my
plans for the weekend very quickly as a result of her
request. And she noted that I believe it was a group in
H, was the Legislative Affairs Bureau, was reviewing
all of the--was preparing documents to be provided for,
I thought it was the ARB, and then whatever subsequent
use, presumably congressional review or whatever the
case may be. But I wasn't sure. They were going through
the documents for release, and she said could I join
the group the following day and look at, you know, kind
of looking whether we needed to redact any sensitive
information. That was my role to help in the release of
those documents, and she indicated that night, you
know, depending on how big of a task it is, could you
help me setting up a work flow like other officers from
NEA who could be involved in, you know, going through
and looking for sensitive information that we might
recommend for redaction.
Q: And you said, you recall that it was Columbus Day
weekend?
A: Or close to Columbus Day weekend, because I had
plans to see my brother that I cancelled.
* * *
It had started before that weekend, but DAS Dibble
learned of it, or she realized there wasn't an NEA
participant on that Saturday, so she called me and I
went in the following morning, yeah.
Q: And did you go any other days other than that
Saturday morning? Were you also there on Sunday? Did
you continue on Monday?
A: I went in on Sunday and Monday and then through that
first week, and then I helped develop a rotation
schedule for other colleagues from NEA to kind of make
sure we had an NEA colleague. There were colleagues
from DS and IRM. You know, other subject matter experts
were in the room as well, kind of looking and looking
at documents for I can't recall how long that lasted,
but I helped develop the work schedule.
* * *
I was primarily focused myself on redacting names and
titles of individuals who were private citizens, either
Libyan, American, U.N. staff, other internationals who
were in Libya doing work, because they were talking to
American diplomats. That's a sensitive thing that could
endanger people if that's generally known in some
circumstances. So that's primarily what I was
recommending redacting. And then I also recommended
redacting the names of junior people who were drafting
emails or cables as well.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\Id. at 101.
Mills' involvement in the process was described by Charlene
Lamb, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security. Lamb testified:
She [Mills]--it was my understanding, she was
responsible for getting all of the documents that were
being requested in--and compiled in, you know,
organizing the documents so they made sense, and making
sure nothing got left out.
Because Mills is not a security expert, she had a lot of
questions about security policies, procedures, you know, what
was routine, what was done under exigent circumstances. So
there were several DS [Diplomatic Security] people there, not
just myself, that were working to help bring all these
documents together and to answer questions that she had.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\Testimony of Charlene Lamb, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State for
Diplomatic Security, Int'l Programs, Tr. at 108 (Jan. 7, 2016)
[hereinafter Lamb Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
Mills told the Committee certain documents were set aside
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
for her specific review. As she told the Committee:
The documents I would see were documents where the team
had looked through them and thought that there was a
subset that I should see. Those typically meant that
they were sharing new information, new facts, or other
information that they thought was important for the
senior leadership to know.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\Mills Testimony at 182.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * *
I acknowledge I was pushing pretty hard for them to get
them out the door because our goal was to try to do
that.
Mills explained the ARB's access to these documents:
They [ARB] were looking at records already being
assembled in response to a request that had already
been posed to our department by Members of Congress, as
well as they had their own individual interviews that
they were conducting where they might ask for records
or materials that they felt would be relevant that they
came to have knowledge of.
* * *
Separate and apart from that, the ARB could both reach
to the Administration Bureau to be able to access any
of those records that were being collected, which would
have been records regarding anything related to the
night of September 11 and 12. And, they could also
initiate their own requests for documents.
They [the Administration or ``A'' Bureau] were the
actual repository and kept copies of everything and
they would only make copies to allow other individuals
to review them as opposed to disturb their copy set.
* * *
Their [ARB] mechanisms were threefold, if I really
think about it. One, obviously, they could reach out to
the A Bureau and say, we want to look at all of them or
we want to look at documents of this nature. Two, they
could make requests. Three, they would ask, as our
reviews were going on of records, were there any
records that were relevant that they should be either
looking at or that they would be at least apprised of.
And so that was another mechanism that they had. And so
those could be collected to them if that's what they
reached to ask for. They might have asked for that on a
particular subject matter; has anybody seen anything on
this topic or that topic?
But those were the three ways that they could get it,
with each of those being avenues for them to be able to
ascertain whatever information they believed they
needed, because people didn't have visibility into how
they were making those judgments.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\Mills Testimony at 142-147.
According to the State Department, the ARB reviewed more
than 7,000 documents numbering thousands of pages as part of
its investigation.\56\ Excluded from the ARB panel's review
were documents and emails sent to or by the Secretary or her
senior staff. As the Secretary told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\Letter from Thomas B. Gibbons, Acting Ass't Sec'y, Bureau of
Leg. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Hon. Darrell E. Issa, Chairman,
H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform (Aug. 23, 2013) (on file with the
Committee).
I don't know what they [the ARB] had access to. I know
that, during the time I was at the State Department,
there was certainly a great effort to respond to your
predecessor, Congressman Issa's inquiries. And many
thousands of pages of information was conveyed to the
Congress.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\Testimony of Hillary R. Clinton, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, Tr. at 321-322 (Oct. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Clinton Testimony]
(on file with the Committee).
The ARBs access to information from the Secretary and her
senior staff was extremely limited. The nearly 3,000 pages of
emails from the Secretary were made available only to the
Committee with productions occurring on February 13, 2015, June
25, 2015, and September 25, 2015--well after the conclusion of
the Benghazi ARB. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the ARB
had access to the more than 60,000 pages of senior leader
records produced separately to the Committee during its
investigation.\58\ This was further corroborated by Jacob
Sullivan, Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of Policy
Planning, who told the Committee:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\This number excludes the approximately 4,300 pages of documents
produced to the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q: Did you provide any documents to the ARB?
A: I don't think they asked me for any documents, so I
don't think I provided any.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\Sullivan Testimony at 82.
The State Department informed the Committee, Department
records for senior officials are stored separately.\60\ This
includes a separate email system, which until February 2015 did
not have archiving capability.\61\ Unless separate searches
were conducted by State Department personnel on these systems
and personnel saved their emails, senior leader emails and
records would not have been accessible by the ARB panel.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\April 10, 2015 meeting with the Director of the Office of
Executive Secretariat.
\61\Id.
\62\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subpoena for ARB documents
Like previous Congresses, the Committee sought access to
the underlying documents reviewed by the ARB to better
understand the ARB panel's review and findings. The documents
sought are required by law to be physically separated and
stored by the State Department and should be easily accessible
by the State Department.\63\ Congress issued its first subpoena
for documents reviewed by the ARB on August 1, 2013.\64\ No
documents were produced. On January 28, 2015, the Committee
reissued the subpoena for ARB documents.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\22 U.S.C. 4833(c) (the statute contemplates that ARB records
will become publically available following the conclusion of its work).
\64\August 1, 2013 subpoena to John F. Kerry, Secretary of State
seeking all documents provided by the Department of State to the
Accountability Review Board convened to examine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the September 11-12, 2012 attacks on U.S.
facilities in Benghazi, Libya and all documents and communications
referring or relating to ARB interviews or meetings, including but not
limited to notes or summaries prepared during and after any ARB
interview or meeting.
\65\See January 28, 2015 subpoena issued to John F. Kerry seeking:
1. G``all documents and communications produced by the Department of
State to the Accountability Review Board (``ARB'' or the ARB) convened
to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11-12,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012 attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi Libya.
2. GAll documents and communications referring or relating to the ARB
interviews or meetings, including but not limited to, notes or
summaries prepared during and after any ARB interview or meeting.''
Almost two and a half years after Congress issued its first
subpoena in 2013, the State Department for the first time
produced an ARB record--a four page interview summary for a
witness who was scheduled to appear before the Committee the
following day.\66\ The State Department maintained this posture
over the next several weeks with the production of one or two
ARB interview summaries, totaling 38 pages, each provided less
than a week before the Committee's interviews.\67\ It was not
until April 15, 2015, the State Department produced a larger
trove of ARB documents consisting of 1,758 pages. On April 24,
2015, the State Department produced another 2,523 pages of
documents. Accompanying the April 24, 2015, production was a
letter stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\Letter to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
from Julia E. Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State for Leg. Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State (Feb.13, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
\67\H. Select Comm. on Benghazi Internal Working Document (on file
with the Committee).
[t]his production, together with our production on
April 15, 2015, constitutes our delivery of ARB
documents that were physically set aside following the
ARB's completion and archived. In addition to these
materials, the Department searched for and included in
this production, as responsive to your subpoena's
second a request, a small number of interview summaries
that had not been stored within these physically set
aside files.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\Letter to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
from Julia E. Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State for Leg. Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State, (Apr. 24, 2015) (on file with the Committee).
Although the State Department produced 4,319 pages to the
Committee, previous statements by the State Department that the
ARB reviewed ``7,000 State Department documents numbering
thousands of pages'' suggest the Committee does not have all
the documents reviewed by the ARB.\69\ Moreover, the State
Department by its own admission withheld a number of documents
from the Committee. On April 24, 2015, the State Department
informed the Committee ``a small number of documents'' were
being withheld because of ``executive branch confidentiality
interests.''\70\ The State Department's basis for withholding
the documents was a concocted administrative privilege--one
made up entirely by the Administration and not recognized by
the Constitution.\71\ The State Department has yet to explain
the discrepancy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\Letter from Thomas B. Gibbons, Acting Ass't Sec'y, Leg.
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov't Reform (Aug. 23, 2013).
\70\Id.
\71\Letter to Trey Gowdy, Chairman, H. Select Comm. on Benghazi,
from Julia E. Frifield, Ass't Sec'y of State for Leg. Affairs, U.S.
Dep't of State, Apr. 24, 2015 (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Witness Interviews
The ARB interviewed more than 100 people.\72\ However,
neither the Secretary, nor her inner circle, were interviewed
by the ARB. Mullen offered this explanation:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Briefing on the
Accountability Review Board Report (Dec. 19, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202282.htm (``We interviewed more
than a hundred people, reviewed thousands of documents, and watched
hours of video. We spoke with people who were on the scene in Benghazi
that night, who were in Tripoli, who were in Washington. We talked to
military and intelligence officials, including to many State Department
personnel, and to experts who do not work for the United States
Government.'').
Q: And, there was no interview of Deputy Secretary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nides or Secretary Clinton?
A: There was not.
Q: And was there any discussion as to at what level the
interviews would not take place at? For example, was
there a common--excuse me, I'll start over. Was there a
decision by the board not to interview Mr. Nides?
A: There was early on a discussion, and certainly I had
a discussion, private discussion with Ambassador
Pickering about at least my expectation, and I would
say this was in the first couple weeks, that this
certainly could present the requirement that we would
have to interview everybody up the chain of command,
including the Secretary, and he agreed with that. So
the two of us had sort of set that premise in terms of
obviously depending on what we learned over time, and
our requirement to both affix both responsibility and
accountability per se were, again, based on the facts
as we understood them. So there was a consensus, and it
was a universal consensus over time that we did the
interviews we needed to do and that we didn't do the
interviews we didn't do, which would have included the
ones obviously that we didn't do, which were Nides and
Burns and Secretary.
* * *
Q: So it's fair to say the board decided it didn't need
to interview Cheryl Mills or the Secretary about events
that night?
A: No. And I think to your point about Ms. Mills and
the Secretary, it was really through the, both the
discussions with so many people that we interviewed and
the affirmation and the validation of what happened
that evening, including the conversation the Secretary
had with Mr. Hicks, that we just didn't, we didn't see
any need to clarify that, we knew that had happened. We
were comfortable in the case of Mr. Hicks that he was
walking us through what had happened. So there just
wasn't any further need to go anywhere else.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\Testimony of Admiral Michael Mullen, Vice Chairman,
Accountability Review Board, before the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee, Tr. at 26-28 (Jun. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Mullen
Testimony] (on file with the Committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior Staff Communications with the ARB Members
In addition to selecting members of the ARB and its staff,
identifying and reviewing documents, Mills played a peculiar
role during the ARB's investigation. Within days of the ARB's
start, Mullen reached out to Mills to express concerns about
Lamb's testimony before Congress.\74\ Mullen explained his
reasons for contacting Mills:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\Mills Testimony at 184.
Shortly after we interviewed Ms. Lamb, I initiated a
call to Ms. Mills to give her--what I wanted to give
her was a head's up because at this point she was on
the list to come over here to testify, and I was--so
from a department representation standpoint and as
someone that led a department, I always focused on
certainly trying to make sure the best witnesses were
going to appear before the department, and my reaction
at that point in time with Ms. Lamb at the interview
was--and it was a pretty unstable time. It was the
beginning, there was a lot of unknowns. To the best of
my knowledge, she hadn't appeared either ever or many
times certainly. So essentially I gave Ms. Mills a
head's up that I thought that her appearance could be a
very difficult appearance for the State Department, and
that was--about that was the extent of the
conversation.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\Id. at 23-24.
Mills did not recall the conversation about Lamb, telling
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Committee:
A: I don't recall it [the conversation with Admiral
Mullen], but I would have no reason to believe that he
wouldn't be accurate about that.
Q: Okay. He related that he told you that Charlene Lamb
was not going to be a good witness for the State
Department. Does that ring a bell with you?
A: No, because if I was aware of that, I might have
been thoughtful about that in all the ways of which--
how we could best communicate information. But I don't
dispute that. I'm sure that if that's his memory that
he would be accurately reflecting what he recalls.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\Id. at 173.
Weeks later, Mullen reached out again to Mills and the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary to discuss the ARB's work to date. Mullen explained:
So shortly after we met, first couple weeks there were
some there were some things that we could see early
that we thought it was important that the Secretary of
State know about, not so much in terms of what had
happened, but steps that we thought she might want to
take initially as opposed to wait weeks or months to
see the results of the board. So we put together a list
of--and I honestly can't remember the number, but
somewhere between 10 and 20 recommendations for her to
take a look at immediately. So, for example, one of
them clearly, because there was a fire issue, was
consider getting breathing apparatuses out to high
threat posts immediately. So there were things like
that, and we sent that list up, and to the best of my
knowledge, that's something that Ambassador Pickering
either handed, transmitted to Ms. Mills and the
Secretary.
At the end of the ARB we met with Secretary Clinton for
about 2 hours to give her a briefing on what we had
come across, and at least at that point, and we hadn't
finished or signed it out, but at least the major
recommendations that we had concluded up to that point.
The only other State Department employee that was in
the room with Secretary Clinton then was Ms. Mills.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\Mullen Testimony at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mills confirmed the meeting with Pickering and Mullen:
In the course of their investigation, we had one
briefing where they stepped through where they were in
their process--and, by that, the other person who was
briefed was the Secretary--that they stepped through
where they were in their process and that they
anticipated being on time and what their own
assessments were, but that they had not come to
conclusions yet about accountability. So this was
basically a briefing before they had stepped through
their accountability elements.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\Mills Testimony at 187-188.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Editing the Report
Mills also described Pickering and Mullen's outreach as
they were drafting their final report:
A: And then, as they were preparing their report, they
reached out to say, ``We have a draft of the report.''
They shared that draft with me. I shared back my
observations of instances where there were issues or
facts that I thought were relevant for their
consideration. They took them, or they didn't.
Ultimately, they had to make that judgement.
Q: So you reviewed the draft before it went public,
before it was released?
A: Well, the draft before it went to--ultimately, it
goes to the Secretary----
Q: Right.
A: --and then it actually gets--we made a determination
to release it. ARBs are not always released publicly,
but the Secretary had said she wanted to release this
one publicly.
Q: And can you tell me the extent of edits that you
and/or the Secretary made to the report?
A: The Secretary didn't. And the Secretary did not, at
least to my knowledge, review a draft.
Q: So Secretary Clinton didn't review it; you just
reviewed it.
A: I reviewed the draft. That's correct.
Q: All right. And were there--you said there was some
suggestions. So what were the edits, what were the
changes that you asked the ARB to make?
A: I can't tell you that were the different issues now,
because that's obviously too long away. But basically
what I stepped through was, if there was information
that we had that didn't seem to be reflected there, I
would flag that. If there were other reactions or
observations I had, I would share that. And that's what
I would have done.
Q: So I just want to be clear. First, you reviewed it.
Second, you said there are changes that need to be
made, and you gave those changes to the ARB. Is that
right?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Well, then tell me what's right.
A: Okay. I reviewed it, and I identified areas where I
either saw that there was, from my perspective, based
on where I was sitting, information that wasn't
present, information that might be different, or other
factors that I thought were relevant for their
consideration in deciding what went in the document.
And they then made their own judgement.
Q: Well, that sounds like changes.
A: I certainly----
Q: So you suggested changes?
A: I certainly made recommendations for places where I
thought there were inaccuracies or misstatements or
other information that might not be fully reflective of
what the information was that was there. I certainly
made those, yes.
A: You reviewed it, and you recommended changes. It was
up to them whether they implemented the changes or
included them in the----
A: Yes. Recommend changes or flagged areas where I
thought there might be inaccuracies.
Q: Change this, delete that, that kind of--that kind
of----
A: No.
Q: I just want to be clear.
A: Oh. Thank you.
Q: All right?
A: I appreciate that.
Q: You recommended changes. Then what happened? Did
they do it or not?
A: So some they took probably, and some they didn't. My
impression is that----
Q: Why is there a ``probably'' there? I mean, the final
report--you didn't look at the final report? The
Secretary looked at it.
A: I did look at the final report, but what I didn't
have is an errata sheet and say, ``Oh, that's not
there. Oh, this is there.'' I didn't do that, so that's
why I don't have a frame of reference.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\Id. at 187-191.
Mills' peculiar role in the ARB investigation extended
beyond the selection of members to approving senior State
Department officials meeting with the ARB. On November 3, 2012,
Thomas Nides, Deputy Secretary of State, sought approval from
Mills for the ARB's request to meet with him. On November 3,
2012, Nides wrote Mills ``I assume this is a y.''\80\ Mills
responded ``Y''.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\Email from Thomas Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State for Management
and Resources, U.S. Dep't of State, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff,
U.S. Dep't of State (Nov. 3, 2012 12:26 PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0058538).
\81\Email from Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Thomas Nides, Deputy Sec'y of State for Management and
Resources, U.S. Dep't of State (Nov. 3, 2012 1:10 PM) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0058537).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accountability of State Department Personnel
Among the 29 recommendations made to the State Department,
the ARB found:
Systematic failures and leadership and management
deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of the
State Department (``the Department'') resulted in a
Special Mission security posture that was inadequate
for Benghazi and grossly inadequate to deal with the
attack that took place.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\Unclassified Benghazi Accountability Review Board, U.S. Dep't
of State [hereinafter Unclassified ARB].
The ARB identified one official from the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs and three officials from the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security at fault for Benghazi security failures.
Notwithstanding their finding of inferior performance in these
two bureaus, the ARB ``did not find reasonable cause to
determine that any individual U.S. government employee breached
his or her duty,''\83\ the performance standard set out in law.
A breach of duty must rise to ``willful misconduct or knowingly
ignor[ing] his or her responsibilities.''\84\ The Board noted
that poor performance does not ordinarily constitute a breach
of duty that would serve as a basis for disciplinary action but
is instead addressed through the performance management
system.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\See Finding # 5, id., at 7; see also Classified Accountability
Review Board, U.S. Dep't of State, at 10 [hereinafter Classified ARB].
\84\See Statement of Admiral Mullen, U.S. Dep't of State, Briefing
on the Accountability Review Board Report (Dec. 19, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202282.htm; see also Statement of
Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Dep't of State, Briefing on the
Accountability Review Board Report (Dec. 19, 2012), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/202282.htm.
\85\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mills shared with the Committee her reaction upon learning
of the ARB's findings on personnel:
What I do recall is that they had made determinations
around personnel, and I recall one of them being
surprising to me, and I told her [the Secretary] that I
was surprised that they had made a conclusion about one
particular individual.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\Mills Testimony at 192.
Emails between Burns and Mills suggest others were
surprised by the ARB's finding with regard to personnel. On
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 18, 2012, Burns wrote to Mills:
Hi,
Went down to talk to Eric this evening but missed him.
Sent him note, and will follow up tomorrow. Also had
long talk with Pat. He's coping, but as you well know
its not easy.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\Email from William Burns, Deputy Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S. Dep't of
State (Dec. 18, 2012, 7:26 PM) (Subject: Fw: DS) (on file with the
Committee, SCB0045827).
Emails between Kennedy and Mills indicate discussions were
underway to reassign staff as an eventual, or perhaps even
preventative, response to the ARB's finding. On December 13,
2012, five days before the ARB report was released, Kennedy
proposed to Mills a staffing change dealing with three of the
four individuals ultimately named in the ARB, all of whom were
under Kennedy's supervision. His plan called for placing two
individuals identified by the ARB with the Office of Foreign
Missions. The third individual under Kennedy's supervision
would have been responsible for security at non-high threat
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
posts. Unsure of the plan, Kennedy wrote:
Cheryl
As we discussed, I'm sending along my first-cut on
staffing
Still playing with it
But think its worth a gut check
Regards
Pat\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\Email from Patrick F. Kennedy, Under Sec'y for Management, U.S.
Dep't of State, to Cheryl D. Mills, Chief of Staff and Counselor, U.S.
Dep't of State (Dec. 13, 2012,10:12 AM) (on file with the Committee,
SCB100920).
Notwithstanding Kennedy's proposal, all four individuals
were placed on administrative leave and eventually reinstated
within the State Department. Lamb described her experience to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Committee:
A: We were put on four State Department employees were
put on administrative leave for a short period of time.
Q: Right. With pay or without pay?
A: With pay.
Q: And was there any due process for you to go through
to what was the due process measures? They come to you
State Department comes to you and says, you're going to
be suspended on administrative leave not suspended on
administrative leave for 4 weeks. Was there some kind
of due process rights that you had when that was first
given to you?
A: I was not given any guidance.
Q: They didn't tell you had any way to appeal that or
anything?
A: No.
Q: Okay. And who told you that? Who told you that you
were going to be suspended? Or you were going you were
going to be on a 4 week administrative leave?
A: Eric Boswell.
Q: All right. And when he told you that, he didn't say
there's tell me how he gave it to you, he told you that
information.
A: He called me and Scott Bultrowicz in, and he said
that we were to be out of the building by the end of
the business day, and that we were on administrative
leave.
Q: And did you ask him what was your response? I think
I would say, really? Can I talk to anyone? Can I give
my side of the story or
A: No, I Scott and I have been around DS a long time.
And, I mean, we've seen this process, and we knew that
there were administrative things that people were
looking into, and we just said, yes, and did as we were
told.
Q: And then how were you notified that you were you
were when you could come back? Did you know right ahead
that today you are going to leave and you can come back
to a date in the future? What did they tell you?
A: We were sent a letter telling us when to report back
to duty.
Q: Okay.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\Lamb Testimony at 106-107.
While the ARB's findings of accountability extended to
three individuals within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the
findings were limited. The ARB correctly assessed the State
Department's inadequate security posture at the Benghazi
Mission both in terms of its physical security as well as the
lack of security staffing. However, the ARB failed to
distinguish between responsibility for security staffing and
responsibility for physical security. This confusion is
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
reflected in the Chairman of the ARB's testimony:
Q: So the decisions about additional physical security,
who were those made by?
A: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
* * *
Q: How high up did they go?
A: To Assistant Secretary Boswell principally, but to
[Deputy Assistant Secretary] Charlene Lamb in fact.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\Ambassador Thomas Pickering Testimony at 153.
Contrary to the Chairman of the ARB's understanding,
responsibility for the physical security of the Benghazi
Mission did not fall within the Office of International
Programs but within the Office of Countermeasures and the
relevant offices under its purview.
Moreover, the decisions to exclude the Benghazi Mission
from the physical security rules were generally made at the
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and Under
Secretary for Management levels. The Benghazi ARB described
``the flawed process by which Special Mission Benghazi's
extension until the end of December 2012 was approved,''
determining it was ``a decision that did not take security
considerations adequately into account.''\91\ Yet, the ARB
failed to ascribe responsibility to those who drafted and
approved the Benghazi Mission's 12 month extension.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\Unclassified ARB, supra note 81, at 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Benghazi ARB's failure to recognize deficiencies at the
highest levels of the State Department's leadership is curious.
As stated above, the State Department has been told repeatedly
by past ARBs that change is needed both in its culture and with
respect to security. Following two of the most significant
terrorist attacks in State Department history, the Nairobi and
Dar es Salaam embassy bombings in 1998, the ARB described steps
the State Department should take to bolster the security of
facilities abroad; chief among them, the application of the
security rules at U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad. The State
Department rejected these past ARB recommendations and excluded
the Benghazi Mission from the security rules.
Furthermore, it is ironic that in the summer of 2009 the
State Department conducted a Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review, which was intended to be a ``sweeping
review of diplomacy and development, the core missions of the
State Department and USAID.''\92\ The report came out in
December 2010 and was lauded as a ``sweeping assessment of how
the Department of State'' could ``become more efficient,
accountable, and effective in a world in which rising powers,
growing instability, and technological transformation create
new threats, but also new opportunities.''\93\ The report
cautioned that the State Department must change in order to:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\See U.S. Dep't of State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review Fact Sheet, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
153109.pdf.
\93\Leading Through Civilian Power, Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review, U.S. Dep't of State, at 72 (2010).
[I]nstitute procedures to integrate security and risk
management into every stage of policy and operational
planning in Washington and the field. Including
security considerations in the design and development
of policy and programs from the outset will make it
easier to find effective ways to mitigate risk. We will
also ensure Diplomatic Security Regional Directors are
more actively and regularly involved in regional
bureaus' policy development so there is a shared
understanding between those responsible for ensuring
security and those responsible for developing and
implementing policy.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\Id.
Yet the State Department maintained the status quo and
rejected the findings of this report. In fact, every ARB review
has concluded that the State Department needs a significant
change in its culture and organizational structure to improve
security. Lasting and significant change must be directed from
the top.
House Armed Services Committee Majority Interim Report:
Benghazi Investigation Update
Between September 2012 and April 2014, the House Armed
Services Committee conducted its own review of the events
surrounding the September 11-12, 2012, terrorist attacks,
including the days leading up to and following the attacks.
Specifically, the Armed Services Committee looked at the
military's role: ``the response of the Department of Defense'',
``what preparations the U.S. military had made for the
possibility of an attack'', and ``what arrangements have
subsequently been put in place to minimize the possibility of a
similar occurrence.''\95\ In February 2014, the Armed Services
Committee issued a ``Majority Interim Report: Benghazi
Investigation Update'' outlining its findings to date. At the
time of its interim report, the Armed Services Committee had
conducted seven classified briefings, two public hearings and
one transcribed witness interview. Based on the information
obtained, it issued six findings in its February 2014 report:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\House Armed Services Committee, Majority Interim Report:
Benghazi Investigation Update, at 3 (Feb. 2014) (on file with the
Committee).
1. LIn assessing military posture in anticipation of the
September 11, 2012 anniversary, White House officials failed to
comprehend or ignored the dramatically deteriorating security
situation in Libya and the growing threat to U.S. interests in
the region. Official public statements seem to have exaggerated
the extent and rigor of the security assessment conducted at
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the time.
2. LU.S. personnel in Benghazi were woefully vulnerable in
September 2012 because a.) the administration did not direct a
change in military force posture, b.) there was no intelligence
of a specific ``imminent'' threat in Libya, and c.) the
Department of State, which has primary responsibility for
diplomatic security, favored a reduction of Department of
Defense security personnel in Libya before the attack.
3. LDefense Department officials believed nearly from the
outset of violence in Benghazi that it was a terrorist attack
rather than a protest gone awry, and the President subsequently
permitted the military to respond with minimal direction.
4. LThe U.S. military's response to the Benghazi attack was
severely degraded because of the location and readiness posture
of U.S. forces, and because of lack of clarity about how the
terrorist action was unfolding. However, given the uncertainty
about the prospective length and scope of the attack, military
commanders did not take all possible steps to prepare for a
more extended operation.
5. LThere was no ``stand down'' order issued to U.S.
military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in
Benghazi. However, because official reviews after the attack
were not sufficiently comprehensive, there was confusion about
the roles and responsibilities of these individuals.
6. LThe Department of Defense is working to correct many
weaknesses revealed by the Benghazi attack, but the global
security situation is still deteriorating and military
resources continue to decline.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCOPE LIMITATIONS: MAJORITY INTERIM REPORT
Notwithstanding its findings, the Armed Services Committee
acknowledged at the outset the limitations of its report
stating ``This report should be considered one component of
continuing comprehensive Benghazi related oversight underway in
the House of Representatives.''\97\ Moreover, the Armed
Services Committee recognized the scope of its review of the
terrorist attacks was limited, stating, ``[i]n keeping with the
committee's jurisdiction, however, this document addresses only
the activities and actions of personnel in DOD.''\98\ Finally,
the report acknowledged ``the committee's inquiry continues'',
``staff . . . [will] interview additional witnesses in coming
weeks, including individuals who were involved in responding to
the Benghazi events and other officials. Some individuals who
have already provided information will appear for further
questioning and clarification.''\99\ The Armed Services
Committee conducted eight transcribed interviews after
releasing the interim report.\100\ The last transcribed
interview occurred in April 2014, one month prior to the Select
Committee's formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\Id. at 1.
\98\Id.
\99\Id. at 4.
\100\Committee on Armed Services: Benghazi Materials, p. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTENT LIMITATIONS: MAJORITY INTERIM REPORT
The value of information obtained was necessarily limited.
Public hearings and briefings typically do not lend themselves
to uncovering new facts or witnesses. The Defense Department
was positioned to influence the content of information
presented in these settings. As a result, the Armed Services
Committee was limited in its understanding of the policies and
procedures that contributed to the military's posture prior to
and its response during the September 11-12, 2012, attacks.
For example, the Armed Services Committee had not conducted
transcribed interviews of the top military officials prior to
its 2014 report to understand the discrepancies in the
discussions that took place during the September 10, 2012,
meeting with the White House regarding the nation's
preparedness and security posture on September 11, 2012.\101\
It did not interview Secretary Panetta to discuss his December
2011 trip to Libya, his understanding of the Benghazi Mission
compound, and his role in the military's response--specially
why only one asset made it to Libya more than 24 hours after
his verbal order to deploy the Commander's in Extremis Force,
special operations forces located in the United States, and two
Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams including one to Benghazi
and one to Tripoli.\102\ Further, it did not interview many
military personnel on the ground at the installations and
intermediate staging bases in Europe to understand the orders
given and status of assets on September 11-12, 2012. Finally,
the Armed Services Committee did not have access to other
agency documents referencing military discussions that could
shed light on issues relating to military planning and
operations prior to and during the attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\Id. at 7.
\102\Id. at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Broadly speaking, the Armed Services Committee
predominantly confined its inquiry to whether the military had
assets close enough to have ``made a difference'' in Benghazi.
Further, it did not have access to new information with respect
to assets potentially available outside of then-established
military planning for such contingencies. Nowhere does the
Armed Service Committee's report consider: Was Benghazi ever
part of the military's response? Why did it take the military
so long to get to Tripoli? What assets received orders to
deploy? Why did it take so long to put U.S. forces into motion?
And, most basically, whether it is accurate to state no assets
could have arrived in time for the second fatal attack on the
annex?
SELECT COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION
The Select Committee sought to answer these and other
important questions based on all the evidence presented not
just the facts as presented by Defense Department. At the
Select Committee's insistence, it conducted 24 interviews, 16
of whom had never been interviewed. The Select Committee also
received approximately 900 pages of documents never before
produced to Congress. The Select Committee's insistence on
additional information was met with opposition from the Defense
Department, a department seemingly more used to dictating the
terms of congressional oversight. From the perspective of the
Defense Department, the Select Committee should have been
satisfied with the witnesses and documents it provided. For
example, the Defense Department chided the Committee for
wanting to speak to a low-level service member that may have
evidence contradicting the Department's version of events. In
the Department's view, however, ``locating these types of
individuals are [sic] not necessary since such claims are
easily dismissed by any one of the multiple high-level military
officers already interviewed.'' The Select Committee, however,
was not in the business of accepting the word of anyone single
person, ``high-level military officers'' or otherwise. The
Select Committee was interested in finding and confirming facts
wherever those facts emerged to understanding the truth about
the military's role on the night of September 11-12, 2012.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Chairman's Report
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
released its report to the public on November 21, 2014. The
report was limited in scope, its focus narrowly aimed at
reviewing the performance of the Intelligence Community related
to the deaths of four Americans in Benghazi on September 11,
2012. The Select Committee, having the benefit of time, breadth
of inquiry and resources has identified facts that contradict a
key, overly broad conclusion contained in the Chairman's
report. Namely, the Chairman's report asserted that there was
``no evidence of an intelligence failure.''
The Select Committee received testimony from two senior
Obama Administration officials who stated that in their view an
``intelligence failure'' had taken place with respect to
Benghazi.
Further, the Select Committee received testimony with
respect to not one, but two, important analytical tradecraft
irregularities that career line analysts uniformly described as
significant and gave rise to important concerns. Both directly
impacted significant analysis with respect to Benghazi,
including an assessment given to the President of the United
States. This too was a significant intelligence failure.
The Intelligence Committee interviewed less than one-third
of the CIA personnel on the ground that night in Benghazi--two-
thirds of whom held the exact same position. It did not
interview key witnesses who would have helped it better
understand the overall CIA mission in Benghazi and its response
to the attacks, including analytical issues in the wake of the
attacks. The Intelligence Committee did not interview any of
the CIA analysts at headquarters. The Select Committee's
interviews with these analysts allowed it to draw conclusions
about the errors of the products produced by the analysts
involved in drafting.
Finally, the Chairman's report draws several conclusions
about the analytical assessments done by the CIA. As described
previously in this report, the Select Committee received
testimony with respect to two separate serious analytical
tradecraft incidents with respect to Benghazi: sloppy
analytical work gave rise to key fallacies of the
Administration's talking points with respect to the attack, and
another incident where the President's briefer substituted her
own personal assessment for the properly coordinated and vetted
work of line analysts in the President's Daily Brief.
In short, the Select Committee has had access to and
received evidence from numerous witnesses and documents that
the Intelligence Committee never obtained. It has had the time
and resources to inquire into the intelligence efforts before,
during and after the attacks in Benghazi. This Committee
believes this report provides a truly thorough review of the
intelligence community's performance related to the attacks.
APPENDIX L:
Biographies of Glen A. Doherty,
Sean P. Smith, J. Christopher Stevens,
and Tyrone S. Woods
Glen A. Doherty
Glen Doherty (born 1970) was a personal security specialist
serving in Libya. He was raised in Massachusetts and joined the
Navy SEALS in 1995 and became a paramedic and sniper
specializing in the Middle East. He responded to the attack on
the USS Cole in 2000 and served two tours in Iraq. After a
decorated Navy career, Mr. Doherty worked as a private security
contractor in a number of countries, including Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Yemen.
Sean P. Smith
Sean Patrick Smith (born 1978) was an Information
Management Officer with the United States Foreign Service. He
lived in The Hague, Netherlands and was on temporary duty to
Benghazi in September 2012.
Smith previously served in the Air Force, where he spent
six years as a ground radio maintenance specialist, including a
deployment to Oman. Smith was awarded the Air Force
Commendation Medal.
Smith was an only child and grew up in San Diego. As a
Foreign Service employee, he lived in The Hague, Netherlands,
with his wife and two children.
He was posthumously awarded the Thomas Jefferson Star for
Foreign Service on May 3, 2013.
J. Christopher Stevens
Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens (born 1960) served as
U.S. Ambassador to Libya from May 2012 to September 2012. He
had previously served in Libya as the Deputy Chief of Mission
from 2007 to 2009 and as the Special Representative to the
Libyan Transitional National Council from March 2011 to
November 2011. Stevens also served overseas in Jerusalem,
Cairo, and Riyadh.
While in Washington, Stevens served as Director of the
Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs; Pearson
Fellow with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; special
assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs; Iran
desk officer; and staff assistant in the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs.
Prior to joining the Foreign Service in 1991, Ambassador
Stevens was an international trade lawyer in Washington, DC.
From 1983 to 1985 he taught English as a Peace Corps volunteer
in Morocco.
He was born and raised in northern California. He earned
his undergraduate degree at the University of California at
Berkeley in 1982, a J.D. from the University of California's
Hastings College of Law in 1989, and an M.S. from the National
War College in 2010. He spoke Arabic and French.
Tyrone S. Woods
Tyrone Woods (born 1971) was a personal security specialist
in Libya. He was a highly decorated Navy SEAL for almost twenty
years, serving in various locations, including Iraq. After his
retirement in 2010, he protected U.S. facilities around the
world.
Woods was raised in Portland, Oregon, and was an avid
runner, surfer, and car enthusiast in addition to being a
registered nurse and certified paramedic. He is survived by his
wife and three sons.
MINORITY VIEWS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]