[Senate Report 113-120]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       Calendar No. 244
113th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                    113-120

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014

                                _______
                                

               November 13, 2013.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

      Mrs. Feinstein, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 1681]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 1681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
year 2014 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government and the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    On June 27, 2013, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
111-259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly 
disclosed that the President's aggregate request for the 
National Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2014 is 
$52.2 billion. Other than for limited unclassified 
appropriations, primarily the Intelligence Community Management 
Account, the classified nature of United States intelligence 
activities precludes any further disclosure, including by the 
Committee, of the details of its budgetary recommendations. 
Accordingly, the Committee has prepared a classified annex to 
this report that contains a classified Schedule of 
Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status 
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for 
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2014 that is being reported by the Committee.

              Title I--Budget and Personnel Authorizations


Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for Fiscal Year 2014.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2014 are contained in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the 
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
Representatives and to the President.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility 
to the DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the 
Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103(a) provides that the 
DNI may authorize employment of civilian personnel in Fiscal 
Year 2014 in excess of the number of authorized positions by an 
amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit 
applicable to each IC element under Section 102. The DNI may do 
so only if necessary to the performance of important 
intelligence functions.
    Section 103(b) requires the DNI to establish guidelines 
that would ensure a uniform and accurate method of counting 
certain personnel under a system of personnel levels. The DNI 
has issued such a policy. Subsection (b) confirms in statute 
the obligation of the DNI to establish these guidelines.
    Section 103(c) provides that the DNI must report the 
decision to allow an IC element to exceed the personnel ceiling 
in advance to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the 
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA 
for Fiscal Year 2014.
    Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $568,736,000 
for Fiscal Year 2014 for the activities of the ICMA. Subsection 
(b) authorizes 855 positions for elements within the ICMA for 
Fiscal Year 2014 and provides that such personnel may be 
permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) or detailed from other elements of the 
United States Government.
    Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and 
positions for the classified Community Management Account as 
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and 
permits the funding for advanced research and development to 
remain available through September 30, 2015.

 Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System


Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2014 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability Fund.

Section 202. CIARDS and FERS special retirement credit for service on 
        detail to another agency

    Section 202 amends the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement Act to clarify that ``qualifying service'' for 
purposes of obtaining certain enhanced retirement benefits 
available to CIA employees who carry out duties abroad that are 
hazardous to life or health or involve specialized skills 
includes service while on detail to another government agency.
    CIA recently informed the Committee that a number of Agency 
employees on detail to other intelligence agencies who 
otherwise qualify for enhanced retirement benefits, and had 
been advised by prior CIA leadership that they were entitled to 
those additional benefits, would be denied the enhanced 
benefits because the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act 
does not extend such benefits to CIA employees on detail to 
another intelligence agency. Section 202 corrects this inequity 
by clarifying that ``qualifying service'' includes service on 
detail to another agency.

           Title III--General Intelligence Community Matters


                      SUBTITLE A--GENERAL MATTERS

Section 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 301 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 302 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 303. OPEN FOIA protections

    Section 303 amends Section 103H of the National Security 
Act, the organic statute for the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, to provide that the identity of an 
individual who makes a complaint or provides information may be 
withheld in response to a request under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). Under FOIA, information may be withheld 
in response to a FOIA request pursuant to a statute that 
requires that matters be withheld from the public in such a 
manner as to leave no discretion, or establishes criteria for 
withholding information or referring to particular types of 
matters to be withheld and specifically cites to FOIA. The OPEN 
FOIA Act of 2009 (PL 111-83, sec. 564, October 28, 2009) 
requires that a statute providing an exemption from disclosure 
under FOIA, if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN 
FOIA Act of 2009, must specifically cite Section 552(b)(3) of 
Title 5, United States Code. The organic statute for the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (PL 111-259, 
sec. 405) was enacted at a later date, October 7, 2010. 
Accordingly, while Title 5 Inspectors General may exercise this 
authority without a reference to Section 552(b)(3), the OPEN 
FOIA Act requires that the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community's statute have a specific reference to 
Section 552(b)(3), as amended by the OPEN FOIA Act, to be 
operative. Section 303 provides the necessary reference.

Section 304. Functional managers

    Section 304(a) codifies in statute the existing 
requirement, under Section 1.3 of Executive order 12333, to 
designate functional managers for signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and geospatial 
intelligence (GEOINT), and other intelligence disciplines. At 
present, the functional managers for SIGINT, HUMINT, and GEOINT 
are the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), the 
Director of the CIA, and the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), respectively. In 
addition, Section 304(a) gives responsibility for designating 
functional managers to the President. Under Executive order 
12333, the functional managers are designated by the DNI.
    Section 304(b) codifies the existing responsibilities of 
the functional managers to act as the principal adviser to the 
DNI for their respective intelligence function. Section 304(b) 
also specifies that the functional managers shall act in the 
same capacity for the Secretary of Defense.
    Section 304(c) establishes a new requirement for each 
functional manager to report to Congress annually on the state 
of their function, scheduled to occur no later than two weeks 
after the President's budget submission. The reporting 
requirement calls on each functional manager to identify those 
programs, projects, and activities that comprise the 
intelligence discipline for which they are responsible 
(regardless of the funding source) and to report on resource 
issues and other matters relevant to the state of the function.

Section 305. Auditability

    Section 305 requires the ODNI, CIA, Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), NGA, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and 
NSA to undergo full financial audits conducted by internal or 
external independent accounting or auditing organizations 
beginning with each agency's Fiscal Year 2014 financial 
statements. In addition, each of the aforementioned agencies is 
required to obtain an unqualified opinion not later than the 
audit of their Fiscal Year 2016 financial statements. The chief 
financial executive of each of the aforementioned agencies is 
required to provide to the congressional intelligence 
committees an annual report of each audit conducted.

Section 306. Software licensing

    Section 305 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2013 required the chief information officers of 
each element of the IC to conduct an inventory of software 
licenses held by such element, including both utilized and 
unutilized licenses. Section 305 also required that the Chief 
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community (CIO) report 
those inventories to the congressional intelligence committees 
within 180 days of enactment of the Fiscal Year 2013 Act. The 
Committee received that report on August 22, 2013.
    Section 306(a) builds upon Section 305 of the Fiscal Year 
2013 Act by requiring that every two years the chief 
information officers of each element of the IC: (1) conduct an 
inventory of software licenses held by such element, including 
both utilized and unutilized licenses held by the element, and 
(2) assess the actions that could be carried out by such 
element to achieve the greatest possible economies of scale and 
associated cost savings in software procurement and usage. 
Section 306(a) also specifies that the initial inventories and 
assessments shall be based on the inventories that were 
required under Section 305 of the Fiscal Year 2013 Act.
    Section 306(b) provides that, not later than 180 days after 
enactment, and every two years thereafter, the CIO shall 
compile an inventory of all existing software licenses of the 
IC and assess actions that could be carried out by the IC to 
achieve the greatest possible economies of scale and associated 
cost savings in software procurement and usage.
    Section 306(c) requires that the CIO submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a copy of each inventory 
compiled under Section 306(b).

Section 307. Public Interest Declassification Board

    Section 307 extends the current authorization for the 
Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) from December 31, 
2014 until December 31, 2018. The PIDB was created in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 to promote 
public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary 
record of significant United States national security decisions 
and activities.

Section 308. Reports of fraud, waste, and abuse

    Section 308 amends Section 8H of the Inspector General Act 
of 1978, as amended, to expressly permit IC employees and 
contractors who intend to report a complaint or information 
with respect to an urgent concern to Congress to first report 
those complaints or urgent concerns to their respective agency 
Inspector General as well as the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community.

              SUBTITLE B--TARGETED LETHAL FORCE OVERSIGHT

Section 311. Targeted lethal force oversight reform

    Section 311 requires that the head of an element of the IC 
notify the DNI upon a determination that a particular, known 
United States person is knowingly engaged in acts of 
international terrorism against the United States, such that 
the United States Government is considering the legality or the 
use of targeted lethal force against that United States person. 
Not later than 15 days after the date the DNI receives such a 
notification from the head of an element, the DNI is required 
to complete an independent alternative analysis of the 
determination made by the head of the notifying element. In 
addition, the DNI is required to report, as soon as 
practicable, to the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community and the congressional intelligence committees.
    Section 311 also requires that the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community conduct an annual review of IC 
compliance with all appropriate policies and procedures related 
to consideration of the use of targeted lethal force against 
particular, known United States persons and to report the 
findings to the DNI and the congressional intelligence 
committees.
    Section 311 does not prohibit a department or agency of the 
United States Government from using targeted lethal force 
against a United States person pending notification of the DNI 
or completion of the independent alternative analysis. This 
section is intended to require independent alternative analysis 
of the analytic judgments made by IC elements in support of a 
determination to use targeted lethal force against a United 
States person. It is not intended to require independent 
alternative analysis of the determination to use such force or 
the legality of such use by a department or agency of the 
United States Government.

Section 312. Unclassified annual report on the use of targeted lethal 
        force outside the United States

    Section 312 requires that the President prepare and make 
public an annual report that sets forth the total number of 
combatants and noncombatant civilians killed or injured during 
the preceding year by the use of targeted lethal force outside 
the United States by remotely piloted aircraft. The reporting 
requirement under this section does not apply to any use of 
targeted lethal force in Afghanistan prior to the end of combat 
operations by the United States or to any use of targeted 
lethal force pursuant to a declaration of war or authorization 
for the use of military force, where such declaration or 
authorization is issued after the date of enactment of this 
section. This section requires the President to make public 
aggregate annual figures for combatants and noncombatant 
civilians killed or injured by the use of targeted lethal 
force, regardless of whether such deaths or injuries are 
intended or unintended. It does not require the President to 
report specific information concerning individual uses of force 
or the entity responsible for such uses.

                         SUBTITLE C--REPORTING

Section 321. Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel concerning 
        intelligence activities

    Section 321(a) requires that the Attorney General provide 
the congressional intelligence committees a listing of every 
opinion of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department 
of Justice that has been provided to an element of the IC, 
whether classified or unclassified.
    Section 321(b) provides an exception to the listing 
requirement in Section 321(a) when the President determines 
that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding 
under Section 503(c)(2) of the National Security Act. In such 
cases, the President may limit access to information concerning 
such a finding that is subject to disclosure under Subsection 
(a) to those members of Congress who have been granted access 
to the relevant finding.
    Section 321(c) provides a second exception to the 
disclosure requirements in Section 321(a) where the President 
determines that information subject to disclosure under 
Subsection (a) is subject to Executive privilege. In such 
cases, the Attorney General must notify the congressional 
intelligence committees, in writing, of the legal justification 
for the assertion of the privilege prior to the date by which 
the opinion or listing is required to be disclosed.
    The Committee regularly conducts oversight of intelligence 
activities that are the subject of one or more OLC legal 
opinions. These opinions often represent the best and most 
comprehensive expression of the legal basis for the 
intelligence activities that the Committee oversees. The 
Committee regards access to these legal opinions as necessary 
to the performance of its oversight functions and often 
requests access to such opinions, or the legal analysis 
contained in such opinions, when the Committee is made aware of 
their existence.
    While the Committee generally is kept apprised of the legal 
basis for U.S. intelligence activities, as required by Sections 
502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947, neither the 
Department nor the IC routinely advises the Committee of the 
existence of OLC opinions that are relevant to the Committee's 
oversight functions. This presents an impediment to the 
Committee's oversight function, as the Committee cannot request 
access to legal analysis when it is not made aware that such 
analysis exists. Section 321 would ensure that the Committee is 
aware of the existence of relevant OLC opinions so that it can 
obtain access to the legal analysis set forth in these opinions 
through a process of accommodation with the Executive branch.
    The Committee recognizes that, in certain limited cases, 
the fact that an OLC opinion exists may be entitled to 
Executive privilege or may reveal information concerning 
certain compartmented covert action programs. Therefore, 
Subsections 321(b) and (c) provide exceptions for such cases.

Section 322. Submittal to Congress by heads of elements of intelligence 
        community of plans for orderly shutdown in event of absence of 
        appropriations

    Section 322 requires the head of each element of the IC, 
upon submission of a plan pertaining to agency operations in 
the absence of appropriations to the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, to submit a copy of such plan to the 
congressional committees of jurisdiction in a manner consistent 
with security handling requirements. During the most recent 
government shutdown, such plans pertaining to elements of the 
IC were neither publicly available because of classification 
constraints, nor readily provided to the Committee.

Section 323. Reports on chemical weapons in Syria

    Section 323 directs the DNI to submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees, within 30 days, a report on the 
Syrian chemical weapons program containing specific elements as 
described in Subsection 323(b). In addition, Section 323 
requires the DNI to provide the appropriate congressional 
committees with progress reports every 90 days that include any 
material updates on the Syrian chemical weapons program.

Section 324. Reports to the Intelligence Community on penetrations of 
        networks and information systems of certain contractors

    Section 324 directs the DNI to establish procedures that 
require cleared intelligence contractors to notify the 
government of any successful unauthorized penetration of the 
contractor's network or information systems and to provide the 
government with access to such systems in order to perform 
forensic analysis in the event of such a penetration.

Section 325. Repeal or modification of certain reporting requirements

    Congress frequently requests information from the IC in the 
form of reports, the contents of which are specifically defined 
by statute. The reports prepared pursuant to these statutory 
requirements provide Congress with an invaluable source of 
information about specific matters of concern.
    The Committee recognizes, however, that congressional 
reporting requirements, and particularly recurring reporting 
requirements, can place a significant burden on the resources 
of the IC. The Committee reconsiders these reporting 
requirements on a periodic basis to ensure that the reports 
that have been requested are the best mechanism for the 
Congress to receive the information it seeks. In some cases, 
annual reports can be replaced with briefings or notifications 
that provide the Congress with more timely information and 
offer the IC a direct line of communication to respond to 
congressional concerns.
    In response to a request from the DNI, the Committee 
examined a set of recurring reporting requirements nominated by 
the IC, including those which arise from legislation reported 
or managed by committees other than the congressional 
intelligence committees. Section 325 eliminates three reports 
that were burdensome to the IC when the information in the 
reports could be obtained through other means or was no longer 
considered relevant to current concerns. Section 325 also 
modifies four reports to replace requirements for annual 
reports with notification requirements, sunsets a report one 
year earlier, and changes the periodicity of a report from a 
quarterly basis to a semiannual basis.

  Title IV--Matters Relating to Elements of the Intelligence Community


                  SUBTITLE A--NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

Section 401. Appointment of the Director of the National Security 
        Agency

    Section 401 amends the National Security Agency Act of 1959 
to provide that the Director of the NSA shall be appointed by 
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Under present law and practice, the President appoints the 
Director of the NSA. The appointment has been indirectly 
subject to confirmation through Senate confirmation of the 
military officers who have been promoted into the position. 
Section 401 will make explicit that the filling of this key 
position in the Intelligence Community should be subject to 
Senate confirmation.
    The Committee has had a long-standing interest in ensuring 
Senate confirmation of the Director of the NSA, and this 
requirement has previously been supported by the Senate. The 
Committee renews the requirement for Senate confirmation of the 
Director of NSA in this Act in light of NSA's critical role in 
the national intelligence mission, particularly with respect to 
activities that may raise privacy concerns.
    Through advice and consent, the Senate can enable the 
Congress to fulfill more completely its responsibility for 
providing oversight of the intelligence activities of the 
United States Government and ensure that the NSA's 
responsibilities and foreign intelligence activities receive 
appropriate attention.
    Section 401 does not alter the role of the Committee on 
Armed Services of the Senate in reviewing and approving the 
promotion or assignment of military officers. The Committee 
intends to approve a separate Senate Resolution that would 
dictate the roles of the Committee and the Armed Services 
Committee in considering the nomination of a new Director of 
the NSA, with the order of the committees' actions to be 
determined by whether the nominee is a military officer.
    Finally, the section makes clear that the requirement for 
Senate confirmation applies prospectively. Therefore, the 
Director of the NSA on the date of enactment will not be 
affected by this section, which will apply initially to the 
appointment and confirmation of his successor.

Section 402. Appointment of the Inspector General of the National 
        Security Agency

    Section 402 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 
U.S.C. App.) to provide that the Inspector General of the NSA 
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Under present law and practice, the 
Director of the NSA appoints the NSA Inspector General.
    The Inspector General of the NSA performs a critical role 
in ensuring that the NSA carries out its national intelligence 
mission in full compliance with the law and applicable policies 
and regulations. By requiring Presidential appointment and 
Senate confirmation of the NSA Inspector General, this 
provision will ensure the NSA Inspector General operates 
independently of the Director of the Agency in overseeing the 
activities of the NSA, particularly with respect to activities 
that may raise privacy concerns.

               SUBTITLE B--NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

Section 411. Appointment of the Director of the National Reconnaissance 
        Office

    Section 411 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) to provide that the Director of the NRO 
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.
    The Director of the NRO is responsible for a number of 
highly technical programs that involve the obligation and 
expenditure of significant sums of appropriated funds. By 
requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of 
the NRO Director, Congress will be better able to fulfill its 
responsibility for providing oversight of these important 
programs.

Section 412. Appointment of the Inspector General of the National 
        Reconnaissance Office

    Section 412 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 
U.S.C. App.) to provide that the Inspector General of the NRO 
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. Under present law and practice, the 
Director of the NRO appoints the NRO Inspector General.
    The Inspector General of the NRO performs a critical role 
in overseeing complex, high-dollar value programs conducted by 
the NRO. In the past, the NRO Inspector General has been 
successful in identifying significant instances of fraud, 
waste, and abuse within the NRO. By requiring Presidential 
appointment and Senate confirmation of the NRO Inspector 
General, this provision will ensure the NRO Inspector General 
continues to operate with appropriate independence from the NRO 
Director in overseeing the activities of the NRO.

                   Title V--Security Clearance Reform


Section 501. Appropriate committees of Congress defined

    Section 501 defines the term ``appropriate committees of 
Congress'' for this title.

Section 502. Technology improvements to security clearance processing

    Section 502 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM), to conduct an analysis of the 
relative costs and benefits of potential improvements to the 
process for investigating persons who are proposed for access 
to classified information and adjudicating whether such persons 
satisfy the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such 
information.

Section 503. Enhanced reciprocity of security clearances

    Section 503 amends Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(d)) to 
include a provision that prohibits an agency from rejecting 
another agency's determination that an individual is eligible 
for access to classified information on the basis that such 
eligibility determination is out-of-scope, unless the rejecting 
agency certifies that it does not employ any personnel who have 
background investigations that also are out-of-scope.
    Section 503 also amends Section 3001 of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(d)) 
to establish a presumption that personnel who have been 
determined to be eligible for access to classified information 
also are suitable for employment.
    The Committee understands that some agencies have denied 
security clearance reciprocity for some IC personnel where an 
eligibility determination is out-of-scope, even when the agency 
employs personnel whose eligibility determinations also are out 
of scope. In addition, the Committee understands that some 
agencies have delayed employment of personnel who have been 
determined to be eligible for access to classified information 
while the agency adjudicates their suitability for employment. 
The Committee believes that both of these practices 
inappropriately impede the movement of cleared personnel 
between agencies, often at significant cost to the government.

Section 504. Report on reciprocity of security clearances

    Section 504 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress 
each year, through 2017, that provides information on the 
reciprocal treatment of security clearances, including (1) the 
periods of time required by authorized adjudicative agencies 
for accepting background investigations and determinations 
completed by an authorized investigative entity or authorized 
adjudicative agency, (2) the total number of cases in which a 
background investigation or determination completed by an 
authorized investigative entity or authorized adjudicative 
agency is accepted by another agency, and (3) the total number 
of cases in which a background investigation or determination 
completed by an authorized investigative entity or authorized 
adjudicative agency is not accepted by another agency.

Section 505. Improving the periodic reinvestigation process

    Section 505 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of OPM to transmit to 
Congress each year, through 2017, a strategic plan for 
improving the process for periodic reinvestigations.

       Title VI--Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protections


Section 601. Protection of Intelligence Community whistleblowers

    Section 601 would create a new Section 2303A of Title 5 of 
the United States Code, modeled on protections for Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employees in Section 2303 of 
Title 5. This new section would prohibit taking a personnel 
action against an IC employee as a reprisal for making a 
protected whistleblower disclosure to the DNI (or his 
designee), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
the head of the employing agency (or his designee), the 
appropriate Inspector General of the employing agency, a 
congressional intelligence committee, or a member of a 
congressional intelligence committee. The President would be 
directed to provide for enforcement of this section. The 
section also clarifies that this bill in no way affects the FBI 
provisions under Section 2303 of Title 5.

Section 602. Review of security clearance or access determinations

    Section 602 would prohibit making security clearance and 
access determinations because of a protected whistleblower 
disclosure.
    The section would direct the DNI to create procedures to 
allow appeals of adverse security clearance and access 
determinations alleged to be in retaliation for a protected 
disclosure. This section would create certain due process 
protections, including the right to an independent and 
impartial fact-finder; for notice and the opportunity to be 
heard, including the opportunity to present relevant evidence, 
including witness testimony; to be represented by counsel; to 
receive a decision based on the record developed; and to 
receive a decision within 180 days, unless the employee and the 
agency agree to an extension, or the impartial fact-finder 
determines in writing that a greater time period is needed in 
the interest of fairness or national security.
    If whistleblower retaliation is found, the agency would be 
required to take corrective action, which could include back 
pay, costs, and compensatory damages not to exceed $300,000. 
Relief may not be granted if the agency demonstrates by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same 
personnel action absent the disclosure, giving the utmost 
deference to the agency's assessment of the particular threat 
to United States national security interests.
    Classified information may be used in the process, 
including through ex parte submissions if the agency determines 
that national security interests so warrant. The employee would 
have no right to compel the production of classified 
information except as necessary to establish that the employee 
made a protected disclosure. The DNI would be directed to 
create procedures to allow individuals to retain government 
employment, to the extent practicable, during this appeal 
process. However, an appeal of an agency's suspension of a 
security clearance or access determination for the purposes of 
conducting an investigation would not be allowed if a 
suspension lasts longer than one year.
    An employee would be permitted to appeal the agency's 
decision within 60 days of receiving it. The appellate board's 
review would be de novo, based on the complete agency record 
and any portions of the record that were submitted ex parte 
shall remain ex parte during the appeal. If the board 
determines that further fact-finding is necessary, it would 
remand the matter to the agency for additional proceedings. If 
the board finds that an adverse security clearance or access 
determination violated this section, it would order corrective 
action. The board would then separately determine whether 
reinstituting the security clearance or access determination is 
clearly consistent with national security, with any doubt 
resolved in favor of national security. The board may 
recommend, but may not order, reinstatement of the security 
clearance or access determination. Additionally, the board may 
recommend, but not order, reinstatement or the rehiring of a 
former employee. The board may order that the former employee 
be treated as though the employee were transferring from the 
most recent position held when seeking other federal 
employment. The agency would be required to take the actions 
ordered within 90 days, unless the DNI, Secretary of Defense, 
or Secretary of Energy determines that doing so would endanger 
national security. Congressional notification of board orders 
would be required, but neither judicial review nor a private 
cause of action would be permitted.

Section 603. Revisions of other laws

    Section 603 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978 and 
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to establish 
procedures for resolving instances in which a complaint or 
information would create a conflict of interest. In addition, 
Section 603 amends the Inspector General Act of 1978, the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and the National 
Security Act of 1947 to authorize an individual who has 
submitted a complaint or information to an Inspector General 
under those acts to notify any member of Congress or 
congressional staff member of the fact that such individual has 
made such submission.

Section 604. Regulations; reporting requirements; nonapplicability to 
        certain terminations

    Section 604 would require the DNI to issue regulations to 
carry out the IC protections created by Section 601 and to 
report to Congress on the implementation of these regulations 
within two years. This section also would require the DNI to 
establish the appellate board referenced in Section 602.
    Section 604 also provides that the legislation affords no 
protections for certain terminations of employment: (1) those 
under 10 U.S.C. 1609; and (2) those personally and summarily 
carried out by the DNI, the Director of the CIA, or an agency 
head under 5 U.S.C. 7532, if the Director or agency head 
determines the termination to be in the interest of the United 
States, determines that the procedures prescribed in other 
provisions of law that authorize the termination of the 
employee's employment cannot be invoked in a manner consistent 
with national security, and notifies Congress within five days 
of the termination.

                        Title VII--Other Matters


Section 701. Repeal of the termination of notification requirements 
        regarding the authorized disclosure of national intelligence

    Section 701 eliminates the sunset for Section 504 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. Section 
504 of that Act requires government officials responsible for 
making certain authorized disclosures of national intelligence 
or intelligence related to national security to notify the 
congressional intelligence committees concurrent with such 
disclosures.

Section 702. Gifts, devises, and bequests

    Section 702 amends Section 12 of the Central Intelligence 
Agency Act of 1949 in order to provide the Director of the CIA 
with express authority to engage in fundraising in an official 
capacity for the benefit of nonprofit organizations that 
provide support to surviving family members of deceased Agency 
employees or that otherwise provide support for the welfare, 
education, or recreation of Agency employees, former Agency 
employees, or their family members. Section 702 limits such 
fundraising to active participation in the promotion, 
production, or presentation of an event designed to raise funds 
and requires that such fundraising adhere to ethical 
constraints established by the Office of Government Ethics.

Section 703. Budgetary effects

    Section 603 provides that the budgetary effects of this 
Act, for the purpose of complying with the Statutory Pay-As-
You-Go-Act of 2010, shall be determined by reference to the 
latest statement titled, ``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO 
Legislation'' for this Act, submitted for printing in the 
Congressional Record by the Chairman of the Senate Budget 
Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted 
prior to the vote on passage.

                           Committee Comments


Analytic integrity

    Since at least 2008, the IC has provided draft assessments 
for comment to policymakers and warfighters who have direct and 
potentially conflicting interests in the subjects being 
assessed. For example, commanders are asked to comment on IC 
assessments of aspects of their military missions and 
Ambassadors are asked to comment on IC analyses of trends in 
security or national politics within their country of 
assignment. In both examples, policymakers and warfighters have 
insights and access to unique information that should be 
reported and included as intelligence that informs the analytic 
debate. In each example, however, analysts are required to make 
assessments about issues that could reflect directly on the 
offices and operations of those asked to comment. This creates 
professional tension between the IC and policy communities and 
could put undue pressure on analysts to conform to the analysis 
provided by the more senior warfighter or policymaker.
    Sound intelligence analysis requires that analysts who are 
dealing with issues of concern network in the United States and 
internationally to develop trusted relationships with partners 
external to the IC. These trusted relationships could include, 
as appropriate, experts in academia; think tanks; industry; 
nongovernmental organizations; the scientific world (e.g., U.S. 
Government laboratories, national academies, national research 
councils, and Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centers); state, local, tribal and territorial governments; and 
other non-IC U.S. Government agencies. These communities allow 
the IC to expand its knowledge base, share burdens, challenge 
assumptions and cultural biases, and encourage innovative 
thinking.
    Such trusted relationships should be a key component of the 
normal integration, evaluation, and analysis of intelligence 
information that results in the production of finished 
intelligence judgments and assessments. Elements of the IC 
should use outside experts to closely review analytical 
assumptions, logic and, where appropriate, evidence, both 
during analysis and after assessments have been completed.
    At the same time, the IC is responsible for ensuring that 
all finished intelligence is timely, objective, based on all 
available sources of information, independent of political 
consideration, and employs the standards of proper analytic 
tradecraft. In view of this, no intelligence product of the IC 
should be unduly delayed or inappropriately altered to conform 
to the timelines or viewpoints of external partners, and care 
should be taken to avoid operational or policy-related 
conflicts of interest when seeking outside commentary. For 
example, IC assessments about the efficacy of a particular 
policy or covert action under consideration should not be 
altered to conform to the views of the policymakers crafting 
the policy. Likewise, assessments of the capabilities of 
foreign security services trained by the U.S. military or U.S.-
led coalitions should not be delayed or altered to conform to 
the assessments of those responsible for the training.

Threat finance intelligence

    Counter threat finance (CTF) leverages the capabilities of 
the interagency to help detect, deter, disrupt, and destroy 
terrorist organizations and those supporting terrorism by 
targeting the foundation of their operations, their financial 
resources. CTF is dependent upon the effective collection, 
analysis, and integration of Threat Finance Intelligence (TFI). 
TFI-enabled CTF is a critical component of the United States 
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, which was 
released on July 25, 2011. A number of agencies within the IC 
have played a significant role in interagency CTF efforts 
against al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and other key actors. IC 
agencies continue to develop and expand their ability to 
support efforts to disrupt our adversaries using the CTF 
discipline. IC support to the Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC) 
under joint DOD-Department of Treasury leadership and the 
Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC) under Drug Enforcement Agency 
leadership enabled efforts to identify and disrupt funding 
sources supporting insurgent and terrorist organizations, aided 
in the identification of key insurgency members and enablers, 
and supported TFI collection and analysis. It is important for 
the IC to ensure that lessons learned from these initiatives 
are captured and institutionalized to build upon successes and 
mature the IC's capability to apply the CTF discipline to new 
problem sets.
    The Committee believes that the CTF discipline is an 
essential tool in combating transnational criminal networks and 
terrorist organizations worldwide, and believes it should be 
fully integrated into IC tradecraft, programmatic priorities, 
and operational planning. Furthermore, the IC must be able to 
integrate with, support, and enable other law enforcement and 
government agencies' CTF and TFI activities. Finally, it is 
important that the IC execute and organize TFI and CTF efforts 
throughout the community in a way that maximizes effectiveness 
and prevents duplication.
    The Committee directs the DNI to submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, not later than 180 days 
after enactment of this Act, a report outlining each CTF and 
TFI activity currently being planned or conducted by an element 
of the IC. Each summary should include a detailed description 
of the activity, identification of lead and supporting 
agencies, a description of each agency's role, the level and 
source of funding associated with each activity, a description 
of the desired outcomes from each activity, and a description 
of how this activity aligns with the goals of existing 
interagency strategies to address terrorism, corruption, 
crimes, narcotics, and other transnational threats, including 
the United States Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 
Crime. The report should also include a summary of operational 
lessons, best practices, and tools employed in ITFC and ATFC 
efforts, and how they can be replicated to advance other IC CTF 
missions. It should also include a description of the efforts, 
both within the IC and between the IC and other relevant 
agencies, to foster communication and ensure integrated support 
to interagency partners. Further, the report should identify 
any current gaps in the IC's CTF capabilities and authorities.

Suspension and debarment

    The Committee is concerned that the IC does not have an IC-
wide mechanism for identifying and tracking exploitative, 
unscrupulous, suspended or debarred contractors to ensure the 
Community deals only with vendors who are responsible in 
fulfilling their legal and contractual obligations. It is 
through the sharing of such information that the IC can make 
informed decisions, ensure the Community conducts business only 
with responsible contractors, prevent suspended and debarred 
contractors from initiating or repeating business throughout 
the IC, and avoid misuse or loss of potentially billions of 
dollars of taxpayer money.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI to develop a plan 
to meet the requirement, per the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, to determine whether prospective vendors are 
debarred, suspended or listed on the federal government's 
System for Awards Management (SAM), a Web-based system 
maintained by the General Services Administration (GSA). 
Additionally, the DNI shall create an IC-wide Contractor 
Responsibility Watch List. This plan will be approved by the 
head of each IC element and the DNI, submitted to the 
congressional intelligence committees within 120 days of 
enactment of this bill, and implemented within a year of the 
date of such enactment.

DIA and NRO Financial Management System Study

    The Committee has learned that implementation of the NSA's 
financial management system has experienced multiple delays and 
that the system requirements have been re-baselined since 
program inception. These delays have introduced additional risk 
for both the NSA and DIA towards achieving unqualified opinions 
on the Fiscal Year 2016 financial statements, as required by 
this Act. Therefore, the Committee requests that the DIA and 
the NRO conduct a joint study to determine the cost and 
feasibility of the DIA adopting the NRO's business systems and 
processes to the greatest extent possible. Additionally, the 
Committee requests that the NSA and the NRO conduct a joint 
study to determine the cost and feasibility of the NSA adopting 
the NRO's business systems and processes to the greatest extent 
possible.
    The NGA and the NRO previously conducted a similar study. 
This study would serve as a useful basis for both of these new 
studies. The Committee requests that the joint study teams 
evaluate the cost, schedule, and performance requirements 
associated with implementing a system at both the DIA and the 
NSA, similar to that already in use at the NRO and the NGA.
    The Committee requests that the chief financial executives 
of the DIA and the NSA, in association with the NRO, each 
complete a report and provide those reports to the 
congressional intelligence committees in 60 days.

Insider threats

    The recent unauthorized disclosures to the media, and 
potentially to foreign adversaries, by Edward Snowden, a core 
contractor working at the National Security Agency, highlights 
the threat posed by insiders entrusted with access to IC 
facilities and networks.
    The IC relies on a varied workforce comprised of civilians, 
uniformed military and core contractors to perform its work. 
These individuals are deployed at many government and 
contractor sites around the world. The IC also grants limited 
access to foreign partners, officials at the federal, state and 
local levels of government, and select representatives from 
industry. In this complex environment, the IC employs multi-
layered counterintelligence and security measures to mitigate 
the potential threat posed by a trusted insider. It screens 
individuals through hiring, security clearance and contracting 
processes. The IC induces compliance through nondisclosure and 
secrecy agreements. It monitors these people over time through 
periodic reinvestigations, and financial and other regular 
reporting requirements. The IC monitors and audits behavior on 
official networks to detect inappropriate access and 
transmission of classified and sensitive information. The 
Justice Department punishes violations as a deterrent.
    Despite this layered defense, there are still 
counterintelligence and security lapses. Mr. Snowden's decision 
to provide classified and sensitive information to the media 
will have ramifications for our national security for years to 
come. Initiatives have been underway for years to deal with 
such contingencies, most recently the President's National 
Insider Threat Policy, signed in November 2012. However, the 
Committee is concerned that this policy has not been fully 
implemented across the IC.
    The Committee supports substantially enhancing and 
expediting efforts to deter the insider threat. The Committee 
believes that addressing the insider threat requires an 
integrated counterintelligence and security apparatus that 
spans the IC and the U.S. Government. Stovepiping 
counterintelligence and security capabilities can prevent 
derogatory information about personnel from being shared and 
allow spies and others seeking to disclose classified national 
security information to roam undetected in the Community. The 
Committee believes the IC's information technology 
modernization effort--the IC Information Technology 
Enterprise--must provide the infrastructure to detect insider 
threats earlier and more effectively. Robust 
counterintelligence data and analytic tools to monitor, analyze 
and audit personnel behavior will be critical to this endeavor.
    Under current law, the IC is required to have a fully 
operable automated insider threat detection system in place by 
the end of Fiscal Year 2014. In this bill and associated 
classified annex, the Committee has recommended additional 
resources to help assure the IC meets this and other 
counterintelligence and security goals as soon as possible.

Action on R&D Commission findings

    In June 2013, the bipartisan National Commission for the 
Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United 
States Intelligence Community issued its report to Congress, as 
required by Public Law 107-306. The commission identified a 
number of concerns, many of which have been surfaced in 
previous studies (dating to the 1948 Eberstadt Report) and been 
the subject of past reform efforts (including the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004). Most notably, the 
commission found the continued inability of the IC to 
confidently estimate research and development (R&D) investments 
across the various agencies and elements (e.g., cyber R&D), 
which would enable smarter spending in today's constrained 
budget environment. Being able to identify R&D investments is a 
baseline requirement to properly stewarding these resources. 
The Commission also highlighted the IC's inability to 
understand, let alone bring coherence to, the efforts of its 
various elements against foreign science and technology (known 
as S&TI). S&TI informs not only IC R&D investment decisions, 
but also policymakers' decisions about what capabilities to 
develop. The IC's R&D and S&TI capabilities are only growing in 
importance given the pace and scope of change in technology and 
the threat environment.
    Therefore, within 180 days of enactment, the DNI, in 
conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence (USD(I)), shall provide a Zero Based Review to the 
congressional intelligence committees. This Zero Based Review 
shall include the following:
         The identification of total financial 
        investments for R&D functions and programs allocated 
        across the NIP and Military Intelligence Program (MIP), 
        and their relationship to investments at other U.S. 
        Government departments and agencies;
         An explanation of the requirements process for 
        S&TI across the IC, including identifying similarities 
        and differences in procedure and nomenclature across 
        the various agencies and elements;
         A review of current organization, to include 
        IC leadership and management of R&D and S&TI efforts 
        across the IC and within each agency, for how the IC 
        attains synergies and unity of effort, and how it 
        avoids unnecessary duplication of R&D.
    The Committee also believes a strategic plan for R&D and 
S&T is essential to meeting the challenges of a globalized, 
interconnected world. The rapid diffusion of science and 
technology across the globe provides state and non-state actors 
with new opportunities to develop asymmetric advantages, 
increasing the risk of strategic surprise to the U.S. 
Government. From advanced manufacturing to advanced biometrics, 
we cannot take for granted legacy superiority in technology and 
expect the United States to maintain its competitive edge. The 
unique nature of science and technology requires a renewed 
commitment from senior leaders within the IC, especially at a 
time when neither R&D nor S&TI attracts sufficient 
prioritization from policymakers in the executive and 
legislative branches of government.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in conjunction 
with USD(I), to append a Strategic Plan to the Fiscal Year 2015 
congressional budget submission. The plan shall include both 
the NIP and MIP. The Strategic Plan must include mechanisms to:
         Establish robust leadership, unity of effort, 
        and an emphasis on R&D issues;
         Establish an executive agent within the IC for 
        S&TI
         Better align R&D investments across the IC in 
        order to avoid unnecessary duplication and to achieve 
        synergies among R&D efforts across the NIP and MIP;
         Develop partnerships with, and leverage talent 
        from, academia and industry, especially smaller, 
        innovative firms that may not traditionally collaborate 
        or contract with the U.S. Government, and an R&D 
        reserve corps to supplement the IC's expertise as 
        needed;
         Increase policymakers' exposure to global R&D 
        trends that could affect U.S. national security or 
        undermine the U.S. Government's R&D efforts;
         Leverage the foreign scientific and technical 
        talent increasingly available to U.S. academic 
        institutions and businesses.

Analysis of commercial imagery capabilities

    In our increasingly constrained budget environment, the 
Committee is committed to reducing the costs of acquiring 
electro-optical and radar satellite imagery to meet the 
requirements of our nation's leaders, military forces and other 
mission partners.
    Imagery obtained from the commercial satellite industry has 
several virtues, including supporting IC and Department of 
Defense missions that require sharing unclassified imagery 
products with foreign or other government partners, and 
assisting first-responders during natural disasters such as 
floods or forest fires. In addition, it may be more cost-
effective, depending on specific capabilities on orbit. The 
Committee supports commercial imagery and believes industry 
proposals to further enhance the capabilities of commercial 
data providers are worthy of additional discussion.
    Leveraging commercial imagery and radar is in line with 
longstanding policy guidance. The U.S. Commercial Remote 
Sensing Policy (April 2003) states, ``the United States 
Government will rely to the maximum practical extent on U.S. 
commercial remote sensing space capabilities for filling 
imagery and geospatial needs for military, intelligence, 
foreign policy, homeland security and civil users.'' The 
National Space Policy (Presidential Policy Directive 4, June 
2010) directs the Executive branch to, ``Purchase and use 
commercial space capabilities and services to the maximum 
practical extent when such capabilities and services are 
available in the marketplace and meet the U.S. Government's 
requirements [and] modify commercial space capabilities and 
services to meet government requirements when existing 
commercial capabilities and services do not fully meet these 
requirements and the potential modification represents a more 
cost-effective and timely acquisition approach for the 
government.'' The DNI's and Secretary of Defense's ``Electro-
Optical Way Ahead'' strategy (approved on April 7, 2009) 
combined high-resolution government satellites and enhanced use 
of mid-resolution commercial systems and called for increasing 
the use of imagery available through U.S. commercial providers.
    More generally, Part 10 of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation favors commercial solutions, requiring government 
agencies, before any major acquisition, to conduct market 
research, ``To determine if commercial items or, to the extent 
commercial items suitable to meet the agency's needs are not 
available, non-developmental items are available that meet the 
agency's requirements, could be modified to meet the agency's 
requirements, or could meet the agency's requirements if those 
requirements were modified to a reasonable extent.''
    Pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal 
Year 2013, the Committee impaneled an independent GEOINT 
Commission, whose mandate was to examine the entire scope of 
the nation's GEOINT architecture, including its performance, 
ability to meet mission requirements, and affordability. The 
commission's findings echo a need to closely examine current 
utilization of commercial satellite imagery.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI and the Secretary 
of Defense to conduct an analysis to determine: (1) which 
national and military intelligence mission requirements can be 
satisfied with current or proposed architectures from the 
commercial electro-optical and radar imagery satellite 
industry; (2) whether long-term service level agreements (i.e., 
10 years or longer) with commercial providers would be more 
cost effective in meeting mission requirements than future 
government-owned constellations of the same or similar systems; 
and (3) whether greater reliance on commercial systems may 
provide certain benefits (e.g., greater resiliency, easier 
replacement, risk-sharing with the private sector, and greater 
ability to share unclassified imagery with others) or encumber 
certain risks. This analysis should inform decisions about the 
amount and mix of National Technical Means and commercially 
available imagery that the IC should invest in in the future 
that balances meeting mission requirements and cost. This 
analysis should be presented to the Committee no later than 90 
days after the enactment of this legislation.

Commercial imagery

    The Committee understands that a commercial data provider 
has requested licensing approval to collect and sell on the 
open market, electro-optical imagery with a ground sample 
distance of 0.25-meter. Recognizing the ability of U.S. 
commercial imagery providers to contribute more substantially 
to the national security mission at a lower cost point, and 
consistent with the U.S. policy of enabling U.S. companies to 
maintain a leadership position in this industry, the Committee 
encourages the GEOINT functional manager and the DNI to 
promptly review this licensing request. The Committee is 
concerned that foreign commercial imagery providers may soon be 
able to provide imagery at or better than the currently allowed 
commercial U.S. resolution limit of 0.5 meters. As foreign 
firms approach or surpass this level of resolution, current 
restrictions on U.S. commercial imagery data providers put the 
United States at a competitive disadvantage and may harm an 
industrial base that is important to national security.

Cross-intelligence cost and effectiveness report

    In a time of tightening budgets for the IC, the Committee 
requires accurate and detailed data on the effectiveness of all 
of the intelligence disciplines given the anticipated missions 
the IC will face, relative to their costs to the taxpayer, in 
order to effectively legislate and authorize expenditures for 
the NIP.
    Therefore, the Committee directs the ODNI to complete a 
detailed analysis comparing the effectiveness and costs of the 
Geospatial, Human, Measurement and Signatures, Open Source, and 
Signals Intelligence disciplines. The study must include 
detailed analysis of the costs and effectiveness of 
subcomponents and major programs of each intelligence 
discipline. The DNI shall provide a written report and oral 
brief covering this analysis to the Committee no later than 90 
days after the enactment of this legislation.

Intelligence Community Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics 
        workforce needs

    The IC's long-term success in a highly competitive security 
landscape will depend on a workforce that has significant 
expertise in the science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics (STEM) disciplines. The Committee supports 
workforce recruitment efforts to create pipelines of STEM-
trained students from our nation's universities. Such efforts 
may include fellowships, summer internships, semester 
externships, and sponsored-research. The Committee is aware of 
interest in such program at some of the IC's technically 
focused elements, including NRO. The IC's Centers for Academic 
Excellence, for which the DIA is the executive agent, and the 
NSA's Cyber Center for Academic Excellence may offer models and 
a set of best practices that can be applied to the STEM student 
population. The Committee also is aware of a STEM coop program 
that involves an initial group of schools, including the 
University of Southern California, University of Nevada at Las 
Vegas, Mississippi State University and Auburn University, that 
has promise.
    Therefore, the Committee encourages the IC's human capital 
officers and their mission partners to develop and invest in 
programs that are designed to attract a large pool of STEM 
students from the full geographic diversity of U.S. academic 
institutions. These programs should have cost-effective 
operating models and demonstrate clear benefit to the IC. The 
Committee also requests briefings on such initiatives.

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)

    The Committee continues to strongly support the mission of 
the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), 
which focuses on high-risk, high-reward research and 
development to help the IC meet a dynamic and rapidly changing 
security and threat environment. IARPA's mission should remain 
a priority, even during the fiscal environment when research 
and development investment can come under pressure. Its mission 
and work should be integral to the IC R&D strategic plan 
required above.
    Therefore, the Committee strongly supports full 
preservation of the budget request for IARPA in Fiscal Year 
2014 and encourages robust investment by the IC in IARPA in 
Fiscal Year 2015.

Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation of positions within 
        the Intelligence Community

    In S. 1681, the Committee provides for the direct Senate 
confirmation of four positions--the Director of the NSA, the 
Inspector General of the NSA, the Director of the NRO, and the 
Inspector General of the NRO. The Committee believes that 
Senate confirmation of these four positions will improve 
oversight and accountability and, ultimately, the effectiveness 
of the agencies in question. While the Committee supports 
Senate confirmation of these four positions, the Committee also 
believes that it is necessary to reduce the overall number of 
positions subject to Senate confirmation across the government. 
Therefore, the Committee will evaluate whether there are other 
positions within the IC that are currently subject to Senate 
confirmation that do not continue to require Senate advice and 
consent. The Committee also is cognizant of the need to ensure 
that critical leadership positions within the IC do not remain 
vacant as a result of a lengthy appointment or confirmation 
processes.

National Security threat assessments

    The Committee has an interest in reviewing intelligence 
assessments prepared by the IC as part of the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process and has 
reached an agreement with the ODNI and Senate Banking Committee 
on this matter.
    Under this agreement, upon completion of a review or 
investigation that concludes CFIUS action, or the announcement 
by the President of a decision, for a covered transaction, the 
DNI will alert the congressional intelligence committees to the 
availability of any National Security Threat Assessment (NTSA) 
completed by the IC. These alerts will occur on a biweekly 
basis, will be included in the ``National Intelligence Council 
(NIC) Weekly,'' and shall include the title of the NSTA, 
foreign company host country, date of publication, and short 
summary. Further, the DNI shall provide a briefing on any NSTA 
and the NSTA itself upon request by the congressional 
intelligence committees.

                            Committee Action

    On November 5, 2013, a quorum being present, the Committee 
met to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the 
following actions:

Votes on amendments to committee bill, this report and the classified 
        annex

    By unanimous consent, the Committee made the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman's bill the base text for purposes of amendment. 
The Committee also authorized the staff to make technical and 
conforming changes in the bill, report, and annex, following 
the completion of the mark-up.
    By unanimous consent, the Committee agreed to a managers' 
amendment by Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Chambliss to: 
(1) strike a provision from the bill concerning Committee 
access to reports and assessments produced as part of the CFIUS 
process and replace it with language in the report to accompany 
the bill; (2) require IC elements to submit plans to Congress 
concerning plans for orderly shutdown in the event of a lapse 
in appropriations; (3) require reports on the Syrian chemical 
weapons program; (4) require Senate confirmation of the 
Director of the NSA and the Inspector General of the NSA; (5) 
amend the whistleblower title to add protection for 
whistleblower disclosures made to Inspectors General within the 
IC and to the congressional intelligence committees; and (6) to 
make amendments to the classified annex.
    By a vote of 8 ayes to 7 noes the Committee agreed to an 
amendment by Senator Feinstein to require the President to make 
public an annual report on the number of combatants and 
noncombatant civilians killed or injured by the use of targeted 
lethal force. The votes on the amendment in person or by proxy 
were as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye; Senator Rockefeller--
aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--
aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--
aye; Vice Chairman Chambliss--no; Senator Burr--no; Senator 
Risch--no; Senator Coats--no; Senator Rubio--no; Senator 
Collins--no; Senator Coburn--no.
    By a vote of 10 ayes to 5 noes the Committee agreed to an 
amendment by Senator King to require independent alternative 
analysis of the analytic basis for use of targeted lethal force 
against a United States person. The votes on the amendment in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye; 
Senator Rockefeller--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator 
Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator 
Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Vice Chairman Chambliss--no; 
Senator Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Coats--no; Senator 
Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; Senator Coburn--no.
    By a vote of 6 ayes to 9 noes the Committee rejected an 
amendment offered by Senator Feinstein to substitute with 
report language the text of an amendment offered by Senator 
Coburn to make the Director and Inspector General of the NRO 
subject to Senate confirmation. The votes on the amendment in 
person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye; 
Senator Rockefeller--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Mikulski--
aye; Senator Udall--no; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--
aye; Senator King--aye; Vice Chairman Chambliss--no; Senator 
Burr--no; Senator Risch--no; Senator Coats--no; Senator Rubio--
no; Senator Collins--no; Senator Coburn--no.
    By a vote of 14 ayes to 0 noes the Committee agreed to the 
amendment by Senator Coburn to make the Director and Inspector 
General of the NRO subject to Senate confirmation. The votes on 
the amendment in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Rockefeller--did not vote; Senator 
Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--aye; Senator 
Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--aye; Vice 
Chairman Chambliss--aye; Senator Burr--aye; Senator Risch--aye; 
Senator Coats--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator Collins--aye; 
Senator Coburn--aye.

Vote to report the committee bill

    The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a 
vote of 13 ayes and 2 noes. The votes in person or by proxy 
were as follows: Chairman Feinstein--aye; Senator Rockefeller--
aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Udall--
aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Heinrich--aye; Senator King--
aye; Vice Chairman Chambliss--aye; Senator Burr--no; Senator 
Risch--aye; Senator Coats--aye; Senator Rubio--aye; Senator 
Collins--aye; Senator Coburn--no.

                       Compliance With Rule XLIV

    Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires 
publication of a list of any ``congressionally directed 
spending item, limited tax benefit, and limited tariff 
benefit'' that is included in the bill or the committee report 
accompanying the bill. Consistent with the determination of the 
Committee not to create any congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks, none have been included in the bill, the 
report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also 
contain no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On November 
7, 2013, the Committee transmitted this bill to the 
Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the 
costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        Changes in Existing Laws

    In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to 
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the 
business of the Senate.

                                  
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