[House Report 113-39]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


113th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                     113-39

======================================================================



 
             CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT

                                _______
                                

 April 15, 2013.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Rogers of Michigan, from the Permanent Select Committee on 
                 Intelligence, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 624]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 624) to provide for the sharing of 
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information 
between the intelligence community and cybersecurity entities, 
and for other purposes, having considered the same, report 
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill 
as amended do pass.
    The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

  This Act may be cited as the ``Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
          ``cyber threat intelligence and information sharing
  ``Sec. 1104.  (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Intelligence With Private Sector and Utilities.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence 
        shall establish procedures to allow elements of the 
        intelligence community to share cyber threat intelligence with 
        private-sector entities and utilities and to encourage the 
        sharing of such intelligence.
          ``(2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The 
        procedures established under paragraph (1) shall provide that 
        classified cyber threat intelligence may only be--
                  ``(A) shared by an element of the intelligence 
                community with--
                          ``(i) a certified entity; or
                          ``(ii) a person with an appropriate security 
                        clearance to receive such cyber threat 
                        intelligence;
                  ``(B) shared consistent with the need to protect the 
                national security of the United States; and
                  ``(C) used by a certified entity in a manner which 
                protects such cyber threat intelligence from 
                unauthorized disclosure.
          ``(3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing that the head of 
        an element of the intelligence community may, as the head of 
        such element considers necessary to carry out this subsection--
                  ``(A) grant a security clearance on a temporary or 
                permanent basis to an employee or officer of a 
                certified entity;
                  ``(B) grant a security clearance on a temporary or 
                permanent basis to a certified entity and approval to 
                use appropriate facilities; and
                  ``(C) expedite the security clearance process for a 
                person or entity as the head of such element considers 
                necessary, consistent with the need to protect the 
                national security of the United States.
          ``(4) No right or benefit.--The provision of information to a 
        private-sector entity or a utility under this subsection shall 
        not create a right or benefit to similar information by such 
        entity or such utility or any other private-sector entity or 
        utility.
          ``(5) Restriction on disclosure of cyber threat 
        intelligence.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 
        certified entity receiving cyber threat intelligence pursuant 
        to this subsection shall not further disclose such cyber threat 
        intelligence to another entity, other than to a certified 
        entity or other appropriate agency or department of the Federal 
        Government authorized to receive such cyber threat 
        intelligence.
  ``(b) Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Information.--
          ``(1) In general.--
                  ``(A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding any 
                other provision of law, a cybersecurity provider, with 
                the express consent of a protected entity for which 
                such cybersecurity provider is providing goods or 
                services for cybersecurity purposes, may, for 
                cybersecurity purposes--
                          ``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify 
                        and obtain cyber threat information to protect 
                        the rights and property of such protected 
                        entity; and
                          ``(ii) share such cyber threat information 
                        with any other entity designated by such 
                        protected entity, including, if specifically 
                        designated, the Federal Government.
                  ``(B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding any 
                other provision of law, a self-protected entity may, 
                for cybersecurity purposes--
                          ``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify 
                        and obtain cyber threat information to protect 
                        the rights and property of such self-protected 
                        entity; and
                          ``(ii) share such cyber threat information 
                        with any other entity, including the Federal 
                        Government.
          ``(2) Sharing with the federal government.--
                  ``(A) Information shared with the national 
                cybersecurity and communications integration center of 
                the department of homeland security.--Subject to the 
                use and protection of information requirements under 
                paragraph (3), the head of a department or agency of 
                the Federal Government receiving cyber threat 
                information in accordance with paragraph (1) shall 
                provide such cyber threat information in as close to 
                real time as possible to the National Cybersecurity and 
                Communications Integration Center of the Department of 
                Homeland Security.
                  ``(B) Request to share with another department or 
                agency of the federal government.--An entity sharing 
                cyber threat information that is provided to the 
                National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
                Center of the Department of Homeland Security under 
                subparagraph (A) or paragraph (1) may request the head 
                of such Center to, and the head of such Center may, 
                provide such information in as close to real time as 
                possible to another department or agency of the Federal 
                Government.
          ``(3) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat 
        information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
                  ``(A) shall only be shared in accordance with any 
                restrictions placed on the sharing of such information 
                by the protected entity or self-protected entity 
                authorizing such sharing, including appropriate 
                anonymization or minimization of such information and 
                excluding limiting a department or agency of the 
                Federal Government from sharing such information with 
                another department or agency of the Federal Government 
                in accordance with this section;
                  ``(B) may not be used by an entity to gain an unfair 
                competitive advantage to the detriment of the protected 
                entity or the self-protected entity authorizing the 
                sharing of information;
                  ``(C) may only be used by a non-Federal recipient of 
                such information for a cybersecurity purpose;
                  ``(D) if shared with the Federal Government--
                          ``(i) shall be exempt from disclosure under 
                        section 552 of title 5, United States Code 
                        (commonly known as the `Freedom of Information 
                        Act');
                          ``(ii) shall be considered proprietary 
                        information and shall not be disclosed to an 
                        entity outside of the Federal Government except 
                        as authorized by the entity sharing such 
                        information;
                          ``(iii) shall not be used by the Federal 
                        Government for regulatory purposes;
                          ``(iv) shall not be provided by the 
                        department or agency of the Federal Government 
                        receiving such cyber threat information to 
                        another department or agency of the Federal 
                        Government under paragraph (2)(A) if--
                                  ``(I) the entity providing such 
                                information determines that the 
                                provision of such information will 
                                undermine the purpose for which such 
                                information is shared; or
                                  ``(II) unless otherwise directed by 
                                the President, the head of the 
                                department or agency of the Federal 
                                Government receiving such cyber threat 
                                information determines that the 
                                provision of such information will 
                                undermine the purpose for which such 
                                information is shared; and
                          ``(v) shall be handled by the Federal 
                        Government consistent with the need to protect 
                        sources and methods and the national security 
                        of the United States; and
                  ``(E) shall be exempt from disclosure under a State, 
                local, or tribal law or regulation that requires public 
                disclosure of information by a public or quasi-public 
                entity.
          ``(4) Exemption from liability.--
                  ``(A) Exemption.--No civil or criminal cause of 
                action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or State 
                court against a protected entity, self-protected 
                entity, cybersecurity provider, or an officer, 
                employee, or agent of a protected entity, self-
                protected entity, or cybersecurity provider, acting in 
                good faith--
                          ``(i) for using cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify or obtain cyber threat information or 
                        for sharing such information in accordance with 
                        this section; or
                          ``(ii) for decisions made for cybersecurity 
                        purposes and based on cyber threat information 
                        identified, obtained, or shared under this 
                        section.
                  ``(B) Lack of good faith.--For purposes of the 
                exemption from liability under subparagraph (A), a lack 
                of good faith includes, but is not limited to, any act 
                or omission taken with intent to injure, defraud, or 
                otherwise endanger any individual, government entity, 
                private entity, or utility.
          ``(5) Relationship to other laws requiring the disclosure of 
        information.--The submission of information under this 
        subsection to the Federal Government shall not satisfy or 
        affect--
                  ``(A) any requirement under any other provision of 
                law for a person or entity to provide information to 
                the Federal Government; or
                  ``(B) the applicability of other provisions of law, 
                including section 552 of title 5, United States Code 
                (commonly known as the `Freedom of Information Act'), 
                with respect to information required to be provided to 
                the Federal Government under such other provision of 
                law.
          ``(6) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
        be construed to provide new authority to--
                  ``(A) a cybersecurity provider to use a cybersecurity 
                system to identify or obtain cyber threat information 
                from a system or network other than a system or network 
                owned or operated by a protected entity for which such 
                cybersecurity provider is providing goods or services 
                for cybersecurity purposes; or
                  ``(B) a self-protected entity to use a cybersecurity 
                system to identify or obtain cyber threat information 
                from a system or network other than a system or network 
                owned or operated by such self-protected entity.
  ``(c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
          ``(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber 
        threat information shared with the Federal Government in 
        accordance with subsection (b)--
                  ``(A) for cybersecurity purposes;
                  ``(B) for the investigation and prosecution of 
                cybersecurity crimes;
                  ``(C) for the protection of individuals from the 
                danger of death or serious bodily harm and the 
                investigation and prosecution of crimes involving such 
                danger of death or serious bodily harm; or
                  ``(D) for the protection of minors from child 
                pornography, any risk of sexual exploitation, and 
                serious threats to the physical safety of minors, 
                including kidnapping and trafficking and the 
                investigation and prosecution of crimes involving child 
                pornography, any risk of sexual exploitation, and 
                serious threats to the physical safety of minors, 
                including kidnapping and trafficking, and any crime 
                referred to in section 2258A(a)(2) of title 18, United 
                States Code.
          ``(2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal Government 
        may not affirmatively search cyber threat information shared 
        with the Federal Government under subsection (b) for a purpose 
        other than a purpose referred to in paragraph (1).
          ``(3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this section 
        shall be construed to permit the Federal Government to--
                  ``(A) require a private-sector entity or utility to 
                share information with the Federal Government; or
                  ``(B) condition the sharing of cyber threat 
                intelligence with a private-sector entity or utility on 
                the provision of cyber threat information to the 
                Federal Government.
          ``(4) Protection of sensitive personal documents.--The 
        Federal Government may not use the following information, 
        containing information that identifies a person, shared with 
        the Federal Government in accordance with subsection (b) unless 
        such information is used in accordance with the policies and 
        procedures established under paragraph (7):
                  ``(A) Library circulation records.
                  ``(B) Library patron lists.
                  ``(C) Book sales records.
                  ``(D) Book customer lists.
                  ``(E) Firearms sales records.
                  ``(F) Tax return records.
                  ``(G) Educational records.
                  ``(H) Medical records.
          ``(5) Notification of non-cyber threat information.--If a 
        department or agency of the Federal Government receiving 
        information pursuant to subsection (b)(1) determines that such 
        information is not cyber threat information, such department or 
        agency shall notify the entity or provider sharing such 
        information pursuant to subsection (b)(1).
          ``(6) Retention and use of cyber threat information.--No 
        department or agency of the Federal Government shall retain or 
        use information shared pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for any 
        use other than a use permitted under subsection (c)(1).
          ``(7) Privacy and civil liberties.--
                  ``(A) Policies and procedures.--The Director of 
                National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney 
                General, shall establish and periodically review 
                policies and procedures governing the receipt, 
                retention, use, and disclosure of non-publicly 
                available cyber threat information shared with the 
                Federal Government in accordance with subsection 
                (b)(1). Such policies and procedures shall, consistent 
                with the need to protect systems and networks from 
                cyber threats and mitigate cyber threats in a timely 
                manner--
                          ``(i) minimize the impact on privacy and 
                        civil liberties;
                          ``(ii) reasonably limit the receipt, 
                        retention, use, and disclosure of cyber threat 
                        information associated with specific persons 
                        that is not necessary to protect systems or 
                        networks from cyber threats or mitigate cyber 
                        threats in a timely manner;
                          ``(iii) include requirements to safeguard 
                        non-publicly available cyber threat information 
                        that may be used to identify specific persons 
                        from unauthorized access or acquisition;
                          ``(iv) protect the confidentiality of cyber 
                        threat information associated with specific 
                        persons to the greatest extent practicable; and
                          ``(v) not delay or impede the flow of cyber 
                        threat information necessary to defend against 
                        or mitigate a cyber threat.
                  ``(B) Submission to congress.--The Director of 
                National Intelligence shall, consistent with the need 
                to protect sources and methods, submit to Congress the 
                policies and procedures required under subparagraph (A) 
                and any updates to such policies and procedures.
                  ``(C) Implementation.--The head of each department or 
                agency of the Federal Government receiving cyber threat 
                information shared with the Federal Government under 
                subsection (b)(1) shall--
                          ``(i) implement the policies and procedures 
                        established under subparagraph (A); and
                          ``(ii) promptly notify the Director of 
                        National Intelligence, the Attorney General, 
                        and the congressional intelligence committees 
                        of any significant violations of such policies 
                        and procedures.
                  ``(D) Oversight.--The Director of National 
                Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney 
                General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 
                Secretary of Defense, shall establish a program to 
                monitor and oversee compliance with the policies and 
                procedures established under subparagraph (A).
  ``(d) Federal Government Liability for Violations of Restrictions on 
the Disclosure, Use, and Protection of Voluntarily Shared 
Information.--
          ``(1) In general.--If a department or agency of the Federal 
        Government intentionally or willfully violates subsection 
        (b)(3)(D) or subsection (c) with respect to the disclosure, 
        use, or protection of voluntarily shared cyber threat 
        information shared under this section, the United States shall 
        be liable to a person adversely affected by such violation in 
        an amount equal to the sum of--
                  ``(A) the actual damages sustained by the person as a 
                result of the violation or $1,000, whichever is 
                greater; and
                  ``(B) the costs of the action together with 
                reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court.
          ``(2) Venue.--An action to enforce liability created under 
        this subsection may be brought in the district court of the 
        United States in--
                  ``(A) the district in which the complainant resides;
                  ``(B) the district in which the principal place of 
                business of the complainant is located;
                  ``(C) the district in which the department or agency 
                of the Federal Government that disclosed the 
                information is located; or
                  ``(D) the District of Columbia.
          ``(3) Statute of limitations.--No action shall lie under this 
        subsection unless such action is commenced not later than two 
        years after the date of the violation of subsection (b)(3)(D) 
        or subsection (c) that is the basis for the action.
          ``(4) Exclusive cause of action.--A cause of action under 
        this subsection shall be the exclusive means available to a 
        complainant seeking a remedy for a violation of subsection 
        (b)(3)(D) or subsection (c).
  ``(e) Reports on Information Sharing.--
          ``(1) Inspector general report.--The Inspector General of the 
        Intelligence Community, in consultation with the Inspector 
        General of the Department of Justice, the Inspector General of 
        the Department of Defense, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
        Oversight Board, shall annually submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a report containing a review of the use 
        of information shared with the Federal Government under this 
        section, including--
                  ``(A) a review of the use by the Federal Government 
                of such information for a purpose other than a 
                cybersecurity purpose;
                  ``(B) a review of the type of information shared with 
                the Federal Government under this section;
                  ``(C) a review of the actions taken by the Federal 
                Government based on such information;
                  ``(D) appropriate metrics to determine the impact of 
                the sharing of such information with the Federal 
                Government on privacy and civil liberties, if any;
                  ``(E) a list of the departments or agencies receiving 
                such information;
                  ``(F) a review of the sharing of such information 
                within the Federal Government to identify inappropriate 
                stovepiping of shared information; and
                  ``(G) any recommendations of the Inspector General 
                for improvements or modifications to the authorities 
                under this section.
          ``(2) Privacy and civil liberties officers report.--The Civil 
        Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence and the Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties 
        Officer of the Department of Justice, in consultation with the 
        Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, the Inspector 
        General of the Intelligence Community, and the senior privacy 
        and civil liberties officer of each department or agency of the 
        Federal Government that receives cyber threat information 
        shared with the Federal Government under this section, shall 
        annually and jointly submit to Congress a report assessing the 
        privacy and civil liberties impact of the activities conducted 
        by the Federal Government under this section. Such report shall 
        include any recommendations the Civil Liberties Protection 
        Officer and Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer consider 
        appropriate to minimize or mitigate the privacy and civil 
        liberties impact of the sharing of cyber threat information 
        under this section.
          ``(3) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) or (2) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.
  ``(f) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute of a 
State or political subdivision of a State that restricts or otherwise 
expressly regulates an activity authorized under subsection (b).
  ``(g) Savings Clauses.--
          ``(1) Existing authorities.--Nothing in this section shall be 
        construed to limit any other authority to use a cybersecurity 
        system or to identify, obtain, or share cyber threat 
        intelligence or cyber threat information.
          ``(2) Limitation on military and intelligence community 
        involvement in private and public sector cybersecurity 
        efforts.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to provide 
        additional authority to, or modify an existing authority of, 
        the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency or 
        any other element of the intelligence community to control, 
        modify, require, or otherwise direct the cybersecurity efforts 
        of a private-sector entity or a component of the Federal 
        Government or a State, local, or tribal government.
          ``(3) Information sharing relationships.--Nothing in this 
        section shall be construed to--
                  ``(A) limit or modify an existing information sharing 
                relationship;
                  ``(B) prohibit a new information sharing 
                relationship;
                  ``(C) require a new information sharing relationship 
                between the Federal Government and a private-sector 
                entity or utility;
                  ``(D) modify the authority of a department or agency 
                of the Federal Government to protect sources and 
                methods and the national security of the United States; 
                or
                  ``(E) preclude the Federal Government from requiring 
                an entity to report significant cyber incidents if 
                authorized or required to do so under another provision 
                of law.
          ``(4) Limitation on federal government use of cybersecurity 
        systems.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to provide 
        additional authority to, or modify an existing authority of, 
        any entity to use a cybersecurity system owned or controlled by 
        the Federal Government on a private-sector system or network to 
        protect such private-sector system or network.
          ``(5) No liability for non-participation.--Nothing in this 
        section shall be construed to subject a protected entity, self-
        protected entity, cyber security provider, or an officer, 
        employee, or agent of a protected entity, self-protected 
        entity, or cybersecurity provider, to liability for choosing 
        not to engage in the voluntary activities authorized under this 
        section.
          ``(6) Use and retention of information.--Nothing in this 
        section shall be construed to authorize, or to modify any 
        existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal 
        Government to retain or use information shared pursuant to 
        subsection (b)(1) for any use other than a use permitted under 
        subsection (c)(1).
  ``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Availability.--The term `availability' means ensuring 
        timely and reliable access to and use of information.
          ``(2) Certified entity.--The term `certified entity' means a 
        protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
        provider that--
                  ``(A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a security 
                clearance, as determined by the Director of National 
                Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of 
                National Intelligence that such provider or such entity 
                can appropriately protect classified cyber threat 
                intelligence.
          ``(3) Confidentiality.--The term `confidentiality' means 
        preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, 
        including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary 
        information.
          ``(4) Cyber threat information.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The term `cyber threat 
                information' means information directly pertaining to--
                          ``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network 
                        of a government or private entity or utility;
                          ``(ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a system or 
                        network of a government or private entity or 
                        utility or any information stored on, processed 
                        on, or transiting such a system or network;
                          ``(iii) efforts to deny access to or degrade, 
                        disrupt, or destroy a system or network of a 
                        government or private entity or utility; or
                          ``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to 
                        a system or network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility, including to gain such 
                        unauthorized access for the purpose of 
                        exfiltrating information stored on, processed 
                        on, or transiting a system or network of a 
                        government or private entity or utility.
                  ``(B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include 
                information pertaining to efforts to gain unauthorized 
                access to a system or network of a government or 
                private entity or utility that solely involve 
                violations of consumer terms of service or consumer 
                licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute 
                unauthorized access.
          ``(5) Cyber threat intelligence.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The term `cyber threat 
                intelligence' means intelligence in the possession of 
                an element of the intelligence community directly 
                pertaining to--
                          ``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network 
                        of a government or private entity or utility;
                          ``(ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a system or 
                        network of a government or private entity or 
                        utility or any information stored on, processed 
                        on, or transiting such a system or network;
                          ``(iii) efforts to deny access to or degrade, 
                        disrupt, or destroy a system or network of a 
                        government or private entity or utility; or
                          ``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to 
                        a system or network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility, including to gain such 
                        unauthorized access for the purpose of 
                        exfiltrating information stored on, processed 
                        on, or transiting a system or network of a 
                        government or private entity or utility.
                  ``(B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include 
                intelligence pertaining to efforts to gain unauthorized 
                access to a system or network of a government or 
                private entity or utility that solely involve 
                violations of consumer terms of service or consumer 
                licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute 
                unauthorized access.
          ``(6) Cybersecurity crime.--The term `cybersecurity crime' 
        means--
                  ``(A) a crime under a Federal or State law that 
                involves--
                          ``(i) efforts to deny access to or degrade, 
                        disrupt, or destroy a system or network;
                          ``(ii) efforts to gain unauthorized access to 
                        a system or network; or
                          ``(iii) efforts to exfiltrate information 
                        from a system or network without authorization; 
                        or
                  ``(B) the violation of a provision of Federal law 
                relating to computer crimes, including a violation of 
                any provision of title 18, United States Code, created 
                or amended by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 
                (Public Law 99-474).
          ``(7) Cybersecurity provider.--The term `cybersecurity 
        provider' means a non-Federal entity that provides goods or 
        services intended to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
          ``(8) Cybersecurity purpose.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The term `cybersecurity purpose' 
                means the purpose of ensuring the integrity, 
                confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a 
                system or network, including protecting a system or 
                network from--
                          ``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network;
                          ``(ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a system or 
                        network or any information stored on, processed 
                        on, or transiting such a system or network;
                          ``(iii) efforts to deny access to or degrade, 
                        disrupt, or destroy a system or network; or
                          ``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to 
                        a system or network, including to gain such 
                        unauthorized access for the purpose of 
                        exfiltrating information stored on, processed 
                        on, or transiting a system or network.
                  ``(B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include the 
                purpose of protecting a system or network from efforts 
                to gain unauthorized access to such system or network 
                that solely involve violations of consumer terms of 
                service or consumer licensing agreements and do not 
                otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          ``(9) Cybersecurity system.--
                  ``(A) In general.--The term `cybersecurity system' 
                means a system designed or employed to ensure the 
                integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, or 
                safeguard, a system or network, including protecting a 
                system or network from--
                          ``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network;
                          ``(ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a system or 
                        network or any information stored on, processed 
                        on, or transiting such a system or network;
                          ``(iii) efforts to deny access to or degrade, 
                        disrupt, or destroy a system or network; or
                          ``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to 
                        a system or network, including to gain such 
                        unauthorized access for the purpose of 
                        exfiltrating information stored on, processed 
                        on, or transiting a system or network.
                  ``(B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include a system 
                designed or employed to protect a system or network 
                from efforts to gain unauthorized access to such system 
                or network that solely involve violations of consumer 
                terms of service or consumer licensing agreements and 
                do not otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          ``(10) Integrity.--The term `integrity' means guarding 
        against improper information modification or destruction, 
        including ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity.
          ``(11) Protected entity.--The term `protected entity' means 
        an entity, other than an individual, that contracts with a 
        cybersecurity provider for goods or services to be used for 
        cybersecurity purposes.
          ``(12) Self-protected entity.--The term `self-protected 
        entity' means an entity, other than an individual, that 
        provides goods or services for cybersecurity purposes to 
        itself.
          ``(13) Utility.--The term `utility' means an entity providing 
        essential services (other than law enforcement or regulatory 
        services), including electricity, natural gas, propane, 
        telecommunications, transportation, water, or wastewater 
        services.''.
  (b) Procedures and Guidelines.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall--
          (1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of 
        this Act, establish procedures under paragraph (1) of section 
        1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
        subsection (a) of this section, and issue guidelines under 
        paragraph (3) of such section 1104(a);
          (2) in establishing such procedures and issuing such 
        guidelines, consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
        ensure that such procedures and such guidelines permit the 
        owners and operators of critical infrastructure to receive all 
        appropriate cyber threat intelligence (as defined in section 
        1104(h)(5) of such Act, as added by subsection (a)) in the 
        possession of the Federal Government; and
          (3) following the establishment of such procedures and the 
        issuance of such guidelines, expeditiously distribute such 
        procedures and such guidelines to appropriate departments and 
        agencies of the Federal Government, private-sector entities, 
        and utilities (as defined in section 1104(h)(13) of such Act, 
        as added by subsection (a)).
  (c) Privacy and Civil Liberties Policies and Procedures.--Not later 
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the Attorney General, shall establish the 
policies and procedures required under section 1104(c)(7)(A) of the 
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this 
section.
  (d) Initial Reports.--The first reports required to be submitted 
under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (e) of section 1104 of the 
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this 
section, shall be submitted not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
  (e) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at 
the end the following new item:

``Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.''.

SEC. 3. SUNSET.

  Effective on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act--
          (1) section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
        added by section 2(a) of this Act, is repealed; and
          (2) the table of contents in the first section of the 
        National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 2(e) of 
        this Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section 
        1104, as added by such section 2(e).

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 624 is to provide for the sharing of 
certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber threat information 
between the Intelligence Community and cybersecurity entities, 
and other purposes.

                  Background and Need for Legislation


112th Congress

    At the beginning of the 112th Congress, the Committee, 
under the direction of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger, began a bipartisan effort to examine the issue 
of cybersecurity.\1\ The goal of this effort was to better 
understand the threats facing the nation in cyberspace--with 
respect to both the government and in the private sector--and 
to determine what the Intelligence Community could do to help 
better protect the nation. The results of this review were 
stunning: a number of advanced nation-state actors are actively 
engaged in a series of wide-ranging, aggressive efforts to 
penetrate American computer systems and networks; these efforts 
extend well beyond government networks, and reach deep into 
nearly every sector of the American economy, including 
companies serving critical infrastructure needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\This effort involved a series of briefings and hearings, 
including one open hearing, to inform Committee members and, where 
possible, the public, about the serious national security threat posed 
by nation-state actors and other adversaries in the cyber realm. These 
meetings, briefings, and hearings were in turn supported by numerous 
meetings and briefings conducted by Committee staff with agencies and 
individuals from the Executive Branch including, among others, the 
White House, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department 
of Justice (DOJ), including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
the Department of Defense (DOD), including the National Security Agency 
(NSA), and with experts from the academic and think-tank communities. 
The Committee staff also held numerous meetings with private sector 
companies and trade groups in industries including technology, 
telecommunications, financial services, utilities, aerospace, and 
defense. And the Committee staff met with representatives of privacy 
and civil liberties organizations including the Center for Democracy 
and Technology, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, and the CATO Institute, among others. In total, 
the Committee members and staff met with dozens of organizations in 
conducting its review over a seven-month period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perhaps most troubling, these efforts are targeted not only 
at sensitive national security and infrastructure information 
but are also often aimed at stealing corporate research and 
development information that forms the very lifeblood of the 
American economy. China, in particular, is engaged in an 
extensive, day-in, day-out effort to pillage American 
intellectual property. There can be no question that in today's 
modern world, economic security is national security and the 
government must help the private sector to protect itself.
    The Committee's review also revealed that while the 
government is already doing much to provide support and 
assistance to the private sector to address this threat, in 
particular through DHS and the FBI, more can and should be done 
in the immediate future. In particular, the Committee 
determined that the Intelligence Community is currently in 
possession of tremendously valuable intelligence and strategic 
insights derived from its extensive overseas intelligence 
collection efforts that can and should be provided--in both 
classified and unclassified form (when possible)--to the 
private sector to help the owners and operators of the vast 
majority of America's information infrastructure better protect 
themselves. The Committee believes that the Defense Industrial 
Base Opt-in Pilot project (``DIB Pilot''), which has now 
transitioned to the DIB Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (DECS) 
program, is a good model for demonstrating how sensitive 
government threat intelligence can be shared with the private 
sector in an operationally usable manner. Under the DECS, the 
government provides classified threat intelligence to key 
Internet Service Providers, who use the information to protect 
a limited number of companies in the defense industrial base, 
all on a voluntary basis. This program is being expanded to 
non-DIB American companies under DECS program, although the 
effort's progress has been slow. The Committee believes that 
the clear legal authorities in this bill could have eliminated 
much of that delay.
    The Committee's review also determined that while much 
cybersecurity monitoring and threat information sharing takes 
place today within the private sector, real and perceived legal 
barriers to such efforts substantially hamper the efforts of 
even those in the private sector with the best of intentions. 
The Committee determined that these issues are best resolved by 
providing clear, positive authority to permit the monitoring--
by the private sector--of privately-owned and operated networks 
and systems for the purpose of detecting and mitigating 
cybersecurity threats and to permit the voluntary sharing of 
information about those threats and vulnerabilities with 
others, including entities within the private sector and with 
the federal government.
    While some have suggested that the private sector needs 
more regulation or that the government should directly help 
defend certain portions of the private sector, the Committee's 
view is that the protection of the private sector is best left 
in private hands and before reaching for a regulatory 
``stick'', the government should provide as much intelligence 
as possible, in usable form, to better enable voluntary private 
sector efforts. In the view of the Committee, such an 
approach--voluntary, private sector defense of private sector 
systems and networks informed by government intelligence 
information--best protects individual privacy and takes 
advantage of the natural incentives built into our economic 
system, including harnessing private sector drive and 
innovation.
    The Committee's review revealed that America's cyber 
infrastructure is distressingly vulnerable to espionage and 
attacks by nation-states and others with advanced capabilities.

113th Congress

    The Committee has continued its oversight of the advanced 
cyber threats facing the nation, as well as the ongoing efforts 
to protect our nation and our economy from these dangerous 
threats. The Committee focused in particular on the state of 
cyber threat information sharing between the U.S. government 
and private sector, as well as cyber information sharing within 
the private sector. The threat from advanced nation state cyber 
actors, like China and Iran, has only grown since the Committee 
first began its review in the 112th Congress. As the Committee 
continued its work in the 113th Congress a series of high 
profile press revelations concerning Chinese government cyber 
economic espionage directed against American companies and 
institutions, including major newspapers, added impetus to our 
work. Further emphasis was added by press revelations of state-
sponsored cyber distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks 
against major American financial institutions.
    The Committee believes that immediate and serious action is 
necessary to staunch the bleeding of American intellectual 
capital and to better protect our national security. In 
particular, the Committee believes that the Intelligence 
Community must take immediate and decisive action to provide 
intelligence to the private sector to help it better protect 
itself. In turn, the private sector must act aggressively to 
better monitor its own systems and to share information--both 
within the private sector and with the federal government. The 
Committee recognizes that because it focused on the issues 
within its jurisdiction, this legislation does not address many 
of the other issues facing the nation with respect to 
cybersecurity. At the same time, however, the Committee firmly 
believes that this legislation is an important first step in 
the effort to better protect the nation from advanced cyber 
threat actors.

Evolution of Legislation

    Following Committee consideration of H.R. 3523 in the 112th 
Congress, several improvements and changes were made to the 
legislation. Many of those changes were an attempt to address 
perceived privacy and civil liberties deficiencies and are 
detailed below. The bill passed the House of Representatives in 
April, 2012 by a wide bipartisan vote of 248-168. However, 
neither it nor a companion bill moved in the Senate before the 
112th Congress ended. Since that time, the Committee has 
maintained an open dialogue with the Administration, Members of 
Congress and private sector entities, and has actively sought 
to discuss constructive changes to the language in H.R. 624 
that would help allay privacy fears without comprising the 
purpose of the bill.
    On February 13, 2013, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member 
Ruppersberger introduced H.R. 624 in the same form H.R. 3523 
passed the House during the 112th Congress. That bill included 
the various changes to the language that were adopted in an 
attempt to address privacy and civil liberties concerns and 
served as a starting point for additional modifications and 
improvements in the 113th Congress.
    Following introduction, the Committee held an open hearing 
on February 14, 2013 to examine advanced cyber threats facing 
our nation. The witnesses for the hearing were Governor John 
Engler, the former three-term governor of Michigan and 
currently the President of the Business Roundtable; Mr. Ken 
DeFontes, the President and CEO of Baltimore Gas & Electric; 
Mr. Paul Smocer, the President of BITS, the technology policy 
division of the Financial Services Roundtable; and Mr. Kevin 
Mandia, the CEO of MANDIANT Corporation. The hearing largely 
focused on the state of cyber threat information sharing 
between the U.S. government and private sector, as well as 
cyber information sharing within the private sector.
    The Committee considered and favorably reported H.R. 624 on 
April 10, 2013 with amendments by a bipartisan vote of 18-2. 
Many of the amendments were based on further dialogue with the 
private sector, the Administration, and privacy and civil 
liberties advocates. As discussed below, the most notable 
amendments to the bill during Committee consideration were 
designed to further clarify the authorities in response to 
privacy and civil liberties concerns.

Privacy and Civil Liberties

    The Committee has made changes to this legislation at every 
step in the process starting prior to introduction in the 112th 
Congress through the Committee markup in the 113th Congress to 
address privacy and civil liberties concerns. The following 
illustrates extensive changes made to address privacy and civil 
liberties concerns the bill has undergone since the Committee 
last favorably reported the bill.

112th Congress

    1. Changes to the definitions.--The definitions for several 
key provisions in the bill were modified and more narrowly 
crafted to ensure that the legislation works to permit the 
sharing of the types of information necessary to detect protect 
against the cyber threat and to remain adaptable to new 
technology and new intrusion methods over time.
    2. Limits on Government Use.--Throughout the process, the 
Government's use of information share by the private sector has 
been an issue of concern for some and it is an area that has 
been repeatedly clarified in a way to not impede the 
Government's use of cyber threat information to address the 
cyber threat.
    3. IG Provision.--A provision was added that requires the 
Intelligence Community Inspector General to conduct a review of 
activities authorized under the bill and provide a report to 
Congress.
    4. Federal Government Liability.--A private right of action 
against the Federal Government was added to the bill to provide 
federal liability for intentional or willful violations of the 
use or information protection provisions, including damages and 
costs.
    5. Government minimization procedures.--The bill was 
originally silent on government minimization, but a floor 
amendment during the 112th Congress provided the authority for 
the Federal Government to adopt minimization procedures, but 
did not require such.

113th Congress

    During Committee consideration of H.R. 624 several 
provisions were added to further clarify the existing language 
and add adopted language in response to privacy and civil 
liberties concerns raised with the Committee.
    1. Government Minimization.--Mr. Himes offered and the 
Committee adopted an amendment that would require the 
government to establish procedures that minimize the impact on 
privacy and civil liberties, reasonably limit the receipt, 
retention, use and disclosure of cyber threat information that 
is associated with specific persons that is not necessary to 
protect systems or networks from cyber threats in a timely 
manner. The procedures include requirements to safeguard from 
unauthorized access and protect the confidentiality of such 
information non-publicly available cyber threat information 
that could be used to identify specific persons. Importantly, 
however, the procedures must be designed in a way so as not to 
delay or impede the flow of cyber threat information necessary 
to defend against a cyber threat. It is critical that the 
correct balance be struck between creating procedures that 
protect any personally identifying information and ensuring 
that cyber threat information critical to securing our networks 
from cyber intrusion can move in as close to real time as 
possible to and between federal agencies. The amendment also 
included provisions designed to oversee and report compliance 
with the procedures.
    2. National Security Purpose.--Ms. Sewell offered and the 
Committee adopted an amendment that would strike the ``national 
security purpose'' use from the list of five permissible uses 
of shared cyberthreat information by the Federal Government. 
When CISPA was considered on the House Floor during the 112th 
Congress, language was adopted that limited the Federal 
Government's use of cyberthreat information shared by the 
private sector under the bill to five areas: (1) cybersecurity 
purposes; (2) investigation and prosecution of cybersecurity 
crimes; (3) the protection of individuals from bodily harm; (4) 
the protection of minors from child pornography and 
exploitation; and (5) to protect the national security of the 
United States. The ``national security use'' restriction was 
created to give the government flexibility moving forward and 
ensure the bill remained technology neutral. However, many 
opponents of the bill interpreted this as an avenue for the 
Federal Government to do anything it wanted with information 
received under the guise of national security. The Committee 
strongly disagrees with both this interpretation of the bill 
and the insinuation that the Federal Government would use 
``national security'' as a catch-all for otherwise 
impermissible uses of information.
    Given the concerns, however, the Committee voted to remove 
the ``national security purpose'' use in the interest of moving 
the core, critical authorities provided in the legislation 
forward. We recognize that this may mean that the authorities 
have to be revisited sooner than they might have before, but in 
the interest of moving forward adopted the amendment.
    3. Limitation on Private Sector Use.--Mr. Heck and Mr. 
Himes offered and the Committee adopted an amendment that would 
limit the use of cyberthreat information shared with and in the 
private sector by the recipients of such information to 
``cybersecurity purposes.'' It is and has been the intent of 
the Committee that the information shared under these 
authorities could be used by the private sector to better 
secure their networks. However, in response to concerns about 
the private sector selling consumer information for marketing 
purposes and other non cybersecurity purposes, this amendment 
was adopted to clarify this point in the text of the 
legislation.
    4. Oversight and Reporting.--Mr. Thompson offered and the 
Committee adopted an amendment that would enhance the 
Intelligence Community Inspector General review and reporting 
requirement already contained in the bill by adding a 
requirement to consult with the DOD and DOJ Inspectors General, 
as well as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB). It would also add a new report by senior privacy and 
civil liberties officers. Mr. Thompson's amendment will provide 
even more oversight and accountability within the federal 
government, for the activities authorized under this bill. The 
Committee is mindful of the reporting burden on the 
Intelligence Community, but also recognizes the concern with 
ensuring the government is appropriately handling and using 
cyberthreat information obtained under this legislation.

               Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes

    On April 10, 2013, the Committee met in open and closed 
session and ordered the bill H.R. 624 favorably reported, as 
amended.

                              OPEN SESSION

    In open session, the Committee considered the text of the 
bill H.R. 624.
    Chairman Rogers offered an amendment. The amendment 
clarified limitations that could be placed on information 
shared with the Federal Government, requires sharing within the 
Federal Government in as close to real time as possible, 
clarifies that this legislation does not affect other 
requirements in law to report cyber incidents, and made various 
technical changes. The amendment also provided clarification to 
the legislation's liability protection provision. Mr. Schiff 
offered a modification to the amendment, which was agreed to by 
unanimous consent. The amendment, as modified, was agreed to by 
voice vote.
    Mr. Thompson offered an amendment, which amended a 
provision requiring an annual report by the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community (ICIG) reviewing the use of cyber 
threat information provided to the government pursuant to the 
bill. It required the ICIG to consult with the Inspectors 
General of the Justice and Defense Departments, as well as the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Additionally, the 
amendment creates a new review and report by senior privacy and 
civil liberties officers. The amendment was agreed to by voice 
vote.
    Mr. Langevin offered an amendment that would make clear 
that none of the authorities in the bill could be construed to 
permit a cybersecurity provider or self protected entity to 
``hack back'' into others' systems under the authority to 
identify and obtain cyberthreats on its own systems or the 
systems its operating on with consent. The amendment was agreed 
to by voice vote.
    Mr. Heck offered an amendment on behalf of himself and Mr. 
Himes. The amendment would limit the private sector's use of 
cyber threat information received under the authorities in the 
bill to cybersecurity purposes. The amendment was agreed to by 
voice vote.
    Mr. Himes offered an amendment that would require the 
government to establish procedures governing the receipt, 
retention, use and disclosure of non-publicly available cyber 
threat information shared with the Federal Government. It would 
also require the Director of National Intelligence to establish 
a program to monitor and report compliance with the procedures. 
The amendment was agreed to by voice vote.
    Ms. Sewell offered an amendment that would strike 
``national security purpose'' from the enumerated list of 
permissible government uses under (c)(1). There was a motion to 
conduct a portion of debate in closed session, which was agreed 
to by recorded vote of 21 ayes to 0 noes.

        Voting Aye: Mr. Rogers (Chairman), Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
        Miller, Mr. Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, 
        Mr. Westmoreland, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, 
        Mr. Pompeo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
        Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Gutierrez, 
        Mr. Pastor, Mr. Himes, Ms. Sewell.

        Voting No: None.
    The Committee returned to open session. The amendment was 
agreed to by voice vote.

    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment that would remove the 
Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Army, 
the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard 
from the term ``Federal Government'' as set forth in 
(b)(1)(B)(ii). The amendment was not agreed to by a voted of 14 
noes to 5 ayes.

        Voting Aye: Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Pastor, Mr. 
        Himes, Ms. Sewell.

        Voting No: Mr. Rogers (Chairman), Mr. Miller, Mr. 
        Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, Mr. 
        Westmoreland, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, Mr. 
        Pompeo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Langevin.

    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment that would require the 
President to designate an officer who shall establish policies 
and procedures governing the retention, use, and disclosure of 
communications, records, system traffic, or other information 
associated with specific persons by officers, employees and 
agents of the Federal Government in accordance with this 
section, and would establish annual reviews of such. The 
amendment was not agreed to by a voted of 16 noes to 3 ayes.

        Voting Aye: Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Pastor.

        Voting No: Mr. Rogers (Chairman), Mr. Miller, Mr. 
        Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, Mr. 
        Westmoreland, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, Mr. 
        Pompeo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Langevin, 
        Mr. Himes, Ms Sewell.

    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment that would amend the 
Exemption from Liability provision in (b)(4). The amendment was 
not agreed to by a voted of 16 noes to 4 ayes.

        Voting Aye: Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Pastor, Mr. 
        Himes.

        Voting No: Mr. Rogers (Chairman), Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
        Miller, Mr. Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, 
        Mr. Westmoreland, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, 
        Mr. Pompeo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Mr. 
        Langevin, Ms. Sewell.

    Mr. Schiff offered an amendment that would require the 
private sector to take reasonable efforts to remove any 
information that could identify a specific person from cyber 
threat information shared. The amendment was not agreed to by a 
vote of 16 noes to 4 ayes.

        Voting Aye: Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Pastor, Mr. 
        Himes.

        Voting No: Mr. Rogers (Chairman), Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
        Miller, Mr. Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, 
        Mr. Westmoreland, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, 
        Mr. Pompeo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Mr. 
        Langevin, Ms. Sewell.

    The Committee then adopted a motion by the Chairman to 
favorably report the bill H.R. 624 to the House, as amended. 
The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 18 ayes to 2 noes:

        Voting Aye: Mr. Rogers (Chairman), Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
        Miller, Mr. Conaway, Mr. King, Mr. LoBiondo, Mr. Nunes, 
        Mr. Westmoreland, Mrs. Bachmann, Mr. Rooney, Mr. Heck, 
        Mr. Pompeo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Mr. 
        Langevin, Mr. Pastor, Mr. Himes, Ms. Sewell.

        Voting No: Ms. Schakowsky and Mr. Schiff.

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation


                         SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

    The short title of the Act is the Cyber Intelligence 
Sharing and Protection Act.

      SECTION 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

Section 2(a): In General

    This subsection of the Act amends Title XI of the National 
Security Act of 1947 by adding a new section, Section 1104.

Section 1104(a) of Title 50: Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber 
        Threat Intelligence with Private Sector

    Subsection (a) of new Section 1104 provides for the sharing 
of cyber threat intelligence--both classified and 
unclassified--by elements of the Intelligence Community with 
entities in the private sector. It is the view of the Committee 
that the routine and fulsome sharing of such intelligence 
information with appropriate cleared entities and individuals 
within the private sector is critically important to protecting 
the nation from advanced cyber threats. It is critical that as 
much information as possible be shared at machine-speed, in 
real-time, and in a manner that the information--whether 
classified or not--is operationally usable by entities within 
the private sector.
    This subsection seeks to set forth a general framework and 
requires the establishment of specific procedures and 
guidelines to make such sharing happen in the immediate future 
and to make it continue so long as the nation faces this 
significant threat to our national security. The Committee 
intends to engage in vigorous oversight of the Intelligence 
Community use of the authorities under this section and, in 
particular, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI), which is charged with promulgating appropriate 
procedures and guidelines under this subsection. The Committee 
expects to be consulted by ODNI in the formulation of these 
guidelines to ensure that the Committee's intent in achieved by 
them.
    While the term ``private sector'' is not defined in the 
legislation, the Committee intends that term to be given the 
broadest possible meaning and specifically intends the term to 
include utilities, whether organized as public, private, or 
quasi-public entities, to ensure at the entities that provide 
Americans with access to power, water, gas, and other critical 
services are also provided with access to critical federal 
government intelligence regarding cyber threats.
    In addition, the Committee expects that private sector 
entities receiving classified intelligence pursuant to this 
subsection will use this information not only to protect their 
own systems and networks, but also, where they find appropriate 
as a business matter, to sell cybersecurity goods and services 
appropriately incorporating this information to protect other 
corporate customers.
            Paragraph 1: In General
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) requires the Director of 
National Intelligence to establish procedures to allow 
Intelligence Community elements to share cyber threat 
intelligence with the private sector and to encourage the 
sharing of such intelligence. The Committee intends the DNI's 
procedures to create a sea change in the current intelligence 
sharing practices of the Intelligence Community with respect to 
the private sector.
    First, the DNI's procedures should ensure that as much 
cyber threat intelligence as possible is downgraded to the 
lowest classification level possible, including 
declassification where appropriate, and made available to as 
broad an audience in the private sector as possible, consistent 
with the need to protect the national security.
    Second, the DNI's procedures should ensure that cyber 
threat intelligence, including classified information, is 
routinely and consistently provided out to entities and 
individuals in the private sector with the appropriate 
clearances.
            Paragraph 2: Sharing and Use of Classified Intelligence
    Paragraph (2) of subsection (a) requires that the DNI's 
procedures with respect to classified cyber threat intelligence 
require that classified information only be shared with 
certified entities, as defined by the legislation, or with 
individuals who possess appropriate security clearances. 
Certified entities are cybersecurity providers, protected 
entities, or self-protected entities that possess or are 
eligible to obtain a security clearance and can demonstrate to 
the Director of National Intelligence that they are able to 
appropriately protect such classified cyber threat 
intelligence.
    Paragraph (2) also requires that the DNI's procedures 
provide that the sharing of classified cyber threat 
intelligence be consistent with the need to protect national 
security, which as noted above, includes the protection of the 
nation's economic security. As such, the legislation makes 
clear that the Intelligence Community can and should provide 
classified information to the private sector to enable American 
industry to protect itself from the theft of the intellectual 
property that is at the heart of our economic system.
    Finally, paragraph (2) requires that the DNI's procedures 
provide that classified cyber threat intelligence only be used 
by certified entities in a manner that protects the classified 
information from unauthorized disclosure. This provision 
ensures that when certified entities employ classified 
intelligence to protect unclassified systems or networks, they 
do so in a way that does not reveal classified information 
directly or indirectly.
    The Committee expects that the DNI's procedures will be 
flexible in nature and will take account of private sector 
innovation and incorporate current and future information 
sharing and security best practices. As a result, the Committee 
expects the DNI to work closely with the private sector to 
establish these procedures, to work with the private sector to 
meet the requirements of the procedures, and to ensure that 
these procedures result in the routine and consistent sharing 
of operationally-usable cyber threat intelligence. The 
Committee also expects the DNI to review and revise these 
procedures on a regular basis, at least annually, and to 
conduct such review in cooperation with the private sector, as 
well as to account for new technologies and cyber defense 
techniques developed by the private sector in each set of 
revised procedures. The DNI should also strongly consider the 
establishment of a private-sector advisory committee composed 
of senior executives at key private companies to advise on 
these procedures on a regular basis.
            Paragraph 3: Security Clearance Approvals
    Paragraph (3) requires the DNI to issue guidelines allowing 
the head of Intelligence Community elements to grant temporary 
or permanent security clearances to certified entities and 
their employees and officers (including non-employee officers 
such as board members) in order to allow the government to 
share classified cyber security threat intelligence with those 
certified entities. The Committee's intent is that the 
Intelligence Community grant security clearances to entities 
that are involved in protecting their own and their corporate 
customers' networks from cyber threats and that the 
Intelligence Community share cyber threat intelligence to 
protect the nation from advanced cyber threat actors. In 
particular, the Committee wishes to ensure that the private 
sector be able to received highly classified cyber threat 
intelligence, including at the Top Secret/Sensitive 
Compartmented Information level, as appropriate to protect 
national security, and is concerned that certain industries and 
entities may currently lack sufficient clearances at the 
appropriate level.
    Paragraph (3) also requires the DNI's guidelines to allow 
Intelligence Community elements to grant approval for the use 
of appropriate facilities and to expedite security clearances 
as necessary, consistent with the need to protect national 
security. The Committee's intent is that the approval process 
for the granting of security clearances and the use of 
facilities for the handling of classified information be 
expedited and broadened by these provisions.
    Because additional security clearances or facility 
approvals may be necessary to effectuate the goals of this 
legislation, it is further the Committee's intent that the cost 
for these security clearances and facility approvals, as well 
as the underlying investigations and adjudications necessary to 
obtain and maintain them, be fully borne by the private sector. 
As noted above, it is the Committee's intent that private 
sector entities that become certified entities will be able to 
better protect themselves, as well as to sell cybersecurity 
goods and services appropriately incorporating this information 
to protect other corporate customers in the private sector. It 
is therefore the Committee's view that these entities should 
bear the full cost of obtaining access to the valuable cyber 
threat intelligence the government will provide under the 
legislation to certified entities. The Committee therefore 
expects that the DNI's guidelines authorized by the legislation 
will provide for full payment of such costs by the private 
sector entity obtaining the security clearances or facility 
approvals.
            Paragraph 4: No Right or Benefit
    Paragraph (4) makes clear that while the Committee expects 
the Intelligence Community to work with private sector entities 
to help them meet the requirements to serve as a certified 
entity, no private sector entity is entitled to receive cyber 
threat intelligence from the government and that no right or 
benefit to cyber threat intelligence is created by the 
provision of such intelligence to a particular private sector 
entity or group of entities.
    Paragraph (5) places a restriction on further disclosure of 
cyber threat intelligence received from the Federal Government 
by a certified entity other than by another certified entity or 
other appropriate agency or department of the Federal 
Government authorized to receive such cyber threat 
intelligence.

Section 1104(b) of Title 50: Private Sector Use of Cybersecurity 
        Systems and Sharing of Cyber Threat Information

    Subsection (b) of new Section 1104 provides clear, positive 
authority, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to 
private sector entities to monitor their own systems and 
networks or those of their corporate customers through the use 
of cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain cyber threat 
information, and to mitigate threats or vulnerabilities to 
their own systems or networks or those of their corporate 
customers. The Committee intends the notwithstanding clauses 
contained in subsection (b), as applied to this authority, to 
have the effect of removing any prohibition, real or perceived, 
to the monitoring, for cybersecurity purposes, of private 
sector systems and networks by the private sector entities that 
own the systems or networks or by security services contracted 
by the system or network owner to protect those networks and 
systems. Potential barriers to such cybersecurity monitoring 
include federal laws governing electronic surveillance, such as 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and various 
provisions of the federal criminal code, among others.
    Subsection (b) also provides clear, positive authority, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the private 
sector to share cyber threat information identified and 
obtained through such cybersecurity monitoring with other 
entities within the private sector, as well as with the Federal 
Government on a purely voluntary basis, at the discretion of 
the private sector entities whose systems or networks are being 
protected. The Committee intends the notwithstanding clauses 
contained in subsection (b), as applied to this authority, to 
have the effect of removing any prohibition, real or perceived, 
to the sharing of cyber threat information within the private 
sector, as well as with the Federal Government. Potential 
barriers to such sharing absent such positive authority 
include, but are not limited to, provisions of federal 
antitrust law, which some believe may limit sharing of cyber 
threat information between competitors in the private sector, 
as well as provisions of the surveillance laws mentioned above, 
as well as certain provisions of federal telecommunications and 
privacy laws. The provision is not intended to authorize the 
unlawful fixing of prices or other prohibited activities, but 
is intended to permit robust sharing of information amongst 
private sector entities.
    The Committee notes that the protections related to the 
authorities provided in this section are fairly robust, even 
standing alone. First, as noted below, only cyber threat 
information--that is information about a threat to, or 
vulnerability of government or private systems or networks--may 
be identified, obtained, or shared. And any such monitoring or 
sharing may only take place for cybersecurity purposes. And 
finally, the liability protection provided in this subsection 
only applies when an entity is acting in good faith. These 
provisions, taken together and building on top of one another, 
in the Committee's view, are a strong step towards protecting 
the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.
            Paragraph 1: In General
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) provides the twin 
authorities discussed above to cybersecurity providers, who 
provide goods and services to their corporate customers for 
cybersecurity purposes and to self-protected entities, who 
provide such cybersecurity goods and services for themselves. 
In providing these authorities, the legislation makes clear 
that the monitoring and sharing of information either by a 
cybersecurity provider or a self-protected entity may only take 
place for cybersecurity purposes, a defined term that, as 
discussed below, limits the identification, obtaining, and 
sharing of cyber threat information to the protection of 
private or government systems or networks from threats to, or 
vulnerabilities, of those systems or networks. Similarly, the 
identification and obtaining of cyber threat information by a 
provider or a self-protected entity may only take place as part 
of an effort to protect the rights and properties of the 
provider's corporate customer or the self-protected entity 
itself, as the case may be. In this context, it is the 
Committee's intent that the protection of the rights and 
property of a corporate entity includes, but is not limited to, 
the protection of the systems and networks that make up its own 
corporate internal and external information systems but also 
the systems and networks over which it provides services to its 
customers. For example, the Committee expects that an internet 
service provider or telecommunications company may seek to 
protect not only its own corporate networks but also the 
backbone communications systems and networks over which it 
provides services to its customers. Similarly, for example, the 
Committee expects that a utility may seek not only to protect 
its corporate network but may seek to protect the systems and 
networks over which it provides electricity, water, or gas 
services to its customers. The Committee specifically intends 
the authorities provided in subsection (b) to permit private 
sector entities to protect such systems and networks broadly.
    Paragraph (1) also requires that a cybersecurity provider 
obtain the express consent, whether in writing, electronically, 
orally, or otherwise, of its corporate customer before 
conducting any cybersecurity monitoring or sharing under these 
authorities. It is the Committee's intent that express consent 
may be provided on a going-forward basis by a corporate 
customer to a provider for a specified period of time, to be 
determined by the corporate customer.
    In addition, paragraph (1) makes clear that the sharing of 
information either by a cybersecurity provider or a self-
protected entity is to be purely voluntary and at the 
discretion of the entity whose systems or networks are being 
protected. Moreover, the legislation requires that where a 
provider is doing the sharing on behalf of a corporate 
customer, the customer must designate the entities or group of 
entities it wishes to share information with, and that it must 
specifically designate the Federal Government if it wishes to 
share information with the government.
    It is the Committee's expectation that many entities will 
be able to take advantage of the authorities provided in 
paragraph (1) when acting both as a cybersecurity provider and 
as a self-protected entity. For example, an entity such as an 
internet service provider may act as a cybersecurity provider 
when providing managed security services to a corporate 
customer and may simultaneously be acting as a self-protected 
entity when protecting its own corporate systems and networks 
as well as the systems and networks over which it provides 
services to is customers. The Committee's intent is that 
private sector entities will be able to simultaneously take 
advantage of multiple authorities provided within the 
legislation.
            Paragraph 2: Sharing with the Federal Government
    Paragraph (2)(A) requires the head of a department or 
agency of the Federal Government receiving cyber threat 
information under paragraph (1) to share that information with 
the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) of the Department of Homeland Security in as 
close to real time as possible. Paragraph 2 further authorizes 
an entity who is sharing information with NCCIC to request that 
information be provided to another federal agency or department 
and permits the head of NCCIC to do so in as close to real time 
as possible.
    It is the Committee's expectation that the requirement to 
share cyber threat information in as close to real time as 
possible will mean in practice that agencies will automate the 
transfer of information between agencies to the greatest extent 
possible and that information will be provided in a form that 
is usable by the consumers of the information. To the extent 
that automation is not possible or practical, the agencies will 
adopt and maintain a rules based system that minimizes the 
number of interventions or decisions necessary before 
information is shared.
            Paragraph 3: Use and Protection of Information
    Paragraph (3) of subsection (b) provides protections to 
promote the robust sharing of cyber threat information both 
within the private sector as well as from the private sector to 
the government.
    Paragraph (3) provides that cyber threat information shared 
pursuant to paragraph (1) may only be shared in accordance with 
restrictions placed upon such sharing by the protected entity 
or the self-protected entity whose systems and networks are 
being protected and who therefore authorized the sharing. 
Paragraph (3) further provides that these restrictions may 
include the appropriate anonymization or minimization as 
determined by the protected entity or self-protected entity 
authorizing the sharing, but may not limit which federal agency 
receives the information once shared with the Federal 
Government. The Committee's intent is that through paragraphs 
(1), (2) and (3), a private sector entity choosing to share 
cyber threat information under these provisions has may decide 
which government agency it provides the information to, and 
whether the information it shares is anonymized or minimized.
    Paragraph (3) also provides that information shared 
pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be used by a receiving entity 
to gain an unfair competitive advantage to the detriment of the 
entity sharing the information. The Committee understands that 
cybersecurity is enhanced by robust threat information sharing 
within the private sector, both amongst partners and 
competitors, without fear that a competitor will use the cyber 
threat or vulnerability information to unfairly obtain a 
competitive advantage--such as greater market share--rather 
than simply to protect itself. The situation the Committee 
intends this provision to address is best demonstrated by an 
example: Company A shares information about a cyber 
vulnerability in one of its products with Company B, a 
competitor in the same marketplace; Company B the next day puts 
out an advertisement saying, ``Don't buy Company A's product 
because it has the following vulnerability . . . instead, buy 
our product which doesn't have the same vulnerabilities.'' This 
provision is not intended to prevent any company from obtaining 
a fair competitive advantage by, for example, using the shared 
information to build a better, more secure product that can be 
marketed without reference to the vulnerability shared by the 
particular entity. In addition, the Committee wishes to note 
that the provision is not accompanied by any private or public 
cause of action and thus may only be enforced by a private 
party choosing to limit or completely curtail sharing of cyber 
threat information with a bad actor (as well as encouraging 
others to do so also).
    Paragraph (3) further provides that cyber threat 
information voluntarily shared with the Federal Government 
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be exempt from disclosure under 
the Freedom of Information Act, shall be considered proprietary 
information, shall not be disclosed by the Federal Government 
to an entity outside the Federal Government except as 
authorized by the entity sharing the information, and shall not 
be used by the Federal Government for regulatory purposes. The 
Committee intends this provision to address the key concerns 
expressed by the private sector regarding the sharing of their 
sensitive information with the federal government: first, that 
the government might expose its most sensitive threat and 
vulnerability information to a wide audience by releasing the 
information, thereby providing a roadmap for attacks by cyber 
threat actors; second, that the government might take the 
information provided by the private sector and use it to 
regulate or impose sanctions upon them.
    The Committee determined that the best way to address these 
concerns and incentivize the sharing of cyber threat 
information with the government was to explicitly and clearly 
protect the information from being disclosed, to require the 
government to carefully protect the information, and finally, 
to prohibit the government from using information provided in 
this cybersecurity channel from being used for regulatory 
purposes. The Committee was cognizant of the fact that cyber 
threat information provided to the government under these 
authorities might also be required to be provided by certain 
private sector entities to their regulators and therefore 
provided elsewhere in the legislation that the mere 
classification of the information as cyber threat information 
or its provision to the government under this mechanism does 
not satisfy those regulatory requirements nor override any 
appropriate regulation that may take place based on the 
provision of such information to the government through other 
channels. Rather, the limitation on regulatory action was 
designed by the Committee to provide a safe harbor where 
private sector entities could provide real-time cyber threat 
information to the government without fear that that particular 
information would be used to regulate them directly.
    Paragraph 3 also provides that such information shall not 
be provided by the receiving agency of the Federal Government 
to another if the head of the receiving agency or the entity 
providing the information determines it will undermine the 
purpose of the sharing. It also provides shall be handled by 
the government consistent with the need to protect sources and 
methods and the national security.
            Paragraph 4: Exemption from Liability
    Paragraph (4) provides a bar to civil or criminal causes of 
action being brought or maintained in federal or state court 
against an entity or its officers, employees, or agents acting 
in good faith to use cybersecurity systems for monitoring to 
identify and obtain cyber threat information in accordance with 
the provisions of the legislation. The Committee's intent is to 
provide strong liability protection for private sector entities 
when they act to take advantage of the authorities provided 
under paragraph (1) of subsection (b) to do what the statute 
seeks to encourage them to do: robustly monitor their own 
systems and networks and those of their corporate customers and 
share information about threats and vulnerabilities to better 
protect their systems. Specifically, the Committee intends that 
civil or criminal actions based on the use of cybersecurity 
systems to monitor systems or networks to identify and obtain 
cyber threat information using the authorities of this statute 
shall be dismissed immediately by the courts and prior to 
significant discovery and extensive motion practice.
    Paragraph (4) also provides an identical bar to actions 
against such entities acting in good faith for decisions made 
for cybersecurity purposes based on cyber threat information 
identified, obtained or shared under this section. The 
Committee believes that if information sharing does become 
truly robust, the amount of cyber threat information and the 
speed with which such information will be shared will make it 
nearly impossible to always protect against every threat in 
real-time and, as such, private sector entities ought not be 
held liable for such actions. Similarly, the Committee 
recognizes that particular entities may engage in a cost-
benefit analysis with respect to implementing protections 
against particular threats and the Committee intends this 
provision to help ensure that a private sector entity making 
such a judgment not be held liable for making such reasonable 
determinations.
    At the same time, the Committee was fully cognizant of the 
concern that it not create a moral hazard by providing too 
broad a liability protection provision and that it not 
incentivize bad acts. As a result, Paragraph (4) requires that 
the entity be acting in good faith to obtain the benefits of 
this liability protection. Therefore, the Committee included an 
amendment during markup which is intended to construe the scope 
of the liability provision. It makes clear that certain acts or 
omissions taken with intent to injure, defraud, or otherwise 
endanger an individual, government or private entity or utility 
would not receive protection from liability. That is, where an 
entity acts in bad faith, it does not receive the benefit of 
the strong liability protection provided by the legislation. Of 
course, where an entity is seeking to take advantage of 
specific statutory authority provided by Congress and where 
Congress is seeking to incentivize cybersecurity activities, as 
with government action taken pursuant to statutory authority 
and the presumption of regularity that attaches to such 
actions, the Committee expects that good faith will be presumed 
in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary.
            Paragraph 5: Relationship to Other Laws Requiring the 
                    Disclosure of Information
    Paragraph (5)(A) provides that the provision of cyber 
threat information to the government under the voluntary system 
established by this statute does not satisfy or affect any 
requirement under other provisions of law to provide 
information to the Federal Government. As noted briefly 
earlier, the Committee intends this provision to ensure that 
while information provided to the government under this 
legislation is protected from use by the government for 
regulatory purposes, that information otherwise required to be 
provided to the government must still be provided and that such 
information--required by other law to be provided to the 
government--may still be used for all lawful purposes, 
including, as required by law, for regulatory purposes.
    Paragraph (5)(B) provides that provision of cyber threat 
information to the government under these authorities would 
also not satisfy or affect the applicability of other 
provisions of law including FOIA, with respect to information 
required to be provided to the Federal Government.

Section 1104(c) of Title 50: Federal Government Use of Information

    Subsection (c) of new Section 1104 provides certain 
limitations on the government's use of cyber threat information 
provided by the private sector and ensures that the private 
sector's provision of information to the government is purely 
voluntary. The Committee intends these provisions, along with 
others in the legislation, to help protect the privacy and 
civil liberties of Americans.
            Paragraph (1): Limitation
    Paragraph (1) of subsection (c) limits the Federal 
Government's use of information shared with the government by 
the private sector to four specific areas: 1) for cybersecurity 
purposes; 2) to investigate and prosecute cybersecurity crimes; 
3) to protect individuals from the danger of death or serious 
bodily harm and the investigation and prosecution of such; and 
4) to protect minors from child pornography, sexual 
exploitation, and serious threats to the physical safety of 
such minors and to investigate and prosecute such crimes.
            Paragraph 2: Affirmative Search Restriction
    Paragraph (2) limits the Federal Government's affirmative 
searching of data provided exclusively under this legislation 
to the government by the private sector to only the permissible 
uses enumerated in paragraph (1). The Committee intends this 
provision to ensure that information provided under this 
authority not be affirmatively searched by the government for 
other purposes. At the same time, however, the Committee does 
not intend this provision to limit in any way the government's 
ability to act on information that is discovered in the process 
of searching or analyzing the information provided for the 
specified purposes.
            Paragraph 3: Anti-Tasking Restrictions
    Paragraph (3) makes clear that nothing in this legislation 
permits the government to require a private sector entity to 
share with the Federal Government nor to condition the sharing 
of cyber threat intelligence under subsection (a) on the 
provision of cyber threat information back to the Federal 
Government under subsection (b). The Committee intends this 
provision to ensure that cyber threat information sharing by 
the private sector with the Federal Government remains purely 
voluntary and that the government not attempt to compel such 
sharing by withholding valuable cyber threat intelligence. The 
Committee believes that this provision also prevents the 
government from ``tasking'' the collection of information as 
the government might do under appropriate criminal or foreign 
intelligence surveillance authority because it ensures that the 
private sector cannot be required to provide information back 
to the government.
            Paragraph 4: Protection of Sensitive Personal Documents
    Paragraph (4) limits the Federal Government's use of 
library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales 
records, book customer lists, firearms sales records, tax 
return records, educational records and medical records.
    Paragraph (5) requires the Federal Government to notify the 
provider of information shared under (b)(1) if it determines 
the information is not cyber threat information.
    Paragraph (6) prohibits the Federal Government from 
retaining or using information shared under (b)(1) for any use 
other than a permissible use under (c)(1).
    Paragraph (7) requires the DNI to establish procedures 
governing the receipt, retention, use and disclosure of non-
publicly available cyber threat information shared with the 
Federal Government under (b)(1). The policies and procedures 
must minimize the impact on privacy and civil liberties, 
reasonably limit the receipt, retention, use and disclosure of 
cyber threat information not necessary to protect systems from 
cyber threats, and to protect the confidentiality of cyber 
threat information associated with specific persons as well as 
to guard such information from unauthorized access. The 
procedures must also not delay or impede the flow of cyber 
threat information necessary to defend against or mitigate a 
cyber threat. The procedures must be implemented by agencies 
receiving cyber threat information under (b)(1) and must be 
submitted to Congress. Additionally, the DNI must establish a 
program to monitor and oversee compliance with the procedures, 
and agencies receiving cyber threat information under (b)(1) 
must report compliance incidents to the DNI, AG and the 
intelligence committees.

Section 1104(d) of Title 50: Federal Government Liability for 
        Violations of Restrictions on the Disclosure, Use, and 
        Protection of Voluntarily Shared Information

    Subsection (d) creates a cause of action for persons 
adversely affected by a willful or intentional violation of 
(b)(3)(D) or (c) of the section. The liability avenue also 
provides for damages and costs and attorney fees.

Section 1104(e) of Title 50: Report on Information Sharing

    Subsection (e) of new Section 1104 requires the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the 
Inspectors General of the Justice and Defense Departments, and 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to report 
annually to the Congressional intelligence committees, in 
unclassified form accompanied by a classified annex as needed, 
on the use of the information shared with the Federal 
Government under this legislation. The report on the use of 
information shared with the Federal Government will include: 
(1) a review of the use of such information for purposes other 
than cybersecurity; (2) a review of the type of information 
shared with the Federal Government; (3) a review of the actions 
taken by the Federal Government based on the information 
shared; (4) appropriate metrics to determine the impact of such 
sharing on privacy and civil liberties, if any such impact 
exists; and (5) any recommendations of the Inspector General 
for improvements or modifications to the authorities provided 
under this legislation. It is the Committee's intent that this 
report provide the Committee with the information it needs to 
ensure that the privacy and civil liberties of Americans are 
being appropriately protected.

Section 1104(f) of Title 50: Federal Preemption

    Subsection (f) of new Section 1104 provides that the 
legislation supersedes any provision of state or local law that 
may prohibit the activities authorized by this legislation. The 
Committee's intent is to ensure, as with the federal provisions 
discussed above, that state and local law on wiretapping, 
antitrust, and public disclosure, to name but a few, do not 
stand as a bar to the kind of robust cyber threat intelligence 
and information sharing that the Committee hopes to engender 
through the process of legislation.

Section 1104(g) of Title 50: Savings Clauses

    Subsection (g)(1) of new Section 1104 makes clear that 
nothing in this legislation trumps existing laws or authorities 
permitting the use of cybersecurity systems or efforts to 
identify, obtain, or share cyber threat information. Many 
private sector entities today take advantage of certain 
provisions of federal law to conduct the limited monitoring for 
cybersecurity purposes. While this legislation provides much 
more robust authorities, the Committee believed it important to 
ensure that existing authorities remained in place and that 
those authorities could continue to be used by the appropriate 
government agencies and entities.
    Paragraph (2) makes clear that nothing in the legislation 
may be construed as providing additional authority to or 
modifying existing authority of the Department of Defense 
including the National Security Agency or any other element of 
the Intelligence Community to control or direct the 
cybersecurity efforts of a private sector entity or component 
of the Federal Government or state, local or tribal government.
    Paragraph (3) makes clear that nothing in the legislation 
can be construed to limit or modify an existing information 
sharing relationship, or prohibit or require a new information 
sharing relationship. It also makes clear that nothing in this 
legislation modifies the authority of a department or agency of 
the Federal Government to protect sources and methods and the 
national security of the United States, and nothing shall be 
construed to preclude the Federal Government from requiring 
reporting on significant cyber incidents already authorized or 
required under law.
    Paragraph (4) makes clear that the legislation cannot be 
construed to provide additional authority to or modify existing 
authority of any entity to use a cybersecurity system owned or 
controlled by the federal Government on a private sector system 
or network to protect such.
    Paragraph (5) makes clear that nothing in the legislation 
can be construed to subject anyone to liability for choosing 
not to engage in the voluntary activities authorized under the 
legislation.
    Paragraph (6) makes clear that the legislation cannot be 
construed to authorize the Federal Government to retain or use 
information shared under (b)(1) of the legislation for any use 
other than those authorized under (c)(1).

Section 1104(g) of Title 50: Definitions

    Subsection (g) of the new Section 1104 provides important 
definitions for the purpose of this legislation. The Committee 
notes that much of the work on limiting the scope and breadth 
of this legislation is done by the definitions and commends 
those interested in this legislation to carefully review these 
definitions in the context of the legislation.
            Paragraph 1: Availability
    Defines the term ``availability'' to mean ensuring timely 
and reliable access to and use of information.
            Paragraph 2: Certified Entity
    As noted briefly above, a certified entity is defined as a 
cybersecurity provider, a protected entity, or a self-protected 
entity that also possesses or is eligible to obtain a security 
clearance at the level appropriate to receive classified cyber 
threat intelligence, as determined by the DNI, and can 
demonstrate to the Director of National Intelligence that it 
can appropriately protect that classified information.
            Paragraph 3: Confidentiality
    The term confidentiality is defined as preserving 
authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary 
information.
            Paragraph 4: Cyber Threat Information
    Cyber threat information is defined to mean information 
that directly pertains to a vulnerability of, or threat to the 
integrity, confidentiality or availability of, a system or 
network of a government or private entity. Such information 
includes, but is not limited to, information pertaining to the 
protection of a system or network from efforts to deny access 
to, degrade, disrupt or destroy the network, as well as efforts 
to gain unauthorized access to such system for the purpose of 
exfiltrating information from the system or network. The 
Committee specifically excluded from the definition of 
cyberthreat information pertaining to efforts to gain 
unauthorized access to such system or network that solely 
involve violations of consumer terms of service or consumer 
licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute 
unauthorized access.
            Paragraph 5: Cyber Threat Intelligence
    The definition of cyber threat intelligence is consistent 
with the definition of cyber threat information except that 
cyber threat intelligence is information that is originally in 
the possession of an element of the Intelligence Community. The 
Committee used different terms in this legislation with similar 
definitions in order to distinguish the origin of information.
            Paragraph 6: Cybersecurity Crime
    Cybersecurity crime is defined as a crime a crime under 
federal or state law that involves efforts to deny access, 
degrade, disrupt, destroy, gain unauthorized access to a system 
or network or to exfiltrate information from a system or 
network without authorization. The definition also means a 
violation of federal law relating to computer crimes including 
a violation of any provision of Title 18 of the United States 
code that was created or amended by the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act of 1986.
            Paragraph 7: Cybersecurity Provider
    A cybersecurity provider is defined to be a non federal 
entity that provides goods or services intended to be used for 
cybersecurity purposes. The Committee intentionally excluded 
federal entities from this construct to avoid any concern that 
federal government agencies might serve as cybersecurity 
providers to private sector entities.
            Paragraph 8: Cybersecurity Purpose
    A cybersecurity purpose is defined as the purpose of 
ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of, 
or safeguarding, a system or network. This includes, but is not 
limited to, the protection of a system or network from a 
vulnerability of a system or network, a threat to the 
integrity, confidentiality, or availability of a network, 
efforts to deny access to, degrade, disrupt or destroy a 
network, as well as the protection of a system or network from 
efforts to gain unauthorized access for the purpose of 
exfiltrating information.
            Paragraph 9: Cybersecurity System
    A cybersecurity system is defined as a system designed or 
employed to ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and 
availability of, or safeguard, a system or network. This 
includes, but is not limited to, a system designed or employed 
to protect a system or network from a vulnerability of a system 
or network, a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or 
availability of a network, efforts to deny access to, degrade, 
disrupt or destroy a network, as well as the protection of a 
system or network from efforts to gain unauthorized access for 
the purpose of exfiltrating information. It does not include, 
however, a system designed or employed to protect a system or 
network from efforts to gain unauthorized access to such that 
solely involves violations of consumer terms of service or 
consumer licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute 
unauthorized access.
            Paragraph 10: Integrity
    The term integrity as used in this legislation means 
guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, including ensuring information nonrepudiation and 
authenticity.
            Paragraph 11: Protected Entity
    A protected entity is defined as an entity, other than an 
individual, that contracts with a cybersecurity provider for 
goods or services to be used for cybersecurity purposes. The 
Committee intentionally excluded individuals from this 
definition so as to limit the direct scope of the legislation 
to the protection of corporate entities.
            Paragraph 12: Self-Protected Entity
    A self-protected entity is defined as an entity, other than 
an individual, that provides goods or services for 
cybersecurity purposes to itself. As with the definition of a 
protected entity, the Committee intentionally excluded 
individuals from this definition so as to limit the direct 
scope of the legislation to the protection of corporate 
entities.
            Paragraph 13: Utility
    The term utility means an entity providing essential 
services (other than law enforcement or regulatory services), 
including electricity, natural gas, propane, 
telecommunications, transportation, water or wastewater 
services.

Section 2(b): Procedures and Guidelines

    This subsection of the Act requires the DNI to establish 
the procedures for sharing of cyber threat intelligence and to 
issue the guidelines for granting security clearances within 60 
days of the date of enactment of the Act. This subsection of 
the Act also requires the DNI to expeditiously distribute the 
procedures and guidelines to appropriate federal government and 
private sector entities. The Committee intends to require the 
DNI to meet these deadlines and to broadly distribute the 
procedures and guidelines. As previously noted, the Committee 
expects the DNI to work closely with the private sector in 
developing these procedures and guidelines.

Section 2(c): Privacy and Civil Liberties Policies and Procedures

    This subsection requires the DNI to establish the 
procedures for minimizing privacy and civil liberties within 60 
days of the date of enactment of the Act.

Section 2(d): Initial Reports

    This subsection of the Act requires the first reports to be 
provided to the Congressional intelligence committees by the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community under 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (e) of section 1104 to be 
provided no later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.

Section 2(e): Table of Contents Amendment

    This subsection of the Act provides for amendments to the 
table of contents of the National Security Act of 1947.

Section 3: Sunset

    Section (3) sets a five year sunset on the legislation from 
the date of enactment.

                 Oversight Findings and Recommendations

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee held one open 
hearing, and numerous informal information meetings or 
briefings during the 113th Congress. The Committee also held 
hearings, briefings and informational meetings during the 112th 
Congress, detailed in footnote 1, above. The Committee's 
extensive oversight of the cyber threat resulted in the subject 
matter bill which would authorize cyber threat information 
sharing between and amongst the private sector and government 
for the purposes of better securing systems and networks 
against the cyber threat.

         Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives

    The goals and objectives of H.R. 624 are to provide clear 
legal authority for sharing cyber threat information between 
and among private sector entities and the Federal Government, 
and to enhance the security of networks from the growing cyber 
intrusion threat.

                       Unfunded Mandate Statement

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act (as amended by section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of 
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded 
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee 
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office 
included herein.

                  Statement on Congressional Earmarks

    Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, the Committee states that the bill as 
reported contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax 
benefits, or limited tariff benefits.

     Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives and section 402 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received 
the following cost estimate for H.R. 624 from the Director of 
the Congressional Budget Office.

                                                    April 12, 2013.
Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman:  The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 624, the Cyber 
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Jason 
Wheelock and Ray Hall.
            Sincerely,
                                              Douglas W. Elmendorf.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 624--Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act

    H.R. 624 would amend the National Security Act of 1947 to 
require the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to 
establish procedures to promote the sharing of information 
about cyber threats between intelligence agencies and the 
private sector. The DNI also would be directed to establish 
guidelines for granting security clearances to employees of the 
private-sector entities with which the government shares such 
information. CBO estimates that implementing the bill would 
have a discretionary cost of $20 million over the 2014-2018 
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. 
Enacting H.R. 624 could affect direct spending or revenues; 
therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. However, CBO 
estimates that those effects would be insignificant for each 
year.
    CBO anticipates additional personnel would be needed to 
administer the program and to manage the exchange of 
information between intelligence agencies and the private 
sector. Based on information from the DNI and the Office of 
Personnel Management, CBO estimates that those activities would 
cost approximately $4 million annually over the 2014-2018 
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts.
    H.R. 624 would allow for a person to collect damages and 
attorney's fees if the federal government intentionally or 
willfully violated the conditions in the bill regarding the 
handling and use of information shared with the government and 
that person was harmed by such actions. Because any costs borne 
by the government for those cases would probably be paid from 
the Treasury's Judgment Fund (a permanent, indefinite 
appropriation for claims and judgments against the United 
States), the bill could affect direct spending. However, CBO 
anticipates that any such cases would be rare and that the 
impact on direct spending would be insignificant in every year.
    The bill would impose intergovernmental and private-sector 
mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 
(UMRA), by extending civil and criminal liability protection to 
entities and cybersecurity providers that share or use cyber 
threat information. The bill also would impose additional 
intergovernmental mandates on state governments by preempting 
state disclosure and liability laws. Because of uncertainty 
about the number of cases that would be limited and any forgone 
compensation that would result from compensatory damages, CBO 
cannot determine whether the costs of the mandate would exceed 
the annual threshold established in UMRA for private-sector 
mandates ($150 million in 2013, adjusted annually for 
inflation). However, CBO estimates that the aggregate costs of 
the mandates on public entities would fall below the threshold 
for intergovernmental mandates ($75 million in 2013, adjusted 
annually for inflation).
    The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jason Wheelock 
and Ray Hall (for federal costs), J'nell J. Blanco (for the 
intergovernmental impact), and Elizabeth Bass (for the private-
sector impact). This estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, 
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, and existing law in which no 
change is proposed is shown in roman):

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947


                              short title

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
     * * * * * * *

                       TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



           CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

  Sec. 1104. (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Intelligence with Private Sector and Utilities.--
          (1) In general.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall establish procedures to allow 
        elements of the intelligence community to share cyber 
        threat intelligence with private-sector entities and 
        utilities and to encourage the sharing of such 
        intelligence.
          (2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The 
        procedures established under paragraph (1) shall 
        provide that classified cyber threat intelligence may 
        only be--
                  (A) shared by an element of the intelligence 
                community with--
                          (i) a certified entity; or
                          (ii) a person with an appropriate 
                        security clearance to receive such 
                        cyber threat intelligence;
                  (B) shared consistent with the need to 
                protect the national security of the United 
                States; and
                  (C) used by a certified entity in a manner 
                which protects such cyber threat intelligence 
                from unauthorized disclosure.
          (3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of 
        National Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing 
        that the head of an element of the intelligence 
        community may, as the head of such element considers 
        necessary to carry out this subsection--
                  (A) grant a security clearance on a temporary 
                or permanent basis to an employee or officer of 
                a certified entity;
                  (B) grant a security clearance on a temporary 
                or permanent basis to a certified entity and 
                approval to use appropriate facilities; and
                  (C) expedite the security clearance process 
                for a person or entity as the head of such 
                element considers necessary, consistent with 
                the need to protect the national security of 
                the United States.
          (4) No right or benefit.--The provision of 
        information to a private-sector entity or a utility 
        under this subsection shall not create a right or 
        benefit to similar information by such entity or such 
        utility or any other private-sector entity or utility.
          (5) Restriction on disclosure of cyber threat 
        intelligence.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law, a certified entity receiving cyber threat 
        intelligence pursuant to this subsection shall not 
        further disclose such cyber threat intelligence to 
        another entity, other than to a certified entity or 
        other appropriate agency or department of the Federal 
        Government authorized to receive such cyber threat 
        intelligence.
  (b) Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Information.--
          (1) In general.--
                  (A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding 
                any other provision of law, a cybersecurity 
                provider, with the express consent of a 
                protected entity for which such cybersecurity 
                provider is providing goods or services for 
                cybersecurity purposes, may, for cybersecurity 
                purposes--
                          (i) use cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify and obtain cyber threat 
                        information to protect the rights and 
                        property of such protected entity; and
                          (ii) share such cyber threat 
                        information with any other entity 
                        designated by such protected entity, 
                        including, if specifically designated, 
                        the Federal Government.
                  (B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding 
                any other provision of law, a self-protected 
                entity may, for cybersecurity purposes--
                          (i) use cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify and obtain cyber threat 
                        information to protect the rights and 
                        property of such self-protected entity; 
                        and
                          (ii) share such cyber threat 
                        information with any other entity, 
                        including the Federal Government.
          (2) Sharing with the Federal Government.--
                  (A) Information shared with the national 
                cybersecurity and communications integration 
                center of the department of homeland 
                security.--Subject to the use and protection of 
                information requirements under paragraph (3), 
                the head of a department or agency of the 
                Federal Government receiving cyber threat 
                information in accordance with paragraph (1) 
                shall provide such cyber threat information in 
                as close to real time as possible to the 
                National Cybersecurity and Communications 
                Integration Center of the Department of 
                Homeland Security.
                  (B) Request to share with another department 
                or agency of the federal government.--An entity 
                sharing cyber threat information that is 
                provided to the National Cybersecurity and 
                Communications Integration Center of the 
                Department of Homeland Security under 
                subparagraph (A) or paragraph (1) may request 
                the head of such Center to, and the head of 
                such Center may, provide such information in as 
                close to real time as possible to another 
                department or agency of the Federal Government.
          (3) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat 
        information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
                  (A) shall only be shared in accordance with 
                any restrictions placed on the sharing of such 
                information by the protected entity or self-
                protected entity authorizing such sharing, 
                including appropriate anonymization or 
                minimization of such information and excluding 
                limiting a department or agency of the Federal 
                Government from sharing such information with 
                another department or agency of the Federal 
                Government in accordance with this section;
                  (B) may not be used by an entity to gain an 
                unfair competitive advantage to the detriment 
                of the protected entity or the self-protected 
                entity authorizing the sharing of information;
                  (C) may only be used by a non-Federal 
                recipient of such information for a 
                cybersecurity purpose;
                  (D) if shared with the Federal Government--
                          (i) shall be exempt from disclosure 
                        under section 552 of title 5, United 
                        States Code (commonly known as the 
                        ``Freedom of Information Act'');
                          (ii) shall be considered proprietary 
                        information and shall not be disclosed 
                        to an entity outside of the Federal 
                        Government except as authorized by the 
                        entity sharing such information;
                          (iii) shall not be used by the 
                        Federal Government for regulatory 
                        purposes;
                          (iv) shall not be provided by the 
                        department or agency of the Federal 
                        Government receiving such cyber threat 
                        information to another department or 
                        agency of the Federal Government under 
                        paragraph (2)(A) if--
                                  (I) the entity providing such 
                                information determines that the 
                                provision of such information 
                                will undermine the purpose for 
                                which such information is 
                                shared; or
                                  (II) unless otherwise 
                                directed by the President, the 
                                head of the department or 
                                agency of the Federal 
                                Government receiving such cyber 
                                threat information determines 
                                that the provision of such 
                                information will undermine the 
                                purpose for which such 
                                information is shared; and
                          (v) shall be handled by the Federal 
                        Government consistent with the need to 
                        protect sources and methods and the 
                        national security of the United States; 
                        and
                  (E) shall be exempt from disclosure under a 
                State, local, or tribal law or regulation that 
                requires public disclosure of information by a 
                public or quasi-public entity.
          (4) Exemption from liability.--
                  (A) Exemption.--No civil or criminal cause of 
                action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or 
                State court against a protected entity, self-
                protected entity, cybersecurity provider, or an 
                officer, employee, or agent of a protected 
                entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
                provider, acting in good faith--
                          (i) for using cybersecurity systems 
                        to identify or obtain cyber threat 
                        information or for sharing such 
                        information in accordance with this 
                        section; or
                          (ii) for decisions made for 
                        cybersecurity purposes and based on 
                        cyber threat information identified, 
                        obtained, or shared under this section.
                  (B) Lack of good faith.--For purposes of the 
                exemption from liability under subparagraph 
                (A), a lack of good faith includes, but is not 
                limited to, any act or omission taken with 
                intent to injure, defraud, or otherwise 
                endanger any individual, government entity, 
                private entity, or utility.
          (5) Relationship to other laws requiring the 
        disclosure of information.--The submission of 
        information under this subsection to the Federal 
        Government shall not satisfy or affect--
                  (A) any requirement under any other provision 
                of law for a person or entity to provide 
                information to the Federal Government; or
                  (B) the applicability of other provisions of 
                law, including section 552 of title 5, United 
                States Code (commonly known as the ``Freedom of 
                Information Act''), with respect to information 
                required to be provided to the Federal 
                Government under such other provision of law.
          (6) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection 
        shall be construed to provide new authority to--
                  (A) a cybersecurity provider to use a 
                cybersecurity system to identify or obtain 
                cyber threat information from a system or 
                network other than a system or network owned or 
                operated by a protected entity for which such 
                cybersecurity provider is providing goods or 
                services for cybersecurity purposes; or
                  (B) a self-protected entity to use a 
                cybersecurity system to identify or obtain 
                cyber threat information from a system or 
                network other than a system or network owned or 
                operated by such self-protected entity.
  (c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
          (1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber 
        threat information shared with the Federal Government 
        in accordance with subsection (b)--
                  (A) for cybersecurity purposes;
                  (B) for the investigation and prosecution of 
                cybersecurity crimes;
                  (C) for the protection of individuals from 
                the danger of death or serious bodily harm and 
                the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
                involving such danger of death or serious 
                bodily harm; or
                  (D) for the protection of minors from child 
                pornography, any risk of sexual exploitation, 
                and serious threats to the physical safety of 
                minors, including kidnapping and trafficking 
                and the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
                involving child pornography, any risk of sexual 
                exploitation, and serious threats to the 
                physical safety of minors, including kidnapping 
                and trafficking, and any crime referred to in 
                section 2258A(a)(2) of title 18, United States 
                Code.
          (2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal 
        Government may not affirmatively search cyber threat 
        information shared with the Federal Government under 
        subsection (b) for a purpose other than a purpose 
        referred to in paragraph (1).
          (3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this 
        section shall be construed to permit the Federal 
        Government to--
                  (A) require a private-sector entity or 
                utility to share information with the Federal 
                Government; or
                  (B) condition the sharing of cyber threat 
                intelligence with a private-sector entity or 
                utility on the provision of cyber threat 
                information to the Federal Government.
          (4) Protection of sensitive personal documents.--The 
        Federal Government may not use the following 
        information, containing information that identifies a 
        person, shared with the Federal Government in 
        accordance with subsection (b) unless such information 
        is used in accordance with the policies and procedures 
        established under paragraph (7):
                  (A) Library circulation records.
                  (B) Library patron lists.
                  (C) Book sales records.
                  (D) Book customer lists.
                  (E) Firearms sales records.
                  (F) Tax return records.
                  (G) Educational records.
                  (H) Medical records.
          (5) Notification of non-cyber threat information.--If 
        a department or agency of the Federal Government 
        receiving information pursuant to subsection (b)(1) 
        determines that such information is not cyber threat 
        information, such department or agency shall notify the 
        entity or provider sharing such information pursuant to 
        subsection (b)(1).
          (6) Retention and use of cyber threat information.--
        No department or agency of the Federal Government shall 
        retain or use information shared pursuant to subsection 
        (b)(1) for any use other than a use permitted under 
        subsection (c)(1).
          (7) Privacy and civil liberties.--
                  (A) Policies and procedures.--The Director of 
                National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
                Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney 
                General, shall establish and periodically 
                review policies and procedures governing the 
                receipt, retention, use, and disclosure of non-
                publicly available cyber threat information 
                shared with the Federal Government in 
                accordance with subsection (b)(1). Such 
                policies and procedures shall, consistent with 
                the need to protect systems and networks from 
                cyber threats and mitigate cyber threats in a 
                timely manner--
                          (i) minimize the impact on privacy 
                        and civil liberties;
                          (ii) reasonably limit the receipt, 
                        retention, use, and disclosure of cyber 
                        threat information associated with 
                        specific persons that is not necessary 
                        to protect systems or networks from 
                        cyber threats or mitigate cyber threats 
                        in a timely manner;
                          (iii) include requirements to 
                        safeguard non-publicly available cyber 
                        threat information that may be used to 
                        identify specific persons from 
                        unauthorized access or acquisition;
                          (iv) protect the confidentiality of 
                        cyber threat information associated 
                        with specific persons to the greatest 
                        extent practicable; and
                          (v) not delay or impede the flow of 
                        cyber threat information necessary to 
                        defend against or mitigate a cyber 
                        threat.
                  (B) Submission to Congress.--The Director of 
                National Intelligence shall, consistent with 
                the need to protect sources and methods, submit 
                to Congress the policies and procedures 
                required under subparagraph (A) and any updates 
                to such policies and procedures.
                  (C) Implementation.--The head of each 
                department or agency of the Federal Government 
                receiving cyber threat information shared with 
                the Federal Government under subsection (b)(1) 
                shall--
                          (i) implement the policies and 
                        procedures established under 
                        subparagraph (A); and
                          (ii) promptly notify the Director of 
                        National Intelligence, the Attorney 
                        General, and the congressional 
                        intelligence committees of any 
                        significant violations of such policies 
                        and procedures.
                  (D) Oversight.--The Director of National 
                Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney 
                General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
                and the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a 
                program to monitor and oversee compliance with 
                the policies and procedures established under 
                subparagraph (A).
  (d) Federal Government Liability for Violations of 
Restrictions on the Disclosure, Use, and Protection of 
Voluntarily Shared Information.--
          (1) In general.--If a department or agency of the 
        Federal Government intentionally or willfully violates 
        subsection (b)(3)(D) or subsection (c) with respect to 
        the disclosure, use, or protection of voluntarily 
        shared cyber threat information shared under this 
        section, the United States shall be liable to a person 
        adversely affected by such violation in an amount equal 
        to the sum of--
                  (A) the actual damages sustained by the 
                person as a result of the violation or $1,000, 
                whichever is greater; and
                  (B) the costs of the action together with 
                reasonable attorney fees as determined by the 
                court.
          (2) Venue.--An action to enforce liability created 
        under this subsection may be brought in the district 
        court of the United States in--
                  (A) the district in which the complainant 
                resides;
                  (B) the district in which the principal place 
                of business of the complainant is located;
                  (C) the district in which the department or 
                agency of the Federal Government that disclosed 
                the information is located; or
                  (D) the District of Columbia.
          (3) Statute of limitations.--No action shall lie 
        under this subsection unless such action is commenced 
        not later than two years after the date of the 
        violation of subsection (b)(3)(D) or subsection (c) 
        that is the basis for the action.
          (4) Exclusive cause of action.--A cause of action 
        under this subsection shall be the exclusive means 
        available to a complainant seeking a remedy for a 
        violation of subsection (b)(3)(D) or subsection (c).
  (e) Reports on Information Sharing.--
          (1) Inspector general report.--The Inspector General 
        of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the 
        Inspector General of the Department of Justice, the 
        Inspector General of the Department of Defense, and the 
        Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, shall 
        annually submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report containing a review of the use of 
        information shared with the Federal Government under 
        this section, including--
                  (A) a review of the use by the Federal 
                Government of such information for a purpose 
                other than a cybersecurity purpose;
                  (B) a review of the type of information 
                shared with the Federal Government under this 
                section;
                  (C) a review of the actions taken by the 
                Federal Government based on such information;
                  (D) appropriate metrics to determine the 
                impact of the sharing of such information with 
                the Federal Government on privacy and civil 
                liberties, if any;
                  (E) a list of the departments or agencies 
                receiving such information;
                  (F) a review of the sharing of such 
                information within the Federal Government to 
                identify inappropriate stovepiping of shared 
                information; and
                  (G) any recommendations of the Inspector 
                General for improvements or modifications to 
                the authorities under this section.
          (2) Privacy and civil liberties officers report.--The 
        Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence and the Chief Privacy 
        and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department of 
        Justice, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Oversight Board, the Inspector General of the 
        Intelligence Community, and the senior privacy and 
        civil liberties officer of each department or agency of 
        the Federal Government that receives cyber threat 
        information shared with the Federal Government under 
        this section, shall annually and jointly submit to 
        Congress a report assessing the privacy and civil 
        liberties impact of the activities conducted by the 
        Federal Government under this section. Such report 
        shall include any recommendations the Civil Liberties 
        Protection Officer and Chief Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Officer consider appropriate to minimize or 
        mitigate the privacy and civil liberties impact of the 
        sharing of cyber threat information under this section.
          (3) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) 
        or (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
        include a classified annex.
  (f) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute 
of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts 
or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under 
subsection (b).
  (g) Savings Clauses.--
          (1) Existing authorities.--Nothing in this section 
        shall be construed to limit any other authority to use 
        a cybersecurity system or to identify, obtain, or share 
        cyber threat intelligence or cyber threat information.
          (2) Limitation on military and intelligence community 
        involvement in private and public sector cybersecurity 
        efforts.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
        provide additional authority to, or modify an existing 
        authority of, the Department of Defense or the National 
        Security Agency or any other element of the 
        intelligence community to control, modify, require, or 
        otherwise direct the cybersecurity efforts of a 
        private-sector entity or a component of the Federal 
        Government or a State, local, or tribal government.
          (3) Information sharing relationships.--Nothing in 
        this section shall be construed to--
                  (A) limit or modify an existing information 
                sharing relationship;
                  (B) prohibit a new information sharing 
                relationship;
                  (C) require a new information sharing 
                relationship between the Federal Government and 
                a private-sector entity or utility;
                  (D) modify the authority of a department or 
                agency of the Federal Government to protect 
                sources and methods and the national security 
                of the United States; or
                  (E) preclude the Federal Government from 
                requiring an entity to report significant cyber 
                incidents if authorized or required to do so 
                under another provision of law.
          (4) Limitation on federal government use of 
        cybersecurity systems.--Nothing in this section shall 
        be construed to provide additional authority to, or 
        modify an existing authority of, any entity to use a 
        cybersecurity system owned or controlled by the Federal 
        Government on a private-sector system or network to 
        protect such private-sector system or network.
          (5) No liability for non-participation.--Nothing in 
        this section shall be construed to subject a protected 
        entity, self-protected entity, cyber security provider, 
        or an officer, employee, or agent of a protected 
        entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
        provider, to liability for choosing not to engage in 
        the voluntary activities authorized under this section.
          (6) Use and retention of information.--Nothing in 
        this section shall be construed to authorize, or to 
        modify any existing authority of, a department or 
        agency of the Federal Government to retain or use 
        information shared pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for 
        any use other than a use permitted under subsection 
        (c)(1).
  (h) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Availability.--The term ``availability'' means 
        ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
        information.
          (2) Certified entity.--The term ``certified entity'' 
        means a protected entity, self-protected entity, or 
        cybersecurity provider that--
                  (A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a 
                security clearance, as determined by the 
                Director of National Intelligence; and
                  (B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of 
                National Intelligence that such provider or 
                such entity can appropriately protect 
                classified cyber threat intelligence.
          (3) Confidentiality.--The term ``confidentiality'' 
        means preserving authorized restrictions on access and 
        disclosure, including means for protecting personal 
        privacy and proprietary information.
          (4) Cyber threat information.--
                  (A) In General.--The term ``cyber threat 
                information'' means information directly 
                pertaining to--
                          (i) a vulnerability of a system or 
                        network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility;
                          (ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a 
                        system or network of a government or 
                        private entity or utility or any 
                        information stored on, processed on, or 
                        transiting such a system or network;
                          (iii) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility; or
                          (iv) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network of a 
                        government or private entity or 
                        utility, including to gain such 
                        unauthorized access for the purpose of 
                        exfiltrating information stored on, 
                        processed on, or transiting a system or 
                        network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility.
                  (B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include 
                information pertaining to efforts to gain 
                unauthorized access to a system or network of a 
                government or private entity or utility that 
                solely involve violations of consumer terms of 
                service or consumer licensing agreements and do 
                not otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          (5) Cyber threat intelligence.--
                  (A) In general.--The term ``cyber threat 
                intelligence'' means intelligence in the 
                possession of an element of the intelligence 
                community directly pertaining to--
                          (i) a vulnerability of a system or 
                        network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility;
                          (ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a 
                        system or network of a government or 
                        private entity or utility or any 
                        information stored on, processed on, or 
                        transiting such a system or network;
                          (iii) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility; or
                          (iv) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network of a 
                        government or private entity or 
                        utility, including to gain such 
                        unauthorized access for the purpose of 
                        exfiltrating information stored on, 
                        processed on, or transiting a system or 
                        network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility.
                  (B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include 
                intelligence pertaining to efforts to gain 
                unauthorized access to a system or network of a 
                government or private entity or utility that 
                solely involve violations of consumer terms of 
                service or consumer licensing agreements and do 
                not otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          (6) Cybersecurity crime.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        crime'' means--
                  (A) a crime under a Federal or State law that 
                involves--
                          (i) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network;
                          (ii) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network; or
                          (iii) efforts to exfiltrate 
                        information from a system or network 
                        without authorization; or
                  (B) the violation of a provision of Federal 
                law relating to computer crimes, including a 
                violation of any provision of title 18, United 
                States Code, created or amended by the Computer 
                Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-
                474).
          (7) Cybersecurity provider.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        provider'' means a non-Federal entity that provides 
        goods or services intended to be used for cybersecurity 
        purposes.
          (8) Cybersecurity purpose.--
                  (A) In general.--The term ``cybersecurity 
                purpose'' means the purpose of ensuring the 
                integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, 
                or safeguarding, a system or network, including 
                protecting a system or network from--
                          (i) a vulnerability of a system or 
                        network;
                          (ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a 
                        system or network or any information 
                        stored on, processed on, or transiting 
                        such a system or network;
                          (iii) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network; or
                          (iv) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network, 
                        including to gain such unauthorized 
                        access for the purpose of exfiltrating 
                        information stored on, processed on, or 
                        transiting a system or network.
                  (B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include 
                the purpose of protecting a system or network 
                from efforts to gain unauthorized access to 
                such system or network that solely involve 
                violations of consumer terms of service or 
                consumer licensing agreements and do not 
                otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          (9) Cybersecurity system.--
                  (A) In general.--The term ``cybersecurity 
                system'' means a system designed or employed to 
                ensure the integrity, confidentiality, or 
                availability of, or safeguard, a system or 
                network, including protecting a system or 
                network from--
                          (i) a vulnerability of a system or 
                        network;
                          (ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a 
                        system or network or any information 
                        stored on, processed on, or transiting 
                        such a system or network;
                          (iii) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network; or
                          (iv) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network, 
                        including to gain such unauthorized 
                        access for the purpose of exfiltrating 
                        information stored on, processed on, or 
                        transiting a system or network.
                  (B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include a 
                system designed or employed to protect a system 
                or network from efforts to gain unauthorized 
                access to such system or network that solely 
                involve violations of consumer terms of service 
                or consumer licensing agreements and do not 
                otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          (10) Integrity.--The term ``integrity'' means 
        guarding against improper information modification or 
        destruction, including ensuring information 
        nonrepudiation and authenticity.
          (11) Protected entity.--The term ``protected entity'' 
        means an entity, other than an individual, that 
        contracts with a cybersecurity provider for goods or 
        services to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
          (12) Self-protected entity.--The term ``self-
        protected entity'' means an entity, other than an 
        individual, that provides goods or services for 
        cybersecurity purposes to itself.
          (13) Utility.--The term ``utility'' means an entity 
        providing essential services (other than law 
        enforcement or regulatory services), including 
        electricity, natural gas, propane, telecommunications, 
        transportation, water, or wastewater services.

 [Effective 5 years after the date of enactment, section 3 of H.R. 624 
  (as reported) provides for a sunset provision to amendments made by 
section 2 of H.R. 624 to the National Security Act of 1947. The version 
  below reflects the execution of the amendments made by section 2 of 
H.R. 624 as if they reflect current law in order to show the repeal of 
                such provisions on such effective date.]



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                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
     * * * * * * *

                       TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



           [CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

  [Sec. 1104. (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber 
Threat Intelligence with Private Sector and Utilities.--
          [(1) In general.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall establish procedures to allow 
        elements of the intelligence community to share cyber 
        threat intelligence with private-sector entities and 
        utilities and to encourage the sharing of such 
        intelligence.
          [(2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The 
        procedures established under paragraph (1) shall 
        provide that classified cyber threat intelligence may 
        only be--
                  [(A) shared by an element of the intelligence 
                community with--
                          [(i) a certified entity; or
                          [(ii) a person with an appropriate 
                        security clearance to receive such 
                        cyber threat intelligence;
                  [(B) shared consistent with the need to 
                protect the national security of the United 
                States; and
                  [(C) used by a certified entity in a manner 
                which protects such cyber threat intelligence 
                from unauthorized disclosure.
          [(3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of 
        National Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing 
        that the head of an element of the intelligence 
        community may, as the head of such element considers 
        necessary to carry out this subsection--
                  [(A) grant a security clearance on a 
                temporary or permanent basis to an employee or 
                officer of a certified entity;
                  [(B) grant a security clearance on a 
                temporary or permanent basis to a certified 
                entity and approval to use appropriate 
                facilities; and
                  [(C) expedite the security clearance process 
                for a person or entity as the head of such 
                element considers necessary, consistent with 
                the need to protect the national security of 
                the United States.
          [(4) No right or benefit.--The provision of 
        information to a private-sector entity or a utility 
        under this subsection shall not create a right or 
        benefit to similar information by such entity or such 
        utility or any other private-sector entity or utility.
          [(5) Restriction on disclosure of cyber threat 
        intelligence.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law, a certified entity receiving cyber threat 
        intelligence pursuant to this subsection shall not 
        further disclose such cyber threat intelligence to 
        another entity, other than to a certified entity or 
        other appropriate agency or department of the Federal 
        Government authorized to receive such cyber threat 
        intelligence.
  [(b) Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing of Cyber Threat 
Information.--
          [(1) In general.--
                  [(A) Cybersecurity providers.--
                Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 
                cybersecurity provider, with the express 
                consent of a protected entity for which such 
                cybersecurity provider is providing goods or 
                services for cybersecurity purposes, may, for 
                cybersecurity purposes--
                          [(i) use cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify and obtain cyber threat 
                        information to protect the rights and 
                        property of such protected entity; and
                          [(ii) share such cyber threat 
                        information with any other entity 
                        designated by such protected entity, 
                        including, if specifically designated, 
                        the Federal Government.
                  [(B) Self-protected entities.--
                Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 
                self-protected entity may, for cybersecurity 
                purposes--
                          [(i) use cybersecurity systems to 
                        identify and obtain cyber threat 
                        information to protect the rights and 
                        property of such self-protected entity; 
                        and
                          [(ii) share such cyber threat 
                        information with any other entity, 
                        including the Federal Government.
          [(2) Sharing with the federal government.--
                  [(A) Information shared with the National 
                Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
                Center of the Department of Homeland 
                Security.--Subject to the use and protection of 
                information requirements under paragraph (3), 
                the head of a department or agency of the 
                Federal Government receiving cyber threat 
                information in accordance with paragraph (1) 
                shall provide such cyber threat information in 
                as close to real time as possible to the 
                National Cybersecurity and Communications 
                Integration Center of the Department of 
                Homeland Security.
                  [(B) Request to share with another department 
                or agency of the federal government.--An entity 
                sharing cyber threat information that is 
                provided to the National Cybersecurity and 
                Communications Integration Center of the 
                Department of Homeland Security under 
                subparagraph (A) or paragraph (1) may request 
                the head of such Center to, and the head of 
                such Center may, provide such information in as 
                close to real time as possible to another 
                department or agency of the Federal Government.
          [(3) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat 
        information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
                  [(A) shall only be shared in accordance with 
                any restrictions placed on the sharing of such 
                information by the protected entity or self-
                protected entity authorizing such sharing, 
                including appropriate anonymization or 
                minimization of such information and excluding 
                limiting a department or agency of the Federal 
                Government from sharing such information with 
                another department or agency of the Federal 
                Government in accordance with this section;
                  [(B) may not be used by an entity to gain an 
                unfair competitive advantage to the detriment 
                of the protected entity or the self-protected 
                entity authorizing the sharing of information;
                  [(C) may only be used by a non-Federal 
                recipient of such information for a 
                cybersecurity purpose;
                  [(D) if shared with the Federal Government--
                          [(i) shall be exempt from disclosure 
                        under section 552 of title 5, United 
                        States Code (commonly known as the 
                        ``Freedom of Information Act'');
                          [(ii) shall be considered proprietary 
                        information and shall not be disclosed 
                        to an entity outside of the Federal 
                        Government except as authorized by the 
                        entity sharing such information;
                          [(iii) shall not be used by the 
                        Federal Government for regulatory 
                        purposes;
                          [(iv) shall not be provided by the 
                        department or agency of the Federal 
                        Government receiving such cyber threat 
                        information to another department or 
                        agency of the Federal Government under 
                        paragraph (2)(A) if--
                                  [(I) the entity providing 
                                such information determines 
                                that the provision of such 
                                information will undermine the 
                                purpose for which such 
                                information is shared; or
                                  [(II) unless otherwise 
                                directed by the President, the 
                                head of the department or 
                                agency of the Federal 
                                Government receiving such cyber 
                                threat information determines 
                                that the provision of such 
                                information will undermine the 
                                purpose for which such 
                                information is shared; and
                          [(v) shall be handled by the Federal 
                        Government consistent with the need to 
                        protect sources and methods and the 
                        national security of the United States; 
                        and
                  [(E) shall be exempt from disclosure under a 
                State, local, or tribal law or regulation that 
                requires public disclosure of information by a 
                public or quasi-public entity.
          [(4) Exemption from liability.--
                  [(A) Exemption.--No civil or criminal cause 
                of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal 
                or State court against a protected entity, 
                self-protected entity, cybersecurity provider, 
                or an officer, employee, or agent of a 
                protected entity, self-protected entity, or 
                cybersecurity provider, acting in good faith--
                          [(i) for using cybersecurity systems 
                        to identify or obtain cyber threat 
                        information or for sharing such 
                        information in accordance with this 
                        section; or
                          [(ii) for decisions made for 
                        cybersecurity purposes and based on 
                        cyber threat information identified, 
                        obtained, or shared under this section.
                  [(B) Lack of good faith.--For purposes of the 
                exemption from liability under subparagraph 
                (A), a lack of good faith includes, but is not 
                limited to, any act or omission taken with 
                intent to injure, defraud, or otherwise 
                endanger any individual, government entity, 
                private entity, or utility.
          [(5) Relationship to other laws requiring the 
        disclosure of information.--The submission of 
        information under this subsection to the Federal 
        Government shall not satisfy or affect--
                  [(A) any requirement under any other 
                provision of law for a person or entity to 
                provide information to the Federal Government; 
                or
                  [(B) the applicability of other provisions of 
                law, including section 552 of title 5, United 
                States Code (commonly known as the ``Freedom of 
                Information Act''), with respect to information 
                required to be provided to the Federal 
                Government under such other provision of law.
          [(6) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this 
        subsection shall be construed to provide new authority 
        to--
                  [(A) a cybersecurity provider to use a 
                cybersecurity system to identify or obtain 
                cyber threat information from a system or 
                network other than a system or network owned or 
                operated by a protected entity for which such 
                cybersecurity provider is providing goods or 
                services for cybersecurity purposes; or
                  [(B) a self-protected entity to use a 
                cybersecurity system to identify or obtain 
                cyber threat information from a system or 
                network other than a system or network owned or 
                operated by such self-protected entity.
  [(c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
          [(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use 
        cyber threat information shared with the Federal 
        Government in accordance with subsection (b)--
                  [(A) for cybersecurity purposes;
                  [(B) for the investigation and prosecution of 
                cybersecurity crimes;
                  [(C) for the protection of individuals from 
                the danger of death or serious bodily harm and 
                the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
                involving such danger of death or serious 
                bodily harm; or
                  [(D) for the protection of minors from child 
                pornography, any risk of sexual exploitation, 
                and serious threats to the physical safety of 
                minors, including kidnapping and trafficking 
                and the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
                involving child pornography, any risk of sexual 
                exploitation, and serious threats to the 
                physical safety of minors, including kidnapping 
                and trafficking, and any crime referred to in 
                section 2258A(a)(2) of title 18, United States 
                Code.
          [(2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal 
        Government may not affirmatively search cyber threat 
        information shared with the Federal Government under 
        subsection (b) for a purpose other than a purpose 
        referred to in paragraph (1).
          [(3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this 
        section shall be construed to permit the Federal 
        Government to--
                  [(A) require a private-sector entity or 
                utility to share information with the Federal 
                Government; or
                  [(B) condition the sharing of cyber threat 
                intelligence with a private-sector entity or 
                utility on the provision of cyber threat 
                information to the Federal Government.
          [(4) Protection of sensitive personal documents.--The 
        Federal Government may not use the following 
        information, containing information that identifies a 
        person, shared with the Federal Government in 
        accordance with subsection (b) unless such information 
        is used in accordance with the policies and procedures 
        established under paragraph (7):
                  [(A) Library circulation records.
                  [(B) Library patron lists.
                  [(C) Book sales records.
                  [(D) Book customer lists.
                  [(E) Firearms sales records.
                  [(F) Tax return records.
                  [(G) Educational records.
                  [(H) Medical records.
          [(5) Notification of non-cyber threat information.--
        If a department or agency of the Federal Government 
        receiving information pursuant to subsection (b)(1) 
        determines that such information is not cyber threat 
        information, such department or agency shall notify the 
        entity or provider sharing such information pursuant to 
        subsection (b)(1).
          [(6) Retention and use of cyber threat information.--
        No department or agency of the Federal Government shall 
        retain or use information shared pursuant to subsection 
        (b)(1) for any use other than a use permitted under 
        subsection (c)(1).
          [(7) Privacy and civil liberties.--
                  [(A) Policies and procedures.--The Director 
                of National Intelligence, in consultation with 
                the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
                Attorney General, shall establish and 
                periodically review policies and procedures 
                governing the receipt, retention, use, and 
                disclosure of non-publicly available cyber 
                threat information shared with the Federal 
                Government in accordance with subsection 
                (b)(1). Such policies and procedures shall, 
                consistent with the need to protect systems and 
                networks from cyber threats and mitigate cyber 
                threats in a timely manner--
                          [(i) minimize the impact on privacy 
                        and civil liberties;
                          [(ii) reasonably limit the receipt, 
                        retention, use, and disclosure of cyber 
                        threat information associated with 
                        specific persons that is not necessary 
                        to protect systems or networks from 
                        cyber threats or mitigate cyber threats 
                        in a timely manner;
                          [(iii) include requirements to 
                        safeguard non-publicly available cyber 
                        threat information that may be used to 
                        identify specific persons from 
                        unauthorized access or acquisition;
                          [(iv) protect the confidentiality of 
                        cyber threat information associated 
                        with specific persons to the greatest 
                        extent practicable; and
                          [(v) not delay or impede the flow of 
                        cyber threat information necessary to 
                        defend against or mitigate a cyber 
                        threat.
                  [(B) Submission to Congress.--The Director of 
                National Intelligence shall, consistent with 
                the need to protect sources and methods, submit 
                to Congress the policies and procedures 
                required under subparagraph (A) and any updates 
                to such policies and procedures.
                  [(C) Implementation.--The head of each 
                department or agency of the Federal Government 
                receiving cyber threat information shared with 
                the Federal Government under subsection (b)(1) 
                shall--
                          [(i) implement the policies and 
                        procedures established under 
                        subparagraph (A); and
                          [(ii) promptly notify the Director of 
                        National Intelligence, the Attorney 
                        General, and the congressional 
                        intelligence committees of any 
                        significant violations of such policies 
                        and procedures.
                  [(D) Oversight.--The Director of National 
                Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney 
                General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
                and the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a 
                program to monitor and oversee compliance with 
                the policies and procedures established under 
                subparagraph (A).
  [(d) Federal Government Liability for Violations of 
Restrictions on the Disclosure, Use, and Protection of 
Voluntarily Shared Information.--
          [(1) In general.--If a department or agency of the 
        Federal Government intentionally or willfully violates 
        subsection (b)(3)(D) or subsection (c) with respect to 
        the disclosure, use, or protection of voluntarily 
        shared cyber threat information shared under this 
        section, the United States shall be liable to a person 
        adversely affected by such violation in an amount equal 
        to the sum of--
                  [(A) the actual damages sustained by the 
                person as a result of the violation or $1,000, 
                whichever is greater; and
                  [(B) the costs of the action together with 
                reasonable attorney fees as determined by the 
                court.
          [(2) Venue.--An action to enforce liability created 
        under this subsection may be brought in the district 
        court of the United States in--
                  [(A) the district in which the complainant 
                resides;
                  [(B) the district in which the principal 
                place of business of the complainant is 
                located;
                  [(C) the district in which the department or 
                agency of the Federal Government that disclosed 
                the information is located; or
                  [(D) the District of Columbia.
          [(3) Statute of limitations.--No action shall lie 
        under this subsection unless such action is commenced 
        not later than two years after the date of the 
        violation of subsection (b)(3)(D) or subsection (c) 
        that is the basis for the action.
          [(4) Exclusive cause of action.--A cause of action 
        under this subsection shall be the exclusive means 
        available to a complainant seeking a remedy for a 
        violation of subsection (b)(3)(D) or subsection (c).
  [(e) Reports on Information Sharing.--
          [(1) Inspector general report.--The Inspector General 
        of the Intelligence Community, in consultation with the 
        Inspector General of the Department of Justice, the 
        Inspector General of the Department of Defense, and the 
        Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, shall 
        annually submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report containing a review of the use of 
        information shared with the Federal Government under 
        this section, including--
                  [(A) a review of the use by the Federal 
                Government of such information for a purpose 
                other than a cybersecurity purpose;
                  [(B) a review of the type of information 
                shared with the Federal Government under this 
                section;
                  [(C) a review of the actions taken by the 
                Federal Government based on such information;
                  [(D) appropriate metrics to determine the 
                impact of the sharing of such information with 
                the Federal Government on privacy and civil 
                liberties, if any;
                  [(E) a list of the departments or agencies 
                receiving such information;
                  [(F) a review of the sharing of such 
                information within the Federal Government to 
                identify inappropriate stovepiping of shared 
                information; and
                  [(G) any recommendations of the Inspector 
                General for improvements or modifications to 
                the authorities under this section.
          [(2) Privacy and civil liberties officers report.--
        The Civil Liberties Protection Officer of the Office of 
        the Director of National Intelligence and the Chief 
        Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer of the Department 
        of Justice, in consultation with the Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Oversight Board, the Inspector General of the 
        Intelligence Community, and the senior privacy and 
        civil liberties officer of each department or agency of 
        the Federal Government that receives cyber threat 
        information shared with the Federal Government under 
        this section, shall annually and jointly submit to 
        Congress a report assessing the privacy and civil 
        liberties impact of the activities conducted by the 
        Federal Government under this section. Such report 
        shall include any recommendations the Civil Liberties 
        Protection Officer and Chief Privacy and Civil 
        Liberties Officer consider appropriate to minimize or 
        mitigate the privacy and civil liberties impact of the 
        sharing of cyber threat information under this section.
          [(3) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) 
        or (2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
        include a classified annex.
  [(f) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any statute 
of a State or political subdivision of a State that restricts 
or otherwise expressly regulates an activity authorized under 
subsection (b).
  [(g) Savings Clauses.--
          [(1) Existing authorities.--Nothing in this section 
        shall be construed to limit any other authority to use 
        a cybersecurity system or to identify, obtain, or share 
        cyber threat intelligence or cyber threat information.
          [(2) Limitation on military and intelligence 
        community involvement in private and public sector 
        cybersecurity efforts.--Nothing in this section shall 
        be construed to provide additional authority to, or 
        modify an existing authority of, the Department of 
        Defense or the National Security Agency or any other 
        element of the intelligence community to control, 
        modify, require, or otherwise direct the cybersecurity 
        efforts of a private-sector entity or a component of 
        the Federal Government or a State, local, or tribal 
        government.
          [(3) Information sharing relationships.--Nothing in 
        this section shall be construed to--
                  [(A) limit or modify an existing information 
                sharing relationship;
                  [(B) prohibit a new information sharing 
                relationship;
                  [(C) require a new information sharing 
                relationship between the Federal Government and 
                a private-sector entity or utility;
                  [(D) modify the authority of a department or 
                agency of the Federal Government to protect 
                sources and methods and the national security 
                of the United States; or
                  [(E) preclude the Federal Government from 
                requiring an entity to report significant cyber 
                incidents if authorized or required to do so 
                under another provision of law.
          [(4) Limitation on federal government use of 
        cybersecurity systems.--Nothing in this section shall 
        be construed to provide additional authority to, or 
        modify an existing authority of, any entity to use a 
        cybersecurity system owned or controlled by the Federal 
        Government on a private-sector system or network to 
        protect such private-sector system or network.
          [(5) No liability for non-participation.--Nothing in 
        this section shall be construed to subject a protected 
        entity, self-protected entity, cyber security provider, 
        or an officer, employee, or agent of a protected 
        entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity 
        provider, to liability for choosing not to engage in 
        the voluntary activities authorized under this section.
          [(6) Use and retention of information.--Nothing in 
        this section shall be construed to authorize, or to 
        modify any existing authority of, a department or 
        agency of the Federal Government to retain or use 
        information shared pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for 
        any use other than a use permitted under subsection 
        (c)(1).
  [(h) Definitions.--In this section:
          [(1) Availability.--The term ``availability'' means 
        ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
        information.
          [(2) Certified entity.--The term ``certified entity'' 
        means a protected entity, self-protected entity, or 
        cybersecurity provider that--
                  [(A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a 
                security clearance, as determined by the 
                Director of National Intelligence; and
                  [(B) is able to demonstrate to the Director 
                of National Intelligence that such provider or 
                such entity can appropriately protect 
                classified cyber threat intelligence.
          [(3) Confidentiality.--The term ``confidentiality'' 
        means preserving authorized restrictions on access and 
        disclosure, including means for protecting personal 
        privacy and proprietary information.
          [(4) Cyber threat information.--
                  [(A) In General.--The term ``cyber threat 
                information'' means information directly 
                pertaining to--
                          [(i) a vulnerability of a system or 
                        network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility;
                          [(ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a 
                        system or network of a government or 
                        private entity or utility or any 
                        information stored on, processed on, or 
                        transiting such a system or network;
                          [(iii) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility; or
                          [(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network of a 
                        government or private entity or 
                        utility, including to gain such 
                        unauthorized access for the purpose of 
                        exfiltrating information stored on, 
                        processed on, or transiting a system or 
                        network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility.
                  [(B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include 
                information pertaining to efforts to gain 
                unauthorized access to a system or network of a 
                government or private entity or utility that 
                solely involve violations of consumer terms of 
                service or consumer licensing agreements and do 
                not otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          [(5) Cyber threat intelligence.--
                  [(A) In general.--The term ``cyber threat 
                intelligence'' means intelligence in the 
                possession of an element of the intelligence 
                community directly pertaining to--
                          [(i) a vulnerability of a system or 
                        network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility;
                          [(ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a 
                        system or network of a government or 
                        private entity or utility or any 
                        information stored on, processed on, or 
                        transiting such a system or network;
                          [(iii) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility; or
                          [(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network of a 
                        government or private entity or 
                        utility, including to gain such 
                        unauthorized access for the purpose of 
                        exfiltrating information stored on, 
                        processed on, or transiting a system or 
                        network of a government or private 
                        entity or utility.
                  [(B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include 
                intelligence pertaining to efforts to gain 
                unauthorized access to a system or network of a 
                government or private entity or utility that 
                solely involve violations of consumer terms of 
                service or consumer licensing agreements and do 
                not otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          [(6) Cybersecurity crime.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        crime'' means--
                  [(A) a crime under a Federal or State law 
                that involves--
                          [(i) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network;
                          [(ii) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network; or
                          [(iii) efforts to exfiltrate 
                        information from a system or network 
                        without authorization; or
                  [(B) the violation of a provision of Federal 
                law relating to computer crimes, including a 
                violation of any provision of title 18, United 
                States Code, created or amended by the Computer 
                Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-
                474).
          [(7) Cybersecurity provider.--The term 
        ``cybersecurity provider'' means a non-Federal entity 
        that provides goods or services intended to be used for 
        cybersecurity purposes.
          [(8) Cybersecurity purpose.--
                  [(A) In general.--The term ``cybersecurity 
                purpose'' means the purpose of ensuring the 
                integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, 
                or safeguarding, a system or network, including 
                protecting a system or network from--
                          [(i) a vulnerability of a system or 
                        network;
                          [(ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a 
                        system or network or any information 
                        stored on, processed on, or transiting 
                        such a system or network;
                          [(iii) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network; or
                          [(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network, 
                        including to gain such unauthorized 
                        access for the purpose of exfiltrating 
                        information stored on, processed on, or 
                        transiting a system or network.
                  [(B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include 
                the purpose of protecting a system or network 
                from efforts to gain unauthorized access to 
                such system or network that solely involve 
                violations of consumer terms of service or 
                consumer licensing agreements and do not 
                otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          [(9) Cybersecurity system.--
                  [(A) In general.--The term ``cybersecurity 
                system'' means a system designed or employed to 
                ensure the integrity, confidentiality, or 
                availability of, or safeguard, a system or 
                network, including protecting a system or 
                network from--
                          [(i) a vulnerability of a system or 
                        network;
                          [(ii) a threat to the integrity, 
                        confidentiality, or availability of a 
                        system or network or any information 
                        stored on, processed on, or transiting 
                        such a system or network;
                          [(iii) efforts to deny access to or 
                        degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system 
                        or network; or
                          [(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized 
                        access to a system or network, 
                        including to gain such unauthorized 
                        access for the purpose of exfiltrating 
                        information stored on, processed on, or 
                        transiting a system or network.
                  [(B) Exclusion.--Such term does not include a 
                system designed or employed to protect a system 
                or network from efforts to gain unauthorized 
                access to such system or network that solely 
                involve violations of consumer terms of service 
                or consumer licensing agreements and do not 
                otherwise constitute unauthorized access.
          [(10) Integrity.--The term ``integrity'' means 
        guarding against improper information modification or 
        destruction, including ensuring information 
        nonrepudiation and authenticity.
          [(11) Protected entity.--The term ``protected 
        entity'' means an entity, other than an individual, 
        that contracts with a cybersecurity provider for goods 
        or services to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
          [(12) Self-protected entity.--The term ``self-
        protected entity'' means an entity, other than an 
        individual, that provides goods or services for 
        cybersecurity purposes to itself.
          [(13) Utility.--The term ``utility'' means an entity 
        providing essential services (other than law 
        enforcement or regulatory services), including 
        electricity, natural gas, propane, telecommunications, 
        transportation, water, or wastewater services.]

                   Disclosure of Directed Rule Making

    The Committee estimates that H.R. 624 specifically directs 
no specific rule makings to be completed within the meaning of 
5 U.S.C. 551.

                    Duplication of Federal Programs

    H.R. 624 does not duplicate or reauthorize an established 
Federal program that was included in any report from the 
Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to 
section 21 of Public Law 111-139, or a program related to a 
program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal 
Domestic Assistance.



                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

    The United States faces a serious and growing threat to our 
cyber security. We support the creation of mechanisms to 
facilitate greater sharing of cybersecurity information between 
the government and private sector. There is an urgent need to 
ensure that timely, actionable information is shared between 
the private sector and the government so that we can secure our 
networks against attacks and intrusion by state and non-state 
actors.
    We support the intent of the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and 
Protection Act (H.R. 624), but we are disappointed in some 
aspects of it and believe that it can be improved to better 
protect privacy and civil liberties, while still working 
effectively to enhance cybersecurity. While the Committee did 
adopt meaningful improvements that are helpful, we are 
disappointed that the Committee rejected a proposed amendment 
that would have required private sector entities to make 
``reasonable efforts'' to remove Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) unrelated to the cybersecurity threat. This 
requirement was included in proposals that enjoyed bipartisan 
support in the Senate, as well as in draft legislation 
submitted to Congress by the White House in 2011.
    In the Committee's hearing on H.R. 624 on February 15, 
2013, witnesses representing the private sector stated clearly 
that removing PII prior to providing it to the government is 
technically feasible and not an onerous requirement. One 
witness testified that such a requirement was ``reasonable,'' 
while another witness stated that, ``The provider of the 
information is in the best position to anonymize it.'' 
Moreover, witnesses made it clear that PII is rarely if ever 
relevant to responding to a cybersecurity threat, with one 
witness informing the Committee that, ``I have never seen a 
package of threat intelligence that's actionable that also 
includes [PII].''
    In addition, we believe that concerns regarding privacy and 
civil liberties should be addressed by requiring that civilian 
agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, serve 
as the primary points of contact with the private sector, 
particularly in receiving information. Elements of the 
Intelligence Community within the Department of Defense have 
important technical expertise that should be harnessed to 
improve cybersecurity, but they should not be the initial 
recipient of cyber security information. Allowing information 
to go directly to military agencies significantly departs from 
longstanding efforts to treat the Internet and cyberspace as 
civilian spheres.
    We are also concerned that the liability shield provided in 
the bill is overly broad and fails to provide reasonable 
protections for consumers. While important improvements were 
made in markup, we remain concerned that the broad scope of the 
shield may allow cybersecurity entities to claim immunity even 
if injuries are the result of neglect or recklessness.
    We strongly support the need to secure our public and 
private systems from the constant, malicious attacks of foreign 
and domestic hackers, and we believe that information sharing 
is an important aspect of enhanced cybersecurity. We appreciate 
the changes already made to H.R. 624, and we hope that as the 
bill moves forward additional improvements can be made.

                                   Adam B. Schiff.
                                   James Himes.
                                   Janice Schakowsky.
                                   Luis V. Gutierrez.

                                  
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