[Senate Report 112-3]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


112th Congress 
 1st Session                     SENATE                          Report
                                                                  112-3
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
                                 REPORT
                                 of the
                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                          covering the period

                            JANUARY 3, 2009

                                   to

                            JANUARY 4, 2011






                 March 17, 2011.--Ordered to be printed


                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                 DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
                SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
    Virginia                         RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    JAMES RISCH, Idaho
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland        DANIEL COATS, Indiana
BILL NELSON, Florida                 ROY BLUNT, Missouri
KENT CONRAD, North Dakota            MARCO RUBIO, Forida
MARK UDALL, Colorado
MARK WARNER, Virginia
                 Harry Reid, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
              Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
                Carl Levin, Michigan, Ex Officio Member
                John McCain, Arizona, Ex Officio Member

                     David Grannis, Staff Director
            Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
                    Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk

During the period covered by this report, the composition of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence was as follows:

                 DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
              CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         ORRIN HATCH, Utah
    Virginia                         OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland        TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       JAMES RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
                 Harry Reid, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
              Mitch McConnell, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
                Carl Levin, Michigan, Ex Officio Member
                John McCain, Arizona, Ex Officio Member

                     David Grannis, Staff Director
                Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
                    Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk

                                PREFACE

    The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate 
this report on its activities from January 3, 2009, to January 
4, 2011. This report also includes references to activities 
underway at the conclusion of the 111th Congress that the 
Committee expects to continue into the future.
    Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th 
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of 
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the 
Intelligence Community of the United States. Most of the 
Committee's oversight must be conducted in secret to protect 
the sources and methods used by the Intelligence Community to 
protect our nation's security. Nevertheless, the Select 
Committee on Intelligence has submitted activities reports 
since 1977, during the 95th Congress, in order to provide as 
much information as possible about its intelligence oversight 
activities to the American public consistent with national 
security concerns. We submit this report to the Senate in 
continuation of that practice.
    We also thank all of the members of the Committee in the 
111th Congress. In particular, we acknowledge the contribution 
of Senator Christopher S. ``Kit'' Bond who served on the 
Committee from 2003 to 2010 and was Vice Chairman during the 
110th and 111th Congresses. Five other Senators who played 
important roles in the oversight of the Intelligence Community 
have also completed their service with the Committee. Senator 
Orrin Hatch served his second term on the Committee from 1997 
to 2010 after previously serving from 1985 to 1990, making him 
the longest-serving member of the Committee in its history. 
Senator Evan Bayh served on the Committee from 2001 to 2010. 
Senator Russell Feingold came to the Committee in 2006 and 
served until 2010. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse served on the 
Committee during the 110th and 111th Congresses from 2007 to 
2010. Senator Tom Coburn served on the Committee during the 
111th Congress from 2009 to 2010. Their unique perspectives and 
support to a strong Intelligence Community have contributed 
substantially to the mission of the Committee and for that we 
are grateful.
    We also thank all the Committee's staff during the 111th 
Congress whose hard work and professionalism were essential to 
the fulfillment of the Committee's oversight and legislative 
responsibilities.
                                   Dianne Feinstein,
                                     Chairman
                                   Saxby Chambliss,
                                     Vice Chairman


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Preface..........................................................   iii
 I. Introduction......................................................1
II. Legislation.......................................................2
    A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.......     2
    B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year............     6
    C. Extensions of Expiring FISA Authorities...................     6
    D. Administration Views on Bills Referred to the Intelligence 
      Committee..................................................     7
        1. Detention and Interrogation, S. 147 and S. 248........     7
        2. GGovernment Accountability Office Participation in 
          Intelligence Community Audits and Evaluations, S. 385..     8
        3. Security Clearance Modernization and Reporting, S. 
          2834...................................................     9
        4. Weapons Acquisition, S. 454...........................    10
    E. Committee Views on the New START Treaty...................    10
    F. GS. Res. 600, Authorizing the Select Committee on 
      Intelligence to Provide Documents in Unauthorized 
      Disclosure of Classified Information Investigation and for 
      Present and Former Employees to Testify....................    11
    G. GRelease of Declassified Narrative Describing the 
      Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel's Opinions 
      on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program...........    12
III.Oversight Activities.............................................12

    A. Annual Worldwide Threat Hearings..........................    12
    B. Cybersecurity Task Force..................................    14
    C. Committee Reviews.........................................    15
         1. Cybersecurity........................................    15
         2. Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation 
          Program................................................    16
         3. High Value Detainee Interrogation Group..............    17
         4. GIntelligence Issues regarding Detainees Held at U.S. 
          Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay..........................    19
         5. Oversight of Intelligence Community Counterterrorism 
          Efforts................................................    20
         6. Mass Shooting at Fort Hood, Texas....................    20
         7. Christmas Day 2009 Attack on Northwest Airlines 
          Flight 253.............................................    20
         8. Najibullah Zazi and David Headley....................    22
         9. Faisal Shahzad.......................................    22
        10. Khowst Attack........................................    22
        11. Afghanistan..........................................    23
        12. Threat Finance and Financial Intelligence............    23
        13. Oversight of the Office of the Director of National 
          Intelligence...........................................    24
        14. Intelligence Community Directive 402.................    25
        15. Information Sharing and Intelligence Community 
          Directive 501..........................................    25
        16. Foreign Language Requirements and Capabilities.......    25
        17. Education and Training...............................    26
        18. Analytic Transformation and Quality of Analysis......    26
        19. Size and Apportionment of Analytic Workforce.........    27
        20. Forward Deployment of Analysts.......................    28
        21. Analytic Integrity and Standards.....................    28
        22. Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis........    28
        23. Analyst-Collector Relationships......................    29
        24. National Intelligence Estimates Production Process...    29
        25. Lessons Learned Programs.............................    30
        26. Measures of Effectiveness............................    30
        27. National Collaboration Development Center............    30
        28. FBI Intelligence Transformation......................    30
        29. GImplementation of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
          and Compliance with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
          Court Orders...........................................    31
        30. Counterintelligence..................................    32
        31. Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information....    32
        32. Covert Action........................................    33
        33. Counterproliferation.................................    34
        34. Research and Development.............................    34
        35. Technical Advisory Group Reviews.....................    35
        36. Commercial Imagery...................................    35
        37. Defense Attache System...............................    36
        38. GOversight of Department of Homeland Security 
          Intelligence Activities................................    36
        39. Intelligence Community Facilities....................    36
        40. Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office 
          (DTSPO)................................................    37
    D. Financial Accounting, Inspectors General, and Audits......    37
        1. Compliance with Federal Financial Accounting Standards    37
        2. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General    41
        3. Audit of Intelligence Community Acquisition Practices.    41
IV. Nominations......................................................41
    A. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence........    42
    B. Leon E. Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence 
      Agency.....................................................    43
    C. David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National 
      Security, Department of Justice............................    44
    D. Priscilla E. Guthrie, Chief Information Officer of the 
      Intelligence Community.....................................    45
    E. Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Director 
      of National Intelligence...................................    45
    F. Philip Mudd, Undersecretary of Information and Analysis, 
      Department of Homeland Security............................    46
    G. Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Central 
      Intelligence Agency........................................    47
    H. David C. Gompert, Principal Deputy Director of National 
      Intelligence...............................................    47
    I. Philip S. Goldberg, Assistant Secretary of State, 
      Intelligence and Research..................................    48
    J. Caryn A. Wagner, Undersecretary for Intelligence and 
      Analysis, Department of Homeland Security..................    49
    K. Leslie Ireland, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
      Intelligence and Analysis..................................    50
    L. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of National Intelligence.    50
    M. David B. Buckley, Inspector General of the Central 
      Intelligence Agency........................................    51
    N. Stephanie O'Sullivan, Principal Deputy Director of 
      National Intelligence......................................    52
 V.  Support to the Senate...........................................52
VI. Appendix.........................................................53


                            I. INTRODUCTION

    The activities of the Committee during the 111th Congress 
were shaped by a range of legislative, nomination, and 
oversight responsibilities.
    As described in part II of this report, the Committee's top 
legislative priority in the 111th Congress was enactment of an 
Intelligence Authorization Act after a lapse, since the end of 
fiscal year 2005, in the enactment of annual intelligence 
legislation.
    During the 111th Congress, the Committee received 14 
nominations for leadership positions in the Intelligence 
Community (IC). In keeping with its record of expeditious 
consideration of nominations, coupled with its commitment to 
the establishment of a public record on the background and 
views of nominees, the Committee requested that nominees answer 
extensive questions, posted on its website the unclassified 
answers to those questions, held 19 hearings and business 
meetings, and recommended that the Senate give its advice and 
consent to 12 nominations. (One nominee withdrew his nomination 
and one nomination, initially made in December 2010, was 
considered early in the 112th Congress.)
    As in the past, the Committee's oversight work may have 
been the most important and least visible of its activities. 
Among other oversight matters, the Committee held numerous 
hearings, and the staff conducted extensive oversight through 
briefings and field visits, on a broad range of activities of 
intelligence agencies, including such matters as intelligence 
support to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
the performance of the Intelligence Community in using 
intelligence collection and analysis to help prevent terrorist 
attacks against the United States. In addition, the Committee 
undertook a study of the Central Intelligence Agency's 
detention and interrogation program as it existed under the 
previous Administration, and inquired into policies and actions 
of the new Administration, in order to shape detention and 
interrogation policies now and in the future. Through review of 
the implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, including the amendments to that Act made in the 110th 
Congress, and through review of the development of U.S. 
Government programs on cybersecurity, the Committee continued 
its oversight of activities implicating national security and 
individual privacy.
    While much of its work was planned early in the Congress, 
the Committee also responded to unfolding events, including 
tragedies that were averted, as in the failed Christmas Day 
2009 attack against Northwest Flight 253, or that were carried 
out, as at the CIA's Khowst base in Afghanistan. In each case 
the Committee sought to learn the lessons needed for the 
Intelligence Community to improve its ability to help protect 
the U.S. homeland, and also protect Intelligence Community and 
other U.S. Government personnel in harm's way overseas.

                            II. LEGISLATION

         A. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010

    The Committee's top legislative priority in the 111th 
Congress was the enactment of an Intelligence Authorization 
Act. As recounted in the Committee's previous two biennial 
reports, the last enactment of an Intelligence Authorization 
Act was in December 2004 for fiscal year 2005. The Committee is 
committed to restoring annual passage of the bill as a key 
instrument of intelligence oversight and took a significant 
step in that direction through the enactment in October 2010 of 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
    In the first months of 2009, the Committee conducted its 
annual review of the President's budget recommendations for the 
civilian and military agencies and departments comprising the 
Intelligence Community (IC) for fiscal year 2010. These reviews 
included the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the 
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the latter about which the 
Committee makes recommendations to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
    The intelligence entities covered by the annual budget 
reviews included the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Security Agency 
(NSA), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the intelligence 
capabilities of the military services and the Coast Guard, as 
well as the intelligence-related components of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Departments of State, 
Treasury, Energy, and Homeland Security (DHS), and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA).
    As part of its reviews, the Committee held closed budget 
hearings at which senior IC officials testified. During 
briefings at the Committee and on site at IC agencies, 
Committee staff, designated as budget monitors for particular 
IC elements, evaluated detailed budget justifications submitted 
by the Executive Branch. On the basis of those reviews, the 
Committee prepared a classified annex to its annual 
authorization bill and report. This annex contained a 
classified schedule of appropriations and classified directions 
to IC elements that addressed a wide range of issues identified 
during the annual budget reviews and other Committee oversight 
activities.
    While the annual budget review proceeded, the Committee 
also reviewed the Administration's proposals for the public 
part of the FY 2010 bill consisting of new or amended 
legislative authority requested by the IC. The Committee posted 
on its public website testimony, in unclassified form, 
presented by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) at a 
closed hearing on May 19, 2009, on the Administration's 
legislative proposals for the FY 2010 bill, as well as the text 
and explanation of the complete Administration legislative 
request that the Committee received on May 22, 2009. The 
Committee posted on its website additional proposed sections 
submitted by the Administration in June and early July 2009. 
The Committee also considered legislative proposals it had 
previously reported as well as a number of new proposals 
formulated by Committee members in response to evolving or 
current oversight matters.
    On July 22, 2009, the Committee reported S. 1494, its 
proposed Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 
accompanied by S. Rep. No. 111-55 (2009), by a vote of 15-0. 
The report explained the provisions of the bill and also 
provided comments, including directions to the IC, which could 
be stated in an unclassified form. As customary, it was 
accompanied by the classified annex with classified budget 
recommendations and guidance on implementation of budget 
authority. With a managers' amendment to address concerns of 
other committees, the bill passed the Senate by unanimous 
consent on September 16, 2009. 155 Cong. Rec. S9447-9480 (daily 
ed.).
    Following passage by the House on February 26, 2010, of 
H.R. 2701, the proposed FY 2010 authorization bill reported by 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sent to 
the intelligence committees a letter setting forth the 
Administration's views on S. 1494 and H.R. 2701. The letter 
identified thirteen serious concerns, three of which were veto-
threat items, including amendments on notification to the 
intelligence committees about sensitive intelligence matters 
and covert actions and provisions on the authority of the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct audits, 
investigations, and evaluations of the IC. On March 15, 2010, 
the Department of Justice wrote to the committees stating its 
concerns about the constitutionality of various provisions in 
the two bills.
    The intelligence committees undertook a three-month process 
of reconciling the House and Senate bills and addressing the 
Administration's concerns. On June 10, 2010, the OMB Director 
wrote to the committees that the Administration had reviewed 
the product of that effort and the President's senior advisers 
would recommend that he sign the resulting legislation.
    On July 19, 2010, the Committee reported a new bill, S. 
3611, which incorporated the agreement. It was accompanied by 
S. Rep. No. 111-223 (2010), which provided a section-by-section 
description of how S. 3611 reconciled S. 1494 and H.R. 2701. 
With a managers' amendment to resolve concerns of other Senate 
committees, the Senate passed S. 3611 by unanimous consent on 
August 5, 2010. 156 Cong. Rec. S6767-6799 (daily ed.).
    Further work remained, however, before final action on the 
FY 2010 legislation. A renewed effort was made to craft 
language on improving notifications to Congress on sensitive 
intelligence activities and covert actions and also on GAO 
authority. After this effort produced amendments acceptable to 
the committees, the House and Senate leadership, and the 
Administration, the Senate acted on September 27, 2010, for a 
third time on the FY 2010 legislation by amending and passing 
H.R. 2701 with this negotiated agreement. 156 Cong. Rec. S7558-
7559 (daily ed.). House passage followed on September 29, 2010, 
and the President signed the FY 2010 bill, as Public Law 111-
259, on October 7, 2010.
    Because fiscal year 2010 was drawing to a close, the final 
negotiations on the bill removed the classified schedule of 
authorizations applicable to the ending fiscal year and the 
classified annex that described those budgetary authorization 
levels. The enacted bill accordingly focused on needed 
improvements in Intelligence Community authorities and 
oversight mechanisms. Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond, 
and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Reyes, however, wrote 
to the President on October 19, 2010, concerning the provisions 
in the classified annex that were reviewed and accepted by the 
Administration and the Intelligence Community during 
negotiations over the legislation, and the fact that these 
would be the subject of further discussion in the future.
    The provisions of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010 are explained more fully in S. Rep. No. 111-
223, the report that accompanied S. 3611, and in the floor 
remarks on Senate passage of H.R. 2701, in which Chairman 
Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond explained the several 
subsequent changes that cleared the way for final action, 156 
Cong. Rec. S7498-7500 and S7558-7559 (daily ed., Sept. 27, 
2010). The provisions include:
     Modifications, in Title V of the National Security 
Act of 1947, to the requirements and the process by which, the 
President, DNI, and heads of all U.S. departments, agencies, 
and entities keep the intelligence committees fully and 
currently informed of all intelligence activities and covert 
actions. This includes the responsibility to furnish to the 
committees any information, requested by them, about the legal 
basis for intelligence activities or covert actions that is 
within the custody or control of the departments, agencies, or 
entities of the United States which are involved in those 
activities or covert actions. The amendments also address 
``Gang of Eight'' notifications to the Senate and House 
leadership, and leadership of the two intelligence committees, 
about covert actions. They require that when a finding or 
notification is limited to the Gang of Eight, the statement of 
reasons for doing so shall be in writing and all members of the 
intelligence committees shall be provided with a general 
description regarding the finding or notification consistent 
with the reasons for not yet fully informing all such members. 
Any such determination would have to be reviewed every 180 
days.
     Acquisition reforms, including vulnerability 
assessments of major systems, establishment of requirements for 
a business enterprise architecture to enhance IC business 
system modernization, and measures developed from the Nunn-
McCurdy Act on defense overruns to curb excessive cost growth 
of major intelligence systems.
     Establishment of a strong and independent 
Inspector General (IG) for the Intelligence Community, 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, to review programs of the Intelligence Community and 
the relationships among the elements of it, and to report to 
the DNI and Congress. Of particular importance, the statutory 
IG for the Intelligence Community will have the authority to 
address issues that run across the jurisdiction of individual 
IC elements and that cannot be fully addressed by Inspectors 
General for individual IC elements whose jurisdictions are 
bounded by the elements in which they serve.
     The Act also strengthens existing IGs that serve 
elements of the Intelligence Community. It provides for the 
availability to the CIA IG of authorities made available to 
other IGs pursuant to the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, 
including the authority to appoint a Counsel to the Inspector 
General who shall report to the CIA IG. For the IGs at the NSA, 
NRO, NGA, and DIA, the Act provides for their statutory 
recognition and the availability to them of the authorities and 
protections applicable to other administratively appointed IGs 
under the Inspector General Act of 1978, such as measures to 
protect independence, provide for access to information, and 
ensure regular reporting to Congress.
     Measures to improve personnel management. These 
include measures designed to improve oversight of IC personnel 
planning and account for the number and use of the IC's 
burgeoned number of contractors. To enable the IC to meet 
advanced technical needs, the Act provides for enhanced pay 
authority for critical positions such as those requiring 
special scientific abilities. It provides for improvements in 
IC education programs, including language programs, and 
personnel management flexibilities that will foster the 
participation of IC employees in language training programs. 
Although omitted from the final text in light of the end of the 
fiscal year, the Committee throughout the consideration of the 
FY 2010 bill supported measures to facilitate the replacement 
of contractors with regular IC employees, and will take up this 
issue again in the 112th Congress.
     Measures to improve information sharing by 
authorizing interagency funding to quickly address deficiencies 
or needs that arise in intelligence information access or 
sharing capabilities. The Act also facilitates information 
sharing with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) by 
extending exemptions from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
search requirements to operational files that have been 
provided to the ODNI, of which NCTC is a part.
     An increase in the maximum penalties for the 
disclosure of the identity of undercover intelligence officers 
and agents.
     A preliminary framework for congressional and 
Executive Branch oversight of federal cybersecurity activities 
to ensure the government's national cybersecurity mission is 
carried out in a manner consistent with legal authorities and 
individual privacy rights.
     A requirement for a comprehensive report by the 
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, on the policies 
and procedures of the U.S. Government concerning participation 
by elements of the Intelligence Community in the interrogation 
of individuals suspected of international terrorism, including 
the legal basis for these policies and procedures.
     A requirement for the DNI to make publicly 
available an unclassified summary of intelligence relating to 
recidivism of detainees held at the Naval Detention Facility at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and an assessment of the likelihood that 
such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with 
persons in terrorist organizations.
     A requirement for a report and strategic plan on 
the intelligence collection efforts of the United States to 
assess the threat from biological weapons and to protect the 
biodefense knowledge and infrastructure of the United States. 
This section of the Act also requires a strategic plan for 
closing important intelligence gaps related to biological 
weapons.
     A requirement that the DNI, in consultation with 
the Comptroller General (as the head of the GAO), issue a 
written directive governing access by the Comptroller General 
to information in the possession of an element of the 
Intelligence Community, and to provide that directive to the 
Congress together with any comments no later than May 1, 2011. 
Unless accelerated by the DNI for reasons of national security, 
the directive or any amendment to it shall take effect 60 days 
after submission to the Congress. The directive shall be 
consistent with both the provisions of Title 31 of the United 
States Code on the authorities of the Comptroller General and 
those of the National Security Act.

         B. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011

    In the first months of 2010, even while consideration of 
the Fiscal Year 2010 bill continued, the Committee reviewed the 
President's Fiscal Year 2011 requests for funding levels and 
legislative proposals.
    As previously, the Committee's budget monitors evaluated 
the budget requests submitted by the Executive Branch. 
Committee staff held briefings at the Committee and onsite at 
agencies, and the Committee conducted closed budget hearings. 
The Committee received the Administration's proposed FY 2011 
bill on May 27, 2010, and conducted a closed hearing on the 
Administration's legislative request on June 22, 2010. The 
Committee subsequently posted on its website both the full 
legislative request and an unclassified version of the 
testimony offered by Robert Litt, the ODNI General Counsel.
    Committee staff prepared budget and bill material for 
consideration early in the 112th Congress in the event the 
Committee determined to proceed with a fiscal year 2011 
intelligence authorization bill.

               C. Extensions of Expiring FISA Authorities

    As the 111th Congress began, three provisions of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)--commonly known as 
the roving wiretaps, lone wolf, and business records sections 
of the Act--were scheduled to expire on December 31, 2009. On 
March 31, 2009, Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond wrote 
to the Attorney General and the Director of National 
Intelligence to request their recommendations on whether the 
provisions should be extended, modified, or allowed to expire. 
On September 14, 2009, the Department of Justice, in a response 
to the Committee for itself and the DNI, recommended that the 
expiring provisions be reauthorized.
    With regard to roving wiretaps, under which roving 
surveillance is authorized by court orders for targets who take 
actions to thwart FISA surveillance, the Justice Department 
stated that the authority ``has proven an important 
intelligence-gathering tool in a small but significant subset 
of FISA electronic surveillance orders.'' For lone wolf 
authority, pursuant to which a non-U.S. person who engages in 
international terrorism may be the subject of FISA collection 
even though connection to a specific international terrorist 
group has not been determined, the Department noted that, as of 
the September 2009 letter, it had not been necessary to use 
that authority. Nevertheless, the Department requested 
reauthorization of the authority on the grounds that it could 
foresee circumstances in which a known terrorism target had 
broken from his terrorist group. Concerning business records, 
the Department urged reauthorization because it believed that 
``[t]he absence of such an authority could force the FBI to 
sacrifice key intelligence opportunities.''
    Section 1004 of H.R. 3326, the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2010, enacted December 19, 2009, extended 
the three expiring provisions to February 28, 2010.
    In February 2010, as the new sunset approached, the 
Attorney General, the DNI, and the intelligence committees took 
steps to enable members of both Houses to understand more fully 
the intelligence collection made possible by the expiring 
authority. The Attorney General and the DNI provided to the 
committees a classified paper and asked for their assistance in 
making it available, in a secure setting, directly and 
personally to any interested Member. On February 23, 2010, 
Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond wrote to each Member 
of the Senate inviting the Member to read the classified paper 
in the Committee's offices and conveying the offer of the 
Attorney General and DNI to have their personnel available to 
meet with any Member who had questions. The House Intelligence 
Committee extended a similar invitation to Members of the 
House. 156 Cong. Rec. H838 (daily ed., Feb. 25, 2010).
    On February 27, 2010, Congress extended the roving, lone 
wolf, and business records provisions once again, this time for 
one year to February 28, 2011 in Public Law 111-141.

D. Administration Views on Bills Referred to the Intelligence Community

    Rule 12.2 of the Committee's Rules of Procedure provides 
that ``Unless otherwise ordered by them, measures referred to 
the Committee shall be referred by the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman to the appropriate department or agency of the 
Government for reports thereon.'' Pursuant to this rule, during 
the 111th Congress the Chairman and Vice Chairman made three 
referrals for comments. Additionally, the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman made one referral to the Director of National 
Intelligence for comment on the effect legislation not referred 
to the Committee but being considered by the Senate would have 
on the Intelligence Community.

1. Detention and Interrogation, S. 147 and S. 248

    On March 3, 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman referred 
to the Director of National Intelligence for comment two bills 
on detention and interrogation: S. 147, introduced by the 
Chairman and co-sponsored by Senators Rockefeller, Wyden, and 
Whitehouse, and S. 248, introduced by the Vice Chairman. Both 
of these bills were referred to the Committee.
    S. 147, entitled the ``Lawful Interrogation and Detention 
Act,'' would bar any person in the custody or under the control 
of an IC element from being subjected to a treatment or 
technique of interrogation not authorized by the Army Field 
Manual. It would require notice of an IC detention and access 
to such detainee, in a manner consistent with the practices of 
the U.S. Armed Forces, to the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. It would bar CIA interrogations by contractors, 
instead requiring that all CIA interrogations be conducted by 
Agency employees. It would also require the closing of the 
detention facility at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.
    S. 248, entitled the ``Limitations on Interrogation 
Techniques Act of 2009,'' would preclude the use of specific 
interrogation techniques, similar to those currently prohibited 
by the Army Field Manual.
    On April 3, 2009, the DNI replied that ``the President has 
directed thorough reviews of detention, interrogation, and 
transfer policies as well as a review of both the options for 
the disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in 
connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations 
and those individuals currently detained at the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base.''
    Further, the DNI noted that the ``President has ordered 
that individuals under the effective control of U.S. Government 
employees or their agents or detained in a U.S. Government 
owned, operated, or controlled facility must be treated 
humanely and shall not be subjected to torture or to outrages 
on personal dignity, including humiliating and degrading 
treatment'' and ``may only be interrogated in accordance with 
the Army Field Manual 2-22.3.'' The DNI also stated that 
``(b)ecause these task forces are reviewing the very issues 
these legislative proposals address, we have forwarded these 
bills to the task forces for their consideration as part of 
their efforts. We anticipate that, once these reviews have been 
completed and the task forces have reported to the President, 
the Administration will be better able to assess these 
proposals.''
    As described earlier in this report, Congress included in 
Section 333 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010 a 
requirement for a comprehensive report by the Director of 
National Intelligence on detention and interrogation 
activities.

2. Government Accountability Office participation in intelligence 
        community audits and evaluations, S. 385

    On March 12, 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman referred 
to the DNI for comment S. 385, a bill referred to the 
Committee, entitled the Intelligence Community Audit Act of 
2009. S. 385, which had been introduced by Senator Akaka and 
co-sponsored by Senators Lautenberg, McCaskill, Sanders, Wyden, 
Carper, and Durbin, to ``reaffirm'' the authority of the 
Comptroller General to perform audits and evaluations of the 
financial transactions, programs, and activities of the 
Intelligence Community. It also would ``reaffirm'' the 
authority of the Comptroller General to obtain access to 
records for the purpose of those audits. It provided that those 
audits may be requested by any committee of jurisdiction and 
may include matters related to strategic planning, financial 
management, information technology, human capital, knowledge 
management, and information sharing conducted by management and 
administration elements of the Intelligence Community. The bill 
proposed a number of limitations on this authority including 
that the Comptroller General may conduct an audit or evaluation 
of intelligence sources or methods, or covert actions, only on 
the request of one of the congressional intelligence committees 
or the House or Senate majority or minority leader.
    On April 20, 2009, the DNI responded to the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman. The DNI stated that, ``I believe that oversight 
of the Intelligence Community by the intelligence committees 
plays a critical role in making sure we are fulfilling our 
responsibilities with regard to keeping our Nation safe while 
ensuring privacy and civil liberties protections. This 
oversight, precisely because it is conducted by the committees 
through a cadre of knowledgeable and experienced staff, is a 
valuable contribution to improving the quality of intelligence 
and the effective, efficient operation of the Intelligence 
Community.'' He continued that the ``Intelligence Community has 
worked together with GAO on hundreds of their reviews ranging 
from personnel security clearance reform, to U.S.-Saudi Counter 
Terrorism and Terrorism Financing, to an examination of the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. We will 
continue working cooperatively with GAO on such reviews to 
improve federal government performance.'' However, the DNI 
concluded that ``there is no clear necessity or benefit from 
expanding GAO's scope of authority to the Intelligence 
Community.'' The DNI was also concerned that S. 385 would 
``authorize the Comptroller General to carry on self-initiated 
work and other work beyond that directed by intelligence 
committees'' which ``would negatively impact the ability of the 
Intelligence Community to respond to requests from the 
intelligence committees in a timely manner, within available 
resources.''
    As described earlier in this report, section 348 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010 provides for the 
issuance by the DNI, no later than May 1, 2011, and in 
consultation with the Comptroller General, of a directive 
governing access of the Comptroller General to information in 
the possession of an element of the Intelligence Community. The 
directive shall be consistent with both the National Security 
Act and the provisions of title 31 of the U.S. Code on the 
authorities of the Comptroller General. The directive shall be 
submitted to Congress together with any comments of the 
Comptroller General.

3. Security clearance modernization and reporting, S. 2834

    On February 9, 2010, the Chairman and Vice Chairman 
referred to the DNI for comment S. 2834, a bill referred to the 
Committee entitled the ``Security Clearance Modernization and 
Reporting Act of 2009.'' This legislation, which had been 
introduced by Senator Akaka and co-sponsored by Senator 
Voinovich, would mandate more detailed and more timely 
reporting on the security clearance process; require a 
comprehensive information technology needs assessment; and 
require the creation of a strategic plan that would outline 
reform goals, establish performance measures, create a more 
robust communications strategy, define clear roles and 
responsibilities for stakeholders, and examine funding needs.
    On July 26, 2010, the DNI responded to the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman. The DNI noted that S. 2834 ``does not recognize 
and build on the significant progress made to date, may limit 
the flexibility and development of the [Performance 
Accountability Council], and requires duplicative reporting.'' 
He noted that ``the significant improvements in timeliness and 
streamlined policy and process successes gained to date are 
likely attributable to IRTPA's legislative foundation flexibly 
executed through a series of Executive Orders that updated, 
clarified and improved the reform effort over time.'' With 
regard to information technology, the DNI stated that 
``(l)egislating in this area may limit continued quality and 
technology improvement going forward.'' The DNI also noted that 
the February 2010 Security and Suitability Process Reform 
Strategic Framework document ``presents the reform effort's 
mission, strategic goals, approach, key deliverables, 
performance measures, external factors, roles and 
responsibilities, and long term funding requirements.''
    Section 367 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 
2010 provides for a series of reports and audits on the U.S. 
Government's security clearance process and the measurement of 
improvement in the timeliness of that process.

4. Weapons acquisition, S. 454

    On April 27, 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman referred 
S. 454, the ``Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,'' 
to the DNI for comment. The Senate Armed Services Committee had 
reported this legislation on April 2, 2009. Although the 
measure was not referred to the SSCI, the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman sought the DNI's views on whether, and if so how, this 
legislation would affect IC acquisition programs. S. 454 set 
additional restrictions and reporting requirements on 
Department of Defense major defense acquisition programs. Since 
many IC agencies reside within the Defense Department, the 
Committee was concerned that the legislation would place 
requirements on IC acquisition programs.
    On May 11, 2009, the DNI responded to this inquiry. He 
assessed that ``S. 454 does not impact the acquisition programs 
funded by the [National Intelligence Program].'' He noted that 
S. 454 is ``specifically applicable to a `major defense 
acquisition program' (MDAP)'' and that Title 10, United States 
Code, Section 2430(a) ``defines a MDAP to exclude a Department 
of Defense (DoD) acquisition program that is a ``highly 
sensitive classified program'' as determined by the SecDef.'' 
Under a March 25, 2008, Secretary of Defense and DNI Memorandum 
of Agreement, ``fully and majority NIP-funded major system 
acquisitions'' are considered to be ``highly sensitive 
classified programs'' and not susceptible to MDAP guidelines.
    The Conference Report on S. 454 (Public Law No. 111-23) 
passed the Senate on May 20, 2009, and was signed into law by 
the President on May 22, 2009.

               E. Committee Views on the New START Treaty

    In mid-September 2010, shortly before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee reported a resolution of advice and consent 
with respect to the ratification of the New START Treaty, the 
Chairman and Vice Chairman submitted separate, classified, 
views letters on the Treaty to the Chairman and Ranking Member 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These letters 
contributed to the Senate Foreign Relations report and minority 
views on the treaty.
    The Committee's oversight activities in relation to this 
treaty began with the start of negotiations in 2009, well 
before the President submitted the treaty to the Senate for its 
advice and consent. In November 2009, the Chairman travelled to 
Geneva, Switzerland, to visit with the U.S. and Russian treaty 
negotiators and gain a first-hand view of the key issues being 
negotiated. Staff activities included IC briefings on Russian 
strategic forces and the capabilities of national technical 
means (NTM) of verification.
    The President submitted the treaty to the Senate on May 13, 
2010, and the Intelligence Community completed a national 
intelligence estimate (NIE) on monitoring under the treaty in 
June 2010. With these events, the Committee's oversight 
activities intensified. Committee staff met with U.S. treaty 
negotiators and with IC officials to fully understand the 
treaty's details and its implications for U.S. monitoring 
capabilities. Staff also conducted a thorough review of the 
NIE. Members participated in several briefings given by 
Administration cabinet members.
    The Committee held a closed hearing on New START in July, 
centered on the NIE and the IC's ability to monitor the 
treaty's limits. Subsequently, the Committee submitted more 
than 70 questions for the record. Testimony at the hearing, 
answers to the questions for the record, and memoranda from 
prior briefings were key inputs to Member treaty views, 
published separately by the Chairman and Vice Chairman. 
Additionally, Committee staff briefed individual Members on 
treaty monitoring issues.
    On December 20, 2010, the Senate held a rare closed session 
in the Old Senate Chamber to review classified materials 
regarding the New START Treaty. During that session, both the 
Chairman and Vice Chairman presented classified information 
from the Intelligence Community on the New START Treaty and 
other issues regarding Russia.
    On December 22, 2010, the Senate ratified the New START 
Treaty by a vote of 71 to 26.
    As the treaty has entered into force, the Committee will 
shift its oversight focus to the IC's efforts in monitoring 
under the treaty, as well as Russia's activities related to the 
treaty.

  F. S. Res. 600, Authorizing the Select Committee on Intelligence To 
Provide Documents in Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information 
     Investigation and for Present and Former Employees To Testify

    On July 28, 2010, the Senate agreed to Senate Resolution 
600, which had been offered by Majority Leader Reid and 
Minority Leader McConnell. The preamble stated that the 
Department of Justice had requested the Select Committee on 
Intelligence to provide documents in a pending investigation 
into the unauthorized disclosure of classified national 
security information.
    The resolution authorized the Chairman and Vice Chairman, 
acting jointly, to provide to the Justice Department copies of 
Committee documents in connection with that investigation and 
authorized former and current Committee employees to testify, 
except concerning matters for which a privilege should be 
asserted. Additionally, the resolution authorized the Senate 
Legal Counsel to represent the Committee and former or current 
employees from whom testimony may be required.
    At the time the Senate acted on the resolution, no 
indictment had been filed and the underlying matter was under 
consideration by a grand jury in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Accordingly, 
neither the resolution nor the accompanying floor statement 
referred to any defendant or otherwise described the subject of 
the investigation.
    On December 22, 2010, the grand jury handed down a sealed 
indictment in United States v. Jeffrey Alexander Sterling, No. 
1:10CR485 (LMB), the case resulting from the investigation for 
which Senate Resolution 600 had authorized the production of 
documents and testimony. The indictment was unsealed on January 
6, 2011. It charges a former CIA officer with the illegal 
disclosure of national security information and obstruction of 
justice. Among other matters, it alleges that the former 
officer sought to induce an author to disclose classified 
information to a national book publisher and then to the 
public, including foreign adversaries of the United States, 
through the publication of a book containing information about 
a classified program and a human asset.

   G. Release of Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of 
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel's Opinions on the Cia's Detention and 
                         Interrogation Program

    On April 22, 2009, the Committee posted on its website a 
declassified narrative describing the Department of Justice's 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions on the CIA's detention 
and interrogation program. As the preface to the narrative 
indicates, the purpose of the document was to provide to the 
public an initial narrative of the history of the opinions from 
2002 to 2007 on the legality of the CIA's detention and 
interrogation program. The effort involved meetings and 
exchanges of drafts among committee counsel and representatives 
of the Department of Justice, CIA, the ODNI, and Counsel to the 
President.
    Although this process produced a draft narrative, 
declassification was not authorized until April 2009. The 
narrative is posted on the committee's website under 
publications for the 111th Congress.

                       III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES


                  A. Annual Worldwide Threat Hearings

    Since 1994, the Committee has held a hearing to review the 
Intelligence Community's assessment of the current and 
projected national security threats to the United States. These 
Worldwide Threat hearings cover national security concerns in 
all geographic regions and transnational threats--such as 
counterterrorism and counterproliferation--that transcend 
borders. These hearings fulfill an important role in educating 
both the Congress and the American public about the threats 
facing the country, the ability of the Intelligence Community 
to provide information and analysis about those threats, and, 
in the case of some agencies, the capabilities within their 
organizations to counter such threats.
    On February 12, 2009, the Committee held an open hearing on 
the current and projected threats to the United States. 
Testifying before the Committee was Dennis C. Blair, the 
recently confirmed Director of National Intelligence. His 
unclassified prepared statement for the record is available in 
the Hearings section of the Committee's website and the record 
of the hearing has been printed as S. Hrg. 111-62.
    Director Blair stated ``The primary near-term security 
concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and 
its geopolitical implications.'' He assessed that the ``crisis 
presents many challenges for the United States'' and that the 
effect of the crisis ``already has increased questioning of 
U.S. stewardship of the global economy and the international 
financial structure.'' In regard to violent extremism, Director 
Blair noted, ``(o)ver the last year and a half, al-Qaeda has 
faced significant public criticism from prominent religious 
leaders and fellow extremists primarily regarding the use of 
brutal and indiscriminate tactics--particularly those employed 
by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaeda in the Lands of Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM)-- that have resulted in the deaths of Muslim 
civilians'' and that a broad array of Muslim nations are 
``having success in stemming the rise of extremism and 
attractiveness of terrorist groups.'' The DNI also noted the 
concern over homegrown extremism and the potential rise of such 
terrorist cells within the U.S. His statement further commented 
on the ``arc of instability'' from the Middle East and South 
Asia; how the rise of India and China would enable them to 
``become the long-term power center of the world;'' the 
impressive stability of democracy in Latin America despite the 
``challenge that populist, often autocratic regimes still pose 
in the region;'' and the ``growing cyber and organized crime 
threat.''
    On February 2, 2010, in the second session of the 111th 
Congress, the Committee held an open hearing on the current and 
projected threats to the United States. DNI Blair presented a 
consolidated statement on behalf of the Intelligence Community 
and was joined by Leon Panetta, Director of the CIA; Lieutenant 
General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director of the DIA; Robert S. 
Mueller, Director of the FBI; and John Dinger, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. Director 
Blair's unclassified statement for the record is available in 
the Hearings section of the Committee's website and the record 
of the hearing has been printed as S. Hrg. 111-557.
    Director Blair focused his initial discussion on the threat 
from cyber attacks and intrusions. He stated that the 
``national security of the United States, our economic 
prosperity, and the daily functioning of our government are 
dependent on a dynamic public and private information 
infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, computer 
networks and systems, and the information residing within'' and 
assessed that this ``critical infrastructure is severely 
threatened.'' He noted that ``neither the U.S. Government nor 
the private sector can fully control or protect the country's 
information infrastructure,'' but suggested that government and 
the private sector could mitigate the threat by working 
together. Director Blair also noted the continuing concerns 
over the consequences of the global recession; the growing 
proliferation threat from chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons; strategic health challenges and threats; and possible 
increased instability in particular geographic regions.

                      B. Cybersecurity Task Force

    On July 1, 2010, the Committee's Cybersecurity Task Force 
submitted its classified Final Report to the full Committee. 
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Senator Olympia Snowe, and Senator 
Barbara Mikulski formed the Cybersecurity Task Force at the 
request of the Chairman and Vice Chairman to undertake an 
intensive six-month survey of the cybersecurity landscape and 
help the full Committee map out an oversight agenda.
    The Task Force launched on January 1, 2010, with five 
principal goals:
          1. Elevate the profile of cybersecurity issues on the 
        Committee's policy and oversight agenda;
          2. Refine the Committee's policy and oversight 
        responsibilities on cyber issues;
          3. Expand the pool of Committee expertise on a 
        technically challenging matter of vital importance to 
        America's national and economic security;
          4. Develop a concise set of policy recommendations on 
        the DHS program known as EINSTEIN 3 that add value to 
        existing policy debates and demonstrate the Committee's 
        intention to assume a more prominent role in the 
        development and oversight of cybersecurity policy; and
          5. Enrich the context in which the Committee debates 
        cybersecurity policy and oversight by providing a 
        layered overview of cybersecurity threats and issues.
    In the six months that followed, the Task Force hosted more 
than three dozen meetings and consulted with leading experts 
from industry, academia, and government, including those in the 
Intelligence Community. The Task Force also performed an 
extensive review of classified and unclassified cybersecurity 
literature.
    The Task Force's classified Final Report consisted of two 
parts: Part I focused on understanding the cyber threat; 
identifying areas of consensus and dissent in cybersecurity 
policy; and analyzing key components of the federal 
government's cyber capabilities and workforce most relevant to 
the purview of the Intelligence Committee. The Task Force 
distilled what it learned into six preliminary observations 
about America's cybersecurity posture:
          1. The threat is malicious, unrelenting, and 
        evolving.
          2. There is a surprisingly robust consensus on a set 
        of general principles that should guide U.S. government 
        cybersecurity efforts.
          3. The consensus does not extend far beyond the need 
        for an appropriate relationship between the federal 
        government and the private sector.
          4. International cooperation on cybersecurity is 
        important but challenging in unique respects.
          5. The federal government is making limited and 
        incremental progress towards improving cybersecurity.
          6. The overwhelming majority of cyber threats to 
        federal and private sector information systems may be 
        effectively mitigated by commercial off-the-shelf 
        technology in the hands of informed users. Mitigating 
        the remaining threats, however, will likely require 
        proprietary technologies as well as the federal 
        government's unique capabilities and authorities.
    The Final Report identified a number of oversight themes 
corresponding to these analytic observations.
    Part II examined EINSTEIN 3, an automated intrusion 
prevention system for protecting the civilian computer networks 
in the Executive Branch. The DHS operates EINSTEIN 3, and the 
NSA provides critical technical and personnel support. EINSTEIN 
3 is managed by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team (US-CERT), the operational arm of DHS's National Cyber 
Security Division. During the 111th Congress, DHS did not 
deploy EINSTEIN 3, and the White House did not approve 
deployment. An exercise was underway, however, to test and 
demonstrate the system.
    Given the centrality of EINSTEIN 3 to current efforts to 
protect civilian Executive Branch networks and the unique 
nature of the technology, the Task Force identified several 
overarching themes that will require sustained oversight from 
the Committee in the 112th Congress. These include evaluating 
the impact of EINSTEIN 3 on privacy and civil liberties, 
ensuring smooth governance and interagency relations concerning 
EINSTEIN 3, and regular assessments of the EINSTEIN 3 
technology.

                          C. Committee Reviews


1. Cybersecurity

    In addition to the Cybersecurity Task Force noted above, 
the Committee held numerous hearings and briefings on 
cybersecurity-related matters. Committee staff met regularly 
with Intelligence Community and other government officials, and 
with private sector entities involved in cybersecurity-related 
efforts. These hearings, briefings, and meetings were 
instrumental in keeping the Committee informed of the 
Intelligence Community's cybersecurity-related programs and 
initiatives. Also, the Committee's all-volunteer Technical 
Advisory Group, consisting of 18 distinguished, nationally 
recognized science and technology leaders, completed three 6-
month studies of technology and policy aspects of 
cybersecurity, and reported findings and recommendations on 
priorities for Congress at a closed Committee hearing.
    The Committee also promoted timely and appropriate 
oversight of government cybersecurity activities by including 
related provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 
2010 (Public Law 111-259). Section 336 of this Act includes a 
number of provisions to enhance government cybersecurity 
efforts and ensure that Congress is fully informed about the 
Executive Branch's cybersecurity programs. For example, Section 
336(a) requires a congressional notification within 30 days of 
the bill's enactment for each cybersecurity program in 
operation, as well as a notification of any new cybersecurity 
program not later than 30 days after the new program's 
commencement. The Committee notes that the report was not 
provided on a timely basis in the 111th Congress and expects 
compliance early in 2011.
    As cybersecurity activities may, in the course of 
authorized operations, encounter U.S. citizen data, this 
Section formally requested documents detailing the legal 
foundations, privacy implications, concept of operations, and 
periodic audits of large government-managed cybersecurity 
programs including the DHS's EINSTEIN 2 and EINSTEIN 3 programs 
and the DoD's cybersecurity system.
    To keep Congress informed of the Executive Branch's 
internal reviews of these programs, Section 336(b) requires 
additional reports on any audits a department or agency has 
conducted on a cybersecurity program.
    Because the Committee recognizes that the United States 
cannot achieve its cybersecurity objectives without a ``whole 
of government'' approach to the problem in partnership with the 
private sector, Section 336(c) mandates a report on the status 
of the sharing of cyber threat information across the 
government and with the private sector. The Committee requested 
that the DNI and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly 
assess how cyber threat intelligence information, including 
classified information, is shared with the U.S. critical 
infrastructure leadership, and combine the best threat 
information from the IC and the best vulnerability information 
from DHS to create a net assessment of the cyber risk to U.S. 
critical infrastructure.
    At the same time, Section 336(d) gives the head of an IC 
element funded through the National Intelligence Program the 
authority to detail personnel to the FBI's National Cyber 
Investigative Joint Task Force or to DHS. This enhanced 
authority will allow the Task Force and DHS to better leverage 
the IC's expertise and experience. In addition, Section 336(e) 
requires the DNI to submit to a plan to Congress for 
recruiting, retaining, and training a highly-qualified 
cybersecurity IC workforce to secure IC networks.
    Finally, Section 336(f) requires the DNI to coordinate a 
report to Congress on guidelines or legislative recommendations 
to improve the cybersecurity capabilities of the IC and law 
enforcement agencies. The Committee believes this report will 
be instrumental as Congress considers whether to develop 
legislation or policy on a range of cybersecurity matters.

2. Study of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

    On March 5, 2009, as described in the joint release of 
Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond, the Committee agreed 
``on a strong bipartisan basis to begin a study of the CIA's 
detention and interrogation program.'' The Committee announced 
that the purpose of the study was to review the program and to 
shape detention and interrogation policies in the future. Among 
other things, the review was to examine:
           How the CIA created, operated, and 
        maintained its detention and interrogation program;
           Whether the CIA accurately described the 
        detention and interrogation program to other parts of 
        the U.S. government, including the Department of 
        Justice's Office of Legal Counsel and the Senate 
        Intelligence Committee;
           Whether the CIA implemented the program in 
        compliance with official guidance, including covert 
        action findings, Office of Legal Counsel opinions, and 
        CIA policy; and
           An evaluation of intelligence information 
        gained through the use of enhanced and standard 
        interrogation techniques.
    The Committee engaged in discussions with the CIA regarding 
the Committee's comprehensive request for documents related to 
the program and made arrangements with the CIA for the proper 
handling of this material. The Committee and the CIA also 
reached an agreement regarding the protection of sources and 
methods, as well as other sensitive matters. Pursuant to these 
arrangements, the CIA has made available to the Committee over 
4 million pages of CIA records relating to its detention and 
interrogation program.
    Additionally, the Committee requested documents related to 
the CIA program from the Department of Defense, the Department 
of State, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.
    On August 24, 2009, Attorney General Holder assigned a 
career prosecutor in the Department of Justice to conduct a 
preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in 
connection with the CIA's interrogation of specific detainees 
at overseas locations. This investigation remains pending.
    On September 25, 2009, the Vice Chairman withdrew his staff 
from the study in response to the Attorney General's decision. 
The Vice Chairman noted his belief that the Attorney General's 
decision made it unlikely that CIA employees involved in the 
program would agree to be interviewed for the Committee's 
study. The Committee's resolution establishing the review has 
remained in force and, pursuant to the Chairman's direction, 
the review has continued toward the goal of presenting to the 
Committee, in the 112th Congress, the results of the review of 
the extensive documentary record that has been provided to the 
Committee.

3. High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group

    On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 
13491 on ensuring lawful interrogations. Section 3(b) directed 
that no individual in the custody or under the control of the 
U.S. Government shall be subjected to an interrogation 
technique not authorized by the Army Field Manual. It further 
provided that ``Nothing in this section shall preclude the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other Federal law 
enforcement agencies, from continuing to use authorized, non-
coercive techniques of interrogation that are designed to 
elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the use of 
force, threats or promises.''
    Executive Order 13491 also established a Special 
Interagency Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies 
whose mission included studying whether Army Field Manual 
practices, when employed by agencies outside of the military, 
provide an appropriate means of acquiring intelligence 
necessary to protect the Nation and, if necessary, recommending 
guidance for other departments or agencies. On August 24, 2009, 
Attorney General Holder announced that the Task Force had 
proposed the Administration establish a specialized 
interrogation group to bring together officials from law 
enforcement, the Intelligence Community, and the Defense 
Department. The Attorney General stated the Task Force had 
unanimously concluded ``that the practices and techniques 
identified by the Army Field Manual or currently used by law 
enforcement provide adequate and effective means of conducting 
interrogations.'' The recommendations of the Task Force were 
approved by the President.
    In the following months, the Committee expressed a strong 
interest, through staff briefings, statements of Members at 
hearings, and legislation, in being advised about the 
implementation of the Task Force recommendations. Part of the 
interest focused on the charter the Administration was 
preparing to govern the operations of the specialized 
interrogation group, which came to be known as the High-Value 
Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG). The Charter was finalized 
on April 19, 2010, and, as a result of legislation in the 
Senate, was provided to the Committee on May 18, 2010.
    The HIG is as an interagency body administratively housed 
within the FBI and subject to policy direction from the 
National Security Council. The leadership of the HIG consists 
of a Director appointed by the Director of the FBI and two 
Deputy Directors, one drawn from the CIA and the other from the 
Defense Department. The Department of Justice, through an 
attorney at the National Security Division, provides legal 
counsel to the HIG.
    The HIG's primary responsibility is to deploy expert Mobile 
Interrogation Teams to conduct and support the interrogation of 
High-Value Detainees who have been identified as having access 
to information with the greatest potential of preventing 
terrorist attacks against the United States. These mobile teams 
are directed to use only those techniques authorized by the 
Army Field Manual; this limitation does not preclude the use of 
authorized, non-coercive interrogation techniques that are 
designed to elicit voluntary statements and do not involve the 
use of force, threats, or promises, in accordance with the 
provisions of Executive Order 13491. The HIG also has 
responsibilities concerning improving the training of 
interrogators and sponsoring research on interrogation.
    The Committee monitored the implementation of the HIG, 
including lessons learned from the initial work of the HIG. 
Section 333 of S. 3611, reported by the Committee on July 19, 
2010, as part of the effort to enact the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for FY 2010, included a requirement that 
within 60 days of enactment the DNI shall submit to the 
appropriate committees an analysis and assessment of lessons 
learned from the operations and activities of the HIG since its 
establishment. As a result of an amendment in the 
Appropriations Committee offered by Senators Bond and 
Feinstein, as members of that committee, this requirement 
became law in section 308 of the Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, 2010, Pub. L. 111-212 (2010). The DNI submitted the 
classified lessons learned report to the Committee on October 
4, 2010.
    On December 16, 2010, the DNI submitted a report pursuant 
to the remaining requirements of section 333 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010 (Public Law 111-
259). Section 333 directed the submission of a comprehensive 
report on the policies and procedures governing participation 
by IC elements, including the legal basis for their 
participation, in the interrogation of international terrorism 
suspects. This reporting requirement applied to the HIG as the 
interagency body established to carry out interrogations. The 
report submitted pursuant to section 333 contains both 
classified and unclassified portions concerning the HIG. The 
Committee has begun the process of seeking further elaboration 
from the DNI about the report.

4. Intelligence issues regarding detainees held at U.S. Naval Station 
        Guantanamo Bay

    During the 110th Congress, the Committee was made aware of 
rising recidivism levels and, as a result, began to review the 
transfer of detainees from the Guantanamo Bay detention 
facility. During the 111th Congress, the Committee continued 
its oversight of Intelligence Community involvement with 
detainees held at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, including 
the IC's role in detainee transfers. The Committee sought to 
review the Intelligence Community's threat assessments about 
the detainees, effectiveness and extent of measures being taken 
to monitor detainees and provide security by countries to which 
the detainees were transferred, and information about detainee 
recidivism. These efforts gained additional momentum following 
reports that two of the leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), the group that claimed responsibility for the 
failed 2009 Christmas Day attack, were former Guantanamo 
detainees. The Chairman and Vice Chairman wrote to the 
President on January 5, 2010, asking that he halt the transfer 
of detainees to Yemen. The Administration has imposed a 
moratorium on such transfers, with the exception of a Yemeni 
detainee ordered released by a U.S. court.
    Concerned about rising rates of recidivism, the Committee 
held Member briefings on the activities and recidivism of 
transferred Guantanamo detainees, and the processes used by, 
and decisions of, the Administration's Guantanamo Detainee 
Review Task Force. The Task Force briefing included 
representatives from the Departments of Justice, State, 
Defense, and Homeland Security and the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
Committee submitted numerous questions for the record and 
document requests following the Task Force briefing to provide 
additional information and context to witness testimony. The 
Committee also held staff level briefings with officials from 
the Detainee Review Task Force, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
    Committee staff also reviewed: (1) the implementation of 
monitoring and security requirements each country negotiated 
with the U.S. government; (2) the foreign government's 
perception of the thoroughness of detainee information provided 
by the United States; (3) how each country dealt with the 
challenges of resettling detainees; (4) the extent and content 
of interaction between the Intelligence Community and 
intelligence services of host countries; and (5) any conditions 
that may permit transferred detainees to re-engage in terrorist 
activity, including an ability to travel abroad. Staff also 
heard from U.S. government representatives about the status of 
the transferred detainees and efforts to monitor them.
    Legislation passed by the Committee and the Senate in S. 
1494, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 
later modified and included in the Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, 2010, required the Administration to provide the 
congressional intelligence committees with the basis for 
detainee disposition decisions reached by the Guantanamo 
Detainee Review Task Force, including the written threat 
analyses prepared on each detainee, and access to the 
intelligence information that formed the basis of the threat 
analyses. The information provided to date has proven 
invaluable to the Committee's understanding of the potential 
threat posed by transferred detainees and those remaining at 
Guantanamo Bay. The Committee will continue to efforts to 
obtain requested information and review intelligence issues 
concerning the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay and 
Intelligence Community involvement with efforts to prosecute, 
transfer, or further hold those detained there.

5. Oversight of Intelligence Community counterterrorism efforts

    The Committee during the 111th Congress increased the scope 
and depth of its oversight of the Intelligence Community's role 
in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The Committee has increased 
oversight by conducting numerous hearings and briefings with IC 
agency heads and staff as well as regularly scheduled staff 
meetings. The Committee has placed particular emphasis on its 
need to examine the underlying legal basis for the IC's 
activities as well as the short and long-term effects and 
consequences of IC activities. The Committee's efforts have 
resulted in additional and more detailed congressional 
notifications by IC agencies. The IC agencies have also 
provided more documentation and detail on current and future 
plans and operations.

6. Mass shooting at Fort Hood, Texas

    On November 5, 2009, a mass shooting at Fort Hood, Texas 
killed thirteen people and wounded thirty-one. The alleged 
shooter, Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Malik Hasan, has been 
described by NCTC Director Michael Leiter as a ``lone actor 
inspired by the global violent extremist movement who attacked 
without oversight or guidance from overseas-based al-Qaeda 
elements.'' The Committee conducted two hearings on the Fort 
Hood shooting and whether the IC and other government agencies 
had information which could have prevented this tragedy, and 
engaged with the IC on ways to improve its investigative 
guidelines and collection, analysis, and sharing of threat 
information related to U.S. persons.

7. Christmas Day 2009 Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253

    On December 25, 2009, a 23-year-old Nigerian man, Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to detonate a concealed 
explosive device on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from 
Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, as the plane was descending 
into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport.
    The Chairman and Vice Chairman announced on December 31, 
2009, that the Committee would conduct hearings on the 
attempted Christmas Day terrorist attack and ``collect all 
intelligence related to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab held by 
various intelligence agencies in order to determine who had 
what, and how the information was handled. In addition, the 
Committee [would] review national security policies on sharing 
information and terrorist watchlisting.'' In the months that 
followed, the Committee gathered information through hearings, 
briefings, and document requests from the ODNI, NCTC, CIA, NSA, 
FBI, Department of State, and DHS (including agencies under its 
purview, such as the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)).
    The Committee held a closed hearing on the attack on 
January 21, 2010. Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond 
issued a joint statement following the hearing that the 
Committee staff had prepared a draft report which had been 
delivered to the Committee members, and that the Committee 
would begin discussing, on a bipartisan basis, conclusions and 
recommendations to include in the report.
    On March 16, 2010, the Committee unanimously approved a 55-
page report and provided it to the Intelligence Community for a 
classification review. Once that classification review was 
completed, the Committee made corrective edits to the report 
based on IC recommendations, and prepared an unclassified 
Executive Summary. On May 18, 2010, the Committee unanimously 
approved that unclassified Executive Summary and released it to 
the public.
    On May 18, 2010, the Committee also unanimously approved a 
motion to report to the Senate its ``Report on the Attempted 
Terrorist Attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253'' which 
consists of: (1) the publicly released unclassified Executive 
Summary together with Additional Views of Senators Chambliss 
and Burr; and (2) the previously adopted classified portion of 
the report, which has been retained by the Committee and is 
available in its secure offices for reading by other Senators.
    The Committee concluded that the IC failed to connect and 
appropriately analyze the information in its possession prior 
to December 25, 2009, that would have identified Abdulmutallab 
as a possible terrorist threat to the United States. The 
Committee believed the IC and other parts of the U.S. 
Government should have taken steps to prevent Abdulmutallab 
from boarding Northwest Flight 253 to Detroit. The SSCI report 
identified fourteen specific points of failure a series of 
human errors, technical problems, systemic obstacles, 
analytical misjudgments, and competing priorities which 
resulted in Abdulmutallab being able to travel to the United 
States on December 25, 2009. In the classified portion of the 
Committee's report, each point of failure includes a 
description, a Committee conclusion, Committee recommendations, 
and a discussion of the corrective actions already being taken 
by the IC at the time of the report's release.
    The first two points of failure identified by the Committee 
relate to failures of the systems and procedures in place to 
prevent suspected terrorists from entering the United States. 
The remaining points discuss why the relevant intelligence was 
not connected and analyzed together. Doing so might have led 
analysts to link sufficient threat and biographical information 
on Abdulmutallab to place him on the relevant watch lists.
    As the Committee's Report describes, the Committee found 
there were systemic failures across the IC that contributed to 
the failure to identify the threat posed by Abdulmutallab. 
Specifically, the NCTC was not organized adequately to fulfill 
its missions. Following 9/11, Congress created the NCTC and 
charged it with serving as ``the primary organization in the 
United States Government for analyzing and integrating all 
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States 
Government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism. . . 
.'' In practice, however, the Committee found that no one 
agency saw itself as responsible for tracking and identifying 
all terrorism threats. In addition, technology across the IC 
was not adequate to provide search enhancing tools for analysts 
who might have identified Abdulmutallab as a potential threat.
    In addition to the review conducted by the Committee, the 
DNI created an Intelligence Community Review Panel chaired by 
John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA. That 
panel's report endorsed three of the specific classified 
recommendations made by the SSCI report. In response to the 
Committee's findings and conclusions, the IC has implemented 
significant changes and reforms. The Committee continues to 
monitor those efforts and study what additional reforms may be 
required.

8. Najibullah Zazi and David Headley

    In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi was arrested and charged 
with plans to attack the New York City subway system. He pled 
guilty in federal court in February 2010. Zazi's alleged two 
New York-based associates were indicted in January 2010. The 
plot, which included the development of hydrogen peroxide-based 
homemade explosives, was the first known instance since 9/11 
that al-Qaeda had successfully deployed a trained operative 
inside the United States.
    On October 27, 2009, the FBI arrested David Headley in 
Chicago on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks in Denmark. 
The FBI later also charged Headley with participating in the 
November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India. In March 
2010, Headley pled guilty in federal court to all charges. 
During this timeframe, the Committee held hearings and 
briefings on these cases and on IC support to these 
investigations.

9. Faisal Shahzad

    In May 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car 
bomb in Times Square, New York City, an attack for which 
Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. It 
was the first time the TTP had been known to expand its 
operational focus from attacks within South Asia to plotting 
attacks inside the United States. The Committee held a hearing 
and conducted staff briefings on this case to review 
Intelligence Community collection and analysis on Shahzad and 
his links to TTP.

10. Khowst attack

    On December 30, 2009, the CIA suffered its most devastating 
losses in its efforts against al Qaeda and related terrorist 
organizations in an attack at Forward Operating Base Chapman in 
Khowst, Afghanistan. The attack was carried out by a foreign 
national who was believed to be working for the CIA and 
providing valuable information against the al Qaeda terrorist 
network. In light of his previous reporting, CIA officers 
decided to meet with him with the hope of forming a more 
productive relationship. However, the assailant used this 
opportunity to detonate an explosive vest, killing seven CIA 
employees and wounding six others.
    The CIA conducted an internal counterintelligence review 
and commissioned an independent external review led by former 
CIA official Charles Allen and retired Ambassador Thomas 
Pickering to determine what happened at Khowst, what lessons 
could be learned, and what steps should be taken to prevent 
such incidents in the future. In response to this attack, the 
Committee held hearings and staff briefings on the attack 
itself and the results of the two counterintelligence reviews. 
The Committee will continue to monitor and actively engage with 
the CIA to ensure the recommendations of the CIA internal 
review and the independent external review are implemented 
quickly and successfully.

11. Afghanistan

    During the 111th Congress, the Committee spent considerable 
time and effort reviewing the IC's support to the 
Administration's commitment of additional resources to U.S. 
military operations in Afghanistan. Commonly known as the 
``surge,'' the increased U.S. military operations in 
Afghanistan required an accompanying increased commitment of 
significant intelligence resources. The Committee held numerous 
hearings to understand developments in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and whether and how the new policy initiatives in the 
region were affecting the situation in the region.
    The Committee's oversight of Afghanistan intelligence 
issues and IC support to the surge focused on the analysis of 
the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and IC activities in 
the region, including intelligence collection and other 
operations.
    In the analysis area, the Committee reviewed the IC's 
assessment of the anticipated challenges to the surge strategy; 
its development of metrics to measure both intelligence support 
and progress on policy goals; its analysis on progress achieved 
compared to the goals of the strategy; its perspective on 
developments immediately following the controversial Afghan 
elections; and the two National Intelligence Estimates on 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, respectively, produced to inform 
policy makers conducting the December 2010 policy review of the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.
    The Committee also focused on IC goals and progress in 
supporting the Afghanistan strategy; the creation of a new 
office of the Associate Director for National Intelligence for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (ADNI Af/Pak), who was responsible for 
coordinating IC efforts to support policy in the region; and 
how the various intelligence disciplines of collection, 
analysis, operations, and counter-intelligence were coordinated 
and reinforced in this region. In addition, the Committee 
reviewed the Administration's Fiscal Year 2010 and 2011 budget 
requests to support these efforts.
    The Committee held a number of other hearings and briefings 
on related activities by various elements of the Intelligence 
Community that included in-depth examination of the complex 
intelligence support to U.S. policy initiatives in the region.

12. Threat finance and financial intelligence

    The Committee conducted a comprehensive survey of the 
elements of the Intelligence Community that collect and analyze 
intelligence pertaining to the financial activities of U.S. 
adversaries, such as the illicit banking and procurement 
transactions related to Iran's and North Korea's missile and 
nuclear development, and the illicit funding streams that fuel 
insurgent networks and terrorist organizations in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. The Committee's work on these issues included 
identifying gaps in coverage; holding multiple meetings and 
briefings with Treasury's Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
and other relevant agencies and Departments; and developing a 
catalog of all financial intelligence-related finished 
intelligence analysis products. In addition, Committee staff 
worked with staff from the Senate Committees on Armed Services, 
Foreign Relations, Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 
Finance, and Banking to develop a coherent cross-Committee and 
interagency approach to these issues throughout the government.
    Following the President's December 1, 2009, announcement of 
the new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the 
Chairman and Vice Chairman, along with Senators Rockefeller, 
Wyden, Bayh, Whitehouse, and Majority Leader Harry Reid, wrote 
to the DNI and the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs to urge that they coordinate a comprehensive 
interagency campaign to identify, target, and attack the 
funding networks that sustain the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The 
Committee also held a hearing to review the efforts of the IC 
and other government agencies in this area. In response to the 
Committee's request, the DNI, on August 1, 2010, issued a 
report detailing the IC's strategy and implementation plan to 
improve collection and analysis against the financing networks 
of the Taliban and al Qaeda.
    On October 6, 2010, Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman 
Bond, along with Senators Rockefeller, Wyden, Bayh, Whitehouse, 
and Snowe, wrote to DNI Clapper to commend the Intelligence 
Community's work pertaining to threat finance and financial 
intelligence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and suggested that 
Director Clapper seek to replicate this work with regard to 
other national security challenges outside of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.

13. Oversight of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    The Committee continued its oversight of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence throughout the 111th 
Congress. The position of the Director of National 
Intelligence, as established by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, was given a variety of 
statutory authorities and responsibilities. The ODNI includes a 
management staff that assists the Director in coordinating the 
resources and activities of the various intelligence agencies. 
It also includes several functional organizations, including 
the National Counterterrorism Center, the National 
Counterproliferation Center, the National Counterintelligence 
Executive, and the National Intelligence Council.
    During the 111th Congress, DNIs Blair and Clapper, as well 
as other officials within their office, appeared before the 
Committee for numerous briefings and hearings. These meetings 
were necessary both to monitor the progress of the ODNI and to 
assist in the oversight of the individual agencies of the 
Intelligence Community.
    The ODNI submitted numerous reports and strategy documents 
to the Committee during 2009 and 2010. For example, the ODNI 
provided the National Intelligence Strategy, the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework, progress reports on the 
implementation of the DNI's budget authorities, a report on 
Information Integration, annual reports on the functions of 
analytic integrity and standards, a report on the status of the 
IC language program, and reports on security and suitability 
process reform.

14. Intelligence Community Directive 402

    The Committee also conducted oversight on Intelligence 
Community Directive (ICD) 402, which DNI Blair issued early in 
his tenure. On May 19, 2009, DNI Blair, completing a process 
that began under previous DNI Michael McConnell, issued ICD 402 
to designate ``DNI representatives'' to U.S. foreign partners 
and international organizations. In recognition of the 
historical overseas role of the CIA, ICD 402 provided that in 
``virtually all cases globally'' the CIA Chief of Station would 
serve as the DNI representative to U.S. diplomatic missions. In 
``rare circumstances,'' according to the document, the DNI, in 
consultation with the Chiefs of Mission, the Director of the 
CIA, and other affected departments or agencies, could 
designate a DNI representative other than a CIA Chief of 
Station. The Committee wrote in S. Report 111-55, which 
accompanied S. 1494, the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010, that ICD 402 was faithful to the National 
Security Act because the DNI is not only the head of the 
Intelligence Community in Washington, D.C., but is the 
Intelligence Community's head wherever it operates in the 
world. In November 2009, however, the National Security Council 
supported the CIA's position that CIA Chiefs of Station should 
be the DNI representatives in all cases.

15. Information sharing and Intelligence Community Directive 501

    The Committee spent considerable time examining the 
progress of the Intelligence Community in implementing ICD 
501--``Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information 
Within the Intelligence Community.'' The ICD directs that IC 
elements ``shall treat information collected and analysis 
produced as national assets and, as such, shall act as stewards 
of information who have a predominant responsibility to 
provide.''
    The Committee found that, while the DNI and IC agencies 
have made substantial progress at improving discoverability and 
sharing of information across the IC, much more needs to be 
done to fulfill the goals set forth in ICD 501. The Committee 
discovered that policies and practice regarding access to 
needed information differed from agency to agency. More than 
once, the Committee intervened to improve access to specific 
programs for specific IC managers and analysts. However, the 
Committee believed that the need for its involvement to improve 
information sharing was contrary to the spirit of ICD 501. The 
Committee will continue to oversee the implementation of ICD 
501 to ensure information necessary for intelligence officials 
to perform their mission is made available in a systemic and 
routine fashion, with appropriate measures in place to protect 
sources and methods.

16. Foreign language requirements and capabilities

    The Committee reviewed the IC's foreign language 
requirements and capabilities in order to discern the specific 
gaps, shortfalls, weaknesses, and national level issues that 
contribute to the IC's overall deficit in foreign language 
capability. This effort focused on a range of issues, including 
IC requirements for heritage speakers; security clearance 
processes; professional language training throughout the IC; 
foreign language professional retention and incentive programs; 
linguist utilization and language maintenance pay; and the use 
of foreign language contractors worldwide.
    The Committee found that serious shortfalls persist for 
languages critical to intelligence agency missions in spite of 
multiple past and ongoing efforts to improve this capability. 
While IC agencies have attempted to correct their hiring 
patterns and increase their language training programs, many 
still rely heavily on contract linguists, interpreters, and 
translators for critical languages. Persistent shortfalls in 
critical languages coupled with the increasing volumes of 
information available through open source and other means have 
exacerbated the effects of a national deficit in foreign 
language capability on intelligence collection and analysis.
    By the end of the reporting period, the Committee staff had 
ascertained a number of systemic, community-wide and/or agency 
specific problems in the areas of billet structure and language 
training; contractor hiring and utilization; security clearance 
processes; linguist recruitment and hiring practices; and 
military linguist utilization. The Committee will continue to 
follow and address the foreign language deficit of the 
Intelligence Community.

17. Education and training

    The Committee spent considerable time examining the 
progress and status of a wide range of educational, training, 
and scholarship programs within and associated with the 
Intelligence Community, including the IC Centers of Academic 
Excellence (CAE) in National Security Studies Program, the 
National Security Education Program (NSEP), Boren Scholars, and 
the National Intelligence University.
    The IC CAE in National Security Studies Program was 
established during 2005 in response to the nation's increasing 
need for IC professionals who are educated and trained with the 
unique knowledge, skills, and capabilities to carry out 
America's national security objectives. The Committee is 
monitoring the program, particularly in schools whose programs 
were originally funded with program money but are now self-
sustaining.
    In multiple meetings with academic scholarship and program 
managers, Committee staff explored the scope, scale, and 
resourcing of programs, and examined the historical and 
potential returns on investment experienced throughout the IC. 
The Committee sought to ensure that the IC is adequately 
resourced to educate, recruit, and train a broad spectrum of 
professionals capable of contributing to the national security 
of the United States, including through educational programs 
that lead to quantitative and qualitative increases in the 
national talent pool from which the IC recruits.

18. Analytic transformation and quality of analysis

    The Committee maintained its focus on ongoing analytic 
transformation as well as the quality of analytic products 
disseminated to customers of the IC. The 2004 Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) mandated a number 
of reforms in the IC to improve the analytic standards of the 
community, address faulty intelligence analysis, and increase 
information sharing between analysts and agencies. The DNI 
implemented policies and procedures to encourage sound analytic 
methods and tradecraft throughout the IC elements, and the 
Committee continued to monitor the progress of agencies and 
analytic directorates at meeting those standards.
    The Committee conducted a full committee hearing with top 
analytic leaders of the IC on the state of intelligence 
analysis, as well as efforts to improve the quality of analytic 
tradecraft since the passage of IRTPA. The Committee remains 
keenly interested in significant issues relating to 
intelligence analysis, including: IC and individual agency 
efforts to create and follow community-wide standards of 
analytic tradecraft; analyst recruitment, training, utilization 
and retention; the balance between the IC's focus on reporting 
current threats versus long-term analysis; and the status of 
analytic collaboration and intelligence-sharing within and 
among intelligence agencies.
    In addition to the hearing, the Committee received regular 
substantive briefings from analysts, held analysis oversight 
meetings with senior analysts and analytic chiefs, and 
conducted quality of analysis meetings with the IC's analytic 
ombudsman. These activities supported intelligence oversight in 
general, but specifically contributed to focusing the analytic 
community on a continuing pursuit of analytic quality.
    A large part of the analytic transformation underway in the 
IC should be happening in the realm of information technology, 
the tools that analysts use to discover, retrieve, share, 
analyze, produce, and share intelligence. Unfortunately, 
individual agencies continue to develop analyst tools, 
technologies, and databases for their own analysts that may not 
be usable by all the IC agencies. The Committee continues to 
see stovepipes in the development and fielding of analytic 
technologies, although collaborative workspaces, common 
metadata, shared databases, and universal access to needed 
information should be the rule rather than the exception.

19. Size and apportionment of analytic workforce

    The Committee began to look more closely into the IC's 
analytic workforce, apportionment, and division of labor to 
determine if the specific analytic personnel requests of the IC 
agencies were justified. The Committee examined the analysis 
being produced, the analysts requested and required, and the 
National Intelligence Priorities that serve as the foundational 
basis for resource requests to determine what redundancies or 
gaps if any, were present. In multiple substantive briefings, 
the Committee reviewed the oversight of analytic accounts, 
discussing the number of analysts focused on specific issues, 
determining whether a particular agency was duplicating the 
efforts of another, or discovering whether analytic gaps were 
left unaddressed. The Committee continues to encourage IC 
agencies to align growth in analytic resources to meet 
specified priorities and missions, rather than allowing general 
growth across all analytic missions randomly.

20. Forward deployment of analysts

    During its consideration of the Fiscal Year 2010 
Intelligence Authorization Act, the Committee noted the 
increasing numbers and locations where IC strategic level 
analysts are forward deployed to overseas locations. The 
Committee understands the value of providing periodic ``quality 
of analysis''-type regional familiarization opportunities for 
analysts and recognizes that geographical proximity to 
customers is important for some analytic mission sets. At the 
same time, the Committee continues to examine the link between 
foundational intelligence strategy documents such as ICD 204 
(``Roles and Responsibilities for the National Intelligence 
Priorities Framework''), National Intelligence Priorities 
Framework, and the actual deployment of analytic resources 
globally. The Committee remains concerned that the forward 
deployment of analysts in support of operational or tactical 
missions should not undercut the strategic priorities of the 
Intelligence Community.

21. Analytic integrity and standards

    Concerned that there appeared to be a wide disparity in 
analytic tradecraft standards followed across the IC, in some 
cases diverging from the standards mandated in IRTPA, the 
Committee undertook a study of Analytic Integrity and Standards 
(AIS) at the ODNI and in several agencies. This study explored 
the organization and functioning of AIS offices across the IC, 
the rigor with which analytic integrity and tradecraft review 
standards are being applied, actions being taken to improve 
AIS, and what further steps could be taken to increase and 
improve the analytic standards and policies of the IC.
    One of the reforms put in place with the passage of IRTPA 
was the creation, formalization, and enhancement of AIS 
organizations at the ODNI and within individual agencies. These 
AIS organizations were meant to improve both the conduct and 
outcomes of analysis. Every IC agency which produces analysis 
has created one or more offices with the specific 
responsibilities of training analysts in analytic 
methodologies, tradecraft, and standards, conducting in-depth 
post-production reviews of analytic products for adherence to 
tradecraft standards, and creation and dissemination of 
analytic ``lessons learned'' and ``best practices.''
    In the course of visiting AIS offices and officers 
throughout the IC, Committee staff found that while the IC has 
generally raised its level of emphasis on teaching, mentoring, 
monitoring, and enforcing analytic tradecraft standards, there 
are still specific areas requiring improvement. These areas as 
well as agency ``best practices'' have been identified and 
recommendations made to ODNI and agency staffs.

22. Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis

    During the 111th Congress, the Committee continued to 
monitor the activities and programs of the CIA's Sherman Kent 
School for Intelligence Analysis. The Sherman Kent School 
provides CIA officers with an integrated, career-long program 
that combines specialized training in the craft of intelligence 
analysis with a substantive curriculum interwoven with the 
values, traditions, and history of the CIA.
    The Committee's oversight included: examining the size and 
scope of programs; the numbers and specialties of analysts 
trained compared to the number and specialties of analysts 
requiring training; future growth of the school; strategic 
planning; and ties to the wider IC.
    The Committee found that the School provides excellent 
foundational and follow-on training for intelligence analysts. 
The Committee also identified resource shortfalls that, if 
corrected, could lead to a broader and more robust analytic 
capability in the wider IC.

23. Analyst-collector relationships

    In late 2010, the Committee initiated a study into the 
technological, cultural, and policy issues that affect the 
relationships between intelligence analysts and various 
collection systems. The Committee believes that individual 
agencies' analysts currently use agency-specific systems to 
manage collection requirements, have little capability to task 
beyond their own agencies, and are often discouraged from 
direct contact with collection organizations, a situation that 
may create stovepipes and obstruct the flow of information.
    The Committee has developed a better understanding of the 
relationships between analysts and collectors/collection 
systems, and has developed new insights into the depth of 
planning and involvement of the ODNI in collection management. 
The Committee is establishing a baseline understanding of 
technical systems which support the flow of information between 
analysts and collectors.
    The Committee plans to explore these relationships in more 
depth by examining IC and individual agency policies regarding 
analyst communications with collectors in the field; IC and 
individual agency policies regarding collector communications 
with analysts and input into analytic assessments; the manner 
and specific technologies used to task collection within 
individual agencies and across the IC; the manner and specific 
technologies used to provide feedback to collectors within an 
agency and across the IC; and analyst interaction with 
collection managers.

24. National Intelligence Estimates production process

    In 2010, the Committee initiated a research project that 
examined the procedural reforms put into place since 2004 in 
the production processes of National Intelligence Estimates 
(NIEs). NIEs are the most authoritative written means by which 
the DNI conveys to the President and other senior policymakers 
the judgments of the entire IC regarding national security 
issues. Committee staff interviewed National Intelligence 
Officers and their deputies, as well as analysts who had 
participated directly in the drafting of Estimates, Community 
Memoranda, and Terms of Reference. Intelligence Community 
officials expressed their belief that there is presently 
greater consistency and formality to the NIE production process 
than there was in the years prior to 2005, noted a variety of 
process improvements under consideration, and identified other 
areas that still require improvements.
    This initial work has laid the foundation for further 
research in 2011 that will include interviews of policymakers, 
the principal customers of NIEs, and coordination with the 
ODNI's Director of Analytic Integrity and Standards, the office 
responsible for ensuring quality analysis. The Committee seeks 
to understand how well the reforms to the NIE process put into 
place since the creation of the DNI in 2004 have addressed the 
quality of analysis and satisfied the needs of policymakers.

25. Lessons Learned Programs

    During the 111th Congress, the Committee began to review 
the individual intelligence agencies to determine the scope and 
depth of their commitment for self-examination, with an 
emphasis on increasing the use of lessons learned programs. The 
Committee believes such programs are essential to help 
intelligence agencies learn from their successes and mistakes, 
and to anticipate and be ready for new challenges. The 
Committee commended the CIA for establishing a Lessons Learned 
Program and fully supports its growth into the individual 
components of the CIA.
    The Committee firmly believes that the IC should 
institutionalize the lessons learned process and develop policy 
supporting that effort. To that end, the Committee has 
encouraged the IC to increase the number and type of studies, 
to create web-based lesson-sharing environments, to modernize 
its oral history programs, and to support component-based 
lessons learned activities throughout the IC.

26. Measures of effectiveness

    The Committee continued to press the Intelligence Community 
during the 111th Congress to establish quantitative measures of 
effectiveness to provide insight into how effectively a program 
is performing. The Committee believes well-designed measures of 
effectiveness that accurately reflect performance and cost 
issues can assist decision makers in making better informed and 
timelier decisions.
    The Committee is pleased that the IC is developing more 
meaningful measures of effectiveness for its programs and will 
continue to monitor the agencies as they refine established 
measures and expand them to additional programs.

27. National Collaboration Development Center

    During the 111th Congress, the Committee reviewed and 
supported the creation of the National Collaboration 
Development Center (NCDC). The NCDC emphasizes the development 
of working relationships at the field level between U.S. 
officials charged with intelligence, national security, and 
homeland security missions. The Committee believes that 
participants in the NCDC learn to recognize information of 
national security value, and to evaluate and implement joint 
intelligence collection and operational opportunities as a 
result. The Committee strongly supports the NCDC mission of 
facilitating cooperation between U.S. agencies and will 
continue to monitor the development of the Center in the 
future.

28. FBI intelligence transformation

    The Committee continued to examine efforts by the FBI to 
transform itself into a premier intelligence and national 
security organization. The Committee held hearings and 
briefings with FBI officials, conducted oversight visits to FBI 
field offices and Legal Attaches, met with representatives of 
FBI-employee associations, and consulted with current and 
former intelligence officials regarding the strengthening of 
FBI intelligence and national security functions.
    The Committee successfully secured additional surveillance 
resources for threat mitigation and intelligence collection, 
and has worked with the FBI to ensure the Committee has an 
increasingly broad view of FBI national security operations and 
activities, including written analysis of international 
terrorism and counterintelligence matters. In addition, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required 
the DNI, in coordination with the Director of the FBI, to 
establish performance metrics and timetables for FBI reform 
initiatives. The DNI is required to submit a report on FBI 
reform efforts to the congressional intelligence committees on 
a semi-annual basis for five years.

29. Implementation of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and compliance 
        with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders

    During the 111th Congress, the Committee held three closed 
hearings and numerous staff briefings to review issues related 
to implementation of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and 
compliance with the orders of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC).
    In conducting its oversight, the Committee utilized 
reporting required under provisions in FISA and the USA PATRIOT 
Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act, including the annual 
and semi-annual reports from the Attorney General, the DNI, and 
relevant inspectors general. In particular, the Committee has 
benefited from being able to review decisions, orders, and 
opinions, as well as the related pleadings, applications, and 
memoranda of law, that include ``significant construction or 
interpretation of any provision'' of FISA that are required to 
be submitted to the oversight committees under 50 U.S.C. 
1871(c). These documents were routinely the subject of 
subsequent briefings by officials of the Department of Justice 
and the Intelligence Community, in Committee spaces and at the 
relevant agencies.
    Prior to the extension of the expiring FISA provisions in 
February 2010, the Committee acted to bring to the attention of 
the entire membership of the Senate important information 
related to the nature and significance of the FISA collection 
authority subject to sunset. Chairman Feinstein and Vice 
Chairman Bond notified their colleagues that the Attorney 
General and the DNI had provided a classified paper on 
intelligence collection made possible under the Act and that 
the Committee was providing a secure setting where the 
classified paper could be reviewed by any Senator prior to the 
vote on passage of what became Public Law 111-141 to extend 
FISA sunsets.
    In addition, as part of its oversight activities, the 
Committee regularly reviewed the activities of the Office of 
Compliance of the National Security Agency. The Director of the 
National Security Agency in 2009 appointed a Director of 
Compliance, a position later established in law by Section 433 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, to 
ensure compliance with FISC orders, as well as laws and 
regulations involving the privacy of U.S. persons, during the 
conduct of intelligence operations. The Committee believes that 
the Office of Compliance has brought rigor to NSA's efforts to 
ensure verifiable adherence to the laws, policies, and 
compliance standards under which the Agency is required to 
operate as it conducts its mission.

30. Counterintelligence

    During the 111th Congress, the Intelligence Committee held 
oversight hearings and briefings on the state of 
counterintelligence (CI) in the Intelligence Community. 
Specifically, the Committee held an oversight hearing on the 
National Counterintelligence Executive's (NCIX) policies and 
efforts to unify CI practices across the Intelligence 
Community, as well as efforts by the FBI to combat the 
activities of foreign intelligence organizations in the United 
States. Additionally, the Committee was briefed by the FBI on 
their efforts to uncover and dismantle a ring of Russian spies 
operating in the United States. The Committee will continue to 
focus on how the Intelligence Community can enhance and unify 
counterintelligence efforts among the intelligence agencies in 
the 112th Congress.
    Additionally, the Committee reviewed issues related to the 
NCIX's internal management, community acquisition practices, 
and ways to enhance the timely production of damage assessments 
by the NCIX. Committee staff met with DNI Blair's National 
Counterintelligence Review Group (NCIRG) in March 2009. The 
NCIRG, which was chaired by former FBI Director Louis Freeh, 
solicited the Committee's views and input on how to best 
elevate the Intelligence Community's counterintelligence 
policy, operations, and training in the coming years.
    In September 2009, Robert M. Bryant was named the third 
National Counterintelligence Executive. Later, Douglas Thomas 
was selected to be the Deputy National Counterintelligence 
Executive. During the course of the 111th Congress, Committee 
staff met repeatedly with these two officials and their staff 
to discuss pending counterintelligence issues, and will 
continue to do so in the next Congress.

31. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information

    The Committee continued its vigorous oversight of the 
Intelligence Community's efforts to address unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information. In furtherance of this 
effort, the Committee held a hearing with Attorney General 
Holder, FBI Director Mueller, and former DNI Blair on how to 
best address the damaging nature of leaks of classified 
information. Additionally, the Committee conducted multiple 
oversight briefings with the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Department of Justice on their collective 
efforts to stem leaks of classified information. To keep the 
intelligence committees better informed of the IC's efforts, in 
September 2010, DNI Clapper agreed to provide the Committee 
with additional information on leaks of classified information.
    This agreement includes notifying the Committee of any 
serious and significant leak of classified information to the 
media, including if and when an IC element has reported and 
referred the matter to the Department of Justice; notifying the 
Committee if administrative sanctions are imposed upon any IC 
employee for the unauthorized disclosure of classified 
material; and, finally, at the beginning of each calendar year, 
the Department of Justice will provide the Committee the number 
of leak matters reported to the Attorney General by the IC and 
the number of matters referred to the originating agencies for 
administrative action.
    Additionally, the Committee's review of unauthorized 
disclosures identified a number of ways to combat future 
potential releases of classified information. These include 
consideration of enhanced resources for the auditing and 
monitoring of information technology systems handling 
classified information; strengthening laws prohibiting 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information; and ensuring 
proper implementation of the ``need to know'' principle with 
respect to the sharing of classified information.
    The Committee also held a hearing on the Wikileaks 
organization and the principle of ``need to know.'' Wikileaks 
is an international organization that has published improperly 
obtained classified material including approximately 77,000 
tactical and situational reports relating to U.S. military 
activities in Afghanistan, some of which included sensitive 
intelligence information; nearly 400,000 US military cables on 
the Iraq War, which included intelligence assessments and 
operational information; and some 250,000 U.S. State Department 
cables, which highlight various aspects of the United States 
global diplomatic efforts and intelligence matters.
    The Committee's review of Wikileaks and other unauthorized 
releases of classified information raised concerns about how 
the Intelligence Community is balancing the ``need to know'' 
with efforts to share information more broadly, and its ability 
to identify anomalous activities by its employees. The 
Committee in the 112th Congress will use information gained 
from oversight of these issues to determine whether additional 
statutory or policy changes are necessary to help protect 
information vital to U.S. national security.

32. Covert action

    Under the National Security Act, the DNI shall keep the 
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of, 
are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any 
department or agency of the United States, including 
significant failures. The National Security Act defines a 
covert action to be ``an activity of the United States 
Government to influence political, economic, or military 
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the 
U.S. Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly.'' The DNI is responsible for furnishing the 
committees with any information concerning covert actions that 
is in the possession of any U.S. Government entity and which is 
requested by either intelligence committee in order to carry 
out its responsibilities. The only qualification on this 
reporting responsibility is due regard for protection from 
unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to 
sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other 
exceptionally sensitive matters.
    Throughout the 111th Congress, the Committee continued to 
conduct rigorous oversight of covert action programs. In 
accordance with Committee rules, these reviews occur on a 
quarterly basis. Every quarter, the Committee receives a 
written report on each covert action that is being carried out 
under a presidential finding. Committee staff then devotes 
several sessions to review with Intelligence Community 
personnel the reports on each subject, and often pose follow up 
questions and receive further briefings or written answers. The 
Committee also holds quarterly hearings on covert action 
programs and often holds other hearings and briefings on these 
programs on a more frequent basis.
    The Committee reviewed covert action programs to ensure 
their means and objectives were consistent with United States 
foreign policy goals, and conducted in accordance with all 
applicable U.S. laws. The Committee pursues its oversight 
responsibilities for covert action with the understanding that 
these programs can be a significant factor in accomplishing 
foreign policy objectives.
    In 2009, the National Security Council led a review of all 
ongoing covert action programs. The Committee held closed 
hearings at which the results of this review were discussed.
    At an open hearing in 2010, Senator Feinstein noted that 
``the CIA IG conducts a detailed review on each authorized 
covert action program every three years,'' and asked the new 
CIA IG nominee if he planned to continue this practice. The 
nominee, David Buckley, replied that ``while a routine, every-
three-years audit will obviously get some coverage of each of 
the covert actions, I'm also open to reviewing a covert action 
twelve months later if that's what's required to make sure 
things stay on track.'' The Committee routinely receives the 
results of the reviews that Mr. Buckley mentioned, and often 
follows up by examining the issue in committee hearings or via 
staff inquiries.

33. Counterproliferation

    The Committee continues to conduct oversight on the IC's 
counterproliferation collection and analysis. The Committee 
staff also met regularly with the National Counterproliferation 
Center (NCPC) and components in the intelligence agencies which 
handle proliferation issues to receive updates. In particular, 
the Committee has strongly supported NCPC's work on performance 
budgeting, which has been an exemplar for performance budgeting 
in the IC.

34. Research and development

    Recent studies sponsored by the Intelligence Community and 
the Committee concluded that the Intelligence Community must 
dramatically increase funding for research and development in 
order to develop new capabilities that will provide unique and 
actionable intelligence to U.S. decision-makers in the future. 
The Committee recommended in the report accompanying the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 that the 
Intelligence Community should invest proportionately more on a 
broad portfolio of longer term research and development 
projects with the potential for high-impact effects on 
intelligence collection and analysis. To that end, the 
Committee strongly supported additional funding for the new 
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, a dedicated, 
community-wide research activity created to take great 
scientific risks with the hope of reaping great technological 
rewards for the Intelligence Community.

35. Technical Advisory Group reviews

    The Committee's Technical Advisory Group (TAG) is comprised 
of distinguished experts in various scientific disciplines who 
volunteer their time to assist the SSCI in reviewing the 
technological needs and programs of the Intelligence Community.
    In 2009, the TAG conducted reviews of cybersecurity policy, 
operations, and research and development. The TAG's studies 
have supported the Committee's intelligence oversight 
activities and helped to inform the debate over appropriate 
U.S. policy for cybersecurity. The TAG studies also identified 
problems with the government's ability to attract and retain a 
skilled and trained cyber work force. To help address this 
problem, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 requires the DNI to submit a plan for recruiting, 
retaining, and training qualified personnel for cybersecurity 
work within the Intelligence Community.
    In 2010, the TAG conducted a year-long review of planned 
investment in electro-optical satellite collection systems. The 
TAG found flawed processes and results from the earliest stage 
of the requirements process, through the analysis of 
alternatives, and into the selection and design phases. The 
study group members judged the technical justification for the 
proposed system fell far short of the standard they expected 
from an investment of this magnitude. Moreover, the depth of 
engineering analysis, documentation, and clarity of Executive 
Branch presentations all fell short of contemporary common 
practices demanded of analogous systems in the scientific arena 
and in the private sector. The TAG recommended the IC pursue 
alternative satellite constellations than currently planned and 
more rigorous external engineering and technical peer review 
for all satellite acquisitions. The Committee continues to 
pursue these TAG recommendations to ensure the IC pursues the 
most cost-effective solution for its electro-optical satellite 
requirements.

36. Commercial imagery

    During the 111th Congress, the Committee reviewed issues 
related to the acquisition, management, security, 
dissemination, and use of commercially acquired imagery and the 
government's role in supporting the domestic commercial 
satellite industry. The Secretary of Commerce, through the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
licenses and regulates the U.S. commercial remote sensing space 
industry, pursuant to the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 
1992. At the same time, elements of the IC acquire and use 
domestic and foreign commercial imagery from a variety of 
sources, in the conduct of their intelligence missions. The 
Committee will continue to focus on how the IC acquires and 
manages the tasking, processing, exploitation, and 
dissemination (TPED) of commercial imagery as means of 
fulfilling its intelligence collection requirements.

37. Defense Attache System

    The Committee continued its oversight of the Defense 
Attache System (DAS), which is managed by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA). As a result of Committee actions, 
the Director of the DIA and the Director of National 
Intelligence agreed to begin routine notifications of the 
Congress when attaches are dismissed for other than health-
related, family and compassionate reasons. The Committee staff 
also found that too many attaches are not sufficiently 
conversant in the languages, cultures, and traditions of the 
countries to which they are assigned. While the Committee staff 
found a preponderance of individual attaches exceptionally 
qualified and thoroughly productive, many others were ill-
suited and underprepared. Additionally, the Committee sought to 
enhance the security and capability of the DAS information 
technology systems and programs. The Committee has worked with 
the DIA's Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Center (DCHC) 
and the DIA Chief Information Officer to identify resource 
requirements and specific locations for improving secure 
communications.

38. Oversight of Department of Homeland Security Intelligence 
        activities

    The Committee continued its oversight of the development of 
the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). The 
Committee continues to have concerns over I&A's personnel 
situation and related budget issues, as well as the quality of 
the analysis performed at I&A. Close to half of I&A's personnel 
during the 111th Congress were contractors and approximately a 
third of its government positions have remained unfilled for 
years; nonetheless, I&A has continued to request additional 
positions in its budget submissions. As contractors on average 
cost significantly more than government employees, the 
Committee believes that I&A needs to improve its personnel 
recruitment and retention efforts, and hire for the unfilled 
positions before requesting additional personnel.
    Further, the Committee notes that I&A still needs to refine 
the scope and quality of its finished intelligence products. In 
particular, the strategic products produced by I&A often do not 
appear to meet the tactical and operational needs of the 
individual DHS components. The Committee will continue to 
review I&A's efforts to better meet the needs of its customers 
and acquire the appropriate personnel to perform its mission.

39. Intelligence community facilities

    The Committee continues to examine issues related to the 
design, construction, renovation, use, lease negotiation, and 
lease termination of facilities owned and leased by the IC. 
With the growth of the IC workforce following the 9/11 attacks, 
and the decrease in facilities caused in part by the Base 
Realignment and Closure recommendations of 2005, space suitable 
for IC agencies especially in the National Capitol Region is in 
increasingly short supply.
    To address these issues, the Committee met with numerous IC 
facilities managers, financial officers, and IT professionals 
to review the status of IC facilities. The Committee found that 
standards for sizes of individual and common area work spaces 
vary greatly from agency to agency and within agencies, costs 
per square foot vary widely for similar facilities in similar 
locations, and agency strategies for future space development 
and management have not been coordinated within their agencies 
and across the IC.
    The Committee will continue to review the IC's efforts to 
develop common facilities standards where applicable, to 
conduct strategic management of properties through their needed 
lifecycle, and to determine appropriate performance measures 
for adequate use of space across the IC.

40. Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office

    The Committee continues to monitor the operation of the 
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTS-PO) 
to ensure it is meeting the communication needs of all United 
States government agencies and departments operating from 
diplomatic and consular facilities abroad, including the needs 
of agencies with national security missions for secure, 
reliable and robust communication capabilities. During the 
111th Congress, the Committee identified organizational changes 
that will strengthen DTS-PO including reorganizing that office, 
establishing a Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Governance 
Board, funding DTS-PO on a two-year fiscal schedule, and 
permitting DTS-PO to charge fees for its services. The 
Committee included provisions to implement these reforms in the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.

        D. Financial Accounting, Inspectors General, and Audits

    The Committee's rules provide that within its staff there 
``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of 
programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies 
with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of 
persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out 
such functions in accordance with accepted auditing 
standards.'' The functions described in this rule were 
performed during the 111th Congress by the Committee's 
Oversight Team. The Oversight Team also was responsible for the 
Committee's oversight of the IC's compliance with financial 
accounting standards and was the Committee element responsible 
for reviewing the work and performance of the various IGs whose 
work includes or covers the Intelligence Community.

1. Compliance with Federal financial accounting standards

    The Committee has a long history of oversight and reform 
efforts in financial management. The Committee has emphasized 
the importance of achieving auditable financial statements, 
dating back to the Committee's Fiscal Year 2002 Intelligence 
Authorization bill. That bill called for the NRO, NSA, CIA, 
DIA, and what is now called the NGA to produce auditable 
financial statements by March 1, 2005. Since that time, the 
Committee has been continuously engaged in a dialogue with the 
IC on financial auditability and on the modern business systems 
that are necessary to sustain auditability. The Committee has 
also played a central role in encouraging elements of the IC to 
ensure that they properly estimate costs and budget for the 
programs they are pursuing.
    To date, the NRO is the only one of the IC agencies 
required to produce auditable financial statements that has 
achieved what appears to be a sustainable opinion with no 
qualifications from its independent auditors. The Chairman and 
Vice Chairman officially congratulated the NRO in a December 
2009 letter and urged the NRO to help lead other IC agencies 
toward auditability. The CIA has submitted its financial 
reports to an independent auditor but has received a disclaimer 
of opinion due to the inability of the auditor to gather 
certain relevant facts. The NSA, DIA, and NGA are still not 
even prepared to submit their financial reports to independent 
audit.
    During the 111th Congress, Committee staff analyzed these 
agencies' annual financial reports and met with each of the 
agencies' Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) to discuss this 
analysis. Most of these annual financial reports showed some 
improvement in quality and forthrightness, but still reflected 
insufficient progress toward auditability. The NSA's annual 
financial report was the exception, in that it showed no 
apparent improvement. In particular, the Committee was 
concerned about the failed implementation of NSA's new 
financial system. An NSA Inspector General report found that 
this system was put into operation before it was adequately 
tested and that operators were not properly trained to use it. 
The NSA also made $7 million in duplicative invoice payments, 
and the agency could not successfully reconcile its financial 
books at the end of fiscal year 2008. Further, a July 2008 Army 
Finance Command report, referenced by the NSA IG, found that 
the NSA's accounting system was in violation of public laws, 
Treasury Department financial manuals, and DoD regulations, and 
was inconsistent with the Federal Managers Financial Integrity 
Act. Accordingly, staff held meetings with the NSA's Inspector 
General in 2009, as well as with the NSA's Chief Financial 
Executive, to understand this problem, its implications, and 
prospects for improvement.
    In March 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman sent a letter 
to the new DNI expressing their discontent with the state of 
financial accounting in the IC and urging him to ``take strong 
and decisive action to see that appropriate reforms and 
oversight controls are in place as soon as possible.'' In 
particular, the letter expressed alarm at the breakdown in 
internal controls at the NSA following its attempts to 
implement its commercial, off-the-shelf accounting system. The 
letter lent the Committee's support to the DNI's fledgling 
Business Transformation Office (BTO), but cautioned that the 
BTO's work must not delay sorely-needed improvements to 
internal controls. These controls are critical to preventing 
millions of dollars of potential fraud, waste, and abuse, as 
well as providing reliable business information for sound 
decision-making. The Chairman and Vice Chairman requested 
several specific actions to promote progress and ensure careful 
oversight. These included:
           Briefing the Committee on a Business 
        Enterprise Architecture framework by July 31, 2009;
           Presenting an initial Business Enterprise 
        Architecture to the Committee by December 31, 2009;
           Providing monthly updates on progress in 
        staffing the new BTO; and
           Explaining changes to the DNI's April 2007 
        financial auditability plan and apprising the Committee 
        on progress with respect to this revised plan.
    In June 2009, the Director of NSA wrote to the Chairman and 
Vice Chairman, claiming that the NSA was now ``fully compliant 
with the laws, regulations, and manuals'' referenced in the 
U.S. Army Finance Command report and the Federal Financial 
Managers Integrity Act. The NSA Director's letter also stated 
that the NSA had been able to reconcile its fiscal year 2008 
financial records. In July 2009, the Chairman and Vice Chairman 
wrote to the Secretary of Defense concerning the NSA Director's 
letter. They stated that in light of the NSA's past 
difficulties in producing auditable financial statements, the 
Committee believed the progress claimed by the NSA should be 
independently confirmed by the DoD Inspector General. 
Specifically, the letter requested that the DoD IG conduct a 
form and content review of the NSA's fiscal year 2009 financial 
statements to determine whether they were supported by reliable 
accounting data and supporting information.
    The Committee received the results of the DoD IG's review 
in November 2009, which was very critical of NSA's claims. 
Overall, the IG found that the NSA's financial statements were 
not adequately supported by reliable accounting data and 
supporting information. An even more disturbing finding was 
that the NSA's ``remediation plans do not fully address audit 
impediments.'' Specific findings included an inability to 
reconcile critical general ledger balances, failure to perform 
required accounting processes, and inconsistencies between the 
information contained in the notes to the financial statements 
and the information provided to the IG. The IG's findings 
raised serious questions about the assertions made by the NSA 
Director in his June 2009 letter and the support he is 
receiving from the administrative staff involved. During a 
meeting with Committee staff in August 2009, the NSA Deputy 
Director committed to ensure a new level of senior management 
attention to the NSA's financial practices.
    Throughout the 111th Congress, Committee staff met 
frequently with the ODNI to discuss financial auditability and 
business transformation. As requested in the Committee's March 
2009 letter, the IC CFO presented to Committee staff the DNI's 
framework for the Business Enterprise Architecture. Also as 
requested in the March 2009 letter, the ODNI CFO presented 
quarterly progress reports to Committee staff on the CFO's 
revised auditability plan. Committee staff has provided 
feedback to the ODNI on these progress reports, as well as on 
the ODNI's progress reports on BTO staffing.
    In 2010, Committee staff became aware of an internal ODNI 
staff report that estimated that $2 billion could be saved over 
ten years by consolidating business systems and standardizing 
processes throughout the IC. Committee staff met with ODNI and 
OMB staff to review this report and urge the Administration to 
take aggressive steps to maximize savings and efficiencies. 
While IC officials expressed little confidence in the exact 
amount that could be saved, senior IC officials did concede 
that substantial savings and increased efficiencies would 
result from consolidation. Committee efforts in this area 
subsequently focused on encouraging the IC to align programs 
and budgets to achieve these savings and efficiencies.
    In addition to extensive oversight interaction with the IC 
on financial management, the Committee legislated reforms to 
promote financial auditability, business transformation, and 
sound budgetary policy in the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence 
Authorization Act, Pub. L. 111-259.
    Section 322 on ``Business System Transformation'' requires 
that no funds may be obligated for IC business systems that 
cost over $3 million unless the DNI certifies that the 
acquisition complies with the approved business enterprise 
architecture. This will ensure that the IC follows a ``best 
business practice'' of having a business enterprise 
architecture and only building systems that conform to it. 
These business systems are important for producing auditable 
financial statements.
    Section 368, ``Correcting Long-standing Material 
Weaknesses'' requires the head of an intelligence agency to 
name a senior management official who is responsible for 
correcting long-standing, correctable material weaknesses, as 
identified in the agencies' annual financial reports. This is 
intended to ensure accountability for fixing long-standing 
problems that have a high risk of resulting in waste, fraud, 
and abuse, and impede an agency's ability to produce auditable 
financial statements.
    P.L. 111-259 also contained important budget reform 
provisions that will make IC processes more coherent and ensure 
that large acquisition programs are affordable before they are 
initiated.
    Section 406, ``Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence 
Community,'' establishes a DNI-appointed CFO of the IC to be 
the principal resource advisor to the DNI and to carry out 
duties described in the CFO Act. It also requires the CFO to be 
involved in strategic planning and requirements development, 
processes which in the past have resulted in unrealistic 
resource commitments. This provision will better empower the 
DNI to conduct his budgetary responsibilities, and it will 
clarify the budgetary decision-making within the ODNI and the 
IC.
    Section 325, ``Future Budget Projections'' requires the IC 
to produce five year budget plans with a moderate amount of 
detail and projections for the subsequent five year period with 
less detail. When the IC starts a new acquisition, it will be 
required to assess what impact the new acquisition will have on 
this ten year financial projection. The DNI will be required to 
submit this assessment before the President submits the first 
budget for the new acquisition and must update it whenever the 
law requires an Independent Cost Estimate of the acquisition. 
This provision will ensure that the IC considers the long-term 
financial consequences of near-term budget decisions. The 
Committee hopes that enactment of this provision will help end 
the IC's poor record of spending billions of dollars to start 
acquisition programs that it cannot afford to finish.
    Additionally, the Committee included in the unclassified 
report to accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010 an assessment of the IC's progress in 
performance budgeting and encouraging the IC to make further 
progress in specified areas. The Committee continues to believe 
that the Intelligence Community can better achieve its national 
security mission by further use of performance budgeting.

2. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General

    During the 111th Congress, the Committee continued both to 
utilize the work of the IGs of the IC and to promote the 
responsibilities and authorities of these offices. The 
Committee reviewed IG products, including audit reports, 
inspection reports, reports of investigation, and semi-annual 
reports of IG activities; conducted numerous visits to IG 
offices for updates on plans and procedures; and attended and 
participated in IG conferences. The Committee used information 
gained through review of IC IG products in its own oversight of 
the Intelligence Community, and raised IG recommendations with 
the senior leadership of IC agencies.
    As noted in Section II A, the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included provisions to add the IGs of 
the NRO, NSA, NGA, and DIA to Section 8G of the Inspector 
General Act of 1978. This statutory designation provides these 
IGs with additional authorities to conduct investigations 
including the ability to compel production of information. The 
Act also included a provision amending the National Security 
Act of 1947 to establish a statutory charter for the DNI IG.

3. Audit of Intelligence Community acquisition practices

    During the 111th Congress, the oversight staff completed an 
audit on the Intelligence Community Acquisition Processes which 
had begun during the 110th Congress. The audit focused on the 
role of the DNI in overseeing the IC's acquisition processes 
and how the NSA, NGA, NRO, and CIA managed and conducted 
acquisitions for their agencies. This audit found that, 
although the ODNI had provided valuable oversight and has 
placed additional emphasis on improving IC acquisition 
practices, significant problems remain in how the IC agencies 
acquire technology and equipment necessary for their missions.
    The audit found that the senior managers within the IC 
agencies were not appropriately focused on acquisition issues; 
the IC did not have enough experienced acquisition 
professionals to oversee billions of dollars in annual 
acquisitions; and the IC needed better management, training, 
and career planning for its workforce. In addition, the audit 
raised serious concerns about the role of contractors in 
overseeing acquisitions; the insufficient government monitoring 
of contractor performance and the need to better incentivize 
contractor performance; and the need to improve contract audit 
services. The final audit report contained recommendations on 
how to improve acquisition in the Intelligence Community. The 
Committee discussed implementation of these recommendations 
with the ODNI and IC agencies. The Committee will continue to 
follow the IC's implementation of these recommendations and its 
overall acquisition performance in coming years.

                            IV. NOMINATIONS

    During the 111th Congress, coinciding with the beginning of 
a new Administration, fourteen nominations were referred to the 
Committee, twelve directly upon receipt of the nomination in 
the Senate and two sequentially after referral to and reporting 
by another committee. The Committee held hearings for eleven of 
the thirteen pending nominees\1\ and recommended to the Senate 
that it give its advice and consent to each of the pending 
nominations. The Senate in the 111th Congress confirmed all 
twelve of the individuals recommended by the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\The Nomination of Philip Mudd, to be Undersecretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, was 
withdrawn prior to the hearing scheduled on his nomination. The 
Committee did not hold hearings on the nomination of Priscilla Guthrie 
to be the Chief Information Officer and the nomination of S. Leslie 
Ireland to be the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence 
and Analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Throughout the 111th Congress, referrals to the Committee 
were governed by Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 94th 
Congress, which had been added by S. Res. 445 of the 108th 
Congress and was further augmented during the 109th Congress. 
As a result of S. Res. 445, all nominations to advice and 
consent positions in the Intelligence Community are referred to 
the Select Committee on Intelligence, even when they are 
positions--such as the Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security--that are within departments which are primarily under 
the jurisdiction of other Senate committees.
    Four of the nominations received by the Committee were for 
positions created by the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004: the 
DNI; the Principal Deputy DNI; the General Counsel of the ODNI; 
and the Chief Information Officer of the ODNI. One other 
nomination, the position of Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security, was established by the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (March 9, 2006).
    A primary task of the Committee during the 111th Congress 
has been to examine in detail the responsibilities of these 
relatively new leadership positions in the IC. The Committee 
accomplished this not only through questioning the nominees at 
their confirmation hearings but also through extensive 
prehearing questions, the responses to which have been or will 
be printed in the hearing volumes for these nominations, where 
applicable. Through the nomination process and its traditional 
oversight, the Committee has been able to assess the unique 
role and contributions of each position within the Intelligence 
Community.
    The following were the nominations referred to the 
Committee during the 111th Congress, listed in accordance with 
the date of the nomination:

         A. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence

    The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (IRTPA) created the position of the DNI and assigned to 
the DNI the responsibility of serving as the head of the 
Intelligence Community and acting as the principal adviser to 
the President for intelligence matters relating to national 
security. IRTPA provides that any individual nominated to be 
appointed as the DNI shall have extensive national security 
experience. Among the position's duties and responsibilities, 
the DNI is charged with determining the annual National 
Intelligence Program budget and ensuring the effective 
execution of it. The DNI is to determine requirements and 
priorities for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
national intelligence. The DNI shall ensure compliance with the 
Constitution and laws by the CIA and, through their host 
departments, by the other elements of the Intelligence 
Community.
    On January 9, 2009, the President-elect announced he would 
nominate retired Admiral Dennis C. Blair to be the DNI. Admiral 
Blair had served as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, 
the largest of the combatant commands. During his 34-year 
career, Admiral Blair served on guided missile destroyers in 
both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets and commanded the Kitty 
Hawk Battle Group. He served as Director of the Joint Staff and 
as the first Associate Director of Central Intelligence for 
Military Support at the CIA. He also served in budget and 
policy positions on the National Security Council and several 
major Navy staffs. From 2003 to 2006, Admiral Blair was 
President and CEO of the Institute for Defense Analyses. He was 
also the John M. Shalikashvili Chair in National Security 
Studies at the National Bureau of Asian Research, and the 
Deputy Director of the Project on National Security Reform, an 
organization that analyzes the U.S. national security structure 
and develops recommendations to improve its effectiveness. A 
1968 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Blair earned a 
master's degree in History and Languages from Oxford University 
as a Rhodes Scholar, and served as a White House Fellow at the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
    After receiving Admiral Blair's responses to the 
Committee's standard questionnaire and responses to the 
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the 
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been 
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on January 
22, 2009. Admiral Blair's testimony and his responses to the 
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions 
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-125. The Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on January 28, 2009, by a 
vote of 15-0. The Senate confirmed Admiral Blair's appointment 
to be DNI on January 28, 2009, by a voice vote.
    DNI Blair resigned from this position on May 28, 2010.

    B. Leon E. Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

    On January 30, 2009, the President nominated Leon E. 
Panetta to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Prior to his confirmation, Mr. Panetta was the founder and the 
Director of the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public 
Policy at California State University Monterey Bay.
    Mr. Panetta majored in political science at Santa Clara 
University where he graduated magna cum laude in 1960. In 1963, 
Mr. Panetta received his juris doctorate from Santa Clara 
University as well. After law school, he served in the U.S. 
Army from 1964 to 1966 and attended the Army Intelligence 
School.
    In 1966, Mr. Panetta joined the Washington, D.C., staff of 
Senator Thomas Kuchel of California. In 1969, he served as 
director of the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare in the Nixon Administration. From 
1970 to 1971, he worked as the Executive Assistant to New York 
City Mayor John Lindsay. Afterwards, he returned to Monterey to 
practice law. In 1976, Mr. Panetta ran and won election to the 
House of Representatives where he served for 16 years. During 
that time, he also served as Chairman of the House Budget 
Committee.
    In 1993, he joined the Clinton Administration as head of 
the Office of Management and Budget. In July 1994, Mr. Panetta 
became President Clinton's Chief of Staff. He served in that 
capacity until January 1997, when he returned to California to 
found and lead the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public 
Policy at California State University--Monterey Bay.
    After receiving Mr. Panetta's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on February 5 and 6, 
2009. Mr. Panetta's testimony and his responses to the 
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions 
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-172. The Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on February 11, 2009, by a 
vote of 15-0. The Senate confirmed Mr. Panetta's appointment to 
be Director of the CIA on February 12, 2009, by a voice vote.

  C. David S. Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, 
                         Department of Justice

    The National Security Division at the Department of Justice 
and the position of Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security were created by Congress in the USA PATRIOT 
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which became law 
on March 9, 2006, in an effort to coordinate national security 
investigations and prosecutions within the Department of 
Justice. The Assistant Attorney General (AAG) serves as the 
Attorney General's principal legal advisor on national security 
issues and is the primary liaison for the Department of Justice 
to the DNI.
    On February 11, 2009, the President nominated David S. Kris 
to fill the position of AAG for National Security. Prior to his 
confirmation, Mr. Kris served as Senior Vice President and 
Deputy General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer of Time 
Warner, Inc. Previously, he was a career attorney at the U.S. 
Department of Justice, where he rose from attorney in the 
Criminal Division (Appellate Section), 1999-2000, to Associate 
Deputy Attorney General with national security 
responsibilities, 2000-2003. He is co-author of the treatise 
National Security Investigations and Prosecutions (2007) and a 
recognized expert on the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance 
Act of 1978. He was a law clerk for Judge Stephen Trott of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Mr. Kris is a 
graduate of Haverford College and received his J.D. from the 
Harvard Law School.
    Under a procedure established in the PATRIOT Act 
Reauthorization, and incorporated in Senate Resolution 400 of 
the 94th Congress on the Committee's jurisdiction and 
procedures, nominations for the position of Assistant Attorney 
General for National Security are referred first to the 
Judiciary Committee and then sequentially to the Intelligence 
Committee. The nomination was reported favorably by the 
Judiciary Committee on March 5, 2009. It was then referred 
sequentially to this Committee.
    After receiving Mr. Kris's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on March 10, 2009. Mr. 
Kris's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-163. The Committee reported 
the nomination favorably on March 12, 2009, by a vote of 15-0. 
The Senate confirmed Mr. Kris's appointment to be Assistant 
Attorney General of National Security on March 25, 2009, by a 
vote of 97-0.
    Mr. Kris has announced his intention to resign this 
position on March 4, 2011.

D. Priscilla E. Guthrie, Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
                               Community

    On April 20, 2009, the President nominated Priscilla E. 
Guthrie to be the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
Community. Prior to her confirmation, Ms. Guthrie served as the 
Director of the Information Technology and Systems Division at 
the Institute for Defense Analyses, a non-profit corporation 
that administers three federally funded research and 
development centers to provide objective analyses of national 
security issues.
    From 2001 to 2006, Ms. Guthrie served as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Deputy Chief Information Officer) at the 
Department of Defense, where she was responsible for 
information support to deployed forces. Prior to her position 
at the Pentagon, Ms. Guthrie was a Vice President of TRW, Inc. 
(now part of Northrop Grumman), where she established and led a 
small, global unit responsible for driving new IT technology 
into the company's businesses. She also served in several other 
positions at TRW, Inc. during her career. At the time of her 
nomination, Ms. Guthrie was also a member of the Strategy 
Advisory Group for USSTRATCOM, where she chaired the Cyber 
Panel, Chair of the NSA NC2 Review, and Chair of the Penn State 
Leonhard Center for Engineering Excellence Advisory Board. Ms. 
Guthrie holds a B.S. from Pennsylvania State University and an 
M.B.A. from Marymount College.
    After receiving Ms. Guthrie's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about her understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which she had been nominated, 
the Committee reported the nomination favorably on May 19, 
2009, by voice vote. Ms. Guthrie's responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire and additional questions were posted to the 
Committee's website. The Senate confirmed Ms. Guthrie's 
appointment to be Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
Community on May 21, 2009, by voice vote.
    Ms. Guthrie resigned from this position on November 19, 
2010.

  E. Robert S. Litt, General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
                         National Intelligence

    On April 28, 2009, the President nominated Robert S. Litt 
to be the General Counsel of Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. Prior to his confirmation, Mr. Litt was a partner 
at the law firm of Arnold & Porter, since 1999, where his 
practice included representation of current and former 
government officials in national security matters, including 
congressional investigations. Mr. Litt served at the Department 
of Justice as Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General from 
1997 to 1999, and earlier served as Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General for the Criminal Division and as an Assistant U.S. 
Attorney. He also served as Special Advisor to the Assistant 
Secretary of State, Europe. From 1984 to 1993, Mr. Litt was a 
partner and associate at the law firm of Williams and Connelly. 
He held clerkships with Justice Potter Stewart and Judge Edward 
Weinfeld of the Southern District of New York. Mr. Litt is a 
graduate of Harvard University and Yale Law School.
    After receiving Mr. Litt's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on May 21, 2009. Mr. 
Litt's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111--558. The Committee reported 
the nomination favorably on June 11, 2009, by a vote of 8-1. 
The Senate confirmed Mr. Litt's appointment to be General 
Counsel of the ODNI on June 25, 2009, by voice vote.

F. Philip Mudd, Undersecretary of Information and Analysis, Department 
                          of Homeland Security

    On May 5, 2009, the President nominated Philip Mudd to be 
Undersecretary of Information and Analysis, Department of 
Homeland Security. Prior to his nomination, Mr. Mudd served as 
the Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security 
Branch, at the FBI. Prior to his arrival at the FBI, Mr. Mudd 
served as Deputy Director of the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center 
(CTC), a position to which he was appointed in December 2003. 
In his capacity as the Deputy Director, CTC, Mr. Mudd was 
responsible for overseeing operational, analytical, and support 
programs in the Center.
    Mr. Mudd joined the CIA in 1985 as a leadership analyst 
responsible for South Asian issues and continued as a political 
analyst specializing in South Asia until the early 1990s. He 
first shifted to work at CTC during 1992-1995, focusing largely 
on terrorism in the Middle East in general, with an emphasis on 
Iranian state-sponsored terrorism. He later joined the National 
Intelligence Council for a tour as Deputy National Intelligence 
Officer for Near East and South Asian issues. Mr. Mudd worked 
as the Executive Assistant to the CIA's Associate Deputy 
Director for Intelligence in 1998-1999 and then spent two years 
as chief of CIA's analytic group directed against Iraq. From 
February 2001 to January 2002, he was the Director for Gulf 
Affairs Near East and North African Affairs at the National 
Security Council. He then returned to become the Deputy 
Director of the Office of Terrorism Analysis, the analytic arm 
of the CTC.
    Mr. Mudd was presented the Director's Award by the Director 
of Central Intelligence in July 2004 for his leadership, 
extraordinary fidelity, and essential service. In November 
2002, Mr. Mudd received the William L. Langer Award for his 
deep substantive expertise and outstanding talents as a leader. 
Mr. Mudd has also received the CIA's Distinguished Intelligence 
Medal and the George H. W. Bush Award for Excellence in 
Counterterrorism.
    Mr. Mudd earned a Master of Arts in English Literature from 
the University of Virginia (1984), with a specialty in fiction 
from the Victorian era, and a Bachelor of Arts in English 
Literature from Villanova University (1983).
    After receiving Mr. Mudd's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee was informed on July 6, 2009, that the nomination 
of Mr. Mudd was withdrawn.

  G. Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 
                                 Agency

    Under section 403t of title 50, United States Code, the 
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency is the chief 
legal officer of the CIA. The General Counsel shall perform 
such functions as the Director of the CIA may prescribe.
    On May 11, 2009, the President nominated Stephen W. Preston 
to be the General Counsel of Central Intelligence Agency. Prior 
to his confirmation, Mr. Preston served as a partner at the law 
firm of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, from 2001. 
Previously, from 1993 to 2000, he had served as the General 
Counsel of the Department of Navy, the Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General, Civil Division, of the Department of Justice, 
and the Acting General Counsel and Principal Deputy General 
Counsel, the Department of Defense. He clerked for Judge 
Phyllis A. Kravitch, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit. He is a graduate of Yale University and the Harvard 
Law School.
    After receiving Mr. Preston's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on May 21, 2009. Mr. 
Preston's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-558. The Committee reported 
the nomination favorably on June 11, 2009, by a vote of 14-1. 
The Senate confirmed Mr. Preston's appointment to be General 
Counsel of the CIA on June 25, 2009, by voice vote.

H. David C. Gompert, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence

    The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevent Act of 2004 
(IRTPA) established the position of Principal Deputy Director 
of National Intelligence (PDDNI) to assist the DNI in carrying 
out the duties and responsibilities of the Director under the 
National Security Act. The Act provides that the PDDNI shall 
exercise the powers of the DNI during the DNI's absence or 
disability, or in the event of a vacancy. It also provides that 
an individual nominated for appointment as PDDNI shall not only 
have extensive national security experience (a requirement 
applicable to the DNI as well) but also management expertise. 
The Act contains a ``sense of the Congress'' that under 
ordinary circumstances, one of the persons serving as DNI or 
PDDNI shall be a commissioned officer in active status or have, 
by training or experience, an appreciation of military 
intelligence.
    On August 6, 2009, the President nominated David C. 
Gompert, to be the third PDDNI. Prior to his confirmation, Mr. 
Gompert was a Senior Fellow at the RAND Corporation. Prior to 
this he was Distinguished Research Professor at the Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense 
University. In 2003 he was a Senior Advisor for National 
Security and Defense to the Coalition Provisional Authority in 
Iraq. He was also on the faculty of the RAND Pardee Graduate 
School, the United States Naval Academy, and the National 
Defense University. Mr. Gompert served as President of RAND 
Europe from 2000 to 2003, during which period he was on the 
RAND Europe Executive Board and the Chairman of RAND Europe-UK. 
He was Vice President of RAND and Director of the National 
Defense Research Institute from 1993 to 2000. From 1990 to 
1993, Mr. Gompert served as Special Assistant to President 
George H. W. Bush and Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia on 
the National Security Council staff.
    Mr. Gompert has held a number of positions at the State 
Department, including Deputy to the Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs (1982-83), Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs (1981-82), Deputy Director of the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs (1977-81), and Special Assistant to 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1973-75). Mr. Gompert 
worked as an executive in the private sector from 1983-1990, 
when he held executive positions at Unisys and at AT&T. Mr. 
Gompert holds a Bachelor of Science degree in engineering from 
the United States Naval Academy and a Master of Public Affairs 
degree from the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.
    The Committee held a nomination hearing for Mr. Gompert on 
October 13, 2009. Mr. Gompert's testimony and his responses to 
the Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and 
questions for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-545. The 
Committee reported the nomination favorably on October 29, 
2009, by voice vote. The Senate confirmed Mr. Gompert's 
appointment to be Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence on November 9, 2009, by voice vote.
    Mr. Gompert resigned from this position on August 27, 2010.

 I. Philip S. Goldberg, Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and 
                                Research

    On October 26, 2009, the President nominated Philip S. 
Goldberg to be Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and 
Research. Prior to his nomination, Mr. Goldberg served as the 
United States Coordinator for Implementation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions on North Korea. A career foreign 
service officer, Mr. Goldberg has served as Ambassador to 
Bolivia; Chief of Mission in Kosovo and Charge d'affaires and 
Deputy Chief of Mission in Chile. At the time of his 
nomination, he was coordinating implementation of U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1874. His earlier assignments include: 
acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative 
Affairs; Executive Assistant and Special Assistant to the 
Deputy Secretary of State; Bosnia Desk Officer and member of US 
delegation at Dayton Peace Negotiations; Political-Economic 
Officer in South Africa, and Consular and Political officer in 
Colombia. Mr. Goldberg is a graduate of Boston University.
    After receiving Mr. Goldberg's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on December 1, 2009. 
Mr. Goldberg's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-556. The Committee reported 
the nomination favorably on December 10, 2009, by voice vote. 
The Senate confirmed Ambassador Goldberg to be Assistant 
Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research, on February 9, 
2010, by voice vote.

   J. Caryn A. Wagner, Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, 
                    Department of Homeland Security

    On October 26, 2009, the President nominated Caryn A. 
Wagner to be Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis, 
Department of Homeland Security. Prior to her nomination, Ms. 
Wagner served as an instructor in intelligence resource 
management for The Intelligence and Security Academy, LLC. She 
retired from the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence on October 1, 2008, where she served as Budget 
Director and cybersecurity coordinator. Prior to that from 
April 2005 to January 2007, Ms. Wagner served in the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence as an Assistant Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence for Management and the first 
Chief Financial Officer for the National Intelligence Program. 
She assumed this position after serving as the Executive 
Director for Intelligence Community Affairs from May 2004 to 
April 2005.
    Prior to her service with the ODNI, Ms. Wagner was the 
senior Defense Intelligence Agency Representative to the United 
States European Command and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization from April 2003 to May 2004. She also served from 
November 2000 to April 2003 as DIA Deputy Director for Analysis 
and Production and as Director, Military Intelligence Staff, 
from November 1996 to November 2000. Before joining DIA, Ms. 
Wagner was the Staff Director of the Subcommittee on Technical 
and Tactical Intelligence, House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. Her intelligence experience also includes serving 
as a Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officer in the 
United States Army. She has a Bachelor of Arts from the College 
of William and Mary and a Master of Science from the University 
of Southern California.
    After receiving Ms. Wagner's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire, and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about her understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which she had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on December 1, 2009. 
Ms. Wagner's testimony and her responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111--556. The Committee reported 
the nomination favorably on December 10, 2009, by voice vote. 
The Senate confirmed Ms. Wagner to be Undersecretary for 
Intelligence and Analysis on February 11, 2010, by voice vote.

     K. S. Leslie Ireland, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
                       Intelligence and Analysis

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 
created the Treasury Department's Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to replace the Office of Intelligence Support. The 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for the 
receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence information related to the 
operation and responsibilities of the Treasury Department
    S. Leslie Ireland was nominated by the President to the 
position on April 12, 2010. Beginning in 1985, she served for 
twenty-five years as an analyst in the CIA, holding senior 
leadership positions in the Intelligence Community and 
Department of Defense, including intelligence briefer for 
President Barack Obama, Iran Mission Manager in the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, executive assistant to 
CIA Director Porter Goss and Deputy CIA Director John 
McLaughlin, country director for Kuwait and Iran in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, and various analytical and 
management portfolios related to the Middle East and weapons of 
mass destruction.
    On May 25, 2010, the Committee considered the nomination 
and reported it favorably by a unanimous vote. She was 
confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2010, by unanimous consent. 
Ms. Ireland is the second person to hold the position of 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis.
    In November 2010, Director of National Intelligence James 
R. Clapper, Jr. and Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. 
Geithner jointly appointed Assistant Secretary Ireland to serve 
as the National Intelligence Manager for Threat Finance, and, 
in this capacity, to coordinate the Intelligence Community's 
collection and analysis of financial intelligence.

      L. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of National Intelligence

    President Obama nominated Lieutenant General James R. 
Clapper, Jr. (U.S.A.F. Ret.), the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence (USD(I)) to the position of Director of National 
Intelligence on June 7, 2010, after DNI Blair resigned 
effective May 28, 2010.
    At the time of his nomination, General Clapper had over 
forty-six years of experience in the field of intelligence, 
including 32 years on active duty in the Air Force. He was 
nominated to be USD(I) by President George W. Bush and 
confirmed by the Senate by voice vote on April 11, 2007. As 
USD(I), General Clapper served as the Program Executive for the 
Military Intelligence Program and developed and promulgated 
standards for DoD intelligence, counter-intelligence and 
security matters. He was served simultaneously as the DNI's 
Director of Defense Intelligence, to be in what he described as 
a ```bridging' capacity, to help the DNI manage the DoD 
intelligence components.''
    General Clapper began his active duty career in the Air 
Force with two tours of duty in the Southeast Asia conflict. He 
served as a Director of Intelligence (J-2) in three commands 
and learned firsthand the functions of intelligence collection, 
analysis, operations, planning and programming, in each of the 
intelligence disciplines.
    General Clapper headed two of the major intelligence 
agencies within the Intelligence Community. He led the DIA 
while on active duty from 1991-1995 and was appointed to head 
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (subsequently known as 
the National Geo-spatial Intelligence Agency) on September 13, 
2001, and served in that position until June 2006. While in the 
private sector, from 1995 to 2001, General Clapper served on 
boards, commissions and panels related to intelligence, 
defense, and homeland security issues, and held positions in 
industry at several firms.
    After receiving General Clapper's responses to the 
Committee's standard questionnaire and responses to the 
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the 
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been 
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on July 20, 
2010. General Clapper's testimony and his responses to the 
Committee's questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions 
for the record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-857. The Committee 
reported the nomination favorably on July 29, 2010, by a vote 
of 15-0. The Senate confirmed General Clapper's appointment to 
be DNI on August 5, 2010, by a voice vote.

  M. David B. Buckley, Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
                                 Agency

    Under Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, 
the Inspector General of the CIA provides policy and overall 
direction of the Office of Inspector General of the CIA in 
conducting independent inspections, investigations, and audits 
of the CIA. The Inspector General is also responsible for 
keeping the Director of CIA fully and currently informed, and 
reports to and is under the general supervision of the 
Director. Section 17 also states that the appointment of the 
Inspector General of the CIA is to be made ``solely on the 
basis of integrity, compliance with the security standards of 
the Agency, and prior experience in the field of foreign 
intelligence.''
    On August 6, 2010, the President nominated David Buckley to 
be the Inspector General of the CIA. Prior to his confirmation, 
Mr. Buckley was a senior manager at Deloitte Consulting from 
2007 to 2010. Mr. Buckley had served for nearly 30 years in 
Federal Government positions in the areas of national security, 
intelligence, law enforcement, congressional oversight, and 
criminal and administrative investigations. He served on the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as Minority 
Staff Director from 2005 to 2007 and was an investigator and 
then chief investigator at the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations from 1987 to 1995. Mr. Buckley served in the 
Department of Treasury from 1998 to 1999 as a Senior Advisor 
and from 1999 to 2005 as Assistant IG for Investigations for 
the Inspector General for Tax Administration. He has also 
served as Assistant Director of the Office of Special 
Investigations at the Government Accountability Office and as 
Special Assistant to the Inspector General of the Department of 
Defense. Mr. Buckley was also a counterespionage case officer 
for the U.S. Air Force.
    After receiving Mr. Buckley's responses to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire and responses to the Committee's 
prehearing questions about his understanding of the duties and 
responsibilities of the office to which he had been nominated, 
the Committee held a nomination hearing on September 21, 2010. 
Mr. Buckley's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire, prehearing questions, and questions for the 
record are printed in S. Hrg. 111-856. Following those 
hearings, the Committee reported the nomination favorably on 
September 28, 2010 by a vote of 15-0. The Senate approved the 
nomination by unanimous consent the next day.

    N. Stephanie O'Sullivan, Principal Deputy Director of National 
                              Intelligence

    In the final days of the 111th Congress, on December 13, 
2010, the President nominated Stephanie O'Sullivan to be 
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence. Ms. 
O'Sullivan was nominated to the position again on January 5, 
2011, at the beginning of the 112th Congress.

                        V. SUPPORT TO THE SENATE

    The Committee has an important role in supporting the 
Senate's deliberations by providing access to Intelligence 
Community information and officials. In the 111th Congress, the 
Chairman and Vice Chairman wrote to all members explaining the 
intelligence information which it holds and to encourage them 
to make use of these resources. The Chairman and Vice Chairman 
also wrote to new Senators to describe the special role of the 
Intelligence Committee and to make them aware of support the 
Committee provides to members.
    The Committee routinely invited members and staff outside 
the Committee to participate in briefings and hearings on 
issues of shared jurisdiction or interest. The Committee 
maintained and provided access to intelligence information 
regarding topics relevant to current legislation and foreign 
policy interest for members of the Senate.
    The Committee also offered intelligence briefings by its 
professional staff to Members and assisted Members in resolving 
issues with intelligence agencies.

                              VI. APPENDIX


                      Summary of Committee Actions


A. Number of meetings

    During the 111th Congress, the Committee held a total of 
125 on-the-record interviews, meetings, briefings, and 
hearings, and numerous off-the-record briefings. There were 54 
oversight hearings, 9 open and 1 closed confirmation hearings, 
13 hearings on the IC budget, and 2 legislative hearings. Of 
these 79 hearings, 11 were open to the public and 68 were 
closed to protect classified information pursuant to Senate 
rules. The Committee also held 34 on-the-record briefings and 
meetings, and 16 business meetings including mark-ups of 
legislation. Additionally, the Committee staff conducted 6 on-
the-record briefings and interviews and numerous off-the-record 
briefings.

B. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee

    S. Res. 34, An original resolution authorizing expenditures 
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
    S. 1494, An original bill to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
    S. 3611, An original bill to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

C. Bills referred to the Committee

    S. 147, A bill to require the closure of the detention 
facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to limit the use of certain 
interrogation techniques, to prohibit interrogation by 
contractors, to require notification of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross of detainees, and for other 
purposes.
    S. 248, A bill to prohibit the use of certain interrogation 
techniques and for other purposes.
    S. 385, A bill to reaffirm and clarify the authority of the 
Comptroller General to audit and evaluate the programs, 
activities, and financial transactions of the intelligence 
community, and for other purposes.
    S. 1126, A bill to require the Director of National 
Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on retirement 
benefits for former employees of Air America and for other 
purposes.
    S. 1387, A bill to enable the Director of National 
Intelligence to transfer full-time equivalent positions to 
elements of the intelligence community to replace employees who 
are temporarily absent to participate in foreign language 
training, and for other purposes.
    S. 1528, A bill to establish a Foreign Intelligence and 
Information Commission and for other purposes.
    S. 2834, A bill to amend the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to establish a Security 
Clearance and Suitability Performance Accountability Council 
and for other purposes.

D. Publications

    Report 111-6--Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence covering the period January 4, 2007-January 2, 
2009
    S. Prt. 111-20--Rules of Procedure (amended February 24, 
2009)
    Report 111-55--Report to accompany S. 1494
    S. Hrg. 111-62--Current and Projected National Security 
Threats to the United States--February 12, 2009.
    S. Hrg. 111-125--Nomination of Dennis C. Blair to be 
Director of National Intelligence--January 22, 2009.
    S. Hrg. 111-163--Nomination of David S. Kris to be 
Assistant Attorney General for National Security--March 10, 
2009.
    S. Hrg. 111-172--Nomination of Leon Panetta to be Director, 
Central Intelligence Agency--February 5 and 6, 2009.
    Report 111-199--Attempted Terrorist Attack on Northwest 
Airlines Flight 253--May 24, 2010.
    Report 111-223--Report to accompany the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (S. 3611).
    S. Hrg. 111-545--Nomination of David C. Gompert to be 
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence--October 13, 
2009.
    S. Hrg. 111-556--Nomination of Caryn A. Wagner to be Under 
Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis 
and Nomination of Philip S. Goldberg to be Assistant Secretary 
of State for Intelligence and Research--December 1, 2009.
    S. Hrg. 111-557--Current and Projected National Security 
Threats to the United States--February 2, 2010.
    S. Hrg. 111-558--Nomination of Robert S. Litt to be General 
Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and 
Nomination of Stephen W. Preston to be General Counsel, Central 
Intelligence Agency--May 21, 2009
    S. Hrg. 111-856--Nomination of David B. Buckley to be 
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency--September 
21, 2010.
    S. Hrg. 111-857--Nomination of Lieutenant General James 
Clapper, Jr., USAF, Ret., to be Director of National 
Intelligence--July 20, 2010.

                                  
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