[House Report 112-323]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 112-323
======================================================================
UNITED NATIONS TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REFORM ACT OF 2011
_______
December 8, 2011.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2829]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 2829) to promote transparency, accountability, and
reform within the United Nations system, and for other
purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do
pass.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
The Amendment.................................................... 2
Summary.......................................................... 40
Background and Purpose........................................... 42
Hearings......................................................... 50
Committee Consideration and Votes................................ 51
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 51
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 52
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................ 52
General Performance Goals and Objectives......................... 53
New Advisory Committees.......................................... 53
Congressional Accountability Act................................. 53
Earmark Identification........................................... 54
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion....................... 54
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 61
Dissenting Views................................................. 65
The Amendment
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations
Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a
voluntary basis.
Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the
regular budget of the United Nations.
Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform.
TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
Sec. 203. Oversight of United States contributions to the United
Nations System.
Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions.
Sec. 205. Integrity for United States contributions.
Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United
States.
Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the United
Nations.
TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 301. Annual publication.
Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the security council.
Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.
Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel.
Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations.
Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
Sec. 311. Regional group inclusion of Israel.
Sec. 312. United States policy on Taiwan's participation in United
Nations entities.
Sec. 313. United States policy on Tier 3 human rights violators.
TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Statement of policy.
Sec. 403. Implementation.
TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Sec. 501. Findings.
Sec. 502. Human rights council membership and funding.
TITLE VI--GOLDSTONE REPORT
Sec. 601. Findings.
Sec. 602. Statement of policy.
Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer
dollars.
TITLE VII--DURBAN PROCESS
Sec. 701. Findings.
Sec. 702. Sense of congress; statement of policy.
Sec. 703. Non-participation in the Durban process.
Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer
dollars.
TITLE VIII--UNRWA
Sec. 801. Findings.
Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA.
Sec. 803. Sense of Congress.
TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program.
Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the nuclear security action plan
of the IAEA.
TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING
Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping
operations.
Sec. 1003. Certification.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual who
is employed in the general services, professional staff, or
senior management of the United Nations, including consultants,
contractors, and subcontractors.
(2) General assembly.--The term ``General Assembly'' means
the General Assembly of the United Nations.
(3) Member state.--The term ``Member State'' means a Member
State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the
term ``country''.
(4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of
State.
(5) Secretary general.--The term ``Secretary General'' means
the Secretary General of the United Nations.
(6) Security council.--The term ``Security Council'' means
the Security Council of the United Nations.
(7) UN.--The term ``UN'' means the United Nations.
(8) United nations entity.--The term ``United Nations
Entity'' means any United Nations agency, commission,
conference, council, court, department, forum, fund, institute,
office, organization, partnership, program, subsidiary body,
tribunal, trust, university or academic body, related
organization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies
the United Nations flag or is authorized to use the United
Nations logo, including those United Nations affiliated
agencies and bodies identified as recipients of United States
contributions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public
Law 109-364), but not including the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, the International
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation,
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the World
Trade Organization.
(9) United nations system.--The term ``United Nations
System'' means the aggregation of all United Nations Entities,
as defined in paragraph (8).
(10) United states contribution.--The term ``United States
Contribution'' means an assessed or voluntary contribution,
whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United
States Federal Government to a United Nations Entity, including
contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by
a United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include
those contributions identified pursuant to section
1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
(11) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of
the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate.
TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States pays billions of dollars into the
United Nations system every year (almost $7.7 billion in 2010,
according to the White House Office of Management and Budget),
significantly more than any other nation.
(2) Under current rules and contribution levels, it is
possible to assemble the two-thirds majority needed for
important United Nations budget votes with a group of countries
that, taken together, pay less than 1 percent of the total
United Nations regular budget.
(3) The disconnect between contribution levels and management
control creates significant perverse incentives in terms of
United Nations spending, transparency, and accountability.
(4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably high
levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair its
ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.
(5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, and sexual
abuse scandals of the past several years, American public
disapproval of United Nations has reached all-time highs. A
2011 Gallup poll revealed that 62 percent of Americans believe
that the United Nations is doing a poor job, a negative
assessment shared by a majority of respondents from both
political parties. Research polling by another firm in late
2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that the United
Nations is ``no longer effective'' and needs to be
significantly reformed, while 75 percent think that the United
Nations ``needs to be held more accountable''.
(6) Significant improvements in United Nations transparency
and accountability are necessary for improving public
perceptions of and American support for United Nations
operations.
(7) Because of their need to justify future contributions
from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more
incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations
than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are
not tied to performance.
(8) Catherine Bertini, the former UN Under-Secretary General
for Management and director of the World Food Program (WFP),
has stated that ``Voluntary funding creates an entirely
different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP, every staff
member knows that we have to be as efficient, accountable,
transparent, and results-oriented as possible. If we are not,
donor governments can take their funding elsewhere in a very
competitive world among UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral
governments.''.
(9) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations, which
states that ``[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be borne
by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly'', leaves
to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of
apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary
pledges by Member States.
(10) Unlike United States assessed contributions to the
United Nations regular budget, which are statutorily capped at
22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary
contributions.
(11) The United States, which contributes generously to
international organizations whose activities it recognizes as
credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22
percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded United
Nations Specialized Agencies.
SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET ON A
VOLUNTARY BASIS.
(a) United States Policy.--
(1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States to
seek to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of
the United Nations from an assessed to a voluntary basis.
(2) Action at united nations.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the
United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for the regular
budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, and to make
it a priority to build support for such a transformational
change among Member States, particularly key United Nations
donors.
(b) Certification of Predominantly Voluntary UN Regular Budget
Finding.--A certification described in this section is a certification
by the Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees
that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget (not including
extra-budgetary contributions) of the United Nations is apportioned on
a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be shall be effective
for a period of not more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by
the Secretary, with notice to the appropriate congressional committees,
if the underlying circumstances change so as not to warrant such
certification.
(c) Withholding of Nonvoluntary Contributions.--
(1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the effective date
of this Act and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
funds may be obligated or expended for a United States assessed
contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations in an
amount greater than 50 percent of the United States share of
assessed contributions for the regular budget of the United
Nations unless there is in effect a certification by the
Secretary, as described in subsection (b).
(2) Allowance.--For a period of 1 year after appropriation,
funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to
the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from
obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be
obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification
described in subsection (b). After 1 year, in the absence of
such certification, those funds shall revert to the United
States Treasury.
SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
REGULAR BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Detailed Itemization.--The annual congressional budget
justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of
the contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the
United Nations.
(b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.--The detailed itemization
required under subsection (a) shall--
(1) contain information relating to the amounts requested in
support of each of the various sections and titles of the
regular budget of the United Nations; and
(2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with
the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United
States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and
titles.
(c) Adjustments and Notification.--If the United Nations proposes an
adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State
shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and
consult with the appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United
Nations reform.
(b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
describe--
(1) progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for the
United Nations Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as
identified in section 102, and a detailed description of
efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials
toward that end;
(2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in
the prior sections of this title, and a detailed, goal-specific
description of efforts and activities by United States
diplomats and officials toward those ends;
(3) the status of the implementation of management reforms
within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
(4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates
generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been
eliminated;
(5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and
streamline the committee structure and its specific
recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent
with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled
``In larger freedom: towards development, security and human
rights for all'';
(6) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all
mandates older than 5 years and how resources have been
redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005
report of the Secretary General;
(7) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and
Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural
Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those
committees and the Economic and Social Council; and
(8) whether the United Nations or any of its specialized
agencies has contracted with any party included on the Lists of
Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement
Programs.
TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 201. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) As underscored by continuing revelations of waste, fraud,
and abuse, oversight and accountability mechanisms within the
United Nations system remain significantly deficient, despite
decades of reform attempts, including those initiated by
Secretaries General of the United Nations.
(2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any Secretary
General of the United Nations to promote institutional
transparency and accountability within the United Nations
System, the Secretary General lacks the power to impose far
reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the
General Assembly.
(3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the
General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional
contributions to the United Nations system have repeatedly and
successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform
proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and
scrutiny of United Nations system operations and expenditures.
(4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states, including
the United States, lack access to reasonably detailed, reliable
information that would allow them to determine how their
contributions have been spent by various United Nations system
entities, further contributing to the lack of accountability
within the United Nations system.
SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) Transparency certification.--The term ``Transparency
Certification'' means an annual, written affirmation by the
head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity,
provided to the Department of State, that the Entity will
cooperate with the Department of State and Congress, including
by providing the Department of State and Congress with full,
complete, and unfettered access to Oversight Information as
defined in this title.
(2) Oversight information.--The term ``Oversight
Information'' includes--
(A) internally and externally commissioned audits,
investigatory reports, program reviews, performance
reports, and evaluations;
(B) financial statements, records, and billing
systems;
(C) program budgets and program budget implications,
including revised estimates and reports produced by or
provided to the Secretary General and the Secretary
General's agents on budget related matters;
(D) operational plans, budgets, and budgetary
analyses for peacekeeping operations;
(E) analyses and reports regarding the scale of
assessments;
(F) databases and other data systems containing
financial or programmatic information;
(G) documents or other records alleging or involving
improper use of resources, misconduct, mismanagement,
or other violations of rules and regulations applicable
to the United Nations Entity; and
(H) other documentation relevant to the oversight
work of Congress with respect to United States
contributions to the United Nations system.
(3) Accountability certification.--The term ``Accountability
Certification'' means an annual, written affirmation by the
head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity provided
to the Secretary of State that the Entity--
(A) provides the public with full, complete, and
unfettered access to all relevant documentation
relating to operations and activities, including budget
and procurement activities;
(B) implements and upholds policies and procedures to
protect whistleblowers;
(C) implements and upholds policies and procedures to
require the filing of individual annual financial
disclosure forms by each of its employees at the P-5
level and above and to require that such forms be made
available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services,
to Member States, and to the public;
(D) has established an effective ethics office;
(E) has established a fully independent, autonomous,
and effective internal oversight body;
(F) has adopted and implemented, and is in full
compliance with, International Public Sector Accounting
Standards; and
(G) has established a cap on its administrative
overhead costs.
SEC. 203. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED
NATIONS SYSTEM.
(a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to enhance oversight of
United States contributions to the United Nations System and the use of
those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an effort to
eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those
contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of greater
transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the
United Nations System.
(b) Implementation.--
(1) In general.--The Department of State shall collect and
maintain current records regarding Transparency Certifications
and Accountability Certifications by all United Nations
Entities that receive United States contributions and submit
that information for inclusion in the report required under
section 207.
(2) Notification.--The Department of State shall keep the
appropriate congressional committees fully and promptly
informed of how United Nations Entities are spending United
States contributions.
(3) Referrals.--
(A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall
promptly report to the Attorney General and to the
appropriate congressional committees when the Secretary
of State has reasonable grounds to believe a Federal
criminal law has been violated by a United Nations
Entity or one of its employees, contractors, or
representatives.
(B) Notification.--The Secretary of State shall
promptly report, when appropriate, to the appropriate
congressional committees, and to the Secretary General
or to the head of the appropriate United Nations
Entity, cases in which the Secretary of State
reasonably believes that mismanagement, misfeasance, or
malfeasance is likely to have taken place within a
United Nations Entity and disciplinary proceedings are
likely justified.
(4) Confirmation of transparency by united nations
entities.--
(A) Prompt notice by department of state.--Whenever
information or assistance requested from a United
Nations Entity by the Department of State pursuant to a
Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the
Secretary of State, unreasonably refused or not
provided in a timely manner, the Secretary of State
shall notify the appropriate congressional committees,
the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and
the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing,
without delay.
(B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the
information or assistance being sought by the
Department of State in connection with a notification
pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided to the
satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of State shall so notify in writing to the appropriate
congressional committees and the head of that
particular United Nations Entity.
(C) Noncompliance.--If the information or assistance
being sought by the Department of State in connection
with a notification pursuant to subparagraph (A) is not
provided within 90 days of that notification, then the
United Nations Entity that is the subject of the
notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its
Transparency Certification, and
(D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation
has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide
prompt, written notification of that fact and of the
restoration of compliance, along with a description of
the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the
appropriate congressional committees, the head of that
United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any
office or agency of the Federal Government that has
provided that United Nations Entity with any United
States contribution during the prior 2 years.
(5) Confirmation of accountability by united nations
entities.--
(A) Prompt notice by secretary of state.--Whenever a
United Nations Entity that has provided an
Accountability Certification is, in the opinion of the
Secretary of State, not in full compliance with any or
all of the provisions of that certification, the
Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees, the head of that particular
United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the
circumstances in writing, without delay.
(B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the United
Nations Entity resumes full compliance with its
Accountability Certification following the provision of
the notification pursuant to subparagraph (A), the
Secretary of State shall so notify in writing the
appropriate congressional committees and the head of
that United Nations Entity.
(C) Noncompliance.--If the United Nations Entity
named in the notification in subparagraph (A) does not
resume full compliance with its Accountability
Certification to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
State within 90 days of that notification, then the
United Nations Entity that is the subject of the
notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its
Accountability Certification, and the Secretary of
State shall provide prompt, written notification of
that fact to the appropriate congressional committees,
the head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary
General, and any office or agency of the Federal
Government that has provided that United Nations Entity
with any United States Contribution during the prior 2
years.
(D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation
has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide
prompt, written notification of that fact and of the
restoration of compliance, along with a description of
the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the
appropriate congressional committees, the head of that
United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any
office or agency of the Federal Government that has
provided that United Nations Entity with any United
States contribution during the prior 2 years.
(6) Reporting.--
(A) Reporting.--In the report submitted by the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to
Congress pursuant to section 207, the Secretary of
State shall submit for inclusion a section that, among
other things, includes a list and detailed description
of the circumstances surrounding any notification of
compliance issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) or
(5)(C) during the covered timeframe, and whether and
when the Secretary has reversed such finding of
noncompliance.
(B) Prohibited disclosures.--Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to authorize the public
disclosure of information that is--
(i) specifically prohibited from disclosure
by any other provision of law;
(ii) specifically required by Executive Order
to be protected from disclosure in the interest
of national defense or national security or in
the conduct of foreign affairs; or
(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal
investigation.
(C) Privacy protections.--The Secretary of State
shall exempt from public disclosure information
received from a United Nations Entity that the
Secretary of State believes--
(i) constitutes a trade secret or privileged
and confidential personal financial
information;
(ii) constitutes confidential personal
medical information;
(iii) accuses a particular person of a crime;
(iv) would, if publicly disclosed, constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy; and
(v) would compromise an ongoing law
enforcement investigation or judicial trial in
the United States.
SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.
(a) Funding Prerequisites.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no funds made available for use as a United States Contribution to
any United Nations Entity may be obligated or expended if--
(1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not
provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year a
Transparency Certification as defined in section 202(1);
(2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient is
noncompliant with its Transparency Certification as described
in section 203(b)(4)(C);
(3) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not
provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year an
Accountability Certification as defined in section 202(3); or
(4) the intended United Nations Entity is noncompliant with
its Accountability Certification as described in section
203(b)(5)(C).
(b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the conclusion
of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a
United States Contribution to a United Nations Entity during that
fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because of the
restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United States
Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other use. Any
such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to
be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
(c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the limitations of
this subsection with respect to a particular United States Contribution
to a particular United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if
the President determines that failure to do so would pose an
extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States and
provides notification and explanation of that determination to the
appropriate congressional committees.
SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.
(a) Limitation.--(1) No funds made available for use under the
heading ``Contributions to International Organizations'' may be used
for any purpose other than an assessed United States contribution to a
United Nations Entity or other international organization.
(2) No funds made available for use under the heading ``International
Organizations and Programs'' may be used for any purpose other than a
voluntary United States contribution to a United Nations Entity or
other international organization.
(3) No funds made available for use under the heading ``Contributions
to International Peacekeeping Activities'' may be used for any purpose
other than a United States contribution to United Nations peacekeeping
activities, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
(b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the conclusion
of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a
United States contribution to a United Nations Entity during that
fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because of the
restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United States
Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other use. Any
such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to
be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE UNITED
STATES.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to United Nations
Entities and payable back to the United States sometimes remain
in the hands of the United Nations because the United States
has not requested the return of those funds.
(2) Such funds have been paid into, among other United
Nations Entities, the United Nations Tax Equalization Fund
(TEF), which was established under the provisions of United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is
used to reimburse United Nations staff members subject to
United States income taxes for the cost of those taxes.
(3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in considerably more
money than it has paid out, with the United States apparently
overpaying into the TEF by $52.2 million in the 2008-2009
timeframe alone.
(4) According to the United Nations Financial Report and
Audited Financial Statements released on July 29, 2010, ``As of
31 December 2009, an amount of $179.0 million was payable to
the United States of America pending instructions as to its
disposition.''.
(5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwithstanding United
Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, which states that any such
surpluses ``shall be credited against the assessed
contributions due from that Member State the following year.''.
(6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly overcharge the
United States and to retain those overpayments, or to spend
them on wholly unrelated activities, is a disservice to
American taxpayers and a subversion of the Congressional budget
process.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
(1) to annually instruct the United Nations to return to the
United States any surplus assessed contributions or other
overpayments by the United States to any United Nations Entity;
and
(2) to use the voice and vote of the United States to press
the United Nations to reform its TEF assessment procedures to
reduce the repeated discrepancies between TEF income and
expenditures.
(c) Certification and Withholding.--For each and every fiscal year
subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of
State submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
certification that the United Nations has returned to the United States
any surplus assessed contributions or other overpayments by the United
States to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary of State shall
withhold from the regular budget of the United Nations an amount equal
to the amount of the funds that the United Nations has yet to return to
the United States.
SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED
NATIONS.
(a) Annual Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and annually for two years thereafter, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to
Congress a report listing all assessed and voluntary contributions of
the United States Government for the preceding fiscal year to the
United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related
bodies.
(b) Contents.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall set
forth, for the fiscal year covered by such report, the following:
(1) The total amount of all assessed and voluntary
contributions of the United States Government to the United
Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related
bodies.
(2) The approximate percentage of United States Government
contributions to each United Nations affiliated agency or body
in such fiscal year when compared with all contributions to
such agency or body from any source in such fiscal year.
(3) For each such contribution--
(A) the amount of such contribution;
(B) a description of such contribution (including
whether assessed or voluntary);
(C) the department or agency of the United States
Government responsible for such contribution;
(D) the purpose of such contribution; and
(E) the United Nations or United Nations affiliated
agency or related body receiving such contribution.
TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to ensure the United Nations
publishes annually, including on a publicly searchable internet Web
site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and their
functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and
assessed, sorted by donor.
SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to implement a system for the
required filing of individual annual financial disclosure forms by each
employee of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs,
and funds at the P-5 level and above, which shall be made available to
the Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Member States, and to the
public.
SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any
proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion
would--
(1) diminish the influence of the United States on the
Security Council; or
(2) include veto rights for any new members of the Security
Council.
SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to ensure that Member States may,
upon request, have access to all reports and audits completed by the
Board of External Auditors.
SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to ensure that the Secretary
General exercises the right and duty of the Secretary General under
section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations official in
any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice. In
exercising such waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret the
interests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation or
prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly under
investigation for having committed a serious criminal offense or who is
credibly charged with a serious criminal offense.
SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote,
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to work toward
adoption by the General Assembly of--
(1) a definition of terrorism that--
(A) builds upon the recommendations of the December
2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges, and Change;
(B) includes as an essential component of such
definition any action that is intended to cause death
or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of
intimidating a population or compelling a government or
an international organization to do, or abstain from
doing, any act; and
(C) does not propose a legal or moral equivalence
between an action described in subparagraph (B) and
measures taken by a government or international
organization in self-defense against an action
described in such subparagraph; and
(2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes the
definition described in paragraph (1).
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) authoritarian regimes often inaccurately label peaceful,
pro-freedom, pro-democracy movements as terrorist movements in
order to undermine the legitimacy of those movements; and
(2) any United Nations definition of terrorism should not be
used to undermine a peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy
movement against authoritarian rule.
SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report--
(1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to
modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March
2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ``In larger
freedom: towards development, security and human rights for
all''; and
(2) containing the information described in subsection (b).
(b) Contents.--The report shall include--
(1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms at
the United Nations, including an evaluation of--
(A) tenure;
(B) performance reviews;
(C) the promotion system;
(D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced
regulations concerning termination of employment of
employees; and
(E) the implementation of a code of conduct and
ethics training;
(2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing
complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment,
including sexual harassment;
(3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a
rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;
(4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a
prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to the
mission of a member state to the United Nations from
transferring to a position within the United Nations
Secretariat that is compensated at the P-5 level and above;
(5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in travel
allowances and attendant oversight with respect to
accommodations and airline flights; and
(6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary
General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary
General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing
priorities.
SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.
The United States shall withhold from United States contributions to
the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period
amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget that are
expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty
monitoring body or committee that was established by--
(1) a convention (without any protocols) or an international
covenant (without any protocols) to which the United States is
not party; or
(2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United
States is a party to neither.
SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Department of State Review and Report.--
(1) In general.--To avoid duplicative efforts and funding
with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in
the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary
shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act--
(A) complete an audit of the functions of the
entities listed in paragraph (2); and
(B) submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report containing audit findings and
conclusions, and recommendations for the elimination of
such duplicative entities and efforts.
(2) Entities.--The entities referred to in paragraph (1)(A)
are the following:
(A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian
Rights.
(B) The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable
Rights of the Palestinian People.
(C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative
to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Authority.
(D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.
(E) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli
Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian
People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.
(F) Any other entity the Secretary determines results
in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to ensure
balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues.
(b) Implementation by Permanent Representative.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United
Nations to seek the implementation of the recommendations
contained in the report required under subsection (a)(1)(B).
(2) Withholding of funds.--Until such recommendations have
been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United
States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the
United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are
proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended
for such entities.
SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.
The President shall direct the United States permanent representative
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to make every effort to--
(1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a directive by
the Secretary General or the Secretariat, as appropriate,
that--
(A) requires all employees of the United Nations and
its specialized agencies to officially and publicly
condemn anti-Semitic statements made at any session of
the United Nations or its specialized agencies, or at
any other session sponsored by the United Nations;
(B) requires employees of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, programs, and funds to be subject
to punitive action, including immediate dismissal, for
making anti-Semitic statements or references;
(C) proposes specific recommendations to the General
Assembly for the establishment of mechanisms to hold
accountable employees and officials of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and
funds, or Member States, that make such anti-Semitic
statements or references in any forum of the United
Nations or of its specialized agencies;
(D) continues to develop and implements education
awareness programs about the Holocaust and anti-
Semitism throughout the world, as part of an effort to
combat intolerance and hatred; and
(E) requires the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop
programming and other measures that address anti-
Semitism;
(2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General
Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph
(1)(C); and
(3) continue working toward further reduction of anti-Semitic
language and anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations and
its specialized agencies, programs, and funds.
SEC. 311. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative
to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to expand the Western European and
Others Group (WEOG) in the United Nations in Geneva to include Israel
as a permanent member with full rights and privileges.
SEC. 312. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN UNITED
NATIONS ENTITIES.
The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure
meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant United Nations Entities
in which Taiwan has expressed an interest in participating.
SEC. 313. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TIER 3 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS.
The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that no
representative of a country designated pursuant to section 110 of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) by the
Department of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as Chair or
President of any United Nations Entity.
TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 401. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
launched an effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with
the State of Israel by instead pursuing Palestinian membership
in international organizations, which could imply de facto
recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations.
(2) The Executive Branch, with significant support from
Members of Congress, successfully stopped the PLO's effort by
credibly threatening, as noted in a May 1, 1989 statement by
then-Secretary of State James A. Baker, ``that the United
States [would] make no further contributions, voluntary or
assessed, to any international organization which makes any
change in the P.L.O.'s present status as an observer
organization.''.
(3) The United States success in this case demonstrates that
withholding contributions and placing conditions on their
payment can result in real reforms, stop counter-productive
developments, and advance United States interests at the United
Nations.
(4) The Palestinian leadership has recently resumed its
effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with the State of
Israel by seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from
foreign governments and in international forums.
(5) Efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilaterally
declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the United Nations
or other international forums or to foreign governments for
recognition of a Palestinian state or membership or other
upgraded status for the Palestinian observer mission at those
forums, would violate the underlying principles of the Oslo
Accords, the Road Map, and other relevant Middle East peace
process efforts.
(6) On December 15, 2010, the House of Representatives passed
House Resolution 1765, in which, inter alia, the House of
Representatives:
(A) ``reaffirms its strong opposition to any attempt
to establish or seek recognition of a Palestinian state
outside of an agreement negotiated between Israel and
the Palestinians'';
(B) ``supports the Administration's opposition to a
unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state''; and
(C) ``calls upon the Administration to . . . lead a
diplomatic effort to persuade other nations to oppose a
unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state and to
oppose recognition of a Palestinian state by other
nations, within the United Nations, and in other
international forums prior to achievement of a final
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.''.
(7) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United States Deputy
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated on July
26, 2011, ``Let there be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate
Israel at the United Nations in September will not create an
independent Palestinian state . . . The United States will not
support unilateral campaigns at the United Nations in September
or any other time.''.
(8) On September 16, 2011, the Deputy National Security
Advisor for Strategic Communications stated that ``We would
veto actions through the Security Council and oppose action
through the Security Council associated with a unilateral
declaration of [Palestinian] statehood.''.
SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to oppose the recognition of a
Palestinian state by any United Nations Entity, or any upgrade,
including but not limited to full membership or non-member-state
observer status, in the status of the Palestinian observer mission at
the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the
Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative
organization or governing entity, at any United Nations Entity, prior
to the achievement of a final peace agreement negotiated between and
agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians.
SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION.
(a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote,
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to advance the
policy stated in section 402.
(b) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold
United States contributions from any United Nations Entity that
recognizes a Palestinian state or upgrades in any way, including full
membership or non-member-state observer status, the status of the
Palestinian observer mission at the United Nations, the Palestine
Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Authority, or any other
Palestinian administrative organization or governing entity, at that
United Nations Entity, prior to the achievement of complete and final
peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the
Palestinians. Funds appropriated for use as a United States
contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation and
expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to the
United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid
to any United Nations Entity.
TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
SEC. 501. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United Nations Human
Rights Council has failed to meaningfully promote the
protection of internationally recognized human rights, and has
proven to be even more problematic than the United Nations
Human Rights Commission that it was created to replace.
(2) The United Nations Human Rights Council suffers from
fundamental and severe structural flaws present since its
establishment by the United Nations General Assembly, such as
the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly
without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse
result that a number of the world's worst human rights abusers
are members of the council.
(3) For example, the majority of members of the United
Nations Human Rights Council are rated ``Not Free'' or only
``Partly Free'' by Freedom House. Only a minority of members
were rated ``Free''.
(4) The structure and composition of the United Nations Human
Rights Council have made it subject to gross political
manipulation, with the result that, during its almost five
years of operation, the Council has passed over 40 resolutions
censuring the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared
to only a handful censuring the dictatorships in Burma, North
Korea, and Syria, just one addressing the severe, ongoing human
rights abuses in Libya, Iran, and Belarus, and none addressing
the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in China, Cuba, Russia,
Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and elsewhere.
(5) The United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda contains
a permanent item for criticism of the democratic, Jewish State
of Israel, but no permanent items criticizing any other state.
(6) The United Nations Human Rights Council has established,
or preserved the existence of, a number of ``Special
Procedures'' mechanisms to address country-specific situations
or thematic issues. These mechanisms include a number of
``special rapporteurs'' whose expenses and staff support are
paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
(7) The United Nations Human Rights Council has also
established an ``Advisory Committee'' whose expenses and staff
support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
(8) Some of these special rapporteurs and members of the
Advisory Committee have displayed consistent bias against the
United States, Israel, and the Jewish people, while providing
support to human rights abusers.
(9) Richard Falk, the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories
occupied since 1967'', has compared Israel's treatment of the
Palestinians to the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the
events of September 11, 2001, and posted a cartoon on his blog
depicting Americans and Jews as bloodthirsty dogs.
(10) Jean Ziegler, a member of the United Nations Human
Rights Council Advisory Committee and former United Nations
``Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food'', has accused former
President George W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon of committing ``state terrorism'', has called for
an investigation of Israel by the International Criminal Court
for ``war crimes'' following Israel's war against Hezbollah in
2006, has visited Cuba and praised the Cuban regime's provision
of food to the Cuban people, and has stated that Zimbabwean
dictator Robert Mugabe ``has history and morality with him''.
Ziegler was also involved in the establishment of the ``Al-
Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights'', a prize
established by, funded by, and named after Libyan dictator
Muammar al-Gaddafi, and awarded in the past to Fidel Castro,
Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrakhan, and Roger Garaudy, who has denied
the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the events of
September 11, 2001, and supported Iranian leader Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's call for Israel to be ``wiped off the map''.
(11) Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, a member of the United
Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee who has
previously served as President of the United Nations General
Assembly and as foreign minister for the Sandinista regime in
Nicaragua, has implicitly accused the United States of
``terrorism'', has called former President Ronald Reagan a
``butcher'', has called for a international boycott of Israel,
has stated that the Palestinians were being ``crucified'' by
Israel, has called Israel's defensive Operation Cast Lead in
the Gaza Strip a ``monstrosity'' and ``genocide'', has urged
the United Nations to use the term ``apartheid'' in discussing
Israeli treatment of Palestinians, has embraced Iranian leader
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after Ahmadinejad delivered an anti-
American, anti-Israel address to the United Nations General
Assembly, has stated that charges of genocide against Sudanese
dictator Omar Hassan al Bashir are ``racist'', and has declared
Fidel Castro ``World Hero of Solidarity'', stating that Castro
``embod[ied] virtues and values worth emulation by all of us''.
(12) Halima Warzazi, a member of the United Nations Human
Rights Council Advisory Committee, has compared Israel to Nazi
Germany, and used her previous membership in a United Nations
apparatus to shield Saddam Hussein from censure for gassing
Iraqi Kurds in Halabja.
(13) The ongoing five-year review of the United Nations Human
Rights Council concluded on June 17, 2011, and failed make any
significant reforms to its fundamental and severe structural
flaws, including its absence of substantive membership
criteria, or to remove the permanent agenda item on Israel.
(14) On June 17, 2011, John F, Sammis, United States Deputy
Representative to the Economic and Social Council, stated that
``The Geneva process [of the five-year review] failed to yield
even minimally positive results, forcing us to dissociate from
the outcome . . . the final resolution [for the five-year
review] also fails to address the core problems that still
plague the Human Rights Council . . . The United States has
therefore voted `no' on the resolution . . . the Council's
effectiveness and legitimacy will always be compromised so long
as one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely
singled out while others, including chronic human rights
abusers, escape scrutiny . . . The resolution before us today
does nothing to address the Council's failures nor move it any
closer to the founding values of the UN Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.''.
(15) United States membership in the Human Rights Council has
not led to reform of its fundamental flaws diminished the
Council's virulently anti-Israel behavior. The Council has
passed fourteen resolutions criticizing Israel since the United
States joined in 2009.
SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND FUNDING.
(a) In General.--For each and every fiscal year subsequent to the
effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to
Congress a certification that the requirements described in subsection
(b) have been satisfied--
(1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a United
States contribution each fiscal year to a regular budget of the
United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of
such contribution that the Secretary determines would be
allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations
Human Rights Council;
(2) the Secretary of State shall not make a voluntary
contribution to the United Nations Human Rights Council; and
(3) the United States shall not run for a seat on the United
Nations Human Rights Council.
(b) Certification.--The annual certification referred to in
subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary to Congress
that--
(1) the United Nations Human Rights Council's mandate from
the United Nations General Assembly explicitly and effectively
prohibits candidacy for Human Rights Council membership of a
United Nations Member State--
(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; and
(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation
for human rights abuses;
(2) the United Nations Human Rights Council does not include
a United Nations Member State--
(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation
for human rights abuses;
(C) which the Secretary of State has determined, for
purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section
40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of
law, is a government that has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism; or
(D) which the President has designated as a country
of particular concern for religious freedom under
section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998; and
(3) the United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda or
programme of work does not include a permanent item with regard
to the State of Israel.
(c) Special Procedures.--The Secretary of State shall withhold from a
United States contribution each year to a regular budget of the United
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution
that the Secretary determines would be allocated by the United Nations
to support the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in Palestinian territories occupied since 1967'', and any
other United Nations Human Rights Council ``Special Procedures'' used
to display bias against the United States or the State of Israel or to
provide support for the government of any United Nations Member State--
(1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
(2) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for human
rights abuses;
(3) which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes
of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as
continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control
Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or
other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism; or
(4) which the President has designated as a country of
particular concern for religious freedom under section 402(b)
of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.
(d) Reversion of Funds.--Funds appropriated for use as a United
States contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation
and expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to
the United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be
repaid to any United Nations Entity.
TITLE VI--GOLDSTONE REPORT
SEC. 601. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights
Council passed Resolution A/HRC/S-9/L.1, which authorized a
``fact-finding mission'' regarding Israel's conduct of
Operation Cast Lead against violent militants in the Gaza Strip
between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009.
(2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its
investigation by one-sidedly mandating the ``fact-finding
mission'' to ``investigate all violations of international
human rights law and International Humanitarian Law by . . .
Israel, against the Palestinian people . . . particularly in
the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression''.
(3) The mandate of the ``fact-finding mission'' makes no
mention of the relentless rocket and mortar attacks, which
numbered in the thousands and spanned a period of eight years,
by Hamas and other violent militant groups in Gaza against
civilian targets in Israel, that necessitated Israel's
defensive measures.
(4) The ``fact-finding mission'' included a member who,
before joining the mission, had already declared Israel guilty
of committing atrocities in Operation Cast Lead by signing a
public letter on January 11, 2009, published in the Sunday
Times, that called Israel's actions ``war crimes''.
(5) The mission's flawed and biased mandate gave serious
concern to many United Nations Human Rights Council Member
States which refused to support it, including Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland.
(6) The mission's flawed and biased mandate was never
broadened or revised by any plenary meeting of the United
Nations Human Rights Council, and troubled many distinguished
individuals who refused invitations to head the mission.
(7) On September 15, 2009, the ``United Nations Fact Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' released its report, which is
commonly referred to as the ``Goldstone Report''.
(8) The Goldstone Report repeatedly made sweeping and
unsubstantiated determinations that the Israeli military had
deliberately attacked civilians during Operation Cast Lead.
(9) The authors of the Goldstone Report admit that we did not
deal with the issues . . . ``regarding the problems of
conducting military operations in civilian areas and second-
guessing decisions made by soldiers and their commanding
officers in the fog of war''.
(10) In the October 16, 2009 edition of the Jewish Daily
Forward, Richard Goldstone, the head of the ``United Nations
Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'', is quoted as
saying, with respect to the mission's evidence-collection
methods, ``If this was a court of law, there would have been
nothing proven''.
(11) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the State of
Israel the right to self-defense, and never noted the fact that
Israel had the right to defend its citizens from the repeated
violent attacks committed against civilian targets in southern
Israel by Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations
operating from Gaza.
(12) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the culpability of
the Government of Iran and the Government of Syria, both of
whom sponsor Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
(13) The Goldstone Report usually considered public
statements made by Israeli officials not to be credible, while
frequently giving uncritical credence to statements taken from
what it called the ``Gaza authorities'', i.e., the Gaza
leadership of Hamas.
(14) Notwithstanding a great body of evidence that Hamas and
other violent Islamist groups committed war crimes by using
civilians and civilian institutions, such as mosques, schools,
and hospitals, as shields, the Goldstone Report repeatedly
downplayed or cast doubt upon that claim.
(15) In one notable instance, the Goldstone Report stated
that it did not consider the admission of a Hamas official that
Hamas often ``created a human shield of women, children, the
elderly and the mujahideen, against [the Israeli military]''
specifically to ``constitute evidence that Hamas forced
Palestinian civilians to shield military objectives against
attack''.
(16) Hamas was able to significantly shape the findings of
the investigation mission's Goldstone Report by selecting and
prescreening some of the witnesses and intimidating others, as
the Goldstone Report acknowledges when it notes that ``those
interviewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the
presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed
groups . . . from a fear of reprisals''.
(17) Even though Israel is a vibrant democracy with a
vigorous and free press, the Goldstone Report erroneously
asserts that ``actions of the Israeli government . . . have
contributed significantly to a political climate in which
dissent with the government and its actions . . . is not
tolerated''.
(18) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations
Human Rights Council endorse its recommendations, implement
them, review their implementation, and refer the report to the
United Nations Security Council, the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, and the United Nations General
Assembly for further action.
(19) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations
Security Council--
(A) require the Government of Israel to launch
further investigations of its conduct during Operation
Cast Lead and report back to the Security Council
within six months;
(B) simultaneously appoint an ``independent committee
of experts'' to monitor and report on any domestic
legal or other proceedings undertaken by the Government
of Israel within that 6-month period; and
(C) refer the case to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court after that 6-month period.
(20) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations
General Assembly consider further action on the report and
establish an escrow fund, to be funded entirely by the State of
Israel, to ``pay adequate compensation to Palestinians who have
suffered loss and damage'' during Operation Cast Lead.
(21) The Goldstone Report ignored the issue of compensation
to Israelis who have been killed or wounded, or suffered other
loss and damage, as a result of years of past and continuing
rocket and mortar attacks by Hamas and other violent militant
groups in Gaza against civilian targets in southern Israel.
(22) The Goldstone Report recommended ``that States Parties
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 start criminal investigations
[of Operation Cast Lead] in national courts, using universal
jurisdiction'' and that ``following investigation, alleged
perpetrators should be arrested and prosecuted''.
(23) The concept of ``universal jurisdiction'' has frequently
been used in attempts to detain, charge, and prosecute Israeli
and United States officials and former officials in connection
with unfounded allegations of war crimes and has often unfairly
impeded the travel of those individuals.
(24) On September 20, 2009, United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay wrote, ``I lend my full
support to Justice Goldstone's report and its
recommendations''.
(25) The State of Israel, like many other free democracies,
has an independent judicial system with a robust investigatory
capacity and has already launched numerous investigations, many
of which remain ongoing, of Operation Cast Lead and individual
incidents therein.
(26) Several nations have indicated that they intend to
further pursue consideration of the Goldstone Report and
implementation of its recommendations by the United Nations
Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the
United Nations Human Rights Council, and other multilateral
fora.
(27) On September 30, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton described the underlying mandate for the Goldstone
Report as ``one-sided''.
(28) On September 17, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, United
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
expressed the United States' ``very serious concern with the
mandate'' underlying the Goldstone Report and noted that the
United States views the mandate ``as unbalanced, one-sided and
basically unacceptable''.
(29) Israeli President Shimon Peres has called the Goldstone
Report a ``blood libel''.
(30) The Goldstone Report reflects the longstanding, historic
bias at the United Nations against the democratic, Jewish State
of Israel.
(31) The Goldstone Report is being exploited by Israel's
enemies to excuse the actions of violent militant groups and
their state sponsors, and to justify isolation of and punitive
measures against the democratic, Jewish State of Israel.
(32) On November 3, 2009, the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly adopted House Resolution 867, which stated that
the House of Representatives:
(A) ``considers the [Goldstone Report] to be
irredeemably biased and unworthy of further
consideration or legitimacy'';
(B) ``supports the Administration's efforts to combat
anti-Israel bias at the United Nations, its
characterization of the [Goldstone Report] as
`unbalanced, one-sided and basically unacceptable', and
its opposition to the resolution on the report'';
(C) ``calls on the President and the Secretary of
State to continue to strongly and unequivocally oppose
any endorsement of the [Goldstone Report] in
multilateral fora, including through leading opposition
to any United Nations General Assembly resolution and
through vetoing, if necessary, any United Nations
Security Council resolution that endorses the contents
of this report, seeks to act upon the recommendations
contained in this report, or calls on any other
international body to take further action regarding
this report'';
(D) ``calls on the President and the Secretary of
State to strongly and unequivocally oppose any further
consideration of the `Report of the United Nations Fact
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict' and any other
measures stemming from this report in multilateral
fora''; and
(E) ``reaffirms its support for the democratic,
Jewish State of Israel, for Israel's security and right
to self-defense, and, specifically, for Israel's right
to defend its citizens from violent militant groups and
their state sponsors''.
(33) On October 16, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights
Council voted 25-6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and 5 not
voting, and with the United States voting against) to adopt
resolution A-HRC-S-12-1, which endorsed the Goldstone Report
and condemned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, other such
violent militant groups, or their state sponsors. The United
States voted against the resolution.
(34) On November 5, 2009, the United Nations General Assembly
voted 114-18 (with 44 Member States abstaining, and with the
United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/10,
which, among other things:
(A) endorsed the United Nations Human Rights
Council's resolution A-HRC-S-12-1, which endorsed the
Goldstone Report and condemned Israel, without
mentioning Hamas, other such violent militant groups,
or their state sponsors;
(B) requested that the Secretary General of the
United Nations transmit the Goldstone Report to the
United Nations Security Council;
(C) expressed its ``appreciation'' to the ``United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' for
its ``comprehensive report'';
(D) expressed grave concern regarding ``reports
regarding serious human rights violations'' during
Operation Cast Lead, including the findings in the
Goldstone Report; and
(E) recommended ``that the Government of Switzerland,
in its capacity as depositary of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, undertake as soon as possible the steps
necessary to reconvene a Conference of High Contracting
Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention on measures to
enforce the Convention'' in the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip, and ``East Jerusalem''.
(35) On February 26, 2010, the United Nations General
Assembly voted 98-7 (with 31 Member States abstaining, and with
the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/
254, which built on the determinations of A/RES/64/10.
(36) On March 24, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights
Council voted 29-6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and one
not voting, and with the United States voting against) to adopt
resolution A/HRC/13/L.30, which, among other things--
(A) called upon ``all concerned parties, including
United Nations bodies, to ensure their implementation
of the recommendations contained in the [Goldstone
Report]'';
(B) requested that the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights submit a ``progress
report on the implementation of the present resolution
to the [Human Rights] Council at its fourteenth
session'' in May and June 2010; and
(C) decided to ``follow up on the implementation of
the present resolution at [the] fifteenth session'' of
the Human Rights Council in September 2010.
(37) On March 25, 2011, the United Nations Human Rights
Council voted 27-3 (with 16 Member States abstaining, and with
the United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/16/
L.31, which, among other things--
(A) called upon ``all concerned parties, including
United Nations bodies, to ensure the full and immediate
implementation of the recommendations contained in the
[Goldstone Report]'';
(B) recommended that the United Nations General
Assembly again consider the Goldstone Report at its
sixty-sixth session, and urged the General Assembly to
submit the report to the United Nations Security
Council ``for its consideration and appropriate
action,'' including referral to the prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court;
(C) requested that the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights submit a ``progress
report on the implementation of the present resolution
to the Human Rights Council at its eighteenth session
of September 2011''; and
(D) decided to ``follow up on the implementation of
the present resolution at [the] nineteenth session [of
the Human Rights Council] of March 2012''.
(38) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the head of the
``United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict''
that authored the Goldstone Report, wrote an op-ed in the
Washington Post that renounced the Goldstone Report's claim
that the Israeli military deliberately attacked civilians
during Operation Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the Israeli
military's investigations with respect to incidents in
Operation Cast Lead ``indicate that civilians were not
intentionally targeted as a matter of policy''.
(39) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic State of Israel
and deny it the right to defend its citizens and its existence
can be used to delegitimize other democracies and deny them the
same right.
SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to--
(1) consider the Goldstone Report irredeemably biased and
unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy;
(2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any consideration,
legitimization, or endorsement of the Goldstone Report, or any
other measures stemming from this report, in multilateral fora;
(3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in support of the
revocation and repudiation, by the United Nations General
Assembly, of the Goldstone Report and any United Nations
resolutions stemming from the report, including:
(A) United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/
RES/64/10 and A/RES/64/254; and
(B) United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions
A-HRC-S-12-1, A/HRC/13/L.30, and A/HRC/16/L.31; and
(4) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other
responsible countries not to endorse, support, or legitimize
the Goldstone Report or any other measures stemming from the
report.
SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER
DOLLARS.
(a) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold from
the United States contribution to the regular budget of the United
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution
that the Secretary determines would be or has been expended by the
United Nations for any part of the Goldstone Report or its preparatory
or follow-on activities.
(b) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--Funds appropriated for
use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the United
Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to
subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury
and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations
Entity.
TITLE VII--DURBAN PROCESS
SEC. 701. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States is opposed to racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance, and has
long been a party to the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination.
(2) Expensive and politically skewed international
conferences can disserve and undermine the worthy goals that
they are ostensibly convened to support.
(3) The goals of the 2001 United Nations World Conference
Against Racism--held in Durban, South Africa, and commonly
referred to as ``Durban I''--were undermined by hateful, anti-
Jewish rhetoric, and anti-Israel political agendas, prompting
both Israel and the United States to withdraw their delegations
from the Conference.
(4) The official government declaration adopted by Durban I,
the ``Durban Declaration and Program of Action'', focused on
the ``plight of the Palestinian people under foreign
occupation'', and thereby singled out one regional conflict for
discussion and implicitly launched a false accusation against
Israel of intolerance towards the Palestinians.
(5) On September 3, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell
explained the withdrawal of the United States delegation from
Durban I by stating that ``you do not combat racism by
conferences that produce declarations containing hateful
language, some of which is a throwback to the `days of Zionism'
equals racism; or supports the idea that we have made too much
of the Holocaust; or suggests that apartheid exists in Israel;
or that singles out only one country in the world--Israel--for
censure and abuse''.
(6) The late United States Representative Tom Lantos, who
participated as a member of the United States delegation to the
Durban Conference, supported that delegation's withdrawal and
wrote in 2002 that the conference ``provided the world with a
glimpse into the abyss of international hate, discrimination
and, indeed, racism''.
(7) On December 19, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly
approved a resolution initiating preparations for a Durban
Review Conference (commonly referred to as ``Durban II''),
which was held between April 20 and 24, 2009, in Geneva,
Switzerland.
(8) The chair of the preparatory committee for Durban II was
Libya, and the co-chairs included Iran and Cuba.
(9) Throughout the preparatory process for Durban II, member
states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference urged that
the conference again focus criticism on Israel and single out
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for discussion, and also urged
that the conference advocate global speech codes that would
impose restrictions contrary to fundamental freedoms recognized
in the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
(10) In testimony before the House of Representatives on
April 2, 2008, then-Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organizations Kristen Silverberg stated that the
United States had decided against participating in preparatory
activities for Durban II because ``[there is] absolutely no
case to be made for participating in something that is going to
be a repeat of Durban I. We don't have any confidence that this
will be any better than Durban I''.
(11) On September 23, 2008, the House of Representatives
passed House Resolution 1361, which, among other things, called
on the President to ``urge other heads of state to condition
participation in the 2009 [Durban II] Conference on concrete
action by the United Nations and United Nations Member States
to ensure that it is not a forum to demonize any group, or
incite anti-Semitism, hatred, or violence against members of
any group or to call into question the existence of any state''
and urged all United Nations Member States ``not to support a
2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails to adhere to
established human rights standards and to reject an agenda that
incites hatred against any group in the guise of criticism of a
particular government or that seeks to forge a global blasphemy
code''.
(12) The present United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Dr. Navanethem Pillay, who served as Secretary General
of Durban II, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of
hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas
present at Durban I, describing it as merely ``the virulent
anti-Semitic behavior of a few non-governmental organizations
on the sidelines'' and praising the biased 2001 Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action as ``[t]he legacy of this
Conference'', has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of
hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas
present at Durban II and its preparatory activities, and has
repeatedly praised and urged the full implementation of the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.
(13) High Commissioner Pillay has repeatedly and publicly
criticized nations, including the United States, which
announced that they would not participate in Durban II, but has
almost never publicly criticized governments who succeeded in
using the conference and its preparatory activities to single
out Israel for criticism and to attempt to restrict fundamental
freedoms.
(14) A United Nations press release on September 8, 2008,
regarding an address by High Commissioner Pillay, disturbingly
dismissed objections raised by non-governmental organizations
to Durban II as ``ferocious, and often distorted, criticism by
certain lobby groups focused on single issues''.
(15) During February of 2009, the United States actively
participated in intergovernmental consultations on Durban II's
``draft outcome document'' and engaged in high-level diplomatic
efforts to dramatically reverse the path of Durban II by
directing it towards meaningful efforts to combat intolerance
and bigotry and directing it away from efforts to undermine the
cause of fighting discrimination through singling out Israel
for implicit criticism and calling for restrictions on
fundamental freedoms.
(16) On February 27, 2009, a State Department spokesman
stated that, despite United States efforts to redirect the path
of Durban II, ``the document being negotiated has gone from bad
to worse, and the current text of the draft outcome document is
not salvageable . . . A conference based on this text would be
a missed opportunity to speak clearly about the persistent
problem of racism'' and therefore, the United States would not
participate in further consultations and negotiations regarding
the ``draft outcome document,'' and would not participate in
Durban II itself unless the ``draft outcome document'' was
radically shortened and revised to eliminate objectionable
material.
(17) On April 17, 2009, the third and final session of the
preparatory committee for Durban II proposed a final ``draft
outcome document'' that contained a number of provisions
advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, and that also
implicitly singled out and criticized Israel for racism by
reaffirming, in its very first paragraph, the 2001 Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action.
(18) On April 18, 2009, a State Department spokesman
announced that ``the United States will not join the [Durban
II] conference'', noting that ``The current document . . .
still contains language that reaffirms in toto the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA) from 2001, which the
United States has long said it is unable to support . . . The
United States also has serious concerns with relatively new
additions to the text regarding `incitement', that run counter
to the U.S. commitment to unfettered free speech.''.
(19) On April 19, 2009, the President stated at a press
conference that ``I would love to be involved in a useful
conference that addressed continuing issues of racism and
discrimination around the globe . . . we expressed in the run-
up to this conference our concerns that if you incorporated--if
you adopted all the language from 2001, that's just not
something we could sign up for . . . our participation would
have involved putting our imprimatur on something that we just
don't believe . . . Hopefully . . . we can partner with other
countries on to actually reduce discrimination around the
globe. But this wasn't an opportunity to do it.''.
(20) Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland,
Australia, and New Zealand also did not participate in Durban
II, and the Czech Republic walked out of the Conference during
its proceedings, never to return.
(21) Libya was the chair of the Main Committee of Durban II,
and vice presidents of Durban II included Libya, Iran, and
Cuba.
(22) Speaking at Durban II on April 20, 2009, Iranian leader
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the democratic State of Israel
``totally racist'' and ``the most cruel and repressive racist
regime'', and called for Israel's destruction, stating that
``Efforts must be made to put an end to the abuse by Zionists .
. . Governments must be encouraged and supported in their
fights aimed at eradicating this barbaric racism''.
(23) In his speech at Durban II, Ahmadinejad also propagated
anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, saying that ``Those who
control huge economic resources and interests in the world . .
. mobilize all the resources, including their economic and
political influence and world media, to render support in vain
to the Zionist regime''.
(24) Disgusted by Ahmadinejad's biased and incendiary
statements, delegates from about two dozen nations walked out
of the assembly hall in protest, but most delegations remained,
and a large number of delegations and observers repeatedly
applauded Ahmadinejad's remarks.
(25) On April 21, 2009, governments participating in Durban
II adopted by consensus an ``outcome document'' that contained
a number of provisions advocating restrictions on freedom of
expression, and that also implicitly singled out and criticized
Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very first paragraph,
the 2001 Durban Declaration and Program of Action.
(26) Throughout Durban II, many speakers singled out Israel
for criticism or called for restrictions on fundamental
freedoms, including representatives of Iran, Libya, Cuba,
Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Indonesia, Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Bangladesh,
Switzerland, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the
Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and a
number of other organizations and countries.
(27) During Durban II, several speakers who sought to draw
attention to genuine instances of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, related intolerance, and human
rights violations by the governments of Iran, Libya, and China
were repeatedly interrupted by the delegations from those
governments and instructed by the conference's chair to not
refer specifically to those governments.
(28) On December 18, 2009, the United Nations General
Assembly approved Resolution A/RES/64/148, which urged the
``full and effective implementation of the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action'' and called for a ``one-day plenary
event to commemorate the ten-year anniversary [of Durban I]
during the high-level segment of the General Assembly to be
devoted to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and
related intolerance during its sixty-fifth session, in 2011''.
The United States, joined by 12 other nations, voted against
this resolution.
(29) On December 24, 2010, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/65/240, authorizing the
holding of a ``one-day high-level meeting of the General
Assembly to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption
of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, at the level
of Heads of State and Government, on the second day of the
general debate of the sixty-sixth session'' in September of
2011. The resolution also states that the meeting (commonly
referred to as ``Durban III'') will adopt a ``political
declaration aimed at mobilizing political will at the national,
regional, and international levels for the full and effective
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action and its follow-up processes.''. The resolution also
requests that the United Nations Secretary General ``establish
a programme of outreach, with the involvement of Member States
and United Nations funds and programmes as well as civil
society, including non-governmental organizations, to
appropriately commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption
of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.'' The
resolution also requests that ``the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Department
of Public Information of the Secretariat . . . launch a public
information campaign for the commemoration of the tenth
anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action''. The United States, joined by 21 other
nations, voted against this resolution.
(30) The Government of Canada announced that it would not
participate in the Durban III meeting. Canadian Minister of
Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney
stated that ``Our government has lost faith in the entire
tainted Durban process. Canada will not participate in this
charade any longer. We will not lend our country's good name to
a commemoration of what has widely been characterized as a
hatefest . . . Canada is clearly committed to the fight against
racism, but the Durban process commemorates an agenda that
actually promotes racism rather than combats it.''.
(31) The Government of Israel announced that it would not
participate in the Durban III meeting, stating that ``Israel is
part of the international struggle against racism. The Jewish
people was itself a victim of racism throughout history. Israel
regrets that a resolution on an important subject--elimination
of racism--has been diverted and politicized by the automatic
majority at the UN, by linking it to the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action (2001) that many states would prefer to
forget. The Durban Conference of 2001, with its antisemitic
undertones and displays of hatred for Israel and the Jewish
World, left us with scars that will not heal quickly . . .
Under the present circumstances, as long as the [Durban III]
meeting is defined as part of the infamous `Durban process',
Israel will not participate . . .''.
(32) On June 2, 2011, the United States publicly announced
that it would not participate in the Durban III meeting. The
Department of State's deputy spokesman stated that the ``Durban
process includes displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism, and
we don't want to see that commemorated. In our conversations
about this commemoration, we've not seen the kind of progress
that we think is indicative. We remain unconvinced that the
conference is moving in a new direction.''.
(33) The Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom also
did not participate in the Durban III meeting.
(34) On September 22, 2011, at the Durban III meeting, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/66/3,
a ``political declaration'' which ``[r]eaffirm[ed] that the
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action... and the outcome
document of [Durban II]. . . are a comprehensive United Nations
framework and solid foundation for combating racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance'',
``[r]ecall[ed] that the aim of [Durban III] is to mobilize
political will at the national, regional and international
levels and reaffirm our political commitment to the full and
effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action and the outcome document of [Durban II],
and their follow-up processes, at all these levels'', and
``welcome[d] the continued engagement of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights to incorporate the
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action into the United Nations system''.
(35) On September 22, 2011, the White House Press Secretary
stated that ``Since its inception. . . the Durban process has
included ugly displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism. . .
Last December, the United States voted against the resolution
establishing [Durban III] because we did not want to see the
hateful and anti-Semitic displays of the 2001 Durban Conference
commemorated. Over the last few months, we did not participate
in negotiations on [Durban III's] Political Declaration
document and, like many other countries, we were not present
when the Declaration was adopted. We are also deeply
disappointed that the rules established for credentialing non-
governmental organizations to participate were used by some
delegations to silence voices critical of the Durban
process.''.
(36) Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their preparatory
and follow-on activities, have made little or no demonstrable
contribution to combating racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia, and related intolerance.
(37) To date, several million dollars from the United Nations
regular budget has been expended on Durban I, Durban II, Durban
III, and their preparatory and follow-on activities.
(38) The United States is the largest contributor to the
United Nations system, and is assessed for a full 22 percent of
the United Nations regular budget, which is funded by assessed
contributions from Member States.
(39) Funding for Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their
preparatory and follow-on activities through the United Nations
regular budget has resulted in United States taxpayer dollars
being used for those purposes.
(40) Congress, through its adoption of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161) withheld from the
United States assessed contribution for fiscal year 2008 to the
United Nations regular budget an amount equivalent to the
United States share of the United Nations Human Rights Council
budget, including its share of the Council-administered
preparatory process for Durban II.
SEC. 702. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Durban I, Durban II, and Durban III conferences, and
their preparatory and follow-on activities, were subverted by
members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and
irredeemably distorted into a forum for anti-Israel, anti-
Semitic, and anti-freedom activity;
(2) by walking out of the Durban I conference, and by not
participating in the Durban II conference, and announcing that
it would not participate in the Durban III meeting, the United
States Government upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental
commitment of the United States to combating racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance;
(3) the Governments of Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the
Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New Zealand, and the Czech
Republic should be commended for their decision to not
participate or cease participation in the Durban II conference;
(4) the Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada,
the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Latvia, the
Netherlands, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom
should be commended for their decision to not participate in
Durban III; and
(5) the Administration should expeditiously and unequivocally
announce that it will not participate in, support, or
legitimize any part of the Durban process.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States
to--
(1) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other
responsible countries--
(A) not to participate in, support, legitimize, or
fund any part of the Durban process, and
(B) to withhold from their respective contributions
to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the United
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of
such respective contributions that they determine would
be or has been allocated by the United Nations for any
part of the Durban III meeting or its preparatory or
follow-on activities, or for any other part of the
Durban process; and
(2) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to explore credible,
alternative forums for combating racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia, and related intolerance.
SEC. 703. NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE DURBAN PROCESS.
None of the funds made available in any provision of law may be used
for United States participation in any part of the Durban process.
SEC. 704. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER
DOLLARS.
(a) Withholding of Funds for the Durban Process.--The Secretary of
State shall withhold from the United States contribution to the regular
budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage
of such contribution that the Secretary determines would be or has been
expended by the United Nations for any part of the Durban I or Durban
II conferences, the Durban III meeting, their preparatory or follow-on
activities, or any other part of the Durban process, including--
(1) the ``public information campaign for the commemoration
of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action'' requested by United
Nations General Assembly Resolution A.RES/65/240;
(2) the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective
Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action;
(3) the ``group of independent eminent experts on the
implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action''; and
(4) the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary
Standards.
(b) Withholding of Funds for Other Biased and Compromised
Activities.--Until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriate
congressional committees a certification, on a case-by-case basis, that
the requirements described in subsection (d) have been satisfied, the
United States shall withhold from the United States contribution to the
regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to the
percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines has been
allocated by the United Nations for any conference, meeting, or other
multilateral forum, or the preparatory or follow-on activities of any
conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum, that is organized
under the aegis or jurisdiction of the United Nations or of any United
Nations Entity.
(c) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--
(1) In general.--Funds appropriated for use as a United
States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations
but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to
subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States
Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to
any United Nations Entity.
(2) Allowance.--Funds appropriated for use as a United States
contribution to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the
United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure
pursuant to subsection (b) may be obligated and expended for
that purpose upon the certification described in subsection
(d). Such funds shall revert to the United States Treasury if
no such certification is made by the date that is one year
after such appropriation, and shall not be considered arrears
to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
(d) Certification.--The certification referred to in subsection (b)
is a certification made by the Secretary of State to the appropriate
congressional committees concerning the following:
(1) The specified conference, meeting, or other multilateral
forum did not reaffirm, call for the implementation of, or
otherwise support the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action (2001) or the outcome document of the Durban II
conference (2009) or the Durban III meeting (2011).
(2) The specified conference or forum was not used to single
out the United States or the State of Israel for unfair or
unbalanced criticism.
(3) The specified conference or forum was not used to
propagate racism, racial discrimination, anti-Semitism, denial
of the Holocaust, incitement to violence or genocide,
xenophobia, or related intolerance.
(4) The specified conference or forum was not used to
advocate for restrictions on the freedoms of speech,
expression, religion, the press, assembly, or petition, or for
restrictions on other fundamental human rights and freedoms.
(5) The leadership of the specified conference or forum does
not include a Member State, or a representative from a Member
State--
(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation
for human rights abuses; or
(C) the government of which the Secretary of State
has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in
effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act,
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or
other provision of law, is a government that has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.
TITLE VIII--UNRWA
SEC. 801. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (1949)
created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the temporary,
strictly humanitarian mandate to ``carry out . . . direct
relief and works programmes'' for Palestinian refugees.
(2) UNRWA has acknowledged that it is the ``only UN agency
that reports directly to the UN General Assembly, and whose
beneficiary population stems from one nation-group'', and is
responsible solely for Palestinian refugees, while the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible
for other refugees across the world.
(3) UNHCR's definition of a refugee is, in accordance with
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, any
person who ``owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country . . .''.
(4) UNRWA's much broader definition of a ``Palestine
refugee'' is any person, and his descendants, whose ``normal
place of residence was [the former British Mandate of]
Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who
lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948
conflict.''.
(5) UNRWA's overly inclusive definition of a ``Palestine
refugee'' has resulted in an increase in UNRWA's reported
number of ``Palestine refugees'' from under one million in 1950
to over 4.5 million today, encompassing multiple generations of
descendants of the original Palestinian refugees.
(6) Hundreds of thousands of ``Palestine refugees'' are
citizens of recognized states, including Jordan.
(7) UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, does not offer refugees the option
of resettlement and reintegration into their country of refuge
or a third country. Efforts by UN officials in the 1950s to
offer resettlement and reintegration as an option for
Palestinian refugees were dropped under fierce opposition from
Arab governments, and have not been taken up since.
(8) Through its overly inclusive definition of a ``Palestine
refugee'' and its refusal to offer refugees the option of
resettlement and reintegration, UNRWA contributes to the
perpetuation of the suffering of Palestinian refugees, who have
been exploited by Arab governments and Palestinian militant
groups for over six decades as a political tool with which to
assail Israel.
(9) Almost all of UNRWA's almost 30,000 staff are Palestinian
refugees themselves, presenting a clear conflict of interest.
(10) UNRWA's total annual budget, including its core
programs, emergency activities and special projects, exceeds $1
billion.
(11) The United States has long been the largest single
contributing country to UNRWA.
(12) From 1950 to 2010, the United States has contributed
almost $3.9 billion to UNRWA, including an average of over $210
million per year between fiscal years 2007 and 2010.
(13) Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2221(c)) states that ``No contributions by the United
States shall be made to the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East except on the
condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency take
all possible measures to assure that no part of the United
States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any
refugee who is receiving military training as a member of the
so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type
organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.''.
(14) Then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. Lew testified
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 13, 2009,
that ``We have the highest level of scrutiny in terms of
UNRWA''.
(15) However, in contravention of United States law, UNRWA
does not ask its personnel or aid recipients if they are
members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
(16) Even though the United States remains the largest single
contributing country to UNRWA, until 2010, UNRWA did not make
available its list of staff for screening through United States
watch lists, including that of the Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control, refused a United States
request to do so in 2005, and still does not do so for its list
of aid recipients.
(17) UNRWA claims that it has fulfilled its obligations under
section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by
screening personnel through the United Nations Consolidated
List pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution
1267, but the names on that list are largely members of Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, not of Palestinian Foreign Terrorist
Organizations such as Hamas, Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades,
or Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
(18) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter Hansen, stated
in 2004 that ``I am sure that there are Hamas members on the
UNRWA payroll and I don't see that as a crime.''.
(19) A number of UNRWA personnel have been discovered to be
affiliated with Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including,
inter alia:
(A) Issa Batran (now deceased), a commander of
Hamas's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and senior rocket-
maker who taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza;
(B) Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi (now deceased),
who reportedly carried out a homicide bombing that
killed seven Americans and one Jordanian at Forward
Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan on December 30,
2009, reportedly worked as a physician at an UNRWA
clinic in Amman, Jordan, and had longstanding ties to
violent Islamist extremism;
(C) Said Siam (now deceased), a longtime Hamas
official who eventually served as Hamas's Interior
Minister in Gaza, and who taught at an UNRWA school in
Gaza;
(D) Awad al-Qiq (now deceased), a rocket-builder for
Palestinian Islamic Jihad who served as headmaster of
an UNRWA school in Gaza;
(E) Nahd Atallah, an UNRWA staff member in Gaza, who
was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 15 years'
imprisonment by an Israeli military court of using his
UN travel document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in
Gaza in order to transport armed Palestinian militants;
and
(F) an UNRWA teacher who reportedly praised homicide
bombers and permitted Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin (now
deceased) to speak to an assembly of students at an
UNRWA school. UNRWA did not terminate the teacher's
employment, instead only giving him a letter of
censure.
(20) UNRWA staff unions, including the teachers' union, are
frequently controlled by members affiliated with Hamas.
(21) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a
2009 report that--
(A) ``UNRWA . . . obviously does not take `all
possible measures' in practice'' to assure that United
States contributions do not provide assistance to any
refugee with ties to Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
in accordance with section 301(c) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961;
(B) ``UNRWA makes no attempt to weed out individuals
who support extremist positions . . . UNRWA has taken
very few steps to detect and eliminate terrorists from
the ranks of its staff or its beneficiaries, and no
steps at all to prevent members of terrorist
organizations, such as Hamas, from joining its
staff.'';
(C) ``[I]t is rare for an area staff member . . . to
report or confirm that another staff member has
violated rules against political speech, let alone
exhibited ties to terrorism. Not surprisingly, external
allegations of improper speech or improper use of UNRWA
facilities are difficult to prove, as virtually no one
is willing to be a witness against gang members.''; and
(D) ``[T]here are no formal procedures for
deregistering or denying services to a properly
registered refugee, no matter what he or she does.''.
(22) The late Representative Tom Lantos, in a May 13, 2002
letter, expressed his concern that--
(A) ``UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than
ameliorating, the situation of Palestinian refugees'';
(B) ``UNRWA officials have . . . failed to prevent
their camps from becoming centers of terrorist
activity''; and
(C) ``for too long, UNRWA has been part of the
problem, rather than the solution, in the Middle East .
. . UNRWA camps have fostered a culture of anger and
dependency that undermines both regional peace and the
well-being of the camps' inhabitants.''.
(23) UNRWA has long held accounts at the Arab Bank and the
Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS), financial institutions that the
United States deems or believes to be complicit in money
laundering and terror financing.
(24) The Arab Bank is reportedly at the center of United
States investigations into how tens of millions of dollars have
flowed to Palestinian groups that allegedly used some of those
funds to pay off suicide bombers and their relatives, and is
also reportedly being sued in Federal court by American victims
of attacks in Israel, with attorneys for the victims accusing
the bank of facilitating Acts of International Terrorism.
(25) On May 11, 2004, the Department of the Treasury
designated CBS as a financial institution of ``primary money
laundering concern'' pursuant to section 311 of the USA Patriot
Act, stating that ``CBS had been used by terrorists and their
sympathizers and acted as a conduit for the laundering of
proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil'' and
that ``numerous transactions that may be indicative of
terrorist financing and money laundering have been transferred
through CBS, including two accounts at CBS that reference a
reputed financier for Usama bin Laden.''.
(26) On August 10, 2011, the Department of the Treasury
designated CBS, pursuant to Executive Order 13382, for serving
as an ``agent for designated Syrian and North Korean
proliferators''.
(27) CBS is controlled by the Government of Syria, a State
Sponsor of Terrorism.
(28) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which use the textbooks
of their respective host governments or authorities, has long
contained materials that are anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and
supportive of violent extremism.
(29) As far back as over forty years ago, former UNRWA
commissioner-general Laurence Michelmore admitted that UNRWA
schools were supporting a ``bitterly hostile attitude to
Israel.''.
(30) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a
January 2009 report that ``[T]eachers in UNRWA schools were
often afraid to remove posters glorifying `martyrs' (including
suicide bombers) for fear of retribution from armed supporters
of the `martyrs.'''.
(31) UNRWA officials have compromised UNRWA's strictly
humanitarian mandate by engaging in political agitation,
propaganda, and advocacy agitation against Israel and in favor
of Hamas, as reflected by the following, inter alia:
(A) UNRWA officials have repeatedly called for the
United States and other nations to deal directly with
Hamas and have repeatedly called for political
``reconciliation'' between Hamas and Fatah.
(B) UNRWA officials have repeatedly castigated Israel
for her actions to defend innocent civilians from
rocket and mortar attacks from violent extremist groups
in Gaza and from other Acts of International Terrorism,
and has repeatedly blamed Israel, not Hamas and other
violent extremist groups, for present restrictions on
access to Gaza.
(C) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted
in a 2009 report that: ``Although it occasionally
issued mild, pro forma criticisms of Palestinian
attacks (most of which were clearly war crimes),
[UNRWA] put more effort into criticizing Israeli
counterterrorism efforts (which were condemned using
language associated with war crimes, though any such
crimes were far from proved) . . . UNRWA never seems to
acknowledge that Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal from
Gaza, has launched strikes on the territory largely in
order to halt rocket attacks and other assaults.''.
(D) Lindsay also noted that ``UNRWA--through its
leaders and press spokespersons--is constantly involved
in political speech . . . These one-sided speeches on
political matters do not further the goals of a
humanitarian and supposedly nonpolitical agency.''.
(E) UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo Grandi
described as a ``massacre'' Israel's May 31, 2010 naval
operation, and use of self-defense measures, to seize
the Mavi Marmara ship in order to enforce its naval
blockade of the Gaza Strip.
(F) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd
stated in a 2009 meeting with Congressional staff that
``We [UNRWA] are not just humanitarian.''.
(G) In January of 2009, UNRWA spokesman Christopher
Gunness called for an investigation as to whether
Israel had committed ``a war crime.''.
(H) On December 30, 2008, former UNRWA commissioner-
general Karen AbuZayd stated that only Israel was
responsible for the start of the most recent conflict
in Gaza.
(I) On May 25, 2008, in an interview with Press TV,
which is controlled by the Government of Iran, former
UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd reportedly
claimed that Hamas was free from corruption and ``more
popular than ever''.
(J) On October 5, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-
general Karen AbuZayd blamed Israel for violent
extremist groups in Gaza launching rockets and mortars
against Israeli civilian targets, stating that
residents of Gaza ``have absorbed--and continue to
experience--military incursions in which civilian
lives, livelihoods, and property have been destroyed,
and to which they have responded with the continuous
firing of Qassam rockets into Israel.''.
(K) On March 8, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-
general Karen AbuZayd, comparing the 1948 Arab-Israeli
War with more recent conflicts between Israel and
Palestinian militant groups, stated that ``[T]here is a
striking historical continuity in the systematic
approach to use overwhelming and disproportionate force
in the name of security; to separate and exclude
Palestinians from the mainstream; to eject them from
their land; and to occupy Palestinian land.''.
(L) On January 19, 2005, former UNRWA commissioner-
general Peter Hansen stated that ``My job [is] to
represent the refugees.''.
(M) In 2002, former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter
Hansen falsely accused Israel of carrying out a
``massacre'' in UNRWA's Jenin refugee camp after
Israeli forces entered the camp, a base of operations
for Palestinian militant groups, to carry out defensive
operations to halt repeated homicide bombings in
Israel.
(N) In 1964, UNRWA allowed its staff to attend the
conference in Jerusalem where the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) was established.
(32) Despite UNRWA's contravention of U.S. law and activities
that compromise its strictly humanitarian mandate, UNRWA
continues to receive United States contributions, including
$237.8 million in fiscal year 2010.
(33) The bilateral ``Framework for Cooperation'' that the
United States concluded with UNRWA for 2010 actually
``commends'' UNRWA and does not commit UNRWA to vetting its aid
recipients through United States watch lists.
(34) Assistance from the United States and other responsible
nations allows UNRWA to claim that criticisms of the agency's
behavior are unfounded. UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness has
dismissed concerns by stating that ``If these baseless
allegations were even halfway true, do you really think the
U.S. and [European Commission] would give us hundreds of
millions of dollars per year?''.
(35) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a
2009 report that:
(A) ``The United States, despite funding nearly 75
percent of UNRWA's national budget and remaining its
largest single country donor, has mostly failed to make
UNRWA reflect U.S. foreign policy objectives . . .
Recent U.S. efforts to shape UNRWA appear to have been
ineffective . . .'';
(B) ``[T]he United States is not obligated to fund
agencies that refuse to check its rolls for individuals
their donors do not wish to support.'';
(C) ``A number of changes in UNRWA could benefit the
refugees, the Middle East, and the United States, but
those changes will not occur unless the United States,
ideally with support from UNRWA's other main financial
supporter, the European Union, compels the agency to
enact reforms.''; and
(D) ``If the [UNRWA commissioner-general's] power is
used in ways that are conflict with the donors'
political objectives, it is up to the donors to take
the necessary actions to ensure that their interests
are respected. When they have done so, UNRWA--given the
tight financial leash it has been on for most of its
existence--has tended to follow their dictates, even if
sometimes slowly.''.
(36) The Government of Canada has recently placed
restrictions on its contributions to UNRWA, demonstrating
consequences for UNRWA's malfeasance and setting an example for
the United States and other donor governments.
SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA.
Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by
striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:
``(c)(1) Withholding.--Contributions by the United States to the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the
regular budget of the United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a
successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United
Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a
period for which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in
effect.
``(2) Certification.--A certification described in this paragraph is
a written determination by the Secretary of State, based on all
information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the
appropriate congressional committees along with a detailed description
of the factual basis therefor, that--
``(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor,
subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA--
``(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist
Organization;
``(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or incited anti-
American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or
propaganda; or
``(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, including
publications or Web sites, to propagate or disseminate
political materials, including political rhetoric
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
``(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other facility, or
other infrastructure or resource is being used by a Foreign
Terrorist Organization for operations, planning, training,
recruitment, fundraising, indoctrination, communications,
sanctuary, storage of weapons or other materials, or any other
purposes;
``(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial audits by
an internationally recognized third party independent auditing
firm and has implemented an effective system of vetting and
oversight to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any
UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organization or
members thereof;
``(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational institution uses
textbooks or other educational materials that propagate or
disseminate anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic
rhetoric, propaganda or incitement;
``(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a member of a
Foreign Terrorist Organization; and
``(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations with
financial institutions that the United States deems or believes
to be complicit in money laundering and terror financing.
``(3) Definitions.--In this section:
``(A) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term `Foreign
Terrorist Organization' means an organization designated as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Secretary of State in
accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
``(B) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
`appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of
the House of Representatives; and
``(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs of the Senate.
``(4) Effective Duration of Certification.--The certification
described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for a period of 180 days
from the date of transmission to the appropriate congressional
committees, or until the Secretary receives information rendering that
certification factually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event
that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a description of
any information that precludes the renewal or continuation of the
certification.
``(5) Limitation.--During a period for which a certification
described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the United States may not
contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual
amount--
``(A) greater than the highest annual contribution to UNRWA
made by a member country of the League of Arab States;
``(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA budget,
exceeds the proportion of the total budget for the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the
United States; or
``(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of
UNRWA.''.
SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the President and the Secretary of State should lead a
high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible
nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA, to any successor or
related entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations
for the support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff
positions provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or
otherwise) until UNRWA has met the conditions listed in
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 802 of this
Act);
(2) citizens of recognized states should be removed from
UNRWA's jurisdiction;
(3) UNRWA's definition of a ``Palestine refugee'' should be
changed to that used for a refugee by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and
(4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian
refugees, responsibility for those refugees should be fully
transferred to the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.
TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was
established in 1957 with the objectives of seeking to
``accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to
peace, health and prosperity throughout the world'' and to
``ensure . . . that assistance provided by it or at its request
or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way
as to further any military purpose.''.
(2) The United States, via assessed contributions, is the
largest financial contributor to the regular budget of the
IAEA.
(3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now called the
Technical Cooperation Program, financed primarily through
voluntary contributions by member states to the Technical
Cooperation Fund, to provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC)
for peaceful purposes to countries worldwide.
(4) The United States is the largest financial contributor to
the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund.
(5) A March 2009 report by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) found that ``neither [the Department of State] nor
IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries
the United States has designated as state sponsors of
terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria--even though under U.S.
law these countries are subject to sanctions.''.
(6) The GAO report also found that ``Together, [Cuba, Iran,
Sudan, and Syria] received more than $55 million in TC
assistance from 1997 through 2007.''. These four countries have
received continued assistance since 2007.
(7) The GAO report also found that ``proliferation concerns
about the [Technical Cooperation Program] have persisted
because of the assistance it has provided to certain countries
and because nuclear equipment, technology, and expertise can be
dual-use--capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also
useful in contributing to nuclear weapons development.''.
(8) The GAO report also found that ``[The State Department]
reported in 2007 that three TC projects in [Iran] were directly
related to the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr.''.
(9) The GAO report also found that ``The proliferation
concerns associated with the [Technical Cooperation Program]
are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess,
and resolve . . . [because] there is no formal mechanism for
obtaining TC project information during the proposal
development phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State
documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC proposals
were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. policies and
IAEA procedures [including monitoring proliferation risks]
related to TC program fellowships.''.
(10) The GAO report noted that ``IAEA officials told us that
the [Technical Cooperation Program] does not attempt to exclude
countries on the basis of their status as U.S.-designated state
sponsors of terrorism or other political considerations'' and
that, according to the Deputy Director General for the
Technical Cooperation Program, ``there are no good countries
and there are no bad countries'' with respect to provision of
technical cooperation by the IAEA.
(11) The GAO report also found that ``given the limited
information available on TC projects and the dual-use nature of
some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do not believe [the
State Department] can assert with complete confidence that TC
assistance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction]
programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism''.
(12) The GAO report also found that ``we do not share [the
State Department's confidence in IAEA's internal safeguards to
prevent TC projects from contributing to weapons development .
. .]''.
(13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et
seq.) prohibited any of the funds authorized to be appropriated
for ``International Organizations and Programs'' from being
made available for the United States proportionate share for
programs for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation
Organization, inter alia.
(14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105-118)
prohibited any of the funds made available by such Act for the
IAEA from being made available for programs and projects of the
IAEA in Cuba.
(15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
(Public Law 105-277) required the United States to withhold a
proportionate share of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba
regarding the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro Pi
Nuclear Research Center.
(16) The GAO report asked Congress ``to consider directing
[the State Department] to withhold a share of future annual
contributions to the [Technical Cooperation Fund] that is
proportionate to the amount of funding provided from the fund
for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other
countries of concern, noting that such a withholding is a
matter of fundamental principle and intended to foster a more
consistent U.S. policy toward such nations''.
(17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the Government of
Iran continues its work on heavy water-related projects and its
enrichment of uranium, in violation of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803
(2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010).
(18) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006)
decided ``that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the
IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food,
agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes
[inter alia] . . . but that no such technical cooperation shall
be provided that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities . . .''.
(19) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of
Governors on February 25, 2011 that the Government of Iran now
has approximately 7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, is
running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its stockpile
of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilograms, considered
sufficient for further enrichment into enough high-enriched
uranium for more than one atomic bomb. The Government of Iran
has also reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40 kilograms
of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U-235.
(20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February
25, 2011, about the ``outstanding issues related to possible
military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme''.
(21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February
25, 2011, that ``the [IAEA] remains concerned about the
possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed
nuclear related activities involving military-related
organizations, including activities related to the development
of a nuclear payload for a missile.''.
(22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February
19, 2009, that ``Iran has not implemented the Additional
Protocol, which is a prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide
credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the IAEA's]
request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, access to
additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing
of centrifuges, research and development on uranium enrichment,
and uranium mining and milling, as also required by the
Security Council.''.
(23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors, including in his report of February
19, 2009, that ``as a result of the continued lack of
cooperation by Iran in connection with . . . issues which give
rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran's
nuclear programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive progress
on these issues.''.
(24) Iran has refused to comply with resolutions adopted by
the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, November 26,
2003, March 15, 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August
11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31,
2006, regarding ``Iran's many failures and breaches of its
obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement'' and
continues to block IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities,
in violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement.
(25) According to multiple news reports, Iran recently denied
access to its enrichment site at Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and
has also denied a request by the IAEA to place one or more
additional surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at
Natanz.
(26) In April of 2008, United States Government officials
publicly revealed that Syria was building at the Dair Alzour
site, with North Korea's assistance, a secret nuclear reactor
that was based on a North Korean model capable of producing
plutonium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away from
becoming operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly
destroyed the reactor in September 2007.
(27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hayden, the former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated that the
Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour could have produced enough
plutonium for 1 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming
operational.
(28) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of
Governors on November 19, 2008 that the Syrian facility at Dair
Alzour bore features that resembled those of an undeclared
nuclear reactor, adding that ``Syria has not yet provided the
requested documentation in support of its declarations
concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building,
nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations which the
IAEA has requested to visit.''.
(29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated to the IAEA
Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, that ``the limited
information and access provided by Syria to date have not
enabled the Agency to determine the nature of the destroyed
facility'' at Dair Alzour site, that uranium particles have
been found in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature
Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and that the
particles found at both sites ``are of a type not included in
Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material.''.
(30) Commercial satellite photos published on February 23,
2011, indicate efforts by the Government of Syria to conceal
its activities at an additional site, Marj as Sultan, which may
be connected to the Dair Alzour facility.
(31) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of
Governors on February 25, 2011 that ``Syria has not cooperated
with the [IAEA] since June 2008 in connection with the
unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other
three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As a
consequences, the [IAEA] has not been able to make progress
towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those
sites.''.
(b) Prohibition.--No funds from any United States assessed or
voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used to support any
assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation
program to any country, including North Korea that--
(1) is a country the government of which has been determined
by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control
Act, or other provision of law, is a government that has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism;
(2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its obligations
regarding--
(A) its safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
(B) the Additional Protocol;
(C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(D) any relevant United Nations Security Council
Resolution; or
(E) the Charter of the United Nations; or
(3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance
with the obligations specified in paragraph (2).
(c) Withholding of Voluntary Contributions.--Not later than 30 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall withhold from the United States voluntary contribution to the
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA in the period
from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its Technical Cooperation
Program to countries described in subsection (b).
(d) Withholding of Assessed Contributions.--If, not later than 30
days of the date of the enactment of this Act, the amount specified in
subsection (c) has not been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all
assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the
countries described in subsection (b), an amount equal to that
specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld from the United States
assessed contribution to the IAEA.
(e) Waiver.--The provisions in subsections (c) and (d) may be waived
if--
(1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance provided through
its Technical Cooperation Program to the countries described in
subsection (b); or
(2) the President certifies that the countries described in
subsection (b) no longer pose a threat to the national
security, interests, and allies of the United States.
(f) United States Actions at IAEA.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice,
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the
allocation of funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through its
Technical Cooperation Program to any country described in subsection
(b).
(g) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the implementation of this
section.
SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA.
(a) Enforcement and Compliance.--
(1) Office of compliance.--
(A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish
an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA.
(B) Operation.--The Office of Compliance shall--
(i) function as an independent body composed
of technical experts who shall work in
consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess
compliance by IAEA Member States and provide
recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors
concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA
Member States that fail to fulfill their
obligations under IAEA Board resolutions;
(ii) base its assessments and recommendations
on IAEA inspection reports; and
(iii) take into consideration information
provided by IAEA Board Members that are 1 of
the 5 nuclear weapons states as recognized by
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as
the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty'' or the
``NPT'').
(C) Staffing.--The Office of Compliance shall be
staffed from existing personnel in the Department of
Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear
Safety and Security of the IAEA.
(2) Committee on safeguards and verification.--The President
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the
IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
at the IAEA to ensure that the Committee on Safeguards and
Verification established in 2005 shall develop and seek to put
into force a workplan of concrete measures that will--
(A) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and
enforce compliance by Member States of the IAEA with
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Statute of
the International Atomic Energy Agency; and
(B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond the
verification mechanisms and authorities contained in
the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements
between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to
detect with a high degree of confidence undeclared
nuclear activities by a Member State.
(3) Penalties with respect to the iaea.--
(A) In general.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States
at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA
that is under investigation for a breach of or
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has
its privileges suspended, including--
(i) limiting its ability to vote on its case;
(ii) being prevented from receiving any
technical assistance; and
(iii) being prevented from hosting meetings.
(B) Termination of penalties.--The penalties
specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated
when such investigation is concluded and such Member
State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance.
(4) Penalties with respect to the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty.--The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that a
Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in
noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the IAEA all nuclear
materials and technology received from the IAEA, any Member
State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.
(b) United States Contributions.--
(1) Voluntary contributions.--Voluntary contributions of the
United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund
activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or
activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
(2) Limitation on use of funds.--The President shall direct
the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA
to--
(A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are
prioritized for countries that have newly established
nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear programs;
and
(B) block the allocation of funds for any other IAEA
development, environmental, or nuclear science
assistance or activity to a country--
(i) the government of which the Secretary of
State has determined, for purposes of section
6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control
Act, or other provision of law, is a government
that has repeatedly provided support for acts
of international terrorism and the government
of which the Secretary has determined has not
dismantled and surrendered its weapons of mass
destruction programs under international
verification;
(ii) that is under investigation for a breach
of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations
or the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations; or
(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA
obligations or the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations.
(3) Detail of expenditures.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to
secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA
to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country
of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and
nuclear security activities.
(c) Membership.--
(1) In general.--The President shall direct the United States
Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote,
and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block the
membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Member
State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the
Additional Protocol and--
(A) is under investigation for a breach of or
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations.
(2) Criteria.--The United States Permanent Representative to
the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for
Board membership to reflect the principles described in
paragraph (1).
(d) Small Quantities Protocol.--The President shall direct the United
States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and
influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every effort to
ensure that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small Quantities
Protocol in order to--
(1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol;
(2) require that any IAEA Member State that has previously
signed a Small Quantities Protocol to sign, ratify, and
implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access for
IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and agree to
the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and
(3) require that any IAEA Member State that does not comply
with paragraph (2) to be ineligible to receive nuclear
material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA
Member State and subject to the penalties described in
subsection (a)(3).
(e) Nuclear Program of Iran and Syria.--
(1) United states action.--The President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to
make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the
IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions
already imposed, makes Iran and Syria ineligible to receive any
nuclear material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any
IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not
related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the
IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran or Syria, as the
case may be--
(A) is providing full access to IAEA inspectors to
its nuclear-related facilities;
(B) has fully implemented and is in compliance with
the Additional Protocol; and
(C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all
activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment
and reprocessing.
(2) Penalties.--If an IAEA Member State is determined to have
violated the prohibition on assistance to Iran or Syria
described in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of Governors
determines that Iran or Syria, as the case may be, has
satisfied the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through
(C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be subject to
the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), shall be
ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment,
or assistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be
ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not related to
safeguards inspections or nuclear security until such time as
the IAEA Board of Governors makes such determination with
respect to Iran or Syria, as the case may be.
(f) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment
of this Act and annually for 2 years thereafter, the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the
implementation of this section.
SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN
OF THE IAEA.
It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of
the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of
the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General
Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.
TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING
SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have
contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability
for over 6 decades and the majority of peacekeeping personnel
who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with
honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping
has been severely tarnished by operational failures and
unconscionable acts of misconduct;
(2) in response to such failures, successive Secretaries
General of the United Nations have launched numerous reform
efforts, including the high-level Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar
Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the
Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness
Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, and the 2009 New
Partnership Agenda, known as the ``New Horizon'' reports;
(3) despite the fact that the United Nations has had over a
decade to implement many of these reforms, nearly four years to
implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the fact that
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and
the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly
have expressed their commitment ``to implementing fundamental,
systematic changes as a matter of urgency,'' a number of
critical reforms continue to be blocked or delayed by Members
States who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status quo;
(4) further, audits of procurement practices in the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted by the Office
of Internal Oversight Services, and the now-defunct United
Nations Procurement Task Force have uncovered ``significant''
corruption schemes and criminal acts by United Nations
peacekeeping personnel; and
(5) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations
peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning,
management, procurement, training, conduct, and discipline,
must be implemented without further delay.
SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS.
It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
(1) Planning and management.--
(A) Global audit.--As the size, cost, and number of
United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased
substantially over the past decade, independent audits
of each such operation should be conducted annually,
with a view toward ``right-sizing'' operations and
ensuring that all operations are efficient and cost
effective.
(B) Procurement and transparency.--The logistics
established within the United Nations Department of
Field Support should be streamlined and strengthened to
ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced
appropriately, transparently, and in a timely fashion
while individual accountability for waste, fraud and
abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is
uniformly enforced.
(C) Review of mandates and closing operations.--In
conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph
(A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all
United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a
view toward identifying objectives that are practical
and achievable, and report its findings to the Security
Council. In particular, the review should consider the
following:
(i) Except in extraordinary cases, including
genocide, the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations should not be tasked
with activities that are impractical or
unachievable without the cooperation of the
Member State(s) hosting a United Nations
peacekeeping operation, or which amount to de-
facto Trusteeship outside of the procedures
established for such under Chapter XII of the
United Nations Charter, thereby creating
unrealistic expectations and obfuscating the
primary responsibility of the Member States
themselves in creating and maintaining
conditions for peace.
(ii) Long-standing operations that are static
and cannot fulfill their mandate should be
downsized or closed.
(iii) Where there is legitimate concern that
the withdrawal from a country of an otherwise
static United Nations peacekeeping operation
would result in the resumption of major
conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement that
reduces the level of assessed contributions,
similar to that currently supporting the United
Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be
explored and instituted.
(D) Leadership.--As peacekeeping operations become
larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should
adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior
leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on
specific skills and experience, and current senior
leaders and managers who do not meet those standards
should be removed.
(E) Pre-deployment training.--Pre-deployment training
on interpretation of the mandate of the operation,
specifically in the areas of use of force, civilian
protection and field conditions, the Code of Conduct,
HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be mandatory, and all
personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be
required to sign an oath that each has received and
understands such training as a condition of
participation in the operation.
(F) Gratis military personnel.--The General Assembly
should seek to strengthen the capacity the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and ease
the extraordinary burden currently placed upon the
limited number of headquarters staff by lifting
restrictions on the utilization of gratis military
personnel by the Department so that the Department may
accept secondments from Member States of military
personnel with expertise in mission planning,
logistics, and other operational specialties.
(2) Conduct and discipline.--
(A) Adoption of a uniform code of conduct.--A single,
uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a
binding rule and applies equally to all personnel
serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations,
regardless of category or rank, including military
personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into
legal documents governing participation in such an
operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of
Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.
(B) Understanding the code of conduct.--All
personnel, regardless of category or rank, should
receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to
deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition
to periodic follow-on training. In particular--
(i) all personnel, regardless of category or
rank, should be provided with a personal copy
of the Code of Conduct that has been translated
into the national language of such personnel,
regardless of whether such language is an
official language of the United Nations;
(ii) all personnel, regardless of category or
rank, should sign an oath that each has
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that
each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct,
and that each understands the consequences of
violating the Code of Conduct, including
immediate termination of participation in and
permanent exclusion from all current and future
peacekeeping operations, as well as the
assumption of personal liability and victims
compensation, where appropriate, as a condition
of appointment to any such operation; and
(iii) peacekeeping operations should continue
and enhance educational outreach programs to
reach local communities where peacekeeping
personnel of such operations are based,
including explaining prohibited acts on the
part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel
and identifying the individual to whom the
local population may direct complaints or file
allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other
acts of misconduct.
(C) Monitoring mechanisms.--Dedicated monitoring
mechanisms, such as the Conduct and Discipline Teams
already deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping
operations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon,
Timor Leste, Cote d'Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present in each
operation to monitor compliance with the Code of
Conduct, and should report simultaneously to the Head
of Mission, the United Nations Department of Field
Support, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, and the Associate Director of the Office of
Internal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations
(established under section 1114(b)(9)).
(D) Investigations.--A permanent, professional, and
independent investigative body should be established
and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping
operations. In particular--
(i) the investigative body should include
professionals with experience in investigating
sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of
resources, as appropriate, as well as experts
who can provide guidance on standards of proof
and evidentiary requirements necessary for any
subsequent legal action;
(ii) provisions should be included in all
Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model
Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate
Member States that contribute troops to a
peacekeeping operation to designate a military
prosecutor who will participate in any
investigation into credible allegations of
misconduct brought against an individual of
such Member State, so that evidence is
collected and preserved in a manner consistent
with the military law of such Member State;
(iii) the investigative body should be
regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and
should be equipped with modern forensics
equipment for the purpose of positively
identifying perpetrators and, where necessary,
for determining paternity; and
(iv) the investigative body should report
directly to the Associate Director of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services for
Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies
of any reports to the Department of Field
Support, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, the Head of Mission, and the Member
State concerned.
(E) Follow-up.--The Conduct and Discipline Unit in
the headquarters of the United Nations Department of
Field Support should be appropriately staffed,
resourced, and tasked with--
(i) promulgating measures to prevent
misconduct;
(ii) receiving reports by field personnel and
coordinating the Department's response to
allegations of misconduct;
(iii) gathering follow-up information on
completed investigations, particularly by
focusing on disciplinary actions against the
individual concerned taken by the United
Nations or by the Member State that is
contributing troops to which such individual
belongs, and sharing such information with the
Security Council, the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission,
and the community hosting the peacekeeping
operation; and
(iv) contributing pertinent data on conduct
and discipline to the database required
pursuant to subparagraph (H).
(F) Financial liability and victims assistance.--
Although peacekeeping operations should provide
immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse
or exploitation, the responsibility for providing
longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely
with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In
particular:
(i) The United Nations should not assume
responsibility for providing long-term
treatment or compensation under the Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assistance
Mechanism by utilizing assessed contributions
to United Nations peacekeeping operations,
thereby shielding individuals from personal
liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of
impunity.
(ii) If an individual responsible for
misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned,
redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide
assistance, responsibility for providing
assistance to a victim should be assigned to
the Member State that contributed the
contingent to which such individual belonged or
to the manager concerned.
(iii) In the case of misconduct by a member
of a military contingent, appropriate funds
shall be withheld from the troop contributing
country concerned.
(iv) In the case of misconduct by a civilian
employee or contractor of the United Nations,
appropriate wages shall be garnished from such
individual or fines shall be imposed against
such individual, consistent with existing
United Nations Staff Rules, and retirement
funds shall not be shielded from liability.
(G) Managers and commanders.--The manner in which
managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by
those serving under them should be included in their
individual performance evaluations, so that managers
and commanders who take decisive action to deter and
address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create
a permissive environment or impede investigations are
penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
(H) Database.--A centralized database, including
personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data,
should be created and maintained within the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the
Department of Field Support, and other relevant United
Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of
misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and
subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who
have engaged in misconduct or other criminal
activities, regardless of category or rank, are
permanently barred from participation in future
peacekeeping operations.
(I) Cooperation of member states.--If a Member State
routinely refuses to cooperate with the directives
contained herein or acts to shield its nationals from
personal liability, that Member State should be barred
from contributing troops or personnel to future
peacekeeping operations.
(J) Welfare.--Peacekeeping operations should continue
to seek to maintain a minimum standard of welfare for
mission personnel to ameliorate conditions of service,
while adjustments are made to the discretionary welfare
payments currently provided to Member States that
contribute troops to offset the cost of operation-
provided recreational facilities, as necessary and
appropriate.
SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION.
(a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Operations Contingent Upon
Presidential Certification of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.--
(1) No new or expanded peacekeeping operations.--
(A) Certification.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State
certifies that the requirements described in paragraph
(2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the
United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the
United States at the United Nations to oppose the
creation of new, or expansion of existing, United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
(B) Exception and notification.--The requirements
described under paragraph (2) may be waived with
respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the
President determines that failure to deploy new or
additional peacekeepers in such situation will
significantly contribute to the widespread loss of
human life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital
national security interest of the United States. If the
President makes such a determination, the President
shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of
such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional
committees of such determination and resulting waiver.
(2) Certification of peacekeeping operations reforms.--The
certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification
made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional
committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of
reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted
by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or
the General Assembly, as appropriate:
(A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the
status of a binding rule and applies equally to all
personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, regardless of category or rank, has been
adopted by the General Assembly and duly incorporated
into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of
Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for
training such personnel concerning the requirements of
the Code and enforcement of the Code.
(B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank,
serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained
concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and
each has been given a personal copy of the Code,
translated into the national language of such
personnel.
(C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank,
are required to sign an oath that each has received a
copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide
by the Code, and that each understands the consequences
of violating the Code, including immediate termination
of participation in and permanent exclusion from all
current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as
the assumption of personal liability for victims
compensation as a condition of the appointment to such
operation.
(D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and
implemented educational outreach programs to reach
local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such
operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the
part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to
identify the individual to whom the local population
may direct complaints or file allegations of
exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
(E) The creation of a centralized database, including
personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data, has
been completed and is being maintained in the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that
tracks cases of misconduct, including the outcomes of
investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure
that personnel, regardless of category or rank, who
have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities
are permanently barred from participation in future
peacekeeping operations.
(F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the
United Nations and each Member State that contributes
troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by
the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations that specifically obligates each such Member
State to--
(i) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct which
shall apply equally to all personnel serving in
United Nations peacekeeping operations,
regardless of category or rank;
(ii) designate a competent legal authority,
preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the
area of sexual exploitation and abuse where
appropriate, to participate in any
investigation into an allegation of misconduct
brought against an individual of such Member
State;
(iii) refer to its competent national or
military authority for possible prosecution, if
warranted, any investigation of a violation of
the Code of Conduct or other criminal activity
by an individual of such Member State;
(iv) report to the Department of Field
Support and the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations on the outcome of any such
investigation;
(v) undertake to conduct on-site court
martial proceedings, where practical and
appropriate, relating to allegations of
misconduct alleged against an individual of
such Member State; and
(vi) assume responsibility for the provision
of appropriate assistance to a victim of
misconduct committed by an individual of such
Member State.
(G) A professional and independent investigative and
audit function has been established within the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the
Office of Internal Oversight Services to monitor United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
Summary
Title I--Funding of the United Nations:
States the policy of the U.S. to pursue shifting the UN
regular budget to a voluntary basis (rather than the current
assessed basis). This will allow the U.S. to fund only UN
agencies and programs that advance U.S. interests and values,
and the resulting competition among UN entities for funding
will likely make those entities more transparent, accountable,
and effective. This title gives the UN two years after this
bill's enactment date to phase in this reform before the U.S.
is required to withhold funds. However, after two years, should
less than 80% of the UN regular budget be funded on a voluntary
basis, then the U.S. shall, until the 80% threshold is met,
withhold 50% of its non-voluntary regular budget contributions
assessed by the UN. Note that this creates a sliding incentive
scale, not an ``all-or-nothing'' sanction: The more the UN
makes its regular budget voluntary, the less we withhold, up
until the UN hits 80% voluntary funding, at which point there
would be no withholdings.
Title II--Transparency and Accountability for U.S. Contributions to the
United Nations:
Authorizes the Secretary of State to investigate and audit
the use of U.S. contributions to the UN, and makes funding of
UN entities contingent upon their providing the Secretary with
written pledges to cooperate in sharing basic oversight
information with the Secretary and Congress and to operate in a
fully accountable manner (including by taking a number of
specific measures to ensure accountability), and complying with
those pledges. Also protects Congress's role in determining
funding levels to UN entities, by prohibiting U.S.
contributions to the UN from being used for any purpose other
than the specific purposes for which it was made available by
Congress (for example, funds made available for assessed
contributions could not be used for voluntary contributions and
vice versa). Also makes it U.S. policy to seek repayment to the
U.S. Treasury of any overpayments made to any UN entity, and to
seek reform of the UN Tax Equalization Fund.
Title III--U.S. Policy at the United Nations:
States U.S. policy on various issues relating to the UN
(e.g., transparency, reform, Security Council expansion,
terrorism, anti-Semitism, treatment of Israel, Taiwan,
positions of human rights violators at the UN) and requires
reports from the State Department on UN reform and personnel
practices.
Title IV--Status of Palestinian Entities at the United Nations:
Opposes efforts by the Palestinian leadership to evade a
negotiated settlement with Israel and undermine opportunities
for peace by seeking de facto recognition of a Palestinian
state by the UN (through gaining membership for ``Palestine''
in UN agencies or programs). Withholds U.S. contributions from
any UN agency or program that upgrades the status of the PLO/
Palestinian observer mission.
Title V--United Nations Human Rights Council:
States that the U.S. may not run for a seat on the Council,
and must withhold a proportionate share of our UN regular
budget contribution equal to our proportion of Council funding,
until State can certify that the Council does not include
Members: subject to Security Council sanctions; under Security
Council-mandated human rights investigation; that are state
sponsors of terrorism; or that are ``countries of particular
concern'' for religious freedom violations.
Title VI--Goldstone Report:
Declares it is U.S. policy to lead a high-level diplomatic
campaign calling for the UN to revoke and repudiate the
Goldstone Report, which falsely accused Israel of deliberately
attacking Palestinian civilians during Operation Cast Lead.
Would also withhold U.S. funding from the Goldstone Report and
its preparatory and follow-on measures. Also declares it is
U.S. policy to strongly and unequivocally oppose any
consideration, legitimization, or support of the Goldstone
Report, or measures stemming from the report, in international
organizations, and to encourage other nations to repudiate the
report.
Title VII--Durban Process:
Withholds U.S. funding from any part of the UN's
irreparably flawed Durban process, which was supposed to fight
racism and bigotry, but which has been hijacked by rogue
regimes and used to advance an anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, anti-
Western, anti-freedom agenda. Supports the decision of the U.S.
and other countries to not participate in the Durban 2 and 3
conferences. States that it is U.S. policy to lead a high-level
diplomatic campaign to encourage other countries not to
participate in, fund, or legitimize any part of the Durban
process, and to develop credible alternative forums to fight
racism and bigotry. Prohibits funding for U.S. participation in
any part of the Durban process.
Title VIII--UNRWA:
Prohibits U.S. funding to the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency, which aids Palestinian refugees. Despite failing
to meet the requirements under U.S. law to obtain assistance,
UNRWA has received about $500 million in FY 2009 and 2010
alone, with over $230 million in further funding included in
the Administration's FY 2012 budget request. The prohibition on
funding would remain until UNRWA: vets its staff and aid
recipients via U.S. watch lists for ties to Foreign Terrorist
Organizations; stops engaging in anti-Israel propaganda and
politicized activities; improves its accountability and
transparency; and stops banking with financial institutions
under U.S. designation for terror financing or money
laundering.
Title IX--International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
Directs the U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA to
advance a number of reforms at the organization, including
measures to strengthen the IAEA's ability to monitor member
states' compliance with their obligations and ensure that
states not in compliance do not receive nuclear-related
assistance from the IAEA or other countries. Withholds U.S.
funding from the IAEA in proportion to the amount the IAEA
spends on technical assistance to state sponsors of terrorism,
like Iran and Syria.
Title X--Peacekeeping:
Calls for far-reaching reforms in the areas of planning,
management, conduct and accountability in UN peacekeeping, and
mandates U.S. opposition to new or expanded peacekeeping
missions until the most critical, but immediately achievable,
reforms are instituted (subject to a Presidential waiver based
on vital U.S. national security interests or to prevent
genocide or other widespread loss of human life). States it is
U.S. policy to promote the conduct of independent, annual
audits of each peacekeeping operation to guarantee that all
missions are efficient and cost effective. Promotes the review
of all peacekeeping operation mandates with a view toward
identifying objectives that are practical and achievable.
Addresses misconduct and sexual exploitation by personnel
associated with peacekeeping missions by supporting the
introduction of pre-deployment training, the adoption of a code
of conduct, and the establishment of an investigative body to
probe allegations of wrongdoing.
Background and Purpose
Since the United States took a leading role in the founding
of the United Nations in 1945, the U.S. has strongly engaged in
the UN to advance U.S. interests and values, and to hold the UN
accountable to its founding mission. Unfortunately, the UN
continues to fall far short of the noble goals for which it was
founded, and the UN's failures continue to have real and
adverse consequences for American citizens, interests, and
allies. It is precisely because of the significance of the UN
that reforming it is such an urgent priority. Accordingly, the
United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of
2011 seeks to implement lessons learned from past UN reform
efforts by the U.S. in order to pave the way for new action to
make the UN more transparent, accountable, objective, and
effective.
The fundamental problem with the UN is that it consumes
more and more U.S. taxpayer dollars each year, and then uses
American contributions to fund activities that undermine U.S.
interests and values. According to the Office of Management and
Budget, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the U.S. contributed a record
$7.692 billion to the UN system--over 21 percent more than the
previous year's total, which had also been a record. U.S.
annual contributions to the UN system have more than doubled in
the past decade. These dramatic funding increases--even at a
time of skyrocketing deficits and debt for the U.S.
Government--reflect similar dramatic increases in the UN's
budget. The UN's ``regular budget'' (its biennial operating
budget) has more than doubled in the past decade, from $2.49
billion in 2000-2001 to $5.16 billion in 2010-2011. As
Ambassador Joseph Torsella, the U.S. Representative to the UN
for Management and Reform, has stated, ``For a decade now, the
United Nations regular budget has grown dramatically,
relentlessly, and exponentially.'' Likewise, the UN's biennial
peacekeeping budget has more than quadrupled in the past
decade, from $1.7 billion in 2000-2001 to $7.2 billion in 2010-
2011.
In return for their tax dollars, the American people
received a UN that continues to be pervaded by non-
transparency, malfeasance, mismanagement, corruption, waste,
fraud, abuse, and bias. For example, the UN's ``Oil-for-Food''
program, intended to address the humanitarian needs of ordinary
Iraqis, was exploited by Saddam Hussein's regime, which used it
to evade economic sanctions and, according to the Government
Accountability Office, ``obtain[ed] illicit revenues ranging
from $7.4 billion to $12.8 billion.'' A UN-appointed
``Independent Inquiry Committee'' headed by former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker (the ``Volcker Committee'')
accused the former director of the ``Oil-for-Food'' program of
taking bribes in exchange for steering program contracts to an
Egyptian businessman. That official was later indicted in the
Southern District of New York for bribery, wire fraud, and
conspiracy to commit wire fraud and theft or bribery. In 2005,
the Volcker Committee found that ``the cumulative management
performance of the [UN] Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-
General fell short of the standards that the [UN] should strive
to maintain.'' Consequently, the Volcker Committee made six
major recommendations for UN reform, noting: ``The inescapable
conclusion from the Committee's work is that the [UN] needs
thoroughgoing reform--and it needs it urgently . . . real
change must take place, and change over a wide area . . . To
settle for less, to permit delay and dilution, would be to
invite failure. It would, in reality, further erode public
support, undercut effectiveness, and dishonor the ideals upon
which the United Nations is built.''
This Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations also investigated the ``Oil-for-Food'' program,
releasing on December 7, 2005 a report entitled: ``The Oil-for-
Food Program: The Systemic Failure of the United Nations.'' The
report stated: ``Problems associated with the [``Oil-for-Food''
program] are not isolated or unique to that particular UN-
administered program. The [program], and the myriad of problems
associated with it, are symptomatic of a pervasive
mismanagement and failure of leadership at the UN . . . Without
a successful effort by the UN to create a culture of
accountability and transparency, the ability of the
organization to perform its core functions will be
undermined.''
Another example of the need for UN reform was the ``Cash-
for-Kim'' scandal at the UN Development Program (UNDP) office
in North Korea. In 2008, a Senate subcommittee found that: (1)
UNDP's local staff was selected by the North Korean regime, and
UNDP paid staff salaries directly to the regime--in foreign
currency--with no way to know that the funds were not being
diverted to enrich the regime; (2) UNDP prevented proper
oversight and undermined whistleblower protections by limiting
access to its audits and refusing to submit them to the UN
Ethics Office's jurisdiction; (3) the regime used its
relationship with UNDP to move money outside North Korea; and
(4) UNDP transferred funds to a company tied to an entity
designated by the U.S. as North Korea's financial agent for
weapons sales.
In March of 2011, Ambassador Mark Wallace, former U.S.
Representative to the UN for Management and Reform, testified
before this Committee that ``UNDP . . . was acting in violation
of its own rules and regulations and had served as a large and
steady source of hard currency to [North Korea] and Kim Jong
Il's regime. In addition to hard currency, we discovered that
dual-use equipment on the U.S. Commerce Control List were sent
to North Korea without UNDP obtaining proper licenses for re-
export in contravention of U.S. export control laws. We
discovered that a number of other fiduciary controls related to
the hiring and management of local personnel and project
oversight had been grossly neglected. Most troubling, in the
course of our investigation, a whistleblower that had
cooperated with both the U.S. Mission as well as the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, was mistreated by
UNDP management in retaliation for raising legitimate concerns
about UNDP's operations in North Korea.''
In the wake of this scandal, UNDP briefly pulled out of
North Korea, but it later returned and continues to select
staff from a list of candidates hand-picked by the North Korean
regime.
In another example illustrative of the need for immediate
action to address the UN's failures, an independent Procurement
Task Force (PTF) uncovered cases of corruption tainting
hundreds of millions of dollars in UN contracts. In response,
the UN shut down the PTF, transferring its functions and open
cases to the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),
which has largely failed to continue the PTF's work. When the
former head of OIOS, Under-Secretary-General Inga-Britt
Ahlenius, attempted to hire the chairman of the PTF, former
U.S. prosecutor Robert Appleton (who later appeared before this
Committee in a briefing on UN reform in January of 2011), as
OIOS's lead investigator, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
blocked the appointment. As Ahlenius's term in office neared
its conclusion, she stated in an internal report (later leaked)
to Secretary-General Ban that, with respect to the UN, ``There
is no transparency, there is lack of accountability. Rather
than supporting the internal oversight which is the sign of
strong leadership and good governance, you have strived to
control it which is to undermine its position. I do not see any
signs of reform in the [UN].''
Unsurprisingly, Secretary-General Ban has not released
Ahlenius's report to the public, despite direct Congressional
requests to do so. Former UN Deputy-Secretary-General Mark
Malloch Brown has also stated that ``There's a huge redundancy
and lack of efficiency'' in the UN system and that the UN's
budget is ``utterly opaque, un-transparent, and completely in
shadow.''
The UN has also continued to single out one country--the
democratic, Jewish State of Israel--for condemnation. The UN
Human Rights Council--the majority of whose members are not
free democracies, and include many repressive regimes--has
devoted the plurality of its country-specific resolutions and
special sessions to attacking Israel, and the Council's sole
country-specific agenda item focuses on condemnation of Israel.
The UN's Durban process, including the ``Durban III''
meeting held at the UN General Assembly in September of 2011,
continues to single out Israel and implicitly accuse it of
racism against the Palestinians. The UN General Assembly also
continues to pass multiple resolutions each year condemning
Israel, and multiple UN bodies function for the sole purpose of
propagandizing against Israel for purported human rights abuses
against the Palestinians.
Finally, many UN bodies continue to be tarnished by the
presence of authoritarian regimes in positions of leadership.
The Cuban dictatorship is the vice chair of the Human Rights
Council, Iran is a vice president of the General Assembly and a
member of the Commission on the Status of Women, and North
Korea and Cuba recently chaired the Conference on Disarmament,
to cite but a few examples.
This UN bias against democracies has real-world
consequences. For example, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), in contravention of its obligations under
the Oslo Accords, has chosen to bypass direct negotiations with
Israel and instead seek de facto recognition of a ``Palestinian
state'' by the UN via the granting of membership in UN bodies
to ``Palestine.'' While the PLO's application for UN membership
remains pending before the UN Security Council, the General
Conference of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) recently voted to grant full membership
in UNESCO to ``Palestine.'' In addition to discrediting the UN
itself, this step has further undermined chances for peace and
security in the Middle East, has rewarded Palestinian rejection
of direct negotiations and recognition of Israel as a Jewish
state, and has set a dangerous precedent by granting to a non-
state actor privileges previously reserved for sovereign
states.
That the UN is in dire need of reform is not in dispute.
The question is how to achieve such reform. According to
Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN,
the Obama Administration has embarked on a ``new era of
engagement'' regarding the UN, marked by unconditional and full
payment of U.S. assessed contributions to the UN in the hope
that such payments will increase U.S. influence. As Ambassador
Rice said, ``We pay our bills. We push for real reform.''
This ``money now, reform later'' strategy has failed. For
example, the Administration has rightfully urged the UN to cut
its budget and cancel a planned pay raise for UN personnel.
Instead, the UN is poised to go through with the pay raise and
increase the UN regular budget for the next biennium. As
Ambassador Torsella said, this budget increase ``does not
represent a break from `business as usual,' but rather a
continuation of it.''
Likewise, in the six years since the Volcker Committee
released its recommendations for sweeping reforms, such reforms
have not been forthcoming. The Congressional Research Service,
in a communication to the Committee earlier this year, stated
that ``Based on the information we have to date, it appears
that many of the Volcker recommendations have not been
implemented . . . there are many recommendations in the report
that have not been implemented (creating a COO position,
distinguishing Secretariat/Security Council roles, and
overhauling management and hiring practices, to name a few) . .
. [and] of those recommendations that appear to have been
implemented, it's difficult to determine whether they came
about because of the Volcker report. Moreover, there is some
disagreement as to whether these newly implemented management
reforms are actually effective.''
The Obama Administration also decided to seek to reform the
Human Rights Council from within by joining it. However, the
Council's ``five-year review,'' which concluded earlier this
year, failed to enact any of the structural reforms, such as
meaningful membership standards, that are needed to turn the
Council from a rogues' gallery to a useful entity for advancing
human rights. The Council's abominable permanent agenda item
regarding Israel also remained in place. The Administration
itself called the review process a ``race to the bottom.'' The
Council has continued to adopt one anti-Israel resolution after
another. And the Council generally continues to fail to address
longstanding human rights violations until and unless the
perpetrating regimes are already extraordinarily isolated and
the violations have become so blatant and public that inaction
becomes impossible to justify politically. For example, the
Council included Qaddafi's Libyan regime as a member until that
regime began murdering Libyans in the streets in the spring of
2011; the Syrian regime was also poised to become a member of
the Council until it likewise ramped up its public brutality
earlier this year. The longstanding human rights violations
perpetrated by the Qaddafi and Assad regimes for decades prior
to this year did not lead to any action by the Council, and the
Council still has failed to act to condemn abuses by China,
Cuba, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, etc. U.S. membership has not
reformed the Council in any lasting, strategic way, but it has
legitimized a fundamentally illegitimate body that the New York
Times once called ``an ugly sham, offering cover to an
unacceptable status quo.''
Likewise, the Obama Administration's ``new era of
engagement'' failed to prevent UNESCO from voting to grant
membership to ``Palestine.''
A fundamental lesson has not been learned: The reason the
U.S. pays so much to the UN and gets such backwards results in
return is that at the UN, the member countries that call the
shots do not have to pay the bills. The UN's main source of
budgetary funding is assessed (mandatory) contributions. The
U.S. is assessed 22 percent of the cost of the UN's regular
budget. In contrast, two-thirds of the member countries
together pay a total of less than one percent of the regular
budget. But they can and do vote together to adopt bloated and
skyrocketing budgets and deplorable programming decisions, and
then pass the costs on the principal donor countries, such as
the U.S. Because the Administration pays U.S. assessed
contributions in full, with no strings attached, the U.S. has
surrendered its strongest leverage to actually advance our
interests, support our allies, and achieve reforms at the UN.
As long as other countries and UN bureaucrats know that the
U.S. will pay every cent of its dues, no matter what, there is
no incentive for real, sweeping, and lasting reforms. At the
UN, the deck is stacked against the U.S. A game-changer is
needed, and that game-changer is H.R. 2829, the United Nations
Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act.
This legislation builds on lessons learned by conditioning
U.S. funding to the UN on a number of vital reforms and other
actions needed to advance U.S. interests. The most important
reform is to shift the funding basis for the UN regular budget
from assessed to voluntary contributions, so that U.S.
taxpayers, through their elected representatives in Congress,
can choose how much of their tax dollars go to the UN and what
those dollars are spent on. A shift to voluntary funding will
help end the UN's entitlement culture and thereby force UN
bodies to perform better and cut costs in order to justify
their budgets in a competitive funding environment--basic free
market principles.
This voluntary funding model works for the UN Children's
Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, and other UN agencies, and it can
work for the UN as a whole. As Catherine Bertini, the former
head of the World Food Program, has said, ``Voluntary funding
creates an entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN.
At WFP, every staff member knows that we have to be as
efficient, accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as is
possible. If we are not, donor governments can take their
funding elsewhere in a very competitive world among UN
agencies, NGOs, and bilateral governments.''
Shifting more of the UN's funding to a voluntary basis has
been advocated by many other advocates for UN reform.
Ambassador John Bolton, former U.S. Permanent Representative to
the UN, stated that ``[O]nly one UN reform is worth the effort,
and without it nothing else will succeed: Voluntary
contributions must replace assessed contributions. If America
insisted it would pay only for what works, and that we get what
we pay for, we would revolutionize life throughout the UN
system. There is simply no doubt that eliminating the
`entitlement' mentality caused by relying on assessed
contributions would profoundly affect UN officials around the
world.'' He has also stated that ``Contrary to the claims of
those who oppose moving toward voluntary funding, such a system
would not necessarily threaten UN activities. Many independent
UN-affiliated funds, programs, and specialized agencies
currently work well relying on voluntary funding. Such funding
has remained fairly stable from year to year, with donor
nations consistently and reliably providing money for
activities that they support. Indeed, in many cases, voluntary
funding has increased sharply. Almost without exception, only
voluntarily funded activities that fail to meet donor
expectations of performance experience reductions in funding
levels. This type of financial accountability is precisely what
is needed at the UN.''
Similarly, Ambassador Wallace testified before the
Committee that ``[M]any of the UN's best performing agencies do
so because they have to actually compete with their
counterparts in the world of nongovernmental organizations . .
. The United States should strongly consider promoting the
application of this [voluntary] funding model to other UN
agencies. Contrary to what some critics have suggested, this
will not necessarily result in the United States abandoning the
United Nations . . . Given the inability of the UN to reduce
superfluous mandates and implement the most basic performance
requirements for many agencies, it is time for Member States,
and by extension the taxpayers, to begin imposing those
standards ourselves. It is time for agencies within the UN
community to know that, in many cases, there is competition.
The net winners will be not only Member States, but the people
many of these agencies are designed to help in the first
place.''
Brett Schaefer, an expert on the United Nations at the
Heritage Foundation, testified before the Committee that
``Shifting activities funded currently through assessed budgets
to voluntary funding would make it easier for Congress to
support the programs that it wishes and withhold funding for
those it does not. Having U.N. organizations compete for
funding would also contribute to efficiency and effectiveness
and improve responsiveness to member state requests. With this
in mind, Congress should: Seek to shift funding for U.N.
activities and organizations from assessed budgets to voluntary
contributions.''
And in 2005, the bipartisan Gingrich-Mitchell Task Force on
the United Nations concluded that ``The United States should
work with other member-states to identify which of the
operational programs now receiving funds from the assessed
budget should be funded entirely by voluntary contributions . .
. Many UN programs . . . might function better if funded
entirely by voluntary contributions . . . having them rely
entirely on voluntary contributions imposes a kind of market
discipline, forcing them to produce results in order to receive
continued funding.''
To achieve this reform of shifting to a voluntary funding
basis, as well as several other vital reforms throughout the UN
system, this legislation ties U.S. contributions for the UN to
the implementation of these reforms. This is a common-sense
approach: If person A contracts with person B for the provision
of a service to person A, but person B does not meet basic,
minimum standards in providing that service, then person A
could withhold payment until he gets what he contracted for.
If, instead, person A pays his bills to person B on time and in
full, as the Executive Branch does to the UN, then he will
never get what he actually paid for. For years--for decades--
the UN has defaulted on its founding purposes and obligations,
and thus has been in breach of contract with the United States.
Some have claimed that that withholding assessed
contributions to the UN would violate U.S. treaty obligations,
or that this method simply does not work and would lead to
diminished U.S. leadership in the world. However, past
experience proves otherwise.
Withholding of assessed contributions to the UN does not
constitute a violation of treaty obligations. Article 17(2) of
the UN Charter states that ``The expenses of the [UN] shall be
borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.''
However, in the 1957 case of Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court
ruled that ``[A]n Act of Congress, which must comply with the
Constitution, is in full parity with a treaty, and that when a
statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the
treaty null.'' Therefore, whenever Congress has enacted
legislation requiring withholding of U.S. assessed
contributions to the UN, those statutory requirements have
superseded U.S. treaty obligations.
Further, as Thomas E.L. Dewey of the Heritage Foundation
wrote in 1986, ``[I]t has not been established convincingly
that any nation has an absolute obligation . . . to pay an
assessed contribution to the United Nations... The reality is
that withholding assessed contributions is a longstanding and
near universal practice since the founding of the U.N.''
The United States cannot be expected to bind itself,
against its interests, to treaty provisions that have been
nullified by international practice (not to mention U.S. law).
The Executive Branch has previously recognized this point. In
1965, during the Johnson Administration, Ambassador Arthur
Goldberg, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN and a former
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, announced, with the
acquiescence of Congress, what is commonly referred to as the
``Goldberg Reservation.'' Ambassador Goldberg stated that ``. .
. if any member can insist on making an exception to the
principle of collective financial responsibility with respect
to certain activities of the organization, the United States
reserves the same option to make exceptions to the principles
of collective financial responsibility if, in our view, strong
and compelling reasons exist for doing so. There can be no
double standard among the members of the [UN].'' As Ambassador
Goldberg later wrote in the late 1980s to one of his successors
as Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick, ``. . . there can be no question that under the
`Goldberg Reservation' the United States reserves the right to
withhold assessments for UN activities which, in our opinion,
do not serve our national purpose.''
Having determined that withholding assessed contributions
does not violate treaty obligations, the remaining question is
whether this method works. The answer is yes.
In the 1980s, a Democratic House of Representatives and a
Republican Senate enacted the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment,
which conditioned payment of 20 percent of U.S. assessed
contributions to the UN regular budget and specialized agencies
on the implementation of reforms in voting on budgets. Key
reforms in this regard were achieved and, for over a decade,
helped to restrain the growth of UN budgets. When the U.S.
later acquiesced in the abandonment of these budgetary reforms,
UN budgets predictably skyrocketed.
In 1993, Congress conditioned funding for the UN on the UN
General Assembly's creation of an inspector general for
oversight. The next year, the General Assembly created OIOS, an
imperfect body that has, nonetheless, aided somewhat in
addressing the UN's pervasive problems.
In the late 1990s, Senators Jesse Helms and Joe Biden
worked together to draft legislation, adopted by Congress, that
conditioned payment of U.S. arrears to the UN on the
implementation of real, meaningful reforms that saved U.S.
taxpayers money.
Another prominent example of successful ``smart
withholding'' spans over two decades. In 1989, Yasser Arafat's
PLO sought de facto recognition of a ``Palestinian state'' from
the UN via the granting of membership in UN agencies, including
UNESCO and the World Health Organization (WHO), to
``Palestine.'' This campaign looked unstoppable until the
George H.W. Bush Administration threatened, in the words of
Secretary of State James A. Baker, ``that the United States
[would] make no further contributions, voluntary or assessed,
to any international organization which makes any change in the
P.L.O.'s present status as an observer organization.'' UN
agencies recognized that their funding was in danger and
quickly deferred indefinitely action on the PLO's membership
application. Instead of weakening U.S. leadership abroad, the
George H.W. Bush Administration's readiness to set meaningful
and real standards for the payment of U.S. contributions to the
UN strengthened America's hand in advancing U.S. interests and
protecting U.S. allies at the UN. That Administration went on
to achieve many other successes at the UN, including multiple
key UN Security Council resolutions against Saddam Hussein's
regime in Iraq, as well as the UN General Assembly's repeal in
1991 of its infamous ``Zionism is racism'' resolution.
Two separate Democratic Congresses adopted legislation to
support the George H.W. Bush Administration's position with
respect to the status of the PLO at the UN. In 1990, Congress
adopted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 1990 and
1991, which included a provision stating that ``No funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act
shall be available for the United Nations or any specialized
agency thereof which accords the Palestine Liberation
Organization the same standing as member states.'' Likewise, in
1994, Congress adopted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
for 1994 and 1995, which included a provision stating that
``The United States shall not make any voluntary or assessed
contribution--(1) to any affiliated organization of the United
Nations which grants full membership as a state to any
organization or group that does not have the internationally
recognized attributes of statehood, or (2) to the United
Nations, if the United Nations grants full membership as a
state in the United Nations to any organization or group that
does not have the internationally recognized attributes of
statehood, during any period in which such membership is
effective.'' Each of the two bills originated in the Committee
and were both authored by the Committee's chairman.
Fast-forwarding to this year, the Obama Administration's
rhetoric did not stop UNESCO from granting membership to
``Palestine.'' Indeed, it appeared likely that other UN bodies
would soon follow suit, despite extensive U.S. diplomacy in
opposition. Then, on October 31, 2011, after the General
Conference of UNESCO cast its fateful vote in this regard, the
Obama Administration announced that it would implement the
aforementioned U.S. laws and stop contributions to UNESCO. This
use of ``smart withholding'' provoked exactly the kind of
reaction that U.S. law intended. UN Secretary-General Ban, who
had previously posed with PLO leader Abu Mazen when the latter
presented his application for UN membership, sharply changed
course and stated that Palestinian efforts to join other UN
agencies are ``not beneficial for Palestine and not beneficial
for anybody.'' At the time of this report, it is unclear if the
PLO will continue to pursue membership in other UN agencies in
the face of strong opposition from forces which would normally
not stand in the way of anti-Israel measures but are afraid of
the repercussions for U.S. funding of the UN.
In short, at the UN, money talks, and smart withholding
works. It is time to apply this principle across the UN system
in order to achieve reforms in the interest of the American
people, American allies, and all responsible nations. The
United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act
does just that.
Hearings
During the present Congress, the full Committee has held
numerous sessions on United Nations reform, including the
following:
January 25, 2011, ``The United Nations: Urgent Problems that
Need Congressional Action.'' (Brett Schaefer, Jay
Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs, the
Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, the Heritage
Foundation; Robert Appleton, former chairman of the
United Nations Procurement Task Force; Claudia Rosett,
Journalist-in-Residence, the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies; Hillel C. Neuer, Executive Director, UN
Watch; Peter Yeo, Vice President for Public Policy and
Public Affairs, the United Nations Foundation and
Executive Director, the Better World Campaign; and Mark
Quarterman, Senior Adviser and Director, Program on
Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies)
March 3, 2011, ``Reforming the United Nations: Lessons
Learned.'' (Hon. Mark D. Wallace, President and Chief
Executive Officer, United Against Nuclear Iran, and
former United States Representative to the United
Nations for Management and Reform; Hon. Terry Miller,
Director of the Center for International Trade and
Economics, the Heritage Foundation, and former United
States Representative to the United Nations Economic
and Social Council, United States Observer at the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic and Global Issues; and Ted Piccone, Senior
Fellow and Deputy Director for Foreign Policy, the
Brookings Institution)
April 7, 2011, ``Reforming the United Nations: The Future of
U.S. Policy.'' (Hon. Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations)
Committee Consideration and Votes
On October 13, 2011, the Foreign Affairs Committee marked
up the bill, H.R. 2829, pursuant to notice, in open session.
1) LThe Committee considered en bloc and adopted by
unanimous consent five amendments: An amendment in the
nature of a substitute offered by the Chairman, three
amendments offered by Mr. Connolly, and one amendment
offered by Mr. Fortenberry.
2) LAn amendment in the nature of a substitute offered
by the Ranking Member, Mr. Berman, was not agreed to,
by voice vote.
H.R. 2829, as amended, was agreed to by Roll Call vote of
23 ayes--15 noes.
Voting YES: Ros-Lehtinen, Smith (NJ), Burton, Gallegly,
Rohrabacher, Manzullo, Royce, Chabot, Wilson (SC), Mack,
McCaul, Poe, Bilirakis, Schmidt, Johnson (OH), Rivera, Kelly,
Griffin, Marino, Duncan (SC), Buerkle, Ellmers, and Turner.
Voting NO: Berman, Ackerman, Payne, Sherman, Engel, Meeks,
Carnahan, Connolly, Deutch, Cardoza, Higgins, Schwartz, Bass
(FL), Keating, and Cicilline.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House Rule XIII, the
Committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1)
of House Rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions
of this report, particularly the ``Background and Purpose,''
``Summary,'' and ``Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion''
sections.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII, the
Committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget
authority, entitlement authority, and tax expenditures or
revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, November 18, 2011.
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2829, the United
Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sunita
D'Monte, who can be reached at 226-2840.
Sincerely,
Douglas W. Elmendorf.
cc:
Honorable Howard L. Berman
Ranking Member
H.R. 2829--United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act
of 2011
As ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on October 13, 2011
H.R. 2829 would require the Department of State to increase
its oversight of the United Nations (U.N.) and would withhold
assessed and voluntary contributions to the U.N. and its
entities if certain conditions are not met.
The department conducts oversight of the U.N. and most of
its entities through the U.N. Transparency and Accountability
Initiative. H.R. 2829 would impose new oversight requirements
on the department. Under the bill, the department would be
required to obtain and maintain certain annual certifications
from each U.N. entity that receives U.S. funding. In addition,
the department would be required to report to the Congress in
several instances, including:
LIf an entity refuses or delays an inquiry by
the department related to a certification or does not
comply with its certification;
LIf an entity or one of its employees,
contractors, or representatives violates federal
criminal law;
LIf there is mismanagement, misfeasance, or
malfeasance within an entity justifying disciplinary
action;
LRegarding how entities spend U.S.
contributions; and
LDetailing an itemized budget request for U.S.
contributions to the U.N. regular budget.
Based on information from the department, CBO estimates
that to implement the bill the State Department would hire two
additional people at an annual cost of less than $500,000,
which would increase discretionary costs by $2 million over the
2012-2016 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary
amounts.
The bill would withhold contributions to the U.N. and its
entities if certain conditions--such as funding the U.N.'s
regular budget through voluntary contributions instead of
assessments--are not met. Under current law, there are no
existing appropriations or specified authorizations of
appropriations provided for 2012 or future years for
contributions to the U.N. or its entities. Therefore, CBO would
not attribute any savings to the bill's provision that might
result in withholding future contributions.
Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending or
revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply.
H.R. 2829 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Sunita D'Monte.
The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
As explained more specifically in the narrative portions of
this report (Background and Purpose, Summary, and Section-by-
Section Analysis and Discussion), the principal goal of H.R.
2829 is to obtain greater transparency and accountability in
the funding and management of the United Nations, to ensure
that the U.S. taxpayer dollars provided to UN system entities
are in fact serving the values and interests of the United
States. To that end, among other things, the bill: Seeks to
shift the funding for the UN regular budget from an assessed to
a voluntary basis; requires basic oversight cooperation from UN
system entities as a condition of U.S. funding; withholds U.S.
contributions from any UN agency or program that grants de
facto recognition of a Palestinian state outside of a
negotiated settlement with Israel; precludes U.S. funding to
and participation in the UN Human Rights Council until certain
basic reforms are certified; withholds U.S. funding from any
part of the UN's flawed Durban conference process; precludes
U.S. funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency until certain
basic reforms are certified; and seeks basic reforms of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Peacekeeping.
New Advisory Committees
H.R. 2829 does not establish or authorize any new advisory
committees.
Congressional Accountability Act
H.R. 2829 does not apply to the Legislative Branch.
Earmark Identification
H.R. 2829 does not contain any congressional earmarks,
limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in
clauses 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of House Rule XXI.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion
(AS AMENDED BY CHAIRMAN ROS-LEHTINEN'S MANAGER'S AMENDMENT)
Section 1--Short title; table of contents.
Section 2--Definitions.
TITLE I: FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Section 101--Findings.
Contains findings regarding the limited control the U.S.
has over the amount and use of its financial contributions to
the UN, the presence of the rampant corruption at the UN, and
the need for reform of the UN's funding structure.
Section 102--Apportionment of the United Nations Regular Budget on a
Voluntary Basis.
States that it is U.S. policy to pursue shifting the UN
regular budget to a voluntary basis (rather than continue the
assessed/mandatory structure). This title gives the UN two
years after this bill's enactment date to phase in this reform.
After two years, should less than 80% of the UN regular budget
be funded on a voluntary basis, then the U.S. shall, until the
Secretary of State certifies that the 80% threshold is met,
withhold 50% of its assessed (non-voluntary, regular budget
contributions) assessed by the UN.
This is not an ``all-or-nothing'' sanction: The more the UN
makes its regular budget voluntary, the less we withhold, until
the UN budgeting is at least 80% voluntary, at which point
there would be no further U.S. withholdings.
If and when the Secretary makes the above certification
that the 80% threshold has been met, withheld funds could be
expended for a period of one year after their appropriation.
After that one-year period concludes, any unspent funds must be
returned to the U.S. Treasury, unless the Secretary certifies
that the 80% threshold continues to be met.
Section 103--Budget Justifications for United States Contributions to
the Regular Budget of the United Nations.
Requires that the annual congressional budget justification
include an itemized request for contributions to the UN,
including comparisons with previous years' contributions. Also
requires the Secretary of State to notify and consult with
Congress if the UN proposes an adjustment to its regular
budget.
Section 104--Report on United Nations Reform.
Requires that the Secretary of State submit a report to
Congress describing progress towards the goals described in
this section, and the progress of the UN General Assembly to
modernize and streamline its activities and review its
mandates.
TITLE II: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Section 201--Findings.
Contains findings related to the need for management
reforms at the UN to increase transparency and accountability.
Section 202--Definitions.
Section 203--Oversight of U.S. Contributions to the United Nations
System.
Requires the Department of State to collect and maintain
records of Transparency and Accountability Certifications
(written pledges to cooperate in sharing basic oversight
information with the Department of State and Congress and to
operate in a fully accountable manner, including by taking a
number of specific measures to ensure accountability) by all UN
entities.
Requires the Department of State to keep Congress informed
of how UN entities are spending U.S. contributions.
Requires the Secretary of State to:
Lnotify Congress and the Attorney General when she
has reasonable grounds to believe a federal criminal law has
been violated by a UN entity or one of its employees,
contractors, or representatives;
Lnotify Congress, and the UN, of cases where she
believes mismanagement or wrongdoing has likely taken place
within a UN entity and disciplinary proceedings are likely
justified;
Lnotify Congress and the UN whenever a UN entity
unreasonably refuses to provide, or delays in providing,
information or assistance pursuant to a Transparency
Certification; notify Congress and the UN when a UN entity has
not provided such requested information within 90 days of the
above notification (if that occurs, then that UN entity is
deemed to be noncompliant with its Transparency
Certification(s));
Lnotify Congress and the UN when that entity has
resumed full compliance with its Transparency Certification;
Lnotify Congress and the UN whenever a UN entity
is no longer in compliance with its Accountability
Certification. [If a UN entity has not resumed compliance
within 90 days of the above notification, then that UN entity
is deemed to be noncompliant with its Accountability
Certification.] Requires the Secretary of State to notify
Congress and the UN when that entity has resumed full
compliance with its Accountability Certification.
Also requires the Secretary of State to submit for
inclusion in the report authorized by section 207 of this Act a
list and detailed description of the circumstances surrounding
notifications of compliance and noncompliance. Clarifies that
this reporting requirement does not authorize the public
disclosure of sensitive information. Requires privacy
protections with respect to such reporting.
Section 204--Transparency for United States Contributions.
Mandates that U.S. funding may be provided to a UN entity
only if that entity has provided a Transparency Certification
and Accountability Certification to the Department of State and
is in compliance with those certifications. The President may
waive this requirement on a case-by-case basis if he determines
and certifies to Congress that failure to waive would pose an
extraordinary threat to U.S. national security interests.
Section 205--Integrity for United States Contributions.
Requires funds made available under the Contributions to
International Organizations (CIO) account to be used solely for
assessed contributions to a UN entity or international
organization. Requires funds made available under the
International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account to be
used solely for voluntary contributions to a UN entity or
international organization. Requires funds made available under
the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities
(CIPA) account to be used solely for United Nations
peacekeeping activities, for the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Requires that funds appropriated
for use as a U.S. Contribution to a UN Entity but not obligated
or expended because of restrictions in this section be returned
to the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year, and not be
considered arrears to be repaid to any UN entity.
Section 206--Refund of Monies Owed by the United Nations to the United
States.
Finds that U.S. taxpayer funds overpaid to the UN,
particularly to the UN Tax Equalization Fund, often remain in
the hands of the UN. States that it is U.S. policy to instruct
the UN to return these funds to the U.S. Treasury.
Section 207--Annual Reports on United States Contributions to the
United Nations.
Continues the authorization for an annual report (presently
authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act) by the
Office of Management and Budget of all United States assessed
and voluntary contributions to the United Nations.
TITLE III: UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Section 301--Annual Publication.
States that the United States shall use its influence at
the UN to ensure the annual publication of all UN subsidiary
bodies, their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions,
sorted by donor.
Section 302--Annual Financial Disclosure.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to
implement a system for filing individual financial disclosure
forms by employees at the UN and its specialized agencies,
which will be available to the Office of Internal Oversight
Services, to Member States, and to the public.
Section 303--Policy with Respect to Expansion of the Security Council.
States that it is U.S. policy to oppose expansion of the UN
Security Council that would diminish the influence of the U.S.
at the Security Council or include veto rights for new members.
Section 304--Access to Reports and Audits.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to
ensure that member states have access to reports and audits
completed by the Board of External Auditors.
Section 305--Waiver of Immunity.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence to ensure that
the UN Secretary-General waives the immunity of UN officials in
cases in which immunity would impede the course of justice.
Section 306--Terrorism and the United Nations.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to
work towards the adoption of a definition of terrorism that
builds upon recommendations of the December 2004 report of the
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, includes
actions intended to do harm to civilians for purposes of
intimidation of a government, and does not propose legal or
moral equivalency between these actions and actions by a
government in self-defense. States that any UN definition of
terrorism should not be used to undermine peaceful, pro-
freedom, pro-democracy movements against authoritarian regimes.
Section 307--Report on United Nations Personnel.
Requires that the Secretary of State submit to Congress a
report on human resources practices and reforms at the UN.
Section 308--United Nations Treaty Bodies.
Withholds U.S. contributions from the UN regular budget
proportionate to the percentage of the regular budget expended
for a UN human rights treaty monitoring body or committee
established by conventions to which the U.S. is not a party.
Section 309--Equality at the United Nations.
Requires completion of an audit regarding duplicative
efforts at the UN with regard to the Palestinians and making
recommendations for the elimination of duplicative entities.
Withholds U.S. contributions from the UN budget proportionate
to the percentage of our contributions that would be expended
for those entities, until U.S. recommendations for elimination
of duplicative entities have been implemented.
Section 310--Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to
ensure that anti-Semitic behavior at the UN is condemned by the
UN and that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights develop programming to address anti-Semitism.
Section 311--Regional Group Inclusion of Israel.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to
expand the UN's Western European and Others Group (WEOG) to
include Israel as a permanent member.
Section 312--United States Policy on Taiwan Participation in United
Nations.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to
ensure meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant UN
entities in which Taiwan has expressed an interest in
participating.
Section 313--United States Policy on Tier 3 Human Rights Violators.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to
the ensure that no representative of a country designated
pursuant to section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act of 2000 by the Department of State as a Tier 3 country
shall preside as chair or president of any UN entity.
TITLE IV: STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS
Section 401--Findings.
Describes the PLO's previous efforts to obtain de facto
recognition by the UN of a unilaterally-declared Palestinian
state, as well as how the U.S. successfully derailed those
efforts by threatening to cut off U.S. contributions to any UN
entity that upgraded the status of the PLO.
Section 402--Statement of Policy.
States that it is the policy of the U.S. to oppose
recognition of a Palestinian state by any UN entity prior to
the achievement of a final peace agreement negotiated between
and agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians.
Section 403--Implementation.
Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold funds to any
UN entity that upgrades the status of the Palestinian observer
mission in any way.
TITLE V: UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Section 501--Findings.
Describes the flawed structure of the UN Human Rights
Council and the Council's failure to address numerous egregious
human rights violations, while spending a disproportionate
amount of time and resources to condemn the democratic, Jewish
state of Israel.
Section 502--Human Rights Council Membership and Funding.
Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold assessed
contributions to the UN regular budget proportionate to the
percentage of that budget allocated for the Human Rights
Council, prohibits voluntary contributions to the Council, and
prohibits the U.S. from running for a seat on the Council,
until the Secretary of State can certify that the Council does
not include Members: subject to Security Council sanctions;
under Security Council-mandated human rights investigation;
that are state sponsors of terrorism; or that are ``countries
of particular concern'' for religious freedom violations. Also
withholds funds equal to the percentage spent on Council
apporteurs with mandates used to display bias against the U.S.
or Israel or to support foreign governments that are: subject
to Security Council sanctions; under Security Council-mandated
human rights investigation; state sponsors of terrorism; or
``countries of particular concern'' for religious freedom
violations
TITLE VI: GOLDSTONE REPORT
Section 601--Findings.
Describes the anti-Israel bias that pervaded the
commissioning and drafting of the Goldstone Report. Notes
longstanding Congressional and Executive Branch opposition to
the Report.
Section 602--Statement of Policy.
States that it is U.S. policy to reject the Goldstone
report, oppose its legitimacy, and lead a multilateral campaign
to revoke and repudiate the report and UN resolutions stemming
from the report.
Section 603--Withholding of Funds; Refund of United States Taxpayer
Dollars.
Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold from the U.S.
contribution to the UN regular budget an amount proportionate
to the percentage of our contributions determined to have been
expended on the Goldstone Report and related activities.
TITLE VII: DURBAN PROCESS
Section 701--Findings.
Describes the anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, anti-Western bias
that has pervaded the Durban process.
Sec 702--Sense of Congress; Statement of Policy.
States that the Durban conferences were distorted into
forums for anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, anti-freedom activities
and commends those countries that did not participate in
various parts of the Durban Process. States that it is U.S.
policy to create a credible alternative to the Durban process
and to encourage other countries to withhold participation and
funding from the Durban process.
Section 703--Non-Participation in the Durban Process.
Prohibits U.S. funds from being used for U.S. participation
in any part of the Durban process.
Section 704--Withholding of Funds; Refund of United States Taxpayer
Dollars.
Instructs the Secretary of States to withhold from the
United States contribution to the UN regular budget an amount
equal to the percentage of that contribution that would be or
has been spent on the Durban process.
TITLE VIII: UNRWA
Section 801--Findings.
Describes UNRWA's strictly humanitarian mandate and
longstanding problematic behavior, including its refusal to vet
its staff and aid recipients through U.S. terrorist watch
lists, its employment of multiple violent extremists, its anti-
Israel and pro-Hamas propaganda, and its connections with
financial institutions sanctioned by the U.S. Government for
money laundering, terror financing, and support for arms
proliferators.
Section 802--United States Contributions to UNRWA.
Prohibits funding to UNRWA until the Secretary of State
certifies that: none of UNRWA's officials, employees, or
affiliates are members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, or
have disseminated anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic
rhetoric or propaganda; no UNRWA infrastructure is being
exploited by Foreign Terrorist Organizations; UNRWA is subject
to comprehensive and independent financial audits and has
implemented an effective vetting and oversight system, UNRWA-
funded schools do not use biased educational materials, no
recipient of UNRWA funds is a member of a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, and UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations
with financial institutions that the U.S. believes to be
complicit in money laundering or terror financing. If the
Secretary of State makes such a certification, U.S. annual
funding to UNRWA may exceed neither 22 percent of UNRWA's
budget, nor the highest annual contribution made by an Arab
League member state, nor the proportion of the total budget of
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees paid by the U.S.
Section 803--Sense of Congress.
Expresses the sense of Congress that the President and the
Secretary of State should lead a diplomatic effort to encourage
other nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA until UNRWA
implements key reforms.
TITLE IX: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Section 901--Technical Cooperation Program.
Describes how rogue regimes, several of whom are known to
violate UN nonproliferation sanctions, have received assistance
from the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program (TCP). States
that no U.S. contributions to the IAEA may be used to provide
assistance through the TCP to countries that have been
designated by the U.S. as supporting international terrorism or
that are in breach of various non-proliferation treaties and
resolutions. If the IAEA does not suspend assistance to the
aforementioned countries, the U.S. must withhold from
contributions to the IAEA an amount proportionate to the
percentage of such contributions that would be used for
technical assistance to these terrorist regimes and countries
of proliferation concern.
Section 902--United States Policy at the IAEA.
States that the U.S. shall use its influence to establish
an Office of Compliance to ensure that all member states
fulfill their obligations under IAEA Board resolutions. States
that U.S. contributions to the IAEA should be used primarily
support nuclear safety and security or activities relating to
nuclear verification. States that the U.S. will use its
influence to ensure the adoption of resolutions making Iran and
Syria ineligible to receive IAEA assistance.
Section 903--Sense of Congress Regarding the Nuclear Security Action
Plan of the IAEA.
Expresses the sense of Congress that the IAEA General
Conference should adopt a resolution incorporating the Nuclear
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.
TITLE X: PEACEKEEPING
Section 1001--Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
Notes that while UN peacekeeping operations have
contributed greatly to the promotion of peace and security, the
record of UN peacekeeping is tarnished by operational failures
and misconduct.
Section 1002--Policy Relating to Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations.
Calls for far-reaching reforms in the areas of planning,
management, conduct and accountability in UN peacekeeping
States it is U.S. policy to promote the conduct of independent,
annual audits of each peacekeeping operation to guarantee that
all missions are efficient and cost effective. Promotes the
review of all peacekeeping operation mandates with a view
toward identifying objectives that are practical and
achievable. Addresses misconduct and sexual exploitation by
personnel associated with peacekeeping missions by supporting
the introduction of pre-deployment training, the adoption of a
code of conduct, and the establishment of an investigative body
to probe allegations of wrongdoing.
Section 1003--Certification.
Mandates U.S. opposition to new or expanded peacekeeping
missions until the Secretary of State certifies that the most
critical, but immediately achievable, reforms are instituted
(subject to a Presidential waiver based on vital U.S. national
security interests or to prevent genocide or other widespread
loss of human life).
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change
is proposed is shown in roman):
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961
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TITLE XII--FAMINE PREVENTION AND FREEDOM FROM HUNGER
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Chapter 3--International Organizations and Programs
Sec. 301. General Authority.--(a) * * *
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[(c) No contributions by the United States shall be made to
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East except on the condition that the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency take all possible
measures to assure that no part of the United States
contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee
who is receiving military training as a member of the so-called
Palestine Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type
organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.]
(c)(1) Withholding.--Contributions by the United States to
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related
entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations for the
support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff positions
provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may
be provided only during a period for which a certification
described in paragraph (2) is in effect.
(2) Certification.--A certification described in this
paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary of State,
based on all information available after diligent inquiry, and
transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees along
with a detailed description of the factual basis therefor,
that--
(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor,
subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA--
(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist
Organization;
(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or
incited anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-
Semitic rhetoric or propaganda; or
(iii) has used any UNRWA resources,
including publications or Web sites, to
propagate or disseminate political materials,
including political rhetoric regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other
facility, or other infrastructure or resource is being
used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization for
operations, planning, training, recruitment,
fundraising, indoctrination, communications, sanctuary,
storage of weapons or other materials, or any other
purposes;
(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial
audits by an internationally recognized third party
independent auditing firm and has implemented an
effective system of vetting and oversight to prevent
the use, receipt, or diversion of any UNRWA resources
by any foreign terrorist organization or members
thereof;
(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational
institution uses textbooks or other educational
materials that propagate or disseminate anti-American,
anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or
incitement;
(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a
member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization; and
(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations
with financial institutions that the United States
deems or believes to be complicit in money laundering
and terror financing.
(3) Definitions.--In this section:
(A) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term
``Foreign Terrorist Organization'' means an
organization designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization by the Secretary of State in accordance
with section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
(B) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs,
Appropriations, and Oversight and Government
Reform of the House of Representatives; and
(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs of the Senate.
(4) Effective Duration of Certification.--The certification
described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for a period of
180 days from the date of transmission to the appropriate
congressional committees, or until the Secretary receives
information rendering that certification factually inaccurate,
whichever is earliest. In the event that a certification
becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly transmit to
the appropriate congressional committees a description of any
information that precludes the renewal or continuation of the
certification.
(5) Limitation.--During a period for which a certification
described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the United States may
not contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor
entity an annual amount--
(A) greater than the highest annual contribution to
UNRWA made by a member country of the League of Arab
States;
(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA
budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget for
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) paid by the United States; or
(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of
UNRWA.
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Dissenting Views
Introduction
We are all familiar with the flaws, shortcomings, and
outrages of the United Nations, both past and present, and
believe that UN reform is and must remain an important priority
for the United States. However, we strongly oppose this
misguided and irresponsible legislation, which--in the guise of
``reform''--would result in an unprecedented diminution of
American diplomatic influence and likely lead to the U.S.
withdrawing from the organization.
The United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform
Act of 2011 is premised on the notion that withholding our dues
is the only way to leverage meaningful change at the UN. But
there's simply no evidence to support that argument. Previous
attempts at withholding did not lead to any significant and
lasting reforms--they succeeded only in weakening our
diplomatic standing and influence, and undermining efforts to
promote transparency, fiscal responsibility and good management
practices in the UN system. For those reasons, the George W.
Bush Administration opposed the late Chairman Henry Hyde's UN
bill, which was not nearly as draconian as this legislation.
We also note the Department of State's strong objections to
this legislation, which the Secretary expressed in her October
12, 2011 letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member. The
Secretary warned ``If implemented, the bill's requirement to
withhold 50 percent of U.S. assessed contributions to the
United Nations absent a shift to voluntary-only funding would
undercut international collaboration in advancing core U.S.
national security interest such as stauncher nuclear
proliferation, combating terrorism, fully implementing
sanctions on countries such as Iran and North Korea, preventing
conflict around the globe, supporting elections in countries
just undergoing transition to democracy, fighting pandemic
disease, providing life-saving humanitarian relief to countries
such as Haiti, and supporting peaceful transitions in placed
such as the new nation of South Sudan.''
Unilateral Shift to Voluntary Contributions Simply a Backdoor Mechanism
for Pulling U.S. out of UN
Title I of H.R. 2829 states that the U.S. must withhold 50
percent of our assessed contributions unless the President
certifies that at least 80 percent of the entire UN regular
budget is funded by voluntary contributions within two years.
Republicans argue that by funding the UN regular budget on a
voluntary basis, the U.S. will be able to pick and choose what
it pays for--a multilateral a la carte funding scheme. The
unrealistic and reckless certification requirement is premised
on the preposterous assumption that the U.S. would succeed in
amending the United Nations Charter, which requires a two-
thirds vote of all UN member states and unanimous approval by
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The UN
Charter has been amended only four times in its 66-year
history, most recently in 1973 when the body approved an
enlargement of the Economic and Social Council to better
reflect the growth in UN member states. The notion that in two
years time the US could force through an amendment to unravel
the financial stability of the organization over what would
likely be near unanimous opposition strains credulity.
Given the near certitude that the President would be unable
to make such a certification, the withholdings in Title I would
almost inevitably come into force two years after this
legislation was signed into law. Ironically, even if the UN
Human Rights Council was truly reformed, the Goldstone Report
was completely repudiated, and the UN instituted more
meaningful audit and oversight disclosure requirements, this
bill would still defund the UN if it didn't adopt an 80%
voluntarily funded regular budget. As such, it is clear to us
that the withholdings language contained in Title I is not
meant to promote effective management reforms or tackle the
political biases exhibited at the UN and its funds, programs,
and specialized agencies. Rather, Title I can only be viewed as
a thinly veiled attempt to defund the United Nations and
ultimately reduce U.S. influence and relevance at the
organization.
Empty rhetoric on voluntarily funded UN agencies
Republicans argue that UN agencies and programs which are
funded on a voluntary basis are inherently more accountable to
U.S. interests. This view is expressed in the findings
contained in Title I, which state: ``Because of their need to
justify future contributions from donors, voluntarily funded
organizations have more incentive to be responsive and
efficient in their operations than organizations funded by
compulsory contributions that are not tied to performance.''
The Republicans claim this funding arrangement would give the
U.S. greater flexibility to choose among various UN entities
and initiatives, supporting those it prefers and un-funding
those it considers problematic, irresponsible, or beyond
salvage. The logical conclusion would be that the United
Nations would be more sensitive to U.S. preferences, introduce
healthy competition among UN agencies seeking U.S. dollars, and
provide an incentive for greater UN transparency and
accountability.
We agree that voluntary funding is appropriate for certain
UN entities--particularly those focused on short- or medium-
term humanitarian or disaster relief situations. In fact much
of the UN's development and humanitarian assistance efforts are
funded on a voluntary basis. But by seeking to force a shift to
all voluntary contributions, this legislation would unravel the
financial underpinnings of the entire UN regular budget, which
would lead other nations to respond in kind by adopting their
own, selective approach to financing the organization. It is
not unreasonable to expect that UN programs vital to U.S.
foreign policy and national security interests would face
funding reductions as a result. For example, the UN special
political missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are funded
through the UN regular budget--largely out of the insistence of
the U.S.--would almost certainly see severely diminished
financial support from other UN member states, and thus reduced
legitimacy. Other U.S. priorities at the UN, such as the
advancement of women, the protection of human rights, and
counterterrorism cooperation could likely faced reduced funding
under a voluntary funding scheme. These costs of a la carte
funding may not be readily apparent on the surface, but they
are very real.
Limiting the UN's Ability to Protect Woman and Children
While much of the attention on H.R. 2829 has centered on
the bill's impact on UN funding, a little-noticed provision,
Section 308, would have grave consequences for the UN's ability
to protect and promote the rights of women and children. This
section would withhold all U.S. contributions to the UN's
regular budget proportionate to the percentage of the regular
budget expended for a UN human rights treaty monitoring body or
committee established by conventions to which the U.S. is not a
party.
Though no explanation of this provision was presented in
the Chairman's opening remarks or given more than a cursory
explanation in the Majority's section by section analysis, its
impact would be gravely detrimental to the UN's ability
implement the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. If the purpose of this provision was to prevent
the implementation of these two key human rights conventions,
we are puzzled why the Majority made no mention of their
opposition to either convention in the text of H.R. 2829,
especially given the voluminous findings contained in other
parts of the legislation.
Using Middle East Issues as Subterfuge
Republicans have attempted to paint this legislation as a
direct response to the Palestinians' various UN membership
gambits, the Goldstone Report, the Durban Process, and
innumerable examples of bias exhibited at the UN against
Israel. While we share the Majority's deep frustration and
anger over the many continued instances of such bias, the
Republicans have used the issue of Israel's treatment at the UN
as a smokescreen to obscure their true agenda. Indeed, nowhere
in Title I--the section of the legislation containing the most
draconian withholding proposals--are Middle East issued
referenced. Even if the various anti-Israel entities at the UN
were reformed or abolished, the withholdings provisions
contained in Title I would still be triggered.
We also note that the provisions concerning full
Palestinian membership in the UN are duplicative of current
law. Public Law 103-236, Title IV, Sec. 410 and Public Law 101-
246, Title IV already requires withholding of US funds from any
UN entity that grants full membership to the Palestinian
Authority. These provisions of law automatically went into
effect after the UNESCO General Conference voted to grant full
membership to the Palestinians earlier this year. However, we
note that the Palestinian Authority publicly stated that it was
not swayed by U.S. threats to defund the organization if they
were successful in their attempts to gain full membership in
UNESCO. Nor were the member states of UNESCO, who voted
overwhelmingly in support of the Palestinians' membership
gambit.
Undermines Iran sanctions attempts
The top foreign policy priority of this Congress has been
preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability.
Yet if this bill were enacted into law, attempts to slow
Tehran's nuclear program would undoubtedly be weakened.
Ambassador Susan Rice, the United States Permanent
Representative to the UN, has stated explicitly that the
previous round of multilateral sanctions passed by the United
Nations Security Council would not have possible without the
direct and sustained engagement of the U.S. at the UN. In her
letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member, Secretary Clinton
expressed her concerns that: ``If we diminish our global
stature, the United States would surrender a key platform which
to shape international priorities, such as obtaining tough
sanctions on Iran. The restrictions regarding U.S.
contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for
example, are counterproductive to our non-proliferation efforts
to secure nuclear material worldwide, and would undercut our
successes in isolating countries such as Iran.''
Were this legislation to pass, not only would we defund the
Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution
1737, otherwise known as the Iran Sanctions Committee, which is
funded out of the UN's regular budget, but we would hamstring
our ability to push through future rounds of sanctions at the
UN. During the last period of sustained U.S. arrearages accrued
at the UN, we lost our seat on the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which was a severe blow
to U.S. prestige and limited our ability to influence the UN
budget. The consequences of once again falling into arrears
could be much worse.
Sensible Democratic Alternative Rejected
Committee Democrats offered a sensible alternative that
acknowledged the reality that Congress cannot legislate change
at the UN like we can in the Executive Branch. Instead, the
Democratic substitute sought to provide direction to and
strengthen the Administration's efforts to push for greater
transparency, accountability, and ethical standards at the UN.
It would do this by enshrining in law the State Department's UN
Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI)--originally
conceived by former U.S. Ambassador for UN Management Reform,
Mark Wallace, a George W. Bush Administration appointee--which
would strengthen the U.S. government's ability to monitor the
UN's progress on management reform. By enshrining UNTAI into
law, we would ensure that the initiative will endure into the
future and that Congress can play a more effective oversight
role.
While Republicans claim they want to improve transparency
and accountability at the UN, they have paid woefully little
attention to enhancing the U.S. capacity to systematically and
quantifiably monitor the UN's progress on key management
criteria. Rather than building upon the successful monitoring
efforts of Ambassador Wallace, the Republicans initially
attempted to task the Government Accountability Office with
responsibilities the GAO determined ``would be duplicative of
other accountability mechanisms in place, would require
extensive GAO resources, and would not be cost-beneficial.''
While the Majority amended H.R. 2829 to reflect many of the
concerns raised by the GAO, it does little to build upon the
Department's existing UN reform monitoring and evaluation
capacities. By contrast, the Democratic substitute would
mandate rigorous reviews and monitoring programs for various
peacekeeping efforts, and make it the policy of the United
States to work with the UN to institute a number of needed
management reforms.
By ensuring that the US retains its full voice and vote at
the UN, the Democratic substitute would be a far more effective
tool for promoting real reform and countering anti-Israel bias
in the UN.
Overall Package Harms America's Standing and Ability to Lead the
International Community
As described above, this bill includes a number of
provisions that would harm America's foreign policy and
national security interests and undermine our diplomatic
influence and standing in the international community. It is
clear that proponents of the legislation have little interest
in promoting responsible reforms at the United Nations, but
rather seek to disengage the U.S. from multilateral
institutions. Given the untold damage this bill would do to US
interests around the globe, we have absolutely no hesitation in
urging our colleagues to reject this misguided and damaging
legislation.
Howard L. Berman.
Gary L. Ackerman.
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega.
Donald M. Payne.
Brad Sherman.
Gregory W. Meeks.
Russ Carnahan.
Albio Sires.
Gerald E. Connolly.
Theodore E. Deutch.
Brian Higgins.
Allyson Schwartz.
Christopher S. Murphy.
Frederica Wilson.
Karen Bass.
William Keating.
David Cicilline.