[House Report 112-211]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
112th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 112-211
======================================================================
FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM STANDARDS
ACT
_______
September 19, 2011.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Upton, from the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 908]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Energy and Commerce, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 908) to extend the authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security to maintain the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards program, having considered the same, report
favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill
as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Amendment........................................................ 2
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for Legislation.............................. 3
Hearings......................................................... 4
Committee Consideration.......................................... 5
Committee Votes.................................................. 5
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 14
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives............ 14
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures 14
Earmarks......................................................... 14
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 14
Congressional Budget Office Estimate............................. 14
Federal Mandates Statement....................................... 15
Advisory Committee Statement..................................... 15
Applicability to Legislative Branch.............................. 15
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation................... 16
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 17
Minority Views................................................... 19
Amendment
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Full Implementation of the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act''.
SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CHEMICAL FACILITY
ANTI-TERRORISM STANDARDS PROGRAM.
Subsection (b) of section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295; 6 U.S.C. 121 note) is
amended by striking ``2011'' and inserting ``2018''.
SEC. 3. BACKGROUND CHECKS.
Section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295; 6 U.S.C. 121 note) is amended by adding
at the end the following new subsection:
``(i)(1) No security background check is required under this section
for an individual holding a valid transportation security card issued
under section 70105 of title 46, United States Code.
``(2) The Secretary shall determine, on an ongoing basis, whether
alternate security background checks conducted by the Secretary are
sufficient to meet the requirements of the risk-based performance
standards issued under this section such that no additional security
background check is required under this section for an individual who
has passed such a qualifying alternate security background check.
``(3) The owner or operator of a chemical facility subject to the
regulations issued under this section may permit an individual holding
a valid transportation security card issued under section 70105 of
title 46, United States Code, or an individual who has passed a
qualifying alternate security background check under paragraph (2), to
have access to restricted areas or critical assets of such facility
without the satisfaction of any other additional requirements imposed
by the Secretary.
``(4)(A) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to abridge any
right or responsibility of--
``(i) an individual subject to a security background check
under this section; or
``(ii) an owner or operator of a chemical facility subject to
the regulations issued under this section.
``(B) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit an
owner or operator of a chemical facility from requiring, for reasons
other than compliance with this section, that prospective or current
employees or contractors undergo any additional background check in
addition to that required under the risk-based performance standards
issued under this section.''.
SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out section 550 of
the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public
Law 109-295; 6 U.S.C. 121 note) $89,920,000 for each of fiscal years
2012 through 2018.
Purpose and Summary
In the fall of 2006, Congress, through Section 550 of
Public Law 109-295, authorized the Secretary of Homeland
Security to establish risk-based security performance standards
for facilities with chemicals that the Secretary deems to
present high levels of security risk. The Department, as
required by Public Law 109-295, promulgated interim final
regulations on April 9, 2007, resulting in the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). Pursuant to Public
Law 112-10, the statutory authority for CFATS is scheduled to
sunset on October 4, 2011. H.R. 908, the Full Implementation of
the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act extends the
CFATS program seven (7) years, or until October 4, 2018.
In addition to maintaining the existing CFATS program and
extending its legal authority, the legislation also makes
authorizations for appropriations for each year the program's
authority is authorized as well as adds a new provision to
streamline personnel surety and badging requirements at
facilities regulated under CFATS.
Background and Need for Legislation
Chemical facilities are an integral part of the United
States economy. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, combined,
accounted for $329 billion of value added in 2009--or 2.3
percent in Gross Domestic Product to the United States economy.
In addition, the U.S. Commerce Department estimated that
exports of chemical products in 2009, including plastics, were
about $153 billion in 2009, generated a balance of trade
surplus in excess of $20 billion. These facilities, often
located in densely populated areas, hold many chemicals that
could make them attractive terrorist targets. As a result, the
chemical sector is among the 17 critical infrastructure and key
resources (CI/KR) sectors under the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-7 (HSPD-7).
In 2006, Section 550 of the Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2007 (P.L. 109-295) provided the
Secretary of Homeland Security with interim authority to
regulate the nation's chemical facilities. Pursuant to that
authority, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the
final Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards regulations on
April 9, 2007. Those standards, which became effective on June
8, 2007, required each chemical facility to report the amounts
and types of chemicals on site so that DHS could determine
whether that facility would be further regulated by CFATS
rules. Based on those analyses, known as ``Top-Screen''
reviews, DHS began placing regulated facilities into one of
four tiers.
At the outset of the program, DHS expected that roughly
30,000 facilities would be required to comply with the
reporting requirements of the regulations, with approximately
6,000 falling into one of the four (4) high risk categories
requiring further regulation. As of March 2011, almost 40,000
chemical facilities had registered with DHS and completed the
Top-Screen process. Of these facilities, DHS considered more
than 8,064 as high-risk and required them to submit a site
vulnerability assessment.
On March 31, 2011, Rand Beers, the DHS Under Secretary,
National Protection and Programs Directorate, testified before
the Subcommittee on Environment and that Economy that DHS has
determined that CFATS covers 4,744 facilities (4,126 Final
tiered facilities, 618 preliminarily tiered facilities). The
Committee has been informed that as of the March 31, 2011
hearing date the remaining 618 preliminarily tiered facilities
are either gasoline terminals (approximately 350 facilities),
facilities that submitted Alternative Security Plans in lieu of
CSAT Site Vulnerability Assessments, or recent Top Screen
submittals.
In addition, DHS is still in the process of filling all its
positions for chemical facility security officers and
inspectors. DHS plans to continue to hire throughout the fiscal
year. At the March 31 hearing, Under Secretary Beers testified
that DHS has hired, or is in the process of on-boarding, more
than 188 people and DHS plans to hire throughout this fiscal
year to meet its staffing goal of 268 positions. In addition,
Mr. Beers testified that DHS has filled 97 of 103 field
inspector positions and all of the 14 field leadership
positions.
DHS began inspections of Tier 1 facilities in February
2010, and has completed approximately 175 pre-authorization
inspections to date. DHS has inspected some facilities' site
security plans and issued 66 administrative orders to compel
facility compliance. Mr. Beers testified that DHS only
conducted four authorization inspections, or comprehensive and
detailed inspections to verify that the descriptions of
security measures listed in the facility's authorized SSP (or
Alternative Security Plan) are accurate and complete, and that
the equipment, processes, and procedures described are
appropriate and function as intended. In responses to questions
for the record from the March 31, 2011 hearing, Mr. Beers
stated that DHS anticipates conducting authorization
inspections at tiered sites within 180 days of issuance of a
Letter of Authorization for a facility's Site Security Plan.
Final Tiering assignments for facilities in Tiers II, III,
and IV are ongoing. To date, DHS had not yet approved one of
the 4,100 site security plans it has received for facilities in
any risk Tier.
The cost of extra security measures at CFATS-covered
facilities is significant for both the private and public
sector. In the last Congress, a trade association for large
chemical production facilities testified before this Committee
that its member companies spent $8 billion for association
security codes and projects and will spend another $8 billion
to fully comply with CFATS. Moreover, each of the three trade
associations that appeared before the Subcommittee on
Environment and the Economy on March 31, 2011, testified that,
notwithstanding the significant investment of the private
sector for compliance with industry and government mandated
security programs, the heaviest costs to be borne by the
private sector are the major capital investments that regulated
facilities will need to make upon approval of their Site
Security Plans. In addition, DHS, since the inception of CFATS,
has spent around $340 million to initiate the program.
Enactment of H.R. 908 is necessary to prevent the
expiration of the program's legal authority in October 2011,
and to provide long-term predictability for the private sector.
Further, extending CFATS authorization will allow the DHS to
fully implement the CFATS program and gather critical
information on the strengths and weaknesses of a completely
operational program, prevent the stranding of billions of
dollars of investment and work-hours by the public and private
sectors in security enhancements, and ensure our chemical
sector remains secure.
Hearings
The Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy held a
hearing on H.R. 908, the Full Implementation of the Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act on March 31, 2011. The
Subcommittee received testimony from: Rand Beers, Under
Secretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate
(NPPD), U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Andrew Skipp,
President, Hubbard-Hall, on behalf of the National Association
of Chemical Distributors; Mr. Bill Allmond, Vice-President,
Government Relations, Society of Chemical Manufacturers and
Affiliates; Mr. David Tabar, The Sherwin-Williams Company, on
behalf of the American Coatings Association; and Mr. James S.
Frederick, Assistant Director, Health, Safety and Environment,
United Steelworkers, on behalf of the Blue-Green Alliance.
Committee Consideration
On May 4, 2011, the Subcommittee on Environment and the
Economy met in open markup session and approved H.R. 908 for
Full Committee consideration, as amended, by a voice vote.
On May 25 and 26, 2011, the Committee on Energy and
Commerce met in open markup session and reported favorably H.R.
908, as amended, for House consideration, with further
amendment, by a recorded vote of 33-16.
Committee Votes
Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes
on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. A
motion by Mr. Upton to order H.R. 908, as amended, reported to
the House, with further amendments, was agreed to by a recorded
vote of 33-16.
Committee Oversight Findings
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee held a legislative
hearing and made findings that are reflected in this report.
Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives
To extend the authority of the Secretary of Homeland
Security to maintain the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards program.
New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee finds that H.R.
908, the Full Implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-
Terrorism Standards Act, would result in no new or increased
budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or
revenues.
Earmarks
In compliance with clause 9(e), 9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI,
the Committee finds that H.R. 908 contains no earmarks, limited
tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits.
Committee Cost Estimate
The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared
by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to
section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
Congressional Budget Office Estimate
Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate
provided by the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section
402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
H.R. 908--Full Implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards Act
H.R. 908 would extend through fiscal year 2018 the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) authority to regulate
security at certain chemical facilities in the United States.
Under this authority, which under current law is set to expire
in October, DHS runs the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards (CFATS) program. Under CFATS, DHS collects and
reviews information from chemical facilities in the United
States to determine which facilities present a security risk.
Facilities determined to present a high level of security risk
are then required to develop a Site Security Plan (SSP). DHS in
turn conducts inspections to validate the adequacy of a
facility's SSP and their compliance with it.
H.R. 908 would authorize $90 million annually for CFATS
over the 2012-2018 period. That amount is equal to the $90
million provided in 2011 for the program. CBO estimates that
implementing this legislation would cost $361 million over the
2012-2016 period and about $260 million in subsequent years,
assuming the appropriation of the specified amounts.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-------------------------------------------------------
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012-2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Authorization Level..................................... 90 90 90 90 90 450
Estimated Outlays....................................... 32 64 87 89 89 361
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.R. 908 could result in the collection of additional civil
penalties, which are recorded as revenues and deposited in the
Treasury; therefore, pay-as-you go procedures apply. However,
CBO estimates that such collections would be minimal and the
effect on revenues would be insignificant. Enacting the bill
would not affect direct spending.
H.R. 908 would extend intergovernmental and private-sector
mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA), on owners and operators of public and private
facilities where certain chemicals are present. Requirements on
those owners and operators to assess the vulnerability of their
facilities and to prepare and implement security plans would be
mandates. The bill also would extend mandates that require
owners and operators of such facilities to maintain records,
periodically submit reviews of the adequacy of the
vulnerability assessments or facility security plans, and allow
DHS access to their property for inspections and verifications.
In addition, owners and operators would have to continue to
conduct background checks on employees who have access to
restricted areas, and provide training to employees. Based on
information from DHS and industry sources, CBO estimates that
the aggregate costs of complying with the mandates would be
small and would fall below the annual thresholds established in
UMRA for intergovernmental and private-sector mandates ($71
million and $142 million, respectively, in 2011, adjusted
annually for inflation).
The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jason Wheelock
(for the federal costs), Melissa Merrell (for the
intergovernmental impact), and Paige Piper/Bach (for the
private-sector impact). The estimate was approved by Theresa
Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Federal Mandates Statement
The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal
mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act.
Advisory Committee Statement
No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b)
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this
legislation.
Applicability to Legislative Branch
The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to
the terms and conditions of employment or access to public
services or accommodations within the meaning of section
102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act.
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation
Section 1. Short title
This section names this Act as the ``Full Implementation of
the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act''.
Section 2. Extension of Department of Homeland Security Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Program.
This section amends section 550(b) of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-295;
6 U.S.C. 121 note) by striking ``2011'' and inserting ``2018''.
Section 3. Background checks
The Committee is aware of the substantial burden that is
placed on CFATS regulated facilities and their employees by the
myriad of personnel surety and identification card requirements
and costs. The Committee believes that this program can and
should be streamlined to allow for appropriate screening
against the Terrorist Watch List for the financial benefit and
convenience of workers and their employers.
This section adds a new subsection (i) to Section 550 of
the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007
(Public Law 109-295; 6 U.S.C. 121 note) to provide that no
additional security background check is required under CFATS
for an individual holding a valid transportation worker
identification card (TWIC) issued under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, section 70105 of title 46, United
States Code. In addition, the owner or operator of a CFATS-
regulated facility may permit an individual holding a valid
TWIC or an individual who has passed a qualifying alternate
security background check--approved by the Secretary of
Homeland Security because it satisfies CFATS's risk-based
performance criteria--to have access to restricted areas or
critical assets of such facility without needing to meet any
other additional requirements imposed by the Secretary.
This section also requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to determine, on an ongoing basis, whether alternate
security background checks conducted by the Secretary are
sufficient to meet DHS's risk-based performance standards
issued such that no additional security background check is
required under CFATS for an individual who has passed such a
qualifying alternate security background check.
Nothing in Section 550(i) abridges the collective
bargaining rights of workers or employers or collective
bargaining agreements already signed, except to the extent that
they may require DHS-mandated backgrounds checks or
identification cards made unnecessary by this section. Rather,
by eliminating redundant requirements for background checks and
identification cards subsection (i) is intended to benefit
workers and employers by reducing compliance burdens such as
extra application fees, time wasted filling out needless forms,
and red-tape obstacles to career advancement.
Nor does Section 550(i) prevent an owner or operator of a
CFATS regulated facility from requiring, for reasons other than
compliance with CFATS, that prospective or current employees or
contractors undergo any additional background check in addition
to that required under CFATS's risk-based performance
standards.
Section 4. Authorization of appropriations
This section authorizes $89.92 million for appropriation
for Section 550 of Public Law 109-295 in each fiscal year that
this section is authorized under this bill, from fiscal year
2012 through fiscal year 2018. The Committee is aware that in
fiscal year 2011, DHS was appropriated $89.928 million or
$8,000 more than what is authorized by this bill. The Committee
anticipates that as DHS becomes more proficient in operating
CFATS, the financial burden to operate the program could
lessen, allowing scarce federal resources to be deployed in
other areas.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 550. (a) * * *
(b) Interim regulations issued under this section shall apply
until the effective date of interim or final regulations
promulgated under other laws that establish requirements and
standards referred to in subsection (a) and expressly supersede
this section: Provided, That the authority provided by this
section shall terminate on October 4, [2011] 2018.
* * * * * * *
(i)(1) No security background check is required under this
section for an individual holding a valid transportation
security card issued under section 70105 of title 46, United
States Code.
(2) The Secretary shall determine, on an ongoing basis,
whether alternate security background checks conducted by the
Secretary are sufficient to meet the requirements of the risk-
based performance standards issued under this section such that
no additional security background check is required under this
section for an individual who has passed such a qualifying
alternate security background check.
(3) The owner or operator of a chemical facility subject to
the regulations issued under this section may permit an
individual holding a valid transportation security card issued
under section 70105 of title 46, United States Code, or an
individual who has passed a qualifying alternate security
background check under paragraph (2), to have access to
restricted areas or critical assets of such facility without
the satisfaction of any other additional requirements imposed
by the Secretary.
(4)(A) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
abridge any right or responsibility of--
(i) an individual subject to a security background
check under this section; or
(ii) an owner or operator of a chemical facility
subject to the regulations issued under this section.
(B) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit
an owner or operator of a chemical facility from requiring, for
reasons other than compliance with this section, that
prospective or current employees or contractors undergo any
additional background check in addition to that required under
the risk-based performance standards issued under this section.
MINORITY VIEWS
In 1984, a chemical facility in Bhopal, India accidentally
released 40 tons of methyl isocyanate, killing approximately
3,000 people and injuring thousands more. The tragic event in
Bhopal was an accident; had it been a deliberate terrorist
attack the consequences could have been much worse.
Chemical facilities are an integral part of the United
States economy, generating $550 billion in annual revenues.
These facilities, often located in densely populated areas,
hold many chemicals that can cause serious harm to humans and
the environment if used maliciously or without sufficient care.
These factors make U.S. chemical facilities attractive
terrorist targets. As a result, the chemical sector is among
the 17 critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR)
sectors under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-
7).
In 2006, Congress gave the Department of Homeland Security
the authority to create the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards program, or CFATS. Congress did so not through a
series of hearings, not through extensive negotiation with
interested and concerned parties, but instead through a
provision attached to an appropriations bill. It was intended
as a temporary fix until Congress could establish a
comprehensive program. The provision was slated to expire in
2009.
H.R. 908 does not establish such a comprehensive program.
Instead, it extends the current statutory language and the
interim program without significant amendment. While the CFATS
program is a good start, it is limited by significant flaws in
the underlying law.
Section 550 does not cover a range of facilities that could
endanger thousands in the event of a worst-case chemical
release as a result of a terrorist attack, including drinking
water utilities, chemical plants located on ports, and federal
facilities. The exemption for facilities subject to regulation
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission removes several thousand
high-risk facilities from CFATS, without an evaluation of
whether the NRC regulations address the risks from chemicals
stored there.
These are security gaps that we need to close. Toxic
chemicals stored onsite at a federal facility, for example, are
as lethal as the same chemicals stored at a chemical facility
covered by the program. An NRC regulation requiring a locked
door for a room containing brachytherapy materials will not
prevent an attack on a chemical tank down the hall. Democratic
amendments offered to close these gaps were rejected by the
majority during the Committee process. H.R. 908 would continue
these baseless exemptions, perpetuating these security gaps.
Although section 550 provides for the establishment of
risk-based performance standards, it does not ensure that those
standards will be met. Section 550 says that the Secretary
``may disapprove'' plans that fail to meet these tailored
standards--providing discretion to approve plans that fail to
do so. Section 550 also includes a prohibition on disapproving
a site security plan on the presence or absence of a particular
security measure, even if that security measure is necessary to
meet the risk-based performance standards. The section could
therefore require the approval of plans that fail to meet the
standards. Democratic amendments offered to address these
issues were rejected by the majority, so H.R. 908 does nothing
to ensure that the risk-based performance standards are met or
that these high-risk facilities are secured.
Section 550 fails to protect workers, who might be
subjected to discrimination and other background check abuses
under the guise of homeland security. Because of bipartisan
efforts and negotiations, H.R. 908 will protect some workers,
those already holding security credentials, from these abuses.
H.R. 908 will do nothing to protect other workers.
Section 550 fails to include workers, who are on the front
lines of preventing and responding to a potential terrorist
attack, in the development of site security plans. Workers have
unparalleled experience and knowledge, which should inform the
development of these plans. H.R. 908 would not address this
shortcoming.
Section 550 does not protect whistleblowers. Effective
security for high-risk facilities depends on the timely
furnishing of information about failures and violations. That,
in turn depends on assurances to workers and other
whistleblowers that they will not suffer retaliation for
providing such information. Whistleblower protections are thus
an essential component of an effective CFATS program, and
should be included. H.R. 908 does not offer this essential
protection.
Section 550 does not create timelines for agency action or
include mechanisms for ensuring timely agency action. Instead,
it specifically exempts actions by the Secretary taken under
this section from citizen enforcement and deadline suits.
Despite efforts by democratic members to include deadlines in
H.R. 908, the bill does not include timelines and will not
ensure timely agency action.
Under section 550, a new category of protected information
was created. It is similar to other security related
information categories, and provides significant protection.
But it goes beyond other security related information
designations, in a very troubling way. Section 550 provides
that, in judicial proceedings, security information under this
program should be treated ``as if'' it were classified, even
though it does not meet the criteria to be considered
classified. This distinction is unwarranted, and is a
significant obstacle to administration efforts to harmonize
information protection regimes. It is also an unnecessary
obstacle to transparency and oversight of this important
program. H.R. 908 does not address this issue.
Over the past several months, efforts to address these
shortcomings in H.R. 908 through bipartisan negotiations have
been rebuffed. Rather than reflecting the expertise of the
Energy and Commerce Committee, H.R. 908 preserves much of the
flawed language codified by the Appropriations Committee in
2006. Extending the authorization for this program is
important, but this bill fails to address significant
shortcomings, leaving facilities and the communities around
them unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
Henry A. Waxman.
G.K. Butterfield.
Lois Capps.
Bobby L. Rush.
Eliot L. Engel.
Edward J. Markey.
Donna M. Christensen.
Anna G. Eshoo.
Frank Pallone, Jr.
Doris O. Matsui.