Senate Report 111-63 - APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

[Senate Report 111-63]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

111th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 111-63
======================================================================

APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

_______

July 29, 2009.--Ordered to be printed

_______

Mr. Baucus, from the Committee on Finance, submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany S.J. Res. 17]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint
resolution (S.J. Res. 17) approving the renewal of import
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do
pass.

CONTENTS

Page
I. Report and Other Matters of the Committee......................1
A. Report of the Committee on Finance...................... 1
B. Background.............................................. 2
1. The Government of Burma............................. 2
2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003....... 2
3. S.J. Res. 17 Is a ``Renewal Resolution'' for
Purposes of Extending Import Restrictions.......... 4
4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 17............. 4
5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade
Sanctions Against Burma............................ 4
6. Additional International Sanctions Against Burma.... 8
II. Budgetary Impact of the Joint Resolution..........................9
III.Regulatory Impact of the Joint Resolution and Other Matters......11

IV. Changes in Existing Law..........................................11

I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE

A. Report of the Committee on Finance

B. Background

1. The Government of Burma

Burma is governed by the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC), a military junta that took power in September
1988. Since taking power, the junta has violently suppressed
pro-democracy movements. International human rights
organizations and the U.S. Department of State have reported a
pattern of SPDC policies that include the suppression of
political and civil liberties, jailing of political prisoners,
widespread physical abuses, forced relocation of civilians,
conscription of civilians--including children--into military
services, and conscription of thousands of civilians for work
on economic projects. Recent examples of these human rights
abuses are provided below.
On May 30, 2003, a pro-government group of several hundred
people assaulted the opposition National League for Democracy
(NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters near
Mandalay, Burma's second-largest city. The attackers were
members of the United Solidarity Development Association
(USDA), an organization affiliated with the SDPC. Some NLD
supporters were killed, and others were taken into custody.
In September 2007, the Burmese government engaged in a
violent crackdown against Buddhist monks and other Burmese
citizens who were demonstrating peacefully against the poor
economic conditions in Burma and the repressive policies of the
SPDC. And the government failed to provide adequate
humanitarian assistance or allow speedy entry of international
aid in response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.
Most recently, in May 2009, the Burmese Government accused
Suu Kyi of violating her house arrest by permitting the
uninvited visit of an American man, John Yettaw. Suu Kyi's
trial began in May and is currently underway. United Nations
investigators allege that the Burmese Government has violated
Suu Kyi's substantive and procedural rights during the course
of her trial.

2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003

On June 4, 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of
2003 (the BFDA) was introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) in
response to the attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on May 30, 2003.
A revised version of the legislation was introduced in the
Senate (S. 1215) on June 9, 2003. That latter version, S. 1215,
passed the Senate with an amendment on June 11, 2003, by a
recorded vote of 97-1. In the House, H.R. 2330 passed with an
amendment on July 15, 2003, by a recorded vote of 418-2, 1
Present. The Senate then passed the House-passed version of
H.R. 2330 without amendment on July 16, 2003, by a recorded
vote of 94-1. The legislation was presented to the President on
July 22, 2003, and signed into law by the President on July 28,
2003 (Pub. L. 108-61).
The BFDA bans the importation of any article that is a
product of Burma. The BFDA allows the President to lift these
import restrictions if he certifies to Congress that (1) the
SPDC has made substantial progress to end human rights
violations, including rapes, and no longer systematically
violates workers' rights, including forced and child labor, and
conscription of child soldiers; (2) the SPDC has made
substantial progress toward implementing a democratic
government, including by releasing political prisoners, by
allowing freedom of speech, press, association, and religion,
and by reaching agreement with the NLD for a democratically
elected civilian government; and (3) Burma has not been
designated as a country that has failed to abide by its
obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and
to take other effective counternarcotics measures. In addition
to the import ban, the BFDA also freezes the assets of the
Burmese regime and its officials held by U.S. financial
institutions, directs the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct
the U.S. representatives to international financial
institutions to oppose loans or other assistance to Burma, and
authorizes the President to deny visas to the leaders of the
Burmese regime.
In July 2008, Congress amended the BFDA when it passed the
Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts)
Act of 2008 (JADE Act). The JADE Act was introduced in the
House on October 18, 2007, and passed by voice vote on December
11, 2007. The Senate passed an amended version of the bill on
December 19, 2007. After resolving the differences between the
two bills, the revised legislation was passed by the House on
July 15, 2008 by voice vote and by the Senate on July 22, 2008
by Unanimous Consent. The President signed the legislation into
law on July 29, 2008. The JADE Act amends the import
restrictions of the BFDA by prohibiting the importation into
the United States of jewelry from any country that contains
jadeite or rubies mined in Burma. The JADE Act also imposes
additional financial and visa sanctions on members of the SPDC
or USDA and their immediate family members.
Pursuant to section 9(b) of the BFDA, the import ban
expires after 1 year unless a new joint resolution approving a
1-year renewal of the import ban is enacted into law prior to
the anniversary of the date of enactment of the BFDA. The
current import ban remains in effect through July 28, 2009.
As originally enacted, section 9(b)(3) also limited the
imposition of import restrictions to a maximum of 3 years from
the date of enactment, or until 2006. In 2006, a joint
resolution was introduced to extend this period to a maximum of
6 years from the date of enactment, or until 2009.
Specifically, H.J. Res. 86 was introduced in the House on May
19, 2006, and S.J. Res. 38 was introduced in the Senate on May
26, 2006. The House passed H.J. Res. 86 on July 11, 2006 by
voice vote. H.J. Res. 86 was placed on the Senate calendar on
July 26, 2006 and passed without amendment by voice vote. The
President signed the joint resolution on August 1, 2006 (Pub.
L. 109-251).
S.J. Res. 17 renews the import ban for another year, in
accordance with section 9(b) of the BFDA. The resolution also
extends the limitation on the import restrictions to a maximum
of 9 years from the date of enactment, or until 2012. A similar
resolution (H.J. Res. 56), which included budgetary offsets,
was passed by the House on July 21, 2009, by voice vote. H.J.
Res. 56 was received by the Senate on July 22, 2009, and passed
by Unanimous Consent on July 23, 2009. The resolution was
signed by the President on July 28, 2009.

3. S.J. Res. 17 Is a ``Renewal Resolution'' for Purposes of Extending
Import Restrictions

As described above, the import restrictions in the BFDA may
be renewed for a 1-year period if Congress approves a ``renewal
resolution,'' which section 9(c)(1) defines as a joint
resolution whose sole matter after the resolving clause is
language to renew the import restrictions for 1 year. Section
9(c)(2)(B) applies the expedited procedures set forth in
section 152 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the Trade Act of
1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), to Finance
Committee and floor consideration of a renewal resolution.
S.J. Res. 17 does not meet the definition of ``renewal
resolution'' under section 9(c)(1) of the BFDA because the
resolution both renews the import restrictions for 1 year
(section 1) and extends the limitation on annual renewal
resolutions from 6 years to 9 years (section 2(a)). Section
2(b) of S.J. Res. 17, however, deems the resolution to be a
``renewal resolution'' for purposes of section 9 of the BFDA.
The effect of section 2(b) is to qualify S.J. Res. 17 as a
renewal resolution for the purpose of extending the import
restrictions for 1 year under section 9(b)(2) of the Act;
however, section 2(b) does not trigger the application of the
expedited procedures set forth in section 9(c)(2)(B) of the
BFDA.
S.J. Res. 17 was introduced in the Senate before receipt of
H.J. Res. 56 from the House, and the House passed its
resolution before the Committee reported the Senate measure.
Thus, upon receipt of the House-passed measure, the House
resolution was placed on the Senate calendar, and the Committee
continued to report the Senate measure. After the Committee
reported the Senate measure, the vote on passage in the Senate
was on the House-passed measure.

4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 17

The Committee considered S.J. Res. 17 in open executive
session on July 23, 2009.
With a quorum present, the Committee approved S.J. Res. 17
by voice vote. (Note: Senator Enzi asked for the record to
reflect that he voted ``nay''.)
The Chairman reported the resolution to the Senate on July
23, 2009.

5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade Sanctions
Against Burma

On July 21, 2009, the U.S. Department of State submitted to
Congress a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma,
as required by section 8(b)(3) of the BFDA. At the request of
the Chairman, that report was made a part of the record of the
Committee's consideration of S.J. Res. 17. The State Department
report is reprinted below:
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, July 20, 2009.
Hon. Max Baucus,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The enclosed report reviews measures to
promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the
effectiveness of the trade provisions in the Burmese Freedom
and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) to improve conditions
in Burma and advance U.S. policy objectives. This report also
discusses the importance of maintaining the import ban
contained in the Act.
We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not
hesitate to contact us if we may be of further assistance in
this matter.
Sincerely,
Richard R. Verma,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure:
As stated.

Report on U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Burma

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Pursuant to section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003, P.L. 108-61 (the BFDA), and in view of
the impending expiration of the import ban contained in the
BFDA, this report reviews bilateral and multilateral measures
to promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the
effectiveness of the Act's trade provisions relative to the
improvement of conditions in Bui Ina and the furtherance of
U.S. policy objectives.
During this reporting period (May 2008 to July 2009), the
United States tightened economic sanctions, targeting
additional leaders and affiliates of the Burmese regime, and
added new sanctions pursuant to the Tom Lantos Block Burmese
JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-
286). These restrictions make it more difficult and costly for
regime leaders and their affiliates to continue to profit from
the repression of the Burmese people. Despite these measures,
expanding trade with countries in the region and continued
income from the exploitation of Burma's natural gas reserves
provided the regime the economic means to maintain its military
rule. In the absence of concrete progress toward respect for
human rights, transition to democracy, and other key policy
goals, the State Department supports a renewal resolution to
maintain the import ban.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES

During the reporting period, the United States intensified
its efforts to promote human rights and democracy in Burma
through diplomatic engagement with key stakeholders in
Southeast Asia and beyond, by supporting UN action on Burma,
and by expanding targeted sanctions on the Burmese leadership
and its financial supporters. The United States continued to
push for international pressure on Burmese authorities to begin
a dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority representatives
on a transition to democracy. The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon
maintained regular contact with representatives of civil
society and ethnic minority groups, and used every possible
interaction with Burmese officials to advocate respect for
human rights and encourage political reform.
Senior U.S. officials encouraged their counterparts in the
region and other like-minded states to press the regime to take
concrete and credible actions towards national reconciliation
and democratic transition. The European Union, Australia, and
Canada each maintain financial and trade sanctions against the
Burmese regime. All three continue to impose restrictions on
Burmese imports (focusing on gems and timber) as well as
targeted financial sanctions against senior Burmese government
members and their inner circle of supporters.
The United States has consistently pushed for the United
Nations to keep pressure on the regime through the UN Security
Council and more effective engagement by the UN Secretary
General's Good Offices Mission. On May 2, 2008, the UN Security
Council issued a Presidential Statement that called for the
regime to hold a free and fair constitutional referendum
including full participation of all political actors and
respect for fundamental political freedoms. On May 22, 2009,
the Security Council issued a press statement that expressed
concern about the political impact of the trial of National
League for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. It also
reiterated the need for Burma to create the conditions
necessary for dialogue in order to achieve national
reconciliation, including the release of political prisoners.
UN Special Advisor on Burma Ibrahim Gambari also briefed the UN
Security Council and the Group of Friends.
On April 30, 2008, the President issued an Executive Order
that expanded the scope of financial sanctions against the
regime by permitting the targeting of entities owned or
controlled by the Burmese government or its officials. On July
29, 2008, the President signed the JADE Act, which imposed
additional visa restrictions and financial sanctions and
expanded a prohibition on the importation of Burmese jadeite
and rubies to include jadeite and rubies, and articles of
jewelry containing them. The prohibition on entry into the
United States of such jadeite and rubies, and articles of
jewelry containing them, is expected to hinder the ability of
the Burmese regime to market rough jadeite and rubies to the
international jewelry industry, which will no longer be able to
export such items to the U.S. market. On the same day, the
President also announced financial sanctions against 10 new
businesses and individuals. On January 15, 2009, the United
States imposed financial sanctions on an additional 25
companies and individuals who provide support to the regime.
The United States continues active efforts to identify regime
officials and cronies. To date, the United States has
sanctioned 17 financial supporters of the regime and their
family members, and 41 of their companies.

EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON SITUATION IN BURMA

U.S. economic sanctions have made it more difficult and
more costly for the Burmese regime and its financial supporters
to continue profiting from their repressive policies. Senior
Burmese regime officials, such as the Foreign Minister, have
publicly complained about sanctions and called for them to be
lifted. Influential businessmen in Rangoon with connections to
the regime have increasingly complained about the detrimental
effects sanctions have had on their business operations and
personal lives. Between May 1, 2008, and July 10, 2009, 109
transactions totaling approximately $5,133,000 and involving
Burmese individuals or entities were reported to the Treasury
Department as blocked. Despite these consequences, the Burmese
regime has given no indication that it is open to meaningful
democratization.
During the reporting period, the Treasury Department issued
63 licenses authorizing the release of blocked funds or
otherwise prohibited transactions, for example, to allow NGOs
to conduct non-humanitarian transactions, including
agricultural development, microfinance, and education projects.
In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which devastated Burma in
May 2008, the Department of the Treasury issued General License
14, which, as subsequently amended, continues to provide a
broad authorization for funds transfers in support of
humanitarian and religious activities in Burma.
While the United States and others continue to look at ways
to target sanctions against the Burmese authorities, growing
trade with countries in the region and increased income from
the exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits has provided
the regime the economic means to retain power. According to the
Economist Intelligence Unit, Burma's GDP grew roughly 3.4
percent in 2007, due primarily to rising prices for petroleum
and agricultural exports. According to Burma's Ministry of
Commerce, total trade reached $10.4 billion in 2008, with
exports of $6.6 billion and imports of $3.8 billion.
Nevertheless, foreign investment falls well below potential
investment levels, as the Burmese business climate continues to
worsen.
The regime continued to commit gross human rights abuses
during this reporting period. The military regime severely
restricted and frequently violated freedom of assembly,
expression, association, movement, and religion. Human rights
abuses have included custodial abuses and deaths,
disappearances, rape, torture, recruitment of child soldiers,
and forced labor. The government continued to infiltrate and
covertly and overtly monitor meetings and activities of
virtually all non-governmental organizations, including
religious organizations.
In November and December 2008, the Burmese authorities
sentenced more than 150 political prisoners to draconian prison
terms, in effect life sentences. Many of those prisoners had
been held for nearly a year without being charged and were
convicted of offenses relating to their participation in the
pro-democracy movement, including the August and September 2007
protests (i.e., the ``Saffron Revolution''). Others, such as
political activist and comedian Zarganar, were convicted of
crimes after criticizing the Burmese government's failure to
respond following the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis.
Although the authorities granted amnesty to nearly 10,000
prisoners during the reporting period, fewer than 40 of those
released were political prisoners. Burmese authorities continue
to hold an estimated 2,100 political prisoners.
On May 14, 2009, Burmese authorities charged democratic
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi on spurious counts of
violating her house arrest and transferred her to Insein
Prison, She was subsequently put on trial; as of the writing of
this report, that trial is ongoing. The United States has
joined with many other countries in condemning her arrest and
the related judicial proceedings.

EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON BROADER U.S. INTERESTS

Intensified sanctions targeting regime leaders and their
financial supporters sent a clear signal to the regime and to
the Burmese people of support for a transition to democracy.
Many individuals in. the Burmese democracy movement support
U.S. sanctions. However, some academics and exiled Burmese have
questioned whether U.S. sanctions have any chance of success
without the participation of Burma's major trading partners,
including China, India, ASEAN members, and other countries in
the region.
The trade-related and financial sanctions implemented
pursuant to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003
(BFDA) and Executive Orders 13047, 13310, 13448, and 13464 have
had a limited impact on U.S. relations with other nations.
Although some foreign businesses and their representative
embassies have complained about the impact of sanctions, those
investing in Burma since 2003 have done so recognizing the
difficult operating environment and overall poor economic
climate created by the regime.
The restrictions contained in the JADE Act that amend the
BFDA on the importation of jadeite and rubies into the United
States have an impact on other countries that process jadeite
and rubies. Thailand specifically has expressed strong concern
over the negative impact the JADE Act provisions have had on
its ruby-processing and jewelry manufacturing industry.

CONCLUSION

Burma's generals continue to ignore the desire of the
Burmese people for democracy and respect for human rights.
Nonetheless, the Administration's support for Burma's democracy
movement remains firm. The United States continues to work
within the UN and with countries in Southeast Asia and beyond
to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. Economic
sanctions are one important tool for exerting pressure on the
regime to respect the will of the Burmese people and to
cooperate with the international community's efforts to
facilitate a genuine dialogue with democratic and ethnic
minority representatives on a transition to democracy. In the
absence of concrete progress on the part of the Burmese
authorities in key areas of democracy and human rights, failure
to renew the import ban in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy
Act as amended by the JADE Act, would send Burma's ruling
generals the wrong message. The Department of State supports a
resolution to extend the authorization period for the BFDA,
which will otherwise expire this year, and to renew the BFDA
sanctions for another year.

6. Additional international sanctions against Burma

The international community has joined with the United
States in protesting human rights conditions in Burma. The
European Union, Australia, and Canada each maintain financial
and trade sanctions against the Burmese regime. All three
continue to impose restrictions on Burmese imports, focusing on
gems and timber, as well as targeted financial sanctions
against senior Burmese government members and their inner
circle of supporters. In May 2008, the United Nations Security
Council issued a Presidential Statement that called on the
Burmese Government to hold a free and fair constitutional
referendum, and to allow greater humanitarian aid to enter the
country.

II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION

U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, July 23, 2009.
Hon. Max Baucus,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S.J. Res. 17, a joint
resolution approving the renewal of import restrictions
contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, and
for other purposes.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Zachary
Epstein, who can be reached at 226-2680.
Sincerely,
Robert A. Sunshine
(For Douglas W. Elmendorf).
Enclosure.

S.J. Res. 17--A joint resolution approving the renewal of import
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
of 2003, and for other purposes

Summary--S.J. Res. 17 would renew for one year the ban on
all imports from Burma, including a ban on imports of certain
gemstones originating from Burma. The ban was originally
enacted as the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003
(Public Law 108-61) and was set to expire on July 28, 2004. The
ban has subsequently been renewed five times, most recently in
Public Law 110-287, through its current expiration date of July
28, 2009. Previous legislation limited renewals of the ban to a
total of six years. This joint resolution would increase that
limit to nine years, thereby allowing three additional one-year
bans.
CBO estimates that extending the ban on U.S. imports from
Burma would reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 in
2009 and by about $2 million in 2010, with no effect
thereafter. CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 17 would not
affect federal spending.
Under S.J. Res. 17, the President could lift the import
restrictions if the State Peace and Development Council, the
military regime of Burma, has made substantial and measurable
progress to end violations of human rights, implemented a
democratic government, and met its obligations under
international counter-narcotics agreements. The President also
would have the authority to terminate the restrictions upon the
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or
waive them in the national interest.
By renewing the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 17
would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). Based on information from the U.S.
International Trade Commission (USITC), CBO estimates that the
aggregate direct cost of the mandates would fall below the
annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in
UMRA ($139 million in 2009, adjusted annually for inflation).
S.J. Res. 17 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined
in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
impact of S.J. Res. 17 is shown in the following table. The
costs of this legislation fall within budget function 750
(administration of justice).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2009-2014 2009-2019
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHANGES IN REVENUES

Estimated Revenues................................... * -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: * = Revenue loss less than $500,000.

Basis of estimate: Under S.J. Res. 17, the President would
have the authority to lift or waive the ban imposed by the
resolution. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the President
would not exercise this authority before the termination of the
one-year ban.
Based on data from the USITC on past U.S. imports from
Burma and CBO's most recent forecast of total U.S. imports, CBO
estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 17 would reduce federal
revenues by less than $500,000 in 2009 and by about $2 million
in 2010, net of income and payroll tax offsets.
In years just before the import ban first went into effect,
over half of all U.S. imports from Burma were knitted or
crocheted clothing and apparel goods. The remaining imports
included apparel items not knitted or crocheted, certain types
of fish and crustaceans, goods made of wood, certain precious
and semiprecious stones and metals, and woven fabrics and
tapestries. In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80 percent of duties
collected on these imports came from knitted and crocheted
articles, CBO assumes that most of the banned imports would be
replaced with imports from other countries.
The President could remove the ban on imports upon the
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or if
he were to determine and notify the Congress that to do so is
in the national interest. Should the ban be lifted, U.S.
companies would be allowed to resume importation of goods
produced, manufactured, grown, or assembled in Burma. If such
an action were taken during the 2009-2010 period, the impact on
federal revenues would be reduced accordingly.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: By renewing
for one year the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 17
would impose private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. The
cost of the mandate would be the net value of forgone profits
from banned Burmese products. According to information from the
USITC, the value of imports from Burma was approximately $356
million in 2002 and $276 million in 2003. Based on trade data
from the USITC, CBO concludes that importers have been able to
substitute goods from other countries, mostly within the
region, to compensate for a large portion of the trade loss
with Burma. Based on that information, CBO estimates that the
cost of the mandate would likely fall below the annual
threshold for private-sector mandates established in UMRA ($139
million in 2009, adjusted annually for inflation). CBO has
determined that S.J. Res. 17 contains no intergovernmental
mandates as defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state,
local, or tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Zachary Epstein;
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Burke Doherty;
Impact on the Private Sector: Marin Randall.
Estimate approved by: Frank Sammartino, Acting Assistant
Director for Tax Analysis.

III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION AND OTHER MATTERS

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states
that the resolution will not significantly regulate any
individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy
of individuals, and will result in no significant additional
paperwork.
The following information is provided in accordance with
section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
(Pub. L. 104-04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions of
S.J. Res. 17 as approved by the Committee on July 23, 2009. In
accordance with the requirement of Pub. L. 104-04, the
Committee has determined that the bill contains no
intergovernment mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not
affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by
the resolution, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change
is proposed is shown in roman):

BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

* * * * * * *

SEC. 9. DURATION OF SANCTIONS.

* * * * * * *

(3) Limitation.--The import restrictions contained in
section 3(a)(1) may be renewed for a maximum of [six
years] nine years from the date of the enactment of
this Act.

* * * * * * *