

APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOC-
RACY ACT OF 2003

JULY 29, 2009.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. BAUCUS, from the Committee on Finance,
submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany S.J. Res. 17]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint reso-
lution (S.J. Res. 17) approving the renewal of import restrictions
contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without
amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do pass.

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I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE

A. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint reso-
lution (S.J. Res. 17) approving the renewal of import restrictions

contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the resolution do pass.

B. BACKGROUND

1. *The Government of Burma*

Burma is governed by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), a military junta that took power in September 1988. Since taking power, the junta has violently suppressed pro-democracy movements. International human rights organizations and the U.S. Department of State have reported a pattern of SPDC policies that include the suppression of political and civil liberties, jailing of political prisoners, widespread physical abuses, forced relocation of civilians, conscription of civilians—including children—into military services, and conscription of thousands of civilians for work on economic projects. Recent examples of these human rights abuses are provided below.

On May 30, 2003, a pro-government group of several hundred people assaulted the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters near Mandalay, Burma's second-largest city. The attackers were members of the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), an organization affiliated with the SPDC. Some NLD supporters were killed, and others were taken into custody.

In September 2007, the Burmese government engaged in a violent crackdown against Buddhist monks and other Burmese citizens who were demonstrating peacefully against the poor economic conditions in Burma and the repressive policies of the SPDC. And the government failed to provide adequate humanitarian assistance or allow speedy entry of international aid in response to Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.

Most recently, in May 2009, the Burmese Government accused Suu Kyi of violating her house arrest by permitting the uninvited visit of an American man, John Yettaw. Suu Kyi's trial began in May and is currently underway. United Nations investigators allege that the Burmese Government has violated Suu Kyi's substantive and procedural rights during the course of her trial.

2. *The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003*

On June 4, 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (the BFDA) was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) in response to the attack on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on May 30, 2003. A revised version of the legislation was introduced in the Senate (S. 1215) on June 9, 2003. That latter version, S. 1215, passed the Senate with an amendment on June 11, 2003, by a recorded vote of 97–1. In the House, H.R. 2330 passed with an amendment on July 15, 2003, by a recorded vote of 418–2, 1 Present. The Senate then passed the House-passed version of H.R. 2330 without amendment on July 16, 2003, by a recorded vote of 94–1. The legislation was presented to the President on July 22, 2003, and signed into law by the President on July 28, 2003 (Pub. L. 108–61).

The BFDA bans the importation of any article that is a product of Burma. The BFDA allows the President to lift these import re-

strictions if he certifies to Congress that (1) the SPDC has made substantial progress to end human rights violations, including rapes, and no longer systematically violates workers' rights, including forced and child labor, and conscription of child soldiers; (2) the SPDC has made substantial progress toward implementing a democratic government, including by releasing political prisoners, by allowing freedom of speech, press, association, and religion, and by reaching agreement with the NLD for a democratically elected civilian government; and (3) Burma has not been designated as a country that has failed to abide by its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and to take other effective counternarcotics measures. In addition to the import ban, the BFDA also freezes the assets of the Burmese regime and its officials held by U.S. financial institutions, directs the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. representatives to international financial institutions to oppose loans or other assistance to Burma, and authorizes the President to deny visas to the leaders of the Burmese regime.

In July 2008, Congress amended the BFDA when it passed the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (JADE Act). The JADE Act was introduced in the House on October 18, 2007, and passed by voice vote on December 11, 2007. The Senate passed an amended version of the bill on December 19, 2007. After resolving the differences between the two bills, the revised legislation was passed by the House on July 15, 2008 by voice vote and by the Senate on July 22, 2008 by Unanimous Consent. The President signed the legislation into law on July 29, 2008. The JADE Act amends the import restrictions of the BFDA by prohibiting the importation into the United States of jewelry from any country that contains jadeite or rubies mined in Burma. The JADE Act also imposes additional financial and visa sanctions on members of the SPDC or USDA and their immediate family members.

Pursuant to section 9(b) of the BFDA, the import ban expires after 1 year unless a new joint resolution approving a 1-year renewal of the import ban is enacted into law prior to the anniversary of the date of enactment of the BFDA. The current import ban remains in effect through July 28, 2009.

As originally enacted, section 9(b)(3) also limited the imposition of import restrictions to a maximum of 3 years from the date of enactment, or until 2006. In 2006, a joint resolution was introduced to extend this period to a maximum of 6 years from the date of enactment, or until 2009. Specifically, H.J. Res. 86 was introduced in the House on May 19, 2006, and S.J. Res. 38 was introduced in the Senate on May 26, 2006. The House passed H.J. Res. 86 on July 11, 2006 by voice vote. H.J. Res. 86 was placed on the Senate calendar on July 26, 2006 and passed without amendment by voice vote. The President signed the joint resolution on August 1, 2006 (Pub. L. 109-251).

S.J. Res. 17 renews the import ban for another year, in accordance with section 9(b) of the BFDA. The resolution also extends the limitation on the import restrictions to a maximum of 9 years from the date of enactment, or until 2012. A similar resolution (H.J. Res. 56), which included budgetary offsets, was passed by the House on July 21, 2009, by voice vote. H.J. Res. 56 was received by the Sen-

ate on July 22, 2009, and passed by Unanimous Consent on July 23, 2009. The resolution was signed by the President on July 28, 2009.

3. S.J. Res. 17 Is a “Renewal Resolution” for Purposes of Extending Import Restrictions

As described above, the import restrictions in the BFDA may be renewed for a 1-year period if Congress approves a “renewal resolution,” which section 9(c)(1) defines as a joint resolution whose sole matter after the resolving clause is language to renew the import restrictions for 1 year. Section 9(c)(2)(B) applies the expedited procedures set forth in section 152 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), to Finance Committee and floor consideration of a renewal resolution.

S.J. Res. 17 does not meet the definition of “renewal resolution” under section 9(c)(1) of the BFDA because the resolution both renews the import restrictions for 1 year (section 1) and extends the limitation on annual renewal resolutions from 6 years to 9 years (section 2(a)). Section 2(b) of S.J. Res. 17, however, deems the resolution to be a “renewal resolution” for purposes of section 9 of the BFDA. The effect of section 2(b) is to qualify S.J. Res. 17 as a renewal resolution for the purpose of extending the import restrictions for 1 year under section 9(b)(2) of the Act; however, section 2(b) does not trigger the application of the expedited procedures set forth in section 9(c)(2)(B) of the BFDA.

S.J. Res. 17 was introduced in the Senate before receipt of H.J. Res. 56 from the House, and the House passed its resolution before the Committee reported the Senate measure. Thus, upon receipt of the House-passed measure, the House resolution was placed on the Senate calendar, and the Committee continued to report the Senate measure. After the Committee reported the Senate measure, the vote on passage in the Senate was on the House-passed measure.

4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 17

The Committee considered S.J. Res. 17 in open executive session on July 23, 2009.

With a quorum present, the Committee approved S.J. Res. 17 by voice vote. (Note: Senator Enzi asked for the record to reflect that he voted “nay”.)

The Chairman reported the resolution to the Senate on July 23, 2009.

5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade Sanctions Against Burma

On July 21, 2009, the U.S. Department of State submitted to Congress a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma, as required by section 8(b)(3) of the BFDA. At the request of the Chairman, that report was made a part of the record of the Committee’s consideration of S.J. Res. 17. The State Department report is reprinted below:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, DC, July 20, 2009.

Hon. MAX BAUCUS,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The enclosed report reviews measures to promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the effectiveness of the trade provisions in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108–61) to improve conditions in Burma and advance U.S. policy objectives. This report also discusses the importance of maintaining the import ban contained in the Act.

We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we may be of further assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

RICHARD R. VERMA,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.

Enclosure:

As stated.

REPORT ON U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Pursuant to section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, P.L. 108–61 (the BFDA), and in view of the impending expiration of the import ban contained in the BFDA, this report reviews bilateral and multilateral measures to promote human rights and democracy in Burma and assesses the effectiveness of the Act's trade provisions relative to the improvement of conditions in Burma and the furtherance of U.S. policy objectives.

During this reporting period (May 2008 to July 2009), the United States tightened economic sanctions, targeting additional leaders and affiliates of the Burmese regime, and added new sanctions pursuant to the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P.L. 110–286). These restrictions make it more difficult and costly for regime leaders and their affiliates to continue to profit from the repression of the Burmese people. Despite these measures, expanding trade with countries in the region and continued income from the exploitation of Burma's natural gas reserves provided the regime the economic means to maintain its military rule. In the absence of concrete progress toward respect for human rights, transition to democracy, and other key policy goals, the State Department supports a renewal resolution to maintain the import ban.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL MEASURES

During the reporting period, the United States intensified its efforts to promote human rights and democracy in Burma through diplomatic engagement with key stakeholders in Southeast Asia and beyond, by supporting UN action on Burma, and by expanding targeted sanctions on the Burmese leadership and its financial supporters. The United States continued to push for international pressure on Burmese authorities to begin a dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority representatives on a transition to democ-

racy. The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon maintained regular contact with representatives of civil society and ethnic minority groups, and used every possible interaction with Burmese officials to advocate respect for human rights and encourage political reform.

Senior U.S. officials encouraged their counterparts in the region and other like-minded states to press the regime to take concrete and credible actions towards national reconciliation and democratic transition. The European Union, Australia, and Canada each maintain financial and trade sanctions against the Burmese regime. All three continue to impose restrictions on Burmese imports (focusing on gems and timber) as well as targeted financial sanctions against senior Burmese government members and their inner circle of supporters.

The United States has consistently pushed for the United Nations to keep pressure on the regime through the UN Security Council and more effective engagement by the UN Secretary General's Good Offices Mission. On May 2, 2008, the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement that called for the regime to hold a free and fair constitutional referendum including full participation of all political actors and respect for fundamental political freedoms. On May 22, 2009, the Security Council issued a press statement that expressed concern about the political impact of the trial of National League for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. It also reiterated the need for Burma to create the conditions necessary for dialogue in order to achieve national reconciliation, including the release of political prisoners. UN Special Advisor on Burma Ibrahim Gambari also briefed the UN Security Council and the Group of Friends.

On April 30, 2008, the President issued an Executive Order that expanded the scope of financial sanctions against the regime by permitting the targeting of entities owned or controlled by the Burmese government or its officials. On July 29, 2008, the President signed the JADE Act, which imposed additional visa restrictions and financial sanctions and expanded a prohibition on the importation of Burmese jadeite and rubies to include jadeite and rubies, and articles of jewelry containing them. The prohibition on entry into the United States of such jadeite and rubies, and articles of jewelry containing them, is expected to hinder the ability of the Burmese regime to market rough jadeite and rubies to the international jewelry industry, which will no longer be able to export such items to the U.S. market. On the same day, the President also announced financial sanctions against 10 new businesses and individuals. On January 15, 2009, the United States imposed financial sanctions on an additional 25 companies and individuals who provide support to the regime. The United States continues active efforts to identify regime officials and cronies. To date, the United States has sanctioned 17 financial supporters of the regime and their family members, and 41 of their companies.

EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON SITUATION IN BURMA

U.S. economic sanctions have made it more difficult and more costly for the Burmese regime and its financial supporters to continue profiting from their repressive policies. Senior Burmese regime officials, such as the Foreign Minister, have publicly complained about sanctions and called for them to be lifted. Influential

businessmen in Rangoon with connections to the regime have increasingly complained about the detrimental effects sanctions have had on their business operations and personal lives. Between May 1, 2008, and July 10, 2009, 109 transactions totaling approximately \$5,133,000 and involving Burmese individuals or entities were reported to the Treasury Department as blocked. Despite these consequences, the Burmese regime has given no indication that it is open to meaningful democratization.

During the reporting period, the Treasury Department issued 63 licenses authorizing the release of blocked funds or otherwise prohibited transactions, for example, to allow NGOs to conduct non-humanitarian transactions, including agricultural development, microfinance, and education projects. In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, which devastated Burma in May 2008, the Department of the Treasury issued General License 14, which, as subsequently amended, continues to provide a broad authorization for funds transfers in support of humanitarian and religious activities in Burma.

While the United States and others continue to look at ways to target sanctions against the Burmese authorities, growing trade with countries in the region and increased income from the exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits has provided the regime the economic means to retain power. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Burma's GDP grew roughly 3.4 percent in 2007, due primarily to rising prices for petroleum and agricultural exports. According to Burma's Ministry of Commerce, total trade reached \$10.4 billion in 2008, with exports of \$6.6 billion and imports of \$3.8 billion. Nevertheless, foreign investment falls well below potential investment levels, as the Burmese business climate continues to worsen.

The regime continued to commit gross human rights abuses during this reporting period. The military regime severely restricted and frequently violated freedom of assembly, expression, association, movement, and religion. Human rights abuses have included custodial abuses and deaths, disappearances, rape, torture, recruitment of child soldiers, and forced labor. The government continued to infiltrate and covertly and overtly monitor meetings and activities of virtually all non-governmental organizations, including religious organizations.

In November and December 2008, the Burmese authorities sentenced more than 150 political prisoners to draconian prison terms, in effect life sentences. Many of those prisoners had been held for nearly a year without being charged and were convicted of offenses relating to their participation in the pro-democracy movement, including the August and September 2007 protests (i.e., the "Saffron Revolution"). Others, such as political activist and comedian Zarganar, were convicted of crimes after criticizing the Burmese government's failure to respond following the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis. Although the authorities granted amnesty to nearly 10,000 prisoners during the reporting period, fewer than 40 of those released were political prisoners. Burmese authorities continue to hold an estimated 2,100 political prisoners.

On May 14, 2009, Burmese authorities charged democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi on spurious counts of violating her house arrest and transferred her to Insein Prison. She was subse-

quently put on trial; as of the writing of this report, that trial is ongoing. The United States has joined with many other countries in condemning her arrest and the related judicial proceedings.

EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON BROADER U.S. INTERESTS

Intensified sanctions targeting regime leaders and their financial supporters sent a clear signal to the regime and to the Burmese people of support for a transition to democracy. Many individuals in the Burmese democracy movement support U.S. sanctions. However, some academics and exiled Burmese have questioned whether U.S. sanctions have any chance of success without the participation of Burma's major trading partners, including China, India, ASEAN members, and other countries in the region.

The trade-related and financial sanctions implemented pursuant to the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (BFDA) and Executive Orders 13047, 13310, 13448, and 13464 have had a limited impact on U.S. relations with other nations. Although some foreign businesses and their representative embassies have complained about the impact of sanctions, those investing in Burma since 2003 have done so recognizing the difficult operating environment and overall poor economic climate created by the regime.

The restrictions contained in the JADE Act that amend the BFDA on the importation of jadeite and rubies into the United States have an impact on other countries that process jadeite and rubies. Thailand specifically has expressed strong concern over the negative impact the JADE Act provisions have had on its ruby-processing and jewelry manufacturing industry.

CONCLUSION

Burma's generals continue to ignore the desire of the Burmese people for democracy and respect for human rights. Nonetheless, the Administration's support for Burma's democracy movement remains firm. The United States continues to work within the UN and with countries in Southeast Asia and beyond to promote a peaceful transition to democracy. Economic sanctions are one important tool for exerting pressure on the regime to respect the will of the Burmese people and to cooperate with the international community's efforts to facilitate a genuine dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority representatives on a transition to democracy. In the absence of concrete progress on the part of the Burmese authorities in key areas of democracy and human rights, failure to renew the import ban in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act as amended by the JADE Act, would send Burma's ruling generals the wrong message. The Department of State supports a resolution to extend the authorization period for the BFDA, which will otherwise expire this year, and to renew the BFDA sanctions for another year.

6. Additional international sanctions against Burma

The international community has joined with the United States in protesting human rights conditions in Burma. The European Union, Australia, and Canada each maintain financial and trade sanctions against the Burmese regime. All three continue to impose restrictions on Burmese imports, focusing on gems and timber, as well as targeted financial sanctions against senior Burmese govern-

ment members and their inner circle of supporters. In May 2008, the United Nations Security Council issued a Presidential Statement that called on the Burmese Government to hold a free and fair constitutional referendum, and to allow greater humanitarian aid to enter the country.

II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION

U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, DC, July 23, 2009.

Hon. MAX BAUCUS,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S.J. Res. 17, a joint resolution approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, and for other purposes.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Zachary Epstein, who can be reached at 226-2680.

Sincerely,

ROBERT A. SUNSHINE
(For Douglas W. Elmendorf).

Enclosure.

S.J. Res. 17—A joint resolution approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, and for other purposes

Summary—S.J. Res. 17 would renew for one year the ban on all imports from Burma, including a ban on imports of certain gemstones originating from Burma. The ban was originally enacted as the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-61) and was set to expire on July 28, 2004. The ban has subsequently been renewed five times, most recently in Public Law 110-287, through its current expiration date of July 28, 2009. Previous legislation limited renewals of the ban to a total of six years. This joint resolution would increase that limit to nine years, thereby allowing three additional one-year bans.

CBO estimates that extending the ban on U.S. imports from Burma would reduce federal revenues by less than \$500,000 in 2009 and by about \$2 million in 2010, with no effect thereafter. CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 17 would not affect federal spending.

Under S.J. Res. 17, the President could lift the import restrictions if the State Peace and Development Council, the military regime of Burma, has made substantial and measurable progress to end violations of human rights, implemented a democratic government, and met its obligations under international counter-narcotics agreements. The President also would have the authority to terminate the restrictions upon the request of a democratically elected government in Burma or waive them in the national interest.

By renewing the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 17 would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). Based on information from the U.S.

International Trade Commission (USITC), CBO estimates that the aggregate direct cost of the mandates would fall below the annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in UMRA (\$139 million in 2009, adjusted annually for inflation). S.J. Res. 17 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated impact of S.J. Res. 17 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 750 (administration of justice).

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars—												
2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2009–2014	2009–2019
CHANGES IN REVENUES												
Estimated Revenues	*	–2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	–2	–2
Note: * = Revenue loss less than \$500,000.												

Note: * = Revenue loss less than \$500,000.

Basis of estimate: Under S.J. Res. 17, the President would have the authority to lift or waive the ban imposed by the resolution. For this estimate, CBO assumes that the President would not exercise this authority before the termination of the one-year ban.

Based on data from the USITC on past U.S. imports from Burma and CBO's most recent forecast of total U.S. imports, CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 17 would reduce federal revenues by less than \$500,000 in 2009 and by about \$2 million in 2010, net of income and payroll tax offsets.

In years just before the import ban first went into effect, over half of all U.S. imports from Burma were knitted or crocheted clothing and apparel goods. The remaining imports included apparel items not knitted or crocheted, certain types of fish and crustaceans, goods made of wood, certain precious and semiprecious stones and metals, and woven fabrics and tapestries. In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80 percent of duties collected on these imports came from knitted and crocheted articles, CBO assumes that most of the banned imports would be replaced with imports from other countries.

The President could remove the ban on imports upon the request of a democratically elected government in Burma or if he were to determine and notify the Congress that to do so is in the national interest. Should the ban be lifted, U.S. companies would be allowed to resume importation of goods produced, manufactured, grown, or assembled in Burma. If such an action were taken during the 2009–2010 period, the impact on federal revenues would be reduced accordingly.

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: By renewing for one year the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 17 would impose private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. The cost of the mandate would be the net value of forgone profits from banned Burmese products. According to information from the USITC, the value of imports from Burma was approximately \$356 million in 2002 and \$276 million in 2003. Based on trade data from the USITC, CBO concludes that importers have been able to substitute goods from other countries, mostly within the region, to compensate for a large portion of the trade loss with Burma. Based on that information, CBO estimates that the cost of the mandate

would likely fall below the annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in UMRA (\$139 million in 2009, adjusted annually for inflation). CBO has determined that S.J. Res. 17 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Zachary Epstein; Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Burke Doherty; Impact on the Private Sector: Marin Randall.

Estimate approved by: Frank Sammartino, Acting Assistant Director for Tax Analysis.

III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION AND OTHER MATTERS

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states that the resolution will not significantly regulate any individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy of individuals, and will result in no significant additional paperwork.

The following information is provided in accordance with section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (Pub. L. 104–04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions of S.J. Res. 17 as approved by the Committee on July 23, 2009. In accordance with the requirement of Pub. L. 104–04, the Committee has determined that the bill contains no intergovernment mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.

IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the resolution, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):

BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

* * * * *

SEC. 9. DURATION OF SANCTIONS.

* * * * *

(3) LIMITATION.—The import restrictions contained in section 3(a)(1) may be renewed for a maximum of **[six years]** *nine years* from the date of the enactment of this Act.

* * * * *