[Senate Report 111-347]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


111th                       SENATE                 Report
2d Session                                         111-347
===================================================================
 
                      IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE
                        ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST
                     JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR.




               November 16, 2010.--Ordered to be printed

 Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of November 15, 2010

111th Congress 
 2d Session                      SENATE                          Report
                                                                111-347
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     



                              R E P O R T

                                 of the

                      IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE

                        ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST

                     JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR.




               November 16, 2010.--Ordered to be printed

 Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of November 15, 2010
                      IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE
         On the Articles Against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.
                  CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri, Chairman
                  ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Vice Chairman

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island     JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico                ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware          JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho

                            COMMITTEE STAFF

           Derron R. Parks, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
   Thomas L. Jipping, Deputy Staff Director and Deputy Chief Counsel
                         Justin S. Kim, Counsel
                       Rebecca S. Seidel, Counsel
            Erin P. Johnson, Deputy Counsel and Chief Clerk
                Lake Dishman, Professional Staff Member

                  Congressional Research Service Staff

        Susan Navarro Smelcer, Analyst on the Federal Judiciary

                       Senate Legal Counsel Staff

                Morgan J. Frankel, Senate Legal Counsel
            Patricia Mack Bryan, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel
             Grant R. Vinik, Assistant Senate Legal Counsel
          Thomas E. Caballero, Assistant Senate Legal Counsel
                            ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

    The Committee gratefully acknowledges the high standard of 
professionalism and long hours of dedicated service of its 
staff. The Committee also expresses its appreciation to Lynden 
C. Armstrong, Chief Clerk of the Committee on Rules and 
Administration, and to the following staff of Committee 
members:

                       Staff of Committee Members

              Senator McCASKILL, Chairman, Derron R. Parks
            Senator HATCH, Vice Chairman, Thomas L. Jipping
                    Senator KLOBUCHAR, Paige Herwig
     Senator WHITEHOUSE, Stephen C.N. Lilley and Justin G. Florence
                    Senator UDALL, Matthew T. Nelson
                   Senator SHAHEEN, Thomas J. Maloney
                      Senator KAUFMAN, Nhan Nguyen
                      Senator DeMINT, Erica Suares
                     Senator BARRASSO, Bryn Stewart
                      Senator WICKER, Emily Ferris
                    Senator JOHANNS, Sarah Novascone
                      Senator RISCH, Jason Bohrer

                                Interns

                           Christian Dibblee
                             Timothy Holman
                            Hannah Lockhart
                             Annie Moulton
                            Michael Naclerio
                             Patrick Sadler


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Introduction.....................................................     1

                                PART ONE

Certification to the Senate of the Committee's Proceedings.......     3

                                PART TWO

Summary of the Evidence..........................................     4
Procedural History...............................................     5
 I. Article I.........................................................6
    A. Text of the Article.......................................     6
    B. Introduction to the Evidence..............................     7
    C. Statement of Facts........................................     7
        1. Conduct While a State Court Judge and Curatorships....     7
            a. The House's perspective...........................    10
            b. Judge Porteous's perspective......................    10
        2. Conduct While a Federal Court Judge and Lifemark 
          Hospitals v. Liljeberg Enterprises.....................    10
            a. The House's perspective...........................    14
            b. Judge Porteous's perspective......................    14
    D. Expert Testimony..........................................    15
        1. Professor Charles G. Geyh.............................    15
        2. Professor Dane Ciolino................................    15
II. Article II.......................................................16
    A. Text of the Article.......................................    16
    B. Introduction to the Evidence..............................    17
    C. Statement of Facts........................................    17
        1. Conduct While a State Court Judge and Relationship 
          with the Marcottes.....................................    17
            a. Bail bonds process and alleged favors.............    17
              i. The House's perspective.........................    21
              ii. Judge Porteous's perspective...................    22
            b. Set aside and expungement of criminal convictions.    24
              i. The House's perspective.........................    26
              ii. Judge Porteous's perspective...................    27
            c. Louis Marcotte's interview with the FBI...........    28
              i. The House's perspective.........................    29
              ii. Judge Porteous's perspective...................    29
        2. Conduct While a Federal Court Judge and Relationships 
          with the Marcottes.....................................    29
            a. The House's perspective...........................    31
            b. Judge Porteous's perspective......................    31
    D. Expert Testimony..........................................    32
        1. Professor Charles G. Geyh.............................    32
        2. Professor Dane Ciolino................................    32
III.Article III......................................................33

    A. Text of the Article.......................................    33
    B. Introduction to the Evidence..............................    33
    C. Statement of Facts........................................    33
        1. Background............................................    33
        2. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Overview........................    34
        3. Judge Porteous's Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filings........    35
        4. May 9 Creditors Meeting and June 28 Confirmation of 
          the Chapter 13 Plan....................................    38
        5. Gambling-Related Activity and Extensions of Credit....    39
        6. FBI Investigation into Judge Porteous's Bankruptcy 
          Filings................................................    41
    D. Contested Issues..........................................    42
        1. Using a False Name and Post Office Box on the Original 
          Bankruptcy Petition....................................    42
        2. Concealing Assets and Income..........................    43
        3. Incurring Debt Through the Use of Casino Markers......    46
        4. Preferential Payments to Creditors....................    47
        5. Concealing Gambling Losses............................    49
        6. Incurring More Debt in Violation of Judge Greendyke's 
          Order..................................................    50
        7. The Materiality of Judge Porteous's Conduct...........    50
    E. Expert Testimony..........................................    51
        1. Advice of Counsel.....................................    51
        2. Judge Greendyke's Admonishment Against Incurring More 
          Debt...................................................    52
IV. Article IV.......................................................52
    A. Text of the Article.......................................    52
    B. Introduction to the Evidence..............................    53
    C. Statement of Facts........................................    53
        1. FBI Interviews........................................    54
            a. Initial interviews................................    54
            b. Follow-up interviews..............................    56
        2. Nomination and Senate Confirmation....................    57
    D. Contested Issues..........................................    58
        1. The House's Perspective...............................    58
        2. Judge Porteous's Perspective..........................    58
    E. Expert Testimony..........................................    59
        1. Professor Charles G. Geyh.............................    59
        2. Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie.........................    59
Committee Rollcall Vote..........................................    61

                                ADDENDA

A. Rule XI of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate 
  When Sitting on Impeachment Trials ............................    61
B. Senate Resolution 458.........................................    62
C. Description of Committee Proceedings..........................    63
D. Glossary of Names Appearing in the Committee Report...........    65


          ON THE IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR.

                                _______
                                

               November 16, 2010.--Ordered to be printed

 Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of November 15, 2010

                                _______
                                

 Mrs. McCaskill, from the Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles 
     Against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                              INTRODUCTION

    The United States Constitution provides: ``The President, 
Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction 
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''\1\ The Constitution gives the ``sole Power of 
Impeachment''\2\ to the House of Representatives and the ``sole 
Power to try all Impeachments''\3\ to the Senate.
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    \1\U.S. Const., art. II, Sec.  1A4. While the Constitution does not 
define ``civil Officers of the United States,'' the House and Senate 
have consistently found federal judges to be in this category. Not 
including Judge Porteous, the House has impeached eighteen federal 
officials, fourteen of whom have been judges. Of these fourteen, the 
Senate has convicted seven and acquitted four. The remaining three 
judges resigned before their trials could be completed.
    \2\Id., art. I, 2.
    \3\Id., art. I, 3.
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    On March 17, 2010, pursuant to Rule XI of the Rules of 
Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
Impeachment Trials,\4\ the Senate created this Impeachment 
Trial Committee with its adoption of Senate Resolution 458. 
This resolution authorized the Committee ``to receive and to 
report evidence'' with respect to the articles of impeachment 
presented by the House against U.S. District Court Judge G. 
Thomas Porteous, Jr., of the Eastern District of Louisiana.\5\ 
Pursuant to its mandate, the Committee received evidence on the 
following articles:
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    \4\The text of Rule XI appears as Addendum A to this report.
    \5\The text of Senate Resolution 458 appears as Addendum B to this 
report.
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    Article I alleges that, while a federal judge, Judge 
Porteous improperly denied a motion to recuse himself from 
presiding over a case, despite having a ``corrupt financial 
relationship'' with a law firm representing one of the parties 
to the case. He also allegedly misrepresented this relationship 
during the recusal hearing. Additionally, while the case was 
under advisement, Judge Porteous solicited and accepted things 
of value, including thousands of dollars in cash, from 
attorneys appearing before him.
    Article II alleges ``a longstanding pattern of corrupt 
conduct'' with former bail bondsmen. While on the state court 
bench, Judge Porteous favorably set and structured bonds and 
performed other official acts for bail bondsmen while 
soliciting and accepting things of value from them. As a 
federal judge, he continued to receive things of value in 
exchange for ``us[ing] the power and prestige of his office'' 
to help these bondsmen form corrupt relationships with state 
court judges. Finally, Judge Porteous is alleged to have known 
that one bondsman made false statements to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) in an effort to assist Judge Porteous's 
appointment to the federal bench.
    Article III alleges that, in relation to his personal 
bankruptcy in 2001, Judge Porteous knowingly and intentionally 
made material false statements and representations in his 
bankruptcy filings under penalty of perjury and violated the 
bankruptcy court's order. These alleged actions include using a 
false name in his bankruptcy filing, concealing assets and 
debts, concealing preferential payments to creditors, 
concealing gambling losses, and incurring new debt while the 
case was pending.
    Finally, Article IV alleges that Judge Porteous knowingly 
and intentionally made material false statements to the Senate 
and to the FBI ``in order to obtain the office of United States 
District Court Judge.'' These statements include denying that 
there was anything in his background that could be used to 
influence, coerce, blackmail, or compromise him; embarrass him 
or the President if publicly known; or affect his nomination.
    Having received the evidence, the Committee has two 
responsibilities that it fulfills in this report. First, Rule 
XI directs the Committee to ``report to the Senate in writing a 
certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and 
testimony had and given before such committee.'' The Committee 
satisfies this responsibility in Part I of this report. Second, 
Senate Resolution 458 directs the Committee to ``report to the 
Senate a statement of facts that are uncontested and a summary, 
with appropriate references to the record, of evidence that the 
parties have introduced on contested issues of fact.'' This is 
a ``neutral summary''\6\ because the Committee has no authority 
to make recommendations regarding matters as to the weight of 
the evidence or whether the Senate should vote to convict or 
acquit on the articles of impeachment.\7\ The Committee 
achieves this in Part II of this report.
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    \6\Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Procedure for the 
Impeachment Trial of U.S. District Judge Alcee L. Hastings in the 
United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Rpt. 101-1, at 74 
(February 2, 1989).
    \7\See also Report of the Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles Against Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. 
Rpt. 101-164, at 3 (October 16, 1989) (stating that the Committee ``has 
no authority to recommend to the Senate whether the Senate should vote 
to convict or to acquit Judge Nixon on the Articles of Impeachment''); 
Report of the Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles Against Judge 
Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Rpt. 101-156, at 3 
(October 2, 1989) (Hastings Committee Report) (stating that the 
Committee ``has no authority to recommend whether the Senate should 
vote to convict or to acquit on the articles of impeachment''); id. at 
10 (``The Committee's report is meant to be a neutral statement that 
neither explicitly nor implicitly urges a particular result in the 
case, or on any aspect of it.''); id. at 11 (``In accordance with its 
limited mandate, the Committee as a whole takes no view of the 
evidence.''); On the Impeachment of Harry E. Claiborne, 99th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., S. Rpt. 99-511, at 1 (October 1, 1986) (``Senate Impeachment 
Rule XI does not authorize the Committee to make recommendations to the 
Senate.'').
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  PART ONE--CERTIFICATION TO THE SENATE OF THE COMMITTEE'S PROCEEDINGS

    The record of the Committee's proceedings is printed in the 
Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles Against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.: Hearings Before 
the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, S. Hrg. 111-691, 111th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (2010). The Committee met on November 16, 
2010, and, as Rule XI directs, certified the hearing report to 
be a copy of the transcript of proceedings had and testimony 
given before it.\8\ The roll call vote appears after the 
summary of the evidence.
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    \8\To further assist Senators, Addendum C to this report provides a 
brief narrative description of the Committee's proceedings.
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    Part 1 of this hearing report contains the Committee's pre-
trial proceedings, from its creation on March 17, 2010, to the 
start of its evidentiary hearings on September 13, 2010. Part 2 
consists of the transcript of the Committee's evidentiary 
hearings.\9\ Part 3 contains the exhibits admitted during and 
after the Committee's evidentiary hearings, demonstrative 
exhibits used during the hearing, the parties' proposed 
findings of fact, and other post-trial filings.
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    \9\Twenty-six witnesses testified before the Committee's 
evidentiary hearings. Each was subject to examination and cross-
examination by the parties and to questions from Committee members.
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    Prior to the consideration of the articles of impeachment 
before the full Senate, each Senator will receive copies of 
post-trial briefs from the parties. These post-trial briefs 
present the House's and Judge Porteous's positions on matters 
of fact and law. Each side will also have the opportunity to 
present a summation to the full Senate. The Senate will then 
meet in closed session to deliberate on the merits of the 
articles. Each article is to be voted on separately, and the 
question presented will be whether the respondent, Judge 
Porteous, is ``guilty'' or ``not guilty'' of the article at 
issue.
    The Committee highlights one unresolved matter from its 
pre-trial proceedings. Prior to the evidentiary hearings, both 
parties filed a number of pre-trial motions. These included 
motions to dismiss the articles of impeachment, individually 
and collectively. The Committee declined to act on Judge 
Porteous's motions to dismiss separately each article because 
it is not authorized to dismiss articles of impeachment. If 
Judge Porteous seeks to renew these motions before the full 
Senate, in which case the Senate may decide whether to hear 
argument on these issues and vote separately on the motions or 
whether to consider the issues raised by the motions in the 
context of its disposition of the articles of impeachment.
    Upon the Senate's receipt of this report, Rule XI provides 
that ``the evidence so received and the testimony so taken 
shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the 
right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and 
materiality, as having been received and taken before the 
Senate.'' Thus, the Senate remains the master of the record 
before it and may review the admissibility of the evidence 
received by the Committee and summon witnesses to testify 
before the full Senate.
    There remains a question of the appropriate standard of 
proof for impeachment trials. The Committee notes that during 
his 1986 impeachment trial, U.S. District Judge Harry E. 
Claiborne moved ``to designate `Beyond a Reasonable Doubt' as 
the standard of proof in [his] impeachment trial.''\10\ The 
Senate's Presiding Officer ruled that ``the question of 
standard of evidence is for each Senator to decide individually 
when voting on Articles of Impeachment.''\11\ Upon a Senator's 
request, Judge Claiborne's motion was submitted to the full 
Senate, which voted 17-75 against it, thereby declining to 
establish an obligatory standard.\12\ Each Senator may, 
therefore, use the standard of proof that he or she feels is 
appropriate.
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    \10\132 Cong. Rec. 29152 (Oct. 7, 1986).
    \11\Id.
    \12\Id. at 29153; see also Hastings Committee Report, supra note 7, 
at 5.
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                   PART TWO--SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE


                              Introduction

    The Committee's basic responsibility to receive and report 
evidence is the same as in the three previous impeachments for 
which an impeachment trial committee was used. Carrying out 
that responsibility, however, is unique to each impeachment 
trial. As a result, this report's format and content are guided 
by the responsibilities assigned to the Committee by Rule XI 
and Senate Resolution 458, the nature of these particular 
articles of impeachment, and the evidence in this case. The 
Committee has not sought to present every fact to which the 
parties might attribute some meaning and has undoubtedly 
included facts that one party might consider irrelevant. The 
evidentiary summary does, however, attempt to describe those 
matters that the Committee understands to be the chief factual 
issues and to explain the significance of factual 
controversies.
    This report is not a substitute for the parties' own 
marshaling of facts and arguments in support of their positions 
and is but one resource that the Senate may use in this case. 
The principal discussion of each party's view of the evidence 
and the overall case will be found not in this report but in 
the parties' written briefs and oral summation before the 
Senate. The Committee's description of the parties' arguments 
or perspectives in this report is intended only to aid in 
providing a coherent and meaningful summary.
    The summary of the evidence begins with a procedural 
history, which provides an overview of various proceedings in 
this matter that occurred prior to the Senate trial. This 
procedural history is followed by a discussion of the evidence 
pertaining to each article of impeachment against Judge 
Porteous. As the articles allege relatively distinct patterns 
or sets of conduct, this report will present this discussion in 
four separate sections, one for each article. In each section, 
the text of each article, as drafted by the House, will be 
presented, followed by a presentation of the uncontested and 
contested facts relevant to that article.\13\
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    \13\The full text of the articles were also published within S. 
Doc. 111-13.
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    The Committee has sought to indicate when there is 
conflicting evidence on any factual matter, while also 
presenting a report that is coherent and readable. To that end, 
the discussions of Articles I and II, which rely heavily on 
witness testimony, integrate uncontested and contested facts to 
a greater degree than the discussions of Articles III and IV, 
which rely more heavily on documentary evidence.\14\ Citation 
to exhibits and testimony will reference the record as 
contained in the hearing report.\15\
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    \14\Addendum D contains a glossary of persons who are frequently 
mentioned in this report.
    \15\Citations in this report, whether witness testimony (identified 
by last name), stipulations, or exhibits, will include the part and 
page number of the hearing report. The parties' stipulations are found 
in Part 1C; a transcript of the evidentiary hearings are found in Parts 
2A and 2B; and exhibits appear in Parts 3B through 3E of the certified 
record. Generally, exhibits initially identified by the House are 
numbered between 1-530; those identified by Judge Porteous are numbered 
between 1001-2007.
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                           Procedural History

    Judge Porteous served as a judge on Louisiana's 24th 
Judicial District Court (JDC) from 1984 until 1994, when 
President William J. Clinton appointed him to the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. In 1999, an FBI 
probe into corruption involving judges on the 24th JDC, known 
as ``Operation Wrinkled Robe,'' uncovered allegations of 
corruption involving Judge Porteous. While declining to seek 
criminal charges against Judge Porteous, the Department of 
Justice submitted a complaint of judicial misconduct to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in May 2007.\16\ 
The conduct alleged in the complaint corresponds to the 
allegations in the first and third articles of impeachment now 
before the Senate.
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    \16\In the letter submitting a judicial misconduct complaint to the 
Fifth Circuit, the Department of Justice cited factors contributing to 
its decision not to prosecute Judge Porteous. These include ``the 
relevant statute of limitations'' regarding some incidents; whether the 
government could prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to a 
unanimous jury; whether the government could prove elements such as 
materiality and an intent to deceive; the need for ``consistency in 
charging decisions concerning bankruptcy and criminal contempt 
matters''; and ``the availability of alternative remedies for Judge 
Porteous's history of misconduct while on the bench, including 
impeachment and judicial sanctions.'' Ex. 4, 3B at 378-388. In 2006, 
while a target of a federal grand jury investigation, Judge Porteous 
signed three agreements extending for a total of five months the five-
year statute of limitations regarding certain federal crimes. These 
agreements did not affect the statute of limitations that had expired 
prior to April 2006. Exs. 1003-1005, 3E at 5538-5546.
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    The Judicial Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit appointed a Special Investigatory Committee to 
investigate the allegations concluded that Judge Porteous 
committed judicial misconduct that ``might constitute one or 
more grounds for impeachment.''\17\ On December 20, 2007, the 
Fifth Circuit Judicial Council voted 15-4 to conclude that 
Judge Porteous ``has engaged in conduct which might constitute 
one or more grounds for impeachment under Article II of the 
Constitution.''\18\ Ex. 5, 3B at 464. The Council also voted to 
certify the Justice Department's complaint to the Judicial 
Conference of the United States.\19\
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    \17\The Fifth Circuit Judicial Council is comprised of the Chief 
Judge, nine Fifth Circuit judges, and nine U.S. District Court judges.
    \18\Four dissenting judges agreed that Judge Porteous must be 
publicly reprimanded ``for legal and ethical misconduct during his 
tenure as a federal judge'' but disagreed ``that the evidence 
demonstrates a possible ground for his impeachment and removal from 
office.'' Ex. 6(b), 3B at 472.
    \19\Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 354(b)(2)(A), a judicial council 
``shall promptly certify . . . to the Judicial Conference of the United 
States'' a determination ``that a judge appointed to hold office during 
good behavior may have engaged in conduct which might constitute one or 
more grounds for impeachment under article II of the Constitution.''
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    On June 17, 2008, the Judicial Conference voted unanimously 
to certify to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 
that ``consideration of impeachment of United States District 
Judge G. Thomas Porteous (E.D. La.) may be warranted.'' Ex. 
7(b), 3B at 536. On September 10, 2008, the Fifth Circuit 
Judicial Council issued a public reprimand of Judge Porteous 
for ``conduct that is prejudicial to the effective and 
expeditious administration of the business of the courts'' and 
that ``brought disrepute to the federal judiciary.'' The 
Council ordered that no new cases be assigned to Judge Porteous 
and suspended his authority to employ staff for two years or 
``until Congress takes final action on the impeachment 
proceedings, whichever occurs earlier.''\20\ Ex. 8, 3B at 594-
601.
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    \20\On September 8, 2010, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council 
extended this effective suspension until December 31, 2010.
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    On September 17, 2008, the House of Representatives adopted 
House Resolution 1448, authorizing the Judiciary Committee to 
inquire whether the House should impeach Judge Porteous. A 
Judicial Impeachment Task Force comprised of 12 House members 
held four hearings in November and December 2009. On January 
21, 2010, the Task Force voted unanimously to recommend four 
articles of impeachment, followed by a unanimous vote of the 
House Judiciary Committee on January 27, 2010. The House, in 
turn, voted unanimously to approve each of the four articles of 
impeachment on March 11, 2010.\21\
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    \21\156 Cong. Rec. H1335-37 (daily ed. March 11, 2010).
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                              I. ARTICLE I

A. Text of the Article

    G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., while a Federal judge of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, engaged in a pattern of conduct that is incompatible 
with the trust and confidence placed in him as a Federal judge, 
as follows:
    Judge Porteous, while presiding as a United States district 
judge in Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. v. Liljeberg 
Enterprises, denied a motion to recuse himself from the case, 
despite the fact that he had a corrupt financial relationship 
with the law firm of Amato & Creely, P.C. which had entered the 
case to represent Liljeberg. In denying the motion to recuse, 
and in contravention of clear canons of judicial ethics, Judge 
Porteous failed to disclose that beginning in or about the late 
1980s while he was a State court judge in the 24th JDC in the 
State of Louisiana, he engaged in a corrupt scheme with 
attorneys, Jacob Amato, Jr., and Robert Creely, whereby Judge 
Porteous appointed Amato's law partner as a ``curator'' in 
hundreds of cases and thereafter requested and accepted from 
Amato & Creely a portion of the curatorship fees which had been 
paid to the firm. During the period of this scheme, the fees 
received by Amato & Creely amounted to approximately $40,000, 
and the amounts paid by Amato & Creely to Judge Porteous 
amounted to approximately $20,000.
    Judge Porteous also made intentionally misleading 
statements at the recusal hearing intended to minimize the 
extent of his personal relationship with the two attorneys. In 
so doing, and in failing to disclose to Lifemark and its 
counsel the true circumstances of his relationship with the 
Amato & Creely law firm, Judge Porteous deprived the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals of critical information for its review 
of a petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to overrule 
Judge Porteous's denial of the recusal motion. His conduct 
deprived the parties and the public of the right to the honest 
services of his office.
    Judge Porteous also engaged in corrupt conduct after the 
Lifemark v. Liljeberg bench trial, and while he had the case 
under advisement, in that he solicited and accepted things of 
value from both Amato and his law partner Creely, including a 
payment of thousands of dollars in cash. Thereafter, and 
without disclosing his corrupt relationship with the attorneys 
of Amato & Creely PLC or his receipt from them of cash and 
other things of value, Judge Porteous ruled in favor of their 
client, Liljeberg.
    By virtue of this corrupt relationship and his conduct as a 
Federal judge, Judge Porteous brought his court into scandal 
and disrepute, prejudiced public respect for, and confidence 
in, the Federal judiciary, and demonstrated that he is unfit 
for the office of Federal judge.
    Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of high 
crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office.

B. Introduction to the Evidence

    Article I addresses Judge Porteous's handling of the 
Lifemark v. Liljeberg case in light of his prior relationships 
with Jacob Amato and Robert Creely. The statement of facts 
below outlines those relationships while Judge Porteous served 
as a state court judge, as well as his handling of Lifemark v. 
Liljeberg as a federal judge. The evidence relevant to Article 
I is drawn primarily from Judge Porteous's testimony before the 
Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee,\22\ the parties' 
stipulated facts, and the testimony of Amato and Creely before 
this Committee. Due to the nature of the evidence, creating a 
cohesive narrative required integrating some contested facts 
with uncontested facts. Because Article I relies heavily on 
testimonial evidence, the credibility of witnesses and, as a 
result, the meaning of their testimony are accordingly 
important.
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    \22\Over Judge Porteous's objection, the Committee admitted into 
evidence his testimony before the Special Investigatory Committee of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which was compelled 
pursuant to an immunity order. The Committee declined the House's 
request to issue a subpoena to Judge Porteous to testify in the 
Committee's evidentiary hearings, and Judge Porteous chose not to 
testify before the Committee. See Addendum C. Therefore, the only sworn 
testimony of Judge Porteous relating to any facts underlying the 
articles of impeachment was before the Fifth Circuit Special 
Investigatory Committee.
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C. Statement of Facts

            1. Conduct While a State Court Judge and Curatorships
    Judge Porteous graduated from Louisiana State University in 
1968 and the Louisiana State University Law School in 1971. 
Stip. 5, 1C at 2526. Starting in 1973 and continuing until 
1984, he worked with Jacob Amato as an Assistant District 
Attorney in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana; for part of this time, 
Judge Porteous and Robert Creely also worked in the law firm of 
Edwards, Porteous & Amato. Stips. 8-10, 1C at 2526.\23\
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    \23\Amato and Creely practiced law together from approximately 1973 
until 2005 as partners in the law firm of Creely & Amato. Stip. 54, 1C 
at 2530.
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    After his election to the state court bench in 1984, Judge 
Porteous remained close friends with his colleagues and would 
often have lunch with Amato and with Creely. Stips. 60, 69-70, 
1C at 2531. Between 1984 and 1994, many state court judges in 
the 24th JDC went to lunch with attorneys practicing in the 
area. Stip. 62, 1C at 2531. Both Creely and Amato generally 
paid for lunches they had with state judges, including Judge 
Porteous. Stips. 62-65, 71-76, 1C at 2531-2532. In testimony 
before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee, Judge 
Porteous admitted that it was not uncommon for Creely and Amato 
to treat him to lunch and, on occasion, dinner, noting that, 
when he went out with Creely and Amato, he never paid. Ex. 10, 
3B at 794.
    In addition to dining together, judges and attorneys in 
Gretna, Louisiana, also socialized in other ways, such as 
hunting and fishing together. Stip. 81, 1C at 2532. From their 
time together in private practice through Judge Porteous's 
appointment as a federal judge, Creely and Judge Porteous 
regularly hunted and fished together, and they were often 
joined by Amato. When Robert Creely hosted judges and other 
attorneys on these trips, he usually paid for all of the 
expenses. Amato, 2A at 125-126; Creely, 2A at 257-259; see 
Stips. 79-80, 1C at 2532; Ex. 10, 3B at 800-801. To Judge 
Porteous's children, who often went along on the fishing trips, 
Amato and Creely were ``Uncle Jake'' and ``Uncle Bob.'' Timothy 
Porteous, 2B at 1155, 1157, 1164; Stip. 55, 1C at 2530.
    While serving on the state court bench, Judge Porteous 
occasionally asked Creely for money when they were having lunch 
or hunting and fishing. Creely indicated that Judge Porteous 
would ask for this money to cover ``daily living expenses'' or 
tuition for his children. Creely, 2A at 282. At first, Creely 
gave Judge Porteous whatever cash he had on hand, but over 
time, these amounts increased from under $100 to possibly as 
much as $1,000. Eventually, the amounts increased to the point 
that Creely confronted Judge Porteous, telling him, ``I'm tired 
of giving you money, I'm tired of you asking for money. This 
isn't what friends are supposed to do to one another.'' Id. at 
260-262. Creely refused to give Judge Porteous any more money 
and told him that he needed to get his finances under control. 
Judge Porteous acknowledged in testimony before the Fifth 
Circuit Special Investigatory Committee that he received money 
from Creely over a period of years but does not recall the 
total amount. There, Judge Porteous testified that he 
considered these payments to be gifts or loans but acknowledged 
that he never repaid Creely for these amounts. Ex. 10, 3B at 
785-786.
    Shortly after Creely refused to continue giving him money, 
Judge Porteous started to assign ``curatorships'' to the law 
firm of Amato & Creely.\24\ During this time period, judges on 
the 24th JDC frequently assigned attorneys as ``curators'' to 
represent the interests of absent parties in litigation. These 
curatorship cases were largely administrative, lasted 
approximately three to six months, and generated fees of 
approximately $150 to $200 per case. Amato, 2A at 132, 244-245; 
Creely, 2A at 262-263; Stips. 90, 98, 1C at 2533.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\In addition to receiving curatorship appointments from Judge 
Porteous, Creely received curatorship appointments from several other 
judges in the 24th JDC. Stip. 99, 1C at 2533.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    From 1988 through 1994, available court records show that 
Judge Porteous assigned 192 curatorships to Creely. Stips. 91-
97, 1C at 2533. According to Creely, he neither asked for nor 
wanted the curatorship appointments; he testified that ``[a] 
curator was like a pain in the neck to me.'' Creely, 2A at 263. 
However, Creely accepted the appointments, completed the work, 
and collected the fees for his law partnership. Amato, 2A at 
131-132. These curatorships are estimated to have generated 
approximately $40,000 in fees for the law firm of Creely & 
Amato. Amato, 2A at 134-135.
    During the time he was assigning curatorships to Creely, 
Judge Porteous again started asking Creely for money, and 
Creely obliged. Creely, 2A at 263-264. According to Creely and 
Amato, when Judge Porteous asked for money during this period, 
they would each take an equal draw from the law firm's general 
operating account and arrange for cash to be put in an envelope 
for Judge Porteous. Amato, 2A at 129-130; Creely, 2A at 275-
278; see also Ex. 10, 3B at 796. It was Creely's understanding 
that Judge Porteous ``didn't want checks. He wanted cash.'' 
Creely, 2A at 367. According to Amato, cash was given to 
``avoid any kind of paper trail.'' Amato, 2A at 131.
    Creely eventually began avoiding Judge Porteous because, as 
Creely testified, ``most of the time that I was around him, he 
would begin to ask me for cash.'' Creely, 2A at 266. After 
Creely started avoiding him, Judge Porteous called Creely's 
secretary asking for a portion of the fees resulting from the 
curatorship appointments. Judge Porteous testified before the 
Fifth Circuit that he does not recall this conversation. Id. at 
265; see also Ex. 10, 3B at 800. Amato confirmed that Judge 
Porteous had ``called [Creely] and hounded him and, you know, 
[asked him] where's, you know, my curator money.'' Amato, 2A at 
129. Creely testified that he was troubled by this telephone 
call because he had not drawn a connection between the money he 
gave to Judge Porteous and the fees generated by the 
curatorships Judge Porteous assigned to him. Nonetheless, 
Creely testified that it was clear to him that Judge Porteous 
made such a connection even though there was no explicit 
arrangement to that effect. Creely, 2A at 265-266, 299.
    After this telephone call, Creely testified that he told 
Amato, ``[T]his is getting out of control with a friend. I 
don't know how to handle this anymore. I don't know how to end 
this. I don't know how to control this, but it's got to stop.'' 
Id. at 266-267. Creely and Amato eventually agreed that they 
would continue to give Judge Porteous money because, given the 
firm's revenue from the curatorship fees, the payments 
``weren't costing [them] anything.'' Id. at 267, 274. While he 
never discussed the matter with Judge Porteous, Amato testified 
that he understood that Judge Porteous was assigning 
curatorships and, in turn, Creely was giving money to the judge 
from their respective draws. Amato, 2A at 127-129; Creely, 2A 
at 275. Amato characterized this activity as ``probably 
unethical more than being . . . some type of criminal offense'' 
but judged it to be a form of a kickback.\25\ Amato, 2A at 129.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\Amato testified that he told Creely that he ``thought it was 
going to turn out bad.'' Amato, 2A at 128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House proffered evidence that, ultimately, Judge 
Porteous received approximately half of the fees generated by 
the assignment of curatorships to Amato & Creely. The FBI 
calculated that, in total, Amato & Creely generated $40,000 in 
fees from the 192 curatorships that Judge Porteous assigned to 
Creely. Creely and Amato testified that, over a period of six 
years, they gave Judge Porteous $20,000, or approximately one-
half, of the total fees collected from the curatorships.\26\ 
Amato, 2A at 132, 134-135, 218-220; Creely, 2A at 268, 274-275. 
In October 1994, Judge Porteous was confirmed as a U.S. 
District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana and, 
in this position, was no longer able to assign state court 
curatorships. Creely and Amato both testified that after Judge 
Porteous's appointment to the federal bench, their monetary 
gifts to him all but ceased. Amato, 2A at 133; Creely, 2A at 
278.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\Creely further testified that this $10,000 estimate of the 
amount he himself provided also generally included the money given 
before and after the curatorships. Creely, 2A at 301-302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. The House's perspective
    The House argues that Judge Porteous assigned curatorships 
to Robert Creely as part of a kickback scheme to collect a 
portion of the generated fees. The House asserts that, given 
the amount of money involved and curatorships assigned, an 
implicit understanding existed regarding the curatorship 
appointments and the money given to Judge Porteous by Amato and 
Creely. The House insists that admissions from Judge Porteous 
during his Fifth Circuit testimony, taken as a whole, paint a 
picture of a classic kickback relationship in which Judge 
Porteous received money from Creely and Amato after assigning 
them curatorships. Ex. 10, 3B at 785. Additionally, the House 
argues that Creely's testimony that Judge Porteous called 
Creely's secretary to inquire about the money from the 
curatorships demonstrates that Judge Porteous understood a 
linkage between the curatorships and the money Creely and Amato 
gave to him. The House asserts that this view is also supported 
by evidence that Judge Porteous stopped receiving money from 
them after he became a federal judge when he could no longer 
assign curatorships to Creely and, therefore, could no longer 
ask for money generated from the assignment of those 
curatorships. Amato, 2A at 133; Creely, 2A at 278.
            b. Judge Porteous's perspective
    Judge Porteous contends that the House misrepresents his 
long-standing and close friendships with Amato and Creely, and 
that the evidence shows merely that his good friends provided 
occasional assistance. Before the Fifth Circuit Special 
Investigatory Committee, Judge Porteous testified that the 
money he received from Creely and Amato was a loan or a gift 
from friends, not a kickback from the curatorship assignments. 
Ex. 10, 3B at 785-786. Creely also denied that there was any 
explicit agreement linking the curatorships to the money given 
to Judge Porteous. As a result, Creely did not consider his 
cash gifts to Judge Porteous to constitute a kickback or a quid 
pro quo. Moreover, any money that he gave to Judge Porteous 
could not have been intended as a bribe to influence him 
because Creely did not have any pending cases before the Judge. 
Creely, 2A at 302-303, 347-348.
            2. Conduct While a Federal Court Judge and Lifemark 
                    Hospitals v. Liljeberg Enterprises
    On January 16, 1996, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc. v. 
Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc. was transferred to Judge Porteous. 
This was a complicated, non-jury civil case, filed in 1993, 
involving Louisiana law.\27\ Stip. 104, 1C at 2533. Lifemark 
financed construction of the Kenner Regional Medical Center by 
the Liljeberg family. Once built, Lifemark operated the medical 
center, and the Liljebergs operated the affiliated pharmacy. 
The Liljebergs lost the hospital through foreclosure with 
another lender. Believing that Lifemark bore at least some of 
the responsibility, the Liljebergs sought damages from 
Lifemark. Lifemark then sued the Liljebergs to end its contract 
with them, and the Liljebergs sued Lifemark to recover under 
the pharmacy contract. Mole, 2A at 383-384.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\Before being assigned to Judge Porteous, at least seven 
district court judges and three magistrates presided over various 
portions of the case. Stip. 105, 1C at 2534.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Approximately six weeks before the scheduled start of the 
bench trial, the Liljebergs filed a motion to enter the 
appearances of Jacob Amato and Leonard Levenson as counsel, 
which Judge Porteous granted four days later.\28\ Levenson, 
like Amato, was a close friend of Judge Porteous's. Stips. 108, 
110, 137, 1C at 2534. Judge Porteous testified that, unlike 
Levenson, who often handled complex civil litigation in state 
courts, Amato would not ordinarily have been involved in this 
kind of case because his background and practice were almost 
exclusively in personal injury.\29\ Ex. 10, 3B at 815. 
Liljeberg Enterprises hired both on a contingent fee basis. 
Stip. 109, 1C at 2534. The Liljebergs valued the case at 
between $15 million and $30 million, and if successful, Amato 
stood to earn between $500,000 and $1 million. Amato, 2A at 
136.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\Prior to entering the case, Amato took two to three months to 
evaluate the merits of the case in order to decide whether to enter the 
case. Stip. 113, 1C at 2534. Amato was brought in before Levenson. 
Amato, 2A at 196.
    \29\In Lifemark's motion to recuse, Lifemark attorney Joseph Mole 
describes Leonard Levenson's specialty as personal injury law. This 
differs from Judge Porteous's description of Levenson's specialty in 
the Fifth Circuit proceedings, in which he indicated that Levenson 
dealt with complex civil litigation in state courts. Ex. 10, 3B at 816-
817; Ex. 52, 3B at 1139.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Joseph Mole, Lifemark's lead attorney, was concerned by the 
timing of Amato's and Levenson's appearances in the case. After 
asking around, Mole testified that he ``developed some serious 
concerns that Mr. Amato's and Mr. Levenson's presence in the 
case would be a problem that would keep the case from having a 
fair result.'' Mole, 2A at 386-387. On October 1, 1996, 
Lifemark filed a motion to recuse Judge Porteous, which was 
accompanied by the affidavit of Mole, noting Judge Porteous's 
close relationships with Amato and Levenson. The Liljebergs 
opposed the motion. Id. at 388-389; Stip. 114, 1C at 2534.
    On October 16, 1996, Judge Porteous held a hearing on the 
motion to recuse, at which Amato and Levenson were present. 
Stips. 118-119, 1C at 2534-2535. According to the transcript of 
the hearing, Mole argued that an appearance of impropriety was 
created by the appearance of Amato and Levenson because, as 
Mole asserted at the recusal hearing, ``All they have in common 
is that they are your close friends. The public perception is 
that they dine with you, travel with you, that they have 
contributed to your campaigns.'' Judge Porteous, however, 
refuted Mole's assertion that he received campaign 
contributions from Amato and Levenson, stating, ``Well, 
luckily, I didn't have any campaigns, so I am interested to 
find out how you know that.'' Ex. 56, 3B at 1181. Judge 
Porteous noted that the one instance in which Amato and 
Levenson did contribute to his re-election campaign was through 
a ``Justice for All'' event organized by Jefferson Parish, from 
which each judge received a portion of the contributions. Judge 
Porteous stated:

          You haven't offended me. But don't misstate, don't 
        come up with a document that clearly shows well in 
        excess of $6700 with some innuendo that means that they 
        gave money to me. If you would have checked your 
        homework, you would have found that that was a Justice 
        for All Program for all judges in Jefferson Parish. But 
        go ahead. I don't dispute that I received funding from 
        lawyers.

Id. at 1183. Judge Porteous also stated during this hearing, 
``Yes, Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson are friends of mine. Have I 
ever been to either one of them's house? The answer is a 
definitive no. Have I gone along to lunch with them? The answer 
is a definitive yes. Have I been going to lunch with all 
members of the bar? The answer is yes.'' Id. at 1180. Judge 
Porteous assured Mole that ``I have always taken the position 
that if there was ever any question in my mind that this Court 
should recuse itself that I would notify counsel and give them 
opportunity if they wanted to ask me to get off.'' Id. at 1291.
    Judge Porteous, however, did not disclose that, as a state 
court judge, he had never or rarely paid for lunch when he 
dined hundreds of times with Amato and Creely; nor did Judge 
Porteous disclose that they had given him approximately $20,000 
after he began to assign curatorships to Creely. Mole, 2A at 
389-390; Stip. 114, 1C at 2534; Ex. 10, 3B at 818; Ex. 56, 3B 
at 1174-1198. Judge Porteous also failed to disclose that, 
several months before his appointment to the federal bench, in 
the summer of 1994, he told Rhonda Danos, his secretary, to 
solicit money from Amato, Creely, and Levenson to sponsor his 
son's externship in Washington, D.C. Danos, 2A at 784-785; 
Timothy Porteous, 2B at 1165-1166.
    Judge Porteous denied the motion to recuse but granted a 
stay of the trial pending Lifemark's appeal of his order to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On October 28, 
1996, the Fifth Circuit denied Lifemark's request for a writ of 
mandamus on the motion to recuse. Stips. 12, 114, 120, 1C at 
2526, 2534, 2535; Ex. 59, 3B at 1329-1330. Mole testified that, 
following Lifemark's attempt ``to level the playing field'' 
before the Fifth Circuit failed, he was told to ``hire someone 
who [knew] the judge.'' In consultation with Tom Wilkinson, the 
Jefferson Parish Attorney who had appeared before Judge 
Porteous on the state court bench, Mole hired Donald Gardner, 
another close friend of Judge Porteous.\30\ Stip. 100, 1C at 
2533. Mole hoped that Gardner's addition to Lifemark's legal 
team would induce Judge Porteous to recuse himself since close 
friends represented both parties. Mole, 2A at 393-395, 425.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\Judge Porteous testified before the Fifth Circuit Special 
Investigatory Committee that Gardner was another friend who 
occasionally gave him cash. Ex. 10, 3B at 795.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As part of the retainer agreement, Lifemark agreed to pay 
Gardner $100,000 upon enrollment as counsel. The retainer 
agreement also provided that if Judge Porteous withdrew from 
the case, Lifemark would pay Gardner an additional $100,000, at 
which time Gardner would withdraw as a counsel. Id. at 395-396; 
Stips. 124-126, 1C at 2535; Ex. 35(b), 3B at 1041-1042. On 
March 11, 1997, Lifemark filed a motion to enroll Gardner as an 
additional counsel. Stip. 123, 1C at 2535. Judge Porteous 
acknowledged before the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council that 
Gardner's appearance in the case was ``unusual'' given that 
Gardner dealt mostly with divorces and family law and had 
little expertise in the complex civil issues involved. Ex. 10, 
3B at 817-818.
    The bench trial began on June 16, 1997, and concluded on 
July 23, 1997, at which time Judge Porteous took the case under 
advisement. Stip. 128-129, 1C at 2535. During this time, Judge 
Porteous continued to socialize with and accept things of value 
from Amato, Creely, Gardner, and Levenson. While the case was 
under advisement, Creely and Amato continued to take Judge 
Porteous out to lunch. Ex. 21(b) and 21(c), 3B at 907-1014. In 
May 1999, Creely and Gardner attended a bachelor party in Las 
Vegas for Judge Porteous's son, Timothy. On this trip, Creely 
paid for Judge Porteous's hotel room for three or four days, 
totaling more than $250, as well as meals and entertainment-
related expenses. Creely, 2A at 292-294; Stips. 134-136, 1C at 
2536; Ex. 10, 3B at 806-809. Additionally, Amato and Creely's 
law firm contributed to a party celebrating Judge Porteous's 
five-year anniversary of his appointment to the federal bench. 
Amato, 2A at 148; Danos, 2A at 783-784.
    Around the same time, Amato went on a fishing trip with 
Judge Porteous. Amato testified that, during this trip, Judge 
Porteous became emotionally distraught about his financial 
problems and worried that he would be unable to pay for his 
son's upcoming wedding.\31\ Amato, 2A at 181-182. Upon 
returning from the fishing trip, Amato shared his conversation 
with Creely and proposed to share the cost with him. Creely and 
Amato took equal draws totaling $2,000, from their firm's 
account and placed the money in an envelope, which was picked 
up by Judge Porteous's secretary, Rhonda Danos. Id. at 143-145; 
Creely, 2A at 295-297. When Danos asked what was in the 
envelope, Creely's secretary rolled her eyes. In response, 
Danos said, ``[N]ever mind, I don't want to know.'' Danos, 2A 
at 782-783.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\Judge Porteous testified before the Fifth Circuit Special 
Investigatory Committee that he could not recall this conversation but 
did not deny it. Ex. 10, 3B at 787.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Porteous also continued to occasionally socialize 
with Levenson during the pendency of the case. Sometime between 
1996 and 1998, Judge Porteous went on a hunting trip with 
Levenson, although no testimony was offered as to whether 
Levenson paid for this trip. In April 1999, Levenson attended a 
Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference at Judge Porteous's 
invitation. At this conference, Levenson paid for Judge 
Porteous's meals and drinks. Ex. 10, 3B at 794-795; Stip. 138-
140, 1C at 2536.
    On April 26, 2000, three years after the end of the trial, 
Judge Porteous issued his ruling in Lifemark Hospitals of La., 
Inc. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc. Stip. 130, 1C at 2535. 
Judge Porteous ruled largely in favor of Liljeberg Enterprises, 
returning to the Liljebergs the hospital lost earlier in 
foreclosure, sustaining the pharmacy contract, and ordering 
Lifemark to pay the Liljebergs an award of $10 million, a 
portion of the damages sought. Mole regarded this as a 
``resounding loss'' for his client. Mole, 2A at 403-404.
    Lifemark appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which unanimously 
affirmed Judge Porteous's decision in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded in part. The Fifth Circuit sided predominately 
with Lifemark and was strongly critical of significant parts of 
Judge Porteous's reasoning, opining that Judge Porteous's 
ruling was ``inexplicable,'' ``a chimera,'' ``constructed 
entirely out of whole cloth,'' ``absurd,'' ``close to being 
nonsensical,'' and ``not supported by law.'' See Stip. 131, 1C 
at 2535; Exs. 62-63, 3B at 1474-1477. Lifemark and Liljeberg 
settled within a month of the Fifth Circuit's decision because, 
Mole testified, ``[m]y client did not want to go back to Judge 
Porteous on the remand.'' Mole, 2A at 408.
            a. The House's perspective
    The House argues that, during Lifemark, Judge Porteous 
intentionally misled the parties and actively concealed the 
extent of his relationships with Amato and Levenson. See Amato, 
2A at 146-151. By denying the motion seeking his recusal 
without disclosing the true nature of these financial 
relationships, Judge Porteous deprived Lifemark of a fair trial 
and the Fifth Circuit of information necessary to properly 
decide the subsequently filed mandamus petition seeking to 
remove Porteous from the case. The House suggests that the 
Fifth Circuit's decision on this matter would have been 
different had it known the extent of Judge Porteous's prior 
financial relationship with Amato. See Mole, 2A at 393.
    The House additionally maintains that Judge Porteous 
continued to abuse his office and position as a federal judge 
by accepting and soliciting gifts from the parties' counsels 
during the three years that he had the Lifemark case under 
advisement. In particular, the House points to Amato's 
testimony that Judge Porteous solicited $2,000 for his son's 
wedding during a fishing trip in May or June 1999. Amato 
recalled Judge Porteous asking for financial assistance, which 
was the only time he remembered Judge Porteous directly asking 
him for money. Amato, 2A at 143-44, 181-182. The House argues 
that, during the pendency of the Lifemark case, Judge Porteous 
exercised tremendous leverage over Amato, who worked on little 
else but the Lifemark case for two years and stood to recover 
nothing if he lost the case. See id. at 136-137. Amato himself 
acknowledged that the pending case somewhat affected his 
decision to help Judge Porteous. Id. at 235-236.
            b. Judge Porteous's perspective
    Judge Porteous maintains that he fully acknowledged his 
relationship with Amato and Levenson at the recusal hearing. 
Judge Porteous asserts that, because there was no kickback 
agreement with Amato and Creely, any money given to him by 
Amato was given out of friendship. Thus, there was no financial 
relationship to disclose. Judge Porteous, moreover, contends 
that there was nothing wrong with dining with friends and close 
associates. Attorneys in Gretna, Louisiana, often paid for 
meals, drinks, gifts, and even trips for judges; it was local 
practice and custom. See Creely, 2A at 307-308; Ciolino, 2B at 
1506.
    Judge Porteous asserts that he was impartial in the 
Lifemark case despite the fact that several friends 
representing both sides appeared before him. Both Amato and 
Gardner testified that they never thought that their 
friendships with Judge Porteous would affect his ability to 
preside impartially. From the beginning, Gardner told Mole that 
his involvement alone would not ``steer the result of the 
case'' or ``influence the judge.'' According to Gardner, he 
only believed that he would be able to help Lifemark and its 
attorneys both to better understand Judge Porteous and to 
better present the evidence to him. Mole, 2A at 397, 422-423. 
Judge Porteous also dismisses as mistaken the criticisms found 
in the Fifth Circuit's opinion, which was written by a panel of 
Texas judges on an arcane point of Louisiana law. In Amato's 
opinion, the Fifth Circuit's decision overturning Judge 
Porteous's ruling was ``wrong, wrong, wrong.'' Stip. 132, 1C at 
2535-2536.
    Additionally, Judge Porteous argues that the gift of 
$2,000, given to him by Amato and Creely, was never meant as a 
bribe to affect the outcome of the Lifemark case; Amato himself 
testified that he neither viewed the money as a bribe, nor did 
he believe that it would have an impact on Judge Porteous's 
decision ``one way or the other.'' Moreover, the pending 
Lifemark case was not the primary reason Amato gave Judge 
Porteous money. Amato testified, ``[I gave him money] because 
of my friendship, and I really felt sad for him.'' Amato, 2A at 
182-183.

D. Expert Testimony

    The House and Judge Porteous each offered one expert 
witness whose testimony related to the allegations in Article 
I. The House called Professor Charles G. Geyh of the Indiana 
University--Bloomington Maurer School of Law as an expert in 
judicial ethics. Judge Porteous called Professor Dane Ciolino 
of Loyola University Law School as an expert in legal and 
judicial ethics. Both witnesses were accepted as experts in 
their designated fields. Geyh, 2A at 714-716; Ciolino, 2B at 
1480-1485.
            1. Professor Charles G. Geyh
    Professor Geyh fielded numerous questions about the ethical 
behavior of Judge Porteous concerning the allegations in 
Article I.\32\ With respect to lunches and trips paid for by 
attorneys, Geyh testified, ``[T]here is nothing wrong with 
lawyers and judges socializing, . . . [b]ut there is a point 
where, you know, a line can be crossed, where what the judge 
is, in effect, doing is exceeding the bounds of normal 
hospitality and is trading on his position as a judge for 
private gain.'' In his opinion, Judge Porteous crossed that 
line. Geyh, 2A at 717-718. Geyh said Judge Porteous's conduct 
in assigning curatorships to Creely was ``very, very 
troubling'' and testified that the behavior was a violation of 
the ABA model code of judicial conduct. Id. at 718-721.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\Geyh based his opinions on the House report and the allegations 
set forth within. He admitted that he was not an expert in Louisiana 
legal ethics, and that he did not review rulings by Louisiana judges on 
issues of judicial misconduct. He did, however, review some materials 
from the Louisiana code of judicial conduct dating back to 1984. Geyh, 
2A at 744-748.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regarding Judge Porteous's failure to recuse himself from 
Lifemark, Geyh stated that, while a judge is not required to 
recuse himself simply because a friend is a counsel in the case 
before him, ``the judge must disqualify himself in any 
proceeding where his impartiality might be reasonably 
questioned.'' Id. at 722. Geyh also opined that Judge 
Porteous's solicitation of cash from Amato for his son's 
wedding violated ethics rules governing gifts. Geyh testified 
that based on the evidence of the lunches, curatorship 
assignments, and monetary gifts involving Amato and Creely, 
Judge Porteous should have disqualified himself. Id. at 724-
727.
            2. Professor Dane Ciolino
    Professor Ciolino testified about Louisiana's Code of 
Judicial Conduct and the ethical standards for governing 
Louisiana state court judges. He explained that, during the 
time Judge Porteous was on the state bench, the applicable 
ethical rules were not bright-line or per se rules, but instead 
incorporated the general ``appearance of impropriety'' 
standard. He considered this to be a vague standard that 
offered little guidance to attorneys and judges as to what 
exact behavior was deemed unethical. As a result, Ciolino 
stated that it was common in Louisiana for firms to offer 
judges gifts and lunches, as well as golf, hunting, and fishing 
outings. Ciolino, 2B at 1493-1495, 1505-1508.
    Ciolino also testified that in Louisiana ``most of the 
curatorships are given to friends of the judges, the campaign 
contributors for the judges. Sometimes some judges give them to 
younger lawyers who are just starting out to help them out [or] 
former law clerks.'' Id. at 1511-1512. Curatorships awarded in 
conjunction with a bribe or kickback scheme, however, were both 
unethical and unlawful, even under the nebulous ``appearance of 
impropriety'' standard. Id. at 1512.
    While Ciolino testified that the applicable ethical 
standards at the time were vague and subject to different 
interpretations, Ciolino found the relationship between 
attorneys and judges in Louisiana troubling and testified that 
he considered most of the alleged conduct to be unethical. 
Ciolino additionally testified that any ethical judgment of 
Judge Porteous's conduct depends on where one draws the line 
along a continuum. Ciolino testified that, in his opinion, if 
Judge Porteous did ask for $2,000 from Amato during the 
pendency of the Lifemark case, such behavior would be located 
on the ``malignant end of the spectrum.'' Id. at 1537-1540.

                             II. ARTICLE II

A. Text of the Article

    G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., engaged in a longstanding pattern 
of corrupt conduct that demonstrates his unfitness to serve as 
a United States District Court Judge. That conduct included the 
following: Beginning in or about the late 1980s while he was a 
State court judge in the 24th JDC in the State of Louisiana, 
and continuing while he was a Federal judge in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
Judge Porteous engaged in a corrupt relationship with bail 
bondsman Louis M. Marcotte, III, and his sister Lori Marcotte. 
As part of this corrupt relationship, Judge Porteous solicited 
and accepted numerous things of value, including meals, trips, 
home repairs, and car repairs, for his personal use and 
benefit, while at the same time taking official actions that 
benefitted the Marcottes. These official actions by Judge 
Porteous included, while on the State bench, setting, reducing, 
and splitting bonds as requested by the Marcottes, and 
improperly setting aside or expunging felony convictions for 
two Marcotte employees (in one case after Judge Porteous had 
been confirmed by the Senate but before being sworn in as a 
Federal judge). In addition, both while on the State bench and 
on the Federal bench, Judge Porteous used the power and 
prestige of his office to assist the Marcottes in forming 
relationships with State judicial officers and individuals 
important to the Marcottes' business. As Judge Porteous well 
knew and understood, Louis Marcotte also made false statements 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an effort to assist 
Judge Porteous in being appointed to the Federal bench.
    Accordingly, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., has engaged in 
conduct so utterly lacking in honesty and integrity that he is 
guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, is unfit to hold the 
office of Federal judge, and should be removed from office.

B. Introduction to the Evidence

    Article II focuses on Judge Porteous's relationship with 
Louis and Lori Marcotte, the owners of a bail bonds company in 
Gretna, Louisiana. This section first examines Judge Porteous's 
relationship with the Marcottes first as a state court judge 
and then as a federal judge. The evidence presented here is 
primarily testimonial, and the parties challenge the 
credibility of several witnesses, including the Marcottes (who 
pled guilty to federal corruption charges). As with Article I, 
the description of the evidence integrates uncontested and 
contested facts.

C. Statement of Facts

            1. Conduct While a State Court Judge and Relationship With 
                    the Marcottes
            a. Bail bonds process and alleged favors
    During the 1990s, as a judge on the 24th JDC, Judge 
Porteous was part of a rotational system in which one judge 
would serve as the ``magistrate'' or ``duty'' judge for a given 
week. The magistrate judge was primarily responsible for 
reviewing and setting bail and bail bonds, although all judges 
in the 24th JDC retained this authority. Griffin, 2B at 1637; 
Lori Marcotte, 2A at 576; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 456-457, 506; 
Ex. 1113, 3E at 5970.
    When a judge sets bail, he determines the amount of money 
that a criminal defendant must post with the court as a 
condition of temporary release from imprisonment. If a 
defendant released on bail appears for his court dates and 
complies with other conditions set by the magistrate judge, the 
amount posted with the court is eventually returned to the 
defendant. If the defendant violates the terms of his release, 
the posted bail is forfeited.
    A defendant who cannot afford to post the full amount of 
the set bail can contract with a commercial bail bondsman, who 
posts the bail on the defendant's behalf in exchange for a 
premium. The bond premium is typically ten to fifteen percent 
of the bail set by the court. A bail bondsman profits from the 
premium paid so long as the defendant appears in court; 
otherwise, the bail bondsman forfeits the entire bail amount to 
the court. When a defendant purchases a bail bond, he does not 
recover the premium paid to the bondsman. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 
456-458; see also Ex. 442, 3D at 4650-4651.
    In the 1980s, Louis Marcotte and his sister Lori started 
Bail Bonds Unlimited (BBU) in Gretna, Louisiana. Louis 
Marcotte, 2A at 454; Stip. 11, 1C at 2526. By 1993, the 
Marcottes controlled approximately 90 percent of the bail bonds 
business in the area. In the late 1990s, BBU received 
approximately $6 to $7 million in premiums. In the following 
years, BBU grew considerably, and in 2003, BBU made 
approximately $30 million in premiums and operated in thirty-
four states, with approximately 300 employees and 1,000 
licensed bail agents. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 454-455, 501.
    Louis Marcotte aggressively pursued a strategy to maximize 
BBU's profits. Id. at 456-460. Generally, he sought to have 
bail set at the highest amount for which each defendant could 
afford to pay the percentage-based premium. In many cases, the 
highest bond a defendant can afford may also be the socially 
optimal bond level, so as to eliminate unnecessary detention 
while providing the maximal incentive for the defendant to 
appear. See id. at 504-06. A particular challenge for BBU 
occurred when a bond was set at an amount higher than what the 
defendant could pay; in such a case, unless the bond was 
reduced, the bail bondsman would lose potential business from 
that defendant. Id. at 457. BBU would also lose business when a 
defendant was released on his own recognizance, so Marcotte 
sought to have bail bonds set by a friendly judge before this 
occurred. Id. at 457-458.
    To achieve this end, a BBU employee or agent would seek to 
interview a defendant soon after arrest to gather basic 
identifying information, the basis for the arrest, and any 
prior criminal history. BBU would also locate, interview, and 
run credit reports on family or friends of the defendant 
willing to post the bond to determine how much of a bond 
premium they could afford to pay. BBU would use this 
information to make a bail bond recommendation to a judge. Id 
at 455-456, 473-476.
    After a bail amount had been set, a judge could also choose 
to reduce a bond or approve a ``split'' bond. A split bond is 
comprised of two components: a standard commercial bond and a 
surety, such as property bond or a promissory note signed by an 
individual. For example, if the original bond was set at 
$200,000, it could be divided into a $100,000 standard 
commercial bond underwritten by the bondsman and a $100,000 
property bond or promissory note. Bail bondsmen, including 
Louis Marcotte, often favored split bonds because they reduced 
the amount of cash premium that a defendant needed to pay the 
bondsman and therefore had the same practical effect as a bond 
reduction. Id. at 477.
    Louis Marcotte testified that the bond-setting practices of 
the state judges had an enormous financial impact on his 
business because how bonds were set, reduced, or split affected 
whether defendants needed the services of a bondsman. 
Therefore, a favorable judge willing to exercise discretion in 
setting, reducing, and splitting bonds upon the recommendation 
of BBU was important to maximizing profits. Id. at 457-460, 
472, 474-475; Ex. 447, 3E at 4999.
    As a judge on the 24th JDC, Judge Porteous set bail for 
criminal defendants and approved bail bonds, including cases 
where BBU acted as the bail bondsman. Louis Marcotte met Judge 
Porteous through another bail bondsman, Adam Barnett. Louis 
Marcotte, 2A at 460; Stip. 145, 1C at 2536. Around September 
1993, Judge Porteous began working directly with Marcotte, and 
the two became closer. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 511-512.
    Marcotte testified that Judge Porteous was ``available to 
do bonds at [Marcotte's] request.'' Id. at 472. Then-BBU 
employee Jeffrey Duhon indicated that Marcotte enjoyed an 
``open door'' policy with Judge Porteous and testified, 
``[S]ometimes me and Louis walked in there, they might have had 
10, 12 lawyers sitting there, and we just went right by them, 
right straight into [Judge Porteous's chambers].'' Duhon, 2A at 
613. If a magistrate had not set a bond at all or the bond set 
was too high, Marcotte would go to Judge Porteous to have the 
bond set or reduced. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 472. On these 
occasions, Marcotte testified that he would drop off his 
worksheets, which identified how much the defendant could pay, 
and Judge Porteous would often approve the amount. Sometimes he 
would give Judge Porteous these worksheets himself; other times 
he would drop them off with Rhonda Danos, the judge's 
secretary. When Marcotte needed a bond set at night or when the 
court was not in session, he was able to reach Judge Porteous 
on his home phone. Id. at 472-473.
    During this time, Judge Porteous developed a social 
relationship with Louis Marcotte. Sometime around 1992 to 
1994--the precise year is disputed,\33\ Judge Porteous began to 
have regular lunches with Louis and Lori Marcotte. These 
lunches, for which the Marcottes paid, often included Judge 
Porteous, other judges, and local attorneys. Judge Porteous and 
the Marcottes would discuss a variety of business and personal 
topics at these lunches, including bonds, their families, 
sports, and politics. Stip. 144, 1C at 2536.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\Louis and Lori Marcotte offered somewhat conflicting testimony 
about when the regular lunches with Judge Porteous began. Lori Marcotte 
believed that the lunches started around 1992. Ex. 448, 3E at 5085-
5086, 5130. Louis Marcotte testified that he recalled that the lunches 
began in 1994 or 1995 but said that it could have been earlier; he also 
recalled that he began dealing directly with Judge Porteous and taking 
him out to lunch following some unfavorable press coverage of Judge 
Porteous's dealings with the bondsman Adam Barnett in September 1993. 
Louis Marcotte, 2A at 511-513; Ex. 119z, 3C at 2459.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Louis Marcotte testified that the lunches, which were 
occasionally initiated by Judge Porteous, occurred once or 
twice a week, and that BBU always treated the attendees; Judge 
Porteous never paid. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 460-465, 513-514; 
see Danos, 2A at 804-805; Ex. 442, 3D at 4652-4653; Ex. 448, 3E 
at 5085-5186, 5130, 5136-5137. Judge Porteous was allowed to 
invite whomever he wished because he was perceived as a leader 
at the courthouse, and the Marcottes wanted him to have a good 
time. Thus, according to Marcotte, it was common to dine in 
groups of up to ten or more people. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 461-
462; Duhon, 2A at 614-615. In these groups, the Marcottes 
stated that Judge Porteous would use his influence to persuade 
other state court judges and business executives to put trust 
in and to develop professional relationships with Louis 
Marcotte. Louis Marcotte testified that Judge Porteous 
``brought strength to the table.'' Ex. 447, 3E at 5062. Having 
lunch with Judge Porteous demonstrated to other judges in 
attendance that Louis Marcotte was ``a businessman instead of a 
bondsman'' and that the Marcottes were ``trusted people.'' 
Louis Marcotte, 2A at 462, 489; see Lori Marcotte, 2A at 563. 
According to the Marcottes, Judge Porteous helped ``train'' new 
state court judges in the practice of setting and splitting 
bonds, and even gave a ``sales pitch'' emphasizing the 
importance of setting commercial bonds.\34\ Ex. 448, 3E at 
5128-5130. Louis Marcotte believed that these lunches were an 
investment in his business. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 465; see also 
Ex. 442, 3D at 4660; Ex. 448, 3E at 5131-5132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\For example, Lori Marcotte testified that Judge Porteous helped 
the Marcottes form a relationship with another judge on the 24th JDC, 
who was ultimately charged and convicted on federal corruption charges. 
According to Lori Marcotte, it was during a lunch with this other judge 
that Judge Porteous explained the concept of splitting bonds and 
``[t]hat was kind of like the stage of everything else that would 
happen.'' Ex. 442, 3D at 4665; see also Ex. 73(a)-(d), 3C at 1917-1936.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Judge Porteous contests the testimony proffered at 
the hearings, several witnesses also stated that Marcotte 
arranged and paid for Judge Porteous's car to be repaired and 
maintained on multiple occasions. This service included picking 
up Judge Porteous's car to have it washed, detailed, and filled 
with gas, as well as fixing tires and radios, repairing the 
transmission, and performing bodywork. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 
466-469. When Judge Porteous needed to have one of his cars 
repaired, he or his secretary would let Marcotte know. His cars 
would be picked up and taken for maintenance or repairs by 
Jeffrey Duhon or Aubrey Wallace, both BBU employees during this 
period. Duhon, 2A at 608-610; Wallace, 2A at 634-636. Marcotte 
testified that Judge Porteous owned three or four old cars that 
``were broken a lot,'' and Marcotte, through BBU, would pay for 
repairs ``once a month or once every three months.'' These 
repairs, however, occurred over a period of only six or eight 
months. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 467-469; Stip. 158, 1C at 2537; 
Ex. 442, 3D at 4653-4654; Ex. 448, 3E at 5155.
    Several witnesses testified that on one occasion, Marcotte 
sent Duhon and Wallace to repair a wooden fence on Judge 
Porteous's property after it was damaged in a storm. Louis 
Marcotte, 2A at 469, 520-521, 591. Duhon and Wallace testified 
that this project was completed in approximately three days and 
that Louis Marcotte paid for the necessary materials. Duhon, 2A 
at 610-612; Wallace, 2A at 637-638; Ex. 442, 3D at 4654.
    Louis Marcotte also provided local judges, including Judge 
Porteous, with occasional gifts, including bottles of liquor or 
coolers filled with shrimp. Marcotte testified that, with these 
gifts, he wanted to ``make a statement'' and would give judges 
between $300 and $500 worth of shrimp at a time. According to 
Louis Marcotte, Judge Porteous, unlike some state judges, never 
refused Marcotte's gifts. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 553, 637; see 
Wallace, 2A at 637, 657.
    Finally, Louis Marcotte testified that he took at least one 
trip with Judge Porteous to Las Vegas in 1993 or 1994. On this 
trip, Marcotte and Judge Porteous were joined by two local 
attorneys who were friends of Marcotte, several friends of 
Judge Porteous, and another state court judge. Marcotte 
testified that, ``given the stain that the bail bonds business 
has at the national level,'' he felt that it was important for 
Judge Porteous to invite some attorneys on the trip so ``it 
wouldn't look so bad with him going to Las Vegas with me.'' 
Louis Marcotte, 2A at 469-471. According to Marcotte, Judge 
Porteous's expenses were split between him and the two local 
attorneys, who paid Danos in cash. Danos then deposited the 
money into her account and ``cut the checks for [Judge 
Porteous's] tickets.''\35\ Louis Marcotte explained that they 
reimbursed Judge Porteous for his trip in this manner to ``hide 
it from the world.'' Id. at 471; see also Lori Marcotte, 2A at 
561-562; Ex. 442, 3D at 4654, 4664; Ex. 447, 3E at 5026-
5027.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\Danos also accompanied the Marcottes to Las Vegas on several 
occasions, and the Marcottes paid for these trips ``because she was 
Judge Porteous's secretary and we wanted to get some help from that 
office.'' Lori Marcotte, 2A at 561-562. Danos testified that she 
believed that Judge Porteous was aware that the Marcottes were paying 
her way. Judge Porteous disagrees that he had any knowledge of this. 
Danos, 2A at 788, 803, 807-808; Ex. 448, 3E at 5092, 5096, 5180-5182.
    \36\The House also points to Judge Porteous's failure to disclose 
his attendance at conventions of the Professional Bail Agents of the 
United States in 1996 and 1999 on his annual disclosure forms as 
additional evidence that Judge Porteous was attempting to hide his 
relationship with the Marcottes. Ex. 102a, 3C at 2141-2144; Ex. 105a, 
3C at 2384-2387.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            i. The House's perspective
    The key factual disagreement regarding this article is 
whether, as the House alleges, Judge Porteous engaged in a 
corrupt scheme with the Marcottes to set bail and reduce or 
split bonds in criminal cases to maximize their profits at the 
expense of defendants, their families, and the public in 
exchange for things of value. In particular, the House alleges 
that Judge Porteous's enjoyment of free meals, repairs, and 
gifts from the Marcottes was linked to his favorable bail bonds 
decisions and other official actions he undertook on their 
behalf. While an occasional meal gifted by a professional 
associate may not be worrisome, the House argues that the 
evidence proves that Judge Porteous and the Marcottes had a far 
more extensive arrangement of regular, expensive meals that 
often included heavy drinking. The House contends that a number 
of witnesses corroborate key elements of the Marcottes' 
testimony about these meals, including Judge Porteous's 
secretary, Rhonda Danos, and other employees of BBU. Danos, 2A 
at 804-805; Duhon, 2A at 614-615; Griffin, 2B at 1650-1651.
    According to the House, the lunches, home and car repairs, 
and other favors Louis Marcotte gave to Judge Porteous were in 
return for greater access to the judge and to strengthen the 
Marcottes' bail bonds business. While giving Judge Porteous 
things of value, the Marcottes testified that they frequently 
circumvented the magistrate or duty judge assigned to handle 
bonds for the 24th JDC to have Judge Porteous set bonds at 
their preferred amounts. According to Louis Marcotte, his close 
relationship allowed him direct access to Judge Porteous 
whenever he thought Judge Porteous would set a more favorable 
bond than the assigned magistrate. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 458-
460, 471-479; Ex. 447, 3E at 5064-5065.
    The House contends that the Marcottes enjoyed special 
access to Judge Porteous. Louis Marcotte testified that they 
would go by Judge Porteous's chambers, drop off paperwork with 
Rhonda Danos, or call at Judge Porteous at night or on the 
weekend when the courthouse was not open. See Louis Marcotte, 
2A at 473; see also Duhon, 2A at 612-613; Wallace, 2A at 633. 
Marcotte testified that after he took Judge Porteous to lunch 
or cared for his car, Judge Porteous would be ``more apt to do 
things'' for them. Louis Marcotte described the reasons he gave 
Judge Porteous things of value: ``I wanted service, I wanted 
access, and I wanted to make money'' and ``[Judge Porteous] 
would do more when we would do more for him.'' Louis Marcotte 
believed that Judge Porteous knew he was helping BBU make money 
by setting favorable bonds. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 471-479, 553-
554; Ex. 442, 3D at 4655; Ex. 447, 3E at 4987, 5048; see also 
Ex. 448, 3E at 5193.
    Marcotte testified that his special access to Judge 
Porteous for bond decisions continued until the very end of his 
state court tenure in October 1994. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 517-
519. The House points to documentary evidence that Judge 
Porteous signed twenty-nine bonds for BBU in October 1994; 
twenty-seven of these bonds were signed after his Senate 
confirmation on October 7, 1994. Stips. 152-153, 1C at 2537. 
The House characterizes these bonds as a late rush by the 
Marcottes and Judge Porteous to capitalize on their corrupt 
relationship before Judge Porteous took the federal bench.
    Furthermore, the House alleges that there was a connection 
between Louis Marcotte's favors and Judge Porteous's official 
actions. Louis Marcotte made no pretense that the expensive 
meals and other favors he gave Judge Porteous were anything but 
shrewd investments in his bail bonds business. See, e.g., Louis 
Marcotte, 2A at 471-479, 553-554. Judge Porteous in turn 
provided BBU direct access to his chambers to deal with bond 
issues. The House notes that not all judges worked directly 
with bondsmen and that at least three judges in the 24th JDC 
would work only with lawyers rather than with the bondsmen. See 
Griffin, 2B at 1652-1653.
            ii. Judge Porteous's perspective
    Judge Porteous denies that he set, reduced, or split bonds 
to favor the Marcottes in exchange for meals and other things 
of value and argues that the House's evidence consists only of 
general, misleading testimony about the bond setting process 
and Judge Porteous's relationship with the Marcottes. Judge 
Porteous argues that the House exaggerated both the frequency 
and cost of the meals for which the Marcottes allegedly paid. 
To support this claim, Judge Porteous points to the House's 
lack of documentary evidence of any meal purchased by the 
Marcottes for Judge Porteous while he was on the state bench. 
Moreover, Judge Porteous argues that when these meals occurred, 
they were in the open and in public restaurants; he asserts 
that no one tried to hide the fact that they were dining 
together because the acceptance of the lunches was common and 
customary in Gretna and did not violate any applicable rules or 
ethical obligations.\37\ See Louis Marcotte, 2A at 514, 539. 
Judge Porteous contends the purpose of these lunches was more 
social in nature than business-oriented and that the 
conversation tended to focus on matters unrelated to work. See 
Lori Marcotte, 2A at 587; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 513-514. 
Furthermore, Judge Porteous argues that there was nothing 
improper about accepting occasional meals as gifts, and no 
connection between the occasional lunches he had with the 
Marcottes and the bail bonds he set. Id. at 514-515; Griffin, 
2B at 1641-1642, 1650-1651.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\Testimony regarding ethics rules is discussed in section D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Judge Porteous acknowledges that he occasionally 
accepted meals from the Marcottes, he asserts that the 
testimony that Louis Marcotte paid for car and home repairs or 
trips to Las Vegas is grossly overstated. Judge Porteous 
disputes that Marcotte routinely paid for car repairs and 
maintenance and, while offering no contradictory testimony, 
notes that no documentary evidence corroborates any of the 
testimony offered by the House, all of which is from witnesses 
who are convicted felons. See Louis Marcotte, 2A at 521-522. 
Moreover, Judge Porteous similarly disputes testimony that 
Louis Marcotte ever had his fence repaired and emphasizes that 
the House has no records or documentation to corroborate this 
claim. On cross-examination, Marcotte admitted that he never 
saw the repaired fence. Judge Porteous also challenges the 
credibility of Aubrey Wallace and Jeffrey Duhon, the two BBU 
employees allegedly sent to repair the fence, by noting Louis 
Marcotte's testimony that they were known to use illegal 
narcotics while on the job. See id. at 519-521; Wallace, 2A at 
656-657; Stips. 156, 157, 1C at 2537.
    Judge Porteous does not deny that he received occasional 
gifts of shrimp and liquor from Louis Marcotte, but he points 
to Marcotte's testimony that such gifts were provided to all of 
the local judges and many court personnel, at least during the 
holiday season. See Louis Marcotte, 2A at 538-539; Wallace, 2A 
at 637, 657; Ex. 448, 3E at 5139-5143.
    Judge Porteous also denies that Louis Marcotte paid for any 
trip to Las Vegas, noting that no documentary evidence of the 
details of those expenses has been introduced. To support this 
position, Judge Porteous points to Marcotte's uncertainty over 
whether he was accompanied by Judge Porteous on one or two 
trips while on the state court, as well as Marcotte's admission 
that Judge Porteous may have been traveling to Las Vegas in a 
professional capacity to speak at a Professional Bail Agents of 
the United States (PBUS) convention, in which case the PBUS 
would have compensated Judge Porteous for his travel costs and 
hotel room. See Louis Marcotte, 2A at 522-525; Ex. 447, 3E at 
5026-5027.
    Judge Porteous argues that he never set, reduced, or split 
bonds in order to benefit the Marcottes' bail bonds business. 
He defends his practice of managing bonds in the context of an 
imperfect criminal justice system. Judge Porteous maintains 
that he was a proponent of using commercial and split bonds to 
address chronic problems such as jail overcrowding and that 
aggressive use of commercial bonds, in this context, was in the 
public interest.\38\ Louis Marcotte, 2A at 504-506; Lori 
Marcotte, 2A at 579-582. During the relevant period, the 
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center was under a federal court 
consent decree that limited its capacity to 700 inmates. Under 
the circumstances, many defendants who were not released on 
bond might be released instead on personal recognizance under 
the terms of the consent decree. Bodenheimer, 2B at 1180-1183, 
1193-1194; Mamoulides, 2B at 1562-1566; Stip. 162, 1C at 2538. 
John Mamoulides, the District Attorney in Jefferson Parish from 
1972 until 1996, agreed that defendants released on commercial 
bonds were more likely to appear for required court dates 
because there was another interested party, the bondsman, who 
would be actively looking for those who ``jumped bond.'' 
Mamoulides, 2B at 1574-1575. Former Judge Ronald Bodenheimer 
testified that Judge Porteous was viewed as an experienced 
judge on criminal matters, a public advocate for commercial 
bonds, and a local leader in finding a solution to the jail 
overcrowding problem. Bodenheimer, 2B at 1171, 1179-1180, 1187-
1188, 1193-1194.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\According to studies cited by Judge Porteous, defendants are 28 
percent more likely to appear when released on bonds rather than on 
their own recognizance. See Ex. 1134, 3E at 6071.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Porteous notes that the House has not identified a 
single particular bond that he improperly set, split, or 
reduced. Furthermore, given that the Marcottes held a near-
monopoly of the bail bonds business around the 24th JDC, he 
argues that he essentially had to deal with the Marcottes when 
setting bail or deciding bonds. This problem was exacerbated, 
according to Judge Porteous, because other judges on the 24th 
JDC disliked magistrate duty, were hard to reach, and did not 
like setting bonds. Thus, it was common for bail bondsmen and 
attorneys to bypass the assigned magistrate and seek out 
another judge to secure a bond. Bodenheimer, 2B at 1188-1191; 
Griffin, 2B at 1638-1639; Lori Marcotte, 2A at 576-577; Louis 
Marcotte, 2A at 506-507; Ex. 448, 3E at 5118-5122.
    According to Judge Porteous, he neither ``invented'' split 
bonds nor was the only judge who used them; split bonds were 
very common in the early to mid 1990s. Bodenheimer stated that, 
of the 16 judges in the 24th JDC, ``[all] of them used the 
split bond concept.'' Bodenheimer, 2B at 1181, 1185. The 
Marcottes also went to many other judges to set, reduce or 
split bonds. Lori Marcotte, 2A at 582; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 
508-510; Mamoulides, 2B at 1576; Ex. 447, 3E at 4989.
    Judge Porteous insists that he gave no ``special access'' 
to the Marcottes but maintained an open-door policy to his 
chambers for everyone. Danos, 2A at 800; Griffin, 2B at 1639. 
Rhonda Danos, Judge Porteous's former secretary, testified that 
the Marcottes did not receive special access or treatment from 
chambers. Danos, 2A at 786-787, 800-801. Moreover, Danos and 
Darcy Griffin, Judge Porteous's criminal clerk, testified that 
Judge Porteous did not merely take Marcotte's assertion that a 
certain bond level was appropriate at face value. Before 
setting, reducing, or splitting a bond, it was his standard 
operating procedure to have a member of his staff call the jail 
and obtain information related to the criminal background of 
the arrestee. Id. at 799-800; Griffin, 2B at 1640-1641. Lori 
Marcotte indicated that, at times, Judge Porteous would 
personally call the jail, rather than have his staff perform 
this duty and, on occasion, rejected bond requests. Lori 
Marcotte, 2A at 577-578; Ex. 448, 3E at 5115-5116; see also 
Danos, 2A at 799-800; Griffin, 2B at 1641; Louis Marcotte, 2A 
at 510-511; Wallace, 2A at 654.
    Judge Porteous refutes the House's theory that he approved 
an unusually large number of bonds in October 1994 before he 
was sworn in as a federal judge. He notes that the House failed 
to offer evidence of the average number of bonds handled by a 
judge on the 24th JDC and cites evidence that, as a state 
judge, he signed just as many, if not more, bonds in other 
months. Exs. 2002-2004, 3E at 6077-6197. Thus, twenty-nine 
bonds in a month for BBU, which held a near monopoly of the 
bail bonds business in that courthouse, was not an unusually 
high number. Griffin testified that twenty-nine bonds processed 
in a month was a low number. Griffin, 2B at 1646.
            b. Set aside and expungement of criminal convictions
    Judge Porteous's actions involving the process to expunge 
the criminal convictions of BBU employees Jeffrey Duhon and 
Aubrey Wallace in the early 1990s are also at issue. Louis 
Marcotte wanted Duhon and Wallace to obtain bail bondsman 
licenses to expand his business, but their prior criminal 
convictions precluded them from doing so. Duhon, 2A at 616; 
Louis Marcotte, 2A at 479-480. Both Duhon and Wallace testified 
that Marcotte had spoken with Judge Porteous about the 
expungement of their prior criminal convictions. According to 
Duhon, he was told that Marcotte would ``take care'' of Duhon's 
criminal conviction so that he could get a bail bondsman 
license; one of Duhon's two felony convictions was eventually 
expunged by Judge Porteous. Duhon, 2A at 616-618. Wallace also 
testified that he believed that the set-aside of his burglary 
conviction was done by Judge Porteous at Marcotte's request, an 
accusation that Judge Porteous has denied. Wallace, 2A at 641; 
Goyeneche, 2A at 681-682.
    In Louisiana, there are multiple steps for expunging a 
criminal conviction. If a judge did not originally sentence a 
defendant under ``Article 893,'' a motion must first be made to 
amend the sentence to an Article 893 sentence. Article 893 of 
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure permits a sentence to 
be set aside if probation is successfully completed.\39\ An 
individual must then petition for the enforcement of Article 
893 upon satisfactory completion of probation. After 
petitioning for the enforcement of Article 893, a motion must 
be made to set aside the conviction, and finally, a separate 
motion must be made to expunge the conviction. These last two 
steps are primarily administrative and routine steps if the 
motion to amend sentence and the petition to enforce Article 
893 are granted without objection. Rees, 2B at 1769, 1793-1794.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\Article 893(E) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 
states, in relevant part,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      When the imposition of sentence has been suspended by the 
      court for the first conviction only, as authorized by this 
      Article, and the court finds at the conclusion of the 
      probationary period that the probation of the defendant has 
      been satisfactory, the court may set aside and dismiss the 
      prosecution and the dismissal of the prosecution shall have 
      the same effect as acquittal, except that said conviction 
      may be considered as a first offense and provide the basis 
      for subsequent prosecution of the party as a multiple 
      offender, and further shall be considered as a first 
      offense for purposes of an other law or laws relating to 
      cumulation of offenses. Dismissal under this Paragraph 
      shall occur only once with respect to any person.
    Duhon had two convictions from 1976 on his record. One 
conviction was set aside and expunged by Judge E.V. Richards on 
July 22, 1992. Ex. 2006, 3E 6203-6214. A second conviction was 
set aside by Judge Richards on or about June 17, 1993, but 
Judge Porteous signed the expungement order on July 29, 1993. 
After his record was cleared of his convictions, Duhon 
eventually obtained a bail license. Duhon, 2A at 607; Stip. 
148, 1C at 2537; Exs. 77(a)-(c), 3C at 1937-1943.
    Wallace had a drug conviction arising from a December 1988 
arrest and a burglary conviction from a May 1989 arrest. 
Wallace pled guilty to and was first sentenced on the burglary 
charge, which arose from the second arrest. Judge Porteous 
sentenced Wallace on June 26, 1990, to a three-year suspended 
sentence and two years of probation. On October 15, 1990, while 
on probation, Wallace pled guilty and was sentenced to five 
years imprisonment for the earlier drug charge. Wallace's 
guilty plea on the drug charge and prison sentence triggered a 
violation of his terms of probation on his burglary conviction 
and caused the unsatisfactory termination of his probation. 
Wallace completed his drug sentence and was released from 
prison in August 1993. Wallace, 2A at 656; Ex. 81, 3C at 1944-
2004.
    On September 20, 1994, attorney Robert Rees filed a motion 
to amend Wallace's burglary sentence to an Article 893 sentence 
to begin clearing Wallace's criminal record. On September 21, 
1994, Judge Porteous held a hearing and ordered that Wallace's 
record in the burglary case be amended to remove the 
unsatisfactory completion of probation and to amend the 
sentence to one under Article 893. Stip. 149, 1C at 2537. On 
September 22, 1994, Judge Porteous amended Wallace's burglary 
sentence to reflect that he had pled under Article 893. Stip. 
150, 1C at 2537. On October 14, 1994, Judge Porteous entered an 
order setting aside Aubrey Wallace's 1989 burglary conviction. 
Stip. 151, 1C at 2537; Ex. 81, 3C at 1944-2004; Ex. 82, 3C at 
2005-2111. Judge Porteous, however, never entered an 
expungement order on Wallace's burglary conviction.
    The parties offered conflicting evidence on whether Judge 
Porteous erred as a matter of law in setting aside Wallace's 
conviction. Several sections of the Louisiana Code of Criminal 
Procedure were referenced in testimony regarding the judicial 
authority to set aside a sentence that had already been 
served.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\In addition to Article 893, Articles 881 and 882 were also 
discussed. Article 881 provides that ``the Court may amend or change 
the sentence, within the legal limits of its discretion, prior to the 
beginning of the sentence.'' Ex. 69(d), 3B at 1823. Article 882 permits 
the court to correct or review an ``illegal'' sentence. Id. at 1824-
1828.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Mike Reynolds, the Assistant District Attorney who 
was present for the hearing on the motion to amend Wallace's 
sentence, did not object in court, Reynolds later reported that 
Judge Porteous had unlawfully set aside Wallace's conviction to 
the Metropolitan Crime Commission (MCC), a local nonprofit 
organization that investigates crime and corruption.\41\ Rafael 
Goyeneche, the President of the MCC, investigated the facts and 
agreed with Reynolds that Article 881, which allows for 
correction of a sentence ``prior to the beginning of the 
sentence,'' precluded Judge Porteous from invoking Article 893 
after the commencement of Wallace's sentence and ultimately 
ordering an expungement of his record. Goyeneche, 2A at 670, 
672-674, 681-687.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\John Mamoulides, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney during 
the relevant period, could not explain why Reynolds--if he had 
reservations about the set aside--did not object at the hearing or 
raise the issue with his supervisors before going to the MCC. 
Mamoulides, 2B at 1596-1598.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rees, Wallace's attorney, disagreed and explained that 
regardless of whether Article 893 was explicitly referenced in 
Wallace's original suspended sentence on the burglary 
conviction, it was necessarily invoked because that section 
provided the sole authority for a judge in a felony case to 
order a suspended sentence and probation. Rees, 2B at 1784-
1786, 1799-1800. In other words, Rees believed that the motion 
to amend was a mere formality because the underlying sentence 
was already an Article 893 sentence. According to Rees, the 
motion to amend Wallace's sentence was therefore lawful and 
proper. Id. at 1773, 1779-1780; Ex. 69(d), 3B at 1803-1822. In 
addition, Rees stated that in the first place, it had been 
``incorrect to terminate [Wallace's] probation based on that, 
the fact that he got jail time as a result of a prior arrest.'' 
The wrongful termination of Wallace's probation, in his view, 
permitted Judge Porteous to go back, review, and amend the 
sentence under Section 882. Rees, 2B at 1765-1768.
            i. The House's perspective
    The House argues that Judge Porteous intervened in a highly 
questionable manner to expunge the conviction of Jeffrey Duhon 
in a case assigned to another judge and violated Louisiana law 
in setting aside Aubrey Wallace's sentence. In the House's 
view, Judge Porteous's actions constituted improper favors 
provided to Louis Marcotte.
    The House contends that Judge Porteous completed the 
expungement of Duhon's burglary conviction at the request of 
Louis Marcotte, a point supported by both Marcotte's and 
Duhon's testimony. The House asserts that Judge Porteous's 
action in expunging Duhon's conviction was noteworthy because a 
judge in another section of the court originally had sentenced 
Duhon and completed all but the final step in the expungement 
process. Duhon, 2A at 616-618; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 480-481; 
Ex. 442, 3D at 4656.
    The House also considers the set aside of Wallace's 
burglary conviction as an egregious example of misconduct. The 
House maintains that Louis Marcotte repeatedly asked Judge 
Porteous to set aside Wallace's felony burglary conviction in 
the summer of 1994, around the time that Judge Porteous was 
nominated to the federal bench. Notwithstanding Rees's 
interpretation of the applicable provisions, the House insists 
that Article 881 precludes the amendment of a sentence after 
its commencement. Judge Porteous nonetheless amended Wallace's 
sentence, which he had already served, to permit relief under 
Article 893 and to set aside the conviction. Goyeneche, 2A at 
683-687; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 487-488; Wallace, 2A at 643-644; 
see also Rees, 2B at 1783.
    The House alleges that the timing of Judge Porteous's 
actions to set aside Wallace's conviction was motivated by his 
Senate confirmation to the federal bench. According to 
Marcotte, ``[Judge Porteous] said look, Louis, I'm not going to 
let anything stand in the way of me being confirmed and my 
lifetime appointment, so after that's done, I will do it.'' 
Louis Marcotte, 2A at 487. The House argues that the 
confirmation timeline corroborates Marcotte's testimony by 
showing that Judge Porteous set aside Wallace's conviction on 
October 14, 1994, one week after the Senate confirmed him on 
October 7, 1994, and two weeks before he was sworn in on 
October 28, 1994. Id. at 488; Stips. 14, 16, 1C at 2527; Ex. 
442, 3D at 4659; see Rees, 2B at 1793-1795.
            ii. Judge Porteous's perspective
    Judge Porteous contends that the House misconstrues what 
happened and wrongly interprets the applicable Louisiana law. 
He maintains that what he did in these cases was to act on a 
routine, administrative request for Duhon and to correct a 
legal error from his prior order terminating Wallace's 
probation.
    Judge Porteous counters that the witness testimony 
proffered by the House regarding his role in the Duhon 
expungement is wrong and that Marcotte and Duhon were both 
discredited on this point at the evidentiary hearings. While 
Marcotte and Duhon both testified that Judge Porteous cleared 
the burglary conviction from Duhon's record, the documentary 
evidence shows that another judge had granted the motion to 
amend the sentence, the petition to enforce Article 893, and 
the motion to set aside the conviction. About a month after the 
motion to set aside was granted by Judge Richards following a 
hearing, Judge Porteous granted the motion for expungement--the 
final, administrative step in the process. This fact, in Judge 
Porteous's view, undermines the credibility of Marcotte and 
Duhon. See Duhon, 2A at 620-624; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 527-529; 
Ex. 77(a)-(c), 3C at 1937-1943.
    Judge Porteous also maintains there was nothing improper in 
his handling of the set aside of Aubrey Wallace's burglary 
conviction. In fact, Judge Porteous went beyond the minimum 
required by statute and scheduled a ``show cause'' hearing on 
the motion to amend Wallace's conviction, providing the 
District Attorney with an opportunity to object. See Rees, 2B 
at 1752, 1761-1762. Judge Porteous insists that the motion to 
amend had merit because Wallace's probation on the burglary 
charge was wrongly terminated; his plea and sentence on the 
drug charge did not violate the terms of his probation on the 
burglary conviction because the drug arrest pre-dated the 
burglary arrest. Rees, who represented Wallace and filed the 
motion to set aside the conviction, testified that Judge 
Porteous's actions were not wrong as a matter of law. Id. at 
1750, 1773, 1799-1800.
    Judge Porteous argues that there is no evidence that the 
set aside of Wallace's conviction was either a pre-arranged 
deal with Louis Marcotte or timed to avoid scrutiny during 
Judge Porteous's Senate confirmation. Judge Porteous insists 
that he acted on a routine motion to set aside a conviction 
that was properly noticed and filed on behalf of Wallace to 
which the District Attorney's office did not object. Rees, 2B 
at 1749-1750, 1756-1761, 1764-1774, 1783, 1800; Ex. 69(d), 3B 
at 1818-22; see also Ex. 82, 3C at 2005-2111. Judge Porteous 
also argues that the House's asserted motive is doubtful 
because even if Wallace's burglary conviction had been 
expunged, he still would have been ineligible to serve as a 
bail bondsmen because of his separate drug conviction. To 
address the drug conviction, Wallace would have needed a pardon 
from the governor. See Rees, 2B at 1765-1766; Wallace, 2A at 
643, 658-659.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\Judge Porteous also relies on the testimony of Wallace, who 
stated that it was he who wanted to pursue a bail bondsman license. 
When Wallace--now a reverend--was asked whether he deserved the amended 
sentence and the set aside, he replied, ``I just think I was shown some 
compassion.'' Wallace stated that, since his conviction was amended and 
set aside, he has seen Judge Porteous on occasion, and that he could 
tell Judge Porteous viewed Wallace with ``a sense of pride.'' Wallace, 
2A at 639-640, 644, 659-660.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Louis Marcotte's interview with the FBI
    In 1994, the FBI interviewed Louis Marcotte as part of its 
background investigation of Judge Porteous, who was being 
considered for an appointment to the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana. The FBI interviewed Louis 
Marcotte on or about August 1, 1994. Stips. 171, 178, 1C at 
2539. Marcotte testified that Judge Porteous told him that the 
FBI was going to be coming to interview him. Louis Marcotte, 2A 
at 482.
    According to the written summary of the interview prepared 
by the FBI, Marcotte explained that he was a professional and 
social acquaintance of Judge Porteous who ``sometimes [went] 
out to lunch with the candidate and attorneys in the area.'' 
Stip. 179, 1C at 2539. Marcotte also told the FBI that Judge 
Porteous was ``really helpful and available for everybody'' and 
was ``open-minded and fair, but [was] not a push-over.'' In his 
interview, Marcotte generally discussed bond setting practices 
in the Jefferson Parish courthouse and his bail bonds business. 
Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 471).\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\The Committee admitted Exhibit 69(b), the FBI background 
investigation file for Judge Porteous's federal nomination, with 
certain limitations. Parts of Exhibit 69(b) are part of the public, 
certified record; however, the full exhibit is available only to 
Senators upon their request. Citations to portions of the exhibit that 
were not included into the public record will reflect a general 
citation to the full exhibit and the appropriate Bates number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Also in this interview, Marcotte denied knowledge of any 
abuse of alcohol or prescription drugs by Judge Porteous; 
Marcotte stated that Judge Porteous would have a beer or two at 
lunch but Marcotte had never seen him drunk. Marcotte also told 
the FBI that he had ``no knowledge of the candidate's financial 
situation'' and assured the FBI that ``he [was] not aware of 
anything in the candidate's background that might be the basis 
of attempted influence, pressure, coercion, or compromise or 
that would impact negatively on the candidate's character, 
reputation, judgment, or discretion.'' Id. After the interview, 
Marcotte told Judge Porteous, ``Thumbs up.'' Louis Marcotte, 2A 
at 486.
    At the evidentiary hearings, however, Marcotte testified 
that his statements to the FBI in 1994 about Judge Porteous's 
financial circumstances, his alcohol usage, and general 
``integrity'' were false. According to Marcotte, he lied to 
protect Judge Porteous because the Judge was someone who had 
been good to him, and Marcotte wanted to aid Judge Porteous's 
appointment to the federal bench. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 483-
485.
            i. The House's perspective
    The House argues that Louis Marcotte lied to the FBI during 
its background investigation of Judge Porteous to help him 
attain his judicial appointment and to protect against the 
exposure of their corrupt relationship. Marcotte was a close 
and trusted associate who could be counted on by Judge Porteous 
to say positive things, even if that meant lying, given all 
that Judge Porteous had done for Marcotte over the years. In 
other words, Marcotte's lies on Judge Porteous's behalf were an 
element of their corrupt relationship.
            ii. Judge Porteous's perspective
    Judge Porteous argues that Marcotte did not say anything 
demonstrably false in his FBI interview. Statements to the 
effect that Judge Porteous may have appeared drunk are 
uncorroborated; the available documentary evidence only shows 
that Judge Porteous had one or two drinks at lunches. Exs. 
372(a)-(d), 3D at 4394-4401; Ex. 373(d), 3D at 4408-4410. 
Furthermore, Judge Porteous contends that Marcotte could not 
have lied about Judge Porteous's financial condition because 
Marcotte had no direct knowledge of his financial affairs. He 
argues Marcotte's contrary impeachment trial testimony is based 
solely on his observations about the decrepit state of Judge 
Porteous's cars, ``lifestyle,'' and gambling habits. Louis 
Marcotte, 2A at 535.
    Finally, with regard to Marcotte's response to the 
compromise-or-coercion question, Judge Porteous points to 
Marcotte's own admission that he would have never extorted or 
blackmailed Judge Porteous. See id.; Ex. 447, 3E at 5052-5053. 
Even when asked if Marcotte had information that could 
potentially embarrass Judge Porteous and be used as leverage 
against him, Marcotte responded, ``But I would have never 
leaned on him that kind of way. I would do without before I 
would have leaned on him in that kind of way.'' Id. at 4971, 
5053. From this testimony, Judge Porteous maintains that 
Marcotte himself refutes the House's allegations.
            2. Conduct While a Federal Court Judge and Relationship 
                    With the Marcottes
    It is uncontested that after Judge Porteous became a 
federal judge, his relationship with Louis Marcotte changed, 
and their lunches became less frequent. Nonetheless, records 
submitted as evidence show that the Marcottes paid for lunches 
with Judge Porteous on at least six occasions.\44\ Stip. 164, 
1C at 2538; Exs. 372(a)-(d), 3D at 4394-4401; Ex. 373(a), 3D at 
4402-4404; Ex. 373(c), 3D at 4405-4407; Ex. 373(d), 3D at 4408-
4410; Ex. 375, 3D at 4411. Moreover, Louis Marcotte testified 
that he tried to maintain his relationship with Judge Porteous. 
Louis Marcotte, 2A at 489-490.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\For example, in 1997, the Marcottes set up two lunches with 
Judge Porteous and two justices of the peace, who also had the ability 
to set bonds. At this lunch, Judge Porteous vouched for the Marcottes, 
but in both cases, the justices of the peace were uncomfortable with 
forming a professional relationship with them. Lori Marcotte, 2A at 
563-564; Ex. 447, 3E at 5035-5038; Ex. 448, 3E at 5187-5188. Judge 
Porteous also met with an official from the insurance company that set 
the Marcottes' bond writing authority. At this lunch, Judge Porteous's 
presence helped the Marcottes ``to develop trust, [a good] reputation, 
[and] stability . . . on our part,'' which were important in securing 
the ability to write larger bonds from the insurance company. Lori 
Marcotte, 2A at 564-565.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In March 2002, Marcotte arranged a lunch at Emeril's 
Restaurant with Judge Porteous and Judge Ronald Bodenheimer of 
the 24th JDC, a relatively new state court judge; Marcotte 
wanted Bodenheimer to ``step into [Judge Porteous's] shoes.'' 
Id. at 490. Prior to that lunch, Judge Bodenheimer ``kind of 
stayed away from Louis Marcotte intentionally,'' because, at 
that time, ``the rumor was that [Marcotte] was doing drugs.'' 
Bodenheimer, 2B at 1174-1175. Judge Porteous, however, spoke 
highly of Louis Marcotte's honesty in the bond business, and 
Bodenheimer took Judge Porteous's statements seriously. Id. at 
1171-1175, 1177; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 462, 490; see Stip. 166, 
1C at 2538; Ex. 447, 3E at 5036-5037. Bodenheimer also 
testified that, at some other time, Judge Porteous told him 
that now that Bodenheimer was a judge ``he would never have to 
buy lunch again.'' Bodenheimer clarified that he thought the 
statement to be made in jest. Bodenheimer, 2B at 1175-1177.
    According to Louis Marcotte, after this lunch he provided 
meals, house repairs, and a trip to the Beau Rivage casino to 
Bodenheimer, and in return, Bodenheimer ``became helpful to the 
Marcottes in setting bonds.'' Louis Marcotte, 2A at 490-491; 
see Ex. 375, 3D at 4411; Ex. 442, 3D at 4661; Ex. 447, 3E at 
5040-5041; Ex. 448, 3E at 5144. In his testimony, however, 
Bodenheimer maintained that Judge Porteous never told him what 
to do in relation to the Marcottes, nor did Bodenheimer feel 
that Judge Porteous ever used his position as a federal judge 
to pressure Bodenheimer to work with the Marcottes or to issue 
any bonds. Judge Porteous simply told Bodenheimer that he could 
trust the Marcottes when it came to providing information 
related to a particular offender. Bodenheimer always verified 
the information provided by Marcotte and ``never, ever caught 
him in a lie.'' Bodenheimer, 2B at 1197. Moreover, Bodenheimer 
stated that the pressure to set bonds, in general, came from 
the fact that many defendants would be subject to release on 
personal recognizance due to a federal court decree. Given this 
situation and BBU's dominance in the area, Bodenheimer 
testified that he believed that working with the Marcottes was 
unavoidable. Id. at 1172-1173, 1178-1183, 1196-1197.
    Louis Marcotte pled guilty in 2004 to criminal racketeering 
charges arising from his bail bonds business. Lori Marcotte 
pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud in 2004. 
Bodenheimer pled guilty in 2003 to three counts, including one 
count of honest services fraud. Ex. 71(a), 3B at 1848, 1858-
1859; Ex. 71(e), 3C at 1891-1896; Ex. 88(d), 3C at 2112-2115; 
Ex. 88(f), 3C at 2122-2133; Ex. 88(h), 3C at 2136.
            i. The House's perspective
    The House argues that, when Judge Porteous became a federal 
judge, he could do less for the Marcottes, and, accordingly, 
the Marcottes did less for him. After his appointment to the 
federal bench, the Marcottes no longer repaired Judge 
Porteous's cars or home. See Lori Marcotte, 2A at 591; Louis 
Marcotte, 2A at 522; Wallace, 2A at 657. Nevertheless, the 
House maintains that the Marcottes continued to pay for some 
lunches and drinks, and that Judge Porteous assisted them by 
using the power and prestige of his office to recruit state 
judges to fill his former position as the ``go-to'' judge for 
the Marcottes in setting bonds.
    The Marcottes and BBU also paid for meals and drinks for 
Judge Porteous when he was invited to speak at the annual 
convention of the Professional Bail Agents of the United States 
(PBUS) in 1996 and 1999. In 1996, the convention was held in 
New Orleans and hosted by the Marcottes. In 1999, the 
convention was held in Biloxi, Mississippi, and although PBUS 
paid for Judge Porteous's room and some expenses, the Marcottes 
subsidized other meals and drinks. Lori Marcotte, 2A at 565-
566; Ex. 90(a), 3C at 2137-2138; Ex. 90(b), 3C at 2139-2140.
    The House asserts that the charges against Bodenheimer 
mirror the current allegations against Judge Porteous, in that 
Bodenheimer was charged with ``enrich[ing] himself by setting, 
reducing, and splitting bonds in various criminal matters 
pending before him as well as other judges on terms most 
advantageous to the bail bonding company in exchange for things 
of value, including meals, trips to resorts, campaign 
contributions, home improvements, and other things of value.'' 
According to the House, Louis Marcotte, Lori Marcotte, and 
Bodenheimer all pled guilty to charges arising out of their 
corrupt relationship, while Judge Porteous avoided criminal 
sanction for his similarly corrupt conduct with the Marcottes. 
See Ex. 71(a), 3B at 1845-1863; Ex. 71(e), 3C at 1891-1896; Ex. 
88(d), 3C at 2112-2115; Ex. 88(f), 3C at 2122-2133; Ex. 88(h), 
3C at 2136.
            ii. Judge Porteous's perspective
    Judge Porteous maintains that his contact with the 
Marcottes was minimal after he became a federal judge, which by 
Louis Marcotte's own admission amounted to only five to eight 
lunches. Accepting those lunches was not barred under the 
canons of judicial ethics because he did not use his office as 
a federal judge to influence others inappropriately on behalf 
of the Marcottes. While Marcotte may have wanted Judge Porteous 
to lobby and pressure state court judges to deal with BBU, 
there is no evidence that he did anything other than provide a 
professional reference for Marcotte, as Judge Porteous did with 
Bodenheimer. See Danos, 2A at 805-806; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 
490; Ex. 447, 3E at 5029-5030.
    Judge Porteous argues that the alleged corrupt conduct in 
Article II, then, amounts to a handful of lunches and 
contradictory testimony as to whether he abused the power and 
prestige of his federal judgeship to lobby other state judges 
on behalf of the Marcottes. Rather than providing concrete 
evidence of misconduct, Judge Porteous argues that the House 
merely attempts to link him with the criminal convictions of 
the Marcottes and Bodenheimer, despite the fact that he was 
never charged with a crime. In particular, unlike other judges 
investigated by the FBI and accused of wrongdoing, Judge 
Porteous never asked that the Marcottes provide him with a 
percentage of the premium earned from the bonds he signed for 
them, nor did he receive improper cash payments from the 
Marcottes. See Lori Marcotte, 2A at 568-569; Stip. 163, 1C at 
2538.

D. Expert Testimony

            1. Professor Charles G. Geyh
    In preparing his testimony as an expert witness for the 
House, Professor Geyh used the House Report and sworn pretrial 
testimony before the Senate\45\ as the basis to form his 
opinions.\46\ Geyh, 2A at 716. Geyh stated the applicable 
ethical standard at the time was that no judge should accept 
any gifts or favors that might reasonably appear designed to 
affect his judgment or influence his conduct. He testified 
Judge Porteous's alleged relationship with the Marcottes was a 
``traditional'' form of corruption tantamount to a quid pro quo 
arrangement. Id. at 728. Professor Geyh viewed these 
allegations to be an ``abuse [of] the prestige of his office, 
this time to favor the Marcottes' interests. . . . And in this 
case, Mr. Marcotte . . . thought of Judge Porteous as being on 
commission. I mean, these gifts are designed to affect the 
judge's conduct.'' Id. Similarly, Professor Geyh viewed the 
account of the lunch meeting with new state judges where Judge 
Porteous was described as ``bringing strength to the table'' as 
a continuing quid pro quo where Judge Porteous traded on the 
prestige of his federal office. Id. at 731.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\Louis and Lori Marcotte gave sworn pretrial deposition 
testimony on August 2, 2010. See Ex. 447, 3E at 4926-5070; Ex. 448, 3E 
at 5071-5206.
    \46\Geyh acknowledged that he did not reject any House assertion as 
being untrue. Geyh, 2A at 745.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. Professor Dane Ciolino
    As discussed in Article I, Judge Porteous's expert, 
Professor Ciolino, testified that a judge could not accept a 
gift if it might reasonably appear to affect the judge's 
official conduct. For a more complete discussion on this 
standard, please refer to Professor Ciolino's testimony in 
Article I.
    With respect to the allegations of Judge Porteous doing 
favors for the Marcottes in return for receiving things of 
value, Ciolino also testified that if the allegations regarding 
the Judge's actions were true and a quid pro quo relationship 
existed, then the behavior would be criminal and unethical. 
Ciolino, 2B at 1524. According to Ciolino, an express agreement 
is not necessary to establish a quid pro quo relationship. Id. 
at 1536. Since the applicable standard weighs the totality of 
the circumstances, any change in a fact, such as whether or not 
bonds were set too high or too low for the defendant, may 
result in a different conclusion. Id. at 1529-1530.

                            III. ARTICLE III

A. Text of the Article

    Beginning in or about March 2001 and continuing through 
about July 2004, while a Federal judge in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, G. Thomas 
Porteous, Jr., engaged in a pattern of conduct inconsistent 
with the trust and confidence placed in him as a Federal judge 
by knowingly and intentionally making material false statements 
and representations under penalty of perjury related to his 
personal bankruptcy filing and by repeatedly violating a court 
order in his bankruptcy case. Judge Porteous did so by--
          (1) using a false name and a post office box address 
        to conceal his identity as the debtor in the case;
          (2) concealing assets;
          (3) concealing preferential payments to certain 
        creditors;
          (4) concealing gambling losses and other gambling 
        debts; and
          (5) incurring new debts while the case was pending, 
        in violation of the bankruptcy court's order.
    In doing so, Judge Porteous brought his court into scandal 
and disrepute, prejudiced public respect for and confidence in 
the Federal judiciary, and demonstrated that he is unfit for 
the office of Federal judge.
    Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of high 
crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office.

B. Introduction to the Evidence

    Article III addresses Judge Porteous's actions regarding 
his Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy and relies heavily on 
documentary evidence that is largely uncontested. While there 
was also broad agreement among fact and expert witnesses 
regarding the process of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy generally and 
Judge Porteous's case specifically, a few distinct areas of 
sharp disagreement remain. For this reason, the discussion of 
Article III is organized differently than the discussions of 
Articles I and II, and the House's and Judge Porteous's 
perspectives on contested issues are integrated in one separate 
section following the statement of facts.

C. Statement of Facts

            1. Background
    Between 1996 and 2000, Judge Porteous accrued increasing 
levels of credit card debt and, by the summer of 2000, was in a 
``downward financial spiral.'' Ex. 5, 3B at 434. Judge Porteous 
hired Claude Lightfoot, a New Orleans bankruptcy attorney with 
10 years of experience, in an attempt to ``workout'' debts 
accrued on various unsecured credit cards informally through a 
payment financed by an additional mortgage against Judge 
Porteous's home. Judge Porteous first pursued this option, as 
opposed to filing for bankruptcy, in order to avoid the 
embarrassment of seeking bankruptcy protection, about which 
Judge Porteous's wife, Carmella, was particularly distraught. 
Lightfoot, 2A at 983-984, 1013-1014.
    In order to formulate the workout plan, Lightfoot acquired 
information about Judge Porteous's assets and liabilities soon 
after he was hired. Judge Porteous provided Lightfoot with his 
May 2000 pay stub, which listed a net monthly income of 
$7,531.52, and a handwritten list of his creditors. In August 
2000, Lightfoot asked Judge Porteous to fill out bankruptcy 
worksheets, which provided a fuller picture of Judge Porteous's 
financial health and listed his assets and creditors. 
Additionally, Judge Porteous periodically sent Lightfoot credit 
card statements in order to keep these worksheets current. Id. 
at 985-988, 1000, 1017-1018; Ex. 138(b), 3C at 2553-2581.
    In pursuit of an informal workout, on December 21, 2000, 
Lightfoot wrote a letter to each of Judge Porteous's unsecured 
credit card creditors, asking them to accept a pro rata share 
of money to be borrowed against Judge Porteous's home. Judge 
Porteous's total unsecured credit card debt was listed as 
$182,330.23 across 13 credit cards, with balances ranging from 
$1,724.23 to $28,708.98. This letter twice indicated that Judge 
Porteous might be forced to file for bankruptcy. Lightfoot, 2A 
at 987; Ex. 5, 3B at 431-432; Ex. 146, 3C at 2752.
    Lightfoot attempted to follow up with these creditors for 
months but failed to receive a response. At that point, 
Lightfoot advised Judge Porteous to stop making payments to his 
unsecured creditors in an effort to get their attention, a 
tactic that ultimately increased Judge Porteous's level of 
indebtedness. In March 2001, when it became clear to Lightfoot 
that the workout plan would be unsuccessful, Judge Porteous 
decided to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. 
Lightfoot, 2A at 987, 995, 1023-1025.
            2. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Overview
    Chapter 13 bankruptcy is often called a wage earner's 
bankruptcy. Unlike Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in which the debtor's 
current assets are liquidated to pay creditors, Chapter 13 
bankruptcy is a voluntary process through which a debtor 
commits future disposable income to repay creditors at least 
the value they would have received if the debtor had filed for 
Chapter 7 protection. Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans cannot move 
forward if this equivalency requirement is not met, which is 
determined by the ``best-interest-of-creditors'' test. If this 
test reveals that the debtor's projected disposable income over 
the course of the plan is insufficient to satisfy this 
standard, the debtor's current assets may be used in the plan. 
Keir, 2A at 1096, 1120; Horner, 2A at 932-933; Hildebrand, 2B 
at 1656, 1662; see also 11 U.S.C. Sec. 541(a).\47\
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    \47\The Committee accepted the following individuals as expert 
witnesses: Bankruptcy Judge Duncan W. Keir of the District of Maryland, 
in the area of bankruptcy; Henry Hildebrand, Standing Chapter 13 
Trustee for the Middle District of Tennessee, in matters relating to 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases; Professor Rafael Pardo, Professor of Law 
at the University of Washington School of Law, in matters pertaining to 
bankruptcy law; and former Bankruptcy Judge Ronald Barliant of the 
Northern District of Illinois, in matters pertaining to bankruptcy law. 
See Barliant, 2B at 1701-1702; Hildebrand, 2B at 1655; Keir, 2A at 
1095; Pardo, 2B at 1261-1262.
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    When a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition is filed, a 
bankruptcy estate is automatically created by statute.\48\ 
Although a debtor continues to own his estate throughout the 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy process, a trustee is appointed to 
administer it. All property not accounted for in the debtor's 
plan when the confirmation order is issued vests back to the 
debtor. Keir, 2A at 1117-1118; Pardo, 2B at 1293.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\Unlike a Chapter 7 estate that, with some exceptions, is 
composed only of what the debtor owned when the petition was filed, a 
Chapter 13 estate also encompasses the debtor's future income and other 
post-petition assets. Some assets, such as individual retirement 
accounts, are generally exempt. Pardo, 2B at 1288-1290.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Creditors are sent a notice of the commencement of the case 
after the filing of the petition. This notice contains 
identifying information about the debtor, the deadline by which 
creditors must file claims against the estate, and the date of 
the creditors meeting.\49\ This meeting allows creditors to ask 
questions and object to the plan. During this meeting, the 
trustee reviews the debtor's bankruptcy filings, which include 
a petition, bankruptcy schedules containing information on the 
debtor's assets and liabilities, and a statement of financial 
affairs. Trustees use this opportunity to evaluate the 
sincerity of the debtor through an examination of the debtor 
under oath. Hildebrand, 2B at 1674-1675; Lightfoot, 2A at 1004-
1005; Pardo, 2B at 1270-1271.
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    \49\Creditors meetings are also referred to as ``341 meetings'' 
throughout the testimony. This refers to the section of the United 
States Code (11 U.S.C. Sec. 341) requiring this meeting of the 
creditors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All Chapter 13 plans must be confirmed by a bankruptcy 
judge. After the meeting, the trustee makes a recommendation to 
the assigned bankruptcy judge as to whether the plan should be 
confirmed. If the trustee objects, which is a common 
occurrence, the plan is subject to litigation before a 
bankruptcy judge at a confirmation hearing. After the 
confirmation hearing, the judge rules on the trustee's 
objection and decides whether to confirm the debtor's plan.\50\ 
Beaulieu, 2B at 1400.
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    \50\If confirmed, appeals of this order are heard by U.S. District 
Court judges or, in a few circuits, U.S. Bankruptcy Court judges 
sitting on a bankruptcy appellate panel. In the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, appeals are heard by one of the twelve U.S. District Court 
judges. Pardo, 2B at 1301-1303.
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    Chapter 13 plans can last between three and five years and, 
if the plan is completed, the debtor's debts may be 
discharged.\51\ The statutory basis for the denial of a 
discharge in a Chapter 13 case is failure to complete the plan, 
which occurs in more than two-thirds of cases. A plan may also 
be converted to a Chapter 7 plan or dismissed if the plan was 
not proposed in good faith. If a discharge has been granted, it 
may be revoked if the debtor obtained the discharge through 
fraud. Lightfoot, 2A at 1065; Pardo, 2B at 1265-1268, 1272, 
1313; see also 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1307.
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    \51\Nevertheless, neither debt omitted from the debtor's bankruptcy 
schedules nor debt accrued post-bankruptcy will be discharged when the 
plan is completed. See Pardo, 2B at 1266-1272.
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            3. Judge Porteous's Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filings
    On March 28, 2001, Judge Porteous filed for Chapter 13 
bankruptcy protection. His petition was filed under the 
fictitious name of ``G. T. Ortous'' and used a newly acquired 
post office box as his residential address. His filing 
accurately listed his Social Security number. Lightfoot 
suggested the idea of using the name ``G. T. Ortous'' and a 
post office box to avoid any embarrassment that would result 
from inclusion of Judge Porteous's bankruptcy filing in the New 
Orleans Times-Picayune's weekly listing of local bankruptcies. 
Both Lightfoot and Judge Porteous signed the petition under the 
following declaration: ``I declare under penalty of perjury 
that the information provided in this petition is true and 
correct.'' Lightfoot 2A at 991-994, 1027; Stips. 202, 208, 1C 
at 2541, 2542; Ex. 125, 3C at 2492-2493; Ex. 138(a), 3C at 
2551; Ex. 145, 3C at 2749.
    On April 8, 2001, the Times-Picayune printed a list of 
local bankruptcies, including Judge Porteous's bankruptcy, 
which was filed under the name ``G. T. Ortous.'' Lightfoot 
filed an amended petition on the following day using Judge 
Porteous's correct name, accompanied by bankruptcy schedules, a 
Chapter 13 plan, and a statement of financial affairs to 
accompany the amended petition. These documents were prepared 
by Lightfoot, based on the information he had previously 
received from Judge Porteous. The notice to creditors was not 
sent until after Judge Porteous's schedules were filed, and as 
a result, no creditor received a notice with the name ``G. T. 
Ortous.'' Beaulieu, 2B at 1382; Lightfoot, 2A at 991-995, 1032-
1037; Stips. 189-190, 1C at 2540; Exs. 126-127, 3C at 2497-
2498; Ex. 1064, 3E at 5566-5568.
    The bankruptcy schedules filed by Judge Porteous, labeled 
``A'' through ``J,'' require that the debtor list real 
property; personal property, including assets held in bank 
accounts or retirement plans; all creditors holding various 
types of secured and unsecured claims; any contracts or leases; 
current income; and current expenditures. Judge Porteous signed 
this form under the following declaration: ``I declare under 
penalty of perjury that I have read the forgoing summary and 
schedules, consisting of 18 sheets plus the summary page, and 
that they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, 
information, and belief.'' Ex. 127, 3C at 2499-2524.
    The statement of financial affairs, filed with a debtor's 
bankruptcy schedules, requires the debtor to answer a series of 
21 questions to further assess the financial health of the 
debtor. Among other things, the statement of financial affairs 
asks whether the debtor has made any payments to creditors over 
$600 in the 90 days preceding the debtor's bankruptcy filing 
(question 3). The statement also requires the debtor to list 
any gambling losses incurred in the year immediately preceding 
the commencement of the bankruptcy case or since (question 8). 
Judge Porteous signed this form under the following 
declaration: ``I declare under penalty of perjury that I have 
read the answers contained in the foregoing statement of 
financial affairs and any attachments hereto and that they are 
true and correct.'' Id. at 2499-2524.
    Although unknown to the bankruptcy trustee at the time, 
Porteous's bankruptcy schedules failed to disclose certain 
assets and undervalued others. Judge Porteous's Schedule B, on 
which he was required to list any ``checking, savings, or other 
financial accounts,'' as well as the value of those assets 
(question 2), undervalued his listed Bank One checking account. 
Judge Porteous listed this account as having a balance of $100, 
despite having deposited $2,000 into this account on March 27, 
2001, the day prior to the filing of his original petition. 
Moreover, from March 23 through April 23, the account had an 
opening balance of $559.07 and a closing balance of $5,493.91. 
At no time during this period did Judge Porteous's balance drop 
as low as $100. Horner, 2A at 906-907; Stips. 223-224, 226, 1C 
at 2543; Ex. 127, 3C at 2499-2524, Ex. 144, 3C at 2732-2748.
    Additionally, Judge Porteous failed to list his Fidelity 
money market account on this schedule. Judge Porteous used this 
account frequently, and in the days shortly prior to filing for 
bankruptcy, Judge Porteous wrote numerous checks drawn on the 
Fidelity account, including a check for $40 on March 27, 2001. 
The value of this account on March 28, 2001, the date on which 
Judge Porteous filed his original petition, was $283.42. 
However, for several months during Judge Porteous's bankruptcy, 
the undisclosed Fidelity money market account carried a balance 
significantly higher than in the disclosed Bank One 
account.\52\ Horner, 2A at 907, 927-928; Stips. 228, 230, 1C at 
2543; Ex. 143, 3C at 2725-2731.
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    \52\For example, in May 2002, the account balance in the Fidelity 
money market account was $8,760.37, and the account balance in the Bank 
One account was $1,120.91. In June 2002, the account balance in the 
Fidelity account was over $7,800, and the balance in the Bank One 
account was $857.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Schedule B also requires the debtor to list ``[o]ther 
liquidated debts owing debtor[,] including tax refunds.'' In 
response to this question, Porteous marked ``none.'' However, 
on March 23, 2001, Judge Porteous had filed for a tax refund of 
$4,143. This refund was deposited into Judge Porteous's Bank 
One checking account on April 13, 2001, four days after the 
filing of Judge Porteous's amended petition and bankruptcy 
schedules. Horner, 2A at 902; Lightfoot, 2A at 998; Stips. 221-
222, 240, 1C at 2543, 2544; Ex. 127, 3C at 2504; Ex. 141, 3C at 
2723-2724; Ex. 144, 3C at 2732-2748.
    In addition to the issues described above, Judge Porteous's 
bankruptcy schedules did not accurately reflect his net monthly 
income. Schedule I requires the debtor to list gross monthly 
wages, less payroll deductions, and any other income the debtor 
derives from other sources, which provides the trustee with an 
accounting of the debtor's total net monthly income. On this 
schedule, Judge Porteous listed both his gross wages and net 
monthly income as $7,531.52, and his May 2000 pay stub--the 
same pay stub used by Lightfoot to calculate the ``workout'' 
plan in the summer and autumn of 2000--was attached. Ex. 127, 
3C at 2516-2517.
    Judge Porteous's Schedule I misrepresented his monthly 
income in two ways. First, Judge Porteous had received a pay 
increase between May 2000 and March 2001.\53\ Second, Judge 
Porteous's Schedule I did not account for the fact that Social 
Security taxes were withheld from Judge Porteous's salary only 
until his income reached a statutorily defined annual gross 
salary referred to as the Social Security ``wage base.'' His 
income typically reached this level in July of a calendar year. 
At that point, certain federal taxes are no longer withheld, 
and his net monthly salary increased by several hundred 
dollars.\54\ Horner, 2A at 925-926; Stip. 238, 1C at 2544.
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    \53\On the day that his original petition was filed, Judge 
Porteous's net monthly income was $7,705.51, about $174 more than the 
net monthly income listed on the schedule.
    \54\In July 2001 through the end of the year, Judge Porteous's 
monthly net salary increased to roughly $8,500, about $1,000 more than 
was listed as his net income on his bankruptcy schedules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Question 8 on the statement of financial affairs 
requires the debtor to ``list all losses from fire, theft, 
casualty, or other gambling within one year immediately 
preceding the commencement of this case or since the 
commencement of the case.'' Judge Porteous's listed response 
was ``none.'' Although the parties dispute the amount of Judge 
Porteous's offsetting gambling winnings, Judge Porteous 
incurred at least $12,700 in gambling losses over the previous 
year. Horner, 2A at 910, 913; Ex. 127, 3C at 2521.
            4. May 9 Creditors Meeting and June 28 Confirmation of the 
                    Chapter 13 Plan
    Judge Porteous's Chapter 13 trustee, S.J. Beaulieu, Jr., 
conducted the creditors meeting on May 9, 2001. At this 
meeting, Judge Porteous testified under oath that he had listed 
all of his assets. During this meeting, neither the trustee nor 
any creditor objected to the amount of income listed in Judge 
Porteous's bankruptcy schedules. Additionally, a large number 
of creditors failed to file claims to collect the money 
available through the Chapter 13 plan. Beaulieu, 2B at 1381; 
Lightfoot, 2A at 1134.
    At the end of the meeting, Beaulieu told Judge Porteous 
that he was prohibited from borrowing money or buying anything 
on credit while his case was pending. Specifically, Judge 
Porteous was informed, ``Any charge cards that you may have . . 
. you cannot use any longer. So basically you [sic] on a cash 
basis now.'' Any loan or purchase on credit would have to be 
approved by Beaulieu. Beaulieu, 2B at 1398; Ex. 130, 3C at 
2537; Ex. 135, 3C at 2548.
    Beaulieu had mailed Judge Porteous a pamphlet entitled 
``Your Rights and Responsibilities in Chapter 13'' prior to the 
meeting. This pamphlet explained that while the Chapter 13 
process was ongoing, the debtor was prohibited from borrowing 
money or buying anything on credit without permission from the 
bankruptcy court, including using credit cards or charge 
accounts of any kind. The pamphlet additionally stated that 
``[t]he Trustee also has the right to use [tax] refunds to fund 
your plan.'' While testifying before the Fifth Circuit Special 
Investigatory Committee, Judge Porteous indicated that he had 
understood that he could not incur more credit in bankruptcy. 
Lightfoot, 2A at 1006; Ex. 10, 3B at 728; Ex. 148, 3C at 2754-
2758.
    Prior to the creditors meeting, Beaulieu had objected to 
Judge Porteous's original plan, indicating that he was not 
making use of all available disposable income and had not met 
the Chapter 7 equivalency value.\55\ In his objection and 
motion to amend the bankruptcy plan, Beaulieu requested that 
the bankruptcy court increase the percentage payable to 
unsecured creditors. To resolve these issues, a telephone 
confirmation hearing was arranged with U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
William R. Greendyke, who was sitting by designation from the 
Southern District of Texas.\56\ Beaulieu, 2B at 1378-1379, 
1398-1399; Ex. 129, 3C at 2533; Ex. 135, 3C at 2547; see also 
Lightfoot, 2A at 1007-1008.
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    \55\In particular, Beaulieu objected to an expense relating to the 
Porteouses' daughter, who was receiving $300 to $400 a month for her 
college food plan and rent. Beaulieu, 2B at 1378, 1530; Lightfoot, 2A 
at 1057.
    \56\The Fifth Circuit had ordered that the three bankruptcy court 
judges in the Eastern District of Louisiana recuse themselves from 
Judge Porteous's bankruptcy case; Judge Greendyke was assigned by Judge 
Carolyn Dineen King. Ex. 10, 3B at 723.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 28, 2001, Judge Greendyke confirmed the amended 
bankruptcy plan, allowing an increase in Judge Porteous's 
monthly payments from $875 per month to $1,600 per month, per 
Beaulieu's request, payable to the Chapter 13 trustee for a 
period of 36 months. The failure of many creditors to file 
claims resulted in each creditor receiving a higher repayment 
percentage than proposed by the original plan--in total, 34.5%. 
Beaulieu, 2B at 1379, 1398; Lightfoot, 2A at 1058; Ex. 133, 3C 
at 2543-2545.
    Echoing Beaulieu's admonishment during the May 9 creditors 
meeting, paragraph 4 of Judge Greendyke's order expressly 
stated: ``The debtor(s) shall not incur additional debt during 
the term of this plan without written approval of the Trustee. 
Failure to obtain such approval may cause the claim for such 
debt to be unallowable and non-dischargeable,'' meaning that 
any debt that Judge Porteous incurred after the confirmation 
hearing would not discharge upon the completion of the plan. 
Judge Porteous received a copy of this order. Lightfoot, 2A at 
1008-1009, 1060; Ex. 10, 3B at 728; Ex. 133, 3C at 2443-2445.
    Prior to the end of the 36-month period, Judge Porteous 
completed the repayment plan but, on the advice of his 
attorney, continued to make his monthly payments and distribute 
money to his creditors. Upon the completion of the plan, the 
bankruptcy court discharged the remainder of Judge Porteous's 
scheduled debts in July 2004. In total, Judge Porteous paid 
$57,600 to the trustee to fulfill the Chapter 13 plan, 
$52,567.01 of which was distributed to Judge Porteous's 
unsecured creditors. Compared with most Chapter 13 plans, Judge 
Porteous was considered to have completed a large plan. If he 
had entered into Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and all of his assets 
been accurately listed, the net amount available to creditors 
would have been about $33,677, or $18,890 less than Judge 
Porteous actually paid out to creditors. See Beaulieu, 2B at 
1378; Hildebrand, 2B at 1683; Lightfoot, 2A at 1061, 1063; 
Pardo 2B at 1275-1284; Stip. 330, 1C at 2551; Ex. 4, 3B at 379; 
Ex. 1100(z), 3E at 5823.
            5. Gambling-Related Activity and Extensions of Credit
    Throughout this process, Judge Porteous gambled at casinos 
in and around New Orleans using markers. Under Louisiana law, a 
marker is a check from an individual's bank account, which is 
drawn in exchange for casino chips.\57\ Article III of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted by the state of 
Louisiana, defines a check to be a negotiable instrument in the 
form of a ``draft,'' which is payable on demand and drawn on a 
bank.\58\ If a marker is not repaid, the casino will negotiate, 
or deposit, the marker at the individual's bank for payment 
like a normal check. Horner, 2A at 946; Pardo, 2B at 1297.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\Four judges on the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council noted in the 
dissent to the certification of misconduct, ``Under Louisiana 
commercial law, markers are considered `checks' as defined by Louisiana 
statute.'' This statement does not necessarily imply that markers 
should be treated as checks rather than loans in the bankruptcy 
context, although the definition of markers under Louisiana commercial 
law provides ``some support for a good faith understanding that 
`markers' would be treated as checks and not credit in the bankruptcy 
context within Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit.'' Ex. 6(b), 3B at 510.
    \58\Article III, Sec. 3-104(f), of the Uniform Commercial Code 
defines a check to be ``(i) a draft, other than a documentary draft, 
payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier's check or 
teller's check.'' An instrument may be a check even though it is 
described on its face by another term, such as ``money order.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the 90 days prior to filing for bankruptcy, Porteous 
executed, or took out, nine markers worth $5,500.\59\ These 
nine markers were executed on two separate occasions. The first 
two, totaling $2,000, were executed in February 2001 at the 
Grand Casino Gulfport in Gulfport, Mississippi. Judge Porteous 
left the casino without first redeeming, or repaying, the 
markers. On March 16, the Grand Casino Gulfport deposited these 
markers,\60\ which cleared Judge Porteous's account on March 
24, 2000. On the day his original bankruptcy petition was 
filed, Judge Porteous's balance at the Grand Casino Gulfport 
was zero.\61\ The remaining seven markers, totaling $3,500, 
were executed at the Treasure Chest Casino. Four of these 
markers were redeemed on the same day with chips. Judge 
Porteous redeemed the remaining three markers on March 27, 
2001, the day before he filed for bankruptcy. Horner, 2A at 
890, 896-897; Stip. 193, 1C at 2540.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\The parties disagree as to whether executing and redeeming 
markers constituted preferential payments to creditors that should have 
been listed on his statement of financial affairs. This issue is 
discussed in the ``Contested Issues'' section.
    \60\To cover the markers, Judge Porteous deposited $2,000 into his 
Fidelity money market account, $1,960 of which was drawn from his 
Fidelity Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Horner, 2A at 896; Stips. 
197, 225, 1C at 2541, 2543; Ex. 143, 3C at 2725-2732; Ex. 144, 3C at 
2732-2748; Ex. 301(a), 3D at 3732.
    \61\Stip. 199, 1C at 2541. These markers, however, were returned as 
uncollected on April 3, 2001, due to an invalid account number on the 
markers. This occurred because Porteous's bank merged with another 
bank, and the routing number and account number were incorrect as a 
result. After the markers were returned to the casino on April 3, the 
casino contacted Porteous and the error was corrected. On April 4, 
2001, Porteous's markers were deposited into the correct account. 
Finally, on April 12, the two $1,000 markers cleared Porteous's bank 
account. See Horner, 2A at 916; Stips. 198-199, 1C at 2541; Ex. 301(a), 
3D at 3732.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Porteous also gambled using markers between the date 
of his original bankruptcy filing on March 28, 2001 and the 
creditors meeting on May 9, 2001. During this time, Judge 
Porteous gambled using markers on two separate occasions.\62\ 
On these two trips, Judge Porteous executed eight markers, 
totaling $6,000.\63\ Two markers, totaling $1,000, were later 
repaid by a personal check written by Judge Porteous's 
secretary, Rhonda Danos. Judge Porteous reimbursed her by 
signing over a $1,000 check, drawn from his individual 
retirement account.\64\ Danos, 2A at 796; Horner, 2A at 918. 
Between the creditors meeting on May 9, 2001 and Judge 
Greendyke's confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan on June 28, 
2001, Judge Porteous continued to gamble using markers. During 
this time, he executed four markers, totaling $2,000.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\Between April 7 and 8, Porteous executed four markers, totaling 
$2,000, at the Beau Rivage Casino in Biloxi, Mississippi. Before 
leaving the casino on April 8, Porteous redeemed $1,000 worth of 
markers in chips, but left the casino with $1,000 in markers 
outstanding. Stips. 247-248, 1C at 2545; Ex. 303, 3D at 3741. On May 7, 
2001, Judge Porteous executed four markers at the Treasure Chest Casino 
in Kenner, Louisiana. At this casino, Porteous took out four $1,000 
markers, which were repaid with cash on the same day. Stips. 258-259, 
1C at 2546; Ex. 307, 3D at 3747-3748.
    \63\Judge Porteous redeemed six of these eight markers, totaling 
$5,000, on the same days they were executed.
    \64\On May 4, 2001, Danos's $1,000 check to the Beau Rivage Casino, 
written on Judge Porteous's behalf, was paid at the cage and was 
credited against Judge Porteous's Beau Rivage account. The Beau Rivage 
Casino deposited Danos's $1,000 check on May 5, 2001. Stip. 253, 1C at 
2545; Ex. 304, 3D at 3742-3743.
    \65\On two separate trips, Judge Porteous executed two markers, 
worth $1,000 total, at the Treasure Chest Casino. He redeemed each of 
these markers on the same day they were executed. The remaining two 
markers, worth $1,000 total, were executed at the Grand Casino Gulfport 
on the same trip. Judge Porteous made a $900 payment on these markers, 
repaying one marker in full the day it was executed and another in 
part; the remaining $100 was repaid on the following day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Judge Porteous's gambling activities continued in 
the year following Judge Greendyke's confirmation of his 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. In total, between July 19, 2001, 
and July 5, 2002, Judge Porteous gambled with markers on 14 
different occasions and executed 42 markers, totaling $33,400, 
at 4 different casinos.\66\ Horner, 2A at 922.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\During this time, Judge Porteous gambled at the Treasure Chest 
Casino in Kenner, Louisiana, on eight occasions (Stips. 282-302, 1C at 
2547-2549; Ex. 312, 3D at 3755; Ex. 313(a), 3D at 3756-3757; Ex. 315-
316, 3D at 3760-3762; Ex. 318-319, 3D at 3764-3766; Ex. 322, 3D at 
3769; Ex. 530, 3E at 5247-5250), Harrah's Casino in New Orleans on two 
occasions (Stips. 304-306, 1C at 2549; Ex. 314, 3D at 3759; Ex. 320, 3D 
at 3767), the Beau Rivage Casino in Biloxi, Mississippi, on one 
occasion (Stip. 307, 1C at 2549, Ex. 317, 3D at 3763), and the Grand 
Casino Gulfport in Gulfport, Mississippi, on three occasions (Stips. 
308-312, 1C at 2549-2550; Ex. 321, 3D at 3768; Ex. 323, 3D at 3770; Ex. 
325, 3D at 3772-3774). Of the 42 total markers, Judge Porteous repaid 
26 of the 42 markers on the day the marker was originally executed--a 
total of $21,500. Many of these payments were made with chips. An 
additional six markers, totaling $3,500, were repaid within one day of 
their execution. Horner, 2A at 952-954.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to execute markers at a casino, an individual must 
first apply for a line of credit and undergo a credit check. 
Throughout the bankruptcy process, Judge Porteous sought to 
obtain additional credit at three different casinos. In 
particular, Judge Porteous submitted two applications for 
increases in existing credit or new credit lines prior to the 
May 9, 2001, creditors meeting. On April 6, 2001, less than two 
weeks after the original filing of his bankruptcy petition, 
Judge Porteous requested a temporary credit limit increase of 
$1,500 at the Beau Rivage Casino, bringing his total credit 
limit to $4,000 for that particular visit to the casino. On 
April 30, Judge Porteous submitted a different credit 
application, this time for a new $4,000 credit limit at 
Harrah's Casino. Judge Porteous's last application for an 
increase in credit occurred on July 4, 2002. On this occasion, 
Judge Porteous requested an increase in his credit line at the 
Grand Casino Gulfport, from $2,000 to $2,500. See Horner, 2A at 
917-919; Pardo, 2B at 1315-1316, 1354-1355; Stips. 230, 245, 1C 
at 2543, 2545; Ex. 10, 3B at 791-793; Ex. 149, 3C at 2759; Ex. 
303, 3D at 3741; Ex. 324-325, 3D at 3771-3774.
    Following the confirmation of his plan, in addition to 
applying for extensions of credit at casinos, Judge Porteous 
applied for and used a Capital One Visa credit card without the 
written approval of the trustee. On August 13, Judge Porteous's 
credit card application was approved with a $200 limit. The 
first charge on this card, which occurred on August 23, 2001, 
was a $49.00 charge toward a security deposit.\67\ In May 2002, 
the credit limit on this card was increased to $400 and, six 
months later, increased again to $600. Horner, 2A at 920-921; 
Stips. 314, 318-319, 323, 1C at 2550, 2551.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\In his testimony, Horner incorrectly identified the first 
purchase made on this credit card as a purchase at Lucy's Restaurant on 
September 17, 2001. See Stip. 316, 1C at 2550; Ex. 341(b), 3D at 3921.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            6. FBI Investigation into Judge Porteous's Bankruptcy 
                    Filings
    In late 2001 or early 2002, Special Agent DeWayne Horner 
was assigned as the case agent in the FBI's investigation of 
Judge Porteous after he was identified as a target in 
``Operation Wrinkled Robe.'' Agent Horner, with other FBI and 
DOJ personnel, met with Beaulieu on two occasions prior to 
completion of Judge Porteous's Chapter 13 repayment plan. In 
these meetings, FBI and DOJ personnel discussed Judge 
Porteous's bankruptcy filings with Beaulieu, including problems 
with Judge Porteous's initial filing, his listed assets, his 
use of a new credit card after the confirmation hearing, and 
his execution of markers at casinos. Beaulieu, 2B at 1379-1380; 
Horner, 2A at 956-959; Stips. 326-327, 1C at 2551.
    After his second meeting with Beaulieu, Agent Horner 
received a letter from a staff attorney in Beaulieu's office. 
The letter, responding to advice from FBI and DOJ personnel 
that Beaulieu conduct an investigation into Judge Porteous's 
conduct, indicated that because the FBI was unwilling to 
provide the trustee with ``any evidence of improprieties by 
[Judge Porteous],'' Beaulieu had decided against taking any 
action. Beaulieu presented the FBI with the opportunity to 
provide him with more information or object to Judge Porteous's 
plan before its completion. The FBI did neither.\68\ Beaulieu, 
2B at 1381; Horner, 2A at 962-965; Exs. 298-299, 3D at 3728-
3731.
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    \68\Horner testified that the FBI did not provide Beaulieu with 
more information because ``the position of the Department of Justice 
was that, you know, if you learned something through the questions that 
we ask you, you know, you have to take your own steps, that we can't 
provide you with evidence and documents and things like that, you have 
to ask your own questions, get your own records, and take your own 
course of action.'' Horner, 2A at 954-955.
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D. Contested Issues

            1. Using a False Name and Post Office Box on the Original 
                    Bankruptcy Petition
    The first charge in Article III accuses Judge Porteous of 
attempting to defraud the court and his creditors by filing his 
original bankruptcy petition using a false name and a recently 
acquired post office box. However, Judge Porteous has argued 
that he was merely following the advice of counsel and that, 
while done knowingly, filing his original petition under a 
false name was not done with the intent to defraud creditors. 
Rather, the intent was to avoid unwanted publicity. By filing 
under a false name, Lightfoot hoped that Judge Porteous would 
avoid the publicity that would eventually come from not only 
the initial notice in the Times-Picayune, but any investigation 
into Judge Porteous's private life that may follow. Lightfoot, 
2A at 991-992, 1028-1031, 1036-1037; Stip. 202, 1C at 2541.
    Judge Porteous's contention that he did not intend to 
defraud the creditors is supported by the fact that, as 
discussed above, no creditor received a notice regarding Judge 
Porteous's bankruptcy under the false name ``G. T. Ortous.'' 
Judge Porteous and Lightfoot's plan was always to file an 
amended petition immediately after the Times-Picayune listed 
Porteous's bankruptcy under the false name. Upon filing an 
amended petition, they would also file the bankruptcy schedules 
and Chapter 13 plan. Only after these documents were filed 
would a notice be sent to creditors. As a result, Lightfoot 
knew that no creditor would receive a petition listing a false 
name. This differed from most other petitions filed with 
inadvertently incorrect names in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, in which the incorrect name is not usually caught 
until after the notice is sent to the creditors. See Beaulieu, 
2B at 1383-1384; Lightfoot, 2A at 1034.
    Furthermore, although Lightfoot ``rue[s] the day'' that he 
thought of the idea to file the original petition under a false 
name, he asserted that there is nothing inherently wrong with 
using a post office box as the address on the bankruptcy 
petition. Debtors frequently list post office boxes as their 
address for a variety of reasons. Unlike filing under a false 
name, Lightfoot had no reservations in advising the Porteouses 
to use a post office box in the initial filing. Id. at 1029, 
1032-1033.
    Finally, Judge Porteous argued that, as a debtor faced with 
navigating a complex and highly technical bankruptcy code, he 
was entitled to rely on the advice and guidance of his 
bankruptcy attorney. Four judges on the Fifth Circuit Judicial 
Council issued a dissent from the Fifth Circuit's decision to 
certify findings of misconduct to the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, in which they stated that ``[g]enerally, a 
debtor is entitled to rely on the advice of his bankruptcy 
counsel where reliance is reasonable and in good faith.\69\ Id. 
at 1028; Ex. 6(b), 3B at 508-509.\70\
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    \69\To support this position, the dissenting opinion cited the 
following cases: Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Perez, 124 B.R. 704, 710-11 
(E.D. La. 1991), aff'd 954 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1992); First Beverly 
Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that 
reasonable and good faith reliance on advice of counsel sufficient to 
show debtor lacked requisite fraudulent intent to revoke or deny 
discharge); Beckanstein v. United States, 232 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1956) 
(``The advice of counsel is also important in determining whether 
appellant made the statement with a corrupt motive.''). Additionally, 
the dissent also noted that, ``according to the Commentary to Canon 5C 
of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, [a] judge has the 
rights of an ordinary citizen with respect to financial affairs.'' Ex. 
6(b), 3B at 508-509.
    \70\The House's argument on this issue additionally relies on 
expert testimony, which is discussed in section D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House argues, in contrast, that even though no creditor 
received notice of the bankruptcy petition under the false name 
of ``G. T. Ortous,'' Judge Porteous committed perjury and the 
defense of ``no harm, no foul'' is unacceptable. Furthermore, 
creditors may still have been deceived by the bankruptcy 
listing in the newspaper and been deprived of the opportunity 
to make a claim or take another action with respect to the 
bankruptcy. Judge Porteous's original filing created a false 
record with the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana. If a business wanted to check whether Judge Porteous 
had filed for bankruptcy protection between March 28, 2001, and 
April 9, 2001, and had contacted the bankruptcy court, it would 
have been misled by the false name on the record. Keir, 2A at 
1098-1101.
            2. Concealing Assets and Income
    The second charge in Article III alleges that Judge 
Porteous concealed various assets on his bankruptcy schedules 
and statement of financial affairs. Both parties agree that 
Judge Porteous's bankruptcy filings did not accurately list 
assets held by Judge Porteous at the time of his original 
bankruptcy filing. The House contends that Judge Porteous 
intentionally hid his assets from the bankruptcy trustee and 
his own bankruptcy attorney. By failing to list certain 
accounts in his bankruptcy schedule and undervaluing others, 
Judge Porteous withheld funds that potentially could have been 
made available to creditors. Ex. 4, 3B at 382-383. To support 
this position, the House presented evidence that Judge Porteous 
hid his undisclosed Fidelity money market account from his own 
bankruptcy attorney while, at the same time, using the account 
to accumulate cash for gambling and other purposes.
    Judge Porteous argues that the omission of his Fidelity 
money market account was accidental and, despite its absence on 
his bankruptcy filings, he ``honestly believe[s]'' that he told 
Lightfoot about the Fidelity money market account. Ex. 10, 3B 
at 753. From Judge Porteous's perspective, there was no reason 
not to tell Lightfoot about this account. Judge Porteous 
testified before the Fifth Circuit that, at any given time, the 
disclosed Bank One account, into which Judge Porteous's 
paychecks were deposited, would have had a higher balance than 
the Fidelity account. Furthermore, Judge Porteous presented 
evidence that keeping money in his Fidelity accounts after the 
plan was confirmed was not improper. After a debtor's petition 
is filed, he is not prohibited from keeping money in accounts 
not listed on his Schedule B filings. Horner, 2A at 928; Pardo, 
2B at 1292; Stip. 230, 1C at 2543; Ex. 10, 3B at 753.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\This was a practice of Judge Porteous before he filed for 
bankruptcy in 2001. From 1997 through his bankruptcy, when Judge 
Porteous drew down on his IRA, he would receive funds by check. On 
these occasions, he would deposit the funds into a Fidelity money 
market account. On many occasions, he used this account to write checks 
to casinos to pay gambling debts. See Horner, 2A at 968; Ex. 383, 3D at 
442; Ex. 529, 3E at 5241.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House claims that, in addition to concealing his 
Fidelity money market account, Judge Porteous also 
intentionally undervalued his Bank One checking account. For 
example, the House points to a $2,000 deposit to the Bank One 
account made by Judge Porteous on March 27, 2001, the day 
before he filed his original bankruptcy petition. This suggests 
that Judge Porteous must have been aware that his stated 
account balance of $100 was incorrect. Horner, 2A at 906-907.
    Similar to the omission of the Fidelity money market 
account, Judge Porteous argues that the undervaluation of his 
Bank One account was unintentional. A few days before the 
filing of the bankruptcy schedules, Lightfoot asked Judge 
Porteous to approximate the amount of money in his Bank One 
checking account. He asked only for an approximation, because 
the actual amount in a debtor's checking account at the time of 
filing is not as important in a Chapter 13 plan, which commits 
future income, as it is in a Chapter 7 plan, in which all 
assets are liquidated to pay creditors. Lightfoot did not ask 
Judge Porteous this question until immediately before filing 
the schedules ``because checks are coming and going all the 
time.'' Lightfoot 1138:4-1140:19. Additionally, Judge 
Porteous's bankruptcy filings were not signed by him on the 
date they were filed. Rather, Lightfoot gave the forms to Judge 
Porteous in his chambers, and the Judge then took them home for 
his wife to sign. The date on Judge Porteous's bankruptcy 
documents reflects the date they were filed, not the date on 
which they were signed. Id. at 1050-1052, 1075-1077.
    The House also asserts that, beyond his undisclosed 
Fidelity money market account and his undervalued Bank One 
account, Judge Porteous attempted to conceal his year 2000 tax 
refund from the bankruptcy trustee and his creditors. The 
presence of a tax refund indicates that there is monthly income 
that should possibly be distributed to creditors, and the 
debtor's plan may be too low. Although it may or may not be 
included in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, if the trustee does 
not know that the debtor is receiving a tax refund, then he 
cannot ask the debtor to surrender it. Beaulieu believed that 
this tax refund should have been included in Judge Porteous's 
bankruptcy schedules. Its inclusion would have enabled Beaulieu 
to raise questions as to the amount of disposable income 
available to Judge Porteous, especially since it was a large 
refund, and would have prompted Beaulieu to perform a closer 
examination of Judge Porteous's taxes. Furthermore, the House 
presented evidence that the right to receive a refund is an 
asset. Judge Porteous's refund, for which he had filed prior to 
his original bankruptcy filing, should properly be considered 
to be a liquidated sum.\72\ When Judge Porteous failed to list 
his expected tax refund, he falsified his schedule. Judge 
Porteous discussed his expected year 2000 tax refund with 
neither his bankruptcy attorney nor the Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
trustee. See Beaulieu, 2B at 1383; Keir, 2A at 1103-1104; 
Lightfoot, 2A at 998, 1053.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\Judge Keir clarified that ``[l]iquidated does not mean 
collected; it means quantified.'' Keir, 2A at 1103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Porteous disputes that he was attempting to conceal 
his tax refund. Judge Porteous testified before the Fifth 
Circuit Special Investigatory Committee that he discussed his 
year 2000 return with Lightfoot, who advised him that ``[i]f 
the trustee didn't put a lien on it, put it in your account; 
but they may . . . ask for it back.'' Ex. 10, 3B at 749-750. 
However, Judge Porteous argued that, regardless of whether he 
informed others of his pending refund, the trustee was not in 
the habit of asking for the debtor's current or future tax 
refunds to distribute to creditors. Lightfoot, 2A at 1053; Ex. 
6(c), 3B at 526; Ex. 124, 3C at 2469-2470.
    Judge Porteous also presented evidence that debtors often 
submitted their bankruptcy schedules without listing their tax 
refund, and that these debtors are almost always represented by 
counsel. If a debtor tells an attorney that he had received a 
tax refund, the burden is on the attorney to make sure that the 
tax refund was included on the debtor's bankruptcy schedules. 
Two witnesses also testified that whether or not the tax refund 
was accidentally omitted from Judge Porteous's bankruptcy 
schedules, a tax refund from a previous year should not be 
included in a debtor's Chapter 13 estate. While a Chapter 13 
debtor may liquidate property, ``there can be no requirement 
for him to do so.'' Hildebrand, 2B at 1667, 1671; Pardo, 2B at 
1288-1290.
    In addition to the previously discussed assets, the House 
also points to the fact that Judge Porteous's net monthly 
income, as listed on his bankruptcy schedules, was inaccurate. 
As discussed in the previous section, Judge Porteous's actual 
net monthly income was roughly $174 greater than the listed 
amount. This income information, which was derived from an 
outdated May 2000 pay stub, also failed to disclose that Judge 
Porteous reached the Social Security ``wage base'' on or around 
July of each calendar year.
    Judge Porteous argues, however, that Lightfoot was not 
aware that he received a pay increase prior to his bankruptcy 
filing, nor was Lightfoot aware of federal tax limits 
associated with the Social Security wage base, as Lightfoot's 
regular clients never approached this limit. Moreover, Beaulieu 
never requested that Judge Porteous update his schedules in any 
way, and Judge Porteous was under no obligation to make 
additions to the schedules. Generally, debtors are only ordered 
to update their schedules to reflect changes in income when the 
debtor experienced large fluctuations in his monthly income due 
to the nature of his employment. Barliant, 2B at 1715-1716; 
Lightfoot, 2A at 1047-1048.
    Finally, Judge Porteous presented evidence to demonstrate 
that errors and omissions, such as those found in his own 
bankruptcy filings, are not uncommon among debtors. To 
illustrate this, Judge Porteous presented the findings of an 
empirical study of 1,700 Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed in 
2006. This study found that in 95% of cases examined, the 
debtor, a creditor, or both made inaccurate statements in 
bankruptcy filings. In a separate study of 200 randomly 
selected bankruptcy filings, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven W. 
Rhodes of the Eastern District of Michigan, found that 198 
(99%) contained at least one error, with an average number of 
3.4 errors per case. Thus, an all-or-nothing approach to the 
bankruptcy system, where perfect bankruptcy filings are a 
prerequisite to any relief, is unworkable, unrealistic, and 
would cause the entire bankruptcy system to grind to a 
halt.\73\ Pardo, 2B at 1305-1311; Ex. 1068, 3E at 5650; Ex. 
1070, 3E at 3737.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\Hildebrand testified that perfection is not the standard by 
which bankruptcy filings are or ought to be judged. Hildebrand, 2B at 
1698.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, Judge Porteous argues that, although he served as 
a U.S. District Court judge, he was relatively inexperienced in 
the area of bankruptcy law. District court judges in the 
Eastern District of Louisiana hear few bankruptcy appeals. 
Judge Porteous had written only seven bankruptcy opinions in 
his career as a federal judge, of which only three dealt with 
consumer bankruptcies. Pardo, 2B at 1302. Judge Porteous also 
presented evidence that opinions of federal district court 
judges in bankruptcy cases were reversed at a much higher rate 
than decisions rendered by bankruptcy judges sitting on 
bankruptcy appellate panels. Pardo, 2B at 1301-1304.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\The study also found that circuit courts cited the opinions of 
district court judges less frequently than they cited the opinions 
rendered by a bankruptcy appellate panel. Both of these findings were 
statistically significant. Ex. 1067, 3E at 5571-5572.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Judge Porteous submitted testimony and exhibits 
suggesting that he did not fully understand his own finances. 
In particular, Judge Porteous indicated that ``he did not fully 
understand his financial status and, therefore, never knowingly 
misrepresented his bank accounts.'' Judge Porteous also 
presented evidence that his wife and secretary normally handled 
his personal finances. For example, in a practice that 
developed over time, Danos began paying Judge Porteous's bills 
as they came in, and she would tell him the amount for which he 
needed to reimburse her. Ex. 6(b), 3B at 511; see Danos, 2A at 
794-796.
            3. Incurring Debt Through the Use of Casino Markers
    The third, fourth, and fifth charges in Article III allege 
that Judge Porteous concealed preferential payments to 
creditors, concealed gambling losses and other gambling debts, 
and incurred new debts while his case was pending, in violation 
of the bankruptcy court's order. The House argues that Judge 
Porteous's habit of gambling at casinos using markers is a 
component of each of these offenses.
    As discussed in the previous section, Judge Porteous 
gambled using markers both before and after his plan was 
confirmed. The House recognized that a casino marker is a 
three-party instrument called a ``draft,'' which is an order to 
pay by the signer or drawer (Judge Porteous) on a drawee (the 
bank) to pay the payee or holder (the casino). To support its 
position that this activity created debt, however, the House 
presented evidence that the marker itself is ``separate and 
apart'' from the underlying debt that arises when Judge 
Porteous uses the chips procured by executing a marker. As soon 
as Judge Porteous made a wager on credit, he had an obligation 
to repay the casino for that amount. In other words, ``[w]hen 
the casino pushes the markers across the counter to the 
gambler, who doesn't immediately pay for them, but will pay for 
them, the gambler is now obligated to pay the casino for the 
value of the markers. That's when the debt arises.'' Horner, 2A 
at 946; Keir, 2A at 1106-1107.
    From this perspective, markers, like any other personal 
check, do not suspend the individual's underlying obligation to 
pay. Rather, the obligation to pay is ``just not 
extinguished.'' For example, an individual who pays for 
groceries with a check ``technically incurs a debt until the 
check is honored by his or her bank.'' Once the check is 
honored, however, the drawer's obligation to pay is 
extinguished. If the check is not honored, then the holder of 
the check may pursue a contract action or a suit on the 
instrument. Keir, 2A at 1126-1127.
    Judge Porteous, however, introduced evidence that the use 
of markers did not generate debt for the purposes of 
bankruptcy. In particular, Judge Porteous disagreed with the 
House's interpretation that the execution of a draft, such as a 
marker or personal check, did not suspend the drawer's 
underlying obligation to pay. Judge Porteous presented evidence 
that when a payment is made using a check, the drawer is liable 
and able to be sued by the check's holder if and only if the 
drawee does not honor the check. In other words, contrary to 
the evidence presented by the House, the underlying obligation 
is suspended until the bank dishonors the check. As a result, a 
marker, which is a check and, therefore, an order to pay, is 
not a debt instrument. Pardo, 2B at 1263-1264, 1296-1297, 1316-
1317.
    Judge Porteous presented additional evidence that the 
suspension of the liability is not affected by the amount of 
time the casino holds the marker before depositing it. However, 
what does result is a contingent liability or contingent debt, 
in the sense that the liability is not an actual liability 
until the marker is presented at a bank and dishonored. From 
this perspective, although any markers outstanding at the time 
Judge Porteous's bankruptcy petition was filed should have been 
listed on his bankruptcy schedules as contingent debt, 
redeeming a marker is not equivalent to using a credit card or 
borrowing money. Pardo, 2B at 1281-1283, 1297-1298, 1371-1375.
            4. Preferential Payments to Creditors
    As mentioned above, the third charge in Article III alleges 
that Judge Porteous concealed preferential payments to 
creditors in his statement of financial affairs filed with his 
amended petition on April 9. The House points in particular to 
Judge Porteous's response to question 3 on his statement of 
financial affairs, which requires the debtor to list any 
payments to creditors exceeding $600 in the 90 days preceding 
his bankruptcy filing. Judge Porteous's response was ``normal 
installments.'' The phrase ``normal installments'' was meant to 
capture regular contractual payments associated with Judge 
Porteous's two car leases and two home loans, as Judge Porteous 
had stopped paying his unsecured credit card creditors during 
the ``workout'' period under advice of counsel. Horner, 2A at 
899-900; Lightfoot, 2A at 1001; Ex. 127, 3C at 2499.
    As discussed in the previous section, Judge Porteous made 
payments over $600 at two casinos in the 90 days prior to his 
original bankruptcy filing. Judge Porteous also paid his wife's 
Fleet credit card bill in full. To make this payment, Judge 
Porteous asked his secretary, Rhonda Danos, to write a personal 
check to cover the balance on the Fleet credit card, totaling 
$1,088.41. This payment cleared Danos's account on March 29, 
2001, and Judge Porteous later reimbursed her for the amount. 
Danos, 2A at 789-790, 796; Ex. 329, 3D at 3777.
    Based on the House's understanding of markers, the House 
argues that Judge Porteous should have reported his payments to 
two casinos in the 90 days prior to his original bankruptcy 
filing as ``payments to preferential creditors'' on his 
statement of financial affairs. However, these payments were 
not listed, either as debts outstanding to unsecured creditors 
or payments to preferred creditors, on his bankruptcy schedule. 
See Beaulieu, 2B at 1393-1394; Hildebrand, 2B at 1693; Horner, 
2A at 899-900; Ex. 127, 3C at 2510.
    Under Judge Porteous's understanding of markers, however, 
his payments to casinos made immediately prior to filing for 
bankruptcy do not qualify as ``preferential payments to 
creditors'' and, as such, were correctly excluded on his 
statement of financial affairs. In order for a payment to be 
voidable, or preferential and recoverable by the court, it must 
be a payment to the creditor by the debtor for an antecedent, 
or existing, debt. However, if markers are not debt 
instruments, any obligation Judge Porteous incurred upon 
executing a marker was suspended until the casino deposited the 
marker against his account.\75\ From this perspective, there 
was no antecedent debt. Alternatively, providing payment to a 
casino for a marker could be viewed as a way of purchasing back 
a marker, which is a negotiable instrument, making it Judge 
Porteous's property--not a debt. Pardo, 2B at 1281-1282.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\Additionally, Judge Porteous presented evidence that the 
federal circuits are split as to when, for the purposes of determining 
preferential payments to creditors, a debt is deemed to arise. Some 
circuits take the view that a debt does not arise ``until . . . the 
debtor first becomes legally bound to pay.'' While the casino is still 
in possession of the marker, the debtor has no obligation to pay. From 
this perspective, the payment would only need to be listed on Judge 
Porteous's statement of financial affairs if the casino had attempted 
to deposit the marker and the bank refused to honor it. Pardo, 2B at 
1280-1283.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, Judge Porteous argues that there is nothing 
technically wrong with paying a creditor within 90 days of 
filing for bankruptcy; these are legal debts owed to the 
creditor that require payment. Before an individual files for 
bankruptcy, the principle of equitable distribution does not 
apply. Once a debtor files for bankruptcy protection, however, 
creditors are entitled to an equitable distribution of the 
debtor's assets under his plan. Any recent payments to 
creditors are perceived as having a negative effect on the 
debtor's ability to equitably repay each creditor. Thus, to 
ensure a fair distribution to all creditors, pre-bankruptcy 
payments may be recovered. Id. at 1280.
    Additionally, Judge Porteous argues that Danos's payment on 
the Fleet credit card may not properly be considered a voidable 
payment because Danos, who was a third-party, and not Judge 
Porteous, made the payment. If Danos paid with her own funds 
and was reimbursed by Judge Porteous, he should have listed his 
payment to Danos as a preferential payment. However, if Danos's 
bank account was merely a conduit, and the bill was paid with 
Judge Porteous's money, then the credit card company should 
have been listed as a preferential payment to a creditor. Id. 
at 1363-1367.
    Judge Porteous maintains that, regardless of whether these 
payments are voidable, his failure to list these payments on 
his statement of financial affairs was immaterial because the 
Chapter 13 trustee in the Eastern District of Louisiana 
generally did not try to recover preferential payments to 
creditors. Beaulieu testified that he would not automatically 
attempt to recover preferential payments but, because 
recovering voidable payments costs money, he would weigh the 
cost of going after the payments to preferred creditors. In 
this case, Beaulieu testified that had he known payments to 
preferred creditors had been made in Judge Porteous's case, he 
would not have attempted to recover the payments because, in 
his opinion, the payments were ``inconsequential,'' and were 
not payments to an insider. Beaulieu, 2B at 1385, 1402-1403; 
Lightfoot, 2A at 1055-1056.
            5. Concealing Gambling Losses
    The fourth charge in Article III alleges that Judge 
Porteous concealed gambling losses and other gambling debts. 
The House asserts that, as with his concealment of bank 
accounts, Judge Porteous also concealed gambling losses accrued 
in the previous year. When asked on his statement of financial 
affairs if he had experienced any gambling losses in the 
previous year, Judge Porteous indicated ``none.'' However, an 
FBI analysis proffered by the House indicated that Judge 
Porteous experienced total gross gambling losses of $12,895.35 
and gross winnings of $5,312.15, with net gambling losses of 
$7,583.20. Although gambling losses are not evaluated as part 
of the ``best-interest-of-creditors'' test, the statement of 
financial affairs requires the debtor to answer this question 
because the answer may prompt the Chapter 13 trustee to ask 
particular types of questions in an examination of the debtor. 
Horner, 2A at 913-914; Lightfoot, 2A at 1003-1004; Ex. 337, 3D 
at 3832-3853; see also Ex. 5, 3B at 428.
    Judge Porteous, however, argues that Agent Horner's 
analysis of Judge Porteous's gambling losses is not necessarily 
accurate. His table was calculated using only Judge Porteous's 
winnings and losses when gambling as a ``rated player.'' When 
an individual gambles as a rated player, casinos track ``how 
much [the gambler] bets, how much he wins, [and] how much he 
loses.'' Rated players may earn ``comps'' from the casinos 
based on how much they play, in the form of complimentary or 
reduced rates on hotel rooms or free meals and drinks. Being a 
rated player is also useful for tax purposes. Horner, 2A at 
910-911; Ex. 337, 3D at 3832-3853.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\Horner noted that rated players must fill out a credit 
application with the casino in order to open up a line of credit. Rated 
players then draw on their line of credit to gamble at the casino. 
Horner, 2A at 910-911.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Porteous indicated, however, that he did not always 
gamble as a ``rated player.'' While Porteous was fairly well 
known at the Treasure Chest, he was less well known at casinos 
like the Beau Rivage or others on the Gulf Coast. In these 
casinos, Judge Porteous may have gambled without being rated, 
meaning that Judge Porteous's winnings and losses were not 
tracked at these casinos. Thus, Judge Porteous's net gambling 
losses may have differed from those indicated by Agent Horner's 
analysis. Horner, 2A at 950-952; Ex. 337, 3D at 3832-3853.
    Finally, the House argues that Judge Porteous's effort to 
intentionally hide his gambling losses is reflected in his 
failure to inform his own bankruptcy attorney of his gambling 
activities. Lightfoot indicated that Judge Porteous never told 
him about his gambling losses, and he did not know that 
Porteous gambled at all. Judge Porteous contends that Lightfoot 
should have noticed gambling-related charges reflected in two 
credit card statements sent to Lightfoot in the summer of 2000. 
When questioned about this, however, Lightfoot testified that 
he did not realize that the Beau Rivage and the Treasure Chest, 
the gambling establishments at which Judge Porteous used his 
credit cards, were casinos. Lightfoot, 2A at 1071-1072; Ex. 
343, 3D at 3997, 4003.
            6. Incurring More Debt in Violation of Judge Greendyke's 
                    Order
    The fifth and last charge contained in Article III alleges 
that Judge Porteous incurred new debt in violation of Judge 
Greendyke's June 28 confirmation order. The House argues that 
Judge Porteous violated the order in several ways, including: 
gambling using markers; applying for credit at casinos; and 
applying for and using a new credit card after the confirmation 
of the order. Since gambling with markers necessarily creates 
debt, under this view, Judge Porteous's execution of 42 markers 
after confirmation of his plan violated Judge Greendyke's 
order. Furthermore, the House presented testimony that, the 
instant the credit card was used, Judge Porteous had incurred 
an obligation to repay. Keir, 2A at 1106-1108.
    Judge Porteous argues, however, that executing markers does 
not create debt for the purposes of bankruptcy and, therefore, 
as a result, gambling with markers did not violate Judge 
Greendyke's bankruptcy order. Furthermore, Judge Porteous 
presented evidence that, contrary to Judge Greendyke's 
confirmation order, there is nothing in the bankruptcy code to 
preclude the debtor from borrowing money or making purchases on 
credit without the trustee's approval. The bankruptcy code 
expressly recognizes that a debtor will incur more debt by 
indicating that such debt may not be allowable, meaning not 
part of the Chapter 13 case, or dischargeable upon completion 
of the plan, with certain exceptions. Barliant, 2B at 1716-
1717; Pardo, 2B at 1294-1295.
    Finally, Judge Porteous contends that a literal 
interpretation of Judge Greendyke's order would lead to ``an 
absurd result,'' because a debtor incurs debt when doing 
ordinary tasks, such as going out to eat, getting the oil 
changed in his car, and even turning on the lights in his home. 
However, the House presented evidence that prohibitions on 
incurring debt were common and, while the debtor may choose to 
appeal an order, no one has the right to disregard a lawful 
order. Barliant, 2B at 1719; Hildebrand, 2B at 1692-1693; Keir, 
2A at 1104-1105; Pardo, 2B at 1295-1296.
            7. The Materiality of Judge Porteous's Conduct
    In all of these charges, the House alleges that Judge 
Porteous's conduct harmed the resolution of his bankruptcy 
estate. This position is supported by Beaulieu's testimony, in 
which he indicated that, given the importance of a debtor 
acting in good faith, if he had known about Judge Porteous's 
intentional use of a false name, he would have petitioned the 
court to dismiss and ``[left] it to the discretion of the judge 
and the U.S. trustee to follow up on it if they saw fit.''\77\ 
Furthermore, if Judge Greendyke had known about the ``preferred 
payments, the omitted tax refund, the understated bank account 
balances, and the false names on the petition, he would not 
have signed the confirmation order and would have sua sponte 
objected to confirming a plan on the basis of good faith.'' 
Beaulieu, 2B at 1383; Ex. 335, 3D at 3823.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\Beaulieu did not know at the time that the misspelling of 
Porteous's name was intentional. Beaulieu testified that Lightfoot 
called him and told him that a ``typographical error'' had been made on 
the original petition. Beaulieu, 2B at 1377.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Porteous argues, however, that even if the Chapter 13 
trustee was aware of Judge Porteous's knowing use of a false 
name and the errors on his bankruptcy filings, the trustee 
still should have granted a discharge of his debts. Lightfoot 
testified that, in his experience in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, he had never seen a debtor be held in contempt of 
court for incurring post-confirmation debt without court 
authority. Lightfoot, 2A at 1060.
    Beyond the individual consequences of Judge Porteous's 
actions, the House also argues that Judge Porteous's conduct is 
detrimental to the viability of the bankruptcy system. 
Specifically, the House contends that, in order for the 
bankruptcy system to function, a debtor must act in good faith 
when filing for bankruptcy. The House argues through his 
concealment of assets, preferential payments to creditors, 
undisclosed gambling losses and debts, and accrual of new debt 
following the confirmation of his plan, Judge Porteous failed 
to act in good faith and materially damaged the bankruptcy 
system. Given the number of bankruptcy cases active in the 
Eastern District of Louisiana at any given time, there is no 
opportunity for the trustee to double-check the debtor's 
petition, schedules, and statement of financial affairs. 
Because of this, the candor and honesty of the debtor is 
important; otherwise ``Chapter 13 or Chapter 7 does not work.'' 
Beaulieu, 2B at 1388.

D. Expert Testimony

            1. Advice of Counsel
    As discussed above, Judge Porteous argues that he was 
entitled to rely on advice of counsel with respect to the use 
of a false name on his original bankruptcy petition. Expert 
witnesses presented by the House, however, were critical of the 
position that Lightfoot's recommendation constituted legal 
advice. The Honorable Duncan W. Keir, Chief U.S. Bankruptcy 
Judge for the District of Maryland, testified that he knew of 
no legal defense of or cure for perjury, which Judge Porteous 
committed when he signed his bankruptcy filings under a false 
name. Moreover, Judge Keir indicated that advising someone to 
knowingly commit a wrongful legal act does not constitute legal 
advice and that it may actually be collusion. Keir, 2A at 1099-
1100, 1102.
    Professor Charles Gardner Geyh, who was designated as an 
expert in judicial ethics, echoed this sentiment. Professor 
Geyh testified that Lightfoot's suggestion to commit perjury 
cannot be considered advice of counsel in a ``traditional 
context,'' let alone in Judge Porteous's bankruptcy case. 
Professor Geyh opined that, unlike an undereducated layperson, 
Judge Porteous should fully understand what signing his 
bankruptcy documents under penalty of perjury means. The advice 
of defense counsel, in his opinion, does not obviate the 
ethical implications of Judge Porteous, who ``being a lawyer 
and a judge, was able to exercise independent legal judgment 
[and yet] did not.'' Geyh, 2A at 758-759, 769.
            2. Judge Greendyke's Admonishment Against Accruing More 
                    Debt
    The parties also disagreed as to the validity of paragraph 
4 of Judge Greendyke's order prohibiting Judge Porteous from 
accruing additional debt. Ronald Barliant, a former U.S. 
Bankruptcy Judge in the Northern District of Illinois, 
testified that he considered Judge Greendyke's order to 
constitute judicial error. Barliant testified that had he 
issued such an order, he would have ``kicked himself for having 
entered'' it and vacated the first sentence in paragraph 4 
prohibiting the accrual of additional debt. Barring that, 
Barliant testified, he would attempt to ``construe the order in 
a way that was consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.'' Moreover, 
Barliant testified that he would be very reluctant to dismiss a 
Chapter 13 case as long as the debtor made timely payments, 
even if that debtor had incurred post-petition debt, since 
doing so would end plan repayments and not help any of the 
interested parties. Barliant, 2B at 1719-1723.

                             IV. ARTICLE IV

A. Text of the Article

    In 1994, in connection with his nomination to be a judge of 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., knowingly made material 
false statements about his past to both the United States 
Senate and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in order to 
obtain the office of United States District Court Judge. These 
false statements included the following:
    (1) On his Supplemental SF-86, Judge Porteous was asked if 
there was anything in his personal life that could be used by 
someone to coerce or blackmail him, or if there was anything in 
his life that could cause an embarrassment to Judge Porteous or 
the President if publicly known. Judge Porteous answered ``no'' 
to this question and signed the form under the warning that a 
false statement was punishable by law.
    (2) During his background check, Judge Porteous falsely 
told the Federal Bureau of Investigation on two separate 
occasions that he was not concealing any activity or conduct 
that could be used to influence, pressure, coerce, or 
compromise him in any way or that would impact negatively on 
his character, reputation, judgment, or discretion.
    (3) On the Senate Judiciary Committee's ``Questionnaire for 
Judicial Nominees'', Judge Porteous was asked whether any 
unfavorable information existed that could affect his 
nomination. Judge Porteous answered that, to the best of his 
knowledge, he did not know of any unfavorable information that 
may affect [his] nomination''. Judge Porteous signed that 
questionnaire by swearing that ``the information provided in 
this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and 
accurate''.
    However, in truth and in fact, as Judge Porteous then well 
knew, each of these answers was materially false because Judge 
Porteous had engaged in a corrupt relationship with the law 
firm Amato & Creely, whereby Judge Porteous appointed Creely as 
a ``curator'' in hundreds of cases and thereafter requested and 
accepted from Amato & Creely a portion of the curatorship fees 
which had been paid to the firm and also had engaged in a 
corrupt relationship with Louis and Lori Marcotte, whereby 
Judge Porteous solicited and accepted numerous things of value, 
including meals, trips, home repairs, and car repairs, for his 
personal use and benefit, while at the same time taking 
official actions that benefitted the Marcottes. As Judge 
Porteous well knew and understood, Louis Marcotte also made 
false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an 
effort to assist Judge Porteous in being appointed to the 
Federal bench. Judge Porteous's failure to disclose these 
corrupt relationships deprived the United States Senate and the 
public of information that would have had a material impact on 
his confirmation. Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is 
guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed 
from office.

B. Introduction to the Evidence

    Article IV focuses on the completeness and accuracy of 
Judge Porteous's statements to the FBI and the Senate in 
connection with his nomination to the U.S. District Court. 
These include his responses to questions in the background 
investigation forms, questionnaires, and interviews. As with 
Article III, the evidence comprises mostly documents and is 
largely uncontested. This discussion begins by providing a 
narrative statement of facts, followed by contested issues 
identified by the parties.

C. Statement of Facts

    In 1994, President William J. Clinton began considering 
Judge Porteous for an appointment to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judge Porteous was 
required to complete and submit various forms and 
questionnaires, including ``Standard Form 86'' (SF-86), which 
he completed and signed on or about April 27, 1994. The SF-86 
includes numerous background questions and requests personal 
and professional references. The form also asks the candidate 
about any prior criminal history, use of illegal drugs, or 
abuse of alcohol. See Stips. 167-169, 1C at 2538-2539; Ex. 
69(b) (full exhibit, at 232-243).
    Judge Porteous also filled out and signed a document 
entitled ``Supplement to Standard Form 86 (SF-86), 
Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions (For National Security)'' 
(Supplemental SF-86). Stip. 170, 1C at 2539. Among other 
topics, the Supplemental SF-86 form inquires into the 
candidate's personal finances and interests in business 
entities. Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1790-1791. The final question on the 
Supplemental SF-86 form asks whether ``there [is] anything in 
your personal life that could be used by someone to coerce or 
blackmail you? Is there anything in your life that could cause 
an embarrassment to you or to the President if publicly known? 
If so, please provide full details?'' Judge Porteous answered, 
``No.'' He also signed the document and adopted the following 
declaration: ``I understand that the information being provided 
on this supplement to the SF-86 is to be considered part of the 
original SF-86 dated April 27, 1994 and a false statement on 
this form is punishable by law.'' Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1791.
    Finally, Judge Porteous signed a ``Memorandum for 
Prospective Appointees'' issued by the White House, allowing 
the FBI to ``investigate [his] background or conduct 
appropriate file reviews in connection with the consideration 
of [his] application for employment.'' On June 23, 1994, the 
FBI received instructions to ``initiate a background 
investigation of [Judge Porteous].'' Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, 
at 224-225).
            1. FBI Interviews
    Starting on or about June 24, 1994, a number of FBI agents 
conducted approximately 120 interviews of Judge Porteous's 
personal and professional associates as part of his background 
investigation. Hamil, 2A at 843; Stip. 176, 1C at 2539; see 
generally Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit).\78\ Bobby Hamil, an FBI 
agent from 1983 to 2008,\79\ participated in several key 
interviews, including two of Judge Porteous. See Hamil, 2A at 
814-815. Although he had no independent recollection of his 
responsibilities during Judge Porteous's background 
investigation, Hamil offered testimony about the general 
background investigation interview process and Judge Porteous's 
investigation based on contemporaneous notes and summaries he 
had prepared in 1994. Id. at 819-821, 844.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\Early in the investigation, the FBI interviewed staff 
assistants of Senator J. Bennett Johnston, Jr., and Senator John Breaux 
of the State of Louisiana. Both Senators' aides told the FBI that the 
Senators had known Judge Porteous for several years, thought he was 
well-qualified to be a federal judge, and had not heard any derogatory 
comments about him. Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 278-279).
    \79\Hamil conservatively estimated that he had performed 100 
interviews relating to FBI background checks over the course of his 
career. Hamil, 2A at 843.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prior to a witness interview, an agent would review the 
candidate's SF-86, as well as instructions from FBI 
headquarters. Id. at 818. When candidates, like other 
witnesses, are interviewed, they are not placed under oath nor 
are they given the opportunity to review or comment on the FBI 
agent's summary write-up of the interview.\80\ Id. at 845-846.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\The FBI uses a standard form (FD-302) to prepare interview 
summaries; these summaries are routinely referred to in the impeachment 
proceedings as ``302s.'' See, e.g., Hamil, 2A at 844-845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FBI agents follow a standard interview format that focuses 
on the candidate's character, associates, responsibility, 
loyalty to the United States, ability, bias or prejudice, 
financial responsibility, alcohol abuse, and use of illegal 
drugs or abuse of prescription drugs. The last question in a 
background interview is the so-called ``compromise or 
coercion'' question. This question asks whether there is 
anything in the candidate's background that could be used to 
coerce or compromise the candidate or might subject the 
candidate to undue influence or would impact negatively on his 
or her reputation or character. Id. at 816-818, 849-850.
            a. Initial interviews
    In early July 1994, FBI Agents Charlene Tackett and Bobby 
Hamil interviewed Judge Porteous and prepared a summary. Stip. 
180, 1C at 2539. They asked Judge Porteous a series of 
questions designed to elicit information that might bear upon 
his fitness to serve as a federal judge. The agents' summary 
states, ``PORTEOUS said he is not concealing any activity or 
conduct that could be used to influence, pressure, coerce, or 
compromise him in any way or that would impact negatively on 
the candidate's character, reputation, judgement [sic], or 
discretion.''\81\ Ex. 69(i), 3B at 1831.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\The FBI interview summary also indicates that ``PORTEOUS said 
that he has not abused alcohol or prescription drugs or used illegal 
drugs, to include marijuana, during his entire adult life. He has had 
no participation in drug or alcohol counseling/rehabilitation programs 
since age 18.'' Ex. 69(i), 3B at 1829-1833.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hamil was not surprised that neither Judge Porteous nor any 
of the other persons interviewed in the background 
investigation answered the compromise-or-coercion question in 
the affirmative. Hamil could not recall a single candidate 
answering ``Yes'' to that specific question in all of the 
background investigation interviews he conducted over the 
course of his career; and even in non-candidate interviews, the 
answer is ``just about always no.'' See Hamil, 2A at 851, 867-
868; see also Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit).\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\Interviewees occasionally reveal adverse information about a 
candidate, but not in response to the question about any activity or 
conduct that could be used to influence, pressure, coerce, or 
compromise him in any way or that would impact negatively on the 
candidate's character, reputation, judgment or discretion. Hamil, 2A at 
868-869.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FBI interviewed Louis Marcotte on two occasions during 
its background investigation of Judge Porteous. The first 
interview occurred on or about August 1, 1994. Stips. 171, 178, 
1C at 2539. According to the FBI interview summary, Marcotte 
stated that he was a professional and social acquaintance of 
Judge Porteous who ``sometimes [went] out to lunch with the 
candidate and attorneys in the area.'' Stip. 179, 1C at 2539. 
Marcotte also told the FBI that Judge Porteous was ``really 
helpful and available for everybody'' and was ``open-minded and 
fair, but [was] not a push-over.'' Marcotte generally discussed 
bond setting practices in the Jefferson Parish courthouse and 
his bail bonds business. Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 471).
    In his interview, Marcotte denied knowledge of any use of 
illegal drugs or abuse of alcohol or prescription drugs by 
Judge Porteous; Marcotte stated that Judge Porteous would have 
a beer or two at lunch but Marcotte had never seen him drunk. 
Marcotte also told the FBI that he had ``no knowledge of the 
candidate's financial situation'' and assured the FBI that ``he 
[was] not aware of anything in the candidate's background that 
might be the basis of attempted influence, pressure, coercion, 
or compromise or that would impact negatively on the 
candidate's character, reputation, judgment, or discretion.'' 
Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 471). As discussed above in the 
context of Article II, Marcotte testified in the evidentiary 
hearings that he lied to the FBI during this interview about 
Judge Porteous's financial circumstances, his alcohol usage, 
and in response to the general ``integrity'' questions. 
Marcotte stated that he understood at the time he was 
interviewed that his relationship with Judge Porteous was 
improper and that he lied to protect the lifetime federal 
appointment of Judge Porteous, who had been good to him, and 
himself. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 481-486.
    The FBI also interviewed Robert Creely on or about August 
1, 1994. The FBI summary of Creely's interview states that 
Creely told the FBI that he had ``never known the candidate to 
use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or prescription drugs'' and 
that he ``was not aware of anything in the candidate's 
background that might be the basis of attempted influence, 
pressure, coercion, or compromise or that would impact 
negatively on the candidate's character, reputation, judgment, 
or discretion.'' Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, 476-477). At the 
evidentiary hearing, Creely testified that he misled the FBI in 
this interview about Judge Porteous's finances because he 
``didn't want to hurt the man and hurt his appointment.'' 
Creely, 2A at 282-283.
    On August 8, 1994, the FBI interviewed an individual who 
asked that his/her identity remain anonymous.\83\ This 
confidential source (referred to in the interview summary as T-
6) made a number of allegations regarding Judge Porteous. This 
source alleged that Judge Porteous received things of value 
from Louis Marcotte in return for signing bonds ahead of time 
and reduced bonds in exchange for money. Ex. 69(b) (full 
exhibit, at 524, 526).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\The Committee requested that the Department of Justice and the 
FBI provide unredacted versions of this and other FBI interview 
summaries. The Department declined to disclose information about the 
identity of a number of its confidential sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Follow-up interviews
    After the FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., received 
the results of the initial background investigation, it 
instructed the FBI field office in New Orleans to conduct an 
additional investigation. On August 12, 1994, FBI Headquarters 
sent a teletype to the New Orleans field office directing 
additional interviews ``to verify and corroborate'' information 
provided by a confidential source. Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 
478-479); Hamil, 2A at 831-832. In particular, FBI Headquarters 
ordered the field agents to seek additional information 
concerning Judge Porteous's bond-setting practices. FBI agents 
were also instructed to ask Louis Marcotte whether he was aware 
of any ``exchange of money with Judge Porteous and others to 
get a bond reduction'' for a specific individual. The agents 
were further instructed to re-interview Judge Porteous and to 
give him an opportunity to address these allegations. See Ex. 
69(b) (full exhibit, at 462-463, 478-480).
    Pursuant to the teletype, FBI agents interviewed Adam 
Barnett, another bail bondsman in Gretna, Louisiana, on August 
17, 1994. Barnett stated that he did not know of any 
questionable conduct or acts by Judge Porteous, financial 
problems experienced by Judge Porteous, or personal problems or 
habits that would bar Judge Porteous from service as a federal 
judge; he went on to recommend Judge Porteous for the federal 
bench. Stip. 175, 1C at 2539.
    On or about August 17, 1994, Louis Marcotte was re-
interviewed by the FBI. According to the FBI summary, Marcotte 
was ``confronted with questions and information about his 
knowledge and relationship'' of specific bond matters. Hamil, 
2A at 833; Stip. 172, 1C at 2539. Marcotte ``totally den[ied] . 
. . arranging for a portion of the bond reduction fee to go 
directly to Judge Porteous as a `kickback.''' Ex. 69(b) (full 
exhibit, at 513-514).
    On or about August 18, 1994, Judge Porteous was interviewed 
by the FBI for the second time. Hamil, 2A at 836; Stip. 173, 1C 
at 2539. Agent Hamil interviewed Judge Porteous regarding the 
allegations of misconduct regarding bond-setting practices.\84\ 
Judge Porteous was asked about allegations that he had received 
monies from an attorney and a bail bondsman to reduce bonds; he 
was also questioned about his reduction of an unrelated bond, 
for which Adam Barnett was the bondsman. Judge Porteous denied 
these allegations and the allegations raised by FBI 
confidential source T-6. According to the FBI interview 
summary, Judge Porteous ``denied that he had ever signed any 
bail bonds `in blank' and reiterated that he was unaware of 
anything in his background that might be the basis of attempted 
influence, pressure, coercion, or compromise and/or would 
impact negatively on his character, reputation, judgment, or 
discretion.'' See Hamil, 2A at 837-839; Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1797-
1798; Ex. 69(k), 3B at 1835.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\According to Hamil, after receiving instructions from FBI 
Headquarters to re-interview Judge Porteous but before he had contacted 
Judge Porteous to set up a second interview, Judge Porteous called him 
to discuss allegations of improper bond setting. Apparently, the FBI 
had raised these allegations in its interview of Jolene Acy, Judge 
Porteous's civil court clerk, and she had apprised Judge Porteous. 
Hamil stated that he considered Judge Porteous's unsolicited call to 
discuss such allegations to be ``out of the ordinary'' for a candidate. 
Hamil, 2A at 833-835; see Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1795.
    \85\Hamil did not ask Judge Porteous about lunches with Louis 
Marcotte, curatorships, or gifts received from Robert Creely or Jacob 
Amato. See Hamil, 2A at 846; Exs. 69(i), 3B at 1829-1833; 69(k), 3B at 
1835.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once the FBI field agents completed the background 
investigation, the results were sent to FBI Headquarters for 
transmittal to the Department of Justice. On August 19, 1994, 
the FBI sent a background note to the Department of Justice, 
summarizing the FBI's findings (including the allegations made 
by the confidential source identified as T-6) and stating it 
had completed the investigation. Hamil, 2A at 862-863; Ex. 
69(b) (full exhibit, at 530).
            2. Nomination and Senate Confirmation
    On August 25, 1994, President Clinton nominated Judge 
Porteous to be a United States District Court Judge for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana. During the Senate confirmation 
process, Judge Porteous completed a United States Senate 
Judiciary Committee ``Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees'' 
(Senate Judiciary Questionnaire). Ex. 9(a), 3B at 602-604; 
Stips. 12, 182, 1C at 2526, 2539.
    When asked on the Senate Judiciary Questionnaire whether 
there was ``any unfavorable information that may affect your 
nomination,'' Judge Porteous answered, ``To the best of my 
knowledge, I do not know of any unfavorable information that 
may affect my nomination.'' Judge Porteous adopted the 
affidavit at the end of the Senate Judiciary Questionnaire, 
which stated: ``I, Gabriel Thomas Porteous, Jr., do swear that 
the information provided in this statement is, to the best of 
my knowledge, true and accurate.'' The Senate Judiciary 
Questionnaire was signed by Judge Porteous and notarized. Stip. 
174, 1C at 2539; Ex. 9(f), 3B at 696-697.
    Upon receiving Judge Porteous's nomination, Senate 
Judiciary Committee staff was given access to his FBI 
background investigation file. One staff member took notes on 
this file, which included the following allegations: that Judge 
Porteous ``took kick-backs'' in relation to Louis Marcotte, 
that he was living beyond his means and questioned whether he 
might be involved in some type of criminal activity, that he 
had a drinking problem, and that he gambled on occasion. The 
Judiciary Committee staff also placed additional telephone 
calls to Robert Creely, Donald Gardner, and Louis Marcotte, 
among others. Ex. 439(q) (full exhibit)\86\; see also Stip. 
184, 1C at 2540.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\Like Exhibit 69(b), the Exhibit 439 series is also omitted from 
the public record, but available to Senators upon request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Porteous's confirmation hearing before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee was held on October 6, 1994; he was 
confirmed by the Senate on the following day. Judge Porteous 
received his judicial commission on October 11, 1994, and was 
sworn in on October 28, 1994. Stips. 13-16, 1C at 2527; Ex. 
9(c), 3B at 655-656.

D. Contested Issues

    The parties offer sharply different views about whether 
Judge Porteous misled or withheld information from the FBI or 
the Senate during his background investigation. The core 
factual disagreement is whether, as the House argues, Judge 
Porteous lied to and withheld relevant information from the FBI 
in response to certain questions about his background or 
whether, as Judge Porteous contends, his answers were realistic 
responses to flawed and ambiguous ``catchall'' questions.
            1. The House's Perspective
    The House maintains that several of Judge Porteous's 
answers in response to the background investigation and Senate 
confirmation questions were false and made with the intent to 
deceive in order to obtain a judicial appointment without 
disclosing material information that would have adversely 
affected his nomination. The House identifies four separate 
occasions in which Judge Porteous allegedly lied prior to his 
confirmation: once on the White House Supplemental SF-86, twice 
during FBI interviews, and once to the Senate on the Judiciary 
Committee Questionnaire. According to the House, Judge Porteous 
withheld information during the background investigation and 
confirmation process about his ongoing corrupt relationships, 
namely, the ``curatorship scheme'' with Creely and the firm of 
Amato & Creely, and his corrupt relationship with Louis and 
Lori Marcotte. See Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1791, 1796-1798; Ex. 69(i), 
3B at 1829-1833; Ex. 9(f), 3B 662-697.
            2. Judge Porteous's Perspective
    Judge Porteous denies that he withheld information from, or 
otherwise lied to, the FBI or the Senate during his 
confirmation. Judge Porteous faults the broad ``catchall'' 
questions on the Supplemental SF-86, the FBI interviews, and 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Questionnaire as overly vague 
and ambiguous. To the extent that he admits receiving lunches 
and gifts from friends who were attorneys and bail bondsmen, he 
argues that there is no evidence that he believed such conduct 
to be a basis for coercion, blackmail, public embarrassment, or 
unfavorable to his nomination. In fact, he notes that the 
lunches with Creely, Amato, and the Marcottes all occurred in 
public places because he had nothing to hide. He insists that 
the House has presented no evidence that he concealed 
unfavorable or embarrassing information from the White House, 
the FBI, or the Senate.
    Judge Porteous also dismisses the notion that he misled the 
FBI in light of the information of alleged misconduct gathered 
by the FBI and made available to the Senate. He cites as 
evidence the FBI summaries of Louis Marcotte's interview about 
his occasional lunches and professional relationship with Judge 
Porteous. Hamil, 2A at 847-848, 856-857. These summaries were 
made available to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Ex. 69(b) 
(full exhibit, at 471, 526); Ex. 439(q). Judge Porteous also 
cites Marcotte's testimony that Marcotte never thought he would 
extort or embarrass Judge Porteous as leverage. Ex. 447, 3E at 
5052-5053. In Judge Porteous's view, this admission only 
confirms that he responded truthfully to the compromise-or-
coercion, public embarrassment, and unfavorable information 
questions in the Supplemental SF-86, the FBI interviews, and 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Questionnaire.

D. Expert Testimony

    The parties offered two experts who addressed the 
allegations in Article IV. The House called Professor Charles 
Geyh of the Indiana University--Bloomington Maurer School of 
Law as an expert in judicial ethics. Judge Porteous offered 
Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie of Colby College as an expert in 
presidential appointments, the appointments process, and 
governmental ethics. The Committee accepted both professors as 
experts in their designated areas. See Geyh, 2A at 714-716; 
Mackenzie, 2B at 1807.
            1. Professor Charles G. Geyh
    Professor Geyh was asked a number of questions regarding 
the discipline of a judicial officer for misleading or 
providing false information to the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
When asked about his expert opinion on Judge Porteous's alleged 
conduct during the federal nomination and Senate confirmation 
process, he opined that if Judge Porteous had made false 
statements under oath it would reflect adversely on his 
integrity. Although he acknowledged that the statements in the 
confirmation process are ``a trickier question'' because the 
standard compromise-or-coercion question has ``weasel room,'' 
the serious allegations regarding the curatorships, the bail 
bonds, and other quid pro quo schemes, if true, are subjects 
that would affect any nominee in Judge Porteous's position and 
possibly make him vulnerable to blackmail. Therefore, in this 
circumstance, answering ``no'' to the compromise-or-coercion 
question in his background investigation would ``qualify as 
perjury.'' See Geyh, 2A at 734-736.
    On cross-examination, Professor Geyh was asked about 
several instances in which a candidate for presidential 
appointment was alleged to have made false statements to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. When asked about one case in which 
a judge provided allegedly inconsistent testimony and 
submissions to the Senate, Professor Geyh agreed that the 
intent of the judge is a relevant factor when considering 
discipline of a judge who provided inconsistent or false 
information to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Professor Geyh 
also emphasized that there is important ``context to all 
cases.'' See id. at 757-758,760-761.
            2. Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie
    Professor Mackenzie testified that the process of FBI 
background checks began in the Eisenhower administration and 
was directed at uncovering national security risks. Mackenzie 
explained that the decision to nominate an individual for a 
presidential appointment requiring Senate approval begins an 
elaborate process involving numerous forms and document 
productions. Mackenzie, 2B at 1807-1809. Professor Mackenzie 
stated that the average nominee has to answer approximately 200 
written questions during the nomination process and that many 
of these questions are redundant. Id. at 1826-1827. He also 
stated that there is evidence that ``these background checks 
are not very useful to most people in the process'' because of 
the accumulation of unverified information in background 
files.''\87\ Id. at 1810.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\On cross-examination, Professor Mackenzie agreed that the forms 
and questionnaires include many valid questions (such as the 
compromise-or-coercion question) that are important safeguards for 
high-level federal appointments; he only advocated eliminating some of 
the redundancy in the forms and questionnaires. Id. at 1855-1857.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Professor Mackenzie opined that many candidates find 
answering numerous specific and intrusive questions about their 
professional and personal lives to be quite burdensome and that 
when asked a broad ``catchall'' question (such as the 
compromise-or-coercion question) at the end of the form or 
interview, most candidates consider the question to be 
redundant and answer ``No.'' When asked if he personally knew 
of any candidate who had answered the compromise-or-coercion 
question affirmatively, he responded, ``No, I don't, but I 
suspect [any such candidates] wouldn't have completed the 
process if they added something different to that question.'' 
See id. at 1811-1814.
    Regarding the question on Supplemental SF-86 that seeks 
information that was potentially embarrassing or could be used 
for coercion or blackmail, Professor Mackenzie testified that 
the question is ``ambiguous'' and ``very difficult to apply.'' 
He further noted that ``history is replete with examples of 
people who have answered no to this question, gone into the 
confirmation process or sometimes even gone through 
successfully the confirmation process, only to have information 
come out later which was embarrassing to them, sometimes 
embarrassing to the President.'' Professor Mackenzie also 
testified that while the compromise-or-coercion question is 
asked ``routinely'' of ``virtually everybody who is 
interviewed,'' he could not recall any candidate who had ever 
responded affirmatively to this question. Id. at 1811-1814. Nor 
was he aware of any individual who has ever responded 
affirmatively to a question that asks the candidate to ``advise 
the Committee of any unfavorable information that may affect 
your nomination'' or any nominee who had ever been prosecuted 
or removed from office for falsely answering such a question. 
See id. at 1835.
    Professor Mackenzie clarified that candidates have no right 
to lie in response to ``catchall questions'' on the 
Supplemental SF-86 or the Senate Judiciary Questionnaire, and 
if the nominee were to give false answers, that would be a 
problem. Id. at 1890. He agreed that the disclosure that a 
candidate had taken kickbacks from attorneys as a state court 
judge, as well as receiving gifts from and performing favors 
for bail bondsmen, would unfavorably affect, and likely kill, 
any federal appointment. See id. at 1863-1867. He also 
acknowledged that the catchall question serves the purpose of 
preventing a candidate from hiding and rationalizing 
unfavorable facts during the background investigation as long 
as no question specifically asked about that fact. Id. at 1885-
1886. For these reasons, he was ``not opposed to the catchall 
questions.'' See id. at 1860-1862, 1887.

           *         *         *         *         *


                        COMMITTEE ROLLCALL VOTE

    In compliance with paragraph 7(b) and (c) of rule XXVI of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate, the record of the rollcall 
vote of the Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles Against 
Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., to issue this report to the 
Senate was as follows:
        YEAS                          NAYS
Mrs. McCaskill
Mr. Hatch
Ms. Klobuchar
Mr. Whitehouse
Mr. Udall
Ms. Shaheen
Mr. DeMint
Mr. Barrasso
Mr. Wicker
Mr. Johanns
Mr. Risch (by proxy)

                               ADDENDUM A


   Rule XI of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When 
                   Sitting on Impeachment Trials\88\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United 
States Senate, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., Doc. 99-33, at 4 (August 15, 
1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer 
of the Senate, if the Senate so orders, shall appoint a 
committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony at 
such times and places as the committee may determine, and for 
such purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman 
thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall (unless 
otherwise ordered by the Senate) exercise all the powers and 
functions conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding Officer 
of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of procedure and 
practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials.
    Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of 
procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on 
impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and practice of 
the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall 
report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the 
transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given 
before such committee, and such report shall be received by the 
Senate and the evidence so received and the testimony so taken 
shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the 
right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and 
materiality, as having been received and taken before the 
Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from 
sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open 
Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in 
open Senate.

                               ADDENDUM B


                       111th Congress, 2d Session


                              S. RES. 458

    To provide for the appointment of a committee to receive 
and to report evidence with respect to articles of impeachment 
against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.

           IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 17, 2010

    Mr. Reid (for himself and Mr. McConnell) submitted the 
following resolution; which was considered and agreed to

                               RESOLUTION

    To provide for the appointment of a committee to receive 
and to report evidence with respect to articles of impeachment 
against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.
  Resolved, That pursuant to Rule XI of the Rules of Procedure 
and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, 
the Presiding Officer shall appoint a committee of twelve 
senators to perform the duties and to exercise the powers 
provided for in the rule.
  Sec. 2.  The majority and minority leader shall each 
recommend six members, including a chairman and vice chairman, 
respectively, to the Presiding Officer for appointment to the 
committee.
  Sec. 3.  The committee shall be deemed to be a standing 
committee of the Senate for the purpose of reporting to the 
Senate resolutions for the criminal or civil enforcement of the 
committee's subpoenas or orders, and for the purpose of 
printing reports, hearings, and other documents for submission 
to the Senate under Rule XI.
  Sec. 4.  During proceedings conducted under Rule XI the 
chairman of the committee is authorized to waive the 
requirement under the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the 
Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials that questions by a 
Senator to a witness, a manager, or counsel shall be reduced to 
writing and put by the Presiding Officer.
  Sec. 5.  In addition to a certified copy of the transcript of 
the proceedings and testimony had and given before it, the 
committee is authorized to report to the Senate a statement of 
facts that are uncontested and a summary, with appropriate 
references to the record, of evidence that the parties have 
introduced on contested issues of fact.
  Sec. 6. (a) The actual and necessary expenses of the 
committee, including the employment of staff at an annual rate 
of pay, and the employment of consultants with prior approval 
of the Committee on Rules and Administration at a rate not to 
exceed the maximum daily rate for a standing committee of the 
Senate, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate 
from the appropriation account ``Miscellaneous Items'' upon 
vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that 
no voucher shall be required to pay the salary of any employee 
who is compensated at an annual rate of pay.
  (b) In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under 
this resolution, the committee is authorized, in its discretion 
and with the prior consent of the Government department or 
agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, 
to use on a reimbursable, or nonreimbursable, basis the 
services of personnel of any such department or agency.
  Sec. 7.  The committee appointed pursuant to section one of 
this resolution shall terminate no later than 60 days after the 
pronouncement of judgment by the Senate on the articles of 
impeachment.
  Sec. 8.  The Secretary shall notify the House of 
Representatives and counsel for Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. 
of this resolution.

                               ADDENDUM C


                  Description of Committee Proceedings

    This Addendum offers a brief overview of the Committee's 
proceedings, which are documented by the certified record. The 
Committee's proceedings are best understood in two phases: the 
pre-trial matters and the evidentiary hearings.

                           Pre-Trial Matters

    The pre-trial phase of the Committee's work occurred from 
March 17 to September 13, 2010, during which the Committee 
addressed discovery issues, pre-trial evidentiary disputes, 
witness subpoena and immunity requests, stipulations, and other 
procedural matters. In addition to document discovery, the 
Committee authorized the pre-trial deposition of four principal 
witnesses upon Judge Porteous's request: Jacob Amato, Robert 
Creely, Louis Marcotte, and Lori Marcotte.\89\ 1A at 296-298. 
The correspondence, filings and motions, and Committee orders 
on these pre-trial matters are found in Part 1 of the certified 
record. Three pre-trial matters deserve to be highlighted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\Judge Porteous requested a total of ten depositions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, in June 2010, the Committee disqualified one of 
Judge Porteous's counsel because of a serious conflict of 
interest based on his concurrent representation of two of the 
most important witnesses, Louis and Lori Marcotte, in a 
pending, related civil proceeding. 1A at 625-632. The Committee 
continued its scheduled hearings by six weeks to account for 
the substitution of additional counsel. The filings and the 
Committee's order addressing this conflict of interest are 
found in Part 1A.
    Second, on August 4, 2010, the Committee held a hearing on 
three issues raised in the parties' pre-trial motions: Judge 
Porteous's motion to dismiss based on the asserted 
unconstitutional aggregation of conduct in the articles of 
impeachment, the parties' cross-motions on the use of Judge 
Porteous's prior immunized testimony before the Fifth Circuit 
Special Investigatory Committee, and the parties' cross-motions 
on the admissibility of other prior witness testimony from the 
Fifth Circuit judicial disciplinary hearings and the House 
impeachment proceedings. The Committee declined to hear pre-
trial arguments on Judge Porteous's four motions to dismiss the 
individual articles of impeachment because the motions relied 
on and cited to evidence that had not yet been received by the 
Committee. After deliberations and votes on the remaining 
motions, the Committee issued an order on August 25, 2010, 
denying Judge Porteous's motion to dismiss based on the 
aggregation of conduct, permitting use of Judge Porteous's 
immunized testimony from the Fifth Circuit, and deeming 
admissible some other witness testimony from the Fifth Circuit 
and the House impeachment proceedings, namely, the prior 
testimony of fact witnesses who had been the subject of cross-
examination. 1B at 1967-1973. The Committee denied the House's 
motion to compel Judge Porteous to testify. The order, related 
filings, and transcript from the pre-trial motions hearing are 
found in Part 1B.
    Third, the Committee engaged in prolonged discussions, on 
behalf of Judge Porteous, with the Department of Justice 
regarding discovery requests for documents within the 
possession of the Department. 1C at 1999-2000. As a result, the 
Department made a number of productions from its investigation 
of Judge Porteous in late August and September 2010. The 
filings and correspondence regarding the discovery to the 
Department are found in Part 1C.

                        The Evidentiary Hearings

    The evidentiary hearings of the Committee took place over 
five days, on September 13, 14, 15, 16, and 21, 2010.
    The Committee subpoenaed all fact witnesses requested by 
the parties with two exceptions. Judge Porteous requested 
subpoenas for two attorneys with the Department of Justice, 
Criminal Division, who were involved in the investigation of 
Judge Porteous. The House requested a subpoena to compel Judge 
Porteous's testimony. For both of these matters, the subpoena 
requests were considered and denied by the full Committee. The 
Committee declined to subpoena the parties' proffered expert 
witnesses, but permitted selected expert testimony to be 
introduced. The Committee paid for the travel expenses of all 
subpoenaed witnesses. 1A at 553.
    Each party was allotted twenty hours to present its case. 
The House called 14 witnesses; Judge Porteous called 12 
witnesses. Each witness was subject to examination by counsel 
for the parties and, in some cases, by the members of the 
Committee. Neither side was denied the opportunity to call a 
witness based on insufficient time. 1C at 2581-2582.
    The Committee also admitted exhibits during the evidentiary 
hearings and additional exhibits in consultation with the 
parties following the hearings to complete the record. 3A at 
342-363. The Committee declined to include in the certified 
record two admitted exhibits in their entirety: Exhibit 69(b), 
which is the FBI's background investigation file for Judge 
Porteous's federal appointment, and Exhibit 439, which is the 
Senate Judiciary Committee's nomination file of Judge Porteous. 
These exhibits, however, will be available to Senators only 
upon request for review. The transcripts of the evidentiary 
hearings are found in Parts 2A and 2B, and the admitted 
exhibits are contained in Parts 3B, 3C, 3D, and 3E.
    After the evidentiary hearings, the Committee requested 
from the parties proposed findings of fact and post-trial 
briefs on the factual and legal issues. The proposed findings 
of fact are found in Part 3A. The post-trial briefs will be 
provided separately to each Senator along with this report and 
the certified record.

                               ADDENDUM D


          Glossary of Names Appearing in the Committee Report

    1. Amato, Jacob J., Jr.--Attorney with longstanding 
friendship with Judge Porteous, who was retained as counsel for 
Liljeberg in the Lifemark v. Liljeberg case that is the subject 
of Article I. Former law partner of Judge Porteous and of 
Robert Creely.
    2. Barliant, Ronald--Former U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the 
Northern District of Illinois, called by Judge Porteous as an 
expert witness on bankruptcy law.
    3. Barnett, Adam--Bail bondsman in Gretna, Louisiana, who 
worked with the Marcottes and Judge Porteous.
    4. Beaulieu, S.J., Jr.--Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana who oversaw Judge Porteous's 
personal bankruptcy.
    5. Bodenheimer, Ronald--Former state court judge of the 
24th Judicial District Court, first elected in 1999, who pled 
guilty to corruption in ``Operation Wrinkled Robe.''
    6. Ciolino, Dane--Professor at Loyola University School of 
Law called by Judge Porteous as an expert witness on judicial 
ethics and standards, as well as practices in the 24th Judicial 
District Court.
    7. Creely, Robert--Attorney with longstanding friendship 
with Judge Porteous and partner of Jacob Amato.
    8. Danos, Rhonda--Judge Porteous's secretary during his 
time as both a state court judge and a federal district court 
judge.
    9. Duhon, Jeffrey--Former Employee of Bail Bonds Unlimited.
    10. Gardner, Donald--Attorney with longstanding friendship 
with Judge Porteous, who was retained by Lifemark in the 
Lifemark v. Liljeberg case that is the subject of Article I.
    11. Geyh, Charles G.--Professor at Indiana University 
School of Law who was called as an expert witness by the House 
on judicial ethics.
    12. Goyeneche, Raphael--President of the Metropolitan Crime 
Commission, a non-profit community organization to report crime 
and corruption in New Orleans, LA.
    13. Greendyke, William R.--Former judge of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas who 
presided over Judge Porteous's personal bankruptcy from 2001 
through 2004.
    14. Griffin, Darcy--Criminal minute clerk for Judge 
Porteous between 1992 and 1994 on the 24th JDC.
    15. Hamil, Bobby P., Jr.--Former FBI Agent who was involved 
in the background investigation of Judge Porteous for his 
federal judicial nomination.
    16. Hildebrand, Henry--Standing Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 
Trustee for the Middle District of Tennessee who was called as 
an expert witness by Judge Porteous on bankruptcy law.
    17. Horner, DeWayne--FBI agent who was part of ``Operation 
Wrinkled Robe'' and who led the related investigation of Judge 
Porteous.
    18. Keir, Duncan W.--Chief Judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Maryland who testified as an expert 
witness for the House on the area of bankruptcy law.
    19. Levenson, Leonard--Attorney with longstanding 
relationship with Judge Porteous who represented Liljeberg in 
the Lifemark v. Liljeberg case that is the subject of Article 
I.
    20. Lightfoot, Claude--Bankruptcy attorney retained by 
Judge Porteous in the summer of 2000.
    21. Mackenzie, G. Calvin--Professor of Government at Colby 
College who was called as an expert witness by Judge Porteous 
on the federal appointments process and Senate confirmation.
    22. Mamoulides, John--Former Jefferson Parish District 
Attorney from 1972 to 1996, during which time Judge Porteous 
was an Assistant District Attorney and, later, a state court 
judge.
    23. Marcotte, Lori--Former employee of Bail Bonds Unlimited 
and sister of bail bondsman Louis Marcotte.
    24. Marcotte, Louis--Bail bondsman who founded Bail Bonds 
Unlimited.
    25. Mole, Joseph--Attorney who represented Lifemark in the 
Lifemark v. Liljeberg case that is the subject of Article I.
    26. Netterville, Bruce--Attorney with longstanding 
relationship with the Marcottes and Judge Porteous.
    27. Pardo, Rafael--Professor of law at the University of 
Washington School of Law who was called as an expert witness by 
Judge Porteous on bankruptcy law.
    28. Porteous, Timothy--Judge Porteous's son.
    29. Rees, Robert B.--Criminal defense attorney who 
represented Aubrey Wallace on the set aside of his burglary 
conviction.
    30. Reynolds, Mike--Former Assistant District Attorney who 
represented the state in the hearing on the motion to set aside 
Aubrey Wallace's burglary conviction.
    31. Tackett, Cheyenne--Former FBI Agent who was involved in 
the background investigation of Judge Porteous for his federal 
judicial nomination.
    32. Wallace, Aubrey--Former employee of Bail Bonds 
Unlimited.

                                  
