[Senate Report 111-223]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       Calendar No. 467
111th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 2d Session                                                     111-223

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

                                _______
                                

                 July 19, 2010.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

 Mrs. Feinstein, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted 
                             the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 3611]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 3611) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the United States Government, the Community Management 
Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System, and for other purposes, reports favorably 
thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                Classified Annex to the Committee Report

    The classified nature of United States intelligence 
activities precludes disclosure by the Committee of details of 
its budgetary recommendations. The Committee has prepared a 
classified annex to this report that contains a classified 
Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status 
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the 
Committees of Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for 
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

                          History of the Bill

    This is the second report by the Committee of an 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
    On July 22, 2009, the Committee unanimously reported S. 
1494 with an accompanying report, S. Rep. 111-55 (2009). With 
amendments to address several concerns of other committees, the 
Senate passed S. 1494 by unanimous consent on September 16, 
2009. 155 Cong. Rec. S9447-9480 (daily ed.). On September 17, 
2009, S. 1494 was sent to the House and held there at the desk, 
where it remains today.
    On June 26, 2009, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence reported its proposed Fiscal Year 2010 
Authorization, H.R. 2701, with an accompanying report, H.R. 
Rep. 111-186 (2009). On February 26, 2010, the House passed 
H.R. 2701 with amendments by a vote of 235 to 168. 156 Cong. 
Rec. H936-951 (daily ed.).
    On March 15, 2010, the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) sent to the Intelligence Committees a letter 
setting forth the Administration's views on S. 1494 and H.R. 
2701. The letter identified thirteen serious concerns with 
provisions in either or both bills. The letter stated that 
three of these were so serious that the President's senior 
advisors would recommend that he veto the bill if they were 
included in a bill presented for his signature. The veto-threat 
items were proposed amendments on notifications to Congress of 
sensitive intelligence matters and covert actions, amendments 
on the authority of the Government Accountability Office to 
conduct audits, investigations, and evaluations of elements of 
the Intelligence Community, and provisions on the amounts 
authorized for the National Intelligence Program. OMB provided 
in classified correspondence additional details about its 
concerns. On March 15, 2010, the Department of Justice also 
transmitted to the committees a letter stating its concerns 
about the constitutionality of various provisions in the House 
and Senate bills.
    The committees began a three-month process of reconciling 
the House and Senate bills and addressing the Administration's 
concerns in order to produce a bill which, as a result of a 
conference or an exchange of messages between the House and 
Senate, would in the view of the committees' leadership make a 
substantial contribution to national security and be able to 
pass the two chambers and be signed by the President. The 
process involved extensive meetings and exchanges of drafts 
with and among representatives of the leaders of the two 
committees and the Administration.
    On June 10, 2010, the OMB Director wrote to the leadership 
of the committees that the Administration had reviewed the 
proposed House-Senate agreement and, on the assumption there 
would be no material changes in either the unclassified bill or 
the classified annex, that the President's senior advisors had 
determined that they would recommend that he sign the bill if 
it is presented for his signature. Among the accommodations 
specifically noted in the OMB letter were those responding to 
the Administration's concerns on congressional notification and 
the authority of the Comptroller General.
    Although fiscal year 2010 has entered its final quarter, 
the significance of the legislative provisions of the fiscal 
year 2010 bill is not time limited. Its provisions on 
authorities and oversight will have importance for years to 
come.
    Notwithstanding the opportunity to produce the first 
intelligence authorization in five years, no conference has yet 
been requested on the bills that have passed the Senate and 
House. Accordingly, both S. 1494 and H.R. 2701 remain, as of 
now, in the House of Representatives.
    In order to provide a public record of the agreement on the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, and to 
urge Congress to complete action on this needed legislation, 
the Committee has determined to report the agreement as a new 
measure that the President's senior advisors will recommend 
that he sign into law as soon as he is provided the opportunity 
to do so. The only substantive change from the text reviewed by 
the Administration for the OMB letter of June 10, 2010, is 
described in the sectional analysis for Section 333(c).

              Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2010 that is being reported by the Committee.
    The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee recommended 
the provisions of this bill to the Committee as a 
reconciliation of a bill (S. 1494) that passed the Senate on 
September 16, 2009, and the text of a bill (H.R. 2701) passed 
by the House on February 26, 2010. As described above, the 
reconciliation of the Senate and House bills is the product of 
communications with the Executive Branch and the leadership of 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives.
    This section-by-section analysis describes the differences 
between S. 1494, H.R. 2701, and this Senate bill, except for 
clerical corrections, conforming changes, and minor drafting 
and clarifying changes.

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS


Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2010 
for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of a 
list of United States Government departments, agencies, and 
other elements. Section 101 is identical to Section 101 of S. 
1494 and to Section 101 of the H.R. 2701.

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under Section 101 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal 
year 2010, and (subject to Section 103) the personnel levels 
authorized for fiscal year 2010, are contained in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of 
Authorizations will be made available to the Committees on 
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and 
to the President.
    Section 102 is identical to Section 102 of S. 1494. Section 
102 of H.R. 2701 had provided that personnel authorizations for 
the Intelligence Community would be in terms of personnel 
ceilings, as in prior intelligence authorizations, rather than 
as personnel levels expressed as full-time equivalent 
positions, as in S. 1494. This bill followed the Senate in this 
regard.
    The use of full-time equivalent positions will allow 
Intelligence Community elements to plan for and manage its 
workforce based on overall hours of work, rather than number of 
employees, as a truer measure of personnel levels. This 
approach is consistent with general governmental practice and 
will provide the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and 
Congress with a more accurate measurement of personnel levels. 
For example, it will enable Intelligence Community elements to 
count two half-time employees as holding the equivalent of one 
full-time position, rather than counting them as two employees 
against a ceiling.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 provides procedures to enhance the flexibility 
of the DNI to manage the personnel levels of the Intelligence 
Community.
    Section 103(a) allows the DNI to authorize employment of 
civilian personnel in excess of the number of full-time 
equivalent positions authorized under Section 102 by an amount 
not to exceed three percent of the total limit applicable to 
each Intelligence Community element. Before the DNI may 
authorize this increase, the DNI must determine that the action 
is necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
functions and notify the congressional intelligence committees. 
Section 103 of S. 1494 had provided that this authority could 
extend to five percent. Section 103 of H.R. 2701 had set the 
additional amount at three percent. The agreement of three 
percent in part reflects the fact that employment above the 
number of full-time equivalent positions authorized under 
Section 102 is unlikely given the late date during the fiscal 
year of this bill.
    Section 103(b) establishes authority that will enable the 
DNI to reduce the number of Intelligence Community contractors 
by providing the flexibility to add a comparable number of 
government personnel to replace those contractor employees. 
Section 103(b) accomplishes this by permitting the DNI to 
authorize employment of additional full-time equivalent 
personnel if the head of an element in the Intelligence 
Community determines that activities currently being performed 
by contractor employees should be performed by government 
employees, and the DNI agrees with the determination.
    Section 103(c) requires the DNI to establish guidelines 
that govern, for each element of the intelligence community, 
the treatment under the personnel levels authorized under 
Section 102(a), of a variety of part-time arrangements. These 
include, but are not limited to, the circumstances set forth in 
subsection 103(c): student or trainee programs; re-employment 
of annuitants in the National Intelligence Reserve Corps; joint 
duty rotational assignments; and other full-time or part-time 
positions.
    Subsection 103(d) provides for notifications to the 
congressional intelligence committees of the exercise of 
authority under subsections 103(a) and 103(b). Subsections 
103(b) through (d) are identical to subsections 103(b) through 
(d) of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not have provisions similar to 
subsections (b) and (c).

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes the sum of $710,612,000 in fiscal 
year 2010 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of 
the Director of National Intelligence. The Intelligence 
Community Management Account is part of the Community 
Management Account. The section authorizes 822 full-time 
equivalent personnel for the Intelligence Community Management 
Account, who may be either permanent employees or individuals 
detailed from other elements of the United States Government. 
Section 104 also authorizes additional funds and personnel in 
the classified Schedule of Authorizations for the Community 
Management Account. The DNI may use the authorities in Section 
103 to adjust personnel levels within the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, subject to the limitations in 
that section.
    Section 104 is similar to Section 104 of S. 1494 and 
Section 104 of H.R. 2701.

Section 105. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 105 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the 
United States. Section 105 is identical to Section 105 of S. 
1494 and Section 106 of H.R. 2701.

Section 106. Continuation of prior authorization of funds for certain 
        intelligence activities

    Section 106 amends Section 8079 of the Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-118; 123 
Stat. 3446) in order that the authorization of funds 
appropriated by that Act continue notwithstanding the enactment 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. A 
similar provision is included in section 301 of H.R. 4899, the 
emergency supplemental appropriations act for fiscal year 2010, 
as passed by the Senate.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations of $290,900,000 for 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund. 
Section 201 is identical to Sections 201 of S. 1494 and H.R. 
2701.

Section 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision 
        of Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act

    Section 202 updates the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the 
Senior Intelligence Service program, rather than pay grades, by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Section 202 is identical 
to Section 202 of S. 1494 and similar to Section 512 of H.R. 
2701.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS


                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters


Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law. 
Section 301 is identical to Section 301 of S. 1494 and Section 
301 of H.R. 2701.

Section 302. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to 
        elements of the Intelligence Community

    Section 302 expands from one year to up to two years the 
length of time that United States Government personnel may be 
detailed to elements of the Intelligence Community from other 
parts of the federal government on a reimbursable basis or on a 
non-reimbursable basis under which the employee continues to be 
paid by the home agency. To utilize this authority, the joint 
agreement of the head of the Intelligence Community element and 
the head of the detailing element is required. As explained by 
the DNI, this authority will provide flexibility for the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), for example, 
to receive support from other elements of the Intelligence 
Community or other elements of the United States Government for 
community-wide activities where both the home agency and the 
ODNI would benefit from the detail.
    Section 302 of S. 1494 would have expanded the time 
available for reimbursable or non-reimbursable details to three 
years. Section 303 of H.R. 2701 allowed reimbursable or non-
reimbursable details for periods not to exceed two years. While 
providing in this bill only for a two-year maximum for 
reimbursable or non-reimbursable details to the Intelligence 
Community, the Committee believes that the question of three 
year details merits further study.

Section 303. Pay authority for critical positions

    Section 303 adds a new subsection (s) to section 102A of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) to provide 
enhanced pay authority for critical positions in portions of 
the Intelligence Community where that authority does not now 
exist. Subsection 102A(s) allows the DNI, in coordination with 
the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to 
authorize the head of a department or agency with an 
Intelligence Community element to fix a rate of compensation in 
excess of applicable limits for a position that requires an 
extremely high level of expertise and is critical to 
accomplishing an important mission, to the extent necessary to 
recruit or retain an individual extremely well qualified for 
such position. A rate of pay higher than Executive Level II 
would require written approval of the DNI. A rate of pay higher 
than Executive Level I would require written approval of the 
President in response to a DNI request.
    Section 303 is identical to the corresponding portion of 
Section 303 of S. 1494, with an additional notification 
requirement when the authority is exercised by the employing 
department or agency. H.R. 2701 did not have a comparable 
provision. The section of S. 1494 that contained this pay 
authority also would have provided additional authority to 
enable the DNI to harmonize personnel rules in the Intelligence 
Community. It would have enabled the DNI, with the concurrence 
of a department or agency head, to convert competitive service 
positions and incumbents within an Intelligence Community 
element to excepted service positions. It also would have 
granted authority to the DNI to authorize Intelligence 
Community elements--with concurrence of the concerned 
department or agency heads and in coordination with the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management--to adopt 
compensation, performance, management, and scholarship 
authority that have been authorized for any other Intelligence 
Community element. The Committee agreed to study these 
additional provisions further and not include them in this 
compromise.

Section 304. Award of rank to members of the Senior National 
        Intelligence Service

    Section 304 adds a new subsection (t) to Section 102A of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1). Subsection 
102A(t) authorizes Presidential Rank awards to members of the 
Senior National Intelligence Service (SNIS) and other 
Intelligence Community senior civilian officers not already 
covered by such a rank award program.
    According to the DNI, the authority to issue Presidential 
Rank Awards was originally enacted in 1978 as a program of the 
Senior Executive Service (SES) to honor high-performing senior 
career employees. The CIA and other elements of the 
Intelligence Community were exempted by statute from the SES, 
and thus not eligible for Presidential Rank Awards. Legislation 
enacted since 1978 has opened the eligibility for Presidential 
Rank Awards to senior civilian officers of exempt agencies, 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, and members of the Defense 
Intelligence Senior Executive Service.
    Section 304 would authorize the President to recognize 
members of the SNIS and other senior civilian officers not 
already covered by such a program who deserve such recognition 
with Presidential Rank. This authority must be used in a manner 
consistent with rank awards conferred on other senior 
executives of the Executive Branch, and subject to regulations 
that protect the identity of such individual as a member or 
officer of the intelligence community, if necessary.
    Section 304 is based on Section 304 of S. 1494, which was 
modified to clarify the application of the provision to 
officers of the Intelligence Community who are undercover. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence 
        community

    Section 305 creates a new Section 506B in Title V of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), an 
oversight mechanism that requires the DNI to conduct, in 
consultation with the head of the element of the Intelligence 
Community concerned, an annual personnel level assessment for 
each of the elements within the Intelligence Community and 
provide those assessments with the submission of the 
President's budget request each year. Section 305 is a new 
oversight mechanism that will allow both the Executive branch 
and Congress to better oversee personnel growth in the 
Intelligence Community.
    The assessment consists of three parts. First, the 
assessment must provide basic personnel and core contract 
personnel information for the concerned element of the 
Intelligence Community (with civilian personnel expressed as 
full-time equivalent positions) for the upcoming fiscal year. 
It requires that the data be compared against current fiscal 
year and historical five-year personnel numbers and funding 
levels. The term ``core contractor'' is not defined in Section 
305, but is intended to include those independent contractors 
or individuals employed by industrial contractors who augment 
civilian and military personnel by providing direct support to 
Intelligence Community elements--as opposed to commodity 
contractors (e.g., those working on the production or delivery 
of end-use items such as satellites) or commercial contractors 
(e.g., those providing services to Intelligence Community 
facilities, such as janitorial, landscaping, or food service 
personnel).
    Second, the assessment must include a written justification 
for the requested funding levels. This requirement is necessary 
to ensure that any personnel cost cuts or increases are fully 
documented and justified. Third, the assessment must contain a 
statement by the DNI that, based upon current and projected 
funding, the element concerned will have the internal 
infrastructure to support the requested agency and core 
contract personnel levels, training resources to support agency 
personnel levels, and sufficient funding to support the 
administrative and operational activities of the requested 
agency and contract personnel levels.
    To accommodate Executive branch concerns about the 
sensitivity of information concerning ongoing investigations, 
this bill does not include a requirement that the assessment 
contain a list of all contract personnel who have been the 
subject of an investigation by the inspector general of any 
element of the Intelligence Community during the previous 
fiscal year or who are or have been the subject of an 
investigation during the current fiscal year. The Committee 
expects the congressional intelligence committees to be 
notified under other provisions of law when such investigations 
involve a significant matter.
    The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment 
tool is necessary for the Executive branch and Congress to 
fully understand the consequences of managing the Intelligence 
Community's personnel levels, particularly in light of a 
transition to managing personnel as full-time equivalents 
subject to available funds. In recent years, the congressional 
intelligence committees have been concerned that the sharp 
growth in personnel numbers since the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, is unsustainable. In particular, when 
overall budgets do not keep pace with inflation and decline in 
real terms, personnel costs as a percentage of the budget 
increase each year and divert funds from operations and 
modernization.
    Another longstanding concern of the congressional 
intelligence committees has been the Intelligence Community's 
reliance upon contract personnel to meet mission requirements. 
The Committee believes that the annual personnel level 
assessment tool will assist the DNI and the elements of the 
Intelligence Community in arriving at an appropriate balance of 
contract personnel and permanent government employees.
    Section 305 is similar to Section 305 of S. 1494 and 
Section 332 of H.R. 2701.

Section 306. Temporary personnel authorizations for critical language 
        training

    Section 306 addresses the continuing lack of critical 
language-capable personnel in the Intelligence Community and 
the difficulty of sending employees to get critical language 
training to remedy this shortage. Section 306 gives the DNI the 
authority to transfer full-time equivalent positions to 
elements of the Intelligence Community on a temporary basis, to 
enable these elements to replace individuals who are 
participating in long-term language training, or to accept 
temporary transfers of language-capable employees from other 
elements of the Intelligence Community. This provision 
complements Section 103, which authorizes the DNI to issue 
guidance on the treatment of personnel under personnel 
ceilings, to include exemptions from personnel ceilings for 
personnel engaged in long-term full-time training. Section 306 
authorizes an additional 100 full-time equivalent positions for 
the ODNI and notes that these positions are to be used 
specifically to implement the new authorities granted by this 
section.
    Section 306 refers to ``critical language training,'' 
rather than ``foreign language training.'' The Committee 
understands that this phrasing will permit the DNI to use this 
new authority in situations where an employee of the 
Intelligence Community who speaks English as a second language 
needs further training in English in order to comprehend 
particular complex or technical subjects. The DNI is required 
to submit an annual report to the congressional intelligence 
committees on the use of this authority. Section 306 is based 
on Section 306 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not include a 
comparable provision.

Section 307. Conflict of interest regulations for intelligence 
        community employees

    Section 307 adds a provision to section 102A of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) directing the 
DNI, in consultation with the Director of the Office of 
Government Ethics, to issue regulations prohibiting an officer 
or employee of an element of the intelligence community from 
engaging in outside employment if such employment creates a 
potential conflict of interest. To the extent that the DNI 
considers regulations of the Office of Government Ethics on 
this issue to be adequate, the DNI may incorporate and 
supplement such regulations as appropriate. Section 307 also 
requires an annual report to the congressional intelligence 
committees describing all outside employment that was 
authorized by the head of an element of the intelligence 
community during the preceding calendar year.
    Section 307 is based on Section 305 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
did not have a comparable provision. The House provision would 
also have prohibited an officer or employee of an element of 
the intelligence community from personally owning or 
effectively controlling an entity that markets or sells for 
profit the use of knowledge or skills that such officer or 
employee acquires or makes use of while carrying out the 
employee's official duties. The Committee expects the DNI to 
consider whether to include such a prohibition in the 
regulations issued pursuant to this section.

                     Subtitle B--Education Matters


Section 311. Permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence 
        Scholars Program

    Section 311 provides a permanent authorization for the Pat 
Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP), which was 
originally authorized as a pilot program in Section 318 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 and has 
continued under year-to-year appropriations. The purpose of the 
PRISP is to provide funds for selected students or former 
students to continue academic training, or be reimbursed for 
academic training previously obtained, in areas of 
specialization where the Intelligence Community is deficient or 
likely to be deficient in the future. Section 311 would also 
authorize the use of funds to allow students participating in 
the program to receive funds for books, travel expenses and a 
stipend, and other expenses reasonably appropriate to carry out 
the program.
    The PRISP has provided education funds to over 800 
individuals since its inception in 2004, with an attrition rate 
of less than one percent of program participants. Intelligence 
agencies have been supportive of the program as it provides 
them the flexibility to compete effectively with the private 
sector to recruit individuals who possess critical skills 
sought by the Intelligence Community. Section 311 is similar to 
Section 311 of S. 1494 and H.R. 2701.

Section 312. Modifications to the Louis Stokes Educational Scholarship 
        Program

    Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
U.S.C. 402 note) authorizes the National Security Agency (NSA) 
to establish an undergraduate training program to facilitate 
recruitment of individuals with skills critical to its mission. 
The program is known as the Stokes Educational Scholarship 
Program, named for Representative Louis Stokes, a former 
chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the U.S. House of Representatives.
    Section 312 is intended to expand and strengthen the Stokes 
program. Section 312(a) expands the Stokes program to authorize 
the inclusion of graduate students. Section 312(d) amends 
Section 16 to permit the NSA Director to protect intelligence 
sources and methods by deleting a requirement that NSA publicly 
identify to educational institutions students who are NSA 
employees or training program participants. Deletion of this 
disclosure requirement will enhance the ability of NSA to 
protect personnel and prospective personnel and to preserve the 
ability of training program participants to undertake future 
clandestine or other sensitive assignments for the Intelligence 
Community.
    The Committee recognizes that nondisclosure is appropriate 
when disclosure would threaten intelligence sources or methods, 
would endanger the life or safety of the student, or would 
limit the employee's or prospective employee's ability to 
perform intelligence activities in the future. Notwithstanding 
the deletion of the disclosure requirement, the Committee 
expects NSA to continue to prohibit participants in the 
training program from engaging in any intelligence functions at 
the institutions they attend under the program. See H.R. Rep. 
No. 99-690, Part I (1986) (``NSA employees attending an 
institution under the program will have no intelligence 
function whatever to perform at the institution.'').
    Section 312 is also intended to make the program more 
effective by clarifying that ``termination of employment'' 
includes situations where employees fail to maintain 
satisfactory academic standards. According to the DNI, failure 
to maintain satisfactory academic performance has always been 
grounds for default resulting in the right of the government to 
recoup educational costs expended for the benefit of the 
defaulting employee. Section 312(b) would also expand the 
program by authorizing NSA to offer participation in the Stokes 
program to individuals who are not current federal employees.
    Finally, Section 312(e) authorizes other intelligence 
agencies to establish undergraduate or graduate training 
programs for civilian employees or prospective civilian 
employees that are similar to programs under Section 16 of the 
National Security Agency Act. Section 312 is similar to Section 
312 of S. 1494 and Section 313 of H.R. 2701.

Section 313. Intelligence officer training program

    Section 313 authorizes the Intelligence Officer Training 
Program (IOTP), which builds on two pilot programs that were 
authorized in previous years: the NSA ``Pilot Program on 
Cryptologic Service Training,'' described in Section 922 of the 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 
108-375 (2004) (50 U.S.C. 402 note), and the Director of 
Central Intelligence pilot program ``Improvement of Equality of 
Employment Opportunities in the Intelligence Community,'' under 
Section 319 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-177 (2003) (50 U.S.C. 403 note). The 
purpose of the IOTP is to encourage the preparation, 
recruitment, and retention of civilian personnel for careers in 
the Intelligence Community. It is also to help ensure that the 
Intelligence Community can better recruit and retain a 
workforce that is ethnically and culturally diverse so that it 
can accomplish its critical national security mission.
    The IOTP is to consist of two parts. First, the program 
would provide financial assistance to individuals through 
existing Intelligence Community scholarship authorities to 
pursue studies in critical language, analytic, scientific, 
technical, or other skills necessary to meet current or 
emerging needs of the Intelligence Community. Second, building 
on the ODNI's successful Centers for Academic Excellence 
program, the IOTP would solicit colleges and universities from 
across the country to apply for grants on a competitive basis 
to implement academic programs that will help students develop 
the critical skills needed for careers in the Intelligence 
Community. Although the Committee did not include the specific 
language of H.R. 2701 that would have authorized grant programs 
for historically Black colleges and universities, the Committee 
understands that such colleges and universities have been the 
recipients of such grants in the past. Further, the Committee 
encourages the ODNI to continue to reach out to historically 
Black colleges and universities, as well as Hispanic-serving 
institutions, tribally controlled colleges and universities, 
Alaska Native-serving institutions, and Native Hawaiian-serving 
institutions, in its efforts to recruit and retain a diverse 
workforce.
    Students attending participating colleges and universities 
and taking the prescribed course of study may competitively 
apply for financial assistance including, but not limited to, a 
monthly stipend, tuition assistance, book allowances, and 
travel expenses. Students who receive a threshold amount of 
assistance are obligated to serve in the Intelligence 
Community. The ODNI is to develop application requirements for 
students, which could include the successful completion of a 
security background investigation.
    Section 313 builds on a NSA pilot program that provided 
grants to academic institutions. The original NSA pilot 
program, with its focus on cryptologic service at NSA, although 
beneficial to NSA, no longer meets the variety of the 
Intelligence Community's critical skills requirements. The 
IOTP, with its broader scope, is intended to assist the 
Intelligence Community in establishing and building 
partnerships with academic institutions and ensure a continuous 
pool of qualified entry-level applicants to Intelligence 
Community elements, tailored to changing priorities of an 
evolving Intelligence Community enterprise.
    Section 313 repeals the authorizations for the following 
programs that are either incorporated into or replaced by the 
IOTP: the pilot program authorized by Section 319 (but not the 
section findings) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-177 (2003) (50 U.S.C. 403 
note); the scholarship program authorized by Section 1043 of 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Section 
1003 of the National Security Act, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004) 
(50 U.S.C. 441g-2) (Intelligence Reform Act); and the pilot 
program authorized by Section 922 of the Ronald W. Reagan 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 108-375 (50 U.S.C. 402 note). Section 313 is similar to 
Section 313 of S. 1494 and Section 312 of H.R. 2701.

Section 314. Pilot program for intensive language instruction in 
        African languages

    Section 314 permits the DNI, in consultation with the 
National Security Education Board established under section 
803(a) of the David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 
1991, to establish a pilot program to provide scholarships for 
programs that provide intensive language instruction in any of 
the five highest priority African languages for which 
scholarships are not currently offered. The pilot program will 
terminate five years after the date on which it is established.
    The intent of the program is to begin building capability 
in African languages spoken in areas where U.S. national 
security interests may be affected, but where insufficient 
instructional capability exists in the United States. For 
example, the program may use intensive immersion instruction 
both in the United States and abroad in languages like Somali, 
Hausa, Amharic, Tigrinya, and Kituba.
    Section 314 is intended by the Committee as a component in 
the development of a comprehensive plan for meeting national 
intelligence linguistic requirements, as required by Section 
1041 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 
The Committee believes it is important for the Intelligence 
Community to be proactive in identifying languages from around 
the globe that are in need of attention and further resources. 
The Committee expects that the DNI will develop an overall 
language strategy that anticipates the Intelligence Community's 
future needs and allocates resources accordingly.
    Section 314 is identical to Section 314 of H.R. 2701. S. 
1494 had no comparable provision.

                    Subtitle C--Acquisition Matters


Section 321. Vulnerability assessments of major systems

    Section 321 adds a new oversight mechanism to the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) that requires the 
DNI to conduct an initial vulnerability assessment for each 
major system and its significant items of supply in the 
National Intelligence Program. The provision also requires the 
DNI to conduct subsequent vulnerability assessments throughout 
the procurement of a major system. The intent of the provision 
is to provide Congress and the DNI with an accurate assessment 
of the unique vulnerabilities and risks associated with each 
National Intelligence Program major system, which should enable 
a determination of whether funding for a particular major 
system should be modified or discontinued. The vulnerability 
assessment process will also require the various elements of 
the Intelligence Community responsible for implementing major 
systems to give due consideration to the risks and 
vulnerabilities associated with such implementation.
    The timing of when an initial vulnerability assessment must 
be completed under Section 321 depends upon whether a major 
system has reached Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition 
decision. For new major system acquisitions, the DNI must 
complete a vulnerability assessment and submit it to the 
congressional intelligence committees prior to completion of 
Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision. For major 
systems that have already completed Milestone B or will 
complete Milestone B during the six-month period following such 
enactment, the DNI must complete a vulnerability assessment 
within one year of enactment of the Act. The DNI also has the 
authority to extend the deadline for a major system by an 
additional six months, provided the DNI notifies the 
congressional intelligence committees and includes a 
justification for the extension. Thus, the DNI will have up to 
18 months to complete the vulnerability assessments for 
existing major systems.
    The minimum requirements of the initial vulnerability 
assessment are fairly broad and are intended to provide the DNI 
with significant flexibility in crafting an assessment tailored 
to the proposed major system. The DNI is required to use, at a 
minimum, an analysis-based approach to identify 
vulnerabilities, define exploitation potential, examine the 
system's potential effectiveness, determine overall 
vulnerability, and make recommendations for risk reduction. The 
Committee expects that these required elements will be weighted 
differently depending upon the nature of the major system at 
issue. For example, a major system that is based upon cutting-
edge technology may require a more careful examination of the 
system's potential effectiveness than a system based upon time-
tested technology. Also, certain major systems may share a 
common supply chain that can be assessed once, but incorporated 
into numerous vulnerability assessments. The DNI is obviously 
free to adopt a more rigorous methodology for the conduct of 
initial vulnerability assessments.
    Section 321 contains an enforcement mechanism to ensure 
that major system vulnerability assessments are completed in a 
timely fashion so that Congress and the DNI can make informed 
funding decisions. If a major system vulnerability assessment 
is not completed and submitted to the congressional 
intelligence committees within the deadlines required by 
subsection (a)(1), no funds appropriated for the major system 
may be obligated for a major contract until Congress receives 
the assessment.
    Vulnerability assessments should continue throughout the 
procurement of a major system. Numerous factors and 
considerations can affect the viability of a given major 
system. For that reason, Section 321 provides the DNI with the 
flexibility to set a schedule of subsequent vulnerability 
assessments for each major system when the DNI submits the 
initial vulnerability assessment to the congressional 
intelligence committees. The time period between assessments 
should depend upon the unique circumstances of a particular 
major system. For example, a new major system that is 
implementing an experimental technology might require annual 
assessments, while a more mature major system might not need 
such frequent reassessment. The DNI is also permitted to adjust 
a major system's assessment schedule when the DNI determines 
that a change in circumstances warrants the issuance of a 
subsequent vulnerability assessment. Section 321 also provides 
that a congressional intelligence committee may request that 
the DNI conduct a subsequent vulnerability assessment of a 
major system.
    The minimum requirements for a subsequent vulnerability 
assessment are almost identical to those of an initial 
vulnerability assessment. There are only two additional 
requirements. First, if applicable to the given major system 
during its particular phase of development or production, the 
DNI shall also use a testing-based approach, if applicable, to 
assess the system's vulnerabilities. The testing approach is 
obviously not intended to require the ``crash testing'' of a 
satellite system. Nor is it intended to require the DNI to test 
system hardware. However, the vulnerabilities of a satellite's 
significant items of supply might be exposed by a rigorous 
testing regime. Second, the subsequent vulnerability assessment 
is required to monitor the exploitation potential of the major 
system. A subsequent vulnerability assessment should, 
therefore, monitor ongoing changes to vulnerabilities and 
understand the potential for exploitation. Since new 
vulnerabilities can become relevant and the characteristics of 
existing vulnerabilities can change, it is necessary to monitor 
both existing vulnerabilities and their characteristics and to 
check for new vulnerabilities on a regular basis.
    Section 321 requires the DNI to give due consideration to 
the vulnerability assessments prepared for the major systems 
within the National Intelligence Program. It also requires that 
the vulnerability assessments be provided to the congressional 
intelligence committees within ten days of their completion. 
The Committee encourages the DNI to share the results of these 
vulnerabilities assessments, as appropriate, with other 
congressional committees of jurisdiction.
    Finally, the section contains definitions for the terms 
``items of supply,'' ``major system,'' ``Milestone B,'' and 
``vulnerability assessment.''
    Section 321 is similar to Section 321 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
had no similar provision.

Section 322. Intelligence community business system transformation

    A business enterprise architecture incorporates an agency's 
financial, personnel, procurement, acquisition, logistics, and 
planning systems into one interoperable system. Historically, 
Intelligence Community elements have pursued unique, stovepiped 
systems that do not leverage the investments of other elements 
of the Intelligence Community. More recently, there has been a 
more collaborative effort among the Intelligence Community 
elements on the development of business systems, but true 
transformation to an integrated Intelligence Community 
architecture has not been achieved. Section 322 will help 
ensure that the DNI effectively and efficiently coordinates 
Intelligence Community business systems.
    Section 322 adds a new Section 506D to the National 
Security Act of 1947. It will prohibit the obligation of 
appropriated funds for any system costing more than three 
million dollars that has not been certified by the Director of 
the Office of Business Transformation of the ODNI as complying 
with the enterprise architecture, as necessary for national 
security, or as an essential capability. The certification 
process is to be supported by investment review procedures that 
meet the requirements of Section 11312 of title 40, United 
States Code, relating to maximizing the value, and assessing 
and managing the risks, of information technology acquisitions. 
The review process will be led by a board that will recommend 
business transformation policies and procedures to the DNI and 
review and approve major updates to the enterprise architecture 
and any plans for Intelligence Community business systems 
modernization.
    Section 322 will also require the ODNI to identify all 
``legacy systems'' that will be either terminated or 
transitioned into the new architecture, and to include within 
the annual budget submission details on each business system 
being funded. Further, this section will require the DNI to 
report to the congressional intelligence committees annually 
for five years on the progress being made in implementing the 
new architecture.
    Section 322 requires the DNI to revise the enterprise 
architecture that was submitted to the congressional 
intelligence committees in December 2009 and to more clearly 
define all Intelligence Community business systems, as well as 
the functions and activities supported by those business 
systems, in order to issue detailed guidance on implementation 
of interoperable Intelligence Community business system 
solutions. Section 322 requires the revised enterprise 
architecture to be submitted by September 30, 2010. In 
addition, the enterprise architecture is to be supported by an 
implementation plan that includes an acquisition strategy for 
new systems needed to complete the architecture. The 
acquisition strategy is to be submitted by March 31, 2011.
    Section 322 is based on Section 322 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
had no comparable provision.

Section 323. Reports on the acquisition of major systems

    Sections 323 and 324 amend Title V of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) by creating Sections 506E 
and 506F to regulate the oversight of major system acquisitions 
within the Intelligence Community. In the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982, Congress created a 
statutory scheme (commonly referred to as ``Nunn-McCurdy'') 
which was designed to curtail cost growth in weapons 
procurement programs. The acquisition reforms contained in this 
Act are intended to bridge the current gap in the Intelligence 
Community major system acquisition process in a manner similar 
to the major defense acquisition process. Specifically, Section 
506E is modeled on 10 U.S.C. 2433, which governs the submission 
of unit cost reports for major defense acquisitions.
            Definitions
    Sections 506E and 506F use terminology that is very similar 
to that used in the major defense acquisition process. However, 
some of these terms have been simplified to include terminology 
already familiar to the Intelligence Community. Some of the 
definitions in subsection (a) are not addressed here because 
they are either self-explanatory or merely cross-reference 
existing statutory definitions.
    The term ``cost estimate'' appears only twice in Sections 
506E and 506F and is used to alleviate concern by the 
Intelligence Community that they would have to conduct a full 
``independent cost estimate'' under Section 506A of the 
National Security Act at certain points in the major system 
acquisition process. Section 506E requires the DNI to re-
baseline any major system that is currently in breach of either 
the significant or the critical cost growth thresholds and 
permits the DNI to re-baseline any other existing major system. 
Given that the Act only allows a six-month period for the 
completion of such re-baselining, the Committee agreed that it 
would be unrealistic to expect a revised current Baseline 
Estimate to be based upon an independent cost estimate.
    A similar timing consideration is present in Section 506F, 
which allows the DNI to restructure a major system that has met 
or exceeded its critical cost growth threshold. The DNI must 
submit a Major System Congressional Report and a certification 
to Congress within 90 days after receiving notice of the 
critical cost growth breach. As part of that process, the DNI 
is required to establish a revised current Baseline Estimate. 
Again, the Committee recognized that 90 days was an 
insufficient time period to complete a formal independent cost 
estimate as part of this congressional reporting process. Thus, 
the definition allows the DNI to assess and quantify all of the 
costs and risks associated with each affected major system 
based upon reasonably available information at the time such 
cost estimate is conducted.
    The definition of the term ``critical cost growth 
threshold'' is a simplified version of the same term in the 
major defense acquisition process. As is discussed below, 
Sections 506E and 506F do not differentiate between the terms 
``original Baseline Estimate'' and ``current Baseline 
Estimate.'' Instead, these sections simply utilize ``current 
Baseline Estimate,'' which is subject to revision only in very 
limited circumstances. Also, these sections do not 
differentiate between ``program acquisition unit costs'' or 
``procurement unit costs.'' The single term ``total acquisition 
cost'' is used to encompass both of these concepts, because it 
is currently used and understood by Intelligence Community 
acquisition and budgetary professionals. In addition, the 
definition of ``critical cost growth threshold'' is simplified 
to mean a percentage increase in the total acquisition cost for 
a major system of at least 25 percent over the total 
acquisition cost for the major system, as measured against the 
current Baseline Estimate for the major system. For example, if 
the current Baseline Estimate for a major system is 500 million 
dollars, the major system will reach its critical cost growth 
threshold when the total acquisition cost meets or exceeds 625 
million dollars.
    The term ``current Baseline Estimate'' merges the concepts 
of ``original'' and ``current'' baseline estimates used in the 
major defense acquisition process. There are only three 
circumstances in which a current Baseline Estimate may be 
established or modified. The first occurs when the DNI approves 
the projected total acquisition cost of a major system at 
Milestone B or an equivalent acquisition decision. This is the 
equivalent of an ``original Baseline Estimate'' and may be in 
the form of an independent cost estimate. The second occurs 
only if a major system has experienced a critical cost growth 
breach and the DNI has decided to restructure the major system 
and establish a revised current Baseline Estimate. The third 
may only occur during the six-month grandfather period 
following the enactment of the Act, when the DNI revises the 
current Baseline Estimates for existing major systems pursuant 
to subsection (h). Other than these three situations, the 
section contains no authority for the past practice of periodic 
re-baselining of major systems within the National Intelligence 
Program. Since this periodic re-baselining option has been 
taken off the table, the Committee expects that the incentive 
for accuracy of the independent cost estimates for major 
systems required by Section 506A will increase. If the 
independent cost estimate that drives the current Baseline 
Estimate is too low, the major system will likely breach its 
significant or criticalcost growth thresholds. If the 
independent cost estimate is too high, it might be difficult to obtain 
funding for the major system from Congress.
    The term ``major contract'' is based upon but slightly 
different than the definition of the same term in 10 U.S.C. 
2432(a)(3).
    The term ``Milestone B'' was derived from the definition of 
the term ``Milestone B approval'' in 10 U.S.C. 2366(e)(7) 
substituting the DNI for the Secretary of Defense.
    The term ``program manager'' has a meaning that is 
different from the usual understanding of the term. This 
definition does not include the individual who is responsible 
for the day-to-day administration of a particular major system. 
Rather, the term includes the head of the element of the 
Intelligence Community who is responsible for the budget, cost, 
schedule, and performance of a major system, or, if the major 
system is within the Office of the DNI, the deputy who is 
responsible for the budget, cost, schedule, and performance of 
a major system. The definition was constructed in this manner 
to ensure that Intelligence Community agency heads are fully 
cognizant and accountable for any major system cost overruns 
within their agency.
    The term ``significant cost growth threshold'' was derived 
in a manner similar to that previously described in the 
discussion of the term ``critical cost growth threshold'' and 
is a simplified version of the identical term in the major 
defense acquisition process. A significant cost growth 
threshold is reached when there is a percentage increase in the 
total acquisition cost for a major system of at least 15 
percent over the total acquisition cost for the major system as 
measured against the current Baseline Estimate for the major 
system. For example, if the current Baseline Estimate for a 
major system is 500 million dollars, the major system will 
reach its significant cost growth threshold when the total 
acquisition cost meets or exceeds 575 million dollars.
            Major System Cost Reports
    Section 323 requires Intelligence Community program 
managers to submit a quarterly major system cost report to the 
DNI for each major system. These cost reports will keep the DNI 
updated on the progress of each major system as it progresses 
through the acquisition process. A major system cost report 
shall consist of four elements: (1) the total acquisition cost 
for the major system; (2) any cost or schedule variance in a 
major contract for the major system; (3) any changes from a 
major system schedule milestones or performances that are 
known, expected, or anticipated by the program manager; and (4) 
any significant changes in the total acquisition cost for 
development and procurement of any software component of the 
major system, schedule milestones for such software component, 
or expected performance of such software component that are 
known, expected, or anticipated by the program manager. These 
routine major system cost reports are due to the DNI within 30 
days after the end of the reporting quarter.
    Program managers are also required to submit a major system 
cost report immediately to the DNI if they determine at any 
time during the quarter that there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the total acquisition cost has triggered a 
significant or critical cost growth breach.
            Major System Congressional Reports
    Unlike the Department of Defense acquisition process, 
Section 506E does not require the submission of detailed 
quarterly Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress for each 
major system. Instead, the DNI is only required to submit a 
Major System Congressional Report whenever the DNI determines 
the total acquisition cost of a major system has met or 
exceeded a significant or critical cost growth threshold. The 
elements of a Major System Congressional Report in subsection 
(f) track very closely with the elements contained in the 
congressional report required pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2433(g)(1) 
under the defense acquisition process. The deviations are 
largely the result of terminology differences between the two 
processes or based on the fact that the Selected Acquisition 
Report is not included in the Intelligence Community major 
system acquisition process. Major System Congressional Reports 
for significant cost growth breaches must be submitted to 
Congress no later than 45 days after the date on which the DNI 
receives the major system cost report that identified such 
breach.
    If the DNI determines that the total acquisition cost of a 
major system has met or exceeded the critical cost growth 
threshold, then the DNI is required to follow the procedures 
set forth in Section 506F, which includes a presumption of 
termination of the major system. If the DNI decides not to 
terminate a major system that has experienced a critical cost 
growth breach, the DNI will be required to submit a Major 
System Congressional Report and a certification pursuant to 
Section 506F(b)(2). Section 506F(b)(1) requires that such Major 
System Congressional Report and certification be submitted 
within 90 days after the date the DNI receives the major system 
cost report that identified the critical cost growth breach.
            Prohibition on Obligation of Funds
    To ensure that these reports and certifications are 
submitted to Congress in a timely fashion, Section 506E 
contains an enforcement mechanism that is very similar to that 
found in the major defense acquisition process at 10 U.S.C. 
2433(e)(3). Subsection (g) prohibits the obligation of funds 
for a major system if the DNI fails to submit the required 
reports and certification within the 45-day deadline for a 
significant cost-growth breach or the 90-day deadline for a 
critical cost-growth breach. The prohibition on obligation of 
funds is not triggered by the DNI's determination that there 
has been a significant or critical cost-growth breach under 
subsection (d). Rather, it is triggered by the failure of the 
DNI to submit the required congressional reporting within the 
statutory deadlines established in subsection (e)(1) and 
Section 506F(b)(1).
    The prohibition on obligating funds for a major system will 
cease to apply 45 days after Congress receives the required 
Major System Congressional Report in the case of a significant 
cost-growth breach or the required Major System Congressional 
Report and certification in the case of a critical cost-growth 
breach. The only real difference between this provision and 
that used by the major defense acquisition process is the use 
of a straight-forward 45-day time period as compared to the 
``30 days of continuous session of Congress'' formulation used 
in 10 U.S.C. 2433(e)(3).
            Grandfather Clause
    To ease the transition into this new Intelligence Community 
major system acquisition process, the Committee agreed to 
construct a grandfather clause that would require the DNI to 
establish a revised current Baseline Estimate for all major 
systems with a current total acquisition cost equal to or 
greater than its significant or critical cost-growth threshold 
and permit the DNI to establish a revised current Baseline 
Estimate for the remaining major systems. The DNI has six 
months after enactment of the Act to complete this process and 
submit a report to Congress describing the DNI's determinations 
and each revised current Baseline Estimate. The grandfather 
clause also allows the DNI to include the estimated cost of 
conducting any vulnerability assessments in any such revised 
current Baseline Estimate.
            Reports on Acquisitions of Major Systems
    Section 323 also clarifies that any determination of a 
percentage increase under Section 506E is required to be stated 
in terms of constant base year dollars. In addition, any report 
required to be submitted under Section 506E is required to be 
submitted in a classified form. Finally, Section 323 also 
clarifies that nothing in the Intelligence Community major 
system acquisition process shall be construed to exempt an 
acquisition program of the Department of Defense from the 
requirements of chapter 144 of title 10, United States Code or 
Department of Defense Directive 5000, to the extent that such 
requirements are otherwise applicable.
    Section 323 is based on Section 323 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
had no comparable provision. The Committee agreed to modify 
Sections 323 and 324 in part to address concerns of the ODNI 
and to reflect changes made in Title 10 of the United States 
Code by the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-23 (May 22, 2009).

Section 324. Critical cost growth in major systems

    Section 324 amends Title V of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) by creating Section 506F to 
regulate the oversight of major system acquisitions within the 
Intelligence Community in the case of excessive cost growth. 
Specifically, Section 506F is modeled very closely on 10 U.S.C. 
2433a, which governs the critical cost growth in major defense 
acquisition programs.
            Reassessment of Major System
    If the DNI determines under Section 506E(d) that the total 
acquisition cost of a major system has increased by a 
percentage equal to or greater than the critical cost growth 
threshold for such system, then the DNI is required to 
determine the root causes of the critical cost growth and carry 
out an assessment of the projected costs, any reasonable 
alternatives, and the need to reduce funding for other systems 
to compensate for the cost growth of the major system. This 
reassessment of the major system will be used by the DNI in 
deciding whether the major system should be terminated or 
restructured.
            Presumption of Termination
    After conducting a reassessment of the major system that 
has reached its critical cost growth threshold, the DNI is 
required to terminate the major system unless the DNI submits a 
Major System Congressional Report and a certification to 
Congress that justifies the continuation of the major system. 
The Major System Congressional Report and certification are due 
to Congress not later than 90 days after the date the DNI 
received the major system cost report that provided the basis 
for the DNI's determination under 506E(d).
    The Major System Congressional Report for a critical cost 
growth breach contains all of the elements required by Section 
506E(e) for the Major System Congressional Report required in 
the case of a significant cost growth breach, but also requires 
the following additional elements: (1) the root cause analysis 
and assessment required by subsection (a); (2) the basis for 
the determinations made in the DNI's certification that the 
major system should be continued; and (3) a description of all 
funding changes made as a result of the growth in the major 
system, including the need for any reductions made in funding 
for other systems to accommodate such cost growth. In essence, 
the Major System Congressional Report, in the case of critical 
cost growth, provides Congress with the detailed factual basis 
necessary to determine whether funding for the major system 
should be extended or terminated.
    The certification is intended to make the DNI accountable 
for the decision to proceed with a major system that has 
experienced a critical cost growth breach. The required 
elements of the certification are straight-forward. First, the 
DNI must certify that the continuation of the major system is 
essential to national security.
    The second element is closely related to the first. The DNI 
must certify that there are no less costly alternatives to the 
major system that will provide acceptable capability to meet 
the intelligence requirement.
    Third, the DNI must determine that the new estimates of the 
total acquisition cost are reasonable. If the DNI's analysis 
and assessment reveal that the new estimate of the total 
acquisition cost of the affected major system is unreasonable, 
then this certification element cannot be satisfied and a 
revised current Baseline Estimate should not be prepared.
    The fourth certification element requires the DNI to 
prioritize the affected major system relative to other systems 
whose funding must be reduced to accommodate its cost growth. 
The DNI must certify that the affected major system in question 
is a higher priority than any of the other major systems, 
otherwise this element cannot be satisfied.
    The final certification element is an accountability 
requirement. The DNI must certify that the management structure 
for the major system is adequate to manage and control the 
total acquisition cost. Depending upon the particular 
circumstances, the DNI may need to take steps, in coordination 
with the major system program manager, to ensure that the 
management structure is capable of controlling the total 
acquisition cost of the affected major system.
    If the DNI does not certify to all five of these elements, 
then the DNI is required to terminate the major system under 
subsection (b).
            Actions if a Major System Is Not Terminated
    There are some additional actions that the DNI must 
complete if the DNI elects not to terminate a major system that 
has breached the critical cost growth threshold. These actions 
are in addition to the submission of the Major System 
Congressional Report and certification requirements of 
subsection (b). First, the DNI must restructure the major 
system in a manner that addresses the root causes of the 
critical cost growth. The DNI must also ensure that the system 
has an appropriate management structure. Second, the DNI is 
required to rescind the most recent Milestone approval for the 
major system. Third, the DNI must require a new Milestone 
approval for the major system before taking any action to enter 
into a new contract, exercise an option under an existing 
contract, or otherwise extend the scope of an existing contract 
under the system. The requirement applies except to the extent 
determined necessary by the Milestone Decision Authority, on a 
non-delegable basis, to ensure that the system may be 
restructured as intended by the DNI without unnecessarily 
wasting resources. Fourth, the DNI is required to establish a 
revised current Baseline Estimate for the major system based 
upon an updated cost estimate. This revised current Baseline 
Estimate for the affected major system will be used to 
calculate future breaches of the significant or critical cost 
growth thresholds. Finally, the DNI is required to conduct 
regular reviews of major systems that have experienced a 
critical cost growth breach.
            Actions if a Major System Is Terminated
    If the DNI decides to terminate a major system, the DNI is 
required to submit a brief report to Congress that explains the 
reasons for the termination, the alternatives considered to 
address the problems with the major system, and the course the 
DNI plans to pursue to meet any intelligence requirements 
otherwise intended to be met by the terminated major system.
            Waiver
    The Department of Defense major defense acquisition process 
provides for a waiver of the Selected Acquisition Report 
requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2432 and other Nunn-McCurdy 
requirements when 90 percent of the items to be delivered to 
the United States (90 percent of planned expenditures) have 
been made under a major defense acquisition program. The DNI 
requested that a similar 90 percent waiver provision be added 
to Section 506F.
    The Committee agreed to a somewhat more limited waiver 
provision. Under subsection (f), the DNI may waive certain 
specified requirements in Sections 506E and 506F (e.g., the 
prohibition on obligation of funds, the presumption of 
termination) if the DNI determines that at least 90 percent of 
the amount of the current Baseline Estimate for the major 
system has been expended. If the DNI exercises this authority, 
the DNI is required to provide a written notification to the 
congressional intelligence committees that includes the basic 
information required for a Major System Congressional Report 
under Section 506E(f).
    If the DNI grants the 90-percent waiver, the program 
manager is still required to submit quarterly major system cost 
reports on such major system to the DNI. If the major system 
cost report reveals a significant or critical cost growth 
breach, then the DNI must submit the additional written notice 
required by subsection (f)(2)(A) to the congressional 
intelligence committees. This notification process will 
facilitate Congress monitoring closely any waived major system 
that experiences a significant or critical cost growth breach 
during the last 10 percent of its estimated acquisition cost. 
It also creates an incentive for program managers to ensure 
that cost growth is minimized during the entire procurement of 
a major system.
    Section 324 is based on Section 324 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
had no comparable provision.

Section 325. Future budget projections

    Section 325 adds a new Section 506G to the National 
Security Act of 1947. It requires the DNI, with the concurrence 
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to provide the 
congressional intelligence committees with two future budget 
projections that together span ten years. Section 325 thus 
ensures that the Intelligence Community will make long-term 
budgetary projections that span the same time frame as the 
funding needs of programs it initiates in the budget.
    Section 325 requires first a Future Year Intelligence Plan 
for at least four years after the budget year, which includes 
the year-by-year funding plan for each expenditure center and 
for each major system in the National Intelligence Program. 
Section 325 also requires lifecycle cost and milestones for 
major systems and a Long-term Budget Projection five years 
beyond the Future Year Intelligence Plan, but at a much higher 
level of budget aggregation. Section 325 requires that the 
Long-term Budget Projection include a description of whether, 
and to what extent, the projection for each year for each 
element of the Intelligence Community exceeds the level that 
would result from applying the most recent OMB inflation 
estimate to that element. Both budget projections must be 
submitted to Congress with the President's budget request.
    Section 325 ensures that the Executive branch and Congress 
will be fully aware of the long-term budgetary impact of a 
major system acquisition prior to its development or 
production. This is achieved through a requirement for a major 
system affordability report. This report will assess whether, 
and to what extent, a new acquisition, if developed, procured, 
and operated, would cause an increase in the most recent Future 
Year Intelligence Plan and Long-term Budget Projection. The 
affordability report is required before the time that the 
President submits to Congress the budget for the first fiscal 
year in which appropriated funds are anticipated to be 
obligated for the development or procurement of the system. 
This affordability report will be updated whenever an 
independent cost estimate must be updated. Section 325 is based 
on Section 325 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had no comparable 
provision.

Section 326. National Intelligence Program funded acquisitions

    Section 326 adds a new subparagraph (4) to the acquisition 
authorities of the DNI collected in Section 102A(n) of the 
National Security Act of 1947. Existing subparagraph (1) 
authorizes the DNI to exercise the acquisition and 
appropriations authorities referred to in the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (CIA Act). Although 
subparagraph (1) is not explicit, those authorities are found 
in Sections 3 and 8 of the CIA Act, except, as provided in 
subparagraph (1), for the CIA's authority under section 8(b) to 
expend funds without regard to laws and regulations on 
Government expenditures for objects of a confidential, 
extraordinary, or emergency nature.
    Subparagraph (4)(A) authorizes the DNI to make acquisition 
authority referred to in Sections 3 and 8(a) of the CIA Act 
also available to any Intelligence Community element for an 
acquisition that is funded in whole or in majority part by the 
National Intelligence Program. Among Intelligence Community 
elements, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) already exercise 
these or similar authorities either directly or through the 
CIA. The grant of this authority to the DNI is part of an 
effort to ensure that the DNI has the ability to manage the 
elements of the Intelligence Community as a community by 
enabling the DNI to make available throughout the Intelligence 
Community, when warranted, authority originally enacted for one 
of its elements.
    Subparagraphs 4(B)-(G) establish procedures and controls on 
the grant of this authority. The head of an Intelligence 
Community element, without delegation, must request in writing 
that the DNI make the authority available. The request must 
explain the need for the acquisition authority, including an 
explanation why other authorities are insufficient and a 
certification that the mission of the element would be impaired 
if the requested authority is not exercised. In turn, for the 
authority to be provided, the DNI, the Principal Deputy DNI, or 
a designated Deputy DNI must issue a written authorization that 
includes a justification supporting the use of the authority.
    Requests from the head of an Intelligence Community element 
that are within the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland 
Security, Justice, State, and Treasury shall be transmitted to 
the DNI in accordance with procedures established by the heads 
of those departments. Also, to ensure periodic review, 
authorities may not be granted for a class of acquisitions 
beyond a renewable 3 years, except for a renewable 6 years if 
the DNI personally approves the authority. The congressional 
intelligence committees shall be notified of all authorizations 
granted under subparagraph (4).
    Section 326 is similar to Section 326 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
had no comparable provision.

        Subtitle D--Congressional Oversight, Plans, and Reports


Section 331. Notification procedures

    Section 331 amends requirements concerning congressional 
oversight in Sections 501-503 of the National Security Act of 
1947. It is based on Section 321 of H.R. 2701 and Sections 331-
334 of S. 1494.
    Section 501(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 
provides that the President and the congressional intelligence 
committees shall each establish such procedures as are 
necessary to carry out the accountability provisions of Title V 
of that Act, which include the requirements for reporting on 
intelligence activities and covert actions. Section 331(a) 
amends Section 501(c) to clarify that the procedures required 
by subsection (c) be written procedures.
    Section 331(b) amends Section 502(a)(2) of the National 
Security Act to specify that the requirement to provide the 
congressional intelligence committees with any information or 
material concerning activities other than covert actions 
includes the legal basis under which the significant 
intelligence activity is being or was conducted. A similar 
amendment is made by Section 331(c) to Section 503(b)(2) with 
respect to covert action. In addition, Section 331(c) 
specifies, in an amendment to Section 503(c), that any covert 
action finding shall be reported in writing and that the 
President shall also provide in writing the reasons for any 
limited access to a finding or notice of significant change in 
a finding.
    Section 331(c) also sets forth, as an amendment to Section 
503(d), six factors that the President shall consider, among 
other relevant factors, in determining whether an activity 
constitutes a ``significant undertaking'' for which an 
additional congressional notification is required. These 
factors include: significant risk of loss of life; expansion of 
existing authorities; the expenditure of significant funds or 
other resources; notification under Section 504, pertaining to 
funding of intelligence activities; significant risk of 
disclosure of intelligence sources or methods; or a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of serious risk of damage to diplomatic 
relations if such activity were disclosed without 
authorization. Finally, Section 331(c) also adds a new 
subsection (g) to Section 503 to require the President to 
maintain a record of the Members of Congress to whom a limited 
access finding--or notice of significant change in a previously 
approved covert action or in any significant undertaking 
pursuant to a previously approved finding--was reported and the 
date on which each such Member receives such a finding or 
notice. The President must also maintain the written statement 
required to be made of the reasons for not notifying all 
Members of the intelligence committees of such a finding or 
notice.
    Over the years that the intelligence committees have 
engaged in oversight of the Intelligence Community, many 
elements of the process for notifying Congress concerning 
intelligence activities, including covert actions, have emerged 
from practice that reflects a sense of comity between the two 
branches and a shared sense of responsibility for national 
security matters.
    There have nonetheless been serious disputes over the 
implementation of these practices--and over the meaning of the 
provisions on which they are based--with respect to 
notification regarding certain intelligence activities. The 
modifications to the notification provisions adopted in this 
section are intended to clarify and improve certain specific 
and important elements of this practice, but should not be 
construed to be anything more than specific requirements that 
procedures, findings, and reasons be in writing, and 
information on legality be provided. The modifications 
contained in this section do not alter the fundamental compact 
between the Executive and Legislative branches with respect to 
national security oversight. Moreover, nothing in these 
provisions is intended to infringe on the President's 
constitutional authority in this area or on the constitutional 
authority of Congress to conduct oversight of U.S. intelligence 
activities.

Section 332. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements

    Section 332 requires the head of each element of the 
Intelligence Community to submit a certification on an annual 
basis that the element is in full compliance with Title V of 
the National Security Act of 1947, which requires that the 
congressional intelligence committees be kept fully and 
currently informed of intelligence activities. The head of each 
element of the IntelligenceCommunity must also certify that any 
information required to be submitted to the congressional intelligence 
committees has been submitted. The first certification shall be 
submitted within 90 days of enactment of the Act.
    If the head of an element is unable to submit the 
certification required by this section, the section requires an 
explanation as to why the certification cannot be made, a 
description of information required to be submitted, and an 
affirmation that the head of the element will submit such 
information as soon as possible.
    Section 332 is based on Section 336 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
did not have a comparable provision.

Section 333. Report on detention and interrogation activities

    Section 333 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, to provide the 
congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on 
five matters by December 1, 2010. The report may be submitted 
in classified form.
    Pursuant to subsection (a)(1), the report shall contain the 
policies and procedures of the United States Government 
governing participation by an element of the Intelligence 
Community in the interrogation of individuals detained by the 
United States who are suspected of international terrorism with 
the objective, in whole or in part, of acquiring national 
intelligence. This reporting requirement applies to policies 
and procedures and is not intended to require a description of 
interrogations on a detainee-by-detainee basis. However, with 
respect to policies and procedures, the report is intended to 
be comprehensive. It includes not only interrogation directly 
by an element of the Intelligence Community (a term that 
includes the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the 
intelligence elements of the FBI) but also interrogation 
undertaken with the support of an element of the Intelligence 
Community or by any interagency body established to carry out 
interrogation.
    The report shall include, in accordance with subsection 
(a)(2), the policies and procedures of the United States 
Government for any detention by an individual suspected of 
international terrorism by the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Section 4(a) of Executive Order 13491 (74 Fed. Reg. 4893) 
directed the CIA to close any detention facility that it 
operated at the time of the issuance of the order, on January 
22, 2009, and not to operate any such detention facility in the 
future. However, Section 2(g) of the Executive Order defined 
``detention facility'' as not referring ``to facilities used 
only to hold people on a short-term, transitory basis.'' The 
report required by subsection (a)(1)(B) does not distinguish 
between long-term and short-term detention, but embraces all 
detention of individuals suspected of international terrorism 
by the CIA.
    Pursuant to subsection (a)(3), the comprehensive report 
shall describe the legal basis of the interrogation and 
detention policies and procedures described in subsection 
(a)(1) and (a)(2). This should include the legal basis of such 
policies and procedures under applicable statutes, 
international agreements, and Executive orders.
    In August 2009, the Special Task Force on Interrogation and 
Transfer Policies established by Executive Order 13491 (74 Fed. 
Reg. 4893) recommended that the United States form a 
specialized interagency interrogation group that would 
coordinate the deployment of experienced, interagency 
interrogation teams, develop a set of best interrogation 
practices for training purposes, and establish a program of 
scientific research on interrogation approaches and techniques. 
Under subsection (a)(4) of Section 333, the report should 
describe the actions taken to implement these recommendations 
of the Special Task Force concerning research relating to 
interrogation practices and training on interrogation in the 
Intelligence Community.
    Finally, pursuant to subsection (a)(5), the report should 
describe any actions taken to implement the section of the 
Detainee Treatment Act that provides for the protection against 
civil or criminal liability, as well as counsel fees and other 
expenses, for U.S. Government personnel who had engaged in 
officially authorized interrogations that were determined to be 
lawful at the time.
    Section 333(b) provides to the extent that the report 
required by Section 333 addresses an element of the 
Intelligence Community within the Department of Defense or the 
Department of Justice, that portion of the report must also be 
submitted to the congressional armed services committees or the 
congressional judiciary committees.
    Section 333(c) requires the DNI to provide the appropriate 
committees of Congress with any significant modification or 
revision of the charter and procedures for the specialized 
interagency interrogation group, known as the ``High-Value 
Detainee Interrogation Group'' (HIG), within 30 days after 
their approval. Section 333(c) also requires the DNI to submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting 
forth an analysis and assessment of the lessons learned as a 
result of the operations and activities of the HIG within 60 
days of enactment of this Act. The appropriate committees of 
Congress are the appropriations, armed services, judiciary, 
homeland security and intelligence committees. The requirement 
of reporting to the appropriations, armed services, judiciary, 
and homeland security committees as well as to the 
congressional intelligence committees is intended to conform to 
the provision of the Senate-passed supplemental appropriations 
measure requiring that updates of the HIG charter, HIG 
procedures, and the lessons learned report be provided to those 
committees. This reporting is subject to the requirement, also 
in subsection (b), that it be consistent with the protection of 
sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The reporting 
provisions of Section 333(c), which have been reviewed with the 
ODNI, are the only provisions of the bill that have been 
modified, for other than technical corrections, following the 
OMB letter of June 10.
    Section 333(d) clarifies that any submission required under 
Section 333 may be submitted in classified form.
    Section 333 merges Section 336 of S. 1494 with Section 352 
of H.R. 2701. Several of the specific report matters identified 
in Sections 352 and 358 of H.R. 2701 may be addressed in 
response to the requirement for a report on policies and 
procedures in Section 334. H.R. 2701 also included a number of 
additional provisions governing the operation and conduct of 
interrogation activities. Before taking action on legislation 
that would change the law on interrogations, the Committee 
decided it was important to receive information on the new 
system of detainee detention and interrogation that will be 
described in the report. The Committee therefore decided not to 
attempt to address the operation and conduct of interrogation 
activities in this bill. The following sections from H.R. 2701 
are thus not included in this bill: Section 412, prohibition on 
the use of private contractors for interrogations involving 
persons in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency; 
Section 416, requirement for video recording of interrogations 
of persons in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency; 
and Section 504, prohibition on use of funds to provide Miranda 
warnings to certain persons outside of the United States.

Section 334. Assessments on national security threat posed by 
        Guantanamo Bay detainees

    Section 334 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees the written threat analyses prepared on 
each Guantanamo Bay detainee by the Guantanamo Task Force 
established pursuant to Executive Order 13492. It also requires 
the DNI to provide the congressional intelligence committees 
with any new threat assessment prepared by any element of the 
intelligence community of a Guantanamo Bay detainee who remains 
in detention or is pending release or transfer. In both cases, 
the DNI is also required to provide the congressional 
intelligence committees with access to the intelligence 
information that formed the basis of such threat analyses and 
assessments. It is not the intent of the Committee that the DNI 
create new assessments specifically to meet the reporting 
requirements under this section.
    Section 334 is based on Section 337 of S. 1494 and Section 
367 of H.R. 2701.

Section 335. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism 
        of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
        Bay, Cuba

    Section 335 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Director of the CIA and the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), to make publicly available an 
unclassified summary of intelligence relating to recidivism of 
detainees currently or formerly held by the Department of 
Defense at the United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay and 
an assessmentof the likelihood that such detainees will engage 
in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. 
The unclassified summary must be made available 60 days after the 
enactment of the Act.
    Section 335 is based on Section 350 of S. 1494 and Section 
351 of H.R. 2701. Section 335 extends to 60 days the amount of 
time provided to the DNI to make the unclassified summary 
publicly available, rather than the 30 days provided in Section 
350 of H.R. 2701.

Section 336. Report and strategic plan on biological weapons

    Section 336 provides for a report by the DNI on the 
intelligence collection efforts of the United States against 
biological weapons or the threat of biological weapons in the 
hands of terrorists, rogue states, or other actors, both 
foreign and domestic. The report also must describe 
intelligence collection efforts to protect the United States 
bio-defense knowledge and infrastructure.
    The report required by Section 336 must include the 
following elements: (1) an accurate assessment of the 
intelligence collection efforts of the United States dedicated 
to detecting the development or use of biological weapons by 
state, non-state, or rogue actors, either foreign or domestic; 
(2) detailed information on fiscal, human, technical, open 
source, and other intelligence collection resources of the 
United States for use against biological weapons; and (3) an 
assessment of any problems that may reduce the overall 
effectiveness of United States intelligence collection and 
analysis to identify and protect biological weapons targets, 
including intelligence collection gaps or inefficiencies, 
inadequate information sharing practices, or inadequate 
cooperation among agencies or departments of the United States.
    Additionally, Section 336 provides that this report include 
a strategic plan prepared by the DNI, in coordination with the 
Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of 
Homeland Security, that provides for a coordinated action plan 
for the Intelligence Community to address and close the gaps 
identified in the report. This strategic plan shall also 
include a description of appropriate goals, schedules, 
milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term effectiveness 
of the plan and any long-term resource and human capital issues 
related to the collection of intelligence against biological 
weapons or the threat of biological weapons. The report shall 
also include any recommendation to address shortfalls of 
experienced and qualified staff possessing relevant scientific, 
language, and technical skills.
    Section 336 requires that the DNI submit this report to the 
congressional intelligence committees no later than 180 days 
after the enactment of this bill. The DNI is required to begin 
implementing the strategic plan within 30 days of submitting 
the report.
    Section 336 is identical to Section 339 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 337. Cybersecurity oversight

    Section 337 sets forth a preliminary framework for 
executive and congressional oversight to ensure that the 
government's national cybersecurity mission is consistent with 
legal authorities and preserves reasonable expectations of 
privacy. Section 337 also requires an Inspector General report 
on the sharing of cyber threat information and a plan for 
recruiting, retaining, and training an Intelligence Community 
workforce to secure the networks of the Intelligence Community. 
Finally, Section 337 requires annual reports from the DNI on 
guidelines and legislation to improve the cybersecurity of the 
United States.
    Section 337(h) defines three terms: national cyber 
investigative joint task force, critical infrastructure, and 
cybersecurity program. The definition of the term 
``cybersecurity program'' in Section 337(h) is intentionally a 
narrow one. The definition of cybersecurity programs in this 
section intentionally excludes firewalls, anti-virus programs, 
and other routine programs. Likewise, by requiring a class or 
collection of similar cybersecurity operations, the definition 
of cybersecurity programs intentionally excludes individual 
cyber operations or cyber information-sharing conducted in a 
non-programmatic fashion, such as the sharing of a piece of 
information for a particular cybersecurity, foreign 
intelligence, or national security investigation.
    Section 337 instead focuses on multi-agency cybersecurity 
programs in which large amounts of information are 
characterized, screened, or inspected for the purpose of 
protecting government networks. These programs use more 
effective technologies to integrate cyber defenses among 
government entities that wish to, or are directed to, 
participate. These types of programs pose challenging new legal 
and privacy questions that make congressional and Executive 
branch oversight particularly important. Because the section 
seeks to provide a framework of oversight of only those 
programs that involve significant potential privacy 
implications, the term ``cybersecurity program'' is also 
limited by the requirement that the programs involve personally 
identifiable data.
    Section 337(a) requires the President to notify Congress of 
cybersecurity programs and provide Congress with five types of 
information or documents: the program's legal basis; any 
certifications of the program's legality under 18 U.S.C. 
2511(2)(a)(ii) or other statutory provision; any concept of 
operations; any privacy impact statement; and any plan for 
independent audit or review of the program to be carried out by 
the head of the relevant department or agency, in conjunction 
with the appropriate inspector general. The notification 
requirements of subsection (a) are designed to ensure that 
Congress is aware of significant legal, privacy and operational 
issues with respect to each new cybersecurity program.
    The Department of Justice has expressed concern about 
providing to Congress any certifications of the legality of a 
cybersecurity program under Section 2511(2)(a)(ii) of Title 18 
of the United States Code--certifications which serve to 
insulate from litigation providers of wire or electronic 
communication who provide information to the government--on the 
basis that those types of certifications are not routinely 
provided to Congress. Because of the broad scope of possible 
operations under cybersecurity programs as defined by this 
section, however, the Committee believe that a certification 
under Section 2511(2)(a)(ii) prepared for a cybersecurity 
program would be different than a certification provided in 
other current investigations and law enforcement activities. 
Rather than assessing the legality of a single instance of 
providing information to the government, any certification for 
a ``cybersecurity program'' would have to address the legality 
of the program as a whole. A certification for a cybersecurity 
program therefore has the potential to authorize providers of 
wire or electronic communication to provide significant 
assistance to the government, without fear of litigation. Given 
the potential impact of any certification, the Committee 
believes that significant congressional oversight is warranted.
    For existing cybersecurity programs, the notification and 
documents must be provided no later than 30 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act. For new programs, the 
notification and documents must be provided not later than 30 
days after the date of the commencement of operations of a new 
cybersecurity program.
    Section 337(b) requires the heads of agencies or 
departments with responsibility for a cybersecurity program, in 
conjunction with the inspector general for that department or 
agency, to prepare a report describing the results of any audit 
or review under the audit plan and assessing whether the 
cybersecurity program is in compliance with, and adequately 
described by, the documents submitted to Congress. This 
subsection is designed to provide an independent check that the 
agencies are conducting cyber operations in a manner consistent 
with Executive branch guidance and to supply Congress more 
information about the operation of those programs. In addition, 
these reports should help identify the key difficulties and 
challenges in the cybersecurity programs.
    Section 337(c) requires the inspectors general of the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Community 
to prepare a report on the sharing of cyber threat information 
both within the U.S. government and with those responsible for 
critical infrastructure. This report should be submitted one 
year after the enactment of this Act. In their report, the 
inspectors general should identify any barriers to sharing 
cyber threat and vulnerability information and assess the 
effectiveness of current sharing arrangements.
    Section 337(d) provides the head of an element of the 
Intelligence Community the authority to detail an officer or 
employee to the Department of Homeland Security or the National 
Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force to assist with 
cybersecurity for a period not to exceed three years. This 
section will allow Intelligence Community experts to be made 
available to the Department of Homeland Security, which serves 
as the civilian cyber defense manager but where funding for 
cyber security has not been given the same level of priority as 
the Intelligence Community. In recognition of the intelligence 
committees' ample support for cyber over the last few years, 
the provision permits these details to be provided on a 
nonreimbursable basis. Thisdetail authority, however, is 
restricted to a period not to exceed three years to prevent details 
from being used as an alternative to building expertise at civilian 
cyber defense agencies.
    Section 337(e) requires an additional plan from the DNI for 
recruiting, retaining, and training an adequate cybersecurity 
workforce, including an assessment of the capabilities of the 
current workforce, an assessment of the benefits of outreach 
and training with private industry and academic institutions, 
and an examination of best practices for making the 
Intelligence Community workforce aware of cybersecurity best 
practices and principles.
    Section 337(f) requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
Attorney General, the Director of the NSA, the White House 
Cybersecurity Coordinator, and any other officials the DNI 
considers appropriate, to submit three annual reports 
containing guidelines or legislative proposals to improve the 
capabilities of the Intelligence Community and law enforcement 
agencies to protect the cybersecurity of the United States. The 
report shall include guidelines or recommendations on: 
improving the intelligence community's ability to detect 
hostile actions; the need for data retention requirements; 
improving the ability of the intelligence community to 
anticipate nontraditional targets; and the adequacy of existing 
criminal statutes to successfully deter cyber attacks.
    Finally, Section 337(g) provides that the requirements of 
subsections (a) through (e) will terminate on December 31, 
2013. During the next three years, the Executive branch will 
begin new and unprecedented cybersecurity programs with new 
technology and new legal and privacy challenges. Section 337 
will allow Congress to follow these developments closely and 
gain a deeper and broader understanding of cybersecurity issues 
so that, upon the termination of this section, it may be 
replaced with a permanent framework for oversight.
    Section 337 is based on Section 340 of S. 1494 and Section 
356, Section 360D, Section 360F, and Section 507 of H.R. 2701.

Section 338. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
        community

    Section 338 requires the DNI to report on the Intelligence 
Community's proficiency in foreign languages within one year 
after the date of enactment of the Act, and then biennially for 
four years. The report should include information on: the 
number of positions within the Intelligence Community that 
require foreign language proficiency; foreign language 
training; the number of personnel hired with such proficiency; 
and efforts to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel who 
are proficient in a foreign language. The section requires 
detailed reporting for each foreign language. In addition, the 
report should include identification of critical gaps in 
foreign language proficiency and recommendations for 
eliminating such gaps.
    Section 338 is identical to Section 334 of H.R. 2701. S. 
1494 did not have a comparable provision.

Section 339. Report on plans to increase diversity within the 
        intelligence community

    Section 339 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
heads of the elements of the Intelligence Community to submit a 
report on the plans of each element to increase diversity 
within the Intelligence Community.
    This report must include specific plans: to achieve the 
goals articulated in the DNI's strategic plan on equal 
opportunity and diversity; plans and initiatives to increase 
recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; specific plans and 
initiatives to improve retention of diverse federal employees; 
a description of specific diversity awareness training and 
education programs; and a description of performance metrics to 
measure the success in carrying out the plans, initiatives, and 
programs. The report is due not later than a year after the 
enactment of the Act.
    To carry out its mission most effectively, the Intelligence 
Community needs personnel that look and speak like the citizens 
of the countries in which it operates. In the past, the 
Intelligence Community has not properly focused on hiring a 
diverse workforce, and the capabilities of the Intelligence 
Community have suffered. The Intelligence Community must be 
deliberate and work hard to hire a diverse workforce that 
improves its operational capabilities and effectiveness.
    Section 339 is similar to Section 353 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
had no comparable provision.

Section 340. Report on intelligence community contractors

    Section 340 requires the DNI to provide a report on the use 
of personal services contracts in the Intelligence Community, 
including the impact of such contracts on the Intelligence 
Community workforce, plans for conversion of contractor 
employment into Federal Government employment, and 
accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such 
contractors. This report is seeking information on core 
contractor personnel, those independent contractors or 
individuals employed by industrial contractors who augment 
civilian and military personnel by providing direct support to 
Intelligence Community elements. The report should not include 
information on commodity contractors, such as those who work on 
the production or delivery of end-use items, or commercial 
contractors, such as those who provide services to Intelligence 
Community facilities.
    The report required by Section 340 must include the 
following: a description of any relevant regulation or guidance 
relating to the minimum standards for contract personnel and 
how those standards differ from those for Federal Government 
employees; an identification of contracts where the contractor 
is performing substantially similar functions to a Federal 
Government employee, as well as an estimate of the number of 
such contracts; an assessment of the costs incurred or saved by 
the use of contracts; an assessment of the appropriateness of 
using contractors to perform the activities; a comparison 
between contractor and Federal employee compensation; an 
analysis of Federal Government attrition; a description of the 
positions that will be converted to Federal employment; an 
analysis of the oversight and accountability mechanisms and 
procedures applicable to personal service contracts; and an 
identification of best practices for oversight and 
accountability. The report must be submitted by February 1, 
2011.
    Section 340 is identical to Section 338 of H.R. 2701. S. 
1494 had no comparable provision. The comprehensive report is 
intended to provide the congressional intelligence committees 
information about the Intelligence Community's large contractor 
work force, to aid in conducting oversight of these contracts 
and to assist in devising any appropriate policy solutions.

Section 341. Study on electronic waste destruction practices of the 
        intelligence community

    Section 341 requires the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community to conduct a study on the electronic 
waste destruction practices of the Intelligence Community and 
report the results of the study to the congressional 
intelligence committees not later than one year after the 
enactment of this Act. The study should assess the both the 
security of the Intelligence Community's electronic waste 
disposal practices and the environmental impact of those 
practices. It should also propose methods to improve both the 
security and environmental impact of those disposal practices.
    Section 341 is identical to Section 344 of H.R. 2701. S. 
1494 had no comparable provision.

Section 342. Review of records relating to potential health risks among 
        Desert Storm veterans

    Section 342 requires the Director of the CIA to conduct a 
classification review of CIA records relevant to known or 
potential health effects suffered by veterans of Operation 
Desert Storm. Those health effects were described in a November 
2008 report by the Department of Veterans Affairs Research 
Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans Illnesses. Section 342 
also requires the Director of the CIA to report to Congress the 
results of the classification review, including the total 
number of CIA records determined to be relevant, within a year 
after enactment of the Act. To the extent that a classification 
review for a relevant set of records has already been conducted 
according to current classifications standards, the Director 
should report this to Congress with information concerning the 
review and the location of such records.
    Section 342 is identical to Section 348 of H.R. 2701. S. 
1494 had no comparable provision.

Section 343. Review of Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of 
        enforcement jurisdiction in foreign nations

    Section 343 requires the Director of the FBI, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, to conduct a review 
of constraints under international law and the laws of foreign 
nations to the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction with 
respect to criminal investigations of terrorism offenses under 
U.S. law. Such review should look specifically at 
investigations conducted by FBI agents using funds made 
available by the National Intelligence Program.
    Section 343 is based on Section 354 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
had no similar provision. Section 354 of H.R. 2701 required the 
Director of the FBI to submit the report within sixty days 
after enactment of the Act. Section 343 extends this time frame 
to require submission of the report to the appropriate 
congressional committees within 120 days of enactment of the 
Act.

Section 344. Public release of information on procedures used in 
        narcotics airbridge denial program in Peru

    Section 344 requires the Director of the CIA to make 
publicly available within 30 days an unclassified version of 
the CIA Inspector General report entitled ``Procedures Used in 
Narcotics Airbridge Denial Program in Peru, 1995-2001,'' dated 
August 25, 2008. In releasing such report, the Director may 
declassify and release any additional information he deems 
appropriate related to the narcotics airbridge denial program 
and its subsequent investigation. Section 344 is identical to 
Section 355 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 had no comparable provision.

Section 345. Report on threat from dirty bombs

    Section 345 requires the DNI, in consultation with the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to submit a report summarizing 
intelligence relating to the threat to the United States from 
weapons using radiological materials. The report must be 
submitted within 180 days after the enactment of the Act.
    Section 345 is identical to Section 360B of H.R. 2701. S. 
1494 had no similar provision.

Section 346. Report on creation of space intelligence office

    Section 346 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a report 
on the feasibility and advisability of creating a national 
space intelligence office to manage space-related intelligence 
assets and access to such assets. This report must be submitted 
within 60 days after the enactment of the Act.
    Section 346 is based on Section 360E of H.R. 2701. Section 
410 of S. 1494 had proposed establishing a National Space 
Intelligence Office and had described the mission of the 
Office. Although the Committee followed the House on this 
provision, there is significant interest in establishing a 
National Space Intelligence Office in the future. The Committee 
therefore expects that, if the DNI determines the creation of a 
national space intelligence office to be feasible and 
advisable, the report required by Section 346 will describe how 
such an Office would be established, including a description of 
the proposed organizational structure of the Office and the 
manner in which it would be staffed.

Section 347. Report on attempt to detonate explosive device on 
        Northwest Airlines flight 253

    Section 347 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a report 
on the attempt to detonate an explosive device aboard Northwest 
Airlines flight number 253 on December 25, 2009. This report 
should describe any failures to share or analyze intelligence 
or information and the measures the Intelligence Community has 
taken to prevent such failures in the future. In the report, 
the DNI should describe the roles and responsibilities of 
various elements of the Intelligence Community to synchronize 
and analyze terrorism information; assess the technological 
capabilities of the Federal Government to assess terrorist 
threats; describe watchlisting training and procedures; 
describe the steps the Intelligence Community has taken to 
improve its tradecraft and processes; and assess how to meet 
the challenge of exploiting the ever-increasing volume of 
information available to the Intelligence Community. In 
addition, the DNI should provide any legislative 
recommendations deemed appropriate to improve the sharing of 
intelligence relating to terrorists. The report must be 
submitted no later than 180 days after enactment of this Act.
    Section 347 is based on Section 360L of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
had no comparable provision. The Committee has conducted an 
inquiry into the attempted December 25, 2009, terrorist attack 
and has issued a report, S. Rep. No. 111-199 (2010). Section 
347 therefore asks the DNI to provide a description of steps 
taken to respond to any findings and recommendations provided 
to the DNI from any review by the congressional intelligence 
committees in addition to providing the information requested 
by Section 360L of H.R. 2701.

Section 348. Repeal or modification of reporting requirements

    The congressional intelligence committees frequently 
request information from the Intelligence Community in the form 
of reports, the contents of which are specifically defined by 
statute. The reports prepared pursuant to these statutory 
requirements provide the committees with an invaluable source 
of information about specific matters of concern.
    The Committee recognizes, however, that congressional 
reporting requirements, particularly recurring reporting 
requirements, can place a significant burden on the resources 
of the Intelligence Community. It is therefore important for 
the Congress to reconsider these reporting requirements on a 
periodic basis to ensure that the reports it has requested are 
the best mechanism for the Congress to receive the information 
it seeks. In some cases, annual reports can be replaced with 
briefings or notifications that provide the Congress with more 
timely information and offer the Intelligence Community a 
direct line of communication to respond to congressional 
concerns.
    In response to a request from the DNI, the congressional 
intelligence committees examined some of these recurring 
reporting requirements. Section 348 eliminates certain reports 
that were particularly burdensome to the Intelligence Community 
in cases where the information in the reports could be obtained 
through other means. It also eliminates reports whose 
usefulness has diminished either because of changing events or 
because the information contained in those reports is 
duplicative of information already obtained through other 
avenues.
    Because the majority of recurring reports provide critical 
information relevant to the many challenges facing the 
Intelligence Community today, the Committee has proceeded 
carefully in eliminating only six statutory reporting 
requirements. In addition, the Committee changed the 
requirement of one report to make its submission biennial, 
rather than annual, and making another report annual, rather 
than a semiannual report. The Committee believes that reduction 
in the number of reporting requirements will help the 
Intelligence Community to allocate its resources properly 
towards areas of greatest congressional concern.
    The Committee recognizes the concern expressed by the 
Intelligence Community about the impact of reporting 
requirements. The Committee suggests that the ODNI submit, even 
in advance of the Administration's formal requests for 
legislation, facts (including the cost of preparing particular 
reports and the use of contract personnel, if any, to prepare 
reports) and proposals (including the possible consolidation of 
reports and lengthening the intervals between them) that will 
enable a fuller evaluation of alternatives for providing 
information to Congress. Also, for reports that by law are 
unclassified, the Committee requests that the ODNI advise the 
congressional intelligence committees about any system that is 
in place, or should be put in place, for their public 
dissemination.
    Section 348 is based on Section 341 of S. 1494 and Section 
360M of H.R. 2701.

Section 349. Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 349 incorporates into the Act by reference each 
requirement contained in the classified annex to this Act to 
submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees. 
Section 349 is based on Section 360N of H.R. 2701. Because the 
classified information in the annex cannot be included in the 
text of the bill, incorporating the reporting provisions of the 
classified annex is the only available mechanism to give these 
reporting requirements the force of law. The Committee 
therefore chose to include Section 349 to reflect the 
importance they ascribe to the reporting requirements in the 
classified annex.

Section 350. Conforming amendments for report submission dates

    Section 350 contains conforming amendments to the National 
Security Act made necessary by this Act.

                       Subtitle E--Other Matters


Section 361. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt 
        and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations

    Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires that certain federal 
``employees''--a term that generally applies to all 
Intelligence Community officials and personnel and certain 
contract personnel, spouses, dependents, and others--file 
reports with their employing agency regarding receipt of gifts 
or decorations from foreign governments. Following compilation 
of these reports, the employing agency is required to file 
annually with the Secretary of State detailed information about 
the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations by its employees, 
including the source of the gift. The Secretary of State is 
required to publish a comprehensive list of the agency reports 
in the Federal Register.
    With respect to Intelligence Community activities, public 
disclosure of gifts or decorations in the Federal Register has 
the potential to compromise intelligence sources (e.g., 
confirmation of an intelligence relationship with a foreign 
government) and could undermine national security. Recognizing 
this concern, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was 
granted a limited exemption from reporting certain information 
about such foreign gifts or decorations where the publication 
of the information could adversely affect United States 
intelligence sources. Section 1079 of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-458) 
extended a similar exemption to the DNI in addition to applying 
the existing exemption to the CIA Director.
    Section 361 provides to the heads of each Intelligence 
Community element the same limited exemption from specified 
public reporting requirements that is currently authorized for 
the DNI and CIA Director. The national security concerns that 
prompt those exemptions apply equally to other Intelligence 
Community elements. Section 361 mandates that the information 
not provided to the Secretary of State be provided to the DNI, 
who is required to keep a record of such information, to ensure 
continued independent oversight of the receipt by Intelligence 
Community personnel of foreign gifts or decorations.
    Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between 
senior officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and 
their foreign counterparts should not be excluded under the 
provisions of Section 361 unless there is a serious concern 
that the public disclosure of such contacts or gifts would 
adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods.
    Section 361 is identical to Section 351 of S. 1494 and 
Section 363 of H.R. 2701.

Section 362. Modification of availability of funds for different 
        intelligence activities

    Section 362 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) 
(governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the 
text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the 
Intelligence Reform Act (governing the transfer and 
reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence funding).
    The amendment replaces the ``unforeseen requirements'' 
standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a more flexible standard 
to govern reprogrammings and transfers of funds authorized for 
a different intelligence or intelligence-related activity. 
Under the new standard, a reprogramming or transfer is 
authorized if, in addition to the other requirements of Section 
504(a)(3), the new use of funds would ``support an emergent 
need, improve program effectiveness, or increase efficiency.'' 
This modification brings the standard for reprogrammings or 
transfers of intelligence funding into conformity with the 
standards applicable to reprogrammings and transfers under 
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947. The 
modification preserves congressional oversight of proposed 
reprogrammings and transfers while enhancing the Intelligence 
Community's ability to carry out missions and functions vital 
to national security. Section 362 is identical to Section 352 
of S. 1494 and Section 361 of H.R. 2701.

Section 363. Protection of certain national security information

    Section 363 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties 
involving the disclosure of the identities of undercover 
intelligence officers and agents.
    Section 363(a) amends Section 601(a) to increase criminal 
penalties for an individual with authorized access to 
classified information who intentionally discloses any 
information identifying a covert agent, if the individual knows 
that the United States is taking affirmative measures to 
conceal the covert agent's intelligence relationship to the 
United States. Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure 
by someone who has had ``authorized access to classified 
information that identifies a covert agent'' is 10 years. 
Subsection (a)(1) of Section 364 of this Act increases that 
maximum sentence to 15 years.
    Currently, under Section 601(b) of the National Security 
Act of 1947, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who 
``as a result of having authorized access to classified 
information, learns of the identity of a covert agent'' is 5 
years. Subsection (a)(2) of Section 364 of this Act increases 
that maximum sentence to 10 years.
    Subsection (b) of Section 363 amends Section 603(a) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide 
that the annual report from the President on the protection of 
identities of certain United States undercover intelligence 
officers, agents, informants, and sources, also include an 
assessment of the need, if any, for modification to improve 
legal protections for covert agents. Section 363 is based on 
Section 354 of S. 1494 and Section 362 of H.R. 2701.

Section 364. National Intelligence Program budget

    Section 601(a) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53 (2007) (50 
U.S.C. 415c), requires the DNI to disclose the aggregate amount 
of funds appropriated by Congress for the National Intelligence 
Program for each fiscal year beginning with fiscal year 2007. 
Section 601(b) provides that the President may waive or 
postpone such disclosure if certain conditions are met, 
beginning with fiscal year 2009.
    Section 364 amends Section 601 of the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 to require 
additionally that, on the date that the President submits to 
Congress the annual budget request, the President shall 
disclose to the public the aggregate amount of appropriations 
requested for that fiscal year for the National Intelligence 
Program. Also, in addition to the President's authority under 
present law to waive or postpone disclosure at the end of the 
fiscal year, the Committee agreed to provide for presidential 
waiver authority related to the public disclosure by the 
President of the aggregate amount of funds requested by the 
President.
    Section 364 is based on Section 355 of S. 1494, except for 
the waiver provision that the Committee has added and the 
omission from Section 364 of the congressional findings in 
Section 355 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 365. Improving the review authority of the Public Interest 
        Declassification Board

    Section 365 clarifies that the Public Interest 
Declassification Board may conduct reviews in response to 
requests from the committee of jurisdiction or an individual 
member of such committee. It also clarifies that the Board may 
consider the proper classification level of records, rather 
than simply consider whether or not they should be classified. 
This authority is important to address questions of excessive 
compartmentation or other over-classification that may impede 
needed information sharing, adequate reviews within the 
Executive branch, or oversight by the Congress.
    Section 365 is identical to Section 356 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 366. Authority to designate undercover operations to collect 
        foreign intelligence or counterintelligence

    Various provisions in the United States Code preclude the 
government from conducting the following activities: (1) the 
deposit of funds in a financial institution; (2) the lease 
orpurchase of real property; (3) the establishment and operation of a 
proprietary business on a commercial basis; and (4) the utilization of 
proceeds of the operation to offset necessary and reasonable 
operational expenses. In recognition, however, of the important role 
such activities may play in the conduct of undercover operations, Pub. 
L. No. 102-395 (1992) (28 U.S.C. 533 note) provides a mechanism for the 
FBI to obtain an exemption from these otherwise applicable laws.
    Under Pub. L. No. 102-395, an exemption may be obtained if 
the proposed activity is certified by the Director of the FBI 
and the Attorney General as being necessary to the conduct of 
the undercover operation. For national security investigations, 
the Director of the FBI may delegate certifying authority to an 
Assistant Director in the Counterterrorism, 
Counterintelligence, or Cyber Divisions at the FBI, and the 
Attorney General may delegate such authority to the Assistant 
Attorney General for National Security at the Department of 
Justice.
    Section 366 amends the current delegation level for both 
the FBI and the Department of Justice. It allows the FBI 
Director to delegate certifying authority to a level not lower 
than a Deputy Assistant Director in the National Security 
Branch. It also allows the Attorney General to delegate the 
certifying authority to a level not lower than a Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General in the National Security Division. 
It should be noted that this delegation level for the 
Department of Justice remains at a higher level than that which 
is currently required in criminal undercover operations.
    The Committee is concerned that, because of both statutory 
and administrative limitations, the current delegation levels 
are insufficient to allow for timely processing of undercover 
exemptions. The success and safety of undercover operations can 
depend in part on the ability to do such simple tasks as open a 
bank account or rent an apartment for cover purposes in a 
timely manner. While the creation of the National Security 
Division at the Department of Justice has led to more efficient 
processing of some exemption requests, there remains room for 
improvement. The Committee believes that the new delegation 
levels established in Section 367 will encourage and facilitate 
further internal and administrative improvements in processing 
undercover exemptions both at the FBI and the Department of 
Justice, without sacrificing needed oversight within the FBI 
and Department of Justice.
    Section 366 is identical to Section 357 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 did contain a comparable provision.

Section 367. Security clearances: reports; reciprocity

    Section 367 requires a series of reports and audits on the 
security clearance process and measurement of improvements in 
the timeliness of security clearance process. The reports and 
audits required under this section are intended to provide 
Congress with metrics to evaluate the efficacy of the security 
clearance process.
    Subsection (a) of Section 367 amends Title V of the 
National Security Act of 1947 to add a new section 506H, 
requiring an audit and an annual report. Under new Section 
506H(a), the President must conduct an audit every four years 
of how the Executive branch determines whether a security 
clearance is required for a particular position in the Federal 
Government. This audit must be submitted to Congress within 30 
days of its completion.
    New Section 506H(b) requires an annual report on the number 
of employees and contractors within the Federal Government who 
held or were approved for security clearances; the amount of 
time taken for each element of the Intelligence Community to 
process security clearance determinations; the number of 
security clearance investigations that have remained open for 
extended period of time; and the results of security clearance 
investigation and determinations. The Committee intend for this 
requirement to cover all contractor employees, including those 
employed by commodity contractors and commercial contractors.
    Section 367(a)(2) requires a report on security clearance 
investigations and adjudication, to be submitted no later than 
180 days after the enactment of this Act. That report requires 
information on security clearance adjudication guidance and 
metrics, a plan to improve the professional development of 
security clearance adjudicator, metrics to evaluate the 
investigation quality and the effectiveness of interagency 
clearance reciprocity, and an assessment of the feasibility, 
counterintelligence risk, and cost effectiveness of reducing 
the number of agencies that conduct the investigation and 
adjudication of security clearances. The President may also 
consider the advisability of reducing the number of agencies 
involved in the investigation and adjudication of security 
clearances.
    Under Section 367(c), the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community must conduct an audit of the reciprocity 
of security clearances in the Intelligence Community. This 
audit will include an assessment of the time required to obtain 
reciprocal security clearance for an Intelligence Community 
employee or contractors detailed to, or seeking permanent 
employment with, another Intelligence Community element. This 
audit must be submitted to the congressional intelligence 
committees no later than 180 days after enactment of the Act.
    While the reports required by Section 367 focus on the 
security clearance process, the Committee recognizes that 
safeguarding national security information depends upon 
ensuring not only that new individuals successfully complete 
the security clearance process, but also that current holders 
of clearances receive appropriate and ongoing scrutiny for 
their continued fitness for access to classified information. 
The Committee encourages the DNI, in consultation with the 
Office of Personnel Management if necessary, to develop more 
effective methods for identifying, on a continual basis, 
current holders of security clearances within the Intelligence 
Community who may pose a security risk.
    Section 367 is based on Section 366 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
had no comparable provision. Section 366 of H.R. 2701 had also 
included a provision requiring the DNI to appoint an ombudsman 
for intelligence community security clearances, who would 
annually report to the congressional intelligence committees on 
the concerns, complaints and questions received from persons 
applying for security clearances.

Section 368. Correcting long-standing material weaknesses

    Section 368 requires the heads of the five intelligence 
agencies that have been specifically required to produce 
auditable financial statements (CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA) to 
designate each senior management official who is responsible 
for correcting long-standing, correctable material weaknesses, 
and to notify the DNI and the congressional intelligence 
committees of these designations.
    Under Section 368, the term ``material weakness'' has the 
meaning given that term under OMB Circular A-123, Management's 
Responsibility for Internal Control, revised December 21, 2004. 
In particular, ``[a] material weakness in internal controls is 
a reportable condition, or combination of reportable 
conditions, that results in more than a remote likelihood that 
a material misstatement of the financial statements, or other 
significant financial reports, will not be prevented or 
detected.''
    The Committee has been dissatisfied with the lack of 
progress in correcting material weaknesses. Section 368 is 
intended to ensure there is clear accountability about who is 
responsible for correcting these deficiencies.
    Section 368 pertains only to ``long-standing'' material 
weaknesses, defined as those that were identified in annual 
financial reports prior to fiscal year 2007. Also, Section 368 
pertains only to material weaknesses that are correctable in 
the near term--i.e., those where correction is not 
substantially dependent on a business information system that 
will not be fielded prior to the end of fiscal year 2010. The 
head of an element of the Intelligence Community may be 
designated as the responsible official.
    Section 368 also requires a senior intelligence management 
official to notify the head of the element of the Intelligence 
Community when a long-standing material weakness is corrected. 
The determination that the specified long-standing correctable 
material weakness has been corrected must be based on the 
findings of an independent review conducted by an independent 
auditor, who may be an auditor in the office of the agency's 
inspector general. The element head shall notify the 
congressional intelligence committees that the material 
weakness has been corrected.
    The Committee believes that this legislative step is 
necessary to establish clear accountability for correcting 
these long-standing correctable material weaknesses. Section 
368 is based on Section 358 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had no 
comparable provision.

Section 369. Intelligence community financial improvement and audit 
        readiness

    Section 369 requires the DNI to conduct a review of the 
status of auditability compliance of each element of the 
Intelligence Community and to develop a plan and timeline to 
achieve a full, unqualified audit of each element of the 
Intelligence Community by September 30, 2013. This review and 
development of a plan must be completed within 180 days after 
enactment of this Act.
    Section 369 is based on Section 368 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
had no comparable provision. The Committee has removed the 
sense of the Congress contained in Section 368 of H.R. 2701. 
Although Section 348 of this bill repeals an annual report on 
progress in auditable financial statements, the Committee 
expects to be informed of the status of the review required by 
Section 369, as well as the plan and timeline established to 
achieve full, unqualified audits.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence


Section 401. Accountability reviews by the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Section 401 provides that the DNI shall have new authority 
to conduct accountability reviews of elements within the 
Intelligence Community and the personnel of those elements. The 
primary innovation of this provision is the authority to 
conduct accountability reviews concerning an entire element of 
the Intelligence Community in relation to failures or 
deficiencies.
    This accountability process is intended to be separate and 
distinct from any accountability reviews being conducted 
internally by the elements of the Intelligence Community or 
their Inspectors General, and is not intended to limit the 
authorities of the DNI with respect to his supervision of the 
CIA.
    Section 401 requires that the DNI, in consultation with the 
Attorney General, formulate guidelines and procedures that will 
govern accountability reviews. The Committee envisions that 
these guidelines will govern the process by which the DNI can 
collect sufficient information from the Intelligence Community 
to assess accountability for a given incident.
    Any findings and recommendations for corrective or punitive 
action made by the DNI shall be provided to the head of the 
applicable element of the Intelligence Community. If the head 
of such element does not implement the recommendations, then 
the congressional intelligence committees must be notified and 
provided the reasons for the determination by the head of the 
element.
    In addition, to avoid a construction that a committee of 
Congress on its own could require such a review over the 
objection of the DNI, a concern raised by the ODNI, the section 
makes clear that the DNI shall conduct a review if the DNI 
determines it is necessary, and the DNI may conduct an 
accountability review (but is not statutorily required to do 
so) if requested by one of the congressional intelligence 
committees.
    The Committee hopes that this modest increase in the DNI's 
authorities will encourage elements within the Intelligence 
Community to put their houses in order by imposing 
accountability for significant failures and deficiencies. 
Section 401 will enable the DNI to undertake an accountability 
review in the event that an element of the Intelligence 
Community cannot or will not take appropriate action.
    Section 401 is based on Section 401 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
had no comparable provision.

Section 402. Authorities for intelligence information sharing

    Section 402 amends Section 102A(d)(2) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(2)) to provide the DNI 
statutory authority to use National Intelligence Program funds 
to quickly address deficiencies or needs that arise in 
intelligence information access or sharing capabilities, even 
if those needs arise outside the Intelligence Community.
    The new Section 102A(d)(2)(B) authorizes the DNI to provide 
to a receiving agency or component, and for that agency or 
component to accept and use, funds or systems (which would 
include services or equipment) related to the collection, 
processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of 
intelligence information. The new Section 102A(d)(2)(C) grants 
the DNI authority to provide funds to non-National Intelligence 
Program activities for the purpose of addressing critical gaps 
in intelligence information access or sharing capabilities.
    Section 402(b) makes clear that the head of any department 
or agency is authorized to receive and utilize funds or systems 
made available to the department or agency by the DNI. Without 
these new authorities, development and implementation of 
necessary capabilities could be delayed by an agency's lack of 
authority to accept or utilize systems funded from the National 
Intelligence Program, inability to use or identify current-year 
funding, or concerns regarding the augmentation of 
appropriations.
    These authorities are similar to those granted to the NGA 
for developing and fielding systems of common concern relating 
to imagery intelligence and geospatial intelligence. See 
Section 105(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-5).
    Section 402 is based on Section 402 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
had no comparable provision. The Committee placed the 
authorities in Section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of 
1947, rather than Section 102A(g) of the National Security Act 
of 1947, as was in S. 1494, to ensure that any transfers 
pursuant to this authority would be subject to the terms and 
conditions governing transfers and reprogramming. Because the 
terms and conditions governing transfers and reprogramming 
include prior notice to the congressional intelligence 
committees, which would allow the congressional intelligence 
committees to assess the use of this authority, the Committee 
also eliminated the reporting requirements included in Section 
402 of S. 1494.

Section 403. Location of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Section 403 addresses the issue of the location of the 
Office of the DNI. Section 403 repeals the ban on the co-
location of the Office of the DNI with any other Intelligence 
Community element, which took effect on October 1, 2008, by 
replacing that provision of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-3) with a new subsection 103(e) that allows the 
ODNI to be located outside the District of Columbia within the 
Washington Metropolitan Region.
    In his 2008 legislative request for the fiscal year 2009 
authorization, the DNI asked, for the first time, that Congress 
provide that ``[t]he headquarters of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence may be located in the District of 
Columbia or elsewhere in the Metropolitan Region, as that term 
is defined in Section 8301 of title 40, United States Code.'' 
The purpose of this section is to provide statutory 
authorization for the location of the ODNI outside of the 
District of Columbia.
    Section 72 of Title 4, United States Code--a codification 
enacted in 1947 which derived from a statute signed into law by 
President George Washington in 1790--requires that ``[a]ll 
offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised 
in the District of Columbia and not elsewhere, except as 
otherwise expressly provided by law.'' In 1955, just eight 
years after the 1947 codification, Congress granted statutory 
authority for the Director of Central Intelligence to provide 
for a headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency either in 
the District of Columbia ``or elsewhere.'' 69 Stat. 324, 349.
    Pursuant to the Committee's direction during consideration 
of the fiscal year 2009 authorization act, the ODNI requested 
guidance from the Department of Justice's Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) about the need for a statute authorizing the 
location of the ODNI outside the District of Columbia. The ODNI 
has informed the Committee that OLC informally advised the ODNI 
that there is no basis to exclude the ODNI from the requirement 
of 4 U.S.C. 72 and that a specific exception is needed to 
authorize the location of the ODNI headquarters outside the 
District of Columbia. The Committee urges the ODNI to continue 
to study, and report to the congressional intelligence 
committees, about the impact if any of the ODNI's current 
location outside of the District of Columbia on the daily 
implementation of the ODNI's responsibilities with respect to 
the President, the Congress, and the elements of the 
Intelligence Community.
    Section 403 is based on Section 404 of S. 1494 and Section 
401 of H.R. 2701.

Section 404. Title and appointment of the Chief Information Officer of 
        the Intelligence Community

    Section 404 expressly designates the position of Chief 
Information Officer in the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
Community (IC CIO). The modification to this title is 
consistent with the position's overall responsibilities as 
outlined in Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-3g). Section 404 also eliminates the requirement 
that the IC CIO be confirmed by the Senate while retaining the 
requirement that the IC CIO be appointed by the President. The 
continued requirement of presidential appointment emphasizes 
that the IC CIO has important responsibilities for the 
Intelligence Community enterprise architecture with respect to 
the whole of the Intelligence Community.
    Section 404 is identical to Section 406 of S. 1494 and 
similar to Section 405 of H.R. 2701. Section 405 of H.R. 2701 
did not eliminate the requirement that the IC CIO be confirmed 
by the Senate. To accommodate the possibility that ODNI might 
not have individuals who meet the requisite requirements of the 
Vacancies Act to serve in an acting capacity in Presidentially 
appointed and Senate confirmed positions, a concern the ODNI 
had raised with respect to the IC CIO position, Section 302 of 
H.R. 2701 provided authority for temporary appointment to fill 
vacancies in Senate confirmed positions in the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence. Because Section 404 
eliminates the requirement that the IC CIO be confirmed by the 
Senate, the Committee did not include Section 302 of H.R. 2701 
in this bill.

Section 405. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes the 
DNI to establish an Office of Inspector General if the DNI 
determines that an Inspector General (IG) would be beneficial 
to improving the operations and effectiveness of the ODNI. It 
further provides that the DNI may grant to the IG any of the 
duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in the 
Inspector General Act of 1978. The DNI has appointed an IG and 
has granted certain authorities pursuant to DNI Instruction No. 
2005-10 (September 7, 2005).
    As the congressional intelligence committees have urged in 
reports on proposed authorization acts for fiscal years 2006 
through 2009, a strong IG is vital to achieving the goal, set 
forth in the Intelligence Reform Act, of improving the 
operations and effectiveness of the Intelligence Community. It 
is also vital to achieving the broader goal of identifying 
problems and deficiencies, wherever they may be found in the 
Intelligence Community, with respect to matters within the 
responsibility and authority of the DNI, including the manner 
in which elements of the Intelligence Community interact with 
each other in providing access to information and undertaking 
joint or cooperative activities. By way of a new Section 103H 
of the National Security Act of 1947, Section 405 of this Act 
establishes an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
in order to provide to the DNI, and, through reports, to the 
Congress, the benefits of an IG with full statutory authorities 
and the requisite independence.
    The Office of the IG is to be established within the ODNI. 
The Office of the IG created by this bill is to replace and not 
duplicate the current Office of the IG for the ODNI. The IG 
will keep both the DNI and the congressional intelligence 
committees fully and currently informed about problems and 
deficiencies in Intelligence Community programs and operations 
and the need for corrective actions. The IG will be appointed 
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and will report directly to the DNI. To bolster the IG's 
independence within the Intelligence Community, the IG may be 
removed only by the President, who must communicate the reasons 
for the removal to the congressional intelligence committees. 
To ensure that this language is not construed to prohibit an 
immediate personnel action otherwise authorized by law, the 
Committee added the same clarifying language found in the 
Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-409).
    Under the new subsection 103H(e), the DNI may prohibit the 
IG from conducting an investigation, inspection, audit, or 
review if the DNI determines that is necessary to protect vital 
national security interests. If the DNI exercises this 
authority, the DNI must provide the reasons to the 
congressional intelligence committees within seven days. The IG 
may submit comments in response to the DNI's justification to 
the congressional intelligence committees.
    The IG will have direct and prompt access to the DNI and 
any Intelligence Community employee, or employee of a 
contractor, whose testimony is needed. The IG will also have 
direct access to all records that relate to programs and 
activities for which the IG has responsibility. Failure to 
cooperate will be grounds for appropriate administrative 
action.
    The IG will have subpoena authority. However, information 
within the possession of the United States Government must be 
obtained through other procedures. Subject to the DNI's 
concurrence, the IG may request information from any United 
States Government department, agency, or element. They must 
provide the information to the IG insofar as is practicable and 
not in violation of law or regulation.
    The IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that 
include a description of significant problems relating to 
Intelligence Community programs and activities within the 
responsibility and authority of the DNI. Portions of the 
reports involving a component of a department of the United 
States Government are to be provided to the head of the 
department at the same time the report is provided to the DNI. 
The reports must include a description of IGrecommendations and 
a statement whether corrective action has been completed. Within 30 
days of receiving each semiannual report from the IG, the DNI must 
submit it to Congress.
    The IG must immediately report to the DNI particularly 
serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies. Within 
seven days, the DNI must transmit those reports to the 
intelligence committees together with any comments. In the 
event the IG is unable to resolve any differences with the DNI 
affecting the duties or responsibilities of the IG or the IG 
conducts an investigation, inspection, audit, or review that 
focuses on certain high-ranking officials, the IG is authorized 
to report directly to the congressional intelligence 
committees. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
contains similar language with regard to reports by the CIA 
Inspector General on high-ranking CIA officials. (50 U.S.C. 
403q(d)(3)).
    Intelligence Community employees, or employees of 
contractors, who intend to report to Congress an ``urgent 
concern''--such as a violation of law or Executive order, a 
false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from 
Congress--may report such complaints and supporting information 
to the IG. Following a review by the IG to determine the 
credibility of the complaint or information, the IG must 
transmit such complaint and information to the DNI. On 
receiving the complaints or information from the IG (together 
with the IG's credibility determination), the DNI must transmit 
the complaint or information to the congressional intelligence 
committees. If the IG finds a complaint or information not to 
be credible, the reporting individual may still submit the 
matter directly to the congressional intelligence committees by 
following appropriate security practices outlined by the DNI. 
Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting individuals 
constitute reportable ``urgent concerns.'' The congressional 
intelligence committees will not tolerate actions by the DNI, 
or by any Intelligence Community element, constituting a 
reprisal for reporting an ``urgent concern'' or any other 
matter to Congress. Nonetheless, reporting individuals should 
ensure that the complaint and supporting information are 
provided to Congress consistent with appropriate procedures 
designed to protect intelligence sources and methods and other 
sensitive matters.
    For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IG of the 
Intelligence Community and an IG for another Intelligence 
Community element (or for a parent department or agency), the 
Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve who will 
undertake the investigation, inspection, audit, or review. In 
attempting to resolve that question, the Inspectors General may 
request the assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors 
General Forum (a presently functioning body whose existence is 
ratified by Section 405). In the event that the Inspectors 
General are still unable to resolve the question, they shall 
submit it to the DNI and the head of the agency or department 
for resolution.
    An IG for an Intelligence Community element must share the 
results of any investigation, inspection, audit, or evaluation 
with any other IG, including the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, who otherwise would have had 
jurisdiction over the investigation, inspection, audit, or 
evaluation.
    Consistent with existing law, the Inspector General must 
report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or 
complaint received by the Inspector General relating to 
violations of Federal criminal law.
    Section 405 also provides for the transition from the 
Office of the IG of the ODNI to the Office of the IG of the 
Intelligence Community. The Committee provided that Section 8K 
of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. Note), 
which pertains to the former office, is repealed on the date 
that the Senate-confirmed Inspector General assumes the duties 
of the Office of the IG of the Intelligence Community.
    Following the reporting of the conference on the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress 
enacted the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-409. In light of this recent determination by the Congress 
to protect and augment the authority of Inspectors General 
throughout the Government, Section 405 contains conforming 
changes in the IG provision in this conference report. Among 
these provisions is authority for the IG to appoint a counsel. 
Section 405 makes clear that it is not to be construed to alter 
the duties and responsibilities of the General Counsel of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
    Section 405 is similar to Section 407 of S. 1494 and 
Section 406 of H.R. 2701.

Section 406. Chief Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community

    Section 406 amends Title I of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) to establish in statute a Chief 
Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community (IC CFO) to 
assist the DNI in carrying out budgetary, acquisition, and 
financial management responsibilities.
    By way of a new Section 103I of the National Security Act 
of 1947, under Section 406, the IC CFO will, to the extent 
applicable, have the duties, responsibilities, and authorities 
specified in the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990. The IC 
CFO will serve as the principal advisor to the DNI and the 
Principal Deputy DNI on the management and allocation of 
Intelligence Community budgetary resources and shall 
participate in overseeing a comprehensive and integrated 
strategic process for resource management within the 
Intelligence Community. Section 406 charges the IC CFO with 
ensuring that the strategic plan and architectures of the DNI 
are based on budgetary constraints as specified in the future 
budget projections required in Section 325.
    Section 406 also charges the IC CFO with receiving 
verification from appropriate authorities that major system 
acquisitions satisfy validated national requirements for 
meeting the DNI's strategic plans and that such requirements 
are prioritized based on budgetary constraints as specified in 
the future budget projections required in Section 325. To 
guarantee this is achieved in practice, under Section 406, 
prior to obligation or expenditure of funds for major system 
acquisitions to proceed to Milestone A (development) or 
Milestone B (production), requirements must be validated and 
prioritized based on budgetary constraints as specified in 
Section 325.
    Section 406 requires that the IC CFO preside, or assist in 
presiding, over any mission requirement, architectural, or 
acquisition board formed by the ODNI, and to coordinate and 
approve representations to Congress by the Intelligence 
Community regarding National Intelligence Program budgetary 
resources. An individual serving as the IC CFO may not at the 
same time also serve as a CFO of any other department or 
agency.
    Section 406 is based on Section 408 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
had no comparable provision.

Section 407. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials

    Section 407 confirms in statute that various offices are 
housed within the ODNI: (1) the Chief Information Officer of 
the Intelligence Community; (2) the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community; (3) the Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); (4) the Director of the 
National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC); and (5) the Chief 
Financial Officer of the Intelligence Community. It also 
expressly provides in statute that the DNI shall appoint the 
Director of the NCPC, which is what has been done by 
administrative delegation from the President.
    Section 407 is identical to Section 409 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 408. Protection of certain files of the Office of the Director 
        of National Intelligence

    In the CIA Information Act, Pub. L. No. No. 98-477 (October 
15, 1984) (50 U.S.C. 431), Congress authorized the Director of 
Central Intelligence to exempt operational files of the CIA 
from several requirements of the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), particularly those requiring search and review in 
response to FOIA requests. In a series of amendments to Title 
VII of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress extended the 
exemption to the operational files of the NGA, NSA, NRO, and 
DIA. It also provided that files of the Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) should be treated as 
operational files of the CIA (to the extent they meet the 
criteria for CIA operational files).
    Components of the ODNI, including NCTC, require access to 
information contained in CIA and other operational files. To 
that end, section 408 adds a new section 706 to the National 
Security Act of 1947 to make clear that operational files of 
any Intelligence Community component, for which an operational 
files exemption is applicable, will not lose their exemption 
from FOIA search, review, disclosure, or publication solely 
because they have been provided to the ODNI.
    The new Section 706 provides several limitations on what 
records can be considered operational files. The exemption does 
not apply to records that contain information derived 
ordisseminated from an operational file, unless that record is created 
for the sole purpose of organizing the operational file for use by the 
ODNI. It also does not apply to records disseminated beyond the ODNI.
    As Congress has provided in the operational files 
exemptions for the CIA and other Intelligence Community 
elements, subsection (d) provides that the exemption from 
search and review does not apply to requests by United States 
citizens or permanent residents for information about 
themselves (although other FOIA exemptions, such as appropriate 
classification, may continue to protect such files from public 
disclosure). The exemption from search and review would also 
not apply to the subject matter of a congressional or Executive 
branch investigation into improprieties or violations of law.
    Subsection (e) provides for a decennial review by the DNI 
to determine whether exemptions may be removed from any 
category of exempted files. This review shall include 
consideration of the historical value or other public interest 
in the subject matter of those categories and the potential for 
declassifying a significant part of the information contained 
in them. The Committee underscores the importance of this 
requirement, which applies to the other operational exemptions 
in Title VII. The Committee also expects the DNI to submit the 
results of such review to the congressional intelligence 
committees in a timely manner.
    Subsection (f) describes the manner of judicial review of 
the question of whether the ODNI has withheld records 
improperly under the operational file exemption. In particular, 
subsection (f)(2) permits the ODNI to meet its burden to prove 
the validity of the exemption by submitting a sworn written 
submission that exempted files likely to contain responsive 
records are records provided to the ODNI by an element of the 
Intelligence Community, from the exempted operational files of 
such element.
    Section 408 is identical to Section 411 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 did not contain a comparable provision.

Section 409. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence 
        community

    Section 409 amends Section 1102(a) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a) to eliminate the requirement that 
the NCIX perform certain security functions more appropriately 
carried out by other components of the Intelligence Community.
    Section 409 is identical to Section 412 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 410. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to 
        advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
(5 U.S.C. App.) to regulate the use of advisory committees 
throughout the Federal Government. FACA sets forth the 
responsibilities of the Executive branch with regard to such 
committees and outlines procedures and requirements for them. 
As originally enacted in 1972, FACA expressly exempted advisory 
committees utilized by the CIA and the Federal Reserve System. 
Section 411 amends FACA to extend this exemption to advisory 
committees established or used by the ODNI if the DNI 
determines that for reasons of national security such advisory 
committee cannot comply with the requirements of the Act. The 
section also requires the DNI and the Director of CIA each to 
submit annual reports, which may be classified, on their use of 
these exemptions.
    Section 410 is based on Section 414 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 
did not contain a comparable provision.

Section 411. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 411 substitutes the DNI, or the DNI's designee, as 
a member of the Transportation Security Oversight Board 
established under section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States 
Code, in place of the CIA Director or CIA Director's designee. 
The Transportation Security Oversight Board is responsible for, 
among other things, coordinating intelligence, security, and 
law enforcement activities affecting transportation and 
facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security, and law 
enforcement information affecting transportation among Federal 
agencies.
    Section 411 is identical to Section 415 of S. 1494 and 
Section 402 of H.R. 2701.

Section 412. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 412 amends the authorities and structure of the 
NCIX to eliminate certain independent administrative 
authorities that had been vested in the NCIX when that official 
was appointed by and reported to the President. Those 
authorities are unnecessary now that the NCIX is to be 
appointed by and is under the authority of the DNI. Section 412 
is identical to Section 416 of S. 1494 and Section 423 of H.R. 
2701.

Section 413. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence name, initials or seal

    Section 413 prohibits the unauthorized use of the official 
name, initials or seal of the ODNI. Section 413 also permits 
the Attorney General to pursue injunctive relief for such 
unauthorized use. The provision is modeled on Section 13 of the 
CIA Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403(m)) which provides similar 
protection against misuse of the name, initials, or seal of the 
CIA.
    Section 413 is identical to Section 417 of S. 1494 and 
similar to Section 365 of H.R. 2701.

Section 414. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center 
        energy efficiency reports

    Section 414 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement 
across the Intelligence Community the recommendations of the 
Environmental Protection Agency report on improving data center 
energy efficiency (submitted pursuant to Pub. L. No. 109-431, 
120 Stat. 2920). This planning requirement is intended to 
encourage the Intelligence Community to fulfill its 
responsibility to assess the use of environmental resources 
with regard to the power, space, and cooling challenges of 
Intelligence Community data centers and to promote the use of 
energy-efficient technologies to reduce consumption of 
resources by the Intelligence Community's data centers.
    Section 414 is similar to Section 404 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
did not have a comparable provision.

Section 415. Director of National Intelligence support for reviews of 
        International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Export 
        Administration Regulations

    Section 415 provides that the DNI may support any review 
conducted by a department or agency of the federal government 
of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations or Export 
Administration Regulations, including a review of technologies 
and goods on the U.S. Munitions List and Commerce Control List 
that may warrant controls that are different or additional to 
the controls such technologies and goods are subject to at the 
time of the review.
    Section 415 is identical to Section 407 of H.R. 2701. S. 
1494 had no comparable provision.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency


Section 421. Additional functions and authorities for protective 
        personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 421 amends Section 5(a)(4) of the CIA Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)), which authorizes protective functions 
by designated security personnel who serve on CIA protective 
details. Section 421 authorizes the CIA Director on the request 
of the DNI to make CIA protective detail personnel available to 
the DNI and to other personnel within the ODNI.
    Section 421 is identical to Section 421 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 did not include a comparable provision.

Section 422. Appeals from decisions involving contracts of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 422 amends Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes 
Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. 607(d)) to provide that an appeal from a 
dispute arising out of a CIA contract shall be filed with 
whichever of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or 
the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals is specified by the 
contracting officer and that such board shall have jurisdiction 
to decide the appeal.
    Section 422 is based on Section 422 of S. 1494 and Section 
413 of H.R. 2701.

Section 423. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 423 provides for a Deputy Director of the CIA in a 
new Section 104B of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 402 et seq.). Under the new Section 104B, the Deputy 
Director of the CIA shall be appointed by the President, shall 
assist the Director of the CIA in carrying out the Director's 
duties and responsibilities, and shall assume those duties and 
responsibilities in the event of the Director's absence, 
disability, or when the position is vacant.
    Prior to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004, Congress had provided by law for the appointment 
by the President, with Senate confirmation, of a Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence. The Intelligence Reform Act 
abolished that position and was silent on any deputy to the 
Director of the CIA. Since enactment of the Intelligence Reform 
Act, the position of Deputy Director at the CIA has been solely 
a product of administrative action.
    Given the sensitive nature of the CIA's operations, the 
position of Deputy Director merits consideration through the 
process of presidential appointment. The Committee agreed that 
the position would not be subject to the requirement of Senate 
confirmation, as was called for in Section 423 of S. 1494.
    Section 423(c) provides that the amendments made by Section 
423 apply prospectively. Therefore, the individual performing 
the duties of Deputy Director of the CIA on the date of 
enactment will not be affected by the amendments. Section 423 
is identical to Section 414 of H.R. 2701 and similar to Section 
423 of S. 1494.

Section 424. Authority to authorize travel on a common carrier

    Section 424 amends Section 116(b) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)). Section 116(b) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 allows the DNI to authorize travel on 
common carriers for certain intelligence collection personnel, 
and it further allows the DNI to delegate this authority to the 
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence or to the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Section 424 
permits the Director of the CIA to re-delegate this authority 
within the CIA.
    Section 424 is identical to Section 424 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 425. Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 425 amends Section 17 of the Central Intelligence 
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)), which established a 
statutory CIA Inspector General. The amendment updates and 
clarifies the statute in light of revisions made by Congress in 
the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-409) 
and the recommendations in a recent semiannual report of the 
CIA IG. Among other provisions, Section 425 expands the 
protections against reprisals that now apply to CIA employees 
who bring complaints to the CIA IG to any CIA employee who 
provides information to the CIA IG. Section 425 provides that 
the CIA IG has final approval of the selection of internal and 
external candidates for employment with the Office of the IG 
and may appoint a counsel who reports to the IG. Section 425 
provides that this is not to be construed to alter the duties 
and responsibilities of the General Counsel of the CIA.
    Section 425 is based on Section 425 of S. 1494. Section 415 
of H.R. 2701 expanded the protections against reprisals to any 
CIA employee who provides information to the CIA IG.

Section 426. Budget of the Inspector General of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 426 further amends Section 17 of the CIA Act to 
require the DNI to provide to the President the budget amount 
requested by the CIA IG and to provide that information to the 
congressional appropriations and intelligence committees, 
together with any comments of the CIA IG. These changes are 
similar to revisions made by Congress in the Inspector General 
Reform Act of 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-409) with respect to the 
budgets of other inspectors general within the federal 
government.
    Section 426 is identical to Section 426 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 427. Public availability of unclassified versions of certain 
        intelligence products

    Section 427 requires the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency to make publicly available unclassified 
versions of four documents which assess information gained from 
the interrogation of high value detainees. These documents are 
dated April 3, 2003, July 15, 2004, March 2, 2005, and June 1, 
2005.
    Section 427 is identical to Section 427 of S. 1494. The 
House bill had no comparable provision.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components


Section 431. Inspector general matters

    The Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) 
establishes a government-wide system of inspectors general, 
some appointed by the President with the advice and consent of 
the Senate and others ``administratively appointed'' by the 
heads of their respective Federal entities. These IGs are 
authorized to ``conduct and supervise audits and investigations 
relating to the programs and operations'' of the government and 
``to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
administration of, and. . .to prevent and detect fraud and 
abuse in, such programs and operations.'' 5 U.S.C. App. 2. They 
also perform an important reporting function: ``keeping the 
head of the establishment and the Congress fully and currently 
informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the 
administration of. . .programs and operations and the necessity 
for and progress of corrective action.'' Id. The investigative 
authorities exercised by inspectors general, and their relative 
independence from the government operations they audit and 
investigate, provide an important mechanism to ensure that the 
operations of the government are conducted as efficiently and 
effectively as possible.
    The IGs of the CIA and Departments of Defense, Energy, 
Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury are appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
These IGs--authorized by either the Inspector General Act of 
1978 or Section 17 of the CIA Act--are independent within their 
organizations, subject to certain specified authorities of the 
head of their respective departments or agencies. They also 
have explicit statutory authority to access information from 
their departments or agencies or other United States Government 
departments and agencies and may use subpoenas to access 
information (e.g., from an agency contractor) necessary to 
carry out their authorized functions.
    The NRO, DIA, NSA and NGA have established their own 
``administrative'' Inspectors General. However, because they 
are not identified in Section 8G of the Inspector General Act 
of 1978, they lack explicit statutory authorization to access 
information relevant to their audits or investigations, or to 
compel the production of information via subpoena. This lack of 
authority could impede access to information in particular, 
information from contractors that is necessary for them to 
perform their important function. These inspectors general also 
lack the indicia of independence necessary for the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to recognize their annual financial 
statement audits as being in compliance with the Chief 
Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-576). The lack 
of independence also prevents the DoD IG, and would prevent the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, from relying 
on the results of NRO, DIA, NSA, or NGA inspector general 
audits or investigations when such audits must meet ``generally 
accepted government auditing standards.''
    To provide an additional level of independence and to 
ensure prompt access to the information necessary for these IGs 
to perform their audits and investigations, Section 431 amends 
Section 8G(a)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 to 
include the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA as ``designated federal 
entities.'' As so designated, the heads of these Intelligence 
Community elements will be required by statute to 
administratively appoint inspectors general for these agencies.
    Also, as designated inspectors general under the Inspector 
General Act of 1978, these inspectors general will be 
responsible to the heads of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA. The 
removal or transfer of any of these inspectors general by the 
head of their office or agency must be promptly reported to the 
congressional intelligence committees. These inspectors general 
will also be able to exercise other investigative authorities, 
including those governing access to information and the 
issuance of subpoenas, utilized by other inspectors general 
under the Inspector General Act of 1978.
    To protect vital national security interests, Section 431 
permits the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the DNI, 
to prohibit the inspectors general of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and 
NGA from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or 
investigation they are otherwise authorized to conduct. This 
authority is similar to the authority of the CIA Director under 
Section 17 of the CIA Act with respect to the Inspector General 
of the CIA and the authority of the Secretary of Defense under 
Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 with respect to 
the DoD Inspector General. It will provide the Secretary of 
Defense, in consultation with the DNI, a mechanism to protect 
extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other 
vital national security interests. The Committee expects that 
this authority will be exercised rarely by the DNI or the 
Secretary of Defense.
    Section 431 is identical to Section 431 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 432. Clarification of national security missions of National 
        Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for analysis and dissemination 
        of certain intelligence information

    The National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 (Pub. 
L. No. 104-201 (Sept. 23, 1996) (NIMA Act)) formally merged the 
imagery analysis and mapping efforts of the Department of 
Defense and the CIA. In the NIMA Act, Congress cited a need 
``to provide a single agency focus for the growing number and 
diverse types of customers for imagery and geospatial 
information resources within the Government. . .to harness, 
leverage, and focus rapid technological developments to serve 
the imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information 
customers.'' Section 1102(1) of the NIMA Act. Since then, there 
have been rapid developments in airborne and commercial imagery 
platforms, new imagery and geospatial phenomenology, full 
motion video, and geospatial analysis tools.
    Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003)) changed 
the name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The name change was 
intended to introduce the term ``geospatial intelligence'' to 
better describe the unified activities of NGA related to the 
``analysis and visual representation of characteristics of the 
earth and activity on its surface.'' See S. Rep. 108-46 (May 
13, 2003) (accompanying The National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2004, S. 1050, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.).
    Though the NGA has made significant progress toward 
unifying the traditional imagery analysis and mapping missions 
of the CIA and Department of Defense, it has been slow to 
embrace other facets of ``geospatial intelligence,'' including 
the processing, storage, and dissemination of full motion video 
(``FMV'') and ground-based photography. Rather, the NGA's 
geospatial product repositories--containing predominantly 
overhead imagery and mapping products--continue to reflect its 
heritage. While the NGA is belatedly beginning to incorporate 
more airborne and commercial imagery, its data holdings and 
products are nearly devoid of FMV and ground-based photography.
    The Committee believes that FMV and ground-based 
photography should be included, with available positional data, 
in NGA data repositories for retrieval on Department of Defense 
and Intelligence Community networks. Current mission planners 
and military personnel are well-served with traditional imagery 
products and maps, but FMV of the route to and from a facility 
or photographs of what a facility would look like to a foot 
soldier--rather than from an aircraft--would be of immense 
value to military personnel and intelligence officers. Ground-
based photography is amply available from open sources, as well 
as other government sources such as military units, United 
States embassy personnel, defense attaches, special operations 
forces, foreign allies, and clandestine officers. These 
products should be better incorporated into NGA data holdings.
    To address these concerns, Section 432 adds an additional 
national security mission to the responsibilities of the NGA. 
To fulfill this new mission, NGA would be required, as directed 
by the DNI, to develop a system to facilitate the analysis, 
dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, or 
presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including 
handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of 
human intelligence collection organizations or available as 
open-source information, into the national system for 
geospatial intelligence.
    Section 432 also makes clear that this new responsibility 
does not include the authority to manage tasking of handheld or 
clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of human 
intelligence collection organizations. Although Section 432 
does not give the NGA authority to set technical requirements 
for collection of handheld or clandestine photography, the 
Committee encourages the NGA to engage other elements of the 
Intelligence Community on these technical requirements to 
ensure that their output can be incorporated into the national 
system for geospatial-intelligence within the security handling 
guidelines consistent with the photography's classification as 
determined by the appropriate authority.
    Section 432 is identical to Section 435 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no similar provision.

Section 433. Director of Compliance of the National Security Agency

    Section 433 amends the National Security Agency Act of 1959 
(50 U.S.C. 402 note) to establish a statutory Director of 
Compliance, appointed by the Director of the NSA. The Director 
of Compliance is responsible for the NSA's compliance programs 
over mission activities and is therefore responsible for 
ensuring that the components within NSA are adhering to rules 
and restrictions governing surveillance activities.
    The Committee understands the challenges involved in 
ensuring that the NSA's mission activities, which involve 
complicated and ever-changing technology, are conducted in a 
manner consistent with laws, rules, and restrictions governing 
surveillance. Having a Director of Compliance, who has 
expertise in both the legal and technical arenas of 
surveillance, will help minimize the risk of non-compliance.
    Section 433 is based on Section 425 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
did not have a comparable provision. Section 425 of H.R. 2701 
would have created the position of Associate Director of the 
National Security Agency for Compliance and Training and would 
have given the Associate Director responsibility for ensuring 
that all NSA programs and activities were conducted in a manner 
consistent with all applicable laws, regulations and policies 
and that the training of relevant personnel was sufficient. The 
National Security Agency appointed its first Director of 
Compliance in July 2009. This official reports to the Director 
of the National Security Agency and is responsible for 
developing and maintaining a program of compliance for all of 
NSA's mission activities. Section 433 reflects the office and 
responsibilities of the Director of Compliance as they have 
been established administratively within the NSA. Codifying the 
new position in statute underscores its importance and conveys 
the Committee's belief that one individual should be 
responsible for the mission compliance program of NSA.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements


Section 441. Codification of additional elements of the intelligence 
        community

    Section 441 restores, with respect to the United States 
Coast Guard, the prior definition of ``intelligence community'' 
in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that 
service. See 50 U.S.C. 401a. Section 1073 of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 modified the 
definition of ``intelligence community,'' inadvertently 
limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion in the Intelligence 
Community to the Office of Intelligence or those portions of 
the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis of intelligence. 
Section 441 clarifies that all of the Coast Guard's 
intelligence elements are included within the definition of the 
``intelligence community.''
    Section 441 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and 
Attorney General to designate an office within the Drug 
Enforcement Administration as an element of the Intelligence 
Community. Section 441 is identical to Section 441 of S. 1494 
and similar to Sections 421 and 422 of H.R. 2701.

Section 442. Authorization of appropriations for Coast Guard National 
        Tactical Integration Office

    Section 442 provides authorization of appropriations for 
research and development (R&D) to the Coast Guard National 
Technical Integration Office (NTIO), which is the Coast Guard 
counterpart to the Tactical Exploitation of National 
Capabilities programs in each of the military services. The 
NTIO explores the use of national intelligence systems in 
support of Coast Guard operations. Section 442 is intended to 
enable the National Technical Integration Office to monitor the 
development, procurement, and management of tactical 
intelligence systems and equipment and to conduct related 
research, development, and test and evaluation activities 
within the context of the Coast Guard's existing R&D authority.
    Section 442 is identical to Section 442 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 443. Retention and relocation bonuses for the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation

    Section 443 makes permanent the authority of the Director 
of the FBI to pay bonuses to retain certain employees, such as 
those who have unusually high or unique qualifications or who 
are likely to leave the Federal service, and to pay relocation 
bonuses to employees who are transferred to areas in which 
there is a shortage of critical skills.
    Section 443 is identical to Section 443 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 444. Extension of the authority of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation to waive mandatory retirement provisions

    Existing law permits agencies to exempt law enforcement 
officers from mandatory retirement (generally applicable at age 
57 with 20 years of service) until age 60. Under 5 U.S.C. 
8335(b)(2), pertaining to the Civil Service Retirement System, 
and 5 U.S.C. 8425(b)(2), pertaining to the Federal Employee 
Retirement System, the Director of the FBI may exempt FBI 
officers from mandatory retirement until age 65, if such an 
extension is in the public interest. Section 444 extends the 
waiver authority, which expired at the end of 2009, until the 
end of 2011.
    Section 444 is identical to Section 444 of S. 1494. H.R. 
2701 had no comparable provision.

Section 445. Report and assessments on transformation of the 
        intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation

    Section 445 requires the Director of the FBI, in 
consultation with the DNI, to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees, not later than 180 days after 
enactment of this Act, a report describing the long-term vision 
for the intelligence capabilities of the FBI's National 
Security Branch, a strategic plan for the National Security 
Branch, and the progress in advancing the capabilities of the 
branch. Among other things, the report is to include a 
description of the intelligence and national security 
capabilities that will be fully functional within the 5-year 
period beginning on the date the report is submitted and a 
description of the metrics, timetables, and reforms. The report 
must also describe the activities being carried out to ensure 
the NSB is improving its performance and should address the 
issues pertaining to mandatory reassignment of FBI supervisors 
after serving in a position for seven years. In addition, 
Section 445 requires the DNI, in consultation with the Director 
of the FBI, to conduct for five years an annual assessment of 
the NSB's progress based on those performance metrics and 
timetables.
    As described in the unclassified letter of the Director of 
Management and Budget setting forth the Administration's views 
on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as 
passed by the Senate and House of Representatives, this FBI 
report was tied to a fence on funding in the classified annex. 
The fence was removed at the request of the Executive branch, 
in light of the timing of the enactment of this authorization 
bill late in the fiscal year, but the Committee requires the 
report to be completed within 180 days of enactment and will 
revisit the issue of a fence if the report is not completed on 
a timely basis. Section 445 is based on Section 445 of S. 1494 
and Sections 339 and 349 of H.R. 2701.

 TITLE V--REORGANIZATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE 
                             PROGRAM OFFICE


Section 501. Reorganization of the Diplomatic Telecommunications 
        Service Program Office

    Section 501 provides for the reorganization of the 
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS) which is comprised 
of the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office 
(DTS-PO) and the DTS Network. The purpose of the DTS-PO is to 
establish and maintain a DTS Network that is capable of meeting 
the worldwide communications service needs of United States 
Government departments and agencies operating from diplomatic 
and consular facilities including their national security needs 
for secure, reliable, and robust communications. Section 501 
replaces a reorganization plan enacted in the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 and formally amends that 
Act that will appear in Title 22 of the U.S. Code.
    Section 501 establishes a Governance Board that shall 
direct and oversee the activities of the DTS-PO. The Director 
of OMB shall designate from the departments and agencies that 
use the DTS Network those departments and agencies whose heads 
will appoint members of the Governance Board from among their 
personnel. The OMB Director shall designate the Chair of the 
Board from among its five voting members and also designate 
from among the users of the network the department or agency 
that shall be the DTS-PO Executive Agent.
    The Governance Board shall determine the written 
arrangements, which may be classified, for managing the DTS-PO. 
The Board shall have the power to approve and monitor the DTS-
PO's plans, services, policies, and pricing methodology, and to 
provide to the DTS-PO Executive Agent the Board's 
recommendation with respect to the approval, disapproval, or 
modification of the DTS-PO's annual budget requests. The Board 
will also approve or disapprove of the Executive Agent's 
nomination of a Director of the DTS Program Office.
    Section 501 authorizes two-year appropriations for the DTS-
PO. It requires that the DTS-PO shall charge users only for 
bandwidth costs attributable to that department or agency and 
for specific customer projects.
    In requesting enactment of Section 501, the DNI advised the 
Committee as follows about its purpose: ``The appropriations 
authorized by this measure will promote modernization of the 
[DTS] network and the expansion of its architecture. With the 
authority to recover bandwidth costs, the DTS-PO can vastly 
improve the overall business management and effectiveness of 
DTS-PO operations. The measure will facilitate the 
establishment of a financial management system that employs a 
single system of records, that increases transparency and 
traceability in customer billing, that promotes responsiveness 
to customer requirements, that insures timely acquisition of 
bandwidth and receipt of vendor payments, and that promotes 
cost-conscious behavior among DTS-PO customers.''
    Section 501 is substantially similar to Section 501 of S. 
1494. H.R. 2701 did not include a comparable provision.

     TITLE VI--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION COMMISSION ACT

    Title VI establishes a Foreign Intelligence and Information 
Commission (Commission) to provide, in a year from the 
appointment of its members, recommendations to improve foreign 
intelligence and information collection, analysis, and 
reporting through the strategic integration of the Intelligence 
Community and other elements of the United States Government 
with regard to the collection, reporting, and analysis of 
foreign intelligence and information. Title VI is similar to 
Title VI of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 had no comparable provision. In 
addition to revisions of particular matters concerning the 
Commission, the Committee agreed not to include the findings in 
Section 602 of S. 1494.

Section 601. Short title

    Section 601 provides that this title may be cited as the 
``Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission Act.''

Section 602. Definitions

    Section 602 provides definitions, including subsection 
602(3) which defines ``information'' to include information of 
relevance to the foreign policy of the United States collected 
and conveyed through diplomatic reporting and other reporting 
by personnel of the Government of the United States who are not 
employed by an element of the Intelligence Community, to 
include public and open-source information.

Section 603. Establishment and functions of the Commission

    Section 603 establishes and sets forth the functions of the 
Commission. The Commission shall evaluate any current processes 
or systems for the strategic integration of the Intelligence 
Community, including the DNI's Open Source Center, and other 
elements of the United States Government, including the 
Department of State, with regard to the collection, reporting, 
and analysis of foreign intelligence information.
    The Commission shall provide recommendations on a number of 
matters. It shall recommend how to improve or develop such 
processes or systems including by development of an interagency 
strategy. It shall also provide recommendations on how to 
incorporate into the inter-agency strategy the means to 
anticipate future threats, challenges, and crises, including by 
identifying collection, reporting and analytical capabilities 
that are global in scope and are directed at emerging, long-
term, and strategic threats.
    The Commission shall also provide recommendations related 
to the establishment of any new Executive branch entity, or the 
expansion of the authorities of any existing Executive branch 
entity, as needed to improve the strategic integration of 
foreign intelligence and information collection.
    In addition, the Commission shall provide recommendations 
on strategies for sustaining human and budgetary resources to 
effect the global collection and reporting missions identified 
in the inter-agency strategy.

Section 604. Members and staff of the Commission

    Section 604 establishes that the Commission shall be 
composed of 10 members, eight of whom shall be voting members. 
The voting members shall be two members appointed by the 
Majority Leader of the Senate, two members appointed by the 
Minority Leader of the Senate, two members appointed by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and two members 
appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of 
Representatives. Of the two nonvoting members, one shall be 
appointed by the Director of National Intelligence and the 
other shall be appointed by the Secretary of State.
    Members of the Commission shall be private citizens with 
knowledge and experience in foreign information and 
intelligence collection, reporting, and analysis; knowledge and 
experience in issues related to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States gained by serving in the 
Department of State, other appropriate agency or department or 
independent organization with expertise in the field of 
international affairs; or knowledge and experience with foreign 
policy decision making. The congressional leaders, the DNI, and 
the Secretary of State shall consult among themselves prior to 
the appointment of members in order to achieve a fair and 
equitable representation of points of view on the Commission.
    The members of the Commission shall designate one of the 
voting members to serve as chair. Five voting members of the 
Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of 
transacting the business of the Commission.
    Subsection 604(b) provides for the selection of an 
Executive Director by an appointment of the chair with the 
approval of a majority of the voting members of the Commission. 
The chair is also authorized, in consultation with the 
Executive Director, to appoint other Commission personnel. The 
Committee agreed to set the salary limits for Commission staff 
to those applicable to the maximum annual rate for employees of 
a standing committee of the U.S. Senate.

Section 605. Powers and duties of the Commission

    Section 605 provides the powers and duties of the 
Commission, including holding hearings, taking testimony and 
receiving evidence. The Commission may secure directly from a 
department or agency of the United States information that the 
Commission considers necessary to carry out the title. Upon 
request of the Commission chair, the head of each department or 
agency shall furnish such information to the Commission, 
subject to applicable law. S. 1494 had provided subpoena 
authority to the Commission, but the Committee agreed that the 
Commission would not have the power to issue subpoenas.

Section 606. Report of the Commission

    Section 606 provides that no later than 300 days 
(approximately 10 months) after the appointment of members, the 
Commission shall submit an interim report to the congressional 
intelligence committees. No later than 60 days thereafter, the 
Commission shall submit a final report to the President, the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives.

Section 607. Termination

    Section 607 provides that the Commission shall terminate 60 
days after the submission of the Commission's final report.

Section 608. Nonapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act

    Section 608 provides that the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (5 U.S.C. App.) does not apply to the Commission.

Section 609. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 609 authorizes the appropriation of such sums as 
may be necessary to carry out this title. The sums shall be 
available until expended.

                        TITLE VII--OTHER MATTERS


Section 701. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the 
        Research and Development Programs of the United States 
        Intelligence Community

    The National Commission for Review of Research and 
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
Community was authorized by Title X of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306 
(2002) and lapsed on September 1, 2004, when the time for the 
final report of the Commission was reached without completion 
of the appointment process for the Commission.
    The Congress established the Commission after determining 
that there was a need for a review of the full range of current 
research and development programs within the responsibility of 
the Intelligence Community with the goal of ensuring a unified 
research and development program across the entire Community. 
As this remains an important objective, Section 701 renews 
authority for this Commission by extending the reporting 
deadline to one year after the date that members are appointed 
and requiring that new members be appointed to the Commission. 
This section also authorizes the appropriation of funds for the 
Commission, which shall remain available until expended.
    Section 701 is based on Section 501 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
had no similar provision.

Section 702. Classification review of executive branch materials in the 
        possession of the congressional intelligence committees

    Section 702 authorizes the DNI to conduct classification 
reviews of materials in the possession of the congressional 
intelligence committees that are at least 25 years old and were 
created, or provided to that committee, by the Executive 
branch. The DNI may only exercise this authority at the request 
of one of the congressional intelligence committees, in 
accordance with procedures established by that committee.
    Section 702 is based on Section 503 of H.R. 2701. S. 1494 
had no comparable provision. Section 503 of H.R. 2701 had 
stated that the DNI ``shall'' conduct classification reviews in 
accordance with committee rules. In Section 702, the Committee 
clarified that classification reviews would only be conducted 
at the request of the congressional intelligence committees.

                    TITLE VIII--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS


Section 801. Technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Act of 1978

    Section 801 makes technical amendments to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to correct typographical 
and grammatical errors. Section 801 is identical to Section 701 
of S. 1494 and Section 514 of H.R. 2701.

Section 802. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency 
        Act of 1949

    Section 802 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 by updating references to the National Security Act of 
1947 to reflect amendments made by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section 802 is identical to 
Section 702 of S. 1494 and Section 511 of H.R. 2701.

Section 803. Technical amendments to title 10, United States Code

    Section 803 corrects a number of technical errors in the 
United States Code arising from the enactment of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 
Section 803 is identical to Section 703 of S. 1494 and Section 
519 of H.R. 2701.

Section 804. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 804 makes a number of technical corrections to the 
National Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. 
Section 804 is identical to Section 704 of S. 1494 and Section 
518 of H.R. 2701.

Section 805. Technical amendments to the multiyear National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 805 updates the ``multiyear national intelligence 
program'' to incorporate organizational and nomenclature 
changes made by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004. Section 805 is identical to Section 705 
of S. 1494 and Section 517 of H.R. 2701.

Section 806. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 806 makes a number of technical and conforming 
amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004. Section 806 is substantially similar to Section 
706 of S. 1494 and Section 516 of H.R. 2701.

Section 807. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

    Section 807 makes technical amendments to the Executive 
Schedule to correct outdated and incorrect references to 
``Director of Central Intelligence,'' ``Deputy Directors of 
Central Intelligence,'' and ``General Counsel to the National 
Intelligence Director.'' Section 807 is identical to Section 
707 of S. 1494 and Section 513 of H.R. 2701.

Section 808. Technical amendments to section 105 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

    Section 808 changes the reference to ``the Director of 
Central Intelligence'' to ``the DNI'' in Section 105 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. 
No. 108-77 (December 13, 2003)) to clarify that the 
establishment of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis within 
the Department of the Treasury, and its reorganization within 
the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (Section 222 
of the Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies, and 
General Government Appropriations Act, 2005 (Division H, Pub. 
L. No. 108-447 (December 8, 2004))), do not affect the 
authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an element of the 
Intelligence Community. Section 808 is identical to Section 708 
of S. 1494 and Section 515 of H.R. 2701.

Section 809. Technical amendments to section 602 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995

    Section 809 changes references to ``the Director of Central 
Intelligence'' in Section 602 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1995 to ``the Director of National 
Intelligence'' or to ``the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency'' as appropriate. Section 809 is identical to Section 
709 of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not have a comparable provision.

Section 810. Technical amendments to section 403 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for fiscal year 1992

    Section 810 makes technical amendments to Section 403 of 
the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1992, to 
reflect the creation of the position of the Director of 
National Intelligence and the appropriate definition of the 
Intelligence Community. Section 810 is identical to Section 710 
of S. 1494. H.R. 2701 did not have a comparable provision.

                            General Matters


Items not included

    In addition to items not included in the bill as described 
above, certain other sections from S. 1494 and H.R. 2701 were 
not included because: these sections were unnecessary; the 
requirements in the section had been or would be otherwise 
fulfilled; the sections related to activities for which funds 
would not be available; or for other reasons.
    Section 335 of both S. 1494 and H.R. 2701 provided for 
audits or investigations of the Intelligence Community by the 
GAO. On March 15, 2010, in a letter providing the views of the 
Administration on the House and Senate bills, the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) noted that the 
Administration continued to ``strongly object'' to the GAO 
provisions, indicated that ``current law expressly exempts 
intelligence and counterintelligence activities from GAO 
review,'' and stated that the President's senior advisors would 
recommend that he veto a bill that included the GAO provisions. 
On March 18, 2010, the Acting Comptroller General sent a letter 
to the intelligence committees indicating his disagreement with 
the description of GAO's authorities contained in the OMB 
Director's letter, and noting that existing statutes ``provide 
GAO with the required authority to perform audits and 
evaluations of [Intelligence Community] activities.''
    In light of this, the Committee believes it is important to 
explore further the scope of current GAO arrangements with the 
Intelligence Community, the history of GAO's work on classified 
matters outside of the Intelligence Community, existing GAO 
procedures for working with classified information, and the 
extent to which future GAO investigations and audits of the 
Intelligence Community can be conducted by mutual agreement. In 
this regard, the leadership of the Committee has in this 
Congress and the last Congress asked the DNI and Comptroller 
General whether they can identify selected oversight subjects 
regarding which GAO has expertise and for which assistance 
could be provided by agreement between the Intelligence 
Community and GAO in a manner consistent with national 
security.
    The Committee continues to believe that GAO can make a 
significant contribution to the oversight of the Intelligence 
Community and that the intelligence committees should continue 
to work with the DNI and the Comptroller General to find ways 
to bring GAO's significant skills to bear.
    The bill also eliminates a series of reporting requirements 
from S. 1494 and H.R. 2701 with the expectation that the 
information required by these reports would be obtained by the 
congressional intelligence committees during the course of 
normal oversight activities. The ODNI has offered to provide 
the information requested in these reports in briefings or 
hearings. In particular, the bill does not include from H.R. 
2701: Section 331, report on financial intelligence on 
terrorist assets; Section 333, semiannual reports on nuclear 
weapons programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea; Section 340, 
report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and 
Afghanistan; Section 341, report on international traffic in 
arms regulations; Section 342, report on nuclear trafficking; 
Section 343, study on revoking pensions of persons who commit 
unauthorized disclosures of classified information; Section 
346, study on college tuition programs for employees of the 
Intelligence Community; Section 359, report on dissemination of 
counterterrorism information to local law enforcement agencies; 
Section 360, report on intelligence capabilities of state and 
local law enforcement agencies; Section 360A, Inspector General 
report on over-classification; Section 360C, report on 
activities of the Intelligence Community in Argentina; Section 
360G, report on missile arsenal of Iran; Section 360H, studyon 
best practices of foreign governments in combating violent domestic 
extremism; Section 360I, report on information sharing practices of 
Joint Terrorism Task Force; Section 360J, report on technology to 
enable information sharing; Section 360K, report on threats to energy 
security of the United States; and Section 506, review of intelligence 
to determine if foreign connection to anthrax attacks exists. The 
elimination of the report on global supply chain vulnerabilities 
required by Section 347 of H.R. 2701 is discussed in more detail in the 
classified annex.
    Section 314 of S. 1494 required the DNI to review certain 
educational grant and scholarship programs and report on 
whether those programs could be combined or otherwise 
integrated. The Committee encourages the DNI to consider this 
issue in future budget and legislative submissions. For future 
intelligence authorizations, the congressional intelligence 
committees will be interested in determining whether the ODNI's 
promise of methods of providing information other than through 
reports has worked to satisfy the oversight interest underlying 
the inclusion of these sections in the House and Senate bills.
    The bill also does not include sections of H.R. 2701 and S. 
1494 that have already been enacted into law. These sections 
include: Section 345 of H.R. 2701 and Section 338 of S. 1494, 
each of which required a report on retirement benefits for 
former employees of Air America; Section 357 of H.R. 2701 which 
reiterated an existing requirement to submit report on 
terrorism financing; and Section 428 of H.R. 2701, which 
required the submission of a charter for the National 
Reconnaissance Office. The Committee expects compliance with 
those existing reporting requirements. Similarly, because the 
National Defense Authorization Act has temporarily suspended 
pay authority under the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel 
System pending the submission of findings and recommendations 
by an independent organization, the bill does not include 
Section 304 of H.R. 2701, which contained provisions relating 
to the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System.
    Both Section 403 of H.R. 2701 and Section 405 of S. 1494 
provided additional statutory duties for the DNI's Director of 
Science and Technology. Internal reorganization within the ODNI 
has obviated the need for this provision.
    In addition, the following sections from H.R. 2701 are not 
included: Section 369, sense of the Congress on monitoring of 
northern border of the United States; Section 411, review of 
covert action programs by the Inspector General of the Central 
Intelligence Agency; Section 502, expansion and clarification 
of the duties of the program manager for the information 
sharing environment; and Section 505, sense of the Congress 
honoring the contributions of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
The Committee honors the contribution of the CIA and all other 
elements and personnel of the Intelligence Community but 
believes it is preferable that the intelligence authorization 
act not be the vehicle for expressing the sense of the Congress 
on various matters.
    The following additional sections from S. 1494 are not 
included: Section 353, limitation on reprogrammings and 
transfers of funds; Section 403, authorities for interagency 
funding; Section 413, applicability of the Privacy Act to the 
Director of National Intelligence and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence; Section 432, confirmation of 
appointment of heads of certain components of the Intelligence 
Community; and Section 434, DIA counterintelligence and 
expenditures. Also not included was Section 364 of H.R. 2701, 
exemption of dissemination of terrorist identity information 
from the Freedom of Information Act. These are matters that may 
be the subject of further study by the congressional 
intelligence committees.

Compliance with Rule XXI, CL. 9 (House) and with Rule XLIV (Senate)

    Clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives and rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate require publication of a list of the ``congressionally 
directed spending items'' (the term used in the Senate rule) or 
``congressional earmarks'' (the term used in the House rules) 
that are included in the conference report, the joint 
explanatory statement, or the classified schedule of 
authorizations accompanying the conference report. The list 
must include the name of each Senator, House Member, Delegate, 
or Resident Commissioner who submitted a request to the 
committee of jurisdiction for each item so identified.
    The House and Senate rules also require the listing of 
limited tax or tariff benefits. The conference report, the 
joint explanatory statement, and the classified schedule of 
authorizations contain no limited tax benefits or limited 
tariff benefits as defined in the applicable House and Senate 
rules.
    There were no congressionally directed spending items (as 
defined in the Senate rule) or congressional earmarks (as 
defined in the House rule) in either S. 1494 or H.R. 2701 on 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 
Consistent with the determination of the Committee not to 
create any direct spending items or earmarks, none have been 
newly created in this bill, the report to accompany it, or the 
classified schedule of authorizations.
    Congressionally directed spending items or earmarks for 
intelligence or intelligence-related activities in Fiscal Year 
2010 were contained in the previously enacted Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-118) or in 
the Military Construction and Veterans Administration 
Appropriations Act, 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-117). In accordance 
with the request of the Administration that the authorization 
of these congressionally directed spending items or earmarks 
should remain in effect after passage of this Act, this bill 
does not remove the authorization for those congressionally 
directed items or earmarks contained in the Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2010. A definitive statement under the 
Senate and House rules of the congressionally directed spending 
items or earmarks contained in the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2010 and the Military Construction and 
Veterans Administration Appropriations Act may be found 
respectively in the Committee Print of the Committee on 
Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, on H.R. 3326/
Public Law 111-118, beginning on page 434, and in the 
conference report to accompany H.R. 3288, Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2010, H. Rept. 111-366, beginning on page 
1362.

                            Committee Action


Vote to report the committee bill

    On July 15, 2010, a quorum for reporting being present, the 
Committee voted to report the bill, by a vote of 15 ayes and no 
noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Rockefeller--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; 
Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--
aye; Senator Nelson--aye; Senator Whitehouse--aye; Vice 
Chairman Bond--aye; Senator Hatch--aye; Senator Snowe--aye; 
Senator Chambliss--aye; Senator Burr--aye; Senator Coburn--aye; 
Senator Risch--aye.

                           Estimate of Costs

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) prepared cost estimates for 
H.R. 2701 and S. 1494. The June 25, 2009 cost estimate for H.R. 
2701 and the August 6, 2009 cost estimate for S. 1494 are 
posted on the CBO website. On July 15, 2010, the Committee 
transmitted this bill to the CBO for any further review that is 
warranted, beyond those posted estimates, regarding the costs 
incurred in carrying out the bill's provisions.

                    Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        Changes in Existing Laws

    In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to 
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the 
business of the Senate.

                ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR ROCKEFELLER

    The Congressional notification provisions in the bill that 
we are reporting out today constitute an important improvement 
over the status quo. They require that the congressional 
intelligence committees and the President establish written 
procedures regarding the details of notification processes and 
expectations; that the President provide written notice about 
intelligence activities and covert actions, including changes 
in covert action findings and the legal authority under which 
an intelligence activity or a covert action is or will be 
conducted; that the President provide written reasons for 
limiting access to notifications to less than the full 
committee; and that the President maintain records of all 
notifications, including names of Members briefed and dates of 
the briefings.
    I support these provisions because I expect that they will 
go a long way toward correcting past deficiencies. However, I 
believe that additional clarity is needed regarding whether or 
not the full committee will be aware of three critical facts in 
circumstances of less-than-full-committee notifications: (1) 
the fact that such a limited access notification has occurred, 
(2) the general subject of the limited notification, and (3) 
the reasons for limiting access.
    There are situations in which a limited notification is 
appropriate and even necessary, but those situations are rare. 
Congressional notification procedures--and practices--should 
reflect that rarity. Most importantly, they should prevent 
limited notification from impeding the committees' oversight 
responsibilities, because effective congressional oversight of 
intelligence activities is critical to the national security 
interests of the United States.
    As Senator Snowe and I noted in our additional views to the 
Committee's July 22, 2009 report of an earlier version of this 
bill, the Committee has supported clarity on these matters in 
four consecutive intelligence authorization bills. I will 
continue to work with my colleagues in establishing written 
notification procedures that resolve any ambiguities in favor 
of full committee awareness.
    The Congressional notification provisions in the bill that 
we are reporting out today are a good first step--but only a 
first step.

                                           John D. Rockefeller, IV.

                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINGOLD

    The version of the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence 
Authorization bill reported out by the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence on July 15, 2010, retains a critically 
important provision--the establishment of an independent 
commission to address structural impediments to global coverage 
and our ability to anticipate terrorist and other threats and 
crises before they appear. I am also pleased that the bill 
includes a number of provisions that would improve 
accountability and save taxpayer dollars. Unfortunately, the 
bill removes many other important provisions that were in the 
Senate-passed bill that were aimed at improving oversight and 
transparency, as well as accountability.
    The so-called ``Gang of Eight'' provision of the National 
Security Act should be eliminated entirely so that all members 
of the congressional intelligence committees can be notified of 
all intelligence activities. The earlier version of the bill 
required merely that all members receive basic information 
about matters only briefed to the Chairman and Vice Chairman, 
yet this compromise has been removed. The current version also 
removes a provision ensuring access to the Intelligence 
Community by the Government Accountability Office, as well as 
provisions requiring that the heads of the NSA, NGA and NRO be 
confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Furthermore, the bill waters down 
an amendment I offered with Vice Chairman Bond and Senator 
Wyden requiring the president to submit an unclassified top-
line budget request for the National Intelligence Program by 
adding a presidential waiver. This amendment was intended to 
make possible a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission to 
improve congressional oversight by passing a separate 
intelligence appropriations bill, a structural reform that 
would be seriously complicated by the year-to-year uncertainty 
of a presidential waiver.
    Because of these and other modifications, the bill falls 
short of what should be reported out by the Committee this 
year, or in future years. However, while I will continue to 
fight for the reforms included in the original version, I do 
not wish to stand in the way of finally passing an intelligence 
authorization bill that includes the establishment of the 
independent commission as well as other important provisions.
                                               Russell D. Feingold.

                                  
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