[House Report 111-676]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


111th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     111-676

======================================================================



 
            DISCOUNT PRICING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2009

                                _______
                                

December 8, 2010.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Conyers, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 3190]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill 
(H.R. 3190) to restore the rule that agreements between 
manufacturers and retailers, distributors, or wholesalers to 
set the price below which the manufacturer's product or service 
cannot be sold violates the Sherman Act, having considered the 
same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend 
that the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     5
Committee Consideration..........................................     6
Committee Votes..................................................     6
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     6
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     6
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate........................     6
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     7
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     8
Advisory on Earmarks.............................................     8
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................     8
Additional Views.................................................     9

                          Purpose and Summary

    H.R. 3190, the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 
2009, is intended to undo the harm to consumers stemming from 
the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.\1\ In Leegin, the Supreme Court 
overturned 96 years of antitrust jurisprudence by reversing its 
1911 decision in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 
Co.,\2\ which had expressly prohibited agreements between 
manufacturers and distributors or retailers establishing a 
minimum retail price for the manufacturers' products. Critics 
of the Leegin decision expect it to result in increased prices 
charged to consumers.\3\ H.R. 3190 would negate the Leegin 
decision by again making any such agreements a violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.\4\
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    \1\551 U.S. 877 (2007).
    \2\220 U.S. 373 (1911).
    \3\In his dissent in Leegin, Justice Breyer estimated that even if 
only 10 percent of manufacturers engaged in minimum retail price 
fixing, the annual retail bill for the average family of four would 
increase by between $750 and $1,000. 551 U.S. at 926.
    \4\15 U.S.C. Sec. 1.
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                Background and Need for the Legislation

              RETAIL PRICE FIXING AND THE LEEGIN DECISION

``Rule of Reason'' Analysis vs. ``Per Se'' Prohibition
    Alleged antitrust offenses are generally subject to one of 
two classes of review, either a per se or rule-of-reason 
analysis. The category of analysis is significant both in terms 
of a policy judgment and as an evidentiary burden of proof.
    Per se offenses\5\ consist of a limited number of business 
practices deemed so harmful to competition that proof of the 
practice itself establishes an antitrust violation without 
further analysis. Per se prohibitions are generally limited to 
``conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive,''\6\ that would 
``always or almost always tend to restrict competition and 
decrease output.''\7\
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    \5\The Supreme Court first crafted the per se standard in the 
context of horizontal agreements, i.e., agreements among competitors. 
See e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
    \6\Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
    \7\Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
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    On the other hand, rule-of-reason offenses reflect a 
recognition that some types of business practices are not 
always anticompetitive, and may be, on balance, either 
procompetitive or anticompetitive depending upon the factual 
circumstances.
    Rule-of-reason analysis requires a more in-depth look at 
the practice in question in order to weigh the competitive 
effects.\8\ Such an analysis generally involves expensive and 
time-consuming economic research and analysis.
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    \8\Factors to be considered in a rule-of-reason analysis include 
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, 
the condition of the business before and after the restraint was 
imposed, and the nature of the restraint and its actual and probable 
effects. The history of the restraint, the threat posted, the reasons 
for adopting the remedy, and the ends sought to be obtained are also to 
be taken into consideration. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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Leegin Overturns the Per Se Precedent Set By Dr. Miles
    In its 1911 decision in Dr. Miles,\9\ the Supreme Court 
held that an agreement between a manufacturer of proprietary 
medicines and its dealers to fix the minimum price at which its 
medicines could be sold was illegal under section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.\10\ For the next 96 years, Dr. Miles stood for the 
proposition that agreements between manufacturers and retailers 
that established a minimum price for the manufacturers' 
products were illegal on their face. In antitrust parlance, the 
case established a per se prohibition on vertical minimum price 
restraints, alternately referred to as ``resale price 
maintenance,'' or minimum retail price fixing.
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    \9\220 U.S. 373 (1911).
    \10\The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1-7, prohibits contracts, 
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, as well as acts 
of monopolization.
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    In its 2007 Leegin decision, the Supreme Court overturned 
Dr. Miles, holding that minimum retail price fixing would 
henceforth be judged under the rule of reason, on a case-by-
case basis. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, acknowledged that setting minimum retail prices could 
have anticompetitive effects, but concluded that it could also 
have procompetitive benefits, and that a per se prohibition 
could not be justified, as it could not be ``stated with any 
degree of confidence that retail price maintenance `always or 
almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease 
output.'''\11\ The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a joint amicus brief in favor 
of overturning Dr. Miles' per se prohibition; 37 State 
attorneys general filed one in favor of affirming it.\12\
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    \11\Leegin, 551 U.S. at 894, quoting Business Electronics, 485 U.S. 
at 723.
    \12\The State attorneys general who filed the amicus brief were 
from AK, AR, CT, DE, FL, HI, ID, IL, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, 
MN, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, UT, VT, 
WA, WV, and WY.
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    The effect of Leegin is that minimum retail price 
agreements are no longer per se prohibited by law. This does 
not mean that these agreements are now necessarily always 
legal; they are instead subject to a case-by-case rule-of-
reason analysis.
Minimum Retail Price Fixing in the Wake of Leegin
    Nearing the 3-year anniversary of Leegin, there are a 
number of indications that mandatory minimum retail price 
policies are becoming more common, with an adverse impact on 
consumer prices.\13\
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    \13\Joseph Pereira, Price-Fixing Makes Comeback after Supreme Court 
Ruling, Wall St. J., Aug. 18, 2008, at A1.

 LConsumerWorld.org, which provides price comparisons 
for consumers, has found numerous minimum retail price policies 
imposed upon retailers by manufacturers of baby goods, consumer 
electronics, home furnishings, and pet foods.\14\
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    \14\Id.

 LBabyAge.com reported that 100 of its 465 suppliers 
dictate minimum retail prices.\15\ As a result, the Internet 
retailer had to increase prices 20 to 40 percent on several 
popular products.\16\
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    \15\Id.
    \16\E-Tailers Take on Price Fixing, Consumer Electronics Daily, 
Dec. 5, 2008.

 LDemand Inc., an Internet-only retailer of ergonomic 
office accessories, reported that at least 50 percent of its 
products now have a manufacturer-imposed minimum retail price, 
compared to 10 percent in 2006.\17\
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    \17\Don Davis, How the Supreme Court Fractured Online Pricing, 
InternetRetailer.com, Nov. 2008, http://www.Internetretailer.com/
article.asp?id=28293.

 LSeventy-five percent of eHobbies' products now have a 
manufacturer-imposed minimum retail price.\18\
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    \18\Id.

 LHomeCenter.com has lost millions of dollars in sales 
because of minimum retail price policies imposed by 
manufacturers, such as lighting manufacturer L.D. Kichler, that 
have made the Internet-based retailer less competitive than it 
used to be.\19\
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    \19\Id.

 LTwo lawsuits have been brought against eBay by 
manufacturers for selling their products below a manufacturer-
dictated minimum price.\20\
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    \20\Greg Beck, Companies Claim Right to Interfere with eBay 
Auctions for Charging Too Little, Consumer Law & Policy Blog, July 17, 
2007, http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2007/07/leegin-and-ebay/
comments/page/2/.

Congress' Previous Involvement in the Retail Price-Fixing Issue
    Congress has involved itself directly in the formulation of 
enforcement policy in the area of minimum retail price fixing 
on a number of occasions.
    First, during the Depression, a number of States, as part 
of a general move toward price controls in response to the 
distressed business climate, enacted so-called ``fair trade'' 
laws permitting a manufacturer to enter into agreements with 
retailers stipulating the minimum price at which its products 
could be sold. Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Act\21\ in 
1937 to exempt agreements permitted under the State fair trade 
laws from the antitrust laws, followed by the McGuire Act\22\ 
to extend coverage of the exemption to imposition of a ``fair 
trade'' price agreement even on retailers who had not signed 
it.
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    \21\50 Stat. 693 (1937).
    \22\66 Stat. 632 (1952).
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    By the 1970's, State fair trade laws had come under 
increasing disrepute as anticompetitive, and unwarranted by any 
legitimate business purpose.\23\ Studies conducted by the DOJ 
under President Nixon indicated that retail price fixing 
sheltered by State fair trade laws inflated prices for the 
affected goods by between 18 and 27 percent, and that 
eliminating the fair trade laws would save consumers $1.2 
billion.\24\ The Ford Administration's DOJ called for repealing 
the fair trade laws, as did the FTC. Ronald Reagan, then a 
columnist for the Copley News Service, condemned retail price 
fixing in a column reprinted in the Congressional Record, 
arguing that it stifled competition, added to inflation, and 
was bereft of consumer benefits.\25\
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    \23\In the interim, many States had repealed or curbed their fair 
trade statutes; in four States, the statutes had been declared 
unconstitutional; and in five States, ``non-signer'' clauses had been 
declared unconstitutional. See P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis, 517 
(1974).
    \24\S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1-3 (1975).
    \25\1212 Cong. Rec. 1268 (Jan. 23, 1975).
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    In the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Congress 
repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act.\26\ In 
doing so, it examined and rejected various asserted 
justifications for minimum retail price fixing, including 
assertions that it helped encourage retailers to provide 
additional services, helped protect small businesses, and 
helped new businesses enter the market. Congress concluded that 
minimum retail price fixing served little purpose other than to 
inflate prices.
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    \26\89 Stat. 801 (1975).
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    Congress strongly reaffirmed its bipartisan support for the 
per se prohibition against minimum retail price fixing during 
the 1980's. After the Reagan Administration DOJ filed an amicus 
brief in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Co.\27\ urging the 
Supreme Court to overturn Dr. Miles, Congress, as part of the 
FY 1984 appropriations bill that included DOJ funding, 
expressly prohibited the DOJ from using any funds to advocate 
overturning the per se prohibition.\28\ The prohibition was 
reinstated as part of the FY 1986 appropriations resolution\29\ 
and remained in every DOJ-funding appropriations bill 
thereafter until FY 1992, when the prohibition was dropped only 
after personal assurances from the Assistant Attorney General 
for Antitrust that the Department would not revive its effort 
to undermine the per se prohibition.
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    \27\465 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984).
    \28\Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Appropriations Act, 1984, Sec. 510, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 
stat. 1102-03 (1983).
    \29\Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and 
Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1986, Sec. 605, Pub. L. No. 99-180, 
99 stat. 1169-71.
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    With the change of Administration in 1993, the Department 
quieted the issue by reaffirming its support for the per se 
prohibition and its intent to actively enforce it.\30\ Only 
two-and-a-half years before the Court decided Leegin, the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission, tasked in legislation 
sponsored by then-House Judiciary Committee Chairman James 
Sensenbrenner with conducting a comprehensive review of the 
state of the antitrust laws,\31\ declined to examine retail 
price fixing because there was ``a relatively low level of 
controversy on the subject.''\32\
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    \30\Antitrust Enforcement, Some Initial Thoughts and Actions, 
Address by Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman before Antitrust 
Section of the American Bar Association, August 10, 1993.
    \31\Pub. L. No. 107-273, Sec. Sec. 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856.
    \32\The Leegin Decision: The End of the Consumer Discounts or Good 
Antitrust Policy? Before the Subcomm. On Antitrust, Competition Policy 
and Consumer Rights of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6 
(statement of Richard M. Brunell, Director of Legal Advocacy, American 
Antitrust Institute), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/
archives/files/aai-%20Leegin,%20'senate%20test%20by%20RB,%207-30-
07_080120071016.pdf (quoting Memorandum from the Antitrust 
Modernization Comm. Single-Firm Conduct Working Group 16 (December 21, 
2004)).
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                                Hearings

    On April 28, 2009, the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee 
on Courts and Competition Policy held 1 day of hearings on the 
effect of the Leegin decision on competition in the retail 
environment. Testimony was received from Pamela Jones Harbour, 
Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission; Thomas G. Hungar, 
Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Tod Cohen, Vice President 
and Deputy General Counsel, Government Relations, eBay, Inc.; 
and Richard Brunell, Director of Legal Advocacy, American 
Antitrust Institute, with additional material submitted by the 
National Consumers League; the Consumer Federation of America; 
Consumers Union; U.S. Public Interest Research Group; 
Amazon.com, Inc.; the American Bar Association Section of 
Antitrust Law; and the Consumer Electronics Association.

                        Committee Consideration

    On July 30, 2009, the Subcommittee on Courts and 
Competition Policy met in open session and ordered the bill 
H.R. 3190 favorably reported, with an amendment, by voice vote, 
a quorum being present. On January 13, 2010, the Committee met 
in open session and ordered the bill H.R. 3190 favorably 
reported without amendment, by a voice vote, a quorum being 
present.

                            Committee Votes

    In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that there 
were no recorded votes during the Committee's consideration of 
H.R. 3190.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee advises that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is inapplicable because this legislation does 
not provide new budgetary authority or increased tax 
expenditures.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with 
respect to the bill, H.R. 3190, the following estimate and 
comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget 
Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974:

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, March 5, 2010.
Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3190, the 
``Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009.''
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark 
Grabowicz, who can be reached at 226-2860.
            Sincerely,
                                      Douglas W. Elmendorf,
                                                  Director.

Enclosure

cc:
        Honorable Lamar S. Smith.
        Ranking Member
H.R. 3190--Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009.
    H.R. 3190 would prohibit agreements between manufacturers 
and wholesalers, distributors, or retailers to set minimum 
prices for a product or service. The bill would negate the 
effects of a 2007 Supreme Court decision (Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)) that 
permits minimum price agreements in certain cases.
    Based on information from the Department of Justice, CBO 
estimates that implementing the bill would have no significant 
effect on the department's spending to handle cases involving 
minimum price agreements.
    Pay-as-you-go procedures would apply to the legislation 
because violators of the bill's provisions could be subject to 
civil and criminal fines. Criminal fines are deposited as 
revenues in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. However, 
CBO estimates that any additional revenues and direct spending 
would not be significant in each year.
    H.R. 3190 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined 
in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect 
the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments.
    Prohibiting contracts between manufacturers and 
wholesalers, distributors, or retailers to set minimum retail 
prices would impose a private-sector mandate as defined in 
UMRA. Any existing or future contracts that set such prices 
would be a violation of anti-trust law.
    The cost of that mandate would be any forgone net income 
resulting from prohibiting such agreements; however, how such 
prohibitions would affect industry income is uncertain for 
several reasons. Although a large number of firms could be 
affected by the mandate, contracts involving pricing policies 
are confidential and can vary widely across markets. Further, 
the cost of the legislation would be mitigated to some extent 
because several states already prohibit such contracts and 
because firms could continue to use noncontractual policies 
that have the effect of setting minimum resale prices. Because 
of those uncertainties, CBO cannot determine whether the costs 
would exceed the annual threshold established in UMRA for 
private-sector mandates ($141 million in 2010, adjusted 
annually for inflation).
    The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Mark Grabowicz 
(for Federal costs) and Marin Randall (for the private-sector 
impact). The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy 
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of 
rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. 
3190 will negate the Supreme Court's decision in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. and restores the 
per se prohibition established in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons., Co., holding any agreement between a manufacturer 
and a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor establishing a 
minimum price for the sale of a product or service is a 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article I, section 8, clause 3 of the 
Constitution.

                          Advisory on Earmarks

    In accordance with clause 9 of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, H.R. 3190 does not contain any 
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff 
benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule XXI.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis

    The following discussion describes the bill as reported by 
the Committee.
    Sec. 1. Short title. Section 1 designates the short title 
of the bill as the ``Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act 
of 2009.''
    Sec. 2. Prohibition on Minimum Resale Price Maintenance. 
Section 2 makes any agreement between a manufacturer and a 
retailer, wholesaler, or distributor establishing a minimum 
price for the manufacturer's product or service a violation of 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.
    The term ``agreement'' is to be read synonymously with 
``contract, combination, or conspiracy'' as used in section 1 
of the Sherman Act, and is intended to be read consistently 
with the limitations on intra-enterprise conspiracy as held in 
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.\33\
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    \33\467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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    Sec. 3. Effective Date. This section establishes the bill's 
effective date as 90 days after the date of enactment. Thus, 
agreements subject to challenge under the bill will be per se 
illegal if entered into, or still in effect, 90 days after the 
date of enactment.

                            Additional Views

    I have strong reservations about the effect of H.R. 3190 on 
the market. I believe this legislation is imprudent. It is a 
wholesale prohibition against any price agreements between a 
manufacturer and a retailer. This change in law lumps together 
all market participants, without regard to their pricing power 
in the marketplace. It is unfortunate, since there is a simple 
and effective solution to this shortcoming of the original bill 
that would provide for protection of consumers against unfair 
market practices while recognizing the needs of businesses, big 
and small, to protect their products in the marketplace.
    At the time of the mark up of H.R. 3190, I offered an 
amendment to provide two standards of review for minimum price 
agreements between manufacturers and retailers. If the price 
setter had market power, the price agreement would be a per se 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. If the price setter did 
not have market power, then the court must apply the rule of 
reason standard set by the Supreme Court in Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. in 2007.
    I think Leegin got it right, partially. But the court can 
only use the tools it is given. My amendment was the middle 
ground. It refined and curtailed the Supreme Courts' 
application of the rule of reason standard to recognize 
antitrust concerns regarding market participants with market 
power who negotiate minimum price agreements with retailers. My 
amendment recognized our desire and the need to protect the 
consumers from unfair price-setting and promote competitive 
pricing process.
    On the other hand, my amendment also recognized that there 
more than one dynamic in the marketplace, not just consumer as 
a price-taker. Another dynamic is between the retailer/
distributor and the manufacturer. A manufacturer in retail 
environment has but one product (i.e. a suitcase, a computer, 
an iPod). The retailer, on the other hand, has a plethora of 
choices. Normally, a retailer, if you don't go to the Apple 
store, has Apple, BlackBerry, Samsung, and so on. In fact, most 
retailers, particularly the large retailers and the retailers 
that are in support of this legislation, have all the brands.
    If you are a retailer and you have the ability to take the 
most expensive brand, the best brand, the one that has the most 
demand and advertize it in limited quantities at a reduced 
price, and then when shoppers come in your store enticed by the 
low price, you have created traffic at the expense of the 
perceived value of that product. You have diluted the perceived 
value of the product in the process. You also, of course, have 
the ability to raise and lower that price to suit your whim. 
You have all the options.
    A manufacturer, again, has but one product, the product 
that they are presenting in the way that they would like to 
present it. If that manufacturer--and this was the crux of my 
amendment--has market power, then we should hold that 
manufacturer to the higher standard. But for a small 
manufacturer, a start-up, the little guy, it may be the only 
way to get the attention of the market to price their product 
where it belongs, realizing that it may sell less but it will 
sell to a discerning customer who appreciates the advantage, 
the quality, the unique characteristics of their product. If 
that is the decision of the manufacturer with their product, 
their intellectual property, the thing that they created and 
brought to market, if that manufacturer does not have antitrust 
considerations, if they have no market power, why shouldn't 
they be given some reasonable control over their own product, 
with a standard of review different from the standard of review 
we apply to manufacturer which has real market power? Under 
these circumstances, I believe the rule of reason standard set 
by the Supreme Court in Leegin is the right way to analyze the 
antitrust implications of the pricing agreements. The courts 
are well equipped to make this determination. Market power is 
not a vague standard. There is a huge body of settled antitrust 
law that tells us what market power is.
    The unfortunate effect of this legislation is that it will 
decrease competition in the marketplace by benefitting large 
retailers and manufacturers to the detriment of the small 
retailers and manufacturers, with the ultimate result of less 
consumer choice and lower product quality. It is my hope that 
this Committee will reconsider this matter in the future to 
correct its shortcomings.

                                   Darrell E. Issa.

                                 
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