[House Report 111-186]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


111th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    111-186

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

                                _______
                                

 June 26, 2009.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Reyes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 2701]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 2701) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Prohibition on earmarks.
Sec. 106. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 302. Temporary appointment to fill vacancies in Presidentially 
appointed and Senate confirmed positions in the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence.
Sec. 303. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements 
of the intelligence community.
Sec. 304. Provisions relating to the Defense Civilian Intelligence 
Personnel System.

                         Subtitle B--Education

Sec. 311. Permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence 
Scholars Program.
Sec. 312. Intelligence officer training program.
Sec. 313. Modifications to the Stokes educational scholarship program.
Sec. 314. Pilot program for intensive language instruction in African 
languages.

         Subtitle C--Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions

Sec. 321. Reporting on covert actions.

         Subtitle D--Reports and Other Congressional Oversight

Sec. 331. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 332. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence 
community.
Sec. 333. Semiannual reports on nuclear weapons programs of Iran, 
Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 334. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
intelligence community.
Sec. 335. Government Accountability Office audits and investigations.
Sec. 336. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.
Sec. 337. Reports on foreign industrial espionage.
Sec. 338. Report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 339. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 340. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
Sec. 341. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 342. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 343. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 344. Study on electronic waste destruction practices of the 
intelligence community.
Sec. 345. Report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air 
America.
Sec. 346. Study on college tuition programs for employees of the 
intelligence community.
Sec. 347. National Intelligence Estimate on global supply chain 
vulnerabilities.
Sec. 348. Review of records relating to potential health risks among 
Desert Storm veterans.
Sec. 349. Review of pensions of employees affected by ``five and out'' 
program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 350. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of 
detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 351. Summary of intelligence on Uighur detainees held at United 
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 352. Report on interrogation research and training.
Sec. 353. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence 
community.
Sec. 354. Review of Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction in foreign nations.
Sec. 355. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 356. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 357. Conforming amendments.

                       Subtitle E--Other Matters

Sec. 361. Modification of availability of funds for different 
intelligence activities.
Sec. 362. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 363. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt 
and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 364. Exemption of dissemination of terrorist identity information 
from Freedom of Information Act.
Sec. 365. Misuse of the intelligence community and Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence name, initials, or seal.
Sec. 366. Security clearances: reports; ombudsman; reciprocity.
Sec. 367. Limitation on use of funds for the transfer or release of 
individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.
Sec. 368. Intelligence community financial improvement and audit 
readiness.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy 
efficiency reports.
Sec. 405. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
Community.
Sec. 406. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 411. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 412. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for 
interrogations involving persons in the custody of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Appeals from decisions of Central Intelligence Agency 
contracting officers.
Sec. 414. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 415. Protection against reprisals.
Sec. 416. Requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons 
in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements

Sec. 421. Homeland Security intelligence elements.
Sec. 422. Clarification of inclusion of Drug Enforcement Administration 
as an element of the intelligence community.
Sec. 423. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 424. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of 
the intelligence community.
Sec. 425. Associate Director of the National Security Agency for 
Compliance and Training.
Sec. 426. General Counsel of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 427. Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 428. Charter for the National Reconnaissance Office.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the 
Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
Community.
Sec. 502. Expansion and clarification of the duties of the program 
manager for the information sharing environment.
Sec. 503. Classification review of executive branch materials in the 
possession of the congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 504. Prohibition on use of funds to provide Miranda warnings to 
certain persons outside of the United States.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

Sec. 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision of 
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.
Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to section 105 of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 518. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 519. Technical amendments to title 10, United States Code.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
        ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
                  (A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                  (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate.
          (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2010 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the following elements of the United States Government:
          (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) The Department of Defense.
          (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (5) The National Security Agency.
          (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (7) The Coast Guard.
          (8) The Department of State.
          (9) The Department of the Treasury.
          (10) The Department of Energy.
          (11) The Department of Justice.
          (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
          (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 
103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2010, for 
the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in 
paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill 
H.R. 2701 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The 
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) 
shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for 
suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of 
the Schedule, within the executive branch.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

  (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National 
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess 
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2010 by the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the 
Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, 
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian 
personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element.
  (b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence 
committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an 
authority described in subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2010 the sum of 
$672,812,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced 
research and development shall remain available until September 30, 
2011.
  (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National 
Intelligence are authorized 853 full-time or full-time equivalent 
personnel as of September 30, 2010. Personnel serving in such elements 
may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United 
States Government.
  (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the 
Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available 
to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the 
Intelligence Community Management Account.
  (d) Classified Authorizations.--
          (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts 
        authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
        Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to 
        be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal 
        year 2010 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
        102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and 
        development shall remain available until September 30, 2011.
          (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel 
        authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence 
        Community Management Account as of September 30, 2010, there 
        are authorized such additional personnel for the Community 
        Management Account as of that date as are specified in the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
        102(a).

SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON EARMARKS.

  (a) In General.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations, a report of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate to accompany the bill H.R. 2701 of the One 
Hundred Eleventh Congress, a joint statement of the managers 
accompanying a conference report on such bill, or the classified annex 
to this Act, shall be construed to authorize or require the expenditure 
of funds for a congressional earmark.
  (b) Congressional Earmark Defined.--In this section, the term 
``congressional earmark'' means a provision or report language included 
primarily at the request of a Member, Delegate, or Resident 
Commissioner of the House of Representatives or a Senator providing, 
authorizing, or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget 
authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a 
contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other 
expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State, 
locality, or congressional district, other than through a statutory or 
administrative formula-driven or competitive award process.

SEC. 106. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed 
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity 
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of 
the United States.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2010 the sum of 
$290,900,000.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO FILL VACANCIES IN PRESIDENTIALLY 
                    APPOINTED AND SENATE CONFIRMED POSITIONS IN THE 
                    OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) is 
amended by--
          (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
          (2) inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(e) Temporary Appointment to Fill Vacancies.--Notwithstanding 
section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, if an officer of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, other than the 
Director of National Intelligence, whose appointment to office is 
required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is unable to perform the 
functions and duties of the office--
          ``(1) if during the 365-day period immediately preceding the 
        date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve 
        of the applicable officer, the person serving as the first 
        assistant to the office of such officer served as such first 
        assistant for not less than 90 days, such first assistant shall 
        perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in 
        an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section 
        3346 of title 5, United States Code;
          ``(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President may direct 
        a person who serves in an office for which appointment is 
        required to be made by the President, by and with the advice 
        and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions and duties 
        of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject 
        to the time limitations of such section 3346; or
          ``(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall recommend to the President, and the 
        President may direct, a person to perform the functions and 
        duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity 
        subject to the time limitations of such section 3346, if--
                  ``(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of 
                death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve 
                of the applicable officer, such person served in a 
                position in an element of the intelligence community 
                for not less than 90 days;
                  ``(B) the rate of pay for the position described 
                under subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the 
                minimum rate of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of 
                the General Schedule; and
                  ``(C) in the case of a person who is employed by an 
                element of the intelligence community--
                          ``(i) the Director of National Intelligence 
                        shall consult with the head of such element; 
                        and
                          ``(ii) if the head of such element objects to 
                        the recommendation, the Director of National 
                        Intelligence may make the recommendation to the 
                        President over the objection of the head of 
                        such element after informing the President of 
                        such objection.''.

SEC. 303. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO ELEMENTS 
                    OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113 the 
following new section:
                      ``detail of other personnel
  ``Sec. 113A. Except as provided in section 904(g)(2) of the 
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and 
section 113 of this Act, and notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, an officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed 
Forces may be detailed to an element of the intelligence community 
funded through the Community Management Account from another element of 
the United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable 
basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National Intelligence 
and the head of the detailing element, for a period not to exceed two 
years.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by inserting after the item 
relating to section 113 the following new item:

``Sec. 113A. Detail of other personnel.''.

SEC. 304. PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE 
                    PERSONNEL SYSTEM.

  (a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
          (1) the term ``covered position'' means a defense 
        intelligence position in the Department of Defense established 
        under chapter 83 of title 10, United States Code, excluding an 
        Intelligence Senior Level position designated under section 
        1607 of such title and any position in the Defense Intelligence 
        Senior Executive Service;
          (2) the term ``DCIPS pay system'', as used with respect to a 
        covered position, means the provisions of the Defense Civilian 
        Intelligence Personnel System under which the rate of salary or 
        basic pay for such position is determined, excluding any 
        provisions relating to bonuses, awards, or any other amounts 
        not in the nature of salary or basic pay;
          (3) the term ``Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel 
        System'' means the personnel system established under chapter 
        83 of title 10, United States Code; and
          (4) the term ``appropriate pay system'', as used with respect 
        to a covered position, means--
                  (A) the system under which, as of September 30, 2007, 
                the rate of salary or basic pay for such position was 
                determined; or
                  (B) if subparagraph (A) does not apply, the system 
                under which, as of September 30, 2007, the rate of 
                salary or basic pay was determined for the positions 
                within the Department of Defense most similar to the 
                position involved,
        excluding any provisions relating to bonuses, awards, or any 
        other amounts which are not in the nature of salary or basic 
        pay.
  (b) Requirement That Appointments to Covered Positions After June 16, 
2009, Be Subject to the Appropriate Pay System.--Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law--
          (1) the DCIPS pay system--
                  (A) shall not apply to any individual holding a 
                covered position who is not subject to such system as 
                of June 16, 2009; and
                  (B) shall not apply to any covered position which is 
                not subject to such system as of June 16, 2009; and
          (2) any individual who, after June 16, 2009, is appointed to 
        a covered position shall accordingly be subject to the 
        appropriate pay system.
  (c) Termination of DCIPS Pay System for Covered Positions and 
Conversion of Employees Holding Covered Positions to the Appropriate 
Pay System.--
          (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall take all 
        actions which may be necessary to provide, within 12 months 
        after the date of enactment of this Act, for the termination of 
        the DCIPS pay system with respect to covered positions and for 
        the conversion of any employees holding any covered positions 
        which, as of such date of enactment, remain subject to the 
        DCIPS pay system, to the appropriate pay system. No employee 
        shall suffer any loss of or decrease in pay because of the 
        preceding sentence.
          (2) Report.--If the Secretary of Defense is of the view that 
        the DCIPS pay system should not be terminated with respect to 
        covered positions, as required by paragraph (1), the Secretary 
        shall submit to the President and both Houses of Congress as 
        soon as practicable, but in no event later than 6 months after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, a written report setting 
        forth a statement of the Secretary's views and the reasons 
        therefor. Such report shall specifically include--
                  (A) the Secretary's opinion as to whether the DCIPS 
                pay system should be continued, with or without 
                changes, with respect to covered positions; and
                  (B) if, in the opinion of the Secretary, the DCIPS 
                pay system should be continued with respect to covered 
                positions, with changes--
                          (i) a detailed description of the proposed 
                        changes; and
                          (ii) a description of any administrative 
                        action or legislation which may be necessary.
        The requirements of this paragraph shall be carried out by the 
        Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Director of the 
        Office of Personnel Management.
  (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
considered to affect--
          (1) the provisions of the Defense Civilian Intelligence 
        Personnel System governing aspects of compensation apart from 
        salary or basic pay; or
          (2) the application of such provisions with respect to a 
        covered position or any individual holding a covered position, 
        including after June 16, 2009.

                         Subtitle B--Education

SEC. 311. PERMANENT AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PAT ROBERTS INTELLIGENCE 
                    SCHOLARS PROGRAM.

  (a) Permanent Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.) is amended by adding at 
the end the following new section:
     ``program on recruitment and training of intelligence analysts
  ``Sec. 1022.  (a) Program.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence 
shall carry out a program to ensure that selected students or former 
students are provided funds to continue academic training, or are 
reimbursed for academic training previously obtained, in areas of 
specialization that the Director, in consultation with the other heads 
of the elements of the intelligence community, identifies as areas in 
which the current capabilities of the intelligence community are 
deficient or in which future capabilities of the intelligence community 
are likely to be deficient.
  ``(2) A student or former student selected for participation in the 
program shall commit to employment with an element of the intelligence 
community, following completion of appropriate academic training, under 
such terms and conditions as the Director considers appropriate.
  ``(3) The program shall be known as the Pat Roberts Intelligence 
Scholars Program.
  ``(b) Elements.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a), 
the Director shall--
          ``(1) establish such requirements relating to the academic 
        training of participants as the Director considers appropriate 
        to ensure that participants are prepared for employment as 
        intelligence professionals; and
          ``(2) periodically review the areas of specialization of the 
        elements of the intelligence community to determine the areas 
        in which such elements are, or are likely to be, deficient in 
        capabilities.
  ``(c) Use of Funds.--Funds made available for the program under 
subsection (a) shall be used to--
          ``(1) provide a monthly stipend for each month that a student 
        is pursuing a course of study;
          ``(2) pay the full tuition of a student or former student for 
        the completion of such course of study;
          ``(3) pay for books and materials that the student or former 
        student requires or required to complete such course of study;
          ``(4) pay the expenses of the student or former student for 
        travel requested by an element of the intelligence community in 
        relation to such program; or
          ``(5) for such other purposes the Director considers 
        appropriate to carry out such program.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--
          (1) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section 
        303 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item 
        relating to section 1021 the following new item:

``Sec. 1022. Program on recruitment and training of intelligence 
analysts.''.

          (2) Repeal of pilot program.--Section 318 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 
        U.S.C. 441g note) is repealed.

SEC. 312. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.

  (a) Program.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by section 311 of this Act, 
is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:
                ``intelligence officer training program
  ``Sec. 1023.  (a) Programs.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may carry out a grant program in accordance with 
subsection (b) to enhance the recruitment and retention of an 
ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence community workforce with 
capabilities critical to the national security interests of the United 
States.
  ``(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director of National 
Intelligence shall identify the skills necessary to meet current or 
emergent needs of the intelligence community and the educational 
disciplines that will provide individuals with such skills.
  ``(b) Institutional Grant Program.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may provide grants to institutions of higher education to 
support the establishment or continued development of programs of study 
in educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2).
  ``(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may, with respect to the 
educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2), be used for 
the following purposes:
          ``(A) Curriculum or program development.
          ``(B) Faculty development.
          ``(C) Laboratory equipment or improvements.
          ``(D) Faculty research.
  ``(3) An institution of higher education seeking a grant under this 
section shall submit an application describing the proposed use of the 
grant at such time and in such manner as the Director may require.
  ``(4) An institution of higher education that receives a grant under 
this section shall submit to the Director regular reports regarding the 
use of such grant, including--
          ``(A) a description of the benefits to students who 
        participate in the course of study funded by such grant;
          ``(B) a description of the results and accomplishments 
        related to such course of study; and
          ``(C) any other information that the Director may require.
  ``(c) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out this 
section.
  ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
          ``(1) Institution of higher education.--The term `institution 
        of higher education' has the meaning given the term in section 
        101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
          ``(2) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of 
        National Intelligence.''.
  (b) Repeal of Duplicative Provisions.--
          (1) In general.--The following provisions of law are 
        repealed:
                  (A) Section 319 of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
                for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 403 
                note).
                  (B) Section 1003 of the National Security Act of 1947 
                (50 U.S.C. 441g-2).
                  (C) Section 922 of the Ronald W. Reagan National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public 
                Law 108-375; 50 U.S.C. 402 note).
          (2) Existing agreements.--Notwithstanding the repeals made by 
        paragraph (1), nothing in this subsection shall be construed to 
        amend, modify, or abrogate any agreement, contract, or 
        employment relationship that was in effect in relation to the 
        provisions repealed under paragraph (1) on the day prior to the 
        date of the enactment of this Act.
  (c) Conforming Amendments.--The table of contents in the first 
section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as 
amended by section 311 of this Act, is further amended by--
          (1) striking the item relating to section 1003; and
          (2) inserting after the item relating to section 1022 the 
        following new item:

``Sec. 1023. Intelligence officer training program.''.

SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO THE STOKES EDUCATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM.

  (a) Expansion of Program to Graduate Students.--Section 16 of the 
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)--
                  (A) by striking ``undergraduate'' and inserting 
                ``undergraduate and graduate''; and
                  (B) by striking ``the baccalaureate'' and inserting 
                ``a baccalaureate or graduate''; and
          (2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``undergraduate'' and 
        inserting ``undergraduate and graduate''.
  (b) Termination.--Section 16(d)(1)(C) of such Act is amended by 
striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and inserting 
the following: ``terminated by--
                  ``(i) the Agency due to misconduct by the person;
                  ``(ii) the person voluntarily; or
                  ``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the person 
                to maintain such level of academic standing in the 
                educational course of training as the Director of the 
                National Security Agency specifies in the agreement 
                under this paragraph; and''.
  (c) Authority to Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--
Section 16(e) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 
402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that 
follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency 
efforts''.
  (d) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
          (1) Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441g et seq.), as amended by 
        section 312 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the 
        end the following new section:
                      ``stokes scholarship program
  ``Sec. 1024. The head of an element of the intelligence community may 
establish an undergraduate and graduate training program with respect 
to civilian employees of such element in the same manner and under the 
same conditions as the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish 
such a program under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 
1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note).''.
          (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section 
        312 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item 
        relating to section 1023 the following new item:

``Sec. 1024. Stokes scholarship program.''.

SEC. 314. PILOT PROGRAM FOR INTENSIVE LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION IN AFRICAN 
                    LANGUAGES.

  (a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the National Security Education Board established 
under section 803(a) of the David L. Boren National Security Education 
Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1903(a)), may establish a pilot program for 
intensive language instruction in African languages.
  (b) Program.--A pilot program established under subsection (a) shall 
provide scholarships for programs that provide intensive language 
instruction--
          (1) in any of the five highest priority African languages for 
        which scholarships are not offered under such Act, as 
        determined by the Director of National Intelligence; and
          (2) both in the United States and in a country in which the 
        language is the native language of a significant portion of the 
        population, as determined by the Director of National 
        Intelligence.
  (c) Termination.--A pilot program established in accordance with 
subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the 
date on which such pilot program is established.
  (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
          (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
        carry out this section $2,000,000.
          (2) Availability.--Funds authorized to be appropriated under 
        paragraph (1) shall remain available until the termination of 
        the pilot program in accordance with subsection (c).

         Subtitle C--Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions

SEC. 321. REPORTING ON COVERT ACTIONS.

  (a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended by adding at the end 
the following new paragraph:
  ``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall provide to 
the congressional intelligence committees all information necessary to 
assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, 
budgetary authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including--
          ``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence 
        activity is being or was conducted;
          ``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in 
        carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including 
        dissenting legal views;
          ``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the 
        intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing 
        intelligence sources or methods;
          ``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will 
        exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or other 
        resources; and
          ``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will 
        fail.''.
  (b) Procedures.--Section 501(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413(c)) is 
amended by striking ``such procedures'' and inserting ``such written 
procedures''.
  (c) Intelligence Activities.--Section 502(a)(2) of such Act (50 
U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``(including any information 
or material relating to the legal authority under which an intelligence 
activity is being or was conducted, and any information or material 
relating to legal issues upon which guidance was sought in carrying out 
or planning the intelligence activity, including dissenting legal 
views)'' after ``concerning intelligence activities''.
  (d) Covert Actions.--Section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413b) is 
amended--
          (1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``(including any 
        information or material relating to the legal authority under 
        which a covert action is being or was conducted, and any 
        information or material relating to legal issues upon which 
        guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the covert 
        action, including dissenting legal views)'' after ``concerning 
        covert actions'';
          (2) in subsection (c)--
                  (A) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the 
                following new paragraph:
  ``(2) If, pursuant to the procedures established by each of the 
congressional intelligence committees under section 501(c), one of the 
congressional intelligence committees determines that not all members 
of that committee are required to have access to a finding under this 
subsection, the President may limit access to such finding or such 
notice as provided in such procedures.''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``is limited to the 
                Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2)'' and 
                inserting ``is not provided to all members of one of 
                the congressional intelligence committees in accordance 
                with paragraph (2)'';
          (3) in subsection (d)--
                  (A) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting 
                ``(d)(1) The President'';
                  (B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph 
                (A) of this paragraph, by striking ``specified in'' and 
                inserting ``informed in accordance with''; and
                  (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall constitute a 
`significant undertaking' if the activity--
          ``(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
          ``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, 
        including authorities relating to research, development, or 
        operations;
          ``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or 
        other resources;
          ``(D) requires notification under section 504;
          ``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing 
        intelligence sources or methods; or
          ``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic relations 
        of the United States if such activity were disclosed without 
        authorization.''; and
          (4) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
  ``(g)(1) A Member of Congress to which a finding is reported under 
subsection (c) or notice is provided under subsection (d)(1) may submit 
to the Director of National Intelligence an objection to any part of 
such finding or such notice. Not later than 48 hours after such an 
objection is submitted to the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Director shall report such objection in writing to the President and 
such Member of Congress.
  ``(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection 
(c) or notice provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to 
all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance 
with subsection (c)(2), the President shall provide such members with 
general information on the content of the finding or notice.
  ``(3) The President shall--
          ``(A) maintain a record of the Members of Congress to which a 
        finding is reported under subsection (c) or notice is provided 
        under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each Member of 
        Congress receives such finding or notice; and
          ``(B) not later than 30 days after the date on which such 
        finding is reported or such notice is provided, provide such 
        record to--
                  ``(i) in the case of a finding reported or notice 
                provided to a Member of the House of Representatives, 
                the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                House of Representatives; and
                  ``(ii) in the case of a finding reported or notice 
                provided to a Member of the Senate, the Select 
                Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
  ``(h) Any requirement under section 501, 502, or this section to 
provide information to the congressional intelligence committees shall 
be construed to require the submission of such information to all 
members of such committees, unless such information is specifically 
authorized not to be submitted to all members of one of such committees 
in accordance with subsection (c)(2).''.

         Subtitle D--Reports and Other Congressional Oversight

SEC. 331. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS.

  Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is 
amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and inserting 
        ``annual'';
          (2) in subsection (a)--
                  (A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and 
                inserting ``Annual'';
                  (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
                          (i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and 
                        inserting ``annual basis''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``preceding six-month 
                        period'' and inserting ``preceding one-year 
                        period'';
                  (C) by striking paragraph (2); and
                  (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as 
                paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively; and
          (3) in subsection (d)--
                  (A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the Committee on 
                Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on 
                Appropriations,''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the Committee on 
                Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on 
                Appropriations,''.

SEC. 332. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) 
is amended by inserting after section 507 the following new section:
   ``annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community
  ``Sec. 508.  (a) Assessment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall, in consultation with the head of each element of the 
intelligence community, prepare an annual personnel level assessment 
for such element that assesses the personnel levels of such element for 
the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the assessment is 
submitted.
  ``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each year along 
with the budget submitted by the President in accordance with section 
1105 of title 31, United States Code.
  ``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall 
include, for the element of the intelligence community concerned, the 
following information:
          ``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs of such 
        element for the upcoming fiscal year.
          ``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such 
        costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal 
        year.
          ``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such 
        costs as compared to the personnel costs during the preceding 
        five fiscal years.
          ``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for such 
        element for the upcoming fiscal year.
          ``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such number as compared to the number of personnel positions of 
        such element of the current fiscal year.
          ``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such number as compared to the number of personnel positions of 
        such element during the preceding five fiscal years.
          ``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of 
        contractors to be funded by such element for the upcoming 
        fiscal year.
          ``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of 
        the costs of contractors to be funded by such element during 
        the current fiscal year.
          ``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of 
        contractors, and the number of contractors, of such element 
        during the preceding five fiscal years.
          ``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel 
        and contractor levels.
          ``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts 
        employed or contracted by such element.
          ``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject 
        of an investigation completed by the inspector general of such 
        element during the preceding fiscal year, or are or have been 
        the subject of an investigation by such inspector general 
        during the current fiscal year.
          ``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence 
        of whether, based on current and projected funding, such 
        element will have sufficient--
                  ``(A) internal infrastructure to support the 
                requested personnel and contractor levels;
                  ``(B) training resources to support the requested 
                personnel levels; and
                  ``(C) funding to support the administrative and 
                operational activities of the requested personnel 
                levels.''.

SEC. 333. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF IRAN, 
                    SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA.

  (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 332, is further amended by 
adding at the end the following new section:
 ``semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of iran, syria, 
                            and north korea
  ``Sec. 509.  (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently than 
every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the intentions and 
capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, 
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the 
nuclear weapons programs of each such country.
  ``(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
          ``(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each 
        country;
          ``(2) an evaluation of the sources upon which the 
        intelligence used to prepare the assessment referred to in 
        paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources 
        and an assessment of the reliability of each source;
          ``(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any program 
        gathered or developed since the previous report was submitted 
        under subsection (a), including intelligence collected from 
        both open and clandestine sources for each country; and
          ``(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
        knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in 
        the assessment referred to in paragraph (1).
  ``(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National 
Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the 
intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian 
Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in lieu of 
a report required by subsection (a) for that country.
  ``(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section, 
the term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
          ``(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
          ``(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
          ``(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate.''.
  (b) Applicability Date.--The first report required to be submitted 
under section 509 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 334. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), 
as amended by section 333 of this Act, is further amended by adding at 
the end the following new section:
 ``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community
  ``Sec. 510. Each year on the date provided in section 507, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the proficiency in 
foreign languages and, as appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each 
element of the intelligence community, including--
          ``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element 
        that require foreign language proficiency and the level of 
        proficiency required;
          ``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each 
        element will require during the five-year period beginning on 
        the date of the submission of the report;
          ``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element 
        that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by--
                  ``(A) military personnel; and
                  ``(B) civilian personnel;
          ``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such element 
        in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language 
        proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the 
        proficiency level;
          ``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language 
        and proficiency level;
          ``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently 
        attending foreign language training, including the provider of 
        such training;
          ``(7) a description of the efforts of such element to 
        recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient 
        in a foreign language;
          ``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
        advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
          ``(9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, dialect 
        of a foreign language--
                  ``(A) the number of positions of such element that 
                require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
                  ``(B) the number of personnel of such element that 
                are serving in a position that requires proficiency in 
                the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary 
                duty of the position;
                  ``(C) the number of personnel of such element that 
                are serving in a position that does not require 
                proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to 
                perform the primary duty of the position;
                  ``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated 
                at each level of proficiency of the Interagency 
                Language Roundtable;
                  ``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level 
                of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable 
                meets the requirements of such element;
                  ``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to 
                serve as linguists for such element that are not 
                qualified as linguists under the standards of the 
                Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  ``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as 
                linguists for such element during the preceding 
                calendar year;
                  ``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists 
                that discontinued serving such element during the 
                preceding calendar year;
                  ``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic 
                skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United 
                States; and
                  ``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic 
                skills that is fulfilled by contractors;
          ``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and 
        capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole;
          ``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
        relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of 
        National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant; 
        and
          ``(12) an assessment of the feasibility of employing foreign 
        nationals lawfully present in the United States who have 
        previously worked as translators or interpreters for the Armed 
        Forces or another department or agency of the Federal 
        Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical language 
        needs of such element.''.

SEC. 335. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIONS.

  Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), 
as amended by section 334 of this Act, is further amended by adding at 
the end the following new section:
     ``government accountability office analyses, evaluations, and 
                             investigations
  ``Sec. 511.  (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that personnel of 
the Government Accountability Office designated by the Comptroller 
General are provided with access to all information in the possession 
of an element of the intelligence community that the Comptroller 
General determines is necessary for such personnel to conduct an 
analysis, evaluation, or investigation of a program or activity of an 
element of the intelligence community that is requested by one of the 
congressional intelligence committees.
  ``(b) Exception.--(1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Director of 
National Intelligence may restrict access to information referred to in 
subsection (a) by personnel designated in such subsection if the 
Director determines that the restriction is necessary to protect vital 
national security interests of the United States.
  ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not restrict access 
under subparagraph (A) solely on the basis of the level of 
classification or compartmentation of information that the personnel 
designated in subsection (a) may seek access to while conducting an 
analysis, evaluation, or investigation.
  ``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), 
the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise 
of such authority within 7 days.
  ``(3) The Director shall notify the Comptroller General at the time a 
report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent 
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the 
Comptroller General with a copy of such report.
  ``(4) The Comptroller General shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the 
Comptroller General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Comptroller 
General considers appropriate.''.

SEC. 336. CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OVERSIGHT REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 335 of this Act, is further 
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
       ``certification of compliance with oversight requirements
  ``Sec. 512. The head of each element of the intelligence community 
shall semiannually submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees--
          ``(1) a certification that, to the best of the knowledge of 
        the head of such element--
                  ``(A) the head of such element of the intelligence 
                community is in full compliance with the requirements 
                of this title; and
                  ``(B) any information required to be submitted by 
                such head of such element under this Act before the 
                date of the submission of such certification has been 
                properly submitted; or
          ``(2) if such head of such element is unable to submit a 
        certification under paragraph (1), a statement--
                  ``(A) of the reasons such head of such element is not 
                able to submit such a certification;
                  ``(B) describing any information required to be 
                submitted by such head of such element under this Act 
                before the date of the submission of such statement 
                that has not been properly submitted; and
                  ``(C) that the head of such element will submit such 
                information as soon as possible after the submission of 
                such statement.''.
  (b) Applicability Date.--The first certification or statement 
required to be submitted by the head of each element of the 
intelligence community under section 512 of the National Security Act 
of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted 
not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 337. REPORTS ON FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.

  (a) In General.--Section 809(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. app. 2170b(b)) is amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``Annual'' and inserting 
        ``Biannual'';
          (2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new 
        paragraph:
          ``(1) Submission to congress.--The President shall biannually 
        submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
        Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
        and the Senate, and congressional leadership a report updating 
        the information referred to in subsection (a)(1)(D).'';
          (3) by striking paragraph (2); and
          (4) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).
  (b) Initial Report.--The first report required under section 
809(b)(1) of such Act, as amended by subsection (a)(2) of this section, 
shall be submitted not later than February 1, 2010.

SEC. 338. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

  (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2010, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate a report describing the use of 
personal services contracts across the intelligence community, the 
impact of the use of such contracts on the intelligence community 
workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into Federal 
Government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern 
the performance of such personal services contracts.
  (b) Content.--
          (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
        shall include--
                  (A) a description of any relevant regulations or 
                guidance issued by the Director of National 
                Intelligence or the head of an element of the 
                intelligence community relating to minimum standards 
                required regarding the hiring, training, security 
                clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how 
                those standards may differ from those for Federal 
                Government employees performing substantially similar 
                functions;
                  (B) an identification of contracts where the 
                contractor is performing substantially similar 
                functions to a Federal Government employee;
                  (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings 
                achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of 
                such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead 
                of using full-time employees of the elements of the 
                intelligence community to perform such functions;
                  (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using 
                contractors to perform the activities described in 
                paragraph (2);
                  (E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the 
                number of personnel working under such contracts, 
                related to the performance of activities described in 
                paragraph (2);
                  (F) a comparison of the compensation of contract 
                employees and Federal Government employees performing 
                substantially similar functions;
                  (G) an analysis of the attrition of Federal 
                Government personnel for contractor positions that 
                provide substantially similar functions;
                  (H) a description of positions that will be converted 
                from contractor employment to Federal Government 
                employment;
                  (I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability 
                mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts 
                awarded for intelligence activities by each element of 
                the intelligence community during fiscal years 2008 and 
                2009;
                  (J) an analysis of procedures in use in the 
                intelligence community for conducting oversight of 
                contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of 
                criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other 
                abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel; 
                and
                  (K) an identification of best practices for oversight 
                and accountability mechanisms applicable to personal 
                services contracts.
          (2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are 
        the following:
                  (A) Intelligence collection.
                  (B) Intelligence analysis.
                  (C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, 
                and interrogation activities.

SEC. 339. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF 
                    THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report 
describing the Director's long-term vision for transforming the 
intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the 
internal reforms of the Bureau intended to achieve that vision. Such 
report shall include--
          (1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the 
        intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
          (2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence 
        and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
          (3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms at 
        the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau 
        towards achieving the goals of the Director for the 
        intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau; and
          (4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks that 
        are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau as an 
        intelligence agency, including--
                  (A) identifying new intelligence targets within the 
                scope of the national security functions of the Bureau, 
                outside the parameters of an existing case file or 
                ongoing investigation;
                  (B) collecting intelligence domestically, including 
                collection through human and technical sources;
                  (C) recruiting human sources;
                  (D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit, 
                and handle human sources;
                  (E) working collaboratively with other Federal 
                departments and agencies to jointly collect 
                intelligence on domestic counterterrorism and 
                counterintelligence targets;
                  (F) producing a common intelligence picture of 
                domestic threats to the national security of the United 
                States;
                  (G) producing high quality and timely intelligence 
                analysis;
                  (H) integrating intelligence analysts into its 
                intelligence collection operations; and
                  (I) sharing intelligence information with 
                intelligence community partners.

SEC. 340. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ AND 
                    AFGHANISTAN.

  Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense 
shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and 
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate a report on intelligence collection and analysis resources 
(1) dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal years 2008 and 
2009, and (2) planned to be dedicated during fiscal year 2010. Such 
report shall include detailed information on fiscal, human, technical, 
and other intelligence collection and analysis resources.

SEC. 341. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS.

  (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2011, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a 
report assessing the threat to national security presented by the 
efforts of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage, diversion, 
or other means, sensitive equipment and technology, and the degree to 
which United States export controls (including the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations) are adequate to defeat such efforts.
  (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The term 
``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means those regulations 
contained in parts 120 through 130 of title 22, Code of Federal 
Regulations (or successor regulations).

SEC. 342. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.

  (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2010, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a 
report on the illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and 
equipment.
  (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
include, for a period of time including at least the preceding three 
years--
          (1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit 
        sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of--
                  (A) nuclear or radiological material;
                  (B) equipment useful for the production of nuclear or 
                radiological material; or
                  (C) nuclear explosive devices;
          (2) an assessment of the countries that represent the 
        greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
          (3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in knowledge, 
        or other information that would reduce confidence in the 
        assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in 
classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary.

SEC. 343. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED 
                    DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

  (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a 
study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel of the 
intelligence community who commit unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information, including whether revoking such pensions is 
feasible under existing law or under the administrative authority of 
the Director of National Intelligence or any other head of an element 
of the intelligence community.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results 
of the study conducted under subsection (a).

SEC. 344. STUDY ON ELECTRONIC WASTE DESTRUCTION PRACTICES OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Study.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
conduct a study on the electronic waste destruction practices of the 
intelligence community. Such study shall assess--
          (1) the security of the electronic waste disposal practices 
        of the intelligence community, including the potential for 
        counterintelligence exploitation of destroyed, discarded, or 
        recycled materials;
          (2) the environmental impact of such disposal practices; and
          (3) methods to improve the security and environmental impact 
        of such disposal practices, including steps to prevent the 
        forensic exploitation of electronic waste.
  (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing 
the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).

SEC. 345. REPORT ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AIR 
                    AMERICA.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal 
retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such 
citizens prior to 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated 
company during a period when Air America or the associated company was 
owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or 
managed by the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following:
          (1) The history of Air America and the associated companies 
        prior to 1977, including a description of--
                  (A) the relationship between Air America and the 
                associated companies and the Central Intelligence 
                Agency or any other element of the United States 
                Government;
                  (B) the workforce of Air America and the associated 
                companies;
                  (C) the missions performed by Air America, the 
                associated companies, and their employees for the 
                United States; and
                  (D) the casualties suffered by employees of Air 
                America and the associated companies in the course of 
                their employment.
          (2) A description of--
                  (A) the retirement benefits contracted for or 
                promised to the employees of Air America and the 
                associated companies prior to 1977;
                  (B) the contributions made by such employees for such 
                benefits;
                  (C) the retirement benefits actually paid such 
                employees;
                  (D) the entitlement of such employees to the payment 
                of future retirement benefits; and
                  (E) the likelihood that such employees will receive 
                any future retirement benefits.
          (3) An assessment of the difference between--
                  (A) the retirement benefits that former employees of 
                Air America and the associated companies have received 
                or will receive by virtue of their employment with Air 
                America and the associated companies; and
                  (B) the retirement benefits that such employees would 
                have received or be eligible to receive if such 
                employment was deemed to be employment by the United 
                States Government and their service during such 
                employment was credited as Federal service for the 
                purpose of Federal retirement benefits.
          (4) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of 
        legislative action to treat such employment as Federal service 
        for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the 
        relationship between Air America and the associated companies 
        and the United States Government and the services and 
        sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States.
          (5) If legislative action is considered advisable under 
        paragraph (4), a proposal for such action and an assessment of 
        its costs.
          (6) The opinions of the Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency, if any, on any matters covered by the report that the 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers 
        appropriate.
  (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air America, 
        Incorporated.
          (2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company'' 
        means any entity associated with, predecessor to, or subsidiary 
        to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited, CAT 
        Incorporated, Civil Air Transport Company Limited, and the 
        Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, during the period 
        when such an entity was owned and controlled by the United 
        States Government.

SEC. 346. STUDY ON COLLEGE TUITION PROGRAMS FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a 
study on the feasability of--
          (1) providing matching funds for contributions to college 
        savings programs made by employees of elements of the 
        intelligence community; and
          (2) establishing a program to pay the college tuition of each 
        child of an employee of an element of the intelligence 
        community that has died in the performance of the official 
        duties of such employee.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
Congress a report containing the results of the study conducted under 
subsection (a).
  (c) College Savings Program Defined.--In this section, the term 
``college savings program'' means--
          (1) a qualified tuition program, as defined in section 529 of 
        the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
          (2) a Coverdell education savings account, as defined in 
        section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and
          (3) any other appropriate program providing tax incentives 
        for saving funds to pay for college tuition, as determined by 
        the Director of National Intelligence.

SEC. 347. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN 
                    VULNERABILITIES.

  (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
Congress a National Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence 
Assessment on the global supply chain to determine whether such supply 
chain poses a risk to defense and intelligence systems due to 
counterfeit components that may be defective or deliberately 
manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization.
  (b) Review of Mitigation.--
          (1) NCIX review.--The National Counterintelligence Executive 
        shall conduct a review of the adequacy of the mechanisms to 
        identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in the global supply 
        chain that pose a risk to defense and intelligence systems due 
        to counterfeit components that may be defective or deliberately 
        manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization.
          (2) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the National Counterintelligence 
        Executive shall submit to Congress a report containing the 
        results of the review conducted under paragraph (1).

SEC. 348. REVIEW OF RECORDS RELATING TO POTENTIAL HEALTH RISKS AMONG 
                    DESERT STORM VETERANS.

  (a) Review.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
conduct a classification review of the records of the Agency that are 
relevant to the known or potential health effects suffered by veterans 
of Operation Desert Storm as described in the November, 2008, report by 
the Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf 
War Veterans Illnesses.
  (b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
submit to Congress the results of the classification review conducted 
under subsection (a), including the total number of records of the 
Agency that are relevant.
  (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 349. REVIEW OF PENSIONS OF EMPLOYEES AFFECTED BY ``FIVE AND OUT'' 
                    PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau 
after such supervisor serves in a management position for seven years 
(commonly known as the ``seven and out'' program) until the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation submits to the congressional 
intelligence committees a certification that the Director has completed 
a review of issues related to the pensions of former employees of the 
Bureau affected by a previous program of mandatory reassignment after 
serving in a management position for five years (commonly known as the 
``five and out'' program) and the effect of such program on the Bureau 
and the results of such review.

SEC. 350. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST RECIDIVISM OF 
                    DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, 
                    GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

  Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an 
unclassified summary of--
          (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees 
        currently or formerly held at United States Naval Station, 
        Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
          (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will 
        engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist 
        organizations.

SEC. 351. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE ON UIGHUR DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED 
                    STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

  Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an 
unclassified summary of--
          (1) intelligence relating to threats posed by Uighur 
        detainees currently or formerly held at United States Naval 
        Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; 
        and
          (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will 
        engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist 
        organizations.

SEC. 352. REPORT ON INTERROGATION RESEARCH AND TRAINING.

  (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than December 31, 2009, the 
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of 
the relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report 
on the state of research, analysis, and training in interrogation and 
debriefing practices.
  (b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include--
          (1) an assessment of--
                  (A) the quality and value of scientific and technical 
                research in interrogation and debriefing practices that 
                has been conducted independently or in affiliation with 
                the Federal Government and the identification of areas 
                in which additional research could potentially improve 
                interrogation practices;
                  (B) the state of interrogation and debriefing 
                training in the intelligence community, including the 
                character and adequacy of the ethical component of such 
                training, and the identification of any gaps in 
                training;
                  (C) the adequacy of efforts to enhance career path 
                options for intelligence community personnel that serve 
                as interrogators and debriefers, including efforts to 
                recruit and retain career personnel; and
                  (D) the effectiveness of existing processes for 
                studying and implementing lessons learned and best 
                practices of interrogation and debriefing; and
          (2) any recommendations that the Director considers 
        appropriate for improving the performance of the intelligence 
        community with respect to the issues described in subparagraphs 
        (A) through (D) of paragraph (1).

SEC. 353. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2010, the 
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of 
the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each 
element to increase diversity within the intelligence community.
  (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element 
of the intelligence community, including--
          (1) specific implementation plans for each such element 
        designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan 
        of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment 
        opportunity and diversity;
          (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
        increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
          (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
        improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, 
        midgrade, senior, and management levels;
          (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training 
        and education programs for senior officials and managers of 
        each such element; and
          (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the 
        success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs 
        described in paragraphs (1) through (4).

SEC. 354. REVIEW OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION EXERCISE OF 
                    ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION IN FOREIGN NATIONS.

  Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a review of constraints under 
international law and the laws of foreign nations to the assertion of 
enforcement jurisdiction with respect to criminal investigations of 
terrorism offenses under the laws of the United States conducted by 
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in foreign nations and 
using funds made available for the National Intelligence Program, 
including constraints identified in section 432 of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.

SEC. 355. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) Annual Report on Intelligence.--Section 109 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed.
  (b) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section 
1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is 
amended--
          (1) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The 
        Director'' ; and
          (2) by striking paragraph (2).
  (c) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification 
Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsection (d); and
          (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as 
        subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
  (d) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.--Section 826 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed.

SEC. 356. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence 
committees that is included in the classified annex to this Act is 
hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in 
law.

SEC. 357. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

  (a) Report Submission Dates.--Section 507 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)--
                  (A) in paragraph (1)--
                          (i) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (G);
                          (ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C), 
                        (D), (E), (F), (H), (I), and (N) as 
                        subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), 
                        (G), and (H), respectively; and
                          (iii) by adding at the end the following new 
                        subparagraphs:
          ``(I) The annual report on financial intelligence on 
        terrorist assets required by section 118.
          ``(J) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in 
        the intelligence community required by section 510.''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (D); 
                and
          (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of 
such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section 313 of this Act, 
is further amended by--
          (1) striking the item relating to section 109; and
          (2) inserting after the item relating to section 507 the 
        following new items:

``Sec. 508. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence 
community.
``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of Iran, 
Syria, and North Korea.
``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
community.
``Sec. 511. Government Accountability Office analyses, evaluations, and 
investigations.
``Sec. 512. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.''.

                       Subtitle E--Other Matters

SEC. 361. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT 
                    INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity 
                supports an emergent need, improves program 
                effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''.

SEC. 362. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION.

  (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence 
Officers and Agents.--
          (1) Disclosure after access to information identifying 
        agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security 
        Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten 
        years'' and inserting ``15 years''.
          (2) Disclosure after access to classified information.--
        Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five 
        years'' and inserting ``10 years''.
  (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence 
Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting 
``including an assessment of the need for any modification of this 
title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert 
agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert 
agents,''.

SEC. 363. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT 
                    AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS.

  Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended to read as follows:
  ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the 
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the 
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in 
subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element 
certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of 
such information could adversely affect United States intelligence 
sources or methods.
  ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant 
to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the 
Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such 
information.
  ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' has the 
meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.

SEC. 364. EXEMPTION OF DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST IDENTITY INFORMATION 
                    FROM FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

  Section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Section 
404o) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(k) Exemption of Dissemination of Terrorist Identity Information 
From Freedom of Information Act.--(1) Terrorist identity information 
disseminated for terrorist screening purposes or other authorized 
counterterrorism purposes shall be exempt from disclosure under section 
552 of title 5, United States Code.
  ``(2) In this section:
          ``(A) Authorized counterterrorism purpose.--The term 
        `authorized counterterrorism purpose' includes disclosure to 
        and appropriate use by an element of the Federal Government of 
        terrorist identifiers of persons reasonably suspected to be 
        terrorists or supporters of terrorists.
          ``(B) Terrorist identity information.--The term `terrorist 
        identity information' means--
                  ``(i) information from a database maintained by any 
                element of the Federal Government that would reveal 
                whether an individual has or has not been determined to 
                be a known or suspected terrorist or has or has not 
                been determined to be within the networks of contacts 
                and support of a known or suspected terrorist; and
                  ``(ii) information related to a determination as to 
                whether or not an individual is or should be included 
                in the Terrorist Screening Database or other screening 
                databases based on a determination that the individual 
                is a known or suspected terrorist.
          ``(C) Terrorist identifiers.--The term `terrorist 
        identifiers'--
                  ``(i) includes--
                          ``(I) names and aliases;
                          ``(II) dates or places of birth;
                          ``(III) unique identifying numbers or 
                        information;
                          ``(IV) physical identifiers or biometrics; 
                        and
                          ``(V) any other identifying information 
                        provided for watchlisting purposes; and
                  ``(ii) does not include derogatory information or 
                information that would reveal or compromise 
                intelligence or law enforcement sources or methods.''.

SEC. 365. MISUSE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OFFICE OF THE 
                    DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NAME, INITIALS, 
                    OR SEAL.

  (a) Intelligence Community.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new section:
     ``misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or seal
  ``Sec. 1103.  (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with the 
written permission of the Director of National Intelligence or a 
designee of the Director, knowingly use the words `intelligence 
community', the initials `IC', the seal of the intelligence community, 
or any colorable imitation of such words, initials, or seal in 
connection with any merchandise, impersonation, solicitation, or 
commercial activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the 
impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the 
Director of National Intelligence, except that employees of the 
intelligence community may use the intelligence community name, 
initials, and seal in accordance with regulations promulgated by the 
Director of National Intelligence.
  ``(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that 
any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice which 
constitutes or will constitute conduct prohibited by subsection (a), 
the Attorney General may initiate a civil proceeding in a district 
court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court 
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination 
of such action and may, at any time before final determination, enter 
such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action as 
is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to any person 
or class of persons for whose protection the action is brought.''.
  (b) Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--Title XI of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.), as amended by 
subsection (a) of this section, is further amended by adding at the end 
the following new section:
 ``misuse of the office of the director of national intelligence name, 
                           initials, or seal
  ``Sec. 1104.  (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with the 
written permission of the Director of National Intelligence or a 
designee of the Director, knowingly use the words `Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence', the initials `ODNI', the seal of 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or any colorable 
imitation of such words, initials, or seal in connection with any 
merchandise, impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a 
manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is 
approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  ``(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that 
any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice which 
constitutes or will constitute conduct prohibited by subsection (a), 
the Attorney General may initiate a civil proceeding in a district 
court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court 
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination 
of such action and may, at any time before final determination, enter 
such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action as 
is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to any person 
or class of persons for whose protection the action is brought.''.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section 357 of this 
Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new items:

``Sec. 1103. Misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or 
seal.
``Sec. 1104. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence name, initials, or seal.''.

SEC. 366. SECURITY CLEARANCES: REPORTS; OMBUDSMAN; RECIPROCITY.

  (a) Reports Relating to Security Clearances.--
          (1) Quadrennial audit; security clearance determinations.--
                  (A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act 
                of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 
                336 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the 
                end the following new section:
                    ``reports on security clearances
  ``Sec. 513.  (a) Quadrennial Audit of Position Requirements.--(1) The 
President shall every four years conduct an audit of how the executive 
branch determines whether a security clearance is required for a 
particular position in the Federal Government.
  ``(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit 
conducted under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to Congress 
the results of such audit.
  ``(b) Report on Security Clearance Determinations.--(1) Not later 
than February 1 of each year, the President shall submit to Congress a 
report on the security clearance process. Such report shall include, 
for each security clearance level--
          ``(A) the number of Federal Government employees who--
                  ``(i) held a security clearance at such level as of 
                October 1 of the preceding year; and
                  ``(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such 
                level during the preceding fiscal year;
          ``(B) the number of contractors to the Federal Government 
        who--
                  ``(i) held a security clearance at such level as of 
                October 1 of the preceding year; and
                  ``(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such 
                level during the preceding fiscal year; and
          ``(C) for each element of the intelligence community--
                  ``(i) the amount of time it took to process the 
                fastest 80 percent of security clearance determinations 
                for such level;
                  ``(ii) the amount of time it took to process the 
                fastest 90 percent of security clearance determinations 
                for such level;
                  ``(iii) the number of open security clearance 
                investigations for such level that have remained open 
                for--
                          ``(I) 4 months or less;
                          ``(II) between 4 months and 8 months;
                          ``(III) between 8 months and 12 months; and
                          ``(IV) more than a year;
                  ``(iv) the percentage of reviews during the preceding 
                fiscal year that resulted in a denial or revocation of 
                a security clearance;
                  ``(v) the percentage of investigations during the 
                preceding fiscal year that resulted in incomplete 
                information;
                  ``(vi) the percentage of investigations during the 
                preceding fiscal year that did not result in enough 
                information to make a decision on potentially adverse 
                information; and
                  ``(vii) for security clearance determinations 
                completed or ongoing during the preceding fiscal year 
                that have taken longer than one year to complete--
                          ``(I) the number of security clearance 
                        determinations for positions as employees of 
                        the Federal Government that required more than 
                        one year to complete;
                          ``(II) the number of security clearance 
                        determinations for contractors that required 
                        more than one year to complete;
                          ``(III) the agencies that investigated and 
                        adjudicated such determinations; and
                          ``(IV) the cause of significant delays in 
                        such determinations.
  ``(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Director of National 
Intelligence may consider--
          ``(A) security clearances at the level of confidential and 
        secret as one security clearance level; and
          ``(B) security clearances at the level of top secret or 
        higher as one security clearance level.''.
                  (B) Initial audit.--The first audit required to be 
                conducted under section 513(a)(1) of the National 
                Security Act of 1947 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall 
                be completed not later than February 1, 2010.
                  (C) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the 
                first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as 
                amended by section 365 of this Act, is further amended 
                by inserting after the item relating to section 512 the 
                following new item:

``Sec. 513. Reports on security clearances.''.

          (2) Report on metrics for adjudication quality.--Not later 
        than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
        President shall submit to Congress a report on security 
        clearance investigations and adjudications. Such report shall 
        include--
                  (A) Federal Government wide adjudication guidelines 
                and metrics for adjudication quality;
                  (B) a plan to improve the professional development of 
                security clearance adjudicators;
                  (C) metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of 
                interagency clearance reciprocity;
                  (D) Federal Government wide investigation standards 
                and metrics for investigation quality; and
                  (E) the feasibility, counterintelligence risk, and 
                cost effectiveness of--
                          (i) by not later than January 1, 2012, 
                        requiring the investigation and adjudication of 
                        security clearances to be conducted by not more 
                        than two Federal agencies; and
                          (ii) by not later than January 1, 2015, 
                        requiring the investigation and adjudication of 
                        security clearances to be conducted by not more 
                        than one Federal agency.
  (b) Ombudsman for Intelligence Community Security Clearances.--
          (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 303 of this Act, 
        is further amended by inserting after section 103G the 
        following new section:
       ``ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
  ``Sec. 103H.  (a) Appointment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security 
clearances.
  ``(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of the 
intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a security 
clearance through or in coordination with such element with contact 
information for the ombudsman appointed under subsection (a).
  ``(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the ombudsman 
appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report containing--
          ``(1) the number of persons applying for a security clearance 
        who have contacted the ombudsman during the preceding 12 
        months; and
          ``(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and questions 
        received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security 
        clearances.''.
          (2) Appointment date.--The Director of National Intelligence 
        shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security 
        clearances under section 103H(a) of the National Security Act 
        of 1947, as added by paragraph (1), not later than 120 days 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act.
          (3) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by 
        subsection (a)(1)(C) of this section, is further amended by 
        inserting after the item relating to section 103G the following 
        new item:

``Sec. 103H. Ombudsman for intelligence community security 
clearances.''.

  (c) Security Clearance Reciprocity.--
          (1) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
        Community shall conduct an audit of the reciprocity of security 
        clearances in the intelligence community.
          (2) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
        Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a report containing the results of the 
        audit conducted under paragraph (1). Such report shall include 
        an assessment of the time required to obtain a reciprocal 
        security clearance for--
                  (A) an employee of an element of the intelligence 
                community detailed to another element of the 
                intelligence community;
                  (B) an employee of an element of the intelligence 
                community seeking permanent employment with another 
                element of the intelligence community; and
                  (C) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an 
                element of the intelligence community.

SEC. 367. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE TRANSFER OR RELEASE OF 
                    INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL 
                    STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.

  (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence may not use 
any of the amounts authorized to be appropriated in this Act for fiscal 
year 2010 or any subsequent fiscal year to release or transfer any 
individual described in subsection (d) to the United States, its 
territories, or possessions, until 120 days after the President has 
submitted to the congressional defense committees the plan described in 
subsection (b).
  (b) Plan Required.--The President shall submit to Congress a plan on 
the disposition of each individual described in subsection (d). Such 
plan shall include--
          (1) an assessment of the risk that the individual described 
        in subsection (d) poses to the national security of the United 
        States, its territories, or possessions;
          (2) a proposal for the disposition for each such individual;
          (3) a plan to mitigate any risks described in paragraph (1) 
        should the proposed disposition required by paragraph (2) 
        include the release or transfer to the United States, its 
        territories, or possessions of any such individual; and
          (4) a summary of the consultation required in subsection (c).
  (c) Consultation Required.--The President shall consult with the 
chief executive of the State, the District of Columbia, or the 
territory or possession of the United States to which the disposition 
in subsection (b) includes a release or transfer to that State, 
District of Columbia, or territory or possession.
  (d) Detainees Described.--An individual described in this subsection 
is any individual who is located at United States Naval Station, 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, 
who--
          (1) is not a citizen of the United States; and
          (2) is--
                  (A) in the custody or under the effective control of 
                the Department of Defense, or
                  (B) otherwise under detention at the United States 
                Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

SEC. 368. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT AND AUDIT 
                    READINESS.

  (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) it is no longer excusable to allow poor business systems, 
        a deficiency of resources, or a lack of commitment from senior 
        leadership of the intelligence community to foster waste or 
        nonaccountability to the United States taxpayer;
          (2) the Director of National Intelligence has not made 
        compliance with financial management and audit readiness 
        standards a top priority; and
          (3) the Director of National Intelligence should require each 
        element of the intelligence community to develop and implement 
        a specific plan to become compliant with the law.
  (b) Review; Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
          (1) conduct a review of the status of the auditability 
        compliance of each element of the intelligence community; and
          (2) develop a plan and timeline to achieve a full, 
        unqualified audit of each element of the intelligence community 
        not later than September 30, 2013.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF 
                    THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3), 
as amended by section 302(1) of this Act, is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (f) (as so redesignated)--
                  (A) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and 
                inserting ``of Headquarters With Headquarters of'';
                  (B) by striking ``Commencing as of October 1, 2008, 
                the'' and inserting ``(1) Except as provided in 
                paragraph (2), the'';
                  (C) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (2) 
                of this section, by inserting ``the headquarters of'' 
                before ``the Office'';
                  (D) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking 
                ``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters 
                of any other element''; and
                  (E) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(2) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph (1) if the 
President determines that--
          ``(A) a waiver is in the interests of national security; or
          ``(B) the costs of a headquarters of the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence that is separate from the 
        headquarters of the other elements of the intelligence 
        community outweighs the potential benefits of the 
        separation.''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(g) Location of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence may be located in the Washington metropolitan 
region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code).''.

SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE 
                    TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

  Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States 
Code, is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the 
                Director's designee.''.

SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

  Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) 
is amended--
          (1) in subsection (c)--
                  (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
                  (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting ``;''; and
                  (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following 
                new paragraphs:
          ``(5) assist the Director of National Intelligence in 
        establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced research to 
        meet the technology needs of the intelligence community;
          ``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an 
        annual report on the science and technology strategy of the 
        Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the 
        intelligence community; and''; and
          (2) in subsection (d)(3)--
                  (A) in subparagraph (A)--
                          (i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after 
                        ``coordinate''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting 
                        ``;'';
                  (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph 
                (C); and
                  (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following 
                new subparagraph:
                  ``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research 
                programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence 
                community; and''.

SEC. 404. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER ENERGY 
                    EFFICIENCY REPORTS.

  (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan 
to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress 
under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the 
use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public 
Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
  (b) Report.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report containing the plan developed under 
        subsection (a).
          (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted 
        in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 405. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) 
is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
          (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
          (3) in subsection (c) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), 
        by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief 
        Information Officer''; and
          (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.

SEC. 406. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Establishment.--
          (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 366 of this Act, 
        is further amended by inserting after section 103H (as added by 
        such section 366) the following new section:
           ``inspector general of the intelligence community
  ``Sec. 103I.  (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence 
Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community.
  ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community is to--
          ``(1) be an independent and objective office appropriately 
        accountable to Congress and to initiate and conduct 
        investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
        Intelligence;
          ``(2) recommend policies designed--
                  ``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and 
                effectiveness in the administration and implementation 
                of matters within the responsibility and authority of 
                the Director of National Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such 
                matters;
          ``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National 
        Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
                  ``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters 
                within the responsibility and authority of the Director 
                of National Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions; and
          ``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that 
        the congressional intelligence committees are kept informed 
        of--
                  ``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating 
                to matters within the responsibility and authority of 
                the Director of National Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions.
  ``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There is an 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the head 
of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.
  ``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector 
General shall be made--
          ``(A) without regard to political affiliation;
          ``(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security 
        standards of the intelligence community, and prior experience 
        in the field of intelligence or national security;
          ``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, 
        financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
        administration, or auditing; and
          ``(D) on the basis of expertise in investigations.
  ``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  ``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the 
President. The President shall communicate in writing to the 
congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of 
any individual from the position of Inspector General not later than 30 
days before the date on which the Inspector General is removed from 
office.
  ``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g) and 
(h), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall--
          ``(1) provide policy direction for, and plan, conduct, 
        supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, 
        inspections, and audits relating to matters within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
        Intelligence to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in 
        accordance with applicable law and regulations;
          ``(2) keep the Director of National Intelligence and Congress 
        fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and 
        regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud 
        and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may 
        occur in matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
        Director, and report the progress made in implementing 
        corrective action;
          ``(3) take due regard for the protection of intelligence 
        sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by 
        the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the 
        purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as 
        may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence 
        sources and methods described in such reports; and
          ``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities 
        under this section, comply with generally accepted Federal 
        Government auditing standards.
  ``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), 
the Director of National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director 
determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national 
security interests of the United States.
  ``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not prohibit an 
investigation, inspection, or audit under subparagraph (A) solely on 
the basis of the level of classification or compartmentation of 
information that the Inspector General may seek access to while 
conducting such investigation, inspection, or audit.
  ``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), 
the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise 
of such authority within 7 days.
  ``(3) The Director shall notify the Inspector General at the time a 
report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent 
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the 
Inspector General with a copy of such report.
  ``(4) The Inspector General shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector 
General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General 
considers appropriate.
  ``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community shall have direct and prompt access to the Director of 
National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the 
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
  ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or 
any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence 
community whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General.
  ``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, 
reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other 
material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to 
which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section.
  ``(C) The Director or, on the recommendation of the Director, another 
appropriate official of the intelligence community, shall take 
appropriate administrative action against an employee, or employee of a 
contractor, of an element of the intelligence community that fails to 
cooperate with the Inspector General. Such administrative action may 
include loss of employment or termination of an existing contractual 
relationship.
  ``(3) The Inspector General shall, in accordance with subsection (g), 
receive and investigate complaints or information from any person 
concerning the existence of an activity within the authorities and 
responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence constituting 
a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross 
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or 
information has been received from an employee of the Federal 
Government--
          ``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity 
        of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the 
        Inspector General determines that such disclosure is 
        unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the 
        disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice 
        responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be 
        undertaken; and
          ``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
        reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
        employee, unless the complaint was made or the information was 
        disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful 
        disregard for its truth or falsity.
  ``(4) The Inspector General shall administer to or take from any 
person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the 
performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, 
affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an 
employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force 
and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having 
a seal.
  ``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector 
General may require by subpoena the production of all information, 
documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data 
and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and 
responsibilities of the Inspector General.
  ``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the 
United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain 
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, 
and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph 
(A) using procedures other than by subpoenas.
  ``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on 
behalf of, any element of the intelligence community, including the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
  ``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued 
under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any 
appropriate district court of the United States.
  ``(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized under 
section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals 
not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic 
pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 
of title 5, United States Code.
  ``(7) The Inspector may, to the extent and in such amounts as may be 
provided in advance by appropriations Acts, enter into contracts and 
other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, and other services 
with public agencies and with private persons, and to make such 
payments as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
section.
  ``(g) Coordination Among the Inspectors General of the Intelligence 
Community.--(1)(A) If a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an 
investigation, inspection, review, or audit by both the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community and an inspector general with 
oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community, 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such other 
inspector general shall expeditiously resolve the question of which 
inspector general shall conduct such investigation, inspection, review, 
or audit to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the 
inspectors general.
  ``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph (A), the 
inspectors general concerned may request the assistance of the 
Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established under 
subparagraph (C). If a dispute between an inspector general within an 
agency or department of the United States Government and the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community has not been resolved with the 
assistance of the Forum, the inspectors general shall submit the 
question to the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the 
affected agency or department for resolution.
  ``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community Inspectors 
General Forum which shall consist of all statutory or administrative 
inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the 
intelligence community. The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have 
no administrative authority over any inspector general, but shall serve 
as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of individual 
members of the Forum that may be of common interest and discussing 
questions about jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of a 
contractor, records, audits, reviews, documents, recommendations, or 
other materials that may involve or be of assistance to more than one 
of its members.
  ``(2) The inspector general conducting an investigation, inspection, 
review, or audit referred to in paragraph (1) shall submit the results 
of such investigation, inspection, review, or audit to any other 
inspector general, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, with jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, 
review, or audit who did not conduct such investigation, inspection, 
review, or audit.
  ``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community with appropriate and adequate office space at central and 
field office locations and with such equipment, office supplies, 
maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may 
be necessary for the operation of such offices.
  ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall select, appoint, and employ such 
officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions, 
powers, and duties of the Inspector General. The Inspector General 
shall ensure that any officer or employee selected, appointed, or 
employed has a security clearance appropriate for the assigned duties 
of such officer or employee.
  ``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector 
General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the 
requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to 
carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively.
  ``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector 
General shall recommend policies to the Director of National 
Intelligence to create within the intelligence community a career cadre 
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity 
needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector 
General.
  ``(3)(A) The Inspector General may, in consultation with the 
Director, request such information or assistance as may be necessary 
for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector 
General from any department, agency, or other element of the United 
States Government.
  ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or 
assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, 
or element concerned shall furnish to the Inspector General, or to an 
authorized designee, such information or assistance.
  ``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon 
reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence 
community and in coordination with the inspector general of that 
element pursuant to subsection (g), conduct an inspection, review, or 
audit of such element and may enter into any place occupied by such 
element for purposes of the performance of the duties of the Inspector 
General.
  ``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) Not later than January 31 and July 31 of each 
year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall prepare 
and submit to the Director of National Intelligence a report 
summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community during the preceding six-month period. The 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any 
portion of the report involving a component of a department of the 
United States Government to the head of that department simultaneously 
with submission of the report to the Director of National Intelligence.
  ``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include the following:
          ``(i) A list of the titles or subjects of each investigation, 
        inspection, review, or audit conducted during the period 
        covered by such report, including a summary of the progress of 
        each particular investigation, inspection, or audit since the 
        preceding report of the Inspector General under this paragraph.
          ``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and 
        deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation 
        of programs and operations of the intelligence community, and 
        in the relationships between elements of the intelligence 
        community, identified by the Inspector General during the 
        period covered by such report.
          ``(iii) A description of the recommendations for disciplinary 
        action made by the Inspector General during the period covered 
        by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or 
        deficiencies described in clause (ii).
          ``(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective or 
        disciplinary action has been completed on each significant 
        recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, 
        in a case where corrective action has been completed, a 
        description of such corrective action.
          ``(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector General 
        has had full and direct access to all information relevant to 
        the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
          ``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
        authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General 
        during the period covered by such report.
          ``(vii) Any recommendations that the Inspector General 
        considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, 
        efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and 
        implementation of matters within the responsibility and 
        authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to 
        detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters.
  ``(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a report 
under subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit the report to the 
congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the 
Director considers appropriate.
  ``(D) Each report submitted under subparagraphs (A) and (C) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly 
serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to 
matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  ``(B) The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7 days of the 
receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director 
considers appropriate. The Director shall submit to the committees of 
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
department of the United States Government any portion of each report 
under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency 
related to a component of such department simultaneously with 
transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  ``(3) The Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees on an 
investigation, inspection, review, or audit if--
          ``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
        significant differences with the Director affecting the 
        execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector 
        General;
          ``(B) the investigation, inspection, review, or audit carried 
        out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or former 
        intelligence community official who--
                  ``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the 
                intelligence community that is subject to appointment 
                by the President, whether or not by and with the advice 
                and consent of the Senate, including such a position 
                held on an acting basis;
                  ``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the 
                intelligence community, including a position held on an 
                acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of 
                National Intelligence; or
                  ``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an 
                element of the intelligence community or a position 
                covered by subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
          ``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to 
        the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a 
        current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
          ``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
        Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of 
        possible criminal conduct of any current or former official 
        described in subparagraph (B); or
          ``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
        alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
        information in the course of such investigation, inspection, 
        review, or audit.
  ``(4)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an 
employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence 
community, or an employee of a contractor of the intelligence community 
who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with 
respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information 
to the Inspector General.
  ``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-day period beginning on the 
date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under 
subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether the 
complaint or information appears credible. Upon making such a 
determination, the Inspector General shall submit to the Director a 
notice of that determination, together with the complaint or 
information.
  ``(C) Upon receipt of a submittal from the Inspector General under 
subparagraph (B), the Director shall, not later than 7 days after such 
receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence 
committees, together with any comments the Director considers 
appropriate.
  ``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under 
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under 
subparagraph (A), or does not submit the complaint or information to 
the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee 
(subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to 
Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence 
committees directly.
  ``(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence 
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
          ``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
        Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the 
        employee's complaint or information and notice of the 
        employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence 
        committees directly; and
          ``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the 
        Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence 
        committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.
  ``(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional intelligence 
committees who receives a complaint or information under clause (ii) 
does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or 
employee of such committee.
  ``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a 
complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph 
of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint 
or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days 
after any such action is taken.
  ``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under 
this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
  ``(G) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the 
protections afforded an employee of or contractor to the Central 
Intelligence Agency under section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence 
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)).
  ``(H) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means any of the 
following:
          ``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law 
        or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, 
        administration, or operation of an intelligence activity 
        involving classified information, but does not include 
        differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.
          ``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
        withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
        relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an 
        intelligence activity.
          ``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described in 
        section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, 
        constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under 
        subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section.
  ``(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States Code, 
the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney General any 
information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector General 
relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves a program 
or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in the 
relationships between the elements of the intelligence community, 
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney 
General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each 
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
  ``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by the Director in 
consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, include in 
the National Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the 
Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
  ``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the 
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of 
any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the 
intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or affect the 
duties and responsibilities of any other inspector general having 
duties and responsibilities relating to such element.''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 
        note), as amended by section 366 of this Act, is further 
        amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103H 
        the following new item:

``Sec. 103I. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.

  (b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.--Section 8K 
of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is repealed.
  (c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
          ``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
  (d) Applicability Date; Transition.--
          (1) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (b) 
        shall apply on the earlier of--
                  (A) the date of the appointment by the President and 
                confirmation by the Senate of an individual to serve as 
                Inspector General of the Intelligence Community; or
                  (B) the date of the cessation of the performance of 
                the duties of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
                Community by the individual serving as the Inspector 
                General of the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence as of the date of the enactment of this 
                Act.
          (2) Transition.--The individual serving as the Inspector 
        General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
        as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall perform the 
        duties of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
        until the individual appointed to the position of Inspector 
        General of the Intelligence Community assumes the duties of 
        such position.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 411. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
                    CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413b), as amended by section 321 of this Act, is further 
amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (i) and 
        transferring such subsection to the end; and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
          ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an 
        audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits 
        shall be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3) 
        and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
          ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct 
        an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been 
        terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or 
        suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action 
        conducted by the Inspector General and has not been restarted 
        after the date on which such audit was completed.
          ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of 
        an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report containing the 
        results of such audit.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
          (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)'';
          (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''; and
          (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''.

SEC. 412. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR 
                    INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OF 
                    THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) 
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
  ``prohibition on the use of private contractors for interrogations 
  involving persons in the custody of the central intelligence agency
  ``Sec. 24.  (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall not expend 
or obligate funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the 
interrogation of a detainee or prisoner in the custody of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.
  ``(b) Exception.--
          ``(1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence 
        may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under subsection 
        (a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
        determines that--
                  ``(A) no employee of the Federal Government is--
                          ``(i) capable of performing such 
                        interrogation; and
                          ``(ii) available to perform such 
                        interrogation; and
                  ``(B) such interrogation is in the national interest 
                of the United States and requires the use of a 
                contractor.
          ``(2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any 
        contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver 
        under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the conduct 
        of interrogations that would apply if an employee of the 
        Federal Government were conducting the interrogation.''.

SEC. 413. APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                    CONTRACTING OFFICERS.

  Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. 607(d)) 
is amended by inserting before the sentence beginning with ``In 
exercising'' the following new sentence: ``Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, an appeal from a decision of a contracting officer of 
the Central Intelligence Agency relative to a contract made by that 
agency may be filed with whichever of the Armed Services Board or the 
Civilian Board is specified by the contracting officer as the Board to 
which such an appeal may be made and the Board so specified shall have 
jurisdiction to decide that appeal.''.

SEC. 414. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Establishment and Duties of Deputy Director of CIA.--Title I of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by 
inserting after section 104A the following new section:
          ``deputy director of the central intelligence agency
  ``Sec. 104B.  (a) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--
There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall 
be appointed by the President.
  ``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
shall--
          ``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
        in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
          ``(2) during the absence or disability of the Director of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy in the 
        position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, act 
        for and exercise the powers of the Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--
          (1) Executive schedule iii.--Section 5314 of title 5, United 
        States Code, is amended by striking ``Deputy Directors of 
        Central Intelligence (2)'' and inserting ``Deputy Director of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency''.
          (2) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 
        note) is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
        section 104A the following new item:

``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
  (c) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section shall apply 
on the earlier of--
          (1) the date of the appointment by the President of an 
        individual to serve as Deputy Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency, except that the individual 
        administratively performing the duties of the Deputy Director 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the 
        enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties until 
        the individual appointed to the position of Deputy Director of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency assumes the duties of such 
        position; or
          (2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the 
        duties of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency by the individual administratively performing such 
        duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 415. PROTECTION AGAINST REPRISALS.

  Section 17(e)(3)(B) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)(B)) is amended by inserting ``or providing such 
information'' after ``making such complaint''.

SEC. 416. REQUIREMENT FOR VIDEO RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS OF PERSONS 
                    IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403a et seq.), as amended by section 412 of this Act, is further 
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
 ``requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons in the 
               custody of the central intelligence agency
  ``Sec. 25.  (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall establish 
guidelines to ensure that each interrogation of a person who is in the 
custody of the Central Intelligence Agency is recorded in video form 
and that the video recording of such interrogation is maintained--
          ``(1) for not less than 10 years from the date on which such 
        recording is made; and
          ``(2) until such time as such recording is no longer relevant 
        to an ongoing or anticipated legal proceeding or investigation 
        or required to be maintained under any other provision of law.
  ``(b) Exception.--The requirement to record an interrogation in video 
form under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to an 
interrogation incident to arrest conducted by Agency personnel 
designated by the Director under section 15(a) that are assigned to the 
headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency and acting in the 
official capacity of such personnel.
  ``(c) Interrogation Defined.--In this section, the term 
`interrogation' means the systematic process of attempting to obtain 
information from an uncooperative detainee.''.
  (b) Submission of Guidelines.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the 
guidelines developed under section 25(a) of the Central Intelligence 
Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a) of this section. Such 
guidelines shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
classified annex.

                       Subtitle C--Other Elements

SEC. 421. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS.

  Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (H), by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' 
        after ``the Marine Corps,''; and
          (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``The elements'' and all 
        that follows through ``the Coast Guard'' and inserting ``The 
        Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of 
        Homeland Security''.

SEC. 422. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION 
                    AS AN ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
401a(4)(H)), as amended by section 421 of this Act, is further amended 
by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation,''.

SEC. 423. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE 
                    NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

  (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the 
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
          (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and 
        (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), 
        respectively; and
          (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of 
        this subsection, by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) 
        of this section--
                  (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (f)'' 
                and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (f)'' 
                and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and
          (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
                  (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection 
                (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection 
                (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

SEC. 424. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF HEADS OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS OF 
                    THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security 
Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after 
the first section the following new section:
  ``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency.
  ``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed 
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  ``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head 
of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and 
duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''.
  (b) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the 
National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 106(b)(2) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended--
          (1) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B);
          (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (I) as 
        subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively; and
          (3) by moving subparagraph (G), as redesignated by paragraph 
        (2) of this subsection, two ems to the left.
  (d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a) and the provisions of subsection (b) shall apply upon 
the earlier of--
          (1) the date of the nomination by the President of an 
        individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the 
        individual serving in such position as of the date of the 
        enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after 
        such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to 
        such position, by and with the advice and consent of the 
        Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or
          (2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the 
        duties of such position by the individual performing such 
        duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 425. ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FOR 
                    COMPLIANCE AND TRAINING.

  The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as 
amended by section 424 of this Act, is further amended by inserting 
after section 2 (as added by such section 424) the following new 
section:
  ``Sec. 3. (a) There is an Associate Director of the National Security 
Agency for Compliance and Training, who shall be appointed by the 
Director of the National Security Agency.
  ``(b) The Associate Director of the National Security Agency for 
Compliance and Training shall ensure that--
          ``(1) all programs and activities of the National Security 
        Agency are conducted in a manner consistent with all applicable 
        laws, regulations, and policies; and
          ``(2) the training of relevant personnel is sufficient to 
        ensure that such programs and activities are conducted in such 
        a manner.''.

SEC. 426. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

  (a) General Counsel.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by section 425 of this Act, is further 
amended by inserting after section 3 (as added by such section 425), 
the following new section:
  ``Sec. 4. (a) There is a General Counsel of the National Security 
Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.
  ``(b) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency shall serve 
as the chief legal officer of the National Security Agency.''.
  (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take 
effect on the date that is 180 days after the date on which the 
Director of the National Security Agency is appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate in accordance with section 2 of the 
National Security Agency Act of 1959, as added by section 424 of this 
Act.

SEC. 427. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.

  Section 12 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
amended--
          (1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National Security 
        Agency;'' after ``the Federal Emergency Management Agency,''; 
        and
          (2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National Security 
        Agency,'' after ``the National Aeronautics and Space 
        Administration,''.

SEC. 428. CHARTER FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

  Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense 
shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and 
the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16) 
of title 10, United States Code) a revised charter for the National 
Reconnaissance Office (in this section referred to as the ``NRO'') . 
The charter shall include the following:
          (1) The organizational and governance structure of the NRO.
          (2) NRO participation in the development and generation of 
        requirements and acquisition.
          (3) The scope of NRO capabilities.
          (4) The roles and responsibilities of the NRO and the 
        relationship of the NRO to other elements of the intelligence 
        community and the defense community.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE 
                    RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED 
                    STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Extension.--
          (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
        107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1, 
        2004'' and inserting ``February 1, 2011''.
          (2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the amendment 
        made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the 
        enactment of such section 1007.
          (3) Commission membership.--
                  (A) In general.--The membership of the National 
                Commission for the Review of the Research and 
                Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
                Community established under subsection (a) of section 
                1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2438) 
                (referred to in this section as the ``Commission'') 
                shall be considered vacant and new members shall be 
                appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as 
                amended by subparagraph (B).
                  (B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section 
                1002(b) of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy 
                Director of Central Intelligence for Community 
                Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy 
                Director of National Intelligence.''.
          (4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act is 
        amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking 
        ``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research and 
        development programs and activities. Such review shall 
        include--''.
  (b) Funding.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
        by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
        the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000 
        available to the Commission to carry out title X of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
        107-306; 116 Stat. 2437).
          (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until 
        expended.

SEC. 502. EXPANSION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE DUTIES OF THE PROGRAM 
                    MANAGER FOR THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.

  Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)--
                  (A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``terrorism and 
                homeland security information'' and inserting 
                ``national security information'';
                  (B) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as 
                paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and
                  (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following 
                new paragraph:
          ``(4) National security information.--The term `national 
        security information' includes homeland security information 
        and terrorism information.'';
          (2) in subsection (b)--
                  (A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``terrorism 
                information'' and inserting ``national security 
                information''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2) in the first sentence of the 
                matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking 
                ``terrorism information'' and inserting ``national 
                security information''; and
          (3) in subsection (f)(1)--
                  (A) in the second sentence, by inserting ``in the 
                Executive Office of the President and shall serve'' 
                after ``The individual designated as the program 
                manager shall serve''; and
                  (B) in the third sentence, by striking ``homeland 
                security information, terrorism information, and 
                weapons of mass destruction information'' and inserting 
                ``national security information''.

SEC. 503. CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH MATERIALS IN THE 
                    POSSESSION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMITTEES.

  The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance with 
procedures established by each of the congressional intelligence 
committees, conduct a classification review of materials in the 
possession of each of those committees that--
          (1) are not less than 25 years old; and
          (2) were created, or provided to that committee, by the 
        executive branch.

SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PROVIDE MIRANDA WARNINGS TO 
                    CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES.

  None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be 
used to provide the warnings of constitutional rights described in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436 (U.S. 1966), to a person located 
outside of the United States who is not a United States person and is--
          (1) suspected of terrorism, associated with terrorists, or 
        believed to have knowledge of terrorists; or
          (2) a detainee in the custody of the Armed Forces of the 
        United States.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT 
                    OF 1949.

  The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) 
is amended--
          (1) in section 5(a)(1), by striking ``authorized under 
        paragraphs (2) and (3)'' and all that follows through ``(50 
        U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 
        405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''; and
          (2) in section 17(d)(3)(B)--
                  (A) in clause (i), by striking ``advise'' and 
                inserting ``advice''; and
                  (B) in clause (ii)--
                          (i) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive 
                        Director'' and inserting ``Associate Deputy 
                        Director'';
                          (ii) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy 
                        Director for Operations'' and inserting 
                        ``Director of the National Clandestine 
                        Service'';
                          (iii) in subclause (III), by striking 
                        ``Deputy Director for Intelligence'' and 
                        inserting ``Director of Intelligence'';
                          (iv) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy 
                        Director for Administration'' and inserting 
                        ``Director of Support''; and
                          (v) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy 
                        Director for Science and Technology'' and 
                        inserting ``Director of Science and 
                        Technology''.

SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION OF 
                    CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.

  Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 
Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(A) Upon reaching age 65, in the case of a 
                participant in the system who is at the Senior 
                Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or above; and''.

SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

  (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director 
of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
  ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
  (b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United 
States Code is amended by striking the item relating to the General 
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and 
inserting the following new item:
  ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.''.

SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
                    ACT OF 1978.

  The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
seq.) is amended--
          (1) in section 101--
                  (A) in subsection (a), by moving paragraph (7) two 
                ems to the right; and
                  (B) by moving subsections (b) through (p) two ems to 
                the right;
          (2) in section 103, by redesignating subsection (i) as 
        subsection (h);
          (3) in section 109(a)--
                  (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 112.;'' 
                and inserting ``section 112;''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the second period;
          (4) in section 301(1), by striking ```United States''' and 
        all that follows through ``and `State''' and inserting 
        ```United States', `person', `weapon of mass destruction', and 
        `State''';
          (5) in section 304(b), by striking ``subsection (a)(3)'' and 
        inserting ``subsection (a)(2)''; and
          (6) in section 502(a), by striking ``a annual'' and inserting 
        ``an annual''.

SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 105 OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004.

   Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is 
amended--
          (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
        inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
          (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after 
        ``subsection (a)),''.

SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM 
                    PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public 
Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended--
          (1) in section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by 
        striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and 
        inserting ``Department of Justice'';
          (2) in section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
                  (A) in subsection (c)(1)--
                          (i) by striking ``shall,'' and inserting 
                        ``shall''; and
                          (ii) by inserting ``of'' before ``an 
                        institutional culture'';
                  (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National 
                Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with 
                section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of 
                National Intelligence in a manner consistent with 
                applicable law''; and
                  (C) in subsection (f) in the matter preceding 
                paragraph (1), by striking ``shall,'' and inserting 
                ``shall''; and
          (3) in section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
                  (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and 
                inserting ``Federal''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' 
                and inserting ``specific''.

SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

  Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``FOREIGN'';
          (2) in subsection (a)--
                  (A) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign'';
                  (B) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears; 
                and
                  (C) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' 
                and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'';
          (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``The Director'' and 
        inserting ``The Director of National Intelligence''; and
          (4) in subsection (c)--
                  (A) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' 
                and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; 
                and
                  (B) by striking ``section 114a'' and inserting 
                ``section 221''.

SEC. 518. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

  The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is further 
amended--
          (1) section 3(4)(L), by striking ``other'' the second place 
        it appears;
          (2) in section 102A--
                  (A) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual 
                budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and 
                for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and 
                inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence 
                Program or any successor program'';
                  (B) in subsection (d)--
                          (i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``Joint 
                        Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting 
                        ``Military Intelligence Program or any 
                        successor program'';
                          (ii) in paragraph (3) in the matter preceding 
                        subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph 
                        (A)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
                          (iii) in paragraph (5)--
                                  (I) in subparagraph (A), by striking 
                                ``or personnel'' in the matter 
                                preceding clause (i); and
                                  (II) in subparagraph (B), by striking 
                                ``or agency involved'' in the second 
                                sentence and inserting ``involved or 
                                the Director of the Central 
                                Intelligence Agency (in the case of the 
                                Central Intelligence Agency)'';
                  (C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' 
                and inserting ``paragraph''; and
                  (D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' 
                after ``Acquisition'';
          (3) in section 103(b), by striking ``, the National Security 
        Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),'';
          (4) in section 104A(g)(1) in the matter preceding 
        subparagraph (A), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and 
        inserting ``National Clandestine Service'';
          (5) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by 
        striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)'';
          (6) in section 701(b)(1), by striking ``Directorate of 
        Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service'';
          (7) in section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), 
        by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''; and
          (8) in the table of contents in the first section--
                  (A) by striking the item relating to section 1002; 
                and
                  (B) by inserting after the item relating to section 
                1001 the following new item:

``Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and 
training.''.

SEC. 519. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE.

  Section 528(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``Associate Director of CIA 
        for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of 
        Military Affairs, CIA''; and
          (2) by striking ``Associate Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs'' and inserting 
        ``Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence 
        Agency, or any successor position''.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 2701 is to authorize the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government for fiscal year 2010 in order to enhance the 
national security of the United States, to support and assist 
the armed forces of the United States, and to facilitate and 
oversee the execution of the foreign policy of the United 
States. The bill also clarifies certain authorities of the 
Intelligence Community and makes technical corrections to 
existing statutes.

                 Classified Annex and Committee Intent

    The classified annex to this report includes the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory 
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an 
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex 
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the 
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends 
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified 
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the 
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language 
therein.
    The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated 
directly into this legislation by virtue of Section 102 of the 
bill. The classified annex is available for review by all 
members of the House of Representatives, subject to the 
requirements of clause 13 of Rule XXIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, and Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure 
for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In 
addition, Section 356 of the bill incorporates reporting 
requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint Explanatory 
Statement into the Act.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee, 
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Military 
Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information System Security 
Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, as well as intelligence and intelligence-
related activities conducted by: (1) the Department of Defense; 
(2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security 
Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; 
(5) the Coast Guard; (6) the Department of State; (7) the 
Department of the Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9) 
the Department of Justice; (10) the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; (11) the Drug Enforcement Administration; (12) 
the National Reconnaissance Office; (13) the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (14) the Department of 
Homeland Security. The Committee has legislative, authorizing, 
and oversight jurisdiction over these programs.

                           Oversight Findings

    With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, this legislation results from 
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the 
Committee, pursuant to clause 3(m) of Rule X and are reflected 
in the body of this report.
    With respect to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not 
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it 
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or 
expenditures. The bill does, however, authorize appropriations.
    Other fiscal features of this legislation are addressed in 
the estimate prepared by the Committee under clause 3(d)(2) of 
Rule XIII of the rules of the House of Representatives.

                General Performance Goals and Objectives

    With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, this legislation would address 
several general and outcome-related performance goals and 
objectives. The general goals and objectives of this 
legislation are to provide the necessary resources and 
authorities to enhance the national security of the United 
States, to support and assist the armed forces of the United 
States, and to facilitate and oversee the execution of the 
foreign policy of the United States.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in Article I, Section 8 of the United States 
Constitution.

                     Committee Statement and Views


                              A. OVERVIEW

    In drafting the fiscal year 2010 Intelligence Authorization 
Act, the Committee sought to adopt legislative measures and 
authorize funding that would address the country's most 
pressing threats and improve national security. The Committee 
applauds the extraordinary efforts that the brave women and men 
of the Intelligence Community have put forth to protect our 
nation, but recognizes that there is still a great deal of work 
still to be done. To that end, H.R. 2701 provides the 
Intelligence Community with the necessary funding and 
intelligence authorities to continue this important work and 
simultaneously establishes critical oversight mechanisms to 
ensure that these funds are expended and these authorities are 
exercised in an effective, efficient, and responsible manner.
    The bill includes specific provisions that will assist the 
Intelligence Community in its efforts to continue the fight 
against al-Qa'ida where they have established strongholds, to 
address concerns from emerging trouble spots such as Yemen and 
Somalia, and to confront global challenges posed by such 
threats as weapons of mass destruction. The Committee has also 
included provisions to improve accountability and oversight by 
creating an Intelligence Community Inspector General and by 
establishing reporting requirements needed to assess the 
Intelligence Community's progress in closing critical 
intelligence gaps and making important internal reforms.
    As always, the Committee seeks to authorize the funds 
necessary to enable the Intelligence Community to carry out its 
mission while ensuring that the Congress and the courts are 
able to exercise their constitutional responsibility to conduct 
effective oversight on behalf of all Americans.

                        B. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW

    The Committee completed its review of the President's 
fiscal year 2010 budget request, carrying out its annual 
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close 
examination of the U.S. Government's intelligence programs and 
proposed expenditures.
    Over the past two months, the Committee conducted 11 full 
committee-level budget hearings and briefings on numerous 
topics, including the following:
         National Intelligence Program
         Military Intelligence Program
         Signals Intelligence
         Overhead Architecture
         Human Intelligence
         Covert Action
         Human Capital
         Cybersecurity
    In addition to these events, Committee members and staff 
have taken numerous budget-related briefings covering all 
intelligence programs within the National Intelligence Program, 
the Military Intelligence Program, and the Information System 
Security Program.
    As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary 
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings 
and briefings. The actions taken in this legislation are the 
result of the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the 
U.S. Intelligence Community throughout the year. This oversight 
activity includes scores of Committee and Subcommittee hearings 
and briefings; site visits and fact-finding trips; reviews of 
congressionally directed reports; and studies of intelligence 
capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges.

                           C. THE LEGISLATION

    The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of 
Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended 
authorizations for the Intelligence Community for fiscal year 
2010 and includes authorizations for the intelligence portion 
of the funding for overseas contingency operations for fiscal 
year 2010. The legislative provisions in H.R. 2701 will enhance 
U.S. intelligence capabilities in several important respects.
    First, the bill invests in human resources by building upon 
the Committee's longstanding commitment to improving language 
capabilities and increasing diversity in the Intelligence 
Community. The bill adds funding and establishes new reporting 
requirements designed to provide the Committee with the 
information it needs to assess the Intelligence Community's 
progress toward critical personnel goals. In an effort to 
encourage critical language acquisition, the bill authorizes 
the expansion of the Boren Fellowship program to include five 
high-priority African languages, and also makes permanent the 
Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, which provides 
stipends to college students studying critical languages and 
other subjects important to the Intelligence Community. The 
bill further requires the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) to develop a plan to increase diversity within the 
Intelligence Community.
    The bill mandates implementation of security clearance 
reform to allow first- and second-generation Americans, many of 
whom may have critical language skills, to serve in the 
Intelligence Community with proper clearances. The Committee is 
concerned that there are no effective methods of measuring the 
quality of the security clearance process. In the absence of 
such measures, there are no guarantees that the system is 
functioning effectively, by granting trustworthy people access 
to classified information and preventing others from having 
those accesses. In addition, the delay in granting clearances 
frequently costs the Intelligence Community qualified 
applicants.
    Second, the bill enhances congressional oversight by 
ensuring that the Committee receives the information it needs 
to conduct its inherent oversight function. The National 
Security Act of 1947 mandates that the Committee be ``fully and 
currently informed'' of all intelligence activities. Over the 
past several years, the executive branch has failed to meet 
that standard in a number of important cases. These failures 
prompted the Committee to adopt language to enhance reporting 
on intelligence activities to the full membership of the 
congressional intelligence committees.
    One particular provision would repeal the so-called ``Gang 
of Eight'' provision, which has allowed the executive branch to 
limit notification on certain covert actions to only the 
chairmen and ranking members of the congressional intelligence 
committees. The new provision in H.R. 2701 would only allow the 
President to limit briefings pursuant to written procedures 
established by the congressional intelligence committees and 
allows the Committee to set procedures for the receipt of such 
notifications.
    The bill also strengthens the oversight mechanisms 
available to the Committee. It would create a statutory and 
independent Intelligence Community-wide Inspector General with 
a clearly-defined responsibility to report directly to 
Congress. A separate provision clarifies the DNI's obligation 
to cooperate with GAO investigations requested by the 
congressional intelligence committees to ensure that those 
committees will benefit from GAO's skilled personnel and 
thorough, objective analysis.
    In furtherance of the President's emphasis on protecting 
government information systems, the bill also makes a sizeable 
investment in foundational cybersecurity capabilities.
    Finally, the legislation authorizes funding to enhance 
human intelligence collection and provides critical funds for 
traditional intelligence challenges and other enduring and 
emerging global security issues in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America.

                      D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

The way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan

    It is beyond dispute that the security of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan is inextricably linked to the security of the United 
States and its allies. The Committee notes with increasing 
concern that both the political and military situations in 
these countries continue to deteriorate.
    After an eight-year presence of U.S. military and Coalition 
Forces in the region, al-Qa'ida, Taliban, and other affiliated 
groups continue to enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan's Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) from which they are able to 
plan and operate undeterred and with impunity. The Taliban has 
been able to regroup and gain more ground in Afghanistan, 
thereby posing a real challenge to the stability of the 
national government. The opium trade is booming, providing 
funding for the Taliban's illicit activities and attacks on 
Coalition forces. Citizens still lack the basic facilities they 
expect from their government, such as transportation and 
communications infrastructure, education, and health care.
    On the other side of the border in Pakistan, the situation 
is equally dire. The significance of the threat posed by the 
Pakistani Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliates to Pakistan, 
a nuclear-armed ally, cannot be overstated. The Pakistani 
Taliban has shown its strength in critical regions of the 
country, not only in the minimally-governed FATA, but also in 
the settled areas such as Peshawar and the Swat Valley. They 
have conducted suicide attacks against Pakistani and Western 
interests, including the attack against the Marriot Hotel in 
Islamabad, the murder of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, 
and the obstruction of U.S. and Coalition supply routes to 
Afghanistan. More recently, the Pakistani Taliban has made 
brazen attempts to expand its authority into areas dangerously 
close to Islamabad. While the democratically-elected government 
has recently taken military action against the Pakistani 
Taliban, the government will be relatively weak and unable to 
repel these threats without U.S. assistance.
    The Committee applauds the Administration's efforts to 
reemphasize the significance of these two nations and to 
approach the region with a new strategic vision. The Committee 
agrees that the United States must devote more resources, both 
financial and human, and use all instruments of power to 
overcome these challenges.
    The Director of National Intelligence has briefed the 
Committee on the Intelligence Community's plans to adjust its 
strategy to match the situation on the ground. The Committee 
will continue to monitor developments as they relate to this 
region and will work diligently to ensure that the Intelligence 
Community has the resources and support required to carry out 
its mission.

Cybersecurity

    Shortly after inauguration, the President ordered a 60-day 
review to develop a strategic framework for ensuring that all 
the various efforts to protect government information systems 
are fully integrated, properly resourced, and coordinated with 
Congress and the private sector.
    In May 2009, the White House presented the results of that 
review. This review provides a meaningful roadmap for improving 
cybersecurity in the future and outlines some of the challenges 
the nation will face in building a robust cybersecurity 
capability.
    Unfortunately, the national security establishment has come 
late to this issue. The Committee recognizes a need for a 
comprehensive effort on cybersecurity and appreciates the 
gravity and proximity of the cyber threat. The difficulty, as 
always, is in the details. As we move forward, there are 
critical oversight issues, difficult funding decisions, and 
thorny technical and policy questions still to be resolved. In 
some cases, those technical and policy questions may have to be 
resolved before the Committee has gathered enough information 
to be comfortable with authorizing significant sums for loosely 
defined purposes.
    Several standards will guide the Committee's oversight in 
the near-term:
     Funding for cybersecurity programs may need to be 
reduced or slowed until the future direction for cybersecurity 
is better defined.
     Any cybersecurity strategy or plans should include 
clear goals and metrics to enhance program and congressional 
oversight.
     There needs to be a clear doctrine for the use of 
offensive cyber capabilities.
     Securing government information systems should 
include efforts beyond building bigger and better firewalls, 
such as improving the capability to attribute attacks to 
specific government or private actors.
     Expansion of cybersecurity authorities and 
capabilities must include stronger oversight mechanisms to 
ensure that any monitoring is conducted in a manner consistent 
with laws and regulations.
     Securing government information systems will 
require both a significant increase in the number of 
cybersecurity experts in government service and a cultural 
change in the way federal employees approach computer and 
information security.
    The Committee will continue to monitor this area closely 
and looks forward to cooperating with the Administration in its 
efforts. The Committee will be prepared to authorize the 
expenditure of funds where those expenditures appear necessary 
and will offer legislation when there is a need for new 
authorities or greater oversight.

Diversity in the Intelligence Community

    The Committee has long been concerned about the lack of 
diversity in the Intelligence Community. Despite efforts to 
improve the diversity of its workforce, intelligence agencies 
continue to lag behind the rest of the federal workforce in 
this area.
    Diversity in the Intelligence Community is an operational 
imperative. For our intelligence apparatus to operate 
clandestinely throughout the world, the Intelligence Community 
needs officers of differing ethnicities. Diversity can improve 
our operational capabilities and, thereby, increase the quality 
and quantity of the intelligence our officers are able to 
collect.
    In order to achieve this operational objective, the 
Intelligence Community must adopt measures of diversity that 
match its mission requirements. Currently, in measuring 
diversity, intelligence agencies use only the six Office of 
Management and Budget-approved categories for identifying race 
and national origin. These are limited to: (1) Hispanic or 
Latino, (2) American Indian or Alaska Native, (3) Asian, (4) 
Black or African-American, (5) Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander, and (6) White. These categories were created to 
prevent discriminatory employment and education practices, not 
to measure the foreign language skills and cultural knowledge 
the Intelligence Community needs to succeed.
    While it is important that the Intelligence Community have 
a workforce that reflects the American population, it is far 
more important that its workforce be capable of operating in, 
collecting information about, and analyzing developments in all 
parts of the world. If the Intelligence Community is to succeed 
in its global mission, it must have a global face.
    The Committee is, however, encouraged by the proposal of a 
new form for self-identification of ancestry, ethnicity, and 
cultural expertise. The form was made available for public 
comment on May 11, 2009. This is a good first step toward 
improving mission-oriented diversity, and the Committee looks 
forward to reviewing public comments.

Improving foreign language proficiency and management

    Expert foreign language capability is critical to effective 
intelligence collection and analysis. The Committee is 
encouraged that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has 
launched an initiative to double the number of employees with 
critical foreign language skills and looks forward to 
evaluating the fruits of that initiative in coming years.
    While the Intelligence Community has made significant 
strides in hiring personnel who have limited proficiency in a 
foreign language, the Committee believes that the Intelligence 
Community must intensify efforts to train these personnel to a 
higher level of professional proficiency. This degree of 
language expertise generally requires a substantial commitment 
of time and resources, but the Committee is convinced that 
serious, extended foreign language study will yield substantial 
benefits for the Intelligence Community. In particular, the 
Committee recommends that programs for overseas immersion 
language training be expanded.
    Currently, many agencies evaluate foreign language 
capabilities by tallying the number of filled billets that are 
categorized as ``foreign language required'' or ``foreign 
language desired.'' This method of accounting does not 
distinguish between the varied levels of foreign language 
proficiency. In effect, the mechanism distorts the agency's 
assessment of foreign language readiness, which, in turn, 
adversely affects the agency's ability to accurately evaluate 
its foreign language needs, plan its hiring strategies, or 
implement necessary training programs.
    In order to better inform agency foreign language plans, 
the Committee urges the Intelligence Community to adopt a more 
precise mechanism to measure the foreign language capabilities 
of individual agencies, preferably one that takes into account 
language proficiency levels.

Intelligence cooperation with Mexico and Latin America

    The Committee notes that Latin America has not received 
attention from the Intelligence Community commensurate with the 
region's importance to U.S. national security. As a result, 
intelligence agencies are hard-pressed to provide needed 
insights about the complex threats emanating from the Western 
Hemisphere, including a brutal narcotics trade and the 
proliferation of violent youth gangs that have moved into 
American cities beyond the Southwest border region.
    The Committee considers the recent announcement of the 
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy to be a 
positive indicator of the Administration's dedication to meet 
these hemispheric challenges head-on. In formulating specifics 
for the future course of this initiative, the Committee 
recommends that the Intelligence Community modify its approach 
to the region in the following ways.
    First and foremost, the Committee recommends greater 
collaboration among the elements of the Intelligence Community. 
In particular, the Department of Homeland Security Intelligence 
and Analysis Division (DHS I&A) must do a better job of 
filtering and disseminating the unique intelligence that it 
draws from its operations on the U.S. borders and from state, 
local, and tribal resources. The Committee is pleased that DHS 
I&A plans to deploy at least one full-time employee to each of 
the 70 Fusion Centers operating throughout the country.
    Additionally, the Intelligence Community should harness the 
expertise of the growing number of Hispanic-Americans, many of 
whom have strong cultural and linguistic ties to the region, 
including proficiency in regional dialects. To this end, the 
Committee encourages the Intelligence Community to intensify 
its multipronged efforts to attract Hispanics and other 
minorities to its ranks. For hard target countries in the 
region, such as Cuba, the Committee urges the Intelligence 
Community to tailor recruiting drives to attract exiles from 
those countries, just as the United States has done with Iraqi-
Americans in seeking to meet intelligence objectives in Iraq.
    Finally, the Committee encourages the Intelligence 
Community to strengthen its relationships in Latin America, 
particularly with the Mexican government. Mexico is confronting 
powerful drug cartels that have used billions of dollars from 
drug sales in the United States to bribe officials and arm 
themselves with American-purchased weaponry. This is a shared 
problem for which the United States and Mexico must both 
shoulder the responsibility of finding a solution.

Emerging terrorist safehavens

    In its role as both the overseer of the Intelligence 
Community and a consumer of intelligence, the Committee seeks 
to identify those areas of the world in which future threats 
lie in order to provide resources and funding to meet those 
threats. In that regard, the Committee is concerned with the 
threat of increasing instability in Yemen and the continuing 
turmoil in Somalia. History has demonstrated that al-Qa'ida and 
its affiliates seek out those countries with either a weak 
central government or significant instability to use as 
safehavens from which to plot against the United States or U.S. 
interests abroad. While al-Qa'ida's main safehaven along the 
border of Afghanistan and Pakistan is of gravest concern, it is 
essential that neither Somalia nor Yemen become the next 
safehaven for al-Qa'ida.
    Somalia has not had an effective national government since 
1991. While certain areas of the country have developed 
internationally unrecognized governments, much of Somalia, 
including Mogadishu, remains largely lawless despite 
international efforts. Today, the terrorist group ``al-
Shabaab,'' which has issued statements praising Osama bin Laden 
and associating themselves with al-Qa'ida's global ideology, is 
making strides towards taking control of Mogadishu and southern 
Somalia. Al-Shabaab's control over this territory, including 
its ports, could provide al-Qa'ida a safehaven from which to 
plan terrorist attacks.
    In 2000, Yemen was the site of the attack on the USS Cole, 
an al-Qa'ida strike against the United States that killed 17 
U.S. servicemen. Following al-Qa'ida's attacks against the 
United States on September 11, 2001, the Yemeni government took 
some effective steps against terrorism, but in recent months 
the threat has grown again, as exemplified by the September 
2008 al-Qa'ida attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, which 
killed 16 civilians. Since then, al-Qa'ida elements in Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen merged to become ``Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula'' (AQAP) and are believed to be gaining strength in 
Yemen. Concurrently, the al-Houthi revolt in the north and 
unrest in the south of Yemen threaten the central government 
and may divert its attention from eliminating the AQAP threat. 
AQAP is now using the conflicts in the north and south as a 
rallying cry to recruit more terrorists into its ranks.
    The Committee urges the Intelligence Community, and the 
Administration as a whole, to take immediate steps to address 
the situations in Somalia and Yemen. The Committee looks 
forward to supporting the Intelligence Community in these 
efforts.

Oversight of intelligence activities

    The Committee notes with concern the blurred distinction 
between the intelligence-gathering activities carried out by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the clandestine 
operations of the Department of Defense (DOD). Congress 
chartered the Committee for the purpose of conducting oversight 
of all intelligence activities of the U.S. Government, 
including all programs funded under both the National 
Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program.
    In categorizing its clandestine activities, DOD frequently 
labels them as ``Operational Preparation of the Environment'' 
(OPE) to distinguish particular operations as traditional 
military activities and not as intelligence functions. The 
Committee observes, though, that overuse of this term has made 
the distinction all but meaningless. The determination as to 
whether an operation will be categorized as an intelligence 
activity is made on a case-by-case basis; there are no clear 
guidelines or principles for making consistent determinations. 
The Director of National Intelligence himself has acknowledged 
that there is no bright line between traditional intelligence 
missions carried out by the military and the operations of the 
CIA.
    Clandestine military intelligence-gathering operations, 
even those legitimately recognized as OPE, carry the same 
diplomatic and national security risks as traditional 
intelligence-gathering activities. While the purpose of many 
such operations is to gather intelligence, DOD has shown a 
propensity to apply the OPE label where the slightest nexus of 
a theoretical, distant military operation might one day exist. 
Consequently, these activities often escape the scrutiny of the 
intelligence committees, and the congressional defense 
committees cannot be expected to exercise oversight outside of 
their jurisdiction.
    Based on recent discussions, the Committee is hopeful that 
DOD will be more fulsome in its reporting. In the future, if 
DOD does not meet its obligations to inform the Committee of 
intelligence activities, the Committee will consider 
legislative action clarifying the Department's obligation to do 
so.

              Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes

    On June 18, 2009, the Committee met in open and closed 
session and ordered the bill H.R. 2701 favorably reported, as 
amended.

                              OPEN SESSION

    In open session, the Committee considered the text of the 
bill H.R. 2701.
    Chairman Reyes offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 2701 and moved to adopt the amendment as the 
base text for consideration. The motion was agreed to by a 
voice vote. The contents of the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, as amended, are described in the Section-by-Section 
analysis and the Explanation of Amendment.
    The Committee then considered the following amendments to 
the amendment in the nature of a substitute:
    Mr. Hastings offered an amendment to require the Director 
of National Intelligence to submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees on the plans of each 
element of the Intelligence Committee to increase diversity. It 
was agreed to by a voice vote.
    Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to authorize funds to close 
the National Drug Intelligence Center. It was not agreed to by 
a roll call vote of 9 ayes to 13 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. 
Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
    Mr. Thompson offered an amendment to require the Director 
of National Intelligence to submit a report to the 
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
appropriations committees on the state of research, analysis, 
and training in interrogation and debriefing practices. The 
amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
    Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to prohibit the use of 
funds for the implementation of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Global Justice Initiative. Mr. Rogers withdrew 
his amendment.
    Mr. Langevin offered an amendment to establish, under the 
authority of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, a designee to act as the outreach coordinator for 
information assurance education. The amendment would further 
require an examination of the recruiting, retention, and 
professional development of individuals with specialized cyber 
operations training and skills. Mr. Langevin withdrew his 
amendment.
    Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to prohibit the use of 
funds authorized in the bill to provide Miranda warnings to 
certain persons outside of the United States. The amendment was 
agreed to by a roll call vote of 14 ayes, 7 noes, and 1 
present:
    Voting aye: Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, 
Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. 
Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. 
Kline, Mr. Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky.
    Voting present: Mr. Schiff.
    The Committee then recessed for House floor votes and 
reconvened in open session for business approximately eight 
hours later.
    Mr. Kline offered an amendment to require the Director of 
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional 
defense committees a revised charter for the National 
Reconnaissance Office. The amendment was agreed to by a voice 
vote.
    Mr. Conaway offered an amendment to require the Director of 
National Intelligence to conduct a review of the status of 
audit readiness of each element of the Intelligence Community 
and to develop a plan to achieve a full, unqualified audit of 
each element. The amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
    Mrs. Myrick offered an amendment to prohibit the use of 
funds to transfer detainees from U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, to the United States.
    Mr. Murphy offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to the Myrick amendment, which would limit the use 
of funds for the transfer or release of individuals detained at 
U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States, 
until such time as the President presents to the congressional 
defense committees a plan regarding the disposition of each 
individual to be transferred or released. Mr. Murphy withdrew 
his amendment in the nature of the substitute, pending 
revision.
    Mr. Murphy then offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to the Myrick amendment, which would limit the use 
of funds for the transfer or release of individuals detained at 
U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States, 
until such time as the President presents to Congress a plan 
regarding the disposition of each individual to be transferred 
or released. The amendment was agreed to by a roll call vote of 
12 ayes and 10 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, 
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
    Voting no: Mr. Tierney, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. 
Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. 
Kline, Mr. Conaway.
    The Committee then considered the question of the amendment 
offered by Mrs. Myrick, as amended by the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Murphy. The amendment was 
agreed to by a roll call vote of 14 ayes and 8 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. 
Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
Miller, Mr. Kline.
    Voting no: Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. 
Gallegly, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Conaway.
    Mr. Blunt offered an amendment to prohibit the use of 
intelligence funds to make payments to foreign nations for the 
relocation of detainees held at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote 
of 10 ayes and 12 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Boren, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. 
Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. 
Kline, Mr. Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith.
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the Director 
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, to make publicly available an unclassified 
summary of intelligence relating to the recidivism of detainees 
held at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The amendment 
was agreed to by a roll call vote of 12 ayes and 10 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Langevin, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. 
Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. 
Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Boren.
    Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to require a review of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of enforcement 
jurisdiction in foreign nations. Mr. Rogers withdrew his 
amendment.
    Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to restrict funds for the 
implementation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
``seven-and-out'' program until the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation submits a review of pension issues 
related to the ``five-and-out'' program. Mr. Rogers withdrew 
his amendment.
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the Director 
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, to make publicly available an unclassified 
summary of intelligence on Uighur detainees held at U.S. Naval 
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The amendment was agreed to by a 
voice vote.
    Mr. Thornberry offered an amendment to strike language 
related to the video recording of interrogations of persons in 
the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. The amendment 
was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 9 ayes and 13 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. 
Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
    Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to review the enforcement 
jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with 
respect to the criminal investigation of terrorism offenses 
conducted in foreign nations and using National Intelligence 
Program funds. The amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
    Mr. Langevin and Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to 
restrict funds for the implementation of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's ``seven-and-out'' program until the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation submits a review of pension 
issues related to the ``five-and-out'' program and the effects 
of a mandatory reassignment policy on the Bureau. The amendment 
was agreed to by a voice vote.
    Mr. Conaway offered an amendment to strike language 
relating to Government Accountability Office audits and 
investigations. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call 
vote of 9 ayes and 13 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. 
Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
    Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to prohibit payments to 
foreign nations for the purposes of conducting surveillance or 
monitoring of a detainee who had been held at U.S. Naval 
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The amendment was not agreed to 
by a roll call vote of 9 ayes and 13 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. 
Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency to make publicly available 
unclassified versions of documents relating to congressional 
briefings on the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, as 
well as an unclassified version of intelligence products 
assessing the information gained from detainee reporting. The 
amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 9 ayes and 
13 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. 
Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
    Mr. Thornberry offered an amendment to reform the 
congressional notification process as set forth in the National 
Security Act of 1947. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll 
call vote of 10 ayes and 12 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Holt, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. 
Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. 
Kline, Mr. Conaway.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment restricting the use of 
funds authorized for purposes related to a covert action 
finding.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national 
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered 
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 21 
ayes to 0 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren, Mr. Hoekstra, 
Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. 
Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. Conaway.
    Voting no: None.

                              OPEN SESSION

    After debate, the Committee returned to open session to 
complete consideration of the Hoekstra amendment. Mr. Hoekstra 
withdrew his amendment.
    The Committee then adopted the Chairman's amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, as amended, by a roll call vote of 12 
ayes, 9 noes, and 1 present.
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, 
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
    Voting no: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. 
Conaway.
    Voting present: Mr. Tierney.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    The Chairman announced his intention to discuss the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. Mr. Hoekstra moved to 
close the meeting because national security would be endangered 
if the matters to be considered were disclosed. The motion was 
agreed to by a record vote of 22 ayes to 0 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, 
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren, Mr. 
Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. 
Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. Conaway.
    Voting no: None.

                              OPEN SESSION

    After debate on the classified Schedule of Authorizations, 
the Committee returned to open session.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted the Schedule of 
Authorizations.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the 
Chairman to favorably report the bill to the House, as amended, 
including by reference the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations.

      Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment


                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for fiscal year 2010.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities covered under this title for 
fiscal year 2010 are contained in a classified Schedule of 
Authorizations. Section 102 states that the Schedule of 
Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on 
Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
and to the President.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 allows the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), with the approval of the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), to authorize employment of 
civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized under 
Section 102 by an amount not to exceed three percent of the 
total limit applicable to each element of the Intelligence 
Community. The DNI must determine that the action is necessary 
to the performance of important intelligence functions and must 
notify the congressional intelligence committees prior to the 
exercise of authority under this section.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes the sum of $672,812,000 in fiscal 
year 2010 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The 
Section authorizes 853 full-time, or full-time equivalent, 
personnel for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
who may be either permanent employees of the ODNI or 
individuals detailed from other elements of the United States 
Government. Section 104 also authorizes additional funds and 
personnel in the classified Schedule of Authorizations for the 
Intelligence Community Management Account.

Section 105. Prohibition on earmarks

    Section 105 prohibits the inclusion of any earmarked 
funding requests in this bill.

Section 106. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 106 states that authorization of appropriations for 
an activity does not grant authorization for any intelligence 
activity that is not otherwise permitted under the Constitution 
or laws of the United States.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$290,900,000 for fiscal year 2010 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS


                     SUBTITLE A--PERSONNEL MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Temporary appointment to fill vacancies in presidentially-
        appointed and Senate-confirmed positions in the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence

    Section 302 allows the DNI to fill, in an acting capacity, 
presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed positions at the 
ODNI with either the deputy to the vacant position or another 
Senate-confirmed individual serving elsewhere in the 
Intelligence Community. A significant number of ODNI personnel 
are detailed from other elements of the Intelligence Community, 
and thus may be ineligible under the Vacancies Act to serve in 
an acting capacity in Senate-confirmed ODNI positions. This 
section helps avoid the potentially prolonged vacancies in 
critical positions that could result from the appointment and 
confirmation process by allowing the President to appoint 
individuals from other elements of the Intelligence Community 
with the necessary skills and background to serve in an acting 
capacity.

Section 303. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to 
        elements of the Intelligence Community

    Section 303 expands from one year to two years the maximum 
length of time that U.S. Government personnel may be detailed 
to the ODNI on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. To 
utilize this authority, the agreement of both the DNI and the 
head of the detailing element is required.
    The DNI requested authority to expand the permitted 
duration of details from one year to three years. The Committee 
believes that a two-year detail strikes the appropriate balance 
between the needs of the ODNI and the needs of the other 
elements of the Intelligence Community.

Section 304. Provisions relating to the Defense Civilian Intelligence 
        Personnel System

    Section 304 curtails implementation of the Defense Civilian 
Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) by prohibiting the 
transition or hiring of any new employees into the system. It 
also requires the Secretary of Defense, within one year of 
enactment, to terminate the program and transition employees 
back to the civilian compensation system that was in effect on 
September 30, 2007. The provisions requiring the return of 
employees to the previous compensation system do not apply to 
members of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service or 
to an individual in an Intelligence Senior Level position, as 
defined by Section 1607 of Title 10, Chapter 83.
    If the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, determines that 
the DCIPS pay system should not be terminated with respect to 
covered employees, he is required to provide to Congress, 
within six months of enactment, a written report with the 
Secretary's views and his reasons therefore.
    The Committee, together with the Committee on Armed 
Services, has expressed its concern about the implementation of 
the DCIPS pay system. DCIPS would do away with the existing 
General Schedule-pay scale and replace it with a system of pay 
bands. This pay-banded system has been misleadingly named 
``pay-for-performance.''
    For the past three years, the Committee has expressed 
concerns that this compensation system lacks transparency and 
accountability, and could have an adverse impact on minorities. 
The Committee is also concerned that the system was developed 
without sufficient consultation with employees in the 
Intelligence Community. Further, the pay system is being 
implemented across the Intelligence Community without regard to 
the needs of different career fields or mission needs of the 
various intelligence agencies. In 2003, the Committee objected 
to the implementation of a similar program at the Central 
Intelligence Agency out of concern that it would have an 
undesirable impact on the workforce.
    The Committee continues to be concerned that the 
implementation of such a system has been rushed and that there 
has not been adequate time to ensure managers are properly 
trained. Human resources personnel have raised concerns that 
they will not have sufficient time prior to implementation to 
ensure all employees receive training, nor do they have final 
policy guidance. Recent training events have demonstrated that 
managers need more practice and guidance in determining 
performance objectives under the systems.
    The Committee supports the idea of rewarding performance 
and believes that the performance bonus system has not been 
effectively utilized. Certainly, the existing civil service 
system has flaws and needs reform. The Committee notes that the 
Director of the Office of Personnel Management has indicated 
his intent to reform the civilian personnel system across the 
entire federal government. The Committee believes that 
additional employees should not transition to pay-for-
performance systems prior to the implementation of a broader, 
government-wide pay reform.

                         SUBTITLE B--EDUCATION

Section 311. Permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence 
        Scholars Program

    Section 311 provides permanent authorization for the Pat 
Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP), which provides 
financial assistance to students who pursue studies in critical 
language specialties, area studies, and technical and 
scientific specialties. PRISP was originally authorized as a 
pilot program in Section 318 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 2004 and has continued under year-to-year 
appropriations. The program has been successful and is widely 
supported within the Intelligence Community.

Section 312. Intelligence Officer Training Program

    Section 312 authorizes the Intelligence Officer Training 
Program (IOTP), a program operated by the ODNI and built from a 
combination of previously authorized pilot programs. The IOTP 
seeks to recruit, prepare, and retain an ethnically and 
culturally diverse workforce in the Intelligence Community by 
providing grants to institutions of higher learning to develop 
courses of study in education disciplines that the DNI deems to 
be of critical importance to the intelligence mission. The 
Committee encourages the ODNI to consider awarding grants to 
institutions developing innovative methods for teaching high-
priority foreign language skills, such as those that utilize 
individualized and/or web-based courses of study.

Section 313. Modifications to the Stokes Educational Scholarship 
        Program

    Section 313 expands and strengthens the Stokes Educational 
Scholarship Program. The Stokes Program was originally created 
for the National Security Agency (NSA) to help undergraduate 
students, particularly minority students, develop critical 
skills necessary to the Intelligence Community. This provision 
extends the program to include graduate students. It would also 
make the program available to other elements within the 
Intelligence Community.

Section 314. Pilot program for intensive language instruction in 
        African languages

    Section 314 directs the DNI to establish a pilot program to 
expand the National Security Education Program/Boren Scholars 
Program to include intensive language instruction for five 
high-priority African languages. The program will utilize 
intensive immersion instruction both in the United States and 
abroad, and will likely focus on the Somali, Hausa, Amharic, 
Tigrinya, and Kituba languages. The intent of the program is to 
begin building capability in African languages spoken in areas 
where U.S. national security interests may be affected, but 
where insufficient instructional capability exists in the 
United States.

         SUBTITLE C--CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF COVERT ACTIONS

Section 321. Reporting on covert actions

    Section 321 changes the processes for reporting of 
intelligence activities, including covert actions, to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
    Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 requires the 
President to ensure that the congressional intelligence 
committees are kept fully and currently informed of 
intelligence activities. Section 503 of the National Security 
Act enumerates specific procedures with respect to briefings on 
covert actions.
    In the past, the Committee has struggled with the 
limitations imposed by the executive branch on reporting of 
intelligence activities. To address this problem, subsection 
(a) amends Section 501(a) of the National Security Act by 
explicitly requiring the President to brief the congressional 
intelligence committees on legal authorities, operational 
risks, resource concerns, and potential for failure at issue 
with respect to significant, anticipated, or ongoing 
intelligence activities.
    Subsection (b) amends Section 501(c) of the National 
Security Act by requiring that the procedures governing the 
briefings must be in writing.
    Subsection (c) amends Section 502 of the National Security 
Act by providing explicit guidance on how the President should 
brief the intelligence committees on legal issues related to 
intelligence activities.
    Subsection (d) amends Section 503 of the National Security 
Act by applying the same explicit guidance in subsection (c) to 
briefings on covert actions. This subsection also replaces 
Section 503(c)(2), which allowed the President to limit reports 
on covert actions to the so-called ``Gang of Eight''--the 
chairmen and ranking members of the intelligence committees, 
the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of 
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the 
Senate--if the President determines that extraordinary 
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States 
warrant limiting access.
    This subsection replaces Section 503(c)(2) with a provision 
that requires the President to brief all members of the 
congressional intelligence committees, but implicitly provides 
for the possibility of more restricted briefings pursuant to 
the written procedures established by the congressional 
intelligence committees, pursuant to the revised Section 
501(c). This language vests the authority to limit the 
briefings with the committees, rather than the President. Also, 
in defining the term ``significant undertaking,'' the 
subsection explicitly establishes certain conditions under 
which the President is required to provide information on a 
covert action program to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
    This subsection further provides that, if a briefing on a 
finding or notice is restricted to certain members of the 
committees, the President shall provide those members with 
general information on the content of the finding or notice. It 
also allows any member of Congress to whom a covert action 
finding or notice has been reported to submit to the DNI an 
objection concerning any part of that finding or notice, who 
must report that objection to the President in writing within 
48 hours.
    Additionally, this subsection requires that the President 
maintain a record of the members to whom a finding or notice 
has been reported and provide that record to the congressional 
intelligence committee in question within 30 days.
    Finally, this subsection clarifies that, as a matter of 
construction, any reference in sections 501, 502, or 503 to a 
requirement that information be provided to the intelligence 
committees shall be construed to require that such information 
be provided to all members of those committees, except as 
provided in revised Section 503(c)(2).
    The Committee understands well the need to protect 
intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure and the 
prerogatives of the executive branch with respect to the 
protection of classified information. However, these principles 
must be balanced against the constitutional requirement for 
congressional oversight.
    Section 503 of the National Security Act attempted to 
establish a balance between the executive and legislative 
branches. Over the past eight years, the balance was tipped 
towards the executive at the expense of congressional 
oversight. That state of affairs was particularly troubling in 
light of the controversial nature of some of the programs that 
were not briefed to the full membership of the intelligence 
committees. This section resets that balance with respect for 
the executive branch's prerogatives, but with an eye on 
ensuring that Congress is able to fulfill its oversight 
responsibility.

         SUBTITLE D--REPORTS AND OTHER CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Section 331. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets

    Section 331 modifies 50 U.S.C. Section 404(m) to change the 
requirement for the United States Department of the Treasury to 
submit a report to Congress on financial intelligence 
concerning terrorist assets. The existing provision requires 
the report to be submitted semiannually. This section would 
change the law to require that the report be submitted once 
every year and eliminates certain data requirements from that 
report.

Section 332. Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 332 provides a new mechanism for overseeing 
personnel growth in the Intelligence Community by requiring the 
DNI, in consultation with the head of the element of the 
Intelligence Community concerned, to prepare an annual 
assessment of the personnel and contractor levels for each 
element of the Intelligence Community for the subsequent fiscal 
year.
    The assessment required by Section 332 must report 
information about budgeted personnel and contractor costs and 
levels, a comparison of this information to current fiscal year 
data and data from the previous five fiscal years, and a 
justification for the requested personnel and contractor 
levels. The assessment also requires the DNI to affirm that, 
based on current and projected funding, the individual elements 
of the Intelligence Community will have sufficient internal 
infrastructure and training resources to support the requested 
personnel and contractor levels and sufficient funding to 
support the administrative and operational activities of the 
requested personnel.
    Section 332 also requires that the assessment contain 
information about intelligence collectors and analysts employed 
or contracted by each element of the Intelligence Community, 
and contractors who are the subjects of any inspector general 
investigations. The assessment must be submitted to the 
congressional intelligence committees concurrent with the 
submission of the President's budget request.
    The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment 
required by Section 332 will provide information necessary for 
the executive branch and Congress to understand the 
consequences of modifying the Intelligence Community's 
personnel levels. Section 332 recognizes that personnel growth 
must be better planned in the future to accomplish the goals of 
strengthening intelligence collection, analysis, and 
dissemination. In addition, the Administration must adequately 
fund personnel growth and structure its resources to ensure 
that personnel growth does not compromise the implementation 
and execution of other programs.
    With regard to historical contractor levels to be included 
in the annual assessments, the DNI has expressed concern that 
there was no comprehensive effort, prior to the ODNI's 
contractor inventory initiated in June 2006, to capture 
information on the number and costs of contractors throughout 
the Intelligence Community. In light of the concerns outlined 
by the DNI, the Committee understands that information about 
contractor levels prior to June 2006 may need to be reported as 
a best estimate.
    The personnel assessment required in Section 332 should 
assist the DNI and the congressional intelligence committees in 
determining the appropriate balance of contractors and 
permanent government employees.

Section 333. Semiannual reports on nuclear weapons programs of Iran, 
        Syria, and North Korea

    Section 333 requires the DNI to submit to Congress 
classified reports on the nuclear intentions and capabilities 
of Iran, Syria, and North Korea not less than once in the four 
months after enactment and semiannually thereafter. This 
section provides that the DNI may submit a National 
Intelligence Estimate on the intentions and capabilities of any 
one of the three countries in lieu of submitting a report on 
that particular country during a six-month period.

Section 334. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 334 requires the DNI to report annually on the 
Intelligence Community's proficiency in foreign languages, 
including foreign language training. The report must provide 
data on positions in the various Intelligence Community 
elements that require foreign language proficiency, the number 
of personnel hired with such proficiency, and the efforts of 
those elements to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel 
with such proficiency. Additionally, the report requires the 
DNI to make an assessment on the feasibility of hiring foreign 
nationals previously employed as translators for the U.S. 
Government in Iraq and Afghanistan to help meet critical 
language needs in the Intelligence Community. This information 
is intended to help the Committee better assess the 
Intelligence Community's ability to manage language resources.

Section 335. Government Accountability Office audits and investigations

    Section 335 directs the DNI to ensure that Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) personnel are provided with access 
to all information from the Intelligence Community that the 
Comptroller General determines necessary for a GAO analysis, 
evaluation, or investigation of an Intelligence Community 
program or activity, when the Comptroller General conducts such 
analysis, evaluation, or investigation at the request of a 
congressional intelligence committee. The scope of this 
provision is limited to requests from the congressional 
intelligence committees.
    This provision allows the DNI to restrict access to 
information sought by the GAO if the DNI determines that the 
restriction is necessary to protect the vital national security 
interests of the United States. If the DNI makes such a 
determination, the DNI must submit a statement of the reasons 
for the determination to the congressional intelligence 
committees.

Section 336. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements

    Section 336 requires the head of each element of the 
Intelligence Community to submit on a semiannual basis a 
certification that the element is in full compliance with the 
provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 requiring that 
the congressional intelligence committees be kept fully and 
currently informed of intelligence activities.
    This section provides that, if the head of an element is 
unable to issue such a certification, he or she must submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees an explanation as to 
why a certification could not be made and affirm that the 
relevant information will be submitted to the committees as 
soon as is possible.
    The purpose of this section is to ensure that elements of 
the Intelligence Community remain current and timely with 
respect to their notification obligations.

Section 337. Reports on foreign industrial espionage

    Section 337 modifies 50 U.S.C. Section 2170b(b)(1) and (2) 
to change the requirement for the submission of a report to 
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial 
Espionage. The existing provision requires the report to be 
submitted annually. This section would change the law to 
require that the report be submitted once every two years.

Section 338. Report on intelligence community contractors

    Section 338 requires the DNI to provide a comprehensive 
report on the use of contractors in the Intelligence Community. 
The report must include data on several critical questions 
concerning the use of contractors, including: a description of 
guidance issued by the elements of the Intelligence Community 
on the hiring, training, security clearance, and assignment of 
contract personnel; an identification of contracts in which the 
contractor is performing a substantially similar function to a 
government employee; an assessment of costs incurred or savings 
achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of specific 
functions instead of using full-time employees of the 
Intelligence Community; an assessment of the appropriateness of 
using contractors to perform the activities; and an estimate of 
the number of contracts and the number of contract personnel 
performing intelligence functions.
    These reporting requirements are designed to address the 
Committee's concerns regarding the Intelligence Community's 
large contractor workforce, including: the lack of 
documentation regarding the size and use of the workforce; a 
clear definition of the functions that may be appropriately 
performed by contractors; or procedures for overseeing 
contractors and preventing any waste, fraud, and abuse that may 
occur. The report is intended to aid both the Intelligence 
Community and the congressional intelligence committees in 
conducting oversight and devising appropriate policy solutions.

Section 339. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities 
        of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Section 339 requires the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to submit a comprehensive report on its efforts to 
transform its intelligence capabilities and to achieve long-
term goals for developing the national security functions of 
the Bureau. This report is intended to help establish clear 
goals for the development of the effective functioning of the 
Bureau as an intelligence agency.

Section 340. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and 
        Afghanistan

    Section 340 requires the DNI and the Secretary of Defense 
to submit to the congressional intelligence and defense 
committees a report on the intelligence resources dedicated to 
Iraq and Afghanistan during the preceding two fiscal years and 
on the plan for fiscal year 2010. The Committee wants to ensure 
that such resources are sufficient to support policy 
determinations and tactical decisions related to U.S. forces 
deployed in these two theaters.

Section 341. Report on International Traffic in Arms Regulations

    The executive branch and industry have repeatedly 
identified the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) 
as an impediment to technology development. ITAR was intended 
to protect sensitive technologies and information from being 
transferred to nations deemed a potential security risk. 
Government and industry assert that the State Department has 
managed ITAR in such a way so as to encourage non-U.S. 
companies to develop a collaborative research and development 
environment that has allowed the indigenous production of 
banned technologies, which defeats the premise of ITAR and 
causes a significant loss of market share in key industries for 
U.S. corporations.
    This section requires the DNI to report to the 
congressional intelligence committees and to the congressional 
foreign affairs committees regarding the threat to national 
security posed by foreign government attempts to acquire 
sensitive technology and the effectiveness of ITAR in 
mitigating that threat.
    The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010, which passed the House in June 2009, would give the 
President authority to reform certain aspects of ITAR's 
management. The Committee expects that the report required by 
this section will help the President and Congress better 
evaluate the merits of such a decision.
    Commercial imagery providers have suggested that the U.S. 
Government has imposed on them significant legal restrictions. 
These providers are concerned that U.S. restrictions on the 
sale of commercial imagery are beginning to inhibit their 
growth and their competitiveness in foreign markets, especially 
as foreign imagery satellites improve and foreign reliance on 
U.S. systems diminishes. The Committee expects the report 
called for by this section to help Congress better understand 
the implications of these restrictions.

Section 342. Report on nuclear trafficking

    Section 342 requires the DNI to report to certain 
congressional committees on the illicit trade of nuclear and 
radiological material and equipment. The report must include: 
details of all cases of illicit sale, transfer, brokering, or 
transport of nuclear material or nuclear explosive devices; an 
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of 
nuclear trafficking; and a discussion of any dissents, caveats, 
gaps, or other information that would reduce confidence in the 
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of 
nuclear trafficking. The Committee remains concerned about the 
threat from the proliferation of nuclear and radiological 
materials and equipment, and this report is intended to deliver 
an assessment of that threat.

Section 343. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit 
        unauthorized disclosures of classified information

    Section 343 requires the DNI to conduct a study on the 
feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the 
Intelligence Community who commit unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information and to report the results of that study 
to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 344. Study on electronic waste destruction practices of the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 344 requires the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community to conduct a study on the security and 
environmental impacts of the current electronic waste disposal 
practices of the Intelligence Community and provide the results 
to the congressional intelligence committees. The Committee is 
particularly concerned about the security implications of 
poorly-managed electronic waste disposal, but these disposal 
practices also raise questions about potential for adverse 
environmental effects.

Section 345. Report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air 
        America

    Section 345 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress 
on the advisability of providing federal retirement benefits to 
United States citizens who were employees of Air America during 
a period when it was owned or controlled by the U. S. 
Government. This assessment must include a review of the costs 
associated with providing such a benefit and any 
recommendations for legislative action necessary to enact such 
a benefit.

Section 346. Study on college tuition programs for employees of the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 346 requires the DNI to conduct a study on the 
feasibility of providing matching funds to college savings 
plans of personnel in the Intelligence Community and 
establishing a program to pay the college tuition for the 
children of an employee of the Intelligence Community who dies 
in the line of duty. The purpose of this study is to determine 
whether it would be practical to provide additional assistance 
to employees of the Intelligence Community who face college 
tuition payments.

Section 347. National Intelligence Estimate on global supply chain 
        vulnerabilities

    Section 347 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a 
National Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence 
Assessment on the risks to U.S. national security resulting 
from the presence of counterfeit electronic components that may 
be defective or deliberately manipulated by foreign governments 
or criminal organizations. With the growing concerns over 
cybersecurity, the Committee believes it is appropriate to 
focus the Intelligence Community's attention on threats 
emanating from the global supply chain that provides much of 
the computer systems for both government and private industry.

Section 348. Review of records relating to potential health risks among 
        Desert Storm veterans

    Section 348 requires the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (DCIA) to conduct a classification review 
of all CIA records relevant to known or potential health 
effects suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm. This 
section further requires the DCIA to report the results of the 
classification review to Congress.

Section 349. Review of pensions of employees affected by ``five and 
        out'' program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Section 349 states that none of the funds authorized by the 
bill may be used to implement an FBI program that requires the 
mandatory reassignment of a FBI supervisor after he or she 
serves in a management position for seven years. Funds may only 
be expended for this program after the Director of the FBI 
certifies to the congressional intelligence committees that the 
Director has completed a review of issues related to a previous 
program that required the mandatory reassignment of an FBI 
supervisor after he or she served five years in a management 
position.

Section 350. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism 
        of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
        Bay, Cuba

    Section 350 requires that the DNI, in consultation with the 
DCIA and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, make 
publicly available an unclassified summary of intelligence 
relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held 
at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and an 
assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in 
terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist 
organizations.

Section 351. Summary of intelligence on Uighur detainees held at United 
        States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

    Section 351 requires that the DNI, in consultation with the 
DCIA and the Director of the DIA, make publicly available an 
unclassified summary of intelligence relating to threats posed 
by Uighur detainees currently or formerly held at the U.S. 
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and an assessment of the 
likelihood that those detainees will engage in terrorism or 
communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

Section 352. Report on interrogation research and training

    Section 352 requires that the DNI, in coordination with the 
heads of the relevant elements of the Intelligence Community, 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the 
congressional appropriations committees a report on the state 
of research, analysis, and training in interrogation and 
debriefing process. The report must include: an assessment of 
the quality and value of scientific and technical research in 
interrogation and debriefing practices; the state of 
interrogation and debriefing training in the Intelligence 
Community; the adequacy of efforts to enhance career paths for 
employees who conduct interrogations and debriefings; and the 
effectiveness of processes for studying and implementing best 
practices for interrogation and debriefing.

Section 353. Report on plans to increase diversity within the 
        intelligence community

    Section 353 requires that the DNI, in coordination with the 
heads of the elements of the Intelligence Community, submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans 
of each element to increase diversity within the intelligence 
community. Those reports must include: specific plans to 
achieve the goals articulated in the DNI's strategic plan on 
equal opportunity and diversity; plans and initiatives to 
increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; plans and 
initiatives to improve retention of diverse federal employees 
at the junior, midgrade, senior, and management levels; a 
description of specific diversity awareness training and 
education programs; and a description of performance metrics to 
measure the success of carrying out these plans.

Section 354. Review of Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of 
        enforcement jurisdiction in foreign nations

    Section 354 requires that, no later than 60 days after 
enactment, the Director of the FBI conduct a review of 
constraints under international law and the laws of foreign 
nations to the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction with 
respect to criminal investigations of terrorism offenses under 
U.S. law.

Section 355. Repeal of certain reporting requirements

    Section 355 eliminates certain reporting requirements that 
were considered overly burdensome to the Intelligence Community 
in cases where the usefulness of the report has diminished, 
either because of changing events or because the information 
contained in those reports is duplicative of information 
already obtained through other avenues. The Committee is 
sensitive to the administrative burden placed on the 
Intelligence Community through reporting requirements, and 
seeks to eliminate, wherever possible, those reporting 
requirements that are no longer useful to aid congressional 
oversight.

Section 356. Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 356 incorporates into the Act by reference each 
requirement contained in the classified annex to submit a 
report to the congressional intelligence committees to clarify 
that the requirement to complete these reports is a requirement 
in law.

Section 357. Conforming amendments

    Section 357 makes conforming changes to the National 
Security Act of 1947 arising from changes and additions to the 
reporting requirements enumerated in Section 507 of that Act.

                       SUBTITLE E--OTHER MATTERS

Section 361. Modification of availability of funds for different 
        intelligence activities

    Section 361 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B)) with 
the text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii), as amended by Section 
1011(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, which governs the transfer and reprogramming of 
certain intelligence funding by the DNI. It replaces the 
``unforeseen requirements'' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) 
with a more flexible standard (from Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii)) 
to govern reprogramming and transfers of funds authorized for a 
different intelligence or intelligence-related activity.
    The new standard permits reprogramming or transfer 
authority if the new use of funds ``supports an emergent need, 
improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.'' This 
modification brings the standard for reprogramming and 
transfers of intelligence funding into conformity with the 
standards applicable to reprogramming and transfers under 
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947. This 
provision would make no changes to the relevant congressional 
reporting requirements or processes associated with the 
approval of reprogramming requests.

Section 362. Protection of certain national security information

    Section 362 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for 
individuals with authorized access to classified information 
who intentionally disclose information identifying a covert 
agent, if such individual knows the United States is taking 
affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's intelligence 
relationship to the United States.
    Section 362 also amends Section 603(a) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide that the 
annual report from the President on the protection of 
identities of certain U.S. undercover intelligence officers, 
agents, informants, and sources also include an assessment of 
the need for any legislative modification for the purposes of 
improving legal protections for covert agents.

Section 363. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt 
        and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations

    Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires certain federal 
employees, spouses, dependents, and others to file reports with 
their employing agency regarding receipt of gifts or 
decorations from foreign governments. The employing agency is 
then required to file detailed reports about these gifts, 
including the source of each gift, with the Secretary of State, 
who must then publish a list of these reports in the Federal 
Register.
    The public disclosure of gifts or decorations to personnel 
and certain contractors of the Intelligence Community has the 
potential to compromise intelligence sources or confirm 
intelligence relationships with foreign governments. 
Recognizing the risks to national security, Congress has 
granted limited exemptions to this rule to the DCIA and to the 
DNI. Section 363 provides the heads of each element of the 
Intelligence Community the same limited exemption from the 
specified public reporting requirements previously provided 
only to the DNI and DCIA but requires that any information 
withheld from the Secretary of State be provided to and 
retained by the DNI.

Section 364. Exemption of dissemination of terrorist identity 
        information from the Freedom of Information Act

    Section 364 establishes procedures facilitating the 
transfer of information concerning the identity of known or 
suspected terrorists from the National Counterterrorism Center 
to the Terrorist Screening Center. This section is designed to 
encourage the dissemination of information vital to the 
prevention of terrorist attacks to state and local law 
enforcement by ensuring that the dissemination does not render 
information that would otherwise be exempt from disclosure 
under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) subject to 
such disclosure.

Section 365. Misuse of the Intelligence Community and Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence name, initials, or seal

    Section 365 adds a subsection to the National Security Act 
of 1947 prohibiting the unauthorized use of the official name, 
initials, or seal of either the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence or the Intelligence Community. This 
section also permits the Attorney General to pursue injunctive 
relief for such unauthorized use.

Section 366. Security Clearances: Reports; Ombudsman; Reciprocity

    The Committee welcomes the Intelligence Community's 
progress in improving the timeliness of security clearance 
processing but remains concerned that the processing of some 
security clearances, particularly for industry, takes too long. 
Section 366 requires a series of reports that will contribute 
needed data for ongoing congressional oversight of the security 
clearance process and effective measurement of progress.
    This section requires the President to conduct an audit 
every four years regarding the manner in which the executive 
branch determines whether a security clearance is required for 
a particular position in the federal government. This section 
also requires the President to submit to Congress an annual 
report regarding the number of employees and contractors with 
security clearances, the amount of time taken to process 
security clearance determinations, and the number of security 
clearance determinations that have taken longer than one year 
to complete. The section further requires that the President 
submit to Congress 180 days after enactment of this Act a 
report on establishing security clearance adjudication 
standards across the federal government.
    This section also directs the DNI to appoint an ombudsman 
for security clearances within the Intelligence Community. An 
ombudsman will provide persons experiencing delays in obtaining 
their security clearances with an avenue for seeking help 
resolving such delays.
    The Committee has conducted extensive oversight on the 
security clearance process, and in particular on the 
Administration's attempts to reform the process. In the course 
of that oversight, GAO has testified to the lack of meaningful 
quality metrics to evaluate the efficacy of the security 
clearance process. The legislative measures in this section are 
designed to address the concerns raised by GAO in its 
testimony.

Section 367. Limitation on use of funds for the transfer or release of 
        individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo 
        Bay, Cuba

    Section 367 states that the DNI may not use any of the 
funds authorized by the bill to release or transfer an 
individual held at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, to the United States, its territories, or possessions 
until 120 days after the President has submitted a plan to 
Congress. The plan must include: an assessment of the risk that 
each individual to be transferred or released poses to the 
national security of the United States; a proposal for the 
disposition of each such individual; a plan to mitigate any 
risks, should the proposed disposition include the release or 
transfer of that individual to the United States, its 
territories, or its possessions; and a summary of consultations 
by the President with the chief executive of the State, 
District of Columbia, territory, or possession to which an 
individual may be transferred or released.

Section 368. Intelligence community financial improvement and audit 
        readiness

    Section 368 expresses the sense of Congress regarding the 
need for each element of the Intelligence Community to develop 
and implement a plan to become compliant with financial 
management and audit readiness standards. This section also 
requires that the DNI conduct a review of the status of the 
auditability compliance of each element of the Intelligence 
Community and develop a plan and timeline to achieve a full, 
unqualified audit of each element by September 30, 2013.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


      SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 403-3(e)) provides that the ODNI may not be co-located 
with any element of the Intelligence Community. Section 401 
clarifies that the ban applies only to the co-location of the 
ODNI headquarters with the headquarters of another element of 
the Intelligence Community. It also provides the President with 
authority to waive that limitation where the interests of 
national security so dictate. Further, in response to an 
ambiguous requirement concerning the location of all federal 
government offices, this section clarifies that the ODNI 
offices may be located outside of the District of Columbia.

Section 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 402 substitutes the DNI (or the DNI's designee) for 
the DCIA as a member of the Transportation Security Oversight 
Board, as established by Section 115(b)(1) of Title 49. The 
Transportation Security Oversight Board is responsible for, 
among other things, coordinating intelligence, security, and 
law enforcement activities relating to transportation and 
facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security, and law 
enforcement information relating to transportation among 
federal agencies.

Section 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and 
        Technology

    Section 403 clarifies the additional duties of the DNI's 
Director of Science and Technology. This provision ensures 
there is uniformity in the definitions of basic, applied, and 
advanced research goals and improved prioritization and 
coordination of science and technology across the Intelligence 
Community.

Section 404. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center 
        energy efficiency reports

    Section 404 requires the DNI to submit a plan to Congress 
on compliance with the Environmental Protection Agency's report 
on data center energy efficiency submitted to Congress under 
Section 1 of P.L. 109-431. The plan is intended to encourage 
the Intelligence Community to promote the use of energy 
efficient technologies to reduce consumption of resources such 
as power and water by the Intelligence Community's data 
centers.

Section 405. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 405 clarifies that the Chief Information Officer 
(CIO) at ODNI serves as the Intelligence Community's CIO, and 
not only as the CIO for the ODNI.

Section 406. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevent Act of 2004 authorized the DNI to establish an Office 
of the Inspector General if the DNI determined that such an 
Inspector General would be beneficial to improving the 
operations and effectiveness of the ODNI. The DNI created an 
Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC/IG) in DNI 
Instruction No. 2005-10 (September 7, 2005). However, the 
Committee believes that an IC/IG with full statutory 
authorities and independence can better ensure that the ODNI 
identifies problems and deficiencies within the Intelligence 
Community, especially with respect to the manner in which 
elements of the Intelligence Community share information and 
undertake joint or cooperative activities.
    Section 406 creates a statutory IC/IG to be appointed by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The 
IC/IG will report directly to the DNI and may only be removed 
by the President, who must communicate the reasons for removal 
to the congressional intelligence committees. The DNI may 
prohibit the IC/IG from conducting an investigation, 
inspection, or audit if the DNI determines that such action is 
necessary to protect vital national security interests. The DNI 
must provide the congressional intelligence committees with the 
reasons for such a determination within seven days.
    The IC/IG will have subpoena authority, though information 
within the possession of the United States Government must be 
obtained through other procedures. Subject to the DNI's 
concurrence, the IC/IG may request information from any 
department, agency, or element of the U.S. Government.
    The IC/IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that 
include a description of significant problems relating to the 
programs and operations of the Intelligence Community, and the 
DNI must submit such reports to Congress within 30 days of 
receipt. The IC/IG must also report immediately to the DNI 
serious or flagrant violations of law. Within seven days, the 
DNI must transmit those reports to the congressional 
intelligence committees.
    Employees of the Intelligence Community or employees of a 
contractor who intend to report to Congress a violation of law 
or Executive Order, a false statement to or willful withholding 
from Congress, or other ``urgent concerns'' may report such 
complaints and supporting information to the IC/IG. The IC/IG 
must transmit this complaint, along with a credibility 
determination, to the DNI, which must then transmit the 
complaint, credibility determination, and supporting 
documentation to the congressional intelligence committees. 
This section does not disturb, and the Committee intends to 
retain, the authoritative guidance for analogous provisions of 
the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-272 (October 20, 1998), the Senate Committee report for 
that legislation, S. Rept. 105-185, and the conference report, 
H. Rept. 105-780.
    For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IC/IG and 
an Inspector General for another element of the Intelligence 
Community, the Inspectors General (IGs) shall resolve who will 
undertake an investigation, inspection, or audit. In resolving 
that question, the IGs may request the assistance of the 
Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, an already 
extant body codified in this section. In the event that the IGs 
are still unable to resolve the question, they shall submit the 
matter for resolution to the DNI and to the head of the element 
in which an Inspector General with jurisdiction is located.
    The Committee notes that the current DNI has expressed his 
support for a statutory IG in testimony. In addition, the 
previous Inspector General at the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI/IG) has testified to the challenges 
that the ODNI/IG faces in the absence of an authorizing statute 
and to the benefits that the creation of a statutory IC/IG 
would bring to the oversight of the Intelligence Community.

                SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Section 411. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, entitled 
``Accountability for Intelligence Activities,'' sets forth the 
Act's basic requirements for executive branch obligations to 
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed 
of intelligence activities. Section 503 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is specifically devoted 
to presidential findings and congressional notification on 
covert actions.
    Section 411 of this bill augments oversight of covert 
actions by requiring that the CIA Inspector General (CIA/IG) 
conduct an audit of each covert action at least once every 
three years and submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report containing the audit results within 60 days 
of completing the audit. To a considerable extent, this 
requirement codifies in statute existing practice and assures 
its regularity.
    The DNI has expressed concern that this audit requirement, 
and several other provisions pertaining to reports by the 
Intelligence Community, raises concerns with respect to the 
President's authority to control access to national security 
information. To allay any such concern regarding the covert 
action audit requirement, the Committee has drafted Section 411 
to state that the requirement is subject to the longstanding 
provisions of section 17(b)(3) and (4) of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)(3) and (4)), 
which empower the DCIA to prohibit the CIA/IG from initiating, 
carrying out, or completing an audit if the Director determines 
that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national 
security interests of the United States, provided that the 
Director reports the reasons to the congressional intelligence 
committees.

Section 412. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for 
        interrogations involving persons in the custody of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 412 prohibits the DCIA from obligating or expending 
funds to any contractor to conduct the interrogation of a 
detainee in the custody of the CIA. The DNI may, however, grant 
a waiver if the DCIA determines that no employee of the federal 
government is capable and available to conduct the 
interrogation and that the interrogation is in the national 
interest of the United States. This section also provides that 
contractors conducting interrogations pursuant to a waiver by 
the DNI shall be governed by the same laws that would apply if 
the interrogation were conducted by an employee of the federal 
government. The Committee believes that conducting custodial 
interrogations is an inherently governmental function, which 
should, to the maximum extent practicable, be conducted by U.S. 
Government personnel.

Section 413. Appeals from decisions of Central Intelligence Agency 
        contracting officers

    Section 413 amends current law by providing that an appeal 
from a decision of a CIA contracting officer may be made to 
whichever of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or 
the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals is specified by the 
contracting officer as the appropriate Board. This section also 
provides that the board so specified shall have jurisdiction to 
decide the appeal.

Section 414. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 414 establishes the position of Deputy Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency (DDCIA) and specifies that the 
President shall appoint the DDCIA. This section further 
outlines that the duties of the DDCIA are to assist the DCIA in 
carrying out his or her duties and to act as DCIA during the 
absence of the DCIA or a vacancy in the position.

Section 415. Protection against reprisals

    Section 415 expands the protections to CIA personnel who 
provide assistance to the CIA/IG. Section 17(e)(3)(B) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
403q(e)(3)(b)) authorizes the CIA/IG to receive and investigate 
both complaints and information. Currently, Section 17(e)(3)(B) 
only extends protections to employees against reprisal or 
threat of reprisal made in response to complaints filed with 
the CIA/IG. This provision would clarify that these protections 
also apply with respect to information provided to the CIA/IG 
employees that may not be in direct connection with a 
complaint.

Section 416. Requirement for video recording of interrogations of 
        persons in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 416 adds to the National Security Act of 1947 a 
requirement for the DCIA to establish guidelines to ensure that 
interrogations of detainees in CIA custody are recorded in 
video form, and that the video recording and attendant audio 
recording of such interrogation is maintained for a specified 
period of time. This provision does not apply a videotaping 
requirement to security officers who might question a witness 
or a suspect in the course of their official duties while 
assigned to CIA headquarters.

                       SUBTITLE C--OTHER ELEMENTS

Section 421. Homeland Security intelligence elements

    Section 421 affirms that both the Coast Guard and Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis in the Department of Homeland 
Security are elements of the Intelligence Community. This 
section further clarifies that the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis is the Department of Homeland Security's Intelligence 
Community member in accordance with existing practice and as 
defined in Executive Order 12333. The Coast Guard is listed 
herein as a military, multi-mission, maritime service that is 
located within the Department of Homeland Security.

Section 422. Clarification of inclusion of Drug Enforcement 
        Administration as an element of the Intelligence Community

    Section 422 codifies the joint decision of the DNI and the 
Attorney General that the Drug Enforcement Administration 
should be within the Intelligence Community.

Section 423. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 423 amends the authorities and structures of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to eliminate 
administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX 
when that official was appointed by and reported to the 
President. Those authorities are unnecessary now that the NCIX 
is appointed by and under the authority of the DNI.

Section 424. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components 
        of the Intelligence Community

    Section 424 establishes that the directors of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
are to be presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed. Under 
present law and practice, the directors of the NSA and NRO, 
each with a distinct and significant role in the national 
intelligence mission, are not confirmed by the Senate in 
relation to their leadership of these agencies. Presently, the 
President appoints the Director of NSA and the Secretary of 
Defense appoints the Director of the NRO. Under current law, 
neither of these appointments must be confirmed by the Senate 
unless a military officer is promoted or transferred into the 
position.
    The Committee believes that holding confirmation hearings 
in both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
Senate Armed Services Committee would bring to these positions 
an appropriate level of accountability and responsiveness to 
congressional oversight.

Section 425. Associate Director of the National Security Agency for 
        Compliance and Training

    Section 425 establishes an Associate Director for 
Compliance and Training at the NSA. This official will report 
to the NSA Director and will be responsible for ensuring that 
all NSA surveillance programs are in compliance with applicable 
laws, regulations, and policies.
    The Committee understands the challenges involved in 
bringing together surveillance laws with the complicated and 
ever-changing technology that the NSA uses to collect vital 
intelligence. To date, the NSA has distributed the 
responsibility for compliance and training across several 
offices within the organization, with none occupying a 
sufficiently prominent position to influence outcomes 
effectively.
    The Committee believes that the establishment of an 
additional Associate Director whose sole responsibility is to 
ensure that each component within NSA is adhering to the rules 
governing surveillance authorities is the best way to minimize 
the risk of non-compliance.
    The Associate Director for Compliance and Training should 
have expertise in both the legal and technical arenas of 
surveillance so that he or she can be accountable for each and 
every surveillance program the NSA administers.
    The Associate Director for Compliance and Training will 
also be responsible for establishing and implementing a 
training regimen to ensure that the NSA workforce understands 
the procedures necessary to comply with the law.

Section 426. General Counsel of the National Security Agency

    Section 426 requires presidential appointment and Senate 
confirmation for the General Counsel of the NSA. The General 
Counsel of the NSA faces important legal, privacy, and civil 
liberties issues that are only increasing in complexity. The 
Committee believes that holding confirmation hearings in both 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate 
Armed Services Committee for the NSA's General Counsel is a 
warranted additional measure of congressional oversight.

Section 427. Inspector General of the National Security Agency

    Section 427 amends Section 12 of the Inspector General Act 
of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to establish an Inspector General of 
the NSA. As noted, complex legal, privacy, and civil liberties 
issues may arise during the performance of the NSA's mission. 
The Committee believes that the Inspector General will play a 
vital role in ensuring that the NSA effectively executes its 
mission in a manner consistent with all applicable laws and 
regulations.

Section 428. Charter for the National Reconnaissance Office

    Section 428 requires that the DNI and Secretary of Defense 
jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and 
congressional defense committees a revised charter for the 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The NRO charter has not 
changed since the agency's founding nearly forty years ago, and 
the Committee believes an updated charter would help the NRO 
better implement its current mission.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS


                SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Section 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the 
        Research and Development Programs of the United States 
        Intelligence Community

    The National Commission for the Review of Research and 
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
Community was authorized in the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2003 and lapsed on September 1, 2004. Section 
501 renews the authority for this Commission by extending the 
reporting deadline to February 1, 2011, and by requiring that 
new members be appointed to the Commission. This section also 
authorizes $2 million for the Commission from the Intelligence 
Community Management Account.

Section 502. Expansion and clarification of the duties of the Program 
        Manager for the Information Sharing Environment

    Section 502 clarifies the duties of the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE) Program Manager by directing that the ISE 
Program Manager shall reside in the Executive Office of the 
President.

Section 503. Classification review of executive branch materials in the 
        possession of the congressional intelligence committees

    Section 503 requires the DNI to conduct a classification 
review of executive branch materials older than 25 years in the 
possession of the congressional intelligence committees. This 
provision is intended to review the holdings of the 
intelligence committees to determine what executive branch 
materials no longer need to remain classified.

Section 504. Prohibition on use of funds to provide Miranda warnings to 
        certain persons outside of the United States

    Section 504 states that no funds authorized by the bill may 
be used to provide the warnings of constitutional rights 
described in the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona 
(384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)) to any person located outside of the 
United States who is not United States person and: (1) is 
suspected of terrorism, associated with terrorists, or believed 
to have knowledge of terrorists; or (2) is a detainee in the 
custody of the U.S. Armed Forces.

                    SUBTITLE B--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS

Section 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency 
        Act of 1949

    Section 511 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 by updating references to the National Security Act of 
1947 to reflect amendments made by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act and changes in the titles of certain 
positions of the CIA.

Section 512. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision of 
        Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act

    Section 512 updates the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the 
Senior Intelligence Service program, rather than pay grades, by 
the CIA.

Section 513. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

    Section 513 makes technical amendments to the Executive 
Schedule to correct outdated and incorrect references to 
``Director of Central Intelligence'' and ``General Counsel to 
the National Intelligence Director.''

Section 514. Technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence 
        Surveillance Act of 1978

    Section 514 corrects typographical errors and makes other 
technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978.

Section 515. Technical amendments to Section 105 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

    Section 515 clarifies that the reorganization of the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury 
into the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence does 
not affect its status as an element of the Intelligence 
Community or the Director of National Intelligence's 
responsibility with respect to that office.

Section 516. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 516 makes technical and conforming amendments to 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that 
correct typographical errors, update titles, and make language 
internally consistent.

Section 517. Technical amendments relating to the multi-year National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 517 updates the ``multi-year national intelligence 
program'' to incorporate organizational and nominal changes 
made by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.

Section 518. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 518 makes technical corrections to the National 
Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. It also corrects other 
technical errors.

Section 519. Technical amendments to Title 10, United States Code

    Section 519 amends Title 10 by changing the title of 
``Associate Director of CIA for Military Affairs'' to 
``Associate Director of Military Affairs, CIA.''

                     Statement of Federal Mandates

    Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of 
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded 
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee 
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office 
included herein.

                  Statement on Congressional Earmarks

    Pursuant to clause 9 of Rule XXI of the Rules of the House 
of Representatives, the Committee reports that the bill 
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or 
limited tariff benefits.

               Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate



                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                     Washington, DC, June 25, 2009.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
 Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2701, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason 
Wheelock.
            Sincerely,
                                      Douglas W. Elmendorf,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 2701--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010

    Summary: H.R. 2701 would authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2010 for intelligence activities of the U.S. 
government, for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System (CIARDS).
    Since CBO does not provide estimates for classified 
programs, this estimate addresses only the unclassified 
portions of the bill. In addition, CBO cannot provide estimates 
of provisions that affect both classified and unclassified 
programs. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that 
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $236 
million in 2010 and $669 million over the 2010-2014 period. 
Enacting H.R. 2701 would not affect direct spending or 
revenues.
    H.R. 2701 includes new subpoena authority that would impose 
an intergovernmental and private-sector mandate as defined in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO expects the 
cost of complying with the mandate would be small and well 
below the thresholds established in UMRA ($69 million for 
intergovernmental mandates and $139 million for private-sector 
mandates in 2009, adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of H.R. 2701 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050 
(national defense).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                    ------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       2010      2011      2012      2013      2014    2010-2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Intelligence Community Management Account:
    Authorization Level............................       673         0         0         0         0        673
    Estimated Outlays..............................       236       283       121        20         7        667
Training in African Languages:
    Authorization Level............................         2         0         0         0         0          2
    Estimated Outlays..............................         0         1         1         0         0          2
    Total Changes:
        Authorization Level........................       675         0         0         0         0        675
        Estimated Outlays..........................       236       284       122        20         7        669
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 
2701 will be enacted near the beginning of fiscal year 2010, 
that the specified amounts will be appropriated, and that 
outlays will follow historical spending patterns for existing 
or similar programs.

Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of $673 
million for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
which provides the principal source of funding for the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence and provides resources 
for coordinating programs, overseeing budgets, and managing the 
intelligence agencies. CBO estimates that implementing this 
provision would cost $667 million over the 2010-2014 period, 
assuming appropriation of the specified amount.

Training in African languages

    Section 314 would authorize the Director of National 
Intelligence, after consultation with the National Security 
Education Board, to establish a pilot program to provide 
scholarships for training in certain African languages not 
currently covered by existing scholarship programs. The bill 
would authorize the appropriation of $2 million for that 
purpose, and CBO estimates that those amounts would result in 
outlays of $1 million in both fiscal years 2010 and 2011, 
assuming the appropriation of the specified amount.

Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System

    Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $291 
million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to 
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The 
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the 
authorization under this bill would be the same as the amount 
in the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not ascribe any 
additional cost to that provision.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 2701 
contains an intergovernmental and private-sector mandate as 
defined in UMRA. Section 501 would extend the National 
Commission for the Review of Research and Development Programs 
of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the subpoena authority 
of that commission. Entities in the public and private sectors, 
if subpoenaed, would be required to provide testimony, 
documents, or other evidence. CBO expects that the commission 
would likely issue subpoenas sparingly and that the costs to 
comply with a subpoena would not be significant. Thus, we 
estimate that the total costs of the mandate would be small and 
well below the annual thresholds established in UMRA ($69 
million for intergovernmental mandates and $139 million for 
private-sector mandates in 2009, adjusted annually for 
inflation).
    The bill also would create a grant program to promote the 
recruitment and retention of an ethnically and culturally 
diverse workforce within the intelligence community, which 
would benefit public colleges and universities. Any costs they 
may incur, including matching funds, would result from 
complying with conditions of aid.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jason Wheelock; Impact 
on state, local, and tribal governments: Burke Doherty; Impact 
on the private sector: Elizabeth Bass.
    Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

  Correspondence With Other Committees Regarding Particular Provisions



         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

     * * * * * * *

               Title I--Coordination for National Security

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 103H. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
Sec. 103I. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 109. Annual report on intelligence.]
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 113A. Detail of other personnel.
     * * * * * * *

           Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 508. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence 
          community.
Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of Iran, 
          Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
          community.
Sec. 511. Government Accountability Office analyses, evaluations, and 
          investigations.
Sec. 512. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.
Sec. 513. Reports on security clearances.
     * * * * * * *

         TITLE X--Education in Support of National Intelligence

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training.
     * * * * * * *

               Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

     * * * * * * *
[Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training.
[Sec. 1003. Intelligence Community Scholarship Program.]
Sec. 1022. Program on recruitment and training of intelligence analysts.
Sec. 1023. Intelligence officer training program.
Sec. 1024. Stokes scholarship program.

                       TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1103. Misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or seal.
Sec. 1104. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
          name, initials, or seal.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                              DEFINITIONS

  Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the 
        following:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, 
                the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the 
                Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
                Administration, and the Department of Energy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (K) [The elements of the Department of 
                Homeland Security concerned with the analysis 
                of intelligence information, including the 
                Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard] The 
                Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
                Department of Homeland Security.
                  (L) Such other elements of any [other] 
                department or agency as may be designated by 
                the President, or designated jointly by the 
                Director of National Intelligence and the head 
                of the department or agency concerned, as an 
                element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                              INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 102A. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Budget Authorities.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall 
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of 
the [annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program 
and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities] annual 
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
program.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and 
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) * * *
  (B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director 
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming 
funds made available under the [Joint Military Intelligence 
Program] Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
program.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer 
or reprogram funds referred to in [subparagraph (A)] paragraph 
(1)(A)--
          (A)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds [or personnel] 
may be made under this subsection only if--
          (i)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to 
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph 
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the 
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The 
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by 
the head of the department [or agency involved] involved or the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the 
Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1) * * *
  (2)(A) * * *
  (B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
[section] paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 103. (a) * * *
  (b) Function.--The function of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence is to assist the Director of National 
Intelligence in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of 
the Director under this Act[, the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),] and other applicable provisions of 
law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by 
the President or by law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Temporary Appointment to Fill Vacancies.--Notwithstanding 
section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, if an officer of 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, other than 
the Director of National Intelligence, whose appointment to 
office is required to be made by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is unable 
to perform the functions and duties of the office--
          (1) if during the 365-day period immediately 
        preceding the date of death, resignation, or beginning 
        of inability to serve of the applicable officer, the 
        person serving as the first assistant to the office of 
        such officer served as such first assistant for not 
        less than 90 days, such first assistant shall perform 
        the functions and duties of the office temporarily in 
        an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of 
        section 3346 of title 5, United States Code;
          (2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President may 
        direct a person who serves in an office for which 
        appointment is required to be made by the President, by 
        and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to 
        perform the functions and duties of the vacant office 
        temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time 
        limitations of such section 3346; or
          (3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Director of 
        National Intelligence shall recommend to the President, 
        and the President may direct, a person to perform the 
        functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily 
        in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations 
        of such section 3346, if--
                  (A) during the 365-day period preceding the 
                date of death, resignation, or beginning of 
                inability to serve of the applicable officer, 
                such person served in a position in an element 
                of the intelligence community for not less than 
                90 days;
                  (B) the rate of pay for the position 
                described under subparagraph (A) is equal to or 
                greater than the minimum rate of pay payable 
                for a position at GS-15 of the General 
                Schedule; and
                  (C) in the case of a person who is employed 
                by an element of the intelligence community--
                          (i) the Director of National 
                        Intelligence shall consult with the 
                        head of such element; and
                          (ii) if the head of such element 
                        objects to the recommendation, the 
                        Director of National Intelligence may 
                        make the recommendation to the 
                        President over the objection of the 
                        head of such element after informing 
                        the President of such objection.
  [(e)] (f) Limitation on Co-Location [With] of Headquarters 
With Headquarters of Other Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--[Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the] (1) Except 
as provided in paragraph (2), the headquarters of the  Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-located 
with [any other element] the headquarters of any other element 
of the intelligence community.
  (2) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph (1) 
if the President determines that--
          (A) a waiver is in the interests of national 
        security; or
          (B) the costs of a headquarters of the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence that is separate from 
        the headquarters of the other elements of the 
        intelligence community outweighs the potential benefits 
        of the separation.
  (g) Location of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington 
metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, 
United States Code).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

  Sec. 103E. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) assist the Director on the science and technology 
        elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence[; and];
          (5) assist the Director of National Intelligence in 
        establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced 
        research to meet the technology needs of the 
        intelligence community;
          (6) submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees an annual report on the science and 
        technology strategy of the Director that shows 
        resources mapped to the goals of the intelligence 
        community; and
          [(5)] (7) perform other such duties as may be 
        prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or 
        specified by law.
  (d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology 
Committee.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Committee shall--
          (A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research 
        and development related to intelligence[; and];
          (B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research 
        programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence 
        community; and
          [(B)] (C) perform such other functions as the 
        Director of Science and Technology shall prescribe.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

  Sec. 103G. (a) Chief Information Officer.--To assist the 
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the 
responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other 
applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information 
Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by 
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.
  (b) Chief Information Officer of Intelligence Community.--The 
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall 
serve as the chief information officer of the intelligence 
community.
  (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information 
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
          (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief 
Information Officer.--An individual serving in the position of 
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may 
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer 
of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the 
United States Government.

        OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES

  Sec. 103H. (a) Appointment.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence 
community security clearances.
  (b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of the 
intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a 
security clearance through or in coordination with such element 
with contact information for the ombudsman appointed under 
subsection (a).
  (c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the 
ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
          (1) the number of persons applying for a security 
        clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the 
        preceding 12 months; and
          (2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and 
        questions received by the ombudsman from persons 
        applying for security clearances.

            INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 103I. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence 
Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community.
  (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community is to--
          (1) be an independent and objective office 
        appropriately accountable to Congress and to initiate 
        and conduct investigations, inspections, and audits on 
        matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
        Director of National Intelligence;
          (2) recommend policies designed--
                  (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and 
                effectiveness in the administration and 
                implementation of matters within the 
                responsibility and authority of the Director of 
                National Intelligence; and
                  (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in 
                such matters;
          (3) provide a means for keeping the Director of 
        National Intelligence fully and currently informed 
        about--
                  (A) problems and deficiencies relating to 
                matters within the responsibility and authority 
                of the Director of National Intelligence; and
                  (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions; and
          (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure 
        that the congressional intelligence committees are kept 
        informed of--
                  (A) significant problems and deficiencies 
                relating to matters within the responsibility 
                and authority of the Director of National 
                Intelligence; and
                  (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions.
  (c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There 
is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who 
shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as 
Inspector General shall be made--
          (A) without regard to political affiliation;
          (B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with the 
        security standards of the intelligence community, and 
        prior experience in the field of intelligence or 
        national security;
          (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in 
        accounting, financial analysis, law, management 
        analysis, public administration, or auditing; and
          (D) on the basis of expertise in investigations.
  (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to the 
Director of National Intelligence.
  (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by 
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to 
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the 
removal of any individual from the position of Inspector 
General not later than 30 days before the date on which the 
Inspector General is removed from office.
  (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g) 
and (h), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
shall--
          (1) provide policy direction for, and plan, conduct, 
        supervise, and coordinate independently, the 
        investigations, inspections, and audits relating to 
        matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
        Director of National Intelligence to ensure they are 
        conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable 
        law and regulations;
          (2) keep the Director of National Intelligence and 
        Congress fully and currently informed concerning 
        violations of law and regulations, violations of civil 
        liberties and privacy, fraud and other serious 
        problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in 
        matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
        Director, and report the progress made in implementing 
        corrective action;
          (3) take due regard for the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of 
        all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to 
        the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of 
        such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate 
        to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and 
        methods described in such reports; and
          (4) in the execution of the duties and 
        responsibilities under this section, comply with 
        generally accepted Federal Government auditing 
        standards.
  (e) Limitations on Activities.--(1)(A) Subject to 
subparagraph (B), the Director of National Intelligence may 
prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, 
inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such 
prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security 
interests of the United States.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence may not prohibit an 
investigation, inspection, or audit under subparagraph (A) 
solely on the basis of the level of classification or 
compartmentation of information that the Inspector General may 
seek access to while conducting such investigation, inspection, 
or audit.
  (2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph 
(1), the Director shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement 
of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7 
days.
  (3) The Director shall notify the Inspector General at the 
time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the 
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such 
report.
  (4) The Inspector General shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the 
Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the 
Inspector General considers appropriate.
  (f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to 
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any 
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the 
Inspector General.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any 
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of 
the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the 
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
  (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all 
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs 
and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has 
responsibilities under this section.
  (C) The Director or, on the recommendation of the Director, 
another appropriate official of the intelligence community, 
shall take appropriate administrative action against an 
employee, or employee of a contractor, of an element of the 
intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the 
Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss 
of employment or termination of an existing contractual 
relationship.
  (3) The Inspector General shall, in accordance with 
subsection (g), receive and investigate complaints or 
information from any person concerning the existence of an 
activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the 
Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of 
laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of 
funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger 
to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or 
information has been received from an employee of the Federal 
Government--
          (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the 
        identity of the employee without the consent of the 
        employee, unless the Inspector General determines that 
        such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the 
        investigation or the disclosure is made to an official 
        of the Department of Justice responsible for 
        determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; 
        and
          (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
        reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
        employee, unless the complaint was made or the 
        information was disclosed with the knowledge that it 
        was false or with willful disregard for its truth or 
        falsity.
  (4) The Inspector General shall administer to or take from 
any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever 
necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector 
General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when 
administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated 
by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect 
as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a 
seal.
  (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector 
General may require by subpoena the production of all 
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, 
papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in 
the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the 
Inspector General.
  (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements 
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall 
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose 
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by 
subpoenas.
  (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on 
behalf of, any element of the intelligence community, including 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
  (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena 
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable 
by order of any appropriate district court of the United 
States.
  (6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized 
under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for 
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum 
annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General 
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
  (7) The Inspector may, to the extent and in such amounts as 
may be provided in advance by appropriations Acts, enter into 
contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, 
and other services with public agencies and with private 
persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry 
out the provisions of this section.
  (g) Coordination Among the Inspectors General of the 
Intelligence Community.--(1)(A) If a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community that may be subject to an investigation, inspection, 
review, or audit by both the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community and an inspector general with oversight 
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community, 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such 
other inspector general shall expeditiously resolve the 
question of which inspector general shall conduct such 
investigation, inspection, review, or audit to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of the activities of the inspectors 
general.
  (B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph 
(A), the inspectors general concerned may request the 
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General 
Forum established under subparagraph (C). If a dispute between 
an inspector general within an agency or department of the 
United States Government and the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community has not been resolved with the 
assistance of the Forum, the inspectors general shall submit 
the question to the Director of National Intelligence and the 
head of the affected agency or department for resolution.
  (C) There is established the Intelligence Community 
Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory 
or administrative inspectors general with oversight 
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community. 
The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall serve 
as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have no 
administrative authority over any inspector general, but shall 
serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of 
individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest 
and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to 
employees, employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews, 
documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve 
or be of assistance to more than one of its members.
  (2) The inspector general conducting an investigation, 
inspection, review, or audit referred to in paragraph (1) shall 
submit the results of such investigation, inspection, review, 
or audit to any other inspector general, including the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with 
jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, review, 
or audit who did not conduct such investigation, inspection, 
review, or audit.
  (h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office 
space at central and field office locations and with such 
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and 
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for 
the operation of such offices.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall select, appoint, and 
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry 
out the functions, powers, and duties of the Inspector General. 
The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or employee 
selected, appointed, or employed has a security clearance 
appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer or 
employee.
  (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the 
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees 
have the requisite training and experience to enable the 
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector 
General effectively.
  (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the 
Inspector General shall recommend policies to the Director of 
National Intelligence to create within the intelligence 
community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide 
appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective 
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
  (3)(A) The Inspector General may, in consultation with the 
Director, request such information or assistance as may be 
necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of 
the Inspector General from any department, agency, or other 
element of the United States Government.
  (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or 
assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, 
agency, or element concerned shall furnish to the Inspector 
General, or to an authorized designee, such information or 
assistance.
  (C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, 
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the 
intelligence community and in coordination with the inspector 
general of that element pursuant to subsection (g), conduct an 
inspection, review, or audit of such element and may enter into 
any place occupied by such element for purposes of the 
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
  (i) Reports.--(1)(A) Not later than January 31 and July 31 of 
each year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
shall prepare and submit to the Director of National 
Intelligence a report summarizing the activities of the Office 
of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community during 
the preceding six-month period. The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall provide any portion of the report 
involving a component of a department of the United States 
Government to the head of that department simultaneously with 
submission of the report to the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include the 
following:
          (i) A list of the titles or subjects of each 
        investigation, inspection, review, or audit conducted 
        during the period covered by such report, including a 
        summary of the progress of each particular 
        investigation, inspection, or audit since the preceding 
        report of the Inspector General under this paragraph.
          (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, 
        and deficiencies relating to the administration and 
        implementation of programs and operations of the 
        intelligence community, and in the relationships 
        between elements of the intelligence community, 
        identified by the Inspector General during the period 
        covered by such report.
          (iii) A description of the recommendations for 
        disciplinary action made by the Inspector General 
        during the period covered by such report with respect 
        to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies 
        described in clause (ii).
          (iv) A statement of whether or not corrective or 
        disciplinary action has been completed on each 
        significant recommendation described in previous 
        semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective 
        action has been completed, a description of such 
        corrective action.
          (v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector 
        General has had full and direct access to all 
        information relevant to the performance of the 
        functions of the Inspector General.
          (vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
        authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector 
        General during the period covered by such report.
          (vii) Any recommendations that the Inspector General 
        considers appropriate for legislation to promote 
        economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
        administration and implementation of matters within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate 
        fraud and abuse in such matters.
  (C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a 
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit the 
report to the congressional intelligence committees together 
with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
  (D) Each report submitted under subparagraphs (A) and (C) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
classified annex.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility and 
authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
  (B) The Director shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) 
within 7 days of the receipt of such report, together with such 
comments as the Director considers appropriate. The Director 
shall submit to the committees of the Senate and of the House 
of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the 
United States Government any portion of each report under 
subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency 
related to a component of such department simultaneously with 
transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  (3) The Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit 
a report to the congressional intelligence committees on an 
investigation, inspection, review, or audit if--
          (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
        significant differences with the Director affecting the 
        execution of the duties or responsibilities of the 
        Inspector General;
          (B) the investigation, inspection, review, or audit 
        carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any 
        current or former intelligence community official who--
                  (i) holds or held a position in an element of 
                the intelligence community that is subject to 
                appointment by the President, whether or not by 
                and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
                including such a position held on an acting 
                basis;
                  (ii) holds or held a position in an element 
                of the intelligence community, including a 
                position held on an acting basis, that is 
                appointed by the Director of National 
                Intelligence; or
                  (iii) holds or held a position as head of an 
                element of the intelligence community or a 
                position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of 
                section 106;
          (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector 
        General to the Department of Justice on possible 
        criminal conduct by a current or former official 
        described in subparagraph (B);
          (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
        Department of Justice declining or approving 
        prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current 
        or former official described in subparagraph (B); or
          (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all 
        possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant 
        documentary information in the course of such 
        investigation, inspection, review, or audit.
  (4)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence 
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of 
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor of 
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may 
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
  (B) Not later than the end of the 14-day period beginning on 
the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or 
information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall 
determine whether the complaint or information appears 
credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector 
General shall submit to the Director a notice of that 
determination, together with the complaint or information.
  (C) Upon receipt of a submittal from the Inspector General 
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, not later than 7 
days after such receipt, forward such transmittal to the 
congressional intelligence committees, together with any 
comments the Director considers appropriate.
  (D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under 
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under 
subparagraph (A), or does not submit the complaint or 
information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph 
(B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the 
complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or 
both of the congressional intelligence committees directly.
  (ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence 
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the 
employee--
          (I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
        Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of 
        the employee's complaint or information and notice of 
        the employee's intent to contact the congressional 
        intelligence committees directly; and
          (II) obtains and follows from the Director, through 
        the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the 
        intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate 
        security practices.
  (iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional 
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information 
under clause (ii) does so in that member or employee's official 
capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
  (E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General 
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph 
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall 
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is 
taken.
  (F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General 
under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
  (G) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the 
protections afforded an employee of or contractor to the 
Central Intelligence Agency under section 17(e)(3) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)).
  (H) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means any 
of the following:
          (i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation 
        of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to 
        the funding, administration, or operation of an 
        intelligence activity involving classified information, 
        but does not include differences of opinions concerning 
        public policy matters.
          (ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
        withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
        relating to the funding, administration, or operation 
        of an intelligence activity.
          (iii) An action, including a personnel action 
        described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United 
        States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of 
        reprisal prohibited under subsection (f)(3)(B) of this 
        section.
  (5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States 
Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney 
General any information, allegation, or complaint received by 
the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal 
criminal law that involves a program or operation of an element 
of the intelligence community, or in the relationships between 
the elements of the intelligence community, consistent with 
such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General 
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each 
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
  (j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued 
by the Director in consultation with the congressional 
intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence 
Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community.
  (k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the 
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an 
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to 
modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other 
inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating 
to such element.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 104A. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (g) Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior Level 
Positions in Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Except as 
provided pursuant to paragraph (2), an individual may not be 
appointed to a position in the Senior Intelligence Service in 
the Directorate of Intelligence or the [Directorate of 
Operations] National Clandestine Service of the Central 
Intelligence Agency unless the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency determines that the individual--
          (A)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


           DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 104B. (a) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency who shall be appointed by the President.
  (b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall--
          (1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
        of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
          (2) during the absence or disability of the Director 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy 
        in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency, act for and exercise the powers of the Director 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


     APPOINTMENT OF OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED 
                               ACTIVITIES

  Sec. 106. (a) * * *
  (b) Concurrence of DNI in Appointments to Positions in the 
Intelligence Community.--(1) * * *
  (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
          [(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
          [(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance 
        Office.]
          [(C)] (A) The Director of the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency.
          [(D)] (B) The Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Intelligence and Research.
          [(E)] (C) The Director of the Office of Intelligence 
        of the Department of Energy.
          [(F)] (D) The Director of the Office of 
        Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
          [(G)] (E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence 
        and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
          [(H)] (F) The Executive Assistant Director for 
        Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or 
        any successor to that position.
          [(I)] (G) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security 
        for Intelligence and Analysis.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE

  [Sec. 109. (a) In General.--(1)(A) Not later each year than 
the date provided in section 507, the President shall submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
requirements of the United States for intelligence and the 
activities of the intelligence community.
  [(B) Not later than January 31 each year, and included with 
the budget of the President for the next fiscal year under 
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the 
report described in subparagraph (A).
  [(2) The purpose of the report is to facilitate an assessment 
of the activities of the intelligence community during the 
preceding fiscal year and to assist in the development of a 
mission and a budget for the intelligence community for the 
fiscal year beginning in the year in which the report is 
submitted.
  [(3) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
may include a classified annex.
  [(b) Matters Covered.--(1) Each report under subsection (a) 
shall--
          [(A) specify the intelligence required to meet the 
        national security interests of the United States, and 
        set forth an order of priority for the collection and 
        analysis of intelligence required to meet such 
        interests, for the fiscal year beginning in the year in 
        which the report is submitted; and
          [(B) evaluate the performance of the intelligence 
        community in collecting and analyzing intelligence 
        required to meet such interests during the fiscal year 
        ending in the year preceding the year in which the 
        report is submitted, including a description of the 
        significant successes and significant failures of the 
        intelligence community in such collection and analysis 
        during that fiscal year.
  [(2) The report shall specify matters under paragraph (1)(A) 
in sufficient detail to assist Congress in making decisions 
with respect to the allocation of resources for the matters 
specified.
  [(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means the following:
          [(1) The Committee on Appropriations and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
          [(2) The Committee on Appropriations and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       DETAIL OF OTHER PERSONNEL

  Sec. 113A. Except as provided in section 904(g)(2) of the 
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 
402c(g)(2)) and section 113 of this Act, and notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, an officer or employee of the 
United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to 
an element of the intelligence community funded through the 
Community Management Account from another element of the United 
States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, 
as jointly agreed to by the Director of National Intelligence 
and the head of the detailing element, for a period not to 
exceed two years.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   [SEMIANNUAL] ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST 
                                 ASSETS

  Sec. 118. (a) [Semiannual] Annual Report.--On a [semiannual 
basis] annual basis, the Secretary of the Treasury (acting 
through the head of the Office of Intelligence Support) shall 
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
that fully informs the committees concerning operations against 
terrorist financial networks. Each such report shall include 
with respect to the [preceding six-month period] preceding one-
year period--
          (1)  * * *
          [(2) the total number of applications for asset 
        seizure and designations of individuals or entities 
        suspected of having engaged in financial support of 
        terrorist activities that were granted, modified, or 
        denied;]
          [(3)] (2) the total number of physical searches of 
        offices, residences, or financial records of 
        individuals or entities suspected of having engaged in 
        financial support for terrorist activity; and
          [(4)] (3) whether the financial intelligence 
        information seized in these cases has been shared on a 
        full and timely basis with the all departments, 
        agencies, and other entities of the United States 
        Government involved in intelligence activities 
        participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking 
        Center.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means the following:
          (1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
        the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed 
        Services, and the Committee on Financial Services of 
        the House of Representatives.
          (2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
        Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed 
        Services, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
        Urban Affairs of the Senate.

                    NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

  Sec. 119. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Reporting.--(1) * * *
  (2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
          (A) * * *
          (B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence 
        of the National Counterterrorism Center under 
        [subsection (h)] subsection (i).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (k) Exemption of Dissemination of Terrorist Identity 
Information From Freedom of Information Act.--(1) Terrorist 
identity information disseminated for terrorist screening 
purposes or other authorized counterterrorism purposes shall be 
exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United 
States Code.
  (2) In this section:
          (A) Authorized counterterrorism purpose.--The term 
        ``authorized counterterrorism purpose'' includes 
        disclosure to and appropriate use by an element of the 
        Federal Government of terrorist identifiers of persons 
        reasonably suspected to be terrorists or supporters of 
        terrorists.
          (B) Terrorist identity information.--The term 
        ``terrorist identity information'' means--
                  (i) information from a database maintained by 
                any element of the Federal Government that 
                would reveal whether an individual has or has 
                not been determined to be a known or suspected 
                terrorist or has or has not been determined to 
                be within the networks of contacts and support 
                of a known or suspected terrorist; and
                  (ii) information related to a determination 
                as to whether or not an individual is or should 
                be included in the Terrorist Screening Database 
                or other screening databases based on a 
                determination that the individual is a known or 
                suspected terrorist.
          (C) Terrorist identifiers.--The term ``terrorist 
        identifiers''--
                  (i) includes--
                          (I) names and aliases;
                          (II) dates or places of birth;
                          (III) unique identifying numbers or 
                        information;
                          (IV) physical identifiers or 
                        biometrics; and
                          (V) any other identifying information 
                        provided for watchlisting purposes; and
                  (ii) does not include derogatory information 
                or information that would reveal or compromise 
                intelligence or law enforcement sources or 
                methods.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

               GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS

  Sec. 501. (a)(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall 
provide to the congressional intelligence committees all 
information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, 
cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk 
of an intelligence activity, including--
          (A) the legal authority under which the intelligence 
        activity is being or was conducted;
          (B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought 
        in carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, 
        including dissenting legal views;
          (C) any specific operational concerns arising from 
        the intelligence activity, including the risk of 
        disclosing intelligence sources or methods;
          (D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity 
        will exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of 
        funds or other resources; and
          (E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity 
        will fail.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) The President and the congressional intelligence 
committees shall each establish [such procedures] such written 
procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
this title.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence 
activities'' includes covert actions as defined in section 
[503(e)] 503(i), and includes financial intelligence 
activities.

     REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS

  Sec. 502. (a) In General.--To the extent consistent with due 
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, 
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all 
departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States 
Government involved in intelligence activities shall--
          (1) keep the congressional intelligence committees 
        fully and currently informed of all intelligence 
        activities, other than a covert action (as defined in 
        section [503(e)] 503(i)), which are the responsibility 
        of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on 
        behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the 
        United States Government, including any significant 
        anticipated intelligence activity and any significant 
        intelligence failure; and
          (2) furnish the congressional intelligence committees 
        any information or material concerning intelligence 
        activities (including any information or material 
        relating to the legal authority under which an 
        intelligence activity is being or was conducted, and 
        any information or material relating to legal issues 
        upon which guidance was sought in carrying out or 
        planning the intelligence activity, including 
        dissenting legal views), other than covert actions, 
        which is within their custody or control, and which is 
        requested by either of the congressional intelligence 
        committees in order to carry out its authorized 
        responsibilities.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS

  Sec. 503. (a) * * *
  (b) To the extent consistent with due regard for the 
protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified 
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and 
methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director 
of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments, 
agencies, and entities of the United States Government involved 
in a covert action--
          (1) * * *
          (2) shall furnish to the congressional intelligence 
        committees any information or material concerning 
        covert actions (including any information or material 
        relating to the legal authority under which a covert 
        action is being or was conducted, and any information 
        or material relating to legal issues upon which 
        guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the 
        covert action, including dissenting legal views) which 
        is in the possession, custody, or control of any 
        department, agency, or entity of the United States 
        Government and which is requested by either of the 
        congressional intelligence committees in order to carry 
        out its authorized responsibilities.
  (c)(1) * * *
  [(2) If the President determines that it is essential to 
limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances 
affecting vital interests of the United States, the finding may 
be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority 
leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and 
minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or 
members of the congressional leadership as may be included by 
the President.]
  (2) If, pursuant to the procedures established by each of the 
congressional intelligence committees under section 501(c), one 
of the congressional intelligence committees determines that 
not all members of that committee are required to have access 
to a finding under this subsection, the President may limit 
access to such finding or such notice as provided in such 
procedures.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (4) In a case under paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the 
finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the 
chairman of each congressional intelligence committee. When 
access to a finding [is limited to the Members of Congress 
specified in paragraph (2)] is not provided to all members of 
one of the congressional intelligence committees in accordance 
with paragraph (2), a statement of the reasons for limiting 
such access shall also be provided.
  [(d) The President] (d)(1) The President shall ensure that 
the congressional intelligence committees, or, if applicable, 
the Members of Congress [specified in] informed in accordance 
with subsection (c)(2), are notified of any significant change 
in a previously approved covert action, or any significant 
undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the 
same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection 
(c).
  (2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall 
constitute a ``significant undertaking'' if the activity--
          (A) involves the potential for loss of life;
          (B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, 
        including authorities relating to research, 
        development, or operations;
          (C) results in the expenditure of significant funds 
        or other resources;
          (D) requires notification under section 504;
          (E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing 
        intelligence sources or methods; or
          (F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic 
        relations of the United States if such activity were 
        disclosed without authorization.
  (e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
          (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the 
        Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency 
        shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least 
        every 3 years. Such audits shall be conducted subject 
        to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of 
        subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
          (2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not 
        required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a 
        covert action that has been terminated or suspended if 
        such covert action was terminated or suspended prior to 
        the last audit of such covert action conducted by the 
        Inspector General and has not been restarted after the 
        date on which such audit was completed.
          (3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the 
        completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph 
        (1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report containing the results of such 
        audit.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (g)(1) A Member of Congress to which a finding is reported 
under subsection (c) or notice is provided under subsection 
(d)(1) may submit to the Director of National Intelligence an 
objection to any part of such finding or such notice. Not later 
than 48 hours after such an objection is submitted to the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director shall report 
such objection in writing to the President and such Member of 
Congress.
  (2) In any case where access to a finding reported under 
subsection (c) or notice provided under subsection (d)(1) is 
not made available to all members of a congressional 
intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2), 
the President shall provide such members with general 
information on the content of the finding or notice.
  (3) The President shall--
          (A) maintain a record of the Members of Congress to 
        which a finding is reported under subsection (c) or 
        notice is provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date 
        on which each Member of Congress receives such finding 
        or notice; and
          (B) not later than 30 days after the date on which 
        such finding is reported or such notice is provided, 
        provide such record to--
                  (i) in the case of a finding reported or 
                notice provided to a Member of the House of 
                Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                  (ii) in the case of a finding reported or 
                notice provided to a Member of the Senate, the 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
  (h) Any requirement under section 501, 502, or this section 
to provide information to the congressional intelligence 
committees shall be construed to require the submission of such 
information to all members of such committees, unless such 
information is specifically authorized not to be submitted to 
all members of one of such committees in accordance with 
subsection (c)(2).
  [(e)] (i) As used in this title, the term ``covert action'' 
means an activity or activities of the United States Government 
to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States 
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but 
does not include--
          (1) * * *

                   FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

  Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence 
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or 
intelligence-related activity only if--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by 
        the Congress for a different activity--
                  (A) * * *
                  [(B) the need for funds for such activity is 
                based on unforseen requirements; and]
                  (B) the use of such funds for such activity 
                supports an emergent need, improves program 
                effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any 
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government 
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any 
covert action, as defined in section [503(e)] 503(i), unless 
and until a Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of 
section 503 has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance 
with that subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  DATES FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS ANNUAL AND SEMIANNUAL REPORTS TO THE 
                 CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES

  Sec. 507. (a) Annual Reports.--(1) The date for the submittal 
to the congressional intelligence committees of the following 
annual reports shall be the date each year provided in 
subsection (c)(1)(A):
          [(A) The annual report on intelligence required by 
        section 109.]
          [(B)] (A) The annual report on intelligence provided 
        to the United Nations required by section 112(b)(1).
          [(C)] (B) The annual report on the protection of the 
        identities of covert agents required by section 603.
          [(D)] (C) The annual report of the Inspectors 
        Generals of the intelligence community on proposed 
        resources and activities of their offices required by 
        section 8H(g) of the Inspector General Act of 1978.
          [(E)] (D) The annual report on the acquisition of 
        technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and 
        advanced conventional munitions required by section 721 
        of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        1997 (Public Law 104-293; 50 U.S.C. 2366).
          [(F)] (E) The annual report on commercial activities 
        as security for intelligence collection required by 
        section 437(c) of title 10, United States Code.
          [(G) The annual update on foreign industrial 
        espionage required by section 809(b) of the 
        Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 
        1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C. App. 
        2170b(b)).]
          [(H)] (F) The annual report on certifications for 
        immunity in interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit 
        drug trafficking required by section 1012(c)(2) of the 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 
        (22 U.S.C. 2291-4(c)(2)).
          [(I)] (G) The annual report on activities under the 
        David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991 
        (title VIII of Public Law 102-183; 50 U.S.C. 1901 et 
        seq.) required by section 806(a) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 
        1906(a)).
          [(N)] (H) The annual report on hiring and retention 
        of minority employees in the intelligence community 
        required by section 114(c).
          (I) The annual report on financial intelligence on 
        terrorist assets required by section 118.
          (J) The annual report on foreign language proficiency 
        in the intelligence community required by section 510.
  (2) The date for the submittal to the congressional 
intelligence committees of the following annual reports shall 
be the date each year provided in subsection (c)(1)(B):
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(D) The annual report on counterdrug intelligence 
        matters required by section 826 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.]
  (b) Semiannual Reports.--The dates for the submittal to the 
congressional intelligence committees of the following 
semiannual reports shall be the dates each year provided in 
subsection (c)(2):
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(6) The semiannual report on financial intelligence 
        on terrorist assets required by section 118.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 508. (a) Assessment.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each 
element of the intelligence community, prepare an annual 
personnel level assessment for such element that assesses the 
personnel levels of such element for the fiscal year following 
the fiscal year in which the assessment is submitted.
  (b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees 
each year along with the budget submitted by the President in 
accordance with section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.
  (c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) 
shall include, for the element of the intelligence community 
concerned, the following information:
          (1) The budget submission for personnel costs of such 
        element for the upcoming fiscal year.
          (2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the 
        current fiscal year.
          (3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such costs as compared to the personnel costs during 
        the preceding five fiscal years.
          (4) The number of personnel positions requested for 
        such element for the upcoming fiscal year.
          (5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease 
        of such number as compared to the number of personnel 
        positions of such element of the current fiscal year.
          (6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease 
        of such number as compared to the number of personnel 
        positions of such element during the preceding five 
        fiscal years.
          (7) The best estimate of the number and costs of 
        contractors to be funded by such element for the 
        upcoming fiscal year.
          (8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease 
        of such costs of contractors as compared to the best 
        estimate of the costs of contractors to be funded by 
        such element during the current fiscal year.
          (9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease 
        of such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of 
        contractors, and the number of contractors, of such 
        element during the preceding five fiscal years.
          (10) A written justification for the requested 
        personnel and contractor levels.
          (11) The number of intelligence collectors and 
        analysts employed or contracted by such element.
          (12) A list of all contractors that have been the 
        subject of an investigation completed by the inspector 
        general of such element during the preceding fiscal 
        year, or are or have been the subject of an 
        investigation by such inspector general during the 
        current fiscal year.
          (13) A statement by the Director of National 
        Intelligence of whether, based on current and projected 
        funding, such element will have sufficient--
                  (A) internal infrastructure to support the 
                requested personnel and contractor levels;
                  (B) training resources to support the 
                requested personnel levels; and
                  (C) funding to support the administrative and 
                operational activities of the requested 
                personnel levels.

SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND 
                              NORTH KOREA

  Sec. 509. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently 
than every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the nuclear weapons 
programs of each such country.
  (b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea--
          (1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each 
        country;
          (2) an evaluation of the sources upon which the 
        intelligence used to prepare the assessment referred to 
        in paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such 
        sources and an assessment of the reliability of each 
        source;
          (3) a summary of any intelligence related to any 
        program gathered or developed since the previous report 
        was submitted under subsection (a), including 
        intelligence collected from both open and clandestine 
        sources for each country; and
          (4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
        knowledge, or other information that would reduce 
        confidence in the assessment referred to in paragraph 
        (1).
  (c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National 
Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the 
intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea in lieu of a report required by subsection (a) for 
that country.
  (d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
          (1) the congressional intelligence committees;
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
        on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
          (3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

  REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 510. Each year on the date provided in section 507, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a 
report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as 
appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the 
intelligence community, including--
          (1) the number of positions authorized for such 
        element that require foreign language proficiency and 
        the level of proficiency required;
          (2) an estimate of the number of such positions that 
        each element will require during the five-year period 
        beginning on the date of the submission of the report;
          (3) the number of positions authorized for such 
        element that require foreign language proficiency that 
        are filled by--
                  (A) military personnel; and
                  (B) civilian personnel;
          (4) the number of applicants for positions in such 
        element in the previous fiscal year that indicated 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign 
        language indicated and the proficiency level;
          (5) the number of persons hired by such element with 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign 
        language and proficiency level;
          (6) the number of personnel of such element currently 
        attending foreign language training, including the 
        provider of such training;
          (7) a description of the efforts of such element to 
        recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are 
        proficient in a foreign language;
          (8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
        advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
          (9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, 
        dialect of a foreign language--
                  (A) the number of positions of such element 
                that require proficiency in the foreign 
                language or dialect;
                  (B) the number of personnel of such element 
                that are serving in a position that requires 
                proficiency in the foreign language or dialect 
                to perform the primary duty of the position;
                  (C) the number of personnel of such element 
                that are serving in a position that does not 
                require proficiency in the foreign language or 
                dialect to perform the primary duty of the 
                position;
                  (D) the number of personnel of such element 
                rated at each level of proficiency of the 
                Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  (E) whether the number of personnel at each 
                level of proficiency of the Interagency 
                Language Roundtable meets the requirements of 
                such element;
                  (F) the number of personnel serving or hired 
                to serve as linguists for such element that are 
                not qualified as linguists under the standards 
                of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as 
                linguists for such element during the preceding 
                calendar year;
                  (H) the number of personnel serving as 
                linguists that discontinued serving such 
                element during the preceding calendar year;
                  (I) the percentage of work requiring 
                linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally 
                of the United States; and
                  (J) the percentage of work requiring 
                linguistic skills that is fulfilled by 
                contractors;
          (10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity 
        and capabilities of the intelligence community as a 
        whole;
          (11) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
        relating to foreign-language proficiency that the 
        Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or 
        no longer relevant; and
          (12) an assessment of the feasibility of employing 
        foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States 
        who have previously worked as translators or 
        interpreters for the Armed Forces or another department 
        or agency of the Federal Government in Iraq or 
        Afghanistan to meet the critical language needs of such 
        element.

      GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE ANALYSES, EVALUATIONS, AND 
                             INVESTIGATIONS

  Sec. 511. (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection 
(b), the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that 
personnel of the Government Accountability Office designated by 
the Comptroller General are provided with access to all 
information in the possession of an element of the intelligence 
community that the Comptroller General determines is necessary 
for such personnel to conduct an analysis, evaluation, or 
investigation of a program or activity of an element of the 
intelligence community that is requested by one of the 
congressional intelligence committees.
  (b) Exception.--(1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the 
Director of National Intelligence may restrict access to 
information referred to in subsection (a) by personnel 
designated in such subsection if the Director determines that 
the restriction is necessary to protect vital national security 
interests of the United States.
  (B) The Director of National Intelligence may not restrict 
access under subparagraph (A) solely on the basis of the level 
of classification or compartmentation of information that the 
personnel designated in subsection (a) may seek access to while 
conducting an analysis, evaluation, or investigation.
  (2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph 
(1), the Director shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement 
of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7 
days.
  (3) The Director shall notify the Comptroller General at the 
time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the 
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, provide the Comptroller General with a copy of 
such report.
  (4) The Comptroller General shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the 
Comptroller General has notice under paragraph (3) that the 
Comptroller General considers appropriate.

        CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OVERSIGHT REQUIREMENTS

  Sec. 512. The head of each element of the intelligence 
community shall semiannually submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees--
          (1) a certification that, to the best of the 
        knowledge of the head of such element--
                  (A) the head of such element of the 
                intelligence community is in full compliance 
                with the requirements of this title; and
                  (B) any information required to be submitted 
                by such head of such element under this Act 
                before the date of the submission of such 
                certification has been properly submitted; or
          (2) if such head of such element is unable to submit 
        a certification under paragraph (1), a statement--
                  (A) of the reasons such head of such element 
                is not able to submit such a certification;
                  (B) describing any information required to be 
                submitted by such head of such element under 
                this Act before the date of the submission of 
                such statement that has not been properly 
                submitted; and
                  (C) that the head of such element will submit 
                such information as soon as possible after the 
                submission of such statement.

                     REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES

  Sec. 513. (a) Quadrennial Audit of Position Requirements.--
(1) The President shall every four years conduct an audit of 
how the executive branch determines whether a security 
clearance is required for a particular position in the Federal 
Government.
  (2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit 
conducted under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to 
Congress the results of such audit.
  (b) Report on Security Clearance Determinations.--(1) Not 
later than February 1 of each year, the President shall submit 
to Congress a report on the security clearance process. Such 
report shall include, for each security clearance level--
          (A) the number of Federal Government employees who--
                  (i) held a security clearance at such level 
                as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
                  (ii) were approved for a security clearance 
                at such level during the preceding fiscal year;
          (B) the number of contractors to the Federal 
        Government who--
                  (i) held a security clearance at such level 
                as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
                  (ii) were approved for a security clearance 
                at such level during the preceding fiscal year; 
                and
          (C) for each element of the intelligence community--
                  (i) the amount of time it took to process the 
                fastest 80 percent of security clearance 
                determinations for such level;
                  (ii) the amount of time it took to process 
                the fastest 90 percent of security clearance 
                determinations for such level;
                  (iii) the number of open security clearance 
                investigations for such level that have 
                remained open for--
                          (I) 4 months or less;
                          (II) between 4 months and 8 months;
                          (III) between 8 months and 12 months; 
                        and
                          (IV) more than a year;
                  (iv) the percentage of reviews during the 
                preceding fiscal year that resulted in a denial 
                or revocation of a security clearance;
                  (v) the percentage of investigations during 
                the preceding fiscal year that resulted in 
                incomplete information;
                  (vi) the percentage of investigations during 
                the preceding fiscal year that did not result 
                in enough information to make a decision on 
                potentially adverse information; and
                  (vii) for security clearance determinations 
                completed or ongoing during the preceding 
                fiscal year that have taken longer than one 
                year to complete--
                          (I) the number of security clearance 
                        determinations for positions as 
                        employees of the Federal Government 
                        that required more than one year to 
                        complete;
                          (II) the number of security clearance 
                        determinations for contractors that 
                        required more than one year to 
                        complete;
                          (III) the agencies that investigated 
                        and adjudicated such determinations; 
                        and
                          (IV) the cause of significant delays 
                        in such determinations.
  (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Director of National 
Intelligence may consider--
          (A) security clearances at the level of confidential 
        and secret as one security clearance level; and
          (B) security clearances at the level of top secret or 
        higher as one security clearance level.

     TITLE VI--PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

     PROTECTION OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES UNDERCOVER 
         INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES

  Sec. 601. (a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access 
to classified information that identifies a covert agent, 
intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert 
agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified 
information, knowing that the information disclosed so 
identifies such covert agent and that the United States is 
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's 
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 
[ten years] 15 years, or both.
  (b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to 
classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent 
and intentionally discloses any information identifying such 
covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive 
classified information, knowing that the information disclosed 
so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is 
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's 
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 
[five years] 10 years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                 REPORT

  Sec. 603. (a) The President, after receiving information from 
the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on 
measures to protect the identities of covert agents, including 
an assessment of the need for any modification of this title 
for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert 
agents, and on any other matter relevant to the protection of 
the identities of covert agents. The date for the submittal of 
the report shall be the date provided in section 507.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES

          OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 701. (a) * * *
  (b) In this section, the term ``operational files'' means--
          (1) files of the [Directorate of Operations] National 
        Clandestine Service which document the conduct of 
        foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations 
        or intelligence or security liaison arrangements or 
        information exchanges with foreign governments or their 
        intelligence or security services;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


          OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 705. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Allegation; Improper Withholding of Records; Judicial 
Review.--(1) * * *
  (2) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner 
provided under paragraph (1) as follows:
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (D)(i) When a complainant alleges that requested 
        records were improperly withheld because of improper 
        exemption of operational files, the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency shall meet its burden under section 
        552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by 
        demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission 
        that exempted operational files likely to contain 
        [responsible] responsive records currently perform the 
        functions set forth in subsection (b).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


         TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Subtitle A--Science and Technology

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


              [INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM

  [Sec. 1003. (a) Establishment.--
          [(1) In general.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each 
        agency of the intelligence community, shall establish a 
        scholarship program (to be known as the ``Intelligence 
        Community Scholarship Program'') to award scholarships 
        to individuals that is designed to recruit and prepare 
        students for civilian careers in the intelligence 
        community to meet the critical needs of the 
        intelligence community agencies.
          [(2) Selection of recipients.--
                  [(A) Merit and agency needs.--Individuals 
                shall be selected to receive scholarships under 
                this section through a competitive process 
                primarily on the basis of academic merit and 
                the needs of the agency.
                  [(B) Demonstrated commitment.--Individuals 
                selected under this section shall have a 
                demonstrated commitment to the field of study 
                for which the scholarship is awarded.
          [(3) Contractual agreements.--To carry out the 
        Program the head of each agency shall enter into 
        contractual agreements with individuals selected under 
        paragraph (2) under which the individuals agree to 
        serve as full-time employees of the agency, for the 
        period described in subsection (g)(1), in positions 
        needed by the agency and for which the individuals are 
        qualified, in exchange for receiving a scholarship.
  [(b) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible to participate in 
the Program, an individual shall--
          [(1) be enrolled or accepted for enrollment as a 
        full-time student at an institution of higher education 
        and be pursuing or intend to pursue undergraduate or 
        graduate education in an academic field or discipline 
        described in the list made available under subsection 
        (d);
          [(2) be a United States citizen; and
          [(3) at the time of the initial scholarship award, 
        not be an employee (as defined under section 2105 of 
        title 5, United States Code).
  [(c) Application.--An individual seeking a scholarship under 
this section shall submit an application to the Director of 
National Intelligence at such time, in such manner, and 
containing such information, agreements, or assurances as the 
Director may require.
  [(d) Programs and Fields of Study.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall--
          [(1) make publicly available a list of academic 
        programs and fields of study for which scholarships 
        under the Program may be used; and
          [(2) update the list as necessary.
  [(e) Scholarships.--
          [(1) In general.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence may provide a scholarship under the 
        Program for an academic year if the individual applying 
        for the scholarship has submitted to the Director, as 
        part of the application required under subsection (c), 
        a proposed academic program leading to a degree in a 
        program or field of study on the list made available 
        under subsection (d).
          [(2) Limitation on years.--An individual may not 
        receive a scholarship under this section for more than 
        4 academic years, unless the Director of National 
        Intelligence grants a waiver.
          [(3) Student responsibilities.--Scholarship 
        recipients shall maintain satisfactory academic 
        progress.
          [(4) Amount.--The dollar amount of a scholarship 
        under this section for an academic year shall be 
        determined under regulations issued by the Director of 
        National Intelligence, but shall in no case exceed the 
        cost of tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses as 
        established by the Director.
          [(5) Use of scholarships.--A scholarship provided 
        under this section may be expended for tuition, fees, 
        and other authorized expenses as established by the 
        Director of National Intelligence by regulation.
          [(6) Payment to institution of higher education.--The 
        Director of National Intelligence may enter into a 
        contractual agreement with an institution of higher 
        education under which the amounts provided for a 
        scholarship under this section for tuition, fees, and 
        other authorized expenses are paid directly to the 
        institution with respect to which the scholarship is 
        provided.
  [(f) Special Consideration for Current Employees.--
          [(1) Set aside of scholarships.--Notwithstanding 
        paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (b), 10 percent of 
        the scholarships awarded under this section shall be 
        set aside for individuals who are employees of agencies 
        on the date of enactment of this section to enhance the 
        education of such employees in areas of critical needs 
        of agencies.
          [(2) Full- or part-time education.--Employees who are 
        awarded scholarships under paragraph (1) shall be 
        permitted to pursue undergraduate or graduate education 
        under the scholarship on a full-time or part-time 
        basis.
  [(g) Employee Service.--
          [(1) Period of service.--Except as provided in 
        subsection (i)(2), the period of service for which an 
        individual shall be obligated to serve as an employee 
        of the agency is 24 months for each academic year for 
        which a scholarship under this section is provided. 
        Under no circumstances shall the total period of 
        obligated service be more than 8 years.
          [(2) Beginning of service.--
                  [(A) In general.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), obligated service under 
                paragraph (1) shall begin not later than 60 
                days after the individual obtains the 
                educational degree for which the scholarship 
                was provided.
                  [(B) Deferral.--In accordance with 
                regulations established by the Director of 
                National Intelligence, the Director or designee 
                may defer the obligation of an individual to 
                provide a period of service under paragraph (1) 
                if the Director or designee determines that 
                such a deferral is appropriate.
  [(h) Repayment.--
          [(1) In general.--Scholarship recipients who fail to 
        maintain a high level of academic standing, as defined 
        by the Director of National Intelligence, who are 
        dismissed from their educational institutions for 
        disciplinary reasons, or who voluntarily terminate 
        academic training before graduation from the 
        educational program for which the scholarship was 
        awarded, shall be in breach of their contractual 
        agreement and, in lieu of any service obligation 
        arising under such agreement, shall be liable to the 
        United States for repayment within 1 year after the 
        date of default of all scholarship funds paid to them 
        and to the institution of higher education on their 
        behalf under the agreement, except as provided in 
        subsection (i)(2). The repayment period may be extended 
        by the Director when determined to be necessary, as 
        established by regulation.
          [(2) Liability.--Scholarship recipients who, for any 
        reason, fail to begin or complete their service 
        obligation after completion of academic training, or 
        fail to comply with the terms and conditions of 
        deferment established by the Director of National 
        Intelligence under subsection (i)(2)(B), shall be in 
        breach of their contractual agreement. When recipients 
        breach their agreements for the reasons stated in the 
        preceding sentence, the recipient shall be liable to 
        the United States for an amount equal to--
                  [(A) the total amount of scholarships 
                received by such individual under this section; 
                and
                  [(B) the interest on the amounts of such 
                awards which would be payable if at the time 
                the awards were received they were loans 
                bearing interest at the maximum legal 
                prevailing rate, as determined by the Treasurer 
                of the United States, multiplied by 3.
  [(i) Cancellation, Waiver, or Suspension of Obligation.--
          [(1) Cancellation.--Any obligation of an individual 
        incurred under the Program (or a contractual agreement 
        thereunder) for service or payment shall be canceled 
        upon the death of the individual.
          [(2) Waiver or suspension.--The Director of National 
        Intelligence shall prescribe regulations to provide for 
        the partial or total waiver or suspension of any 
        obligation of service or payment incurred by an 
        individual under the Program (or a contractual 
        agreement thereunder) whenever compliance by the 
        individual is impossible or would involve extreme 
        hardship to the individual, or if enforcement of such 
        obligation with respect to the individual would be 
        contrary to the best interests of the Government.
  [(j) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall prescribe regulations necessary to carry out this 
section.
  [(k) Definitions.--In this section:
          [(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means each element 
        of the intelligence community as determined by the 
        Director of National Intelligence.
          [(2) Institution of higher education.--The term 
        ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning 
        given that term under section 101 of the Higher 
        Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
          [(3) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the 
        Intelligence Community Scholarship Program established 
        under subsection (a).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      PROGRAM ON RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

  Sec. 1022. (a) Program.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall carry out a program to ensure that selected 
students or former students are provided funds to continue 
academic training, or are reimbursed for academic training 
previously obtained, in areas of specialization that the 
Director, in consultation with the other heads of the elements 
of the intelligence community, identifies as areas in which the 
current capabilities of the intelligence community are 
deficient or in which future capabilities of the intelligence 
community are likely to be deficient.
  (2) A student or former student selected for participation in 
the program shall commit to employment with an element of the 
intelligence community, following completion of appropriate 
academic training, under such terms and conditions as the 
Director considers appropriate.
  (3) The program shall be known as the Pat Roberts 
Intelligence Scholars Program.
  (b) Elements.--In carrying out the program under subsection 
(a), the Director shall--
          (1) establish such requirements relating to the 
        academic training of participants as the Director 
        considers appropriate to ensure that participants are 
        prepared for employment as intelligence professionals; 
        and
          (2) periodically review the areas of specialization 
        of the elements of the intelligence community to 
        determine the areas in which such elements are, or are 
        likely to be, deficient in capabilities.
  (c) Use of Funds.--Funds made available for the program under 
subsection (a) shall be used to--
          (1) provide a monthly stipend for each month that a 
        student is pursuing a course of study;
          (2) pay the full tuition of a student or former 
        student for the completion of such course of study;
          (3) pay for books and materials that the student or 
        former student requires or required to complete such 
        course of study;
          (4) pay the expenses of the student or former student 
        for travel requested by an element of the intelligence 
        community in relation to such program; or
          (5) for such other purposes the Director considers 
        appropriate to carry out such program.

                 INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM

  Sec. 1023. (a) Programs.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may carry out a grant program in accordance with 
subsection (b) to enhance the recruitment and retention of an 
ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence community 
workforce with capabilities critical to the national security 
interests of the United States.
  (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director of National 
Intelligence shall identify the skills necessary to meet 
current or emergent needs of the intelligence community and the 
educational disciplines that will provide individuals with such 
skills.
  (b) Institutional Grant Program.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence may provide grants to institutions of 
higher education to support the establishment or continued 
development of programs of study in educational disciplines 
identified under subsection (a)(2).
  (2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may, with respect to 
the educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2), 
be used for the following purposes:
          (A) Curriculum or program development.
          (B) Faculty development.
          (C) Laboratory equipment or improvements.
          (D) Faculty research.
  (3) An institution of higher education seeking a grant under 
this section shall submit an application describing the 
proposed use of the grant at such time and in such manner as 
the Director may require.
  (4) An institution of higher education that receives a grant 
under this section shall submit to the Director regular reports 
regarding the use of such grant, including--
          (A) a description of the benefits to students who 
        participate in the course of study funded by such 
        grant;
          (B) a description of the results and accomplishments 
        related to such course of study; and
          (C) any other information that the Director may 
        require.
  (c) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out 
this section.
  (d) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) Institution of higher education.--The term 
        ``institution of higher education'' has the meaning 
        given the term in section 101 of the Higher Education 
        Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
          (2) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the 
        Director of National Intelligence.

                       STOKES SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM

  Sec. 1024. The head of an element of the intelligence 
community may establish an undergraduate and graduate training 
program with respect to civilian employees of such element in 
the same manner and under the same conditions as the Secretary 
of Defense is authorized to establish such a program under 
section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
U.S.C. 402 note).

TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

  Sec. 1102. (a)  * * *
  (b) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--[(1) The Director] 
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and 
implement a process for all elements of the intelligence 
community to review, on an annual basis, individuals included 
on distribution lists for access to classified information. 
Such process shall ensure that only individuals who have a 
particularized ``need to know'' (as determined by the Director) 
are continued on such distribution lists.
  [(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director 
shall certify to the congressional intelligence committees that 
the review required under paragraph (1) has been conducted in 
all elements of the intelligence community during the preceding 
fiscal year.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


      MISUSE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NAME, INITIALS, OR SEAL

  Sec. 1103. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with 
the written permission of the Director of National Intelligence 
or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the words 
``intelligence community'', the initials ``IC'', the seal of 
the intelligence community, or any colorable imitation of such 
words, initials, or seal in connection with any merchandise, 
impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner 
reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is 
approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director of National 
Intelligence, except that employees of the intelligence 
community may use the intelligence community name, initials, 
and seal in accordance with regulations promulgated by the 
Director of National Intelligence.
  (b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General 
that any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or 
practice which constitutes or will constitute conduct 
prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General may initiate 
a civil proceeding in a district court of the United States to 
enjoin such act or practice. Such court shall proceed as soon 
as practicable to the hearing and determination of such action 
and may, at any time before final determination, enter such 
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action 
as is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to 
any person or class of persons for whose protection the action 
is brought.

  MISUSE OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NAME, 
                           INITIALS, OR SEAL

  Sec. 1104. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with 
the written permission of the Director of National Intelligence 
or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the words ``Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence'', the initials 
``ODNI'', the seal of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, or any colorable imitation of such words, 
initials, or seal in connection with any merchandise, 
impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner 
reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is 
approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General 
that any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or 
practice which constitutes or will constitute conduct 
prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General may initiate 
a civil proceeding in a district court of the United States to 
enjoin such act or practice. Such court shall proceed as soon 
as practicable to the hearing and determination of such action 
and may, at any time before final determination, enter such 
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action 
as is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to 
any person or class of persons for whose protection the action 
is brought.
                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
                    TREASURY.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Construction of Authority.--Nothing in section 311 of 
title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or 
in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the 
authorities and responsibilities of the [Director of Central 
Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence with respect to 
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of 
the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle B--Intelligence

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[SEC. 318. PILOT PROGRAM ON RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE 
                    ANALYSTS.

  [(a) Pilot Program.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall carry out a pilot program to ensure that 
selected students or former students are provided funds to 
continue academic training, or are reimbursed for academic 
training previously obtained, in areas of specialization that 
the Director, in consultation with the other heads of the 
elements of the intelligence community, identifies as areas in 
which the current analytic capabilities of the intelligence 
community are deficient or in which future analytic 
capabilities of the intelligence community are likely to be 
deficient.
  [(2) A student or former student selected for participation 
in the pilot program shall commit to employment with an element 
of the intelligence community, following completion of 
appropriate academic training, under such terms and conditions 
as the Director considers appropriate.
  [(3) The pilot program shall be known as the Pat Roberts 
Intelligence Scholars Program.
  [(b) Elements.--In carrying out the pilot program under 
subsection (a), the Director shall--
          [(1) establish such requirements relating to the 
        academic training of participants as the Director 
        considers appropriate to ensure that participants are 
        prepared for employment as intelligence analysts; and
          [(2) periodically review the areas of specialization 
        of the elements of the intelligence community to 
        determine the areas in which such elements are, or are 
        likely to be, deficient in analytic capabilities.
  [(c) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot 
program under subsection (a) during fiscal years 2004 through 
2006.
  [(d) Limitation on Number of Members During Fiscal Year 
2004.--The total number of individuals participating in the 
pilot program under subsection (a) during fiscal year 2004 may 
not exceed 150 students.
  [(e) Responsibility.--The Director shall carry out the pilot 
program under subsection (a) through the Deputy Director of 
National Intelligence.
  [(f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to 
Congress a preliminary report on the pilot program under 
subsection (a), including a description of the pilot program 
and the authorities to be utilized in carrying out the pilot 
program.
  [(2) Not later than one year after the commencement of the 
pilot program, the Director shall submit to Congress a report 
on the pilot program. The report shall include--
          [(A) a description of the activities under the pilot 
        program, including the number of individuals who 
        participated in the pilot program and the training 
        provided such individuals under the pilot program;
          [(B) an assessment of the effectiveness of the pilot 
        program in meeting the purpose of the pilot program; 
        and
          [(C) any recommendations for additional legislative 
        or administrative action that the Director considers 
        appropriate in light of the pilot program.
  [(g) Funding.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
by this Act, $4,000,000 shall be available until expended to 
carry out this section.

[SEC. 319. IMPROVEMENT OF EQUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  [(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
          [(1) It is the recommendation of the Joint Inquiry of 
        the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
        House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into 
        Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the 
        Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, that the 
        Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a 
        more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and 
        devise a strategy to capitalize upon the unique 
        cultural and linguistic capabilities of first 
        generation Americans.
          [(2) The Intelligence Community could greatly benefit 
        from an increased number of employees who are 
        proficient in foreign languages and knowledgeable of 
        world cultures, especially in foreign languages that 
        are critical to the national security interests of the 
        United States. Particular emphasis should be given to 
        the recruitment of United States citizens whose 
        linguistic capabilities are acutely required for the 
        improvement of the overall intelligence collection and 
        analysis effort of the United States Government.
          [(3) The Intelligence Community has a significantly 
        lower percentage of women and minorities than the total 
        workforce of the Federal government and the total 
        civilian labor force.
          [(4) Women and minorities continue to be under-
        represented in senior grade levels, and in core mission 
        areas, of the intelligence community.
  [(b) Pilot Project To Promote Equality of Employment 
Opportunities for Women and Minorities Throughout the 
Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies.--The 
Director of National Intelligence shall carry out a pilot 
project under this section to test and evaluate alternative, 
innovative methods to promote equality of employment 
opportunities in the intelligence community for women, 
minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and expertise.
  [(c) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the 
Director shall employ methods to increase diversity of officers 
and employees in the intelligence community.
  [(d) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the 
project under this section for a 3-year period.
  [(e) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the 
Director implements the pilot project under this section, the 
Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project. The 
report shall include--
          [(1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the 
        project; and
          [(2) recommendations on the continuation of the 
        project, as well recommendations as for improving the 
        effectiveness of the project in meeting the goals of 
        promoting equality of employment opportunities in the 
        intelligence community for women, minorities, and 
        individuals with diverse ethnic and cultural 
        backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and 
        expertise.
  [(f) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004, 
the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a 
report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled the 
``DCI Diversity Strategic Plan'', and any subsequent revision 
to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and employees 
in the intelligence community, including the short- and long-
term goals of the plan. The report shall also provide a 
detailed description of the progress that has been made by each 
element of the intelligence community in implementing the plan.
  [(2) In implementing the plan, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall incorporate innovative methods for 
recruitment and hiring that the Director has determined to be 
effective from the pilot project carried out under this 
section.
  [(g) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term 
in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
401(4)).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


  RONALD W. REAGAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
2005

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE IX--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle C--Intelligence-Related Matters

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[SEC. 922. PILOT PROGRAM ON CRYPTOLOGIC SERVICE TRAINING.

  [(a) Program Authorized.--The Director of the National 
Security Agency may carry out a pilot program on cryptologic 
service training for the intelligence community.
  [(b) Objective of Program.--The objective of the pilot 
program is to increase the number of qualified entry-level 
language analysts and intelligence analysts available to the 
National Security Agency and the other elements of the 
intelligence community through the directed preparation and 
recruitment of qualified entry-level language analysts and 
intelligence analysts who commit to a period of service or a 
career in the intelligence community.
  [(c) Program Scope.--The pilot program shall be national in 
scope.
  [(d) Program Participants.--(1) Subject to the provisions of 
this subsection, the Director shall select the participants in 
the pilot program from among individuals qualified to 
participate in the pilot program utilizing such procedures as 
the Director considers appropriate for purposes of the pilot 
program.
  [(2) Each individual who receives financial assistance under 
the pilot program shall perform one year of obligated service 
with the National Security Agency, or another element of the 
intelligence community approved by the Director, for each 
academic year for which such individual receives such financial 
assistance upon such individual's completion of post-secondary 
education.
  [(3) Each individual selected to participate in the pilot 
program shall be qualified for a security clearance appropriate 
for the individual under the pilot program.
  [(4) The total number of participants in the pilot program at 
any one time may not exceed 400 individuals.
  [(e) Program Management.--In carrying out the pilot program, 
the Director shall--
          [(1) identify individuals interested in working in 
        the intelligence community, and committed to taking 
        college-level courses that will better prepare them for 
        a career in the intelligence community as a language 
        analyst or intelligence analyst;
          [(2) provide each individual selected for 
        participation in the pilot program--
                  [(A) financial assistance for the pursuit of 
                courses at institutions of higher education 
                selected by the Director in fields of study 
                that will qualify such individual for 
                employment by an element of the intelligence 
                community as a language analyst or intelligence 
                analyst; and
                  [(B) educational counseling on the selection 
                of courses to be so pursued; and
          [(3) provide each individual so selected information 
        on the opportunities available for employment in the 
        intelligence community.
  [(f) Duration of Program.--(1) The Director shall terminate 
the pilot program not later than six years after the date of 
the enactment of this Act.
  [(2) The termination of the pilot program under paragraph (1) 
shall not prevent the Director from continuing to provide 
assistance, counseling, and information under subsection (e) to 
individuals who are participating in the pilot program on the 
date of termination of the pilot program throughout the 
academic year in progress as of that date.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security 
Agency.
  (b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.
  (c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the 
head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such 
functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise 
by law.
  Sec. 3. (a) There is an Associate Director of the National 
Security Agency for Compliance and Training, who shall be 
appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency.
  (b) The Associate Director of the National Security Agency 
for Compliance and Training shall ensure that--
          (1) all programs and activities of the National 
        Security Agency are conducted in a manner consistent 
        with all applicable laws, regulations, and policies; 
        and
          (2) the training of relevant personnel is sufficient 
        to ensure that such programs and activities are 
        conducted in such a manner.
  Sec. 4. (a) There is a General Counsel of the National 
Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  (b) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency shall 
serve as the chief legal officer of the National Security 
Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  Sec. 16. (a) The purpose of this section is to establish an 
[undergraduate] undergraduate and graduate training program, 
which may lead to [the baccalaureate] a baccalaureate or 
graduate degree, to facilitate the recruitment of individuals, 
particularly minority high school students, with a demonstrated 
capability to develop skills critical to the mission of the 
National Security Agency, including mathematics, computer 
science, engineering, and foreign languages.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d)(1) To be eligible for assignment under subsection (b), an 
employee of the Agency must agree in writing--
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (C) to reimburse the United States for the total cost 
        of education (excluding the employee's pay and 
        allowances) provided under this section to the employee 
        if, prior to the employee's completing the educational 
        course of training for which the employee is assigned, 
        the assignment or the employee's employment with the 
        Agency is [terminated either by the Agency due to 
        misconduct by the employee or by the employee 
        voluntarily; and] terminated by--
                  (i) the Agency due to misconduct by the 
                person;
                  (ii) the person voluntarily; or
                  (iii) by the Agency for the failure of the 
                person to maintain such level of academic 
                standing in the educational course of training 
                as the Director of the National Security Agency 
                specifies in the agreement under this 
                paragraph; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e)[(1) When an employee is assigned under this section to an 
institution, the Agency shall disclose to the institution to 
which the employee is assigned that the Agency employs the 
employee and that the Agency funds the employee's education.]
  [(2)] Agency efforts to recruit individuals at educational 
institutions for participation in the [undergraduate] 
undergraduate and graduate training program established by this 
section shall be made openly and according to the common 
practices of universities and employers recruiting at such 
institutions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VIII--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 809. REPORTS ON FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.

  (a) * * *
  (b) [Annual] Biannual Update.--
          [(1) Submittal to congressional intelligence 
        committees.--Not later each year than the date provided 
        in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947, 
        the President shall submit to the congressional 
        intelligence committees a report updating the 
        information referred to in subsection (a)(1)(D).]
          (1) Submission to congress.--The President shall 
        biannually submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees, the Committees on Armed Services of the 
        House of Representatives and the Senate, and 
        congressional leadership a report updating the 
        information referred to in subsection (a)(1)(D).
          [(2) Submittal to congressional leadership.--Not 
        later than April 14 each year, the President shall 
        submit to the congressional leadership a report 
        updating the information referred to in subsection 
        (a)(1)(D).]
          [(3)] (2) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle E--Terrorism

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 343. TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(d) Reporting and Certification.--(1) The Director shall 
review on an annual basis the information provided by various 
departments and agencies for purposes of the list under 
subsection (a) in order to determine whether or not the 
information so provided is derived from the widest possible 
range of intelligence available to such departments and 
agencies.
  [(2) The Director shall, as a result of each review under 
paragraph (1), certify whether or not the elements of the 
intelligence community responsible for the collection of 
intelligence related to the list have provided information for 
purposes of the list that is derived from the widest possible 
range of intelligence available to such department and 
agencies.]
  [(e)] (d) Report on Criteria for Information Sharing.--(1) * 
* *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(f)] (e) System Administration Requirements.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(g)] (f) Report on Status of System.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(h)] (g) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In 
this section, the term ``congressional intelligence 
committees'' means--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[SEC. 826. ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

  [(a) Annual Report.--The Counterdrug Intelligence 
Coordinating Group shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress each year a report on current counterdrug 
intelligence matters. The report shall include the 
recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating 
Group on the appropriate number of permanent staff, and of 
detailed personnel, for the staff of the Counterdrug 
Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
  [(b) Submittal Date.--The date of the submittal each year of 
the report required by subsection (a) shall be the date 
provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947, 
as added by section 811 of this Act.
  [(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
          [(1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
        and House of Representatives; and
          [(2) the congressional intelligence committees (as 
        defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1002. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND 
                    DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Composition.--The Commission shall be composed of 12 
members, as follows:
          (1) [The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for 
        Community Management.] The Principal Deputy Director of 
        National Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (i) Review.--The Commission shall review the status of 
research and development programs and activities within the 
intelligence community, [including] including advanced research 
and development programs and activities. Such review shall 
include--
          (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.

  (a) Final Report.--Not later than [September 1, 2004] 
February 1, 2011, the Commission shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as 
required by section 1002(h)(2).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART III--EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5313. Positions at level II

  Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
          Deputy Secretary of Defense.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [Director of Central Intelligence.]
          Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5314. Positions at level III

  Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
          Solicitor General of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and 
        Space Administration.
          [Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (2)] Deputy 
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV

  Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
          Deputy Administrator of General Services.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [General Counsel of the Office of the National 
        Intelligence Director.]
          General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SUBCHAPTER IV--FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 7342. Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f)(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency may delete the information described in subparagraphs 
(A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies 
in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of 
such information could adversely affect United States 
intelligence sources.
  [(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National 
Intelligence may delete the information described in 
subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the 
Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that 
the publication of such information could adversely affect 
United States intelligence sources.]
  (4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the 
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the 
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph 
(2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head 
of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State 
that the publication of such information could adversely affect 
United States intelligence sources or methods.
  (B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State 
pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be 
transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall 
keep a record of such information.
  (C) In this paragraph, the term ``intelligence community'' 
has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle I--Department OF Transportation

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 1--ORGANIZATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board

  (a) * * *
  (b) Membership.--
          (1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be 
        composed of 7 members as follows:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  [(F) The Director of the Central Intelligence 
                Agency, or the Director's designee.]
                  (F) The Director of National Intelligence, or 
                the Director's designee.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 
                        OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

  [Sec. 8K. If the Director of National Intelligence determines 
that an Office of Inspector General would be beneficial to 
improving the operations and effectiveness of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National 
Intelligence is authorized to establish, with any of the 
duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in this 
Act, an Office of Inspector General.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                              DEFINITIONS

  Sec. 12. As used in this Act--
          (1) the term ``head of the establishment'' means the 
        Secretary of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, 
        Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban 
        Development, the Interior, Labor, State, 
        Transportation, Homeland Security, or the Treasury; the 
        Attorney General; the Administrator of the Agency for 
        International Development, Environmental Protection, 
        General Services, National Aeronautics and Space, or 
        Small Business, or Veterans' Affairs; the Director of 
        the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National 
        Security Agency; or the Office of Personnel Management; 
        the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or 
        the Railroad Retirement Board; the Chairperson of the 
        Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board; the Chief 
        Executive Officer of the Corporation for National and 
        Community Service; the Administrator of the Community 
        Development Financial Institutions Fund; the chief 
        executive officer of the Resolution Trust Corporation; 
        the Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
        Corporation; the Commissioner of Social Security, 
        Social Security Administration; the Director of the 
        Federal Housing Finance Agency; the Board of Directors 
        of the Tennessee Valley Authority; the President of the 
        Export-Import Bank; or the Federal Cochairpersons of 
        the Commissions established under section 15301 of 
        title 40, United States Code; as the case may be;
          (2) the term ``establishment'' means the Department 
        of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, 
        Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban 
        Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State, 
        Transportation, Homeland Security, or the Treasury; the 
        Agency for International Development, the Community 
        Development Financial Institutions Fund, the 
        Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency 
        Management Agency, the General Services Administration, 
        the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the 
        National Security Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory 
        Commission, the Office of Personnel Management, the 
        Railroad Retirement Board, the Resolution Trust 
        Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
        the Small Business Administration, the Corporation for 
        National and Community Service, or the Veterans' 
        Administration, the Social Security Administration, the 
        Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Tennessee Valley 
        Authority, the Export-Import Bank, or the Commissions 
        established under section 15301 of title 40, United 
        States Code, as the case may be;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          GENERAL AUTHORITIES

  Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions, 
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
  (1) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies 
such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or 
activities [authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 
102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections 
(a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), 
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)] authorized under section 104A of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), and any 
other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive 
from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of 
law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations. 
Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this 
paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the 
authority of this Act without regard to limitations of 
appropriations from which transferred;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or 
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to 
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) In the event that--
          (A) * * *
          (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried 
        out by the Inspector General should focus on any 
        current or former Agency official who--
                  (i) holds or held a position in the Agency 
                that is subject to appointment by the 
                President, by and with the [advise] advice and 
                consent of the Senate, including such a 
                position held on an acting basis; or
                  (ii) holds or held the position in the 
                Agency, including such a position held on an 
                acting basis, of--
                          (I) [Executive Director] Associate 
                        Deputy Director;
                          (II) [Deputy Director for Operations] 
                        Director of the National Clandestine 
                        Service;
                          (III) [Deputy Director for 
                        Intelligence] Director of Intelligence;
                          (IV) [Deputy Director for 
                        Administration] Director of Support; or
                          (V) [Deputy Director for Science and 
                        Technology] Director of Science and 
                        Technology;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
investigate complaints or information from any person 
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a 
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, 
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such 
complaint or information has been received from an employee of 
the Agency--
          (A) * * *
          (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
        reprisal, for making such complaint or providing such 
        information may be taken by any employee of the Agency 
        in a position to take such actions, unless the 
        complaint was made or the information was disclosed 
        with the knowledge that it was false or with willful 
        disregard for its truth or falsity.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR INTERROGATIONS 
  INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 24. (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall not expend or obligate funds for payment to any 
contractor to conduct the interrogation of a detainee or 
prisoner in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (b) Exception.--
          (1) In general.--The Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency may request, and the Director of 
        National Intelligence may grant, a written waiver of 
        the requirement under subsection (a) if the Director of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency determines that--
                  (A) no employee of the Federal Government 
                is--
                          (i) capable of performing such 
                        interrogation; and
                          (ii) available to perform such 
                        interrogation; and
                  (B) such interrogation is in the national 
                interest of the United States and requires the 
                use of a contractor.
          (2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--
        Any contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to 
        a waiver under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all 
        laws on the conduct of interrogations that would apply 
        if an employee of the Federal Government were 
        conducting the interrogation.

  REQUIREMENT FOR VIDEO RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS OF PERSONS IN THE 
               CUSTODY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 25. (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection 
(b), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
establish guidelines to ensure that each interrogation of a 
person who is in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency 
is recorded in video form and that the video recording of such 
interrogation is maintained--
          (1) for not less than 10 years from the date on which 
        such recording is made; and
          (2) until such time as such recording is no longer 
        relevant to an ongoing or anticipated legal proceeding 
        or investigation or required to be maintained under any 
        other provision of law.
  (b) Exception.--The requirement to record an interrogation in 
video form under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to 
an interrogation incident to arrest conducted by Agency 
personnel designated by the Director under section 15(a) that 
are assigned to the headquarters of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and acting in the official capacity of such personnel.
  (c) Interrogation Defined.--In this section, the term 
``interrogation'' means the systematic process of attempting to 
obtain information from an uncooperative detainee.
                              ----------                              


CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT OF 1978

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   AGENCY BOARDS OF CONTRACT APPEALS

  Sec. 8. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) The Armed Services Board shall have jurisdiction to 
decide any appeal from a decision of a contracting officer of 
the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the 
Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration relative to a 
contract made by that department or agency. The Civilian Board 
shall have jurisdiction to decide any appeal from a decision of 
a contracting officer of any executive agency (other than the 
Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the 
Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the United 
States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission, or the 
Tennessee Valley Authority) relative to a contract made by that 
agency. Each other agency board shall have jurisdiction to 
decide any appeal from a decision of a contracting officer 
relative to a contract made by its agency. Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, an appeal from a decision of a 
contracting officer of the Central Intelligence Agency relative 
to a contract made by that agency may be filed with whichever 
of the Armed Services Board or the Civilian Board is specified 
by the contracting officer as the Board to which such an appeal 
may be made and the Board so specified shall have jurisdiction 
to decide that appeal. In exercising this jurisdiction, the 
agency board is authorized to grant any relief that would be 
available to a litigant asserting a contract claim in the 
United States Court of Federal Claims.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE IX--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel 
who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National 
Counterintelligence Executive.
  [(2) The general counsel shall--
          [(A) provide legal advice and counsel to the 
        Executive on matters relating to functions of the 
        Office;
          [(B) ensure that the Office complies with all 
        applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and 
        guidelines; and
          [(C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may 
        specify.]
  [(e)] (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall 
be as follows:
          (1) National threat identification and prioritization 
        assessment.--Subject to [subsection (f)] subsection 
        (e), in consultation with appropriate department and 
        agencies of the United States Government, and private 
        sector entities, to produce on an annual basis a 
        strategic planning assessment of the 
        counterintelligence requirements of the United States 
        to be known as the National Threat Identification and 
        Prioritization Assessment.
          (2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject 
        to [subsection (f)] subsection (e), in consultation 
        with appropriate department and agencies of the United 
        States Government, and private sector entities, and 
        based on the most current National Threat 
        Identification and Prioritization Assessment under 
        paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy 
        for the counterintelligence programs and activities of 
        the United States Government to be known as the 
        National Counterintelligence Strategy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(f)] (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat 
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National 
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) A National Threat 
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under [subsection 
(e)(1)] subsection (d)(1), and any modification of such 
assessment, shall not go into effect until approved by the 
President.
  (2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under [subsection 
(e)(2)] subsection (d)(2), and any modification of such 
strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the 
President.
  (3) The National Counterintelligence Executive shall submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees each National 
Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, or 
modification thereof, and each National Counterintelligence 
Strategy, or modification thereof, approved under this section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(g)] (f) Personnel.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the 
appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and 
separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the 
provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes 
of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of 
the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be 
treated as the head of the Office.
  [(4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service 
positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code.]
  [(h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of 
Defense, and Director of National Intelligence may each provide 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such 
support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out 
its functions under this section.
  [(2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide 
administrative and contract support to the Office as if the 
Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  [(3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided 
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of 
the official providing such support.
  [(i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National 
Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for 
the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing 
personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under 
subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to 
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such 
personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be.
  [(j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National 
Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract, 
lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the 
Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under 
this section.
  [(2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into 
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other 
transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and 
limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under 
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative 
agreements, and other transactions.]
  [(k)] (g) Treatment of Activities Under Certain 
Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated 
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for 
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under 
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as 
operational files of an element of the Agency.
  [(l)] (h) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office 
of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed 
as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress, 
to--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(m)] (i) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as affecting the authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the 
National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (3) Information sharing environment.--The terms 
        ``information sharing environment'' and ``ISE'' mean an 
        approach that facilitates the sharing of [terrorism and 
        homeland security information] national security 
        information, which may include any method determined 
        necessary and appropriate for carrying out this 
        section.
          (4) National security information.--The term 
        ``national security information'' includes homeland 
        security information and terrorism information.
          [(4)] (5) Program manager.--The term ``program 
        manager'' means the program manager designated under 
        subsection (f).
          [(5)] (6) Terrorism information.--The term 
        ``terrorism information''--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(6)] (7) Weapons of mass destruction information.--
        The term ``weapons of mass destruction information'' 
        means information that could reasonably be expected to 
        assist in the development, proliferation, or use of a 
        weapon of mass destruction (including a chemical, 
        biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon) that could 
        be used by a terrorist or a terrorist organization 
        against the United States, including information about 
        the location of any stockpile of nuclear materials that 
        could be exploited for use in such a weapon that could 
        be used by a terrorist or a terrorist organization 
        against the United States.
  (b) Information Sharing Environment.--
          (1) Establishment.--The President shall--
                  (A) create an information sharing environment 
                for the sharing of [terrorism information] 
                national security information in a manner 
                consistent with national security and with 
                applicable legal standards relating to privacy 
                and civil liberties;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (2) Attributes.--The President shall, through the 
        structures described in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of 
        paragraph (1), ensure that the ISE provides and 
        facilitates the means for sharing [terrorism 
        information] national security information among all 
        appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, 
        and the private sector through the use of policy 
        guidelines and technologies. The President shall, to 
        the greatest extent practicable, ensure that the ISE 
        provides the functional equivalent of, or otherwise 
        supports, a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated 
        environment that--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to 
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the 
ISE. The report shall include the following:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal 
        departments and agencies that will participate in the 
        ISE, including an identification of the agencies that 
        will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and 
        manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department 
        or agency components that are part of the ISE), with 
        such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) the authority of the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and 
                the role of the Department of Homeland Security 
                and the [Attorney General] Department of 
                Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and 
                tribal officials and the private sector.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) Program Manager.--
          (1) Designation.--Not later than 120 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, with notification to 
        Congress, the President shall designate an individual 
        as the program manager responsible for information 
        sharing across the Federal Government. The individual 
        designated as the program manager shall serve in the 
        Executive Office of the President and shall serve as 
        program manager until removed from service or replaced 
        by the President (at the President's sole discretion). 
        The program manager, in consultation with the head of 
        any affected department or agency, shall have and 
        exercise governmentwide authority over the sharing of 
        information within the scope of the information sharing 
        environment, including [homeland security information, 
        terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction 
        information] national security information, by all 
        Federal departments, agencies, and components, 
        irrespective of the Federal department, agency, or 
        component in which the program manager may be 
        administratively located, except as otherwise expressly 
        provided by law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


               TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL 
                    BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and 
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection 
(b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
[shall,] shall develop and maintain a specialized and 
integrated national intelligence workforce consisting of 
agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who 
are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures 
the existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an 
institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and 
commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) * * *
  (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance 
of the Attorney General and [the National Intelligence Director 
in a manner consistent with section 112(e)] the Director of 
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable 
law.
  (f) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation [shall,] shall establish a budget structure of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four 
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
          (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.

  Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the 
United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives a report that contains, with respect to each 
preceding 12-month period--
          (1) * * *
          (2) any legal or practical impediments to using 
        translators employed by [the Federal] Federal, State, 
        or local agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared 
        basis;
          (3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        for [the specific] specific translation services in 
        certain languages, and recommendations for meeting 
        those needs;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


  TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
SYSTEM

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 235. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Mandatory Retirement for Age.--
          (1) In general.--A participant in the system shall be 
        automatically retired from the Agency--
                  [(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a 
                participant in the system receiving 
                compensation under the Senior Intelligence 
                Service pay schedule at the rate of level 4 or 
                above; and]
                  (A) Upon reaching age 65, in the case of a 
                participant in the system who is at the Senior 
                Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or above; 
                and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 TITLE I--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR FOREIGN 
                         INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

                              DEFINITIONS

  Sec. 101. As used in this title:
          (a) ``Foreign power'' means--
                  (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (7) an entity not substantially composed of 
                United States persons that is engaged in the 
                international proliferation of weapons of mass 
                destruction.
          (b) ``Agent of a foreign power'' means--
                  (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (c) ``International terrorism'' means activities 
        that--
                  (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (d) ``Sabotage'' means activities that involve a 
        violation of chapter 105 of title 18, United States 
        Code, or that would involve such a violation if 
        committed against the United States.
          (e) ``Foreign intelligence information'' means--
                  (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (f) ``Electronic surveillance'' means--
                  (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (g) ``Attorney General'' means the Attorney General 
        of the United States (or Acting Attorney General), the 
        Deputy Attorney General, or, upon the designation of 
        the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General 
        designated as the Assistant Attorney General for 
        National Security under section 507A of title 28, 
        United States Code.
          (h) ``Minimization procedures'', with respect to 
        electronic surveillance, means--
                  (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (i) ``United States person'' means a citizen of the 
        United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
        residence (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the 
        Immigration and Nationality Act), an unincorporated 
        association a substantial number of members of which 
        are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully 
        admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation 
        which is incorporated in the United States, but does 
        not include a corporation or an association which is a 
        foreign power, as defined in subsection (a) (1), (2), 
        or (3).
          (j) ``United States'', when used in a geographic 
        sense, means all areas under the territorial 
        sovereignty of the United States and the Trust 
        Territory of the Pacific Islands.
          (k) ``Aggrieved person'' means a person who is the 
        target of an electronic surveillance or any other 
        person whose communications or activities were subject 
        to electronic surveillance.
          (l) ``Wire communication'' means any communications 
        while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other 
        like connection furnished or operated by any person 
        engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating 
        such facilities for the transmission of interstate or 
        foreign communications.
          (m) ``Person'' means any individual, including any 
        officer or employee of the Federal Government, or any 
        group, entity, association, corporation, or foreign 
        power.
          (n) ``Contents'', when used with respect to a 
        communication, includes any information concerning the 
        identity of the parties to such communications or the 
        existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that 
        communication.
          (o) ``State'' means any State of the United States, 
        the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
        Rico, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, an 
        any territory or possession of the United States.
          (p) ``Weapon of mass destruction'' means--
                  (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                         DESIGNATION OF JUDGES

  Sec. 103.
  (a)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(i)] (h) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce or 
contravene the inherent authority of the court established 
under subsection (a) to determine or enforce compliance with an 
order or a rule of such court or with a procedure approved by 
such court.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                               PENALTIES

  Sec. 109. (a) Offense.--A person is guilty of an offense if 
he intentionally--
          (1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of 
        law except as authorized by this Act, chapter 119, 121, 
        or 206 of title 18, United States Code, or any express 
        statutory authorization that is an additional exclusive 
        means for conducting electronic surveillance under 
        [section 112.;] section 112; or
          (2) disclose or uses information obtained under color 
        of law by electronic surveillance, knowing or having 
        reason to known that the information was obtained 
        through electronic surveillance not authorized by this 
        Act, chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United 
        States Code, or any express statutory authorization 
        that is an additional exclusive means for conducting 
        electronic surveillance under section 112.[.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   TITLE III--PHYSICAL SEARCHES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR FOREIGN 
                         INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

                              DEFINITIONS

  Sec. 301. As used in this title:
          (1) The terms ``foreign power'', ``agent of a foreign 
        power'', ``international terrorism'', ``sabotage'', 
        ``foreign intelligence information'', ``Attorney 
        General'', ``United States person'', [``United 
        States'', ``person'', ``weapon of mass destruction'', 
        and ``State''] ``United States'', ``person'', ``weapon 
        of mass destruction'', and ``State'' shall have the 
        same meanings as in section 101 of this Act, except as 
        specifically provided by this title.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                          ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER

  Sec. 304. (a) * * *
  (b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists for 
purposes of an order under [subsection (a)(3)] subsection 
(a)(2), a judge may consider past activities of the target, as 
well as facts and circumstances relating to current or future 
activities of the target.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


 TITLE V--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
PURPOSES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 502. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

  (a) On [a annual] an annual basis, the Attorney General shall 
fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate 
concerning all requests for the production of tangible things 
under section 501.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              


SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                                  1991

SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL [FOREIGN] INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

  (a) Annual Submission of Multiyear National [Foreign] 
Intelligence Program.--The [Director of Central Intelligence] 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional committees specified in subsection (d) each year 
a multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan 
reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed 
appropriations required to support that program. Any such 
multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan shall 
cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is 
submitted and at least four succeeding fiscal years.
  (b) Time of Submission.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit the report required by subsection (a) 
each year at or about the same time that the budget is 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code.
  (c) Consistency With Budget Estimates.--The [Director of 
Central Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence and the 
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred 
to in subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the 
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the 
multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section [114a] 
221 of title 10, United States Code.
                              ----------                              


TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Subtitle A--General Military Law

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


PART II--PERSONNEL

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 32--OFFICER STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION IN GRADE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Sec. 528. Officers serving in certain intelligence positions: military 
                    status; exclusion from distribution and strength 
                    limitations; pay and allowances

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) [Associate Director of CIA for Military Affairs] 
Associate Director of Military Affairs, CIA.--An officer of the 
armed forces serving in the position of [Associate Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs] Associate 
Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, or 
any successor position, while serving in that position, shall 
be excluded from the limitations in sections 525 and 526 of 
this title.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                             Minority Views

     H.R. 2701--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010

    We are disappointed that this year's intelligence 
authorization bill has taken a significant step back from last 
year's bipartisan legislation. It puts aside consensus in last 
year's bill and in this year's classified Schedule of 
Authorizations with respect to many significant issues. 
Instead, it advances provisions that appear to be designed for 
partisan messaging rather than to address critical national 
security issues, and it would reopen and modify areas of 
bipartisan consensus reached with respect to several discrete 
issues in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. 
In its current form, the bill also contains provisions that we 
believe would inappropriately hamper the flexibility and 
responsiveness of the intelligence community and includes 
discrete items that we believe are flawed or have not been 
fully vetted. In many respects, the bill is not fully 
transparent with respect to its purpose and effect or in making 
information available to the public that could be released on 
important issues.
    While we believe that the bill has been strengthened by 
successful bipartisan work on the classified schedule of 
authorizations and by Republican amendments adopted by the 
Committee, on balance we have significant reservations with the 
bill in its current form that force us to oppose it. We hope 
that these issues can be addressed going forward in the 
legislative process in order to complete bipartisan legislation 
to authorize the critical activities of the intelligence 
community.

     THE BILL FAILS TO ADDRESS CRITICAL NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES, 
            CONCENTRATING INSTEAD ON CREATING PARTISAN COVER

    The transition to a new Administration has caused several 
longstanding national security issues to be revisited, from the 
President's decision to release legal memoranda concerning 
sensitive compartmented activities of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and to close the detention facility at Guantanamo, to 
decisions to relocate detainees and potentially to bring them 
into the United States, to the apparent initiation of policies 
intended to convert the global war on terrorism into a matter 
of prosecution and litigation. While we recognize that changes 
in policy are inevitable in a new Administration and that 
President Obama has also wisely continued many past policies, 
we are deeply concerned that many decisions with significant 
implications for the intelligence community have been and 
continue to be implemented with absolutely no consultation with 
Congress, contrary to the established practice of the previous 
Administration.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\We have expressed concern in the past at the failure of the 
previous Administration to fully brief the Committee with respect to 
certain discrete matters, but the record is clear that the Committee 
was consulted regularly with respect to certain major initiatives. By 
contrast, the current Administration has conducted little to no 
consultation at all. In fact, the President's task forces with respect 
to some of the most relevant issues still have not briefed the 
Committee even on their processes and have twice cancelled Committee 
briefings, despite having held repeated meetings with outside advocacy 
groups. This is plainly unacceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    H.R. 2701 fails entirely to address many of these critical 
issues, abdicating the responsibility of the Committee. In 
other areas, it appears more focused on creating partisan cover 
for certain inconvenient truths faced by the Majority than in 
honestly confronting them. These inconvenient truths include 
the bipartisan consensus that has existed with respect to 
critical national security programs, even though they may no 
longer be seen as ``politically correct'' as threats become 
perceived as less imminent. We continue to believe that these 
issues must be addressed on their substantive merits, with the 
paramount goal of empowering the intelligence community to 
protect the American people consistent with our values. It is 
unfortunate that this bill fails to do so.
National Security Act Amendments
    Last year, we wrote that ``It is likely that there is no 
single current issue on which there is a stronger bipartisan 
consensus than our shared deep concern that the Administration 
is not fulfilling its statutory duty to keep each member of the 
Committee fully and currently informed with respect to certain 
intelligence matters.'' It is precisely for this reason that we 
joined with Chairman Reyes at that time in supporting truly 
bipartisan language to reform provisions of the National 
Security Act governing reporting of intelligence activities to 
the Committee. Inexplicably, that provision was removed from 
this year's bill and replaced with a partisan provision with 
serious flaws. The need for the change was so poorly understood 
that Chairman Reyes centered his opposition to a Republican 
amendment to restore the bipartisan language on provisions that 
had been in his own bill last year, and Majority counsel had to 
correct the record at markup to clarify that they had not 
properly described or apparently even understood their own 
proposal. The core provisions of the National Security Act are 
no place for such hasty, partisan lawmaking.
    This fiasco seems to have arisen because the Majority 
believed it needed political cover for its claims that it had 
not been briefed with respect to several intelligence community 
programs on which the record incontrovertibly shows not only 
that multiple members were briefed repeatedly on the programs 
in question on a bipartisan basis, but that they raised no 
objections, and took no action to object or to defend the 
programs as career intelligence officers acted in reliance on 
such approvals. Thus was born the canard that the ``problem'' 
somehow was not the failure of members to seek further 
information or raise whatever concerns they may have had, but 
instead was the fault of the career briefers, or the process 
itself. The Majority promptly issued a press release to promise 
that it would fix such problems--with no mention of the 
bipartisan provisions from the previous year.\2\ Those 
provisions were developed to address the real and repeatedly 
demonstrated problem of briefings that had been too narrowly 
limited to certain members rather than the new, politically 
convenient, false issues relating to the conduct of the 
briefings themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\``Reyes Statement on Congressional Notification Reform,'' May 
14, 2009. (http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/
ReyesRelease051109.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 502 of last year's bill makes amendments to certain 
congressional notification procedures of the National Security 
Act of 1947. It was the product of bipartisan discussion and 
agreement between Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra 
and includes language suggested by both. The provision 
expressly provided that information briefed to the Committee 
reporting on activities other than covert actions shall be made 
available to each member of the Committee, unless the President 
requests in writing that access to the information be limited 
and details extraordinary circumstances justifying the request. 
In the event of such a request to limit access, the Chairman 
and Ranking Member of the Committee may jointly determine 
whether and how to limit access to the material within the 
Committee. Absent such an agreement, access to the information 
or material would be limited. The provision specifically 
addressed and balanced the Constitutional powers and 
responsibilities of both the Executive and Legislative 
Branches, and set forth a specific mechanism to reconcile them.
    By contrast, the partisan provision in Section 321 of this 
year's bill would do nothing to solve the problem. In fact, it 
is so poorly drafted that it would lead to nothing but 
confusion. It nowhere creates a statutory presumption that all 
Members of the Committee should be briefed. Instead, it would 
require the Committee to unilaterally develop procedures for 
the handling of reporting on sensitive matters, even though the 
President has significant constitutional authorities in the 
area of national security that Courts have repeatedly said must 
be considered with and balanced against the authorities of 
Congress. The provision nowhere provides a mechanism for 
ensuring that decisions within the Committee are made on a 
bipartisan basis or for reconciling any dispute between the 
branches with respect to such reporting, which is a recipe for 
Constitutional gridlock that could be disastrous with respect 
to such sensitive matters.
    Moreover, the partisan provision purports to regulate 
objections that Members might wish to raise to a sensitive 
activity, including a statutory 48 hour time limit. The 
Majority staff indicated its belief at markup that this 
provision only requires an objection to be memorialized and 
transmitted to the Executive Branch within 48 hours, but the 
overall structure of the provision is not explicit. It is 
possible that such a provision could be read to restrict the 
time period in which members could raise objections. While we 
agree that formalizing and memorializing the process of 
objection to sensitive activities may be warranted, this sloppy 
provision nowhere states the legal scope or effect of such an 
objection and could require hasty decisionmaking on potentially 
critical matters. Moreover, if circumstances change or 
additional information is gathered after initial reporting of a 
covert action, the provision might be read to bar subsequent 
objection by Congress.
    Congressman Mac Thornberry offered an amendment at markup 
to replace this sloppy provision with last year's bipartisan 
language--further extended to include reporting of covert 
actions--even though we believe parts of that compromise are 
excessively prescriptive and focus disproportionately on legal 
issues rather than intelligence policy issues. The amendment to 
remove the partisan provision was defeated virtually on a party 
line vote, with only Congressman Rush Holt now supporting the 
original compromise on the Majority side. The core of the 
National Security Act is far too important for such 
gamesmanship, and this provision must be addressed and repaired 
as the legislation advances.
Release of unclassified versions of briefing memoranda and finished 
        intelligence products assessing information gained from 
        detainee reporting
    On a related issue, Ranking Member Hoekstra offered an 
amendment that would allow the American people to reach their 
own well-informed conclusions with respect to briefings to 
Congress on the use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. This 
issue gave rise to the broader controversy over briefings to 
the Committee after President Obama unilaterally and 
selectively released legal memoranda dealing with previously 
highly compartmented intelligence activities that lead to 
public calls for individuals to be held accountable for the 
activities, despite clear bipartisan consensus and support for 
the programs in question in repeated briefings to Members of 
the Committee. Ranking Member Hoekstra and Republican Members 
and staff of the Committee have had the opportunity to review 
the memoranda memorializing such briefings and believe that two 
facts are readily apparent. First, the memoranda clearly 
indicate that members of the Committee supported the activities 
in question on a bipartisan basis and raised no objections to 
the activities in question. Second, while certain redactions 
might still be justified to protect identities of intelligence 
community personnel, detainees, or details of sources and 
methods, there is little reason why the core of the documents 
could not be declassified and publicly released to allow the 
American people to decide for themselves.
    Similarly, Ranking Member Hoekstra's amendment would have 
provided for the release of unclassified versions of finished 
intelligence products assessing the information gained from 
detainee reporting after the September 1 1 attacks. 
Unfortunately, however, despite the President's unilateral 
decision to release the legal memoranda and publicly confirm 
substantial elements of these sensitive intelligence 
activities, the Majority voted in favor of partisan cover and 
would not support the release of these documents that would 
allow the full picture to be known and understood. It is ironic 
that many members of the Committee who have so vehemently 
argued in favor of greater transparency by the intelligence 
community and against perceived selective ``cherry-picking'' of 
publicly disclosed intelligence opposed this amendment, again 
for apparent partisan purposes. The record on this matter 
cannot he fully or fairly evaluated by the public until a 
version of these documents is made public.
``Global Justice'' Initiative
    The bill also has not addressed critical aspects of the so-
called ``Global Justice'' initiative being considered by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which we believe could 
significantly hamper intelligence collection and potentially 
prevention of terrorist acts by making it a priority to handle 
these matters abroad as law enforcement matters. While we 
appreciate the commitments from Chairman Reyes and Subcommittee 
Chairman Thompson to further review the matter, we believe that 
the Committee should have immediately made a clear and 
unambiguous statement against the implementation of any such 
policy.
    The Committee has devoted substantial energy and attention 
since the September 11, 2001 attacks to ensure that prevention 
of attacks and intelligence collection take priority in foreign 
countries over the inherent disadvantages of the criminal 
justice model. The FBI and Department of Justice should not 
unilaterally seek to undo these important, carefully 
coordinated efforts. The 9/11 Commission noted that ``The 
concern about the FBI is that it has long favored its criminal 
justice mission over its national security mission.'' 
Unfortunately, efforts to develop the ``Global Justice'' 
initiative suggest that this message has not yet been fully 
heeded.
    The initiative represents a fundamental policy shift in the 
fight against radical jihadists. As part of this new 
initiative, FBI agents would be deployed in the middle of 
intelligence collection activities worldwide, potentially 
including the battlefield, to gather evidence. FBI agents would 
also take first priority in questioning persons of interest 
rather than trained intelligence interrogators. Thus, FBI 
agents might read Miranda warnings to non-U.S. persons held 
overseas who are not entitled to such rights outside the 
context of a criminal prosecution inside the United States--a 
significant disincentive for any subject to provide information 
that might be urgently needed to prevent an attack. And if 
those detainees didn't immediately ``lawyer up,'' FBI agents 
would ask questions to build a litigation case- not to produce 
intelligence.
    Given the gravity of this potential policy shift, we are 
pleased that the Committee recognized the importance of some 
implications of the Global Justice Initiative, but we do not 
believe sufficient steps have been taken to address our 
fundamental concerns about this new and dangerous program. On a 
positive note, the Committee adopted two amendments offered by 
Congressman Mike Rogers. The first amendment prohibits the use 
of intelligence funds to read Miranda warnings to non-U.S. 
person detainees held by the U.S. military overseas. As 
previously mentioned, we believe strongly that such warnings 
could impair the immediate collection of critical intelligence 
and could serve as a significant disincentive to cooperation. 
It is important to emphasize that U.S. courts have repeatedly 
held that foreign persons in foreign countries generally do not 
enjoy constitutional protections, rendering the Miranda 
warnings unnecessary absent an immediate, specific intent to 
initiate criminal prosecution.
    The second amendment related to the ``Global Justice'' 
initiative requires the FBI Director to review the legal 
problems caused by FBI agents trying to conduct investigations 
(using intelligence funding) of non U.S. persons outside of the 
United States and to report his findings to the congressional 
intelligence committees. As recognized by the authoritative 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, international law clearly provides as a matter of 
sovereignty that U.S. law enforcement officers may only 
exercise their functions in other countries with the specific 
consent of duly authorized officials of those countries. 
Without such authorization, those countries could protest and 
seek reparation from the United States.
    This initiative must be reviewed carefully as the 
legislation moves forward.
National Drug Intelligence Center
    Congressman Mike Rogers offered an amendment that would 
have authorized funding to close the National Drug Intelligence 
Center (NDIC), which is located in central Pennsylvania and has 
long-been a controversial and questionable effort inside the 
intelligence community. U.S. News and World Report once 
famously describe the center as, a ``Drug War boondoggle rocked 
by scandal'' and quoted its first deputy director as stating 
that the center was, ``in search of a mission.'' In light of 
its reputation and dubious usefulness, the previous 
administration repeatedly recommended the facility be budgeted 
for closure and its minimal efforts shifted to the more 
productive and better situated El Paso Intelligence Center. The 
Majority refused to take responsibility for this boondoggle, 
and voted against the amendment.
    NDIC has only remained open the past several years as a 
result of receiving the largest single, pork barrel expenditure 
in the intelligence budget. In the Fiscal Year 2007 
Intelligence Authorization Act, the Majority improperly 
included the earmark in the bill with no transparency, contrary 
to the applicable rules. Oversight visits and briefings with 
the Committee have repeatedly borne out that the center is 
duplicative, poorly located, lacking in mission, with no clear 
direction for the future, and its funding could be directed to 
higher intelligence community priorities.
    In light of bipartisan, Republican-led, action in the 
Intelligence Committee in recent years to end the earmark and 
close NDIC, its political patrons apparently had enough and 
have attempted to shift its authorization to the House 
Judiciary Committee after years hidden away in intelligence 
funding. The resulting attempt to hide oversight for an 
``intelligence center'' in the Judiciary Committee is a direct 
affront to this Committee's proper authorities and 
responsibilities in the House. It is an unprecedented effort to 
shift and diminish the power of this Committee for purely 
political reasons and the Majority should not have allowed this 
bald-faced political move to stand. This amendment would have 
placed NDIC back under the proper oversight of the House 
Intelligence Committee and directs, as this Committee has 
previously, that funds be appropriated to cease the center's 
operations.
    Since its inception, more than $400 million in taxpayer 
dollars has been spent with little to show in the way of 
results. A report by the House Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight concluded that NDIC should be terminated because 
it is ``an expensive and duplicative use of scarce Federal drug 
enforcement resources,'' and the Office of Management and 
Budget previously concluded that ``NDIC has experienced 
problems with duplication of effort and lack of coordination 
with other intelligence providers and consumers. Focusing 
resources on a smaller number of intelligence providers would 
increase the impact of those resources.''
    At a time when the American people are stretching to more 
with less and the federal budget deficit is soaring out of 
control, this Committee has an obligation to ensure taxpayer 
money for national security is being used in the wisest and 
best manner possible to ensure our nation's safety. Committee 
Members have a fiduciary responsibility to stand up for the 
Committee's authorities. The Majority, however, voted to accept 
this attempt to shift and hide NDIC funding and continue to 
shirk responsibility for Member pet projects.
Detainees
    This bill fails entirely to address the critical issue of 
the disposition of the detainees currently held at Guantanamo 
Bay in the wake of the President's unilateral decision to close 
the facility, before reviewing the relevant facts and options 
and with no plan. We believe that the security of the American 
people must come first. The Majority blocked an amendment, 
offered by Congressman Roy Blunt, which would have prohibited 
the use of intelligence funds to foreign countries in exchange 
for accepting newly relocated Guantanamo detainees. This issue 
must be handled transparently--secret intelligence funds should 
not be used as a slush fund to pay foreign countries to relieve 
the United States of its responsibilities.
    Despite its willingness to secretly pay foreign nations 
potentially significant amounts of taxpayer dollars to take 
detainees, the Majority apparently believes that these 
detainees are still dangerous, voting against an amendment 
offered by Congressman Mike Rogers to clarify the record on the 
issue by preventing the Administration from paying foreign 
countries to conduct surveillance on or monitor newly released 
detainees. The Majority apparently agrees that these newly 
released detainees need to be monitored, but does not believe 
they pose a sufficient threat to prevent them from being 
released in the first place.
    The Majority also rejected an amendment, offered by 
Congresswoman Sue Myrick, which would have prevented 
intelligence dollars from being spent to bring Guantanamo 
detainees into the United States, despite clear bipartisan 
opposition in the House and among the American people to 
bringing dangerous terrorists into the United States. Instead, 
the Majority adopted a watered-down substitute that withholds 
money until the President submits a ``plan'' for these 
Guantanamo detainees.
    Hastily drafted despite delays in the Committee's markup, 
the substitute amendment requires the ``plan'' to be submitted 
to the Congressional defense committees rather than this 
Committee, despite later Majority criticism of a Republican 
amendment on the ground that such a provision would cause a 
sequential referral. In addition, the watered down substitute 
would have limited effect, restricting funding only to the 
Director of National Intelligence and not to individual 
agencies in the intelligence community. The Majority is 
apparently comfortable allowing the Administration to put down 
whatever it likes on paper, call it a ``plan'' for dealing with 
detainees, and spend money to send these terrorists virtually 
anywhere from Palau to Peoria. We are not satisfied by half 
measures. The President and the Majority must more meaningfully 
address the ``problem'' of Guantanamo Bay--caused by the 
premature decision to close the facility--head on.
    The Committee agreed to two amendments offered by Ranking 
Member Hoekstra to require the intelligence community to 
produce an unclassified summary of the threat posed by the 
Uighurs at Guantanamo and an unclassified summary on the 
recidivism of Guantanamo detainees repatriated or released to 
third countries over the years, although we are disappointed 
that only a few members of the Majority supported these 
amendments. These amendments will provide greater transparency 
and clarity to the public debate over these detainees. The 
American people deserve to know exactly what kind of people are 
being held at Guantanamo and exactly what kind of threats we 
will all face if these detainees are released, brought to this 
country for trial, or ultimately inserted into the federal 
prison system.

Failure to protect intelligence community personnel

    This bill also contains a provision that we believe will 
unnecessarily expose intelligence personnel to risk. Section 
416 of this bill requires the Central Intelligence Agency to 
videotape interrogations of detainees. This requirement could 
quickly become a substantial liability for our CIA officers in 
the field if the President allows them to interrogate suspected 
terrorists again. These tapes could pose a logistical and 
security nightmare, and it is clear that the implications of 
such a requirement have not been fully vetted.\3\ Officers at 
remote locations would have to figure out a way to securely 
store the tapes. If these tapes were ever lost or stolen, they 
would create tremendous risks. Videotaped interrogations could 
reveal the identity of our CIA officers--making them and their 
families a target for retaliation. Tapes could also betray 
detainees who might choose to cooperate and mark them for 
death. Of course, images from even a lawful, properly conducted 
interrogation might provide material for our adversaries to 
exploit for propaganda purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\The Committee's investigation with respect to the destruction of 
previous tapes has suggested potentially significant issues with 
respect to the destruction of previously created interrogation 
videotapes. We wish to note the distinction between the need to 
preserve existing or future videotapes once created and the policy 
question of whether such tapes should be created in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congressman Mac Thornberry offered an amendment to strip 
section 416 out of this bill and protect our CIA officers going 
forward. Unfortunately, the amendment was defeated in a split 
partisan vote. This provision must be more carefully addressed 
going forward.
    More broadly, we are concerned at the increasing 
politicization of career intelligence community personnel 
merely for carrying out policies that were authorized by the 
President and approved and funded by the Congress.
    On May 4, 2009, Philip Mudd, a veteran intelligence officer 
who has worked for the CIA and the FBI, was nominated to be 
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis for the 
Department of Homeland Security. However, on June 5, 2009, Mudd 
withdrew his nomination because of worries that attacks by 
Senate Democrats over his work on anti-terror programs would be 
a ``distraction'' to the Obama administration. Last November, 
former CIA officer John Brennan withdrew from consideration to 
be appointed the CIA Director for the same reason.
    We are concerned that highly qualified intelligence 
officers are becoming pawns in a political game which has 
caused the careers of some extremely talented intelligence 
officers, like Mudd and Brennan, to hit a brick wall. These 
officers are being punished not for wrongdoing but for their 
success in administering innovative anti-terrorist programs 
that kept our nation safe from terrorist attack over the last 
seven years.
    It is time to stop this assault on our intelligence 
community. This is not just wrong, it's dangerous. There are 
many dire threats facing our nation from radical jihadists, WMD 
proliferation, the global economic situation, and many regional 
issues. America needs an intelligence corps that is prepared to 
take manageable risks without fear of being undercut by 
changing political moods. Using intelligence officers as pawns 
in political games will dissuade our best and brightest 
intelligence officers from serving in controversial and high-
risk environments.

            THE BILL CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE FLAWS

    The base bill hastily drafted by the Majority contains 
several operative provisions that significantly concern us, and 
equally as many that are poorly researched, of questionable 
need or have unknown implications. Many of the new provisions 
reflect the fact that this bill was thrown together in a few 
days time and is largely cobbled from ODNI proposals that have 
not been thoroughly considered, and reversals on old issues 
that were resolved on a bipartisan basis during negotiations on 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).

Management issues

    The base bill was improved by two Republican initiatives on 
key management issues. One Republican amendment, offered by 
Congressman John Kline, requires the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO) to submit an updated charter to Congress within 90 
days of enactment of the bill. The NRO's existing charter was 
adopted in 1965 and has not been updated in the forty plus 
years since that time and no longer reflects the 
organizational, functional and operational realities of today's 
NRO. For example, from a practical perspective, neither the 
ODNI nor the current DOD acquisition guidelines existed when 
the current charter was written. This amendment would require 
the NRO and DOD to finalize and submit a new charter, which we 
understand has been in the drafting process for quite some 
time. The amendment was intended to ensure that the NRO's 
current organizational structure and reporting chains are 
reflected in the charter, as well as the modern day functional 
duties of NRO.
    Another Republican amendment offered by Congressman Mike 
Conaway contained a sense of Congress that reaching 
auditability for all intelligence community elements should be 
a priority for the DNI. This is intended to put the IC on 
notice that it is critically necessary to reach and maintain a 
level of auditability for all elements of the community and to 
make certain that the DNI takes a leadership role in ensuring 
this happens. The amendment also requires the DNI to complete a 
review to determine specifically where the office is in this 
process, and to come up with a measurable time frame for 
reaching a point where the entire IC can be audited. It is 
essential that the DNI maintains strong financial management 
and business systems that allow for comprehensive auditing, in 
order to improve financial management government-wide. The 
American taxpayers should be assured that we hold government 
agencies to the same high standards as we do publicly traded 
companies. These two Republican amendments significantly 
improve the bill from management and accountability standpoint.

Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    We have significant concerns with Section 406 of the bill, 
which would create a new Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community. While we do not oppose either enhanced oversight of 
the intelligence community or a capability to review cross-
cutting issues within the intelligence community, we are 
concerned that this provision duplicates efforts of Department 
and Agency inspectors general, is unnecessarily complex and 
unwieldy, and threatens to further grow the size and 
bureaucracy of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. For example, the bill would make various changes 
that would subject the National Security Agency to the 
jurisdiction of not one, but three statutory inspectors 
general. (Department of Defense, Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, and National Security Agency). 
Moreover, the Committee's experience has been that increasing 
size of the bureaucracy has in some cases delayed work on 
important investigations. This provision can only make the 
problem worse and further hamper the timeliness of review by 
the Committee.

General Accounting Office

    Section 335 of the bill would require the DNI to provide 
access for GAO employees to all information that the 
Comptroller General of the GAO deems necessary to conduct an 
investigation that is requested by one of the intelligence 
committees. It is unclear why the Majority believes this broad 
expansion is even necessary. The elements of the intelligence 
community all currently have Inspectors General that are able 
to perform the investigative and auditory functions sought 
here, while limiting the number of persons that have access to 
sensitive intelligence information. Moreover, this Committee is 
charged with oversight of IC programs, and we find it 
surprising that the Majority is willing to outsource that 
oversight responsibility. That the Majority is incapable or 
unwilling to perform the Committee's oversight function is not 
a sufficient reason to break from a longstanding, carefully 
structured oversight process designed to balance congressional 
oversight needs with the Executive's need to protect sensitive 
information. This provision dangerously subordinates the DNI's 
responsibility to protect the Nation's most sensitive national 
security information to an entity responsible for performing 
audits at Congress' behest.
    The provision also lacks any restriction governing the 
handling of classified information by the GAO--which is not 
subject to the detailed Rules of the House or the Committee on 
such matters--and the use and distribution of GAO products. As 
drafted, the GAO will have access to the most sensitive 
national security information, and there is no restriction on 
how they may use that information, who may be designated to 
receive it and how it may be distributed--especially after the 
information is incorporated into a GAO product or report. Under 
the House Rules, this Committee has jurisdiction over sources 
and methods, and nothing in this provision would prevent the 
GAO from distributing sensitive sources and methods material 
beyond this Committee. Aside from the institutional interests 
that the Majority should be more concerned with protecting, the 
potential for sensitive information to be inadvertently or 
intentionally disclosed greatly and dangerously increases with 
this provision included in the bill.

Less flexibility and more bureaucracy for the intelligence community

    The bill also contains several provisions that will hamper 
the flexibility of community personnel. It will require for the 
first time Senate confirmation of the National Security Agency 
Director, NSA General Counsel, and the Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office. These positions have traditionally not 
required Senate confirmation and have been filled by career 
intelligence professionals. Despite the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendation that we minimize as much as possible the 
disruption of national security policymaking by accelerating 
the process for national security appointments, the Majority 
seeks to instead add more politics and more delay into the 
process by requiring additional key intelligence positions to 
be subject to lengthy, politicized Senate confirmation process. 
It is unclear how subjecting career intelligence employees to 
these processes or replacing them in favor of partisan 
political appointments will enhance our ability to respond to 
catastrophic terrorist attacks like 9/11.
    The bill also adds another layer of bureaucracy to NSA by 
creating a new Associate Director position that will duplicate 
oversight responsibilities already charged to the General 
Counsel. If there are concerns with the way NSA's Office of the 
General Counsel has handled matters in the past, creating 
another layer in the bureaucracy at an additional cost to the 
taxpayers is not the best way to address those concerns.
    Further hampering the IC is the Majority's unexplained 
decision to mandate personnel practices in the Defense 
Department that are opposed by the current Administration. 
Section 304 of the bill terminates DOD's use of the Defense 
Civilian Intelligence Personnel System or ``pay for 
performance'' as the system is more familiarly known. The 
rationale for this provision is not transparent. DOD is 
implementing DCIPS to bring DOD intelligence personnel in line 
with the rest of the IC. While we are aware of some concerns 
with respect to compensation reform at the CIA, we believe that 
the concept has generally worked at DOD. The Administration has 
already responded to the Majority's concerns about pay for 
performance earlier this month after delaying implementation 
and conducting a review following a request from the Chairman. 
Suspension of DCIPS will leave Intelligence employees working 
side by side under different systems and different terms of 
employment.

Burdensome reports and Congressionally Directed Actions

    We are once again troubled by the proliferation of reports 
that are required of the intelligence community. At least 41 
new reports and Congressionally Directed Actions are mandated 
in the bill and classified annex, while only five statutorily 
required reports are removed.
    In order for the House and Senate intelligence committees 
to do their job on behalf of Congress and the American people, 
the Committees must have access to the necessary information. 
Requiring that an agency produce a periodic report on certain 
activities is sometimes the most efficient way to obtain that 
information. But at other times, a briefing or a simple letter 
can serve just as well. Too often, requiring a new report is 
used as a substitute for reading, studying, and learning from 
what has already been provided. Many times, such a requirement 
is used to convey interest in a topic or as a fall-back 
position to a thwarted legislative provision.
    The burden of researching, writing, approving, and 
transmitting this volume of reports to Congress, strains the 
resources of the intelligence community. If the congressional 
Committees were to carefully read and study each one, it would 
also strain the Committee's resources. Unfortunately, these 
reports frequently become a paper shuffling exercise for both 
branches, rather than a serious, substantive exchange of 
information needed for proper oversight and decisions.
    We believe that the Committee should be much more judicious 
in the reports it requires and that it should demand high 
quality responses to those requests. The growing demand for 
little read or used mounds of paper does not benefit either 
branch.

Modifications to provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
        Prevention Act

    Several provisions of the bill change elements of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) 
enacted after exhaustive bipartisan discussion and 
consideration. With no apparent rationale, the Majority has 
also loosened the agreed upon threshold that is required for 
the IC to request a reprogramming of funds that were directed 
by Congress to be used in specific ways. Currently, the IC may 
request a reprogramming of funds when there is need based on 
``unforeseen requirements.'' Under the standard just adopted by 
the Majority, the IC may request reprogramming based on an 
emergent need, improved program effectiveness or an increase in 
efficiency. In effect, this significant change would allow 
reprogrammings whenever the Executive Branch seeks to do so 
with only the thinnest of justifications. It is unclear why the 
Majority would water down our institutional interests by giving 
up control and oversight of IC spending.
    Several provisions are also inconsistent with the 
bipartisan IRTPA agreement that became law not quite five years 
ago, and the reason for the changes are not transparent. The 
DNI requested that Agencies be mandated to allow non-
reimbursable detailees to serve at ODNI for an extended period, 
and the Majority did so without an appropriate review of 
whether it was truly needed, or what the repercussions may be. 
Similarly, the bill makes changes to the duties of the program 
manager for the Information Sharing Environment whose 
responsibilities were set forth in IRTPA. Without explanation, 
the Majority decided to open up issues long ago resolved where 
there is no demonstrated need to do so. Like many of the IRTPA 
provisions, these provisions were the subject of detailed 
Committee consideration and in-depth discussions in 2004 and 
ill-considered changes at the behest of the ODNI whose 
authorities were so carefully balanced in that bill without 
full consideration for the implications is ill-advised.

Additional substantive concerns

    The bill also contains additional provisions that do not 
appear to have been well-thought through or vetted, some 
submitted by the Administration two days before the legislative 
package was drafted and incorporated verbatim in the bill. 
While these provisions may appear technical on the surface, 
they could have significant substantive implications and do not 
appear to have been studied or justified. It is simply not 
possible to thoroughly study and contemplate the intent and 
implications of these provisions in just a couple of days. 
Rather than spending the time to consider these provisions, the 
Majority added them to this bill.
    Notably, several education and scholarship programs are 
made permanent without any specific demonstration of their 
effectiveness and impact from the IC. While these programs may 
have merit, it does not make sense to permanently authorize 
certain pilot programs merely because the IC asks for them. The 
Committee has not received any information indicating how these 
programs have worked and why they should be made permanent. To 
blindly enact these programs does a disservice to the 
Committee's important oversight role.
    Section 302 of the bill also permits the DNI to temporarily 
appoint certain personnel from other IC agencies to fill 
vacancies of presidentially appointed or Senate confirmed 
positions. This is another provision that the Committee 
received from the Administration days before it was included in 
the bill. ODNI indicated it recently had trouble filling a 
specialized Senate confirmed position on a temporary basis 
necessitating this provision. Instead of considering whether 
the ODNI's issue may be addressed in other ways, the Majority 
accepted most of the Administration's language on this 
provision and the implications of greatly expanding the DNI's 
authority to fill critical positions previously subject to 
confirmation remain unknown.
    Section 413 allows CIA contractors to appeal disputes to 
the Armed Services contracting appeals board. The provision 
also appeared in the bill just days after the Administration 
requested the provision be included in this year's 
authorization bill. The provision would amend current law to 
permit a CIA contracting officer to appeal a contracting 
decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the 
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. Until recently, the law 
provided for appeal to both boards and was only recently 
amended to permit appeal to the Civilian Board only. We are 
unaware of any consideration given to the ramifications of 
expanding this jurisdiction or even if the reasoning behind why 
the law was recently amended has been reviewed.
    The bill contains provisions requested by the DNI that 
would protect from misuse of the DNI seal. We have no 
information from the DNI that misuse of the seal is a 
significant problem they have encountered. This provision was 
also added to the bill without any consideration of its 
necessity. Frankly, we find it surprising that a provision like 
this would receive any attention in a time where the IC is 
facing much more pressing and serious issues that the Committee 
needs to address, particularly when the Community has not had 
an authorization bill in several years.
    Section 502 of the bill extends the National Commission for 
the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the 
intelligence community. Again, the Committee has not been 
provided with a rationale for reauthorizing this Commission and 
the Majority has not articulated any reason to reauthorize a 
Commission whose previous authorization expired before the 
Committee ever met.
    Section 503 of the bill requires the DNI to conduct a 
classification review of materials in the possession of the 
intelligence communities that are at least twenty-five years 
old and were provided to the Committee by the Executive Branch. 
This provision appeared in the draft bill in the days before 
Committee consideration without explanation and fails to 
recognize that the Executive Branch already conducts 
classification reviews of such material pursuant to its 
original classification authorities. We believe that our 
intelligence professionals could better spend their time on a 
variety of matters that do not involve doing duplicative 
classification reviews. Our recommendation on a better method 
for minimizing the mounds of paper that are put into the 
Committee's storage would be to stop propounding dozens of new 
reporting requirements to the IC each time we pass an 
authorization bill.

Conclusion

    In conclusion, we are disappointed that substantial 
bipartisan agreement on this year's classified Schedule of 
Authorizations and in the legislative provisions of last year's 
bill have been put aside, apparently to turn this critical 
national security bill into a partisan messaging tool and a 
vehicle in many cases for questionable provisions to advance 
partisan policy initiatives or rubber stamp the requests of the 
Administration, ignoring other critical substantive issues. We 
hope that these concerns can be addressed as the bill moves 
forward in the legislative process, but must urge our 
colleagues to oppose it in its current form.
                                   Peter Hoekstra.
                                   Elton Gallegly.
                                   Mac Thornberry.
                                   Mike Rogers.
                                   Sue Myrick.
                                   Roy Blunt.
                                   Jeff Miller.
                                   John Kline.
                                   K. Michael Conaway.

                            Additional Views

    During committee consideration of the bill H.R. 2701, I 
indicated that I had additional questions on portions of the 
classified annex and was not yet prepared to vote to approve 
the Schedule of Authorizations. As a result, I requested that I 
be recorded as voting present on the question of whether to 
report the bill favorably to the House.
    I have subsequently received answers to my questions. Had I 
known those answers at the time of the mark-up, I would have 
voted to report the bill favorably.
                                         Alcee L. Hastings,
                                                     Vice Chairman.

                                  
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