[Senate Executive Report 111-6]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


111th Congress                                              Exec. Rept.
                                 SENATE
 2d Session                                                       111-6

======================================================================



 
                     TREATY WITH RUSSIA ON MEASURES
                  FOR FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
                      OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS



                         (THE NEW START TREATY)

                                _______
                                

                October 1, 2010.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

          Mr. Kerry, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                        submitted the following

                                 REPORT

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                    [To accompany Treaty Doc. 111-5]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred 
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, 
with Protocol (Treaty Document 111-5), having considered the 
same, reports favorably thereon with 10 conditions, 3 
understandings, and 13 declarations, as indicated in the 
resolution of advice and consent for such treaty, and 
recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to 
ratification thereof, as set forth in this report and the 
accompanying resolution of advice and consent.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

  I. Purpose..........................................................2
 II. Background and Discussion........................................2
III. Views of the Committee on Armed Services........................64
 IV. Views of the Select Committee on Intelligence...................78
  V. Committee Action................................................78
 VI. Committee Recommendation and Comments...........................81
VII. Text of Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification.......100
VIII.Minority Views of Senators Risch, DeMint, Barrasso, Wicker, and 
     Inhofe.........................................................110
 IX. Additional Documents...........................................124

                               I. Purpose

    The Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (hereinafter, the New 
START Treaty) will commit the United States and Russia to 
reductions in strategic offensive arms. By continuing 
predictability and transparency between the Parties, it would 
ensure strategic stability while enabling the United States to 
maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. New START builds upon 
the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) of 1991 and the 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow 
Treaty) of 2002.
    The START Treaty limited each Party to 6,000 strategic 
warheads attributed to 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles. The 
Moscow Treaty limited each Party to between 1,700 and 2,200 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The New START Treaty 
contains lower limits of 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 
700 deployed delivery vehicles. Unlike START and the Moscow 
Treaty, New START also limits each State Party to 800 deployed 
and non-deployed launchers of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), launchers of submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. In contrast with the START 
Treaty, the New START Treaty does not establish sub-limits on 
types of strategic offensive arms. Instead, each Party may 
determine its own force structure, within the treaty's limits 
and subject to its other provisions, as is the case under the 
Moscow Treaty. New START contains no limitations on U.S. 
missile defenses other than a silo conversion ban contained in 
paragraph 3 of Article V; it explicitly permits modernization 
of each Party's strategic offensive arms; and it does not 
constrain development of long-range conventional strike 
systems, although conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs would 
count toward the treaty's limits on deployed delivery vehicles, 
on deployed warheads, and on deployed and non-deployed 
launchers.
    The New START Treaty would supersede the Moscow Treaty upon 
entry into force, and its verification provisions revise, 
update, and build upon those in the START Treaty, which expired 
on December 5, 2009. The Treaty consists of the main treaty 
text and a protocol, which contains ten parts and three 
annexes.

                     II. Background and Discussion


                                HISTORY

    The START process of reducing and limiting strategic 
offensive arms began during the Reagan administration. As 
former Secretary of State James Baker testified to the 
committee:

          Negotiations on the original START Treaty began . . . 
        in the early 1980s during some of the most contentious 
        years in the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, when the United 
        States and Soviet Union were running the arms race at a 
        really fast clip. Many feared that the Cold War would 
        turn hot. And START was about stopping that race.
          It was about beginning to shrink the enormous nuclear 
        arsenals that each side had built, and it was about 
        stabilizing the nuclear relationship between the two 
        countries so that our diplomatic relationship could 
        evolve without the fear that either side was going to 
        seek an atomic advantage. By dramatically reducing each 
        side's nuclear forces, START took a relationship that 
        was filled with uncertainty, and made it far more 
        predictable. The original treaty provided a foundation 
        for Washington and Moscow to reduce their arsenals, and 
        to improve diplomatic ties and overall cooperation.

    Those negotiations culminated in the START Treaty, which 
President George H.W. Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev 
signed in July 1991. The Bush administration then quickly 
proceeded to negotiate a follow-on agreement that would further 
reduce U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear forces to 
between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads. START II, as this agreement 
was known, was signed in 1993, just before President Bush left 
office, but it never entered into force because of subsequent 
disagreements between Russia and the United States over missile 
defense issues. In 1997, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris 
Yeltsin agreed to a framework for a START III treaty, which 
would have reduced deployed arsenals to between 2,000 and 2,500 
strategic warheads. However, formal negotiations never began 
because in 2000 the Russian Duma conditioned the entry into 
force of START II on U.S. ratification of agreements made in 
the Standing Consultative Commission in September 1997 
concerning missile defense.
    The George W. Bush administration continued the process of 
negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear forces, albeit in 
different form. In 2001, President Bush announced his intention 
to unilaterally reduce the number of operationally deployed 
strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 and suggested 
that the Russians could reciprocate. Russia, however, wanted 
such reductions to be made through a bilateral, legally-binding 
agreement, and in May 2002 the two countries signed the Moscow 
Treaty, a far simpler and shorter accord than START or START 
II.
    Although its warhead limits were lower, the Moscow Treaty 
did not replace the START Treaty. The Moscow Treaty relied on 
START's verification and transparency mechanisms. It did create 
a Bilateral Implementation Commission, but the commission was 
not empowered to decide on any measures for verification. 
During the Senate's consideration of the treaty, some 
questioned whether that arrangement would be sufficient to 
ascertain compliance since START was to expire on December 5, 
2009, three years before the Moscow Treaty's limits came into 
effect. But during consideration of the Moscow Treaty, 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the committee that, 
``between now and 2009 . . . there is plenty of time to sort 
through what we will do thereafter.'' Similarly, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell testified at the time:

          We thought that long before we got to 2009, as a 
        result of the work of the bilateral implementation 
        committee and because of additional work that had been 
        undertaken but not completed yet with respect to 
        transparency measures and other things we can do in the 
        area of confidence-building and transparency, that by 
        the time we got to 2009 we would know what we needed to 
        know, and if not then we could suggest some time long 
        before 2009 that it might be in the interest of both 
        parties to extend those provisions of START.

    In 2006, the United States and Russia began discussions on 
what, if anything, would replace START. At that time, Russia 
indicated that it wanted to negotiate a successor agreement 
similar to the original accord, but the Bush administration 
initially maintained that few of the measures contained in the 
START Treaty were still needed. Both countries wanted to 
maintain some of the verification and monitoring provisions 
established in START. Russia wanted these provisions to be part 
of a new legally-binding accord, but the Bush administration 
suggested a less formal regime of transparency and confidence-
building measures that might include voluntary data exchanges 
and on-site visits.
    The United States and Russia continued to discuss these 
issues in 2007 and 2008 but failed to reach agreement, although 
in April 2008 Presidents Bush and Putin did issue a Strategic 
Framework Declaration in which they committed to reducing their 
nuclear forces ``to the lowest possible level consistent with 
our national security requirements and alliance commitments.'' 
The United States and Russia also met in November 2008 in the 
context of a meeting of START's Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission (JCIC)--together with representatives from Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which were Parties to the START Treaty 
as successor states to the Soviet Union--to discuss extending 
the treaty, but they did not agree on a course of action.
    After taking office in January 2009, the Obama 
administration continued strategic talks with the Russians. In 
March, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov met in Geneva and agreed that the United 
States and Russia would try to negotiate a new strategic arms 
control accord before START expired at the end of the year. In 
April, meeting in London, Presidents Obama and Medvedev 
instructed their negotiators to begin work on a new agreement 
on ``the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms'' 
to levels below those established by the Moscow Treaty. They 
said the new agreement would ``mutually enhance the security of 
the Parties and predictability and stability in strategic 
offensive forces, and will include effective verification 
measures drawn from the experience in implementing the START 
Treaty.''
    In July 2009, following initial meetings between American 
and Russian negotiators, Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed a 
Joint Understanding which indicated that the new treaty would 
limit each country to between 500 and 1,100 strategic delivery 
vehicles with 1,500 to 1,675 associated warheads. American and 
Russian negotiators met throughout the year but had not reached 
agreement by the time the START Treaty expired on December 5, 
2009. At that time Presidents Obama and Medvedev released a 
joint statement, which said:

          Recognizing our mutual determination to support 
        strategic stability between the United States of 
        America and the Russian Federation, we express our 
        commitment, as a matter of principle, to continue to 
        work together in the spirit of the START Treaty 
        following its expiration, as well as our firm intention 
        to ensure that a new treaty on strategic arms enter 
        into force at the earliest possible date.

    In March 2010, the United States and Russia concluded 
negotiations. On April 8, Presidents Obama and Medvedev met in 
Prague and signed the New START Treaty. The treaty was 
submitted to the Senate on May 13, 2010, along with an article-
by-article analysis of the treaty, protocol, and annexes 
(Treaty Doc. 111-5).

                   STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR THE TREATY

Strategic Stability

    The United States and Russia are no longer enemies as they 
were during the Cold War, but the two countries still have 
significant disagreements, including disagreements over 
political-military issues such as the nature of NATO, the 
status of Russian military deployments in countries that have 
not agreed to a Russian troop presence, and the 2008 war in 
Georgia. Moreover, each country still maintains thousands of 
strategic nuclear weapons that have the potential to destroy 
the other. Under these circumstances, it is prudent to maintain 
appropriate measures to assure both countries regarding the 
stability of the nuclear balance.
    The New START Treaty's limits of 1,550 deployed warheads, 
700 deployed delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and non-
deployed launchers and heavy bombers would ensure that neither 
side has a significant nuclear advantage. By re-establishing 
limits on strategic nuclear forces and continuing monitoring 
and verification procedures, the treaty also establishes 
predictability, so that each Party can base its military 
planning on reliable data regarding the other Party's strategic 
offensive arms and avoid estimates based on guesses that can 
lead to destabilizing strategic competition. In his testimony 
to the committee, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, 
General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, explained why predictability 
was important:

          [I]f we don't get the treaty, (a) [the Russians are] 
        not constrained in their development of force 
        structure, and (b) we have no insight into what they're 
        doing. So, it's the worst of both possible worlds. And 
        so, what that means to us is that we have to guess or, 
        through other national technical means, estimate what 
        their force structure and what the capability of their 
        weapons are, which then leads us to do analysis on what 
        [we] need. And the less precise that is, the more the 
        probability that we either under- or over-develop the 
        force structure we require. And neither is a good 
        result. ``Under,'' it would be a security issue; 
        ``over'' would be a cost issue. We could end up 
        developing capabilities that we really didn't require.

    At the same time, the treaty permits more flexibility than 
the original START Treaty in the composition and deployment of 
strategic offensive arms, as it eliminates sub-limits on 
different types of delivery vehicles. Because it does not limit 
non-deployed warheads and because U.S. ICBMs and bombers will 
retain the capacity to carry more warheads than they are 
deployed with or (in the case of bombers) more than the number 
of nuclear weapons attributed to them under the treaty, the New 
START Treaty also allows the United States to hedge against 
technical or geopolitical surprise (for example, if a warhead 
type were to fail unexpectedly or if relations with Russia were 
to deteriorate precipitously). The treaty thus allows the 
United States to maintain a sufficient nuclear deterrent, while 
continuing to reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms. In 
response to a question for the record, General Chilton wrote, 
``Under the 700 limit on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers, and 800 limit on deployed and non-
deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable 
heavy bombers, the US will maintain a sufficiently robust and 
flexible deterrent force.'' (The text of unclassified questions 
and answers for the record growing out of the committee's 
hearings on the New START Treaty will be published by the 
committee in a separate print.)
    Of course, the predictability and resulting stability 
established by an arms control agreement are achieved only 
insofar as each Party is confident that the other is adhering 
to the treaty's terms. Trust between the United States and 
Russia is significantly greater than in 1991. When the START 
Treaty was negotiated, a verification regime to deter or detect 
efforts to hide or deploy more warheads and missiles than 
allowed under the treaty was a new mechanism. Soviet levels of 
production and deployments of strategic offensive arms were 
also vastly higher than are Russia's production and deployments 
today. Fifteen years of inspections under START have given the 
United States a detailed understanding of Russian strategic 
nuclear forces and established a basis for evaluating aspects 
of the START verification regime that may no longer be needed 
due to changed circumstances. Just as under previous treaties, 
verifying Russian compliance with New START's limits is 
essential, which is why New START contains extensive monitoring 
provisions, including unique identifiers for all delivery 
vehicles, regular notifications and data exchanges, and 18 on-
site inspections per year. The transparency that these measures 
provide will maintain and in some ways increase our 
understanding of the modern Russian arsenal of strategic 
offensive arms, develop confidence in Russian compliance with 
the new treaty's limits, and in turn enhance strategic 
stability between the United States and Russia.
    The New START Treaty's preamble recognizes, ``the existence 
of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and 
strategic defensive arms.'' It also notes that, ``this 
interrelationship will become more important as strategic 
nuclear arms are reduced.'' The treaty does not contain any 
binding limitation on U.S. missile defenses beyond paragraph 3 
of Article V, and the preamble also notes that ``current 
strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and 
effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties,'' 
indicating that the Russians do not feel threatened by current 
U.S. missile-defense deployments. In testimony to the Foreign 
Relations Committee, two Pentagon officials--Dr. James N. 
Miller, Jr., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, and Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA, 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency--indicated that they had 
briefed the Russians on all four phases of the Obama 
administration's Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in 
Europe and that the Russians had expressed understanding that 
the administration's plans would not threaten their deterrent. 
They also stressed that neither the preamble, nor a unilateral 
statement regarding U.S. missile defenses made on April 7, 
2010, is in any way binding on the United States.
    Some Members of the committee have expressed concern that 
the New START Treaty's preamble suggests that the United States 
will not build missile defenses to protect the United States 
from a Russian attack. Those Members note that their concern is 
reinforced by Russia's unilateral statement, which suggested 
that Russia might withdraw from the treaty in the event of ``a 
build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the 
United States of America such that it would give rise to a 
threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian 
Federation.'' Developing the capability to counter a massive 
strike by Russia's strategic nuclear forces has not been the 
policy of the United States under Presidents Clinton, Bush, or 
Obama. The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-38) 
provides that it is the policy of the United States ``to deploy 
as soon as is technologically possible an effective National 
Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of 
the United States against limited ballistic missile attack 
(whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).'' [Emphasis 
added.] As Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates testified to 
the committee on May 18, 2010:

          Under the last administration, as well as under this 
        one, it has been the United States policy not to build 
        a missile defense that would render useless Russia's 
        nuclear capabilities. It has been a missile defense 
        intended to protect against rogue nations such as North 
        Korea and Iran or countries that have very limited 
        capabilities. The systems that we have, the systems 
        that originated and have been funded in the Bush 
        administration as well as in this administration, are 
        not focused on trying to render useless Russia's 
        nuclear capability. That, in our view, as in theirs, 
        would be enormously destabilizing, not to mention 
        unbelievably expensive.

U.S.-Russian Relations

    In the 20 years since the end of the Cold War, the tenor of 
U.S.-Russian relations varied, reaching a nadir after Russia's 
conflict with Georgia in August 2008. Ambassadorial and 
ministerial contacts at the NATO-Russia Council were suspended 
for the remainder of 2008, and in September 2008, the Bush 
administration withdrew from congressional consideration the 
U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation. 
Moreover, for much of the previous decade, Russian foreign 
policy (particularly regarding Iran, Afghanistan, and North 
Korea) tended to exhibit a reflexive resistance to U.S. 
positions even when substantial commonality of interest 
existed.
    In early 2009, the Obama administration initiated a ``re-
set'' of relations with Moscow, focusing on several areas of 
mutual interest, including the expansion of the Northern 
Distribution Network to supply U.S. and coalition forces in 
Afghanistan, diplomatic containment of Iran's nuclear 
ambitions, nuclear security, non-proliferation, trade, and 
economics, and other areas.
    The New START Treaty is an integral element in ``re-
setting'' the policy agenda with Russia in a constructive and 
mutually beneficial way. Its ratification will have a positive 
impact on U.S.-Russian cooperation, particularly on nuclear 
cooperation, security, and nonproliferation matters. During the 
Cold War and in the intervening years, arms control 
implementation has endured ups and downs in our bilateral 
relations and has remained an abiding area of cooperation. As 
former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley testified to 
the committee,

          I think you do need to see this treaty in context of 
        really a 20-year effort spanning Republican and 
        Democratic administrations. . . . And quite frankly, 
        it's an indication of one more thing where Russia and 
        the United States have found it in their common 
        interest to work together cooperatively, and that's an 
        important contribution to the overall environment 
        between Russia and U.S. relations.

    Partly as a result of positive momentum generated by the 
New START negotiations, the United States and Russia have 
reached new agreements that have materially advanced our shared 
interests around the world. For example, in November 2009, 
Russia supported the International Atomic Energy Agency Board 
of Governors resolution condemning Iran's failure to suspend 
uranium enrichment and cooperate with the IAEA; on June 9, 
2010, Russia joined the United States in supporting U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1929, which further sanctioned Iran 
for its nuclear program. Russia has also announced that it 
would not deliver its advanced S-300 air defense system to 
Iran--a sale that the United States has opposed since the deal 
was initially reached in 2007. In June 2009, the United States 
and Russia signed the Afghanistan Air Transit Agreement, which 
has allowed 35,000 U.S. personnel and troops to fly to 
Afghanistan via Russian airspace.\1\ Russia also joined the 
United States in supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 
1874, condemning North Korea for its nuclear test in May. In 
their joint statement of June 24, 2010, Presidents Obama and 
Medvedev expressed their commitment ``to continuing the 
development of a new strategic relationship based on mutual 
trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation by following 
up on the successful negotiation of the Treaty on Measures for 
the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\The White House, ``U.S.-Russia Relations: `Reset' Fact Sheet,'' 
June 24, 2010; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ratification of New START could lead to an improved 
dialogue on other areas where acute disagreements with Russia 
exist. Russia's repeated use of energy exports as a tool of 
political coercion of its neighbors and its ongoing occupation 
of Georgian territory demonstrate a continuing willingness to 
dominate its neighborhood. Russia's implementation of the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty also has 
remained suspended since 2007.
    The bottom line is that the United States needs Russian 
cooperation to address pressing regional and global security 
concerns, including accounting for and securing its substantial 
tactical nuclear weapon arsenal; continued implementation of 
the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; and 
implementation other U.S.-Russian bilateral threat reduction 
programs to secure Russian nuclear sites and fissile material.
    Many witnesses who testified to the committee noted that 
rejecting the treaty would severely undercut such efforts. 
Former National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF 
(Ret.), said that ``the principal result of non-ratification 
would be to throw the whole nuclear negotiating situation into 
a state of chaos.'' And former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger testified:

          This START treaty is an evolution of treaties that 
        have been negotiated in previous administrations of 
        both parties. And its principal provisions are an 
        elaboration or a continuation of existing agreements. 
        Therefore, a rejection of them would indicate that a 
        new period of American policy had started that might 
        rely largely on the unilateral reliance of its nuclear 
        weapons, and would therefore create an element of 
        uncertainty in the calculations of both adversaries and 
        allies. And therefore, I think it would have an 
        unsettling impact on the international environment.

    The degree to which tensions have subsided between 
Washington and Moscow during the past 25 years is remarkable, 
but it remains true that many Russian security officials 
continue to view NATO as a the primary threat to their country 
and its interests. Over time, continued cooperation on issues 
involving our mutual security and the expansion of our economic 
and social ties will continue to improve bilateral relations. 
The New START treaty is part of a process that has resulted in 
a de-escalation of dangerously strained superpower relations 
and the ongoing construction of cooperation on issues of mutual 
interest.

Non-Proliferation

    There is widespread agreement that the spread of nuclear 
weapons--and in particular their diversion to terrorists--is 
the chief threat to American security. President Bush stated 
that the single most serious threat to the United States was 
the possibility of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons. 
President Obama agrees; the National Security Strategy, 
released in May 2010, said:

          The American people face no greater or more urgent 
        danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon. 
        And international peace and security is threatened by 
        proliferation that could lead to a nuclear exchange. 
        Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of a 
        nuclear attack has increased. Excessive Cold War 
        stockpiles remain. More nations have acquired nuclear 
        weapons. Testing has continued. Black markets trade in 
        nuclear secrets and materials. Terrorists are 
        determined to buy, build, or steal a nuclear weapon. 
        Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered in a 
        global nonproliferation regime that has frayed as more 
        people and nations break the rules.

    The centerpiece of the global nonproliferation regime is 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT; 
Treaty Doc. 90-24), which opened for signature in 1968. 
Although the NPT is aimed at preventing states from acquiring 
nuclear weapons, it is an important tool in the fight against 
nuclear terrorism as well because would-be nuclear terrorists 
would need to acquire fissile material from a state in order to 
make a bomb. State-sponsored nuclear programs are also the most 
likely source of weapons technology and components.
    The NPT prohibits all but five of its States Parties--
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States--from possessing nuclear weapons, but in exchange for 
the restraint of the treaty's non-nuclear weapons States 
Parties, those five agreed to work toward the eventual 
elimination of their weapons. Thus, in the treaty's preamble, 
the States Parties declare ``their intention to achieve at the 
earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race 
and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament . . .''. More significantly, Article VI of the NPT 
establishes a legal commitment to that effect: ``Each of the 
Parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, 
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control.''
    The United States and Russia have used their bilateral 
agreements on strategic arms reductions as proof of progress 
toward this obligation. The preamble to the original START 
Treaty noted that the signatories were ``[m]indful of their 
undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article 
VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 
July 1, 1968.'' The preamble to START II cited the NPT twice in 
its preamble: ``Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, 
and their desire to contribute to its strengthening'' and 
``Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic 
offensive arms under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968.'' The 
preamble to the Moscow Treaty says the United States and Russia 
are ``[m]indful of their obligations under Article VI of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 
1968.'' Similarly, the New START Treaty's preamble says that 
the United States and Russia are ``[c]ommitted to the 
fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, 
and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity 
from the nuclear threat.''
    By working eventually to fulfill their end of the NPT 
bargain, the United States and Russia may strengthen the non-
nuclear-weapon states' commitment to nonproliferation. 
Continuing the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive 
arms has been seen as furthering the process of disarmament 
under the NPT. Such measures may only indirectly encourage 
rogue states like North Korea or Iran to come into compliance 
with their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT as non-
nuclear weapon states and their obligations under U.N. Security 
Council resolutions that condemn their illegal nuclear weapons 
activities. But U.S. leadership in reducing the size of its own 
forces could encourage non-nuclear-weapon states to assist the 
United States in its efforts to combat proliferation.
    During the committee's hearings on New START, many 
witnesses made this point. James Baker testified, ``I happen to 
be one who strongly believes that it is important for our 
country and for Russia to maintain a vigorous commitment to 
arms control as a part of our efforts to create and maintain an 
effective non-proliferation regime.'' Former Secretary of 
Defense James Schlesinger said, ``[F]or the United States at 
this juncture to fail to ratify the treaty in the due course of 
the Senate's deliberation would have a detrimental effect on 
our ability to influence others with regard to particularly the 
nonproliferation issue.'' Former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger agreed: ``[N]onproliferation has to be a central 
American objective. . . . And the ability to achieve its 
objectives depends on the credibility of the government. It 
would be more difficult for us to achieve the objectives that, 
again, have been proclaimed on a bipartisan basis for many 
decades'' if the United States failed to ratify the New START 
Treaty.
    At conferences to review the NPT's implementation, which 
are held every 5 years, success or failure has often been 
influenced by the perception of how much progress has been made 
toward nuclear disarmament. In the run-up to the 2010 review 
conference, many states participating in preparatory meetings 
called on the United States and Russia to negotiate a successor 
agreement to the original START Treaty and continue reductions 
to their nuclear arsenals.\2\ The month after Presidents Obama 
and Medvedev signed the New START Treaty, the States Parties to 
the NPT met in New York for the 2010 review conference. 
Signature of the treaty appears to have helped the United 
States deflect efforts by Iran to distract attention from its 
own nuclear program by pointing out that the United States 
maintains a substantial arsenal. In testimony delivered while 
the review conference was being held, Secretary Clinton said of 
the New START Treaty:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\Paul K. Kerr et al., ``2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Review Conference: Key Issues and Implications,'' Congressional 
Research Service, May 3, 2010, p. 7.

          In my discussions with many foreign leaders, 
        including earlier this month in New York at the 
        beginning of the Nonproliferation Treaty review 
        conference, I have already seen how this New START 
        Treaty and the fact that the United States and Russia 
        could agree has made it more difficult for other 
        countries to shift the conversation back to the United 
        States. We are seeing an increasing willingness both to 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        be held accountable and to hold others accountable.

    Later in her testimony, Secretary Clinton said:

          [T]he nonaligned movement states have historically 
        come to their NPT obligations with some criticism that 
        the United States is not doing its part on the 
        disarmament front. There was none of that at this 
        conference in New York because of the fact that we had 
        reached this agreement with Russia. So it does provide 
        a stronger platform on which we stand to make the case 
        against proliferation.

                   LIMITS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

    Like the Moscow Treaty, the New START Treaty is designed to 
regulate, reduce, and limit the strategic nuclear forces of two 
countries that maintain the capability to destroy each other 
many times over, but in dramatically different strategic 
circumstances than obtained during the Cold War. The original 
START Treaty reflected the Cold War, and there was little 
confidence in Soviet compliance with substantial arms reduction 
and limitation obligations. The New START Treaty reflects a 
changed strategic relationship in which both countries have a 
record of meeting such obligations (although there have been 
many disputes regarding verification and transparency), and 
both countries seek to lower the costs of such measures and to 
maintain greater freedom to decide how to meet their 
obligations. The result is a treaty that specifies numerical 
limits but does not include all of the detailed START Treaty 
limitations on throw weight, missiles with multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), certain 
strategic military exercises, and other out-of-base activities 
involving mobile ICBM launchers.
    The key provisions of the New START Treaty are the central 
limits contained in Article II, which require the United States 
and Russia to reduce their nuclear forces to:

   700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers;
   1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear 
        warheads counted for heavy bombers;
   800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM 
        launchers, and heavy bombers.

    Within these limits the United States and Russia can 
structure their forces as they see fit. They have 7 years after 
the treaty enters into force to meet these limits.
    These limits are lower and are structured differently than 
those in the original START accord and the Moscow Treaty. START 
limited the United States and the Soviet Union to 6,000 
strategic warheads attributed to 1,600 delivery vehicles (it 
did not distinguish between delivery vehicles and their 
launchers). It also contained sub-limits on different types of 
warheads and delivery vehicles. (For example, no more than 
4,900 of the warheads could be attributed to deployed ICBMs and 
SLBMs.) The Moscow Treaty limited each Party to between 1,700 
and 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads, but it did not contain 
any limits on delivery vehicles or launchers.
    The New START Treaty counts treaty-limited items 
differently than its predecessors did. Because of the 
difficulty in determining how many warheads an ICBM or SLBM is 
deployed with at any given time, the original START agreement 
simply attributed to each deployed missile an agreed number of 
warheads (sometimes, but not always, the maximum number of 
warheads that it could carry). Thus, every deployed Soviet/
Russian SS-24 counted as 10 warheads within the central 
limitation of 6,000 warheads (and as one delivery vehicle 
toward the central limitation of 1,600 delivery vehicles) 
regardless of how many warheads it was actually carrying. 
Putting more warheads on a missile than the attributed number 
was banned. By contrast, the New START Treaty counts the actual 
number of warheads on each deployed ICBM and SLBM, rather than 
relying on an attribution of a certain number of warheads to 
each deployed missile type. New START thus aims to give a more 
accurate account of each Party's strategic offensive ICBMs and 
SLBMs, and the treaty's verification provisions--notably 
including improved reentry vehicle inspections--have been 
structured to reflect this change.

Bomber Counting Rule

    The original START Treaty also had different counting rules 
for bomber-borne nuclear weapons. Bombers incapable of carrying 
long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) were 
counted as having one warhead, even if they could carry 
multiple bombs or short-range missiles. Bombers capable of 
carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs were counted as having half 
the number of weapons that they could actually carry. In part, 
this was a function of the difficulty of counting how many 
weapons could be deployed on bombers because such weapons are 
often stored separately from their delivery vehicles. In 
addition, the United States and the Soviet Union wanted to 
encourage greater reliance on bombers because they are more 
stabilizing than missiles, particularly ICBMs. Bombers are 
slow, they can be recalled, and they can be shot down. Thus, 
the treaty ``discounted'' the number of warheads each bomber 
carried.
    The New START Treaty applies similar reasoning to the 
counting of bombers, but its counting rule is simpler than 
START's. Each heavy bomber--defined either as a bomber with a 
range of greater than 8,000 kilometers or a bomber that can 
carry long-range nuclear ALCMs--is counted as having one 
warhead, regardless of how many it can carry. As Dr. Edward L. 
Warner III, the Secretary of Defense's representative to the 
negotiations, explained in response to a question for the 
record:

          This attribution rule was adopted because on a day-
        to-day basis neither the United States nor the Russian 
        Federation maintains any nuclear armaments loaded on 
        its deployed heavy bombers. If the counting approach 
        adopted for deployed ballistic missiles had been 
        applied to deployed heavy bombers, each deployed heavy 
        bomber would have been counted with zero nuclear 
        warheads. The New START Treaty approach strikes a 
        balance between the fact that neither side loads 
        nuclear armaments on its bombers on a day-to-day basis 
        and the fact that these bombers, nonetheless, have the 
        capability to deliver nuclear armaments stored in 
        nuclear weapons storage bunkers on or near their air 
        bases.

    The Moscow Treaty contained no counting rules, saying only 
that each country would reduce its ``strategic nuclear 
warheads'' to between 1,700 and 2,200 and that each Party would 
``determine for itself the composition and structure of its 
strategic offensive arms.'' In a November 13, 2001, statement 
cited in the treaty, President Bush said the United States 
would reduce its ``operationally deployed'' strategic nuclear 
warheads, but he did not define that term. The Moscow Treaty 
allowed each Party to determine for itself which warheads 
counted toward the treaty limit, and those determinations 
differed. One press report indicated that Russia did not count 
its bombers as having any warheads, while the United States 
counted the number of associated weapons stored with each 
bomber.\3\ And the reports submitted to the committee in the 
Annual Report on Implementation of the Moscow Treaty provided 
pursuant to Condition 2(2) of the Senate Resolution of Advice 
and Consent to Ratification of the Moscow Treaty have stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\Peter Baker, ``Arms Control May Be Different on Paper and on the 
Ground,'' The New York Times, March 30, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/03/31/world/europe/31start.html.

          The Treaty makes clear that the Parties need not 
        implement their reductions in an identical manner. 
        Russia, like the United States, may reduce its 
        strategic nuclear warheads by any method it chooses. 
        Russia could use the U.S. definition of ``operationally 
        deployed strategic nuclear warheads'' or some other 
        counting method to quantify its reductions.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\See, for example, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/141429.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

    The committee examined a claim that the New START Treaty 
would not limit Russian ICBMs if they were launched from rail-
mobile launchers. At the time of the START Treaty, the Soviet 
Union deployed the 10-warhead SS-24 ICBM on a rail-based 
launcher. (The United States had also explored deploying the 
10-warhead Peacekeeper ICBM on a rail-based system.) Russia 
deployed 36 SS-24 rail-based launchers at the height of its 
deployment. The START II Treaty would have required Russia to 
eliminate or convert all of its ICBM launchers capable of 
deploying MIRVs by 2003. To comply with those limits, Russia 
and the United States worked together, under the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, to destroy Russia's SS-24 
ICBMs and rail-based launchers. Those cooperative efforts 
continued even though the START II Treaty ultimately did not 
come into force, and the last Russian SS-24 launcher was 
eliminated in 2007.
    In addition to its overall limit on the total number of 
warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and their associated 
launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and 
deployed heavy bombers, the START Treaty contained a sublimit 
on warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of 
ICBMs. There was also a sublimit on the aggregate number of 
non-deployed ICBMs for all mobile launchers of ICBMs, with a 
further limit that the number of non-deployed ICBMs for rail-
mobile launchers of ICBMs could not exceed half of the 
aggregate number. The systems covered by these sublimits were 
therefore tied to the START Treaty's definition of a ``mobile 
launcher of ICBMs.'' Because the sublimit needed to cover both 
the rail-mobile and road-mobile launchers that were deployed at 
the time of the treaty, the START Treaty's definition of 
``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' was ``a road-mobile launcher of 
ICBMs or a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs.''
    Article II of the New START Treaty, by contrast, contains 
only plain limits on ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM 
launchers, and heavy bombers, with no sublimits. Within those 
limits, each side retains the flexibility to shape its 
strategic nuclear forces. As a result, there is no sublimit on 
the number of deployed mobile ICBMs within the treaty's limit 
of 700 total deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy 
bombers. Similarly, the limit of 800 total deployed and non-
deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM 
launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers contains 
no sublimit on deployed and non-deployed mobile launchers of 
ICBMs.
    Consequently, the characteristics of the strategic 
offensive arms limited by Article II of the treaty--in 
particular, the deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, 
the deployed ICBMs, and their associated warheads--do not hinge 
on the treaty's definition of ``mobile launchers of ICBMs'' 
(which, as discussed below, the treaty retains for purposes 
other than the limits of Article II). Article II uses defined 
terms to establish the limits, and Part One of the Protocol 
explicitly defines the terms ``ICBM,'' ``deployed ICBM,'' 
``ICBM launcher,'' and ``deployed launcher of ICBMs'' that are 
used in Article II.
    Specifically, Article II, paragraph 1(a) limits each side 
to no more than 700 ``deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and 
deployed heavy bombers.'' Paragraph 37 of Part One of the 
Protocol defines the term ``intercontinental ballistic 
missile,'' or ``ICBM,'' as ``a land-based ballistic missile 
with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.'' Paragraph 13 of 
Part One of the Protocol defines the term ``deployed ICBM'' to 
mean ``an ICBM that is contained in or on a deployed launcher 
of ICBMs.'' Paragraph 14 of Part One of the Protocol in turn 
defines ``deployed launcher of ICBMs'' as ``an ICBM launcher 
that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM 
training launcher, or an ICBM launcher located at a space 
launch facility.'' The term ``ICBM launcher'' is also a defined 
term: Paragraph 28 of Part One of the Protocol defines it to 
mean ``a device intended or used to contain, prepare for 
launch, and launch an ICBM.''
    Reading these defined terms together leads the committee to 
conclude that any land-based ballistic missile with a range in 
excess of 5,500 kilometers that is contained in or on a device 
intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an 
ICBM--which device is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM 
training launcher or an ICBM launcher located at a space launch 
facility--counts under the limit in Article II, paragraph 1(a), 
whether that ICBM is deployed in a silo launcher, a road-mobile 
launcher, or a rail-mobile launcher. (Article II, paragraph 
1(b) in turn limits warheads on items counted under paragraph 
1(a); thus the warheads on any deployed ICBM count toward the 
1,550 limit.)
    Article II, paragraph 1(c) also limits each side to 800 
``deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-
deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy 
bombers.'' Yet again, the definitions of the relevant terms do 
not depend upon the Protocol's definition of the term ``mobile 
launcher of ICBMs.'' As stated above, the phrase ``deployed 
launcher of ICBMs'' is defined by paragraph 14 of Part One of 
the Protocol. Paragraph 49 of Part One of the Protocol defines 
a ``non-deployed launcher of ICBMs'' as ``an ICBM test 
launcher, an ICBM training launcher, an ICBM launcher located 
at a space launch facility, or an ICBM launcher, other than a 
soft-site launcher, that does not contain a deployed ICBM.'' 
The definitions of the terms ``test launcher'' (paragraph 80 of 
Part One of the Protocol), ``training launcher'' (paragraph 83) 
and ``space launch facility'' (paragraph 73) do not reference, 
and are not affected by, the defined term ``mobile launcher of 
ICBMs.'' Thus, regardless of whether it contained a deployed 
ICBM, any rail-mobile launcher that satisfied the definition of 
an ``ICBM launcher''--that is, it was ``a device intended or 
used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch'' a land-based 
ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers--
would count under the limit established by Article II, 
paragraph 1(c).
    As noted above, however, even though the treaty does not 
handle mobile launchers of ICBMs differently than other 
launchers of ICBMs for the purposes of the Article II limits, 
mobile ICBM launchers are treated differently than fixed, silo 
launchers in certain other ways. Part One of the Protocol, 
paragraph 45 creates a special definition for mobile launchers 
of ICBMs; the term is defined as ``an erector-launcher 
mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled device on 
which it is mounted.'' This definition excludes the reference 
to a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs that had been contained in 
the definition in the START Treaty. (START defined a rail-
mobile launcher of ICBMs as ``an erector-launcher mechanism for 
launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is 
mounted.'') When asked why the definition of mobile launcher of 
ICBMs was changed to exclude the reference to rail-mobile 
launchers, the Secretary of Defense answered for the record, 
``Rail-mobile ICBMs are not specifically mentioned in the New 
START Treaty because neither Party currently deploys ICBMs in 
that mode.''
    The term ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' is used in, or 
otherwise affects, Articles III, IV, VI, VII, and XI, as well 
as provisions in the Protocol and Annexes related to those 
articles. For example:

   In the main Treaty text, Article III, paragraph 5 
        states that mobile launchers of ICBMs will first become 
        subject to the treaty when they leave a production 
        facility (as opposed to silo launchers, which become 
        subject to the treaty when the silo door is first 
        installed and closed).
   Article IV, paragraph 3(a) bars mobile launchers of 
        prototype ICBMs from being located at maintenance 
        facilities of ICBM bases. Article IV, paragraph 4 
        allows non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs to be in 
        transit between facilities for no more than 30 days at 
        a time.
   Part Two of the Protocol, which describes the 
        information that is provided for the database created 
        by Article VII of the treaty, establishes differing 
        types of information that must be provided related to 
        ICBM bases, production facilities, storage facilities, 
        repair facilities, and conversion or elimination 
        facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The Parties 
        must also provide height, width, and length data 
        regarding mobile launchers of ICBMs.
   Section III, paragraphs 4-7 of Part Three of the 
        Protocol--which sets out in detail how the Parties will 
        satisfy Article VI of the treaty on conversion and 
        elimination--establishes conversion and elimination 
        procedures specific to mobile launchers. Paragraph 2 of 
        Section VII of Part Three of the Protocol establishes a 
        specific elimination procedure for fixed structures for 
        mobile launchers of ICBMs.
   Paragraph 3(a) of Section II of Part Four of the 
        Protocol (which covers notifications) requires that the 
        Parties notify one another no later than five days 
        after the emergence of new versions of mobile launchers 
        of ICBMs.
   Sections VI and VII of Part Five (on Inspection 
        Activities) of the Protocol establish slightly 
        different procedures for inspections of facilities that 
        house deployed, non-deployed, or eliminated mobile 
        launchers of ICBMs. For example, paragraph 7(c) of 
        Section VI of Part Five of the Protocol gives the 
        inspected Party only five hours after the completion of 
        pre-inspection procedures at an inspected ICBM base to 
        transport inspectors to conduct a Type One inspection 
        of an ICBM on a mobile launcher of ICBMs (the inspected 
        Party has 12 hours to transport inspectors to a silo 
        launcher designated for inspection). Part Five of the 
        Protocol, Section VII, paragraph 4 permits Type Two 
        inspections in order to confirm, among other things, 
        that mobile launchers of ICBMs have actually been 
        eliminated in accordance with an earlier notification.

    The committee believes that it is highly unlikely that 
during the duration of the treaty the Russian Federation, after 
years of working with the United States to destroy its 
remaining Cold War-era rail-mobile launchers, would divert 
limited resources and infrastructure from its planned 
deployment of new road-mobile ICBM forces and instead (or in 
addition) build and deploy rail-mobile launchers.
    Nevertheless, while a new rail-mobile system would clearly 
be captured under the Article II limits despite the exclusion 
of rail-mobile launchers from the definition of mobile 
launchers of ICBMs, those provisions that actually use the 
defined term ``mobile launchers of ICBMs'' would not cover 
rail-mobile systems if Russia were to re-introduce them. The 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense explained for 
the record that, if a Party chose to develop and deploy rail-
mobile ICBMs, ``Appropriate detailed arrangements for 
incorporating rail-mobile ICBM launchers and their ICBMs into 
the treaty's verification and monitoring regime would be worked 
out in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.'' Under Article 
XV, paragraph 2, under the auspices of the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission (BCC) the Parties may make changes to 
the Protocol or Annexes that do not affect substantive rights 
and obligations of the Parties, without resorting to the 
constitutional procedures for amending the main treaty text or 
for making changes to the Protocol or Annexes that do alter 
substantive rights and obligations of the Parties. If Russia 
were again to produce rail-mobile ICBM launchers, the Parties 
would work within the BCC to find a way to ensure that the 
treaty's notification, inspection, and monitoring regime would 
adequately cover them.
    The committee does not believe that there is any 
disagreement between the United States and the Russian 
Federation on any of these points. Rather than take this for 
granted, however, the committee recommends that the Senate 
include in its resolution of advice and consent to the 
ratification of the treaty an understanding, to be included in 
the instrument of ratification, that sets forth the United 
States' understanding of how the treaty would apply to rail-
mobile-launched ICBMs and their launchers.

             U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE UNDER THE TREATY'S LIMITS

    The executive branch has provided some details as to how it 
will reduce U.S. nuclear forces to comply with New START's 
limits in both its Nuclear Posture Review (submitted pursuant 
to section 1070 of Title X of Public Law 110-181, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008) and a plan 
provided to Congress in accordance with section 1251 of Title 
XII of Public Law 111-84, the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (the ``1251 report''). In the plan 
contained in the 1251 report, the Department of Defense 
indicated that it would maintain the U.S. nuclear triad of 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, but reduce the size of each leg. 
Currently, the United States has 450 ICBM silos, and the 
administration plans to retain up to 420 ICBMs, each carrying a 
single warhead. The United States has 94 deployable nuclear-
capable heavy bombers; the administration plans to convert some 
of these bombers to a conventional-only role (at which point 
they would not count toward the treaty's limits) and to retain 
up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers. The administration plans to 
retain all 14 strategic nuclear submarines that the United 
States has, but it will reduce the number of SLBM launch tubes 
on each submarine from 24 to 20 and it will deploy no more than 
240 SLBMs at any one time.
    These figures add up to 720 delivery vehicles, so the 
United States will have to make further cuts in order to meet 
treaty limits. When asked in a question for the record why the 
plan did not specify all the cuts that would be made, the 
Secretary of Defense responded:

          Because the treaty covers a 10-year period after 
        entry into force, the Department has outlined a 
        baseline force structure that fully supports U.S. 
        strategy. This structure is important for planning 
        purposes and shows our commitment to maintaining the 
        Triad, but also allows us to modify our force structure 
        plans while fielding a force of 700 deployed strategic 
        delivery vehicles, as circumstances dictate.

    During its deliberations, the committee examined whether 
New START's limits would allow the United States to field an 
effective nuclear deterrent force. Several Members pointed out 
that, in a 2008 white paper, the Departments of Defense and 
Energy had recommended maintaining a larger deployed force of 
862 ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers.\5\ In response, Secretary Gates 
noted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\``National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,'' 
September 2008. http://www.defense.gov/news/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf.

          The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) conducted detailed 
        analysis of current and future threats, as well as 
        potential reductions in strategic weapons, including 
        delivery vehicles that would allow the United States to 
        sustain stable deterrence at lower force levels. The 
        conclusion from the NPR analysis is that stable 
        deterrence could be maintained at lower strategic 
        delivery vehicle levels, given our estimates of current 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        and future Russian strategic forces.

    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. 
Mullen, USN, also noted that this determination was made using 
existing guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons: 
``Utilizing existing targeting policies, the NPR conducted 
detailed analysis of potential reductions in strategic weapons, 
and concluded that stable deterrence could be maintained at 
lower levels, assuming parallel reductions by Russia to meet 
the lower ceiling of the New START Treaty.''
    In addition, Secretary Gates pointed out that the 2008 
white paper had used different counting rules than those used 
in the New START Treaty. For example, under New START's 
counting rules and provisions for conversion, it is possible to 
retain all 14 strategic nuclear submarines with only 240 
accountable SLBMs--96 fewer than assumed in the 2008 paper. 
Thus, much of the difference between the 862 delivery vehicles 
called for in the white paper and the 700 allowed by New START 
can be achieved without reducing the number of U.S. strategic 
submarines (SSBNs) or heavy bombers.
    Similarly, Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, Vice Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote the Committee on Armed 
Services to explain why the treaty's limit of 700 deployed 
strategic delivery vehicles ``provides a sound framework for 
maintaining stability and allows us to maintain a strong and 
credible deterrent that ensures our national security while 
moving to lower levels of strategic nuclear forces.'' That 
letter is reprinted in full at the end of this report.
    General Chilton, who is responsible for the operation of 
U.S. nuclear forces, also told the committee that he strongly 
supported the New START Treaty and that its limits would not 
degrade the U.S. nuclear deterrent. In answering a question for 
the record, he replied, ``Under the 700 limit on deployed 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and 800 limit 
on deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, 
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, the US will maintain a 
sufficiently robust and flexible deterrent force.''
    His predecessors agree. On July 14, 2010, seven former 
Commanders of Strategic Air Command and U.S. Strategic Command 
sent a letter to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed 
Services, noting their support for the New START Treaty and 
explaining that its limits were reasonable:

          [A]lthough the New START Treaty will require U.S. 
        reductions, we believe that the post-treaty force will 
        represent a survivable, robust and effective deterrent, 
        one fully capable of deterring attack on both the 
        United States and America's allies and partners. The 
        Department of Defense has said that it will, under the 
        treaty, maintain 14 Trident ballistic missile 
        submarines, each equipped to carry 20 Trident D-5 
        submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). As two 
        of the 14 submarines are normally in long-term 
        maintenance without missiles on board, the U.S. Navy 
        will deploy 240 Trident SLBMs. Under the treaty's 
        terms, the United States will also be able to deploy up 
        to 420 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
        missiles (ICBMs) and up to 60 heavy bombers equipped 
        for nuclear armaments. That will continue to be a 
        formidable force that will ensure deterrence and give 
        the President, should it be necessary, a broad range of 
        military options.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\General Larry Welch (USAF, Ret), General John Chain (USAF, Ret), 
General Lee Butler (USAF, Ret), Admiral Henry Chiles (USN, Ret), 
General Eugene Habiger (USAF, Ret), Admiral James Ellis (USN, Ret), 
General Bennie Davis (USAF, Ret); Letter to Senator Carl Levin, Senator 
John McCain, Senator John F. Kerry, and Senator Richard G. Lugar; July 
14, 2010.

    This letter is reprinted in full at the end of this report.

                   TREATY COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

    The President of the United States, in his letter of 
transmittal of the New START Treaty to the Senate, stated:

          The treaty will promote transparency and 
        predictability in the strategic relationship between 
        the United States and the Russian Federation and will 
        enable each Party to verify that the other Party is 
        complying with its obligations through a regime that 
        includes on-site inspections, notifications, a 
        comprehensive and continuing exchange of data regarding 
        strategic offensive arms, and provisions for the use of 
        national technical means of verification.

    The Secretary of Defense, who had said that the New START 
Treaty ``maintains an effective verification regime'' when the 
text of the treaty was first released, testified to the 
committee that he was confident of the verifiability of the 
treaty:

          In my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its 
        provision for a strong verification regime . . . which 
        provides a firm basis for monitoring Russia's 
        compliance with its treaty obligations while also 
        providing important insights into the size and the 
        composition of Russian strategic forces.

    Admiral Mullen, when asked whether the New START 
verification regime would increase or decrease our overall 
understanding of the Russian arsenal compared to the START 
Treaty period, replied, ``I think, on balance, it would 
increase it.''
    The committee notes, and witnesses conceded, that the New 
START verification regime does not include the START Treaty 
regime's perimeter and portal continuous monitoring (PPCM) 
facility at the Votkinsk missile production plant in Russia, or 
the exchange of nearly all telemetry from long-range missile 
tests, and it provides for fewer on-site inspections than under 
the START Treaty (although some inspections will include a 
range of activities that would have required two inspections 
under START, and the number of Russian strategic weapons 
facilities to be inspected has decreased over the years as its 
strategic forces have been reduced and consolidated). Some 
committee members were skeptical, moreover, regarding the 
benefits to be gained from such new aspects of the New START 
verification regime as increased use of unique identifiers on 
Russian missiles and bombers, more extensive notifications of 
missile and bomber movements, and inspection of up to 10 
missiles per year to determine how many reentry vehicles are 
actually on them (as opposed to the less rigorous requirement, 
under the START Treaty, to ensure that the missile did not have 
more reentry vehicles than the number attributed to it under 
that treaty).
    The fact remains, however, that the START Treaty's 
verification regime ended when that treaty expired on December 
5, 2009. Neither Russia nor the United States proposed 
extending that treaty, so the choice today is between the New 
START Treaty regime and no regime at all. As General Chilton 
explained to the committee:

          [I]f we don't get the treaty, (a) they're not 
        constrained in their development of force structure, 
        and (b) we have no insight into what they're doing. So, 
        it's the worst of both possible worlds. And so, what 
        that means to us is that we have to guess or, through 
        other national technical means, estimate what their 
        force structure and what the capability of their 
        weapons are, which then leads us to do analysis on what 
        [we] need. And the less precise that is, the more the 
        probability that we either under- or overdevelop the 
        force structure we require. And neither is a good 
        result. ``Under,'' it would be a security issue; 
        ``over'' would be a cost issue. We could end up 
        developing capabilities that we really didn't require.

    The committee heard testimony in closed session from U.S. 
Intelligence Community witnesses and from chief New START 
negotiator Rose Gottemoeller in her capacity as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance. The 
committee also reviewed both public and classified materials on 
these issues, including: the National Intelligence Estimate on 
U.S. capabilities to monitor Russian compliance with the 
treaty; the State Department's report on the verifiability of 
the treaty, provided pursuant to section 306(a)(1) of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2577(a)(1)); and the 
Secretary of State's report (with the concurrence of the 
Director of National Intelligence) on other countries' 
compliance with their arms control obligations under treaties 
to which the United States is a party, provided pursuant to 
section 403(a) of the same Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)), which 
included a discussion of START Treaty compliance issues for the 
period between 2005 and the expiration of that treaty in 
December 2009. All three reports were discussed at this closed 
hearing.
    The committee received a letter from the Secretary of 
Defense that summarized ``the Department's assessment of the 
military significance of potential Russian cheating or 
breakout, based on the recent National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) on monitoring the treaty.'' (The unclassified text of 
that letter is appended to this report.) The committee also 
received classified letters from the chairman and from the vice 
chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which 
conducted its own review and held its own hearings on 
verification issues relating to the New START Treaty. Based on 
its review of all these materials, the committee concludes that 
the New START Treaty is effectively verifiable.
    The standard of ``effective verification'' is a term of art 
that has been used since the Reagan administration, which 
applied it regarding the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty in 1988. Ambassador Paul Nitze explained the term 
to the committee as follows:

          What do we mean by effective verification? We mean 
        that we want to be sure that, if the other side moves 
        beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily 
        significant way, we would be able to detect such 
        violation in time to respond effectively and thereby 
        deny the other side the benefit of the violation.

    The Secretary of Defense's letter to the committee 
addressed the concept in similar terms, explaining that:

          [A] key criterion in evaluating whether the treaty is 
        effectively verifiable is whether the U.S. would be 
        able to detect, and respond to, any Russian attempt to 
        move beyond the treaty's limits in a way that has 
        military significance, well before such an attempt 
        threatened U.S. national security.

    Arms control verification is not perfect science, and no 
arms control treaty comes with the assurance of perfect 
compliance or verification. Arms control compliance can be less 
than complete even when countries are trying to comply with 
their obligations, either because the obligations are unclear 
or because they are difficult to implement. Disclosing military 
information to representatives of another country runs against 
the grain of most militaries, moreover, and that is surely so 
in Russia. Items limited by arms control treaties are seen as 
significant instruments of national power and sovereignty. To 
understand verification and compliance under the New START 
Treaty, it helps to consider how these concerns were addressed 
under the START Treaty and what factors go into estimating the 
likelihood and implications of various potential cheating 
scenarios.
    When the original START Treaty was considered in 1992, the 
imperfections of arms control verification were readily 
conceded. The Director of Central Intelligence (Robert M. 
Gates, who is now Secretary of Defense) testified that the 
Intelligence Community would have difficulty counting the 
number of non-deployed mobile missiles and the number of 
Russian warheads. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
added that there would be ``relatively low levels of monitoring 
confidence with respect to the range and arming of air-launched 
cruise missiles (ALCMs), as well as the number of ALCMs 
actually carried by a heavy bomber.'' The same concerns exist 
today for mobile missiles and for warheads. There are no 
specific ALCM provisions in New START, so verification of the 
numbers and capabilities of such systems is no longer needed, 
although transparency regarding ALCM numbers and the carrying 
capacity of Russian heavy bombers remains a concern.
    The desire for strict verification of the other party's 
compliance with treaty obligations must be balanced against the 
desire in one's own armed forces to avoid such verification of 
their activities. Thus, in the START Treaty, the Joint Staff 
preferred to treat sea-launched cruise missiles in a political 
arrangement outside the treaty so as to avoid any verification 
requirements. In return, the United States agreed to a similar 
arrangement that avoided any treaty-mandated verification of 
Russian commitments regarding the Backfire bomber. And 
exemptions were added to the telemetry exchange provisions of 
START to satisfy military concerns in both countries. In New 
START, the desire of both countries to avoid having to disclose 
telemetry relating to missile defense systems or to reentry 
vehicle penetration features led to a treaty in which the 
provision of telemetry is a largely discretionary transparency 
measure, rather than a verification requirement.
    Strategic arms control agreements are often complex, 
moreover, and compliance disputes can arise due to differing 
interpretations of treaty text that is not crystal clear. The 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence noted three areas in 
which the original START Treaty might lead to compliance 
disputes, warning, in part, that:

          START's ban on ``concealment measures'' does not 
        apply to ``cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases 
        and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental 
        shelters for strategic offensive arms.'' Neither 
        ``concealment measures'' nor ``concealment practices'' 
        is defined, so it is not clear precisely what 
        activities are to be permitted.

    The same provision appears in paragraph 2 of Article X of 
the New START Treaty. An optimist could conclude that the 
concerns voiced in 1992 did not come to pass; a pessimist might 
respond that New START will inherit some of the START Treaty's 
risk of compliance disputes.
    Many factors influence the verifiability of an arms control 
treaty. One way to think about these factors is to consider the 
calculations of a would-be violator of the treaty. This 
highlights a key element that Nitze's definition of ``effective 
verification'' leaves out: that the most effective verification 
is that which deters other parties from violating the treaty in 
the first place. It is never a certain matter what the other 
party's political and military leaders contemplate in this 
regard, so we rarely measure verification effectiveness by its 
impact on their calculations, but arms control treaties and 
their verification regimes can still be constructed to maximize 
such an impact.
    To the extent that the other country is a rational actor, 
its decisions related to treaty compliance will be based on a 
cost-benefit analysis. What is to be gained by cheating, and 
what costs and risks (which are a contingent form of cost) 
would this entail? One reason why the Moscow Treaty contained 
no verification regime of its own was the belief that, since it 
merely codified decisions that each Party had already made, 
neither Party would have any desire to cheat.
    Similarly, a good case can be made that Russia has little 
incentive to violate the core obligations of the New START 
Treaty. Owing to economic pressures, it is very likely that 
Russian forces would be reduced with or without the treaty, and 
Russia's objective in the negotiations was probably to prevent 
the United States from taking the opportunity to maintain 
substantially larger strategic forces than Russa can afford to 
field. If this is so, then the same dynamic that was at play in 
the Moscow Treaty may pertain for New START: a country that 
already plans to reduce its forces is less likely to cheat than 
one that feels compelled by the treaty to undertake distasteful 
actions.
    The perceived benefits of cheating will also be influenced 
by how one party believes the other would respond. Would the 
United States detect Russian noncompliance in time to respond? 
And what could it do if it did so? When the Soviet Union 
violated the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), there was 
little the United States could do other than publicize the 
evidence of the violation and prepare for possible biological 
weapons attacks in the event of a war. The publicity affected 
Soviet prestige, however, and eventually the massive 
Biopreparat infrastructure for biological weapon research and 
production under the cover of civilian activities was 
dismantled or diverted into acceptable pursuits. (Concerns 
remain regarding the activities of Russian military 
laboratories.) Similarly, the Soviet Union admitted and 
remedied its construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar in violation 
of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty).
    Department of Defense witnesses on the New START Treaty 
have emphasized the ability of the United States to respond to 
any serious Russian violation of the treaty. General Chilton 
said: ``What gives me some confidence, just looking at it from 
the DOD perspective, is that we have preserved a hedge 
capability, both for technical failure and for geopolitical 
surprise, that I think makes me comfortable with where we are 
at this time.'' Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Miller elaborated on that hedge, noting:

          [T]he Treaty allows us to maintain our stockpile of 
        nondeployed warheads in an upload capacity with our 
        strategic delivery systems, which provide a hedge 
        against adverse technical developments or a serious 
        deterioration in the international security 
        environment.

    Russian commentary during the negotiation of the treaty 
suggests that Russia is very sensitive to U.S. upload 
capabilities, and it would be reasonable to assume that such 
capabilities would figure in the Russian cost-benefit analysis 
of any proposed serious violation of the treaty.
    While the U.S. upload capacity lowers the perceived 
benefits of any Russian violation scenario, Russian concerns 
over those upload capabilities could lead it to improve its own 
force reconstitution capabilities, so as to be prepared if the 
United States were to break out from New START. The United 
States begins with an advantage in this area, however, because 
it plans to deploy its ICBMs and SLBMs with fewer warheads than 
they are equipped to carry--thus leaving a significant upload 
capacity. Russia has not announced similar plans and would have 
to increase its production of ICBMs and SLBMs (and associated 
launchers) to make much progress in this regard, which means 
that there would be real costs involved. Any newly-produced 
Russian solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM must be notified to the 
United States at least 48 hours before the missile leaves the 
final assembly plant, so the United States will have a good 
sense of whether Russia is building up its stock of readily-
deployable non-deployed missiles.
    A more readily available (although still not cost-free) 
approach to increasing upload potential might be for Russia to 
increase its stock of heavy bombers, gravity bombs or ALCMs. 
Bombs and cruise missiles are not limited in this treaty, in 
keeping with the U.S. position ever since the original START 
Treaty to encourage the use of heavy bombers as second-strike 
weapons. As chief New START negotiator Rose Gottemoeller told 
the committee, ``heavy bombers have long been considered to be 
more stabilizing than ICBMs or SLBMs because, as slow-flying 
weapons systems, compared to ballistic missiles, they are not 
well suited to first-strike missions.''
    An important feature of New START breakout scenarios is 
that while they could be conducted in secrecy, neither Party 
would appear to have much to gain through covert production and 
stockpiling of non-deployed warheads. In Russia's case, 
moreover, if its plans call for missile and launcher numbers 
well below the New START limits, it may have the option of 
increased overt production of those systems. In short, New 
START offers each Party a perfectly legal alternative to 
cheating scenarios, including for Russia to build the same 
upload capacity that the United States plans to maintain. If 
Russia finds such an overt build-up unnecessary or too costly, 
then it is that much more likely to reject covert options. In 
any case, the incentive to cheat and attempt to evade detection 
under New START is not great for Russia.
    A treaty's verification provisions and U.S. monitoring 
capabilities (especially our ``national technical means of 
verification'' (NTM), satellites and radars that are protected 
from interference by Article X of the treaty) would also figure 
in any Russian cost-benefit calculus. A strong verification 
regime and effective U.S. monitoring would raise both the 
likelihood of detection (and, therefore, of having to pay the 
costs that are incurred if cheating is exposed) and the costs 
associated with trying to avoid such detection in the first 
place.
    The original START Treaty broke new ground in the 
verification of strategic arms control compliance, as had the 
earlier INF Treaty for nuclear-capable missiles with shorter 
ranges. START combined notifications and on-site inspections 
with PPCM at the Votkinsk missile production plant, exhibitions 
of weapons of each type and variant, detailed (and, as it 
turned out, unbearably expensive) standards for the conversion 
or elimination of treaty-limited items, a substantial ban on 
telemetry encryption, a requirement for extensive exchange of 
telemetry, and the right to require, from time to time, that 
heavy bombers or mobile launchers of ICBMs be displayed in the 
open for six hours so that they could be located and counted 
through the use of satellite imagery.
    The verification regimes established by the INF and START 
Treaties were an immense success. Some pre-START estimates of 
Soviet weapons production were found to be inflated as 
inspectors visited Russian bases, came to know their military 
hosts, and learned the day-to-day production, basing and 
deployment activities of Russian strategic offensive arms. (Of 
course, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union also helped change both Russian capabilities and American 
perceptions.) Monitoring at Votkinsk gave the United States 
over 20 years of observing Russian missile production. And 15 
years of exchanging telemetry tapes provided extraordinary 
insight into Russian missile design and characteristics.
    PPCM at Votkinsk ended when the START Treaty expired. PPCM 
had been needed to distinguish INF Treaty-limited missiles from 
ICBM stages, and it was used under START to monitor mobile ICBM 
production. The New START Treaty has no sublimits on mobile 
missile numbers, so the need for PPCM is decreased; the treaty 
does provide for 48 hours' notice of the departure of a solid-
fueled ICBM or SLBM from a production facility; and Russia made 
clear years ago that it would oppose continuing PPCM at the 
Votkinsk facility after the expiration of the START Treaty, as 
there was no similar facility for Russians to monitor in the 
United States. For all these reasons, neither the Bush 
administration nor the Obama administration insisted upon 
retaining PPCM in a replacement of the START Treaty.
    The New START Treaty is a treaty for an era in which 
neither Russia nor the United States seriously worries that the 
other country contemplates nuclear war. The treaty has fewer 
restrictions on strategic forces, and its verification regime--
although based on that of the START Treaty--had to compete in 
both countries with the goals of force flexibility, information 
security, and cost containment. Under this treaty, as under 
START, it will still be difficult to determine with certainty 
how many deployed warheads or non-deployed mobile ICBMs Russia 
has. And under this treaty, as under START, treaty compliance 
will have to compete with other pressing priorities for the use 
of U.S. intelligence systems.
    The New START verification regime and U.S. arms control 
monitoring will still put major obstacles in the path of any 
significant cheating scenario, however, and the notifications, 
inspections, and possible telemetry exchanges that will result 
from this treaty will still foster important transparency and 
confidence building regarding each country's strategic nuclear 
forces. That is why the committee judges that the treaty is 
effectively verifiable, so long as a high priority is given to 
the use of the treaty's verification regime and U.S. NTM.
    Under the New START Treaty, an initial database will be 
created within 45 days of the treaty's entry into force. This 
database will include the unique identifier (UID) of each 
deployed or non-deployed ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber (in 
effect, a serial number printed on each heavy bomber; on each 
missile and, as appropriate, on its canister; and on or near 
its launcher) and specify its location. It will also specify 
the total number of deployed warheads each country has, by type 
of missile. The database will be fully updated every six 
months.
    As noted earlier, a new solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM will no 
longer be observed by on-site inspectors as it leaves the 
production facility. But Russia will be required to provide 48 
hours' prior notice of that departure, so that the United 
States can monitor the production facility with satellite 
imagery and perhaps observe the event. The notification will 
include the UID of each missile leaving the production plant.
    Most changes to the database will be notified within five 
days. When a new missile or heavy bomber is deployed, or when a 
deployed missile or launcher is moved from one base to another, 
this change to the database must be notified. When a missile or 
heavy bomber goes into maintenance or is lost due to accident, 
disablement, placement on static display, conversion, or 
launch, it changes from deployed to non-deployed and, so, must 
be notified. Similarly, when it returns to deployed status, 
this must be notified to the United States.
    Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit no 
longer than 30 days at a time, pursuant to paragraph 4 of 
Article IV. Such launchers may otherwise be located only at 
ICBM bases, production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, 
repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or 
elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and 
space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs 
shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases, 
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article IV.
    At any given time, therefore, the United States will have a 
reasonable understanding of where each Russian ICBM, SLBM, and 
heavy bomber is based and whether that missile or bomber is 
deployed or in maintenance. Over time, moreover, the United 
States will get a sense of each missile and heavy bomber's 
deployment and maintenance routine.
    On-site inspections will offer access to additional data on 
Russian missiles or heavy bombers. When a missile base is 
inspected (and there will be up to ten inspections per year of 
bases housing deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers), the 
inspectors will be told and shown where each missile is, and 
told how many warheads are deployed on it. The warhead 
information is new to this treaty, as is the identification of 
each SLBM and silo-based ICBM. The inspectors may then pick one 
missile and be shown how many warheads that missile is 
carrying. This is different from reentry vehicle inspections 
under START, in which the only requirement was to demonstrate 
that the missile did not have more warheads than the number 
attributed to it in the START database. This different 
requirement--and years of JCIC discussions with Russia that 
resolved many, but not all, disputes regarding the use of 
reentry vehicle covers to limit the information provided in 
these inspections--led the New START negotiators to include 
more detailed language regarding the nature of permitted covers 
in reentry vehicle inspections under the new treaty. New START 
also includes provisions for the use of radiation detection 
equipment, as necessary, to confirm that an object on the front 
section of a missile that is declared to be non-nuclear (and, 
hence, not a reentry vehicle) is, in fact, non-nuclear. This 
technique was developed during the START years and was adopted 
by the JCIC as a measure to improve the viability and 
effectiveness of that treaty.
    As it did under the START Treaty, the executive branch will 
rely on authorities in the treaty to give effect to certain of 
the New START Treaty's provisions, including those that relate 
to according privileges and immunities to inspectors and 
aircrew members and provide for the transfer to the Russian 
Federation of certain restricted data.
    The committee cannot know whether there will be further 
compliance disputes over the use of covers in these 
inspections, but both Parties clearly understand the 
requirement to demonstrate precisely how many reentry vehicles 
are on the inspected missile. Senior U.S. negotiators explained 
one way they addressed the possibility of disputes on this 
issue:

          [T]he New START Treaty has a provision that requires 
        that before a hard or combined RV cover is used for the 
        first time during a reentry vehicle inspection, the 
        fully assembled cover must first be demonstrated, 
        including the right to measure the cover. This approach 
        is intended to help address issues early on if Russia 
        elects to use reentry vehicle covers that hampered the 
        ability of U.S. inspectors to accurately count the 
        number of RVs emplaced on an ICBM or SLBM during the 
        implementation of START.

    Assuming that the results of a reentry vehicle inspection 
under New START are undisputed, the question arises of what 
inferences analysts may draw from knowing the number of 
warheads on up to ten Russian missiles per year. Under the 
START Treaty, to the extent that the United States could 
determine that no inspected Russian missile had more than the 
permitted number of warheads, it could infer that the 
uninspected missiles were also within treaty limits. The 
confidence with which that inference could be reached rose with 
the number of such inspections and with the size of the 
cheating scenario that one was worried about (since a cheating 
scenario involving more missiles with extra warheads would 
raise the odds of detection in a reentry vehicle inspection, 
and would therefore raise the significance of conducting x 
inspections without finding any offenders). If a missile had 
been found with more warheads than the number attributed to 
that type of missile, moreover, it would have been in violation 
of Article V, paragraph 12 of the treaty.
    Drawing inferences from New START inspections will arguably 
be more complicated. If a missile at the inspected base is not 
the one that inspectors were told it was, or if it is not one 
that previous notifications placed at that base, then clearly 
an error has been made; whether the error implies the existence 
of a purposeful violation of the treaty may be difficult to 
judge. If there are more missiles or launchers present than 
were declared for that base, then the error may more readily be 
viewed as evidence of a violation. If the missile designated 
for reentry vehicle inspection has fewer warheads than the 
number that was given to the inspection team, the error may be 
viewed as unintentional. If the missile has more warheads than 
the number given to the inspection team and if no missile of 
that type has been declared to have that many warheads, then 
intentional deceit would be a reasonable conclusion. But if 
some missiles of that type have x warheads and some have a 
larger number y, and if a missile declared to have x warheads 
turns out to have y, it will be difficult to infer a systemic 
violation on the basis of finding a single error. If several 
inspections produce similar results, then the inference of 
systematic cheating may be more readily drawn, although it 
could still be difficult to prove.
    The question also arises of what inferences can be drawn if 
reentry vehicle inspections always find precisely the number of 
warheads that Russian hosts told the inspection team the 
inspected missile was carrying. From a statistical standpoint, 
repeated findings of ``no problem'' do increase the likelihood 
that there is, indeed, no problem. That inference will be more 
readily drawn if the declared number of warheads is constant 
for a given type of missile (even if the missile is capable of 
carrying more warheads than are found on it), because that will 
suggest that the loading is a standard operating procedure for 
Russian forces. If the declared warhead loading is at or near 
the maximum that we believe the missile is designed to carry, 
then we will more readily infer from ``no problem'' inspection 
results that little or no cheating could possibly be taking 
place. And if a given Russian missile base is inspected a few 
times and no anomalies are found, then the odds become good 
that there is no problem, at least at that base.
    This statistical inference, or inference aided by analysis 
of standard and current Russian practices regarding the warhead 
loadings of each type of its missiles, may be supplemented by 
considering the cost-benefit calculus that would govern any 
decision to violate the treaty. The costs to Russia of being 
caught with more warheads than it has declared could be 
substantial. As noted earlier, the United States could readily 
upload American heavy bombers or missiles in response to an 
apparent Russian violation. It seems unlikely, therefore, that 
Russia would violate a major provision of the treaty (such as 
its Article II limits) if the perceived odds of being caught 
were not quite low. Viewed from that standpoint, up to ten ``no 
problem'' inspections per year may in only a few years give us 
confidence that, unless Russia became desperate or profoundly 
foolish, there was in fact no significant cheating going on.
    One complicating factor is the possibility that some SLBMs 
or mobile ICBMs might be away from the base when an inspection 
is carried out. Extra missile launchers could be put on patrol 
or more warheads put on out-of-base missiles than on those made 
available for inspection. It would be a challenge, however, to 
add extra missile launchers without ever being observed by NTM, 
or to carry extra warheads without ever being caught in an 
inspection when the offending unit came back to base. (Pursuant 
to paragraph 1 of Section I of Part Six of the Annex on 
Inspection Activities, no later than one hour after an 
inspection team names the base that it wants to inspect, the 
inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection restrictions at 
that site, including ceasing the removal of any treaty-limited 
items or other items large enough to hold treaty-limited 
items.) Keeping the offending unit or submarine permanently 
out-of-base would be impractical, moreover, both because the 
equipment requires regular maintenance and because all troops 
(not just the troops in a unit with extra launchers or 
warheads) need periodic out-of-base training. After a few 
inspections at a base, there would be a record regarding 
whether particular launchers were being kept out-of-base to an 
unusual extent (thanks to being provided the UID of each 
missile at a base through the notification process and being 
able to confirm the UID of each missile on base whenever we 
inspect that base).
    Given Russia's apparently low production rates for SLBMs, 
submarines, and mobile missiles and launchers over the last 15 
years, it is hard to believe that Russia will have the number 
of extra missiles and launchers over the next 10-15 years that 
would enable it to field a militarily significant covert force. 
This is especially true in light of the hedge that the United 
States will retain against technical or strategic surprise, as 
discussed earlier. The Secretary of Defense's letter to the 
committee presented essentially the same conclusion:

          The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint 
        Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and I 
        assess that Russia will not be able to achieve 
        militarily significant cheating or breakout under New 
        START, due to both the New START verification regime 
        and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the 
        planned U.S. strategic force structure. Additional 
        Russian warheads above the New START limits would have 
        little or no effect on the U.S. assured second-strike 
        capabilities that underwrite stable deterrence. U.S. 
        strategic submarines (SSBNs) at sea, and any alert 
        heavy bombers will remain survivable irrespective of 
        the numbers of Russian warheads, and the survivability 
        of U.S. inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
        would be affected only marginally by additional 
        warheads provided by any Russian cheating or breakout 
        scenario.
          If Russia were to attempt to gain political advantage 
        by cheating or breakout, the U.S. will be able to 
        respond rapidly by increasing the alert levels of SSBNs 
        and bombers, and by uploading warheads on SSBNs, 
        bombers, and ICBMs. Therefore, the survivable and 
        flexible U.S. strategic posture planned for New START 
        will help deter any future Russian leaders from 
        cheating or breakout from the treaty, should they ever 
        have such an inclination.

    Despite the low likelihood of significant cheating, 
violations and compliance disputes are a fact of life in the 
implementation of arms control treaties. Over the course of 15 
years, the JCIC, where START compliance concerns were discussed 
and sometimes resolved, issued 55 agreements, 40 joint 
statements, and 60 formal unilateral or coordinated plenary 
statements by Parties to the treaty (as well as 29 changes to 
the diagrams specifying areas open to inspection in the 
facilities covered under the treaty). These were not disputes 
over how many missiles each country had, but rather over 
compliance with locational restrictions, conversion and 
elimination procedures, inspection modalities, and the like. 
The likely reason for non-compliant activities was less a plot 
to maintain additional forces than a desire to avoid the costs 
associated with treaty compliance. Even the famous Krasnoyarsk 
radar violation of the ABM Treaty noted earlier was probably 
due to the costs associated with building and maintaining that 
radar in a treaty-compliant location. (The Soviet Union's 
violation of the BWC was another matter, and it stands as a 
stark reminder of why effective verification is so important.)
    The Secretary of Defense's letter to the committee included 
assurances regarding the seriousness with which any Russian 
violation of the New START Treaty would be addressed:

          The U.S. expects Russia to fully abide by the treaty, 
        and the U.S. will use all elements of the verification 
        regime to ensure this is the case. Any Russian cheating 
        could affect the sustainability of the New START 
        Treaty, the viability of future arms control 
        agreements, and the ability of the U.S. and Russia to 
        work together on other issues. Should there be any 
        signs of Russian cheating or preparations to breakout 
        from the treaty, the Executive branch would immediately 
        raise this matter through diplomatic channels, and if 
        not resolved, raise it immediately to higher levels. We 
        would also keep the Senate informed.

    It is reasonable to expect that there will be disputes 
regarding implementation of the New START Treaty. U.S. 
negotiators told the committee, however, that there was a 
systematic effort to reduce the likelihood of such disputes. 
Both negotiating teams included experienced START inspectors, 
and their influence is reflected at times in the easing or 
removal of START requirements that were too expensive to meet, 
as well as in the greater detail and clarity provided regarding 
certain matters, such as the covers that will be permitted in 
reentry vehicle inspections.
    The classic example of a START requirement that had 
unintended consequences was the strict regime regarding 
conversion and elimination of weapons covered by the treaty. 
Some of the compliance disputes with Russia concerned weapons 
that Russia counted as eliminated without meeting the detailed 
requirements for elimination, but that both sides knew were 
effectively no longer serviceable. The American approach to the 
inordinate cost of complying with elimination requirements was 
to keep decommissioned aircraft on the books for START 
accounting purposes, even as they sat rusting in Arizona at 
Davis-Monthan AFB. The approach taken by New START was both to 
ease the requirements for conversion and elimination and to 
permit a Party to simply devise its own procedures and 
demonstrate them to the other Party. The easier requirements 
were adopted partly because of the costs to the verifier of 
conversion and elimination. As the executive branch explained 
to the committee:

          Under START elimination inspections, inspectors were 
        required to remain at the elimination inspection sites 
        up to several weeks a year as items were undergoing the 
        entire elimination process. During a Type Two 
        elimination inspection under New START, inspectors now 
        would confirm only the results of the elimination 
        process once notified by the possessing Party that an 
        item of inspection has been eliminated.

    New START recognizes that creating one's own conversion or 
elimination procedures may lead to compliance disputes. The 
treaty establishes (in Section I of Part Three of the Protocol) 
ground rules for such disputes: if a Party develops its own 
procedures, it must notify the other Party of those procedures; 
if requested, it must demonstrate those procedures to the other 
Party; and once having done that, its procedures are recorded 
and it may proceed, even if the other Party still finds fault 
with the procedures.
    The treaty provides that converted or eliminated systems 
must be made visible to NTM for 60 days, beginning on the date 
when such conversion or elimination is notified to the other 
Party. If the notification is of multiple conversions or 
eliminations that are displayed together, then the display need 
last only 30 days. In either case, display satisfies the 
requirement (and may be ended if a Type Two inspection takes 
place). Inspection of the converted or eliminated system may be 
undertaken within 30 days after receiving notification that 
that an elimination or conversion has been carried out.
    Paragraph 2 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol 
states: ``Elimination of strategic offensive arms subject to 
the treaty shall be carried out by rendering them inoperable, 
precluding their use for their original purpose.'' In the case 
of eliminated mobile launchers of ICBMs, paragraph 7 of Section 
III provides that ``the vehicle may be used for purposes not 
inconsistent with the treaty.'' Paragraph 5 adds that if the 
``eliminated'' vehicle is used at a declared facility, it must 
be painted so as to make it distinguishable by NTM from a 
working mobile launcher of ICBMs.
    The administration stated in an answer for the record that 
in determining whether newly developed elimination procedures 
are sufficient, the United States will not limit itself to a 
predetermined set of criteria. Rather, it will assess the 
procedures used and take into account the experience and 
knowledge gained from 15 years of START Treaty implementation 
to determine whether the procedure will render that item 
inoperable. In the event questions arise regarding newly 
developed procedures, a Party may request that the Party 
carrying out the elimination conduct, within the framework of 
the BCC, a demonstration of the procedures. Demonstrations may 
include descriptions, diagrams, drawings, and photographs, as 
needed, or may be conducted on-site, if so agreed. 
Demonstrations will not count against the limit of eight Type 
Two inspections per year.
    If significantly ambiguous procedures are continually 
applied with no effective resolution in the BCC, they could 
defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty. In such 
a case, the burden shifts to the converting or eliminating 
Party. Pursuant to Article VIII:

          In those cases in which one of the Parties determines 
        that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that 
        Party shall take measures to ensure the viability and 
        effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, 
        openness, and predictability concerning the reduction 
        and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

    If the ambiguity resulting from conversion or elimination 
procedures were to become grave, it could even lead to U.S. 
withdrawal under Article XIV. This said, however, it is highly 
unlikely that such situations will result from the conversion 
and elimination aspects of the New START Treaty. The Parties 
sought to create fundamentally more flexible treatment for 
conversion and elimination as compared to START, and the United 
States gained greater flexibility for its bombers and 
submarines in this regard. Had there been a record of 
significant concern regarding Russian conversion and 
elimination of strategic offensive arms subject to START, then 
a different scheme would have been applied in the new treaty.
    The committee recommends that the Senate's resolution of 
advice and consent to ratification include the requirement in 
Condition (10) that the President's annual report on treaty 
implementation contain either a certification that New START 
conversion and elimination procedures have not resulted in 
ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of New 
START, or a list of any cases where a Russian procedure has led 
to doubts and the steps the United States has taken to address 
them.
    The United States has taken a similar approach to the 
question of whether future, strategic-range non-nuclear weapon 
systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of the New 
START Treaty would be considered new kinds of strategic 
offensive arms. The United States recognizes that compliance 
disputes could arise and accepts the requirement to attempt to 
resolve such issues in the BCC pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
Article V of the treaty. At the same time, the United States 
asserts that there is no requirement to delay deployment of the 
new system pending such resolution. The committee recommends 
that the Senate's resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification include an understanding, to be included in the 
instrument of ratification, that demonstrates the Senate's 
endorsement of this interpretation of New START.
    Transparency is an important objective of arms control, and 
one that is different from compliance and verification. While a 
treaty may have specific requirements that demand compliance 
and lead to the need for verification, transparency may be 
encouraged, rather than required, and may apply to activities 
or data that are otherwise not even addressed by a treaty. In 
the START Treaty, telemetry exchange and a ban on most 
activities that would deny telemetry to the other Party were 
requirements. There were persistent disputes regarding 
compliance with these requirements, but telemetry exchanges 
provided information that was vital to verifying compliance 
with START Treaty provisions that dealt with missile 
capabilities (e.g., a missile type's launch weight, throw 
weight, and number of reentry vehicles ever released or 
simulated in a test launch). In New START, there are no 
provisions that require telemetric information to verify 
compliance. Such information can still provide useful insights 
into the nature of Russian weapon systems, however, and both 
the United States and Russia could use it to assure each other 
that their missile tests do not relate to the development of 
undeclared capabilities that could deprive the other side of 
its nuclear deterrent. The telemetry exchange and non-
interference provisions of New START do not require that any 
exchange of telemetry occur, and they point toward a regime in 
which any transmission of unencrypted telemetry may be limited 
to information about the boost stages of a missile. The 
authority is created, however, for such provision and exchange 
of telemetry as the two Parties may decide, in the coming 
years, is in their national security interests. The telemetry 
exchange exemptions written into the START Treaty were rarely 
used, so it is possible that the two countries will agree to 
exchange useful telemetric information under New START.
    This said, it will be important that the Russian telemetry 
obtained by the United States be meaningful. Telemetric 
information exchange decisions will take place in the year 
following a test, so each Party will have a good idea of what 
telemetry it seeks. Russia is undertaking several ICBM and SLBM 
modernization and testing programs. The United States is less 
likely to flight test new ICBMs in the next decade, so Russia 
may instead request telemetry on tests of U.S. missile defense 
interceptors or on conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) 
systems. The committee recommends that the Senate's resolution 
of advice and consent to ratification make clear in Condition 
(5) that the treaty does not obligate the United States to 
provide any missile defense telemetry, and that it require in 
Condition (7) both that CPGS telemetry provided to Russia not 
undermine the effectiveness of the tested system and that such 
telemetry be provided either to demonstrate that such system is 
not subject to the limits in Article II of the New START Treaty 
or to obtain telemetry on a Russian test of a system that is 
not listed in Article III of the treaty or that was not 
deployed before the START Treaty expired.
    The committee can predict with more confidence that the 
notification and inspection regimes established by this treaty 
will lead to increased transparency. Apart from the use of 
notifications and inspections to verify compliance with treaty 
obligations, these regimes will maintain the access that START 
provided into the thinking and normal practices of Russian 
military officers who handle strategic weapons. And the treaty 
will maintain momentum in Russia for accepting U.S. assistance 
through the global Nunn-Lugar and other cooperative threat 
reduction programs, which will provide additional insight into 
Russian force composition and planning and additional avenues 
through which each side can learn about the other. The 
committee believes strongly that these transparency initiatives 
have been of immense importance in maintaining strategic 
stability between the United States and Russia, and it urges 
both countries to maintain and support these programs.
    The Senate has addressed compliance and verification 
concerns when it approved the ratification of past strategic 
arms control agreements, and the committee believes that it 
should do so on the New START Treaty as well. The resolution of 
advice and consent that the committee recommends to the Senate 
includes several provisions on this topic. Condition (2) of the 
committee's recommended resolution of advice and consent 
requires that prior to entry into force, and annually 
thereafter, the President certify that U.S. monitoring 
capabilities are sufficient to ensure effective monitoring, to 
include timely warning of any Russian effort to break out of 
the treaty's limits. The committee recommends further that the 
resolution require the Intelligence Community to present a plan 
for New START monitoring and to regularly update that plan.
    The committee recommends that the executive branch be 
required to offer briefings regarding compliance issues to the 
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees before and 
after each meeting of the BCC, in order to keep those 
committees informed, especially of compliance issues that are 
to be raised in that forum and of the results of such efforts. 
Its recommended resolution also calls for the President to 
continue cooperative threat reduction assistance to Russia, 
including for the purpose of facilitating implementation of 
this treaty.
    The committee recommends that the resolution of advice and 
consent to this treaty call for the President to submit an 
annual report to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
Committees, which would include a discussion of any compliance 
issues. The report would also include specific discussions of 
any ambiguities raised by Russian conversion or elimination 
practices and of the operation of the treaty's transparency 
mechanisms, including its telemetry provisions. Such a report 
will not only inform the Senate, but also encourage the 
executive branch to make its own annual evaluation of the 
treaty's compliance and verification record.
    As aggregate levels of strategic offensive arms decrease, 
the strategic implications of a Russian breakout may increase 
(although, as discussed above, such scenarios are unlikely and 
U.S. military leaders assured the committee that any breakout 
under the New START Treaty would be unlikely to be of military 
significance). The committee recommends that the Senate's 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification include a 
condition requiring that if the President, after consultation 
with the Director of National Intelligence, determines that the 
Russian Federation intends to break out of the limits specified 
in Article II of the New START Treaty, the President shall 
immediately inform the Committees on Foreign Relations and 
Armed Services of the Senate, with a view to determining 
whether circumstances exist that jeopardize the supreme 
interests of the United States, such that withdrawal from the 
New START Treaty may be warranted pursuant to paragraph 3 of 
Article XIV of the treaty.
    Finally, the committee recommends that the resolution of 
advice and consent to this treaty require that if the President 
determines that the Russian Federation is acting or has acted 
in a manner that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of 
the New START Treaty, or is in violation of the treaty, to such 
an extent as to threaten the national security interests of the 
United States, then the President shall consult with the Senate 
regarding the implications of such actions, urgently seek a 
meeting with the Russian Federation at the highest level with 
the objective of bringing the Russian Federation into full 
compliance with its obligations, and then submit a report to 
the Senate detailing: (a) whether adherence to the New START 
Treaty remains in the national security interest of the United 
States; and (b) how the United States will redress the impact 
of Russian actions on the national security interests of the 
United States. Strategic arms control succeeds only when all 
parties to an agreement abide by its terms, and the Senate 
should keep a watchful eye on the implementation of such a 
sensitive agreement as the New START Treaty.

                            MISSILE DEFENSE

    For at least two decades, the United States has pursued a 
missile defense policy focused on defending the United States, 
its troops, and its friends and allies from limited ballistic 
missile threats. The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 
(Public Law 106-38) codified that policy:

          It is the policy of the United States to deploy as 
        soon as is technologically possible an effective 
        National Missile Defense system capable of defending 
        the territory of the United States against limited 
        ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, 
        unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to 
        the annual authorization of appropriations and the 
        annual appropriation of funds for National Missile 
        Defense.

    In February 2010, the Department of Defense submitted to 
Congress its Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report, as 
required by Section 234 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417).\7\ The BMDR 
established the following priorities to fulfill the National 
Missile Defense Act of 1999:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\Department of Defense, ``Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
Report,'' February 2010; available at 
BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20web.pdf.

   ``The United States will continue to defend the 
        homeland against the threat of limited ballistic 
        missile attack.''
   ``The United States will defend against regional 
        missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies 
        and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.''

    In his preface to the BMDR Report, the Secretary of Defense 
went on to explain,

          I have made defending against near-term regional 
        threats a top priority of our missile defense plans, 
        programs and capabilities. I have also directed that we 
        sustain and enhance the U.S. military's ability to 
        defend the homeland against attack by a small number of 
        long-range ballistic missiles.

    The BMDR Report argued that, with the deployment by year's 
end of 30 Ground-Based Interceptors, the United States ``is 
currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack, 
as a result of investments made over the past decade in a 
system based on Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD).'' 
Regarding regional missile threats to U.S. forces, allies, and 
partners, the BMDR Report concluded:

          Over the past decade the United States has made 
        significant progress in developing and fielding 
        essential capabilities for protection against attack 
        from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 
        However, these capabilities are modest numbers when set 
        against the rapidly expanding regional missile threat.

    The BMDR Report outlines the administration's plan to 
maintain the United States' capability to defend against 
limited ballistic missile attacks against the territory of the 
United States, and to address regional threats to U.S. forces, 
allies, and partners. In pursuit of this plan, Secretary of 
Defense Gates testified to the committee in May 2010 that ``we 
are putting our money where our beliefs are'': the 
administration's Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget request included 
$9.9 billion for ballistic missile defense, an increase of 
nearly $700 million over the amount appropriated for FY 2010. 
Secretary Gates went on to state that ``we have a comprehensive 
missile defense program, and we are going forward with all of 
it. And our plan is to add even more money to it in FY 12.''
    In line with the policy established by the National Missile 
Defense Act of 1999, the plans outlined in the BMDR Report 
would not create a capacity to threaten the deterrent potential 
of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation. The 
BMDR Report stated:

          While the [Ground-Based Missile Defense] system would 
        be employed to defend the United States against limited 
        missile launches from any source, it does not have the 
        capacity to cope with large scale Russian or Chinese 
        missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the 
        strategic balance with those countries.

    This lack of capacity is far less a matter of choice than a 
matter of technical and financial reality: Russia currently 
deploys too many strategic nuclear weapons for the United 
States to defeat with anything resembling its current missile 
defense capability. Lt. Gen. O'Reilly explained to the 
committee in testimony on June 16, 2010, that current United 
States missile defense employment doctrine generally requires 
setting aside a minimum of two interceptors against each 
reentry vehicle that would be targeted--and in some cases, four 
interceptors would need to be dedicated to each target. 
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Miller 
explained in his prepared testimony for the same hearing that 
``Russia will likely field well over 1,000 ICBM and SLBM 
warheads,'' even under the limitations that would be 
established under the New START Treaty. Putting in place a 
ballistic missile defense to defeat Russia's strategic arsenal 
under even the minimal two-to-one interceptor-to-target 
doctrine would require constructing, deploying, and maintaining 
at least 2,000 Ground-Based Interceptors--a capability far 
greater than the 30 interceptors that the United States has 
managed to deploy after more than a decade of effort. Even if 
the United States decided to pursue this approach, Russia could 
observe the United States as it was planning, constructing, and 
deploying this capability, and would have ample time to react. 
Russia could do so by deploying more warheads on more ICBMs and 
SLBMs, by deploying greater numbers of alternative delivery 
systems such as bomber-delivered cruise missiles, or by 
developing more sophisticated missile defense countermeasures 
that would force the United States to employ still more 
interceptors against each target.
    For these reasons, former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger 
explained to the committee that the United States might have to 
accept for the foreseeable future its inability to wholly 
defeat Russia's strategic offensive arms with missile defenses: 
``It's not because we would not like to have an impenetrable 
defense, as President Reagan had hoped for. It's just beyond 
our capability. They can always beat us with the offensive 
capabilities.''
    In 2007, President George W. Bush made clear that he also 
recognized that the United States did not have the capability 
to defeat Russia's strategic offensive forces, and argued that 
this reality should not be a concern:

          The missile defenses we can employ would be easily 
        overwhelmed by Russia's nuclear arsenal. . . . 
        Moreover, the missile defenses we will deploy are 
        intended to deter countries who would threaten us with 
        ballistic missile attacks. We do not consider Russia 
        such a country. The Cold War is over. Russia is not our 
        enemy.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\``President Bush Visits National Defense University, Discusses 
Global War on Terror,'' Washington, DC., October 23, 2007; http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071023-
3.html.

    In his testimony before the committee on May 18, 2010, the 
Secretary of Defense explained that it has long been the policy 
of the United States not to attempt to defeat Russia's 
strategic offensive forces with its missile defenses, because 
trying to do so would be both prohibitively costly and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
strategically dangerous:

          [O]ne point needs to be clarified here. Under the 
        last administration, as well as under this one, it has 
        been the United States policy not to build a missile 
        defense that would render useless Russia's nuclear 
        capabilities. It has been a missile defense intended to 
        protect against rogue nations, such as North Korea and 
        Iran, or countries that have very limited capabilities. 
        The systems that we have, the systems that originated 
        and have been funded in the Bush administration, as 
        well as in this administration, are not focused on 
        trying to render useless Russia's nuclear capability. 
        That, in our view, as in theirs, would be enormously 
        destabilizing, not to mention unbelievably expensive.

    Secretary Gates went on to say that:

          Our ability to protect other countries is going to be 
        focused on countries like Iran and North Korea, the 
        countries that are rogue states, that are not 
        participants in the NPT [the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty], countries that have shown aggressive intent. 
        And we are putting in defenses in Europe that will be 
        able to defend them. We have defenses in Asia. We're 
        building defenses in the Middle East. So, we have 
        missile defense capabilities going up all around the 
        world, but not intended to eliminate the viability of 
        the Russian nuclear capability.

New START Treaty Preamble Language on Missile Defense

    In April 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev stated that 
they would pursue a new, legally-binding treaty to replace the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; the subject of the treaty 
would be ``the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive 
arms.'' In July 2009, the two presidents reached a further 
joint understanding that, while the new treaty would address 
reductions and limitations of their ``strategic offensive 
arms,'' it would contain ``[a] provision on the 
interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic 
defensive arms.''
    The preamble of the treaty ultimately signed by Presidents 
Obama and Medvedev contains the following statement:

          Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship 
        between strategic offensive arms and strategic 
        defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become 
        more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, 
        and that current strategic defensive arms do not 
        undermine the viability and effectiveness of the 
        strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

    Secretary of State Clinton testified to the committee that 
the preamble should be regarded as ``simply a statement of 
fact,'' not as a constraint. Indeed, Secretary Clinton stated 
for the record that

          The Obama administration has consistently informed 
        Russia that while we seek to establish a framework for 
        U.S.-Russia BMD cooperation, the United States cannot 
        agree to constrain or limit U.S. BMD capabilities 
        numerically, qualitatively, operationally, 
        geographically, or in other ways.

    In his testimony, former Secretary of State Kissinger 
agreed with Secretary Clinton, saying of the preambular 
language, ``it's a truism. It is not an obligation. It's 
something to which countries can react unilaterally.''
    This is by no means the first time the interrelationship 
between offensive and defensive systems has been recognized. 
For example, in their joint statement of July 21, 2001, 
President Bush and President Putin agreed that ``major changes 
in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and 
defensive systems. We already have some strong and tangible 
points of agreement. We will shortly begin intensive 
consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and 
defensive systems [emphasis added].''\9\ In the press 
conference that followed, President Bush emphasized that 
offensive and defensive systems were interrelated, stating, 
``And along these lines, as the President said, that we're 
going to have open and honest dialogue about defensive systems, 
as well as reduction of offensive systems. The two go hand-in-
hand in order to set up a new strategic framework for 
peace.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\``Joint Statement by President Bush and Russian President Putin 
on Upcoming Consultations on Strategic Issues,'' July 22, 2001, 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/07/20010722-6.html.
    \10\``Press Conference by President Bush and President Putin, 
Palasso Doria Spinola, Genoa, Italy,'' July 22, 2001, available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/07/
20010722-3.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The interrelationship between our strategic defensive arms 
and other countries' strategic offensive arms is fundamental to 
our current missile defense policy: the United States desires 
that our capability to defend against limited attack will 
render useless the initial strategic offensive capability that 
certain countries are contemplating or developing. As the BMDR 
Report notes, in addition to defeating a limited ICBM attack 
should deterrence fail, our Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 
system is designed to ``dissuade'' other states from developing 
an ICBM capability and to ``deter'' those countries from using 
an ICBM if they develop or acquire such a capability.\11\ The 
United States is thus counting on the interrelationship between 
strategic defensive and offensive arms to which the New START 
preambular language alludes to undermine the threats posed by 
countries capable of deploying only limited numbers of 
strategic offensive arms against the United States, its forces, 
its allies, and its partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\BMDR Report, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Article V Ban on ICBM/SLBM Launcher Conversion to Missile Defense 
        Interceptors

    Article V, paragraph 3 of the New START Treaty bars the 
Parties from placing missile defense interceptors into ICBM 
launchers and SLBM launchers. (The Parties also may not place 
ICBMs and SLBMs in former launchers of missile defense 
interceptors.) Paragraph 3 explicitly exempts from this 
restriction those launchers that had been converted to 
launchers of missile defense interceptors as of April 8, 2010, 
the day the treaty was signed. This exemption thus permits the 
five Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) launchers at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base (VAFB) in California that had been converted from 
ICBM launchers to remain outside of the treaty as missile 
defense interceptors. Four of these launchers house deployed 
GBIs, and one is dedicated for use as a GBI test launcher. The 
Seventh Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol provides 
for one exhibition, ``to demonstrate that these launchers are 
no longer capable of launching ICBMs as well as to determine 
the features that distinguish a converted silo launcher of 
ICBMs from a silo launcher of ICBMs that has not been 
converted.'' The agreed statement also provides for a second 
exhibition, no later than 30 days after a request by the 
Russian Federation, to confirm that Vandenberg missile defense 
interceptor launchers have not been reconverted.
    Because this provision, unlike the language in the preamble 
regarding the interrelationship between strategic offensive 
arms and strategic defensive arms, was not referenced by the 
July 2009 joint presidential statement, the committee worked to 
understand why the provision was included in the treaty and 
what constraints, if any, it might place on U.S. missile 
defense plans. (On August 3, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton 
also provided to the committee a classified summary of 
discussions in the New START Treaty negotiations on the issue 
of missile defense.) An answer for the record by Secretary 
Gates and Admiral Mullen summarizes the executive branch's 
view: the provision ``does not constrain the Department's 
current or future missile defense plans in any way.''
    In testimony for the committee's hearing on June 16, 2010, 
Lt. Gen. O'Reilly stated that he had ``frequently consulted'' 
with the treaty negotiating team on potential impacts to U.S. 
missile defense plans, and provided additional information on 
why he was comfortable with Article V:

          MDA never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos 
        at VAFB. In 2002, we began converting ICBM silos to 
        operational silos for launching GBIs because we had not 
        developed a silo specifically for GBIs at that time. 
        Since then, we have developed a GBI silo that costs 
        $20M less than converting ICBM silos and is easier to 
        protect and maintain.
          Likewise, the conversion of Submarine Launched 
        Ballistic Missiles into missile defense interceptors, 
        or the modification of our submarines to carry missile 
        defense interceptors, would be very expensive and 
        impractical. Furthermore, submerged submarines are not 
        easily integrated into our missile defense command and 
        control network.

    Lt. Gen. O'Reilly stated during the hearing that, ``for 
many different reasons,'' he would ``never'' recommend either 
converting existing ICBM silos or SLBM launchers into missile 
defense interceptor launchers or converting. He explained:

          [F]rom a technical basis and being responsible for 
        the development of our missile defenses, I would say 
        that either one of those approaches, of replacing ICBMs 
        with ground-based interceptors or adapting the 
        submarine-launched ballistic missiles to be an 
        interceptor, . . . would actually be . . . a major 
        setback to the development of our missile defenses; 
        one, because of the extensive amount of funding 
        required, and resources, to redesign both the fire-
        control system, the communications system, but 
        especially the interceptors. They're of completely 
        different size and completely different functionality, 
        different fuels, so they are incompatible, our 
        interceptors are, with submarines. And also, the 
        submarine-launched ballistic missiles have a launch 
        environment which is significantly different than what 
        our interceptors have today. And the front end, the 
        most critical part of our interceptors, would have to 
        be completely redesigned in order to withstand the 
        shocks and the other launch environments.
          So, in both cases, there would have to be an 
        extensive redesign of our systems, and some of the 
        basic, fundamental engineering that we've been doing 
        over the past decade would have to be redone in order 
        to adapt them for either one of those applications.

    General Chilton further explained to the committee that, 
from his perspective as the commander of U.S. strategic 
offensive forces, he would have concerns with any plan to 
remove strategic offensive missiles from launchers and replace 
them with missile defense interceptors.

          [T]he missile tubes that we have are valuable, in the 
        sense that they provide the strategic deterrent. And I 
        think the value of the nuclear deterrent far--per 
        missile--far outweighs the value of a single missile 
        defense interceptor. So, I would not want to trade 
        Trident D5, and how powerful it is and its ability to 
        deter, for a single missile defense interceptor.

    He also raised a concern that launching missile defense 
interceptors from existing ICBM silo launchers could cause 
Russia to falsely identify a missile defense interceptor launch 
as an ICBM launch. Specifically, General Chilton stated:

          [F]rom an ICBM-field perspective . . . there would be 
        some issues that would be raised if you were to launch 
        a missile defense asset from an ICBM field, with regard 
        to the opposite side seeing a missile come off and 
        wondering, ``Well, was that a . . . defensive missile 
        or is that an offensive missile?'' So, just in my 
        opinion, I don't see . . . that . . . [that option] 
        would be particularly beneficial.

    In an answer for the record, the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense pointed out that, in addition to 30 
operationally deployed Ground-Based Interceptors, the United 
States plans to maintain a cushion of eight empty silos at Fort 
Greely, Alaska, in which to deploy extra interceptors if they 
are needed. That will provide a margin of over 25 percent 
beyond the current number of deployed interceptors before any 
new construction would need to be initiated. As noted in the 
testimony above, even after filling those eight silos that will 
sit empty under the current plan, building new silos for GBIs 
would be cheaper, and easier to protect and maintain, than 
trying to convert additional ICBMs silos.
    Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger speculated that the 
negotiators saw this provision ``as a throw-away on their part 
because we were not planning to use the Minuteman silos, et 
cetera, for defensive missiles.'' Former Secretary of State 
Baker said that he thought the provision could be regarded as 
``tipping the hat, if you will, to [a Russian] concern, without 
really giving them anything.'' It is also possible that the 
real Russian concern was to bar the conversion of U.S. missile 
defense silos in Europe for use as ICBM launchers.

Missile Defense and the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)

    Article XV, paragraph 1 provides that any amendments to the 
main treaty text itself shall enter into force in accordance 
with the procedures governing entry into force of the treaty 
(for in the United States, this would entail the Senate advice 
and consent process established by Article II, Section 2, 
clause 2 of the Constitution). For those changes to the 
Protocol (including its three integral Annexes) that do not 
affect the substantive rights or obligations of the Parties 
under the treaty, however, Article XV, paragraph 2 permits the 
Parties to use the BCC to reach agreement on changes without 
resorting to the procedures governing entry into force of the 
treaty. Changes to the Protocol or the three integral Annexes 
that do affect the substantive rights or obligations of the 
Parties would only enter into force in accordance with the same 
procedures that govern entry into force of the entire treaty. 
As the executive branch stated in an answer for the record to 
the committee, ``Any change that does affect substantive rights 
or obligations would be an amendment and would require Senate 
advice and consent.''
    The START Treaty contained similar language in each of its 
Protocols, under which the Parties used the JCIC to make 
changes in the Protocols that did ``not affect substantive 
rights or obligations under'' that treaty. Secretary Clinton 
stated in an answer for the record that:

          The experience of the START Treaty's Joint Compliance 
        and Inspection Commission (JCIC) provides some helpful 
        examples of the type of changes that might be agreed 
        upon within the framework of the New START Treaty's 
        Bilateral Consultative Commission. For example, the 
        JCIC agreed on the releasability of Treaty-related 
        data, as is also provided for under paragraph 5 of 
        Article VII of the New START Treaty, on specific 
        procedures for use of radiation detection equipment, 
        and on changes to types of inspection equipment.

A complete listing of agreements reached in the JCIC under 
START is available at http://www.dod.gov/acq/acic/treaties/
start1/other/agreements/index.htm.
    Article XV does not in any way enable the BCC to alter 
substantive rights or obligations related to missile defense 
under the treaty. The only restriction related to United States 
missile defense activities is contained in Article V, paragraph 
3, of the main Treaty text. Pursuant to Article XV, paragraph 
1, any change to that paragraph would need to be submitted to 
the Senate for its advice and consent before it could come into 
force. In the Protocol, paragraph 44 of Part One of the 
Protocol defines the term ``missile defense interceptor''\12\ 
and paragraph 40 of Part One of the Protocol defines the term 
``launcher of missile defense interceptors.''\13\ Those terms 
are used only in Article V, paragraph 3. (The Seventh Agreed 
Statement does not use the term ``missile defense,'' but it 
does establish the procedures governing exhibitions for the 
five converted launchers of missile defense interceptors.) It 
is difficult to imagine any changes to those definitions that 
could alter the restriction in Article V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\A ``missile defense interceptor'' is defined as a ``missile 
that was developed, tested, and deployed in order to intercept ICBMs, 
SLBMs, or their reentry vehicles.''
    \13\A ``launcher of missile defense interceptor'' is defined as ``a 
device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch 
missile defense interceptors.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to questions for the record, the executive 
branch provided further assurances regarding the role of the 
BCC in missile defense. First, it assured the committee, ``The 
Obama Administration does not intend to negotiate, as part of 
its missile defense cooperation talks with Russia, agreements 
similar to those agreed to in the Standing Consultative 
Commission in September 1997.'' Then, it stated specifically 
that ``the United States cannot agree to constrain or limit 
U.S. [ballistic missile defense] capabilities numerically, 
qualitatively, operationally, geographically, or in other 
ways.''

Missile Defense and Telemetry Exchange

    Article IX of the New START Treaty establishes that 
telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs (which 
means, as defined in Part One of the Protocol, ``information 
that originates on board a missile during its initial motion 
and subsequent flight that is broadcast'') shall be exchanged 
on a parity basis. The Parties are to agree on the amount of 
exchange of such information. Part Seven of the Protocol states 
that the exchange of telemetric information shall occur on an 
equal number of launches, but on no more than five launches of 
ICBMs or SLBMs each calendar year. In other words, within that 
five-launch cap, the actual number of launches for which 
telemetric information will be exchanged each year is by mutual 
agreement of the Parties. If one side insists on providing 
telemetric information on only three launches in a given year, 
it may do so; it will simply have to live with the fact that in 
return the other Party will provide telemetric information on 
just three launches of its own. The Parties are to agree at the 
beginning of the year on the specific number of launches in the 
previous year for which telemetric information will be 
provided. Paragraph 2 of Part Seven of the Protocol states that 
the testing Party may decide for itself which launches it will 
use to meet the agreed number. Thus, neither Party is required 
to provide telemetric information on any given launch, although 
nothing prevents the Parties from reaching a political 
agreement that specifies specific launches when they discuss 
the number of launches in the previous year for which 
telemetric information will be shared. The conditions and 
procedures governing the exchange of telemetric information are 
set forth in the Protocol's Annex on Telemetric Information.
    The original START Treaty contained a much more extensive 
telemetry exchange regime than that of the New START Treaty 
because a mechanism was needed to verify various START limits 
on launch weight, throw weight and the attributed number of 
warheads for each type of missile. For the large majority of 
launches of treaty-limited items, the START Treaty barred the 
Parties from encrypting broadcast telemetric information. It 
also required the testing Party to provide data types 
containing the telemetric information recorded during the 
launch, to allow the observing Party to confirm the veracity of 
the information broadcast from the launch. The Treaty required 
the provision of telemetric information on launches of any 
booster that included the first stage of a START-accountable 
missile. START's far-sweeping telemetry regime required the 
United States to share telemetric information on missile tests 
related to development of U.S. missile defense technologies--in 
particular, for certain satellite launches, missile defense 
sensor targets, and missile defense interceptor targets. All 
told, prior to the treaty's expiration on December 5, 2009, the 
United States had been required to broadcast unencrypted 
telemetric information and provide telemetry tapes on 17 
launches of missile defense-related satellite launches, missile 
defense sensor targets, and missile defense interceptor 
targets. (Because no U.S. missile defense interceptor uses a 
first stage from a START-accountable item, the United States 
has never provided missile defense interceptor telemetry to the 
Russian Federation.)
    The New START Treaty thus provides greater flexibility than 
the START Treaty did for the development of U.S. missile 
defenses: the United States would not be required to share 
information about the capabilities of target missiles, i.e., 
the missiles that it is working to ensure its missile defense 
systems will defeat. With respect to missile defense 
interceptors, the New START Treaty treats telemetric 
information no differently than the START Treaty. As the 
Secretary of Defense stated in answer to a question for the 
record, the New START Treaty ``neither prohibits, nor does it 
require, the provision of missile defense interceptor test 
telemetry to Russia.'' To ensure that there is no question on 
these points, the committee recommends including in the 
Senate's resolution of advice and consent to ratification a 
condition that, before ratifying the treaty, the President 
certify to the Senate that the United States is indeed not 
required to provide telemetric information regarding these 
launches.

Benefits from the New START Treaty for U.S. Missile Defense Development

    It is important to note that the New START Treaty, in 
comparison to the START Treaty, will actually reduce 
constraints on the development of U.S. missile defense in 
several areas. Lt. Gen. O'Reilly pointed out one key reduced 
constraint in his testimony before the committee:

          For example, MDA's intermediate-range LV-2 target 
        booster system, used in key tests to demonstrate 
        homeland defense capabilities and components of the new 
        European Phased Adaptive Approach, was accountable 
        under the previous START Treaty because it employed the 
        first stage of the now-retired Trident I SLBM. Under 
        New START, this missile is not accountable, thus we 
        will have greater flexibility in conducting testing 
        with regard to launch locations, telemetry collection, 
        and processing, thus allowing more efficient test 
        architectures and operationally realistic intercept 
        geometries.

    In an answer for the record, Secretary Gates and Admiral 
Mullen added that the New START Treaty would not restrict the 
production, testing, or deployment of air-to-surface ballistic 
missiles, as the START Treaty had done. Using an air-to-surface 
ballistic missile in missile defense tests, which would not 
have been possible under the START Treaty, could provide new 
information that would aid in improving our missile defense 
capabilities:

          Such launches provide the Missile Defense Agency with 
        greater flexibility to design tests that are more 
        operationally realistic by enabling them to launch 
        targets along any azimuth (or angle) in relation to the 
        interceptor missile.

    Article V, paragraph 18(a) of the START Treaty also barred 
the Parties from producing, testing, and deploying ballistic 
missiles of ranges in excess of 600 kilometers on waterborne 
vehicles other than submarines. The New START Treaty does not 
contain this ban, so the United States will have the right, if 
it chooses, to launch ballistic missiles of ranges greater than 
600 kilometers from surface ships as part of a missile defense 
testing program.
    In an answer for the record, Secretary Gates and Admiral 
Mullen explained the benefits that would result from these 
changes:

          The use of targets utilizing missiles not accountable 
        under the New START Treaty, launched from airplanes and 
        surface ships, which was prohibited by START but is not 
        prohibited by the New START Treaty, will support more 
        cost-effective testing of missile defense interceptors 
        against medium- and intermediate- range ballistic 
        missile threats in the Pacific region.

    Additionally, Lt. Gen. O'Reilly stated that the New START 
Treaty would lift a constraint put in place by the START Treaty 
that had limited the Missile Defense Agency to the use of five 
space launch facilities for launching targets to be used in 
missile defense tests.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\Department of Defense, ``Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Request for Information,'' May 17, 2010, available at http://
lugar.senate.gov/issues/start/pdf/SFRCrequest.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unilateral Statements Regarding Missile Defense

    On April 7, 2010, the Russian Federation issued a 
unilateral statement concerning missile defense:

          The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the 
        United States of America on Measures for the Further 
        Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
        signed at Prague on April 8, 2010, may be effective and 
        viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative 
        or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system 
        capabilities of the United States of America. 
        Consequently, the extraordinary events referred to in 
        Article XIV of the treaty also include a build-up in 
        the missile defense system capabilities of the United 
        States of America such that it would give rise to a 
        threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the 
        Russian Federation.

    Pursuant to Article XIV, paragraph 3, each Party is 
accorded the right to withdraw from the treaty if it ``decides 
that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.'' In its 
article-by-article analysis, the State Department noted that 
this withdrawal standard is not new, and that the Russian 
statement does not add or subtract from the treaty:

          The withdrawal standard in Article XIV contains 
        language identical to the withdrawal provisions in many 
        arms control agreements, including the START Treaty, 
        the INF Treaty, and the NPT. The withdrawal provision 
        is self-judging in that each Party may decide when 
        extraordinary events related to the subject matter of 
        the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. 
        Accordingly the Russian statement merely records that 
        the circumstances described in its statement would, in 
        its view, justify such a decision on its part. It does 
        not change the legal rights or obligations of the 
        Parties under the treaty.

    The second sentence of the unilateral statement ties 
Russian actions pursuant to Article XIV to a build-up in U.S. 
missile defense capabilities ``such that it would give rise to 
a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the 
Russian Federation.'' As discussed above, the United States is 
so far away technically from developing a missile defense 
capability that would threaten the Russian Federation's 
strategic nuclear deterrent that the committee does not foresee 
any possibility that the conditions outlined in the Russian 
unilateral statement would obtain over the life of the treaty.


    Secretary of State Clinton summarized the executive 
branch's view of the Russian unilateral statement during the 
committee's May 25, 2010, hearing: ``We have not agreed to this 
view, and we are not bound by this unilateral statement.'' 
Secretary of Defense Gates emphasized the point: ``the Russians 
can say what they want, but, as Secretary Clinton said, these 
unilateral statements are totally outside the treaty, they have 
no standing, they're not binding, never have been.''
    In response to a question for the record, Secretary Clinton 
further underlined that the unilateral statement will not 
change U.S. ballistic missile defense plans:

          The Russian unilateral statement does not change the 
        legal rights or obligations of the Parties under the 
        treaty and is not legally binding. The United States 
        will continue its missile defense programs and 
        policies, as outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense 
        Review. Russia's unilateral statement has not changed 
        our course, as laid out in the Review, nor will it.

    This statement for the record underscored what the United 
States had already communicated to Russia in its own unilateral 
statement, issued on April 7, 2010. In that statement, the 
United States stated:

          The United States missile defense systems are not 
        intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. 
        The United States missile defense systems would be 
        employed to defend the United States against limited 
        missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, 
        allies and partners against regional threats. The 
        United States intends to continue improving and 
        deploying its missile defense systems in order to 
        defend itself against limited attack and as part of our 
        collaborative approach to strengthening stability in 
        key regions.

    The United States had, in fact, fully briefed responsible 
Russian officials regarding U.S. missile defense plans well in 
advance of the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement. The United 
States focused its briefings on its Phased Adaptive Approach to 
missile defense in Europe. (The committee notes that the 
chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, Senator Carl 
Levin, received from Admiral Mullen a letter concerning the New 
START Treaty and the Phased Adaptive Approach; that letter is 
appended to this report.) Some have raised the concern that, 
while it may accept the current state of U.S. missile defenses, 
Russia will object to the later phases of the Phased Adaptive 
Approach, which is slated to include deployment in 2018 of the 
Standard Missile-3 Block IIA interceptor to defend Europe 
against medium- and intermediate-range missiles, and in 2020 of 
the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB to provide a capability 
against an ICBM launched from the Middle East against the 
United States. In the committee's June 16 hearing, Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Miller, explained 
that,

          [B]oth General O'Reilly and I, along with others, 
        have briefed the Russians, at various times and in 
        various fora, on the Phased Adaptive Approach for 
        Europe. My first one was with Ambassador Kislyak the 
        day of the announcement, in September, of the Phased 
        Adaptive Approach. We've gone through each of the 
        phases, including, in detail, phases three and four.

    Lt. Gen. O'Reilly made clear that Russian officials 
understood the full breadth of U.S. plans, and that these plans 
would not undermine Russia's strategic deterrent:

          I also have briefed Russian officials in Moscow, a 
        rather large group of them in October of 2009. I went 
        through . . . all four phases of the Phased Adaptive 
        Approach, especially phase four. And while the missiles 
        that we have selected for--as interceptors in phase 
        four, as Dr. Miller says, provide a very effective 
        defense for a regional-type threat, they are not of the 
        size that have a long range to be able to reach . . . 
        strategic missile fields. And it's a very verifiable 
        property of these missiles, given their size and the 
        Russian expertise in understanding what the missiles' 
        capabilities will be, given the size of the missiles 
        that we're planning to deploy and develop. It was not a 
        very controversial topic of the fact that a missile, 
        given this size of a payload, could not reach their 
        strategic fields.

    He went on to explain:


          I have briefed the Russians, personally in Moscow, on 
        every aspect of our missile defense development. I 
        believe they understand what that is. And that--those 
        plans for development are not limited by this Treaty.


    All of these briefings occurred before Russia signed the 
treaty on April 8, 2010. The committee notes that the Russian 
Government understands the United States' missile defense plans 
for the ten-year life of the treaty, and it signed the treaty 
anyway. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov 
reportedly stated later to a Russian parliamentary committee:

          There has never been a goal to restrict the 
        development of either the U.S. or global missile-
        defense system through this treaty. This treaty has no 
        such restrictions. Whether this treaty is ratified or 
        not, the United States under this administration will 
        act toward implementing the so-called Phased Adaptive 
        Approach to a four-stage process of creating a global 
        missile-defense system.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\``START Does Not Aim to Restrict Development of U.S. Missile-
defense System--Ministry,'' Moscow Interfax in English, 1100 GMT July 
6, 2010.

    Russian President Medvedev explained the Russian view 
regarding the unilateral statement during a television 
interview in April 2010. His statement makes clear that Russia 
is going to continue to press its concerns about U.S. missile 
defense plans and actions. But he also explained that the 
unilateral statement was not intended to signal that the 
Russian Federation intended to pull out of the treaty in short 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
order:

          That does not mean that if the USA starts developing 
        missile defense the treaty would automatically be 
        invalidated, but it does create an additional argument 
        that binds us and that makes it possible for us to 
        raise the question of whether quantitative change to 
        missile defense systems would affect the fundamental 
        circumstances underlying the treaty. If we see that 
        developments do indeed represent a fundamental change 
        in circumstances, we would have to raise the issue with 
        our American partners. But I would not want to create 
        the impression that any changes would be construed as 
        grounds for suspending a treaty that we have only just 
        signed.

    President Medvedev clearly did say, as the April 7 
unilateral statement had stated, that Russia might need to 
reconsider whether it would remain Party to the treaty if 
fundamental changes in circumstances related to U.S. missile 
defense activities arose that undermined Russia's strategic 
nuclear deterrent. As discussed above, barring an unexpected 
technological breakthrough, the committee does not foresee any 
possibility that U.S. missile defense capabilities will in any 
way threaten Russia's deterrent over the lifetime of the 
treaty. Having said that, Russia is entitled to take advantage 
of Article XIV's withdrawal clause if it determines that the 
limitations the treaty places on the United States' strategic 
offensive arms are not sufficient to offset threats to its 
supreme interests that it perceives have developed. The 
committee nevertheless supports the inclusion of withdrawal 
clauses similar to that in Article XIV in this and future 
strategic arms control treaties as a way to protect American 
national security interests.
    Lt. Gen. Scowcroft urged the committee to put Russian 
statements about missile defense in perspective: ``I would say 
that on both sides, this is an issue of domestic politics. The 
Treaty is amply clear. It does not restrict us. Would the 
Russians like it to restrict us? Yes, of course. I do not think 
there is substance to this argument.''
    Indeed, Russia has attempted to use previous arms control 
treaties to get the United States to change course on missile 
defense. At the time of the signing of the START Treaty, when 
the ABM Treaty remained in force, the Soviet Union issued a 
unilateral statement similar to that issued this year.

          This Treaty may be effective and viable only under 
        conditions of compliance with the treaty between the 
        U.S. and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
        Missile Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972.
          The extraordinary events referred to in Article XVI 
        of this Treaty also include events related to 
        withdrawal by one of the Parties from the Treaty on the 
        Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or 
        related to its material breach.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\The full text of the unilateral statement is available at: 
http://www.dod.gov/acq/acic/treaties/start1/other/other--
statements.htm.

    Despite this warning, the United States withdrew from the 
ABM Treaty in 2002, and the Russian Federation continued to 
fully implement the START Treaty until its expiration in 
December 2009. Pursuant to the Russian law that approved the 
START II Treaty, however, in 2002, after the United States 
completed its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced 
that it would not bring the START II Treaty into force and 
would no longer consider itself to be bound by its terms.
    In the committee's May 25 hearing, Secretary of Defense 
Gates offered a lengthy explanation of past Russian attitudes 
on missile defense and why advocates of missile defenses should 
not be concerned that this treaty somehow undercuts U.S. 
missile defense efforts:

          So, from the very beginning of this process, more 
        than 40 years ago, the Russians have hated missile 
        defense. They hated it even more in 1983, when Ronald 
        Reagan--when President Reagan made his speech, saying 
        we were going to do strategic missile defense. And so, 
        the notion that this Treaty has somehow focused this 
        antagonism on the part of the Russians, toward missile 
        defense, all I would say is, it's the latest chapter in 
        a long line of Russian objections to our proceeding 
        with missile defense. And, frankly, I think it's 
        because--particularly in the `70s and `80s, and 
        probably equally now, it's because we can afford it and 
        they can't. And we're going to be able to build a good 
        one, and are building a good one, and they probably 
        aren't. And they don't want to devote the resources to 
        it, so they try and stop us from doing it, through 
        political means. This Treaty doesn't accomplish that 
        for them.

U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Missile Defense

    In June 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin issued a joint 
statement on a Global Protection System against ballistic 
missiles; the two Presidents agreed ``that their two nations 
should work together with allies and other interested states in 
developing a concept for such a system.''\17\ In its resolution 
providing its advice and consent to ratification of the START 
II Treaty, the Senate stated that it was the sense of the 
Senate that ``[d]efenses against ballistic missiles are 
essential for new deterrent strategies and for new strategies 
should deterrence fail.'' It further stated that it was the 
sense of the Senate that the governments of the United States 
and the Russian Federation should ``promptly undertake 
discussions based on the Joint Statement to move forward 
cooperatively in the development and deployment of defenses 
against ballistic missiles.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\``Joint United States-Russian Statement on a Global Protection 
System,'' Washington, 
D.C., June 17, 1992; available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu / 
research / publicpapers. php ? id = 4445 & year = 1992 & month = 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In July 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed ``to 
continue the discussion concerning the establishment of 
cooperation in responding to the challenge of ballistic missile 
proliferation.''\18\ The February 2010 BMDR Report went on to 
say that the executive branch was giving ``special emphasis to 
renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense.''\19\ At 
the April 8, 2010, signing of the New START Treaty, President 
Obama stated that President Medvedev and he:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\The White House, ``Joint Statement by Dmitry A. Medvedev, 
President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the 
United States of America, on Missile Defense Issues,'' July 6, 2009; 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-
Statement-by-Dmitry-A-Medvedev-President-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-
Barack-Obama-President-of-the-United-States-of-America-on-Missile-
Defense-Issues/. 
    \19\BDMR Report, p. 34.

          have also agreed to expand our discussions on missile 
        defense. This will include regular exchanges of 
        information about our threat assessments, as well as 
        the completion of a joint assessment of emerging 
        ballistic missiles. And as these assessments are 
        completed, I look forward to launching a serious 
        dialogue about Russian-American cooperation on missile 
        defense.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\The White House, ``Remarks by President Obama and President 
Medvedev of Russia at New START Treaty Signing Ceremony and Press 
Conference,'' Prague, Czech Republic, April 8, 2010; available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-
president-medvedev-russia-new-start-treaty-signing-cere.

    The committee feels that there are indeed opportunities for 
the United States and Russia to cooperate on missile defense. 
Given Russia's proximity to Iran, that country's development of 
medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles potentially 
threatens Russia every bit as much as it does the United States 
and its European allies. As noted in the BMDR Report, Russian 
radars based in the south of that country could contribute 
useful warning and tracking data to a European missile defense 
system. Possibilities may well exist for the United States and 
Russia to begin by discussing how their tracking systems might 
communicate with one another. Defeating shorter range missiles, 
a mission in which the United States has been particularly 
active in recent years, might also prove a fruitful area in 
which to pursue cooperation.

Recommendations to the Senate

    In 1996, the Senate made clear in its resolution of advice 
and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty that missile 
defense would be an essential element of deterrence in the 21st 
century. As noted above, Congress enacted the National Missile 
Defense Act of 1999 to set U.S. missile defense policy. The 
committee recommends that the resolution of advice and consent 
to ratification of the New START Treaty similarly include 
provisions regarding missile defense. The committee recommends 
that the Senate's resolution of advice and consent include an 
understanding, to be included in the United States' instrument 
of ratification, that:

   The New START Treaty does not impose any limitations 
        on the deployment of missile defenses other than the 
        requirements of paragraph 3 of Article V of the New 
        START Treaty, which states, ``Each Party shall not 
        convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM 
        launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors 
        therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall 
        not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for 
        placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision 
        shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted 
        prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of 
        missile defense interceptors therein.'';
   Any additional New START Treaty limitations on the 
        deployment of missile defenses beyond those contained 
        in paragraph 3 of Article V, including any limitations 
        agreed under the auspices of the Bilateral Consultative 
        Commission, would require an amendment to the New START 
        Treaty which may enter into force for the United States 
        only with the advice and consent of the Senate, as set 
        forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
        Constitution of the United States; and
   The April 7, 2010, unilateral statement by the 
        Russian Federation on missile defense does not impose a 
        legal obligation on the United States.

    Given the reported testimony of Russia's deputy foreign 
minister on this aspect of the treaty, the committee believes 
that the Government of the Russian Federation has a similar 
understanding.
    The committee recommends that the resolution also declare 
that further limitations on the missile defense capabilities of 
the United States are not in the national security interest of 
the United States, and that it call for regular briefings from 
the executive branch on missile defense issues related to the 
treaty and on U.S.-Russia missile defense dialogue and 
cooperation. To help ensure that the BCC is not used in a 
manner that would undermine U.S. missile defense options, the 
committee recommends that the resolution also call for 
briefings before and after each BCC meeting.
    As noted above, the committee recommends that the 
resolution of advice and consent include a condition requiring 
the President to certify that provision of telemetric 
information to the Russian Federation is not required by the 
treaty for the launch of a missile defense interceptor, 
satellite launches, launches of missile defense sensor or 
intercept targets, or any missile described in clause (a) of 
paragraph 7 of Article III of the treaty.

               CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE SYSTEMS

    The United States is currently exploring a range of options 
for CPGS capability to strike targets anywhere in the world in 
an hour or less. The Department of Defense is examining CPGS 
within the context of its portfolio of all non-nuclear long-
range strike capabilities, including land-based and sea-based 
systems as well as standoff and/or penetrating bombers. 
According to the Department of State, investment 
recommendations stemming from this study will be reflected in 
the FY 2012 budget submission.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and 
Implementation, ``Conventional Prompt Global Strike,'' April 8, 2010, 
available at http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/139913.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States entered into negotiations on a 
replacement for the original START Treaty with a goal of 
ensuring that it maintains the ability to deploy conventional 
strategic-range systems. The chief U.S. negotiator of the New 
START Treaty, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and 
Compliance Rose Gottemoeller, told the committee at its hearing 
on June 15, 2010:

          We were firm during the negotiations that the treaty 
        must allow for strategic missiles [of] conventional 
        configuration and also that future non-nuclear systems 
        of strategic range that do not otherwise meet the 
        definitions of the treaty should not be considered new 
        kinds of strategic offensive arms for the purposes of 
        this treaty.

    The Secretary of Defense's Representative to the Post-START 
Negotiations, Dr. Edward L. Warner III, explained that, with 
this goal in mind, the United States ``agreed to a permit-and-
count regime whereby conventionally armed ICBMs or SLBMs would 
be permitted but counted under the strategic delivery vehicle 
and strategic warhead ceilings.'' Thus, the New START Treaty 
makes no distinction between those ICBMs and SLBMs--as those 
terms are defined by the treaty--that carry nuclear warheads 
and those that carry non-nuclear warheads. Non-nuclear 
strategic delivery systems that otherwise satisfy the defined 
range criteria would count toward the treaty's limits on 
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; their associated 
warheads; and deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy 
bombers.
    This approach largely matches that taken by the START 
Treaty. It is important to note, however, that START 
attributed, for each ICBM and SLBM, a total number of warheads 
against the warhead limit, often based on the total number of 
warheads--non-nuclear or nuclear--such ICBM or SLBM had been 
shown to be capable of fielding. Thus, an ICBM or SLBM armed 
with a single conventional warhead under the original START 
Treaty would have counted as having the attributable number of 
warheads assigned to that particular ICBM or SLBM even if that 
attribution number was far greater than the actual number of 
conventional warheads deployed on the missile. By contrast, 
only the number of conventional warheads actually deployed on 
each ICBM or SLBM--which may well be just one, for CPGS 
systems--would count toward the limits under the New START 
Treaty. (In addition, beyond its limitation on strategic 
delivery vehicles, START also explicitly barred the Parties 
from deploying ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 
kilometers on surface ships; New START contains no such 
prohibition.)
    There are reasons for limiting ICBMs and SLBMs in the same 
way whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads. It 
would be extremely difficult to verify compliance with a treaty 
that attempted to count conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs 
differently than nuclear-tipped ICBMs and SLBMs that otherwise 
shared the same physical characteristics. A ballistic missile 
capable of carrying a conventional warhead over 5,500 
kilometers, or capable of being launched from a submarine and 
travelling over 600 kilometers, would be equally capable of 
delivering a nuclear payload. It is not possible to use 
national technical means of verification to determine from a 
distance whether a given missile holds nuclear or non-nuclear 
payloads under its nose cone. It is therefore not reasonable to 
expect one country to accept mutual limits to nuclear-armed 
missiles, while tolerating the other country's unlimited 
deployment of the same kinds of long-range missiles based only 
on the promise that those latter missiles are carrying non-
nuclear warheads. It would be too easy in that situation for 
the second country to use its conventionally armed missiles as 
a mask for covertly-deployed nuclear ones, or for a nuclear 
breakout capability, and thus acquire superiority over the 
other side's strategic forces. By basing treaty limits on the 
properties of the delivery vehicle, parties to a treaty can be 
more confident that the other side is not gaining an advantage 
by cheating on the treaty's limits in plain sight.
    The preamble to the New START Treaty contains a statement 
that both sides are ``[m]indful of the impact of conventionally 
armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.'' The language 
does not impose a binding obligation on the Parties. In an 
answer for the record, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. 
Warner offered some explanation of Russian concerns regarding 
non-nuclear strategic-range options:

          It appears that Russia believes the deployment of 
        conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs would have an 
        impact on strategic stability, if they were accurate 
        and numerous enough to hold at risk a significant 
        portion of Russia's deployed strategic deterrent 
        systems. Russian commentators have raised the concern 
        that the threshold for launching conventionally-armed 
        ICBMs and SLBMs might be lower than that for launching 
        a nuclear-armed missile, and that this would be 
        destabilizing. Finally, Russian observers have also 
        expressed concerns about the possibility that one would 
        not be able to determine whether a conventionally-armed 
        ICBM or SLBM in flight was, in fact, conventionally-
        armed, and whether it was being targeted on a third 
        country or on Russia.

    Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner added that 
Russia did not have any reason to fear U.S. CPGS capabilities 
over the life of this treaty, because those systems would not 
be aimed at Russia and would be deployed in insufficient 
numbers to threaten Russia's strategic offensive capabilities:

          If the United States chooses to acquire conventional 
        prompt global strike systems, such systems would not be 
        acquired for use against Russia. Moreover, because any 
        U.S. plans for acquiring conventional prompt global 
        strike systems would be limited to [a] small number of 
        such systems, Russia could be assured that they would 
        not pose a threat to the survivability of the Russian 
        nuclear deterrent.

    The committee agrees that the conventionally armed 
strategic-range systems that the United States might deploy 
over the life of the treaty will not undermine strategic 
stability between the United States and the Russian Federation, 
and it recommends that the Senate's resolution of advice and 
consent to ratification of the treaty include a declaration to 
this effect. Most such systems are still only in the early 
stages of research and development, and the treaty-limited 
systems that might be available for deployment within a few 
years (e.g., ICBMs or SLBMs with a conventional payload) would 
be so expensive as to warrant use only against the highest 
priority time-sensitive targets.
    Pursuant to the Eighth Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the 
Protocol, the Parties also agreed that, considering military 
utility, they will simultaneously place only non-nuclear 
objects other than reentry vehicles and nuclear-armed reentry 
vehicles on a front section of an ICBM or SLBM. Thus, ICBMs and 
SLBMs would not be deployed with both nuclear and non-nuclear 
reentry vehicles at the same time. The State Department's 
article-by-article analysis explains that ``[t]his statement is 
premised on the shared assumption that there is no military 
utility in carrying nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed 
reentry vehicles on the same ICBM or SLBM.'' One effect of this 
agreement is to remove one possible reason for Russian concern 
regarding U.S. CPGS programs.
    The committee examined extensively whether the treaty's 
limits on strategic offensive arms would allow the United 
States to deploy simultaneously a sufficiently robust CPGS 
capability and an appropriately sized nuclear deterrent. The 
executive branch made clear that it believed that the treaty's 
limits were certainly sufficient to accommodate the level of 
CPGS deployments that is foreseeable over the lifetime of the 
treaty. In an answer for the record, the Secretary of Defense 
stated:

          As envisaged by our military planners, the number of 
        such conventionally armed delivery vehicles and the 
        warheads they carry would be very small when measured 
        against the overall levels of strategic delivery 
        systems and strategic warheads. Should we decide to 
        deploy them, counting this small number of conventional 
        strategic systems and their warheads toward the treaty 
        limits will not prevent the United States from 
        maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent.

    Admiral Mullen concurred, stating on March 26, 2010, that 
the treaty ``protects our ability to develop a conventional 
global strike capability should that be required.'' When he 
testified before the committee on June 16, 2010, Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Miller went on to 
explain:

          While our analysis of non-nuclear prompt global 
        strike is still underway, DOD has concluded that any 
        deployment of conventionally armed ICBMs or SLBMs with 
        a traditional trajectory, which would count under the 
        treaty limits, should be limited to a niche capability. 
        That's based on military considerations. The required 
        number could easily be accounted for under the treaty's 
        limits while still retaining a robust nuclear triad. 
        [Emphasis added.]

    The committee sees no reason to doubt statements by the 
cognizant civilian and uniformed military officials that, at 
least over the ten-year duration of the treaty, the treaty's 
limits provide sufficient room to accommodate both the 
strategic nuclear forces and the limited number of CPGS weapons 
the United States is likely to deploy. The committee concurs 
that the New START Treaty's limits appear to provide, over at 
least the treaty's ten-year duration, sufficient margins in 
which to deploy those CPGS systems that would meet the treaty's 
definitions and therefore are subject to Article II's limits.
    Moreover, the United States is also exploring CPGS 
capabilities that would not meet the definitions of ICBMs, 
SLBMs, or heavy bombers in the treaty, and which therefore 
would not count toward the treaty's limits. At the committee's 
hearing on June 16, 2010, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy Miller stated:

          DOD is also exploring the potential of conventionally 
        armed long-range systems that fly a non-ballistic 
        trajectory; for example, boost-glide systems. We are 
        confident that such non-nuclear systems, which do not 
        otherwise meet the definitions for the New START 
        Treaty, would not be accountable as, ``new kinds of 
        strategic offensive arms,'' for the purposes of the 
        treaty.

    To be counted under the treaty's limits as a deployed ICBM, 
the weapon-delivery vehicle must be a land-based ballistic 
missile--that is, ``a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a 
ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path,'' pursuant 
to the definition contained in paragraph 6 of Part One of the 
Protocol--with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers. To be 
counted as a deployed SLBM, the weapon-delivery vehicle must be 
``a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers 
of a type, any one of which has been contained in, or launched 
from, a submarine.'' Thus, a land-based weapon-delivery vehicle 
that had a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers but that did not 
have a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path would 
not count as an ICBM; similarly, a weapon-delivery vehicle of a 
type, any one of which has been contained in, or launched from, 
a submarine, that had a range in excess of 600 kilometers, but 
that did not have a ballistic trajectory over most of its 
flight path would not count as an SLBM.
    The treaty contemplates that strategic offensive arms may 
emerge that do not meet the definitions of the items limited by 
Article II, and provides a mechanism for discussing the 
situation. Specifically, Article V, paragraph 2 of the treaty 
states that ``When a Party believes that a new kind of 
strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the 
right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm 
for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.'' 
In its article-by-article analysis, the Department of State 
explained its position with respect to counting strategic-range 
non-nuclear weapons that do not otherwise meet the definitions 
in the treaty:

          The Parties understand that they may use the BCC to 
        discuss whether new kinds of arms are subject to the 
        treaty. The United States stated that it would not 
        consider future, strategic range non-nuclear systems 
        that do not otherwise meet the definitions of this 
        treaty to be ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms'' 
        for purposes of the treaty. The Parties understand 
        that, if one Party deploys a new kind of strategic 
        range arm for delivering non-nuclear weapons that it 
        asserts is not a ``new kind of strategic offensive 
        arm'' subject to the treaty, and the other Party 
        challenges that assertion, the deploying Party would be 
        obligated to attempt to resolve the issue within the 
        framework of the BCC. There is no requirement in the 
        treaty for the deploying Party to delay deployment of 
        the new system pending such resolution. [Emphasis 
        added.]

    Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller informed the committee, in 
response to a question for the record, that the United States 
expressed a similar view during negotiations for the original 
START Treaty regarding whether it was necessary to delay 
deployment of new kinds of strategic offensive arms while the 
Parties discussed how they might be handled under that treaty. 
When asked whether Russia agreed with the U.S. approach 
regarding the treatment of strategic-range non-nuclear systems 
that do not meet the definitions of the treaty, Assistant 
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner stated for the record: 
``The Russian Federation did not make a definitive statement 
regarding this matter.''
    The committee agrees that the United States need not delay, 
in any way, the research, development, testing, evaluation, and 
deployment of strategic-range non-nuclear weapons systems that 
do not otherwise meet the definitions of the treaty while a 
question is discussed in the BCC concerning whether such a 
system is a new kind of strategic offensive arm. The committee 
notes that the Department of Defense has instructed personnel 
that New START will not impede U.S. research and development of 
CPGS systems. A September 3, 2010, memorandum from the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
provided in a letter of September 13, 2010, from the Secretary 
of Defense to the ranking member of the committee, states:

          The New START Treaty does not in any way limit or 
        constrain research, development, testing, and 
        evaluation (RDT&E) of any strategic concepts or 
        systems, including prompt global strike capabilities. 
        It is essential that the Department continue to conduct 
        RDT&E on a wide range of advanced strategic concepts 
        and systems, irrespective of whether or not such 
        systems, if procured, would be accountable under the 
        New START Treaty.

    The committee recommends that the Senate's resolution of 
advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty 
contain an understanding, which would be included in the 
instrument of ratification provided to the Government of the 
Russian Federation, that parallels the statements on this point 
that were made by the United States in the negotiations.
    As the United States proceeds with its development of CPGS 
systems, however, it would be wise to consider, inter alia, how 
each proposed system might be affected by New START and how 
each system could be deployed so as to minimize the risk that 
it would be mistaken for a nuclear-armed weapons system. The 
committee recommends that the Senate's resolution of advice and 
consent to ratification of the New START Treaty include a 
requirement that the President submit a report to the Armed 
Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate that 
will address these issues regarding the CPGS systems that are 
currently under development. The committee further recommends 
that the President be required to consult with the Senate if 
the President ever concludes that the needed number of 
conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs cannot be accommodated 
within the New START limits while sustaining a robust nuclear 
triad.
    Some have questioned whether it was wise not to 
specifically exclude tests of CPGS systems from the telemetric 
information exchange provisions of Article IX of the New START 
Treaty. The committee notes that some such systems would be 
excluded from the treaty in any event, because they will not 
meet any of the definitions of systems covered by the treaty. 
In any case, the telemetric information exchange provision does 
not require the exchange of telemetry on any given test; it 
merely provides a framework within which the Parties might 
agree to exchange such telemetry. One reason why the United 
States might find it in our national security interest to 
exchange such telemetry would be for the purpose of 
demonstrating that the system in question did not qualify as a 
strategic offensive arm under the treaty (e.g., that its range 
was too low or that the weapon-delivery vehicle did not have a 
ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path). Another 
reason might be that the Russian Federation was prepared to 
exchange telemetry from an especially interesting Russian test 
in return for this U.S. telemetry.
    The committee believes that it would be prudent to require 
that the President, before agreeing to exchange telemetry on a 
test launch of a conventional prompt global strike system, 
certify to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed 
Services in the Senate that the provision of such information 
is either to demonstrate that such system is not limited by 
Article II of the New START Treaty or to receive in return 
significant telemetric information of a system deployed by the 
Russian Federation prior to December 5, 2009. The committee 
further recommends that the President be required to certify 
that such telemetry exchange is in the national security 
interest of the United States and that it will not undermine 
the effectiveness of the system being tested.

                     NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    The United States has sought for at least two decades to 
limit and secure shorter-range, non-strategic nuclear weapons 
(also known as ``tactical'' or ``theater'' nuclear weapons). 
These weapons threaten to blur the distinction in 
decisionmakers' minds between conventional and nuclear war, 
even though the actual use of ``non-strategic'' nuclear weapons 
in war should be expected to produce physical effects--and 
international political consequences--much closer to those of 
``strategic'' nuclear systems than to any conventional weapon. 
By virtue of their small size, mobility, and potential for 
widely dispersed deployment, numerous concerns have also been 
expressed about the possibility that non-strategic weapons 
could be stolen and used by a terrorist group.
    Russia provides extremely little transparency regarding the 
number, location, and deployment status of its non-strategic 
nuclear weapons. (The United States does not publicly disclose 
information about the size of its non-strategic deployments.) 
Russia's lack of transparency contributes to widely varying 
estimates of the number of non-strategic weapons that it 
deploys or has stockpiled. One open source estimate concludes 
that Russia deploys about 2,000 non-strategic weapons.\22\ The 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 
States cited unnamed ``senior Russian experts'' who have 
estimated that Russia possesses some 3,800 non-strategic 
operational warheads.\23\ Despite the uncertainty surrounding 
the size of Russia's operational non-strategic arsenal, there 
is wide agreement that the United States, in partnership with 
its NATO allies, deploys far fewer non-strategic weapons in 
Europe than Russia does in its territory.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, ``Russian Nuclear 
Forces,'' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2010; 
available at http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/4337066824700113/
fulltext.pdf. 
    \23\William J. Perry, Chairman and James R. Schlesinger, Vice-
Chairman, America's Strategic Posture, The Final Report of the 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, 
Washington, D.C., May 6, 2009 (available at http://www.usip.org/files/
America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf), p. 13.
    \24\Russia is not believed to deploy non-strategic nuclear forces 
outside its national territory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Strategic Posture Commission concluded that, ``As part 
of its effort to compensate for weaknesses in its conventional 
forces, Russia's military leaders are putting more emphasis on 
non-strategic nuclear forces . . ..'' Russia, in the 
Commission's view, ``no longer sees itself as capable of 
defending its vast territory and nearby interests with 
conventional forces.''\25\ As Russia reduces the number of 
warheads deployed on strategic delivery systems, the relative 
importance of its non-strategic arsenal will increase. (The 
Strategic Posture Commission argued, however, that, while the 
size of Russia's non-strategic nuclear arsenal must be a 
consideration for the United States in its nuclear force 
planning, the United States need not seek numerical equality to 
Russia in non-strategic nuclear forces.) The Commission also 
noted that the current imbalance between U.S. and Russian non-
strategic nuclear warheads is ``worrisome to some U.S. allies 
in Central Europe,'' an analysis that Secretary Gates echoed in 
his testimony before the committee.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\Perry and Schlesinger, America's Strategic Posture, p. 12.
    \26\Ibid, p. 21
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite its concerns about Russia's non-strategic nuclear 
forces, the Strategic Posture Commission concluded in early 
2009 that the next step in U.S.-Russian arms control should be 
to ensure that there is a successor to the START Treaty. It 
cautioned against over-reaching for innovative approaches in 
the negotiations on that successor treaty, and instead 
envisioned discussing non-strategic nuclear forces in a follow-
on to START-replacement negotiations.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\Ibid, pp. 66-68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The administration followed this recommendation: like the 
START Treaty, the START II Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty, the 
New START Treaty does not address non-strategic nuclear 
weapons. Presidents Obama and Medvedev in their April 2009 
joint statement and their July 2009 joint understanding made 
clear from the outset that the purpose of the treaty was to 
replace the START Treaty and further reduce and limit 
``strategic offensive arms,'' thus excluding non-strategic 
nuclear weapons from the negotiations. Article I of the New 
START Treaty therefore requires the Parties to reduce and limit 
their strategic offensive arms. As noted in the State 
Department's article-by-article analysis, the term ``strategic 
offensive arms'' is not defined in the New START Treaty--as was 
the case in the preceding START Treaty. ``Strategic,'' 
according to the State Department, indicates that, in general, 
the forces covered are those of intercontinental range, while 
``offensive'' is in contrast to defensive strategic arms, such 
as ballistic missile defense systems. Articles II and III 
establish that the term ``strategic offensive arms'' applies in 
this treaty to: deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; their 
associated warheads; and deployed and non-deployed ICBM 
launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. Part One of the 
Protocol defines each of these terms based on the range of the 
systems, and on other criteria.
    Ballistic missiles and bombers that do not satisfy the 
range and other criteria established for ICBMs, SLBMs, and 
heavy bombers are not limited by the treaty, even if they are 
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. (The INF Treaty, which 
remains in force for the United States and the Russian 
Federation, does prohibit either side from possessing ground-
launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles 
with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers.) Similarly, cruise 
missiles, long-range missiles that do not have a ballistic 
trajectory over most of their flight path, and aircraft that 
are capable of delivering a nuclear gravity bomb, but that do 
not meet the heavy bomber range criteria, are not limited by 
the New START Treaty.
    In its consideration of the New START Treaty, the committee 
focused much attention on the continued lack of a formal 
bilateral arms control agreement, other than the INF Treaty, 
governing non-strategic nuclear weapons. Secretary Schlesinger 
called the issue of Russia's deployment of relatively numerous 
non-strategic nuclear forces ``frustrating, vexatious, and 
increasingly worrisome,'' although he did note that he had not 
anticipated that the New START negotiations would address the 
issue, and that he saw the New START Treaty as a precursor to 
negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons. Secretaries 
Perry and Kissinger, as well as Lt. Gen. Scowcroft, all 
concurred with Secretary Schlesinger that, in Secretary 
Kissinger's words, non-strategic nuclear weapons ``will have to 
be included in any further deliberations.'' Indeed, Secretary 
Kissinger argued that the New START Treaty was ``probably the 
last agreement on strategic arms that can be made without 
taking tactical nuclear weapons into account.''
    In an answer for the record to a question, the Secretary of 
State explained why the administration did not seek to include 
limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons in the New START 
Treaty:

          A more ambitious treaty that addressed tactical 
        nuclear weapons would have taken much longer to 
        complete, adding significantly to the time before a 
        successor agreement, including verification measures, 
        could enter into force following START's expiration in 
        December 2009.

    Beyond the issue of timing, the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense, in an answer for the record, offered a 
rationale for not addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons in 
these negotiations:

          Because of their limited range and very different 
        roles from those played by strategic nuclear forces, 
        the vast majority of Russian tactical nuclear weapons 
        could not directly influence the strategic nuclear 
        balance between the United States and Russia. [For 
        example] Russian nuclear-armed sea launched cruise 
        missiles, which could be launched from attack 
        submarines deployed off U.S. coasts, hold locations in 
        the United States at risk, but could not threaten 
        deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (which 
        will comprise a significant fraction of U.S. strategic 
        forces under New START), and would pose a very limited 
        threat to the hundreds of silo-based ICBMs that the 
        United States will retain under New START. Because the 
        United States will retain a robust strategic force 
        structure under New START, Russia's tactical nuclear 
        weapons will have little or no impact on strategic 
        stability.

    In response to another question for the record, the 
Secretaries pointed out, ``We did not make this [i.e., reducing 
non-strategic nuclear weapons] an objective for this agreement, 
because from the outset the New START Treaty was intended to 
replace the START Treaty, which was about strategic offensive 
forces.''
    General Chilton stated in response to a question for the 
record that there remain important differences between 
strategic and non-strategic nuclear systems, and that the 
United States could call upon capabilities other than non-
strategic nuclear weapons to address Russian capabilities:

          Under the assumptions of limited range and different 
        roles, Russian tactical nuclear weapons do not directly 
        influence the strategic balance between the US and 
        Russia. Though numerical asymmetry exists in the 
        numbers of tactical nuclear weapons the [United States] 
        has and we estimate Russia possesses, when considered 
        within the context of our total capability and given 
        force levels as structured in New START, this asymmetry 
        is not assessed to substantially affect the strategic 
        stability between the [United States] and Russia. 
        Furthermore, within the regional context, the [United 
        States] relies on multiple capabilities, including its 
        superior conventional force capabilities, tactical 
        nuclear capabilities, U.S. strategic nuclear 
        capabilities, ballistic missile defenses, and allied 
        capabilities, to support extended deterrence and power 
        projection.

    Nevertheless, in its Nuclear Posture Review report, the 
administration stated that it was a goal to: ``Engage Russia, 
after ratification and entry into force of New START, in 
negotiations aimed at achieving substantial further nuclear 
force reductions and transparency that would cover all nuclear 
weapons--deployed and non-deployed, strategic and 
nonstrategic.''\28\ The Secretary of State elaborated in an 
answer to a question for the record:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010; available at http://
www.defense.gov/npr/docs/
2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf. 

          It is the U.S. view that in any future reductions, 
        our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase 
        transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons in 
        Europe, relocate these weapons away from the territory 
        of NATO members, and include non-strategic nuclear 
        weapons in the next round of U.S.-Russian arms control 
        discussions alongside strategic and non-deployed 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        nuclear weapons.

    The Secretary of State stated in an answer to another 
question for the record that ``President Medvedev has expressed 
interest in further discussions on measures to further reduce 
both nations' nuclear arsenals.'' Nevertheless, former 
Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger argued that such a next step, 
while necessary, will likely prove to be exceedingly difficult 
to negotiate. Critics argue that this difficulty will be all 
the greater because the United States has given up so much that 
there is nothing left to offer in return for Russian 
willingness to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons. Former 
Secretary of Defense Perry noted in a committee hearing, 
however, that Russia still has deep concerns regarding the 
United States' capacity to upload nuclear bombs and warheads 
from its significant reserve stockpile on its existing heavy 
bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs. The Secretary of State's answer for 
the record suggests that the executive branch, at least, 
believes that each side will have something to gain in follow-
on negotiations.
    The committee recommends that the Senate include in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the New 
START Treaty a declaration calling upon the President to begin 
discussions with Russia as soon as possible on tactical nuclear 
weapons. It will be ever more difficult, if not impossible, to 
make additional progress on measures to limit or reduce 
strategic offensive arms if tactical nuclear weapons are not 
also addressed. An early priority in such efforts should be 
enhancing the transparency each side is willing to offer to the 
other regarding the size, location, deployment status, and 
security of these forces.

                           NEGOTIATING RECORD

    As part of the committee's consideration of the treaty, and 
in particular in its evaluation of any effect the treaty might 
have on current and future U.S. missile defense efforts, 
several Members of the committee requested that the executive 
branch provide the ``full negotiating record'' of the treaty, 
which was to include all draft versions of the treaty, all 
memoranda and notes relating to the negotiating history of the 
treaty, and any and all other relevant documents or records, 
such as drafts, memoranda, notes, statements, records of 
meetings, working papers, transcriptions, correspondence, 
letters, electronic mail, or any other form of communication 
between representatives of the United States and the Russian 
Federation. The executive branch declined to provide this 
extensive collection of information. Instead, on August 3, 
2010, the State Department provided a classified summary of 
discussions in the treaty negotiations on the issue of missile 
defense. Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs 
Richard R. Verma wrote to the committee that the summary

          [P]rovides a detailed account of the negotiations, 
        starting in April 2009 through to the conclusion in 
        March 2010, including Russian proposals regarding 
        missile defense, the negotiations in Geneva between the 
        parties as this issue evolved, and the U.S. responses 
        and counterproposals regarding the language in the 
        treaty.

    The full text of Assistant Secretary Verma's letter is 
appended to this report.
    The classified document was made available to Members of 
the committee and their appropriately cleared staff for their 
review.
    There is little precedent for the Senate to undertake a 
review of the complete negotiating record for treaties pending 
its advice and consent. When the President submits a treaty to 
the Senate for its advice and consent, he typically provides a 
detailed written analysis of the treaty's provisions. In 
addition, executive branch officials testify and respond to 
questions for the record on the treaty, including addressing 
questions about the executive branch's understanding of the 
meaning of particular treaty provisions. The Senate relies on 
these materials and testimony as representing authoritative 
statements about the treaty's meaning and effect. Consistent 
with this approach, the Senate did not review the negotiating 
record to the committee in connection with either the original 
START Treaty or the START II Treaty. Cable traffic from some 
arms control negotiations may have been provided to the Senate 
Arms Control Working Group while those negotiations progressed, 
but that accommodation to Senate interest was separate from the 
formal consideration of those treaties by the committee of 
jurisdiction.
    The one recent exception to this practice arose in 
connection with the Senate's consideration of the INF Treaty. 
In that case, in response to a request from several Senators, 
the executive branch provided access to records of the INF 
negotiations conducted in the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks 
and in ministerial and summit meetings. The documents involved 
were only those that were exchanged with Soviet negotiators. 
Then-Secretary of State George P. Shultz explained that the 
executive branch would not provide internal executive branch 
deliberative material that was not provided to the other side 
because ``such material does not reflect mutual intent of the 
parties, and therefore, cannot be used as a basis for 
interpretation of obligations.''
    The circumstances that led Senators to request to review 
materials for the INF Treaty negotiating record were unusual. 
At the time the INF Treaty was pending before the Senate, a 
debate was underway between the Reagan Administration and some 
Members of the Senate over the proper interpretation of the ABM 
Treaty, to which the United States was a party at the time. In 
connection with that debate, the State Department Legal 
Adviser, Abraham Sofaer, suggested that statements made by the 
executive branch to the Senate during the ratification process 
for the ABM Treaty did not represent authoritative statements 
about the treaty's meaning and interpretation. In testimony to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Sofaer stated that, 
``When the Senate gives its advice and consent to the treaty, 
it is [only] to the treaty that is made, irrespective of the 
explanation [that the Senate] was provided.''\29\ This proposed 
doctrine regarding treaty consideration caused great concern 
within the committee and the Senate, and in response, several 
Senators demanded that the negotiating record for the INF 
Treaty be provided when the President submitted it for Senate 
consideration early in 1988. In the words of the committee's 
report at the time, these Senators were ``underscoring the 
point that the Administration's assertions about the role of 
the Senate in treaty-making had destroyed any basis on which 
the Senate could operate in confidence of Executive good 
faith.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\Committee on Foreign Relations, ``The INF Treaty,'' Executive 
Report 100-15, April 14, 1988, p. 88. The discussion that follows draws 
extensively from that report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To respond to this erosion of trust between the Senate and 
the executive, then-Senator Biden proposed conditioning the 
Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty 
on the statement of certain principles, ``which derive, as a 
necessary implication, from the provisions of the 
Constitution.'' The committee recommended the condition in 
order to

   ``Avoid the need for other conditions pertaining to 
        specific interpretations of the INF Treaty,''
   To ``repudiate a pernicious doctrine that was 
        asserted solely for a specific purpose,'' and
   To ``establish a position with regard to future 
        treaties such that the Senate can avoid repeating the 
        inclusion of a formal condition.''

    The Senate adopted a modified version of this condition in 
the final resolution of advice and consent to ratification. As 
discussed later in this report, in the section-by-section 
analysis of the proposed resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification to the New START Treaty, the committee recommends 
citing by reference this condition as adopted by the full 
Senate.
    Having responded to the ABM Treaty interpretation 
controversy with this condition on the INF Treaty's 
ratification, the committee turned its attention to what it 
called ``the task of ensuring that Senate review of 
`negotiating records' does not become an institutionalized 
procedure.'' The rationale that the committee offered in 1988 
for recommending that the Senate not seek, as a matter of 
routine, the negotiating record in its consideration of 
treaties is worth reprinting in full today:

          First, a systematic expectation of Senate perusal of 
        every key treaty's ``negotiating record'' could be 
        expected to inhibit candor during future negotiations 
        and induce posturing on the part of U.S. negotiators 
        and their counterparts during sensitive discussions.
          Second, by seeking possession of the myriad internal 
        Executive memoranda comprising the ``negotiating 
        record,'' the Senate would impose upon itself a 
        considerable task with no clear purpose. Because this 
        ``record'' does not constitute an agreed account of the 
        negotiations, such documents have no formal standing. 
        Accordingly, regularized efforts to reconcile these 
        ``snapshots'' of the negotiation process with the 
        resulting treaty text as explained by the Executive 
        would serve only to divert the Senate's attention from 
        the central aim of the ratification process--which is 
        to build, between the Executive and the Senate, a clear 
        ``shared understanding'' of the treaty text and the 
        obligations which that text entails.
          The overall effect--of fully exposed negotiations 
        followed by a far more complicated Senate review--would 
        be to weaken the treaty-making process and thereby to 
        damage American diplomacy.
          The traditional approach does not, of course, 
        preclude references to the ``record'' where such 
        reference can be useful in explaining the effect of 
        treaty provisions which may appear ambiguous or about 
        which questions may arise. The Executive may sometimes 
        wish to initiate such reference to the ``record''; on 
        some occasions the Senate may request a detailed 
        account of the interchange which resulted in a 
        particular treaty provision. But this case-by-case 
        approach is far superior to a systematic submission of 
        the ``negotiating record,'' which implies either that 
        treaties tend to be replete with ambiguity or that the 
        Executive cannot be trusted to present an accurate 
        account of the obligations to be assumed by the United 
        States. Neither assumption should be allowed to govern 
        the basic Executive-Senate interaction in the treaty-
        making process.
          Now that the INF Treaty ``negotiating record'' has 
        been made available to the Senate, the status of these 
        documents requires resolution. In the Committee's view, 
        that resolution would not have been satisfactorily 
        achieved by any stipulation in the resolution of 
        ratification declaring that the Senate had scrutinized 
        the ``record'' and satisfied itself that the ``record'' 
        was in harmony with the formal Executive branch 
        presentation of the treaty. Such an approach could 
        entail three significant problems:
                  (a) institutionally, it could imply that such 
                scrutiny is important to the Senate's 
                examination of treaties and thus should be 
                institutionalized;
                  (b) retroactively, it could imply that such 
                scrutiny should have been exercised in the 
                past; and
                  (c) specifically, with regard to the INF 
                Treaty, it could leave open the question of 
                what is to be done if, in the future, there is 
                an assertion--for example, by a subsequent 
                Administration--that notwithstanding the 
                Senate's perception of harmony there was an 
                inconsistency between the ``record'' and the 
                Executive presentation.
          Accordingly, the Committee believes that no formal 
        finding concerning the contents of the INF Treaty 
        ``negotiating record'' would be wise. In the 
        Committee's judgment, the status of this ``record'' is 
        established by the basic principles affirmed in the 
        Biden Condition. If U.S. treaty interpretation is to be 
        based upon the shared understanding of the Senate and 
        the Executive branch at the time of ratification, and 
        if the common understanding is reflected in 
        authoritative Executive branch statements made in 
        seeking Senate consent to ratification, then sources of 
        interpretation which appear at variance must be 
        subordinated to those authoritative statements.
          In sum, although internal Executive memoranda and 
        other negotiating materials may have been available to 
        members of the Senate, some of whom have sought to 
        assure themselves that this ``record'' is consistent 
        with the Administration's formal presentation, the 
        clear corollary of the constitutional principles cited 
        in the Biden Condition is that such documents need not 
        have been examined for consistency and should not be 
        deemed material to U.S. interpretation of the INF 
        Treaty insofar as they are inconsistent with the 
        Executive branch's formal presentation of the INF 
        Treaty.


    The committee believes this analysis remains correct today.

             III. Views of the Committee on Armed Services

    Between June and August of this year, the Committee on 
Armed Services reports that it held five hearings and three 
briefings on the New START Treaty and related issues. On 
September 14, 2010, Senator Carl Levin, the committee's 
chairman, and Senator John McCain, its ranking member, each 
submitted a letter to the Foreign Relations Committee outlining 
their views on the treaty.

                         SENATOR LEVIN'S VIEWS

    Senator Levin wrote that he supported the treaty because, 
``[a]s a verifiable treaty with enduring limitations, 
ratification of the New START Treaty will provide 
predictability, confidence, transparency, and stability in the 
U.S.-Russian relationship.'' Senator Levin noted in particular 
that the treaty would restore visibility into Russia's nuclear 
arsenal that disappeared with the expiration of the START 
Treaty in December 2009, that it provides sufficient 
flexibility for the United States to meet unexpected technical 
or political developments, and that it will lead to greater 
cooperation with Russia. Senator Levin also recommended four 
points for inclusion in the resolution of ratification, all of 
which are addressed in the resolution that the committee 
recommends to the Senate.
    First, Senator Levin--noting that the only limitation on 
missile defense in the New START Treaty is the prohibition 
contained in Article V Paragraph 3 on the conversion of ICBM 
and SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor launchers and 
vice versa--recommended that the resolution include an 
understanding explicitly stating that the New START Treaty does 
not constrain U.S. missile defense plans or programs in any 
other way. Understanding 1(A) in the resolution recommended by 
the committee does precisely this.
    Second, Senator Levin wrote that the Senate should ``urge 
the President to discuss with NATO and Russia the establishment 
of limitations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons 
with the goal of reaching an agreement on reducing such 
weapons.'' Declaration 11 in the resolution recommended by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations:

          [C]alls upon the President to pursue, following 
        consultation with allies, an agreement with the Russian 
        Federation that would address the disparity between the 
        tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian 
        Federation and of the United States and would secure 
        and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable 
        manner.

    Third, Senator Levin--noting his committee's concern about 
the ability to maintain without testing the safety, security, 
and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile--wrote that 
the Senate:

          [S]hould urge the President to establish clear, 
        realistic requirements for the modernization of the 
        nuclear weapons complex, the life extension programs, 
        and the scientific, experimental, and analytical tools 
        needed by the laboratories to ensure a continued safe, 
        secure, and reliable stockpile, and to request funds as 
        needed on an annual basis to support these 
        requirements.

    Condition 9 of the resolution recommended by the Committee 
on Foreign Relations addresses this issue. It states that, 
because the United States is committed to proceeding with a 
robust stockpile stewardship program and to modernizing nuclear 
weapons production capabilities, the United States is committed 
to providing the nuclear weapons labs with, at a minimum, the 
funds called for in the President's 1251 report. If 
appropriations fail to meet those levels--or if at any time 
more resources are required--the resolution requires the 
President to submit a report detailing the impact of the 
shortfall and how the President proposes to remedy it.
    Finally, Senator Levin suggested that:

          [G]iven the concern that the absence of telemetric 
        information will reduce the confidence that the United 
        States will have in the overall capabilities of the 
        Russian strategic offensive systems, the Senate should 
        require submission of an annual report for the first 5 
        years of the New START Treaty that will assess the 
        overall adequacy of the verification and inspection 
        provisions to monitor compliance with the treaty, and 
        their ability to provide adequate information on the 
        overall capabilities of Russian strategic offensive 
        systems.

    The resolution recommended by the Committee on Foreign 
Relations addresses this concern in Condition 2(A), which 
requires the President, prior to entry into force and annually 
thereafter, to certify that U.S. NTM, combined with the 
verification activities provided for in New START, provide 
effective monitoring of Russian compliance with the treaty. 
Moreover, Condition 10 requires the President to submit to the 
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services an annual 
report certifying Russian compliance with the treaty or 
detailing its noncompliance, and assessing the operation of New 
START's transparency measures, including the exchange of 
telemetric data. Also, Declaration 6(B) states that, given its 
concerns about compliance issues, the Senate expects the 
executive branch to brief the Committees on Foreign Relations 
and Armed Services at least four times a year on any compliance 
issues that have arisen in the course of implementing the 
treaty.

                         SENATOR MCCAIN'S VIEWS

    In his letter, Senator McCain wrote, ``The New START Treaty 
represents the continuation of decades-long efforts to promote 
strategic stability with Russia through the bilateral 
reductions of our nuclear weapons arsenals.'' He added, ``I 
support many of the New START Treaty's goals,'' but he also 
said that ``a number of significant flaws must be addressed by 
the Senate prior to ratification.'' The resolution of advice 
and consent to ratification recommended by the Foreign 
Relations Committee addresses many of the issues raised by 
Senator McCain.
    First, Senator McCain wrote, ``I am strongly opposed to the 
New START Treaty's references and legally-binding limitations 
on ballistic missile defense.'' He added, ``I . . . strongly 
believe that the Resolution of Ratification must make it clear 
that any limitations on the development or deployment of 
missile defenses designed to protect the United States, its 
allies, and deployed forces will be prohibited.'' As cited 
above, Understanding 1(A) in the resolution recommended by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations says that ``the New START Treaty 
does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missile 
defenses other than the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article 
V,'' which prohibits the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers 
for missile defense interceptor launchers and vice versa. 
Declaration 1(A)(iii) in the recommended resolution notes that 
``further limitations on the missile defense capabilities of 
the United States are not in the national interest of the 
United States.'' Declaration 1(B) states:

          The New START Treaty and the April 7, 2010, 
        unilateral statement of the Russian Federation on 
        missile defense do not limit in any way, and shall not 
        be interpreted as limiting, activities that the United 
        States Government currently plans or that might be 
        required over the duration of the New START Treaty to 
        protect the United States pursuant to the National 
        Missile Defense Act of 1999, or to protect United 
        States Armed Forces and United States allies from 
        limited ballistic missile attack . . ..

    Second, Senator McCain wrote:

          The resolution of ratification should address the 
        modernization of both the weapons complex and the 
        nuclear triad. At a minimum, the resolution should 
        signal that a failure to adequately modernize could 
        jeopardize U.S. national security and, in an extreme 
        circumstance, could even constitute grounds for 
        withdrawing from the treaty.

    As noted above, Condition 9 in the resolution recommended 
by the Committee on Foreign Relations states the U.S. 
commitment to providing the nuclear weapons labs with, at a 
minimum, the funds called for in the President's 1251 report. 
If appropriations fail to meet those levels--or if at any time 
more resources are required--the resolution requires the 
President to submit a report detailing the implications of the 
shortfall and how he proposes to remedy it. Concerning the 
triad, Declaration 13 of the recommended resolution says:

          [I]t is the sense of the Senate that United States 
        deterrence and flexibility is assured by a robust triad 
        of strategic delivery vehicles. To this end, the United 
        States is committed to accomplishing the modernization 
        and replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery 
        vehicles, and to ensuring the continued flexibility of 
        United States conventional and nuclear delivery 
        systems.

    Third, Senator McCain voiced concern about the powers of 
the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC): ``The resolution 
of ratification must establish limitations for the BCC and 
prohibit any role for this Commission that risk[s] impinging on 
the Senate's Constitutional responsibilities.'' The resolution 
recommended by the Committee on Foreign Relations addresses the 
limits of the BCC in a number of places. Condition 8 provides 
close oversight, requiring the President to consult with the 
Foreign Relations Committee 15 days before any meeting of the 
BCC to consider additional measures to improve the viability or 
effectiveness of the treaty or to determine whether the treaty 
applies to a new kind of strategic offensive arm; the 
consultation will address whether any resulting proposal, if 
adopted, would require the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Declaration 6(B) states that the Senate expects the executive 
branch to provide briefings on all compliance issues addressed 
at the BCC. Understanding 1(B) indicates that any additional 
limitation on missile defense beyond that in paragraph 3 of 
Article V, including any agreed to at the BCC, would be subject 
to the advice and consent of the Senate. And Understanding 
3(D)(ii) indicates that any prohibition on the deployment of 
future strategic-range, non-nuclear weapons systems, including 
any agreed to at the BCC, would require the Senate's advice and 
consent.
    Fourth, Senator McCain wrote that, ``the Resolution of 
Ratification should assert that any future arms control 
negotiations with Russia must address reductions in Russian 
tactical nuclear weapons.'' As noted above, Declaration 11 in 
the resolution recommended by the Committee on Foreign 
Relations:

          [C]alls upon the President to pursue, following 
        consultation with allies, an agreement with the Russian 
        Federation that would address the disparity between the 
        tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian 
        Federation and of the United States and would secure 
        and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable 
        manner.

    Fifth, Senator McCain wrote that, ``the Resolution of 
Ratification should require that the President provide a plan 
for funding, developing, and deploying future CPGS capabilities 
as well as an assessment of whether such capabilities would be 
accountable under the New START Treaty.'' Condition 6 in the 
resolution recommended by the Committee on Foreign Relations 
requires the President to submit such a report to the 
Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations prior to 
entry into force of the New START Treaty.
    Finally, articulating concerns about the treaty's 
provisions on verification and telemetry, Senator McCain wrote:

          [T]he Resolution of Ratification should require the 
        President to report annually on the level of national 
        confidence in Russian compliance with the treaty. 
        Additionally . . . the United States [should] insist 
        that Russia share telemetric data on any of those new 
        strategic offensive systems developed over the duration 
        of the treaty.''

    As noted above, Condition 2(A) in the resolution 
recommended by the Committee on Foreign Relations requires the 
President, prior to entry into force and annually thereafter, 
to certify that U.S. NTM, combined with the verification 
activities provided for in New START, provide effective 
monitoring of Russian compliance with the treaty. Moreover, 
Condition 10 requires the President to submit to the Committees 
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services an annual report 
certifying Russian compliance with the treaty and assessing the 
operation of New START's transparency measures, including the 
exchange of telemetric data. Finally, Condition 7 sets up a 
framework for seeking significant Russian telemetry in return 
for any telemetry the United States provides on CPGS systems.
    The letters from Senator Levin and Senator McCain are 
reprinted below:

                                                September 14, 2010.
Hon. John Kerry,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.

Hon. Richard Lugar,
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar: The Committee 
on Armed Services has completed its review of the military 
implications of The Treaty between the United States and the 
Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, (the New START Treaty), 
signed on April 8, 2010. As requested, this letter is to 
provide you with my views on the New START Treaty and to offer 
my suggestions for issues the Foreign Relations Committee 
should consider in preparing a resolution of ratification for 
the treaty.
    The committee held 5 hearings and 3 briefings on the treaty 
and related issues between June 17, 2010 and August 6, 2010.
    The Senate Armed Services Committee's hearings allowed 
members to consider a broad range of issues associated with the 
treaty. On June 17, 2010, the Committee convened in open 
session to receive testimony on the New START Treaty and 
implications for national security from Hillary Rodham Clinton, 
Secretary of State; Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense; Dr. 
Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy; and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On July 15, 2010, the 
Committee received testimony in both open and closed session on 
sustaining nuclear weapons under the New START Treaty. 
Witnesses at this hearing included Dr. Michael R. Anastasio, 
Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory; Dr. George H. 
Miller, Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Dr. 
Paul J. Hommert, Director of Sandia National Laboratories; and 
Dr. Roy F. Schwitters, Chairman of the JASON Defense Advisory 
Group. The Committee met in open session on July 20, 2010, to 
receive testimony on implementation of the New START Treaty. 
Appearing as witnesses at this hearing were Dr. James N. 
Miller, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; 
Thomas D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration; and General Kevin P. Chilton, 
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. The Committee met in open 
session on July 27, 2010, to receive independent analyses of 
the New START Treaty from Ambassador Stephen Pifer, Director of 
the Arms Control Initiative at the Brookings Institution; 
Franklin C. Miller, Independent Consultant; Dr. John S. Foster, 
Jr., Independent Consultant; and Dr. Keith B. Payne, Professor 
and Head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic 
Studies at Missouri State University (Washington Campus). The 
Committee held its final open hearing on July 29, 2010, during 
which Senators continued to receive testimony on the New START 
Treaty from Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State 
for the Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; 
and Dr. Edward L. Warner III, Secretary of Defense 
Representative to Post-START Negotiations.
    The Committee also held three closed briefings to review 
the New START Treaty. The first of the Committee's closed 
sessions focused on the Intelligence Community's judgment of 
its ability to monitor compliance with the New START Treaty, 
while the remaining two sessions examined strategic force 
structure options for the United States and Russia, 
respectively, under the New START Treaty. The Committee 
convened on July 14, 2010, to consider the National 
Intelligence Estimate on the verifiability of the New START 
Treaty with Andrew M. Gibb, National Intelligence Officer for 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the National Intelligence 
Council, as the witness before the Committee. The Committee met 
again on July 29, 2010, to receive a briefing on the Department 
of Defense strategic force structure options under the New 
START Treaty with Dr. Edward L. Warner III, Secretary of 
Defense Representative to Post-START Negotiations on behalf of 
the Department of Defense, and Mr. Michael S. Elliott, Deputy 
Director for Plans and Policy at the U.S. Strategic Command, as 
witnesses. On August 5, 2010, the Committee met in a final 
closed session to receive a briefing on Russian strategic force 
structure under the New START Treaty. Mr. Robert D. Walpole, 
Principal Deputy Director of the National Counterproliferation 
Center, and Mr. Charles F. Monson, Deputy National Intelligence 
Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction (Ballistic and Land-
Attack Cruise Missiles) for the National Intelligence Council, 
appeared as witnesses. During these three closed-session 
meetings, the witnesses appearing before the Committee were 
accompanied by, and the Committee was able to hear from, 
representatives from the broader Intelligence Community, 
including representatives from the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), National Intelligence Council 
(NIC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and the Department 
of Energy (DOE).
    I support the New START Treaty and the limitations on 
strategic offensives arms, including ballistic missiles, 
ballistic missile launchers, heavy bombers, and nuclear 
warheads that it contains. Since the expiration of the START I 
Treaty on December 4, 2009, the United States has not had 
visibility into Russian strategic offensive nuclear arms. This 
lack of transparency as well as the lack of limitations on the 
numbers of delivery systems, if not addressed through a New 
START Treaty, will lead to increasing uncertainty by each 
country in the makeup of the other country's forces, which in 
turn could prove destabilizing in the long term. While the 
Moscow Treaty established a limit of 1,700 to 2,200 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by December 
31, 2012, that treaty contains no verification or inspection 
provisions, no definition of ``operationally deployed,'' and 
because it is not enduring, the day after the limitation must 
be achieved, it will no longer be in force.
     I believe that the Senate should grant its consent to 
ratification of the New START Treaty because ratification of 
this treaty is in the national security interest of the United 
States for many reasons. One strong reason is that we again 
will have visibility into Russian nuclear arms. As a verifiable 
treaty with enduring limitations, ratification of the New START 
Treaty will provide predictability, confidence, transparency, 
and stability in the U.S.-Russian relationship.
     As the Committee heard from Secretary of Defense Gates and 
the senior military commanders, the number of strategic 
ballistic missiles, ballistic missile launchers, heavy bombers, 
and nuclear warheads permitted under the treaty, was derived as 
a result of careful analysis of the capabilities needed to meet 
the deterrence requirements of the United States for the 
foreseeable future. The limitations in the treaty provide 
sufficient flexibility for the United States to address any 
unforeseen situation, including technical or political issues, 
through a robust nuclear triad. The limitations in the New 
START Treaty are 74 percent lower than the limitations in the 
Cold War era START I Treaty. That reflects the reality of the 
significant reductions in both warheads and delivery systems 
that both Russia and the United States have made in the 20 
years since the end of the Cold War.
    Previous treaties included prescriptive provisions, 
including provisions limiting the specific capabilities of 
specific strategic delivery systems, and the numbers of 
specific types of delivery systems that either the United 
States or Russia could possess. The New START Treaty limits the 
total numbers of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM 
launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to 
800; the total number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and 
deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to 700; 
and the total number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to 
1550 warheads, with each deployed heavy bomber equipped for 
nuclear armaments counting as one warhead. These broad limits 
allow each side to balance their respective forces as they see 
fit. For the United States, the majority of the nuclear 
warheads will be deployed at sea on SLBMs, but the flexible 
limits will also allow the United States to retain a large 
number of single warhead ICBMs and heavy bombers equipped for 
nuclear armaments. Retention of unlimited numbers of non-
deployed nuclear warheads will preserve the U.S. ability to 
upload additional warheads on the ICBMs if circumstances should 
require. In addition, this treaty will also allow the United 
States to maintain a large fleet of heavy bombers for 
conventional use only, as the treaty places no limits on heavy 
bombers that have been converted to non-nuclear use. The B-1 
bomber will no longer be counted as a heavy bomber equipped for 
nuclear armaments, once their conversion has been completed, 
and many of the B-52H bombers will also be converted to non-
nuclear capability.
    During the course of the hearings and briefings conducted 
by the Armed Services Committee on the New START Treaty, there 
was considerable discussion on whether the treaty limits U.S. 
ballistic missile defenses. The testimony was clear: the treaty 
does not contain provisions that constrain the development or 
deployment of effective or planned U.S. missile defenses. The 
only limitation in the treaty itself dealing with missile 
defense is the provision (Article V, paragraph 3) that 
prohibits the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers for 
ballistic missile defense use. The United States has no plan or 
need to convert additional ICBM silos for missile defense use. 
Indeed, it would be dangerous for either side to convert silos 
because such action would cause ambiguity and uncertainty as to 
what was being launched.
    A statement in the treaty preamble that recognizes the 
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and 
strategic defensive arms does not limit U.S. missile defenses, 
but states a fact that the United States has recognized since 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1972.
    A Russian unilateral statement on U.S. ballistic missile 
defense programs is not a part of the treaty and does not limit 
or constrain the development or deployment of effective or 
planned U.S. missile defenses. Our own unilateral statement 
says that U.S. missile defenses are not intended to affect the 
strategic balance with Russia and that we will continue to 
improve and deploy missile defense systems. The Russian 
unilateral statement that Russia could withdraw from the treaty 
if the United States builds up missile defense system 
capabilities that threaten Russian strategic forces is nothing 
more than a recognition that either side could withdraw from 
the treaty if its supreme national interest is jeopardized. It 
is not a limitation on U.S. missile defenses.
    The New START Treaty recognizes and adopts the reductions 
in strategic offensive systems that have been made by the 
United States and Russia, including nuclear warheads, since the 
end of the Cold War by establishing new lower limits for both 
deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive delivery systems 
and for deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The treaty will 
reinstate inspection and verification regimes lost with 
expiration of the START I Treaty and will re-establish the 
practice of having and complying with legally binding, 
verifiable arms control agreements.
    Ratification will also lead to greater cooperation with 
Russia in other important areas. Failure to ratify this treaty, 
in the words of Secretary of State Clinton before our Committee 
on July 15, 2010, would have the opposite effect. She stated 
that ``The consequences of not ratifying this treaty would have 
very serious impacts on our relationship with Russia and would 
frankly give aid and comfort to a lot of the adversaries we 
face around the world . . . It [failure to ratify] would very 
much undermine the relationship that President Obama has been 
leading us to establish to provide more confidence between the 
United States and Russia so that together we can tackle the 
threats posed by Iran, North Korea, and networks of 
terrorists.'' The New START Treaty will hopefully lead to 
discussions with Russia in the future to address non-strategic 
nuclear weapons and to ballistic missile defense cooperation.
    I recommend a number of items be considered for inclusion 
in the resolution of ratification, as follows:


          1. The prohibition in the New START Treaty on 
        converting ICBM silos for missile defense purposes, and 
        vice versa, does not place constraints on U.S. missile 
        defense plans or programs because there are no plans or 
        any programmatic reason to convert additional ICBM 
        silos to missile defense uses. Indeed, it would be 
        dangerous to allow such conversion because of the 
        ambiguity and uncertainty that such conversions could 
        generate. There are no other provisions in the New 
        START Treaty that would limit U.S. missile defense 
        programs. To make that conclusion abundantly clear, it 
        would be useful for the Senate to include an 
        understanding in its resolution of ratification that 
        the New START Treaty and its accompanying documents, 
        including the provision with respect to silo 
        conversion, do not constrain U.S. missile defense plans 
        or programs to develop or deploy ballistic missile 
        defenses.
          2. Many of the members of the Armed Services 
        Committee have expressed concern that the New START 
        Treaty is limited to strategic offensive arms only. 
        While non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons are 
        clearly an important issue for the United States and 
        Russia to address, this is not an issue that can be 
        addressed in bilateral treaty negotiations. NATO is an 
        indispensible party to any future discussions for a 
        treaty that would include resolutions or limitations on 
        non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. 
        Nevertheless, it is important to take steps that could 
        lead to future agreements limiting non-strategic or 
        tactical nuclear weapons. The Senate should urge the 
        President to discuss with NATO and Russia the 
        establishment of limitations on non-strategic or 
        tactical nuclear weapons with the goal of reaching an 
        agreement reducing such weapons.
          3. During the Armed Services Committee hearings, 
        considerable attention was paid to the ability of the 
        Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security 
        Administration (NNSA) to maintain, without testing, the 
        safety, security, and reliability of a smaller 
        stockpile of nuclear weapons. While not an element of 
        the New START Treaty, funding for modernization of the 
        nuclear weapons complex and the Stockpile Stewardship 
        Program, including the stockpile management and life 
        extension programs, has become a significant topic of 
        discussion. The committee heard from the directors of 
        the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility for 
        maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile and discussed 
        their concerns about both the financial and technical 
        future of the laboratories, particularly their ability 
        to maintain the scientific skills necessary to maintain 
        a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile. The directors 
        support ratification of the treaty because of their 
        concern about the uncertainty that would result in the 
        nuclear weapons program if the treaty were not 
        ratified.
          The committee also heard testimony from the Secretary 
        of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator 
        of the NNSA discussing their commitment to reverse the 
        downward budgetary trend in previous years and to make 
        sure that the entire nuclear weapons complex is 
        modernized so that a smaller stockpile will be safe, 
        secure, and reliable into the future. While the 
        modernization effort at the laboratories has been 
        substantial, there has been a downward trend in the 
        facility modernization efforts and the budget since 
        2005 that is reversed with the substantial increases in 
        the fiscal year 2011 budget request and projected 
        budgets for the out years. A portion of the increase 
        will also support two major production facilities that 
        are old and will have to be replaced. Each of these new 
        facilities will be multi-billion dollar facilities and 
        each is in the early phases of design. As a result, the 
        specific design, technology, cost, and construction 
        schedule all still need to be established. As more 
        detail becomes available for the new facilities, and as 
        each of the life extension programs for specific 
        nuclear weapons is defined, the exact amount needed for 
        each year will have to be adjusted as part of the 
        annual authorization and appropriation process.
          Some members have expressed concern that financial 
        support for modernization will not be sustained and 
        that because the costs of the new buildings are not yet 
        known the projected out-years funding is not enough. 
        The Senate should urge the President to establish 
        clear, realistic requirements for the modernization of 
        the nuclear weapons complex, the life extension 
        programs, and the scientific, experimental, and 
        analytical tools needed by the laboratories to ensure a 
        continued safe, secure, and reliable stockpile, and to 
        request funds as needed on an annual basis to support 
        these requirements.
          4. The verification, inspection, and transparency 
        provisions in the START I Treaty expired in December 
        2009, and the Moscow Treaty has no such provisions. As 
        a result, there are currently no such provisions in 
        effect that can provide insight into the respective 
        strategic forces of each party. The New START Treaty 
        includes a number of verification, inspection, and 
        transparency provisions and protocols designed to 
        provide information about each party's strategic 
        offensive arms, and to ensure that each side is in 
        compliance with the limitations and obligations 
        contained in the treaty. The New START Treaty does not 
        include the same level of exchange of telemetric data 
        as the START I Treaty, primarily because the 
        prohibitions and limitations in the New START Treaty do 
        not need telemetric data to monitor and verify treaty 
        compliance. Arms control treaties generally include 
        mechanisms adequate to monitor, demonstrate, and ensure 
        compliance with the limitations and obligations 
        specific to the individual treaty. The extensive data 
        exchanges and on-site inspections provided for in the 
        New START Treaty are adequate to monitor compliance 
        with the terms of the treaty. Nevertheless, the New 
        START Treaty has been criticized because it does not 
        include START I requirements for the exchange of 
        telemetric information, although the extensive data 
        exchange provided for, together with the on-site 
        inspections of the New START Treaty, provide comparable 
        information on new systems and will also provide 
        substantially more information on the overall nature of 
        the deployed and non-deployed systems of each country.
          However, given the concern that the absence of 
        telemetric information will reduce the confidence that 
        the United States will have in the overall capabilities 
        of the Russian strategic offensive systems, the Senate 
        should require submission of an annual report for the 
        first 5 years of the New START Treaty that will assess 
        the overall adequacy of the verification and inspection 
        provisions to monitor compliance with the treaty, and 
        their ability to provide adequate information on the 
        overall capabilities of Russian strategic offensive 
        systems.


    I hope you find these recommendations useful as you prepare 
to mark up the resolution of ratification for the New START 
Treaty. I appreciate the opportunity to share my views with 
you.
            Sincerely,
                                                Carl Levin,
                                                          Chairman.

September 14, 2010.
Hon. John Kerry,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Hon. Richard Lugar,
Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar: The purpose 
of this letter is to provide my views, as Ranking Member of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, on the national security 
implications of the Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further 
Reduction and Limitation of the Strategic Offensive Arms (``the 
New START Treaty''), based on numerous hearings and briefings 
in the Committee with administration officials and independent 
expert witnesses, as well as the administration's responses to 
numerous questions for the record concerning all aspect of the 
treaty. The New START Treaty represents the continuation of 
decades-long efforts to promote strategic stability with Russia 
through the bilateral reductions of our nuclear weapons 
arsenals. While I support many of the New START Treaty's goals, 
a number of significant flaws must be addressed by the Senate 
prior to endorsing ratification. If the New START Treaty is to 
be in the national security interests of the United States, the 
Senate's Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification must 
at a minimum establish binding prohibitions against constraints 
on ballistic missile defense; a long term commitment to the 
modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and the nuclear 
triad; limitations on the authority of the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission (BCC); and assurances that future arms 
control negotiations with Russia address reductions in tactical 
nuclear weapons.

Missile Defense

    I am strongly opposed to the New START Treaty's references 
and legally-binding limitations on ballistic missile defense. 
Unlike arms control treaties of the past, the New START Treaty 
explicitly asserts the existence of an interrelationship 
between offensive and defensive strategic weapons. Such a 
linkage not only diverts attention from the more significant 
interrelationship between strategic and tactical offensive 
weapons but affords the Russian government the opportunity they 
so desire to draw unfounded linkages between strategic nuclear 
weapons and defensive arms. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov has already done so, stating, ``linkage to missile 
defense is clearly spelled out in the accord and is legally 
binding.''
    Prior to treaty negotiations, the administration told the 
Senate that the treaty would not reference missile defense, and 
no linkages would be drawn between offensive and defensive 
weapons. Then the Senate was informed that there would be such 
a reference, but only in the preamble of the treaty, which is 
not legally binding. However, in the final treaty text--not 
just in the preamble, but Article 5 of the treaty itself--there 
is a clear, legally-binding limitation on our missile defense 
options. While this limitation may not be a meaningful one, it 
is a limitation, and it sets a troubling precedent. I remain 
significantly concerned that the administration agreed to this 
language in the treaty text and strongly believe that the 
Resolution of Ratification must make it clear that any 
limitations on the development or deployment of missile 
defenses designed to protect the United States, its allies, and 
deployed forces will be prohibited.

Modernization of the Nuclear Weapons Complex and the Triad of Nuclear 
        Delivery Vehicles

    The resolution of ratification should address the 
modernization of both the weapons complex and the nuclear 
triad. At a minimum, the resolution should signal that a 
failure to adequately modernize could jeopardize U.S. national 
security and, in an extreme circumstance, could even constitute 
grounds for withdrawing from the treaty.
    The May 2009 report by the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger 
Strategic Posture Commission articulated to Congress the dire 
need for modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. At that 
time, the Commission stated that, while the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) has a reasonable plan, they 
lacked the necessary funding to implement it properly. The 
administration's ten-year modernization plan that accompanied 
the New START Treaty--also referred to as the 1251 report--was 
expected to address these funding concerns. However, testimony 
before the Committee has made it increasingly clear that the 
President's plan may not meet our full recapitalization and 
modernization needs.
    By combining funds already planned for sustainment with 
those for the modernization effort, the 1251 report painted a 
misleading picture. Estimates suggest that $70 billion, or 
almost 90 percent of the $80 billion allocated over the next 
ten years, will be required to simply sustain the complex at 
today's level. That leaves less than $10 billion for the design 
and construction of two major facilities that could alone cost 
more than $10 billion, as well as at least two and perhaps 
three multibillion dollar life extension programs. Indeed, the 
director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory testified this 
year that there is ``already a gap emerging between 
expectations and fiscal realities,'' and that ``much of the 
[administration's] planned funding increase for weapons 
activities do not come to fruition until the second half of the 
ten-year period.''
    The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) endorsed retaining a 
smaller nuclear triad. However, with the exception of the next 
generation ballistic missile submarine, the NPR and the 1251 
report provided little detail about long-term modernization 
efforts or the projected cost. The NPR recognized that 
decisions need to be made on the next generation ICBM, the next 
generation bomber, and the next air-launched cruise missile but 
incorrectly cited little urgency in making those decisions. The 
cost alone for modernizing both the nuclear weapons complex and 
the triad are substantial, and as we move to reduce the size of 
our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes all 
the more important. Factoring in the cost of missile defense 
and conventional prompt global strike--both essential and 
critical, but also costly, programs--the overall funding 
requirements could grow much larger than the administration has 
suggested. It is not clear how such funding requirements would 
be met, especially as pressure builds in the administration and 
Congress to reduce the growth of discretionary spending.
    Recognizing that many questions remain concerning the cost 
of implementing the vision set forth in the NPR, the funding 
thus far outlined by the administration indicates significant 
uncertainty for the future of the nuclear weapons complex and 
the nuclear triad. I therefore urge the administration either 
to clarify its commitment to modernizing the weapons complex, 
to revise its plan for modernizing the national nuclear 
enterprise, or to clarify the risks entailed by a failure to 
fund adequately the priorities and programs identified in the 
1251 report and the NPR.

Bilateral Consultative Commission

    I have concerns with the New START Treaty's establishment 
of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), a body 
empowered to make unilateral modifications regarding undefined 
treaty implementation and technical issues. If left unchecked, 
the BCC risks undermining the Constitutional responsibilities 
of the Senate. The resolution of ratification must establish 
limitations for the BCC and prohibit any role for this 
Commission that risk impinging on the Senate's Constitutional 
responsibilities.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

    With respect to Russian Tactical Nuclear weapons, I remain 
concerned by the treaty's failure to address or at a minimum 
establish a framework for addressing the significant Russian 
disparity. Russia's non-strategic arsenal outnumbers that of 
the United States by a factor of ten-to-one and presents an 
immediate concern that must be addressed in the context of 
strategic reductions. As former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger has stated during testimony before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, the distinction between strategic and non-
strategic weapons is ``bound to erode'' as strategic arsenals 
are reduced, resulting in an imbalance which could, in 
Kissinger's words, ``threaten [our] ability to undertake 
extended deterrence.'' To rectify these concerns, the 
Resolution of Ratification should assert that any future arms 
control negotiations with Russia must address reductions in 
Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

Conventional Prompt Global Strike

    Significant uncertainty exists concerning the future of 
Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) if the New START 
Treaty were to enter into force. To date, the administration 
has failed to articulate its CPGS development and deployment 
strategy and it remains unclear if future capabilities would be 
subject to the limits in Article II of the treaty. Absent 
further clarification, the Resolution of Ratification should 
require that the President provide a plan for funding, 
developing, and deploying future CPGS capabilities as well as 
an assessment of whether such capabilities would be accountable 
under the New START Treaty.

Verification and Telemetry

    The administration has argued that the same level of 
telemetry exchanges and on-site inspections required under the 
original START Treaty are no longer needed to verify the terms 
of the New START Treaty. While this may be true, the New START 
Treaty's permissive approach to verification will result in 
less transparency and create additional challenges for our 
ability to monitor Russia's current and future capabilities. 
Near-term assessments of the Russian nuclear force will benefit 
from the visibility gained through the legacy START 
verification protocols. However, the reduction of on-site 
inspections and the lack of meaningful telemetry data exchanges 
under the new treaty will greatly diminish our ability to 
assess and evaluate future Russian capabilities and may lead to 
increasing uncertainty. To address these concerns, the 
Resolution of Ratification should require the President to 
report annually on the level of national confidence in Russian 
compliance with the treaty. Additionally, as Russia continues 
to develop and deploy new strategic offensive capabilities over 
the years ahead, I believe it is in the national security 
interest of the United States to use the framework provided 
within the New START Treaty to insist that Russia share 
telemetric data on any of those new strategic offensive systems 
developed over the duration of the treaty.
            Sincerely,
                                               John McCain,
                                                    Ranking Member.

           IV. Views of the Select Committee on Intelligence

    The committee received classified letters from Senator 
Dianne Feinstein, chairman of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and Senator Christopher S. Bond, vice chairman of 
the Select Committee on Intelligence, expressing their views on 
the New START Treaty. These letters may be reviewed by all 
Senators in the Office of Senate Security.

                          V. Committee Action

    Committee action on the New START Treaty began during the 
negotiations of the treaty: on June 18, August 5, October 8, 
November 4, and December 3, 2009, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, along with the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Senate National Security Working Group, received closed 
briefings on the progress of negotiations from relevant 
executive branch officials, including the Honorable Rose 
Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and 
Compliance and Chief U.S. Negotiator in Post-START 
Negotiations.
    In addition, the committee conducted 12 hearings on the 
treaty.
    On April 29, 2010, the committee held a hearing on ``The 
Historical and Modern Context for U.S.- Russian Arms Control.'' 
The witnesses were the Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Chairman 
of the Board of the MITRE Corporation and former Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Director of Central 
Intelligence, and the Honorable William J. Perry, Michael and 
Barbara Berberian Professor, Center for International Security 
and Cooperation, Stanford University, and former Secretary of 
Defense. Senator Kerry chaired the hearing.
    On May 18, 2010, the committee held a hearing on ``The New 
START Treaty.'' The witnesses were the Honorable Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, Secretary of State; the Honorable Robert M. Gates, 
Secretary of Defense; and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Senator Kerry chaired 
the hearing.
    On May 19, 2010, the committee held a hearing on ``The 
History and Lessons of START.'' The witness was the Honorable 
James A. Baker III, Senior Partner, Baker Botts L.L.P., and 
former Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury. 
Senator Kerry chaired the hearing.
    On May 25, 2010, the committee held a hearing on ``The Role 
of Strategic Arms Control in a Post-Cold War World.'' The 
witness was the Honorable Henry Kissinger, Chairman of 
Kissinger McLarty Associates, and former National Security 
Advisor and Secretary of State. Senator Kerry chaired the 
hearing.
    On June 8, 2010, the committee held a closed hearing on the 
negotiation of the treaty. The witnesses were the Honorable 
Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Verification and Compliance and Chief U.S. Negotiator at the 
Post-START Negotiations, and the Honorable Edward L. Warner 
III, Secretary of Defense Representative to Post-START 
Negotiations. Senator Kerry chaired the hearing.
    On June 10, 2010, the committee held a hearing on 
``Strategic Arms Control and National Security.'' The witnesses 
were Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), President 
of the Scowcroft Group and former National Security Advisor, 
and the Honorable Stephen J. Hadley, Senior Adviser for 
International Affairs at the United States Institute of Peace 
and former National Security Advisor. Senator Kerry chaired the 
hearing.
    On June 15, 2010, the committee held a hearing on the 
negotiation of the New START Treaty. The witnesses were the 
Honorable Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Verification and Compliance and Chief U.S. Negotiator in Post-
START Negotiations, and the Honorable Edward L. Warner III, 
Secretary of Defense Representative to Post-START Negotiations. 
Senator Kaufman chaired the hearing.
    On June 16, 2010, the committee held a hearing on ``The New 
START Treaty: Views from the Pentagon.'' The witnesses were the 
Honorable James N. Miller, Jr., Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, General Kevin P. Chilton, 
USAF, Commander of United States Strategic Command, and 
Lieutenant General Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA, Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency. Senator Kerry chaired the hearing.
    On June 24, 2010, the committee held a hearing on ``The New 
START Treaty: Implementation--Inspections and Assistance.'' The 
witnesses were the Honorable James N. Miller, Jr., Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Kenneth A. 
Myers III, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and 
the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. Senator Casey chaired the hearing.
    On June 24, 2010, the committee held a hearing on benefits 
and risks related to the treaty. The witnesses were the 
Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Senior Scholar at the National 
Institute for Public Policy and former Under Secretary of State 
for Arms Control and International Security, the Honorable Eric 
S. Edelman, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments and Visiting Scholar at the Philip 
Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins 
University School of Advanced and International Studies, and 
former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Dr. Morton H. 
Halperin, Senior Advisor at the Open Society Institute and 
former Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff. 
Senator Shaheen chaired the hearing.
    On July 14, 2010, the committee held a closed hearing on 
monitoring and verification of treaty compliance with 
Intelligence Community officials and the Honorable Rose 
Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and 
Compliance. Senator Kerry chaired the hearing.
    On July 15, 2010, the committee held a hearing on 
``Maintaining a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Arsenal.'' 
The witnesses were Dr. Michael R. Anastasio, Director of Los 
Alamos National Laboratory; Dr. George H. Miller, Director of 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and Dr. Paul J. 
Hommert, Director of Sandia National Laboratories. Senator 
Kerry chaired the hearing.
    At a business meeting on September 16, 2010, the committee 
met to consider the treaty and a draft resolution of advice and 
consent to ratification.
    The committee first adopted by voice vote an amendment, in 
the form of a substitute, to the draft resolution, which was 
offered by Senator Lugar.
    An amendment to the treaty offered by Senator Barrasso, to 
strike certain language in the treaty's preamble, was rejected, 
by a vote of 6 to 13. Ayes: Senators Isakson, Risch, DeMint, 
Barrasso, Wicker, and Inhofe; Nays: Senators Kerry, Dodd, 
Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, 
Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, and Corker.
    An amendment to the resolution offered by Senator Risch, to 
include in the resolution a declaration on the modernization 
and replacement of strategic delivery vehicles, was adopted, by 
voice vote.
    An amendment to the resolution offered by Senator Risch, to 
require certain missile defense activities, was rejected, by a 
vote of 7 to 12. Ayes: Senators Corker, Isakson, Risch, DeMint, 
Barrasso, Wicker, and Inhofe; Nays: Senators Kerry, Dodd, 
Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, 
Kaufman, Gillibrand, and Lugar.
    An amendment to the resolution offered by Senator Risch, to 
strike a declaration in the resolution on tactical nuclear 
weapons and to replace it with a new declaration on tactical 
nuclear weapons, was rejected, by a vote of 7 to 12. Ayes: 
Senators Corker, Isakson, Risch, DeMint, Barrasso, Wicker, and 
Inhofe; Nays: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, 
Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, and Lugar.
    An amendment to the resolution offered by Senator Inhofe, 
as modified, to include in the resolution a declaration on the 
deployment of a missile defense capability to ensure a shoot-
look-shoot missile defense on both the east and west coasts of 
the United States by 2015, was rejected, by a vote of 5 to 14. 
Ayes: Senators Risch, DeMint, Barrasso, Wicker, and Inhofe; 
Nays: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, 
Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, Corker, and 
Isakson.
    An amendment to the resolution offered by Senator DeMint, 
as modified, to include in the resolution a declaration 
concerning the defense of the United States and Allies against 
strategic attack, was adopted, by voice vote.
    An amendment to the resolution offered by Senator Barrasso, 
to condition the Senate's advice and consent to ratification on 
a certification by the President that the President will not 
deploy fewer than 450 ICBMs, was rejected, by voice vote.
    An amendment to the resolution offered by Senator Inhofe, 
as modified, to include in the resolution a declaration 
concerning missile modernization, was rejected, by a vote of 5-
14. Ayes: Senators Risch, DeMint, Barrasso, Wicker, and Inhofe; 
Nays: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, 
Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, Gillibrand, Lugar, Corker, and 
Isakson.
    The committee agreed by a vote of 14 to 4 to report the New 
START Treaty to the Senate, and to recommend to the Senate the 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification contained in 
this report, which includes 10 conditions, 3 understandings, 
and 13 declarations. Ayes: Senators Kerry, Dodd, Feingold, 
Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Shaheen, Kaufman, 
Gillibrand, Lugar, Corker, and Isakson; Nays: Senators Risch, 
Barrasso, Wicker, and Inhofe. Senator DeMint was not present 
during this vote, but later wrote to the chairman of the 
committee to indicate that he would have voted against the 
resolution if he had been present.

               VI. Committee Recommendation and Comments

    The committee believes that the New START Treaty will 
contribute to the security of the United States by limiting 
Russian strategic offensive arms while re-establishing an 
intrusive verification and transparency regime. It will give 
the United States flexibility in how it meets the treaty's 
limits. The treaty's verification provisions will deepen U.S. 
understanding of Russia's nuclear forces, and bringing it into 
force will contribute to U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorists. Even though 
America's relationship with Russia is now strong enough that 
neither side fears an attack from the other, it still makes 
sense for the nuclear superpowers--our two countries possess 
some 90 percent of the world's atomic weaponry--to establish 
clear limits on their arsenals. The predictability that stems 
from having such limits, along with the transparency provided 
by the monitoring and verification provisions contained in New 
START, produces stability that will make it less likely that a 
crisis would arise and would help make any such crisis less 
dangerous.
    Accordingly, the committee urges the Senate to act promptly 
to give its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty, 
as set forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of 
advice and consent. The committee has included in the 
resolution of advice and consent 10 conditions, 3 
understandings, and 13 declarations.

                   CONDITION (1). GENERAL COMPLIANCE

    The committee recommends that the Senate condition its 
advice and consent to ratification by requiring that the 
President take several steps if the President determines that 
the Russian Federation is acting or has acted in a manner that 
is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the New START 
Treaty, or is in violation of the treaty, to such an extent as 
to threaten the national security interests of the United 
States. In such a case, the President shall consult with the 
Senate regarding the implications of such actions by the 
Russian Federation. The President shall also urgently seek a 
meeting with the Russian Federation at the highest level with 
the objective of bringing the Russian Federation into full 
compliance with its obligations. Finally, the President shall 
then promptly submit a report to the Senate detailing: (a) 
whether adherence to the New START Treaty remains in the 
national security interest of the United States; and (b) how 
the United States will redress the impact of Russian actions on 
the national security interests of the United States.
    Strategic arms control succeeds only when all parties to an 
agreement abide by its terms, and the Senate will keep a 
watchful eye on the implementation of such a sensitive 
agreement as the New START Treaty. This condition is modeled on 
the Senate's resolution of advice and consent to ratification 
of the START II Treaty (the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on 
January 3, 1993, including the following documents, which are 
integral parts thereof: the Elimination and Conversion 
Protocol; the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol; and the 
Memorandum of Attribution; Treaty Doc. 103-1), which was agreed 
to in the Senate on January 26, 1996. As discussed earlier, in 
the section on treaty compliance and verification, the 
committee does not anticipate that the Russian Federation will 
pursue actions that are inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the treaty, or will violate the treaty, in ways that 
threaten the national security interests of the United States. 
The committee nevertheless feels it is important, as a 
condition of advice and consent to ratification, to establish 
what steps the President must take in case that expectation is 
not fulfilled.

  CONDITION (2). PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS AND REPORTS ON NATIONAL 
                            TECHNICAL MEANS.

    Through its regime of notifications, inspections, and 
exhibitions, the New START Treaty will provide important 
information about Russian strategic offensive arms that United 
States National Technical Means of verification (NTM) are not 
able to provide on their own. At the same time, the United 
States will rely upon NTM, in addition to the treaty's 
verification and transparency mechanisms, to independently 
confirm that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the 
provisions of the treaty. The committee therefore recommends 
that, as a condition of its advice and consent to ratification, 
the Senate require that, prior to the treaty's entry into force 
pursuant to Article XIV, paragraph 1 of the treaty, and 
annually thereafter, the President certify that United States 
NTM, in conjunction with the verification activities provided 
for in the treaty, are sufficient to ensure effective 
monitoring of Russian compliance with the provisions of the 
treaty. Each certification subsequent to the initial 
certification is to be accompanied by a report to the Senate, 
in unclassified or classified form, indicating how such NTM, 
including collection, processing, and analytic resources, will 
be utilized to ensure effective monitoring of Russian 
compliance. Subsequent reports shall update the long-term plan 
to maintain New START Treaty monitoring. This condition is 
modeled on a condition that the Senate placed on its advice and 
consent to ratification of the START II Treaty.

                       CONDITION (3). REDUCTIONS.

    The committee recommends that the Senate include a 
condition in its resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification that would require that, if, prior to entry into 
force of the New START Treaty, the President plans to implement 
reductions of United States nuclear forces below the levels 
currently planned and consistent with the Moscow Treaty, the 
President will consult with the Senate prior to implementing 
such reductions. The condition further states that the 
President shall not implement any such reductions until the 
President submits to the Senate a determination that such 
reductions are in the national security interest of the United 
States.
    This condition is modeled on a condition that the Senate 
placed on its advice and consent to ratification of the START 
II Treaty. The committee includes this condition to make clear 
that the Senate will closely examine any proposed reductions in 
our nation's strategic nuclear forces that are not matched by 
reductions in Russia's forces and enshrined in arms control 
treaties that have been considered and approved by the Senate.

               CONDITION (4). TIMELY WARNING OF BREAKOUT.

    The committee recommends that the Senate condition its 
advice and consent to ratification of the treaty with a 
requirement that if the President, in consultation with the 
Director of National Intelligence, determines that the Russian 
Federation intends to break out of the limits on strategic 
offensive arms specified in Article II of the treaty, then the 
President shall immediately consult with the Senate with a view 
to determining whether adherence to the treaty remains in the 
national interest of the United States.
    As discussed earlier, in the section on treaty compliance 
and verification, the committee considers it unlikely that the 
Russian Federation would pursue such a breakout capability, 
given economic constraints and the costs and consequences of 
detection and a resulting competition with the United States in 
an overt race to produce extra warheads and the missiles or 
bombers and associated armaments to carry them. Nevertheless, 
the committee feels that it is important for the Senate to 
require the President to take the actions required by this 
condition if the President determines that the Russian 
Federation is going down such a path.

      CONDITION (5). UNITED STATES MISSILE DEFENSE TEST TELEMETRY.

    In light of the discussion in the section of this report on 
missile defense and telemetry exchange, the committee 
recommends including in the resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification a condition that, before ratifying the treaty, the 
President certify to the Senate that the United States is 
indeed not required to provide telemetric information on the 
launch of any satellite launches, missile defense sensor 
targets, or missile defense intercept targets, even when such 
launches use the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM limited by the 
treaty.
    With respect to missile defense interceptors, the New START 
Treaty treats telemetric information no differently than the 
START Treaty. As the Secretary of Defense stated in answer to a 
question for the record, the New START Treaty ``neither 
prohibits, nor does it require, the provision of missile 
defense interceptor test telemetry to Russia.'' In order to be 
absolutely clear on this point, the committee recommends that 
the Senate condition its advice and consent to ratification on 
a requirement that the President certify that the provision of 
telemetric information to the Russian Federation is not 
required for the launch of any missile defense interceptors. It 
also recommends conditioning ratification on the President's 
making a similar certification with respect to the provision of 
telemetric information for any missile (as described in Article 
III, paragraph 7(a)) of a type developed and tested solely to 
intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the 
Earth; such a missile is not treated as a ballistic missile, 
and is therefore not limited by the treaty.

           CONDITION (6). CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE.

    The committee recommends that the Senate include a 
condition in its resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification that would require the President to submit, prior 
to the entry into force of the New START Treaty, a report to 
the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the 
Senate containing several items related to United States 
development and deployment of conventional prompt global strike 
systems. Specifically, the report, which may be supplemented by 
a classified annex, shall contain: a list of all conventionally 
armed, strategic-range weapon systems that are currently under 
development; an analysis of the expected capabilities of each 
such system; a statement for each such system as to whether any 
of the limits in Article II of the treaty would apply to such 
system; an assessment of the costs, risks, and benefits of each 
non-nuclear prompt global strike capability; a discussion of 
alternative deployment options and scenarios for each weapon 
system; and a summary of the measures that would be used with 
respect to each such system to help distinguish non-nuclear 
from nuclear systems and thereby reduce the risks of 
misinterpretation and a resulting claim that such systems might 
alter strategic stability.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\The information, reports, and other relevant materials 
generated under the resolution of advice and consent will go to the 
committees of the Senate named in the relevant provisions. Such 
information is also relevant to the interests of members of the 
National Security Working Group (NSWG), a large portion of whom also 
sit on the same committees. Accordingly, the committee will work to 
ensure that all such information is shared with the NSWG, to the extent 
possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The condition would further require that if, at any time 
after the New START Treaty enters into force, the President 
concludes that the deployment of conventional warheads on ICBMs 
or SLBMs is required at levels that cannot be accommodated 
within the limits specified in Article II of the treaty while 
sustaining a robust United States nuclear triad, then the 
President shall consult immediately with the Senate regarding 
the reasons for such determination. The Senate has been assured 
by the executive branch that conventional prompt global strike 
will be pursued during the life of the treaty with very little 
impact on U.S. nuclear forces. If that should change, this 
condition is intended to result in prompt consultation with the 
Senate.

          CONDITION (7). UNITED STATES TELEMETRIC INFORMATION.

    As noted in the section of this report on missile defense 
and telemetry exchange and in the section on conventional 
prompt global strike systems, after the two sides agree on the 
number of test launches on which to exchange telemetric 
information, each Party gets to decide for itself which 
particular launches it will use to meet its quota. There is no 
treaty obligation, therefore, to provide telemetry on the test 
of a conventional prompt global strike system. There could be 
cases, however, in which that would be in the national security 
interest of the United States. The committee recommends that 
the Senate include in its resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification a condition that, prior to agreeing to provide to 
the Russian Federation any amount of telemetric information for 
a U.S. test launch of a prompt global strike system, the 
President shall certify to the Committees on Foreign Relations 
and Armed Services in the Senate that the provision of such 
information is either to demonstrate that such system is not 
limited by Article II of the New START Treaty or to receive in 
return significant telemetric information on a system not 
deployed by the Russian Federation prior to December 5, 2009. 
The President must also certify that providing the telemetric 
information is in the national security interest of the United 
States and will not undermine the effectiveness of the system 
in question.

           CONDITION (8). BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

    Article XII establishes a Bilateral Consultative Commission 
(BCC) in order ``[t]o promote the objectives and 
implementation'' of the treaty. Article XV, paragraph 2 states 
that, under the auspices of the BCC, the Parties may, without 
resorting to the procedures required to bring the full 
agreement into force in the first place, reach agreement on 
changes only to the Protocol and its integral Annexes (and not 
to main treaty text), and only provided that such changes do 
not affect substantive rights or obligations under the treaty. 
(The BCC can be a forum for discussing changes to the main 
treaty text and changes to the Protocol and its integral 
Annexes that do affect substantive rights or obligations under 
the treaty, but any such changes take effect only pursuant to 
the procedures required to bring the agreement into force in 
the first place; in the United States, the President would need 
the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify such changes, as 
set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution of the United States.) Within these parameters, 
Section I of Part Six of the Protocol authorizes the BCC, among 
other things, to resolve questions relating to compliance with 
the Parties' obligations under the treaty, to agree upon such 
additional measures as may be necessary to improve the 
viability and effectiveness of the treaty, and to resolve 
questions related to the applicability of provisions of the 
treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm.
    The committee recommends that the Senate condition its 
advice and consent to ratification on a requirement that, 
before any meeting of the BCC to consider a proposal for 
additional measures to improve the viability and effectiveness 
of the treaty or to resolve questions related to the 
applicability of provisions of the treaty to a new kind of 
strategic offensive arm, the President consult with the 
committee with regard to whether the proposal would constitute 
an amendment to the treaty requiring the advice and consent of 
the Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution. This requirement is designed to ensure that the 
Senate has the opportunity to participate fully in decisions 
about any use of the BCC's procedures to make changes to the 
treaty's protocol or annexes, and to ensure that the Senate's 
role in the treaty making process will be respected.

CONDITION (9). UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS ENSURING THE SAFETY, SECURITY, 
                 AND PERFORMANCE OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCES.

    The New START Treaty places no limitation on the management 
of either deployed or non-deployed warheads, and its terms do 
not affect the investments that the United States will make to 
ensure that its nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and 
reliable. In fact, Article V, paragraph 1 of the treaty 
explicitly states that ``modernization and replacement of 
strategic offensive arms may be carried out.'' The treaty will 
not by itself affect how the United States maintains its 
nuclear weapons stockpile. Dr. Paul Hommert, Director of Sandia 
National Laboratories, which among other things is responsible 
for the design, development, and qualification of non-nuclear 
components of nuclear weapons and for the systems engineering 
and integration of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile, 
emphasized this point in his testimony before the committee:

          The New START Treaty, if ratified and entered into 
        force, would not constrain or interfere with the 
        upcoming stockpile life extension imperatives. It would 
        not change our planned approach or the tools we will 
        apply. It would not limit the required introduction of 
        modern technologies into existing warhead designs and 
        the realization of the attendant benefits.

    The committee felt, however, that the treaty should be 
viewed within the context of our nation's overall nuclear 
weapons policy, including by better understanding the results 
to date of the ongoing nuclear stockpile stewardship program 
and by examining the future resources that might be needed to 
sustain and modernize the nuclear infrastructure. This was an 
unusual departure for the committee, and it reflected the 
unusual extent to which the issue of stockpile stewardship has 
been raised regarding a treaty that does not limit the 
development, testing, or production of nuclear weapons. The 
committee explored these questions in part by conducting 
hearings that included General Chilton and the directors of the 
Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia national nuclear 
weapons laboratories.
    The committee concludes that reductions in strategic 
offensive arms and continued support for our nation's nuclear 
weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure should move 
forward together. In its proposed resolution of advice and 
consent to ratification, the committee therefore recommends 
that the Senate declare its commitment to proceeding with a 
robust stockpile stewardship program and to maintaining nuclear 
weapons production capabilities and capacities, in order to 
ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the United 
States nuclear arsenal at the New START Treaty levels. This 
provision closely parallels a provision included in the Senate-
approved START II resolution of advice and consent. The 
committee further recommends that the Senate declare the United 
States' commitment to maintaining United States nuclear weapons 
laboratories and protecting the core nuclear weapons 
competencies therein.
    In the committee's hearing on June 16, 2010, General 
Chilton testified that

          [T]he [Nuclear Posture Review] and the President's 
        Budget recognize the need to improve, sustain, and 
        ensure all necessary elements of a safe, secure, and 
        effective deterrence enterprise, including weapons, 
        delivery systems, warning and communication 
        capabilities, and their supporting human capital and 
        technological infrastructures, and to make sustained 
        investments to adequately preserve these capabilities 
        for their foreseeable future. These investments are 
        required in order to confidently reduce the overall 
        U.S. stockpile while sustaining the credibility of our 
        nuclear stockpile, which is fundamental to effective 
        deterrence. Investments that revitalize [the National 
        Nuclear Security Administration's] aging infrastructure 
        and intellectual capital strengthen our security with 
        the facilities and people needed to address 
        technological surprises, geopolitical change, and a 
        range of cutting-edge national security challenges.

    He further stated for the record that ``sustained funding 
will be required to ensure our continued confidence in our 
strategic deterrent. If increases contained in the FY11 budget 
submission do not materialize, we will experience delays in 
addressing aging concerns with our systems.''
    Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, testified that he viewed the administration's FY 
2011 budget request for defense activities of the National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) ``as a positive first 
step,'' and he urged its approval by Congress. At the same 
time, he noted his concern that

           . . . some may perceive that the FY11 budget request 
        meets all of the necessary budget commitments for the 
        program; however, there are still significant financial 
        uncertainties, for example, the design of the UPF [the 
        Uranium Processing Facility] and CMRR [the Chemistry 
        and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility] 
        are not complete and the final costs remain uncertain.

    As noted above, in section 1251 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84), 
Congress required that, not later than 30 days after the later 
of the date of the enactment of that act or the date the 
President submitted a follow-on treaty to the START Treaty to 
the Senate for its advice and consent, the President submit to 
the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives a report on the plan to (a) 
enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear 
weapons stockpile of the United States; (b) modernize the 
nuclear weapons complex; and (c) maintain the delivery 
platforms for nuclear weapons. The report was required to 
include an estimate of the budget requirements to carry out the 
plan over a 10-year period. The Administration submitted the 
classified 1251 report on May 13, 2010, the date on which the 
President submitted the New START Treaty to the Senate.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\A public fact sheet on the plan outlined in the report, titled 
``The New START Treaty--Maintaining a Strong Nuclear Deterrent,'' is 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
New%20START%20section%201251%20fact%20sheet.pdf. It is also appended to 
this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pursuant to sections 4203 and 4204 of the Atomic Energy 
Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2523 and 2524), the Secretary of Energy 
is required to submit an annual update of the plan for 
maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as the long-
term plan to extend the effective life of the weapons in the 
nuclear weapons stockpile without the use of nuclear weapons 
testing. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu submitted the ``FY 2011 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan'' in May 2010. The 
plan was aligned with Nuclear Posture Review Report and the 
plan contained in the 1251 report.
    The 10-year plan would provide approximately $80 billion 
from FY 2011 through FY 2020 for NNSA's Weapons Activities 
account to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons stockpile 
and supporting infrastructure, starting with a request of 
approximately $7 billion for FY 2011, an increase of $624 
million over the FY 2010 level. The plan provides for increases 
each year until FY 2018, reaching a height of $9.0 billion 
before falling back to $8.8 billion in FY 2020. To be sure, 
because the plan in the 1251 report is presented in current 
year, or nominal, funding, some of the increased funding is 
necessary simply to keep up with inflation. But even after 
accounting for inflation, the administration has calculated 
that in constant FY 2010 dollars the plan would be worth $73.16 
billion; thus, the plan would generate an extra $9.16 billion, 
in FY 2010 dollars, over the next ten years, an increase of 
over 14 percent above the baseline level of activity.
    Through FY 2015, the administration has listed as its 
priorities under the plan the following:

   Complete the ongoing Life Extension Program (LEP) 
        for the W76 warhead and full nuclear scope life 
        extension program study and follow-on activities for 
        the B61 bomb to ensure first production begins in FY 
        2017.
   Begin an LEP study in FY 2011 to explore the life 
        extension options for the W78 system.
   Increase pit manufacturing capacity and capability 
        at the Plutonium Facility (PF)-4 (part of the main 
        plutonium facility) at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
   Complete the design and begin construction of the 
        Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement 
        Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) at the Los Alamos National 
        Laboratory. Plan and program to complete construction 
        by 2020, followed by full operations by 2022.
   Complete the design and begin construction of the 
        Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National 
        Security Complex. Plan and program to complete 
        construction by 2020, followed by full operations by 
        2022.
   Increase warhead surveillance and essential science, 
        technology, and engineering (ST&E) investments to 
        support stockpile assessment and certification in the 
        absence of underground nuclear testing.

    According to the ``FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and 
Management Plan,'' funding for the W76-1 LEP would continue at 
relatively steady levels from FY 2011 through FY 2017, funding 
for the B61 LEP would increase from FY 2011 to FY 2018 before 
beginning to tail off, and funding for a W78 LEP would increase 
from FY 2011 until FY 2021, with a substantial increase from FY 
2013 to FY 2014. Planning for the UPF, which would replace five 
old production buildings, and the CMRR-NF is not yet complete. 
According to the ``FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management 
Plan,'' the plan reflected in the 1251 report includes $8 
billion to accommodate possible future changes in planning 
estimates for these two facilities. Additionally, the ten-year 
plan includes an estimated increase of approximately $100 
million per year starting in FY 2016 for ST&E campaigns within 
the nuclear weapons complex.
    Ten-year funding plans are unique. Even within existing 
five-year plans, such as the Future-Years Nuclear Security Plan 
(FYNSP), there is a possibility that new information will 
produce new estimates for how much a given program of work will 
cost. Such is the case with the plan contained in the 1251 
report and the ``FY 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management 
Plan.'' The committee therefore recommends that the Senate 
include a condition that the United States is committed to 
providing the resources needed to achieve objectives related to 
ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of the United 
States nuclear arsenal, at a minimum at the levels set forth in 
the 1251 report. The committee further recommends that the 
Senate require that if appropriations are enacted that fail to 
meet the resource requirements set forth in 1251 report, the 
President submit to Congress, within 60 days of such enactment, 
a report detailing: (a) how the President proposes to remedy 
the resource shortfall; (b) if additional resources are 
required, the proposed level of funding required and an 
identification of the activity for which additional funds are 
required; (c) the impact of the resource shortfall on the 
safety, reliability, and performance of United States nuclear 
forces; and (d) whether and why, in the changed circumstances 
brought about by the resource shortfall, it remains in the 
national interest of the United States to remain a Party to the 
New START Treaty. In this regard, the committee notes that in a 
letter to the committee on September 15, 2010, Vice President 
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., stated, ``Later this fall, the 
Administration will provide the Congress with information that 
updates the Section 1251 report. At that time, and in our 
future budgets, we will address any deficiencies in the Future 
Years National Security Program.'' The full letter from the 
Vice President is reprinted at the end of this report.

                     CONDITION (10). ANNUAL REPORT.

    The committee's proposed resolution would require the 
executive branch to submit a report to the Committees on 
Foreign Relations and Armed Services not later than January 31, 
2012, and each year thereafter, which would provide information 
on several matters. The report is to include details on each 
Party's reductions in strategic offensive arms during the 
previous calendar year (though the first report should cover 
the full time prior to December 31, 2011, that the treaty was 
in force).
    In keeping with recommended Declaration 6 regarding the 
importance of compliance with the treaty, the report is also to 
provide a certification that the Russian Federation is in full 
compliance with the terms of the treaty; if that cannot be 
provided, the report shall have a detailed discussion of any 
noncompliance by the Russian Federation.
    Article VI of the treaty and Part Three of the Protocol 
establish the parameters for permissible methods to convert or 
eliminate treaty-accountable items. To eliminate an item from 
treaty accountability, it must be rendered inoperable, pursuant 
to Part Three of the Protocol, section I, paragraph 2. To meet 
this standard, Part Three of the Protocol permits the Parties 
to develop new procedures for elimination of ICBM launchers, 
SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. The United States sought 
flexibility in the treaty's elimination procedures to ease the 
burdens and costs imposed on the Parties in eliminating items 
from treaty accountability. If the other Party has a question 
about the new procedures, the question will be discussed in the 
framework of the BCC. While the new procedures must be 
discussed and demonstrated within the framework of the BCC as 
requested by the other Party, the possessing Party would not be 
obligated to delay the use of the new procedures. The committee 
believes that, on balance, the treaty's flexibility on 
developing new procedures to eliminate treaty-limited items may 
prove to be a reasonable approach for reducing costs while 
still resulting in verifiable arms reductions. The committee 
nevertheless thinks that the Senate will need to watch very 
closely to understand how this new approach works in practice. 
It therefore recommends that the Senate include as part of this 
annual report a certification by the President that any 
conversion or elimination procedures that have been adopted do 
not result in ambiguities that could defeat the object and 
purpose of the treaty. If such a certification cannot be made, 
then the report shall include a list of any cases in which a 
conversion or elimination procedure that Russia has 
demonstrated nevertheless remains ambiguous or otherwise does 
not satisfy the criteria established in Part Three of the 
Protocol, as well as a summary of the steps the United States 
has taken in light of the situation.
    The committee also recommends that this annual report 
include an assessment of the treaty's transparency mechanisms, 
including the extent to which either Party has encrypted or 
otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information, and 
the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric 
information. Finally, the committee recommends that this annual 
report include an assessment of the whether a strategic 
imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests 
of the United States.

                  UNDERSTANDING (1). MISSILE DEFENSE.

    As discussed in the sections of this report on missile 
defense, the committee focused extensive attention on whether 
the New START Treaty would prevent the United States from 
effectively defending itself and its allies against ballistic 
missile attack and, if so, how. In multiple hearings and 
numerous questions for the record, the committee sought 
information on this question from executive branch witnesses 
including the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, 
and the Secretary of Defense's Representative to the Post-START 
Negotiations.
    To reflect what the committee has learned in its 
examination of this matter, the committee recommends that the 
Senate include in its resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification an understanding of the United States, which shall 
be included in the instrument of ratification that the United 
States provides to the Russian Federation, in accordance with 
Article XIV, paragraph 1, to bring the treaty into force. The 
provision states that it is the understanding that the New 
START Treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment 
of missile defenses other than the requirements of paragraph 3 
of Article V, which states:

          Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM 
        launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile 
        defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall 
        not convert and shall not use launchers of missile 
        defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs 
        therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM 
        launchers that were converted prior to signature of 
        this treaty for placement of missile defense 
        interceptors therein.

    It is also the understanding of the United States that any 
additional New START Treaty limitations on the deployment of 
missile defenses beyond those contained in paragraph 3, Article 
V of the treaty, including any changes agreed to under the 
auspices of the BCC, may enter into force for the United States 
only with the advice and consent of the Senate as set forth in 
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the 
United States. Finally, the provision notes that it is the 
understanding of the United States that the April 7, 2010, 
unilateral statement by the Russian Federation does not impose 
a legal obligation on the United States.

                 UNDERSTANDING (2). RAIL-MOBILE ICBMS.

    The committee recommends that the Senate include in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification an 
understanding of the United States, which shall be included in 
the instrument of ratification that the United States provides 
to the Russian Federation, regarding rail-mobile ICBMs. This 
provision states that it is the understanding of the United 
States that any rail-mobile-launched ballistic missile with a 
range in excess of 5,500 kilometers would be an ICBM, as the 
term is defined in paragraph 37 of Part One of the Protocol (in 
the English-language numbering), for the purposes of the New 
START Treaty, specifically including the limits in Article II 
of the treaty. It is the understanding of the United States 
also that an erector-launcher mechanism for launching an ICBM 
and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted would be a 
launcher of ICBMs, as the term is defined in paragraph 28 (in 
the English-language numbering) of Part One of the Protocol, 
for the purposes of the treaty, including Article II. It is 
also the understanding of the United States that if either 
Party should produce a rail-mobile ICBM system, the BCC would 
address the application of other parts of the treaty to that 
system, including Articles III, IV, VI, VII, and XI of the 
treaty and relevant portions of the Protocol and the Annexes to 
the Protocol. It is the understanding of the United States that 
any such agreement is subject to the requirements of Article XV 
(regarding how such changes can brought into effect), and that 
if such agreement creates substantive rights or obligations 
that differ significantly from those in the New START Treaty 
regarding a ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' as defined in Part One 
of the Protocol, then such an amendment would need to be 
considered an amendment to the treaty to which the procedures 
established by Article XV, paragraph 1 apply.
    As discussed in the section of this report on rail-mobile 
launchers of ICBMs, the text of the treaty leads the committee 
to conclude that, if the Russian Federation were to again build 
and deploy ICBMs launched from rail-mobile launchers, those 
ICBMs would count as deployed ICBMs, and their launchers would 
count as ICBM launchers. The executive branch shares this 
conclusion. The committee has no reason to think that there is 
any dispute with Russia about this matter. The committee 
believes that it is unlikely that either the United States or 
the Russian Federation will produce rail-mobile ICBM launchers 
or deploy rail-mobile ICBMs for the duration of the treaty. The 
committee proposes this provision so that the United States 
will fully communicate its understanding regarding the treaty's 
language and effect regarding rail-mobile ICBMs to the Russian 
Federation.

    UNDERSTANDING (3). STRATEGIC-RANGE, NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS.

    The committee recommends that the Senate include in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification an 
understanding of the United States regarding strategic-range 
non-nuclear weapon systems, which shall be communicated to the 
Russian Federation. This provision states that it is the 
understanding of the United States that the United States will 
not consider future, strategic-range non-nuclear weapon systems 
that do not otherwise meet the definitions of the New START 
Treaty to be ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms'' subject 
to the treaty; that nothing in the treaty restricts United 
States research, development, testing, and evaluation of 
strategic-range, non-nuclear weapons, including any weapon that 
is capable of boosted aerodynamic flight; and that nothing in 
the treaty prohibits deployments of strategic-range non-nuclear 
weapon systems.
    The purpose of the treaty is to reduce and limit strategic 
offensive arms. Article II of the treaty establishes specific 
limits on certain strategic offensive arms, namely, ICBMs and 
ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM 
warheads, SLBM warheads, and nuclear warheads counted for 
deployed heavy bombers. Definitions for these terms are 
provided in Part One of the Protocol. Article V, paragraph 2 
states that when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic 
offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to 
raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for 
consideration in the BCC. In the State Department article-by-
article analysis that was included the President's message to 
the Senate transmitting the New START Treaty, the executive 
branch informed the Senate that, ``the United States stated 
[during the negotiations] that it would not consider future, 
strategic range non-nuclear systems that do not otherwise meet 
the definitions of this treaty to be ``new kinds of strategic 
offensive arms' for purposes of the treaty.'' The committee's 
recommendation would ensure that the United States formally 
communicate this understanding to the Russian Federation, thus 
making clear that this position was understood and endorsed by 
the Senate when it considered the treaty.

                   DECLARATION (1). MISSILE DEFENSE.

    In addition to above conditions and understandings, the 
committee recommends that the Senate include in its resolution 
of advice and consent to ratification 13 declarations, which 
express the intent of the Senate. The first two of these 
declarations concerns missile defense.
    In 1996, the Senate made clear in its resolution of advice 
and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty that missile 
defense would be an essential element of 21st century 
deterrence. Similarly, the committee recommends that the Senate 
declare that it is the sense of the Senate:

   That it is the policy of the United States, pursuant 
        to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 
        106-38), ``to deploy as soon as is technologically 
        possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
        capable of defending the territory of the United States 
        against limited ballistic missile attack (whether 
        accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)'';
   That defenses against ballistic missiles are 
        essential for new deterrent strategies and for new 
        strategies should deterrence fail; and
   That further limitations on the missile defense 
        capabilities of the United States are not in the 
        national security interest of the United States.

    The committee further recommends that the Senate declare 
that the New START Treaty and the statement made by the Russian 
Federation on April 7, 2010, do not limit in any way, and must 
not be interpreted as limiting, activities that the United 
States Government currently plans or that might be required 
over the duration of the treaty to protect the United States 
pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, or to 
protect United States Armed Forces and United States allies 
from limited ballistic missile attack, including further 
planned enhancements to the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 
system and all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to 
missile defense in Europe.
    The committee recommends further that the resolution state 
the Senate's expectation that the executive branch will provide 
regular briefings on missile defense issues related to the 
treaty and on U.S.-Russia missile defense dialogue and 
cooperation. To help ensure that the BCC is not used in a 
manner that would undermine U.S. missile defense options, the 
committee recommends that the resolution also call for 
briefings before and after each BCC meeting. The committee has 
been assured that the briefings and reports that this and other 
declarations expect from the executive branch will indeed be 
provided by the executive branch, as has been the case with 
similarly-worded declarations in the resolutions of advice and 
consent to ratification of past strategic arms control 
treaties.

    DECLARATION (2). DEFENDING THE UNITED STATES AND ALLIES AGAINST 
                           STRATEGIC ATTACK.

    The committee recommends the Senate note that it is a 
paramount obligation of the United States to defend its people, 
armed forces, and allies against nuclear attack to the best of 
its ability. Because of the vulnerabilities inherent in the 
condition of mutual assured destruction, which depends upon two 
nuclear-armed powers fearing each other's nuclear retaliatory 
capabilities, the committee recommends the Senate express its 
hope that the United States and the Russian Federation can move 
cooperatively to a less risky strategic relationship, in which 
case the United States is ready to cooperate with the Russian 
Federation on strategic defenses. Noting the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, the declaration states that 
strategic stability can be enhanced by strategic defenses and 
that the United States remains free to construct a layered 
missile defense system. Finally, it states that the United 
States remains committed to improving its strategic defensive 
capabilities, as is allowed by the treaty.

 DECLARATION (3). CONVENTIONALLY ARMED, STRATEGIC-RANGE WEAPON SYSTEMS.

    As discussed earlier, in the section on conventional prompt 
global strike systems, the United States does not intend to use 
against Russia any conventional prompt global strike systems it 
may acquire. Furthermore, over the duration of the treaty, any 
such systems that the United States may deploy will be in 
numbers far too limited to pose any threat to the survivability 
of the Russian nuclear deterrent. Consistent with these facts, 
the committee recommends that the Senate include a declaration 
that conventionally armed weapon systems not co-located with 
nuclear-armed systems do not affect strategic stability between 
the United States and the Russian Federation.

       DECLARATION (4). NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION.

    Congress first approved a program of Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) in November 1991 legislation offered by 
Senators Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, after a failed coup in 
Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union threatened 
the safety and security of Soviet nuclear forces and 
facilities. In addition, the START Treaty, which had been 
signed earlier that year, mandated steep reductions in the 
Soviet arsenal, and the Lisbon Protocol called for the return 
to Russia of all Soviet nuclear warheads based in the newly 
independent states of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The 
linkage between the START Treaty and Nunn-Lugar was made plain 
by former Secretary Baker, who stated in testimony before the 
Committee on May 19, 2010, that:

          START also enabled our diplomatic, scientific, and 
        military establishments to form deeper levels of trust 
        and collaboration. And as [Senator Lugar] knows very 
        well, a direct result of that was the Nunn-Lugar 
        Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which 
        immeasurably improved our security by helping keep 
        nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists. I 
        really don't think Nunn-Lugar would have been nearly as 
        successful as it was if the Russians had lacked the 
        legally binding assurance of parallel U.S. reductions 
        through the START Treaty.

    The committee strongly believes that the CTR Program has 
played a major role in the elimination of strategic offensive 
arms that were taken out of service due to implementation of 
the START Treaty, and has played, in concert with the non-
proliferation programs of the Department of Energy, a very 
significant role in securing Russian nuclear weapons and stocks 
of fissile materials. The committee believes that the CTR 
Program can facilitate Russian implementation of its 
obligations under the New START Treaty. Even if Russian 
elimination of certain ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM 
launchers, and heavy bombers is not required to keep Russian 
forces within the limits of the treaty, continuing CTR Program 
assistance to eliminations enables the Russian Government to 
eliminate old, destabilizing systems. The committee recommends 
that in the resolution of advice and consent to ratification, 
the Senate state that it is its sense that the CTR Program has 
made an invaluable contribution to the safety and security of 
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and 
materials in Russia and elsewhere, and that the President 
should continue the global CTR Program and CTR assistance to 
Russia, including for the purpose of facilitating 
implementation of the New START Treaty.

               DECLARATION (5). ASYMMETRY IN REDUCTIONS.

    The committee recommends that the Senate include in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification a declaration 
that it is the sense of the Senate that the President should 
regulate reductions in United States strategic nuclear forces 
so that the number of strategic offensive arms accountable 
under the New START Treaty that are possessed by the Russian 
Federation does not exceed the comparable number of accountable 
strategic offensive arms possessed by the United States to such 
an extent that a strategic imbalance endangers the national 
security interests of the United States. The Senate included 
similar language in a declaration in its resolution of advice 
and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty. At that 
time, there was greater concern that the United States might be 
financially capable of carrying out the reductions required to 
comply with the limits and schedules for reductions under the 
START and START II treaties more quickly than the Russian 
Federation could, even with assistance under the Nunn-Lugar CTR 
Program. The Senate wanted to make clear that it did not want 
the United States to move too quickly in its reductions.
    In the case of the New START Treaty, the Parties are given 
seven years after the treaty's entry into force to comply with 
the limits established by Article II. The size of the Russian 
Federation's strategic offensive arsenal has already been 
limited in recent years due to economic constraints and, as 
Admiral Mullen testified to the committee, the Russian 
Federation is already below the treaty's limits on strategic 
delivery vehicles. Nevertheless, Russia and the United States 
will need to comply with all of the treaty's limits within 
seven years. The committee believes that this provision is 
needed in order to make clear that, in meeting its obligations 
under the treaty, the United States should not move so quickly 
in its reductions that a significant strategic imbalance with 
Russia's strategic forces is created.

                      DECLARATION (6). COMPLIANCE

    In addition to the compliance condition that the committee 
has recommended, the committee also recommends that the 
Senate's resolution of advice and consent to ratification 
include a declaration regarding compliance. The committee 
recommends that the Senate declare that the New START Treaty 
will remain in the interests of the United States only to the 
extent that the Russian Federation is in strict compliance with 
its obligations under the treaty.
    The declaration recommended by the committee would call for 
the executive branch to offer briefings regarding compliance 
issues to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees 
before and after each meeting of the BCC, to keep those 
committees informed especially of compliance issues that are to 
be raised in that forum and of the results of such efforts.

  DECLARATION (7). EXPANSION OF STRATEGIC ARSENALS IN COUNTRIES OTHER 
                              THAN RUSSIA.

    The committee recommends that the resolution of advice and 
consent to ratification include a declaration that if, during 
the time the treaty remains in force, the President determines 
that there has been an expansion of the strategic arsenal of 
any country not party to the treaty so as to jeopardize the 
supreme interests of the United States, then the President 
should consult immediately with the Senate to determine whether 
adherence to the treaty remains in the national interest of the 
United States. The Senate included a similar declaration in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the START 
II Treaty.
    General Chilton stated, in an answer to a question for the 
record, that:

          Our nuclear forces are postured today to deter other 
        nuclear capable nations from attacking the U.S. and to 
        also assure allies to whom the U.S. has extended an 
        umbrella of strategic deterrence. . . . New START's 
        lower strategic force levels are based on force 
        analyses conducted during the Nuclear Posture Review. . 
        . . In reaching these conclusions, the analyses 
        conducted during the Nuclear Posture Review took into 
        account the nuclear arsenals of other declared nuclear 
        weapon states, as well as the nuclear programs of 
        proliferant states.

    The committee accepts that the analysis regarding the level 
of strategic offensive arms to be limited in this bilateral 
treaty accounted for our current understanding and projections 
of the size of nuclear arsenals other than those of the Russian 
Federation. And the committee does not at this time expect that 
an expansion of another strategic arsenal would occur during 
the duration of this treaty that would force the United States 
to withdraw from the treaty. The committee recommends this 
declaration, however, to make clear that the Senate will remain 
watchful for this possibility. This declaration will further 
ensure that, if unanticipated changes in those arsenals should 
occur, the executive branch and the Senate will work together 
to evaluate whether the New START Treaty poses an unacceptable 
constraint in responding to those changes.

                DECLARATION (8). TREATY INTERPRETATION.

    The Committee on Foreign Relations has taken pains to 
maintain the constitutional role of the United States Senate in 
the treatymaking process. To that end, the resolution of advice 
and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the 
Senate on May 27, 1988, included an important condition (1) 
that has been cited by reference in every subsequent resolution 
of advice and consent to ratification of an arms control 
treaty:
          (A) the United States shall interpret a treaty in 
        accordance with the common understanding of the treaty 
        shared by the President and the Senate at the time the 
        Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification;
          (B) Such common understanding is based on:
                  (i) first, the text of the treaty and the 
                provisions of this resolution of ratification; 
                and
                  (ii) second, the authoritative 
                representations which were provided by the 
                President and his representatives to the Senate 
                and its Committees, in seeking Senate consent 
                to ratification, insofar as such 
                representations were directed to the meaning 
                and legal effect of the text of the treaty;
          (C) the United States shall not agree to or adopt an 
        interpretation different from that common understanding 
        except pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a 
        subsequent treaty or protocol, or the enactment of a 
        statute; and
          (D) if, subsequent to ratification of the treaty, a 
        question arises as to the interpretation of a provision 
        of the treaty on which no common understanding was 
        reached in accordance with paragraph (B), that 
        provision shall be interpreted in accordance with 
        applicable United States law.
    In 1997, a similarly important condition was added to the 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) Flank 
Document, which condition has also been cited by reference in 
subsequent resolutions of advice and consent to ratification 
for arms control treaties:

          Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of 
        ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate 
        on May 27, 1988, shall be construed as authorizing the 
        President to obtain legislative approval for 
        modifications or amendments to treaties through 
        majority approval of both Houses.

    Each of these conditions applies to all treaties. For this 
reason, the Senate has not needed to restate them as conditions 
in subsequent resolutions of advice and consent to 
ratification. Rather, it has cited them by reference in 
declarations of its intent, as this declaration does, so as to 
remind subsequent administrations of the continuing obligations 
imposed by the Senate's treaty-making role under the United 
States Constitution.

       DECLARATION (9). TREATY MODIFICATION OR REINTERPRETATION.

    The committee recommends that the Senate include in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification a declaration 
that any agreement or understanding which in any material way 
modifies, amends, or reinterprets United States or Russian 
obligations under the New START Treaty, including the time 
frame for implementation of the New START Treaty, should be 
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
ratification, in accordance with Article II, section 2, clause 
2 of the Constitution of the United States. The recommended 
declaration matches one that the Senate included in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the START 
II Treaty. This limitation on treaty reinterpretation by the 
executive branch should not be read as undermining Article XV, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the treaty; pursuant to those paragraphs, 
any change to the main treaty text and any change to the 
Protocol that affects substantive rights or obligations of the 
Parties under the treaty may enter into force only in 
accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of 
the treaty, which preserves the role of the Senate.

                    DECLARATION (10). CONSULTATIONS.

    To provide a formal expression of the Senate's concerns and 
expectations regarding action to extend, supersede, or withdraw 
from the treaty, the committee recommends that the resolution 
of advice and consent to ratification contain a declaration of 
the Senate's expectation that the President will consult with 
the Senate prior to actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
Article XIV. This declaration is similar to one the Senate 
included in its resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification of the Moscow Treaty.
    The Senate and this committee have an institutional 
interest in the close observation of arms control negotiations 
and the successful implementation of resulting agreements. Past 
administrations have recognized that consultation with the 
Senate prior to taking actions relating to signing, amending, 
or withdrawing from such agreements may avert serious 
disagreements. The committee recognizes that this declaration 
cannot affect any authority the Constitution grants in this 
regard.
    Should it become necessary for a Party to withdraw from the 
treaty, Article XIV provides for three months' notice of such a 
decision. Should a circumstance arise in which prior 
consultation with the Senate on a decision to supersede, 
extend, or withdraw from the treaty is not feasible, notably if 
the Senate were out of session, the committee expects that the 
President, to the extent that it is feasible, will consult the 
leadership of the Senate and the committee. This declaration is 
a formal request that the executive branch maintain the 
consultation policy to which past administrations have 
committed.

              DECLARATION (11). TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

    As noted earlier, in the section on non-strategic nuclear 
weapons, the United States followed the recommendation of the 
Strategic Posture Review Commission and did not seek to limit 
tactical nuclear weapons (sometimes referred to as ``non-
strategic nuclear weapons'' or ``theater nuclear weapons'') in 
its negotiations to replace the expiring START Treaty, which 
similarly did not limit tactical nuclear weapons. The committee 
accepts the Secretary of State's conclusion that ``[a] more 
ambitious treaty that addressed tactical nuclear weapons would 
have taken much longer to complete, adding significantly to the 
time before a successor agreement, including verification 
measures, could enter into force following START's expiration 
in December 2009.'' The committee therefore urges the 
administration to begin discussions with Russia as soon as 
possible on tactical nuclear weapons. To this end, the 
committee recommends that the Senate include in its resolution 
of advice and consent to ratification a provision calling upon 
the President to pursue, following consultation with allies, an 
agreement with the Russian Federation that would address the 
disparity between the tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles of 
the United States and the Russian Federation, and would secure 
and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.
    Given the concerns, as discussed above, concerning the 
security of tactical nuclear weapons, the committee also 
recommends that, as part of this declaration, the Senate urge 
the President to engage the Russian Federation with the 
objective of establishing cooperative measures to give each 
Party to the New START Treaty improved confidence regarding the 
accurate accounting and security of non-strategic nuclear 
weapons maintained by the other Party. The Senate should also 
urge the President to provide United States or other 
international assistance to help the Russian Federation ensure 
the accurate accounting and security of its tactical nuclear 
weapons. These provisions are modeled on a declaration 
contained in the Senate's resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

          DECLARATION (12). FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS.

    The committee recommends that the Senate include in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification a declaration 
that recognizes the obligation under Article VI of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty ``to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control,'' and that calls upon the 
other nuclear weapons states to give careful and early 
consideration to corresponding reductions of their own nuclear 
arsenals. Upon the entry into force of the New START Treaty, 
the United States and the Russian Federation will accept a 
limit on the size of their nuclear arsenals (which will come 
into effect seven years later) at levels lower than they have 
fielded in decades. The committee believes that it is important 
to stress to other nuclear weapons states that they also have 
an obligation under the NPT, toward which those states should 
take similarly concrete steps.
    The committee also recommends that the Senate include a 
declaration that further arms reduction agreements obligating 
the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or 
armaments of the United States in any militarily significant 
manner may be made only pursuant to the treaty-making power of 
the President as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 
of the Constitution of the United States. This declaration 
states nothing more than what is already established law, 
contained in section 303(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)).

   DECLARATION (13). MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF UNITED STATES 
                      STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS.

    The committee recommends that the Senate include in its 
resolution of advice and consent to ratification a declaration 
of the importance to the U.S. nuclear deterrent of the triad of 
delivery vehicles--ICBMS, SLBMs, and bombers--and that it state 
the U.S. commitment to modernizing and replacing those delivery 
vehicles.

     VII. Text of Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification

    Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein), That the Senate advises and consents to the 
ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in 
Prague on April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including Annex on 
Inspection Activities to the Protocol, Annex on Notifications 
to the Protocol, and Annex on Telemetric Information to the 
Protocol, all such documents being integral parts of and 
collectively referred to in this resolution as the ``New START 
Treaty'' (Treaty Document 111-5), subject to the conditions of 
subsection (a), the understandings of subsection (b), and the 
declarations of subsection (c).
    (a) CONDITIONS.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the 
following conditions, which shall be binding upon the 
President:
          (1) General Compliance.--If the President determines 
        that the Russian Federation is acting or has acted in a 
        manner that is inconsistent with the object and purpose 
        of the New START Treaty, or is in violation of the New 
        START Treaty, so as to threaten the national security 
        interests of the United States, then the President 
        shall--
                  (A) consult with the Senate regarding the 
                implications of such actions for the viability 
                of the New START Treaty and for the national 
                security interests of the United States;
                  (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting with 
                the Russian Federation at the highest 
                diplomatic level with the objective of bringing 
                the Russian Federation into full compliance 
                with its obligations under the New START 
                Treaty; and
                  (C) submit a report to the Senate promptly 
                thereafter, detailing--
                          (i) whether adherence to the New 
                        START Treaty remains in the national 
                        security interests of the United 
                        States; and
                          (ii) how the United States will 
                        redress the impact of Russian actions 
                        on the national security interests of 
                        the United States.
          (2) Presidential certifications and reports on 
        national technical means.--(A) Prior to the entry into 
        force of the New START Treaty, and annually thereafter, 
        the President shall certify to the Senate that United 
        States National Technical Means, in conjunction with 
        the verification activities provided for in the New 
        START Treaty, are sufficient to ensure effective 
        monitoring of Russian compliance with the provisions of 
        the New START Treaty and timely warning of any Russian 
        preparation to break out of the limits in Article II of 
        the New START Treaty. Following submission of the first 
        such certification, each subsequent certification shall 
        be accompanied by a report to the Senate indicating how 
        United States National Technical Means, including 
        collection, processing, and analytic resources, will be 
        utilized to ensure effective monitoring. The first such 
        report shall include a long-term plan for the 
        maintenance of New START Treaty monitoring. Each 
        subsequent report shall include an update of the long-
        term plan. Each such report may be submitted in either 
        classified or unclassified form.
                  (B) It is the sense of the Senate that 
                monitoring Russian Federation compliance with 
                the New START Treaty is a high priority and 
                that the inability to do so would constitute a 
                threat to United States national security 
                interests.
          (3) Reductions.--(A) The New START Treaty shall not 
        enter into force until instruments of ratification have 
        been exchanged in accordance with Article XIV of the 
        New START Treaty.
          (B) If, prior to the entry into force of the New 
        START Treaty, the President plans to implement 
        reductions of United States strategic nuclear forces 
        below those currently planned and consistent with the 
        Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
        Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 
        signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (commonly referred to 
        as ``the Moscow Treaty''), then the President shall--
                  (i) consult with the Senate regarding the 
                effect of such reductions on the national 
                security of the United States; and
                  (ii) take no such reductions until the 
                President submits to the Senate the President's 
                determination that such reductions are in the 
                national security interest of the United 
                States.
          (4) Timely warning of breakout.--If the President 
        determines, after consultation with the Director of 
        National Intelligence, that the Russian Federation 
        intends to break out of the limits in Article II of the 
        New START Treaty, the President shall immediately 
        inform the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed 
        Services of the Senate, with a view to determining 
        whether circumstances exist that jeopardize the supreme 
        interests of the United States, such that withdrawal 
        from the New START Treaty may be warranted pursuant to 
        paragraph 3 of Article XIV of the New START Treaty.
          (5) United states missile defense test telemetry.--
        Prior to entry into force of the New START Treaty, the 
        President shall certify to the Senate that the New 
        START Treaty does not require, at any point during 
        which it will be in force, the United States to provide 
        to the Russian Federation telemetric information under 
        Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part Seven of the 
        Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to 
        the Protocol for the launch of--
                  (A) any missile defense interceptor, as 
                defined in paragraph 44 of Part One of the 
                Protocol to the New START Treaty;
                  (B) any satellite launches, missile defense 
                sensor targets, and missile defense intercept 
                targets, the launch of which uses the first 
                stage of an existing type of United States ICBM 
                or SLBM listed in paragraph 8 of Article III of 
                the New START Treaty; or
                  (C) any missile described in clause (a) of 
                paragraph 7 of Article III of the New START 
                Treaty.
          (6) Conventional Prompt global strike.--(A) The 
        Senate calls on the executive branch to clarify its 
        planning and intent in developing future conventionally 
        armed, strategic-range weapon systems. To this end, 
        prior to the entry into force of the New START Treaty, 
        the President shall provide a report to the Committees 
        on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate 
        containing the following:
                          (i) A list of all conventionally 
                        armed, strategic-range weapon systems 
                        that are currently under development.
                          (ii) An analysis of the expected 
                        capabilities of each system listed 
                        under clause (i).
                          (iii) A statement with respect to 
                        each system listed under clause (i) as 
                        to whether any of the limits in Article 
                        II of the New START Treaty apply to 
                        such system.
                          (iv) An assessment of the costs, 
                        risks, and benefits of each system.
                          (v) A discussion of alternative 
                        deployment options and scenarios for 
                        each system.
                          (vi) A summary of the measures that 
                        could help to distinguish each system 
                        listed under clause (i) from nuclear 
                        systems and reduce the risks of 
                        misinterpretation and of a resulting 
                        claim that such systems might alter 
                        strategic stability.
                  (B) The report under subparagraph (A) may be 
                supplemented by a classified annex.
                  (C) If, at any time after the New START 
                Treaty enters into force, the President 
                determines that deployment of conventional 
                warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs is required at 
                levels that cannot be accommodated within the 
                limits in Article II of the New START Treaty 
                while sustaining a robust United States nuclear 
                triad, then the President shall immediately 
                consult with the Senate regarding the reasons 
                for such determination.
          (7) United states telemetric information.--In 
        implementing Article IX of the New START Treaty, Part 
        Seven of the Protocol, and the Annex on Telemetric 
        Information to the Protocol, prior to agreeing to 
        provide to the Russian Federation any amount of 
        telemetric information on a United States test launch 
        of a conventionally armed prompt global strike system, 
        the President shall certify to the Committees on 
        Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate 
        that--
                  (A) the provision of United States telemetric 
                information--
                          (i) consists of data that demonstrate 
                        that such system is not subject to the 
                        limits in Article II of the New START 
                        Treaty; or
                          (ii) would be provided in exchange 
                        for significant telemetric information 
                        regarding a weapon system not listed in 
                        paragraph 8 of Article III of the New 
                        START Treaty, or a system not deployed 
                        by the Russian Federation prior to 
                        December 5, 2009;
                  (B) it is in the national security interest 
                of the United States to provide such telemetric 
                information; and
                  (C) provision of such telemetric information 
                will not undermine the effectiveness of such 
                system.
          (8) Bilateral consultative commission.--Not later 
        than 15 days before any meeting of the Bilateral 
        Consultative Commission to consider a proposal for 
        additional measures to improve the viability or 
        effectiveness of the New START Treaty or to resolve a 
        question related to the applicability of provisions of 
        the New START Treaty to a new kind of strategic 
        offensive arm, the President shall consult with the 
        Chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate with regard to 
        whether the proposal, if adopted, would constitute an 
        amendment to the New START Treaty requiring the advice 
        and consent of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, 
        section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United 
        States.
          (9) United states commitments ensuring the safety, 
        reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces.--
                  (A) The United States is committed to 
                ensuring the safety, reliability, and 
                performance of its nuclear forces. It is the 
                sense of the Senate that--
                          (i) the United States is committed to 
                        proceeding with a robust stockpile 
                        stewardship program, and to maintaining 
                        and modernizing the nuclear weapons 
                        production capabilities and capacities, 
                        that will ensure the safety, 
                        reliability, and performance of the 
                        United States nuclear arsenal at the 
                        New START Treaty levels and meet 
                        requirements for hedging against 
                        possible international developments or 
                        technical problems, in conformance with 
                        United States policies and to underpin 
                        deterrence;
                          (ii) to that end, the United States 
                        is committed to maintaining United 
                        States nuclear weapons laboratories and 
                        preserving the core nuclear weapons 
                        competencies therein; and
                          (iii) the United States is committed 
                        to providing the resources needed to 
                        achieve these objectives, at a minimum 
                        at the levels set forth in the 
                        President's 10-year plan provided to 
                        the Congress pursuant to section 1251 
                        of the National Defense Authorization 
                        Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
                        111-84).
                  (B) If appropriations are enacted that fail 
                to meet the resource requirements set forth in 
                the President's 10-year plan, or if at any time 
                more resources are required than estimated in 
                the President's 10-year plan, the President 
                shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of 
                such enactment or the identification of the 
                requirement for such additional resources, as 
                appropriate, a report detailing--
                          (i) how the President proposes to 
                        remedy the resource shortfall;
                          (ii) if additional resources are 
                        required, the proposed level of funding 
                        required and an identification of the 
                        stockpile work, campaign, facility, 
                        site, asset, program, operation, 
                        activity, construction, or project for 
                        which additional funds are required;
                          (iii) the impact of the resource 
                        shortfall on the safety, reliability, 
                        and performance of United States 
                        nuclear forces; and
                          (iv) whether and why, in the changed 
                        circumstances brought about by the 
                        resource shortfall, it remains in the 
                        national interest of the United States 
                        to remain a Party to the New START 
                        Treaty.
          (10) Annual report.--As full and faithful 
        implementation is key to realizing the benefits of the 
        New START Treaty, the President shall submit a report 
        to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed 
        Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of 
        each year beginning with January 31, 2012, which will 
        provide--
                  (A) details on each Party's reductions in 
                strategic offensive arms between the date the 
                New START Treaty entered into force and 
                December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, 
                during the previous year;
                  (B) a certification that the Russian 
                Federation is in compliance with the terms of 
                the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion 
                of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation;
                  (C) a certification that any conversion and 
                elimination procedures adopted pursuant to 
                Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part 
                Three of the Protocol have not resulted in 
                ambiguities that could defeat the object and 
                purpose of the New START Treaty, or--
                          (i) a list of any cases in which a 
                        conversion or elimination procedure 
                        that has been demonstrated by Russia 
                        within the framework of the Bilateral 
                        Consultative Commission remains 
                        ambiguous or does not achieve the goals 
                        set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of 
                        Section I of Part Three of the 
                        Protocol; and
                          (ii) a comprehensive explanation of 
                        steps the United States has taken with 
                        respect to each such case;
                  (D) an assessment of the operation of the New 
                START Treaty's transparency mechanisms, 
                including--
                          (i) the extent to which either Party 
                        encrypted or otherwise impeded the 
                        collection of telemetric information; 
                        and
                          (ii) the extent and usefulness of 
                        exchanges of telemetric information; 
                        and
                  (E) an assessment of whether a strategic 
                imbalance exists that endangers the national 
                security interests of the United States.
    (b) UNDERSTANDINGS.--The advice and consent of the Senate 
to the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the 
following understandings, which shall be included in the 
instrument of ratification:
          (1) Missile defense.--It is the understanding of the 
        United States that--
                  (A) the New START Treaty does not impose any 
                limitations on the deployment of missile 
                defenses other than the requirements of 
                paragraph 3 of Article V of the New START 
                Treaty, which states, ``Each Party shall not 
                convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and 
                SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense 
                interceptors therein. Each Party further shall 
                not convert and shall not use launchers of 
                missile defense interceptors for placement of 
                ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall 
                not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted 
                prior to signature of this treaty for placement 
                of missile defense interceptors therein.'';
                  (B) any additional New START Treaty 
                limitations on the deployment of missile 
                defenses beyond those contained in paragraph 3 
                of Article V, including any limitations agreed 
                under the auspices of the Bilateral 
                Consultative Commission, would require an 
                amendment to the New START Treaty which may 
                enter into force for the United States only 
                with the advice and consent of the Senate, as 
                set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of 
                the Constitution of the United States; and
                  (C) the April 7, 2010, unilateral statement 
                by the Russian Federation on missile defense 
                does not impose a legal obligation on the 
                United States.
          (2) Rail-mobile icbms.--It is the understanding of 
        the United States that--
                  (A) any rail-mobile-launched ballistic 
                missile with a range in excess of 5,500 
                kilometers would be an ICBM, as the term is 
                defined in paragraph 37 of Part One of the 
                Protocol (in the English-language numbering), 
                for the purposes of the New START Treaty, 
                specifically including the limits in Article II 
                of the New START Treaty;
                  (B) an erector-launcher mechanism for 
                launching an ICBM and the railcar or flatcar on 
                which it is mounted would be an ICBM launcher, 
                as the term is defined in paragraph 28 of Part 
                One of the Protocol (in the English-language 
                numbering), for the purposes of the New START 
                Treaty, specifically including the limits in 
                Article II of the New START Treaty;
                  (C) if either Party should produce a rail-
                mobile ICBM system, the Bilateral Consultative 
                Commission would address the application of 
                other parts of the New START Treaty to that 
                system, including Articles III, IV, VI, VII, 
                and XI of the New START Treaty and relevant 
                portions of the Protocol and the Annexes to the 
                Protocol; and
                  (D) an agreement reached pursuant to 
                subparagraph (C) is subject to the requirements 
                of Article XV of the New START Treaty and, 
                specifically, if an agreement pursuant to 
                subparagraph (C) creates substantive rights or 
                obligations that differ significantly from 
                those in the New START Treaty regarding a 
                ``mobile launcher of ICBMs'' as defined in Part 
                One of the Protocol to the New START Treaty, 
                such agreement will be considered an amendment 
                to the New START Treaty pursuant to Paragraph 1 
                of Article XV of the New START Treaty and will 
                be submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
                consent to ratification.
          (3) Strategic-range, non-nuclear weapon systems.--It 
        is the understanding of the United States that--
                  (A) future, strategic-range non-nuclear 
                weapon systems that do not otherwise meet the 
                definitions of the New START Treaty will not be 
                ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms'' 
                subject to the New START Treaty;
                  (B) nothing in the New START Treaty restricts 
                United States research, development, testing, 
                and evaluation of strategic-range, non-nuclear 
                weapons, including any weapon that is capable 
                of boosted aerodynamic flight;
                  (C) nothing in the New START Treaty prohibits 
                deployments of strategic-range non-nuclear 
                weapon systems; and
                  (D) the addition to the New START Treaty of--
                          (i) any limitations on United States 
                        research, development, testing, and 
                        evaluation of strategic-range, non-
                        nuclear weapon systems, including any 
                        weapon that is capable of boosted 
                        aerodynamic flight; or
                          (ii) any prohibition on the 
                        deployment of such systems, including 
                        any such limitations or prohibitions 
                        agreed under the auspices of the 
                        Bilateral Consultative Commission,
                would require an amendment to the New START 
                Treaty which may enter into force for the 
                United States only with the advice and consent 
                of the Senate, as set forth in Article II, 
                section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the 
                United States.
    (c) DECLARATIONS.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to the 
following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:
          (1) Missile defense.--(A) It is the sense of the 
        Senate that--
                          (i) pursuant to the National Missile 
                        Defense Act of 1999 (Public Law 106-
                        38), it is the policy of the United 
                        States ``to deploy as soon as is 
                        technologically possible an effective 
                        National Missile Defense system capable 
                        of defending the territory of the 
                        United States against limited ballistic 
                        missile attack (whether accidental, 
                        unauthorized, or deliberate)'';
                          (ii) defenses against ballistic 
                        missiles are essential for new 
                        deterrent strategies and for new 
                        strategies should deterrence fail; and
                          (iii) further limitations on the 
                        missile defense capabilities of the 
                        United States are not in the national 
                        security interest of the United States.
                  (B) The New START Treaty and the April 7, 
                2010, unilateral statement of the Russian 
                Federation on missile defense do not limit in 
                any way, and shall not be interpreted as 
                limiting, activities that the United States 
                Government currently plans or that might be 
                required over the duration of the New START 
                Treaty to protect the United States pursuant to 
                the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, or to 
                protect United States Armed Forces and United 
                States allies from limited ballistic missile 
                attack, including further planned enhancements 
                to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system 
                and all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach 
                to missile defense in Europe.
                  (C) Given its concern about missile defense 
                issues, the Senate expects the executive branch 
                to offer regular briefings, not less than twice 
                each year, to the Committees on Foreign 
                Relations and Armed Services of the Senate on 
                all missile defense issues related to the New 
                START Treaty and on the progress of United 
                States-Russia dialogue and cooperation 
                regarding missile defense.
          (2) Defending the united states and allies against 
        strategic attack.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
                  (A) a paramount obligation of the United 
                States Government is to provide for the defense 
                of the American people, deployed members of the 
                United States Armed Forces, and United States 
                allies against nuclear attacks to the best of 
                its ability;
                  (B) policies based on ``mutual assured 
                destruction'' or intentional vulnerability can 
                be contrary to the safety and security of both 
                countries, and the United States and the 
                Russian Federation share a common interest in 
                moving cooperatively as soon as possible away 
                from a strategic relationship based on mutual 
                assured destruction;
                  (C) in a world where biological, chemical, 
                and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver 
                them are proliferating, strategic stability can 
                be enhanced by strategic defensive measures;
                  (D) accordingly, the United States is and 
                will remain free to reduce the vulnerability to 
                attack by constructing a layered missile 
                defense system capable of countering missiles 
                of all ranges;
                  (E) the United States will welcome steps by 
                the Russian Federation also to adopt a 
                fundamentally defensive strategic posture that 
                no longer views robust strategic defensive 
                capabilities as undermining the overall 
                strategic balance, and stands ready to 
                cooperate with the Russian Federation on 
                strategic defensive capabilities, as long as 
                such cooperation is aimed at fostering and in 
                no way constrains the defensive capabilities of 
                both sides; and
                  (F) the United States is committed to 
                improving United States strategic defensive 
                capabilities both quantitatively and 
                qualitatively during the period that the New 
                START Treaty is in effect, and such 
                improvements are consistent with the treaty.
          (3) Conventionally armed, strategic-range weapon 
        systems.--Consistent with statements made by the United 
        States that such systems are not intended to affect 
        strategic stability with respect to the Russian 
        Federation, the Senate finds that conventionally armed, 
        strategic-range weapon systems not co-located with 
        nuclear-armed systems do not affect strategic stability 
        between the United States and the Russian Federation.
          (4) Nunn-lugar cooperative threat reduction.--It is 
        the sense of the Senate that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
        Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has made an invaluable 
        contribution to the security and elimination of weapons 
        of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and 
        materials in Russia and elsewhere, and that the 
        President should continue the global CTR Program and 
        CTR assistance to Russia, including for the purpose of 
        facilitating implementation of the New START Treaty.
          (5) Asymmetry in reductions.--It is the sense of the 
        Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by 
        the New START Treaty, the President should regulate 
        reductions in United States strategic offensive arms so 
        that the number of accountable strategic offensive arms 
        under the New START Treaty possessed by the Russian 
        Federation in no case exceeds the comparable number of 
        accountable strategic offensive arms possessed by the 
        United States to such an extent that a strategic 
        imbalance endangers the national security interests of 
        the United States.
          (6) Compliance.--(A) The New START Treaty will remain 
        in the interests of the United States only to the 
        extent that the Russian Federation is in strict 
        compliance with its obligations under the New START 
        Treaty.
                  (B) Given its concern about compliance 
                issues, the Senate expects the executive branch 
                to offer regular briefings, not less than four 
                times each year, to the Committees on Foreign 
                Relations and Armed Services of the Senate on 
                compliance issues related to the New START 
                Treaty. Such briefings shall include a 
                description of all United States efforts in 
                United States-Russian diplomatic channels and 
                bilateral fora to resolve any compliance issues 
                and shall include, but would not necessarily be 
                limited to, a description of--
                          (i) any compliance issues the United 
                        States plans to raise with the Russian 
                        Federation at the Bilateral 
                        Consultative Commission, in advance of 
                        such meetings; and
                          (ii) any compliance issues raised at 
                        the Bilateral Consultative Commission, 
                        within thirty days of such meetings.
          (7) Expansion of strategic arsenals in countries 
        other than russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that 
        if, during the time the New START Treaty remains in 
        force, the President determines that there has been an 
        expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not 
        party to the New START Treaty so as to jeopardize the 
        supreme interests of the United States, then the 
        President should consult on an urgent basis with the 
        Senate to determine whether adherence to the New START 
        Treaty remains in the national interest of the United 
        States.
          (8) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
        applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally 
        based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in 
        condition (1) of the resolution of advice and consent 
        to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United 
        States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
        Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
        Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the 
        related memorandum of understanding and protocols 
        (commonly referred to as the ``INF Treaty''), approved 
        by the Senate on May 27, 1988, and condition (8) of the 
        resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of 
        the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the 
        Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 
        November 19, 1990 (commonly referred to as the ``CFE 
        Flank Document''), approved by the Senate on May 14, 
        1997.
          (9) Treaty modification or reinterpretation.--The 
        Senate declares that any agreement or understanding 
        which in any material way modifies, amends, or 
        reinterprets United States or Russian obligations under 
        the New START Treaty, including the time frame for 
        implementation of the New START Treaty, should be 
        submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
        ratification.
          (10) Consultations.--Given the continuing interest of 
        the Senate in the New START Treaty and in strategic 
        offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels 
        consistent with national security requirements and 
        alliance obligations of the United States, the Senate 
        expects the President to consult with the Senate prior 
        to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
        Article XIV of the New START Treaty.
          (11) Tactical nuclear weapons.--(A) The Senate calls 
        upon the President to pursue, following consultation 
        with allies, an agreement with the Russian Federation 
        that would address the disparity between the tactical 
        nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation 
        and of the United States and would secure and reduce 
        tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.
                  (B) Recognizing the difficulty the United 
                States has faced in ascertaining with 
                confidence the number of tactical nuclear 
                weapons maintained by the Russian Federation 
                and the security of those weapons, the Senate 
                urges the President to engage the Russian 
                Federation with the objectives of--
                          (i) establishing cooperative measures 
                        to give each Party to the New START 
                        Treaty improved confidence regarding 
                        the accurate accounting and security of 
                        tactical nuclear weapons maintained by 
                        the other Party; and
                          (ii) providing United States or other 
                        international assistance to help the 
                        Russian Federation ensure the accurate 
                        accounting and security of its tactical 
                        nuclear weapons.
          (12) Further strategic arms reductions.--(A) 
        Recognizing the obligation under Article VI of the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
        done at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968, 
        ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
        measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race 
        at any early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a 
        treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
        and effective international control,'' and in 
        anticipation of the ratification and entry into force 
        of the New START Treaty, the Senate calls upon the 
        other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early 
        consideration to corresponding reductions of their own 
        nuclear arsenals.
                  (B) The Senate declares that further arms 
                reduction agreements obligating the United 
                States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or 
                armaments of the United States in any 
                militarily significant manner may be made only 
                pursuant to the treaty-making power of the 
                President as set forth in Article II, section 
                2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United 
                States.
          (13) Modernization and replacement of united states 
        strategic delivery vehicles.--In accordance with 
        paragraph 1 of Article V of the New START Treaty, which 
        states that, ``Subject to the provisions of this 
        treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic 
        offensive arms may be carried out,'' it is the sense of 
        the Senate that United States deterrence and 
        flexibility is assured by a robust triad of strategic 
        delivery vehicles. To this end, the United States is 
        committed to accomplishing the modernization and 
        replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, 
        and to ensuring the continued flexibility of United 
        States conventional and nuclear delivery systems.

 VIII. Minority Views of Senators Risch, DeMint, Barrasso, Wicker, and 
                                 Inhofe

    In the 18 years since the original START Treaty was 
ratified, a lot has changed for U.S. national security, our 
global interests, and those of our allies. During the Cold War, 
the United States and NATO had to rely on nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent to a numerically superior Soviet conventional force.
    Today the world is much different. Russia relies on nuclear 
weapons--mostly tactical nuclear weapons--to counter superior 
conventional U.S. and NATO forces while threatening new NATO 
members near its borders. Meanwhile, the United States must 
balance a rising China--and its growing conventional and 
nuclear arsenals--with security commitments to protect more 
than 30 nations that make up the pledge of U.S. extended 
deterrence. Further, countries like Iran and North Korea pose 
potentially severe risks to U.S. forces abroad, U.S. allies, 
and global stability with their chemical, biological, and 
nuclear weapons programs as well as their growing ballistic 
missile capabilities. This is in addition to a number of other 
countries with ballistic missile and nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons programs.
    These new actors increase the spectrum of threats we and 
our allies must face, and this uncertainty places a larger 
burden on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to assure our allies. Our 
nuclear and conventional forces must be strong enough to deter 
any aggressor or combination of aggressors for the foreseeable 
future.
    However, we believe the Obama administration was narrowly 
centered on the issue of ``resetting'' U.S. relations with 
Russia which focused almost exclusively on bilateral nuclear 
stability between the United States and Russia in these 
negotiations and paid little attention to the question of 
maintaining multilateral nuclear stability in an uncertain and 
proliferated world.
    New START supposedly establishes a ceiling of 1,550 
warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Yet, due to 
the porous limitations and permissive bomber and other counting 
rules, that would allow unlimited air-launched cruise missiles 
and could include other uncounted options like sea-launched 
cruise missiles, there is a distinct possibility that by the 
end of the ten-year life of this treaty Russia will easily have 
well over 2,000 real--as opposed to accountable--deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads and thousands of tactical nuclear 
warheads. At the same time, China could have on the order of 
500 to 1,000 warheads, Pakistan and India could have roughly 
150 each, and Iran and North Korea could have roughly 50 each. 
This, of course, excludes the weapons that may be retained by 
our allies including France and Great Britain.
    Thus, the United States may need to address the 
requirements for deterrence with a force of 1,550 deployed 
strategic warheads in a world where cumulatively the rest of 
the world could retain more than double this number, and in the 
context of an unpredictable coalition dynamic.
    Yet, as Secretary of Defense Gates answered, the Department 
of Defense's ``Office of Net Assessment was not tasked to 
provide a net assessment of the New START Treaty's numerical 
limitations.'' Before New START was signed, the Office of the 
Net Assessment should have been directed to study the 
appropriateness of the numerical limitations imposed by New 
START, the qualitative structure of the U.S. strategic nuclear 
forces under the treaty, and how the United States would 
attempt to maintain deterrence and assurance in this 
proliferated environment. And Senators should have been given 
access to the analysis U.S. Strategic Command provided to the 
Department of Defense before they were asked to vote on the 
Resolution of Ratification.
    U.S. military leaders have testified that New START allows 
the U.S. forces necessary for deterrence. However, there are 
also three fundamental assumptions underlying this conclusion; 
each of which is optimistic in the extreme--(1) U.S. planning 
guidance for strategic forces would remain the same; (2) there 
would be no requests for an increase in forces; and (3) Russia 
would be compliant with New START. Assuming Russian treaty 
compliance violates the historical record, and it ignores the 
very real evidence of renewed Russian nuclear threats to U.S. 
allies and friends.
    In addition, there are many plausible threat scenarios, 
including many not involving Russia, that could emerge during 
the tenure of New START that would demand significant changes 
in current planning and new deterrence requirements. Would New 
START provide the necessary forces and flexibility if the 
administration's three optimistic assumptions do not hold? We 
do not believe it does.
    Instead of looking at the new and shifting 21st century 
challenges, New START embraces the paradigm of the Cold War by 
focusing only on Russia with its porous limits on nuclear 
warheads, delivery vehicles, and inspection regimes. As 
Secretary of State Clinton stated, ``the New START Treaty is 
needed in order to provide a critical framework for the 
strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and 
Russia.'' Secretary Clinton's comment by definition ignores the 
nuclear forces that exist or will exist shortly in other 
countries. And the lack of precise definitions and inclusion of 
other provisions in New START means that U.S. offensive and 
defensive conventional forces could be substantially 
constrained.
    Already, Russia is below New START's limits on strategic 
delivery vehicles and launchers due to atrophy of its strategic 
nuclear force. The only party that will actually have to 
eliminate strategic delivery vehicles and launchers under the 
provisions of the treaty is the United States.
    New START is a bad deal coming and going: it neither places 
effective limits on a future Russian renewal of its strategic 
nuclear forces (the beginnings of which already can be seen), 
nor does it demand real Russian reductions now. This the 
administration touts as a great negotiating accomplishment.
    From these issues come a list of our specific concerns for 
U.S. security and that of our friends.

                            MISSILE DEFENSE

    First, missile defense is a key component of our defense 
posture--and that of our allies. It is clear there is a 
fundamental disagreement between the United States and the 
Russian Federation on missile defense and what constitutes any 
qualitative or quantitative improvements. If a treaty is 
supposed to show points of agreement, this treaty falls far 
short.
    Lacking consensus, the Obama administration says that the 
preamble of the treaty, which mentions an ``interrelationship 
between strategic offensive and defensive arms that will become 
more important as strategic arms are reduced,'' was a non-
binding concession given to appease the Russians. Russian 
officials, in turn, say that it is legally binding and that 
they would like to recreate the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile 
treaty that severely limited missile defense. Despite the 
preamble, this treaty also limits missile defense in Article V. 
While this administration has stated it has no plans to act in 
a way inconsistent with Article V, a future administration may 
find these limits unacceptable. Under New START, the 
administration has created new missile defense limitations in 
the body of treaty, and opened the door to more restrictions.
    This treaty, and the debate during the Foreign Relations 
Committee's business meeting, also highlights a fundamental 
contrast between treaty supporters and ourselves on the effect 
missile defense systems have on strategic stability. Senator 
Lugar's efforts to limit further damage to missile defense in 
his Resolution of Ratification go a long way, but do not fully 
alleviate our concerns. We were particularly troubled by the 
lengthy debate over whether it was in the national security 
interest of the United States to move away from the policy of 
mutual assured destruction toward a fundamentally defensive 
posture. Senator DeMint's amendment sought to address this 20th 
century thinking, but the concern, voiced by administration 
officials during the business meeting, over words like ``remain 
committed'' to a layered ballistic missile defense capability 
in his amendment, is quite disturbing.
    For more than 50 years, the Russians have argued against 
U.S. missile defense plans and we have no doubt that, despite 
Senator Lugar's language, the Russians will attempt to use the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission as a forum to discuss missile 
defense plans and seek further concessions. For all of this 
capitulation to the Russians on this issue, it is still unclear 
what the United States received for making this concession.
    Given all of the concerns expressed by Senators and the 
adamant insistence that nothing was ``given away,'' it is still 
perplexing that the administration is unwilling to share the 
negotiating record with the Senate on this important topic. If 
the negotiating record is as the administration has described, 
and the President had approached the Senate as a partner in the 
ratification process, many of these concerns could have been 
addressed quickly.
    However, answers to Senator Wicker's questions for the 
record on missile defense called into question the commitment 
of the Obama administration to fully implement the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review Report from February 2010, and the 
objection to further efforts by Senator Barrasso, Senator 
Risch, and Senator Inhofe to amend the treaty and Resolution of 
Ratification further eroded our confidence in the 
administration's commitments on this important issue.

                        TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    Second, what is even more perplexing is that if the 
preamble language is non-binding, then why did the 
administration forgo seeking an equal statement on tactical 
nuclear weapons? If missile defenses and conventionally-armed 
ballistic missiles are relevant to strategic nuclear 
reductions, why is there no linkage with nonstrategic nuclear 
weapons, such as Russia's plan to develop long-range, nuclear-
armed, sea-launched cruise missiles?
    The United States has made enormous security commitments to 
allies around the world, and especially to our NATO partners. 
The United States is a protector of many, while Russia is a 
protector of none, and U.S. extended deterrence is intended to 
protect and assure these countries against attack as much as it 
is to protect the United States.
    As a result, Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed on 
the borders of our NATO allies--but based inside of Russian 
territory--represent a very real threat. However, with a small 
number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, U.S. 
extended deterrence is provided in large part by U.S. strategic 
nuclear forces. This is the course the United States has chosen 
for decades. Hence, there is a long-standing interrelationship 
between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, that can 
undermine deterrence and the assurances of allies when the 
United States accepts limits that reduce the flexibility of our 
strategic forces and cuts strategic warheads so low that 
Russia's tactical arsenal alone dwarfs the entire U.S. nuclear 
arsenal.
    Sadly, the Obama administration does not seem to understand 
this relationship. As Secretary Clinton stated, ``tactical 
nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic balance 
between the United States and Russia.'' Unfortunately, because 
of this narrow thinking, President Obama removed the issue of 
tactical nuclear forces from the negotiations so early that he 
denied negotiators one of the few points of leverage that could 
have guaranteed missile defense would not have been in the 
treaty.
    The Committee's Resolution of Ratification only offers a 
simple declaration regarding how to address the disparity 
between the United States and Russian tactical nuclear weapons. 
We do not share the administration's optimism that this treaty 
will lead to an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons. Russia 
is currently not honoring its commitments under the 
Presidential Nuclear Initiative of the early 1990s regarding 
these weapons and the rejection by the committee of Senator 
Risch's amendment regarding this issue highlights the 
unwillingness to deal with it.

                   CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

    Third, New START places limits on conventional strategic 
offensive capabilities and further limits U.S. deterrence 
flexibility and options. As the State Department Bureau of 
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation website states; 
``long-range conventional ballistic missiles would count under 
the treaty's limit of 700 delivery vehicles, and their 
conventional warheads would count against the limit of 1,550 
warheads.''
    The administration attempts to justify this situation by 
saying START I did not make a distinction between nuclear and 
conventional warheads on ballistic missiles. However, START I 
was also written 20 years ago, before advancements in military 
technology and U.S. capabilities were able to envision new 
types of systems. While conventional prompt global strike 
(CPGS) is still an infant technology, the limitations in New 
START substantially restrict further development and deployment 
of the most mature technology, instead betting on as of yet 
unproven advanced technologies, and in the process limiting 
U.S. options to respond to future threats, which was another 
key goal of the Russian Federation.
    U.S. engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that 
advancements in military technology can be instrumental, but 
they have also shown the limitations of integrating existing 
technology with time-sensitive information. CPGS could offer an 
incredible capability to swiftly respond to a threat anywhere 
in the world, and eliminate the threat before it matures.
    Whether emerging threats come from non-state actors, 
terrorist organizations, or rogue nations, this capability 
could also provide the President with a valuable and scalable 
option to respond to emerging threats without the need to rely 
on nuclear force, such as a rogue nation with only a few 
nuclear weapons. If required to conduct a large-scale 
conventional military operation in an anti-access environment, 
the U.S. military could also find a weapons system like this 
necessary.
    The unwillingness of the Obama administration to understand 
this changing dynamic or to protect American interests and 
flexibility is dangerous. These constraints are more troubling 
when President Obama argues that New START's reductions are 
acceptable because the United States has such a strong 
conventional force-endorsed by Secretary Gates in his written 
answers. Yet, Secretary Gates is also pushing to cut spending 
on U.S. conventional capabilities, and simultaneously seeks to 
transfer $5 billion from our military to the Department of 
Energy.
    It is disconcerting that the only place where President 
Obama could find money for modernization was the Department of 
Defense. The founding mission of DOE was to ensure that the 
building and maintenance of U.S. nuclear weapons remained in 
civilian hands. Sadly, it appears the core mission of DOE is 
now a low priority, but our conventional military forces and 
their readiness should not have to suffer because of misplaced 
priorities at the DOE.
    Since this treaty was intended to focus on strategic 
nuclear reductions, the inclusion of CPGS remains dubious. 
Although the State Department's analysis determined that CPGS 
options would count under the treaty's central limits, it 
remains unclear if it is really compelled by the terms of the 
treaty or is simply the intent of the negotiating parties. 
Because the Obama administration again refuses to share the 
negotiating record, the Resolution of Ratification should have 
included an understanding or reservation that an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or submarine-launched 
ballistic missile loaded with only a conventional warhead 
should not count towards the treaty's central limits pertaining 
to either delivery vehicles or warheads.
    At a minimum the existing resolution should be expanded to 
ensure that it is not in the jurisdiction of the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission to limit the deployment of CPGS systems 
of the United States.

                      INSPECTIONS AND VERIFICATION

    If the United States is to accept increased uncertainty and 
risk, then we should have absolute confidence in our ability to 
monitor the Russians and verify compliance. However, the 
effectiveness and adequacy of any arms control treaty's 
verification measures ultimately depends on what and how the 
treaty limits operate. By reverting back to the Cold War 
standard of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear parity and basing 
deterrence on mutual nuclear threats, New START establishes the 
need for the kind of vigorous verification measures found in 
the START I treaty.
    Despite Secretary Clinton's comment that this treaty 
``provides detailed rules and significant transparency 
regarding each side's strategic forces through its extensive 
verification regime,'' we do not share the administration's 
confidence. To the contrary, verification in this treaty is 
very weak in comparison to START I, especially for the warhead 
limit.
    First, quality is just as important as quantity because the 
details matter and the treaty falls short on both counts. Over 
the life of START I the United States conducted roughly 600 
inspections; under New START we are limited to 18 annually (180 
total). With 35 Russian facilities and only 17 U.S. facilities 
to inspect, Russia begins at a significant advantage.
    Second, the Obama administration has touted New START's 
inspection regime as being a monumental shift toward counting 
actual warheads, instead of using attribution accounting rules. 
However, the treaty relies on an annual limit of ten Type I 
inspections, which would provide the United States with 
visibility on only about two to three percent of the entire 
missile force each year. Conveniently, these are the same kind 
of inspections that the Russians illegally obstructed, for 
certain types of missiles, throughout the START I Treaty. Now, 
that obstruction seems to be acceptable practice.
    Fortunately, START I did not rely on these inspections 
alone for verification; it wisely relied primarily on our 
National Technical Means (NTM) to verify an ``attribution'' 
rule that in general, counted warheads based on their 
demonstrated capability. (Under this rule, a missile type was 
considered to have a certain attributed number of warheads, 
such that warhead verification became an exercise of simply 
multiplying numbers of missiles observed with satellites 
multiplied by the attributed warhead number.)
    New START abandoned many limitations on strategic nuclear 
weapons as well as this tried and true verification structure, 
and relies instead on good Russian inspection behavior for 
verification. This is unwise. If the Russians continue their 
obstruction, our ability to verify the warhead limit will be 
substantially degraded. Hypothetically, even if the Russians 
departed from past practice and did not obstruct the 
inspections, their utility is still inherently limited.
    The Russians are not required to tell us how many warheads 
are located on each missile at the initial data exchange. 
Instead, it's only after a U.S. inspection team declares its 
intention to visit a missile site that the Russians will 
declare how many re-entry vehicles are deployed on missiles 
located at that inspection site. The U.S. team then gets to 
look at only one of those missiles. There is no way to 
determine from this single inspection whether the rest of the 
Russian missile force also contains that number of warheads. 
The United States cannot deduce from so few inspections whether 
Russia is complying with the overall 1,550 limit. No one should 
be under the illusion that we are ``counting'' Russian 
warheads. The lack of confidence in verifying this central 
limit undermines confidence in the entire agreement.
    Third, the warhead limit is not our only verification 
concern. START I's reliance on NTM to verify its warhead limits 
was buttressed by two other key measures, both of which were 
dropped from New START--(1) continuous portal/perimeter 
monitoring at the Russian assembly plant for mobile ICBMs (the 
type most difficult to monitor with NTM); and (2) full access 
to telemetry, which is extremely useful for understanding 
missile systems, including whether the Russians were complying 
with START I's prohibition on flight-testing missiles that 
exceded the warhead limit for each type of missile. As a result 
of New START's omission or limitation of these important 
verification measures, the uncertainty with respect to Russian 
mobile ICBM production and overall missile capabilities will 
increase substantially. Secretary Gates admitted in his 
testimony before the committee that U.S. ability to monitor 
this treaty would decline over time.
    As the number of nuclear weapons decreases, verification 
becomes even more important and must become more robust because 
the benefits of cheating increase. On this point New START 
moves completely in the wrong direction.

                               COMPLIANCE

    As we referenced earlier, Russia has a long track record of 
ignoring international agreements that it has signed. Russia 
repeatedly violated START I all the way to its expiration in 
December 2009, as clearly stated in the 2005 and 2010 State 
Department Compliance Reports.
    Specifically, Russian failures to comply with telemetry 
sharing under START I raises concerns about U.S. access to 
data, and New START does nothing to ensure telemetry is shared 
regarding ballistic missile delivery vehicles for warheads. It 
simply leaves this issue to the BCC to resolve at some later 
point.
    Russia has also directly impeded U.S. inspectors' ability 
to accurately account for the number of reentry vehicles (RVs) 
on ballistic missiles, which again speaks to the efficacy of 
the Type I inspections under New START. As the 2005 State 
Department report noted, ``Russian RV covers, and their method 
of emplacement, have in some cases hampered U.S. inspectors 
from ascertaining that the front section of the missiles 
contains no more RVs than the number of warheads attributed to 
a missile of that type under the treaty.''
    In addition, the U.S. government has serious concerns with 
Russian compliance on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
Biological Weapons Convention, and the Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty.
    Russia has a long history of acting in bad faith and 
violating arms control agreements and commitments. The 
disregard for international arms control treaties when it does 
not suit Russian interests provides little support to the 
assumption that Russia will in good faith comply with the New 
START Treaty.

                             MODERNIZATION

    According to Secretary Gates, the United States is the only 
nuclear nation that is not currently pursuing nuclear 
modernization. The French, Russians, British, and others are 
constantly designing and building new weapons so that their 
scientists and engineers do not lose critical skills. Secretary 
Gates has also made clear that nuclear modernization is a 
prerequisite to nuclear reductions. As he stated in a speech to 
the Carnegie Endowment, ``To be blunt, there is absolutely no 
way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number 
of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing 
our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.''
    Sadly, the United States has starved its own capabilities 
for so long that we have lost core competencies in our ability 
to maintain current weapons as well as have the capability to 
design and build new weapons. As some, including professors 
Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, have pointed out the United States 
must preserve options.
    In our opinion this does not mean we currently need to 
build new weapons immediately, but it does mean that if the 
United States wants to remain a leader in the international 
system, we cannot cede this ability to other nations. It is 
imperative that we unshackle our scientists and allow them the 
freedom to pursue scientific discovery as they see fit. Simply 
turning them into systems analysts for weapons that were 
designed 30 years ago does not keep the United States on the 
cutting edge. Unfortunately, President Obama's Nuclear Posture 
Review (NPR) does precisely that.
    In a letter signed by ten former DOE National Lab Directors 
to Secretary Gates and Secretary of Energy Chu they stated:

          Unfortunately, we are concerned that language in the 
        NPR imposes unnecessary constraints on our engineers 
        and scientists when it states that ``the United States 
        will give strong preference to options for 
        refurbishment or reuse,'' and that the replacement of 
        nuclear components ``would be undertaken only if 
        critical Stockpile Management Program (SMP) goals could 
        not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by 
        the President and approved by Congress.''
          Based on our experience as former laboratory 
        directors, we believe this ``higher bar'' for certain 
        life extension options will stifle the creative and 
        imaginative thinking that typifies the excellent 
        history of progress and development at the national 
        laboratories, and indeed will inhibit the NPR's goal of 
        honing the specialized skills needed to sustain the 
        nuclear deterrent. If these skills are not exercised, 
        they will be lost. Moreover, the United States is 
        already taking on a certain amount of risk by not 
        testing its nuclear weapons. Failure to preserve 
        nuclear weapons skill sets will add further risk, and 
        unnecessarily so.

    Further, President Obama and his administration must commit 
the levels of funding necessary to modernize our nuclear 
complex, the warheads themselves, and the delivery vehicles and 
platforms necessary for our nuclear deterrence. While President 
Obama's fiscal year 2011 budget and Section 1251 plan are a 
good start, it is clear that it does not completely meet the 
needs for the nuclear complex. And the Resolution of 
Ratification could do more to ensure the President honors his 
commitments to modernization.
    While many focus on the warheads themselves, the 
modernization of U.S. strategic delivery vehicles and platforms 
that make up the nuclear triad is also vitally important. 
Unfortunately, the funding as outlined by the Secretary of 
Defense is barely adequate to replace the Ohio class 
submarines, but leaves virtually no funding for 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) life extensions, a 
follow on ICBM to replace the Minuteman III, a new long-range 
bomber, and a follow on to our aged air-launched cruise 
missile. In the absence of such modernization programs, the 
U.S. strategic forces will not retain the survivability and 
flexibility that is necessary to deter enemies and assure 
allies. This raises questions about the intentions of this 
administration. Senators have been told that maintaining the 
nuclear triad is vital to ``stability'' at the reduced force 
levels in the treaty, but after years of delay the 
administration has yet to make any decisions about strategic 
delivery vehicles beyond a replacement submarine.
    We believe the committee's proposal for advancing nuclear 
weapons modernization is of uncertain reliability. The 
administration itself has stated explicitly that its highest 
nuclear policy priority is non-proliferation and movement 
toward nuclear disarmament. The Resolution of Ratification 
includes a provision designed to ensure sustained funding for 
the President's ten-year plan for preserving the safety, 
reliability and performance of U.S. nuclear forces, which he 
submitted pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This provision purports 
to embody a deal between the President and the Senate to 
sustain nuclear weapons modernization for ten years in exchange 
for Senate consent to the ratification of New START.
    Such a deal is made necessary by what we believe is the 
accurate assumption that the President does not favor the 
provisions in the section 1251 plan on their merits, but only 
as a means for securing the ratification of New START. 
Nevertheless, the relevant provision in the Resolution of 
Ratification leaves it to the President alone to determine if 
resources become inadequate to support the plan and trigger the 
reporting requirement to identify the additional resources to 
preserve nuclear modernization.
    Senators Inhofe and Risch's efforts on this were additional 
steps to ensure the specific modernization of our strategic 
delivery vehicles, and while the committee accepted a modified 
version of Senator Risch's amendment, it does not satisfy all 
of the concerns we have.

                                PROCESS

    We are also very disappointed in the lack of respect for 
the constitutional role that the Senate plays in any treaty 
process. Some treaties require more scrutiny than others, and 
sadly, the process by which this treaty has been considered by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been negligent. In 
May when hearings were first starting, seven Senators on this 
committee requested nine witnesses (letter attached). Some of 
these individuals support the treaty and some do not, but 
Senators felt these voices were important and necessary to 
cover the breadth of concerns.
    In twelve hearings there were only two voices of opposition 
out of twenty-two. This is a far cry from the normal precedent 
of the minority being allowed to have one witness on each 
panel. Also, the fact that no former national lab directors 
were invited to testify demonstrated a lack of balance and 
serious scrutiny on key issues. When all the witnesses have 
been hand-picked by the chairman to avoid critical voices, the 
argument that this treaty has been fully vetted and endorsed by 
witnesses lacks credibility.
    Given a stacked deck of witnesses, it is even more 
troubling that questions for the record were not answered in a 
timely manner. In fact, the administration did not provide 
substantive answers to any questions for the record until after 
the last administration witness testified. The desire of the 
Obama administration to avoid serious and thoughtful 
consideration of the merits of this treaty only leaves us to 
speculate why the administration was filibustering Senators' 
requests for more information.
    Further the administration delayed releasing reports, which 
would have provided the larger context necessary for Senators 
to understand. These reports included a National Intelligence 
Estimate, Force Structure report, State Department Compliance 
Reports, and other documents (letter attached). With some 
provisions of this treaty so contentious, providing the 
negotiating record on these points would have been a wise and 
prudent gesture. The insistence on trusting administration 
officials without any supporting documentation simply 
undermines their credibility.
    The rush to ratify this treaty and avoid scrutiny has been 
of serious concern, and the argument made by some 
administration officials that any Senator standing in the way 
was doing so for political reasons is inappropriate and 
disrespectful.
    While the administration wants to see New START in place to 
restart the inspections that have been absent since START I 
expired in December 2009, we do not believe their mistakes 
should force the Senate to surrender its obligations or due 
diligence. START I provided a five year extension to keep 
inspections in place, which the administration did not 
exercise. And Senator Lugar introduced the START I Treaty 
Inspections and Monitoring Protocol Continuation Act to do 
likewise. We voted for this legislation when it came before the 
Foreign Relations Committee, but the administration was 
uninterested in this approach.
    However, it should be clear that the Obama administration 
took five months after START I's expiration to complete the 
treaty's negotiations, sign it, and send it to the Senate. Why 
was the anniversary of President Obama's speech in Prague a 
more important deadline than the expiration of START I? More 
importantly, it took the administration more than 12 months to 
negotiate this treaty, but it has sought the ratification of 
this treaty through the Senate in less than five months.
    To put this in context, the Senate considered START I for 
almost an entire year, and the Moscow Treaty, which was much 
shorter and far less complex than New START laid before the 
Senate for almost nine months. The rush to ratification 
undermines the important role of advice and consent that the 
Senate must exercise on any treaty of this magnitude.
    Combined with a lack of transparency, the rush creates an 
impression that the administration is hiding something. Given 
the changing nature of global security, a more thoughtful and 
measured approach should have been taken, and the 
administration should not have filibustered Senators' requests 
for information and clarity.

                               CONCLUSION

    In conclusion, we believe the treaty will substantially 
limit U.S. flexibility and constrain the overall strategic 
posture of the United States in a way that emerging threats and 
nations could weaken U.S. national security, undermine security 
for important friends and allies, and possibly encourage 
proliferation. The United States appears to have received 
nothing in return for its concessions on strategic nuclear 
force levels, conventional strategic forces, or missile 
defense. The treaty effectively requires unilateral U.S. 
reductions and its limitations are so porous and permissive 
that it does not place effective ceilings on the slowly 
emerging comprehensive Russian strategic modernization program. 
Moreover, these concessions in New START deprive the United 
States the leverage that would be necessary for negotiating any 
future meaningful nuclear reduction agreements.
    While we believe the Committee's Resolution of Ratification 
serves to identify the most important flaws and weaknesses 
either derived from, or found within, New START, we cast our 
votes in opposition to reporting New START to the Senate for 
consideration based on our view that the proposed remedies in 
the Resolution of Ratification adopted by the Committee are 
insufficient. We sincerely hope these issues can be resolved 
before a final vote on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

LETTER FROM SENATORS CORKER, ISAKSON, RISCH, DEMINT, BARRASSO, WICKER, 
               AND INHOFE TO SENATOR KERRY, MAY 18, 2010

                                               U.S. Senate,
                                      Washington, DC, May 18, 2010.
Hon. John Kerry,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington. DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: We deeply appreciate your efforts and 
those of the Committee to hold hearings in order to carefully 
examine the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
    As you know, while the issue of arms control is not a new 
one, most of us have never had to consider an arms control 
treaty in the U.S. Senate, and none of us have done so while 
serving on the Foreign Relations Committee. Given the unique 
role the Committee plays in consideration of treaties, we were 
encouraged by your statement that, ``the way to ratify it is to 
fully explain it, vet it, and thoroughly address any kinds of 
concerns that people may have.''
    In order to fully understand the provisions of this treaty 
and its potential impacts on American security and that of our 
allies and friends, it is necessary to hear from a wide range 
of witnesses.
    Below is a list of individuals who are uniquely qualified 
to address the potential effects of this treaty. We would 
appreciate having a majority of them testify to cover the 
breadth of issues.

   Ambd. John Bolton--Fellow, American Enterprise 
        Institute
   Gen. Kevin Chilton--Commander, U.S. Strategic Forces 
        Command
   Ambd. Eric Edelman--Fellow, Center for Strategic and 
        Budgetary Assessments
   Mr. Brian Green--Former Dep. Asst. Secretary of 
        Defense for Strategic Capabilities
   Dr. Keith Payne--President, National Institute for 
        Public Policy
   Mr. Stephen Rademaker--Former Asst. Secretary of 
        State for Arms Control
   Mr. Dimitri Simes--President, The Nixon Center
   Ambd. Dave Smith--Fellow, Potomac Institute for 
        Policy Studies
   Ambd. James Woolsey--Former Director of Central 
        Intelligence

    Thank you for your patience as we analyze this complex 
treaty. We appreciate your assistance with this matter and look 
forward to working with you to schedule these witnesses.
            Sincerely.
                                   Bob Corker.
                                   Johnny Isakson.
                                   James Risch.
                                   Jim DeMint.
                                   John Barrasso.
                                   Roger Wicker.
                                   James Inhofe.

LETTER FROM SENATORS CORKER, ISAKSON, RISCH, DEMINT, BARRASSO, WICKER, 
               AND INHOFE TO SENATOR KERRY, JUNE 29, 2010

                                               U.S. Senate,
                                     Washington, DC, June 29, 2010.
Hon. John Kerry,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington. DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: We deeply appreciate your efforts to 
hold a number of hearings in order to carefully examine the new 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty currently before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.
    Considering the history of past arms control treaties, the 
number of hearings being held on New START seems appropriate. 
However, we are concerned by a recent press release announcing 
your intention to move the treaty out of committee before the 
August recess.
    We believe that a full and open debate on the substance and 
implications of this treaty is necessary and that should 
determine when the committee votes on this treaty. If the 
Senate moves according to the announced schedule, the 
ratification process would be one of the quickest in the 
history of arms control treaties--faster than START I and even 
the Moscow Treaty, which was significantly less complex than 
New START.
    Also a month ago, we sent a letter requesting a number of 
witnesses that would help fully vet this treaty. Some of the 
proposed witnesses support the treaty and some do not. 
Unfortunately, the recently announced series of hearings does 
not adequately address the request we made. According to your 
press release and subsequent hearing notices, only two of the 
nine witnesses we requested would appear before you seek to 
vote the treaty out of committee.
    Further, the Senate has not received the National 
Intelligence Estimate, the State Department Verifiability 
Assessment, nor the five State Department Compliance Reports. 
These reports are crucial to understanding the real world 
implications of the New START Treaty. The 2005 Compliance 
Report alone highlighted a number of direct violations of START 
I by the Russians. For five years and two administrations we 
have not seen a single report to confirm if Russia has improved 
its transparency with the United States and is completely 
honoring its treaty obligations.
    In addition, both the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will need to hold 
hearings on this treaty and submit their own reports to the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Even if we receive these reports 
quickly, it leaves little time for serious and thoughtful 
consideration of what may be in them.
    Finally, we have still not received the full negotiating 
record nor answers from any administration witnesses regarding 
the questions for the record that many of us submitted. Both 
the record as well as responses to our questions would be 
helpful in making scheduled hearings more fruitful, but are 
especially critical to timely consideration and voting.
    We take very seriously the role of advise and consent for 
treaties that the Senate--and especially our committee--has in 
this process. And given these outstanding issues, we believe 
talk of scheduling a business meeting is premature. We 
encourage you to work with us to make sure this treaty is fully 
understood and vetted, and ask that you wait to schedule a 
business meeting on this treaty until after everyone has 
testified and members have had a reasonable amount of time to 
review all the reports, documents, and answers.
    Thank you for your patience as we analyze this complex 
treaty. We appreciate your assistance with this mailer and look 
forward to working with you to schedule a business meeting at 
the appropriate time.
    Sincerely.
                                   Bob Corker.
                                   Johnny Isakson.
                                   James Risch.
                                   Jim DeMint.
                                   John Barrasso.
                                   Roger Wicker.
                                   James Inhofe.

                        IX. Additional Documents


 LETTER FROM THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., VICE PRESIDENT OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER 15, 2010









 LETTER FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, JULY 
                                30, 2010









 LETTER FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WITH 
                     ATTACHMENT, SEPTEMBER 30, 2010













   LETTER TO THE HONORABLE CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 
 SERVICES, FROM ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 
                     CHIEFS OF STAFF, JUNE 9, 2010









LETTER TO THE HONORABLE CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED 
SERVICES, FROM GENERAL JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE 
                JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 2, 2010









  LETTER FROM THE HONORABLE RICHARD R. VERMA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
             STATE FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, AUGUST 3, 2010














   LETTER FROM FORMER COMMANDERS OF STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, AND U.S. 
                    STRATEGIC COMMAND, JULY 14, 2010









        FACT SHEET ON THE PLAN IN THE 1251 REPORT, MAY 13, 2010





                                    

      
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