[Senate Report 110-75]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                       Calendar No. 181
110th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                     110-75

======================================================================



 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

                                _______
                                

                  May 31, 2007.--Ordered to be printed

   Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of May 25, 2007

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Rockefeller, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted 
                             the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                            ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 1538]

    The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 
original bill (S. 1538) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
year 2008 for the intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Intelligence 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the 
bill do pass.

                CLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT

    The classified nature of United States intelligence 
activities precludes disclosure by the Committee of details of 
its budgetary recommendations. The Committee has prepared a 
classified annex to this report that contains a classified 
Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status 
of public law. The classified annex is made available to the 
Committees of Appropriations of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives and to the President. It is also available for 
review by any Member of the Senate subject to the provisions of 
Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th Congress (1976).

              SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

    The following is a section-by-section analysis and 
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008 that is being reported by the Committee. Following 
that analysis and explanation, the report sets forth Committee 
comments on other matters. The report also includes additional 
views offered by Members of the Committee.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES


Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes 
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities for fiscal year 2008.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel 
levels (expressed as full-time equivalent positions) for fiscal 
year 2008 are contained in a classified Schedule of 
Authorizations. The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and 
House of Representatives and to the President.
    Although prior intelligence authorization acts have not 
defined Intelligence Community (IC) personnel limits in terms 
of full-time equivalent positions, the Committee has determined 
it would be consistent with general governmental practice to do 
so. This will enable IC elements to count two half-time 
employees as holding the equivalent of one full-time position, 
rather than counting them as two employees against a ceiling.
    In the Administration's request for legislative authorities 
as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has asked for 
broad authority to manage the IC within the limits of available 
funds but without legislatively-fixed civilian end-strength 
personnel limits. The DNI's submission to the Committee states 
that statutory ceilings have led to increased use of 
contractors and have hindered the IC's civilian joint duty, 
student employment, and National Intelligence Reserve Corps 
programs. The Committee will continue to study this recently 
received proposal. In the meantime, the flexibility provided in 
this section by the use of full-time equivalents as a measure 
of personnel levels and the additional flexibility provided in 
Section 103 should help to address the concerns raised by the 
DNI.

Section 103. Personnel level adjustments

    Section 103(a) provides that the DNI, with approval of the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), may 
authorize employment of civilian personnel in fiscal year 2008 
in excess of the number of authorized full-time equivalent 
positions by an amount not exceeding 5 percent (rather than 2 
percent in prior law) of the total limit applicable to each IC 
element under Section 102. The DNI may do so only if necessary 
to the performance of important intelligence functions. Any 
exercise of this authority must be reported in advance to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
    Section 103(b) provides additional flexibility when the 
heads of IC elements determine that work currently performed by 
contractors should be performed by government employees. It 
does so by authorizing the DNI, with OMB's approval, to 
authorize employment of additional full-time equivalent 
personnel in a number equal to the number of contractor 
employees currently performing that work. Any exercise of this 
authority also must be reported in advance to the congressional 
intelligence committees.
    Any exercise of the personnel level flexibility should be 
implemented in accordance with a plan that includes adequate 
support for personnel. This matter is addressed in Section 315.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence 
Community Management Account (CMA) of the DNI and sets the 
full-time equivalent personnel end-strength for the elements 
within the CMA for fiscal year 2008.
    Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $715,076,000 
for fiscal year 2008 for the activities of the CMA. Subsection 
(a) also authorizes funds identified for advanced research and 
development to remain available for two years. Subsection (b) 
authorizes 1,768 full-time equivalent personnel for elements 
within the CMA for fiscal year 2008 and provides that such 
personnel may be permanent employees of a CMA element or 
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
    Subsection (c) provides that personnel level flexibility 
available to the DNI under Section 103 is also available to the 
DNI in adjusting personnel levels within the CMA. Subsection 
(d) authorizes additional appropriations and personnel for the 
CMA as specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
and permits the additional funding for research and development 
to remain available through September 30, 2009.

Section 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 105 incorporates into the Act each requirement to 
submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees 
contained in the joint explanatory statement to accompany the 
conference report or in the classified annex accompanying the 
conference report.

Section 106. Development and acquisition program

    Section 106 requires the DNI to transfer not less than an 
amount specified in the classified annex to the Office of the 
DNI (ODNI) to fund the development and acquisition of a program 
specified in the classified annex. The Committee supports 
immediate development and acquisition of an innovative program. 
Further details concerning this matter are provided in the 
classified annex.

Section 107. Availability to public of certain intelligence funding 
        information

    Section 107 requires the President to disclose to the 
public the aggregate amount of funds requested for the National 
Intelligence Program for each fiscal year. It also requires 
Congress to disclose to the public the aggregate amount 
authorized to be appropriated and the aggregate amount 
appropriated for the National Intelligence Program.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM


Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 
$262,500,000 for fiscal year 2008 for the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability Fund.

Section 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision 
        of CIA Retirement Act

    Section 202 updates the CIA Retirement Act to reflect the 
Agency's use of pay levels rather than pay grades within the 
Senior Intelligence Service.

   TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS


Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 302 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.

Section 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community 
        under the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 303 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as 
``elements of the intelligence community'' of elements of 
departments and agencies of the United States Government 
whether or not those departments and agencies are listed in 
Section 3(4).

Section 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
        intelligence collection personnel

    Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
404k) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common carrier 
when it is consistent with IC mission requirements or, more 
specifically, is required for cover purposes, operational 
needs, or other exceptional circumstances. As presently 
written, the DNI may only delegate this authority to the 
Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI) or, with respect to CIA employees, 
to the Director of the CIA.
    Section 304 provides that the DNI may delegate the 
authority in Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 
to the head of any IC element. This expansion is consistent 
with the view of the Committee that the DNI should be able to 
delegate authority throughout the IC when such delegation 
serves the overall interests of the IC.
    Section 304 also provides that the head of an IC element to 
which travel authority has been delegated is also empowered to 
delegate it to senior officials of the element as specified in 
guidelines issued by the DNI. This allows for administrative 
flexibility consistent with the guidance of the DNI for the 
entire IC. To facilitate oversight, the DNI shall submit the 
guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 305. Modification of availability of funds for different 
        intelligence activities

    Section 305 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) 
(governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the 
text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Pub. 
L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004)) (governing the transfer and 
reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence funding).
    The amendment replaces the ``unforeseen requirements'' 
standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a more flexible standard 
to govern reprogrammings and transfers of funds authorized for 
a different intelligence or intelligence-related activity. 
Under the new standard, a reprogramming or transfer is 
authorized if, in addition to the other requirements of Section 
504(a)(3), the new use of funds would ``support an emergent 
need, improve program effectiveness, or increase efficiency.'' 
This modification brings the standard for reprogrammings or 
transfers of intelligence funding into conformity with the 
standards applicable to reprogrammings and transfers under 
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947. The 
modification preserves congressional oversight of proposed 
reprogrammings and transfers while enhancing the IC's ability 
to carry out missions and functions vital to national security.

Section 306. Increase in penalties for disclosure of undercover 
        intelligence officers and agents

    Section 306 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for 
individuals with authorized access to classified information 
who intentionally disclose any information identifying a covert 
agent, if those individuals know that the United States is 
taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's 
intelligence relationship to the United States. Currently, the 
maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who has had 
``authorized access to classified information that identifies a 
covert agent'' is 10 years. Subsection (a) increases that 
maximum sentence to 15 years. Currently, the maximum sentence 
for disclosure by someone who ``as a result of having 
authorized access to classified information, learns of the 
identity of a covert agent'' is 5 years. Subsection (b) 
increases that maximum sentence to 10 years.

Section 307. Extension to intelligence community of authority to delete 
        information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and 
        decorations

    Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires that certain federal 
``employees''--a term that generally applies to all IC 
officials and personnel and certain contractors, spouses, 
dependents, and others--file reports with their employing 
agency regarding receipt of gifts or decorations from foreign 
governments. Following compilation of these reports, the 
employing agency is required to file annually with the 
Secretary of State detailed information about the receipt of 
foreign gifts and decorations by its employees, including the 
source of the gift. The Secretary of State is required to 
publish a comprehensive list of the agency reports in the 
Federal Register.
    With respect to IC activities, public disclosure of gifts 
or decorations in the Federal Register has the potential to 
compromise intelligence sources (e.g., confirmation of an 
intelligence relationship with a foreign government) and could 
undermine national security. Recognizing this concern, the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted a limited 
exemption from reporting certain information about such foreign 
gifts or decorations where the publication of the information 
could adversely affect United States intelligence sources. 
Section 1079 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004) 
(``Intelligence Reform Act''), extended a similar exemption to 
the DNI in addition to applying the existing exemption to the 
CIA Director.
    Section 307 provides to the heads of each IC element the 
same limited exemption from specified public reporting 
requirements that is currently authorized for the DNI and CIA 
Director. The national security concerns that prompt those 
exemptions apply equally to other IC elements. Section 307 
mandates that the information not provided to the Secretary of 
State be provided to the DNI to ensure continued independent 
oversight of the receipt by IC personnel of foreign gifts or 
decorations.

Section 308. Public Interest Declassification Board

    As described in its report on activities in the 109th 
Congress (S. Rep. No. 110-57, at p. 26), in September 2006, the 
Committee released two reports on prewar intelligence regarding 
Iraq. In the introduction to one, the Committee expressed 
disagreement with the IC's decision to classify portions of the 
report. Members of the Committee wrote to the then recently 
constituted Public Interest Declassification Board to request 
that it review the material and make recommendations about its 
classification. The Board responded that it might not be able 
to do so without White House authorization. In December 2006, 
the Board wrote to Congress to request that the statute 
establishing the Board be clarified to enable it to begin, 
without White House approval, a declassification review 
requested by Congress.
    Section 308 authorizes the Public Interest Declassification 
Board, upon receiving a congressional request, to conduct a 
review and make recommendations regardless of whether the 
review is requested by the President. It further provides that 
any recommendations submitted by the Board to the President 
shall also be submitted to the chairman and ranking minority 
member of the requesting committee. Finally, it extends the 
life of the Board for four years until the end of 2012.

Section 309. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to 
        elements of the intelligence community

    Section 309 expands from one year to up to three years the 
length of time that United States Government personnel may be 
detailed to the ODNI on a non-reimbursable basis under which 
the employee continues to be paid by the sending agency. To 
utilize this authority, the joint agreement of the DNI and head 
of the detailing element is required. As explained by the DNI, 
this authority will provide flexibility for the ODNI to receive 
support from other elements of the IC for community-wide 
activities where both the sending agency and the ODNI would 
benefit from the detail.

Section 310. Director of National Intelligence report on compliance 
        with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions 
        of the Military Commissions Act of 2006

    Section 310 requires the DNI to submit a classified report 
to the congressional intelligence committees on all measures 
taken by the ODNI and by any IC element with relevant 
responsibilities on compliance with detention and interrogation 
provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006. The report is to be submitted 
no later than September 1, 2007.
    The Detainee Treatment Act provides that no individual in 
the custody or under the physical control of the United States, 
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be 
subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Congress 
reaffirmed this mandate in Section 6 of the Military 
Commissions Act, adding an implementation mechanism that 
requires the President to take action to ensure compliance 
including through administrative rules and procedures. Section 
6 further provides not only that grave breaches of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are war crimes under Title 
18 of the United State Code, but also that the President has 
authority for the United States to promulgate higher standards 
and administrative regulations for violations of U.S. treaty 
obligations. It requires the President to issue those 
interpretations by Executive Order published in the Federal 
Register.
    The report shall include a description of any detention or 
interrogation methods that have been determined to comply with 
the prohibitions of the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military 
Commissions Act or have been discontinued pursuant to them.
    The Detainee Treatment Act also provides for the protection 
against civil or criminal liability for United States 
Government personnel who had engaged in officially authorized 
interrogations that were determined to be lawful at the time. 
Section 310 requires the DNI to report on actions taken to 
implement that provision.
    The report shall also include an appendix containing all 
guidelines on the application of the Detainee Treatment Act and 
the Military Commissions Act to the detention or interrogation 
activities, if any, of any IC element. The appendix shall also 
include all legal justifications of the Department of Justice 
about the meaning of the Acts with respect to detention or 
interrogation activities, if any, of any IC element.

Section 311. Terms of service of Program Manager for the Information 
        Sharing Environment and the Information Sharing Council

    The Intelligence Reform Act established two important 
instruments for promoting information sharing, a Program 
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment and an 
Information Sharing Council. The Act limited the duration of 
the Program Manager and Council to two years. In recognition of 
the need for continued management of the Information Sharing 
Environment, Section 311 enables the President to continue the 
tenure of the Program Manager and the Information Sharing 
Council beyond that two-year period.

Section 312. Improvement of notification of Congress regarding 
        intelligence activities of the United States Government

    Section 312 amends the requirements for notifications to 
Congress under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a & 413b). First, Section 312 
requires that, in the event that the DNI or the head of an 
Intelligence Community element does not provide to all members 
of the congressional intelligence committees the notification 
required by Section 502 (relating to intelligence activities 
other than covert actions) or Section 503 (relating to covert 
actions) of the National Security Act of 1947, the committees 
will be provided with a notification of this fact and will be 
provided with a description of the main features of the 
intelligence activity or covert action. The provision specifies 
that no restriction shall be placed on the access to this 
notification by any member of the committees. Second, Section 
312 extends requirements in Section 502 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 on the form and contents of reports to the 
congressional intelligence committees on intelligence 
activities other than covert actions to the requirements for 
notifications to Congress under Section 503 of that Act 
(relating to covert actions). Third, the section requires that 
any change to a covert action finding under Section 503 of that 
Act must be reported to the committees, rather than the 
existing requirement to report any significant change.

Section 313. Additional limitation on availability of funds for 
        intelligence and intelligence-related activities

    Section 313 adds to the requirements of Section 504 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), which specify 
that appropriated funds may be obligated or expended for an 
intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if the 
congressional intelligence committees have been ``fully and 
currently informed'' of that activity. Section 313 adds that, 
for intelligence activities or covert actions covered under 
Section 312, the committees should be considered to have been 
``fully and currently informed'' only if a notification 
providing the main features of the activity or covert action 
has been provided as required by Section 313.

Section 314. Vulnerability assessments of major systems

    Section 314 adds a new oversight mechanism to the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) that requires the 
DNI to conduct regular vulnerability assessments throughout the 
life-span of every major system in the National Intelligence 
Program. Major systems are significant programs of an element 
of the IC with projected total development and program costs 
exceeding $500 million in current fiscal year dollars. (50 
U.S.C. 415a-1(e)(3)). The intent of the provision is to provide 
Congress and the DNI with an accurate assessment of the unique 
vulnerabilities and risks associated with each National 
Intelligence Program major system to allow a determination of 
whether funding for a particular major system should be 
modified or discontinued. The vulnerability assessment process 
will also require the various elements of the Intelligence 
Community responsible for implementing major systems to give 
due consideration to the risks and vulnerabilities associated 
with such implementation.
    The need for this oversight mechanism has been demonstrated 
by the failure of a number of major systems within the National 
Intelligence Program. For example, there have been major 
systems that have not been able to perform the missions for 
which they were originally designed. Also, there have been 
major systems that were essentially obsolete by the time they 
were finally deployed. The Committee believes that the use of 
the vulnerability assessment tool should greatly enhance the 
IC's ability to manage successfully its current and future 
major systems.
    Section 314 requires the DNI to conduct an initial 
vulnerability assessment on every major system proposed for the 
National Intelligence Program. The minimum requirements of the 
initial vulnerability assessment are fairly broad and intended 
to provide the DNI with significant flexibility in crafting an 
assessment tailored to the proposed major system. Thus, the DNI 
is required to use an analysis-based approach to identify 
applicable vulnerabilities, define exploitation potential, 
examine the system's potential effectiveness, determine overall 
vulnerability, and make recommendations for risk reduction. The 
DNI is obviously free to adopt a more rigorous methodology for 
the conduct of initial vulnerability assessments.
    Vulnerability assessment should continue through the life 
of a major system. Numerous factors and considerations can 
affect the viability of a given major system. For example, 
technologies will change, countermeasures can be developed, 
priorities can shift, new threats can emerge, secrets can be 
stolen, production schedules can slip, and costs can increase 
unexpectedly. For that reason, Section 314 provides the DNI 
with the flexibility to set a schedule of subsequent 
vulnerability assessments for each major system when the DNI 
submits the initial vulnerability assessment to the 
congressional intelligence committees. The time period between 
assessments should depend upon the unique circumstances of a 
particular major system. For example, a new major system that 
is implementing some experimental technology might require 
annual assessments while a more mature major system might not 
need such frequent re-assessment. The DNI is also permitted to 
adjust a major system's assessmentschedule when the DNI 
determines that a change in circumstances warrants the issuance of a 
subsequent vulnerability assessment. Section 314 also provides that a 
congressional intelligence committee may request the DNI to conduct a 
subsequent vulnerability assessment of a major system.
    The minimum requirements for a subsequent vulnerability 
assessment are almost identical to those of an initial 
vulnerability assessment. There are only two additional 
requirements. First, if applicable to the given major system 
during its particular phase of development or production, the 
DNI must also use a testing-based approach to assess the 
system's vulnerabilities. Obviously, common sense needs to 
prevail here. For example, the testing approach is not intended 
to require the ``crash testing'' of a satellite system. 
However, the vulnerabilities of a satellite's items of supply 
might be exposed by a rigorous testing regime. Second, the 
subsequent vulnerability assessment is required to monitor the 
exploitation potential of the major system. Thus, a subsequent 
vulnerability assessment should monitor ongoing changes to 
vulnerabilities and understand the potential for exploitation. 
Since new vulnerabilities can become relevant and the 
characteristics of existing vulnerabilities can change, it is 
necessary to monitor both existing vulnerabilities and their 
characteristics, and to check for new vulnerabilities on a 
regular basis.
    Section 314 requires the DNI to give due consideration to 
the vulnerability assessments prepared for the major systems 
within the National Intelligence Program. It also requires that 
the vulnerability assessments be provided to the congressional 
intelligence committees within ten days of their completion.
    Finally, the section contains definitions for the terms 
``items of supply,'' ``major system,'' and ``vulnerability 
assessment.''

Section 315. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence 
        community

    Section 315 adds a new oversight mechanism to the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) that requires the 
DNI to conduct, in consultation with the head of the element of 
the Intelligence Community concerned, an annual personnel level 
assessment for each of the elements within the Intelligence 
Community and provide those assessments to the congressional 
intelligence committees no later than January 31st of each 
year.
    The assessment consists of three parts. First, the 
assessment must provide basic personnel and contractor 
information for the concerned element of the Intelligence 
Community. It requires that the data be compared against 
current fiscal year and historical five-year numbers and 
funding levels. Second, the assessment must include a written 
justification for the requested funding levels. This 
requirement is necessary to ensure that any personnel cost cuts 
or increases are fully documented and justified. Finally, the 
assessment must contain a statement by the Director of National 
Intelligence that based upon current and projected funding the 
concerned element will have the internal infrastructure, 
training resources, and sufficient funding to support the 
administrative and operational activities of the requested 
personnel and contractor levels.
    The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment 
tool is necessary for the Executive branch and Congress to 
fully understand the consequences of modifying the Intelligence 
Community's personnel levels. This assessment process is 
essential to the adoption and continuation of the personnel 
level flexibility authority provided in Section 103. In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the 
Administration undertook sharp increases in personnel for the 
Intelligence Community under the assumption that the 
intelligence deficiencies leading up to the attacks resulted 
from personnel shortfalls. Various external reviews have also 
recommended more personnel. Since the attacks, Intelligence 
Community personnel end strength has grown by about 20 percent.
    The Committee originally supported personnel growth as a 
way to strengthen intelligence collection, analysis, and 
dissemination, but now questions its previous position for four 
reasons: (1) the recent history of large scale personnel growth 
indicates that personnel increases do not improve performance 
commensurate with the cost; (2) the Administration is not 
adequately funding the personnel growth it has planned; (3) 
hiring additional personnel diverts fiscal resources from both 
current mission and modernization needs; and (4) personnel 
costs always increase, while budgets do not. Therefore, when 
overall budgets do not keep pace with inflation and decline in 
real terms, personnel costs as a percentage of the budget 
increase each year and divert funds from operations and 
modernization.
    In February 2005, the Committee initiated an audit to 
examine the full scope of activities and resources necessary to 
support the Administration's projections for Intelligence 
Community personnel growth during fiscal years 2006-2011. As a 
result of this review and further study of the issue, the 
Committee has concluded that increasing personnel without a 
plan for enabling those personnel to work productively neither 
prevents intelligence failures, nor guarantees enhanced 
performance. The Committee has also concluded that the 
Administration has not adequately funded its personnel growth 
plan and that resources provided for personnel growth in some 
cases are done so at the expense of other programs.
    Another concern of the Committee is the Intelligence 
Community's increasing reliance upon contractors to meet 
mission requirements. It has been estimated that the average 
annual cost of a United States Government civilian employee is 
$126,500, while the average annual cost of a ``fully loaded'' 
(including overhead) core contractor is $250,000. Given this 
cost disparity, the Committee believes that the Intelligence 
Community should strive in the long-term to reduce its 
dependence upon contractors. The Committee believes that the 
annual personnel assessment tool will assist the Director of 
National Intelligence and the congressional intelligence 
committees in arriving at an appropriate balance of contractors 
and permanent government employees.

Section 316. Business enterprise architecture and business system 
        modernization for the intelligence community

    One of the greatest challenges facing the IC today is the 
modernization of its business information systems. Guidance 
from the Office of Management and Budget has called for all 
business information systems in government organizations to 
become integrated into a business enterprise architecture. A 
business enterprise architecture incorporates an agency's 
financial, personnel, procurement, acquisition, logistics, and 
planning systems into one interoperable system. Currently, each 
IC element is building unique, stovepiped systems that do not 
leverage the investments of other elements of the IC. Section 
314 gives the DNI a structure for creating a coherent business 
enterprise architecture that will be useful for the 
intelligence professional, as well as cost-effective for the 
taxpayer.
    Section 316 requires the DNI to create a business 
enterprise architecture that defines all IC business systems, 
as well as the functions and activities supported by those 
business systems, in order to guide with sufficient detail the 
implementation of interoperable IC business system solutions. 
Section 316 also requires the submission of a preliminary draft 
of the transition plan for implementing the business enterprise 
architecture. The business enterprise architecture and 
transition plan are to be submitted to the congressional 
intelligence committees by March 1, 2008.
    Section 316 will provide the congressional oversight 
committees the assurance that business systems that cost more 
than a million dollars and that receive more than 50 percent of 
their funding from the National Intelligence Program will be 
efficiently and effectively coordinated. It will also provide a 
list of all ``legacy systems'' that will be either terminated 
or transitioned into the new architecture. Further, this 
section will require the DNI to report to the Committee no less 
often than annually, for five years, on the progress being made 
in successfully implementing the new architecture.

Section 317. Reports on the acquisition of major systems

    The Committee is concerned with the growing costs 
associated with major system acquisitions. Cost overruns and 
schedule delays prevent the IC from fielding essential systems. 
For example, with respect to a particular intelligence 
community agency, it was found that of a sample of thirty 
historical major system acquisitions, twenty-one had cost 
overruns of 30 percent or more. With respect to current IC 
space acquisitions, half have experienced cost growth of 50 
percent or more. This is unacceptable.
    In order to address the cause and impact of cost increases 
and schedule delays, the Committee has created a mechanism in 
Section 317 that requires the DNI to submit annual reports for 
each major system acquisition by an element of the IC. These 
reports must include, among other items, information about the 
current total anticipated acquisition cost for such system, the 
development schedule for the system including an estimate of 
annual development costs until development is completed, the 
current anticipated procurement schedule for the system, 
including the best estimate of the DNI of the annual costs and 
units to be procured until procurement is completed, a full 
life-cycle cost analysis for such system, and the result of any 
significant test and evaluation of such major system as of the 
date of the submittal of such report.

Section 318. Excessive cost growth of major systems

    Section 318 requires that, in addition to the annual report 
under Section 317, the Director of National Intelligence must 
review cost increases of the acquisition of a major system 
todetermine whether such increases are at least 20 percent from the 
baseline cost. This section mirrors the Nunn-McCurdy provision in Title 
10 of the United States Code that applies to major defense acquisition 
programs. The Committee believes that a framework similar to Nunn-
McCurdy would be beneficial to IC acquisitions. The Committee envisions 
that this determination will be done as needed and should not wait 
until the time that the annual report is filed. In other words, the 
Committee expects that the DNI will be advised on a regular basis by 
elements of the IC about the progress and associated costs of a major 
system acquisition.
    If the cost growth is at least 20 percent, the DNI must 
prepare a notification and submit a new independent cost 
estimate to the congressional intelligence committees, and also 
certify that the acquisition is essential to national security, 
there are no other alternatives that will provide equal or 
greater intelligence capability at equal or lesser cost, the 
new estimates of the full life-cycle cost for such major system 
are reasonable, and the structure for the acquisition of such 
major system is adequate to manage and control full life-cycle 
cost of such major system. The program may then be allowed to 
continue.
    If, however, the DNI determines that the cost growth is at 
least 40 percent, then the President must certify the four 
factors previously certified by the DNI. The Committee does not 
envision the certification process to be a rubber-stamp. 
Rather, considerable care and judgment should be exercised in 
making, or deciding not to make, the certification.
    If the required certification, at either the 20 percent or 
40 percent level, is not submitted to the congressional 
intelligence committees, Section 318 creates a mechanism in 
which funds cannot be obligated for a period of time. If 
Congress does not act during that period, then the acquisition 
may continue.
    By making the DNI, and indeed the President, an integral 
part of this process, the Committee hopes that the President, 
the DNI, and the elements of the IC will recognize that the 
Committee expects the DNI to assert, and be allowed to assert, 
the DNI's statutory authority over the IC, particularly with 
respect to budgetary matters including major systems 
acquisitions.
    The Committee believes that these initial steps are 
necessary given the current state of cost overruns and the 
reluctance of certain elements of the IC to assert needed 
control over such acquisitions. The Committee not only has the 
responsibility of maintaining appropriate oversight of the IC 
and its acquisitions, but bears the obligation to ensure that 
taxpayer funds are being spent responsibly and without waste or 
delay. Our warfighters and policymakers depend on accurate and 
timely intelligence to do their jobs. If systems that have been 
deemed at one point to be essential are allowed to take years 
or even decades to complete, then their usefulness is 
significantly diminished, particularly given the rapidly-
changing pace of technology.
    The Committee believes that this provision is necessary due 
to the severe damage that a multi-billion dollar cost overrun 
can have in an IC budget. With approximately a $500 billion 
budget, the DoD can more readily absorb unanticipated program 
increases. The National Intelligence Program is a small 
fraction of the amount provided to DoD. Absorption of large 
cost overruns within the National Intelligence Program can 
cause disproportionate problems within the Intelligence 
Community.

Section 319. Submittal to Congress of certain court orders under the 
        Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978

    Section 319 requires the Attorney General to provide to the 
congressional intelligence and judiciary committees copies of 
decisions, orders, or opinions of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review that include significant construction or 
interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), as well as associated pleadings, within 45 days. The 
amendment further requires that any such decisions, orders or 
opinions, and associated pleadings from the previous five years 
which were not previously included in FISA semi-annual reports 
be submitted to the committees. Finally, the amendment requires 
that orders that include significant construction or 
interpretation of FISA be included in semi-annual reports, 
along with decisions and opinions.
    Section 319 addresses three issues that have hampered the 
Congress in its oversight and legislative responsibilities with 
regard to FISA. First, under the current semi-annual report 
provision of FISA, significant constructions or interpretations 
of FISA are not required to be provided to the Congress if they 
are contained in orders, as opposed to decisions or opinions. 
This section closes that loophole. Second, there are times when 
the most important discussions of legal interpretations are 
included in pleadings. This section requires that pleadings be 
provided to the Congress as well. Third, under the current 
semi-annual reporting requirement, Congress's access to the 
Court's interpretations of law can be significantly delayed. 
Section 319 ensures that Congress will have the ability to 
review those interpretations in a timely fashion.

Section 320. Submittal to Congress of certain President's Daily Briefs 
        on Iraq

    Section 320 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any President's Daily Brief (PDB), or 
any portion of a PDB, of the Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI) during the period beginning on January 20, 1997, and 
ending March 19, 2003, that refers to Iraq or otherwise 
addresses Iraq in any fashion.

Section 321. National intelligence estimate on global climate change

    Section 321 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) within 270 days on the 
impact to U.S. national security of the geopolitical effects 
brought about by global climate change. The Committee notes 
that the National Intelligence Council (NIC) is presently 
writing such an assessment, which will either be produced as a 
National Intelligence Assessment or an NIE on an unclassified 
basis. Section 321 allows the DNI to determine whether the 
requirement to produce an NIE would be duplicative of the 
current NIC effort if both products would have the same 
drafting and review procedures.
    Section 321 directs the DNI to use as the baseline for the 
NIE the mid-range projections of the fourth assessment report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The IC would 
therefore have no requirement to assess the underlying science 
of global climate change or predict its immediate effects. 
Rather, the NIE would focus on the direct impact from global 
climate change on U.S. national security and strategic economic 
interests. Changes resulting from global climate change present 
potentially wide-ranging threats to the United States that may 
require military, diplomatic, financial, and other national 
responses. It is the IC's responsibility to prepare Executive 
and Legislative branch policymakers for such possibilities.
    The Committee does not anticipate that producing an NIE 
will require the diversion of any collection or analytic 
resources away from other key priorities. In response to input 
from the DNI, Section 321 specifically directs that other 
entities within the federal government assist the Director of 
National Intelligence in the production of the NIE as 
appropriate. The Committee expects this assistance will likely 
come in the contribution of knowledge of environmental and 
energy issues, resulting competition for resources or human 
migration, the nature of military deployments that may be 
required to address such impacts, or similar contributions. The 
Director is also authorized to obtain nongovernmental 
assistance, through contractor support, commissioned studies, 
or otherwise, as appropriate to carry out this section.

Section 322. Repeal of certain reporting requirements

    The Committee frequently requests information from the 
Intelligence Community in the form of reports, the contents of 
which are specifically defined by statute. The reports prepared 
pursuant to these statutory requirements provide this Committee 
with an invaluable source of information about specific matters 
of concern.
    The Committee recognizes, however, that congressional 
reporting requirements, and particularly recurring reporting 
requirements, can place a significant burden on the resources 
of the Intelligence Community. It is therefore important for 
the Congress to reconsider these reporting requirements on a 
periodic basis to ensure that the reports it has requested are 
the best mechanism for the Congress to receive the information 
it seeks. In some cases, annual reports can be replaced with 
briefings or notifications that provide the Congress with more 
timely information and offer the Intelligence Community a 
direct line of communication to respond to congressional 
concerns.
    In response to a request from the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Committee examined some of these recurring 
reporting requirements. Section 322 therefore eliminates 
certain reports that were particularly burdensome to the 
Intelligence Community when the information in the reports 
could be obtained through other means. It also eliminates 
reports whose usefulness has diminished either because of 
changing events or because the information contained in those 
reports is duplicative of information already obtained through 
other avenues.
    Because the vast majority of recurring reports provide 
critical information relevant to the many challenges facing the 
Intelligence Community today, the Committee ultimately 
eliminated only seven statutory reporting requirements, a very 
small percentage of the many recurringreports currently 
requested. The Committee believes that elimination of these reports 
will help the Intelligence Community to allocate its resources properly 
towards areas of greatest congressional concern.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY


      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence


Section 401. Requirements for accountability reviews by the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    Section 401 provides the Director of National Intelligence 
with a new authority to conduct accountability reviews of 
significant failures or deficiencies within the Intelligence 
Community. Such accountability reviews may be conducted on 
elements of the Intelligence Community or their personnel. This 
process is intended to be separate and distinct from any 
accountability reviews being conducted internally by the 
elements of the Intelligence Community or their Inspectors 
General, and is not intended to limit the authorities of the 
Director of National Intelligence with respect to his 
supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency.
    Section 401 requires that the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, must 
formulate guidelines and procedures that will govern 
accountability reviews. The Committee envisions that these 
guidelines will govern the process by which the Director of 
National Intelligence can collect sufficient information from 
the Intelligence Community to assess accountability for a given 
incident.
    This enhancement to the authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence is warranted given the apparent 
reluctance of various elements of the Intelligence Community to 
hold their agencies or personnel accountable for significant 
failures or deficiencies. Recent history provides several 
examples of serious failures to adhere to sound analytic 
tradecraft. In its reviews of both the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks and the faulty Iraq prewar assessments on 
weapons of mass destruction, the Committee found specific 
examples of these failures yet no one within the Intelligence 
Community has been held accountable. Other examples of a lack 
of accountability within the Intelligence Community can be 
found by examining the history of certain major system 
acquisition programs. Despite clear management failures that 
resulted in significant cost overruns and unreasonable 
scheduling delays, these programs continue to stumble along 
without any imposition of accountability.
    The Committee hopes that this modest increase in the 
Director of National Intelligence's authorities will encourage 
elements within the Intelligence Community to put their houses 
in order by imposing accountability for significant failures 
and deficiencies. Section 401 will enable the Director of 
National Intelligence to get involved in the accountability 
process in the event that an element of the Intelligence 
Community cannot or will not take appropriate action.

Section 402. Additional authorities of the Director of National 
        Intelligence on intelligence information sharing

    Section 402 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to 
provide the DNI statutory authority to use National 
Intelligence Program funds to quickly address deficiencies or 
needs that arise in intelligence information access or sharing 
capabilities.
    The new Section 102A(g)(1)(G) authorizes the DNI to provide 
to a receiving agency or component, and for that agency or 
component to accept and use, funds or systems (which would 
include services or equipment) related to the collection, 
processing, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination of 
intelligence information.
    The new Section 102A(g)(1)(H) grants the DNI authority to 
provide funds to non-National Intelligence Program (NIP) 
activities for the purpose of addressing critical gaps in 
intelligence information access or sharing capabilities. 
Without this authority, development and implementation of 
necessary capabilities could be delayed by an agency's lack of 
authority to accept or utilize systems funded from the NIP, 
inability to use or identify current-year funding, or concerns 
regarding the augmentation of appropriations.
    These are similar to authorities granted to the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) for developing and 
fielding systems of common concern relating to imagery 
intelligence and geospatial intelligence. See Section 
105(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 403-5).

Section 403. Modification of limitation on delegation by the Director 
        of National Intelligence of the protection of intelligence 
        sources and methods

    Section 403 amends Section 102A(i)(3) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 to modify the limitation on delegation by 
the DNI (which now extends only to the Principal Deputy DNI) of 
the authority to protect intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure. It permits the DNI to delegate the 
authority to any Deputy DNI, the Chief Information Officer of 
the IC, or the head of any IC element.

Section 404. Additional administrative authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    The DNI should be able to rapidly focus the IC on an 
intelligence issue through a coordinated effort that uses all 
available resources. The ability to coordinate the IC response 
to an emerging threat should not depend on the budget cycle and 
should not be constrained by general limitations in 
appropriations law (e.g., 31 U.S.C. 1346) or other prohibitions 
on interagency financing of boards, commissions, councils, 
committees, or similar groups.
    To provide this flexibility, Section 404 grants the DNI the 
authority to approve interagency financing of national 
intelligence centers established under Section 119B of the 
National Security Act of 1947. The section also authorizes 
interagency funding for boards, commissions, councils, 
committees, or similar groups established by the DNI for a 
period not to exceed two years. This would include the 
interagency funding of ``mission managers,'' such as 
recommended by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities 
of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Under Section 404, the DNI could authorize the pooling of 
resources from various IC agencies to finance national 
intelligence centers or other organizational groupings designed 
to address identified intelligence matters. The provision also 
expressly permits IC elements, upon the request of the DNI, to 
fund or participate in these interagency activities.
    To better understand how the DNI utilizes the authority of 
Section 404, the Committee requests that the DNI provide a 
report by February 1st annually through the end of fiscal year 
2010 providing details on how this authority has been 
exercised.

Section 405. Enhancement of authority of the Director of National 
        Intelligence for flexible personnel management among the 
        elements of the intelligence community

    Section 405 adds three subsections to Section 102A of the 
National Security Act of 1947, all intended to promote the 
DNI's ability to manage all the elements of the IC as a single 
cohesive community.
    Subsection 102A(t) enables the DNI, with concurrence of a 
department or agency head, to convert competitive service 
positions and incumbents within an IC element to excepted 
positions. In requesting this authority, the DNI points out 
that because of their unique intelligence, investigative and 
national security missions, most IC elements are in the 
excepted civil service. However, civilian employees in several 
smaller IC elements are still covered under competitive service 
rules. The ability to convert those to the excepted service 
will enable the IC to maintain a system throughout the 
Intelligence Community that is responsive to the needs of the 
IC both for secrecy and the ability to quickly respond to 
personnel requirements. Subsection (t) additionally allows the 
DNI to establish the classification and ranges of rates of 
basic pay for positions so converted.
    Subsection 102A (u) provides enhanced pay authority for 
critical positions in portions of the IC where that authority 
does not now exist. It allows the DNI to authorize the head of 
a department or agency with an IC element to fix a rate of 
compensation in excess of applicable limits with respect to a 
position that requires an extremely high level of expertise and 
is critical to accomplishing an important mission. A rate of 
pay higher than Executive Level II would require written 
approval of the DNI. A rate of pay higher than Executive Level 
I would require written approval of the President in response 
to a DNI request.
    Subsection 102A(v) grants authority to the DNI to authorize 
IC elements, with concurrence of the concerned department or 
agency head and in coordination with the Director of the Office 
of Personnel Management, to adopt compensation, performance 
management, and scholarship authority that have been authorized 
for any other IC element.

Section 406. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 406 clarifies that the ban on co-location of the 
Office of the DNI with any other IC element, which is slated to 
take effect on October 1, 2008, applies to the co-location of 
the headquarters of the Office of the DNI with the headquarters 
of any other Intelligence Community agency or element.

Section 407. Additional duties of the Director of Science and 
        Technology of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    The Director of Science and Technology serves as the DNI's 
chief representative for science and technology, assisting the 
DNI in formulating a long-term strategy for scientific advances 
in the field of intelligence and among the science and 
technology elements of the intelligence budget. Section 407 
sets forth additional duties for the Director of Science and 
Technology and for the DNI's Science and Technology Committee.

Section 408. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 408 expressly designates the position of Chief 
Information Officer in the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
Community. The modification to this title is consistent with 
the position's overall responsibilities as outlined in Section 
103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g).

Section 409. Reserve for Contingencies of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    Section 409 establishes a Reserve for Contingencies of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The reserve 
will be an additional means of enabling the DNI to determine, 
oversee, and implement the National Intelligence Program. As 
described by the DNI to the Committee, the reserve will enable 
the DNI to address emergency requirements, operational 
exigencies, and opportunities that arise outside of the budget 
formulation cycle and cannot be addressed in a timely way 
through existing budget procedures. In contrast to 
reprogramming authority, it will not require that the DNI take 
funds from another authorized program to meet new needs.
    Funds placed in the reserve as a result of an appropriation 
or a transfer shall be available for expenditure in the fiscal 
year of the deposit or transfer and the following fiscal year. 
The DNI's declared intention is to limit the size of the 
reserve to $50,000,000, although, of course, that is subject to 
congressional appropriations and a continuing evaluation of the 
use of the reserve. Section 409 will limit the use of the funds 
to purposes for support of emergent needs, improvements to 
program effectiveness, or increased efficiency.
    In order for reserve funds to be made available for a 
program or activity, the DNI, consistent with the provisions of 
Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413a-413b), must notify the congressional intelligence 
committees, at least 15 days before the funds are made 
available, of the intention to utilize the reserve for the 
particular program or activity. Additionally, the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget must approve the use of the 
reserve for any program or activity not previously authorized 
by Congress. Pursuant to Section 504 of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), funds may not be made available 
for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity for which 
funds were denied by Congress.
    The use of any amounts in the reserve shall be subject to 
the direction and approval of the DNI or the DNI's designee and 
be subject to procedures that the DNI prescribes. The DNI 
should provide these regulations and related guidance to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
    The Central Intelligence Agency has a similar reserve for 
contingencies. The DNI should report to the congressional 
intelligence committees, no later than the submission of the 
President's fiscal year 2009 budget, on whether the CIA's 
reserve and the reserve established under Section 409 should be 
integrated into a single Intelligence Community reserve.
    The Committee intends that the Reserve for Contingencies be 
used as an alternative for the DNI's budgetary reprogramming 
authorities on a limited basis. The reserve should not be used 
for programmatic needs that could have been planned for or 
anticipated. Reprogramming is to be preferred, when it can be 
used, in that it entails a decision to cut spending elsewhere, 
when that is possible.

Section 410. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes the 
DNI to establish an Office of Inspector General if the DNI 
determines that an Inspector General (IG) would be beneficial 
to improving the operations and effectiveness of the Office of 
the DNI. It further provides that the DNI may grant to the 
Inspector General any of the duties, responsibilities, and 
authorities set forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978. The 
DNI has appointed an Inspector General and has granted certain 
authorities pursuant to DNI Instruction No. 2005-10 (Sept. 7, 
2005).
    As this Committee urged in reports on proposed 
authorization acts for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, a strong IG 
is vital to achieving the goal, set forth in the Intelligence 
Reform Act, of improving the operations and effectiveness of 
the Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the 
broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies, wherever 
they may be found in the IC, with respect to matters within the 
responsibility and authority of the DNI, including the manner 
in which elements of the IC interact with each other in 
providing access to information and undertaking joint or 
cooperative activities. By way of a new Section 103I of the 
National Security Act of 1947, Section 410 of this Act 
establishes an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
in order to provide to the DNI and through reports to the 
Congress, the benefits of an IG with full statutory authorities 
and the requisite independence.
    The Office of the Inspector General is to be established 
within the Office of the DNI. The IG will keep both the DNI and 
the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
informed about problems and deficiencies in IC programs and 
operations and the need for corrective actions. The IG will be 
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, and will report directly to the DNI. To bolster the 
IG's independence within the Intelligence Community, the IG may 
be removed only by the President, who must communicate the 
reasons for the removal to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
    Under the new Subsection 103I(e), the DNI may prohibit the 
IG from conducting an investigation, inspection, or audit if 
the DNI determines that is necessary to protect vital national 
security interests. If the DNI exercises the authority to 
prohibit an investigation, the DNI must provide the reasons to 
the intelligence committees within seven days. The IG may 
submit comments in response to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
    The IG will have direct and prompt access to the DNI and 
any IC employee, or employee of a contractor, whose testimony 
is needed. The IG will also have direct access to all records 
that relate to programs and activities for which the IG has 
responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for 
appropriate administrative action.
    The IG will have subpoena authority. However, information 
within the possession of the United States Government must be 
obtained through other procedures. Subject to the DNI's 
concurrence, the IG may request information from any United 
States Government department, agency, or element. They must 
provide the information to the IG insofar as is practicable and 
not in violation of law or regulation.
    The IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that 
include a description of significant problems relating to IC 
programs and operations and to the relationships between IC 
elements. The reports must include a description of IG 
recommendations and a statement whether corrective action has 
been completed. Within 30 days of receiving each semiannual 
report from the IG, the DNI must submit it to Congress.
    The IG must immediately report to the DNI particularly 
serious or flagrant violations. Within seven days, the DNI must 
transmit those reports to the intelligence committees together 
with any comments. In the event the IG is unable to resolve any 
differences with the DNI affecting the duties or 
responsibilities of the IG or the IG conducts an investigation, 
inspection, or audit that focuses on certain high-ranking 
officials, the IG is authorized to report directly to the 
intelligence committees.
    IC employees, or employees of contractors, who intend to 
report to Congress an ``urgent concern''--such as a violation 
of law or Executive order, a false statement to Congress, or a 
willful withholding from Congress--may report such complaints 
and supporting information to the IG. Following a review by the 
IG to determine the credibility of the complaint or 
information, the IG must transmit such complaint and 
information to the DNI. On receiving the complaints or 
information from the IG (together with the IG's credibility 
determination), the DNI must transmit the complaint or 
information to the intelligence committees. If the IG finds a 
complaint or information not to be credible, the reporting 
individual may still submit the matter directly to the 
committees by following appropriate security practices outlined 
by the DNI. Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting 
individuals constitute reportable ``urgent concerns.'' The 
Committee will not tolerate actions by the DNI, or by any IC 
element, constituting a reprisal for reporting an ``urgent 
concern'' or any other matter to Congress.Nonetheless, 
reporting individuals should ensure that the complaint and supporting 
information are provided to Congress consistent with appropriate 
procedures designed to protect intelligence sources and methods and 
other sensitive matters.
    For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IG of the 
Intelligence Community and an Inspector General for another IC 
element (or for a parent department or agency), the Inspectors 
General shall expeditiously resolve who will undertake the 
investigation, inspection, or audit. In attempting to resolve 
that question, the Inspectors General may request the 
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General 
Forum (a presently functioning body whose existence is ratified 
by Section 410). In the event that the Inspectors General are 
still unable to resolve the question, they shall submit it to 
the DNI for resolution.
    An IG for an IC element must share the results of any 
investigation, inspection, or audit with any other IG, 
including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
who otherwise would have had jurisdiction over the 
investigation, inspection, or audit.
    Consistent with existing law, the Inspector General must 
report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or 
complaint received by the Inspector General relating to 
violations of Federal criminal law.

Section 411. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials

    Section 411 confirms in statute that various offices are 
within the Office of the DNI: (1) the Chief Information Officer 
of the Intelligence Community; (2) the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community; (3) the Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center; and (4) the Director of the National 
Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). It also expressly provides 
in statute that the DNI shall appoint the Director of the NCPC, 
which is what has been done by administrative delegation from 
the President.

Section 412. National Space Intelligence Office

    The United States maintains a large investment in 
satellites and this investment has grown dramatically in recent 
years. These satellites serve the commercial and national 
security needs of the nation. As such, a loss of any or all of 
these assets would do tremendous harm to our economy and 
security.
    At the same time, our investment in intelligence collection 
concerning threats to our interests in space has declined 
markedly in relation to our overall investment in space 
systems. Despite this significant overall investment, some 
estimates indicate that we commit only 10 percent of what we 
did nearly 25 years ago to the analysis of threats to space 
systems. Recent international events have only served to 
highlight this problem.
    In an effort to better understand future threats to our 
space assets, as well as potential threats to the United States 
from space, Section 412 establishes a National Space 
Intelligence Office (NSIO). It is not the intent of the 
Committee that the NSIO be a physical consolidation of existing 
intelligence entities with responsibilities for various types 
of intelligence related to space. Rather, the functions of 
NSIO, among others delineated in Section 412, will be to 
coordinate and provide policy direction for the management of 
space-related intelligence assets as well as to prioritize 
collection activities consistent with the DNI's National 
Intelligence Collection Priorities. The NSIO is to augment the 
existing efforts of the National Air and Space Intelligence 
Center (NASIC) and Missile and Space Intelligence Center 
(MSIC); it is not designed to replace them. The Committee 
intends that NSIO work closely with NASIC and MSIC to ensure a 
coordinated IC response to issues that intersect the 
responsibilities of all three organizations.
    The NSIO Director shall be the National Intelligence 
Officer for Science and Technology. The Committee encourages 
appointment of an Executive Director from the Senior 
Intelligence Service.

Section 413. Operational files in the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence

    In the CIA Information Act, Congress authorized the DCI to 
exempt operational files of the CIA from several requirements 
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), particularly those 
requiring search and review in response to FOIA requests. In a 
series of amendments to Title VII of the National Security Act 
of 1947, Congress has extended the exemption to the operational 
files of the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), 
the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). It has 
also provided that files of the Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) should be treated as 
operational files of the CIA (to the extent they meet the 
criteria for CIA operational files).
    Section 413 adds a new Section 706 to the National Security 
Act of 1947. Components of the ODNI, including the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), require access to information 
contained in CIA and other operational files. The purpose of 
Section 413 is to make clear that the operational files of any 
IC component, for which an operational files exemption is 
applicable, retain their exemption from FOIA search, review, 
disclosure, or publication.
    Section 413 provides several limitations. The exemption 
does not apply to information disseminated beyond the ODNI. 
Also, as Congress has provided in the operational files 
exemptions for the CIA and other IC elements, Section 413 
provides that the exemption from search and review does not 
apply to requests by United States citizens or permanent 
residents for information about themselves (although other FOIA 
exemptions, such as appropriate classification, may continue to 
protect such files from public disclosure). The search and 
review exemption would not apply to the subject matter of 
congressional or Executive branch investigations into 
improprieties or violations of law.
    Section 413 also provides for a decennial review by the DNI 
to determine whether exemptions may be removed from any 
category of exempted files. It provides that this review shall 
include consideration of the historical value or other public 
interest in the subject matter of those categories and the 
potential for declassifying a significant part of the 
information contained in them. The Committee underscores the 
importance of this requirement, which applies to the other 
operational exemptions in Title VII, and also reiterates its 
interest in being advised by the DNI about the benefits of 
coordinating the five decennial reviews presently required by 
Title VII.

Section 414. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 414 amends the authorities and structure of the 
Office of the NCIX to eliminate certain independent 
administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX 
when that official was appointed by and reported to the 
President. Those authorities are unnecessary now that the NCIX 
is to be appointed by and is under the authority of the DNI.

Section 415. Inapplicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act to 
        advisory committees of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) 
(5 U.S.C. App.) to regulate the use of advisory committees 
throughout the Federal Government. FACA sets forth the 
responsibilities of the Executive branch with regard to such 
committees and outlines procedures and requirements for them. 
As originally enacted in 1972, FACA expressly exempted advisory 
committees utilized by the CIA and the Federal Reserve System. 
Section 415 amends FACA to extend this exemption to advisory 
committees established or used by the ODNI. The DNI should 
inform the intelligence committees periodically about the 
composition and use by the ODNI of advisory committees.

Section 416. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 416 substitutes the DNI, or the DNI's designee, as 
a member of the Transportation Security Oversight Board 
established under Section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States 
Code, in place of the CIA Director or CIA Director's designee.

Section 417. Applicability of the Privacy Act to the Director of 
        National Intelligence and Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence

    The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) has long contained a 
provision under which the DCI and then (after enactment of the 
Intelligence Reform Act) the CIA Director could promulgate 
rules to exempt any system of records within the CIA from 
certain disclosure requirements under the Act. The provision 
was designed to ensure that the CIA could provide safeguards 
for certain sensitive information in its records systems. In 
assuming the leadership of the Intelligence Community, the DNI 
similarly requires the ability to safeguard sensitive 
information in records systems within the ODNI. Section 417 
extends to the DNI the authority to promulgate rules under 
which records systems of the ODNI may be exempted from certain 
Privacy Act disclosure requirements.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency


Section 421. Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency

    In abolishing the positions of DCI and Deputy DCI, the 
Intelligence Reform Act provided for a Director of the CIA but 
did not provide for a statutory deputy to the Director.
    Section 421 establishes the position of Deputy Director of 
the CIA. The Deputy will be appointed by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate and will assist the 
Director in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of 
that office. In the event of a vacancy in the position of CIA 
Director, or during the absence or disability of the Director, 
the Deputy will act for and exercise the powers of the 
Director. The CIA Director will obtain the concurrence of the 
DNI before recommending a nominee to the President to fill a 
vacancy in this position.
    With the amendment made by Section 421, the presidential 
nomination of both the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA 
must be confirmed by the Senate. Given the sensitive operations 
of the CIA, nominees for both positions merit close scrutiny by 
Congress to examine their qualifications prior to their 
assumption of office. With respect to the Deputy Director, the 
requirement for Senate confirmation also provides assurance 
that, in the event of a vacancy in the position of Director, or 
during the absence or disability of the Director, Congress will 
have previously expressed its confidence in the ability of the 
nominee to assume those additional duties.
    Section 421 also requires that not more than one of the 
individuals serving in the positions of Director and Deputy 
Director may be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in 
active status. This is similar to the bar in the Intelligence 
Reform Act on the simultaneous service by active duty officers 
as DNI and Principal Deputy DNI.
    With respect to the CIA Deputy Director, the Committee has 
also included a provision that will make the nomination and 
confirmation requirements of Section 421 applicable to the 
successor to the individual who is administratively performing 
the duties of the Deputy Director of the CIA on the date of 
enactment of this Act. The requirement that the position be 
filled by a Presidential nominee confirmed by the Senate will 
not take effect until the earlier of the date the President 
nominates an individual to serve in such position (except that 
the Deputy who had been appointed administratively may continue 
until the advice and consent Deputy assumes the position) or 
the date the individual presently performing the duties of that 
office leaves the post.
    To insulate an officer serving as CIA Director or Deputy 
Director from undue military influence, Section 421 provides 
that so long as the individual continues to perform the duties 
of CIA Director or Deputy Director, that person is not subject 
to the supervision or control of the Secretary of Defense or 
any of the military or civilian personnel of the Department of 
Defense.

Section 422. Inapplicability to the Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency for annual report requirement on progress 
        in auditable financial statements

    Section 422 relieves the CIA Director from the requirement 
in Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 to submit 
to the intelligence committees an annual report describing the 
activities being taken to ensure that financial statements of 
the CIA can be audited in accordance with applicable law and 
the requirements of OMB. As discussed in the Committee 
Comments, the Committee remains concerned that CIA has had 
minimal success in achieving unqualified opinions on its 
financial statements. The report required by Section 114A, 
however, is unnecessary as the Committee now receives annual 
audits of CIA's financial statements from the CIA Inspector 
General. The requirements of Section 114A continue to apply to 
the Directors of NSA, DIA, and NGA.

Section 423. Additional functions and authorities for protective 
        personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 423 amends Section 5(a)(4) of the CIA Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) which authorizes protective functions by 
designated security personnel who serve on CIA protective 
details.
    Section 423 authorizes protective detail personnel, when 
engaged in the performance of protective functions, to make 
arrests in two circumstances. Protective detail personnel may 
make arrests without a warrant for any offense against the 
United States--whether a felony, misdemeanor, or infraction--
that is committed in their presence. They may also make arrests 
without a warrant if they have reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a 
felony, but not other offenses, under the laws of the United 
States. The provision specifically does not grant any authority 
to serve civil process or to investigate crimes.
    Section 423 provides that the CIA Director and the Attorney 
General will issue regulations or guidelines that will provide 
safeguards and procedures to ensure the proper exercise of this 
authority. These shall be provided to the intelligence 
committees.
    The authority provided by this section is consistent with 
those of other Federal elements with protective functions, such 
as the Secret Service (18 U.S.C. 3056(c)(1)(C)), the State 
Department Diplomatic Security Service (22 U.S.C. 2709(a)(5)), 
and the United States Capitol Police (2 U.S.C. 1966(c)). The 
grant of arrest authority is supplemental to all other 
authority CIA protective detail personnel have by virtue of 
their statutory responsibility to perform the protective 
functions set forth in the CIA Act of 1949.
    In requesting that the Congress extend this authority to 
the CIA, the DNI has represented that this ``arrest authority 
will contribute significantly to the ability of CIA protective 
detail personnel to fulfill their responsibility to protect 
officials against serious threats without being dependent on 
the response of federal, state, or local law enforcement 
officers.'' It is essential, in the regulations or guidelines 
approved by the CIA Director and the Attorney General, and in 
the supervision and training of protective duty personnel, that 
the use of the authority is firmly kept to its purpose, namely, 
protecting officials and any other covered persons against 
serious threats.
    Section 423 also authorizes the CIA Director on the request 
of the DNI to make CIA protective detail personnel available to 
the DNI and to other personnel within the ODNI.
    The CIA Director should provide to the congressional 
intelligence committees regulations or guidelines that are 
approved by the Director and the Attorney General. The Director 
should also keep the congressional intelligence committees 
fully and currently informed about any use of this authority.

Section 424. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain Central 
        Intelligence Agency positions

    Section 424 replaces out-of-date titles for CIA positions 
with the current titles of the successors of those positions in 
a provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 on 
the obligation of the CIA Inspector General to notify the 
congressional intelligence committees about investigations, 
inspections, or audits concerning high-ranking CIA officials.

Section 425. Availability of the Executive Summary of the report on 
        Central Intelligence Agency accountability regarding the 
        terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001

    Section 425 provides that by September 1, 2007, the CIA 
Director shall prepare and make available to the public a 
version of the Executive Summary of a report by the CIA 
Inspector General that is declassified to the maximum extent 
possible consistent with national security. The underlying 
document is the Office of Inspector General Report on Central 
Intelligence Agency Accountability Regarding Findings and 
Conclusions of the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community 
Activities Before and After September 11, 2001. The CIA 
Director is to submit to the intelligence committees a 
classified annex that explains why any redacted material in the 
Executive Summary was withheld from the public.
    The Committee's efforts to obtain this measure of public 
accountability are detailed in its report on the Committee's 
activities in the 109th Congress, S. Rep. No. 110-57, at pp. 
24-26 (2007). The full Senate has endorsed this effort by 
including an identical provision in S. 4, Improving America's 
Security Act of 2007.

Section 426. Director of National Intelligence report on retirement 
        benefits for former employees of Air America

    Section 426 provides for a report by the DNI on the 
advisability of providing federal retirement benefits to United 
States citizens who were employees of Air America or an 
associated company prior to 1977, during the time that the 
company was owned or controlled by the United States and 
operated by the CIA.
    There were bills in the Senate and House (S. 651 and H.R. 
1276) during the 109th Congress that would have provided 
federal retirement benefits for those employees. By including 
Section 426 in this authorization bill, the Committee takes no 
position on the merits of that legislation.
    The sole purpose of Section 426 is to direct the DNI to 
undertake a study about Air America, its relationship to the 
CIA, the missions it performed, and casualties its employees 
suffered, as well as the retirement benefits that had been 
contracted for or promised to Air America employees and what 
they received. The DNI should submit any recommendations on the 
advisability of legislative action and include any views that 
the CIA Director may have on the matters covered by the report. 
On the request of the DNI, the Comptroller General shall assist 
in the preparation of the report in a manner consistent with 
the protection of classified information.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components


Section 431. Enhancements of National Security Agency training program

    Section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
U.S.C. 402 note) authorizes the National Security Agency (NSA) 
to establish an undergraduate training program to facilitate 
recruitment of individuals with skills critical to its mission. 
Under the program, the government has always had the right to 
recoup the educational costs expended for the benefit of 
employees whose employment with the NSA is ``terminated'' 
whether voluntarily by the employee or by NSA for misconduct.
    Section 431(a) amends Section 16(d) of the NSA Act to 
clarify that ``termination of employment'' includes situations 
in which employees fail to maintain satisfactory academic 
performance as defined by the Director of the NSA. Such 
employees shall be in breach of their contractual agreement 
and, in lieu of any service obligation arising under such 
agreement, shall be liable for repayment. Failure to maintain 
satisfactory academic performance has always been grounds for 
default, resulting in the right of the United States Government 
to recoup the educational costs expended for the benefit of the 
defaulting employee. Thus, this provision is a clarification of 
that obligation.
    Section 431(b) permits the NSA Director to protect 
intelligence sources and methods by deleting a requirement that 
NSA publicly identify to educational institutions students who 
are NSA employees or training program participants. Deletion of 
this disclosure requirement will enhance the ability of NSA to 
protect personnel and prospective personnel and to preserve the 
ability of training program participants to undertake future 
clandestine or other sensitive assignments for the Intelligence 
Community. The Committee recognizes that nondisclosure is 
appropriate when disclosure would threaten intelligence sources 
or methods, would endanger the life or safety of the student, 
or would limit the employee's or prospective employee's ability 
to perform intelligence activities in the future. 
Notwithstanding the deletion of the disclosure requirement, the 
Committee expects NSA to continue to prohibit participants in 
the training program from engaging in any intelligence 
functions at the institutions they attend under the program. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 99-690, Part I (July 17, 1986) (``NSA 
employees attending an institution under the program will have 
no intelligence function whatever to perform at the 
institution.'').

Section 432. Codification of authorities of National Security Agency 
        protective personnel

    Section 432 amends the NSA Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) 
by adding a new Section 20 to clarify and enhance the authority 
of protective details for NSA.
    New Section 20(a) would authorize the Director of NSA to 
designate NSA personnel to perform protective detail functions 
for the Director and other personnel of NSA who are designated 
from time to time by the Director as requiring protection. 
Section 11 of the NSA Act of 1959 presently provides that the 
Director of NSA may authorize agency personnel to perform 
certain security functions at NSA headquarters, at certain 
other facilities, and around the perimeter of those facilities. 
The new authority for protective details would enable the 
Director of the NSA to provide security when the Director or 
other designated personnel require security away from those 
facilities.
    New Section 20(b) would provide that NSA personnel, when 
performing protective detail functions, may exercise the same 
arrest authority that Section 423 provides for CIA protective 
detail personnel. The arrest authority for NSA protective 
detail personnel would be subject to guidelines approved by the 
Director of NSA and the Attorney General. The purpose and 
extent of that arrest authority, the limitations on it, and 
reporting expectations about it are described in the section-
by-section explanation for Section 423. That analysis and 
explanation applies equally to the arrest authority provided to 
NSA protective detail personnel by Section 20(b).
    While this bill provides separately for authority for CIA 
and NSA protective details, the DNI should advise the 
intelligence committees whether overall policies, procedures, 
and authority should be provided for protective services, when 
necessary, for other IC elements or personnel (or their 
immediate families).

Section 433. Inspector general matters

    The Inspector General Act of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-452 (Oct. 
12, 1978)) established a government-wide system of Inspectors 
General, some appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate and others ``administratively appointed'' 
by the heads of their respective Federal entities. These IGs 
were authorized to ``conduct and supervise audits and 
investigations relating to the programs and operations'' of the 
government and ``to promote economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness in the administration of, and * * * to prevent 
and detect fraud and abuse in, such programs and operations.'' 
5 U.S.C. App. 2. They also perform an important reporting 
function, ``keeping the head of the establishment and the 
Congress fully and currently informed about problems and 
deficiencies relating to the administration of * * * programs 
and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective 
action.'' Id. The investigative authorities exercised by 
Inspectors General, and their relative independence from the 
government operations they audit and investigate, provide an 
important mechanism to ensure that the operations of the 
government are conducted as efficiently and effectively as 
possible.
    The IGs of the CIA and Departments of Defense, Energy, 
Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury are appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
These IGs--authorized by either the Inspectors General Act of 
1978 or Section 17 of the CIA Act of 1949--enjoy a degree of 
independence from all but the head of their respective 
departments or agencies. They also have explicit statutory 
authority to access information from their departments or 
agencies or other United States Government departments and 
agencies and may use subpoenas to access information (e.g., 
from an agency contractor) necessary to carry out their 
authorized functions.
    The National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have established their 
own ``administrative'' Inspectors General. However, because 
they are not identified in Section 8G of the Inspector General 
Act of 1978, they lack explicit statutory authorization to 
access information relevant to their audits or investigations, 
or to compel the production of information via subpoena. This 
lack of authority has impeded access to information, in 
particular, information from contractors that is necessary for 
them to perform their important function. These Inspectors 
General also lack the indicia of independence necessary for the 
Government Accountability Office to recognize their annual 
financial statement audits as being in compliance with the 
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-576 (Nov. 
15, 1990)). The lack of independence also prevents the DoD IG, 
and would prevent the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, from relying on the results of NRO, DIA, NSA, or NGA 
Inspector General audits or investigations that must meet 
``generally accepted government auditing standards.''
    To provide an additional level of independence and to 
ensure prompt access to the information necessary for these IGs 
to perform their audits and investigations, Section 433 amends 
Section 8G(a)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 to 
include NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA as ``designated federal 
entities.'' As so designated, the heads of these IC elements 
will be required by statute to administratively appoint 
Inspectors General for these agencies.
    Also, as designated Inspectors General under the Inspector 
General Act of 1978, these Inspectors General will be 
responsible to the heads of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA. The 
removal or transfer of any of these IG by the head of their 
office or agency must be promptly reported to the congressional 
intelligence committees. These Inspectors General will also be 
able to exercise other investigative authorities, including 
those governing access to information and the issuance of 
subpoenas, utilized by other Inspectors General under the 
Inspector General Act of 1978.
    To protect vital national security interests, Section 433 
permits the DNI or the Secretary of Defense to prohibit the 
Inspectors General of the NRO, DIA, NSA, and NGA from 
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or 
investigation they are otherwise authorized to conduct. This 
authority is similar to the authority of the CIA Director under 
Section 17 of the CIA Act of 1949 with respect to the Inspector 
General of the CIA and the authority of the Secretary of 
Defense under Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 
with respect to the DoD Inspector General. It will provide the 
President, through the DNI or the Secretary of Defense, a 
mechanism to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources 
and methods or other vital nationalsecurity interests. The 
Committee expects that this authority will be exercised rarely by the 
DNI or the Secretary of Defense.

Section 434. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components 
        of the intelligence community

    Under present law and practice, the directors of the NSA, 
NGA, and NRO, each with a distinct and significant role in the 
national intelligence mission, are not confirmed by the Senate 
in relation to their leadership of these agencies. Presently, 
the President appoints the Directors of NSA and NGA, and the 
Secretary of Defense appoints the Director of the NRO. None of 
the appointments must be confirmed by the Senate, unless a 
military officer is promoted or transferred into the position. 
Under that circumstance, Senate confirmation of the promotion 
or assignment is the responsibility of the Committee on Armed 
Services. That committee's review, however, relates to the 
military promotion or assignment and not specifically to the 
assumption by the individual of the leadership of a critical IC 
element.
    Section 434 provides, expressly and uniformly, that the 
heads of each of these entities shall be nominated by the 
President and that the nominations will be confirmed by the 
Senate. NSA, NGA, and NRO play a critical role in the national 
intelligence mission. Their spending comprises a significant 
portion of the entire intelligence budget of the United States, 
and a substantial portion of the National Intelligence Program. 
Through advice and consent, the Senate can enable the Congress 
to fulfill more completely its responsibility for providing 
oversight to the intelligence activities of the United States 
Government. Section 434 does not alter the role of the 
Committee on Armed Services in reviewing and approving the 
promotion or assignment of military officers.
    Section 434(b) provides that the amendments made by Section 
434 apply prospectively. Therefore, the Directors of NSA, NGA, 
and NRO on the date of the enactment of this Act will not be 
affected by the amendments, which will apply initially to the 
appointment and confirmation of their successors.

Section 435. Clarification of national security missions of National 
        Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for analysis and dissemination 
        of certain intelligence information

    The National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act of 1996 (Pub. 
L. No. 104-201 (Sept. 23, 1996) (NIMA Act)) formally merged the 
imagery analysis and mapping efforts of Department of Defense 
and the CIA. In the NIMA Act, Congress cited a need ``to 
provide a single agency focus for the growing number and 
diverse types of customers for imagery and geospatial 
information resources within the Government * * * to harness, 
leverage, and focus rapid technological developments to serve 
the imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information 
customers.'' Section 1102(1) of the NIMA Act. Since then, there 
have been rapid developments in airborne and commercial imagery 
platforms, new imagery and geospatial phenomenology, full 
motion video, and geospatial analysis tools.
    Section 921 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003)) changed 
the name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The name change was 
intended to introduce the term ``geospatial intelligence'' to 
better describe the unified activities of NGA related to the 
``analysis and visual representation of characteristics of the 
earth and activity on its surface.'' See S. Rep 108-46 (May 13, 
2003) (accompanying The National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004, S. 1050, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.).
    Though the NGA has made significant progress toward 
unifying the traditional imagery analysis and mapping missions 
of the CIA and DoD, it has been slow to embrace other facets of 
``geospatial intelligence,'' including the processing, storage, 
and dissemination of full motion video (FMV) and ground-based 
photography. Rather, the NGA's geospatial products 
repositories--containing predominantly overhead imagery and 
mapping products--continue to reflect its heritage. While the 
NGA is belatedly beginning to incorporate more airborne and 
commercial imagery, its data holdings and products are nearly 
devoid of FMV and ground-based photography.
    The Committee believes that FMV and ground-based 
photography should be included, with available positional data, 
in NGA data repositories for retrieval on DoD and IC networks. 
Current mission planners and military personnel are well-served 
with traditional imagery products and maps, but FMV of the 
route to and from a facility or photographs of what a facility 
would look like to a foot soldier--rather than from an 
aircraft--would be of immense value to military personnel and 
intelligence officers. Ground-based photography is amply 
available from open sources, as well as other government 
sources such as military units, United States embassy 
personnel, Defense Attaches, Special Operations Forces, foreign 
allies, and clandestine officers. These products should be 
better incorporated into NGA data holdings.
    To address these concerns, Section 435 adds an additional 
national security mission to the responsibilities of the NGA. 
To fulfill this new mission, NGA would be required, as directed 
by the DNI, to develop a system to facilitate the analysis, 
dissemination, and incorporation of likenesses, videos, or 
presentations produced by ground-based platforms, including 
handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of 
human intelligence collection organizations or available as 
open-source information into the national system for geospatial 
intelligence.
    Section 435 also makes clear that this new responsibility 
does not include the authority to manage or direct the tasking 
of, set requirements and priorities for, set technical 
requirements related to, or modify any classification or 
dissemination limitations related to the collection of, 
handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf of 
human intelligence collection organizations. Although Section 
435 does not give the NGA direct authority to set technical 
requirements for collection of handheld or clandestine 
photography, the Committee encourages the NGA to engage IC 
partners on these technical requirements to ensure that their 
output can be incorporated into the National System for 
Geospatial-Intelligence.
    Section 435 does not modify the definition of ``imagery'' 
found in Section 467(2)(A) of Title 10, United States Code, or 
alter any of the existing national security missions of the 
NGA. With Section 435, the Committee stresses the merits of FMV 
and ground-based photography and clarifies that the exclusion 
of ``handheld or clandestine photography taken by or on behalf 
of human intelligence organizations'' from the definition of 
``imagery'' under the NIMA Act does not prevent the 
exploitation, dissemination, and archiving of that photography. 
In other words, NGA would still not dictate how human 
intelligence agencies collect such ground-based photography, 
have authority to modify its classification or dissemination 
limitations, or manage the collection requirements for such 
photography. Rather, NGA should simply avail itself of this 
ground-based photography, regardless of the source, but within 
the security handling guidelines consistent with the 
photography's classification as determined by the appropriate 
authority.

Section 436. Security clearances in the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Although the NSA and the NGA have much in common as 
technical intelligence agencies administratively linked with 
the Department of Defense, their present authorities for 
handling security clearances differ significantly. The 
Secretary of Defense has delegated to the NSA authority for 
contracting out background investigations and performing 
adjudications on individuals doing work for the agency, both 
for government employees and contractors. In contrast, the NGA 
must rely on the Defense Security Service (DSS) or the Office 
of Personnel Management (OPM) for background investigations and 
on the DIA for adjudication.
    The consequences at the NGA for processing times are 
dramatic, particularly regarding contractor clearances. As the 
Committee noted in its report on its Fiscal Year 2007 bill, 
according to information provided by the DNI's Special Security 
Center, the average end-to-end processing times for contractors 
in July 2005 was 73 days for NSA and 540 days for NGA. NSA and 
NGA processing times for contractors in the first quarter of 
fiscal year 2006 showed that this significant discrepancy 
continued. Moreover, the ability of the DSS to mitigate the 
problem suffered a setback on April 25, 2006, when the DSS 
temporarily suspended its acceptance of new contractor security 
clearance applications.
    The NGA's long backlog for contractor clearances is 
deleterious for both the agency and the contractors that 
support it. For NGA, the backlog drives up financial costs and 
makes it more difficult to compete for talent. The backlog also 
distorts efficiencies and good business practices in the 
private sector, as contractors adjust to the realities of 
significantly different agency clearance timelines.
    Section 436 therefore provides that the Secretary of 
Defense will delegate to the Director of the NGA personnel 
security authority with respect to the NGA that is identical to 
the personnel security authority delegated to the Director of 
the NSA with respect to the NSA. The Committee calls upon the 
DNI to follow closely the progress made by the NGA in reducing 
processing times and to monitor the variation among the 
processing times of other intelligence agencies with similar 
requirements. The Committee anticipates that the arrangement 
created by Section 436 will be a temporary measure, pending the 
consistent attainment of reduced processing times by the OPM, 
the DIA, and the DSS.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements


Section 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
        Enforcement Administration as elements of the intelligence 
        community

    Section 441 restores, with respect to the United States 
Coast Guard, the prior definition of ``intelligence community'' 
in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that 
service. See 50 U.S.C. 401a. Section 1073 of the Intelligence 
Reform Act modified the definition of ``intelligence 
community,'' inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion 
in the Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or 
those portions of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis 
of intelligence. Section 441 clarifies that all of the Coast 
Guard's intelligence elements are included within the 
definition of the ``intelligence community.''
    Section 441 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and 
Attorney General to designate an office within the Drug 
Enforcement Administration as an element of the Intelligence 
Community.

Section 442. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

    Section 442 clarifies that the establishment of the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the 
Treasury (Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003))), and 
its reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence (Section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, 
Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations 
Act, 2005 (Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004))), do 
not affect the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with 
respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an 
element of the Intelligence Community.

                         Title V--Other Matters


Section 501. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 501 corrects several inadvertent technical 
anomalies in the National Security Act of 1947 arising from the 
amendments made to that Act by the Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 502. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
        Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and 
        Related Activities

    Section 502 makes technical clarifications to Section 102A 
of the National Security Act of 1947 to preserve the 
participation of the DNI in the development of the annual 
budget for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the 
successor program of the Joint Military Intelligence Program 
and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. Section 502 
also preserves the requirement for consultation by the 
Secretary of the Defense with the DNI in the reprogramming or 
transfer of MIP funds.

Section 503. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 503 corrects a number of inadvertent technical 
errors in the specified sections of the Intelligence Reform 
Act.

Section 504. Technical amendments to Title 10, United States Code, 
        arising from enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
        Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 504 corrects a number of inadvertent technical 
errors in Title 10, United States Code, arising from enactment 
of the Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 505. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
        of 1949

    Section 505 amends Section 5(a)(1) of the CIA Act of 1949 
by striking or updating outdated references to the National 
Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence Reform Act significantly 
restructured and renumbered multiple sections of the National 
Security Act of 1947, leaving references in Section 5(a)(1) of 
the CIA Act to provisions that no longer exist or that are no 
longer pertinent.

Section 506. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 506 updates the ``multiyear national foreign 
intelligence program'' provision to incorporate and reflect 
organizational and nomenclature changes made by the 
Intelligence Reform Act.

Section 507. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

    Section 507 makes several technical corrections to the 
Executive Schedule. This section substitutes the ``Director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency'' for the previous reference in 
Executive Schedule Level II to the ``Director of Central 
Intelligence.'' See 5 U.S.C. 5313. Section 507 also strikes 
outdated references to Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence 
from Executive Schedule Level III. See 5 U.S.C. 5314. The 
provision also corrects the erroneous reference to the 
``General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director'' in 
Executive Schedule Level IV. See 5 U.S.C. 5315.

Section 508. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the 
        National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 508 makes several technical and conforming changes 
to existing law to bring these provisions in line with the 
change in name of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to 
the NGA, as provided for in Section 921(b) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 
108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003)).

Section 509. Other technical amendments relating to the 
        responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence as 
        head of the intelligence community

    Section 509 makes several technical and conforming changes 
to the Public Interest Declassification Act of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 
435 note) to substitute the ``Director of National 
Intelligence'' for the ``Director of Central Intelligence.''

                           COMMITTEE COMMENTS

CIA Detention and Interrogation Program

    The fiscal year 2008 intelligence authorization bill is the 
first passed by the Committee in which all members were briefed 
on the CIA's detention and interrogation program. While the 
program has been briefed from its outset to the Committee's 
Chairman and Vice Chairman, the Administration's decision to 
withhold the program's existence from the full Committee 
membership for five years was unfortunate in that it 
unnecessarily hindered congressional oversight of the program.
    Significant legal issues about the CIA detention and 
interrogation program remain unresolved. The Department of 
Justice has not produced a review of aspects of the program 
since the Supreme Court's Hamdan decision and the passage into 
law of the Detainee Treatment Act in 2005 and the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006. The Committee urges prompt completion 
of such a legal review as soon as possible, regardless of 
whether the program is currently being used. The Committee 
expects that such review will be provided to the Committee as a 
part of its ongoing oversight of the program.
    The Committee recognizes that the program was born in the 
aftermath of the attacks of September 11, when follow-on 
attacks were expected. The Committee acknowledges that 
individuals detained in the program have provided valuable 
information that has led to the identification of terrorists 
and the disruption of terrorist plots. More than five years 
after the decision to start the program, however, the Committee 
believes that consideration should be given to whether it is 
the best means to obtain a full and reliable intelligence 
debriefing of a detainee. Both Congress and the Administration 
must continue to evaluate whether having a separate CIA 
detention program that operates under different interrogation 
rules than those applicable to military and law enforcement 
officers is necessary, lawful, and in the best interests of the 
United States.
    Moreover, the Committee believes that the demonstrated 
value of the program should be weighed against both the 
complications it causes to any ultimate prosecution of these 
terrorists, and the damage the program does to the image of the 
United States abroad.

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Modernization and Liability 
        Defense

    The Committee remains committed to giving careful 
consideration to the issues involved in the Administration's 
legislative proposal to amend the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act and the proposal to provide liability 
protection to telecommunications companies who are alleged to 
have assisted the Intelligence Community in carrying out the 
President's surveillance program.
    The Committee's review of the Administration's proposals 
and possible alternatives cannot be completed, however, until 
it receives key documents at the heart of the surveillance 
program: the President's orders authorizing the warrantless 
surveillance and the Department of Justice opinions on the 
legality of the program. The Administration's refusal to 
satisfy these document requests span over a year and hampers 
the Committee's ability to move forward on the legislation 
before it.
    The Committee is also concerned about continued 
Administration requests to limit access by Committee staff to 
information related to the program. Limited staff access 
impedes congressional oversight as well as the Committee's 
ability to consider legislation related to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. Access to the program should 
therefore be expanded to the Committee's professional staff, 
including all Members' designees.

Oversight of major acquisition programs

    A major concern of the Committee is the need for 
significant reform of the processes that govern the creation 
and continuation of major acquisition programs. When Congress 
and the President created the DNI, it gave the DNI milestone 
decision authority for all major systems acquisitions funded 
exclusively within the National Intelligence Program and shared 
milestone decision authority with the Secretary of Defense for 
major systems acquisitions within the Department of Defense.
    The Committee is concerned that there is an inadequate 
management structure within the ODNI to prioritize national 
requirements, consider possible alternatives for proposed 
systems, and determine mission-based requirements as they 
relate to major systems acquisition programs. In essence, it 
appears that there is a lack of rigor in the planning, 
development, and management of such programs.
    Although the bill does not contain a provision that 
addresses the management structure with respect to such 
programs, the Committee intends to continue to explore issues 
relating to major acquisition programs. Accordingly, the 
Committee requests that the DNI review the current management 
structure within the Intelligence Community relating to the 
approval of major acquisition programs, including all 
requirements, priorities, and procedures for approval. 
Particular attention should be given to the desirability of 
creating an Intelligence Resources Oversight Council within the 
ODNI to assist the DNI in exercising his authority over such 
programs. A report with any conclusions and recommendations on 
this concept should be forwarded to the Committee no later than 
December 1, 2007.
    In addition, the Intelligence Reform Act contained a 
requirement for the DNI to provide the Congress with a report 
on the status of major intelligence systems funded within the 
National Intelligence Program. Specifically, the DNI was 
required to ensure the development and implementation of a 
program management plan for each major system acquisition. The 
plans were to contain cost, schedule and performance goals, and 
program milestone criteria.
    The Committee received the DNI's first report, titled 2006 
Annual Report to Congress, Intelligence Community Program 
Management Plans, in February 2007, and applauds the effort of 
the Office of the DNI in producing this document. For the first 
time there is a single source for information on the status of 
the Intelligence Community's major systems acquisitions. The 
report contains not only details on the status of individual 
programs, but valuable summary information on the acquisition 
shortcomings of the individual agencies. For example, the 
report highlights the lack of meaningful baseline data for a 
number of NSA programs and the NRO's need to more prudently 
align program baselines with anticipated budget resources. It 
is likely that the availability of such information in prior 
years would have helped prevent or contain cost overruns and 
schedule delays.
    The 2006 report was used by the Committee in preparing this 
authorization bill. It will be used for further inquiry by the 
Committee's budget and audit staffs and will be a baseline that 
allows the Congress and DNI to derive trend data from future 
reports. The Committee supports plans to expand the report's 
coverage to include additional major systems, significant 
programs that do not meet the threshold to be categorized as 
major systems, and joint Intelligence Community and Department 
of Defense programs. The Committee suggests that the DNI 
consider using these reports to identify both positive 
acquisition practices that should employed throughout the 
Intelligence Community and unsuccessful practices that should 
be eliminated.
    The Committee also believes that the report could be 
improved by adding more information on accountability. Future 
versions of the report should present greater detail on the 
DNI's perspective, propose solutions to the issues raised in 
the report, and identify specific actions to be taken in 
response to the failure to meet the milestones conveyed in 
prior reports.
    The Committee has also adopted two statutory requirements 
for assessments and reporting to Congress on major systems 
acquisition. In Section 314 of the bill, the Committee requires 
the DNI to conduct an initial vulnerability assessments of 
major systems proposed for inclusion in the National 
Intelligence Program and subsequent assessments under certain 
circumstances. The Committee also has created a mechanism for 
IC major system acquisitions similar to the Nunn-McCurdy 
process that applies to major defense acquisition programs in 
Sections 317 and 318.

Intelligence Community personnel growth and contractor support

    The Committee in Section 103 recommends that the DNI have 
greater flexibility in determining personnel levels for 
elements of the Intelligence Community in order to allow the 
DNI to better manage the balance of government and contractor 
employees. The Committee, however, continues to have concerns 
over the lack of hard data on the IC's personnel structure, 
size, and cost over the short, medium, and long terms. It is 
essential that the DNI be able to explain what criteria should 
be used to determine the proper mix of government and 
contractor employees within the Intelligence Community. The 
Committee continues to emphasize that the best analysis and 
collection will not be attained by simply increasing the 
quantity of analysts and collectors, but by also increasing the 
quality of analysts, collectors and their support networks. The 
DNI must also be able to explain the trade-offs that occur with 
hiring more people, as opposed to using the same appropriations 
to purchase other capabilities.
    The Committee supports the DNI's efforts to survey and 
better understand the use of contractors in the Intelligence 
Community, and was encouraged that the April 2007 report 
entitled IC Core Contractor Inventory provided a preliminary 
snapshot of the total number of full time equivalent (FTE) 
contractors by expenditure center. The report is a good first 
step, but still more needs to be done.
    A Committee audit of Intelligence Community personnel found 
that end strength has grown by about 20 percent since the 
attacks of September 11, 2001; unfortunately, significant 
shortages in training capacity and secure office space, along 
with inadequate planning for administrative, logistical, and 
technical support have accompanied that growth. The Committee 
in its audit has recommended that no future personnel growth 
should take place until the challenges experienced in 
implementing the past growth have been addressed. The Committee 
continues to be concerned about the rate of growth in total 
personnel costs as a percentage of the overall intelligence 
budget and the lack of planning being done by the Executive 
branch to control that growth for the future.
    In Section 315, the Committee addresses the need for 
additional information on personnel and contractor levels with 
the requirement for the DNI to prepare an annual personnel 
level assessment for each element of the Intelligence Community 
by January of each year.

Auditable financial statements

    For a number of years, the Committee has encouraged the 
Intelligence Community to modernize its financial system 
architecture to allow for auditable financial statements. The 
Committee was pleased that the DNI's United States Intelligence 
Community 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration of 
April 2007 included a serious commitment to improving financial 
management. The Committee is also encouraged by the hard work 
the ODNI put into the report Financial Statement Auditability 
Plan, also of April 2007. The report outlines the current state 
of the IC's financial management systems and explains the 
challenges to achieving clean audits. The report fails, 
however, to provide certain key pieces of information, 
including timelines on when and how independent audit 
assessments of important milestones will be conducted, when the 
IC will reach the proposed architecture, and whether the 
retention of outside experts would help address workforce 
competency shortfalls at certain agencies.
    Further, the Committee remains concerned that the proposal 
for unqualified audit opinions, referred to as clean audits, by 
2012 does not convey the urgent nature of the challenges facing 
our country's intelligence elements when it comes to managing 
and accounting for theirresources efficiently and effectively. 
The NGA, NRO, NSA, CIA, and DIA all have been given ample opportunity, 
first with the President's relevant guidance in 1997 and again with the 
Committee's fiscal year 2002 intelligence authorization bill, to 
address this issue using their current authorities. Unfortunately, 
other than the NRO using first year estimates to receive a one-time 
clean audit opinion, these organizations have repeatedly failed to 
achieve tangible results on this important topic.
    The Committee now turns to the DNI to provide much needed 
leadership. Such leadership will be essential in conducting the 
follow-on study on the ``way ahead'' required in the Financial 
Statement Auditability Plan in a meaningful way. The Committee 
expects this study to evaluate impartially not only the 
objectives stated in the report, but also:
           The authority of the Director of National 
        Intelligence on this topic;
           The role and responsibilities of the IC's 
        Chief Information Officer in overseeing the integration 
        of the business enterprise architecture;
           Financial considerations, including the most 
        cost effective system solution based on the future 
        direction of the software industry;
           Operational considerations and change 
        management issues related to the workforce 
        ``unlearning'' and ``relearning'' critical skills;
           Risk considerations and the 
        counterintelligence implications from foreign ownership 
        of software providers;
           Ideal system integrator structure and 
        software upgrade considerations, including dates when 
        the IC will have interface and business process 
        standards for major feeder systems, and accounting code 
        standards;
           The findings of IC information technology 
        assessments and Inspector General reports completed 
        over the last five years; and
           Intellectual property rights concerns.
This study should also examine whether it would be best for the 
IC to outsource the oversight of implementing the chosen ``way 
ahead'' to the experts currently working in the Department of 
Defense's Business Transformation Agency, or if the IC should 
immediately hire its own ``highly qualified employees'' or 
``special advisors'' to oversee the future implementation.
    Additionally, based on the Committee's research with 
private sector experts and key personnel from the Business 
Transformation Agency, and a review of the best of breed model 
found at the Department of Transportation, the Committee is not 
convinced that the two-system approach outlined in the 
Financial Services Auditability Plan report is the most cost 
effective and efficient path. The Committee is concerned that 
the two-system solution rests too heavily on past decisions and 
sunk costs of the individual agencies, and does not fully 
embrace the shared service model endorsed by the OMB. 
Therefore, by December 1, 2007, the Committee requests that the 
DNI, in coordination with the Director of OMB, provide the 
Committee with the follow-on plan that includes the information 
described above and offers a specific timeframe and critical 
milestones for the IC to move to a single shared services 
financial system that will be used by the NGA, NRO, NSA, CIA, 
DIA, and the Office of the DNI.
    The follow-on plan should help inform the implementation of 
Section 316 of the bill for a proposed Business Enterprise 
Architecture to be provided to the oversight committees by 
March 1, 2008. These documents will assist in the goal of 
executing a realistic plan to achieve sustainable, clean audits 
and provide the added benefit of integrating the IC's business 
management systems. Such integrated systems will build on the 
positive steps the Office of the DNI has already taken by 
creating the IC's single Human Resources Information System and 
single budget system called the Intelligence Resource 
Information System. This business architecture will minimize 
expensive and complex system interfaces and provide a cost-
conscious solution that will promptly provide valuable data for 
future Directors of National Intelligence and agency heads. 
Also, this course of action will leverage the best private 
sector practices and allow the IC to benefit from the research 
and development dollars industry has already invested in these 
business management tools.
    Finally, the Committee believes that both the Congress and 
the DNI would benefit from the creation of a consolidated 
National Intelligence Program financial statement. Such a 
statement would provide valuable macro-level data and, once 
established, offer insight into financial trends within the 
Intelligence Community. Therefore, the Committee requests that 
the DNI begin preparing a consolidated financial statement for 
the National Intelligence Program beginning with fiscal year 
2010. In accordance with the DNI's Financial Statement 
Auditability Plan, by fiscal year 2012, this consolidated 
financial statement should be based on the fully auditable data 
provided by each of the Intelligence Community agencies. As 
such, a separate audit will not be required for the 
consolidated statement.

Intelligence Community contracting

    The Committee is concerned about apparent conflicts of 
interest within the intelligence acquisition community. Despite 
provisions in the Federal Acquisition Regulation intended to 
preclude such conflicts, the Committee is concerned that 
organizational conflicts of interest may have adversely 
impacted major acquisitions.
    The Executive Branch is relying increasingly on contractors 
to assist in managing or integrating complex acquisitions. 
Contractor advisory and assistance service (CAAS) and systems, 
engineering, and technical assistance (SETA) contracts are 
often used to perform what would otherwise be inherently 
governmental functions. There are merits to the government 
utilizing the technical and program management expertise which 
exists in the private sector. Close relationships, however, 
between CAAS/SETA contractors and their parent, affiliate, or 
subsidiary companies could bias those contractors in providing 
advice to the government.
    Where a program's prime contractor has a contractor 
affiliate working in the program office setting program 
requirements, assisting in source selections, and determining 
award and incentive fees for the same program, there is strong 
potential for conflicts of interest. An Inspector General 
report from an element of the Intelligence Community expressed 
concern about such apparent conflicts which were negatively 
impacting the interests of that particular element. Indeed, the 
Committee notes that several major prime contractors have 
corporate affiliates supporting government program offices in 
the management of major Intelligence Community acquisitions. 
The Committee believes this practice is undesirable, and should 
be fully addressed by the Inspectors General of the respective 
elements of the Intelligence Community, including the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence.

Supplemental budgeting

    The Committee remains concerned over the Administration's 
continued use of supplemental appropriations bills to request 
funding for intelligence operations. Since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community has 
expended significant resources in supplemental funding on the 
effort to defeat al Qa'ida and related terrorist groups, and on 
intelligence operations in support of the conflict in Iraq. 
While initially the costs associated with these two efforts may 
have been unforeseen or unknowable, the Committee believes the 
Intelligence Community has for some time been able to 
anticipate and budget effectively on an annual basis for its 
operations against terrorists and in Iraq, yet this has not 
been reflected in the regular budget requests. The Committee is 
further concerned that the Executive branch has misused the 
supplemental process to request funding for long-term 
acquisition and research and development programs, as well as 
numerous projects of questionable value.
    The Committee supports the Administration's decision to 
request more funding for the Global War on Terrorism and Iraq 
requirements in the fiscal year 2008 budget request. The 
Committee, however, has many concerns regarding the continued 
use of supplemental funding outside the regular budget process 
to fund some counterterrorism operations. The conflict against 
al Qa'ida and its supporters has proceeded for more than five 
years, and many analysts and observers have concluded that it 
may span a generation or more before it is over. Due to the 
likely length of this effort, the Committee believes the 
Intelligence Community should plan, budget, and fund its 
counterterrorism operations for the long-term. This is not 
possible if supplemental funding continues. Supplemental 
requests introduce uncertainty into funding plans. Instead of 
encouraging discipline, supplemental requests present 
opportunity for gamesmanship. Instead of allowing for steady 
employment of experienced personnel, supplemental requests 
force the use of more expensive and more transient contractor 
employees. The Committee believes that the practice of 
budgeting by supplementals must end to better enable the 
Intelligence Community to protect our citizens at home and 
defeat those that threaten United States interests both here 
and abroad.
    The Committee expects the Presidential request funds for 
all counterterrorism operations in the base budget beginning 
with the fiscal year 2009 request.

Al Qa'ida

    The Committee is concerned with recent assessments that 
indicate al-Qa'ida has regenerated and resumed its operational 
planning against western targets from its relative safe-haven 
in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Despite the apprehension and 
death of key leaders, al-Qa'ida continues to train operatives 
and expand its reach, as evidenced by the 2007 North Africa 
attacks by the newly named ``al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb.''
    The resurgence of al-Qa'ida, nearly six years after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, suggests the 
Intelligence Community should reevaluate its current strategy 
to defeat the al-Qa'ida network. The Committee addresses this 
issue further in the classified annex.

Long-term strategic planning for the FBI National Security Branch

    The Committee remains concerned that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) is not properly conducting long-term 
strategic planning, especially in regard to the growth of the 
National Security Branch (NSB) and the transformation of the 
NSB into an intelligence-driven organization.
    Many of the reforms required to appropriately transform the 
NSB into a premier intelligence organization that can 
effectively meet the intelligence needs of our post 9/11 world 
within the United States remain in the planning and 
implementation phases, when those reforms should be in the 
evaluation and refinement stages.
    The FBI is the premier law enforcement agency of the nation 
and it has a strong foundation on which to build the NSB; 
however, the Committee believes more should be done to define 
and focus the intelligence mission of the NSB. This effort 
should not impede information sharing or create new stove pipes 
within the FBI, but rather recognize the sophistication, unique 
training, and cultural change required to effectively address 
the current threat environment.
    The FBI has provided the Committee with an unclassified 
five-page ``Counterterrorism Strategy,'' but it fails to 
adequately address the transformation that must take place at 
the FBI, or the urgency by which that change needs to occur.
    A long-term strategic plan should be developed in 
conjunction with the ODNI that examines: (1) NSB growth; (2) 
how that growth is threat aligned; (3) how the NSB plans to 
recruit personnel with intelligence expertise; (4) how the NSB 
will identify training needs, implement training programs, and 
measure the success of training; (5) how the NSB will manage 
career paths--including a transparent career ladder--and 
elevate the Intelligence Analyst position; and (6) how the NSB 
will develop and utilize benchmarks and metrics to measure the 
growth and success of all NSB programs and personnel.
    Furthermore, the plan should describe what will drive the 
NSB's allocation of analytical resources at headquarters and 
across FBI field offices and evaluate the impact that the 
National Intelligence Program (NIP) and non-NIP appropriations 
have on the NSB.
    Additionally, the plan should comprehensively address how 
the FBI will use the increased funding authorized by the bill 
for Counterterrorism Division (CTD) training and travel. The 
increased funding is intended for Supervisory Special Agents, 
Intelligence Analysts, and other Professional Staff in those 
CTD units that provide oversight, management support, and 
guidance to FBI field offices addressing international 
terrorism and related matters.
    Therefore, the Committee requests a comprehensive National 
Security Branch long-term strategic plan be completed by the 
FBI in conjunction with the ODNI that includes, but is not 
limited to, the requirements above. The plan should be 
unclassified, and if necessary, contain a classified annex. The 
plan should be provided to the intelligence committees by March 
1, 2008.

Department of the Treasury intelligence activities

    The Committee is concerned that the roles and 
responsibilities of the various components of the Office of 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) at the Department of 
Treasury are not sufficiently delineated in the area of 
intelligence analysis. The Committee requests that by no later 
than February 1, 2008, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit 
a report to the congressional intelligence committees on 
intelligence analysis within the TFI.
    The report should include a description of the roles of the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) with regard to analysis of 
intelligence information and analytic support for sanctions, 
designations, and assistance to law enforcement conducted 
pursuant to the authorities of the Department.
    The report should also include the guidelines and policies 
governing analysts at the OIA, OFAC and FinCEN related to 
access to intelligence information, specifically: (1) sharing 
of intelligence information within TFI; (2) direct sharing of 
intelligence information between OFAC and FinCEN and the 
Intelligence Community; and (3) sharing of intelligence 
information by the TFI with federal agencies outside of the 
Intelligence Community, as well as with state and local 
authorities and law enforcement.
    In addition, the report should include a description of 
databases of financial information and information on financial 
transactions maintained by the TFI and the Intelligence 
Community. The report should include: (1) the legal authorities 
governing the collection, maintenance and use of such 
databases; (2) the purpose of such databases; (3) authorities 
and policies governing direct access to such databases as well 
as search parameters and the use of analytical tools; (4) 
authorities and policies governing dissemination of information 
from such databases as well as minimization requirements; (5) 
authorities and policies related to the use of such databases 
in coordination with each other; and (6) issues related to 
privacy and United States person information with respect to 
these databases.

Science and technology leadership

    The Intelligence Community Chief Technology Officer (IC 
CTO), known in statute as the Director for Science and 
Technology (S&T), is the chief S&T advisor for the Director of 
National Intelligence. After the reorganization announced by 
the DNI in April 2007, the IC CTO reports indirectly, through 
two other positions, to the DNI, whereas other chief advisor 
positions such as the Chief Information Officer and Chief 
Financial Officer are empowered to report directly to the DNI. 
Though the Committee appreciates the potential benefits of 
having the IC CTO report to the DNI's acquisition leadership to 
improve technology transition, the Committee notes that the IC 
CTO has a broad portfolio of important responsibilities beyond 
those directly related to acquisition. The Committee continues 
to see a significant need for an IC CTO to directly influence 
IC policy and strategy regarding S&T issues, as originally set 
forth in the Intelligence Reform Act. Though the Committee 
understands that the DNI is still working on the details of his 
organization plan, there is concern that S&T may not be able to 
get the attention it deserves in the Office of the DNI.
    One of the IC CTO's principal responsibilities is to guide 
IC research and development, and one of the CTO's major 
achievements to date is the establishment of the Intelligence 
Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA). The IARPA has been 
well-represented in the DNI's 100 Day Plan and in the DNI's 
statements supporting community research and development. 
Studies by distinguished independent advisory groups such as 
the Intelligence Science Board and the Committee's Technical 
Advisory Group emphasize the need for an IARPA. In strongly 
supporting the establishment of the IARPA, created with some of 
the best practices of the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) in mind, the Committee intends to nurture high-
priority (and sometimes high-risk and long-term) community 
research and development activities by allowing an independent 
organization to manage and sustain them over time, insulated 
from agency-specific operational pressures that frequently 
threaten research and development resources.
    The IARPA Director is expected to face significant 
challenges inherent to the position in areas such as budget 
control, relationships with the ODNI and IC leadership, and 
translation of mission requirements into research and 
development priorities. Further, the first IARPA Director, as 
head of a new community research and development activity, is 
expected to face significant challenges from the entrenched 
bureaucracy and the operations-focused agencies. It is critical 
that the DNI hire a uniquely qualified person to fill this 
position. The Committee is concerned, however, that the IARPA 
will not be able to attract the best candidates for Director if 
the position is deeply buried in the Office of the DNI 
organization. In the DARPA model, the DARPA Director reports to 
the Secretary of Defense's deputy for research and engineering, 
who reports to the Secretary of Defense. The Committee is 
concerned that the DNI's new organizational plan does not 
follow a similar model empowering the IARPA Director to report 
to the DNI's CTO who would report to the DNI, and instead 
places the IARPA under officials with other priorities. The 
Committee encourages the IC leadership to take full advantage 
of the rare opportunity created by the establishment of the 
IARPA and to strengthen S&T leadership at all levels.
    Another of the IC CTO's responsibilities is to improve 
coordination and integration of S&T activities across the IC, 
and to that end the IC CTO must ensure that IARPA activities 
are well-coordinated with IC agency activities. The Committee 
requests that the IC CTO and the National Intelligence Science 
and Technology Committee (composed of the principal S&T 
officers of the National Intelligence Program) present by 
October 1, 2007 a unified plan clearly describing the division 
of research and development responsibilities and the processes 
for effective coordination among the agencies and the IARPA. 
Section 407 of the bill addresses additional duties that the 
Committee believes the Director of Science and Technology and 
theNational Intelligence Science and Technology Committee 
should address.
    Further, following the recommendations that were made by 
the Committee's Technical Advisory Group, the Committee 
requests that the IARPA present by October 1, 2007 a concept of 
operations to include how research ideas will be solicited and 
selected for funding; a strategy for technology insertion into 
operational organizations in the IC; and a plan for flexible 
hiring of the necessary S&T experts from industry and academia, 
with particular attention to additional authorities or 
resources that may be required.

Civil Liberties Protection Officer

    The Intelligence Reform Act mandated the creation of a 
Civil Liberties Protection Officer, with significant statutory 
responsibilities. While the current Civil Liberties Protection 
Officer has made a commendable effort to carry out these 
responsibilities since his appointment, he has been 
unnecessarily hampered by a lack of staff and resources, as 
well as a lack of relevant security clearances.
    The Committee is recommending an increase in resources for 
the Civil Liberties Protection Office in the classified annex 
to this Act. The Committee also urges the DNI to ensure that 
the Civil Liberties Protection Officer and his staff have 
adequate access to all intelligence activities that have the 
potential to impact the privacy and civil liberties of United 
States persons, so that the Office is able to fulfill its 
mandate.

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center

    The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) is the 
only medical intelligence organization in the United States and 
is without peer worldwide. AFMIC is the recognized expert on 
infectious disease and the consequences of pandemic outbreaks 
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents. For this 
reason, the AFMIC has significant new responsibilities for 
supporting the Department of Homeland Security, just as it has 
taken on a significant share of the lead for the United States 
Government in assisting other nations in efforts to prepare for 
and respond to potential pandemic disease outbreaks or large-
scale WMD incidents.
    Although the commanders and chief executives of AFMIC 
historically have been officers of exceptional skill and 
undeniable quality, at the rank of colonel, the Committee 
believes AFMIC's new interagency responsibilities and growing 
international visibility suggest the need for a more senior 
level of leadership. Should there be a catastrophic biological 
or chemical attack or the spread of a pandemic disease, the 
leader of AFMIC will need to have the rank to serve as a 
principal advisor at the most senior levels of the government.
    Therefore, the Committee requests that the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Intelligence, the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of National Intelligence 
develop a plan for installing a senior executive service 
officer or military officer of flag rank to lead AFMIC and 
report to the congressional oversight committees on such a plan 
by September 1, 2007.

Senior Defense Intelligence Officers

    The Committee believes intelligence personnel serving 
within the Department of Defense should provide direct and 
continuous expert intelligence information and advice to senior 
Department officials, specifically those of the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy [USD(P)]. The Committee 
believes building trust and confidence in intelligence requires 
time and contact with policymakers.
    At present, the Defense Intelligence Agency has identified 
senior intelligence officers to support the policy apparatus, 
but these personnel are based at DIA facilities at Bolling 
A.F.B., not at the Pentagon. Comparatively junior officers with 
little or no standing with the senior officials they support 
are detailed to distribute finished intelligence to policy 
makers through their policy staff. These officers attend 
meetings as back-benchers and take carefully-crafted notes, 
which are passed up to the offices of the DIA Director through 
a bureaucratic network. The Committee does not believe this is 
an optimum way to manage the interaction of intelligence and 
policy.
    Policymakers need ready access to dedicated, senior-level, 
expert intelligence advisors who are guided, managed and 
empowered by the Under Secretary of Defense of Intelligence 
[USD(I)] and the Director of the DIA to speak for the defense 
intelligence community. These experts should be fully 
integrated and routinely available to address policymaker 
questions regarding current intelligence, intelligence 
community capabilities, threat concerns, strategic warning, 
outstanding requests for intelligence, collection requirements 
and a myriad of issues that require more than what finished 
intelligence products delivered by action officers and routine 
community briefings can provide.
    The Committee believes defense policy makers should not be 
expected to maintain an expert understanding of the complex 
organization and evolving capabilities of the Intelligence 
Community. Similarly, they cannot be expected to become aware 
of regional intelligence through briefings and intelligence 
products alone. The Committee believes a senior intelligence 
officer with standing within the Intelligence Community should 
be present during the early stages of a crisis or the 
development of a critical issue. Furthermore, senior 
intelligence officers who establish appropriate professional 
relationships with senior policymakers are a valuable source of 
insight and feedback to the USD(I) and DIA Director. This 
effort is of mutual benefit, in the Committee's view.
    Therefore, the Committee requests that the USD(I) and 
Director of DIA develop a plan and report to the congressional 
oversight committees by January 1, 2008, to provide senior 
defense policymakers with intelligence support from senior 
defense intelligence community officers, appropriate to their 
responsibilities and position. The Committee recommends USD(I) 
work with the DIA to draw on the existing capabilities within 
the Senior Intelligence Executive Service and the assets of the 
DIA Executive Support Office, the DIA International Engagements 
Office, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff J2.
    The USD(I) and the Director of the DIA should draw on the 
history of and lessons learned from the Defense Intelligence 
Officer (DIO) program. The Committee believes the DIO program 
was a viable enterprise, which was more in need of an overhaul 
than complete elimination. While the threat environment and 
intelligence community have changed dramatically since the DIOs 
were created, the Committee believes the DIO program was sound 
and could be a model for the future.

Space Radar

    The Committee opposes the Space Radar program of record. 
The Committee is skeptical of the program's mission utility and 
objects to its expected costs. In addition, the Committee 
questions the validity of more stringent requirements being 
levied upon the program. Therefore, the Committee recommends 
that the Space Radar program be terminated and directs that no 
National Intelligence Program funds be spent on the program.
    Space Radar--formerly known as Space Based Radar (SBR)--is 
a joint effort between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
IC. In January 2005, the DoD and the IC committed to pursuing a 
single space radar capability. According to a recent Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, however, a cost-share 
agreement between DoD and the IC has yet to be formalized.
    Initial plans for SBR called for a constellation of many 
satellites. However, fiscal realities intervened, leading to a 
reduction in the number of intended satellites. This has only 
served to drive unit costs far higher while meeting only a 
fraction of the original requirements.
    The GAO report criticized the DoD for beginning more space 
and weapons programs than it could afford, which led to 
pressure to underestimate costs and over-promise capabilities. 
The Committee believes that the IC has the same problem; thus, 
beginning another major acquisition at this time, especially 
one so costly and technically complex, is imprudent.
    DoD's space acquisition programs continue to face 
substantial cost and schedule overruns. At times, cost growth 
has come close to or exceeded 100 percent. The GAO noted that, 
over the next five years, there will be approximately $12 
billion less available for new systems as well as for the 
discovery of promising new technologies because of cost growth. 
Many programs are also experiencing significant schedule 
delays--as much as six years--that postpone delivery of 
promised capabilities to the warfighter and the IC.
    A former head of the Air Force Space Command has commented 
that SBR will be developed ``in a way that we don't ask it to 
do too much, too fast.'' Yet according to the GAO, Space Radar 
and the Transformational Communications Architecture Satellite 
(TSAT) are expected to be the most ambitious, expensive, and 
complex space systems ever. Despite the efforts of the Space 
Radar program office, there is still significant inherent risk 
with integrating critical technologies onboard the satellites 
and developing the software to achieve the satellites' 
capabilities. Further, the DoD has a history of adding 
requirements to a program, even well into the acquisition.
    Basic questions about the Space Radar architecture are 
unanswered. The cost of supporting communications systems 
remains unclear. According to the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO), communications bandwidth comparable to that of the Air 
Force's planned TSAT or some other high-capacity communications 
system is likely to be necessary to relay Space Radar data to 
ground stations in a timely fashion. However, most Space Radar 
cost estimates do not include those expenses since the final 
architecture has yet to be defined.
    According to the GAO, preliminary estimates of the combined 
cost of Space Radar and the TSAT are about $40 billion. The 
Committee believes, however, that the cost and schedule 
estimates for Space Radar will follow typical space acquisition 
patterns and be much higher. The CBO estimates the cost of a 
nine-satellite space radar constellation will cost between 
$34.6 billion to $77.1 billion, depending on design trades.
    The Committee does not oppose a space-based radar 
capability developed jointly by the DoD and the IC, but 
believes there are other means to achieve it. The Committee 
considers the alternatives espoused by the Constellation 
Architecture Panel to offer a less risky, less costly, and more 
flexible acquisition strategy.

                            COMMITTEE ACTION

Vote to report the committee bill

    On May 23, 2007, a quorum for reporting being present, the 
Committee voted to report the bill favorably, subject to 
amendment, by a vote of 12 ayes and 3 noes. The votes in person 
or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator 
Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--aye; Senator Nelson--aye; 
Senator Whitehouse--aye; Vice Chairman Bond--aye; Senator 
Warner--aye; Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Senator 
Hatch--no; Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Burr--no.

Votes on amendments to committee bill and this report

    On May 17, 2007, by a voice vote, the Committee agreed to 
an amendment by Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond to 
include in this report a Committee Comment concerning the CIA 
detention and interrogation program.
    On May 17, 2007, after rejecting by a vote of 5 ayes to 10 
noes a second degree amendment by Vice Chairman Bond, the 
Committee agreed by voice vote to an amendment by Chairman 
Rockefeller to include in this report a Committee Comment on 
the Committee's consideration of legislation on FISA 
modernization and liability defense. The second degree 
amendment would have substituted the following for the second 
paragraph of the Comment: ``The Committee believes that 
receiving the President's orders authorizing the warrantless 
surveillance and the legal justifications embodied in the 
Department of Justice opinions on the legality of the program 
is important to the Committee's review of the Administration's 
proposals and possible alternatives.'' The votes on the second 
degree amendment in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Rockefeller--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator 
Wyden--no; Senator Bayh--no; Senator Mikulski--no; Senator 
Feingold--no; Senator Nelson--no; Senator Whitehouse--no; Vice 
Chairman Bond--aye; Senator Warner--aye; Senator Hagel--no; 
Senator Chambliss--aye; Senator Hatch--aye; Senator Snowe--no; 
Senator Burr--aye.
    On May 17, 2007, by a vote of 10 ayes to 5 noes, the 
Committee adopted an amendment of Chairman Rockefeller to add a 
section to the bill (Section 320) that requires the submittal 
to Congress of portions of the President's Daily Brief from 
January 20, 1997, through March 19, 2003, that address Iraq. 
The votes on the amendment in person or by proxy were as 
follows: Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; 
Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; 
Senator Feingold--aye; Senator Nelson--aye; Senator 
Whitehouse--aye; Vice Chairman Bond--no; Senator Warner--no; 
Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Senator Hatch--no; 
Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Burr--no.
    On May 17, 2007, by a voice vote, the Committee adopted an 
amendment by Vice Chairman Bond, Chairman Rockefeller, Senator 
Burr, Senator Hatch, Senator Wyden and Senator Feingold 
(Section 401) that requires the Director of National 
Intelligence to conduct accountability reviews of elements of 
the Intelligence Community and the personnel of such elements, 
if appropriate.
    On May 17, 2007, on a motion by Vice Chairman Bond and 
Senator Mikulski, after rejecting by a vote of 6 ayes to 9 noes 
a second degree amendment by Senator Feinstein, the Committee 
agreed by voice vote to an amendment (Section 106) on the 
development and acquisition of a program specified in the 
classified annex. The second degree amendment offered by 
Senator Feinstein was to reduce the funding level of the 
underlying amendment and to limit expenditures to pre-
production studies and development in conjunction with other 
planning being done under the auspices of the relevant element 
of the Intelligence Community. Further details are in the 
classified annex. The votes in person or by proxy on the second 
degree amendment were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller--aye; 
Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--no; Senator Bayh--aye; 
Senator Mikulski--no; Senator Feingold--aye; Senator Nelson--
aye; Senator Whitehouse--aye; Vice Chairman Bond--no; Senator 
Warner--no; Senator Hagel--no; Senator Chambliss--no; Senator 
Hatch--no; Senator Snowe--no; Senator Burr--no.
    On May 23, 2007, by a voice vote, the Committee adopted an 
amendment by Vice Chairman Bond, Senator Burr and Senator 
Feingold (Sections 317 and 318) requiring an annual report by 
the Director of National Intelligence on the acquisition of 
major systems and establishing a procedure concerning cost 
overruns.
    On May 23, 2007, by a voice vote, the Committee adopted an 
amendment by Senator Feinstein, Senator Hagel, Senator Warner, 
Senator Whitehouse, Senator Snowe and Senator Mikulski (Section 
321) to require that the Director of National Intelligence 
submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate on the 
anticipated geo-political effects of global climate change.
    On May 23, 2007, by a vote of 10 ayes and 5 noes, the 
Committee adopted an amendment by Senator Feinstein and Senator 
Feingold (Sections 312 and 313) on (a) notifications to the 
congressional intelligence committees under Sections 502 and 
503 of the National Security Act of 1947 and (b) the 
availability of funds under Section 504 of that Act. The votes 
in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller--
aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--
aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--aye; Senator 
Nelson--aye; Senator Whitehouse--aye; Vice Chairman Bond--no; 
Senator Warner--no; Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--no; 
Senator Hatch--no; Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Burr--no.
    On May 23, 2007, by a vote of 4 ayes and 11 noes, the 
Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Chambliss to strike 
Section 107 on the availability to the public of the aggregate 
amount requested by the President and authorized and 
appropriated by Congress for the National Intelligence Program. 
The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman 
Rockefeller--no; Senator Feinstein--no; Senator Wyden--no; 
Senator Bayh--no; Senator Mikulski--no; Senator Feingold--no; 
Senator Nelson--aye; Senator Whitehouse--no; Vice Chairman 
Bond--no; Senator Warner--no; Senator Hagel--no; Senator 
Chambliss--aye; Senator Hatch--aye; Senator Snowe--no; Senator 
Burr--aye.
    On May 23, 2007, by a vote of 10 ayes and 5 noes, the 
Committee adopted an amendment by Senator Feingold (Section 
319) on the provision to the Intelligence and Judiciary 
Committees of opinions and orders of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, and associated pleadings, that include a 
significant construction or interpretation of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act. The votes in person or by proxy 
were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Feinstein--
aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--
aye; Senator Feingold--aye; Senator Nelson--aye; Senator 
Whitehouse--aye; Vice Chairman Bond--no; Senator Warner--no; 
Senator Hagel--aye; Senator Chambliss--no; Senator Hatch--no; 
Senator Snowe--aye; Senator Burr--no.
    On May 23, 2007, by a vote of 9 ayes and 6 noes, the 
Committee adopted an amendment by Senator Feingold and Senator 
Wyden to add to a Committee Comment on FISA modernization and 
liability defense a paragraph on expanded staff access to 
information. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: 
Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator Feinstein--aye; Senator 
Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator Mikulski--aye; Senator 
Feingold--aye; Senator Nelson--aye; Senator Whitehouse--aye; 
Vice Chairman Bond--no; Senator Warner--no; Senator Hagel--no; 
Senator Chambliss--no; Senator Hatch--no; Senator Snowe--aye; 
Senator Burr--no.
    On May 23, 2007, by a vote of 7 ayes and 8 noes, the 
Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Whitehouse and 
Senator Feinstein to add a section that would have barred, 
absent a determination by the President that a national 
exigency exists and that an individual has information about a 
specific and imminent threat, the use of appropriated funds for 
interrogation methods by the CIA or other U.S. agencies that 
are not explicitly authorized by the U.S. Army Field Manual on 
Human Intelligence Collector Operations. The votes in person or 
by proxy were as follows: Chairman Rockefeller--aye; Senator 
Feinstein--aye; Senator Wyden--aye; Senator Bayh--aye; Senator 
Mikulski--aye; Senator Feingold--aye; Senator Nelson--no; 
Senator Whitehouse--aye; Vice Chairman Bond--no; Senator 
Warner--no; Senator Hagel--no; Senator Chambliss--no; Senator 
Hatch--no; Senator Snowe--no; Senator Burr--no.

                           ESTIMATE OF COSTS

    Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to 
include an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this report due to the classified nature of the 
operations conducted pursuant to this legislation. On May 24, 
2007, the Committee transmitted this bill to the Congressional 
Budget Office and requested it to conduct an estimate of the 
costs incurred in carrying out its provisions.

                    EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

    In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no 
substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing 
the provisions of this legislation.

                        CHANGES IN EXISTING LAWS

    In the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary to 
dispense with the requirements of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate in order to expedite the 
business of the Senate.

 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF VICE CHAIRMAN BOND AND SENATORS CHAMBLISS, HATCH, 
                                AND BURR

    The most important means that the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence has for conducting effective oversight of the 
Intelligence Community is the annual intelligence authorization 
bill. Unfortunately, Congress has been unable to pass an 
authorization bill for either fiscal year 2006 or 2007. In an 
effort to break this cycle, the Committee worked hard to 
include in its Chairman/Vice Chairman mark for our fiscal year 
2008 intelligence authorization bill only those provisions that 
had strong bi-partisan support. We were able to amend the 
Chairman/Vice Chairman mark with a number of other provisions 
that also received strong bi-partisan support. We call these 
the ``Good Government'' provisions. There were, however, a few 
amendments that the Committee adopted which will make final 
passage of the bill more difficult because they are inherently 
political in nature. We call these the ``Problem'' provisions.

                       GOOD GOVERNMENT PROVISIONS

    Encouraging good government is a major theme of this year's 
authorization bill. We supported or requested the inclusion of 
several provisions that we believe will improve the efficiency 
and accountability of the Intelligence Community (IC), while at 
the same time, provide the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) with the flexibility he needs to lead the IC. Section 314 
will enhance the IC's ability to obtain quality systems in a 
cost-efficient manner. It requires the DNI to conduct initial 
and subsequent vulnerability assessments for any major system, 
and its items of supply, that is included in the National 
Intelligence Program (NIP). Such assessments will ensure that 
any vulnerabilities or risks associated with a particular 
system are identified and resolved at the earliest possible 
stage. Section 316 requires the DNI to create a comprehensive 
business enterprise architecture that will define all IC 
business systems. This architecture will incorporate IC 
financial, personnel, procurement, acquisition, logistics, and 
planning systems into one interoperable and modernized system. 
As a complement to the architecture required by Section 316, 
the Committee included report language that requires the DNI to 
submit a plan for the IC to move to a single, shared-services 
financial system. In this way, the IC will be better positioned 
to achieve sustainable, clean financial audits.
    Sections 317 and 318 will operate together to address the 
problem of cost overruns in major system acquisitions by the 
IC. These provisions were modeled on the Nunn-McCurdy provision 
in title 10 of the United States Code. They encourage greater 
DNI involvement in the acquisitions process and enable the 
Congressional intelligence committees to perform more effective 
and timely oversight of cost increases.
    Section 315 continues the theme of encouraging good 
government. This section directs the DNI to conduct annual 
personnel level assessments of each element of the IC that 
capture the number and costs of personnel (and contractors) for 
that element. In order to provide the DNI with maximum 
flexibility as he addresses personnel management issues, 
Section 405 allows the DNI, with the concurrence of the head of 
the agency involved, to convert competitive service positions 
in the IC to excepted service positions. It also enables the 
DNI to grant authority (at the discretion of the agency head) 
to fix excess pay for certain critical positions.
    Finally, Section 401 provides the DNI with the authority to 
conduct accountability reviews of elements and personnel of the 
IC in relation to their significant failures or deficiencies. 
We believe this section will encourage IC elements to address 
their own internal failures or deficiencies--something they 
apparently have been reluctant to do before now. In the event 
that they are reluctant or unable to do so, this provision 
gives the DNI the authority he needs to conduct his own 
reviews.
    We believe that these measures will lead to a stronger, 
more efficient, and more effective IC. Major systems 
acquisition is an important issue for our warfighters and 
intelligence collectors, especially as technological 
capabilities evolve. It is also essential that the IC has 
sufficient and appropriate personnel to do the demanding jobs 
that are required to defeat our enemies.

                           PROBLEM PROVISIONS

A. President's daily briefs
    Section 320 will likely be the most problematic provision 
in this bill. This section requires the President to provide 
the Congressional intelligence committees with all President's 
Daily Briefs (PDBs) during the period beginning on January 20, 
1997 and ending on March 19, 2003, that refer to Iraq or 
otherwise address Iraq in any fashion. We anticipate that the 
Administration will strongly oppose inclusion of this provision 
in the final Intelligence Authorization bill. Also, we would 
not be surprised if the inclusion of this provision in the 
final bill results in a Presidential veto.
    PDBs have never been provided to Congress by any 
Administration. The White House has consistently maintained 
that these documents are protected by executive privilege. The 
DNI recently wrote to the Committee that the PDB:

          is a unique intelligence product prepared 
        specifically for the President. It serves as a critical 
        element in Presidential communications and Executive 
        Branch deliberations associated with the formulation 
        and implementation of foreign policy. The contents of 
        the PDB reflect an ongoing dialogue between the 
        President and the [Intelligence Community] concerning 
        the national security of the United States. Restricting 
        access to the PDB is necessary to guarantee the candor 
        of this dialogue and to provide the President with the 
        freedom to explore alternatives in the process of 
        shaping policies.

Even if some of my colleagues do not agree with the 
Administration's argument, Congress cannot magically legislate 
away executive privilege. Section 320 ignores the negotiation 
over access to information that has been ongoing between the 
Executive and Legislative branches since our Constitution was 
adopted. These negotiations have always been part of our 
democraticsystem of checks and balances. Within that system, 
Congress has many tools available to apply pressure to try to get the 
information it wants from the Executive branch. Attempting to create a 
statutory requirement to provide these privileged documents only 
creates additional friction in the ongoing negotiations between the two 
branches as they perform their constitutional roles.
    Another problem with Section 320 is that it creates a false 
impression that Congress did not get all of the intelligence on 
Iraq that the President received before the war. Although 
Congress does not receive the PDBs, we do receive a very 
similar daily intelligence product and a variety of other 
important documents such as the October 2002 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) programs. The bipartisan Robb-Silberman WMD 
Commission examined the prewar PDBs regarding Iraq's WMD 
programs and found that they contained language that was not 
``markedly different'' from the intelligence received by 
Congress, and were just as flawed. In fact, they noted that the 
language in the PDBs was actually ``more alarmist'' and ``less 
nuanced'' than the intelligence received by Congress, such as 
the WMD NIE.
    Proponents of Section 320 must know that neither this 
Administration nor any other Administration will acquiesce to 
providing privileged documents, yet they persist in demanding 
them. We are starting to wonder whether these demands are more 
theater than substance. If they actually received the PDBs they 
would no longer be able to claim that the White House was 
withholding information and they would no longer be able to 
give the false impression that the PDBs contained different 
intelligence on Iraq than the assessments provided to Congress.
    The facts are clear--Congress had the same prewar 
intelligence assessments on Iraq as the President. To keep 
attempting to create the impression that they did not, 
particularly when it prevents the intelligence authorization 
bill from being passed into law, is irresponsible.
    It is because this provision was passed as an amendment 
that Senator Hatch, who joins Vice Chairman Bond in these 
additional views, voted against the bill.

B. Notifications to Congress

    Despite recent difficulties the Congress and the 
Administration have had regarding the oversight of 
intelligence, there has been a history of cooperation and 
compromise between the two, particularly with respect to the 
sharing with Congress of sensitive information regarding 
intelligence sources and methods. While we believe that 
briefings to all Members and staff are the preferred method of 
notification of intelligence activities, the congressional 
intelligence committees have historically acquiesced to 
requests by the Executive branch to limit access on 
particularly sensitive matters to the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman. We support such limited notification when absolutely 
necessary.
    In contrast to the National Security Act of 1947, Section 
312 imposes new requirements when the Executive branch 
determines that disclosure to less than the full membership of 
the Committee is appropriate. It requires that, in those cases, 
the Executive branch must provide the ``main features'' of the 
program to the entire membership of the intelligence 
committees. Although we believe in comprehensive oversight, we 
also believe in working in comity with the Administration 
regarding the President's authority to control access to the 
nation's most sensitive national security programs when 
necessary.
    While we appreciate the majority's efforts to make the 
provision less controversial and more tenable, we believe this 
requirement will still increase tension between the Legislative 
and Executive branches over information access. Rather than 
ensure that Members receive the information they are seeking, 
this provision could instead merely provoke a stalemate.

C. Declassification of the National Intelligence Program top line

    Section 107 of the bill would require the declassification 
of the aggregate amount of appropriations requested, 
authorized, and appropriated for the NIP. A similar provision 
was included in the Committee-passed version of the fiscal year 
2007 Intelligence Authorization bill, and it received criticism 
from the Administration. Senator Chambliss offered an amendment 
to strike this provision of the bill during the markup. 
Although I voted against his amendment and it was not accepted 
by the Committee, I am sympathetic to Senator Chambliss's 
argument that the declassification of the aggregate amounts 
requested, authorized, and appropriated could possibly provide 
our enemies with insight into the cancellation of or creation 
of major intelligence initiatives. Such declassification might 
become the source of political attacks and wasteful spending if 
future administrations feel compelled to keep raising 
intelligence budgets so as not to be accused of neglecting 
national security. As the bill moves forward, we are open to 
considering a number of options to improve this provision, 
including the retroactive declassification of the NIP top line 
to show the fluctuation of the IC budgets during the past 
several decades, and the possibility of declassifying only the 
aggregate amount appropriated by Congress.

D. Global climate change National Intelligence Estimate

    We are also concerned about Section 321, which requires the 
DNI to submit an NIE to Congress on the anticipated 
geopolitical effects of global climate change and the 
implications of such effects on the national security of the 
United States. We recognize that many members on both sides of 
the aisle believe that global climate change is a serious issue 
which could have profound consequences. We also recognize that 
the DNI has said he believes it is appropriate for the National 
Intelligence Council (NIC) to prepare such an assessment and 
that he has, in fact, directed the preparation of such an 
assessment in the hope of precluding legislation on this issue. 
Nonetheless, we believe that the production of an NIE on global 
climate change is inappropriate for the IC.
    Members who support Section 321 cite the national security 
implications of global climate change. We agree that global 
climate change could have national and global security 
implications and that elements of the U.S. government should be 
studying it, but the IC is not one of those elements. The job 
of the IC is not to provide analysis on every issue which has 
national security implications--it is not a think tank. The job 
of the IC is to steal secrets and provide analysis of those 
secrets. There are no secrets to analyze when it comes to 
estimating thegeopolitical effects of an event 20 or more years 
in the future as this bill requires. We do not even know what countries 
or global groups will exist in 20 years.
    This Committee is constantly reminded by various 
Commissions, and the IC itself, that intelligence analysts are 
overtasked, overworked, and do not have the time to devote to 
long-term assessments, even on the countries and issues they 
currently cover on a daily basis, such as terrorism, 
proliferation, Iran, Iraq, and China. Which analysts are going 
to be pulled from their current responsibilities to analyze the 
implications of climate change? Preparing an estimate covering 
all of the geopolitical implications of global climate change 
would seem to require analysis on dozens of countries and 
groups with global reach. Can we really afford to have these 
analysts take a leave of absence from their current 
responsibilities to prepare such an estimate, especially when 
our nation is at war? We are not confident that terrorist 
leaders will stop plotting against us while analysts take time 
off to ponder the potential implications of global climate 
change.
    Finally, we take seriously the comments to our Committee 
from the Office of the DNI that mandating preparation of NIEs 
in legislation sets a harmful precedent. The DNI added that the 
production of products on topics of interest should not be 
reflected in law, particularly in a manner that impinges on the 
flexibility of IC professionals to approach a task in the most 
appropriate manner.
    We agree with the DNI and believe that legislating the 
production of NIEs--particularly when the legislation requires 
them to be unclassified--sets a harmful precedent and further 
politicizes the intelligence process. NIEs are supposed to be 
confidential assessments, based on collected intelligence, to 
inform senior policymakers. They are not supposed to provide 
fodder for political debates. In the past few years we have 
already seen an explosion of legislation demanding NIEs on 
topics like Iraq and Iran. We also have seen the political 
rhetoric and charges of politicization when those NIEs do not 
offer the conclusions the requesters wanted. This is a 
disturbing trend which we fear will only continue to worsen.

E. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act reporting requirements

    Section 319 requires the Department of Justice (DoJ) to 
provide copies of all decisions, orders, and opinions (and 
associated pleadings) issued by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) that involve significant construction 
or interpretation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA). We objected to this section on several grounds. First, 
this section should have been considered in relation to 
upcoming FISA modernization legislation as it directly changes 
a reporting provision in the FISA statute.
    Second, FISA already requires DoJ to provide the 
congressional intelligence and judiciary committees with copies 
of all decisions (but not orders or pleadings) that include a 
significant construction or interpretation of FISA. It seems to 
me that if a particular decision raises issues that the 
Committee believes need to be further explored, then any 
supporting documents can be requested at that time. Expanding 
the FISA reporting requirement to a wholesale submission of 
court orders and pleadings is simply unnecessary.
    In addition, we believe it is the decisions, not the orders 
or pleadings, that are essential to this Committee's oversight. 
Court orders and pleadings relate to particular targets and 
thus have limited value to this Committee's proper role in 
overseeing the implementation of FISA. This Committee can get 
better insight into significant search and surveillance issues 
confronting the FISC or the Intelligence Community by examining 
court decisions or opinions.
    Finally, DoJ will be forced to use valuable resources to 
search five years of FISA applications and orders to identify 
any significant documents. Further resources will then have to 
be expended by IC agencies to review those documents and redact 
any sensitive material. At a time when IC resources are spread 
thin, we should not be requiring extensive document searches 
that we believe are unnecessary. In any event, DoJ's opinion 
about this amendment should have been sought by the Committee 
before it imposed this additional task.
                                   Christopher S. Bond.
                                   Saxby Chambliss.
                                   Orrin G. Hatch.
                                   Richard Burr.

                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FEINGOLD

    The Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill, along 
with the accompanying classified annex, provides vital support 
to our Intelligence Community, as well as the legal framework 
and policy guidance that is so critical to our national 
security. Indeed, congressional oversight has never been more 
important, as our nation seeks a new way forward, with an 
Intelligence Community focusing its resources on defending 
America while operating within the rule of law and with the 
informed support of the Congress.
    One of the most important, as well as long overdue, areas 
for congressional oversight is the CIA's detention and 
interrogation program. I have opposed the program on moral, 
legal and national security grounds. For that reason, while I 
commend the Committee's increased scrutiny of the program, I 
cannot support the Committee's report language stating that the 
Congress must continue to evaluate whether having a separate 
CIA program with different interrogation rules than those 
applicable to military and law enforcement officers is 
necessary, lawful and in the best interests of the United 
States. It is my position that detainees should never be 
interrogated except as authorized by the United States Army 
Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. I 
voted in favor of the amendment offered by Senator Whitehouse, 
which would have restricted the circumstances in which separate 
interrogation techniques can be employed, as a step forward.
    Another critical priority for congressional oversight is 
government wiretapping of Americans, conducted under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and, illegally, under 
the President's warrantless wiretapping program. When the 
program was finally placed within the FISA process, an 
opportunity arose for the Administration and the Congress to 
move forward, under the law. Unfortunately, the Administration 
has yet to demonstrate a real interest in doing so. First, the 
Administration has sought broad new authorities unrelated to 
keeping FISA up-to-date with new technology, and has pursued 
these authorities while refusing to rule out further 
surveillance activities entirely outside of the law. Second, 
the Administration has sought to impose a set of impediments to 
congressional oversight and responsible legislating. I am 
pleased, therefore, that the Committee has stated clearly that, 
before it can legislate, these impediments, including the 
Administration's refusal to provide critical documents related 
to the president's warrantless wiretapping program as well as 
efforts to limit staff access to the program, must be removed. 
I am also pleased that the Committee approved my amendment to 
the bill requiring the Attorney General to provide to the 
congressional intelligence and judiciary committees, in a 
timely manner, all orders, decisions, and opinions of the FISA 
Court and FISA Court of Review that contain significant 
construction or interpretation of the law, as well as 
associated pleadings. No responsible legislature can amend a 
statute without knowing how the courts have interpreted it. The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is no exception.
    For more than four years, the Administration failed to 
inform the full congressional intelligence committees of the 
warrantless wiretapping program. In doing so, the 
Administration violated the National Security Act, which allows 
restricted notification to the ``Gang of Eight'' only in 
certain limited cases involving covert action. In light of this 
abuse of the limited notification provision, I was pleased to 
co-sponsor an amendment offered by Senator Feinstein to ensure 
that all members of the Committee receive, at a minimum, 
summary information about programs that the Administration has 
sought to limit to the Chairman and Vice Chairman.
    Another area about which the Congress needs more 
information is the large databases of information, including on 
American citizens, collected by the government, both inside and 
outside the Intelligence Community. The Committee has requested 
that the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the 
Director of National Intelligence, report on databases of 
financial information and information on financial transactions 
maintained at the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence at the Department of the Treasury, including on 
access to and use of such databases, dissemination of 
information and minimization requirements and issues related to 
privacy and United States person information. This is an 
important step in Congress's efforts to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of all such programs throughout the government.
    I have expressed concern about broad new arrest authorities 
granted to protective personnel at the CIA and NSA that have 
been included in previous intelligence authorization bills 
reported by the Committee. The Administration has yet to 
present a case that these new authorities are necessary. While 
I am disappointed that these provisions were included in this 
year's bill, I am pleased that the Committee's report clearly 
indicates that these authorities are not to be used except to 
protect the specific individuals to whom those CIA and NSA 
personnel are assigned, and that Congress is to be kept fully 
informed of how these authorities are used.
    Finally, I was pleased to cosponsor two amendments offered 
by the Vice Chairman to ensure greater accountability and cost-
savings in the Intelligence Community. The first granted the 
Director of National Intelligence authorities to conduct 
accountability reviews of significant failures or deficiencies 
within the Intelligence Community. The second requires the DNI 
to justify to the Congress cost overruns in major system 
acquisitions exceeding 20 percent, and for the President to 
justify cost overruns over 40 percent. These provisions are 
important steps in the ongoing effort to reform our 
Intelligence Community and demonstrate the Committee's 
bipartisan commitment to ensuring that our nation is defended 
effectively and efficiently and with real accountability for 
financial mismanagement and other wrongdoing.
                                               Russell D. Feingold.

                 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WHITEHOUSE

    I strongly support provisions contained in this legislation 
that I believe will enhance the accountability of managers in 
the Intelligence Community. In my short time on the Committee, 
I have become troubled by the apparent lack of accountability I 
have observed in the management of certain major Intelligence 
Community acquisition programs which have experienced enormous 
cost overruns and significant scheduling delays. The 
Intelligence Community is our nation's early warning system 
against large and increasingly complex threats such as 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The nature and extent of the threats facing the United States 
today requires more than ever that we insure that we get the 
most value possible from our nation's investment in 
intelligence. Yet the secrecy these programs require to be 
effective insulates them from many ordinary channels of 
accountability.
    This legislation contains provisions that provide the 
Director of National Intelligence with the authority to conduct 
accountability reviews of significant failures or deficiencies 
within the Intelligence Community as well as creates a 
mechanism that requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to submit annual reports for each major system acquisition by 
the Intelligence Community. In addition, the Classified Annex 
to this legislation includes a provision I sponsored related to 
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which designs, builds 
and operates the nation's reconnaissance satellites. My 
proposal directs the NRO Inspector General to conduct a review 
of the accountability practices employed for certain NRO 
programs. It is my hope that this review will lead to the 
incorporation of accountability mechanisms into the NRO's 
program management processes.
    During the Committee's mark-up of this legislation, I 
offered an amendment that prohibits the use of funds for 
interrogations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency--or 
any other element of the U.S. Government--that differs from the 
techniques listed in the U.S. Army Field Manual on Human 
Intelligence Collector Operations. My amendment makes an 
exception if the President determines that ``there is an 
immediate national exigency, and that there are compelling 
reasons to believe that the individual has information about a 
specific and imminent threat related to that national 
exigency.''
    I am deeply concerned that so-called enhanced interrogation 
techniques (EITs) may provide unreliable information and that 
their use would undermine our nation's moral standing in the 
world. On June 26, 2003, President Bush issued a statement for 
United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of 
Torture in which he said, ``[t]he United States is committed to 
the world-wide elimination of torture and we are leading this 
fight by example.'' I don't believe that the alleged use of 
these EITs has placed our nation in a leadership position in 
this area. In fact, I believe that the prisoner abuse scandal 
in Abu Ghraib, for example, has done a great deal to damage 
America's standing in the world. And publicized allegations of 
abuse related to the CIA interrogation program raise further 
concern.
    The Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector 
Operations provides interrogation procedures adhered to by all 
branches of the U.S. military. General David Petraeus, 
Commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq wrote in a letter 
to U.S. military forces in Iraq on May 10, 2007:

          Some may argue that we would be more effective if we 
        sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain 
        information from the enemy. They would be wrong. Beyond 
        the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history 
        shows that they also are frequently neither useful nor 
        necessary. Certainly, extreme physical action can make 
        someone ``talk;'' however, what the individual says may 
        be of questionable value. In fact, our experience in 
        applying the interrogation standards laid out in the 
        Army Field Manual (2-22.3) on Human Intelligence 
        Collector Operations that was published last year shows 
        that the techniques in the manual work effectively and 
        humanely in eliciting information from detainees.

    The concern has also been raised that a determined detainee 
will be able to withhold critical, time-sensitive, actionable 
intelligence that could prevent an imminent, catastrophic 
attack on the United States. That is why my amendment allows an 
exception from the limitation on the use of appropriated funds, 
when the President determines that there is ``an immediate 
national exigency, and that there are compelling reasons to 
believe that the individual has the information about a 
specific and imminent threat related to that national 
exigency.''
    The full text of my amendment, co-sponsored by Senator 
Dianne Feinstein, is as follows:

          Absent a determination by the President that there is 
        an immediate national exigency, and that there are 
        compelling reasons to believe that the individual has 
        information about a specific and imminent threat 
        related to that national exigency, none of the funds 
        made available pursuant to this Act or pursuant to any 
        authorization of appropriations in this Act may be used 
        for the interrogation of an individual by the Central 
        Intelligence Agency or any other department, agency, or 
        entity of the United States in a manner that differs 
        from treatment or techniques of interrogation 
        explicitly authorized by, and listed in, the United 
        States Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence 
        Collector Operations.
                                                Sheldon Whitehouse.

                   ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR WARNER

    The annual intelligence authorization bill is vital 
legislation that authorizes the Intelligence Community's 
efforts against national security and provides legislative 
tools and strategic guidance to reform the Intelligence 
Community. In short, the authorization bill supports and 
enhances the Intelligence Community's capabilities to protect 
the United States, its interests, and its allies. There are 
numerous provisions in this year's bill which advance those 
efforts.
    I offer these additional views to discuss one provision 
which I am particularly pleased to support. Section 321, an 
amendment which I cosponsored, requires the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) to submit to Congress a National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the anticipated geopolitical 
effects of global climate change and the implications of such 
effects on the national security of the United States.
    The NIE will use the fourth assessment report of the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to 
illustrate the impacts of global climate change. The IPCC 
report predicted that global warming will increase 0.72 degree 
Fahrenheit during the next two decades with current emission 
trends. This projected increase of 0.72 degree Fahrenheit in 
two decades is a cause for concern considering that the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration said the 
average annual global temperature increased approximately 1.0 
degree Fahrenheit from the start of the 20th century.
    The NIE required by Section 321 will focus on the effects 
global climate change would have on U.S. national security and 
strategic economic interests. Changes resulting from global 
climate change present potentially wide-ranging threats to the 
United States that may require military, diplomatic, financial, 
and other national responses. It is the Intelligence 
Community's responsibility to prepare Executive and Legislative 
Branch policymakers for such possibilities.
    Section 321 considered the views of the Director of 
National Intelligence who told the Committee that ``it is 
entirely appropriate for the NIC to prepare an assessment on 
the geopolitical and security implications of global climate 
change'' and asked that the task of examining the implications 
be worked in coordination with experts from the National 
Academy of Sciences, the national laboratories, and the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. This 
provision calls for that coordination and does not ask the 
Intelligence Community to reach beyond its capabilities to 
explore the sources or causes of global climate changes or 
specific actions that can mitigate such changes.
    In fact, the DNI has already tasked the NIC to produce an 
assessment on this issue. This legislation allows the DNI to 
determine whether the requirement to produce a NIE would be 
duplicative of the current NIC effort if both products would 
have the same drafting and review procedures. Furthermore, such 
an estimate will not require the diversion of any collection 
assets from other intelligence priorities.
    In my 28 years in the Senate, I have focused above all on 
issues of national security, and I see the problem of climate 
change as fitting in with that focus. As a number of retired 
flag officers, including Generals Zinni and Sullivan, reported 
last month, global climate change poses a destabilizing threat 
to US military operations, heightens global tensions, and 
strains long-standing international alliances. As the Senate 
proceeds to legislate on climate change, it is vitally 
important that we receive the Intelligence Community's 
comprehensive view on the problem.
    My own view as a senior member of the Senate Committee on 
the Environment and Public Works, which has conducted a number 
of hearings this year on the issue, is that the national 
consensus is moving beyond the debate over whether global 
warming is real and occurring, and whether human activity is 
contributing to the change in our climate.
    I accept the fact that increased greenhouse gas emissions, 
resulting from human activity, is changing our global 
environment. I concur that we must now begin to devise a 
domestic program and I have joined by cosponsoring the Biden-
Lugar Resolution to urge us to participate in the international 
dialogue to reduce these emissions.
    While I have not personally decided on any specific 
legislative approach on global climate change, the complexity 
of the problem requires careful thought to ensure fairness to 
consumers and to the manufacturing sector of our economy. The 
federal government must take a leadership role in addressing 
this national and international problem, particularly given the 
Supreme Court's ruling earlier this year that confirmed the 
federal government's obligation under the law to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions.
    Without federal leadership, an ineffective patchwork of 
regulations would develop in each of the 50 states, and this 
would serve the needs neither of the environment nor business. 
Any federal program, however, must allow for an economy-wide 
approach that incorporates market-based flexibility, provides 
for a measure of federal investment in new technologies, 
includes cost-containment mechanisms, and has environmental 
integrity. Most important, the federal government must ensure 
international participation by developed and developing 
nations.
    In sum, we must be careful in the Congress to be sure that 
we get it right as we move to legislate on global climate 
change, and this NIE will be critical in providing the 
comprehensive views of the Intelligence Community on the issue.

                                                       John Warner.
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