[Senate Report 110-57]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



110th Congress,
 1st Session                     SENATE                          Report
                                                                 110-57
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     


                                 REPORT

                                 OF THE

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                          COVERING THE PERIOD

                            JANUARY 4, 2005

                                   TO

                            DECEMBER 8, 2006




                 April 26, 2007.--Ordered to be printed


                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

            JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
              CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         JOHN WARNER, Virginia
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland        ORRIN HATCH, Utah
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin       OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida                 RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
                 HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
              MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio Member
                CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio Member
                JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio Member
                   Andrew W. Johnson, Staff Director
                Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
                    Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk

    During the period covered by this report, the composition 
of the Select Committee on Intelligence was as follows:

                     PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
          JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
ORRIN HATCH, Utah                    CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio                    DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri        RON WYDEN, Oregon
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi              EVAN BAYH, Indiana
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine              BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey*
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin*
                BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
                 HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio Member
                JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Ex Officio Member
                 James D. Hensler, Jr., Staff Director
               Andrew W. Johnson, Minority Staff Director
                    Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk

----------
* Sen. Corzine resigned from the Senate on January 17, 2006, to take 
office as Governor of New Jersey. Sen. Feingold was appointed to fill 
this vacancy on the Committee on January 18, 2006.
                                PREFACE

    The Select Committee on Intelligence submits to the Senate 
this report on its activities from January 4, 2005 to December 
8, 2006. In several places, the Committee will include a brief 
reference to actions taken early in the current Congress in 
order to make clear the status of a few items from the 109th 
Congress.
    Under the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 94th 
Congress, the Committee is charged with the responsibility of 
carrying out oversight of the programs and activities of the 
Intelligence Community of the United States. Of necessity, most 
of the Committee's work is conducted in secret. Nevertheless, 
throughout its history, the Committee has believed that its 
activities should be as publicly accountable as possible. It is 
in that spirit that we submit this report to the Senate, just 
as the Committee has been doing since the year after its 
creation in 1976.
    We take this opportunity to thank all of the members of the 
Committee in the 109th Congress. In particular, we take special 
note of those of our colleagues who have completed their 
service on the Committee. Senator Pat Roberts was our chairman 
from 2003 through 2006, having begun his tenure on the 
Committee in 1997. Senator Mike DeWine served on the Committee 
from 1995 through 1999, and from 2001 through 2006 and Senator 
Jon Corzine served on the Committee from the beginning of the 
109th Congress until January 2006 when he left the Senate to 
become governor of New Jersey. Also, Senator Carl Levin served 
as a full voting member of the Committee from 1997 through 
2006. He has completed that portion of his service on the 
Committee and is now a nonvoting ex officio member by virtue of 
his chairmanship of the Committee on Armed Services. Their 
commitment to the work of the Committee and their contribution 
to a strong Intelligence Community are appreciated.
    We also express our deep gratitude for the work of all 
members of the Committee's staff during the 109th Congress. 
Their professionalism and dedication were indispensable to the 
Committee's efforts to meet its responsibilities.
                                   John D. Rockefeller IV,
                                           Chairman.
                                   Christopher S. Bond,
                                           Vice Chairman.


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Preface..........................................................   iii
 I. Introduction......................................................1
II. Legislation.......................................................2
    A. Intelligence Authorization Bills for Fiscal Years 2006 and 
      2007.......................................................     2
    B. USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization and Improvement...........     6
III.Oversight Activities..............................................9

    A. Hearings and Briefings....................................     9
        1. Annual Worldwide Threat Overview......................     9
        2. China.................................................    11
        3. Counterterrorism......................................    11
        4. Cover Issue...........................................    11
        5. India-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement..............    12
        6. Iraq..................................................    12
        7. Overhead Reconnaissance Architecture..................    13
        8. Department of Treasury Intelligence Program...........    13
    B. Committee Inquiries and Reviews...........................    13
        1. Phase II of the Inquiry into Prewar Intelligence 
          Assessments on Iraq....................................    13
        2. Able Danger...........................................    14
    C. Financial Accounting, Inspectors General, and Audits......    15
        1. Intelligence Community Compliance with Federal 
          Financial Accounting Standards.........................    15
        2. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General    17
        3. Audits................................................    17
            a. In-Q-Tel..........................................    17
            b. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.............    18
            c. Intelligence Community Personnel Growth...........    19
            d. Document Exploitation.............................    20
            e. Compartmented Program.............................    20
    D. Restricted Access Programs................................    20
        1. Detention and Interrogation...........................    21
        2. NSA Surveillance......................................    21
    E. Review of Intelligence Related to Iran....................    22
    F. Covert Action.............................................    22
    G. Independent Cost Estimates................................    23
    H. Declassification..........................................    24
        1. CIA Accountability Report.............................    24
        2. Reports on Prewar Intelligence Regarding Iraq.........    26
        3. Iraq WMD Retrospective Series.........................    27
        4. National Archives Audit...............................    27
    I. Office of the Director of National Intelligence...........    27
IV. Nominations......................................................28
    A. John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence.....    29
    B. Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National 
      Intelligence...............................................    29
    C. Janice Bradley Gardner, Assistant Secretary of the 
      Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis.....................    30
    D. Benjamin A. Powell, General Counsel, Office of the 
      Director of National Intelligence..........................    31
    E. John S. Redd, Director, National Counterterrorism Center..    31
    F. Dale W. Meyerrose, Chief Information Officer, Office of 
      the Director of National Intelligence......................    32
    G. John Rizzo, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency..    32
    H. Kenneth Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National 
      Security Division..........................................    33
    I. Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency..    33
    J. Randall Fort, Assistant Secretary of State for 
      Intelligence and Research..................................    34
 V. Support to the Senate............................................34
VI. Appendix.........................................................34
                            I. INTRODUCTION

    Immediately prior to the period covered by this report, 
Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458. The Act replaced 
the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with two 
positions: the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It assigned 
to the DNI two of the DCI's functions, namely, serving as head 
of the Intelligence Community and acting as principal adviser 
to the President for intelligence matters relating to national 
security. The CIA Director was given the DCI's other function, 
that of serving as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
    With respect to the DNI's responsibility as head of the 
Intelligence Community, the Act delineated a range of budget, 
personnel, tasking, and other authorities. To assist in 
carrying out the duties of the DNI, the Act created an Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), to be composed 
of various deputies, the National Intelligence Council, and 
other offices and officials.
    In general, the Act provided that its provisions on 
restructuring the Intelligence Community would become effective 
no than later six months after enactment, a date that occurred 
in mid-June 2005. At the end of March 2005, the Commission on 
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, often referred to by the names of 
its Co-Chairmen as the Robb-Silberman Commission, issued its 
report, adding to the recommendations to be considered in 
implementing the Intelligence Reform Act. Within the six-month 
period provided by the Act, it fell to the President to 
determine the timetable for transition from old to new, the 
lynchpin being appointment of the first DNI. Thus, the period 
covered by this 2005-2006 report coincided with the initial 
implementation of this major reform of the Intelligence 
Community, including the Committee's role in the confirmation 
of the DNI and other officers whose appointments under the Act 
are subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
    The Committee's work during the period of this report was 
also shaped by other enactments or decisions preceding the 
period as well as events occurring within it. The USA PATRIOT 
Act, enacted in October 2001, included a provision on the 
expiration of a number of intelligence investigation 
authorities contained in that Act. The sunset meant that 
legislative action by December 31, 2005 was required in order 
to extend, with changes if warranted, those authorities. The 
Committee's own action in February 2004, in establishing, 
formalizing, and expanding the Committee's inquiry into 
intelligence and the use of it relating to the war in Iraq, 
also shaped a significant aspect of its work during 2005-2006.
    Additionally, events that followed press reports in 
November 2005 about clandestine CIA prisons and in December 
2005 about what was called the President's Terrorist 
Surveillance Program, as well as the decision of the Supreme 
Court in June 2006 on the lawfulness of the military commission 
system that had been established by Executive action, each 
contributed to the work of the Committee and the Senate during 
2005-2006.
    These matters, when added to unfolding events concerning 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea plus the 
normal range of legislative and oversight responsibilities, 
presented the Committee with a broad range of tasks for the 
109th Congress.

                            II. LEGISLATION

   A. Intelligence Authorization Bills for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007

    In the first part of 2005 and then again in 2006, the 
Committee conducted its annual review of the President's budget 
recommendations for the civilian and military agencies and 
departments composing the Intelligence Community. During the 
109th Congress, these budget requests were for fiscal year 2006 
and fiscal year 2007. They encompassed the National 
Intelligence Program, the Joint Military Intelligence Program, 
and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities programs 
of the Department of Defense. The latter two programs were 
merged and became the Military Intelligence Program in 
September 2005.
    The intelligence entities covered by those annual reviews 
included the ODNI, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the intelligence capabilities of 
the military services (concerning which the Committee makes 
recommendations to the Senate Armed Service Committee), as well 
as the intelligence-related components of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Departments of State, Treasury, 
Energy, and Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.
    As part of its review in 2005 and then again in 2006, the 
Committee held closed budget hearings at which senior 
Intelligence Community officials presented testimony. Members 
of the Committee's staff, designated as budget monitors for 
particular Intelligence Community elements, also evaluated the 
detailed budget justification documents submitted by the 
Executive branch both at briefings at the Committee offices and 
on site at Intelligence Community agencies. On the basis of 
this review, the Committee prepared an annex to its annual bill 
and report, one each for fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007. 
Each annex contained a classified schedule of authorizations 
and classified directions to Intelligence Community elements 
that addressed a wide range of issues discerned in the course 
of the budget review and other oversight responsibilities of 
the Committee.
    While this budget review was in progress, the Committee 
also reviewed the Administration's proposals for the public 
part of the Committee's annual bill, consisting of new or 
amended legislative authority requested by the Intelligence 
Community, as well as legislative proposals originating in the 
Committee and elsewhere in the Senate. From this part of its 
work, the Committee produced an original bill and also a public 
report for each of fiscal years 2006 and 2007 that both 
explained the provisions of the bill and also provided 
comments, including directions to the Intelligence Community, 
that could be stated in a public, non-classified form.
    As a result of this extensive process in 2005 and again in 
2006, the Committee reported two Intelligence Authorizations 
Acts with accompanying reports and classified annexes-one for 
fiscal year 2006 and the second for fiscal year 2007.
    On September 29, 2005, the Committee reported S. 1803, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. The 2006 
bill was sequentially referred, first to the Committee on Armed 
Services and then to the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs. It was returned to the Senate Calendar on 
November 16, 2005 to await floor action. To facilitate floor 
action, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee 
prepared a managers' amendment that accepted the 
recommendations of the Armed Services Committee and those of 
the leadership of the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee, as well as recommendations of individual 
members. No Senate floor action occurred, however, on either 
the Committee bill or on H.R. 2475, the House-passed 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.
    On May 25, 2006, the Committee reported S. 3237, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. S. 3237 
included many of the legislative provisions that had been in 
the proposed 2006 authorization bill, as modified to reflect 
the recommendations of the Armed Services and Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committees and individual Senators 
that had been incorporated in the proposed managers' amendment 
to the 2006 bill. The 2007 bill was sequentially referred to 
the Committee on Armed Services, which reported it without 
amendment on June 21, 2006. No Senate floor action occurred on 
the 2007 bill, which expired on the Senate Calendar at the end 
of the 109th Congress together with H.R. 5020, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 that had passed the 
House on April 26, 2006.
    The 109th Congress thus became the first since the 94th 
Congress that did not pass an Intelligence Authorization Act. 
Fiscal year 2006 became the first since 1978 to not only begin 
but also to end without an intelligence authorization. On the 
budget side, this meant that all authorizations for 
Intelligence Community appropriations were accomplished by stop 
gap provisions in the Defense Department Appropriations Acts 
(and similar provisions elsewhere) which provided that funds 
appropriated by them are deemed to be authorized during the 
fiscal year until enactment of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for that year (e.g., Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-148, ( 8092; Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. 
L. No. 109-289, ( 8083).
    The effect of the failure to act on an intelligence 
authorization is not limited to the authorization of 
appropriations. Apart from the rare major restructuring of the 
Intelligence Community in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, for the past nearly 30 years, the 
annual intelligence authorization has been the regular means 
for adjusting, year-to-year as needs are recognized, the 
legislative authorities governing the Intelligence Community. 
The last time that occurred was more than two years ago in the 
enactment in December 2004 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2005.
    The amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, the National Security 
Agency Act of 1959, and other laws--many of which were 
requested by the Intelligence Community--that were contained in 
the proposed fiscal year 2006 and 2007 bills are explained in 
the two reports that the Committee filed in the 109th Congress 
on those authorizations, S. Rep. Nos. 109-142 and 109-259.
    The 2006 and 2007 bills included:
           Measures to improve information sharing, by 
        authorizing interagency funding for the benefit of the 
        Intelligence Community and establishing rules for 
        sharing of information governed by the Privacy Act.
           Establishment of a strong and independent 
        Inspector General (IG) for the Intelligence Community, 
        appointed by the President with the advice and consent 
        of the Senate, to review programs of the Community and 
        the relationships among the elements of it, and to 
        report to the DNI and to the Congress.
           Creation of a National Space Intelligence 
        Center to coordinate all collection, analysis, and 
        dissemination of intelligence related to space, as well 
        as participate in Intelligence Community analyses of 
        requirements for space systems.
           In recognition of the critical 
        responsibilities of the Director of the NSA, as well as 
        those of the Directors of the NRO and the NGA, a 
        requirement that their appointments by the President be 
        confirmed by the Senate.
           Provision for a presidentially-appointed, 
        Senate-confirmed Deputy Director of the CIA to ensure 
        that, in the event of a vacancy in the position of the 
        Director, a Deputy, who has the confidence of the 
        President and the Congress, is available immediately to 
        assume the leadership of that critical agency.
           Enhanced responsibilities on the protection 
        of sources and methods of intelligence.
           Changes to the procedures requiring the 
        provision of timely information to the congressional 
        intelligence committees by the Intelligence Community.
           Public accountability through the disclosure 
        of the overall annual budget request, authorization, 
        and appropriation for the entire Intelligence 
        Community.
           An increase in the penalties for the 
        disclosure of the identity of undercover intelligence 
        officers and agents.
    Both annual authorization bills addressed a recurring 
question on the applicability of the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) to Intelligence Community records: should the 
``operationalfiles'' of certain Intelligence Community elements 
be exempted from FOIA publication, disclosure, search, and review 
requirements? Existing legislation exempts the CIA, NSA, NRO, and NGA 
from those obligations. The rationale is to relieve an administrative 
burden of searching and reviewing sensitive classes of records that in 
the end, most certainly, would not be subject to disclosure under the 
FOIA.
    In the fiscal year 2006 authorization bill, the Committee 
included a provision exempting operational files of the DIA 
from the FOIA's publication, disclosure, search, and review 
requirements. The exemption became law through the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-163. That Act provided that the provision would sunset at 
the end of 2007.
    In its authorization bills for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, 
the Committee included a provision that would grant a limited 
operational files exemption to the ODNI, which had sought a 
broader exemption. The bills limited the exemption to 
information provided to the ODNI from the operational files of 
an intelligence community element that had been exempted from 
publication, disclosure, search, or review requirements. They 
provided that operational files would continue to be subject to 
search and review for information about a U.S. citizen or 
permanent resident and for information that is the subject of 
an investigation by intelligence oversight bodies including the 
House and Senate Intelligence Committees.
    The Committee's reports accompanying both bills did not 
exclude the possibility of a broader exemption but stated that 
before acting on that, the DNI, through the Chief Information 
Officer, should systematically study and report on the 
application of the FOIA to the ODNI. The report should include 
the responsibilities assigned by Congress concerning the 
operational files exemptions now applicable to Intelligence 
Community elements. In both reports, the Committee reminded the 
DNI and the intelligence elements that now have exemptions that 
the decennial reviews that are required for each must include 
consideration of the historical value or other public interest 
in categories of files and the potential for declassifying a 
significant amount of material in them.
    In addition to the issue of FOIA exemptions, the 
Committee's intelligence authorization bills and accompanying 
reports during the 109th Congress addressed a variety of other 
classification issues. In comments in the report on the 2006 
bill, the Committee recommended that the DNI review 
classification rules and guidelines, and propose standards to 
simplify and modernize the classification system. The Committee 
also encouraged the President to reduce disincentives to 
information sharing, including over-classification.
    The Committee's authorization bill for fiscal year 2006 
also recommended the authorization of funds for the Public 
Interest Declassification Board, and the accompanying report 
expressed the Committee's view that funds for the Board should 
be included in future budget requests.
    One item contained in the 2006 authorization bill that did 
not need to be carried over to the 2007 bill was a provision on 
establishing a National Security Division in the Department of 
Justice to be headed by an Assistant Attorney General for 
National Security. By the time that the Committee reported its 
2007 bill, the Congress had established the new Division 
through a provision of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005.
    As with other legislative and oversight reports filed by 
the Committee during the 109th Congress, the reports (including 
additional views) on the two Intelligence Authorizations should 
be read in full to understand the Committee's proposals. 
Notwithstanding reservations on some matters that are evident 
in votes in Committee on amendments or were expressed in 
additional views, the vote in Committee to favorably report 
each of the authorization bills was unanimous.
    At the beginning of the 110th Congress, the Committee again 
reported, with only minor changes, its authorization bill for 
fiscal year 2007: S. 372, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2007; S. Rep. No. 110-2 (2007).

           B. USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization and Improvement

    Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 107-
56) enacted a range of enhanced surveillance and other 
procedures for law enforcement and intelligence investigations. 
Section 224 of the Act established an expiration or sunset 
date, December 31, 2005, for sixteen of those provisions. 
Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 provided for another enhanced 
surveillance authority--the ``lone wolf'' amendment to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)--that would also 
sunset at the end of 2005. That expiration date framed a 
principal task for the 109th Congress--namely, to study the 
implementation of these enhanced procedures and to enact 
legislation to improve and extend them if warranted.
    Within the Senate, this Committee and the Committee on the 
Judiciary have shared jurisdiction over the FISA--involving, as 
it does, both foreign intelligence and judicial matters--ever 
since the initial period of 1976 to 1978 when the two 
committees worked together to secure its enactment in 1978. In 
the 109th Congress, both reported legislation to extend or make 
permanent the expiring provisions and also to modify those and 
other investigative authorities.
    This Committee held three open hearings in April and May 
2005, and also a closed hearing, receiving testimony and 
statements from a broad range of government and non-government 
witnesses. The testimony at the open hearings, and related 
materials, are printed as S. Hrg. 109-341.
    At its open hearing on April 19, 2005, the Committee heard 
testimony from Gregory T. Nojeim, Associate Director and Chief 
Legislative Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union; 
James X. Dempsey, Executive Director of the Center for 
Democracy and Technology; and Heather MacDonald, Senior Fellow 
at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. TheCommittee 
also placed in the record statements from Bob Barr, former Member of 
Congress from Georgia and chairman of Patriots to Restore Checks and 
Balances; former Attorney General Edwin Meese III and Paul Rosenzweig, 
both from The Heritage Foundation; Professor Orin Kerr of the George 
Washington University Law School; and Kate Martin, Director, Center for 
National Security Studies. At its second open hearing, on April 27, 
2005, the Committee heard testimony from Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, and CIA Director Porter 
J. Goss.
    On May 24, 2005, the Committee held a third open hearing. 
Prior to the hearing, the Committee provided to the witnesses a 
draft bill that had been prepared by committee counsel for 
consideration by the Committee, and asked the witnesses to 
comment on it. The witness on the first panel on May 24 was 
Valerie Caproni, FBI General Counsel. The witnesses on the 
second panel were David S. Kris, a former Associate Deputy 
Attorney General; Joseph Onek, Senior Policy Analyst at the 
Open Society Institute and Director of the Liberty and Security 
Initiative at the Constitution Project (and also a former 
Deputy Associate Attorney General); Daniel P. Collins, a former 
Associate Deputy Attorney General and Chief Privacy Officer at 
the Department of Justice; and James X. Dempsey, Executive 
Director of the Center for Law and Technology. The Committee 
also placed in the record a letter setting forth the views of 
Professor Richard A. Seamon of the University of Idaho College 
of Law.
    On June 16, 2005, the Committee reported an original bill, 
S. 1266, to permanently authorize various provisions of the 
PATRIOT Act, clarify certain definitions in the FISA, and 
provide additional tools for intelligence investigations. The 
bill was accompanied by a report, S. Rep. No. 109-85, with 
additional and minority views. The vote to favorably report the 
bill was 11 ayes to 4 noes.
    The main elements of S. 1266 included:
           Permanent authorization for nine 
        intelligence-related authorities in Title II of the 
        PATRIOT Act. These included provisions on information 
        sharing (Section 203), roving wiretaps (Section 206), 
        pen register and trap and trace authority (Section 
        214), business records (Section 215), the threshold 
        test for FISA collection that ``a significant purpose'' 
        is to obtain foreign intelligence information (Section 
        218), and immunity from damages for communications 
        providers that provide information, facilities, or 
        technical assistance in accordance with a court order 
        (Section 225).
           A four-year extension, until December 31, 
        2009, of the sunset for the ``lone wolf'' provision of 
        the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, which expanded the 
        definition of agent of a foreign power (and therefore 
        the FISA(s reach) to include surveillance of an 
        individual who engages in international terrorism or 
        preparation for it regardless of whether there is a 
        known connection to an international terrorist group or 
        other foreign power. This provision applies only to 
        non-United States persons.
           A proposal to amend the definition of 
        foreign intelligence information in the FISA to include 
        information for the protection of national security by 
        use of law enforcement methods such as criminal 
        prosecution.
           An amendment to the business records 
        provision of Title V of the FISA, as amended by Section 
        215 of the PATRIOT Act, to provide that the recipient 
        of an order may disclose to his or her attorney, for 
        the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance, 
        that the FBI is seeking records. The amendment also 
        provided for judicial review in the FISA Court of both 
        the requirement to produce documents and the 
        prohibition on disclosure that the Government is 
        seeking information.
           A new title of the FISA on national security 
        mail covers. The mail cover title would provide that, 
        on request of the FBI, including Special Agents in 
        Charge of field offices, the Postal Service shall 
        furnish information relevant to an authorized 
        investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 
        information or to protect against international 
        terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. The 
        information would be that on the outside cover of any 
        mail or a record of the contents of any unsealed mail 
        as authorized by law.
           A new title of the FISA on administrative 
        subpoenas in national security investigations. The new 
        title would authorize the Attorney General or 
        designated officials (including designated Special 
        Agents in Charge of FBI field offices) to issue 
        administrative subpoenas. The subpoenas could require 
        production of any records relevant to an authorized 
        investigation to obtain foreign intelligence not 
        concerning a U.S. person or to protect against 
        international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
        activities. The title would provide for judicial 
        enforcement of the subpoenas as well as judicial review 
        of them on application by the person or entity that 
        received one.
    Several sets of additional and minority views were filed 
and included in the report accompanying S. 1266. These views 
explain in greater detail the various viewpoints of the 
Committee members and address many of the provisions listed 
above as well as amendments that were not adopted by the 
Committee.
    The Judiciary Committee also reported a bill to reauthorize 
the USA PATRIOT Act, S. 1389. After the House passed its 
reauthorization act, H.R. 3199, the Senate leadership chose to 
act on the bill reported by the Judiciary Committee. That bill 
passed the Senate and was the basis for a conference with the 
House. This Committee's bill thus remained, until the end of 
the Congress, on the Senate Calendar. In recognition of the 
Committee's historical and jurisdictional interest in foreign 
intelligence surveillance legislation, the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman of the Committee were chosen to join the leadership of 
the Judiciary Committee as Senate managers at the conference. 
Five of the Senate's 10 conferees were members of this 
Committee.
    On December 8, 2005, the conference committee submitted a 
report, H.R. Rep. No. 109-133. The House agreed to the 
conference report. After an unsuccessful cloture vote in the 
Senate, Congress postponed until February 3, 2006, the 
expiration of provisions scheduled to sunset. A second act 
extended the sunset until March 10, 2006. On March 1, 2006, the 
Senate passed S. 2271, the USA PATRIOT Act Additional 
Authorizing Amendments Act of 2006, which resolved three 
objections to the conference report. That enabled invocation of 
cloture on H.R. 3199 and its passage in the Senate, after which 
the House agreed to the additional amendments by passing S. 
2271. The two measures were signed by the President on March 9, 
2006, as Pub. L. Nos. 109-177 and 109-178.
    In sum, the PATRIOT Act reauthorization accomplished a 
number of objectives of great interest to the Committee, 
including:
           Making permanent 14 of the 16 PATRIOT Act 
        authorities, plus the ``lone wolf'' authority in the 
        Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
           Extending for four years, until December 31, 
        2009, the sunset for the remaining two PATRIOT 
        authorities that had been scheduled to sunset--those 
        for roving wiretaps under Section 206 of the PATRIOT 
        Act and for business records orders under Title V of 
        the FISA, as had been amended by Section 215 of the 
        PATRIOT Act.
           Amending the business records title to 
        provide that the records sought must be relevant to an 
        authorized investigation, the application include a 
        statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to 
        believe that, the order only require production of 
        things that could be obtained by a grand jury subpoena 
        or other court order, and that there be minimization 
        procedures on the retention and dissemination of 
        information obtained.
           Further amending the FISA business records 
        title to provide for judicial review on the application 
        of the recipient of an order to produce documents or 
        bar disclosure of the receipt of an order, and also 
        providing for high-level FBI approval and statistical 
        reporting to Congress on applications for the 
        production of library, bookseller, tax, firearm sales, 
        and educational records.
           Including amendments regarding national 
        security letters (NSLs) to provide for judicial 
        enforcement on application of the Government, or 
        judicial review at the behest of the recipient, of an 
        NSL for production of any of the categories of 
        documents covered by the existing five NSL statutes or 
        of an order barring disclosure of an NSL.
           Requiring two comprehensive audits by the 
        Department of Justice IG to be completed in two stages 
        each by the end of 2007. One is on the effectiveness 
        and use, including any improper or illegal use, of the 
        investigative authority provided to the FBI under the 
        business records title of the FISA. The other, with a 
        similar span, concerns the use of NSLs issued by the 
        Department of Justice. The first phase of each audit 
        was completed and submitted to the Congress in March 
        2007.
           Establishing a National Security Division in 
        the Department of Justice headed by an Assistant 
        Attorney General for National Security who would serve 
        as the Department's primary liaison to the DNI. The new 
        Division brings together the Department's main 
        intelligence oversight office, the Office of 
        Intelligence Policy and Review, and its principal users 
        of intelligence information, the criminal sections 
        responsible for counterterrorism and counterespionage 
        prosecutions.

                       III. OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES


                       A. Hearings and Briefings


1. Annual worldwide threat overview

    It is the Committee's long-standing practice to begin each 
session of the Congress with a hearing to review the 
Intelligence Community's assessment of the current and 
projected national security threats to the United States. The 
hearings in the 109th Congress covered a wide range of issues 
and were held in open and closed sessions. The hearings 
provided the heads of various all-source analytic agencies an 
opportunity to inform the Committee and the American public 
about the threats facing the country and the abilities of their 
organizations to provide information on and counter such 
threats.
    On February 16, 2005, the Committee held an open hearing on 
the current and projected threats to the United States. 
Testifying before the Committee were Porter J. Goss, DCI; 
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director of the FBI; Vice Admiral 
Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of the DIA; Admiral James Loy, 
Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; and Carol A. 
Rodley, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research. The transcript of the Committee's 
February 16, 2005 open hearing, ``Current and Projected 
National Security Threats to the United States,'' was printed 
and is available to the public as S. Hrg. 109-61 (2005).
    Director Goss identified widely dispersed terrorist 
networks as one of the most serious challenges to U.S. security 
interests at home and abroad. In Iraq, the insurgency remained 
a serious threat to creating a stable representative 
government. He highlighted continuing proliferation challenges 
from North Korea and Iran. North Korea claimed to have made new 
nuclear weapons from reprocessed fuel rods previously stored 
under International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring at its 
Yongbyong reactor and continued to develop, produce, deploy, 
and sell ballistic missiles of increasing range and 
sophistication. While Britain, Germany, and France were seeking 
objective guarantees from Iran that it would not use nuclear 
technology for nuclear weapons, Tehran publicly announced that 
it would not give up its ability to enrich uranium, and 
continued its pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles. 
Director Goss also noted that China'smilitary modernization and 
military buildup was tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait 
and that improved Chinese capabilities threaten U.S. forces in the 
region.
    On February 2, 2006, the Committee held an open hearing on 
the current and projected threats to the United States. This 
was the first open threat hearing since the confirmation of the 
new DNI and Director John D. Negroponte presented a 
consolidated statement on behalf of the Intelligence Community. 
He was accompanied by Porter J. Goss, Director of the CIA; 
Robert S. Mueller III, Director of the FBI; General Michael V. 
Hayden, Principal Deputy DNI; Lieutenant General Michael 
Maples, Director of the DIA; Charles E. Allen, Chief 
Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security; and 
Carol A. Rodley, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research. The record for this hearing has not 
yet been printed.
    In his February 2006 statement to the Committee, Director 
Negroponte explicitly identified terrorism as ``the preeminent 
threat to U.S. citizens, Homeland, interests, and friends.'' He 
said that al-Qa'ida, ``battered but resourceful,'' remained the 
top concern. Al-Qa'ida had inspired other Sunni jihadist 
groups, which, though posing less danger to the homeland, 
increasingly threatened U.S. allies and interests abroad. He 
added that unaffiliated individuals, groups, and cells 
represented a different kind of threat, which nonetheless posed 
a serious intelligence challenge. The future terrorist 
environment would be influenced both by the outcome in Iraq and 
in the world-wide debate between Muslim extremists and 
moderates. Director Negroponte identified the ongoing 
development of dangerous weapons and delivery systems in North 
Korea and Iran as the second major threat posed to the nation, 
U.S. troops, and U.S. allies.

2. China

    The Committee conducted considerable oversight of 
intelligence collection and analysis of China in the 109th 
Congress. The Committee held an oversight hearing on June 23, 
2005 to provide members with assessments of China's military 
modernization, as well as to gain an understanding of how the 
analytic community assesses intelligence sources and gaps that 
may exist in forming their judgments. The Committee was 
especially focused on the community-wide organizational 
structure for maximizing collection efforts on China. Committee 
staff traveled to China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan to make 
independent determinations. Committee staff received regular 
briefings from most key collector agencies and groups on China, 
including from the ODNI, CIA, DIA, State Department Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, the Office of Naval Intelligence, 
NSA, NGA, and FBI, as well as from non-governmental and 
academic experts on China.

3. Counterterrorism

    The Committee maintained a consistent focus on 
counterterrorism issues throughout the 109th Congress. In 
addition to open hearings on Worldwide Threats and the Patriot 
Act, the Committee held more than two dozen formal briefings on 
counterterrorism related topics. The Intelligence Community 
regularly provided Committee members with briefings on current 
intelligence about terrorist threats to the United States. The 
Committee devoted extensive attention to ensuring that the 
Intelligence Community received both the resources and 
authorization needed to combat violent extremists. For example, 
the Committee focused on further developing potent human 
intelligence capable of penetrating terrorist networks and 
increasing the number of intelligence officers in the field. 
The Committee also reviewed the effectiveness of programs 
focusing on terrorist finances and communications.
    Following the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which included the statutory 
authority for the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the 
Committee confirmed Vice Admiral Scott Redd to serve as the new 
NCTC Director and closely followed the development of the 
organization.
    Committee oversight of counterterrorism initiatives was not 
confined to formal hearings. Committee Members traveled to the 
detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, examined 
counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and 
devoted extensive attention to Intelligence Community efforts 
in Southeast Asia and Africa.

4. Cover issue

    Since 1997, when the Committee staff conducted its first 
cover audit, the Committee has been concerned about the 
Intelligence Community's ability to maintain cover for 
clandestine operations. To improve cover, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 provided the 
Intelligence Community with enhanced cover authority. Official 
cover and non-traditional cover of clandestine officers 
continue to be challenged by the increased sophistication of 
commercial and technological programs. The Committee held 
numerous briefings and, in June 2005, held a hearing on cover 
issues. The Committee included language in the Classified Annex 
to the fiscal year 2006 authorization bill designed to focus 
Intelligence Community resources and management attention on 
this critical intelligence challenge.

5. India-U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

    On July 18, 2005, President Bush announced that the 
Administration would seek to create a new relationship with 
India that would allow for cooperation in civil nuclear energy. 
India, not a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 
exploded its first nuclear device in 1974 and exploded a device 
as recently as 1998. In anticipation of the debate on 
legislation to implement the agreement, and in addition to 
ongoing oversight of relevant Intelligence Community analysis 
of this subject, the Committee held a briefing for members on 
March 29, 2006. At that hearing,the National Intelligence 
Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation and the 
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia testified 
about the Intelligence Community's analysis of intelligence issues 
related to the passage of this change in our bilateral relationship, 
and the effect of this change on India's military nuclear program. The 
briefing also covered issues related to the current division between 
Indian civilian and military nuclear development, understanding Indian 
leadership's views of strategic nuclear issues and the effect of this 
agreement on that thinking, the effect on this agreement on India's 
options to test nuclear devices in the future, and India's record as a 
responsible actor in global proliferation.
    The Senate passed H.R. 5682, The United States and India 
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 by 85-12 on November 
16, 2006, and the President signed the bill into law on 
December 18 (Pub. L. 109-401).

6. Iraq

    In addition to exhaustive review of prewar Iraq 
intelligence as part of the Committee's Phase II investigation, 
the Committee conducted regular briefings at the member and 
staff levels on current activities in Iraq. The Committee 
received testimony from the National Intelligence Officers with 
analytic responsibilities for the Near East and Military Issues 
and reviewed a large number of reports on conditions and trends 
in Iraq. The Committee also had numerous meetings with analysts 
and collectors from the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, State Department Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research, military services, and technical collection 
agencies concerning their views and activities related to the 
ongoing conflict in Iraq. In addition, numerous members of the 
Committee visited Iraq throughout the 109th Congress. These 
members not only increased their knowledge of the situation in 
Iraq but were able to make independent assessments of the 
contribution of the Intelligence Community to the effort.

7. Overhead reconnaissance architecture

    The Committee conducted numerous staff briefings and 
interviews, and one hearing with senior Intelligence Community 
officials, to discuss our nation's satellite reconnaissance 
architecture. These sessions dealt with agreements between the 
Department of Defense and the then fledgling Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence; cost concerns relating to 
major system acquisition; ongoing studies about an objective 
architecture and investments related to achieving that 
architecture; and concerns over the agencies' fiscal 
discipline. In the Classified Annexes to the annual 
Intelligence Authorizations bills, the Committee expressed 
concern over the rising costs of ill-defined or poorly managed 
programs; continued ``stovepiped'' acquisitions; inadequate 
investment in foundational capabilities; inadequate functional 
management of the broader intelligence enterprises; and an 
apparent reluctance to embrace new and more cost-effective 
technologies.

8. Department of Treasury Intelligence Program

    On May 11, 2006, the Committee conducted a hearing with the 
Department of the Treasury on the Terrorist Finance Tracking 
Program. The program involves the issuance of subpoenas to 
collect information from a company that operates a worldwide 
messaging system used to transmit bank transaction information. 
The information obtained is searched for counterterrorism 
purposes. The program was publicly acknowledged on June 23, 
2006. Subsequent to the hearing, Committee staff conducted 
several briefings on the program. In addition, the Committee 
held a hearing on July 20, 2006, on terrorist financing.

                          B. Committee Reviews


1. Phase II of the inquiry into the prewar intelligence assessments on 
        Iraq

    In June 2003, the Committee began a review of U.S. 
intelligence related to the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, 
Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the 
region, and his violations of human rights including the actual 
use of WMD against his own people.
    In February 2004, the Committee voted unanimously to 
authorize formally the ongoing review and to expand the scope 
of the work as previously described by the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman in June 2003. It was the stated intention of the 
Chairman to produce an initial report covering areas that were 
near completion. The expanded scope along with questions 
related to the accuracy of prewar WMD and terrorism assessments 
became the five topics in a second phase of the Committee's 
Iraq Review. The other topics in Phase II were to be prewar 
intelligence about postwar Iraq, whether prewar public 
statements were substantiated by intelligence information, the 
Intelligence Community's use of information provided by the 
Iraqi National Congress, and intelligence activities within the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
    The Phase I report--the Report of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar 
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, S. Rep. No. 108-301--was 
submitted to the Senate on July 9, 2004. On September 8, 2006, 
the Committee submitted to the Senate redacted unclassified 
reports on two Phase II matters: (1) Postwar Findings About 
Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare 
with Prewar Assessments, S. Rep. No. 109-331 (``Accuracy 
Report''); and (2) The Use by the Intelligence Community of 
Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress, S. Rep. 
No. 109-330 (``INC Report''). Unredacted classified copies of 
the reports are available to all members of the Senate for 
reading at the Committee.
    The Committee's vote to adopt the findings and conclusions 
of the Accuracy Report was 14 ayes and 1 no. The Committee vote 
to adopt the findings and conclusions of the INC Report was 11 
ayes and 4 noes. Language offered in the form of amendments was 
incorporated in thereports. The Committee Actions section of 
both reports includes a description of each amendment offered and 
action taken on the amendment. Several sets of additional and minority 
views to each report were filed by Senators. All of those views are 
printed in the reports.
    At the end of 109th Congress, the Committee was continuing 
its work evaluating prewar intelligence about post-invasion 
Iraq, and whether prewar public statements were substantiated 
by intelligence information. In early 2007, the Committee 
received a report from the Department of Defense IG on the 
intelligence activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy that had been requested by the Committee 
Chairman in August 2005.

2. Able danger

    The Committee began a review of a Department of Defense 
program, Able Danger, in August 2005, when certain allegations 
relating to the program gained prominence in the media. Able 
Danger was the unclassified name for a 1999 effort directed by 
then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. 
Shelton, U.S. Army, to develop a campaign plan against 
transnational terrorism with an initial focus on the al Qa'ida 
terrorist network.
    Committee staff examined four specific claims made in the 
media about the Able Danger effort:
          Claim 1: The Able Danger program had linked Mohammed 
        Atta and three other September 11 hijackers to al 
        Qa'ida on a chart prepared almost two years prior to 
        September 11, 2001.
          Claim 2: Soon after the September 11 attacks, the 
        pre-September 11, 2001 chart with Mohammed Atta's 
        picture was passed to then-Deputy National Security 
        Advisor Stephen Hadley.
          Claim 3: Defense Department lawyers prevented Able 
        Danger team members from sharing Able Danger's findings 
        with the FBI.
          Claim 4: Defense Department lawyers wrongly 
        interpreted intelligence oversight law and issued legal 
        guidance that unnecessarily restricted the Able Danger 
        effort and caused the destruction of Able Danger 
        program data.
    Committee staff interviewed numerous individuals who had 
worked on the Able Danger program or had knowledge of the 
issues surrounding its activities, including each of the five 
individuals who claimed to have seen Mohammed Atta's name and 
picture on an Able Danger chart produced prior to 9/11. In 
September 2005, Committee staff briefed Committee members about 
this inquiry. Following that brief, Committee staff conducted 
additional interviews and document reviews.
    In September 2006, the Department of Defense IG completed a 
report examining many of the issues that the Committee staff 
had been reviewing plus additional areas of inquiry. The 
Committee staff met with the IG and reviewed the report in 
detail.
    In December 2006, Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman 
Rockefeller wrote to the members of the Committee to inform 
them that the Committee staff had concluded its work and judged 
that Able Danger did not identify Mohammed Atta or any other 9/
11 hijacker at any time prior to September 11, 2001. The 
Chairman and Vice Chairman reported further that Committee 
staff found no evidence to support the allegation that Able 
Danger team members were prevented from pursuing contact with 
the FBI to share terrorism related information found by the 
Able Danger program; no evidence that the Able Danger program 
produced any actionable intelligence or any information which 
would have warranted sharing with the FBI; and the Committee 
staff concluded that Department of Defense lawyers correctly 
interpreted intelligence oversight law and issued appropriate 
legal guidance on the collection, retention, and destruction of 
information. The text of the letter from the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman is available on the Committee's website at http://
intelligence.senate.gov/.

        C. Financial Accounting, Inspectors General, and Audits

    The Committee's rules provide that within its staff there 
``shall be an element with the capability to perform audits of 
programs and activities undertaken by departments and agencies 
with intelligence functions. Such element shall be comprised of 
persons qualified by training and/or experience to carry out 
such functions in accordance with accepted auditing 
standards.'' During the 109th Congress, the name of the staff 
element was changed from Audits and Investigations to Audits 
and Evaluations. In addition to audits, this element has 
responsibility for assisting in the Committee's oversight of 
Intelligence Community compliance with financial accounting 
standards and also the Committee's interaction with the various 
IGs whose work includes or covers the Intelligence Community.

1. Intelligence community compliance with Federal financial accounting 
        standards

    During the 109th Congress, the Committee continued to 
closely monitor the Intelligence Community's financial 
management practices. The foundation for these activities is 
the 1990 Chief Financial Officers Act, which requires public 
sector agencies to report financial information in a structured 
and uniform manner. One goal of the Act was to establish a 
process to provide reliable, useful, and timely financial 
information to support decision making and accountability 
regarding the use of federal funds. The Act requires 
independent audits of agency financial information to evaluate 
performance against this goal. The results of these audits are 
public information.
    Since the enactment of the Chief Financial Officers Act, 
the federal government has made substantial progress in 
strengthening financial management and accountability. In 
fiscal year 2004, 16 of the original 24 federal agencies 
required to comply with the financial statement 
auditrequirement received unqualified opinions on their financial 
statements. According to the Government Accountability Office, the 
underlying trend at these 16 agencies was that they embraced the idea 
of obtaining auditable financial statements, as opposed to giving 
reasons why it would be too costly or difficult to achieve the 
requirement.
    The elements of the Intelligence Community were not 
included in the original 24 agency pilot program. In its report 
accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2002, S. 
Rep. No. 107-63, at 15-16 (2001), this Committee required that 
the DCI, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, direct 
a statutory IG to perform audits of the ``form and content'' of 
the fiscal year 2001 financial statements for the NSA, DIA, 
CIA, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, since renamed 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and report the 
audit findings to the Intelligence Committees by April 1, 2002. 
The Committee further directed that the DCI, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense ``ensure that all agencies in the 
DoD-NFIP [Department of Defense National Foreign Intelligence 
Program] aggregation, including the CIA, receive an audit of 
their financial statements by March 1, 2005.''
    The fiscal year 2001 form and content reviews were not 
comprehensive audits; rather, they were intended to prepare the 
agencies to undergo a comprehensive financial statement audit 
of their fiscal year 2004 data. The IGs completed the form and 
content reviews but the agencies were unable to meet the 2004 
audit requirement, a deadline that has been extended several 
times. In December 2006, when it became evident that the NSA, 
NGA, and DIA were still unable to comply, the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman granted another extension, providing that the fiscal 
year 2007 financial statement audits for all Intelligence 
Community agencies shall be completed by November 15, 2007, and 
that by March 1, 2007, the DNI, in consultation with the Office 
of Management and Budget, shall submit to the Committee a plan 
for Intelligence Community compliance with the financial 
statement audit requirement.
    Beyond the need to satisfy the existing financial statement 
audit requirement, the Committee remained concerned throughout 
the 109th Congress that the agencies of the Intelligence 
Community cannot quantify their cost of doing business nor 
demonstrate a tangible plan to improve financial management. In 
its May 2006 report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007, the Committee directed the DNI and the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to develop a 
plan to transform Intelligence Community financial management. 
One objective is the preparation of a strategic plan for a 
single Intelligence Community financial management system, 
including a consolidated financial statement for the National 
Intelligence Program for fiscal year 2009. The Committee 
directed that the plan should address development of a common 
accounting code and standard business processes for the 
Intelligence Community. S. Rep. No. 109-259, at 44.

2. Oversight of Intelligence Community Inspectors General

    During the 109th Congress, the Committee continued to 
monitor the activities of the Intelligence Community IGs. This 
oversight included: review of numerous IG products, including 
audit reports, inspection reports, reports of investigation, 
and semi-annual reports of IG activities; numerous visits to IG 
offices for updates on plans and procedures; and attendance and 
participation at several IG conferences. In addition to a 
number of Committee hearings on issues reviewed by the IGs, 
staff conducted a number of briefings with Intelligence 
Community program officials and IG personnel in order to follow 
up on the status of IG recommendations. Examples include 
employee grievances, management of operational activities, 
contracting procedures, employee recruitment and security 
processing, the CIA's Working Capital Fund, and effective use 
of resources on new technology.
    During the 109th Congress, the Committee continued its work 
to ensure the effectiveness and independence of the 
administrative, non-statutory IGs at the NRO, NSA, NGA, DIA, 
and the ODNI. The Committee reinforced the importance of the IG 
function through its regular interaction with agency directors, 
the IGs, and their staffs. The administrative IGs also 
submitted annual reports to the Committee detailing their 
requests for fiscal and personnel resources, and the plan for 
their use. These reports included the agency programs and 
activities scheduled for review during the fiscal year, 
comments on the office's ability to hire and retain qualified 
personnel, any concerns relating to the independence and 
effectiveness of the IG's office, and an overall assessment of 
the agency's response to the IG's recommendations during the 
previous year. These annual reports served as a basis for 
Committee oversight throughout the 109th Congress.
    Additionally the Committee included provisions in the 
fiscal years 2006 and 2007 Intelligence Authorization bills to 
add the IGs at the NRO, NSA, NGA, and DIA to the Section 8G of 
the Inspector General Act of 1978. This statutory designation 
will provide the IGs with additional authorities to conduct 
investigation including the ability to compel the production of 
information. Both years' Authorization bills also included a 
provision amending the National Security Act of 1947 to 
establish a statutory charter for the DNI IG.

3. Audits

    During the 109th Congress, the Committee's audit staff 
completed audits of the CIA's In-Q-Tel venture and the 
implementation of the FISA, and made substantial progress 
toward completing three other audits.
            a. In-Q-Tel
    In-Q-Tel was established in 1999 as an independent, 
private, not-for-profit company to identify and deliver 
cutting-edge information technology solutions to the CIA. In 
May 2005, in response to the Committee's concerns about the 
success of In-Q-Tel in achieving this goal, theChairman and 
Vice Chairman asked the Audit and Evaluations Staff to conduct an 
audit. The audit staff examined the success of In-Q-Tel, specifically 
in terms of the commercial technologies actually reaching the CIA.
    In April 2006, the final report of the audit was 
transmitted to the DNI for dissemination within the 
Intelligence Community. The audit determined that while In-Q-
Tel has not revolutionized the way the CIA does business, the 
venture capital model has produced some successes, primarily in 
the area of analytic tools. The CIA's aging information 
technology infrastructure and bureaucratic software 
accreditation process have hindered In-Q-Tel technology 
transfer. The audit concluded that the Committee should 
continue to support the In-Q-Tel program while encouraging the 
CIA to upgrade its infrastructure to better enable In-Q-Tel 
commercial technology infusion and to place a higher priority 
on transferring In-Q-Tel products to CIA end users.
            b. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
    The Committee has periodically reviewed the implementation 
of the FISA since the law was enacted in 1978. The last 
Committee audit of the FISA process, prior to the audit 
completed in the 109th Congress, was conducted in 1998. Since 
then, Congress had made numerous important changes to the 
statute that warranted review of their implementation. While 
the Committee's Audit and Evaluations Staff began its formal 
review of the FISA process in the 108th Congress, the final 
audit report on procedures, practices, and use under the FISA 
was completed in the 109th Congress in support of the 
Committee's deliberations regarding the USA PATRIOT Act. The 
classified report was provided to the DNI for distribution to 
appropriate Intelligence Community elements. In its June 2005 
report to accompany its PATRIOT Act bill, the Committee 
described the audit, which was then nearing completion, to be 
``one of the most thorough reviews of Executive branch 
activities under the FISA since the USA PATRIOT Act was 
enacted.'' S. Rep. No. 109-85, at 2.
    The audit included a review of the backlog of requests for 
FISA coverage, an analysis of the impact of the temporary FISA 
provisions that were included in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 
and an assessment of the resource requirements associated with 
FISA activities. The audit report made a total of 43 
recommendations. Twelve recommendations were addressed to the 
Committee; of these, ten were the subject of legislation that 
was ultimately approved by the Congress.
    In conducting its review, the Committee noted that some 
delays in processing FISA warrants were attributable to 
inadequate staffing levels, inefficient organizational 
structures within the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review 
(OIPR), and differences of opinion between the FBI and the 
OIPR. The Committee offered several recommendations to address 
these delays including the drafting of a Memorandum of 
Understanding that outlines each organization's 
responsibilities for FISA applications. The Committee also 
examined the use of new technology to enhance administrative 
aspects of the FISA process throughout the Intelligence 
Community. Using technology to improve the connectivity between 
the FBI and the OIPR would enhance access to relevant 
documents, thereby decreasing the amount of time necessary to 
process a FISA request.
    During the course of the audit, it came to the Committee's 
attention that most FBI field divisions did not have sufficient 
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities to house 
national security personnel and provide ready access to secure 
communications equipment and resources. The Committee 
recommended that the FBI Director take immediate steps to 
address this shortfall. Finally, the Committee recommended that 
the Attorney General develop new FISA minimization procedures 
to reflect modern target profiles and communication 
capabilities, as well as information processing technologies.
            c. Intelligence community personnel growth
    The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) 
recommended that the Director of the CIA emphasize rebuilding 
that agency's analytic and human intelligence collection 
capabilities. President Bush endorsed this recommendation and, 
in November 2004, directed the CIA to increase its number of 
all source analysts and case officers by 50 percent, increase 
the number of language qualified officers by 50 percent, and 
double the number of personnel doing research and development. 
Although the President's directive focused on the CIA, there 
have been significant personnel increases in other agencies as 
well.
    In February 2005, the Committee initiated an audit to 
examine the full scope of the activities and resources that 
would be necessary to support the proposed personnel growth. 
During the 109th Congress, the Audit and Evaluations Staff 
reviewed whether the Intelligence Community has in place the 
practices and procedures necessary to properly recruit, train, 
equip, field, and retain the additional personnel, and to 
determine the associated funding levels necessary to implement 
this growth in personnel.
    While the audit was not issued and provided to the 
Intelligence Community until early 2007, it essentially was 
complete at the end of 2006. The findings indicate that the 
projected growth of new personnel across the Intelligence 
Community has not been well defined. The requirements for the 
additional personnel have not been documented and there has 
been limited planning for a comparable growth in support 
functions. Specifically, the audit has identified the following 
issues:
           Insufficient hiring processes to meet the 
        personnel targets
           Significant shortages in training capacity 
        and secure office space
           Inadequate planning for administrative, 
        logistics, and technical support
           Minimal controls over the use of contractor 
        support
    To address the concerns identified in this audit, the 
Committee included language in the proposed Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 that fenced funds 
associated with personnel growth and required the DNI to 
provide a comprehensive personnel growth strategy. In the 
report accompanying the authorization bill, the Committee took 
note of the personnel growth audit, stating that the 
Intelligence Community faces significant challenges 
implementing the proposed growth.
            d. Document exploitation
    In December 2005, the Committee's Audit and Evaluations 
staff began a review of the practice of collecting, processing, 
translating, and reporting on information obtained from overtly 
captured and/or clandestinely acquired paper documents and 
electronic media. This overall activity, called document and 
media exploitation or ``DOCEX,'' is an effort that since 2001 
has realized a rapid increase in funding because of the 
valuable intelligence information it provides to both tactical 
operations and strategic analysis.
    The Committee is concerned about the varied and disparate 
Intelligence Community initiatives to process, translate, and 
exploit captured documents and electronic media. The audit has 
analyzed the costs of the various document and media 
exploitation efforts and associated technology development 
programs. The audit is also evaluating the intelligence value 
derived from these efforts and the budget implications for 
sustaining these initiatives over the long-term.
    Building on the preliminary results of this ongoing audit, 
the Committee, in the May 2006 report accompanying its fiscal 
year 2007 bill, encouraged the DNI to appoint a program manager 
for National Intelligence Program DOCEX efforts, develop a 
national DOCEX strategy, and form a DOCEX technology 
investments board to guide and develop a coordinated Community-
wide research and development strategy.
            e. Compartmented program
    The Committee's Audit and Evaluation Staff conducted a 
review of a compartmented Intelligence Community program. Given 
the significant amount of time and money that had been invested 
in that program, the Committee was concerned about the 
termination of a major program element and whether the 
Committee had been adequately informed about the program's 
overall status. The audit examined the series of events and 
activities that led to the current program status, as well as 
the associated cost. This audit will be completed in early 2007 
and will guide the Committee in making future funding decisions 
regarding this program.

                     D. Restricted Access Programs

    During the 109th Congress, public disclosures of two 
previously highly classified programs focused attention on the 
Executive branch practice of providing notification of certain 
intelligence activities to only a limited number of members of 
Congress. This practice is sometimes known as a ``Gang of 
Eight'' notification because of the procedure contained in 
Section 503(c)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947. That 
section authorizes the President, in extraordinary 
circumstances, to limit notification of covert action findings 
to eight members of Congress--the Chairman and ranking members 
of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader 
of the House, and the majority and minority leader of the 
Senate. In the case of these two programs, once they were 
disclosed they became the subject of intense legislative 
interest although very few members were knowledgeable of the 
details of either.

1. Detention and interrogation

    In November 2005, press stories appeared describing a 
program of clandestine detention facilities in various foreign 
locations being run by the CIA. On September 6, 2006, the 
President acknowledged the existence of a CIA program to detain 
and question suspected terrorists outside the United States. He 
also announced the transfer of 14 individuals detained under 
this program from these foreign sites to the U.S. military 
facility at Guantanamo Bay. According to the President, these 
14 were the only individuals detained in the overseas CIA 
facilities at the time of the announcement.
    This Committee had been briefed in a general way about the 
existence of a CIA detention program from its inception. Key 
aspects of the program, however, were briefed to the Chairman 
and Vice Chairman. In November 2006, the information that had 
been restricted previously was provided to the full membership 
of the Committee.
    At the same time the President acknowledged the existence 
of the CIA detention program, he announced his intention to 
send a legislative proposal to the Congress to establish 
military tribunals to try terrorism suspects and also ``to 
ensure that the CIA program goes forward in a way that follows 
the law.'' Several bills on this topic were introduced and 
debated. On September 28, 2006, S. 3930, the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 passed the Senate. It passed the House 
the next day and was signed by the President as Pub. L. No. 
109-366. On signing the bill, the President reiterated that he 
had ``one test for the bill Congress produced: Will it allow 
the CIA program to continue?''
    The Military Commissions Act addresses a number of matters 
of interest to the responsibilities of the Committee. It 
establishes rules on the protection and introduction of 
classified information in military commission. It specifies the 
conduct that would constitute grave breaches of Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions and be subject to U.S. criminal 
penalties. It authorizes the President to promulgate 
administrative regulations regarding violations of the Geneva 
Conventions and to publish interpretations on the meaning and 
application of the Conventions in the Federal Register. It 
provides that the President shall take action to ensure 
compliance with the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment that had been enacted in the Detainee Treatment Act, 
including through the establishment of administrative rules and 
procedures.

2. NSA surveillance

    In December 2005, press reports described an NSA program to 
collect electronic communications intelligence inside the 
United States absent a warrant issued under the FISA. The 
Executive branch subsequently disclosed that knowledge of this 
program had been limited to very few members of Congress--the 
Gang of Eight plus senior members of the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittees and a few other members of the congressional 
leadership. The Chairman and Vice Chairman sought to have 
member access to this program expanded for the members of this 
Committee. In March 2006, the Committee reached agreement with 
the Executive branch to establish an ad hoc subcommittee of 
seven members, including the Chairman and Vice Chairman, to 
oversee the program. In May 2006, the restriction was further 
modified and all members of this Committee were given access to 
information about the NSA program.
    Following resolution of the access question, the Committee, 
and three members of the staff, received several briefings 
about the legal parameters and operation of the program. The 
program generated significant interest in the Congress. 
Different pieces of legislation related to the program were 
introduced. Three of these bills were reported by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and others were placed on the Senate 
Calendar without referral to a committee, but no floor action 
occurred in the Senate. Early in the current Congress, this 
Committee announced its intention to examine carefully 
legislative proposals on surveillance matters.

               E. Review of Intelligence Related to Iran

    In the 109th Congress, the Committee initiated a Community-
wide review of how well our intelligence agencies are 
collecting and analyzing information about Iran, including its 
WMD programs. The review has focused on mapping the Community's 
efforts in order to establish a baseline of what the various 
agencies of the Community are doing to collect information on 
Iran, what their analytic judgments on Iran are, and how well 
grounded those assessments are. The Committee has designated a 
staff team to undertake this review, which has had briefings 
from, or meetings with, various agencies on their Iran 
programs, including the CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, ODNI, Department of 
Energy, Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, NCTC, U.S. Special Forces Command, and National 
Intelligence Council.
    The review is also looking at how well the various 
intelligence agencies work together under the DNI on Iran 
matters. This includes to what extent lessons learned, as 
identified in the Committee's 2004 report on the performance of 
the Intelligence Community before the Iraq War, have been 
applied to current issues such as Iran. It is anticipated that 
the review will result in recommendations to improve U.S. 
intelligence capabilities concerning Iran and in general.

                            F. Covert Action

    Under the National Security Act, the DNI shall keep the 
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently 
informed of all covert actions that are the responsibility of, 
are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any 
department or agency of the United States, including 
significant failures. The National Security Act defines a 
covert action to be an activity of the United States Government 
to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the U.S. 
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. The 
DNI shall furnish the committees with any information 
concerning covert actions that is in the possession of any U.S. 
Government entity and which is requested by either intelligence 
committee in order to carry out its responsibilities. The only 
qualification on this reporting responsibility is consistency 
with due regard for protection from unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters.
    Under the Committee's rules, the Staff Director shall 
ensure that U.S. Government covert action programs receive 
appropriate consideration by the Committee no less frequently 
than once a quarter. Every quarter, the Committee receives a 
written report on each covert action that is being carried out 
under a presidential finding. Committee staff then devote 
several sessions, often over a couple of days, to review with 
Intelligence Community personnel the reports on each subject, 
and often pose follow up questions and receive further 
briefings or written answers.
    As the Committee has written in past reports, the purpose 
of these reviews includes to ensure that their means and 
objectives are consistent with U.S. foreign policy goals, were 
conducted in accordance with U.S. law, produce or can be 
expected to produce reasonable benefits for the resources 
expended, and are consistent with U.S. ideals and principles. 
There is often questioning about the effectiveness of the 
programs.

                     G. Independent Cost Estimates

    During the 109th Congress, the Committee continued its 
efforts to address the growth in major acquisition costs by the 
Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 formalized the process for developing 
independent cost estimates for major Intelligence Community 
acquisitions. The Act required the preparation of an 
independent cost estimate of the full life-cycle cost of 
development, procurement, and operation of any system projected 
to cost more than $500 million. The Act further required the 
President's budget request to reflect the amounts identified in 
the independent cost estimates, or if it did not, to explain 
why it differed.
    Prior to Committee action to address the growth in 
acquisition costs, the budget for major systems generally 
reflected cost estimates prepared by the Intelligence Community 
component responsible for acquiring and operating the system. 
The magnitude and frequency of cost growth in major systems 
indicated a systemic bias within the Intelligence Community to 
underestimatethe costs of such acquisitions. The Committee 
recognized that the use of independent cost estimates prepared by 
offices outside the acquiring and operating components had resulted in 
more accurate projections of the costs of major systems.
    Throughout the 109th Congress, the Committee continued to 
monitor compliance with this Act, including prohibitions on the 
obligation or expenditure of funds for the development or 
procurement of major systems without statutory independent cost 
estimates. Committee staff reviewed independent cost estimates 
for major program acquisitions in the National Intelligence 
Program. The Committee relied on the independent work done by 
the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community Cost 
Analysis Improvement Groups (CAIGs). The Committee has reviewed 
several independent cost estimates from the Department of 
Defense and Intelligence Community CAIGs relating to major 
National Intelligence Program acquisitions. These estimates 
have been very useful tools for the Committee in its ongoing 
effort to instill fiscal discipline into the Intelligence 
Community's budget.

                          H. Declassification

    During the 109th Congress, the Committee dealt with a 
number of issues related to declassification of information.

1. CIA accountability report

    The December 10, 2002, Report of Joint Inquiry Into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 of the Senate and House 
intelligence committees included a three-part recommendation on 
accountability. First, the DCI should report to the Committees 
in 2003 on steps taken to implement a system of accountability 
throughout the Intelligence Community. Second, in the 
confirmation process for Intelligence Community officials, 
Congress should require an affirmative commitment to the 
implementation and use of strong accountability mechanisms.
    Third, a review of whether employees deserved awards for 
outstanding service or should be accountable for failing to 
satisfactorily perform their duties should be conducted. With 
regard to accountability, the recommendation stated:

          . . . the Inspectors General at the Central 
        Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the 
        Department of Justice, and the Department of State 
        should review the factual findings and record of this 
        Inquiry and conduct investigations and reviews as 
        necessary to determine whether and to what extent 
        personnel at all levels should be held accountable for 
        any omission, commission, or failure to meet 
        professional standards in regard to the identification, 
        prevention, or disruption of terrorist attacks, 
        including the events of September 11, 2001.

S. Rep. No. 107-351 and H. Rep. No. 107-792, Recommendation 16 
(2002).

    Each of the IGs listed in the recommendation completed and 
submitted a report to the Committee.
    In July 2004, the Department of Justice IG completed a 421-
page classified report entitled A Review of the FBI's Handling 
of Intelligence Information Relating to the September 11 
Attacks. This report was provided to the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) 
and to the House and Senate Judiciary and Intelligence 
Committees. In June 2005, at the request of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, the Department of Justice IG publicly 
released an unclassified, redacted version of that report, on 
all matters except Zacharias Moussaoui, against whom criminal 
proceedings were then pending in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. In June 2006, after 
the conclusion of the Moussaoui case, the IG released the full 
unclassified report, including the section on the FBI's 
handling of the Moussaoui matter. The total length of the 
Department of Justice IG unclassified report was 370 pages, 
amounting to approximately 87 percent of the original 
classified report.
    In the introduction to the unclassified report, the 
Department of Justice IG noted that the review of the FBI's 
handling of information about two September 11 hijackers, Nawaf 
al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdar (who entered the United States in 
January 2000 and first resided in San Diego), required 
obtaining a significant amount of information from the CIA 
about its interactions with the FBI on that matter. The report 
notes that the IG Office at the Department of Justice had to 
rely on the cooperation of the CIA in providing access to CIA 
witnesses and documents, and that while they were able to 
obtain CIA documents and interview CIA witnesses they ``did not 
have the same access to the CIA that [they] had to Department 
of Justice information and employees.'' The Department of 
Justice IG noted that CIA IG was conducting his own inquiry 
into CIA actions regarding al Mihdar and al Hazmi.
    The CIA IG report was completed in June 2005 and delivered 
to the Committee as a classified document in August of that 
year. In contrast to the Department of Justice IG report, no 
part or summary of the CIA IG report has yet been made public.
    In August 2005, Chairman Roberts wrote to then-CIA Director 
Porter Goss and requested that the CIA IG report be 
declassified ``as soon as practicable and to the maximum extent 
possible.'' Chairman Roberts repeated this request in a second 
letter the following month, stating: ``I believe that the 
deaths of nearly 3,000 citizens on September 11, 2001 gives the 
American public a strong interest in knowing what the IG found 
and whether those whose performance was lacking will be held 
accountable.'' Although Director Goss responded to both 
letters, he did not make any commitment regarding 
declassification of the report.
    In January 2006, Senator Wyden wrote to Director Goss, 
again requesting that the report be redacted and declassified. 
In an April 2006 reply, Director Goss declined to commit to 
releasing the report.
    The issue was raised during the confirmation hearing for 
the new CIA Director, General Michael Hayden, who stated in a 
May 2006 letter to Senator Wyden that he intended to examine 
the issue. In June 2006, Committee staff prepared a proposed 
redacted version of the Executive Summary of the report which 
Chairman Roberts sent to General Hayden for comment. In August 
2006, General Hayden notified the Committee that he did not 
intend to declassify the report.
    In September 2006, Chairman Roberts forwarded the proposed 
redacted Executive Summary to DNI Negroponte, and requested 
that he work with the Committee to determine what redactions 
would be necessary in order to release the report. In a 
November 2006 reply, Director Negroponte declined to do so.
    In January 2007, upon the organization of the Committee in 
the current Congress, Chairman Rockefeller, Vice Chairman Bond, 
and Senator Wyden wrote to Director Negroponte with their 
comments on his November letter. Because the letter completes 
the exchange with Director Negroponte, we describe it here. The 
letter begins by describing the importance of the CIA IG 
report:

          This report provides a unique perspective on one of 
        the defining events in American history, and we believe 
        that, while the body of the report is reviewed for 
        later release, the Executive Summary should be 
        declassified without further delay and released to the 
        public. We recognize that the report contains some 
        sensitive national security information, and this 
        information must be redacted from the Executive Summary 
        before the Summary is released.

    The letter states that if the DNI has particular concerns 
about the proposed redaction of the Executive Summary prepared 
at the Committee, he should ``propose specific further 
redactions that are based on particular classification 
grounds.'' It notes that one reason advanced in the DNI's 
November 2006 letter for declining action on declassification 
is not a valid basis for classification under current law and 
executive orders. While it is possible that some high-profile 
intelligence officials could be identified by their title 
alone, that possibility has not prevented those officials from 
being described in other public reports. To the extent that the 
DNI expressed concern about damage to the reputation of high-
profile intelligence officials whose identities could be 
revealed in the report, the letter encourages the DNI to permit 
release of redacted versions of their responses to the IG 
report.
    Finally, the letter notes that the Department of Justice IG 
had produced a similar report and that most of it had been 
appropriately declassified and released, ``providing a clear 
example to be followed.''

2. Reports on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq

    In September 2006, as described above, the Committee 
released two reports on prewar intelligence regarding Iraq. In 
the introduction to its report on the accuracy of prewar 
assessments of Iraqi WMD and links to terrorism, the Committee 
expressed disagreement with the Intelligence Community's 
decision to classify certain portions of the report and 
concluded that this decision was not justified.
    Seven members of the Committee wrote to the then recently-
constituted Public Interest Declassification Board to request 
that it review the documents and make recommendations regarding 
their classification. In an interim response, the Board 
indicated that it might not be able to conduct such a review 
without White House authorization. This was followed by a 
letter from six senators in October, expressing their 
disagreement with the Board's interpretation of its mandate and 
requesting that the Board begin its review. Chairman Roberts 
and Vice Chairman Rockefeller repeated this request in a 
November letter. These letters are available at the National 
Archives website (http://www.archives.gov/declassification/
pidb/declassification-requests.html).
    In December 2006, the Board wrote to the Chair of the 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 
requesting that the statute authorizing the Board be clarified 
to establish that the Board could begin, without approval by 
the White House, a declassification review requested by the 
Congress. In January 2007, that Committee reported legislation 
to achieve this objective.

3. Iraq WMD Retrospective Series

    The Committee's report on the accuracy of prewar 
intelligence on Iraqi WMD included an appendix that briefly 
described five papers that the CIA had published, starting in 
January 2005, as part of its Iraq WMD Retrospective Series. A 
sixth retrospective was in progress. The series addressed the 
CIA's current post-Operation Iraqi Freedom understanding of 
Iraq's WMD and delivery programs. The Committee stated that it 
was evident that ``the retrospective series will be an 
important source of information about the history of these 
times. For that reason, the Committee has asked the CIA to 
declassify the retrospectives to the extent consistent with 
national security.'' That declassification has not yet 
occurred.

4. National Archives audit

    In early 2006, a National Archives' Information Security 
Oversight Office audit disclosed that records had been removed 
from public access at the National Archives for classification 
reasons. In April 2006, the officials from Information Security 
Oversight Office briefed Committee staff on the results of the 
audit. The audit found that a large number of documents had 
been improperly classified, declassified, or reclassified, and 
made a number of recommendations for improvement of the 
classification process. The audit and recommendations were 
publicly released and can be found on the web page of the 
National Archives (http://www.archives.gov/declassification/).

  I. Oversight of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

    Following confirmation of John Negroponte as the first DNI 
in April 2005, Committee staff conducted oversight of the 
establishment of the ODNI and the implementation of the 
Intelligence Reform Act.
    Committee staff met with and received numerous briefings 
from components of the ODNI, including the offices of the four 
Deputy Directors authorized by the Intelligence Reform Act. The 
DNI used that authority to establish Deputy Directors for 
Analysis (who also serves concurrently as the Chairman of the 
National Intelligence Council), Collection, Management 
(including development and execution of the National 
Intelligence Program budget), and Requirements. The Committee 
staff also received briefings from the DNI's NCTC, National 
Counterproliferation Center, the Mission Managers for Iran and 
North Korea, the DNI IG, the Chief Information Officer, the 
Chief Financial Officer, and the Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Officer, among others.
    The ODNI submitted numerous reports and strategy documents 
to the Committee during 2005 and 2006. For example, the ODNI 
provided the National Intelligence Strategy, the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework, the Annual Report of the 
United States Intelligence Community, semiannual progress 
reports on the implementation of the DNI's budget authorities, 
the Implementation Plan for the Information Sharing 
Environment, the Intelligence Community's Annual Report on the 
Hiring and Retention of Minority Employees, a report on efforts 
to address foreign language shortfalls, a report describing 
reviews of analytic products, the report of the Future Overhead 
SIGINT Architecture Panel, and updates on the activities of the 
Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards & Ombudsman.

                            IV. NOMINATIONS

    During the 109th Congress, ten nominations were referred to 
the Committee, nine directly upon receipt in the Senate and one 
sequentially after referral to and reporting by another 
committee. The Committee held hearings for nine of the ten 
nominees and recommended to the Senate that it give its advice 
and consent to each of those nine nominations, which was done.
    Throughout the Congress, referrals to the Committee were 
governed for the first time by Section 17 of S. Res. 400 of the 
94th Congress, which had been added by S. Res. 445 of the 108th 
Congress and was further augmented during the 109th Congress. 
As a result of S. Res. 445, all nominations to advice and 
consent positions in the Intelligence Community are referred to 
this Committee, even when they are positions--such as the 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis or the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence 
and Research--that are within departments which are primarily 
under the jurisdiction of other Senate committees.
    Four of the nominations were for positions created by the 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 that were being filled for the 
first time: DNI; Principal Deputy DNI; the Director of the 
NCTC; and the General Counsel, Office of Director of National 
Intelligence.
    Three nominations were for positions, also filled for the 
first time, that were created by other legislation in the 108th 
or 109th Congress: Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Intelligence and Analysis, established by the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (December 13, 2003); 
Chief Information Officer, ODNI, established by the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (December 
23, 2004); and Assistant Attorney General for National 
Security, established by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (March 9, 2006).
    A primary task of the Committee during the 109th Congress 
was to examine in detail, for the first time in the setting of 
a nomination, the responsibilities of these new leadership 
positions in the Intelligence Community. The Committee 
accomplished this not only through questioning the nominees at 
their confirmation hearings but also through extensive 
prehearing questions, the responses to which have been or will 
be printed in the hearing volumes for these nominations.
    During the 109th Congress, the Committee also received and 
acted on a nomination for Director of the CIA, but not as an 
immediate consequence of the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. 
In a formal opinion in January 2005, the Office of Legal 
Counsel at the Department of Justice concluded that when the 
Intelligence Reform Act took effect (within six months of its 
enactment in December 2004), the then-current DCI would not 
require a new appointment to the office of the Director of the 
CIA should the President wish him to serve in that position. In 
accordance with that opinion and the President's wish, the DCI, 
who was then Porter Goss, served as Director of the CIA until 
his resignation in May 2006, at which time the President 
nominated and the Committee and Senate acted on the nomination 
of General Michael Hayden to be Director the CIA.
    The following were the nominations referred to the 
Committee during the 109th Congress, listed in accordance with 
the date of the nomination:

        A. John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence

    As described earlier in this report, the Intelligence 
Reform Act of 2004 created the position of DNI and assigned to 
the DNI the responsibility of serving as the head of the 
Intelligence Community and acting as the principal adviser to 
the President for intelligence matters relating to national 
security. The Reform Act provides that any individual nominated 
to be appointed as DNI shall have extensive national security 
experience.
    Among the position's duties and responsibilities, the DNI 
is charged with determining the annual National Intelligence 
Program budget and ensuring the effective execution of it. The 
DNI is to determine requirements and priorities for the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination ofnational 
intelligence. The DNI shall ensure compliance with the Constitution and 
laws by the CIA and, through their host departments, by the other 
elements of the Intelligence Community.
    On March 17, 2005, the President nominated John D. 
Negroponte, then serving as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, to be the 
first DNI. In the course of a long diplomatic career, he had 
served as U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, Mexico, and the 
Philippines, and, immediately before Iraq, as the U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He had also 
served in the White House as a Deputy National Security Adviser 
and in the State Department as an Assistant Secretary for 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.
    After receiving Ambassador Negroponte's responses to the 
Committee's standard questionnaire, and responses to the 
Committee's prehearing questions about his understanding of the 
duties and responsibilities of the office to which he had been 
nominated, the Committee held a nomination hearing on April 12, 
2005. Following the hearing, members also posed additional 
questions in writing. Ambassador Negroponte's testimony and 
answers to the written questions are printed in S. Hrg. 109-79.
    The Committee reported the nomination favorably on April 
14, 2005, by a vote of 14 to 1. The Senate confirmed Ambassador 
Negroponte's appointment to be DNI on April 21, 2005, by a vote 
of 98-2.

      B. Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National 
                              Intelligence

    The Intelligence Reform Act established the position of 
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) to 
assist the DNI in carrying out the duties and responsibilities 
of the Director under the National Security Act. The Act 
provides that the PDDNI shall exercise the powers of the DNI 
during the DNI's absence or disability, or in the event of a 
vacancy. It also provides that an individual nominated for 
appointment as PDDNI shall not only have extensive national 
security experience (a requirement applicable to the DNI as 
well) but also management expertise. It contains a sense of 
Congress that under ordinary circumstances, one of the persons 
serving as DNI or PDDNI shall be a commissioned officer in 
active status or have, by training or experience, an 
appreciation of military intelligence.
    On April 11, 2005, the President nominated Lieutenant 
General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, who was then serving as the 
Director of the NSA, to be the first PDDNI. General Hayden 
entered active duty in 1969. During his career, he served as 
Commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and Director of the 
Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, Deputy Chief of 
Staff, United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea, and then, 
beginning in 1999 as Director of NSA for six years.
    The Committee held a nomination hearing on April 14, 2005. 
General Hayden's testimony and his responses to the Committee's 
questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed in S. Hrg. 
109-270. The Committee reported the nomination favorably that 
day, by a unanimous vote of 15 to 0. On April 21, 2005, the 
Senate agreed by voice vote to the nomination, together with 
General Hayden's nomination to be a full General, which had 
been reported by the Committee on Armed Services.

  C. Janice Bradley Gardner, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
                       Intelligence and Analysis

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 
created the Treasury Department's Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to replace the Office of Intelligence Support. The 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis is responsible for the 
receipt, analysis, collation, and dissemination of foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence information related to the 
operation and responsibilities of the Treasury Department.
    Janice Bradley Gardner was nominated by the President to 
the position on May 16, 2005. She served for more than twenty 
years as an intelligence officer, entering on duty at the CIA 
in 1983. For a decade she worked as an analyst focusing on East 
Asia issues, followed by service as the Chief of the CIA's 
Persian Gulf Branch, as the DCI Representative to the National 
Security Council, as Special Advisor to the Vice President for 
Foreign Affairs, and then as Deputy Director of the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, before beginning as a Senior 
Intelligence Officer at the Department of the Treasury in 2002. 
In May 2004, Ms. Gardner assumed the position of Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis to stand up the office that Congress had then just 
established. Ms. Gardner is the first person named to fill the 
position of Assistant Secretary.
    On June 16, 2005, the Committee held a public hearing on 
the nomination. The nominee's testimony and responses to the 
Committee's questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed 
in S. Hrg. 109-269. The nomination was reported favorably by 
the Committee on July 26, 2005, by unanimous consent. She was 
confirmed by the Senate on July 28, 2005, by voice vote.

   D. Benjamin A. Powell, General Counsel, Office of the Director of 
                         National Intelligence

    The position of General Counsel for the ODNI was created by 
the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. The Act provides that the 
General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the ODNI and 
shall perform such functions as the DNI may prescribe. The 
explicit law-related function of the DNI is to ensure 
compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States 
by the CIA and ensure such compliance by other elements of the 
Intelligence Community through their host executive 
departments.
    Benjamin A. Powell was nominated by the President to the 
position on June 9, 2005. Since July 2002 and at the time of 
his nomination, Mr. Powell served as Associate Counsel and 
Special Assistant to the President. Prior to that, he served as 
a corporate counsel and as a lawclerk for United States Supreme 
Court Justices Byron White and John Paul Stevens. Mr. Powell is the 
first person named to fill the position of General Counsel.
    On July 19, 2005, the Committee held a public hearing on 
the nomination. The nominee's testimony and answers to the 
Committee's questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed 
in S. Hrg. 109-242. His nomination was reported favorably by 
the Committee on July 26, 2005, by unanimous consent, but not 
acted on by the Senate in the first session of the 109th 
Congress.
    Mr. Powell received a recess appointment by the President 
on January 4, 2006, and was nominated again on February 10, 
2006. Following filing of a cloture motion on April 5, 2006, 
the Senate approved his nomination on April 6, 2006, by voice 
vote.

   E. John S. Redd, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center

    The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 established, within the 
ODNI, a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
    The Act provides that the NCTC Director has two reporting 
responsibilities: to the DNI on NCTC's budget and programs, the 
activities of its Directorate of Intelligence, and the conduct 
of intelligence operations implemented by other elements of the 
Intelligence Community; and to the President on the planning 
and progress of joint counterterrorism operations other than 
intelligence operations.
    The Act provides that NCTC is the government's primary 
organization for the analysis of counterterrorism and terrorism 
intelligence, except for intelligence pertaining solely to 
domestic terrorism. Beyond analysis, it is to conduct strategic 
operational planning for counterterrorism activities, 
integrating all instruments of national power, including 
diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland 
security, and law enforcement. It is to assign roles and 
responsibilities to lead agencies, but not direct the execution 
of resulting operations. It is to ensure that agencies receive 
the necessary intelligence support to fulfill their own 
operational or intelligence missions. The Director of NCTC 
serves as the principal adviser to the DNI on counterterrorism 
operations.
    On June 30, 2005, the President nominated retired Vice 
Admiral John S. Redd to be the first Director of the NCTC. 
Admiral Redd had most recently served as Executive Director of 
the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, often referred to 
as the WMD or Robb-Silberman Commission. Immediately prior to 
that, he served as Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating 
Officer for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. A 
retired Navy veteran, Admiral Redd held a number of senior 
military positions, including Commander of the Navy's Fifth 
Fleet in the Middle East.
    The Committee held a nomination hearing on July 21, 2005. 
Admiral Redd's testimony and his answers to the Committee's 
standard questionnaire and prehearing questions are printed in 
S. Hrg. 109-241. The Committee acted favorably on Admiral 
Redd's nomination on July 26, 2005, by unanimous consent. The 
Senate confirmed his appointment on July 28, 2005, by voice 
vote.

F. Dale W. Meyerrose, Chief Information Officer, Office of the Director 
                        of National Intelligence

    The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
(December 23, 2004) established an additional Senate-confirmed 
position, that of Chief Information Officer (CIO), within the 
ODNI. It provided that the new official would serve as the 
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. Among 
the CIO's responsibilities are managing activities relating to 
the information technology infrastructure of the Intelligence 
Community and directing and managing all information 
technology-related procurement for the Community. The CIO has 
the responsibility to ensure that all expenditures for 
information and research and development activities are 
consistent with the Intelligence Community enterprise 
architecture and the strategy of the DNI for that architecture.
    On September 8, 2005, the President nominated Major General 
Dale W. Meyerrose to be the first Intelligence Community CIO. 
During the course of the nomination process, he completed his 
retirement from active duty. Over a thirty-year career in the 
Air Force, General Meyerrose had extensive information 
technology, communications, and information sharing experience. 
He was a Chief Information Officer of three Air Force major 
commands and three joint combatant commands, including the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command and the U.S. Northern 
Command.
    On November 17, 2005, the Committee held a public hearing 
on the nomination. (As of the filing of this report, the 
hearing record had not been printed). Following the hearing 
that day, the Committee favorably reported the nomination by 
unanimous consent. The Senate confirmed General Meyerrose on 
December 17, 2005, by voice vote.

     G. John A. Rizzo, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency

    On March 15, 2006, the President nominated John Rizzo to be 
General Counsel of the CIA. The position of General Counsel had 
become vacant on August 1, 2004, upon the resignation of Scott 
Muller. During the period of the vacancy, Mr. Rizzo has served 
as the Acting General Counsel. No hearing on the nomination was 
scheduled during the 109th Congress. On December 9, 2006, upon 
the final adjournment of the 109th Congress, the nomination was 
returned to the President under the provisions of Rule 31.6 of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate. Mr. Rizzo has been 
renominated in the 110th Congress.

H. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National Security 
                    Division, Department of Justice

    As described earlier in this report, the National Security 
Division at the Department of Justice and the position of 
Assistant Attorney General for National Security were created 
by Congress in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, which became law on March 9, 2006, in an effort to 
coordinate national security investigations and prosecutions 
within the Department of Justice. The Assistant Attorney 
General serves as the Attorney General's principal legal 
advisor on national security issues and is the primary liaison 
for the Department of Justice to the DNI.
    On March 13, 2006, the President nominated Kenneth L. 
Wainstein, who was then the United States Attorney for the 
District of Columbia, to fill the new position. Previously, he 
had served in two capacities at the FBI, as the General Counsel 
and as the Chief of Staff for the FBI Director. For 
approximately nine years, he had served as an Assistant United 
States Attorney in the District of Columbia.
    Under a procedure established in the PATRIOT Act 
Reauthorization, and incorporated in Senate Resolution 400 of 
the 94th Congress on this Committee's jurisdiction and 
procedures, nominations for the position are referred first to 
the Judiciary Committee and then sequentially to this 
Committee. The nomination was reported favorably by the 
Judiciary Committee on June 15, 2006. It was then referred 
sequentially to this Committee which held a public hearing on 
May 16, 2006. (As of the filing of this report, the hearing 
record had not yet been printed.) The Committee reported the 
nomination favorably on June 22, 2006, by unanimous consent. 
The Senate confirmed Mr. Wainstein on September 21, 2006, by 
voice vote. Upon the confirmation, the new National Security 
Division commenced operation.

      I. Michael V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency

    As the head of the CIA, the Director is responsible, under 
the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, for collecting 
intelligence through human sources, evaluating and 
disseminating intelligence related to the national security, 
and for providing overall direction and coordination of the 
collection of national intelligence outside the United States. 
The Act provides that the Director shall report to the DNI 
regarding the activities of the CIA.
    On May 8, 2006, the President nominated General Hayden, 
then serving as the PDDNI, to fill the vacancy created by the 
resignation of Porter Goss as Director of the CIA.
    On May 18, 2006, the Committee held a public hearing on the 
nomination. The Committee reported the nomination favorably on 
May 23, 2006, by a vote of 12 to 3. The nominee's testimony and 
responses to the Committee's questionnaire and prehearing 
questions are printed in S. Hrg. 109-808. The Senate considered 
and approved the nomination on May 26, 2006, by a vote of 78-
15.

  J. Randall Fort, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
                                Research

    The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR), a member of the Intelligence Community, was established 
in 1946. It is not a collection agency; rather, it provides 
intelligence support to the Secretary of State and other 
Department policy makers on issues that fall within the purview 
of the Department, as well as being the source of high level 
analysis for the entire community.
    On June 12, 2006, the President nominated Mr. Randall Fort 
to be the Assistant Secretary of State for INR. From 1996 
through 2006, he had been employed in various capacities by the 
global investment bank Goldman Sachs. He previously served for 
four years as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Functional 
Analysis and Research at INR. From 1987-1989, he was the 
Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security and 
Director of the Office of Intelligence Support at the 
Department of the Treasury.
    On July 27, 2006, the Committee held a public hearing on 
the nomination. Mr. Fort's nomination was reported favorably by 
the Committee on August 2, 2006, by voice vote. (As of the 
filing of this report, the hearing record had not yet been 
printed.) The Senate considered and approved the nomination on 
August 3, 2006, by voice vote.

                        V. SUPPORT TO THE SENATE

    The Committee undertook a number of activities to support 
the Senate's deliberations. In addition to its unclassified 
reports, the Committee has sought to support Senate 
deliberations by inviting the participation of members outside 
the Committee in briefings and hearings on issues of shared 
jurisdiction or interest. The Committee has made available for 
the Senate intelligence information regarding topics relevant 
to current legislation. Members outside the Committee have 
frequently sought and received intelligence briefings by 
members of the Committee staff. Members have also requested and 
received assistance in resolving issues with elements of the 
Intelligence Community. Finally, the Committee routinely 
invites staff from other Committees to briefings on 
intelligence issues of common concern.

                              VI. APPENDIX


                      Summary of Committee Actions


A. Number of meetings

    During the 109th Congress, the Committee held a total of 
125 on-the-record meetings, briefings, and hearings, and 
numerous off-the-record briefings. There were 13 oversight 
hearings, 11 confirmation hearings, seven hearings on the 
Intelligence Community budget, and four legislative hearings. 
Of these 35 hearings, 12 were open to the public and 23 were 
closed toprotect classified information pursuant to Senate 
rules. The Committee also held 62 on-the-record briefings and 28 
business meetings. Additionally, the Committee staff conducted 106 on-
the-record briefings and interviews and numerous off-the-record 
briefings.

B. Bills and resolutions originated by the Committee

    S. Res. 22--An original resolution authorizing expenditures 
by the Select Committee on Intelligence.
    S. 1266--A bill to permanently authorize certain provisions 
of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, to reauthorize a provision of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, to 
clarify certain definitions in the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, to provide additional investigative 
tools necessary to protect the national security, and for other 
purposes.
    S. 1803--Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 
2006.
    S. 3237--Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 
2007.

C. Bills referred to the Committee

    S. 640--To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide 
for the establishment of a unified combatant command for 
military intelligence, and for other purposes.
    S. 2175--To require the submittal to Congress of any 
Presidential Daily Briefing relating to Iraq during the period 
beginning on January 20, 1997 and ending on March 19, 2003.
    S. 2408--To require the DNI to release documents captured 
in Afghanistan or Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, Operation 
Enduring Freedom, or Operation Iraqi Freedom.
    S. 2660--To amend the National Security Act of 1947 to 
require notice to Congress of certain declassifications of 
intelligence information, and for other purposes.
    S. 3536--To ensure oversight of intelligence on Iran, and 
for other purposes.
    S. 3968--Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2006.

D. Publications

    S. Print 109-12--Rules of Procedure (Amended January 26, 
2005).
    S. Print 109-22--Rules of Procedure (Amended March 15, 
2005).
    S. Report 109-85--Report to accompany S. 1266.
    S. Hrg. 109-61--Current and Projected National Security 
Threats to the United States (February 16, 2005).
    S. Report 109-142--Report to Accompany S. 1803.
    S. Hrg. 109-79--Nomination of Ambassador John D. Negroponte 
to be Director of National Intelligence.
    S. Hrg. 109-241--Nomination of Vice Admiral John Scott Redd 
to be Director, National Counterterrorism Center (July 21, 
2005).
    S. Hrg. 109-242--Nomination of Benjamin A. Powell to be 
General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (July 19, 2005).
    S. Hrg. 109-269--Nomination of Janice B. Gardner to be 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and 
Analysis (June 16, 2005).
    S. Report 109-259--Report to accompany S. 3237, FY 2007 
Intelligence Authorization Bill.
    S. Hrg. 109-341--USA PATRIOT Act hearings (April 19, April 
27, and May 24, 2005).
    S. Hrg. 109-270--Nomination of Lieutenant General Michael 
V. Hayden, to be Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence.
    S. Report 109-331--Report of the SSCI on Postwar Findings 
about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They 
Compare with Prewar Assessments.
    S. Report 109-330--Report of the SSCI on the Use by the 
Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi 
National Congress.
    S. Hrg. 109-808--Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden, 
to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

                                  
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