[Senate Report 110-496]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                                      Calendar No. 1074
110th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                    110-496

======================================================================



 
                    SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2008

                                _______
                                

                         Ordered to be printed

           Mr. Dodd, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                        submitted the following

                                 REPORT

                         [To accompany S. 3563]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under 
consideration an original bill (S. 3563) to authorize 
appropriations under the Arms Export Control Act and the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for security assistance for 
fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and for other purposes, reports 
favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

  I. Purpose..........................................................1
 II. Committee Action.................................................3
III. Summary..........................................................3
 IV. Section-By-Section Analysis.....................................14
  V. Cost Estimate...................................................39
 VI. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact.................................40
VII. Changes in Existing Law.........................................40
VIII.Appendix I......................................................73

 IX. Appendix II.....................................................75
  X. Appendix III....................................................77

                               I. Purpose

    The Committee on Foreign Relations is the committee of 
jurisdiction in the Senate for most foreign military and 
related assistance, including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
and International Military Education and Training (IMET), for 
international arms transfers, and for a variety of arms 
control, nonproliferation and anti-terrorism programs under the 
purview of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security. The principal laws governing these 
functions are the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended 
(P.L. 87-195), the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629), the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83-703), and the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242). The 
principal means of authorizing these programs and up-dating the 
law in this area are regular security assistance acts or 
similar provisions incorporated in Department of State and 
foreign relations authorization acts.
    The Security Assistance Act of 2008 covers all the above 
programs and includes both routine updates and important policy 
adjustments. Titles I and III authorize funding for fiscal 
years 2009 and 2010 for military and related assistance, for 
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, humanitarian demining, and 
related programs, and for certain contributions to 
international organizations carrying out critical 
nonproliferation tasks.
    Title II, the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008, grants the 
legally required approval for the transfer, as a grant, of six 
naval vessels: a guided missile frigate for Pakistan; two 
minehunter coastal ships for Greece; an oiler for Chile; and 
two amphibious tank landing ships for Peru.
    Title IV, the Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act of 2008, 
provides increased support to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system by addressing a funding 
shortfall in the safeguards system. It furthers the policy of 
the United States to discourage the development of enrichment 
and reprocessing capabilities in additional countries, 
encourage the creation of bilateral and multilateral assurances 
of nuclear fuel supply, and ensure that all supply mechanisms 
operate in strict accordance with the IAEA safeguards system 
and do not result in any additional unmet verification burdens 
for the system. It authorizes the President to negotiate, on 
both a bilateral and multilateral level, mechanisms to assure 
nations that forgo national nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities a 
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. It also ties the 
supply of nuclear fuel and an expansion of nuclear power to the 
ability of the IAEA to assure, through safeguards 
implementation, the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and 
activities involving them in states receiving nuclear fuel 
under such mechanisms.
    Title V, the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2008, is 
designed to enhance the capability of the international 
community to detect, identify, and contain infectious disease 
outbreaks, whether the cause of those outbreaks is intentional 
or natural in origin. This bill targets U.S. assistance to 
developing nations in the following areas:


   Training of public health personnel in epidemiology, 
        including diagnosis and containment of likely 
        bioterrorism agents;

   Acquisition of laboratory and diagnostic equipment;

   Acquisition of communications technology to quickly 
        transmit data on disease patterns and pathogen 
        diagnoses to national public health authorities and to 
        international institutions such as the World Health 
        Organization (WHO);

   Expansion of overseas Centers for Disease Control and 
        Prevention (CDC) and Department of Defense laboratories 
        engaged in infectious disease research and disease 
        surveillance, with the approval of host countries, 
        through the establishment of additional laboratories, 
        enlargement of existing facilities, increases in the 
        number of personnel, and/or expanding the scope of 
        their activities; and

   Expanded assistance to the WHO and regional international 
        disease surveillance efforts, including expansion of 
        U.S.-administered Field Epidemiology Training Programs.


    Title VI, the International Space Station Payments Act of 
2008, permits the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) to continue payments to Russia related to the 
International Space Station after 2011.

                          II. Committee Action

    On September 23, 2008, the committee, by voice vote, 
ordered an original bill to be reported favorably.

                              III. Summary

    This legislation covers matters of American foreign policy 
that are critical to ensuring the peace and security of the 
American people. Combating the threat posed to the United 
States by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons, and their means of delivery, must be a 
central focus of our relations with the rest of the world, 
because the threat posed by those weapons is unlike any other 
that our country and the world face. As the 9/11 Commission 
concluded, ``The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack 
in the United States will materialize if the world's most 
dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous 
weapons. . . . Preventing the proliferation of these weapons 
warrants a maximum effort.''\1\
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    \1\National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States (New York: Norton, 2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
911/report/index.htm.
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    The current National Security Strategy of the United States 
notes that because nuclear weapons ``are unique in their 
capacity to inflict instant loss of life on a massive scale,'' 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons ``poses the greatest 
threat to our national security.''\2\ ``Biological weapons,'' 
the National Security Strategy goes on to say, ``also pose a 
grave WMD [weapons of mass destruction] threat because of the 
risks of contagion that would spread disease across large 
populations and around the globe.''\3\ Additionally, chemical 
weapons ``are a serious proliferation concern and are actively 
sought by terrorists, including al-Qaida.''\4\
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    \2\The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 23, 2006), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.
    \3\Ibid.
    \4\Ibid.
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    These assessments were written in prior years, but the 
threat remains no less stark today. The Director of National 
Intelligence testified to the Armed Services Committee in 
February 2008 that:


          In addition to terrorism, the ongoing efforts of 
        nation-states and terrorists to develop and/or acquire 
        dangerous weapons and delivery systems constitute major 
        threats to the safety of our nation, our deployed 
        troops, and our friends. We are most concerned about 
        the threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear 
        proliferation. We also are concerned about the threat 
        from biological and chemical agents.\5\
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    \5\J. Michael McConnell, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on the Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National 
Security of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, 2008), http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/
20080227_testimony.pdf.


    This legislation addresses some important facets of the 
United States' response to the threat posed by the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 
This committee is not the only one in the Senate with a role to 
play in responding to this threat, and certainly agencies other 
than the Department of State--in particular, the Departments of 
Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security--have responsibilities 
for policies and programs that are vital to dealing with this 
danger. But nonproliferation, export control, and related 
assistance will continue to be an important part of the State 
Department's mission.
    This legislation also amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended, which governs civil nuclear cooperation between the 
United States and other nations, groups of nations, and 
international organizations. As discussed in more detail in 
connection with Title IV, civilian nuclear power is receiving 
renewed attention domestically and globally. The Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
of 1978 ensured that decisions about cooperation in civil 
nuclear power were treated as important foreign policy 
decisions in which Congress must participate. Those acts also 
ensured that decisions about the extent of civilian nuclear 
cooperation with other nations are balanced explicitly against 
the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
the technology that might be used to build those weapons. The 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, in particular, also 
sought to ensure that decisions the United States makes about 
cooperation with other nations in the field of civilian nuclear 
energy are firmly grounded in decisions about cooperation with 
those nations on all forms of energy production and 
conservation. Framing conversations with other countries on 
nuclear energy in the larger energy context was a smart idea 30 
years ago, and is an absolute necessity today.
    At the same time, decisions on conventional military and 
related assistance, and policies related to the sale or 
transfer of military equipment, are also a vital aspect of 
American diplomacy. Those decisions can have far-reaching and 
long-lasting implications for the security environment the 
United States and its allies face. Other countries certainly 
view U.S. decisions on such questions as an important part of 
their relations with the United States. The United States 
should never use military assistance as a substitute for its 
strategy in dealing with foreign states. But military and 
related assistance can and will continue to be an important 
aspect of U.S. strategy in the world.
    The committee is concerned about any suggestion--either 
explicit or as implied by certain proposals--that overall 
policymaking authority for military and related assistance and 
international arms transfers should rest with anyone other than 
the Secretary of State, reporting to the President. The 
Secretary of State is, and should be, the nation's chief 
foreign policy officer, and choices on military and related 
assistance and arms exports are of central importance to U.S. 
foreign policy. There is room for experimentation and 
flexibility in cooperation with foreign governments on these 
matters, but such efforts should be firmly grounded within 
larger U.S. foreign policy, and should be guided by those 
setting that policy.
    Regarding Title IV, significant international attention has 
focused in recent years on the problem of the increasing number 
of states seeking access to technical capabilities in the 
enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent nuclear 
fuel. At the same time, increasing interest in nuclear power 
has led many countries to make new policy determinations that 
favor the use of nuclear power. A decision by any country to 
enter into the nuclear power field requires a clear 
understanding of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities for the 
storage or production of fuel to run reactors, the numbers and 
types of reactors that will be built, and the disposition of 
spent nuclear fuel and waste that will result from the 
operation of reactors. New nuclear facilities, be they 
production or utilization facilities, carry with them 
safeguards burdens. A substantial increase in the use of 
nuclear power throughout the world could result in many new 
facilities with nuclear material in new states over the coming 
decades. Such a situation poses inherent risks for U.S. 
national security and global peace and stability if the 
international community does not plan for an expansion of 
nuclear power in a manner that ensures that the nuclear 
nonproliferation system--which depends heavily on the IAEA's 
safeguards system--has the resources and technology available 
to it to cope with an expansion of civilian nuclear power. The 
committee believes that support for IAEA safeguards is thus an 
urgent priority.
    Most projections regarding the expansion of nuclear power 
show some increase in the number of facilities and the amount 
of power generated, but are uncertain regarding the rate and 
scope of the rise in the use of nuclear power for electricity 
generation and the pace in construction of new utilization 
facilities or reactors. There are currently 435 commercial 
nuclear power plants operating in 30 countries around the 
globe, with a combined capacity of 370 GW(e). These plants 
supply 16 percent of the world's electricity.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\See http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf01.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A number of states, including China, India, Pakistan, 
Japan, Russia, the Republic of Korea, and the United States, 
have stated their intention to expand their nuclear power 
sectors. In the past year, there have been more than 25 
announcements of license applications by the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various U.S. nuclear power 
entities for planned activities in the United States. Canada 
has recently undertaken preparatory activities for additional 
nuclear power plants. The United Kingdom has concluded in a 
major government review that nuclear power would form a key 
part of that country's energy strategy over the next century. 
The governments of Egypt, Nigeria, Indonesia, Turkey, and 
Belarus have all announced their intention to build their first 
nuclear reactors. The February 2005 Report of the IAEA Experts 
Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
found that ``In light of existing, new and reawakened interest 
in many regions of the world, the prospect of new nuclear power 
stations on a large scale is therefore real. A greater number 
of States will consider developing their own fuel cycle 
facilities and nuclear know-how, and will seek assurances of 
supply in materials, services and technologies.''
    There has also been an expansion of the capacity to make 
nuclear fuel within the last several years. In 2006-2007, 
Brazil completed work on its uranium enrichment facility at 
Resende. In the United States construction is underway on the 
National Enrichment Facility, and France also began building a 
new enrichment facility, to be called Georges Besse II.
    The United States has for many years maintained a policy 
that it will not transfer enrichment and reprocessing 
technology to any state. President Bush has stated that his 
administration's policy is to prevent the further spread of 
such technology to new states. At the same time, the rising 
interest in nuclear power has challenged the international 
community to find ways to assure states contemplating nuclear 
power that they do not need to create national fuel cycles, 
which necessitate enrichment and reprocessing, to enjoy the 
benefits of nuclear power.
    In 2005, Senator Lugar, then chairman of the committee, 
formed a Policy Advisory Group (PAG) on nuclear 
nonproliferation, which made and forwarded certain 
recommendations to President George W. Bush regarding the 
future of the nuclear fuel cycle and the dangers of 
proliferation. Co-chaired by Ronald F. Lehman II, formerly 
Administrator of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
and Ashton B. Carter, formerly Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Policy, the group included notable 
experts in the fields of nuclear nonproliferation, verification 
and arms control.\7\
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    \7\For more information, see also Senate Report 110-151, and the 
Appendix contained therein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PAG focused on the future of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the larger nonproliferation 
system it supports. The PAG found that the existing safeguards 
regime has failed to keep pace with the increase in the global 
availability of nuclear weapons technology, especially the 
technology and equipment for uranium enrichment and spent 
nuclear reactor fuel reprocessing. While the number of 
recognized nuclear-weapon states has not dramatically increased 
over the years, the dangers of proliferation have become more 
apparent, as demonstrated by the A.Q. Khan network and the 
Iranian, North Korean and Libyan examples.
    The PAG found that the construction of new facilities for 
the enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear 
fuel, even for ostensibly peaceful purposes, poses an 
unacceptable long-term risk to the national security of the 
United States. The enrichment technology intended to produce 
fuel for nuclear power reactors can also be used to create 
material for a nuclear weapon, and the plutonium that is 
produced from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel is weapons-
usable. Safeguards, even if applied as envisioned by the IAEA's 
Model Additional Protocol to country safeguards agreements 
(hereinafter, ``additional protocol''), cannot solve the 
fundamental problems inherent in detecting enrichment 
facilities, which can be easily hidden. The spread of 
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities dangerously increases 
the possibility that more nations could develop their own 
nuclear weapons or that terrorists might obtain fissile or 
radiological materials for a dirty bomb. Given such threats, 
the PAG called on the United States to lead an international 
effort to halt the expansion of enrichment and reprocessing to 
new countries.
    The PAG found that the use of nuclear power is likely to 
increase, both in developed countries and, in particular, in 
developing countries. Importantly, however, the PAG concluded 
that expansion of nuclear power does not require--either 
technically or economically--the construction of new enrichment 
and reprocessing facilities in countries that do not currently 
have them. ``Under most scenarios,'' the PAG found, ``excess 
capacity already exists and will continue to exist for many 
years.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\See the Appendix to Senate Report 110-151.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The increasing international focus on nuclear power and 
consequent concerns about nonproliferation have resulted in the 
world's leading nuclear states offering a variety of proposals 
that not only favor the expansion of nuclear power, but also 
draw attention to the dangers of proliferation. In 2006, the 
United States announced a major initiative called the ``Global 
Nuclear Energy Partnership'' (GNEP). According to the 
administration, GNEP would seek to increase energy security and 
promote nonproliferation through the expanded use of 
proliferation-resistant nuclear energy facilities to meet 
growing electricity demand. The key elements of GNEP would 
include expanding domestic use of nuclear power; demonstration 
of proliferation-resistant actinide recycling of irradiated 
nuclear fuel; the minimization of nuclear waste; the 
development of advanced burner reactors; the establishment of 
reliable global fuel services; the demonstration of small- and 
medium-scale, proliferation-resistant reactors; and the 
revitalization of programs for advanced nuclear safeguards.
    With regard to safeguards, GNEP may include such enhanced 
activities (which remain largely undefined) as:


   Incorporation of nuclear safeguards technology into designs 
        for recycle facilities, advanced fast reactors, and 
        associated nuclear materials storage and 
        transportation, making them proliferation resistant.

   Development of high-reliability, remote, and unattended 
        monitoring technologies; advanced containment and 
        surveillance; smart safeguards information collection, 
        management, and analysis systems; nuclear facility use-
        control systems; and next generation nondestructive 
        analysis and process monitoring sensors.

   Research and development of advanced material tracking 
        methodologies, process control technologies, and plant 
        engineering.

   Remote sensing, environmental sampling and forensic 
        verification methods.

   International facilities for conducting testing and 
        demonstration.

   Continued support for global best practices for security 
        and accounting of nuclear materials.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\See http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepNuclearSafeguards.html.


    In January 2006, President Vladimir Putin of Russia also 
proposed creation of ``a system of international centres, 
providing nuclear fuel-cycle services, including enrichment, on 
a non-discriminatory basis and under the control of the 
IAEA.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ ``Paper Profiles Russian-Kazakh-Uzbek Uranium Enrichment 
Deal,'' Text of a Report from the Kommersant Newspaper, January 29, 
2006, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, available on Nexis.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to the U.S. and Russian proposals, a number of 
other ideas have been placed before the IAEA by major nuclear 
states, which were considered at a Special Event on a New 
Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy in the 21st 
century during the 50th IAEA General Conference.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\See http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/
Announcements.asp?ConfID=147.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the wide expectation of increased nuclear facility 
construction, there has been little increase in financial 
support to the IAEA's Department of Safeguards to ensure that 
it can meet both existing and future safeguards demands. The 
committee notes that all of the work conducted by the IAEA to 
implement existing safeguards is carried out under a budget 
that is not sufficient to meet the growing demands for 
safeguards. With activities likely to resume in North Korea, as 
well as verification of North Korean compliance with agreements 
reached in the Six Party Talks, ongoing activities in Iran, 
increasing activities in many European states, a likely new and 
costly set of safeguards requirements that will result from 
renewed international nuclear cooperation with India, expanded 
reprocessing activities in Japan, and the welcome 
implementation of additional protocols by more states, along 
with stresses the IAEA is already experiencing in its 
verification program, particularly as more environmental 
samples come to it for analysis under additional protocols, 
funding for safeguards now demands immediate attention. The 
IAEA must maintain an ability to implement unprogrammed 
safeguards and verification activities when issues arise, but 
maintaining routine safeguards grows difficult in times when 
many of its resources are already engaged. The United States 
and all IAEA member states must prevent a scenario in which the 
IAEA is forced to reduce--or cease altogether--safeguards 
efforts in key states because of budget shortfalls.
    Historically, certain policies have adversely affected the 
ability of the IAEA to meet growing safeguards challenges. In 
1985, the Geneva Group (the 14 largest contributors to the 
United Nations) imposed a policy of ``zero real growth'' on the 
IAEA's budget, save for staff salaries. This policy was 
reversed by the IAEA's Board of Governors in July 2003. The 
committee strongly supported the decision to end the zero real 
growth policy, a decision consistent with previously-enacted 
legislation.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\See section 1305 of P.L. 107-228, The Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nevertheless, overall budgetary support remains 
insufficient to meet existing safeguards needs, much less the 
dramatically expanded requirements that may present themselves 
in the future. Moreover, additional constraints on the IAEA's 
verification effort, such as those on the amount of time staff 
may work at the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, pose 
other challenges. In this regard, certain provisions of S. 1138 
again call to attention the need for reform.
    Title IV deals with the realities of expanding nuclear 
power given the existing demands on IAEA safeguards. Much of 
the work that will create a more proliferation-resistant, 
nuclear-powered future can be done today, but this requires 
more than technical progress in the design of new nuclear 
facilities. Such technologies are many years away from being 
commercially available. What are needed now are sustained U.S. 
leadership and increased financial support for IAEA safeguards. 
The committee finds that S. 1138 will positively contribute to 
and enhance existing safeguards and will enhance nuclear fuel 
supply mechanisms that take into account important 
nonproliferation criteria, and to these ends has reported 
favorably this legislation.
    Regarding Title V, the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 
2008, in January 2000, the National Intelligence Council 
released a National Intelligence Estimate entitled, The Global 
Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United 
States. The key judgments in that report were sobering:


          New and reemerging infectious diseases will pose a 
        rising global health threat and will complicate US and 
        global security over the next 20 years. These diseases 
        will endanger US citizens at home and abroad, threaten 
        US armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate 
        social and political instability in key countries and 
        regions in which the United States has significant 
        interests.\13\
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    \13\National Intelligence Council, ``The Global Infectious Disease 
Threat and Its Implications for the United States,'' National 
Intelligence Estimate NIE 99-17D (January 2000), p. 5.

          Development of an effective global surveillance and 
        response system probably is at least a decade or more 
        away, owing to inadequate coordination and funding at 
        the international level and lack of capacity, funds, 
        and commitment in many developing and former communist 
        states.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\Ibid.,  p. 8.

          The probability of a bioterrorist attack against US 
        civilian and military personnel overseas or in the 
        United States also is likely to grow as more states and 
        groups develop a biological warfare capability. 
        Although there is no evidence that the recent West Nile 
        virus outbreak in New York City was caused by foreign 
        state or non-state actors, the scare and several 
        earlier instances of suspected bioterrorism showed the 
        confusion and fear they can sow regardless of whether 
        or not they are validated.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\Ibid.,  p. 11.


    The Estimate went on to elaborate regarding the challenges 
to maintaining an effective world-wide disease surveillance 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
system:


          A major obstacle to effective global surveillance and 
        control of infectious diseases will continue to be poor 
        or inaccurate national health statistical reporting by 
        many developing countries and lack of both capacity and 
        will to properly direct aid . . . and to follow WHO and 
        other recommended health care practices. Those areas of 
        the world most susceptible to infectious disease 
        problems are least able to develop and maintain the 
        sophisticated and costly communications equipment 
        needed for effective disease surveillance and 
        reporting. In addition to the barriers dictated by low 
        levels of development, revealing an outbreak of a 
        dreaded disease may harm national prestige, commerce, 
        and tourism.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\Ibid.,  p. 34.


    In January 2001, the National Intelligence Council released 
another National Intelligence Estimate, entitled, The 
Biological Warfare Threat. The report pointed to the growing 
biological warfare capabilities of state and non-state actors 
and, more importantly, highlighted the similar patterns and 
symptoms of a deliberately initiated disease outbreak and a 
naturally occurring outbreak. Once an outbreak is detected and 
begins to spread, it is very difficult to distinguish between a 
deliberate and a natural disease outbreak. Both are potentially 
devastating to human, animal, and plant life, moreover, as well 
as economically costly. Epidemiologists and public health 
experts rely on similar tools to help prevent, detect, and 
contain both intentional and naturally occurring disease 
outbreaks.
    According to an August 2001 report by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO, now known as the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office), WHO officials said that more than 60 
percent of laboratory equipment in developing countries was 
either outdated or non-functioning, and that the vast majority 
of national personnel were not familiar with quality assurance 
principles for handling and analyzing biological samples. 
Deficiencies in training and equipment meant that many public 
health units in Africa and Asia were simply unable to perform 
accurate and timely disease surveillance.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\United States General Accounting Office, ``Global Health: 
Challenges in Improving Infectious Disease Surveillance Systems,'' GAO-
01-722 (August 2001), p.3.
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    On September 5, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee held a hearing regarding the threat of bioterrorism 
and the spread of infectious diseases. Witnesses included 
former Senator Sam Nunn, Dr. Donald A. Henderson of Johns 
Hopkins University (later a scientific advisor to the White 
House and the Department of Health and Human Services), and Dr. 
David L. Heymann, then Executive Director for Communicable 
Diseases at the WHO. After the appearance, later in September 
2001, of letters containing anthrax spores, which left 5 dead 
and caused major disruptions in the U.S. Senate and elsewhere, 
the committee held a March 19, 2002, hearing on the chemical 
and biological weapons threat. At that hearing, Dr. Alan P. 
Zelicoff, Senior Scientist at Sandia National Laboratories, 
testified on the role of syndromic surveillance in bioterrorism 
prevention.
    The committee believes that the threat of bioterrorism 
poses significant challenges not only for the United States, 
but for the entire world. It is difficult to protect our 
nation's health without international cooperation in an age of 
unprecedented air travel and international trade, as infectious 
pathogens are transported across borders each day. The global 
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, was an 
unfortunate reminder of this vulnerability. More recently, a 
man thought at the time to have extensively drug-resistant 
tuberculosis flew across an ocean--twice--and drove across 
several national borders, reminding us how readily a disease 
can be spread in the modern world. Fortunately, although 
extensively drug-resistant TB is especially difficult to treat, 
it does not spread as readily as influenza or some other 
diseases. Authorities knew who the disease vector was, 
moreover, and they knew (more or less) what he had. The risk 
with H5N1 avian influenza or a bioterrorism attack is 
heightened by the likelihood that the disease will spread 
before its presence is even evident.
    Infectious disease outbreaks are transnational threats and 
the defense of our homeland is not an isolated activity. Rather 
it requires a comprehensive strategy, including a critical 
international component. Whether intentional or natural, 
infectious diseases do not recognize the boundaries set by 
national borders.
    Developing nations represent one of the weak links in a 
comprehensive global surveillance and monitoring network. For 
example, even though the world has made substantial efforts to 
combat and prepare for the possibility of a global avian 
influenza pandemic, a recent GAO report suggests that the 
surveillance capabilities of many countries--even when focused 
on a single disease--remain dangerously inadequate. The report 
cites a senior WHO official as saying that numerous ``disease 
blind spots'' around the world hamper the organization's 
ability to identify H5N1 outbreaks. It goes on to say that 
studies conducted in 2006 by the UN System Influenza 
Coordinator, in collaboration with the World Bank, found that 
about one-third of the countries surveyed lacked the capacity 
to diagnose avian influenza in humans.\18\
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    \18\United States Government Accountability Office, ``Influenza 
Pandemic: Efforts to Forestall Onset Are Under Way: Indentifying 
Countries at Greatest Risk Entails Challenges,'' GAO-07-604 (June 
2007), pp. 16n and 18-19.
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    Unfortunately, naturally occurring disease outbreaks are 
most likely to occur in these areas where poor sanitary 
conditions, poverty, and a weak medical infrastructure combine 
to offer ideal breeding grounds for pathogens. In addition, 
some developing countries border rogue states or states that 
offer sanctuaries for international terrorist groups, which 
have a documented interest in biological agents.
    In 2005, two sets of researchers reported in the journals 
Nature and Science that, based on computer simulations, if an 
outbreak of human-to-human-transmitted avian flu were to occur 
in a rural part of Southeast Asia, it might be possible to stem 
that dangerous epidemic by using anti-viral drugs to treat the 
tens of thousands of people who might have been exposed in the 
initial outbreak. One key requirement, however, was that the 
outbreak would have to be discovered, identified and reported 
very quickly; in one study, the assumption was that 
countermeasures were instituted when only 30 people had 
observable symptoms.\19\ These simulations underscore both the 
challenge of disease surveillance and the potential benefits if 
effective and timely surveillance can be made available where 
it is most needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\Neil M. Ferguson, Derek A.T. Cummings, Simon Cauchemez, 
Christophe Fraser, Steven Riley, Aronrag Meeyai, Sopon Iamsirithaworn 
and Donald S. Burke, ``Strategies for containing an emerging influenza 
pandemic in Southeast Asia,'' Nature, August 3, 2005. See also I.M. 
Longini Jr., A. Nizam, S. Xu, K. Ungchusak, W. Hanshaoworakul, D.A. 
Cummings, and M.E. Halloran, ``Containing pandemic influenza at the 
source,'' Science, August 3, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    So it is vital to give these countries the capability to 
track epidemics and to feed that information into international 
surveillance networks. Disease surveillance is a systematic 
approach that requires trained public health personnel, proper 
diagnostic equipment to identify viruses and pathogens, and 
prompt transmission of data from the doctor or clinic level all 
the way to national governments and the WHO.
    The Global Pathogen Surveillance Act will offer such help 
to those countries that agree to give the United States and the 
WHO prompt access to disease outbreaks, so that we can help 
determine their origin. Recipients of this training will also 
be able to learn to spot diseases that might be used in a 
bioterrorist attack.
    The Global Pathogen Surveillance Act was first introduced 
in 2002. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported this 
bill, either separately or as a title of a larger bill, on 
several occasions since 2002, and the Senate passed the bill in 
2002 and 2005. The original bill was drafted in consultation 
with the WHO, the CDC, the Department of Defense and others, 
and later versions benefited from suggestions from the State 
Department and, in 2005, from staff of the Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee.
    The primary authority for implementation of the bill's 
provisions is vested in the Department of State. The committee 
expects that the Department of Health and Human Services will 
also play a critical role, however, including being consulted 
to the greatest extent possible.
    Two years ago the Secretary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, 
expressed her strong backing for this legislation in an answer 
for the record:


          We believe that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act 
        will indeed help strengthen developing countries'' 
        abilities to identify and track pathogens that could be 
        indicators of dangerous disease outbreaks--either 
        naturally-occurring or deliberately released. Improved 
        disease surveillance and communication among nations 
        are critical defenses against both bioterrorism and 
        natural outbreaks. We look forward to working with you 
        in support of the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act. . . 
        .

          One of the true ``nightmare'' scenarios--of a 
        bioterrorist attack or a naturally occurring disease--
        involves a contagious biological agent moving swiftly 
        through a crowded urban area of a densely populated 
        developing nation. Thus, we believe that it is critical 
        to increase efforts to strengthen the public health and 
        scientific infrastructure necessary to identify and 
        quickly respond to infectious disease outbreaks--and 
        that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act will provide 
        valuable support in these efforts.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ ``The Nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of 
State,'' Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate, January 18 and 19, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-151, pp. 253-254.


    The WHO also shares the committee's concern. During the 
SARS epidemic, Dr. Michael Heymann, who was the highest-ranking 
American in the WHO, stated at a press conference: ``it is 
clear that the best defense against the spread of emerging 
infections such as SARS is strong national public health--
national disease detection and response capacities that can 
identify new diseases and contain them before they spread 
internationally.'' He went on to highlight the important role 
that disease surveillance plays in combating both natural and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
terrorist outbreaks:


          Global partnerships to combat global microbial 
        threats make good sense as a defense strategy that 
        brings immediate benefits in terms of strengthened 
        public health and surveillance systems. The resulting 
        infectious disease intelligence brings dual benefits in 
        terms of protecting populations against both naturally 
        occurring and potentially deliberately caused 
        outbreaks. As SARS has so vividly demonstrated, the 
        need is urgent and of critical importance to the health 
        of economies as well as populations.

          Support to developing countries such as proposed in 
        the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act . . . will help 
        strengthen capacity of public health professionals and 
        epidemiologists, laboratory and other disease detection 
        systems, and outbreak response mechanisms for naturally 
        occurring infectious diseases such as SARS. This in 
        turn will strengthen WHO and the world's safety net for 
        outbreak detection and response, of which the United 
        States is a major partner. And finally, strengthening 
        this global safety net to detect and contain naturally 
        occurring infectious diseases will strengthen the 
        world's capacity to detect and respond to infectious 
        diseases that may be deliberately caused.


    Title VI, the ``International Space Station Payments Act of 
200.'' was also introduced by Senators Biden and Lugar as 
stand-alone legislation at the request of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to permit payments 
to Russia relating to the International Space Station after the 
year 2011. The administration says that this legislation is 
necessary now so that NASA can contract for space on additional 
International Space Station missions and Russia can build the 
necessary additional Soyuz vehicles.
    Existing law only permits NASA to make payments to Russia 
in support of the International Space Station until December 
31, 2011. The Russian vehicles provide transportation and, if 
necessary, rescue services for the Space Station, but there is 
a three-year time lag between when NASA signs a contract and 
when Russia completes the needed vehicle for a Space Station 
mission. According to NASA:


          The Russian Federal Space Agency has communicated to 
        NASA that a contract must be in place 36 months prior 
        to launch, in order to begin procurement of longlead 
        items to produce the Soyuz vehicles for the U.S., which 
        are in addition to their own spacecraft manufacturing 
        needs.

          Since Soyuz crew rotations for fall 2011 will return 
        in spring 2012. NASA must have new legislative 
        authority in place by fall of 2008, if we are to 
        maintain a U.S. and international partner (Europe, 
        Canada, and Japan) presence onboard the International 
        Space Station after October 2011. The legislative 
        authority would allow for contract payments to be made 
        beyond 2012.


    Title VI includes provisions to encourage the space 
industry in the United States. It does not authorize the use of 
Russia's Progress vehicle for cargo deliveries after 2011. It 
does not authorize use of the Soyuz vehicle for crew 
transportation after Orion--the successor to the Space 
Shuttle--is fully operational. The bill also discontinues use 
of the Soyuz vehicle if a U.S. commercial provider 
``demonstrates the capability to meet mission requirements of 
the International Space Station.''
    The committee understands NASA's urgency on this matter, 
though it notes its concern that the United States has become 
as reliant as it apparently has on Russia for a mission as 
critical to the International Space Station's success as cargo 
and crew transportation. The committee also believes that the 
only certain result of any attempt to block this legislative 
change, in a misguided attempt to punish Russia for its recent 
actions, would in fact be to ensure that the United States, 
Canada, Europe, and Japan would not be able to continue to make 
use of the International Space Station after 2011.
    Included in an appendix are three letters from the 
Honorable Michael D. Griffin, Administrator of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, dated April 11, July 17, 
and September 8, 2008, explaining NASA's request for this 
change.

                    IV. Section-By-Section Analysis

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

    This Act may be cited as the ``Security Assistance Act of 
2008''.

                Title I--Military and Related Assistance


Subtitle A--Funding Authorizations

SECTION 101. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM.

    This section authorizes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
for fiscal year (FY) 2009 at $4,982,000, matching the Senate's 
appropriations mark, and authorizes FY 2010 funding for the 
program. It amends the Security Assistance Act of 2000, as 
amended by the Security Assistance Act of 2002, to authorize 
the requested increase in FMF for Israel (in line with the plan 
to provide $30 billion of FMF to Israel over the next 10 
years), and to ensure that FMF funds are provided to Israel 
early in the fiscal year after such funds are appropriated. 
Subsection (c) amends the Security Assistance Act of 2000, as 
amended by the Security Assistance Act of 2000, to authorize 
FMF assistance for Egypt and continues the requirement to 
disburse such assistance for Egypt to an interest-bearing 
account.
    Except for the updated funding amounts and time periods, 
this section matches Section 2126 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 102. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

    This section authorizes funding for FY 2009 for 
International Military Education and Training at $91,500,000, 
matching the Senate's appropriations mark, and authorizes FY 
2010 funding for the program. Subsection (b) authorizes the use 
of these funds for training personnel of international 
organizations.
    Except for the updated funding amounts and time periods, 
this section matches Section 2123 from the  Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007  (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.

Subtitle B--Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 Amendments and Related 
        Provisions

SECTION 111. WAIVER OF NET PROCEEDS RESULTING FROM DISPOSAL OF UNITED 
        STATES DEFENSE ARTICLES PROVIDED TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY ON A 
        GRANT BASIS

    This section amends section 505(f) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act to broaden the existing authority of the 
President to waive the requirement that net proceeds resulting 
from the disposal of defense articles provided to a foreign 
country on a grant basis be paid to the United States. Existing 
law limits the waiver authority to items delivered before 1985.
    This section matches Section 2207 from the  Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007  (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 112. ADDITIONS TO WAR RESERVE STOCKPILES FOR ALLIES FOR FISCAL 
        YEARS 2009 AND 2010

    This section extends through FY 2010 the President's 
authority to transfer excess items to the Department of Defense 
War Reserve Stockpile.
    Except for the updated time period, this section matches 
Section 2208 from the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 109th Congress), which was 
ordered to be reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations by 
a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 2005.
SECTION 113. ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES

    This section amends section 660 of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961.
    Paragraph (1) amends subsection (b)(6), consistent with 
current law, to make it clear that the authority of this 
paragraph may be used in cases where instability has occurred 
at the sub-national level. Paragraph (1) further amends 
subsection (b) to add exceptions to the prohibition on 
assistance for law enforcement forces. New paragraph (8) 
permits the provision of assistance to combat corruption 
consistent with the objectives of section 133 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act. New paragraph (9) is the same as current law 
but is included as a separate paragraph to make it clear that 
the authority to provide human rights, rule of law, and other 
training is not limited to post-conflict situations. New 
paragraph (10) is an authority related to assistance to combat 
trafficking in persons. New paragraph (11) permits the 
provision of assistance for constabularies and gendarmes.
    Paragraph (2) amends section 660 to provide the President 
with the authority to waive the limitations of this section on 
a case-by-case basis if the President determines that it is 
important to the national interest to do so. It is anticipated 
that this authority will be exercised by the Secretary of State 
under appropriate delegations of authority. The obligation of 
funds pursuant to such a waiver is subject to prior 
notification of the appropriate congressional committees under 
section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act.
    This section matches Section 2220 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 114. DATABASE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE

    The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 
and 2001 (P.L. 106-113) first established the requirement that 
the annual U.S. military assistance report required under 
Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 be made 
available to the public on the Internet. In the years since, 
the State Department has complied with this requirement; 
however, the current report is posted on the Internet only in a 
PDF document, thus making it difficult for users to manipulate 
the data in any meaningful fashion. For example, users are not 
able to compare data over time and across countries and 
different munitions categories.
    In an effort to make the Section 655 report more user-
friendly, this section requires the State Department to 
establish an Internet-accessible, interactive database, 
consisting of all the unclassified information currently 
available in the printed report. The database would be 
searchable by various criteria. Such criteria could include, 
among others, the recipient country, the United States 
Munitions List category of article or service provided, and the 
year of the sale or grant. With such a database, interested 
parties from academia, non-governmental organizations, the 
defense industry, and the Congress could access immediately 
cumulative data, cross-referenced among several categories. 
Because the Department already organizes the data in the 
Section 655 report through electronic processing, no new data 
collection will be required.
    This section matches Section 2225 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 115. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING

    This amendment changes the date upon which the report is 
due to the Congress from January 31 to March 1, and limits the 
content to military training provided during the previous 
fiscal year.
    This section matches Section 2503 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 116. DEMINING PROGRAMS

    Subsection (a) amends section 551 of the Foreign Assistance 
Act to make it clear that, in accordance with previous 
interpretations of the Peacekeeping program's statutory 
authorities, the program may include demining activities and 
other efforts to destroy small arms, light weapons and other 
conventional weapons. Subsection (b) continues and makes 
permanent an authority contained in prior year appropriations 
acts to allow the Department of State and USAID to dispose of 
demining equipment on a grant basis in foreign countries.
    This section matches Section 2211 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 117. SPECIAL WAIVER AUTHORITY

    This section amends section 614 of the Foreign Assistance 
Act by updating authorities and funding limitations in that 
section.
    New subsection (a)(1) provides that the authority of 
section 614 may be used to waive provisions of law that limit 
the President's ability to authorize assistance under the 
authority of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export 
Control Act, and any Act authorizing or appropriating foreign 
assistance funds without regard to the provisions of law cited 
in subsection (b), as revised by this section. The standards 
used to allow the provision of both economic and military 
assistance are the same as current law. The provision also 
increases one of the annual country limitations.
    New subsection (b) lists the provisions of law that may be 
waived. In addition to provisions contained in foreign 
assistance authorization and appropriations acts, provisions of 
law contained in other legislation that limit the provision of 
assistance under those acts may also be waived under the 
authority of this section.
    The requirements for prior consultation with the 
appropriate committees of the Congress and submission of a 
written policy justification before the President may exercise 
the authority contained in section 614 remain unchanged.
    This section matches Section 2212 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 118. MILITARY COUPS

    This section amends the Foreign Assistance Act to prohibit 
assistance to a country if the duly elected head of government 
of such country is deposed by decree or military coup. Similar 
restrictions have been included in appropriations acts since 
1986. Exempted from this restriction is assistance to promote 
democratic elections, and a presidential waiver would permit 
assistance upon a determination that such assistance is 
important to the national security interest of the United 
States.
    This section matches Section 2214 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 119. FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

    This section adds a component to the International Military 
and Education Program focused on training foreign militaries to 
protect civilians who are refugees and internally displaced 
persons.
    This section matches Section 2734 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.

Subtitle C--Arms Export Control Act Amendments and Related Provisions

SECTION 121. THRESHOLDS FOR ADVANCE NOTICE TO CONGRESS OF SALES OR 
        UPGRADES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES, DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTIONS 
        SERVICES, AND MAJOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

    This section raises the minimum dollar thresholds at which 
sales of certain defense articles, design and construction 
services, and major defense articles (or upgrades of such 
sales) must be reported to the Congress under Section 36 of the 
Arms Export Control Act, and at which transfers must consented 
to by the President.
    This section raises the level of notification thresholds 
from $14,000,000 to $50,000,000 for major defense equipment, 
from $50,000,000 to $100,000,000 for defense articles and 
defense services, and from $200,000,000 to $350,000,000 for 
design and construction.
    This section also allows for notification of additional 
cases ``if the President determines it is appropriate.''
    This section matches Section 2231 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 122. CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ADVANCE NOTICE TO 
        CONGRESS OF COMPREHENSIVE EXPORT AUTHORIZATIONS

    This section requires the President to make certifications 
to the Congress under Section 36(c)(1) of the Arms Export 
Control Act before issuing comprehensive authorizations under 
Section 126.14 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) for the export of defense articles or defense services 
to an eligible foreign country or foreign partner.
    This section matches Section 2232 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 123. TRANSFERS OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

    For any proposed sale, export, or transfer of firearms 
listed in category I of the United States Munitions List, this 
section would REQUIRE that the President, in the congressional 
notification on such sale, provides a description of any 
assistance or other measures, whether provided by the United 
States or undertaken by the foreign end user to deal with the 
firearms in the recipient's possession that are being replaced 
by the proposed sale, export, or transfer, along with an 
analysis of the impact the sale, export, or transfer would have 
on United States efforts to collecting and destroying small 
arms and light weapons around the world.
    In its 2007-2012 Strategic Plan, under its strategic goal 
of Achieving Peace and Security, the State Department stated 
the following about its efforts to deal with the threat posed 
by small arms, light weapons, and other conventional weapons:


          We will reduce stockpiles of destabilizing 
        conventional weapons and munitions, and control their 
        proliferation to areas of concern. Small arms and light 
        weapons fuel civil wars, regional conflicts, and 
        terrorist and criminal activity. We help limit illicit 
        proliferation by strengthening multilateral export 
        control regimes, and destroying surplus, poorly 
        protected, or otherwise at-risk arms and munitions.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\United States Department of State and United States Agency for 
International Development, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012 (May 
7, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
86291.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee includes this provision simply to ensure that 
the pursuit of other valid security goals--ensuring that allies 
receive appropriate security assistance for legitimate defense 
requirements--does not run counter to, or set back, the 
Department's efforts to combat the threat posed by certain 
destabilizing small arms and light weapons.
SECTION 124. PLAN REGARDING CLUSTER MUNITIONS SOLD TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

    This section requires the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to report on a plan 
to eliminate the risk posed to innocent civilians by cluster 
munitions previously sold or transferred to other countries 
under the Arms Export Control Act that are beyond their design 
life. A 2005 report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Munitions System Reliability found that cluster munitions are 
more likely to fail, and therefore leave unexploded ordnance, 
as they age past their designed service life. The committee 
notes the June 2008 memorandum by the Secretary of Defense 
concerning ``DoD Policy Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm 
to Civilians.'' The memorandum establishes a policy, consistent 
with other U.S. law and policy, concerning transfers to foreign 
governments of cluster munitions following the issuance of the 
memorandum.
SECTION 125. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE CATALOGING DATA AND SERVICES TO NON-
        NATO COUNTRIES

    This section authorizes the President to provide cataloging 
data and services to non-NATO countries on a reciprocal basis. 
Currently, authority exists only to provide such data and 
services to NATO and to NATO-member governments.
    This section matches Section 2233 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 126. HAITIAN COAST GUARD

    This section grants eligibility to the Government of Haiti 
for the purchase of defense articles and services for the 
Haitian Coast Guard under the Arms Export Control Act subject 
to existing notification requirements.
    This section matches Section 2237 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 127. SECURITY COOPERATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

    This section would amend Section 36 of the Arms Export 
Control Act so that proposed sales, licenses for export, and 
commercial technical assistance and manufacturing licensing 
agreements of defense articles and sales involving the Republic 
of Korea are treated the same way as such sales, licenses, and 
agreements involving NATO member countries, Australia, Japan, 
and New Zealand. Certifications to Congress would be required 
15 days before proceeding with such sales, licenses, and 
agreements, as opposed to 30 days, as is currently required in 
the case of the Republic of Korea.
SECTION 128. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON AGREEMENTS RELATING TO ASSISTANCE, 
        TRANSFER, OR SALE OF CERTAIN MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES.

    This section states the sense of Congress that it is the 
responsibility of the United States Government to negotiate 
with foreign governments any agreement pursuant to section 
646(b)(2) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public 
Law 110-161) specifying that qualifying cluster munitions or 
cluster munitions technology will only be used against clearly 
defined military targets and will not be used where civilians 
are known to be present. The committee sees such agreements as 
a governmental responsibility to secure, not something to be 
left to private companies seeking to engage in otherwise 
legitimate defense sales. It could disadvantage U.S. firms when 
competing with firms in other nations for certain sales if such 
requirements are left to them to negotiate with foreign 
governments.

Title II--Authority to Transfer Naval Vessels

    This title matches the language of S. 3052, the Naval 
Vessel Transfer Act of 2008, which was introduced by Senators 
Biden and Lugar on May 22, 2008.
SECTION 201. SHORT TITLE

    This title may be cited as the ``Naval Vessel Transfer Act 
of 2008.''
SECTION 202. TRANSFER OF NAVAL VESSELS TO CERTAIN FOREIGN RECIPIENTS

    This section permits the transfer of certain U.S. Navy 
vessels to particular foreign countries.
    Pursuant to section 824(b) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 1994, as amended, 10 U.S.C. 7307(a), a 
naval vessel that is in excess of 3,000 tons or that is less 
than 20 years of age may not be disposed of to another nation 
unless the disposition of that vessel is approved by law 
enacted after August 5, 1974. This section would provide that 
required approval for six transfers: a guided missile frigate 
for Pakistan; two minehunter coastal ships for Greece; an oiler 
for Chile; and two amphibious tank landing ships for Peru. 
These would all be grant transfers under section 516 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
    This section also contains provisions that are 
traditionally included in ship transfer bills, relating to 
transfer costs and repair and refurbishment of the ships, and 
exempting the value of a vessel transferred on a grant basis 
from the aggregate value of excess defense articles in a given 
fiscal year.
    The authority provided by this bill would expire 2 years 
after the date of enactment of the bill. All of the proposed 
ship transfer authorizations have been requested by the U.S. 
Navy, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget.

Title III--Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, and Export Control 
        Assistance

Subtitle A--Funding Authorizations

SECTION 301. NONPROLIFERATION, ANTI-TERRORISM, DEMINING, AND RELATED 
        PROGRAMS

    This section authorizes $578,500,000 for FY 2009, an 
increase of $75 million over the President's request, and such 
sums as may be necessary for FY 2010 for the Nonproliferation, 
Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account 
at the State Department. The NADR account funds voluntary U.S. 
contributions to certain organizations supporting important 
nonproliferation goals, and provides assistance for export 
control, border security, nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and 
conventional weapons destruction assistance programs at the 
Department of State.
    Within the funds authorized in this section, subsection (c) 
authorizes funding levels for FY 2009 for the various 
individual programs in the NADR account. In addition to the $66 
million for a voluntary contribution to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, subsection (c) authorizes an additional 
$10 million to be contributed to the IAEA's Nuclear Security 
Fund, provided such contributions are matched by contributions 
from other governments or private entities. Subsection (c) also 
authorizes $31 million for FY 2009 for a voluntary contribution 
to pay the current and outstanding United States share of 
construction and provisional operation of the International 
Monitoring System and related functions.
SECTION 302. CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING 
        KEY NONPROLIFERATION GOALS

    This section authorizes, in addition to funds otherwise 
authorized for such purposes, $50,000,000 for FY 2008 for the 
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account at 
the State Department for U.S. obligations to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons, two international organizations that 
directly contribute to U.S. national security and U.S. 
nonproliferation efforts. Because the United States defers 
payment of most of its annual dues to these organizations to 
the fiscal year starting near the end of the organization's 
calendar year, the United States is often unable to pay its 
dues before the end of organization's budget year.
    This section also requires the Secretary of State to report 
by June 30, 2009, on the amounts of any assessments by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for calendar year 2009 or any 
prior year that the Secretary determines will remain unpaid by 
the United States on October 1, 2009, and the reasons for those 
unpaid assessments.

Subtitle B--Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and Limitations

SECTION 311. AMENDMENTS TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

    This section modifies existing provisions in the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Subsection (a) requires that 
any agreement for nuclear cooperation submitted pursuant to 
Section 123 of the Act be accompanied by a report on the 
actions taken and planned with the country involved to fulfill 
the purposes of the program authorized in Section 502 of the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which focuses on reducing 
the dependence of countries on petroleum fuels, with emphasis 
given to utilizing solar and other renewable energy resources. 
This section seeks to ensure that specific agreements on civil 
nuclear cooperation are reached within the context of larger 
discussions between the United States and other nations, or 
groups of nations, on those countries complete energy strategy. 
Civilian nuclear energy might be a part of a nation's energy 
strategy, and the United States may certainly, subject to its 
laws and policies, seek to cooperate with that nation in the 
nuclear component of its energy strategy, but this provision 
would require the executive branch, when submitting to Congress 
an agreement for nuclear cooperation, to inform Congress at the 
same time of the actions taken to cooperate on energy sources 
in the context of the larger U.S. policy in such countries.
    Subsections (b) and (c) would ensure that subsequent 
arrangements and amendments, respectively, to agreements for 
nuclear cooperation that required a joint resolution of 
approval by Congress to enter into force would similarly 
require specific approval by Congress before coming into force. 
This section would seek to remove any doubts that may exist 
that substantive changes to the types of cooperation permitted 
under an agreement requiring congressional assent also require 
such assent.
SECTION 312. BIOSECURITY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM

    This provision would require the Secretary of State to 
establish a program to combat bioterrorism world-wide by 
providing training, equipment, and financial and technical 
(including legal) assistance in such areas as biosecurity, 
biosafety, pathogen surveillance, and timely response to 
outbreaks of infectious disease, and by providing increased 
opportunity for scientists who possess expertise that could 
make a material contribution to the development, manufacture, 
or use of biological weapons to engage in remunerative careers 
that promote public health and safety. This provision is 
intended as a complement to, but not a replacement for, Title 
V, the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2008.
    The committee notes that the State Department has already 
begun a ``Biosecurity Engagement Program'' within its Bureau 
for International Security and Nonproliferation. The program 
states that its objectives include:


          ``Assisting partner countries in maintaining a 
        balance between developing sustainable public and 
        agricultural health infrastructure, and ensuring safe 
        and secure pathogen collections.

          ``Training in biosafety and pathogen security to 
        promote sound laboratory management practices.

          ``Engaging bioscience laboratories in collaborative 
        pathogen security and biosafety projects, including 
        assistance in risk assessment, safety and security 
        consultations, design and implementation.

          ``Training in infectious disease surveillance and 
        molecular diagnostics, and laboratory capacity building 
        activities.

          ``Integrating advances in international biosafety and 
        pathogen security into efforts to enhance international 
        infectious disease surveillance, diagnostics, response 
        and control.''


     The committee applauds this effort, and anticipates that 
this program will satisfy, at least in part, the mandate of 
this section.

Subtitle C--Reporting Requirements

SECTION 321. AMENDMENTS TO THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT

    This section adds the term ``formal commitments'' to the 
elements for which the Verification and Compliance Bureau of 
the Department of State shall provide compliance analysis (arms 
control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements) under 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. To facilitate faster 
submission of the annual report on objectives and negotiations, 
it separates that report from the annual report on compliance, 
which is required to be prepared in coordination with the 
Director of National Intelligence. This section also allows the 
annual report on Chemical Weapons Convention compliance, 
required by condition 10(C) of the resolution of advice and 
consent to U.S. ratification of that Convention, to be 
incorporated in the annual compliance report required by 
Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
    This section matches Section 2511 from the Foreign Affairs 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 (S. 600 in the 
109th Congress), which was ordered to be reported by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-0 on March 3, 
2005.
SECTION 322. ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS

    This section amends the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 
1978 to state that the United States shall seek to act with 
other nations to ensure that the IAEA safeguards mission has 
the resources it needs, and that safeguards activities are 
funded, to the maximum extent possible, through the regular, 
assessed portion of the IAEA budget, as opposed to voluntary 
contributions by IAEA member states.
SECTION 323. ANNUAL REPORT ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

    This section revives and amends the annual report by the 
President on United States efforts to prevent nuclear 
proliferation originally required by Section 601 of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
    The committee believes that this report has been a vital 
source of information for the Congress in evaluating efforts of 
the United States to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The committee was therefore surprised to have been informed by 
the State Department that the Department now believes that, 
pursuant to Public Law 104-66, the Federal Reports Elimination 
and Sunset Act of 1995, the requirement to submit this report 
lapsed in 2000. The committee notes that the State Department 
submitted the annual report as late as April 2007, for the 2006 
reporting year, and also submitted reports for 2005, 2004, 
2003, 2002, and 2001. The committee also notes that the 
President, as part of Executive Order 13313 (July 31, 2003), 
further directed that the Secretary of State ``shall submit.'' 
the ``Report on Nuclear Nonproliferation, consistent with 
section 601(a) of Public Law 95-242, as amended by Public Law 
103-236 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).'' Nevertheless, the committee 
includes this provision to ensure that the committee and the 
Congress continue to benefit from the timely information and 
analysis that the report promises.
    This section permits the report to be submitted by March 1 
of each year, and would permit the report to be submitted by 
June 1 in the first year of a new administration. The section 
adds a requirement to the original language that the President 
report on steps being taken to ensure that the IAEA safeguards 
system is adequately funded. This section consolidates other 
reporting requirements on nonproliferation, and permits the 
President to cite other reports by reference rather than 
reprinting duplicative information in this report.
SECTION 324. AMENDED ADDITIONAL REPORTS ON NONPROLIFERATION

    This section requires the Director of National Intelligence 
to keep the Committees on Armed Services in both House, as well 
as the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, 
fully and currently informed on activities to prevent 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and 
their means of delivery, as well as on the relevant actions of 
foreign nations.
SECTION 325. CONSOLIDATION OF REPORTS ON NON-PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH 
        ASIA

    This section requires that the annual report on 
nonproliferation in South Asia to be submitted by April 1 of 
each year, pursuant to Section 620F(c) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, include a description of the efforts of 
the United States Government to achieve objectives on nuclear 
and missile nonproliferation in the region, as described in 
Section 1601 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY 
2003, the progress made toward achieving such objectives, and 
the likelihood that such objectives will be achieved within the 
following year. This avoids the need for a separate report on 
those efforts.
    This section is largely similarly to Section 2236 from the 
Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 
(S. 600 in the 109th Congress), which was ordered to be 
reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations by a vote of 18-
0 on March 3, 2005.
SECTION 326. REPEAL OF ANNUAL REPORT ON RUSSIAN DEBT REDUCTION FOR 
        NONPROLIFERATION

    This section repeals the annual report on actions to 
implement a program to direct reduced debt owed by Russia 
toward nonproliferation programs.
SECTION 327. ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS OF NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 
        FUND PROJECTS

    This section requires three assessments from the 
Comptroller General of projects carried out, and submitted for 
consideration by, the State Department's Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund.

Title IV--Nuclear Safeguards and Supply

    This title is virtually the same as S. 1138, the Nuclear 
Safeguards and Supply Act of 2007, which was ordered to be 
reported favorably by the Foreign Relations Committee on June 
27, 2007 (see Senate Report 110-151). The only changes are the 
updating of the short title, the definition of ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' for purposes of this title, an 
update to the fiscal year for which funds are authorized for a 
voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to refurbish or possibly replace the IAEA Safeguards 
Analytical Laboratory, and the addition of a new section on a 
safeguards cadre program.
    The Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act of 2008 augments 
existing U.S. activities in support of IAEA safeguards and 
provide authority to the President to negotiate agreements or 
create mechanisms for the supply of nuclear fuel to countries 
forgoing enrichment and reprocessing and meeting certain 
criteria.
SECTION 401. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be referred to as the ``Nuclear Safeguards 
and Supply Act of 2008.''
SECTION 402. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED

    This section defines the term ``appropriate congressional 
committees,'' for the purposes of this title, as the Committee 
on Foreign Relations in the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs in the House of Representatives.

Subtitle A--Nuclear Safeguards and Nuclear Fuel Supply

    This subtitle on provides a set of findings, stipulates 
both existing and new policies of the United States with 
respect to assurances of nuclear fuel supply, increases 
budgetary support for the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory, and calls for an enhanced safeguards technology 
development program.
SECTION 411. FINDINGS

    Sections 411(1)-(19) provide important findings. In the 
past two years, major studies, both in the United States and 
under the auspices of the IAEA, have highlighted critical 
questions confronting the world as it contemplates the nuclear 
future and begins to examine proposals for nuclear supply that 
would use nonproliferation criteria as conditions of supply. 
Particularly significant was the 2005 Report of the IAEA 
Experts Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel 
Cycle, which was chaired by the former Deputy Director General 
of the IAEA for Safeguards, Dr. Bruno Pellaud. The Experts 
Group noted:


          Two primary deciding factors dominate all assessments 
        of multilateral nuclear approaches, namely ``Assurance 
        of non-proliferation'' and ``Assurance of supply and 
        services''. Both are recognised overall objectives for 
        governments and for the NPT community. In practice, 
        each of these two objectives can seldom be achieved 
        fully on its own. History has shown that it is even 
        more difficult to find an optimum arrangement that will 
        satisfy both objectives at the same time.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\See http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/
infcirc640.pdf, hereinafter, ``Pellaud Report.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This statement highlights the difficulty that will confront 
the international community as it works to create international 
fuel supply mechanisms. The committee notes that many supply-
side assurance efforts have been initiated in the past. 
Importantly, Congress proposed in the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Act (NNPA) of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.) that the President 
create and submit to Congress such mechanisms as ``initial fuel 
assurances, including creation of an interim stockpile'' of low 
enriched uranium fuel ``to be available for transfer pursuant 
to a sales arrangement to nations which adhere to strict 
policies designed to prevent proliferation when and if 
necessary to ensure continuity of nuclear fuel supply to such 
nations.''\23\ Congress also mandated that the provision of 
this fuel be equivalent to generation of up to ``100,000 MW(e) 
years of power from light water reactors.''\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\22 U.S.C. 3223(b).
    \24\Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet serious negotiations were never pursued for such a 
proposal by the executive branch. Over the next 20 years, the 
IAEA and other expert groups also initiated studies on fuel 
assurances and nonproliferation. These included the IAEA study 
on Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers, the International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, the Expert Group on 
International Plutonium Storage, and the IAEA Committee on 
Assurances of Supply. No countries substantially changed their 
nuclear policies as a result of these efforts. Consensus was 
difficult to achieve because of the declining interest in (and 
in some cases opposition to) nuclear power and a failure to 
agree on what criteria would govern supply assurances.
    With regard to nonproliferation factors that should 
influence the evaluation of any proposals for assurance of 
supply, the Pellaud report noted:


          The non-proliferation value of a multilateral 
        arrangement is measured by the various proliferation 
        risks associated with a nuclear facility, whether 
        national or multilateral. These risks include the 
        diversion of materials from [a multilateral nuclear 
        approach or MNA] (reduced through the presence of a 
        multinational team), the theft of fissile materials, 
        the diffusion of proscribed or sensitive technologies 
        from MNAs to unauthorised entities, the development of 
        clandestine parallel programmes and the breakout 
        scenario. The latter refers to the case of the host 
        country ``breaking out,'' for example, by expelling 
        multinational staff, withdrawing from the NPT (and 
        thereby terminating its safeguards agreement), and 
        operating the multilateral facility without 
        international control.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\Pellaud Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee strongly concurs with this assessment, and 
notes that proposals for the creation of supply mechanisms must 
directly address these issues at the point of their creation, 
rather than offer only vague understandings that may result in 
later difficulties. Thus, section 411(16) concludes:


          Any proposals for the creation of bilateral or 
        multilateral assurances of supply mechanisms must take 
        into account, and be achieved in a manner that 
        minimizes, the risk of nuclear proliferation or 
        regional arms races and maximizes adherence to 
        international nonproliferation regimes, including, in 
        particular, the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers 
        Group (NSG), and the IAEA Additional Protocol.


    There appears to be wide international support for limiting 
enrichment and reprocessing, based on supply incentives. For 
instance, the 2004 Report of the United Nations Secretary-
General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
found (and section 411(6) notes) that ``creating incentives for 
countries to forego the development of domestic uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities is essential, and that 
such suggestions, if implemented swiftly and firmly, offer a 
real chance to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack, whether by 
states or non-state actors, and that such proposals should be 
put into effect without delay.''\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\See http://www.un.org/secureworld/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee strongly believes that any mechanism 
developed for the provision of nuclear fuel should be country-
neutral, should be based on solid nonproliferation criteria, 
and should, to the maximum degree possible, reinforce the 
existing safeguards system and prevent additional proliferation 
by limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. Even if 
a recipient state were to forgo enrichment and reprocessing, 
the supply of nuclear fuel to that state would require 
effective safeguards measures to be in place. Should an 
international fuel storage facility be located in a nuclear-
weapon state, it would be preferable from a nonproliferation 
standpoint for comprehensive safeguards to be applied to that 
facility, so as to maintain strict accounting for all fuel set 
aside for non-nuclear weapons states.
SECTION 412. DECLARATION OF POLICY

    Section 412(a) continues U.S. policies already enacted in 
the NNPA, namely that it is the policy of the United States:


          (1) to create mechanisms to provide adequate supplies 
        of nuclear fuel consistent with the provisions of the 
        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, in particular 
        title I of such Act (22 U.S.C. 3221 et seq.);

          (2) to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system 
        consistent with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1978, in particular title II of 
        such Act (22 U.S.C. 3241 et seq.); and

          (3) to cooperate with other nations, international 
        institutions, and private organizations to assist in 
        the development of non-nuclear energy resources under 
        title V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 
        (22 U.S.C. 3261 et seq.).


    The committee notes that it has long been U.S. policy, as 
embodied in the NNPA, to create assurances of nuclear supply, 
to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, and to work to 
provide nations seeking new sources of electricity with non-
nuclear options. Much work is already done under the U.S. 
Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS).
    Section 412(b) would enact into law the policy announced in 
President Bush's speech at the National Defense University on 
February 11, 2004:


          The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure 
        that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to 
        fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states 
        renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and 
        reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to 
        harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-
4.html.


    Thus, section 412(b) makes it the policy of the United 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States


          [T]o discourage the development of enrichment and 
        reprocessing capabilities in additional countries, 
        encourage the creation of bilateral and multilateral 
        assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and ensure that all 
        supply mechanisms operate in strict accordance with the 
        IAEA safeguards system and do not result in any 
        additional unmet verification burdens for the system.
SECTION 413. SAFEGUARDS ANALYTICAL LABORATORY

    This section would authorize, in addition to the amount 
requested by the President for U.S. voluntary contributions to 
the IAEA for FY 2009, $10 million for the refurbishment or 
possible replacement of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory (SAL).
    Committee staff and, on one occasion, Senator Lugar, have 
visited SAL. Each time, staff was impressed with the level of 
professionalism and dedication of the laboratory staff but was 
troubled by the apparent state of the facility. Located in 
Seibersdorf, Austria, outside Vienna, the SAL provides 
analytical support to the IAEA Department of Safeguards by 
receiving samples of materials taken during inspections at key 
measurement points of the nuclear fuel cycle for destructive 
chemical and isotopic analysis. This complements physical 
inspections and measurements performed by IAEA inspectors in 
nuclear facilities. Such technical analysis capabilities help 
the IAEA to assure that nuclear material under IAEA safeguards 
is not diverted to military purposes and, at times, to locate 
undeclared nuclear material. When SAL is unable to perform 
certain types of analysis, or when increased verification of 
results is needed, SAL will often involve its Network of 
Analytical Laboratories (in other IAEA member states) to assist 
it in its work.
    During staff site visits, which occurred in February 2004 
and in October and November 2006, staff found that considerable 
investment is needed for the laboratory to meet future IAEA 
requirements. The SAL's workload is growing, laboratory 
infrastructure is aging, and IAEA requirements have become more 
demanding. While initial plans have been made for laboratory 
enhancement, there is no escaping the fact that, as more 
countries implement IAEA safeguards and additional protocols, 
many more nuclear samples are coming to the SAL for analysis.
    Because of the way the laboratory's responsibilities have 
grown over the years, the facilities are not optimal: 
facilities are dispersed throughout the Seibersdorf site, which 
presents a security problem; almost all of the laboratory space 
is rented; the nuclear chemistry lab is 31 years old and has 
outdated infrastructure; and overall, the facility lacks space 
to deal with demands of the future.
    The laboratory also has significant personnel issues that 
stem from rules governing U.N. agencies. The rules create 
problems for the SAL in finding and keeping experienced 
professional staff. As experienced technicians retire, the SAL 
has been unable to replace them with experienced staff, largely 
because the IAEA has been unwilling to provide long-term 
contracts to laboratory personnel.
    The committee finds that, while certain personnel policies 
may be required for most U.N. agencies, the tremendously 
complicated and technical work of IAEA safeguards verification 
represents an especially critical function since that work 
directly enhances international nuclear accountability and 
transparency through safeguards, which in turn allow nations to 
make decisions relating to their future peace and security. The 
IAEA and its Board of Governors should reevaluate staffing 
policies at the SAL, with an eye toward improving staff 
retention through more long-term contracts, increasing 
budgetary support, and ensuring the effective operation of the 
SAL well into the future. Current funding and equipment 
planning is not sufficient to meet these goals, and attention 
to these problems is an urgent matter.
    Significantly, previous years'' State Department budget 
requests have noted that a goal of U.S. contributions to the 
IAEA was ``[s]trengthening quality control and sensitivity of 
analyses by the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and the 
Network of Analytical Laboratories, and reviewing needs for 
possible refurbishment or replacement of SAL.''\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\See http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60647.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Section 413(b), therefore, requires the Secretary of State 
to submit a report to Congress not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act on the refurbishment or 
possible replacement of the SAL. In such a report, the 
committee expects the Secretary to examine equipment, 
personnel, and budgetary issues associated with the SAL, 
including estimates of the total costs of completely 
refurbishing the SAL or replacing it.
SECTION 414. SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

    This section requires the Secretary of State, in 
cooperation with the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of 
the National Laboratories and in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, 
to pursue a program to strengthen technical safeguards research 
and development; to increase resources, identify near-term 
technology goals, formulate a technology roadmap, and improve 
interagency coordination on safeguards technology; and to 
examine proliferation resistance in the design and development 
of all future nuclear energy systems.
    The committee notes that much of this work is already done 
under POTAS, but that significant research done by various non-
governmental organizations has called for greater emphasis in 
this area. In particular, the May 2005 Report of the Nuclear 
Energy Study Group of the American Physical Society Panel on 
Public Affairs, titled ``Nuclear Power and Proliferation 
Resistance: Securing Benefits, Limiting Risks,'' contained 
important recommendations for future safeguards work.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\See http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/
proliferation-resistance/upload/proliferation.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The report noted:


          The current Safeguards program largely implements or 
        transfers technologies that are the result of [research 
        and development] carried out 10-20 years ago. 
        Revitalizing Safeguards [research and development] is 
        the most significant technical investment that can 
        enhance the proliferation resistance of nuclear power 
        within the next five years.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECTION 415. SAFEGUARDS CADRE PROGRAM.

    This section authorizes the Secretary of State, in 
cooperation with the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of 
the United States Department of Energy National Laboratories 
and Technology Centers, to establish a program to create a 
dedicated cadre of professionals assigned to the task of 
promoting, strengthening, and providing technical assistance to 
the IAEA safeguards system. Subsection (b) provides for certain 
requirements for ensuring that the careers of detailees to the 
IAEA are in no way damaged by their detail.

Subtitle B--Nuclear Fuel Supply

    This subtitle is identical to the corresponding title in S. 
1138, the Nuclear Safeguards and Supply Act. It provides 
Presidential authority, consistent with existing law, for 
negotiation of bilateral and multilateral assurances of nuclear 
fuel supply to states meeting certain criteria, requires a 
report on the establishment of an International Nuclear Fuel 
Authority, and contains a sense of the Senate provision on IAEA 
activities for nuclear fuel supply.
SECTION 421. AUTHORITY FOR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FUEL 
        SUPPLY MECHANISMS.

    Section 421(a) authorizes the President to create, 
consistent with title I of the NNPA and other applicable 
provisions of law, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to 
provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to those countries 
and groups of countries that adhere to policies designed to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that decide to 
forgo a national uranium enrichment program and spent nuclear 
fuel reprocessing facilities. The committee recognizes that 
forgoing enrichment and reprocessing strikes many countries as 
restricting rights they understand themselves to have acquired 
by ratifying or acceding to the NPT. Section 421(a) does not 
require countries to foreswear any rights. Rather, they must 
refrain from investing in sensitive fuel cycle facilities. The 
committee believes that there would be little value added to 
the existing nonproliferation regime by any assurance of 
nuclear fuel supply that did not rest on at least this basic 
assurance of nonproliferation. Notwithstanding such assurances, 
moreover, as a general matter, the committee believes that 
enrichment and reprocessing transfers should be denied to 
states that do not already operate full-scale enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities.
    Section 421(a) would, again, provide a statutory embodiment 
of the President's policy regarding the supply of nuclear fuel 
and the proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technology 
announced on February 11, 2004. It is also written so as to 
require consistency with the NNPA. Many proposals for the 
expansion of nuclear power have included substantial programs 
for international cooperation on reprocessing. While the 
nuclear fuel cycle envisioned by some more than 50 years ago 
included substantial re-use of plutonium in fast neutron 
reactors, many became concerned regarding the inherent 
proliferation risks posed by the use of such reactors and 
reprocessing. Today, some proposals contemplate expanded use of 
long-lived, separated actinides, including plutonium, in new, 
more sophisticated fast neutron reactors. Such reactors appear 
to be many years from being commercially viable. Several 
important studies, including a recent study commissioned by the 
Keystone Center, have also noted:
    No commercial reprocessing of nuclear fuel is currently 
undertaken in the U.S. . . . while reprocessing of commercial 
spent fuel has been pursued for several decades in Europe, 
overall fuel cycle economics have not supported a change in the 
U.S. from a ``once-through'' fuel cycle. Furthermore, the long-
term availability of uranium at reasonable cost suggests that 
reprocessing of spent fuel will not be cost-effective in the 
foreseeable future.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\See http://www.keystone.org/spp/documents/FinalReport--NJFF6--
12--2007(1).pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given this assessment of the domestic nuclear picture, and 
recalling the conclusions of the 2005 PAG on nonproliferation, 
it is unclear when reprocessing technologies would be prudent 
to advocate as a part of assured fuel supply to certain states. 
Given the current supply of natural uranium, the undemonstrated 
nature of certain new technologies, and uncertainties regarding 
the proliferation resistance of new fast neutron reactor 
designs, the committee believes it prudent at this time to 
offer instead light water thermal reactors, and a supply of 
low-enriched uranium for them.
    The committee notes that the administration has already 
taken steps toward just such a mechanism, with an announcement 
by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) that it 
has awarded a contract to Wesdyne International and Nuclear 
Fuel Services, Inc., to down-blend 17.4 metric tons of U.S. 
highly enriched uranium and store the resulting low-enriched 
uranium for a reliable fuel supply program.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\See http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2007/PR--2007-06-
29--NA-07-26.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The material would be converted, by 2010, to a stockpile of 
some 290 metric tons of low-enriched uranium fuel. According to 
the NNSA, ``[t]he fuel will be available for use in civilian 
reactors by nations in good standing with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that have good nonproliferation 
credentials and are not pursuing uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This proposal was first announced by Secretary of Energy 
Samuel Bodman at the 49th General Conference of the IAEA in 
2005, when he stated that ``the U.S. Department of Energy will 
reserve up to 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium for an 
IAEA verifiable assured supply arrangement.''\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\See http://www
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee notes the importance of such progress. This 
title envisions such initiatives as a part of assurance of 
supply mechanisms, instead of simply authorizing additional 
money to the IAEA to achieve such purposes. While money for an 
IAEA-administered nuclear fuel bank may well be needed, the 
provision of materials, particularly down-blended former 
weapons materials, also supports a fuel assurance policy and 
demonstrates U.S. nonproliferation leadership by permanently 
removing such materials from our weapons program.
    Section 421(b) provides a set of factors that the President 
shall take into account when creating mechanisms for fuel 
supply under this title. Section 421(b) is intended to be a 
partial, not exhaustive, list of relevant criteria that should 
inform decisions regarding to which nations nuclear supply 
should be extended. Importantly, this provision states that 
these factors shall be taken into account ``to the maximum 
extent practicable.'' To the extent that one or more factors 
included in this section prove impracticable, or that other 
factors should be taken into account given a particular 
country's circumstances, the provision is intended to permit 
flexibility.
    The committee notes that no aspect of the creation of 
multilateral or bilateral mechanisms assuring nuclear fuel 
supply will be more difficult than the criteria for access to 
that supply. Section 421(b) sets forth factors the President 
shall examine in addition to the basic criteria related to 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons or fuel cycle facilities:


          (1) The economic rationale for a country or countries 
        pursuing nuclear power, including existing sources of 
        power for such country or countries.

          (2) Whether such country or countries are in 
        compliance with their obligations under applicable 
        safeguards agreements and additional protocols with the 
        IAEA.

          (3) Whether or not the development in such country or 
        countries of the complete nuclear fuel cycle would 
        impose new, costly IAEA safeguards measures that cannot 
        be supported by current IAEA safeguards implementation 
        in such country or countries, such that there is a 
        reasonable assurance that all nuclear materials in such 
        country or countries are for peaceful purposes and that 
        there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities 
        in such country or countries.

          (4) An evaluation of the proliferation dangers of 
        such country or countries developing nuclear fuel cycle 
        facilities for the production and disposition of source 
        and special nuclear materials.

          (5) Whether or not the country or countries that 
        would be recipients of nuclear fuel or other assistance 
        provided by the United States are or have ever been 
        designated as state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to 
        section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
        U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act 
        (22 U.S.C. 2780), or section 6(j) of the Export 
        Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)).

          (6) If done under a bilateral supply mechanism, 
        whether IAEA safeguards are being applied or will be 
        applied to any facility, site, or location where 
        international nuclear fuel supply activities are to be 
        carried out.

          (7) Whether, in the case of a multilateral supply 
        mechanism, procedures are in place to ensure that when 
        United States funds are used or when United States 
        nuclear materials are to be used, exported, or 
        reexported, all applicable provisions of United States 
        law are followed.

          (8) Whether the recipient country or countries of any 
        fuel provided under this Act are or will become a 
        party, prior to the commencement of any nuclear fuel 
        supply under this Act, to--

                  (A) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

                  (B) in the case of a non-nuclear-weapon State 
                Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
                a comprehensive safeguards agreement that is in 
                force, pursuant to which the IAEA has the right 
                and obligation to ensure that safeguards are 
                applied, in accordance with the terms of the 
                agreement, on all source or special fissionable 
                material in all peaceful nuclear activities 
                within the territory of such country, under its 
                jurisdiction, or carried out under its control 
                anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of 
                verifying that such material is not diverted to 
                nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
                devices;

                  (C) an additional protocol;

                  (D) the Convention on Nuclear Safety, done at 
                Vienna September 20, 1994, and entered into 
                force October 24, 1996;

                  (E) the Convention on Physical Protection of 
                Nuclear Materials, done at Vienna October 26, 
                1979, and entered into force February 8, 1987; 
                and

                  (F) the Convention on Supplementary 
                Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna 
                September 12, 1997.

          (9) The extent to which the recipient country or 
        countries have or will have prior to the commencement 
        of any nuclear fuel supply under this Act effective and 
        enforceable export controls regarding nuclear and dual-
        use nuclear technology and other sensitive materials 
        comparable to those maintained by the United States.

          (10) The conformity of the safety and regulatory 
        regimes in the recipient country or countries regarding 
        the nuclear power sector with similar United States 
        laws and regulations.

          (11) The history of safety or environmental problems 
        associated with any nuclear site, facility, or location 
        in the recipient country or countries in the past, and 
        the potential for future safety or environmental 
        problems or issues in connection with the civilian 
        nuclear power development plan of the country or 
        countries.

          (12) Whether the recipient country or countries have 
        resident within them any persons or entities involved 
        in the illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons, nuclear 
        materials, or dual-use nuclear technology.

          (13) Whether the recipient country or countries have 
        or will have sufficiently open and transparent civilian 
        power markets such that United States firms may benefit 
        from any such bilateral or multilateral supply 
        mechanisms.


    The committee notes that one of these factors, section 
421(b)(7), requires an examination by the President of 
compliance with relevant U.S. laws when providing funds or 
materials for international fuel assurances. For example, 
United States law would appear to prohibit supply in cases 
where ultimate use of material is to be by a state sponsor of 
terrorism. Section 421(b)(5) would also provide that the 
President take into account whether state sponsors of terrorism 
would be involved in any assurance of supply. In view of the 
complexity presented by this question, the committee hopes the 
administration will initiate consultations with the committee 
regarding its own analysis of U.S. laws and regulations at the 
earliest possible time, so as to permit clearer understandings 
of the various problems that may present themselves.
    Section 421(c) provides a rule of construction, stipulating 
that nothing in this Act shall be construed to provide any 
authority with respect to bilateral cooperation with another 
country or countries or any international organization or 
organizations in atomic energy that is additional to the 
authority provided under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) and all other applicable laws and 
regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. 
This provision guards against an overbroad reading of the Act's 
terms to obviate restrictions in current law regarding nuclear 
cooperation with other nations.
SECTION 422. REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FUEL 
        AUTHORITY.

    This section requires a new report from the executive 
branch regarding the creation of an International Nuclear Fuel 
Authority or INFA, which Congress first required in section 
104(a)(1) of the NNPA (22 U.S.C. 3223(a)(1)). In addition to 
the factors that were reported many years ago, this section 
would call for an updated and expanded report that would take 
into account, under subsection (b), new elements:


          (1) United States laws and regulations that could be 
        affected by the establishment of an INFA.

          (2) What the cost to the United States Government 
        could be of establishing an INFA.

          (3) Potential locations for the INFA.

          (4) The potential for creating a fuel supply bank 
        under the control of the INFA.

          (5) Nuclear materials that should be placed within 
        the control of the INFA, including which nuclear 
        activities should be carried out by the INFA for the 
        production of nuclear fuel or for use as fuel.

          (6) Whether the INFA should provide nuclear fuel 
        services to recipient countries.

          (7) Whether a multilateral supply mechanism, such as 
        the INFA, is, in the judgment of the President, 
        superior to bilateral mechanism for nuclear fuel 
        supply.

          (8) How such an international organization should 
        operate to preserve freedom of markets in nuclear fuel 
        and avoid undue interference in the efficient operation 
        of the international nuclear fuel market.

          (9) The degree and extent to which such a 
        multilateral supply mechanism should be under the 
        control of, or a subordinate organization within, the 
        IAEA, including whether establishing such an INFA would 
        be superior or preferable to allowing the IAEA, 
        pursuant to Article IX of the Statute of the IAEA, to 
        become an international broker of nuclear fuel and 
        nuclear fuel services, including with respect to an 
        examination of the costs to IAEA Member States of 
        effectively carrying out clauses (1) through (4) of 
        paragraph (H) of such Article.

          (10) The likely receptivity of the major countries 
        involved in the supply of nuclear fuel and nuclear 
        services to the creation of a multilateral supply 
        mechanism such as the INFA or one under the IAEA.

SECTION 423. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON IAEA FUEL SUPPLY.

    This section provides a sense of the Senate on an IAEA-
administered fuel bank. It concludes that

          [A] combination of public and private efforts, 
        including the provisions of law previously enacted in 
        the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 
        3201 et seq.) and other applicable laws, initiatives 
        supported by the President, efforts provided for by 
        private groups, and the recommendations of many 
        relevant studies, such as those cited in section 101, 
        will be necessary to effectively and flexibly manage 
        the growth of civilian nuclear power in a manner that 
        does not result in undue burdens on the IAEA safeguards 
        system.

Title V--Global Pathogen Surveillance

    This title matches S. 1687, the Global Pathogen 
Surveillance Act of 2007, which the committee ordered to be 
reported on favorably on June 27, 2007.
SECTION 501. SHORT TITLE

    This title is called the ``Global Pathogen Surveillance Act 
of 2008.''
SECTION 502. FINDINGS; PURPOSE

    This section lays out the findings and purposes of this 
Act.
SECTION 503. DEFINITIONS

    This section defines five terms of art and sets forth one 
routine definition. The definition of ``International Health 
Organization'' in definition (3) is meant to be illustrative, 
rather than exclusive; additional organizations to those cited 
in the definition may also qualify as international health 
organizations under the Act.
SECTION 504. ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE

    This section requires, in general, that assistance under 
the provisions of this Act be given only to those eligible 
developing countries that permit personnel from the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) to investigate infectious disease 
outbreaks on their territory and that provide pathogen 
surveillance data derived from such assistance to appropriate 
U.S. departments and agencies in addition to international 
health organizations. The committee intends that this 
requirement be met in a manner that does not reveal any 
classified information to persons not authorized to receive 
such information. Subsection (b) authorizes the Secretary of 
State to waive the limitation in subsection (a) if the 
Secretary determines that it is in the national interest of the 
United States to provide such a waiver.
SECTION 505. RESTRICTION

    This section restricts access by foreign nationals 
participating in programs authorized under this title to select 
agents that may be used as, or in, a biological weapon, except 
in a supervised and controlled setting. The committee does not 
believe that such a restriction will constrain foreign 
nationals from fully participating in various training and 
educational programs under this Act. Subsection (b) makes clear 
that this restriction may not be construed to limit the ability 
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to prescribe, 
through regulation, standards for the handling of a select 
agent or toxin or an overlap select agent or toxin.
SECTION 506. FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

    This section authorizes the Secretary of State to award 
fellowships to eligible nationals of eligible developing 
countries to pursue a master of public health degree or 
advanced public health training in epidemiology within the 
United States. Each fellow may also take courses of study at 
the CDC or at an equivalent facility on diagnosis and 
containment of likely bioterrorism agents. The committee 
believes that carefully chosen programs of this sort should be 
encouraged as they not only impart technical skills utilizing 
state-of-the-art technology, but also help cultivate the 
management and organizational skills of future leaders for 
developing country public health programs.
    Subsection (c) requires that fellows enter into an 
agreement with the Secretary of State under which the fellow 
will maintain satisfactory academic performance and, upon 
completing the education or training, will return to his or her 
country of nationality or last habitual residence (so long as 
it is an eligible developing country) and complete at least 
four years of employment in a public health position in the 
government or a non-governmental, not-for-profit entity in that 
country. Alternatively, with the Secretary's consent, the 
fellow can complete part or all of this four-year requirement 
with an international health organization. If the fellow is 
unable to meet these requirements, he or she will be required 
to reimburse the U.S. government for the value of the 
assistance provided; the Secretary may waive the limitation in 
this subsection if the Secretary determines that it is in the 
national interest of the United States to provide such a 
waiver.
    Subsection (d) authorizes the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
to enter into an agreement with any eligible developing country 
to establish the procedures for implementing the program.
    Subsection (e) allows for the participation of U.S. 
citizens on a case-by-case basis, if the Secretary of State 
determines that it is in the national interest of the United 
States to provide for such participation. Such participants 
would be required, upon completion of education or training, to 
complete at least five years of employment in a public health 
position in an eligible developing country or at an 
international health organization.
    Subsection (f) allows the Secretary, with the concurrence 
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), to use 
existing HHS programs to provide the education and training 
described in this section, if the requirements of subsections 
(b), (c) and (d) will be substantially met under such existing 
programs.
SECTION 507. IN-COUNTRY TRAINING IN LABORATORY TECHNIQUES AND DISEASE 
        AND SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE

    This section authorizes the provision of short-term 
training courses outside the United States for laboratory 
technicians and public health officials in laboratory 
techniques relating to the identification, diagnosis, and 
tracking of pathogens responsible for infectious disease 
outbreaks. This training may take place in overseas facilities 
of the CDC or the Overseas Medical Research Units of the 
Department of Defense, as appropriate. Any such training shall 
be coordinated with existing programs and activities of 
international health organizations. Such training courses offer 
the opportunity for public health personnel to train in their 
indigenous environment, utilizing the available technology.
    Subsection (b) authorizes short training courses, which 
shall be conducted either via the Internet or in appropriate 
facilities located in a foreign country, on disease and 
syndrome surveillance techniques. Using disease and syndrome 
surveillance, the emergence of a disease in a population is 
monitored based on geographic patterns of clinician-reported 
patient complaints and signs derived from physical examination 
and laboratory data.
SECTION 508. ASSISTANCE FOR THE PURCHASE AND MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC 
        HEALTH LABORATORY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

    This section authorizes the President to furnish assistance 
to eligible developing countries to purchase and maintain 
public health laboratory equipment and supplies that are needed 
to collect, analyze, and identify expeditiously a broad array 
of pathogens, including mutant strains, which may cause disease 
outbreaks or be used in a biological weapon. The equipment and 
supplies are to be appropriate for use in the intended 
geographic area and compatible with general standards set forth 
by the WHO and, as appropriate, the CDC. They must not be 
defense articles or articles that would be subject to the Arms 
Export Control Act or likely be barred or subject to special 
conditions under the Export Administration Act of 1979 if 
purchased in the United States. This section does not exempt 
the exporting of goods or technology from compliance with 
applicable provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
(as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).
    Subsection (e) provides that preference should be given to 
the purchase of equipment and supplies of U.S. manufacture. 
Subsection (f) requires that the eligible developing country 
agree to properly house, maintain, support, secure, and 
maximize the use of equipment and supplies provided under this 
section.
SECTION 509. ASSISTANCE FOR IMPROVED COMMUNICATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
        INFORMATION

    This section authorizes the President to provide assistance 
to eligible developing countries to purchase and maintain 
communications equipment and information technology to 
effectively and quickly collect, analyze, and transmit public 
health information within and among developing countries and to 
and from international health organizations. The requirements 
and limitations applied to assistance in section 8 are also 
applied to section 9. In addition, subsection (f) authorizes 
the President to provide assistance to international health 
organizations to facilitate standardization in the reporting of 
public health information.
SECTION 510. ASSIGNMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH PERSONNEL TO UNITED STATES 
        MISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

    This section authorizes the heads of Executive branch 
departments and agencies to assign public health personnel to 
U.S. diplomatic missions and international health organizations 
when requested, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State 
and of the employee concerned, for the purpose of enhancing 
disease and pathogen surveillance efforts in developing 
countries. The Department of State is authorized, under certain 
circumstances, to reimburse an agency or department for the 
costs incurred by reason of the detail of such personnel.
SECTION 511. EXPANSION OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES 
        ABROAD

    This section mandates the expansion of the overseas 
laboratories and other related facilities of the CDC and the 
Department of Defense, subject to the availability of 
appropriations. This expansion applies to both numbers of 
personnel and the scope of operations. The intent of this 
provision is to further the goals of global pathogen 
surveillance and monitoring. Overseas CDC and Department of 
Defense facilities, working with host governments, play a 
crucial role in enhancing the capability of developing 
countries to monitor disease outbreaks and possible biological 
weapons attacks. The committee intends that the expansion of 
CDC and Department of Defense overseas laboratory activities be 
undertaken in close cooperation with host countries, to benefit 
their well-being and national security as well as that of the 
United States.
    Subsection (b) provides that the expansion be carried out 
in such a manner as to foster cooperation and avoid duplication 
between and among laboratories. Subsection (c) provides that 
the expansion may not detract from the established core 
missions of the laboratories or compromise the security of 
those laboratories.
SECTION 512. ASSISTANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL HEALTH NETWORKS AND EXPANSION 
        OF FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY TRAINING PROGRAMS

    This section authorizes the President to provide assistance 
for the purposes of enhancing the surveillance and reporting 
capabilities of the WHO and existing international regional and 
international health networks and for developing new 
international regional and international health networks, as a 
means of continuing to expand the reach of a global 
surveillance network.
    Subsection (b) authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to establish new country or regional international 
Field Epidemiology Training Programs in eligible developing 
countries. These programs offer two years of intense training 
for health professionals in entry- or mid-level positions to 
help build up indigenous capacity in epidemiology and public 
health.
SECTION 513. REPORTS

    This section requires the Secretary of State to submit a 
report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, not later than 90 days after the 
date of enactment of this Act, on the implementation of 
programs under this Act, including an estimate of the level of 
funding required to carry out such programs at a sufficient 
level.
SECTION 514. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

    This section authorizes appropriations for carrying out 
provisions of this title for Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009. The 
section authorizes $115 million in total. Of this amount, $40 
million is authorized for FY 2008 and $75 million for FY 2009. 
Subsection (b) provides that the amounts appropriated pursuant 
to subsection (a) are authorized to remain available until 
expended. Subsection (c) provides that not more than 10 percent 
of the amount appropriated for FY 2008 may be obligated before 
the date on which a report is submitted, or required to be 
submitted, whichever first occurs, under section 13.

Title VI--International Space Station Payments

    This title matches S. 3103, the International Space Station 
Payments Act of 2008, which was submitted by Senators Biden and 
Lugar, by request, on June 9, 2008.
SECTION 601. SHORT TITLE

    Provides that this title may be cited as the 
``International Space Station Payments Act of 2008''.
SECTION 602. AUTHORITY TO MAKE CERTAIN EXTRAORDINARY PAYMENTS IN 
        CONNECTION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION.

    The administration has informed the committee that this 
legislation is necessary now so that NASA can contract for 
space on additional International Space Station missions and 
Russia can build the necessary additional Soyuz vehicles. The 
Russian vehicles provide transportation and, if necessary, 
rescue services for the Space Station. There is a 3-year time 
lag between when NASA signs a contract and when Russia 
completes the needed vehicle for a Space Station mission.
    The NASA language includes provisions to encourage the 
space industry in the United States. It does not authorize the 
use of Russia's Progress vehicle for cargo deliveries after 
2011, and it does not authorize use of the Soyuz vehicle for 
crew transportation after Orion--the successor to the Space 
Shuttle--is fully operational. This section also bars continued 
use of the Soyuz vehicle if a U.S. commercial provider 
``demonstrates the capability to meet mission requirements of 
the International Space Station.''

                            V. Cost Estimate

    Rule XXVI, paragraph 11(a) of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires that committee reports on bills or joint 
resolutions contain a cost estimate for such legislation. To 
date, the committee has not received the Congressional Budget 
Office cost estimate.

                  VI. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact

    Rule XXVI, paragraph 11(b) of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate requires an evaluation of the regulatory impact of the 
bill. Section 121 increases the monetary thresholds for 
notification of arms exports to Congress under section 36 of 
the Arms Export Control Act, and will therefore require minor 
modifications to existing regulations issued under the 
authority of Section 38 of that Act.

                      VII. Changes in Existing Law

    In compliance with Rule XXVI, paragraph 12 of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, 
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in 
italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 
roman).

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



PART II

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Chapter 2--Military Assistance

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    (f) Effective July 1, 1974, no defense article shall be 
furnished to any country on a grant basis unless such country 
shall have agreed that the net proceeds of sale received by 
such country in disposing of any weapon, weapons system, 
munition, aircraft, military boat, military vessel, or other 
implement of war received under this chapter will be paid to 
the United States Government and shall be available to pay all 
official costs of the United States Government payable in the 
currency of that country, including all costs relating to the 
financing of international educational and cultural exchange 
activities in which that country participates under the 
programs authorized by the Mutual Educational and Cultural 
Exchange Act of 1961. [In the case of items which were 
delivered prior to 1985, the] The President may waive the 
requirement that such net proceeds be paid to the United States 
Government if he determines that to do so is in the national 
interest of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 514. Stockpiling of Defense Articles for Foreign 
Countries.--(a) * * *
    (b)(1) The value of defense articles to be set aside, 
earmarked, reserved, or intended for use as war reserve stocks 
for allied or other foreign countries (other than for purposes 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or in the 
implementation of agreements with Israel) in stockpiles located 
in foreign countries may not exceed in any fiscal year an 
amount that is specified in security assistance authorizing 
legislation for that fiscal year.
    (2)(A) The value of such additions to stockpiles of defense 
articles in foreign countries shall not exceed $200,000,000 
[for each of fiscal years 2007 and 2008] for each of fiscal 
years 2009 and 2010.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (B) Of the amount specified in subparagraph (A) for a 
fiscal year, not more than $200,000,000 may be made available 
for stockpiles in the State of Israel.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 516. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.

    (a) Authorization.-- * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (f) Advance Notification to Congress for Transfer of 
Certain Excess Defense Articles.--
          (1) In general.--The President may not transfer 
        excess defense articles that are significant military 
        equipment (as defined in section 47(9) of the Arms 
        Export Control Act) or excess defense articles valued 
        (in terms of original acquisition cost) at $7,000,000 
        or more, under this section or under the Arms Export 
        Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) until 30 days 
        after the date on which the President has provided 
        notice of the proposed transfer to the congressional 
        committees specified in section 634A(a) in accordance 
        with procedures applicable to reprogramming 
        notifications under that section.
          (2) Contents.--Such notification shall include--
                  (A) a statement outlining the purposes for 
                which the article is being provided to the 
                country, including whether such article has 
                been previously provided to such country;
                  (B) an assessment of the impact of the 
                transfer on the military readiness of the 
                United States;
                  (C) an assessment of the impact of the 
                transfer on the national technology and 
                industrial base and, particularly, the impact 
                on opportunities of entities in the national 
                technology and industrial base to sell new or 
                used equipment to the countries to which such 
                articles are to be transferred[; and]
                  (D) for any proposed transfer of firearms 
                listed in category I of the United States 
                Munitions List that would require a license for 
                international export under section 36 of the 
                Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776)--
                          (i) an analysis of the impact of the 
                        23 proposed sale on efforts by the 
                        United States relating to the 
                        collection and destruction of excess 
                        small arms and light weapons; and
                          (ii) a detailed description of any 
                        provision or requirement for the 
                        recipient state to dispose of firearms 
                        that would become excess as a result of 
                        the proposed transfer; and
                  [(D)] (E) a statement describing the current 
                value of such article and the value of such 
                article at acquisition.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


        Chapter 5--International Military Education and Training

    Sec. 541. General Authority.--(a) The President is 
authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions consistent 
with this Act as the President may determine (but whenever 
feasible on a reimbursable basis), military education and 
training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign 
countries and comparable personnel of international 
organizations. Such civilian personnel shall include foreign 
governmental personnel of ministries other than ministries of 
defense, and may also include legislators and individuals who 
are not members of the government, if the military education 
and training would (i) contribute to responsible defense 
resource management, (ii) foster greater respect for and 
understanding of the principle of civilian control of the 
military, (iii) contribute to cooperation between military and 
law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotics law 
enforcement efforts, [or (iv)] (iv) improve military justice 
systems and procedures in accordance with internationally 
recognized human [rights.] rights, or (v) improve the 
protection of civilians, especially women and children, 
including those who are refugees or displaced persons. Such 
training and education may be provided through--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 542. Authorization.--[There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the President to carry out the purposes of this 
chapter $56,221,000 for the fiscal year 1986 and $56,221,000 
for the fiscal year 1987] There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the President to carry out the purposes of this 
chapter $91,500.000 for fiscal year 2009 and such sums as may 
be necessary for fiscal year 2010.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                   Chapter 6--Peacekeeping Operations

    Sec. 551. General Authority.--The President is authorized 
to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international 
organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may 
determine, for peacekeeping operations and other programs 
carried out in furtherance of the national security interests 
of the United States. [Such assistance may include 
reimbursement]
          (1) Reimbursements to the Department of Defense for 
        expenses incurred pursuant to section 7 of the United 
        Nations Participation Act of 1945, except that such 
        reimbursements may not exceed $5,000,000 in any fiscal 
        year unless a greater amount is specifically authorized 
        by this section.
          (2) Demining activities, clearance of unexploded 
        ordnance, destruction of small arms, light weapons, and 
        other conventional weapons, and related activities, 
        notwithstanding any other provision of law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


CHAPTER 9--NONPROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 584. INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL TRAINING.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 584A. GLOBAL PATHOGEN SECURITY PROGRAM.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish 
a program to combat bioterrorism world-wide by providing 
training, equipment, and financial and technical (including 
legal) assistance in such areas as biosecurity, biosafety, 
pathogen surveillance, and timely response to outbreaks of 
infectious disease, and by providing increased opportunity for 
scientists who possess expertise that could make a material 
contribution to the development, manufacture, or use of 
biological weapons to engage in remunerative careers that 
promote public health and safety.
    (b) Activities Included.--Activities in the program 
established pursuant to subsection (a) may include such 
activities as the Biosecurity Engagement Program of the Office 
of Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Department of State.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                                PART III


Chapter 1--General Provisions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 614. Special Authorities.--(a)[(1) The President may 
authorize the furnishing of assistance under this Act without 
regard to any provision of this Act, the Arms Export Control 
Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the 
United States, and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds 
for use under this Act, in furtherance of any of the purposes 
of this Act, when the President determines, and so notifies in 
writing the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 
that to do so is important to the security interests of the 
United States.] 
    (1) The President may authorize any assistance, sale, or 
other action under this Act, the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), or any other law that authorizes the 
furnishing of foreign assistance or the appropriation of funds 
for foreign assistance, without regard to any of the provisions 
described in subsection (b) if the President determines, and 
notifies the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations 
of the Senate and the Committees on Foreign Affairs and 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives in writing--
          (A) with respect to assistance or other actions under 
        chapter 2 or 5 of part II of this Act, or sales or 
        other actions under the Arms Export Control Act, that 
        to do so is vital to the national security interests of 
        the United States; and
          (B) with respect to other assistance or actions, that 
        to do so is important to the security interests of the 
        United States.
    [(2) The President may make sales, extend credit, and issue 
guarantees under the Arms Export Control Act, without regard to 
any provision of this Act, the Arms Export Control Act, any law 
relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, 
and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under 
the Arms Export Control Act, in furtherance of any of the 
purposes of such Act, when the President determines, and so 
notifies in writing the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, that to do so is vital to the national security 
interests of the United States.]
    [(3)] (2) Before exercising the authority granted in this 
subsection, the President shall consult with, and shall provide 
a written policy justification to, the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
    [(4)] (3)(A) The authority of this subsection may not be 
used in any fiscal year to authorize--
          (i) more than $750,000,000 in sales to be made under 
        the Arms Export Control Act;
          (ii) the use of more than $250,000,000 of funds made 
        available for use under this Act or the Arms Export 
        Control Act; and
          (iii) the use of more than $100,000,000 of foreign 
        currencies accruing under this Act or any other law.
    (B) If the authority of this subsection is used both to 
authorize a sale under the Arms Export Control Act and to 
authorize funds to be used under the Arms Export Control Act or 
under this Act with respect to the financing of that sale, then 
the use of the funds shall be counted against the limitation in 
subparagraph (A)(ii) and the portion, if any, of the sale which 
is not so financed shall be counted against the limitation in 
subparagraph (A)(i).
    (C) Not more than [$50,000,000] $75,000,000 of the 
$250,000,000 limitation provided in subparagraph (A)(ii) may be 
allocated to any one country in any fiscal year unless that 
country is a victim of active aggression, and not more than 
$500,000,000 of the aggregate limitation of $1,000,000,000 
provided in subparagraphs (A)(i) and (A)(ii) may be allocated 
to any one country in any fiscal year.
    [(5)] (4) The authority of this section may not be used to 
waive the limitations on transfers contained in section 610(a) 
of this Act.
    [(b) Whenever the President determines it to be important 
to the national interest, he may use funds available for the 
purposes of chapter 4 of part I in order to meet the 
responsibilities or objectives of the United States in Germany, 
including West Berlin, and without regard to such provisions of 
law as he determines should be disregarded to achieve this 
purpose.
    [(c) The President is authorized to use amounts not to 
exceed $50,000,000 of the funds made available under this Act 
pursuant to his certification that it is inadvisable to specify 
the nature of the use of such funds, which certification shall 
be deemed to be a sufficient voucher for such amounts. The 
President shall fully inform the chairman and ranking minority 
member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives and the chairman and ranking minority member of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate of each use of 
funds under this subsection prior to the use of such funds.]
    (b) Inapplicable or Waivable Laws.--The provisions referred 
to in subsection (a) are those set forth in any of the 
following:
          (1) Any provision of this Act.
          (2) Any provision of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
        U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
          (3) Any provision of law that authorizes the 
        furnishing of foreign assistance or appropriates funds 
        for foreign assistance.
          (4) Any other provision of law that restricts 
        assistance, sales or leases, or other action under a 
        provision of law referred to in paragraph (1), (2), or 
        (3).
          (5) Any provision of law that relates to receipts and 
        credits accruing to the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 620. Prohibitions Against Furnishing Assistance.--
(a)(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (l) The President shall consider denying assistance under 
this Act to the government of any less developed country which, 
after December 31, 1966, has failed to enter into an agreement 
with the President to institute the investment guaranty program 
under section 234(a)(1) of this Act, providing protection 
against the specific risks of inconvertibility under 
subparagraph (A), and expropriation or confiscation under 
subparagraph (B), of such section 234(a)(1).
    (m)(1) No assistance may be furnished under this Act or the 
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) for the 
government of a country if the duly elected head of government 
for such country is deposed by decree or military coup. The 
prohibition in the preceding sentence shall cease to apply to a 
country if the President determines and certifies to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that after 
the termination of assistance a democratically elected 
government for such country has taken office.
    (2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to assistance to promote 
democratic elections or public participation in democratic 
processes.
    (3) The President may waive the application of 2 paragraph 
(1), and any comparable provision of law, to 3 a country upon 
determining that it is important to the 4 national security 
interest of the United States to do so.
    (o) In determining whether or not to furnish assistance 
under this Act, consideration shall be given to excluding from 
such assistance any country which hereafter seizes, or imposes 
any penalty or sanction against, any United States fishing 
vessel on account of its fishing activities in international 
waters. The provisions of this subsection shall not be 
applicable in any case governed by international agreement to 
which the United States is a party.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 620F. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA.

    (a) Findings.-- * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (c) Report on Progress Toward Regional Non-proliferation.-- 
Not later than April 1 of each year, the President shall submit 
a report to the Committees on Appropriations, the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives, and the chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate, on nuclear proliferation in 
South Asia, including efforts taken by the United States to 
achieve a regional agreement on nuclear non-proliferation, and 
including a comprehensive list of the obstacles to concluding 
such a regional agreement. Such report shall also include a 
description of the efforts of the United States Government to 
achieve the objectives described in subsections (a) and (b) of 
section 1601 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228; 116 Stat. 1459), the progress 
made toward achieving such objectives, and the likelihood that 
such objectives will be achieved within the year following the 
reporting period.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Chapter 3--Miscellaneous Provisions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 655. ANNUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE REPORT.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than February 1 of each 
year, the President shall transmit to the Congress an annual 
report for the fiscal year ending the previous September 30.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(c) Availability on Internet.--All unclassified portions 
of such report shall be made available to the public on the 
Internet through the Department of State.]
    (c) Availability of Report Information on the Internet.--
          (1) Requirement for database.--The President shall 
        make available to the public the unclassified portion 
        of each such report in the form of a database that is 
        available via the Internet and that may be searched by 
        various criteria.
          (2) Schedule for updating.--Not later than April 1 of 
        each year, the President shall make available in the 
        database the information contained in the annual report 
        for the fiscal year ending the previous September 30.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 656. ANNUAL FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING REPORT.

    (a) Annual Report.
          (1) In general.--Not later than [January 31] March 1 
        of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Secretary of State shall jointly prepare and submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
        all military training provided to foreign military 
        personnel by the Department of Defense and the 
        Department of State during the previous fiscal year[ 
        and all such training proposed for the current fiscal 
        year].

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Sec. 660. Prohibiting Police Training.--(a) On and after 
July 1, 1975, none of the funds made available to carry out 
this Act, and none of the local currencies generated under this 
Act, shall be used to provide training or advice, or provide 
any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law 
enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of 
internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign 
government within the United States or abroad.
    (b) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply--
          (1) with respect to assistance rendered under section 
        515(c) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
        Act of 1968 with respect to any authority of the Drug 
        Enforcement Administration or the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation which relates to crimes of the nature 
        which are unlawful under the laws of the United States, 
        or with respect to assistance authorized under section 
        482 of this Act;
          (2) to any contract entered into prior to the date of 
        enactment of this section with any person, 
        organization, or agency of the United States Government 
        to provide personnel to conduct, or assist in 
        conducting, any such program;
          (3) with respect to assistance, including training, 
        in maritime law enforcement and other maritime skills;
          (4) with respect to assistance provided to police 
        forces in connection with their participation in the 
        regional security system of the Eastern Caribbean 
        states; [or]
          (5) with respect to assistance, including training, 
        relating to sanctions monitoring and enforcement;
          (6) with respect to assistance provided to 
        reconstitute civilian police authority and capability 
        in the post-conflict restoration of host nation 
        infrastructure for the purposes of supporting a nation 
        emerging from instability, [and the provision of 
        professional public safety training, to include 
        training in internationally recognized standards of 
        human rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the 
        promotion of civilian police roles that support 
        democracy] including any regional, district, municipal, 
        or other sub-national entity emerging from instability;
          (7) with respect to assistance provided to customs 
        authorities and personnel, including training, 
        technical assistance and equipment, for customs law 
        enforcement and the improvement of customs laws, 
        systems and procedures[.] ;
          (8) with respect to assistance to combat corruption 
        in furtherance of the objectives for which programs are 
        authorized to be established under section 133 of this 
        Act;
          (9) with respect to the provision of professional 
        public safety training, including training in 
        internationally recognized standards of human rights, 
        the rule of law, and the promotion of civilian police 
        roles that support democracy;
          (10) with respect to assistance to combat trafficking 
        in persons; or
          (11) with respect to assistance for constabularies or 
        comparable law enforcement authorities in support of 
        developing capabilities for and deployment to peace 
        operations.
Notwithstanding clause (2), subsection (a) shall apply to any 
renewal or extension of any contract referred to in such 
paragraph entered into on or after such date of enactment.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (c) Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a 
country which has a longstanding democratic tradition, does not 
have standing armed forces, and does not engage in a consistent 
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights.
    [(d) Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in 
subsection (a), assistance may be provided to Honduras or El 
Salvador for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 if, at least 30 days 
before providing assistance, the President notifies the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, in 
accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
notifications pursuant to section 634A of this Act, that he has 
determined that the government of the recipient country has 
made significant progress, during the preceding six months, in 
eliminating any human rights violations including torture, 
incommunicado detention, detention of persons solely for the 
non-violent expression of their political views, or prolonged 
detention without trial. Any such notification shall include a 
full description of the assistance which is proposed to be 
provided and of the purposes to which it is to be directed.]
    (d) Subsection (a) shall not apply to assistance for law 
enforcement forces for which the President, on a case by-case 
basis, determines that it is important to the national interest 
of the United States to furnish such assistance and submits to 
the committees of the Congress referred to in subsection (a) of 
section 634A of this Act an advance notification of the 
obligation of funds for such assistance in accordance with such 
section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


The Arms Export Control Act

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



    Chapter 1--FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OBJECTIVES AND 
RESTRAINTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 3. Eligibility.--(a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (d)(1) [Subject to paragraph (5), the] The President may 
not give his consent under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) or 
under the third sentence of such subsection, or under section 
505(a)(1) or 505(a)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
to a transfer of any major defense equipment valued (in terms 
of its original acquisition cost) at [$14,000,000] $50,000,000 
or more, or any defense article or related training or other 
defense [service valued (in terms of its original acquisition 
cost) at $50,000,000] service valued (in terms of its original 
acquisition cost) at $100,000,000 or more, unless the President 
submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a written 
certification with respect to such proposed transfer 
containing--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (3)(A) [Subject to paragraph (5), the] The President may 
not give his consent to the transfer of any major defense 
equipment valued (in terms of its original acquisition cost) at 
[$14,000,000] $50,000,000 or more, or of any defense article or 
defense [service valued (in terms of its original acquisition 
cost) at $50,000,000] service valued (in terms of its original 
acquisition cost) at $100,000,000 or more, the export of which 
has been licensed or approved under section 38 of this Act, 
unless before giving such consent the President submits to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a certification 
containing the information specified in subparagraphs (A) 
through (E) of paragraph (1). Such certification shall be 
submitted

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(5) In the case of a transfer to a member country of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Australia, Japan, 
or New Zealand that does not authorize a new sales territory 
that includes any country other than such countries, the 
limitations on consent of the President set forth in paragraphs 
(1) and (3)(A) shall apply only if the transfer is--
          [(A) a transfer of major defense equipment valued (in 
        terms of its original acquisition cost) at $25,000,000 
        or more; or
          [(B) a transfer of defense articles or defense 
        services valued (in terms of its original acquisition 
        cost) at $100,000,000 or more).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


            Chapter 2--Foreign Military Sales Authorizations

    Sec. 21. Sales From Stocks.--(a)(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (h)(1) The President is authorized to provide (without 
charge) quality assurance, inspection, contract administration 
services, and contract audit defense services under this 
section--
          (A) in connection with the placement or 
        administration of any contract or subcontract for 
        defense articles, defense services, or design and 
        construction services entered into after the date of 
        enactment of this subsection by, or under this Act on 
        behalf of, a foreign government which is a member of 
        the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the 
        Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, or 
        Israel, if such government provides such services in 
        accordance with an agreement on a reciprocal basis, 
        without charge, to the United States Government; or
          (B) in connection with the placement or 
        administration of any contract or subcontract for 
        defense articles, defense services, or design and 
        construction services pursuant to the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization Security Investment program in 
        accordance with an agreement under which the foreign 
        governments participating in such program provide such 
        services, without charge, in connection with similar 
        contracts or subcontracts.
    (2) In carrying out the objectives of this section, the 
President is authorized to provide cataloging data and 
cataloging services, without charge, [to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization or to any member government of that 
Organization if that Organization or member 
governmentovides] to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, to any member government of that Organization, or 
to the government of any other country if that Organization, 
member government, or other government provides such data and 
services in accordance with an agreement on a reciprocal basis, 
without charge, to the United States Government.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Chapter 3--Military Export Controls

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


    Sec. 36. Reports on Commercial and Governmental Military 
Exports; Congressional Action.--(a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (b)(1) [Subject to paragraph (6), in] In the case of any 
letter of offer to sell any defense articles or services under 
this [Act for $50,000,000] Act for $100,000,000 or more, any 
design and construction [services for $200,000,000] services 
for $350,000,000 or more, or any major defense equipment for 
[$14,000,000] $50,000,000 or more, and in other cases if the 
President determines it is appropriate, before such letter of 
offer is issued, the President shall submit to the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a numbered 
certification with respect to such offer to sell containing the 
information specified in clauses (i) through (iv) of subsection 
(a), or (in the case of a sale of design and construction 
services) the information specified in clauses (A) through (D) 
of paragraph (9) of subsection (a), and a description, 
containing the information specified in paragraph (8) of 
subsection (a), of any contribution, gift, commission, or fee 
paid or offered or agreed to be paid in order to solicit, 
promote, or otherwise to secure such letter of offer. Such 
numbered certifications shall also contain an item, classified 
if necessary, identifying the sensitivity of technology 
contained in the defense articles, defense services, or design 
and construction services proposed to be sold, and a detailed 
justification of the reasons necessitating the sale of such 
articles or services in view of the sensitivity of such 
technology. In a case in which such articles or services listed 
on the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex are intended to 
support the design, development, or production of a Category I 
space launch vehicle system (as defined in section 74), such 
report shall include a description of the proposed export and 
rationale for approving such export, including the consistency 
of such export with United States missile nonproliferation 
policy. Each such numbered certification shall contain an item 
indicating whether any offset agreement is proposed to be 
entered into in connection with such letter of offer to sell 
(if known on the date of transmittal of such certification). In 
addition, the President shall, upon the request of such 
committee or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, transmit promptly to both such committees a 
statement setting forth, to the extent specified in such 
request--

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (A) a detailed description of the defense articles, 
        defense services, or design and construction services 
        to be offered, including a brief description of the 
        capabilities of any defense article to be offered;
          (B) an estimate of the number of officers and 
        employees of the United States Government and of United 
        States civilian contract personnel expected to be 
        needed in such country to carry out the proposed sale;
          (C) the name of each contractor expected to provide 
        the defense article, defense service, or design and 
        construction services proposed to be sold and a 
        description of any offset agreement with respect to 
        such sale;
          (D) an evaluation, prepared by the Secretary of State 
        in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the 
        Director of Central Intelligence, of the manner, if 
        any, in which the proposed sale would--
                  (i) contribute to an arms race;
                  (ii) support international terrorism;
                  (iii) increase the possibility of an outbreak 
                or escalation of conflict;
                  (iv) prejudice the negotiation of any arms 
                controls; or
                  (v) adversely affect the arms control policy 
                of the United States;
          (E) the reasons why the foreign country or 
        international organization to which the sale is 
        proposed to be made needs the defense articles, defense 
        services, or design and construction services which are 
        the subject of such sale and a description of how such 
        country or organization intends to use such defense 
        articles, defense services, or design and construction 
        services;
          (F) an analysis by the President of the impact of the 
        proposed sale on the military stocks and the military 
        preparedness of the United States;
          (G) the reasons why the proposed sale is in the 
        national interest of the United States;
          (H) an analysis by the President of the impact of the 
        proposed sale on the military capabilities of the 
        foreign country or international organization to which 
        such sale would be made;
          (I) an analysis by the President of how the proposed 
        sale would affect the relative military strengths of 
        countries in the region to which the defense articles, 
        defense services, or design and construction services 
        which are the subject of such sale would be delivered 
        and whether other countries in the region have 
        comparable kinds and amounts of defense articles, 
        defense services, or design and construction services;
          (J) an estimate of the levels of trained personnel 
        and maintenance facilities of the foreign country or 
        international organization to which the sale would be 
        made which are needed and available to utilize 
        effectively the defense articles, defense services, or 
        design and construction services proposed to be sold;
          (K) an analysis of the extent to which comparable 
        kinds and amounts of defense articles, defense 
        services, or design and construction services are 
        available from other countries;
          (L) an analysis of the impact of the proposed sale on 
        United States relations with the countries in the 
        region to which the defense articles, defense services, 
        or design and construction services which are the 
        subject of such sale would be delivered;
          (M) a detailed description of any agreement proposed 
        to be entered into by the United States for the 
        purchase or acquisition by the United States of defense 
        articles, defense services, design and construction 
        services or defense equipment, or other articles, 
        services, or equipment of the foreign country or 
        international organization in connection with, or as 
        consideration for, such letter of offer, including an 
        analysis of the impact of such proposed agreement upon 
        United States business concerns which might otherwise 
        have provided such articles, services, or equipment to 
        the United States, an estimate of the costs to be 
        incurred by the United States in connection with such 
        agreement compared with costs which would otherwise 
        have been incurred, an estimate of the economic impact 
        and unemployment which would result from entering into 
        such proposed agreement, and an analysis of whether 
        such costs and such domestic economic impact justify 
        entering into such proposed agreement;
          (N) the projected delivery dates of the defense 
        articles, defense services, or design and construction 
        services to be offered;
          (O) a detailed description of weapons and levels of 
        munitions that may be required as support for the 
        proposed sale[; and] ;
          (P) an analysis of the relationship of the proposed 
        sale to projected procurements of the same item[.] ; 
        and
          (Q) for any proposed sale of firearms listed in 
        category I of the United States Munitions List that 
        require a license for international export under this 
        section--
                  (i) an analysis of the impact of the proposed 
                sale on efforts by the United States relating 
                to the collection and destruction of excess 
                small arms and light weapons; and
                  (ii) a detailed description of any provision 
                or requirement for the recipient state to 
                dispose of firearms that would become excess as 
                a result of the proposed sale.
A certification transmitted pursuant to this subsection shall 
be unclassified, except that the information specified in 
clause (ii) and the details of the description specified in 
clause (iii) of subsection (a) may be classified if the public 
disclosure thereof would be clearly detrimental to the security 
of the United States, in which case the information shall be 
accompanied by a description of the damage to the national 
security that could be expected to result from public 
disclosure of the information. The letter of offer shall not be 
issued, with respect to a proposed sale to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, any member country of such Organization, 
the Republic of Korea,  Japan, Australia, or New Zealand, if 
the Congress, within fifteen calendar days after receiving such 
certification, or with respect to a proposed sale to any other 
country or organization, if the Congress within thirty calendar 
days after receiving such certification, enacts a joint 
resolution prohibiting the proposed sale, unless the President 
states in his certification that an emergency exists which 
requires such sale in the national security interests of the 
United States. If the President states in his certification 
that an emergency exists which requires the proposed sale in 
the national security interest of the United States, thus 
waiving the congressional review requirements of this 
subsection, he shall set forth in the certification a detailed 
justification for his determination, including a description of 
the emergency circumstances which necessitate the immediate 
issuance of the letter of offer and a discussion of the 
national security interests involved.
    (2) Any such joint resolution shall be considered in the 
Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of 
the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976, except that for purposes of consideration of any 
joint resolution with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, any member country of such Organization, the 
Republic of Korea,  Japan, Australia, or New Zealand, it shall 
be in order in the Senate to move to discharge a committee to 
which such joint resolution was referred if such committee has 
not reported such joint resolution at the end of five calendar 
days after its introduction.
    (3) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 
enactment of joint resolutions under this subsection, a motion 
to proceed to the consideration of any such joint resolution 
after it has been reported by the appropriate committee shall 
be treated as highly privileged in the House of 
Representatives.
    (4) In addition to the other information required to be 
contained in a certification submitted to the Congress under 
this subsection, each such certification shall cite any 
quarterly report submitted pursuant to section 28 of this Act 
which listed a price and availability estimate, or a request 
for the issuance of a letter of offer, which was a basis for 
the proposed sale which is the subject of such certification.
    (5)(A) If, before the delivery of any major defense article 
or major defense equipment, or the furnishing of any defense 
service or design and construction service, sold pursuant to a 
letter of offer described in paragraph (1), the sensitivity of 
technology or the capability of the article, equipment, or 
service is enhanced or upgraded from the level of sensitivity 
or capability described in the numbered certification with 
respect to an offer to sell such article, equipment, or 
service, then, at least 45 days before the delivery of such 
article or equipment or the furnishing of such service, the 
President shall prepare and transmit to the chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate a report--
          (i) describing the manner in which the technology or 
        capability has been enhanced or upgraded and describing 
        the significance of such enhancement or upgrade; and
          (ii) setting forth a detailed justification for such 
        enhancement or upgrade.
    (B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) apply to an article 
or equipment delivered, or a service furnished, within ten 
years after the transmittal to the Congress of a numbered 
certification with respect to the sale of such article, 
equipment, or service.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (C) [Subject to paragraph (6), if] If the enhancement or 
upgrade in the sensitivity of technology or the capability of 
major defense equipment, defense articles, defense services, or 
design and construction services described in a numbered 
certification submitted under this subsection [costs 
$14,000,000] costs $50,000,000 or more in the case of any major 
defense [equipment, $50,000,000] equipment $100,000,000 or more 
in the case of defense articles or defense services, [or 
$200,000,000] or $350,000,000 or more in the case of design or 
construction services, and in other cases if the President 
determines it is appropriate, then the President shall submit 
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a new 
numbered certification which relates to such enhancement or 
upgrade and which shall be considered for purposes of this 
subsection as if it were a separate letter of offer to sell 
defense equipment, articles, or services, subject to all of the 
requirements, restrictions, and conditions set forth in this 
subsection. For purposes of this subparagraph, references in 
this subsection to sales shall be deemed to be references to 
enhancements or upgrades in the sensitivity of technology or 
the capability of major defense equipment, articles, or 
services, as the case may be.
    (D) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ``major 
defense article'' shall be construed to include electronic 
devices, which if upgraded, would enhance the mission 
capability of a weapons system.
    [(6) The limitation in paragraph (1) and the requirement in 
paragraph (5)(C) shall apply in the case of a letter of offer 
to sell to a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) or Australia, the Republic of Korea,  
Japan, or New Zealand that does not authorize a new sales 
territory that includes any country other than such countries 
only if the letter of offer involves--
          [(A) the sale of major defense equipment under this 
        Act for, or the enhancement or upgrade of major defense 
        equipment at a cost of, $25,000,000 or more, as the 
        case may be; and
          [(B) the sale of defense articles or services for, or 
        the enhancement or upgrade of defense articles or 
        services at a cost of, $100,000,000 or more, as the 
        case may be; or
          [(C) the sale of design and construction services 
        for, or the enhancement or upgrade of design and 
        construction services at a cost of, $300,000,000 or 
        more, as the case may be.]
    (c)(1) [Subject to paragraph (5), in] In the case of an 
application by a person (other than with regard to a sale under 
section 21 or section 22 of this Act) for a license for the 
export of any major defense equipment sold under a contract in 
the amount of [$14,000,000] $50,000,000 or more or of defense 
articles or defense [services sold under a contract in the 
amount of $50,000,000] services sold under a contract in the 
amount of $100,000,000 or more, (or, in the case of a defense 
article that is a firearm controlled under category I of the 
United States Munitions List, $1,000,000 or more) and in other 
cases if the President determines it is appropriate, before 
issuing such license the President shall transmit to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an 
unclassified numbered certification with respect to such 
application specifying (A) the foreign country or international 
organization to which such export will be made, (B) the dollar 
amount of the items to be exported, and (C) a description of 
the items to be exported. Each such numbered certification 
shall also contain an item indicating whether any offset 
agreement is proposed to be entered into in connection with 
such export and a description of any such offset agreement. 
Each numbered certification regarding the proposed export of 
firearms listed in category I of the United States Munitions 
List shall include an analysis of the impact of the proposed 
sales on efforts by the United States relating to the 
collection and destruction of excess small arms and light 
weapons and a detailed description of any provision or 
requirement for the recipient state to dispose of firearms that 
would become excess as a result of the proposed export. In 
addition, the President shall, upon the request of such 
committee or the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, transmit promptly to both such committees a 
statement setting forth, to the extent specified in such 
request a description of the capabilities of the items to be 
exported, an estimate of the total number of United States 
personnel expected to be needed in the foreign country 
concerned in connection with the items to be exported and an 
analysis of the arms control impact pertinent to such 
application, prepared in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense and a description from the person who has submitted the 
license application of any offset agreement proposed to be 
entered into in connection with such export (if known on the 
date of transmittal of such statement). In a case in which such 
articles or services are listed on the Missile Technology 
Control Regime Annex and are intended to support the design, 
development, or production of a Category I space launch vehicle 
system (as defined in section 74), such report shall include a 
description of the proposed export and rationale for approving 
such export, including the consistency of such export with 
United States missile nonproliferation policy. A certification 
transmitted pursuant to this subsection shall be unclassified, 
except that the information specified in clause (B) and the 
details of the description specified in clause (C) may be 
classified if the public disclosure thereof would be clearly 
detrimental to the security of the United States, in which case 
the information shall be accompanied by a description of the 
damage to the national security that could be expected to 
result from public disclosure of the information.
    (2) Unless the President states in his certification that 
an emergency exists which requires the proposed export in the 
national security interests of the United States, a license for 
export described in paragraph (1)--
          (A) in the case of a license for an export to the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization, any member country 
        of that Organization or the Republic of Korea,  
        Australia, Japan, or New Zealand, shall not be issued 
        until at least 15 calendar days after the Congress 
        receives such certification, and shall not be issued 
        then if the Congress, within that 15-day period, enacts 
        a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed export;
          (B) in the case of a license for an export of a 
        commercial communications satellite for launch from, 
        and by nationals of, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
        or Kazakhstan, shall not be issued until at least 15 
        calendar days after the Congress receives such 
        certification, and shall not be issued then if the 
        Congress, within that 15-day period, enacts a joint 
        resolution prohibiting the proposed export; and
          (C) in the case of any other license, shall not be 
        issued until at least 30 calendar days after the 
        Congress receives such certification, and shall not be 
        issued then if the Congress, within that 30-day period, 
        enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed 
        export.
If the President states in his certification that an emergency 
exists which requires the proposed export in the national 
security interests of the United States, thus waiving the 
requirements of subparagraphs [(A) and (B)] (A), (B), and (C) 
of this paragraph, he shall set forth in the certification a 
detailed justification for his determination, including a 
description of the emergency circumstances which necessitate 
the immediate issuance of the export license and a discussion 
of the national security interests involved.
    (3) (A) Any joint resolution under this subsection shall be 
considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of 
section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
    (B) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 
enactment of joint resolutions under this subsection, a motion 
to proceed to the consideration of any such joint resolution 
after it has been reported by the appropriate committee shall 
be treated as highly privileged in the House of 
Representatives.
    (4) The provisions of subsection (b)(5) shall apply to any 
equipment, article, or service for which a numbered 
certification has been transmitted to Congress pursuant to 
paragraph (1) in the same manner and to the same extent as that 
subsection applies to any equipment, article, or service for 
which a numbered certification has been transmitted to Congress 
pursuant to subsection (b)(1). For purposes of such 
application, any reference in subsection (b)(5) to ``a letter 
of offer'' or ``an offer'' shall be deemed to be a reference to 
``a contract''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(5) In the case of an application by a person (other than 
with regard to a sale under section 21 or 22 of this Act) for a 
license for the export to a member country of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Republic of Korea,  
Australia, Japan, or New Zealand that does not authorize a new 
sales territory that includes any country other than such 
countries, the limitations on the issuance of the license set 
forth in paragraph (1) shall apply only if the license is for 
export of--
          [(A) major defense equipment sold under a contract in 
        the amount of $25,000,000 or more; or
          [(B) defense articles or defense services sold under 
        a contract in the amount of $100,000,000 or more.]
    (d)(1)(A) In the case of an approval under section 38 of 
this Act of a United States commercial technical assistance or 
manufacturing licensing agreement which involves the 
manufacture abroad of any item of significant combat equipment 
on the United States Munitions List, before such approval is 
given, the President shall submit a certification with respect 
to such proposed commercial agreement in a manner similar to 
the certification required under subsection (c)(1) containing 
comparable information, except that the last sentence of such 
subsection shall not apply to certifications submitted pursuant 
to [this subsection] this subparagraph.
    (B) Notwithstanding section 27(g), in the case of a 
comprehensive authorization described in section 126.14 of 
title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (of any corresponding 
similar regulation) for the proposed export of defense articles 
or defense services in an amount that exceeds a limitation set 
forth in subsection (c)(1), before the comprehensive 
authorization is approved or the addition of a foreign 
government or other foreign partner to the comprehensive 
authorization is approved, the President shall submit a 
certification with respect to the comprehensive authorization 
in a manner similar to the certification required under 
subsection (c)(1) of this section and containing comparable 
information, except that the last sentence of such subsection 
shall not apply to certifications submitted pursuant to this 
subparagraph.
    (2) A certification under this subsection shall be 
submitted--
          (A) at least 15 days before approval is given in the 
        case of an agreement for or in a country which is a 
        member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the 
        Republic of Korea,  Australia, Japan, or New Zealand; 
        and
          (B) at least 30 days before approval is given in the 
        case of an agreement for or in any other country;
unless the President states in his certification that an 
emergency exists which requires the immediate approval of the 
agreement in the national security interests of the United 
States.
    (3) If the President states in his certification that an 
emergency exists which requires the immediate approval of the 
agreement in the national security interests of the United 
States, thus waiving the requirements of paragraph (4), he 
shall set forth in the certification a detailed justification 
for his determination, including a description of the emergency 
circumstances which necessitate the immediate approval of the 
agreement and a discussion of the national security interests 
involved.
    (4) [Approval for an agreement subject to paragraph (1) may 
not be given under section 38] Approval for an agreement 
subject to paragraph (1)(A), or for a comprehensive 
authorization subject to paragraph (1)(B), may not be given 
under section 38 or section 126.14 of title 22, Code of Federal 
Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation), as the 
case may be, if the Congress, within the 15-day or 30-day 
period specified in paragraph (2)(A) or (B), as the case may 
be, enacts a joint resolution prohibiting such approval.
    (5)(A) Any joint resolution under paragraph (4) shall be 
considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of 
section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and 
Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
    (B) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 
enactment of joint resolutions under paragraph (4), a motion to 
proceed to the consideration of any such joint resolution after 
it has been reported by the appropriate committee shall be 
treated as highly privileged in the House of Representatives.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                    Arms Control and Disarmament Act


TITLE III--FUNCTIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



                       verification of compliance

    Sec. 306.(a) In General.--In order to ensure that arms 
control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements can be 
verified, the Secretary of State shall report to Congress, on a 
timely basis, or upon request by an appropriate committee of 
the Congress--
          (1) in the case of any arms control, 
        nonproliferation, or disarmament agreement or other 
        formal commitment that has been concluded by the United 
        States, the determination of the Secretary of State as 
        to the degree to which the components of such agreement 
        can be verified;
          (2) in the case of any arms control, 
        nonproliferation, or disarmament agreement or other 
        formal commitment that has entered into force, any 
        significant degradation or alteration in the capacity 
        of the United States to verify compliance of the 
        components of such agreement;
          (3) the amount and percentage of research funds 
        expended by the Department of State for the purpose of 
        analyzing issues relating to arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament verification; and
          (4) the number of professional personnel assigned to 
        arms control verification on a full-time basis by each 
        Government agency.
    (b) Assessments Upon Request.--Upon the request of the 
chairman or ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate or the Committee on International 
Relations of the House of Representatives, in case of an arms 
control, nonproliferation, or disarmament proposal presented to 
a foreign country, the Secretary of State shall submit a report 
to the Committee on the degree to which elements of the 
proposal are capable of being verified.
    (c) Standard for Verification of Compliance.--In making 
determinations under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a), 
the Secretary of State shall assume that all measures of 
concealment not expressly prohibited could be employed and that 
standard practices could be altered so as to impede 
verification.
    (d) Rule of Construction.--Except as otherwise provided for 
by law, nothing in this section may be construed as requiring 
the disclosure of sensitive information relating to 
intelligence sources or methods or persons employed in the 
verification of compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, 
and disarmament agreements.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE IV--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



                       [ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

    [Sec. 403.(a) In General.--Not later than April 15 of each 
year, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate a report prepared by the Secretary of 
State with the concurrence of the Director of Central 
Intelligence and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 
the Secretary of Energy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, on the status of United States policy and actions 
with respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and 
disarmament. Such report shall include--
          [(1) a detailed statement concerning the arms 
        control, nonproliferation, and disarmament objectives 
        of the executive branch of Government for the 
        forthcoming year;
          [(2) a detailed assessment of the status of any 
        ongoing arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament 
        negotiations, including a comprehensive description of 
        negotiations or other activities during the preceding 
        year and an appraisal of the status and prospects for 
        the forthcoming year;
          [(3) a detailed assessment of adherence of the United 
        States to obligations undertaken in arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, including 
        information on the policies and organization of each 
        relevant agency or department of the United States to 
        ensure adherence to such obligations, a description of 
        national security programs with a direct bearing on 
        questions of adherence to such obligations and of steps 
        being taken to ensure adherence, and a compilation of 
        any substantive questions raised during the preceding 
        year and any corrective action taken;
          [(4) a detailed assessment of the adherence of other 
        nations to obligations undertaken in all arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or 
        commitments, including the Missile Technology Control 
        Regime, to which the United States is a participating 
        state, including information on actions taken by each 
        nation with regard to the size, structure, and 
        disposition of its military forces in order to comply 
        with arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament 
        agreements or commitments, and shall include, in the 
        case of each agreement or commitment about which 
        compliance questions exist--
                  [(A) a description of each significant issue 
                raised and efforts made and contemplated with 
                the other participating state to seek 
                resolution of the difficulty;
                  [(B) an assessment of damage, if any, to the 
                United States security and other interests; and
                  [(C) recommendations as to any steps that 
                should be considered to redress any damage to 
                United States national security and to reduce 
                compliance problems;
          [(5) a discussion of any material noncompliance by 
        foreign governments with their binding commitments to 
        the United States with respect to the prevention of the 
        spread of nuclear explosive devices (as defined in 
        section 830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention 
        Act of 1994) by non-nuclear-weapon states (as defined 
        in section 830(5) of that Act) or the acquisition by 
        such states of unsafeguarded special nuclear material 
        (as defined in section 830(8) of that Act), including--
                  [(A) a net assessment of the aggregate 
                military significance of all such violations;
                  [(B) a statement of the compliance policy of 
                the United States with respect to violations of 
                those commitments; and
                  [(C) what actions, if any, the President has 
                taken or proposes to take to bring any nation 
                committing such a violation into compliance 
                with those commitments; and
          [(6) a specific identification, to the maximum extent 
        practicable in unclassified form, of each and every 
        question that exists with respect to compliance by 
        other countries with arms control, nonproliferation, 
        and disarmament agreements with the United States.
    [(b) Classification of the Report.--The report required by 
this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, with 
classified annexes, as appropriate. The portions of this report 
described in paragraphs (4) and (5) of subsection (a) shall 
summarize in detail, at least in classified annexes, the 
information, analysis, and conclusions relevant to possible 
noncompliance by other nations that are provided by United 
States intelligence agencies.
    [(c) Reporting Consecutive Noncompliance.--If the President 
in consecutive reports submitted to the Congress under this 
section reports that any designated nation is not in full 
compliance with its binding nonproliferation commitments to the 
United States, then the President shall include in the second 
such report an assessment of what actions are necessary to 
compensate for such violations.
    [(d) Each report required by this section shall include a 
discussion of each significant issue described in subsection 
(a)(6) that was contained in a previous report issued under 
this section during 1995, or after December 31, 1995, until the 
question or concern has been resolved and such resolution has 
been reported in detail to the appropriate committees of 
Congress (as defined in section 1102(1) of the Arms Control, 
Non-Proliferation, and Security Assistance Act of 1999).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                       annual reports to congress

    Sec. 403. (a) Report on Objectives and Negotiations.--Not 
later than April 15 of each year, the President shall submit to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Chairman 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 
prepared by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of 
National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, on the status of United States policy and actions with 
respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. 
Such report shall include--
          (1) a detailed statement concerning the arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament objectives of the 
        executive branch of Government for the forthcoming 
        year; and
          (2) a detailed assessment of the status of any 
        ongoing arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament 
        negotiations, including a comprehensive description of 
        negotiations or other activities during the preceding 
        year and an appraisal of the status and prospects for 
        the forthcoming year.
    (b) Report on Compliance.--Not later than April 15 of each 
year, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate a report prepared by the Secretary of 
State with the concurrence of the Director of National 
Intelligence and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 
the Secretary of Energy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff on the status of United States policy and actions with 
respect to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament 
compliance. Such report shall include--
          (1) a detailed assessment of adherence of the United 
        States to obligations undertaken in arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, including 
        information on the policies and organization of each 
        relevant agency or department of he United States to 
        ensure adherence to such obligations, a description of 
        national security programs with a direct bearing on 
        questions of adherence to such obligations and of steps 
        being taken to ensure adherence, and a compilation of 
        any substantive questions raised during the preceding 
        year and any corrective action taken;
          (2) a detailed assessment of the adherence of other 
        nations to obligations undertaken in all arms control, 
        nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or 
        commitments, including the Missile Technology Control 
        Regime, to which the United States is a participating 
        state, including information on actions taken by each 
        nation with regard to the size, structure, and 
        disposition of its military forces in order to comply 
        with arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament 
        agreements or commitments, including, in the case of 
        each agreement or commitment about which compliance 
        questions exist--
                  (A) a description of each significant issue 
                raised and efforts made and contemplated with 
                the other participating state to seek 
                resolution of the difficulty;
                  (B) an assessment of damage, if any, to 
                United States security and other interests;
                  (C) recommendations as to any steps that 
                should be considered to redress any damage to 
                United States national security and to reduce 
                compliance problems; and
                  (D) for states that are not parties to such 
                agreements or commitments, a description of 
                activities of concern carried out by such 
                states and efforts underway to bring such 
                states into adherence with such agreements or 
                commitments;
          (3) a discussion of any material noncompliance by 
        foreign governments with their binding commitments to 
        the United States with respect to the prevention of the 
        spread of nuclear explosive devices (as defined in 
        section 830(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention 
        Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(4)) by non-nuclear-weapon 
        states (as defined in section 830(5) of that Act (22 
        U.S.C. 6305(5)) or the acquisition by such states of 
        unsafeguarded special nuclear material (as defined in 
        section 830(8) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 6305(8)), 
        including--
                  (A) a net assessment of the aggregate 
                military significance of all such violations;
                  (B) a statement of the compliance policy of 
                the United States with respect to violations of 
                those commitments; and
                  (C) what actions, if any, the President has 
                taken or proposes to take to bring any country 
                committing such a violation into compliance 
                with those commitments; and
          (4) a specific identification, to the maximum extent 
        practicable in unclassified form, of each and every 
        question that exists with respect to compliance by 
        other countries with arms control, nonproliferation, 
        and disarmament agreements and other formal commitments 
        with the United States.
    (c) Chemical Weapons Convention Compliance Report 
Requirement Satisfied.--The report submitted pursuant to 
subsection (b) shall include the information required under 
section 2(10)(C) of Senate Resolution 75, 105th Congress, 
agreed to April 24, 1997, advising and consenting to the 
ratification of the Convention 10 on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, with annexes, done at Paris 
January 13, 1993 and entered into force April 29, 1997 
(popularly known as the ``Chemical Weapons Convention''; T.Doc. 
103-21).
    (d) Classification of Report.--The reports required by this 
section shall be submitted in unclassified form, with 
classified annexes, as appropriate. The report portions 
described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall 
summarize in detail, at least in classified annexes, the 
information, analysis, and conclusions relevant to possible 
noncompliance by other countries that are provided by United 
States intelligence agencies.
    (e) Reporting Consecutive Noncompliance.--If the President 
in consecutive reports submitted to the Congress under 
subsection (b) reports that any country is not in full 
compliance with its binding nonproliferation commitments to the 
United States, then the President shall include in the second 
such report an assessment of what actions are necessary to 
compensate for such violations.
    (f) Additional Requirement.--Each report required by 
subsection (b) shall include a discussion of each significant 
issue described in paragraph (4) of such subsection that was 
contained in a previous report issued under this section during 
1995, or after December 31, 1995, until the question or concern 
has been resolved and such resolution has been reported in 
detail to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



              DIVISION B--SECURITY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2002


                      TITLE X--GENERAL PROVISIONS


SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.

    This division may be cited as the ``Security Assistance Act 
of 2002''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


   Subtitle B--Russian Federation Debt Reduction for Nonproliferation


SEC. 1311. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Russian Federation Debt 
for Nonproliferation Act of 2002''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


[SEC. 1321. ANNUAL REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

    [Not later than December 31, 2003, and not later than 
December 31 of each year thereafter, the President shall 
prepare and transmit to Congress a report concerning actions 
taken to implement this subtitle during the fiscal year 
preceding the fiscal year in which the report is transmitted. 
The report on a fiscal year shall include--
          [(1) a description of the activities undertaken 
        pursuant to this subtitle during the fiscal year;
          [(2) a description of the nature and amounts of the 
        loans reduced pursuant to this subtitle during the 
        fiscal year;
          [(3) a description of any agreement entered into 
        under this subtitle;
          [(4) a description of the progress during the fiscal 
        year of any projects funded pursuant to this subtitle;
          [(5) a summary of the results of relevant audits 
        performed in the fiscal year; and
          [(6) a certification, if appropriate, that the 
        Russian Federation continued to meet the condition 
        required by section 1317(a), and an explanation of why 
        the certification was or was not made.]


    [Section 1321 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
Fiscal Year 2003 will be repealed by this legislation.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                  TITLE XVI--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS


SEC. 1601. NUCLEAR AND MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA.

    (a) United States Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States, consistent with its obligations under the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 U.S.T. 483), to 
encourage and work with the governments of India and Pakistan 
to achieve the following objectives[ by September 30, 2003]:
          (1) Continuation of a nuclear testing moratorium.
          (2) Commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons.
          (3) Commitment not to deploy ballistic missiles that 
        can carry nuclear weapons and to restrain the ranges 
        and types of missiles developed or deployed.
          (4) Agreement by both governments to bring their 
        export controls in accord with the guidelines and 
        requirements of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
          (5) Agreement by both governments to bring their 
        export controls in accord with the guidelines and 
        requirements of the Zangger Committee.
          (6) Agreement by both governments to bring their 
        export controls in accord with the guidelines, 
        requirements, and annexes of the Missile Technology 
        Control Regime.
          (7) Establishment of a modern, effective system to 
        control the export of sensitive dual-use items, 
        technology, technical information, and materiel that 
        can be used in the design, development, or production 
        of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
          (8) Conduct of bilateral meetings between Indian and 
        Pakistani senior officials to discuss security issues 
        and establish confidence-building measures with respect 
        to nuclear policies and programs.
    (b) Further United States Policy.--It shall also be the 
policy of the United States, consistent with its obligations 
under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 
U.S.T. 483), to encourage, and, where appropriate, to work 
with, the Governments of India and Pakistan to achieve [not 
later than September 30, 2003], the establishment by those 
governments of modern, effective systems to protect and secure 
their nuclear devices and materiel from unauthorized use, 
accidental employment, or theft. Any such dialogue with India 
or Pakistan would not be represented or considered, nor would 
it be intended, as granting any recognition to India or 
Pakistan, as appropriate, as a nuclear weapon state (as defined 
in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).
    [(c) Report.--Not later than March 1, 2003, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report describing United States efforts to achieve the 
objectives listed in subsections (a) and (b), the progress made 
toward the achievement of those objectives, and the likelihood 
that each objective will be achieved by September 30, 2003.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Atomic Energy Act of 1954

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



TITLE I--ATOMIC ENERGY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



Chapter 11. International Activities

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 123. COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS.--

    No cooperation with any nation, group of nations or 
regional defense organization pursuant to section 53, 54 a., 
57, 64, 82, 91, 103, 104, or 144 shall be undertaken until--
          a. the proposed agreement for cooperation has been 
        submitted to the President, which proposed agreement 
        shall include the terms, conditions, duration, nature, 
        and scope of the cooperation; and shall include the 
        following requirements:

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          b. the President has submitted text of the proposed 
        agreement for cooperation (except an agreement arranged 
        pursuant to section 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d.), 
        together with the accompanying unclassified Nuclear 
        Proliferation Assessment Statement and a report on the 
        actions taken and planned by the United States with the 
        country identified in the proposed agreement for 
        cooperation to fulfill the purposes of the program 
        authorized in Section 502 of the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3262), to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives, the President has consulted with such 
        Committees for a period of not less than thirty days of 
        continuous session (as defined in section 130 g. of 
        this Act) concerning the consistency of the terms of 
        the proposed agreement with all the requirements of 
        this Act, and the President has approved and authorized 
        the execution of the proposed agreement for cooperation 
        and has made a determination in writing that the 
        performance of the proposed agreement will promote, and 
        will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common 
        defense and security;
          c. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if not an 
        agreement subject to subsection d.), together with the 
        approval and determination of the President, has been 
        submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
        House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate for a period of thirty days of 
        continuous session (as defined in subsection 130 g.): 
        Provided, however, That these committees, after having 
        received such agreement for cooperation, may by 
        resolution in writing waive the conditions of all or 
        any portion of such thirty-day period; and
          d. the proposed agreement for cooperation (if 
        arranged pursuant to subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., 
        or 144 d., or if entailing implementation of section 
        53, 54 a., 103, or 104 in relation to a reactor that 
        may be capable of producing more than five thermal 
        megawatts or special nuclear material for use in 
        connection therewith), or an amendment to such 
        agreement, has been submitted to the Congress, together 
        with the approval and determination of the President, 
        for a period of sixty days of continuous session (as 
        defined in subsection 130 g. of this Act) and referred 
        to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate, and in addition, in the case of a 
        proposed agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to 
        subsection 91 c., 144 b., 144 c., or 144 d., the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Armed Services of 
        the Senate, but such proposed agreement for cooperation 
        shall not become effective if during such sixty-day 
        period the Congress adopts, and there is enacted, a 
        joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress 
        does not favor the proposed agreement for cooperation: 
        Provided, That the sixty-day period shall not begin 
        until a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement 
        prepared by the Secretary of State, and any annexes 
        thereto, when required by subsection 123 a., have been 
        submitted to the Congress: Provided further, That an 
        agreement for cooperation exempted by the President 
        pursuant to subsection a. from any requirement 
        contained in that subsection, or an agreement with a 
        nation or group of nations that does not have in force 
        an additional protocol to its agreement with the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency for the application 
        of safeguards, or an agreement exempted pursuant to 
        section 104(a)(1) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-
        India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, 
        or an amendment to such agreement, shall not become 
        effective unless the Congress adopts, and there is 
        enacted, a joint resolution stating that the Congress 
        does favor such agreement. During the sixty-day period 
        the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate shall each hold hearings on the proposed 
        agreement for cooperation and submit a report to their 
        respective bodies recommending whether it should be 
        approved or disapproved. Any such proposed agreement 
        for cooperation shall be considered pursuant to the 
        procedures set forth in section 130 i. of this Act for 
        the consideration of Presidential submissions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


SEC. 131. SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS.--

    a. (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    b. With regard to any special nuclear material exported by 
the United States or produced through the use of any nuclear 
materials and equipment or sensitive nuclear technology 
exported by the United States--
          (1) the Secretary of Energy may not enter into any 
        subsequent arrangement for the retransfer of any such 
        material to a third country for reprocessing, for the 
        reprocessing of any such material, or for the 
        subsequent retransfer of any plutonium in quantities 
        greater than 500 grams resulting from the reprocessing 
        of any such material, until he has provided the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate with a report containing his reasons for 
        entering into such arrangement and a period of 15 days 
        of continuous session (as defined in subsection 130 g. 
        of this Act) has elapsed, except that for any such 
        subsequent arrangement under an agreement for 
        cooperation which did not, pursuant to section 123(d) 
        of this Act, become effective until there was enacted a 
        joint resolution favoring such agreement, the Secretary 
        of Energy may not enter into any such subsequent 
        arrangement until Congress adopts, and there is 
        enacted, a joint resolution approving such subsequent 
        arrangement, which resolution shall be considered 
        pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 130(i) 
        of this Act: Provided, however, That if in the view of 
        the President an emergency exists due to unforeseen 
        circumstances requiring immediate entry into a 
        subsequent arrangement, such period shall consist of 
        fifteen calendar days;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Security Assistance Act of 2000

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



TITLE V--INTEGRATED SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANNING

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 513. ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) ESF assistance.--The term ``ESF assistance'' 
        means assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et 
        seq.), relating to the economic support fund.
          (2) Foreign military financing program.--The term 
        ``Foreign Military Financing Program'' means the 
        program authorized by section 23 of the Arms Export 
        Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
    (b) ESF Assistance.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amounts made available for 
        each of the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for ESF 
        assistance, the amount specified in paragraph (2) for 
        each such fiscal year is authorized to be made 
        available for Israel. Such funds are authorized to be 
        made available on a grant basis as a cash transfer.
          (2) Computation of amount.--Subject to subsection 
        (d), the amount referred to in paragraph (1) is equal 
        to--
                  (A) the amount made available for ESF 
                assistance for Israel for the preceding fiscal 
                year, minus
                  (B) $120,000,000.
          (3) Additional esf assistance for fiscal year 2003.--
        Only for fiscal year 2003, in addition to the amount 
        computed under paragraph (2) for that fiscal year, an 
        additional amount of $200,000,000 is authorized to be 
        made available for ESF assistance for Israel, 
        notwithstanding section 531(e) or 660(a) of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961, for defensive, nonlethal, 
        antiterrorism assistance, which amount shall be 
        considered, for purposes of subsection (d), as an 
        amount appropriated by an Act making supplemental 
        appropriations.
    (c) FMF Program.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amount made available for 
        each of the fiscal years [2002 and 2003] 2009 and 2010 
        for assistance under the Foreign Military Financing 
        Program, the amount specified in paragraph (2) for each 
        such fiscal year is authorized to be made available on 
        a grant basis for Israel.
          (2) Computation of amount.--Subject to subsection 
        (d), the amount referred to in paragraph (1) is equal 
        to--
                  (A) the amount made available for assistance 
                under the Foreign Military Financing Program 
                for Israel for the preceding fiscal year, plus
                  (B) $60,000,000.
          (3) Disbursement of funds.--[Funds authorized to be 
        available for Israel under subsection (b)(1) and 
        paragraph (1) of this subsection for fiscal years 2002 
        and 2003 shall be disbursed not later] Funds authorized 
        to be available for Israel under subsection (b)(1) and 
        paragraph (1) for fiscal year 2009 shall be disbursed 
        not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment 
        of an Act making appropriations for foreign operations, 
        export financing, and related programs for fiscal year 
        2009, or October 31, 2008, whichever is later than 30 
        days after the date of enactment of an Act making 
        appropriations for foreign operations, export 
        financing, and related programs for fiscal year 2002, 
        and not later than 30 days after the date of enactment 
        of an Act making appropriations for foreign operations, 
        export financing, and related programs for fiscal year 
        2003, or October 31 of the respective fiscal year, 
        whichever is later.
          (4) Availability of funds for advanced weapons 
        systems.--To the extent the Government of Israel 
        requests that funds be used for such purposes, grants 
        made available for Israel out of funds authorized to be 
        available under paragraph (1) for Israel for fiscal 
        years [2002 and 2003] 2009 and 2010 shall, as agreed by 
        Israel and the United States, be available for advanced 
        weapons systems, of which not less than [$535,000,000 
        for fiscal year 2002 and not less than $550,000,000 for 
        fiscal year 2003] $2,550,000,000 for fiscal year 2009 
        and not less than $2,550,000,000 for fiscal year 2010 
        shall be available for the procurement in Israel of 
        defense articles and defense services, including 
        research and development.
    (d) Exclusion of Rescissions and Supplemental 
Appropriations.--For purposes of this section, the computation 
of amounts made available for a fiscal year shall not take into 
account any amount rescinded by an Act or any amount 
appropriated by an Act making supplemental appropriations for a 
fiscal year.

SEC. 514. ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
          (1) ESF assistance.--The term ``ESF assistance'' 
        means assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et 
        seq.), relating to the economic support fund.
          (2) Foreign military financing program.--The term 
        ``Foreign Military Financing Program'' means the 
        program authorized by section 23 of the Arms Export 
        Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
    (b) ESF Assistance.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amounts made available for 
        each of the fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for ESF 
        assistance, the amount specified in paragraph (2) for 
        each such fiscal year is authorized to be made 
        available for Egypt.
          (2) Computation of amount.--Subject to subsection 
        (d), the amount referred to in paragraph (1) is equal 
        to--
                  (A) the amount made available for ESF 
                assistance for Egypt during the preceding 
                fiscal year, minus
                  (B) $40,000,000.
    (c) FMF Program.--Of the amount made available for each of 
the fiscal years [2002 and 2003] 2009 and 2010 for assistance 
under the Foreign Military Financing Program, $1,300,000,000 is 
authorized to be made available on a grant basis for Egypt.
    (d) Exclusion of Rescissions and Supplemental 
Appropriations.--For purposes of this section, the computation 
of amounts made available for a fiscal year shall not take into 
account any amount rescinded by an Act or any amount 
appropriated by an Act making supplemental appropriations for a 
fiscal year.
    (e) Disbursement of Funds.--[Funds estimated to be outlayed 
for Egypt under subsection (c) during fiscal years 2002 and 
2003 shall be disbursed to an interest-bearing account for 
Egypt in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York not later than 30 
days after the date of enactment of an Act making 
appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and 
related programs for fiscal year 2002, and not later than 30 
days after the date of enactment of an Act making 
appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and 
related programs for fiscal year 2003, or by October 31 of the 
respective fiscal year, whichever is later] Funds estimated to 
be outlayed for Egypt under subsection (c) during fiscal year 
2009 shall be disbursed to an interest-bearing account for 
Egypt in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York not later than 30 
days after the date of the enactment of an Act making 
appropriations for foreign operations, export financing, and 
related programs for fiscal year 2009, or by October 31, 2008, 
whichever is later, provided that--
          (1) withdrawal of funds from such account shall be 
        made only on authenticated instructions from the 
        Defense Finance and Accounting Service of the 
        Department of Defense;
          (2) in the event such account is closed, the balance 
        of the account shall be transferred promptly to the 
        appropriations account for the Foreign Military 
        Financing Program.
          (3) none of the interest accrued by such account 
        should be obligated unless the Committee on 
        Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations and 
        the Committee on International Relations of the House 
        of Representatives are notified.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



  TITLE II--UNITED STATES INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL 
                           SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM


                                 policy

    Sec. 201. The United States is committed to continued 
strong support for the principles of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to a strengthened and more 
effective International Atomic Energy Agency and to a 
comprehensive safeguards system administered by the Agency to 
deter proliferation. Accordingly, the United States shall seek 
to act with other nations to--
          (a) continue to strengthen the safeguards program of 
        the IAEA and, in order to implement this section, 
        contribute funds, technical resources, and other 
        support to assist the IAEA in effectively implementing 
        safeguards;
          [(b) ensure that the IAEA has the resources to carry 
        out the provisions of article XII of the Statute of the 
        IAEA;]
          (b) ensure that the IAEA has the financial, 
        technical, and personnel resources available to fully 
        carry out its safeguards mission and that, to the 
        maximum extent possible, safeguards activities are 
        financed by the regular budget of the IAEA and not by 
        voluntary contributions to the Agency;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


TITLE VI--EXECUTIVE REPORTING

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



                           additional reports

    Sec. 602.(a) The annual reports to the Congress by the 
Commission and the Department of Energy which are otherwise 
required by law shall also include views and recommendations 
regarding the policies and actions of the United States to 
prevent proliferation which are the statutory responsibility of 
those agencies. The Department's report shall include a 
detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced 
enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and 
alternative nuclear fuel cycles. This part of the report shall 
include a comprehensive version which includes any relevant 
classified information and a summary unclassified version.
    (b) The reporting requirements of this title are in 
addition to and not in lieu of any other reporting requirements 
under applicable law.
    (c)(1) The Department of State, the Department of Defense, 
the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the 
Commission, and, with regard to subparagraph (B), the [Director 
of Central Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence, 
shall keep the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, 
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the [Committee on 
International Relations] of the House of Representatives fully 
and currently informed with respect to--
          (A) their activities to carry out the purposes and 
        policies of this Act and to otherwise prevent 
        proliferation, including the proliferation of nuclear, 
        chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of 
        delivery; and
          (B) the current activities of foreign nations which 
        are of significance from the proliferation standpoint.
    (2) For the purposes of this subsection with respect to 
paragraph (1)(B), the phrase ``fully and currently informed'' 
means the transmittal of credible information not later than 60 
days after becoming aware of the activity concerned.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *



SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

    For purposes of this Act, the following terms have the 
following meanings:
          (1) Extraordinary payments in connection with the 
        international space station.--The term ``extraordinary 
        payments in connection with the International Space 
        Station'' means payments in cash or in kind made or to 
        be made by the United States Government--
                  (A) for work on the International Space 
                Station which the Russian Government pledged at 
                any time to provide at its expense; or
                  (B) for work on the International Space 
                Station, or for the purchase of goods or 
                services relating to human space flight, that 
                are not required to be made under the terms of 
                a contract or other agreement that was in 
                effect on January 1, 1999, as those terms were 
                in effect on such date, ]except that such term 
                does not mean payments] except that such term 
                does not mean--
                          (i) payments in cash or in kind made 
                        or to be made by the United States 
                        Government prior to January 1, 2012, 
                        for work to be performed or services to 
                        be rendered prior to that date 
                        necessary to meet United States 
                        obligations under the Agreement 
                        Concerning Cooperation on the Civil 
                        International Space Station, with 
                        annex, signed at Washington January 29, 
                        1998, and entered into force March 27, 
                        2001, or any protocol, agreement, 
                        memorandum of understanding, [or 
                        contract related thereto.] or contract 
                        related thereto; or
                          (ii) payments in cash or in kind made 
                        or to be made by the United States 
                        Government between January 1, 2012, and 
                        reentry into Earth's atmosphere of the 
                        International Space Station at its end 
                        of life, for work to be performed or 
                        services to be rendered during that 
                        period necessary to meet United States 
                        obligations under the Agreement 
                        Concerning Cooperation on the Civil 
                        International Space Station, with 
                        annex, signed at Washington January 29, 
                        1998, and entered into force March 27, 
                        2001, or any protocol, agreement, 
                        memorandum of understanding, or 
                        contract related thereto, except that 
                        this clause does not allow for payments 
                        in cash or in kind to be made by the 
                        United States Government for--
                                  (I) any cargo services 
                                provided by a Progress vehicle; 
                                or
                                  (II) any crew transportation 
                                or rescue services provided by 
                                a Soyuz vehicle after--
                                          (aa) the Orion Crew 
                                        Exploration Vehicle 
                                        reaches full 
                                        operational capability; 
                                        or
                                          (bb) a United States 
                                        commercial provider of 
                                        crew transportation and 
                                        rescue services 
                                        demonstrates the 
                                        capability to meet 
                                        mission requirements of 
                                        the International Space 
                                        Station.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

   VIII. Appendix I.--Letter from the Honorable Michael D. Griffin, 
  Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
                          dated April 11, 2008





    IX. Appendix II.--Letter from the Honorable Michael D. Griffin, 
  Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
                          dated July 17, 2008







    X. Appendix III.--Letter from the Honorable Michael D. Griffin, 
  Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
                        dated September 8, 2008














                                    

      
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