[Senate Report 110-31]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



110th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                     110-31
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                                                        Calendar No. 68
 
                   AVIATION SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                                 OF THE

           COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                                   on

                                 S. 509



                                     

        DATE deg.March 5, 2007.--Ordered to be printed


       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                       one hundred tenth congress
                             first session

                   DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
                   TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice-Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    Virginia                         TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota        OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California            GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
THOMAS CARPER, Delaware              JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
          Margaret Cummisky, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
         Lila Helms, Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director
                    Margaret Spring, General Counsel
               Lisa Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
           Christine Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
               Kenneth Nahigian, Republican Chief Counsel


                                                        Calendar No. 68
110th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                     110-31

======================================================================




                   AVIATION SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT

                                _______
                                

                 March 5, 2007.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

       Mr. Inouye, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                Transportation, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                         [To accompany S. 509]

    The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to 
which was referred the bill (S. 509) TITLE deg. to 
provide improved aviation security, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with 
amendments and recommends that the bill (as amended) do pass.

                          Purpose of the Bill

  The Aviation Security Improvement Act, S. 509, as reported, 
would strengthen aviation security by addressing unimplemented 
air transportation security recommendations of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the United States (9/11 
Commission). The legislation proposes new security measures, 
assessments and programs focused on air cargo, baggage and 
checkpoint screening, passenger pre-screening, and general 
aviation.

                          Background and Needs

  Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), 
Congress acted promptly to address immediate threats to our 
Nation's transportation infrastructure system and passed the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) (P.L. 107-71). 
ATSA was signed into law on November 19, 2001, and created the 
Transportation Security Administration within the Department of 
Transportation (TSA), which took control over all aspects of 
transportation security. On November 25, 2002, Congress passed 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), which created 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) into which TSA was 
incorporated.
  On November 27, 2002, Congress passed H.R. 4628, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-
306). Title VI of P.L. 107-306 created the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, now known as the 
``9/11 Commission''. The 9/11 Commission was established as an 
independent, bipartisan commission tasked with preparing a 
complete account of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, including analysis of the 
preparedness for, and the immediate response to, the attacks. 
The 9/11 Commission's mandate was to provide recommendations 
designed to guard against future terrorist attacks.
  On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its public 
report on the events of 9/11. Among its key findings, the 9/11 
Commission concluded that al Qaeda operatives had exploited 
known weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although legislative 
and administrative actions to strengthen aviation security were 
implemented immediately following the terrorist attacks, the 9/
11 Commission concluded that several weaknesses continued to 
exist. These weaknesses included inadequate screening and 
access controls at airports and perceived vulnerabilities in 
cargo and general aviation security.
  As part of its initial report, the 9/11 Commission issued a 
variety of recommendations designed to strengthen aviation 
security by: enhancing passenger pre-screening, improving 
measures to detect explosives on passengers, addressing human 
factors issues at screening checkpoints, expediting deployment 
of in-line baggage screening systems, intensifying efforts to 
identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo, and 
deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In 
addition to these specific recommendations, an overarching 
recommendation for transportation security policy asserted that 
priorities should be based on risk, and the most practical and 
cost-effective deterrents should be implemented, assigning 
appropriate roles and missions to Federal, State, and local 
authorities, as well as private stakeholders.
  After the 9/11 Commission formally ceased on August 21, 2004, 
its 10 members initiated a nationwide public education campaign 
known as the ``9/11 Public Discourse Project''. This effort was 
aimed at fulfilling the 9/11 Commission's original mandate of 
guarding against future terrorist attacks. On December 5, 2005, 
through the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, the 9/11 Commission 
published a report card on the Federal Government's efforts to 
implement the 41 primary recommendations of the Commission. Of 
those 41 recommendations, only 3 focused specifically on 
aviation security and a fourth called for a national strategy 
for transportation security. The 9/11 Public Discourse Project 
issued the following grades on Federal implementation of the 9/
11 Commission's aviation security recommendations: checked 
baggage and cargo screening received a ``D'', airline passenger 
explosive screening received a ``C'', and airline passenger 
prescreening received an ``F''.
  All of the 9/11 Commission's primary recommendations on 
aviation security focus on key elements of the layered approach 
that TSA adopted to defend the U.S. airspace system following 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The TSA has 
continued working to address the 9/11 Commission's primary 
recommendations on aviation security, but the agency has faced 
significant challenges in moving forward on aspects of these 
recommendations.
  Checked baggage and cargo screening requirements have placed 
a considerable burden on the security regime due to the sheer 
volume of items that need to be processed on a daily basis. 
Currently, TSA uses 2 types of devices in U.S. airports to 
screen the annual 535 million parcels of checked baggage for 
explosives: explosive detection systems (EDS), and explosive 
trace detection machines (ETD). Since TSA's creation in 
November 2001, more than 1,678 EDS machines, and 7,478 ETDs 
have been installed in airports nationwide.

EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS

  EDS machines are the primary method used to screen checked 
baggage for threat items. One of the advantages of this 
technology is that it is able to screen up to 500 bags per 
hour. However, the bulky size of the equipment also makes it a 
burden to install in airports, usually requiring considerable 
adjustment of the layout of the airport, thus triggering 
additional cost expenditures.
  To meet the deadline imposed by ATSA for the electronic 
screening of all checked baggage transported by commercial 
passenger aircraft, TSA placed many EDS machines in airport 
lobbies, which resulted in overcrowding, inefficient service, 
and generally unsafe conditions. Analysis by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has suggested that a practical 
solution would involve the integration of EDS equipment into 
the checked baggage conveyor system, or ``in-line'' EDS. This, 
however, only has occurred at a limited number of airports due 
to the high cost of reconfiguring airports, including 
reinforced floors, electrical upgrades, information technology 
(IT) networking, and new conveyor systems.
  The TSA's own reviews indicate broader application of in-line 
EDS at the majority of commercial airports could provide 
significant savings and other cost and personnel benefits 
through the integration of such systems into an airport's 
baggage conveyor process. Research conducted on the airports 
that have undergone this transition indicates that the 
government would recoup these implementation costs in 1 to 5 
years, primarily through lower TSA staffing and maintenance 
costs. In February 2006, TSA delivered a Strategic Planning 
Framework for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP). 
That framework details TSA's long-term planning philosophy for 
the development and implementation of optimal baggage screening 
solutions at the Nation's top 250 airports, where over 99 
percent checked baggage originates, and guides TSA's investment 
and deployment decisions. Currently, 51 airports are either 
operational or deploying some form of advanced in-line baggage 
screening system.
  The GAO and the 9/11 Commission both called for more rapid 
integration of in-line baggage systems as part of a streamlined 
screening methodology. The installment of such in-line systems, 
however, has been hindered by funding constraints, despite the 
fact that Congress envisioned a cost-sharing and reimbursement 
program conducted through letters of intent (LOI).
  Under the LOI program, airports fund EDS projects and are 
subsequently reimbursed by TSA for their non-match amount over 
a 3 to 5 year period, subject to the availability of Federal 
funds. Congress first authorized LOIs for security projects in 
the fiscal year (FY) 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill (P.L. 
108-7) for 5 years, at $500 million annually. The Vision-100 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization bill 
(P.L. 108-176) established a security capital fund also 
authorized at $500 million per year, of which $250 million was 
mandatory spending for 4 years to fund LOIs and to meet other 
airport security-related capital improvements. To date, TSA has 
issued LOIs to nine airports.

EXPLOSIVE TRACE DETECTION

  In comparison to the EDS equipment, ETD machines are smaller 
and relatively cheaper. Instead of using radiation to scan a 
piece of baggage, these machines are able to detect vapors and 
residue from explosives. A screener is able to collect a sample 
by rubbing a bag or piece of luggage with a swab, and the 
sample is then chemically analyzed for traces of explosive 
material. While ETD devices have higher detection rates and a 
lower number of false positives than EDS, the screening process 
is much slower. Therefore, ETD machines ideally would be best 
deployed in low baggage throughput airports. Currently, ETDs 
are used as a major screening method in over 300 airports 
nationwide, but are located at most airports as a secondary 
screening method for both passengers and baggage.
  S. 509 would improve and expedite the deployment of in-line 
baggage systems at our Nation's airports by providing TSA with 
a stable and long-term funding stream which would significantly 
improve the current LOI process. Congress, TSA, and airports 
have all struggled to find a workable funding solution to the 
in-line baggage problem. By utilizing and extending the current 
mandatory funding process established through the Aviation 
Security Capital Fund, the bill would strengthen TSA's ability 
to improve aviation security.

AIR CARGO SCREENING

  While all passenger baggage is screened prior to placement in 
airplane cargo, this is not the case for shipped cargo on 
passenger planes. The vast amount of air cargo, the speed at 
which it is required to be delivered, and the numerous entry 
points to the supply chain have created a difficult environment 
in which to develop a comprehensive cargo security system. The 
U.S. supply chain handles more than 50,000 tons of air cargo 
each day, of which approximately one quarter is designated for 
passenger air carriers.
  Currently, TSA relies on a ``Known Shipper'' program for 
which shipping companies may qualify if they meet certain 
security requirements. The TSA prohibits passenger aircraft 
from transporting cargo not from a Known Shipper. A recent GAO 
report highlighted weaknesses in this program, citing 
unreliability of shipper data, and questioned TSA's methodology 
of identifying risky shippers. Some members of Congress have 
called for screening of all cargo on passenger planes.
  In November 2004, TSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) in the Federal Register for enhanced air cargo security 
requirements throughout the air cargo supply chain. The Air 
Cargo Final Rule, published on May 26, 2006, affects the air 
cargo supply chain by consolidating approximately 4,000 private 
industry Known Shipper lists into 1 central database managed by 
TSA. The rule also requires background checks of approximately 
51,000 off-airport freight forwarder employees and extends 
secure areas of airports to include ramps and cargo facilities.
  As with its other programs, TSA has followed a layered 
approach to air cargo security, by: allowing only known 
shippers to offer cargo for passenger-carrying aircraft, using 
canine teams throughout the cargo system, screening the most 
high-risk cargo with electronic EDS, deploying hundreds of 
dedicated cargo-only aviation security inspectors to conduct 
scheduled and unscheduled compliance inspections in cargo 
facilities, requiring air carriers to physically inspect some 
cargo, and utilizing transportation security officers at over 
250 small airports to screen all cargo at these airports, and 
requiring random screening in addition to the above measures.
  In November 2006, TSA implemented new rules were to require 
100 percent of high risk cargo to be screened with the same 
degree of scrutiny as checked baggage before being placed on 
passenger aircraft. This includes packages presented to air 
carriers at the airport or other facilities and packages 
requested to be placed on a specific flight. Additionally, TSA 
removed all exceptions for screening air cargo on passenger 
planes.
  S. 509 would require TSA to provide for the screening of all 
cargo being carried on commercial passenger aircraft within 3 
years after the date of enactment of this Act. The system must 
allow for a level of screening ``comparable'' to that of 
checked baggage screening and ensure the security of all cargo 
that is shipped on passenger aircraft. The bill also included 
language directing TSA to evaluate the use of blast resistant 
cargo containers and develop a program to make such containers 
available to air carriers as needed to address threats, as 
recommended by the 9/11 Commission.
  The Committee believes TSA should consider establishing a 
system whereby aviation ground service providers that perform 
cargo security screening services for passenger aircraft are 
compensated for costs incurred as a result of increased cargo 
security requirements.

PASSENGER CHECKPOINT SCREENING TECHNOLOGY

  Over the past year, evolving security threats have increased 
the urgency of screening air passengers for explosives at 
checkpoints. A terrorist plot that targeted several U.S. air 
carriers with liquid explosives was foiled in London on August 
10, 2006. The TSA responded to the scheme by enacting enhanced 
security measures at all airports to limit the amount of liquid 
materials that could be carried on commercial aircraft. This 
step was necessary because the agency had, and continues to 
have, only a limited ability to use advanced technology to 
detect such threat items.
  Congress sought to establish a framework in ATSA for enhanced 
aviation security measures that incorporate advanced 
technology. Among the mandates included in ATSA are several 
provisions that are noteworthy, including stipulations for 
research, development, and deployment of technologies that 
would advance aviation security, especially explosive detection 
technology used for both people and baggage. In addition, ATSA 
establishes Federal requirements for airports to maximize the 
use of technology and equipment designed to detect or 
neutralize chemical or biological weapons.
  The Committee believes the best way to provide for the 
research and development of technologies and techniques to 
prevent explosives from being placed onto passenger aircraft is 
to pilot these technologies at a diverse group of airports. The 
Committee directs the Secretary to give priority for these 
pilot projects to airports that have demonstrated their 
expertise as pilot sites and were selected by TSA as model 
airports for the deployment of technology to detect explosives.
  In implementing ATSA, TSA proposed layers of security, such 
as advanced screener training and installation of new 
machinery, that have demonstrated some progress; nevertheless, 
assessments by the 9/11 Commission, the DHS Office of Inspector 
General (OIG), as well as GAO, indicate that more improvement 
is still necessary. In addition to screening checked baggage, 
TSA has awarded contracts to private companies to create 
technology capable of detecting explosives, weapons, and other 
items carried by passengers on commercial aircraft. These 
devices include ``backscatter'' machines that screen 
individuals for hidden items, ``puffer'' machines that analyze 
air particles for explosives, document scanners, advanced 
checkpoint x-ray devices, and enhanced metal detectors.
  The 9/11 Commission commented that while more advanced 
screening technology is being developed, Congress needs to 
provide the funding for, and TSA needs to move as expeditiously 
as possible with, the appropriate installation of explosives 
detection trace portals or other appropriate technology at more 
of the Nation's commercial airports. Backscatter technology 
evaluated by DHS over the last few years has demonstrated that 
it can provide significant improvements in threat detection at 
airport passenger screening checkpoints for both carry-on 
baggage and the screening of passengers. The Committee urges 
TSA to deploy this technology quickly and broadly to address 
security shortcomings at passenger screening checkpoints.
  The Committee believes steps must be taken to improve the 
survivability of Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders (FDRs, 
CVRs) to assure that complete flight information is quickly 
available to investigators following civil aviation accidents 
to determine the potential role of terrorism. Most of the FDRs 
and CVRs on the 9/11 flights did not survive, depriving 
investigators, policymakers, and the public of valuable 
information. The Committee also is concerned that locating and 
recovering FDRs and CVRs from civilian air accidents over water 
have proven time consuming and difficult, often taking days and 
weeks to recover from the ocean depths. The Committee 
understands deployable FDRs and CVRs avoid the crash site, and 
can float indefinitely over water, increasing their 
survivability and recoverability. Therefore, S. 509 directs the 
DHS Secretary, in conjunction with the Secretary of 
Transportation, to establish a grant program to test and 
certify deployable flight data, cockpit voice recorder, and 
emergency locator beacon technology on a civilian passenger 
aircraft.
  S. 509 recognizes the threat presented by passengers 
transporting explosives through security checkpoints and 
addresses this risk. Under the bill, TSA must produce and fully 
implement a strategic plan to deploy explosive detection 
equipment at airport checkpoints within 1 year of its 
submission. The agency also must provide specialized training 
to the screener workforce in the areas of behavior observation, 
and explosives detection.
  In addressing the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, TSA has 
been subject to harsh criticism for its efforts to develop a 
new, advanced system to improve passenger prescreening, which 
have experienced consistent delays and confronted numerous 
privacy concerns.
  Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, ATSA required 
the DOT to ensure that all commercial aviation passengers were 
prescreened using a system that evaluated the security risks of 
each passenger and potential need for additional screening upon 
the passenger's arrival at the airport. In accordance with that 
mandate, TSA began to develop a ``second generation'' 
prescreening program known as Computer Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening System II (CAPPS II). In contrast to its 
predecessor program, CAPPS II was intended to be operated by 
the Government, rather than by the air carriers. In 2004, 3 
years after ATSA was passed, and after numerous delays and 
challenges, DHS was compelled to cancel the CAPPS II program 
and continued to utilize its existing passenger prescreening 
system.
  Upon termination of the CAPPS II project, TSA began 
development of a successor program known as Secure Flight, a 
modified version of CAPPS II. In August 2004, TSA announced 
that Secure Flight would be utilized to compare passenger 
information, provided by aircraft operators to the agency 
whenever reservations for domestic flights are made, against 
data from consolidated watchlist databases maintained by the 
government. Like its predecessor, Secure Flight has faced 
numerous challenges and has encountered major opposition from 
privacy advocates.
  Under the Secure Flight program, TSA plans to take over from 
commercial air carriers the responsibility for comparing 
identifying information on passengers against the records of 
known or suspected terrorists. However, TSA took steps to 
reassess or ``re-baseline'' Secure Flight in February of 2006, 
and has not yet completed that process. Under the current 
system, TSA has indicated that over 30,000 individuals have 
contacted the agency with verification forms and supporting 
documentation under this process.
  In its original design, Secure Flight was an amalgamation of 
components from CAPPS I, CAPPS II and recommendations from the 
9/11 Commission report. Secure Flight is intended only to 
prescreen passengers flying within the United States; a 
separate program for screening international flights exists 
within the Customs & Border Protection (CBP) division of DHS.
  The DHS Appropriations Act of 2005 (Public Law 108-334) 
identified 10 critical aspects of the development and 
implementation of Secure Flight, and mandated that GAO assess 
and report on TSA's progress. The GAO report, published in 
March 2005, indicated that TSA only had accomplished 1 out of 
the 10 goals, with various stages of progress on the remaining 
nine. Overall, the report was fairly critical of TSA's slow 
action and expressed concern that overarching policies, 
technical frameworks, and cost structures had yet to be 
developed.
  Over the course of 2006, both TSA and GAO have reported 
informally that progress is being made with respect to each of 
the 10 goals. Among the significant problems hindering the 
implementation of Secure Flight are the following: privacy, 
redress, management oversight, management policies, operations 
and performance goals, and life-cycle costs.
  To address ongoing problems in developing an advanced 
passenger pre-screening system, S. 509 would ensure that a 
system is in place to coordinate passenger redress for those 
individuals misidentified against the ``No-Fly'' or 
``Selectee'' watchlists, and also would require TSA to submit a 
strategic plan to Congress for the testing and implementation 
of its advanced passenger prescreening system.
  In addition, to address general aviation (GA) security, S. 
509 would direct TSA to develop a threat assessment program 
that is standardized and focused on GA facilities. The bill 
also would require foreign-based GA aircraft entering U.S. 
airspace to have their passengers checked against appropriate 
watch lists.

                         Summary of Provisions

  S. 509 would seek to fully address the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations on aviation security with a focus on improving 
TSA's layered aviation security approach and available tools. 
As such, the bill authorizes an extension of funding for key 
aviation security programs to assist with aviation security 
research and development (R&D) and EDS installation.
  S. 509 further would require TSA to develop and implement a 
system to provide for the screening of all cargo being carried 
on passenger aircraft, and develop a system by which TSA would 
provide blast-resistant cargo containers to such air carriers 
at the discretion of the agency.
  The bill directs DHS to expedite R&D pilot projects that 
advance technologies that can more effectively protect 
passenger planes from the threat of explosive devices, and 
requires the establishment of a grant program to fund projects 
the agency develops through this process.
  S. 509 would mandate the continued annual dedication of $250 
million of the amounts currently collected in aviation security 
fees to the Aviation Security Capital Fund for the installation 
of in-line screening systems for the enhanced screening of 
checked baggage at airports. The bill would bolster the 
existing LOI program through changes in funding allocation 
requirements and by requiring a prioritization schedule for 
planned projects, and requiring the submission of an overdue 
cost-sharing study on in-line EDS.
  S. 509 also would remove the existing screener cap of 45,000 
full-time equivalent (FTE) employees that is currently imposed 
on TSA's screener workforce, and require TSA to provide 
specialized training to Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) 
for the development of advanced security skills, including 
behavior observation, explosives detection, and document 
verification.
  The bill would direct DHS to issue a strategic plan for the 
deployment of explosive detection equipment at airport 
checkpoints and would require TSA to implement the strategic 
plan within 1 year of its submission.
  To address ongoing concerns about passenger pre-screening 
redress procedures, S. 509 would require DHS to create an 
Office of Appeals and Redress to establish and administer a 
timely and fair process for airline passengers who believe they 
been misidentified against the ``No-Fly'' or ``Selectee'' 
watchlists. DHS also would be required to submit a strategic 
plan to Congress that would include timelines for the testing 
and implementation of its advanced passenger prescreening 
system.
  S. 509 would require that security rules be put in place at 
foreign aircraft repair stations, and that TSA develop a 
program under which foreign registered GA aircraft must submit 
passenger information to TSA to be checked against appropriate 
watch list databases prior to entering the United States. TSA 
also would be directed to develop a standardized threat and 
vulnerability assessment program for GA airports, to perform 
such assessments at GA airports in the United States on a risk-
assessed basis, and to study the feasibility of a grant program 
for GA airport operators to fund key projects to upgrade 
security at such facilities.
  The bill would require a report on efforts to institute a 
sterile area access system that would grant flight deck and 
cabin crews expedited access to secure areas through screening 
checkpoints, and to deploy such system within 1 year of the 
report's submission.
  S. 509 further would require a doubling of DHS's existing dog 
team capacity to be used for explosive detection across the 
Nation's transportation network.

                          Legislative History

  Chairman Inouye, along with Vice-Chairman Stevens, and 
Senators Rockefeller, Lott and Lautenberg, introduced S. 509, 
the Aviation Security Improvement Act, on February 6, 2007.
  On January 17, 2007, the Senate Commerce Committee held a 
hearing to review the status of TSA's efforts to address the 9/
11 Commission's air security recommendations and to consider 
options for strengthening the Nation's aviation security 
system. The Committee received testimony from Mr. Edmund 
``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security for 
TSA.
  During the 109th Congress, the Committee held several other 
hearings related to aviation security. On February 15, 2005, 
the Committee held a hearing to examine the President's FY 2006 
budget request for TSA, during which the Committee heard 
testimony from TSA, GAO, and various trade associations. On 
Thursday, June 9, 2005, the Committee held a hearing to review 
GA security with witnesses from DHS, FAA, and GA industry 
interests. The Committee held a hearing on December 12, 2005, 
to review TSA's proposal to implement enhanced aviation 
security procedures and remove some previous objects from the 
agency's ``Prohibited Items List'' with witnesses representing 
TSA, the air carriers and labor interests. On February 9, 2006, 
the Committee held a hearing on the status of TSA's primary 
passenger pre-screening programs, Secure Flight and Registered 
Traveler (RT) at which TSA and various stakeholder 
representatives testified. The Committee also held a hearing on 
April 4, 2006, to review TSA's physical screening of airline 
passengers and baggage at which TSA, GAO, and a representative 
of domestic airports testified.
  On February 13, 2007, the Committee met in Executive Session 
during which S. 509 was considered. Three additional amendments 
were filed to the bill, but only 2 were offered at the 
Executive Session and subsequently accepted. An amendment 
offered by Senator Hutchison to maximize the use of DHS's 
National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program, and an 
amendment offered by Senator Kerry to require a GAO assessment 
of the Secure Flight program. S. 509, as amended, was adopted 
unanimously by the Committee and the bill as amended was 
ordered reported.

                            Estimated Costs

  In compliance with subsection (a)(3) of paragraph 11 
of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee 
states that, in its opinion, it is necessary to dispense with 
the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of that subsection 
in order to expedite the business of the Senate. deg.
  In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee provides the 
following cost estimate, prepared by the Congressional Budget 
Office:
                                                     March 2, 2007.
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. 
        Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
completed the enclosed cost estimate for S. 509, the Aviation 
Security Improvement Act.
    The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Megan Carroll 
(for federal costs), Sarah Puro (for the state and local 
impact), and Paige Piper/Bach (for the private-sector impact).
            Sincerely,
                                                   Peter R. Orszag.
    Enclosure.

S. 509--Aviation Security Improvement Act

    Summary: S. 509 would extend and reauthorize certain 
federal programs related to aviation security that are 
primarily implemented by the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). CBO estimates that implementing the legislation would 
result in new discretionary spending of $6.8 billion over the 
2008-2012 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary 
amounts.
    In addition, S. 509 would affect direct spending by 
authorizing TSA to collect, over the 2008-2028 period, $250 
million annually in fees from airline passengers and spend 
those amounts to improve security measures at airports. CBO 
estimates that such fees would initially exceed spending, 
resulting in a net reduction in direct spending of $225 million 
in 2008 and $500 million over the next 10 years. Those savings 
would eventually be fully offset by corresponding increases in 
direct spending after the agency's authority to collect fees 
expires in 2028, resulting in no net change in direct spending 
over the long run.
    S. 509 would authorize airports to leverage, by issuing 
tax-exempt bonds, certain funds they receive as grants from 
TSA. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimates that 
resulting reductions in revenues would total $98 million over 
the 2008-2017 period.
    S. 509 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would impose no 
costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
    S. 509 could impose private-sector mandates as defined in 
UMRA. The bill would require DHS to implement a system to 
screen all cargo transported on passenger aircraft operated by 
certain air carriers. The requirements established under the 
bill could impose mandates on entities that send cargo on 
passenger aircraft or certain air carriers. Because the 
screening system has not been established, CBO does not have 
enough information to determine whether the system would impose 
mandates or whether the direct cost would exceed the annual 
threshold established by UMRA for private-sector mandates ($131 
million in 2007, adjusted annually for inflation).
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of S. 509 is shown in Table 1. The costs of 
this legislation fall within budget function 400 
(transportation).

                                                          TABLE 1.--BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF S. 509
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                       -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               2007               2008               2009               2010               2011               2012
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Net Spending Under Current Law for
 Aviation Security:
    Estimated Budget Authority a......              2,367                  0                  0                  0                  0                  0
    Estimated Outlays.................              3,075                773                221                 97                 30                 20
Proposed Changes:
    Net Funding for Aviation Security:
      Estimated Authorization Level...                  0              2,493              2,571                  0                  0                  0
      Estimated Outlays...............                  0              1,255              2,286              1,169                252                102
    In-Line Baggage Screening:
      Authorization Level.............                  0                450                450                  0                  0                  0
      Estimated Outlays...............                  0                 45                150                248                248                158
    Cargo Security Provisions:
      Estimated Authorization Level...                  0                102                114                106                 98                100
      Estimated Outlays...............                  0                 72                111                104                 97                 99
    Other Activities:
      Estimated Authorization Level...                  0                 72                 79                 87                 96                104
      Estimated Outlays...............                  0                 47                 72                 86                 95                104
      Total Changes:
        Estimated Authorization Level.                  0              3,117              3,214                193                194                204
        Estimated Outlays.............                  0              1,419              2,619              1,607                692                463
Net Spending Under S. 509 for Aviation
 Security:
    Estimated Authorization Level a...              2,367              3,117              3,214                193                194                204
    Estimated Outlays.................              3,075              2,192              2,840              1,704                722                483

                                                         CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES

Net Aviation Security Fees and
 Spending b:
    Estimated Budget Authority........                  0                  0                  0                  0                  0                  0
    Estimated Outlays.................                  0               -225               -162                -88                -25                  0
Estimated Revenues....................                  0                  *                  *                 -2                 -4                -8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Negative numbers indicate reductions in spending or reductions in revenues; * = between -$500,000 and zero.
a The 2007 level is the net amount appropriated for that year for aviation security.
b The legislation's changes in direct spending would have no net effect over time.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation.

    Basis of estimate: CBO estimates that implementing S. 509 
would cost $6.8 billion over the 2008-2012 period, assuming 
appropriation of the amounts authorized and estimated to be 
necessary. In addition, over the next 10 years, CBO estimates 
that the bill would increase both offsetting receipts and 
direct spending by about $2.5 billion, resulting in a net 
reduction in direct spending of $500 million over that time. 
(Over the long run, however, we estimate that the bill would 
have no net effect on direct spending.) Finally, S. 509 would 
result in forgone revenues totaling $98 million over the next 
10 years. For this estimate, we assume that the legislation 
will be enacted before the end of fiscal year 2007 and that the 
necessary amounts will be appropriated each year. Estimated 
outlays are based on historical spending patterns for existing 
or similar programs.

Spending subject to appropriation

    CBO estimates that implementing S. 509 would cost about 
$6.8 billion over the 2008-2012 period, assuming appropriation 
of the necessary amounts. Most of that funding would be used to 
continue TSA's existing aviation security programs. Other 
amounts would be used for in-line baggage screening systems at 
airports, activities related to cargo security, and other 
aviation security activities.
    Aviation Security. The bill would authorize the 
appropriation of sums necessary for TSA's aviation security 
programs for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, particularly for 
salaries for screeners of passengers and baggage, and for 
related expenses. CBO estimates that implementing those 
programs would require gross appropriations totaling $10.1 
billion over the next two years. (The gross appropriation level 
for aviation security programs in 2007 is $4.8 billion.) That 
estimate is based on information from TSA regarding the cost of 
continuing existing programs and implementing certain new 
provisions of S. 509. Those provisions would lift the existing 
cap on the number of full-time equivalent staff TSA may employ 
and require TSA or DHS to:
         Strengthen passenger prescreening and security 
        at airport checkpoints;
         Establish certain appeal and redress 
        procedures for passengers wrongly delayed or prohibited 
        from boarding a flight;
         Certify aviation security programs at foreign 
        repair stations; and
         Implement systems to grant airline crews 
        expedited access through airport screening checkpoints.
    CBO assumes that a portion of the $10.1 billion authorized 
for aviation security over the 2008-2009 period would come from 
certain fees that TSA is authorized to collect to offset the 
agency's costs. Most of those collections would result from 
fees charged on tickets sold by commercial airlines. Additional 
collections would result from security fees paid directly to 
TSA by air carriers. Under existing law, TSA's authority to 
collect and spend such fees is subject to appropriation.
    Based on information from TSA about the anticipated numbers 
of airline passengers and travel patterns, CBO estimates that 
such fees would offset nearly $5 billion of the amounts 
provided for aviation security over the 2008-2009 period, thus 
reducing the net appropriation that would be necessary to 
implement the legislation. Accordingly, we estimate that fully 
funding aviation security programs under S. 509 would require 
net appropriations totaling about $5.1 billion over the 2008-
2009 period--averaging about $2.5 billion a year. (By 
comparison, net appropriations totaled a little under $2.4 
billion for 2007.) We estimate that the net outlays resulting 
from such funding would total $5.1 billion over the 2008-2009 
period.
    In-Line Baggage Screening. S. 509 would authorize the 
appropriation of $450 million in each of fiscal years 2008 and 
2009 for grants to airports. Airports would use those amounts 
to install in-line systems to screen checked baggage. (These 
systems allow checked baggage to be screened within an 
airport's baggage conveyor system.) Based on information from 
TSA and historical spending patterns for such grants, CBO 
estimates that fully funding this provision would cost $45 
million in 2008 and $849 million over the 2008-2012 period, 
with additional spending of $51 million occurring in later 
years.
    Cargo Security. S. 509 would direct TSA and DHS to 
undertake efforts to enhance the security of cargo transported 
aboard passenger aircraft. Specifically, the legislation would 
require the TSA to establish a system for screening such cargo 
that provides a level of security comparable to the level of 
effort for passenger-checked baggage. The legislation also 
would require DHS to expedite certain research and establish a 
pilot program to support projects to improve the safety of 
cargo transported aboard passenger aircraft. Finally, S. 509 
would direct TSA to purchase blast-resistant cargo containers 
and distribute them to certain air carriers. Taken together, 
CBO estimates that those provisions would cost $72 million in 
2008 and $483 million over the next five years.
    Enhanced Cargo Screening. S. 509 does not specify how TSA 
should enhance cargo screening. According to the agency, it is 
currently in the process of evaluating a range of technologies 
and systems that could be used to strengthen its current risk-
based techniques to selectively screen air cargo. For this 
estimate, CBO assumes that, under S. 509, the agency would 
double its current level of effort related to screening air 
cargo. Under the legislation, the agency would hire more cargo 
inspectors and program managers and develop a program to 
certify cargo shippers. Based on current levels of spending for 
cargo screening, CBO estimates that those activities would cost 
$45 million in 2008 and $298 million over the next five years.
    DHS research programs. The bill would require DHS to 
establish a program to fund projects to deploy and test certain 
technologies, particularly to mitigate the risk of explosions 
aboard passenger aircraft. S. 509 specifies that technologies 
studied should include blast-resistant cargo containers and 
other technologies to enhance the security of cargo. Based on 
information from DHS about the cost of similar programs, CBO 
estimates the proposed projects would cost $15 million in 2008 
and $135 million over the next five years.
    Blast-Resistant Cargo Containers. Based on information from 
TSA, CBO estimates that purchasing and distributing blast-
resistant cargo containers to air carriers would cost $12 
million in 2008 and $50 million over the 2008-2012 period, with 
additional spending continuing beyond that time. That estimate 
assumes that the containers are provided to nearly 600 wide-
body aircraft over a three-year period and includes annual 
costs to repair and maintain them.
    Other Provisions. CBO estimates that implementing other 
provisions of S. 509 would require appropriations totaling $438 
million over the next five years. That amount includes:
         $258 million for DHS programs to conduct 
        research and develop technologies related to 
        transportation security;
         $105 million to train and expand the use of 
        canine teams in detecting explosives at airports, and;
         $75 million for grants to enhance security at 
        general aviation airports.
    Those estimates are based on information from TSA regarding 
costs of existing or similar programs. Based on historical 
spending patterns, CBO estimates that fully funding those 
activities would cost $47 million in 2008 and $404 million over 
the next five years, assuming appropriation of the necessary 
amounts.

Direct spending and revenues

    The legislation's effect on direct spending and revenues 
over the next 10 years is shown in Table 2.
    Direct Spending. S. 509 would authorize TSA to spend, 
without further appropriation, $250 million annually over the 
2008-2028 period from TSA' s aviation security capital fund. 
TSA would use amounts in that fund to help airports install 
certain equipment to screen checked baggage. CBO estimates that 
this provision would increase direct spending by $25 million in 
2008 and $2 billion over the next 10 years.
    To offset the cost of those activities, the legislation 
would authorize the agency to collect passenger fees totaling 
$250 million a year over the 2008-2028 period. Under current 
law, such fees may be collected only to the extent provided for 
in advance in appropriations acts, and income from those fees 
is recorded as an offset to appropriated spending for TSA' s 
existing aviation security programs. S. 509 would require TSA 
to collect $2.5 billion over the 2008-2017 period from 
passengers without subsequent legislation. Because S. 509 would 
cause such fees to be used to finance activities related to 
installing screening equipment and improving explosives 
detection at airport checkpoints, such fees would not be 
available to reduce the costs of other TSA spending. In other 
words, the collections under S. 509 would lead to a reduction 
in the amount of fees recorded as offsets to appropriated 
spending--essentially changing some discretionary offsetting 
collections into mandatory offsetting receipts. By doing so, 
those collections would no longer be available to offset annual 
discretionary appropriations.

                                        TABLE 2.--ESTIMATED CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES UNDER S. 509
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  2008     2009     2010     2011     2012     2013     2014     2015     2016     2017
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING a

Aviation Security Capital Fund: Gross Spending:
    Estimated Budget Authority................................      250      250      250      250      250      250      250      250      250      250
    Estimated Outlays.........................................       25       88      162      225      250      250      250      250      250      250
Offsetting Receipts:
    Estimated Budget Authority................................     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250
    Estimated Outlays.........................................     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250     -250
Net Spending:
    Estimated Budget Authority................................        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays.........................................     -225     -163      -88      -25        0        0        0        0        0        0

                                                                   CHANGES IN REVENUES

Estimated Revenues............................................        *        *       -2       -4       -8      -11      -14      -17      -19     -22
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Negative numbers indicate reductions in spending or reductions in revenues. * = between -$500,000 and zero.
\a\ The legislation's changes in direct spending would have no net effect over time.

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation.

    Based on historical spending patterns for similar 
activities, CBO estimates that fees collected under this 
provision would exceed the amounts spent for installation of 
screening equipment over the next few years. Hence, we estimate 
that enacting S. 509 would reduce net direct spending by $225 
million in 2008 and $500 million over the next 10 years. (After 
TSA's authority to collect fees expires in 2028, those savings 
would eventually be offset by corresponding increases in direct 
spending.)
    Revenues. S. 509 would authorize airports to leverage 
certain funds they receive as grants from TSA. The Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimates that, under the legislation, 
airports would use this authority to issue additional tax-
exempt bonds, and that consequent reductions in revenues would 
total $98 million over the 2008-2017 period.
    Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments: 
S. 509 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined in 
UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal 
governments. The bill would authorize grants for which state 
and local governments would be eligible to apply. Any resulting 
costs to those entities would result from complying with 
conditions of aid.
    Estimated impact on the private sector: S. 509 could impose 
private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. The bill would 
require DHS to implement a system to screen all cargo 
transported on passenger aircraft within three years of 
enactment. The system would be required, at a minimum, to 
provide a level of security comparable to the level of security 
in effect for passenger checked baggage. The requirements 
established under the bill could impose mandates on entities 
that send cargo on passenger aircraft or certain air carriers. 
Under current law, DHS is required to provide for the screening 
of all property, including cargo and other articles, that are 
carried aboard a passenger aircraft. According to government 
sources, however, DHS would have to enhance its current 
screening system to meet the requirements of the bill and such 
enhancements could impose mandates on the private sector.
    Because the screening system has not been established, CBO 
does not have enough information to determine whether the 
system would impose new mandates or whether the direct cost 
would exceed the annual threshold established by UMRA for 
private-sector mandates ($131 million in 2007, adjusted 
annually for inflation).
    Previous CBO estimate: On February 2, 2007, CBO transmitted 
a cost estimate for H.R. 1, the Implementing the 9/11 
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007, as passed by the House 
of Representatives on January 9, 2007. Title IV of that 
legislation contains provisions that would affect aviation 
security programs.
    Differences in our estimates of discretionary spending 
under title IV of H.R. 1 and S. 509 result primarily because 
H.R. 1 would authorize appropriations to continue existing 
aviation programs over a longer period of time. In addition, we 
estimate that implementing provisions of H.R. 1 that would 
require TSA to inspect 100 percent of all cargo transported 
aboard passenger aircraft would cost significantly more than 
provisions of S. 509 related to air cargo security.
    Differences in the estimates of direct spending under H.R. 
1 and S. 509 result because the two pieces of legislation would 
extend TSA's Aviation Capital Security Fund for different 
periods of time.
    S. 509 contains provisions that the Joint Committee on 
Taxation estimates would increase the level of tax-exempt 
bonds, causing reductions in revenues. Title IV of H.R. 1 would 
not affect revenues.
    Neither title IV of H.R. 1 nor S. 509 contain 
intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA. H.R. 1 would 
require DHS to establish a system to inspect 100 percent of 
cargo carried aboard certain passenger aircraft by the end of 
fiscal year 2009. Because the system has not been established, 
CBO did not have enough information to determine if the system 
would impose new mandates on private-sector entities or whether 
the direct cost would exceed the annual threshold.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Megan Carroll; Impact 
on State, local, and tribal governments: Sarah Puro; Impact on 
the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                      Regulatory Impact Statement

  In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the 
following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the 
legislation, as reported:

                       NUMBER OF PERSONS COVERED

  The reported bill would take steps to improve aviation 
security in the United States through the development of new 
Federal programs and modification of existing law. The bill 
affects DHS, TSA, FAA, and other entities already subject to 
DHS and FAA rules and regulations, thus the number of persons 
covered should be consistent with the current levels of 
individuals impacted under existing DHS and FAA regulations.

                            ECONOMIC IMPACT

  S. 509 is not expected to have a negative impact on the U.S. 
economy. Proper application of the key provisions of the 
legislation on cargo security should not impede the movement of 
air cargo while providing a significantly heightened level of 
security. The bill would authorize the necessary funding in key 
areas to establish a more secure system by requiring DHS to 
take steps to protect the system.

                                PRIVACY

  The reported bill would have a minimal impact on the privacy 
rights of individuals, and provisions that seek to improve the 
redress process for the commercial airline passenger 
prescreening system should provide improved government support 
for individuals who have been falsely identified as a potential 
threat against existing passenger watchlists.

                               PAPERWORK

  It is not anticipated that there would be a major increase in 
paperwork burdens resulting from the enactment of S. 509. In 
those areas where the legislation requires additional 
paperwork, such as reporting requirements for general aviation 
aircraft entering the United States from foreign locations, it 
is aimed at improving the security of the national air 
transportation system.

                      Section-by-Section Analysis


Section 1. Short title; Table of contents

  This section would provide a title for the bill, the 
``Aviation Security Improvement Act'', and a table of contents.

Section 2. Extension of authorization for aviation security funding

  This section would provide an extension of funding for 
aviation security at a level of such sums as necessary through 
FY 2009.

Section 3. Passenger aircraft cargo screening

  This section would require the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, within 3 years, to act through the TSA Administrator 
to develop a system that would provide for the screening of all 
cargo being transported on passenger aircraft. This system 
would be required to meet minimum standards using equipment, 
technology, procedures, personnel, or other methods identified 
by TSA that would provide a level of security comparable to 
that used for passenger checked baggage. The Secretary of 
Homeland Security also would be directed to provide a report to 
Congress that details the system within 1 year of its 
implementation.
  Under this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security would 
be permitted to issue an interim final rule as a temporary 
regulation to implement the cargo screening system without 
regard to standard administrative rulemaking procedures. If an 
interim final rule is issued, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security then would be required to issue a final rule that is 
in accordance with standard administrative rulemaking 
procedures within 1 year of the effective date of the interim 
final rule. If the Secretary of Homeland Security does not 
issue a final rule within the mandated period, the Secretary 
would be required to submit a report to Congress explaining why 
the final rule was not issued and continue to issue reports to 
Congress every 2 months until a final rule is implemented. Upon 
its issuance, the final rule would displace the interim final 
rule.
  This section further would require the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, working through TSA Administrator, to submit a report 
to Congress and to GAO that provides an assessment of the 
exemptions granted from the required screening under the 
agency's passenger aircraft cargo security system. This report 
would be required to be submitted within 6 months of the bill's 
enactment, and GAO would be required to review the report and 
provide Congress an assessment of the exemptions.

Section 4. Blast resistant cargo containers

  This section would require the TSA Administrator to evaluate 
the results of its blast resistant cargo container pilot 
program and develop a system under which TSA would make such 
containers available for use by commercial passenger aircraft 
on a random or risk-assessed basis as determined by the TSA 
Administrator. The Administrator, based on the pilot 
feasibility results, must implement the program before January 
1, 2008, and acquire, provide for the storage, maintenance and 
distribution of the blast-resistant containers to air carriers 
as necessary within 3 months of the system's development.

Section 5. Protection of air cargo on passenger planes from explosives

  This section would require the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to expedite research and development for technology that can 
more effectively address the threat of explosives to passenger 
aircraft. The Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the 
Department of Transportation, would be directed to establish a 
grant program to fund pilot projects to deploy such advanced 
technologies, and to test technology that may improve the 
ability to recover and analyze information from aircraft 
accidents. This section would authorize such sums as necessary 
to carry out the section for FY 2008.

Section 6. In-line baggage screening

  This section would extend the authorization for discretionary 
spending on in-line baggage screening systems at a level of 
$450,000,000 through FY 2009, and require the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to submit a report on alternative funding 
concepts within 30 days.

Section 7. Enhancement of in-line baggage system deployment

  This section would extend the Aviation Security Capital Fund 
through FY 2028 at a level of $250,000,000, and adjust the 
allocation amounts to provide 80 percent of the annual funding 
to fulfill letters of intent (LOIs) for in-line baggage 
screening projects and 20 percent to be distributed on a 
discretionary basis with priority consideration for small and 
non-hub airports. The TSA Administrator would be directed to 
create a priority schedule for airport security projects 
permitted under this section and report that schedule, a 
timeline, and proposed funding allocations for each project to 
the Senate Commerce Committee, the Homeland Security Committee 
and Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the House of 
Representatives within 180 days. Airports that have already 
initiated such projects would be eligible to receive a grant 
under the program, and grants would be permitted to service 
obligations for airports that receive such grants under this 
program.

Section 8. Research and development of aviation and transportation 
        security technology

  This section would extend the authorization of research and 
development for aviation security technology at the current 
level of $50,000,000 through FY 2009, and would allow for a 
broadened application of these technologies to transportation 
security where applicable, although the grants would remain 
focused on aviation threats.

Section 9. Certain TSA personnel limitations not to apply

  This section would remove any limitations on the number of 
employees permitted to be employed by TSA after FY 2007, and 
require the Secretary of Homeland Security to recruit and hire 
the necessary workforce to provide appropriate levels of 
aviation security while ensuing that the average security delay 
at airports is fewer than 10 minutes.

Section 10. Specialized training

  This section would require TSA to provide advanced training 
to its screener workforce for the development of specialized 
security skills such as behavior observation, explosive 
detection, and document verification to improve the 
effectiveness of the aviation security system.

Section 11. Explosive detection at passenger screening checkpoints

  This section would require the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, within 3 months after the date of enactment, to issue 
a strategic plan regarding the utilization of advanced 
explosive detection screening systems at passenger checkpoints. 
The agency would be further directed to fully deploy the 
strategic plan within 1 year of the date of enactment of the 
legislation.

Section 12. Appeal and redress process for passengers wrongly delayed 
        or prohibited from boarding a flight

  This section would direct the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to create the Office of Appeals and Redress to establish and 
administer a timely and fair process for airline passengers who 
believe they have been delayed or prohibited from boarding a 
flight because that individual was misidentified against the 
``No Fly'' and ``Selectee'' watch lists. The office must 
establish a method for maintaining records of those 
misidentified by the watch list process, ensure that the record 
keeping includes information to determine the identity of such 
individuals, and provide such information to the necessary 
agencies to assist in the clearance of passengers.

Section 13. Strategic plan to test and implement advance passenger 
        prescreening system

  This section would direct the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
in consultation with the TSA Administrator, to submit a plan to 
Congress within 6 months after the date of enactment that 
describes the agency's intended advanced passenger prescreening 
system, provides a timeline for each phase of testing and 
implementation, explains how it would be integrated into 
international flights, and describes how it complies with 
existing Federal requirements for maintaining records on 
individuals.

Section 14. Repair station security

  This section would preclude the Administrator of the FAA from 
certifying any new foreign repair stations under part 145 of 
title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), if the TSA 
Administrator does not issue the regulations required by 
section 44924(e) of title 49, U.S.C., within 90 days of the 
enactment of this Act.

Section 15. General aviation security

  This section would require the TSA Administrator to develop a 
standardized threat and vulnerability assessment program for GA 
airports and implement a program within 1 year to perform such 
assessments on a risk-assessed basis at GA airports in the 
United States. The TSA Administrator is further directed, 
within 6 months after the date of enactment, to study the 
feasibility of a grant program to provide grants to GA airport 
operators for projects to upgrade security at their facilities, 
and if determined to be feasible, to establish such a program.
  This section also would require the TSA Administrator to 
develop a system, within 6 months, under which foreign-
registered GA aircraft that are identified through risk-based 
assessment, in conjunction with FAA, are required to submit 
passenger information to TSA and have that information checked 
against appropriate terrorist databases prior to entering U.S. 
airspace.
  This section would authorize such sums as necessary to carry 
out any GA grant program.

Section 16. Security credentials for airline crews

  This section would direct TSA to work with airline, airport, 
and flight crew representatives to transmit a report to the 
Senate Commerce Committee and the House of Representatives 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on the status of 
efforts to develop a sterile area access system to more 
effectively identify airline flight deck and cabin crew 
representatives to grant them more efficient access through 
screening checkpoints. The report must include recommendations 
on the feasibility of implementing the system for the domestic 
airline industry within 1 year of the report being submitted, 
and the TSA Administrator must begin full implementation of the 
system not later than 1 year after the report is transmitted to 
Congress.

Section 17. National explosive detection canine team training center

  This section would direct the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
as soon as practicable, to enhance the National Explosive 
Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) and maximize canine 
training capacity so that up to 100 additional dogs can be 
certified each year. The Secretary would be given flexibility 
across transportation modes to use as needed and deemed 
necessary and encourages the Secretary to review potential 
benefits of potential benefits of establishing new canine 
training partnerships throughout the United States.

                        Changes in Existing Law

  In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, 
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be 
omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new material is printed 
in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown 
in roman):

                      TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE

                    SUBTITLE VII--AVIATION PROGRAMS

                    PART A--AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY

                          SUBPART III--SAFETY

                         CHAPTER 449. SECURITY

                       SUBCHAPTER I. REQUIREMENTS

Sec. 44901. Screening passengers and property

                           [49 U.S.C. 44901]

  (a) In General.--The Under Secretary of Transportation for 
Security shall provide for the screening of all passengers and 
property, including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and 
checked baggage, and other articles, that will be carried 
aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or 
foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air 
transportation. In the case of flights and flight segments 
originating in the United States, the screening shall take 
place before boarding and shall be carried out by a Federal 
Government employee (as defined in section 2105 of title 5, 
United States Code), except as otherwise provided in section 
44919 or 44920 and except for identifying passengers and 
baggage for screening under the CAPPS and known shipper 
programs and conducting positive bag-match programs.
  (b) Supervision of Screening.--All screening of passengers 
and property at airports in the United States where screening 
is required under this section shall be supervised by uniformed 
Federal personnel of the Transportation Security Administration 
who shall have the power to order the dismissal of any 
individual performing such screening.
  (c) Checked Baggage.--A system must be in operation to screen 
all checked baggage at all airports in the United States as 
soon as practicable but not later than the 60th day following 
the date of enactment of the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act.
  (d) Explosive Detection Systems.--
          (1) In general.--The Under Secretary of 
        Transportation for Security shall take all necessary 
        action to ensure that--
                  (A) explosive detection systems are deployed 
                as soon as possible to ensure that all United 
                States airports described in section 44903(c) 
                have sufficient explosive detection systems to 
                screen all checked baggage no later than 
                December 31, 2002, and that as soon as such 
                systems are in place at an airport, all checked 
                baggage at the airport is screened by those 
                systems; and
                  (B) all systems deployed under subparagraph 
                (A) are fully utilized; and
                  (C) if explosive detection equipment at an 
                airport is unavailable, all checked baggage is 
                screened by an alternative means.
          (2) Deadline.--
                  (A) In general.--If, in his discretion or at 
                the request of an airport, the Under Secretary 
                of Transportation for Security determines that 
                the Transportation Security Administration is 
                not able to deploy explosive detection systems 
                required to be deployed under paragraph (1) at 
                all airports where explosive detection systems 
                are required by December 31, 2002, then with 
                respect to each airport for which the Under 
                Secretary makes that determination--
                          (i) the Under Secretary shall submit 
                        to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
                        Science, and Transportation and the 
                        House of Representatives Committee on 
                        Transportation and Infrastructure a 
                        detailed plan (which may be submitted 
                        in classified form) for the deployment 
                        of the number of explosive detection 
                        systems at that airport necessary to 
                        meet the requirements of paragraph (1) 
                        as soon as practicable at that airport 
                        but in no event later than December 31, 
                        2003; and
                          (ii) the Under Secretary shall take 
                        all necessary action to ensure that 
                        alternative means of screening all 
                        checked baggage is implemented until 
                        the requirements of paragraph (1) have 
                        been met.
                  (B) Criteria for determination.--In making a 
                determination under subparagraph (A), the Under 
                Secretary shall take into account--
                          (i) the nature and extent of the 
                        required modifications to the airport's 
                        terminal buildings, and the technical, 
                        engineering, design and construction 
                        issues;
                          (ii) the need to ensure that such 
                        installations and modifications are 
                        effective; and
                          (iii) the feasibility and cost-
                        effectiveness of deploying explosive 
                        detection systems in the baggage 
                        sorting area or other non-public area 
                        rather than the lobby of an airport 
                        terminal building.
                  (C) Response.--The Under Secretary shall 
                respond to the request of an airport under 
                subparagraph (A) within 14 days of receiving 
                the request. A denial of request shall create 
                no right of appeal or judicial review.
                  (D) Airport effort required.--Each airport 
                with respect to which the Under Secretary makes 
                a determination under subparagraph (A) shall--
                          (i) cooperate fully with the 
                        Transportation Security Administration 
                        with respect to screening checked 
                        baggage and changes to accommodate 
                        explosive detection systems; and
                          (ii) make security projects a 
                        priority for the obligation or 
                        expenditure of funds made available 
                        under chapter 417 or 471 until 
                        explosive detection systems required to 
                        be deployed under paragraph (1) have 
                        been deployed at that airport.
          (3) Reports.--Until the Transportation Security 
        Administration has met the requirements of paragraph 
        (1), the Under Secretary shall submit a classified 
        report every 30 days after the date of enactment of 
        this Act to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, 
        and Transportation and the House of Representatives 
        Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
        describing the progress made toward meeting such 
        requirements at each airport.
  (e) Mandatory Screening Where EDS Not Yet Available.--As soon 
as practicable but not later than the 60th day following the 
date of enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act and until the requirements of subsection (b)(1)(A) are met, 
the Under Secretary shall require alternative means for 
screening any piece of checked baggage that is not screened by 
an explosive detection system. Such alternative means may 
include 1 or more of the following:
          (1) A bag-match program that ensures that no checked 
        baggage is placed aboard an aircraft unless the 
        passenger who checked the baggage is aboard the 
        aircraft.
          (2) Manual search.
          (3) Search by canine explosive detection units in 
        combination with other means.
          (4) Other means or technology approved by the Under 
        Secretary.
  (f) Cargo Deadline. --A system must be in operation to 
screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo 
that is to be transported in all-cargo aircraft in air 
transportation and intrastate air transportation as soon as 
practicable after the date of enactment of the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act.
  (g) Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft.--
          (1) In general.--Not later than 3 years after the 
        date of enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement 
        Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through 
        the Administrator of the Transportation Security 
        Administration, shall establish a system to screen all 
        cargo transported on passenger aircraft operated by an 
        air carrier or foreign air carrier in air 
        transportation or intrastate air transportation to 
        ensure the security of all such passenger aircraft 
        carrying cargo.
          (2) Minimum standards.--The system referred to in 
        paragraph (1) shall require, at a minimum, that the 
        equipment, technology, procedures, personnel, or other 
        methods determined by the Administrator of the 
        Transportation Security Administration, provide a level 
        of security comparable to the level of security in 
        effect for passenger checked baggage.
          (3) Regulations.--
                  (A) Interim final rule.--The Secretary of 
                Homeland Security may issue an interim final 
                rule as a temporary regulation to implement 
                this subsection without regard to the 
                provisions of chapter 5 of title 5.
                  (B) Final rule.--
                          (i) In general.--If the Secretary 
                        issues an interim final rule under 
                        subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall 
                        issue, not later than 1 year after the 
                        effective date of the interim final 
                        rule, a final rule as a permanent 
                        regulation to implement this subsection 
                        in accordance with the provisions of 
                        chapter 5 of title 5.
                          (ii) Failure to act.--If the 
                        Secretary does not issue a final rule 
                        in accordance with clause (i) on or 
                        before the last day of the 1-year 
                        period referred to in clause (i), the 
                        Secretary shall submit a report to the 
                        Congress explaining why the final rule 
                        was not timely issued and providing an 
                        estimate of the earliest date on which 
                        the final rule will be issued. The 
                        Secretary shall submit the first such 
                        report within 10 days after such last 
                        day and submit a report to the Congress 
                        containing updated information every 60 
                        days thereafter until the final rule is 
                        issued.
                          (iii) Superseding of interim final 
                        rule.--The final rule issued in 
                        accordance with this subparagraph shall 
                        supersede the interim final rule issued 
                        under subparagraph (A).
          (4) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date on 
        which the system required by paragraph (1) is 
        established, the Secretary shall transmit a report to 
        Congress that details and explains the system.
  [(g)] (h) Deployment of Armed Personnel.--
          (1) In general.--The Under Secretary shall order the 
        deployment of law enforcement personnel authorized to 
        carry firearms at each airport security screening 
        location to ensure passenger safety and national 
        security.
          (2) Minimum requirements.--Except at airports 
        required to enter into agreements under subsection (c), 
        the Under Secretary shall order the deployment of at 
        least 1 law enforcement officer at each airport 
        security screening location. At the 100 largest 
        airports in the United States, in terms of annual 
        passenger enplanements for the most recent calendar 
        year for which data are available, the Under Secretary 
        shall order the deployment of additional law 
        enforcement personnel at airport security screening 
        locations if the Under Secretary determines that the 
        additional deployment is necessary to ensure passenger 
        safety and national security.
  [(h)] (i) Exemptions and Advising Congress on Regulations.--
The Under Secretary--
          (1) may exempt from this section air transportation 
        operations, except scheduled passenger operations of an 
        air carrier providing air transportation under a 
        certificate issued under section 41102 of this title or 
        a permit issued under section 41302 of this title; and
          (2) shall advise Congress of a regulation to be 
        prescribed under this section at least 30 days before 
        the effective date of the regulation, unless the Under 
        Secretary decides an emergency exists requiring the 
        regulation to become effective in fewer than 30 days 
        and notifies Congress of that decision.
  (j) Blast-resistant Cargo Containers.--
          (1) In general.--Before January 1, 2008, the 
        Administrator of the Transportation Security 
        Administration shall--
                  (A) evaluate the results of the blast-
                resistant cargo container pilot program 
                instituted before the date of enactment of the 
                Aviation Security Improvement Act;
                  (B) based on that evaluation, begin the 
                acquisition of a sufficient number of blast-
                resistant cargo containers to meet the 
                requirements of the Transportation Security 
                Administration's cargo security program under 
                paragraph (2); and
                  (C) develop a system under which the 
                Administrator--
                          (i) will make such containers 
                        available for use by passenger aircraft 
                        operated by air carriers or foreign air 
                        carriers in air transportation or 
                        intrastate air transportation on a 
                        random or risk-assessment basis as 
                        determined by the Administrator, in 
                        sufficient number to enable the 
                        carriers to meet the requirements of 
                        the Administration's cargo security 
                        system; and
                          (ii) provide for the storage, 
                        maintenance, and distribution of such 
                        containers.
          (2) Distribution to air carriers.--Within 90 days 
        after the date on which the Administrator completes 
        development of the system required by paragraph (1)(C), 
        the Administrator of the Transportation Security 
        Administration shall implement that system and begin 
        making blast-resistant cargo containers available to 
        such carriers as necessary.
  (i) (k) General Aviation Airport Security Program.--
          (1) In general.--Within 1 year after the date of 
        enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act the 
        Administrator of the Transportation Security 
        Administration shall--
                  (A) develop a standardized threat and 
                vulnerability assessment program for general 
                aviation airports (as defined in section 
                47135(m)); and
                  (B) implement a program to perform such 
                assessments on a risk-assessment basis at 
                general aviation airports.
          (2) Grant program.--Within 6 months after date of 
        enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act the 
        Administrator shall initiate and complete a study of 
        the feasibility of a program, based on a risk-managed 
        approach, to provide grants to general aviation airport 
        operators for projects to upgrade security at general 
        aviation airports (as defined in section 47135(m)). If 
        the Administrator determines that such a program is 
        feasible, the Administrator shall establish such a 
        program.
          (3) Application to foreign-registered general 
        aviation aircraft.--Within 180 days after the date of 
        enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement Act, the 
        Administrator shall develop a risk-based system under 
        which--
                  (A) foreign-registered general aviation 
                aircraft, as identified by the Administrator, 
                in coordination with the Administrator of the 
                Federal Aviation Administration, are required 
                to submit passenger information to the 
                Transportation Security Administration before 
                entering United States airspace; and
                  (B) such information is checked against 
                appropriate databases maintained by the 
                Transportation Security Administration.''.
          (4) Authorization of appropriations.--There are 
        authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security such sums as may be necessary to 
        carry out any program established under paragraph (2).

Sec. 44923. Airport security improvement projects

                           [49 U.S.C. 44923]

  (a) Grant Authority.--Subject to the requirements of this 
section, the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation 
Security of the Department of Homeland Security [may] shall 
make grants to airport sponsors--
          (1) for projects to replace baggage conveyer systems 
        related to aviation security;
          (2) for projects to reconfigure terminal baggage 
        areas as needed to install explosive detection systems;
          (3) for projects to enable the Under Secretary to 
        deploy explosive detection systems behind the ticket 
        counter, in the baggage sorting area, or in line with 
        the baggage handling system; and
          (4) for other airport security capital improvement 
        projects.
  (b) Applications.--A sponsor seeking a grant under this 
section shall submit to the Under Secretary an application in 
such form and containing such information as the Under 
Secretary prescribes.
  (c) Approval.--The Under Secretary, after consultation with 
the Secretary of Transportation, may approve an application of 
a sponsor for a grant under this section only if the Under 
Secretary determines that the project will improve security at 
an airport or improve the efficiency of the airport without 
lessening security.
  (d) Letters of Intent.--
          (1) Issuance.--The Under Secretary [may] shall issue 
        a letter of intent to a sponsor committing to obligate 
        from future budget authority an amount, not more than 
        the Federal Government's share of the project's cost, 
        for an airport security improvement project (including 
        interest costs and costs of formulating the project).
          (2) Schedule.--A letter of intent under this 
        subsection shall establish a schedule under which the 
        Under Secretary will reimburse the sponsor for the 
        Government's share of the project's costs, as amounts 
        become available, if the sponsor, after the Under 
        Secretary issues the letter, carries out the project 
        without receiving amounts under this section.
          (3) Notice to under secretary.--A sponsor that has 
        been issued a letter of intent under this subsection 
        shall notify the Under Secretary of the sponsor's 
        intent to carry out a project before the project 
        begins.
          (4) Notice to congress.--The Under Secretary shall 
        transmit to the Committees on Appropriations and 
        Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations 
        and Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate 
        a written notification at least 3 days before the 
        issuance of a letter of intent under this section.
          (5) Limitations.--A letter of intent issued under 
        this subsection is not an obligation of the Government 
        under section 1501 of title 31, and the letter is not 
        deemed to be an administrative commitment for 
        financing. An obligation or administrative commitment 
        may be made only as amounts are provided in 
        authorization and appropriations laws.
          (6) Statutory construction.--Nothing in this 
        subsection shall be construed to prohibit the 
        obligation of amounts pursuant to a letter of intent 
        under this subsection in the same fiscal year as the 
        letter of intent is issued.
  (e) Federal Share.--
          (1) In general.--The Government's share of the cost 
        of a project under this section shall be 90 percent for 
        a project at a medium or large hub airport and 95 
        percent for a project at any other airport.
          (2) Existing letters of intent.--The Under Secretary 
        shall revise letters of intent issued before the date 
        of enactment of this section to reflect the cost share 
        established in this subsection with respect to grants 
        made after September 30, 2003.
  (f) Sponsor Defined.--In this section, the term ``sponsor'' 
has the meaning given that term in section 47102.
  (g) Applicability of Certain Requirements.--The requirements 
that apply to grants and letters of intent issued under chapter 
471 (other than section 47102(3)) shall apply to grants and 
letters of intent issued under this section.
  (h) Aviation Security Capital Fund.--
          (1) In general.--There is established within the 
        Department of Homeland Security a fund to be known as 
        the Aviation Security Capital Fund. The first 
        $250,000,000 derived from fees received under section 
        44940(a)(1) in each of fiscal years 2004 through [2007] 
        2028 shall be available to be deposited in the Fund. 
        The Under Secretary shall impose the fee authorized by 
        section 44940(a)(1) so as to collect at least 
        $250,000,000 in each of such fiscal years for deposit 
        into the Fund. Amounts in the Fund shall be available 
        to the Under Secretary to make grants under this 
        section.
          [(2) Allocations.--Of the amount made available under 
        paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, $125,000,000 shall be 
        allocated in such a manner that--
                  [(A) 40 percent shall be made available for 
                large hub airports;
                  [(B) 20 percent shall be made available for 
                medium hub airports;
                  [(C) 15 percent shall be made available for 
                small hub airports and nonhub airports; and
                  [(D) 25 percent shall be distributed by the 
                Secretary to any airport on the basis of 
                aviation security risks.
          [(3) Discretionary grants.--Of the amount made 
        available under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, 
        $125,000,000 shall be used to make discretionary 
        grants, with priority given to fulfilling intentions to 
        obligate under letters of intent issued under 
        subsection (d).]
          (2) Allocation.--Of the amount made available under 
        paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, not less than 
        $200,000,000 shall be allocated to fulfill letters of 
        intent issued under subsection (d).
          (3) Discretionary grants.--Of the amount made 
        available under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, up to 
        $50,000,000 shall be used to make discretionary grants, 
        with priority given to small hub airports and non-hub 
        airports.
  (i) Leveraged Funding.--For purposes of this section, a grant 
under subsection (a) to an airport sponsor to service an 
obligation issued by or on behalf of that sponsor to fund a 
project described in subsection (a) shall be considered to be a 
grant for that project.
  [(i)] (j) Authorization of Appropriations.--
          (1) In general.--In addition to amounts made 
        available under subsection (h), there is authorized to 
        be appropriated to carry out this section $400,000,000 
        for each of fiscal years 2005, 2006, and [2007.] 2007, 
        and $450,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008 and 
        2009.  Such sums shall remain available until expended.
          (2) Allocations.--50 percent of amounts appropriated 
        pursuant to this subsection for a fiscal year shall be 
        used for making allocations under subsection (h)(2) and 
        50 percent of such amounts shall be used for making 
        discretionary grants under subsection (h)(3).

Sec. 44924. Repair station security

                           [49 U.S.C. 44924]

  (a) Security Review and Audit.--To ensure the security of 
maintenance and repair work conducted on air carrier aircraft 
and components at foreign repair stations, the Under Secretary 
for Border and Transportation Security of the Department of 
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Administrator of 
the Federal Aviation Administration, shall complete a security 
review and audit of foreign repair stations that are certified 
by the Administrator under part 145 of title 14, Code of 
Federal Regulations, and that work on air carrier aircraft and 
components. The review shall be completed not later than [18 
months] 6 months after the date on which the Under Secretary 
issues regulations under subsection (f).
  (b) Addressing Security Concerns.--The Under Secretary shall 
require a foreign repair station to address the security issues 
and vulnerabilities identified in a security audit conducted 
under subsection (a) within 90 days of providing notice to the 
repair station of the security issues and vulnerabilities so 
identified and shall notify the Administrator that a deficiency 
was identified in the security audit.
  (c) Suspensions and Revocations of Certificates.--
          (1) Failure to carry out effective security 
        measures.--If, after the 90th day on which a notice is 
        provided to a foreign repair station under subsection 
        (b), the Under Secretary determines that the foreign 
        repair station does not maintain and carry out 
        effective security measures, the Under Secretary shall 
        notify the Administrator of the determination. Upon 
        receipt of the determination, the Administrator shall 
        suspend the certification of the repair station until 
        such time as the Under Secretary determines that the 
        repair station maintains and carries out effective 
        security measures and transmits the determination to 
        the Administrator.
          (2) Immediate security risk.--If the Under Secretary 
        determines that a foreign repair station poses an 
        immediate security risk, the Under Secretary shall 
        notify the Administrator of the determination. Upon 
        receipt of the determination, the Administrator shall 
        revoke the certification of the repair station.
          (3) Procedures for appeals.--The Under Secretary, in 
        consultation with the Administrator, shall establish 
        procedures for appealing a revocation of a certificate 
        under this subsection.
  (d) Failure to Meet Audit Deadline.--If the security audits 
required by subsection (a) are not completed on or before the 
date that is [18 months] 6 months after the date on which the 
Under Secretary issues regulations under subsection (f), the 
Administrator shall be barred from certifying any foreign 
repair station until such audits are completed for existing 
stations.
  (e) Priority for Audits.--In conducting the audits described 
in subsection (a), the Under Secretary and the Administrator 
shall give priority to foreign repair stations located in 
countries identified by the Government as posing the most 
significant security risks.
  (f) Regulations.--Not later than 240 days after the date of 
enactment of this section, the Under Secretary, in consultation 
with the Administrator, shall issue final regulations to ensure 
the security of foreign and domestic aircraft repair stations.
  (g) Report to Congress.--If the Under Secretary does not 
issue final regulations before the deadline specified in 
subsection (f), the Under Secretary shall transmit to the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate a report containing an explanation 
as to why the deadline was not met and a schedule for issuing 
the final regulations.

Sec. 44925. Deployment and use of detection equipment at airport 
                    screening checkpoints

                           [49 U.S.C. 44925]

  (a) Weapons and Explosives.--The Secretary of Homeland 
Security shall give a high priority to developing, testing, 
improving, and deploying, at airport screening checkpoints, 
equipment that detects nonmetallic, chemical, biological, and 
radiological weapons, and explosives, in all forms, on 
individuals and in their personal property. The Secretary shall 
ensure that the equipment alone, or as part of an integrated 
system, can detect under realistic operating conditions the 
types of weapons and explosives that terrorists would likely 
try to smuggle aboard an air carrier aircraft.
  (b) Strategic Plan for Deployment and Use of Explosive 
Detection Equipment at Airport Screening Checkpoints.
          (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of enactment of this section, the Assistant 
        Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation Security 
        Administration) shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a strategic plan to promote 
        the optimal utilization and deployment of explosive 
        detection equipment at airports to screen individuals 
        and their personal property. Such equipment includes 
        walk-through explosive detection portals, document 
        scanners, shoe scanners, and backscatter x-ray 
        scanners. The plan may be submitted in a classified 
        format.
          (2) Content.--The strategic plan shall include, at 
        minimum--
                  (A) a description of current efforts to 
                detect explosives in all forms on individuals 
                and in their personal property;
                  (B) a description of the operational 
                applications of explosive detection equipment 
                at airport screening checkpoints;
                  (C) a deployment schedule and a description 
                of the quantities of equipment needed to 
                implement the plan;
                  (D) a description of funding needs to 
                implement the plan, including a financing plan 
                that provides for leveraging of non-Federal 
                funding;
                  (E) a description of the measures taken and 
                anticipated to be taken in carrying out 
                subsection (d); and
                  (F) a description of any recommended 
                legislative actions.
          (3) Full deployment.--The Secretary shall fully 
        implement the strategic plan within 1 year after the 
        date of enactment of the Aviation Security Improvement 
        Act.
  (c) Portal Detection Systems.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary of Homeland Security for the use 
of the Transportation Security Administration $250,000,000, in 
addition to any amounts otherwise authorized by law, for 
research, development, and installation of detection systems 
and other devices for the detection of biological, chemical, 
radiological, and explosive materials.
  (d) Interim Action.--Until measures are implemented that 
enable the screening of all passengers for explosives, the 
Assistant Secretary shall provide, by such means as the 
Assistant Secretary considers appropriate, explosives detection 
screening for all passengers identified for additional 
screening and their personal property that will be carried 
aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or 
foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air 
transportation.

                           PART C--FINANCING

                 CHAPTER 483. AVIATION SECURITY FUNDING

Sec. 48301. Aviation security funding

                           [49 U.S.C. 48301]

  (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, [and 2006] 2006, 2007, 
2008, and 2009  such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
chapter 449 and related aviation security activities under this 
title. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to this section for 
fiscal year 2002 shall remain available until expended.
  (b) Grants for Aircraft Security.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $500,000,000 for fiscal year 2002 to the Secretary 
of Transportation to make grants to or other agreements with 
air carriers (including intrastate air carriers) to--
          (1) fortify cockpit doors to deny access from the 
        cabin to the pilots in the cockpit;
          (2) provide for the use of video monitors or other 
        devices to alert the cockpit crew to activity in the 
        passenger cabin;
          (3) ensure continuous operation of the aircraft 
        transponder in the event the crew faces an emergency; 
        and
          (4) provide for the use of other innovative 
        technologies to enhance aircraft security.

                AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT

                       TITLE I--AVIATION SECURITY

SEC. 137. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF AVIATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY.

                         [49 U.S.C. 44912 note]

  (a) Funding.--To augment the programs authorized in section 
44912(a)(1) of title 49, United States Code, there is 
authorized to be appropriated an additional $50,000,000 for 
each of fiscal years [2002 through 2006,] 2006 through 2009,  
and such sums as are necessary for each fiscal year thereafter 
to the Transportation Security Administration, for research, 
development, testing, and evaluation of the following 
technologies which may enhance [aviation] transportation 
security in the future. Grants to industry, academia, and 
Government entities to carry out the provisions of this section 
shall be available for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for--
          (1) the acceleration of research, development, 
        testing, and evaluation of explosives detection 
        technology for checked baggage, specifically, 
        technology that is--
                  (A) more cost-effective for deployment for 
                explosives detection in checked baggage at 
                small- to medium-sized airports, and is 
                currently under development as part of the 
                Argus research program at the Transportation 
                Security Administration;
                  (B) faster, to facilitate screening of all 
                checked baggage at larger airports; or
                  (C) more accurate, to reduce the number of 
                false positives requiring additional security 
                measures;
          (2) acceleration of research, development, testing, 
        and evaluation of new screening technology for carry-on 
        items to provide more effective means of detecting and 
        identifying weapons, explosives, and components of 
        weapons of mass destruction, including advanced x-ray 
        technology;
          (3) acceleration of research, development, testing, 
        and evaluation of threat screening technology for other 
        categories of items being loaded onto aircraft, 
        including cargo, catering, and duty-free items;
          (4) acceleration of research, development, testing, 
        and evaluation of threats carried on persons boarding 
        aircraft or entering secure areas, including detection 
        of weapons, explosives, and components of weapons of 
        mass destruction;
          (5) acceleration of research, development, testing 
        and evaluation of integrated systems of airport 
        security enhancement, including quantitative methods of 
        assessing security factors at airports selected for 
        testing such systems;
          (6) expansion of the existing program of research, 
        development, testing, and evaluation of improved 
        methods of education, training, and testing of key 
        airport security personnel; and
          (7) acceleration of research, development, testing, 
        and evaluation of aircraft hardening materials, and 
        techniques to reduce the vulnerability of aircraft to 
        terrorist attack.
  (b) Grants.--Grants awarded under this subtitle shall 
identify potential outcomes of the research, and propose a 
method for quantitatively assessing effective increases in 
security upon completion of the research program. At the 
conclusion of each grant, the grant recipient shall submit a 
final report to the Transportation Security Administration that 
shall include sufficient information to permit the Under 
Secretary of Transportation for Security to prepare a cost-
benefit analysis of potential improvements to airport security 
based upon deployment of the proposed technology. The Under 
Secretary shall begin awarding grants under this subtitle 
within 90 days of the date of enactment of this Act.
  (c) Budget Submission.--A budget submission and detailed 
strategy for deploying the identified security upgrades 
recommended upon completion of the grants awarded under 
subsection (b), shall be submitted to Congress as part of the 
Department of Transportation's annual budget submission.
  (d) Defense Research.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
$20,000,000 to the Transportation Security Administration to 
issue research grants in conjunction with the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency. Grants may be awarded under this 
section for--
          (1) research and development of longer-term 
        improvements to airport security, including advanced 
        weapons detection;
          (2) secure networking and sharing of threat 
        information between Federal agencies, law enforcement 
        entities, and other appropriate parties;
          (3) advances in biometrics for identification and 
        threat assessment; or
          (4) other technologies for preventing acts of 
        terrorism in aviation.''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *


                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

      TITLE IV--DIRECTORATE OF BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

                  SUBTITLE C--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

``SEC. 431. APPEAL AND REDRESS PROCESS FOR PASSENGERS WRONGLY DELAYED 
                    OR PROHIBITED FROM BOARDING A FLIGHT.

  (a) In General.--The Secretary shall establish a timely and 
fair process for individuals who believe they have been delayed 
or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft because they 
were wrongly identified as a threat under the regimes utilized 
by the Transportation Security Administration, the Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, or any other Department entity.
  (b) Office of Appeals and Redress.--
          (1) Establishment.--The Secretary shall establish an 
        Office of Appeals and Redress to oversee the process 
        established by the Secretary pursuant to subsection 
        (a).
          (2) Records.--The process established by the 
        Secretary pursuant to subsection (a) shall include the 
        establishment of a method by which the Office of 
        Appeals and Redress, under the direction of the 
        Secretary, will be able to maintain a record of air 
        carrier passengers and other individuals who have been 
        misidentified and have corrected erroneous information.
          (3) Information.--To prevent repeated delays of an 
        misidentified passenger or other individual, the Office 
        of Appeals and Redress shall--
                  (A) ensure that the records maintained under 
                this subsection contain information determined 
                by the Secretary to authenticate the identity 
                of such a passenger or individual; and
                  (B) furnish to the Transportation Security 
                Administration, the Bureau of Customs and 
                Border Protection, or any other appropriate 
                Department entity, upon request, such 
                information as may be necessary to allow such 
                agencies to assist air carriers in improving 
                their administration of the advanced passenger 
                prescreening system and reduce the number of 
                false positives.

                                  
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