[House Report 110-858]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
Union Calendar No. 555
110th Congress} { Report
2d Session } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES {110-858
_______________________________________________________________________
MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE TILLMAN AND LYNCH
EPISODES
__________
FIRST REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
September 16, 2008.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
-----
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-006 PDF WASHINGTON : 2008
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York TOM DAVIS, Virginia
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DAN BURTON, Indiana
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri CHRIS CANNON, Utah
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York DARRELL E. ISSA, California
JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
Columbia VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee BILL SALI, Idaho
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JIM JORDAN, Ohio
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
PETER WELCH, Vermont
JACKIE SPEIER, California
Phil Barnett, Staff Director
Earley Green, Chief Clerk
Lawrence Halloran, Minority Staff Director
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, September 16, 2008.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Ms. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, I submit herewith the
committee's first report to the 110th Congress.
Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman.
(iii)
C O N T E N T S
_______________________________________________________________________
Page
Executive Summary................................................ 1
I. Investigations into Corporal Tillman's Death.....................6
A. Investigations by the Department of Defense........... 6
B. The Committee's Investigation......................... 9
II. Chronology of Events Related to Corporal Tillman................11
A. The Military Service of Corporal Patrick Tillman...... 11
B. Initial Pentagon Reactions............................ 11
C. Early Reports of Friendly Fire........................ 13
D. The Silver Star Award and Corporal Tillman's Memorial 15
Service.
E. The Announcement of the Fratricide.................... 16
III. The White House Response........................................20
A. News Breaks at White House............................ 20
B. Statement Issued Prematurely.......................... 22
C. Discussion of Corporal Tillman in Presidential Speech. 24
D. Knowledge of Fratricide............................... 27
IV. Secretary Rumsfeld's Response...................................29
V. General Myers's Response........................................32
VI. General Abizaid's Response......................................35
VII. The Response of Other Senior Military Leaders...................36
A. General Bryan Brown................................... 36
B. Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger................... 37
VIII.
The Response to the Capture and Rescue of Private Jessica Lynch.41
A. Private Lynch's Capture and Rescue.................... 41
B. The Dissemination of Inaccurate Information........... 41
C. The Response of Public Affairs Officials.............. 45
IX. Other Cases Brought to the Committee's Attention................46
X. Conclusion......................................................47
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
Additional Views of Hon. Tom Davis............................... 50
(v)
Union Calendar No. 555
110th Congress Report
2d Session 110-858
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
======================================================================
MISLEADING INFORMATION FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: THE TILLMAN AND LYNCH
EPISODES
_______
September 16, 2008.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Henry A. Waxman, from the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, submitted the following
FIRST REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
On July 17, 2008, the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform approved and adopted a report entitled ``Misleading
Information from the Battlefield: The Tillman and Lynch
Episodes.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the
Speaker of the House.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report summarizes what the Oversight Committee has
learned about (1) the misleading information given to the
Tillman family and the public following the death of Corporal
Patrick Tillman on April 22, 2004, and (2) the misleading
information released about the capture and rescue of Private
Jessica Lynch in Iraq in March and April, 2003.
Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch are the two most famous
soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The misinformation
in both their cases is an unconscionable distraction from their
actual service and heroism. Their dedication to country and
willingness to voluntarily put themselves at great risk are
extraordinary examples of patriotism and bravery.
The military has conducted seven separate investigations
into Corporal Tillman's death by friendly fire in the mountains
of Afghanistan. Two early Army investigations focused on
reconstructing the events that resulted in the shooting. The
scope of later investigations was broadened to include
evaluations of whether military officials complied with the
Army's casualty notification regulations, whether military
personnel involved in Corporal Tillman's death committed
criminal acts, and whether the previous investigations had been
properly conducted.
These investigations have looked down the chain of command,
resulting in punishment or reprimands for enlisted personnel
and officers who acted improperly before and after Corporal
Tillman's death. To date, the highest ranking officer to
receive a punishment related to Corporal Tillman's death is a
three-star general.
In contrast, the Committee's investigation into Corporal
Tillman's fratricide has looked up the chain of command. The
purpose of the investigation has been to determine what the top
officials at the White House and the Defense Department knew
about Corporal Tillman's fratricide, when they knew this, and
what they did with their knowledge.
The Committee's investigation adds many new details to the
Tillman story. But on the key issue of what senior officials
knew, the investigation was frustrated by a near universal lack
of recall. The Committee interviewed several senior officials
at the White House, including Communications Director Dan
Bartlett, Press Secretary Scott McClellan, and chief
speechwriter Michael Gerson. Not a single one could recall when
he learned about the fratricide or what he did in response.
Similarly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told the
Committee: ``I don't recall when I was told and I don't recall
who told me.''
The highest-ranking official who could recall being
informed about Corporal Tillman's fratricide was former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers,
who said, ``I knew right at the end of April, that there was a
possibility of fratricide in the Corporal Tillman death.''
General Myers testified that it would have been ``logical'' for
him to pass this information to Secretary Rumsfeld, but said
``I just don't recall whether I did it or not.'' He also said
he could not recall ``ever having a discussion with anybody in
the White House about the Tillman case, one way or another.''
The Committee's investigation into the inaccurate accounts
of Private Lynch's capture and rescue also encountered a
consistent lack of recollection. Witnesses who should have
possessed relevant information were interviewed by the
Committee. They said they had no knowledge of how the report
that Private Lynch fired her weapon and was wounded during her
capture was spread to the media and the public. Nor could they
explain why it took so long for the military to correct the
inaccurate story of the ``little girl Rambo from the hills of
West Virginia'' that was widely reported during the opening
days of the Iraq war.
The White House Response to Corporal Tillman's Death
The death of Corporal Tillman on April 22, 2004, generated
a flurry of attention and action inside the White House. On the
day following his death, April 23, White House officials sent
or received nearly 200 e-mails concerning Corporal Tillman.
Several e-mails came from staff members on President Bush's
reelection campaign, who urged the President to respond
publicly to Corporal Tillman's death. The White House did
respond, rushing out a statement notwithstanding a Department
of Defense policy intended to provide a 24-hour period for
private grieving before officials publicly discuss a casualty.
In comparison to the extensive White House activity that
followed Corporal Tillman's death, the complete absence of any
communications about his fratricide is hard to understand. The
Committee requested all White House documents related to
Corporal Tillman. The White House provided what it described as
a complete response, giving the Committee access to
approximately 1,500 pages of e-mails and other documents and
withholding only drafts of a speech in which the President
discussed Corporal Tillman. Yet there is not a single
discussion of the fratricide in any of these communications.
On April 29, 2004, Major General Stanley McChrystal sent a
``personal for'' or ``P4'' memorandum up his chain of command.
This memo warned that the President might be preparing a speech
about Corporal Tillman without knowing that he was killed by
friendly fire, and it urged the generals receiving the memo to
prevent any ``unknowing statements by our country's leaders
which might cause public embarrassment if the circumstances of
Corporal Tillman's death become public.'' When the President
spoke about Corporal Tillman's death in a speech at the White
House Correspondents' Dinner two days later, the President
commented on Corporal Tillman's character and his sacrifice in
enlisting, but did not address the circumstances of Corporal
Tillman's death.
The Committee interviewed seven officials in the White
House about the response to Corporal Tillman's death.
Universally, these officials said they could not recall when
they learned about the fratricide or when the President
learned. Former presidential speechwriter Michael Gerson, who
worked on the President's May 1 speech at the Correspondents'
Dinner, said that he could not remember when he learned about
the friendly fire, whether he knew about it while preparing the
Correspondents' Dinner speech, or whether he ever discussed the
fratricide with the President.
Former Communications Director Dan Bartlett said he did not
have a ``specific recollection'' of when he learned of the
friendly fire. Asked whether he informed the President of the
fratricide, he stated, ``I don't remember a particular
conversation, but I can't rule out that I talked to him about
it.'' Former Press Secretary Scott McClellan said he also could
not remember when he or the President learned about the
fratricide.
Secretary Rumsfeld's Response to Corporal Tillman's Death
Secretary Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat
Tillman's enlistment in the U.S. Army Rangers in 2002. Just
after Corporal Tillman enlisted, Secretary Rumsfeld sent him a
personal note commending him for his ``proud and patriotic''
decision. Around the same time, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a
``snowflake'' memorandum to the Secretary of the Army, noting
that Corporal Tillman ``sound[s] like he is world-class'' and
saying, ``We might want to keep our eye on him.''
Testifying before the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld said he
had no recollection of when he learned about the fratricide or
what he did in response. He testified, ``I don't recall when I
was told and I don't recall who told me. But my recollection is
that it was at a stage when there were investigations under
way.''
General Myers's Response to Corporal Tillman's Death
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard
Myers, learned of Corporal Tillman's death soon after it
occurred. One day after Corporal Tillman's death, General Myers
called the commissioner of the National Football League to
inform him of the incident.
General Myers also learned quickly about the possible
fratricide. He told the Committee that he knew by the end of
April, but could not recall whether he informed Secretary
Rumsfeld or President Bush. General Myers did recall discussing
the fratricide with his public affairs advisor, telling him,
``We need to keep this in mind in case we go before the press.
We've just got to calibrate ourselves. With this investigation
ongoing, we want to be careful how we portray the situation.''
General Myers told the Committee that he had no responsibility
to share the information about the possible fratricide with the
Tillman family or the public.
General Abizaid's Response to Corporal Tillman's Death
General John Abizaid, commanding general at CENTCOM and the
main addressee on General McChrystal's P4 message, testified
that due to a delay at his headquarters, he did not receive the
P4 message until approximately May 6, 2004, a week after it was
sent. When he finally received the message, he immediately
called the Joint Chiefs chairman, General Myers, and discovered
that General Myers was already aware of the potential
fratricide.
General Abizaid also testified that after returning from
theater to Washington, DC, he informed Secretary Rumsfeld
sometime between May 18 and May 20, 2004, that ``there was an
investigation that was ongoing, and it looked like it was
friendly fire.''
The Response of Other Senior Military Leaders to Corporal Tillman's
Death
The Committee investigated the response of other top
military leaders in Corporal Tillman's chain of command,
including General Bryan Brown of U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) and Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger of U.S.
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). General Brown
testified to the Committee that he received General
McChrystal's P4 message in late April, but made no effort to
notify his superiors or the Tillman family about the potential
fratricide. He said he made the ``bad assumption'' that these
tasks would be handled by the ``normal chain of command.''
General Kensinger declined to testify before the Committee
in August 2007, but later agreed to be interviewed by Committee
staff. He acknowledged that he did not inform the Tillman
family as soon as he found out about the potential fratricide,
but claimed that he only learned about the fratricide after
attending the May 3, 2004, memorial for Corporal Tillman. This
version of events was contradicted by General Kensinger's
deputy, Brigadier General Howard Yellen, who told Committee
staff that he spoke with General Kensinger about the fratricide
within two or three days after it occurred. It was also
contradicted by Lieutenant Colonel David Duffy, who testified
that he personally delivered the P4 message to General
Kensinger three days before the memorial service, and by
Colonel Clarence Chinn, deputy commander of the 75th Ranger
Regiment, who testified that General Kensinger informed him
that Corporal Tillman's death was a possible fratricide.
The Response to the Capture and Rescue of Private Jessica Lynch
In the opening days of the Iraq war, a false account of the
capture and rescue of Private Jessica Lynch became a front-page
story across the country. Defense Department officials have
openly acknowledged that the account of Private Jessica Lynch's
capture and rescue in the opening days of the Iraq war was an
``awesome story,'' but they could not explain to the Committee
how and why the embellished account became so widely
disseminated. Key public affairs officials told the Committee
they could not recall any details of the Jessica Lynch
incident.
I. INVESTIGATIONS INTO CORPORAL TILLMAN'S DEATH
A. INVESTIGATIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
There have been seven investigations conducted by the
Department of Defense into the death of Corporal Tillman in
Afghanistan on April 22, 2004, and the Department's response.
Each investigation has had serious flaws or limitations on its
scope.
In the days following Corporal Tillman's death, the 2nd
Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment conducted an Army
Regulation 15-6 investigation (commonly referred to as a ``15-
6'' investigation) into the circumstances surrounding the
casualty.\1\ This investigation reportedly concluded that
Corporal Tillman's death was a likely fratricide.\2\ In a
subsequent review of this investigation, the Defense Department
Inspector General concluded that it was ``tainted by the
failure to preserve evidence, a lack of thoroughness, and the
failure to pursue investigative leads.'' \3\
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\1\ Captain Richard M. Scott, Commander, Headquarters & Headquarter
Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, AR 15-6 Final Report
[Incomplete Draft] (Apr. 29, 2004).
\2\ Id. Although a complete draft of Captain Scott's report has not
been located, the Department of Defense Inspector General collected
available drafts and exhibits and identified Captain Scott's major
findings. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
7 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
\3\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
2 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
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In early May, the commander of the 75th Regiment decided
not to approve the battalion-level investigation because ``he
did not find the work thorough or complete and concluded
further investigation by someone more senior from the
regimental level was required.'' \4\ He instead authorized a
new regimental-level 15-6 investigation, which was approved by
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on May 28, 2004.\5\ This
investigation concluded that ``CPL Tillman's death was the
result of fratricide during an extremely chaotic enemy
ambush.'' \6\ The Inspector General found this second 15-6
investigation also ``lacked credibility,'' in part because the
investigator ``failed to visit the scene,'' ``failed to
identify and interview relevant witnesses,'' and drew
conclusions that ``were not based on evidence included in the
report.'' \7\
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\4\ Id. at 20.
\5\ U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May
28, 2004) (containing May 8, 2004, AR 15-6 report by Lieutenant Colonel
Ralph L. Kauzlarich, Executive Officer, 75th Ranger Regiment).
\6\ Id. at 1.
\7\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
2, 31-32 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
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In August 2004, after an inquiry from the Tillman family,
Army officials discovered that another investigation required
by Army regulations, a ``safety investigation,'' had not been
initiated.\8\ Three months later, in October 2004, the friendly
fire incident was belatedly reported to the Army's Safety
Center, which produced a report in December of that year.\9\
The safety report concluded that a ``high volume of fire'' from
several Rangers ``struck one of the Rangers in the fighting
position, fatally wounding him.'' \10\
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\8\ Id. Army rules require both a 15-6 ``legal'' investigation and
a prompt safety investigation in cases of fratricide. Army Regulation
385-40 (1994); DOD Instruction 6055.7 (2000).
\9\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army
(Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
\10\ U.S. Army Safety Center, U.S. Army Accident Report, Date of
Accident 040422 (undated).
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In response to further inquiries from the Tillman family,
the Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC) authorized in
November 2004 another 15-6 investigation into the events
surrounding Corporal Tillman's death. This investigation was
completed in January 2005.\11\ The scope of this investigation
included not only the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's
death, but also subsequent communications within Corporal
Tillman's chain of command.\12\ One of this investigation's
conclusions was that the Army's failure to immediately tell the
Tillman family about the fratricide suspicions was ``due to a
desire to complete the investigation and gather all available
facts, so as not to give the family an inaccurate or incomplete
picture of what happened.'' \13\
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\11\ Brigadier General Gary M. Jones, U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation--CPL Patrick Tillman
(Jan. 7, 2005).
\12\ Id.
\13\ Id. at 10.
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Reviewing this third 15-6 investigation, the Defense
Department Inspector General concluded that the report ``did
not address accountability for failures by the chain of
command--to comply with Army policy for reporting and
investigating friendly fire incidents, to coordinate with other
investigative authorities, to provide timely information
concerning suspected friendly fire to CPL Tillman's next of
kin, and to ensure accuracy in documentation submitted in
support of the Silver Star'' posthumously awarded to Corporal
Tillman.\14\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
3 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
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After Corporal Tillman's family and others questioned the
thoroughness and objectivity of this fourth Army investigation,
the Department of Defense Inspector General and the Army
Criminal Investigation Command (CID) undertook concurrent
investigations into Corporal Tillman's death. The results of
these two investigations were provided to the Acting Secretary
of the Army, Pete Geren, on March 26, 2007.\15\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The IG investigation found that ``Corporal Tillman's chain
of command made critical errors in reporting Corporal Tillman's
death and in assigning investigative jurisdiction in the days
following his death.'' \16\ The IG also determined that a
Silver Star posthumously awarded to Corporal Tillman was based
on documents with ``materially inaccurate statements'' that
``erroneously implied that CPL Tillman died by enemy fire.''
\17\ An official from the Inspector General's office testified
before the Committee that the IG concluded that two statements
written in support of the Silver Star award had been altered
``somewhere in the approval chain.'' \18\ But he stated that
his office did not attempt to determine which computers were
used to alter the statements or who had access to the
statements when they were altered.\19\ Nevertheless, the IG
concluded that Corporal Tillman's ``immediate superiors
believed his actions merited the award'' notwithstanding the
friendly fire.\20\
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\16\ Id. at 2.
\17\ Id. at 54.
\18\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing
on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 99
(Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
\19\ Id.
\20\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
54 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
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The CID investigation concluded that the soldiers who fired
at Corporal Tillman ``believed they were under enemy fire and
were returning fire at enemy combatants.'' \21\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Report of
Investigation into Death of Corporal Tillman and AMF Soldier Thani, at
2 (Mar. 19, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Neither the IG nor the CID investigation examined the
actions of top military leaders including the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For
example, neither report determined whether these leaders were
forwarded General McChrystal's P4 message.
On the same day the IG and CID reports were completed,
March 26, 2007, Acting Secretary Geren directed the commander
of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, General William
Wallace, to independently review the findings of the earlier
investigations into Corporal Tillman's death.\22\ As a four-
star general and one of the highest-ranking officers in the
Army, General Wallace had the authority to independently
investigate the matter and discipline officers below his rank.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Executive Summary, Army Action--Department of Defense
Inspector General (DoDIG) Report Related to the Death of Corporal (CPL)
Patrick D. Tillman (undated).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 31, 2007, the Army wrote Chairman Waxman and
Ranking Member Tom Davis that General Wallace had completed his
review and generally supported the findings of the IG and CID
investigations.\23\ This letter also informed the Committee
that General Wallace had sanctioned seven officers for their
actions in the aftermath of Corporal Tillman's death.\24\ The
officers sanctioned included four general officers and three
field-grade officers. The highest-ranking officer to be
sanctioned was now-retired Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger,
the former commander of the Army's Special Operations Command
(USASOC).\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Letter from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of
Legislative Liaison, U.S. Army, to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (July 31, 2007); Letter
from Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, U.S.
Army, to Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform (July 31, 2007).
\24\ Id.; see also Executive Summary, Army Action--Department of
Defense Inspector General (DoDIG) Report Related to the Death of
Corporal (CPL) Patrick D. Tillman (undated).
\25\ Id.
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Also on July 31, 2007, Army Secretary Pete Geren publicly
announced General Wallace's findings. Although he denied that
there was a ``conspiracy . . . to deceive the public,'' he
stated:
[T]here was a perfect storm of mistakes, misjudgments,
and a failure of leadership that brought us where we
are today, with the Army's credibility in question
about a matter that strikes at the very heart of Army
core values--our commitment to our fallen soldiers and
their grieving families; soldiers' loyalty to fallen
soldiers.\26\
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\26\ Defense Department Briefing with Secretary of the Army Pete
Geren and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Richard Cody (July
31, 2007).
CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid, in testimony before
this Committee, assessed the military's response to Corporal
Tillman's death more bluntly, saying, ``It's very difficult to
come to grips with how we screwed this thing up. But we screwed
this thing up.'' \27\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 217 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
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B. THE COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATION
The Committee began its investigation into Corporal
Tillman's death in April 2007. On April 24, 2007, the Committee
held a hearing during which it received testimony from two
members of Corporal Tillman's family, an Army Ranger who was an
eyewitness to Corporal Tillman's death, the acting Department
of Defense Inspector General, and the commander of the Army
Criminal Investigation Command.\28\ The Committee also took
testimony from former Private First Class Jessica Lynch, who
described the misinformation surrounding her capture and rescue
in Iraq in 2003.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on
Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24,
2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
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Members of Corporal Tillman's family and Private Lynch
testified that government officials spread inaccurate accounts
of what happened to Corporal Tillman and Private Lynch on the
battlefield. They stated that these misleading narratives
provided inspiring stories of heroism for the American public,
but they fundamentally mischaracterized the two soldiers'
actual conduct and sacrifice.
Corporal Tillman's brother Kevin Tillman, a former Army
Ranger who served together with his brother in Afghanistan,
testified that the story of Corporal Tillman's death by enemy
fire that spread in the weeks after his death was ``utter
fiction,'' and said he believed it was intended to distract the
public from the unsuccessful siege of Fallujah, the emerging
story of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, and other bad news about
the war.\29\ He stated:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Kevin Tillman, Hearing on Misleading Information from the
Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 17 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
In the days leading up to Pat's memorial service, media
accounts, based on information provided by the Army and
the White House, were wreathed in a patriotic glow and
became more dramatic in tone. A terrible tragedy that
might have further undermined support for the war in
Iraq was transformed into an inspirational message that
served instead to support the nation's foreign policy
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.\30\
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\30\ Id.
Following the April 24, 2007, hearing, Chairman Waxman and
Ranking Member Davis decided that the Committee's investigation
into Corporal Tillman's fratricide would focus on the actions
of officials at the top of the chain of command. Specifically,
the Committee sought to determine when the President, senior
White House officials, the Secretary of Defense, and other top
military leaders learned that Corporal Tillman had been killed
as a result of friendly fire and what they did upon learning
this information. The Committee also posed questions regarding
the dissemination of misleading information pertaining to the
capture and rescue of Private Lynch.
The Committee held a second hearing on August 1, 2007,
during which it received testimony from former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld; former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Richard Myers; former commander of U.S. Central
Command, General John Abizaid; and former commander of U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), General Bryan Brown, about
their knowledge of the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's
death.\31\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on
the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense Department
Knew, 110th Cong. (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In the course of the Committee's investigation, the
Committee requested that the White House produce all documents
received or generated by any official in the Executive Office
of the President from April 22 until July 1, 2004, that related
to Corporal Tillman.\32\ The Committee reviewed approximately
1,500 pages produced in response to this request. The documents
produced to the Committee included e-mail communications
between senior White House officials holding the title of
``Assistant to the President.'' According to the White House,
the White House withheld from the Committee only preliminary
drafts of the speech President Bush delivered at the White
House Correspondents' Dinner on May 1, 2004.\33\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, to Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the
President (April 27, 2007).
\33\ Letter from Fred F. Fielding, Counsel to the President, to
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, and Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member,
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Aug. 10, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee also conducted nontranscribed interviews of
three former assistants to the President: former Director of
Communications Dan Bartlett, former Press Secretary Scott
McClellan, and former Chief Speechwriter Michael Gerson.
Because these officials indicated they had only a limited
recall of the events in question, they were not called back for
a transcribed interview or deposition. Transcribed interviews
were conducted with four other former White House officials:
former Spokesman Taylor Gross, former Director of Fact-checking
John Currin, former National Security Council (NSC) Director of
Communications Jim Wilkinson, and former NSC Press Secretary
Sean McCormack.\34\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ No contemporaneous transcript was produced from the interview
with Mr. McCormack, but an unofficial transcript was created from an
audio recording of the interview.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee reviewed over 31,000 documents produced by
the Department of Defense. The Committee conducted transcribed
interviews of six current or former general officers: General
Bantz Craddock, former senior military assistant to Secretary
Rumsfeld; Admiral Eric Olson, former deputy commander of U.S.
Special Operations Command; Lieutenant General John Sattler,
former director of operations at U.S. Central Command;
Lieutenant General James Lovelace, former Director of the Army
Staff; Lieutenant General (Retired) Philip Kensinger, former
commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC); and
Brigadier General (Retired) Howard Yellen, former deputy
commander at USASOC. In addition, the Committee interviewed
seven other officers and civilian officials from Secretary
Rumsfeld's office, the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and USASOC.
II. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO CORPORAL TILLMAN
A. THE MILITARY SERVICE OF CORPORAL PATRICK TILLMAN
Patrick Tillman, a defensive back for the Arizona
Cardinals, and his brother Kevin Tillman, a former professional
baseball player, enlisted in the United States Army in May
2002. Although the Tillman brothers refused to talk publicly
about why they were joining the Army, their enlistment was
widely reported in the media. Their father, Patrick Tillman,
Sr., explained to one newspaper that his sons did not want
recognition ``separate from their peers'' because they felt all
the soldiers with whom they served deserved equal
recognition.\35\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Ex-Player Tillman Likely in Danger Zone as an Army Ranger,
Washington Times (Mar. 21, 2003).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Both Pat and Kevin Tillman trained as elite Army Rangers
and were assigned to the A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger
Regiment, based in Fort Lewis, Washington. Their battalion did
a tour of duty in Iraq in 2003 and began a tour in Afghanistan
in 2004. At the beginning of this tour, both Pat and Kevin
Tillman held the rank of Specialist (E4).
On April 22, 2004, during operations in a rugged region of
eastern Afghanistan, the Tillmans' platoon was divided into two
parts (``serials''). Specialist Pat Tillman was a part of
Serial 1, which proceeded towards the village of Manah,
Afghanistan, through a narrow canyon. Specialist Kevin Tillman
was a part of Serial 2, which was supposed to take a different
route, but ultimately changed plans and followed Serial 1 along
the same canyon road.\36\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army
(Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
During its passage through the canyon, Serial 2 came under
attack. When the Rangers in Serial 1 heard the sounds of the
ambush, they dismounted from their vehicles and took positions
to assist Serial 2. As Serial 2 emerged from the canyon,
several Rangers riding in the lead vehicle opened fire on a
nearby ridge, killing Specialist Pat Tillman and an Afghan
soldier who had been conducting operations with the platoon,
and injuring two other Rangers, including the platoon leader.
The Army posthumously awarded Tillman the Silver Star and
promoted him to the rank of Corporal.\37\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
As he testified at the Committee's hearing on April 24,
2007, Specialist Kevin Tillman did not witness the firefight
that took his brother's life. He also testified that he was
quickly flown back to Bagram Air Base and later accompanied his
brother's remains back to the United States.\38\ He told the
Committee that during these events, he was under the impression
that his brother had been killed by the enemy.\39\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Kevin Tillman, Hearing on Misleading Information from the
Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 18 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
\39\ Id. at 30.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
B. INITIAL PENTAGON REACTIONS
On the morning of April 23, 2004, news of Corporal
Tillman's death broke in the United States. Initial reports
from a Defense Department spokesman in Afghanistan indicated
that a U.S. soldier, identified later that day as Corporal
Tillman, had ``died after a firefight with anti-coalition
militia forces about 25 miles southwest of a U.S. base at
Khost, which has been the scene of frequent attacks.'' \40\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Former NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan, Associated Press
(Apr. 23, 2004); U.S. Military Says NFL Player Killed in Afghanistan
Exemplified All Soldiers' Patriotism, Associated Press (Apr. 24, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 23, 2004, and in the following days, thousands of
stories, commentaries, and tributes to Corporal Tillman
appeared in newspapers, television, and the Internet. An
internal ``Weekend Media Assessment'' produced by the Army
Chief of Staff's Office of Public Affairs on Monday April 25,
2004, reported that the story of Corporal Tillman's death had
helped generate the most media interest in the U.S. Army
``since the end of active combat last year.'' \41\ The report
also noted that ``The Ranger Tillman story had been extremely
positive in all media.'' \42\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ E-mail from David Compton, Office of the Army Chief Public
Affairs, to numerous addressees (Apr. 25, 2004).
\42\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
E-mails reviewed by the Committee also show that the news
of Corporal Tillman's death was discussed by public affairs
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Army on April 23, 2004, potentially
including a ``front office'' morning meeting led by Secretary
Rumsfeld's public affairs chief, Mr. Larry Di Rita.\43\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ E-mail from Lieutenant Commander Jane Campbell, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Major Kristen
Carle, Office of the Army Chief for Public Affairs (Apr. 23, 2004).
(Reporting that Corporal Tillman's death ``was a topic of the
discussion at the front office this morning and CJCS PA [Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs] is also involved.'').
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Mr. Di Rita told Committee staff he could not
recall any particular discussions he had about Corporal
Tillman's death on April 23, 2004, documents produced by the
Department of Defense show that Mr. Di Rita sent two e-mails
that day related to Corporal Tillman. In the first of these e-
mails, Mr. Di Rita responded to a request from the White House
Media Affairs Director, who was seeking information about
Corporal Tillman for a Sports Illustrated reporter.\44\ Mr. Di
Rita responded that he would ``see what we can do. details are
sketchy just now.'' \45\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, to Jeanie Mamo, Director of White House Media Affairs (Apr.
23, 2004).
\45\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In the second e-mail, Mr. Di Rita responded to a Department
of Defense aide who had drafted a statement for the Department
of Defense to use to respond to press inquiries.\46\ Mr. Di
Rita edited the proposed statement and sent it back to the
aide. His revised version stated, ``[o]ur thoughts and prayers
go out to the family of Army Sgt Pat Tillman,'' and noted,
``[w]e mourn the death of every servicemember who makes the
ultimate sacrifice in the Global War on Terror.'' \47\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ E-mail from Lawrence Di Rita, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, to Bryan Whitman, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Apr. 23,
2004).
\47\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The same day, April 23, a memo was prepared by the Army
Human Resources Command for the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-1,
Lieutenant General Franklin Hagenbeck. This executive summary
(``EXSUM'') document explained that Corporal Tillman's casualty
``was a high-profile death because SPC Tillman was a member of
the Arizona Cardinals and SPC Kevin Tillman was a former minor
league baseball prospect in the Cleveland Indians organization
when they enlisted together for three years.'' \48\ The summary
said that in accordance with the Army's policy of holding
casualty information for 24 hours after the soldier's family
has been notified, the Army would not officially announce
Corporal Tillman's death until 11 p.m. that night.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, ``EXSUM''
Document (Apr. 23, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
C. EARLY REPORTS OF FRIENDLY FIRE
As the Tillman family and the American public absorbed the
news that Corporal Tillman had been killed in Afghanistan,
apparently by enemy forces, suspicions that he had actually
been killed by friendly fire quickly traveled through the
Department of Defense. But while military officials at the
highest levels knew within a matter of days that Corporal
Tillman's death was a likely fratricide, they did not share
this information with the Tillman family or the public for
another month.
Members of Corporal Tillman's platoon knew almost
immediately he had been killed by his fellow Rangers.\49\
Moreover, within 24 hours, the top officers in Corporal
Tillman's battalion and regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey
Bailey and Colonel Craig Nixon, also knew about the suspicions
of friendly fire and had authorized the first Army Regulation
15-6 investigation into the circumstances of his death.\50\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of U.S. Army Specialist Bryan O'Neal, Hearing on Misleading Information
from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 94 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No.
110-54); Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
13 (Mar. 26, 2007) (IPO2007E001).
\50\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector General, Hearing
on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong. (Apr. 24,
2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Within several days, Colonel Nixon, the commander of the
75th Ranger Regiment, transmitted the information that Corporal
Tillman may have been killed as a result of fratricide to Major
General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of the joint task
force in Afghanistan under which Corporal Tillman's battalion
was operating.\51\ General McChrystal subsequently called
General Bryan Brown, the top officer at the U.S. Special
Operations Command, the combatant command under which Corporal
Tillman's battalion operated in Afghanistan.\52\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, at 3 (Nov. 26, 2006).
\52\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of General Bryan Brown, at 5 (Nov. 17, 2006).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Colonel Nixon also informed Brigadier General Howard
Yellen, the deputy commander of the Army Special Operations
Command, the Army administrative command responsible for the
75th Ranger Regiment. According to General Yellen, on April 24
or April 25, 2004, he informed his commander, Lieutenant
General Philip Kensinger, of the potential fratricide.\53\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Brigadier General Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
A few days later, on April 29, 2004, General McChrystal
sent a message to the top generals in Corporal Tillman's chain
of command alerting them that the first 15-6 investigation was
nearing completion and would find that ``it is highly possible
that Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire.'' \54\
According to General McChrystal, Colonel Nixon assisted him in
preparing the message.\55\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ ``Personal For'' message from Major General Stanley McChrystal
to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip
Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
\55\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal (Nov. 26, 2006).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The principal addressee of this communication was General
John Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM, the geographic combatant
command that includes Iraq and Afghanistan. The message was
also sent to two recipients for ``information'' purposes. These
recipients were General Brown, the SOCOM commander, and General
Kensinger, the commander of USASOC.\56\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ ``Personal For'' message from Major General Stanley McChrystal
to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip
Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General McChrystal sent this communication as a ``personal
for'' or P4 message, a format flag rank officers reserve for
sensitive, ``for-your-eyes-only'' information. Such a
communication, according to General Abizaid, is ``designed to
pass information that's considered very, very important.'' \57\
According to General Myers, information in a P4 is ``supposed
to be pretty close hold.'' \58\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
\58\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 190 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General McChrystal's P4 message stated:
Sir, in the aftermath of Corporal Patrick Tillman's
untimely yet heroic death in Afghanistan on 22 April
04, it is anticipated that a 15-6 investigation nearing
completion will find that it is highly possible that
Corporal Tillman was killed by friendly fire. This
potential is exacerbated by the unconfirmed but
suspected reports that POTUS [President of the United
States] and the Secretary of the Army might include
comments about Corporal Tillman's heroism and his
approved Silver Star medal in speeeches [sic] currently
being prepared, not knowing the specifics surrounding
his death. . . .
I felt that it was essential that you received this
information as soon as we detected it in order to
preclude any unknowing statements by our country's
leaders which might cause public embarrassment if the
circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death become
public.\59\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ ``Personal For'' message from Major General Stanley McChrystal
to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, Lieutenant General Philip
Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
The day before General McChrystal sent this P4 message,
speechwriting staff from both the Department of Defense and the
White House had contacted a public affairs official at USASOC,
Carol Darby, seeking information about Corporal Tillman's
enlistment, rank, previous duty assignments, and reason for
enlisting.\60\ White House staffer John Currin informed the
USASOC official he was seeking this information for a speech
President Bush would deliver at the May 1, 2004, White House
Correspondents' Dinner.\61\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ E-mail from Carol Darby, Media and Community Relations
Division Chief, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, to Lieutenant
Colonel Hans Bush, Chief of Public Affairs, U.S. Army Special
Operations Command (Apr. 28, 2004).
\61\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Admiral Eric T. Olson, the deputy commander of SOCOM in
April 2004, told the Committee that the point at which General
McChrystal sent the P4 would have been the appropriate time to
tell the Tillman family about the possibility of fratricide.
According to Admiral Olson, ``as soon as there is solid
indication of the cause of death, that should be communicated
to the family.'' \62\ Admiral Olson said he did not see the P4
when it was sent in April 2004, but he told the Committee that
the information in the P4 was sufficiently certain to share
with the family before the memorial service. His ``after-the-
fact'' reflection was:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Admiral Eric T. Olson, at 60 (July 27, 2007).
But now having seen the contents of that P4, during
which General McChrystal said it's highly probably
there was fratricide, and that P4 was released before
the memorial service, it would have been reasonable to
expect that the family was informed of the possibility
of fratricide.\63\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ Id. at 61.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
D. THE SILVER STAR AWARD AND CORPORAL TILLMAN'S MEMORIAL SERVICE
On April 29, 2004, the same day General McChrystal sent his
P4 message, the Army posthumously awarded Corporal Tillman the
Silver Star, an honor reserved for Army soldiers who have
demonstrated ``gallantry in action against an enemy of the
United States.'' \64\ Prior to the award's approval by the
acting Army Secretary on April 29, 2004, several officers in
Corporal Tillman's regiment who were aware of the possibility
of friendly fire, including the regimental commander, Colonel
Nixon, reviewed and edited the Silver Star award.\65\ Yet the
final Silver Star citation asserted that Corporal Tillman ``put
himself in the line of devastating enemy fire.'' \66\ Both of
the eyewitness statements submitted with the Silver Star
paperwork were altered by somebody within the 75th Regiment's
chain of command.\67\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Army Regulation 600-8-22 Sec. 3-10(b) (2006).
\65\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
53 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).
\66\ Silver Star Award Citation for Corporal Patrick D. Tillman,
United States Army (undated).
\67\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
55 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 30, 2004, the same day General McChrystal's P4
message reached USASOC headquarters, USASOC issued a press
release announcing the Silver Star award. The release stated
that Corporal Tillman was being awarded the Silver Star ``for
his selfless actions after his Ranger element was ambushed by
anti-coalition insurgents during a ground assault convoy
through southeastern Afghanistan.'' \68\ The release also
referred to ``hostile fires directed at the Rangers'' and
stated that Corporal Tillman ``was shot and killed while
focusing his efforts on the elimination of the enemy forces and
the protection of his team members.'' \69\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Army Awards Silver Star
to Fallen Ranger (Apr. 30, 2004).
\69\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Brigadier General Howard Yellen, USASOC's
deputy commander in April 2004, the release did not explicitly
say how Corporal Tillman was killed, but ``for the civilian on
the street, the interpretation would be that he was killed by
enemy fire.'' \70\ When interviewed by the Committee, General
Kensinger said he did not recall reviewing the release, but
``possibly could have.'' \71\ He agreed that ``a member of the
public reading this probably would have concluded or assumed
that Corporal Tillman had been killed by the enemy.'' \72\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 69 (July 25, 2007).
\71\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 54 (Feb. 29,
2008).
\72\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Three days after this Army press release, on May 3, 2004, a
memorial service was held for Corporal Tillman in San Jose,
California. During the ceremony, Senior Chief Petty Officer
Steven White, a personal friend of Corporal Tillman and a Navy
SEAL, gave a eulogy in which he described the circumstances of
Corporal Tillman's death using language that suggested he was
killed by enemy forces.\73\ According to Senior Chief White, a
member of the 75th Regiment had read him portions of the Silver
Star citation that morning, and he based his speech on this
information. Testifying before the Committee in April 2007,
Senior Chief White said he felt ``let down'' by the military
because he was given inaccurate information to present
publicly. He told the Committee: ``I'm the guy that told
America how he died, basically, at that memorial, and it was
incorrect. That does not sit well with me.'' \74\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on
Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 110 (Apr.
24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
\74\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Senior Chief Petty Officer Stephen White, Hearing on Misleading
Information from the Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 111 (Apr. 24, 2007)
(Serial No. 110-54).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
E. THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE FRATRICIDE
The information that Corporal Tillman had likely been
killed by friendly fire was not shared with the American public
until the morning of May 29, 2004. On that day, the Saturday of
the Memorial Day weekend, Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger
appeared at a press availability at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
the headquarters of the Army's Special Operations Command, and
announced that an Army investigation had concluded that
``Corporal Tillman probably died as a result of friendly fire
while his unit was engaged in combat with enemy forces.'' \75\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC
Announces Tillman Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at
news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/2004/040529-01.htm).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Kensinger's statement was the only public statement
issued by any Department of Defense or White House official
acknowledging that Corporal Tillman had not been killed by the
enemy, as the American public had believed for more than a
month. When he was asked why the White House played no role in
the public fratricide announcement, former White House Press
Secretary Scott McClellan told Committee staff, ``We would
leave that to the proper department, and that would be DOD.''
\76\ White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett, asked
why the White House issued a statement after Corporal Tillman
died but not after the fratricide was announced, explained
these events ``were fundamentally different things.'' \77\
According to Mr. Bartlett, media interest in a presidential
statement about the fratricide ``was not there.'' \78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).
\77\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).
\78\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence reviewed by the Committee suggests that one reason
the Department of Defense publicly released this information on
May 29, 2004, was because the Tillman family had already begun
learning about the friendly fire and because the media was
about to report it.\79\ In the days before this announcement,
the Department of Defense scrambled to release the information
in a way that would cause the least amount of public relations
damage to the Department.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ See, e.g., E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Bryan
Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs (May 29, 2004) (``No one will ever tell you, but nice job on
this one. May have minimized . . . damage by pushing the panic button
early.'').
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The second Army 15-6 investigation into Corporal Tillman's
death was substantially completed by May 16, 2004.\80\ The
conclusion of this investigation, authored by Lieutenant
Colonel Ralph Kauzlarich, was that ``Corporal Tillman's death
was the result of fratricide during an extremely chaotic enemy
ambush.'' \81\ Over the next two weeks, the report moved upward
through the regiment's chain of command. On Friday, May 28,
2004, CENTCOM's director of operations, Lieutenant General John
F. Sattler, signed off on the report on behalf of General
Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander.\82\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
29 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).
\81\ U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation, at
11 (May 28, 2004).
\82\ Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Interview of General John F. Sattler, at 50 (July 24, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Sattler told the Committee that during this period,
General Abizaid called him at CENTCOM headquarters in Qatar and
asked him to review Colonel Kauzlarich's investigation. General
Sattler recalled that General Abizaid told him reviewing the
report was a top priority, ``so whatever I thought was my
number one priority no longer was.'' \83\ General Sattler
concurred with its findings.\84\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of General John F. Sattler, at 46 (July 24, 2007).
\84\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Although officials told the Committee that the military was
waiting for the investigation to be signed before notifying the
family, the record shows that two Tillman family members were
actually informed of the friendly fire before May 28, 2004.
Earlier in the week, the 2nd Battalion of the 75th Ranger
Regiment had returned to its headquarters in Fort Lewis,
Washington, where Specialist Kevin Tillman encountered the
members of his platoon for the first time since his brother's
death. Fearing that Kevin Tillman would hear about the friendly
fire from his fellow soldiers, the 2nd Battalion's commander,
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Bailey, was authorized to disclose
the information to Kevin Tillman and Corporal Tillman's wife,
Marie Tillman.\85\ According to Colonel Nixon, the commander of
the 75th Ranger regiment, Colonel Bailey asked for this
authorization after he determined that ``Kevin was getting some
sense of what was going on.'' \86\ The Department of Defense
Inspector General concluded that Kevin and Marie Tillman were
informed of the friendly fire on May 26 and May 27, 2004,
respectively.\87\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of Colonel James Craig Nixon, at 121 (Oct. 28, 2006).
\86\ Id.
\87\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Review of
Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, at
44 (Mar. 2007) (IPO2007E001).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time General Sattler was reviewing the report,
other high-level Pentagon officials began preparing for public
release of the finding of fratricide. On May 28, Larry Di Rita,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and
General Brown, the SOCOM commander, coordinated a video
teleconference to plan the public announcement of the
fratricide.\88\ According to various interviews conducted by
the Committee, the video teleconference included Mr. Di Rita,
General Brown, Admiral Olson, General Kensinger, CENTCOM chief
of staff Major General Steve Whitcomb, various public affairs
officials, and at least one lawyer.\89\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Colonel Hans Bush (Sept. 19, 2007).
\89\ Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Interview of Admiral Eric T. Olson (July 27, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Di Rita told Committee staff that he recognized at the
time that this was a ``very important public event'' \90\ He
recalled that that he was ``brought in to it, on the basis of
my professional responsibilities, which was to help with the
public affairs posture on this incident.'' \91\ While military
public affairs officers were planning to release the fratricide
information in a ``passive'' posture, in which the Department
would only respond to press queries, Mr. Di Rita decided to
adopt an ``active approach'' and hold a press conference to
release the information. Describing the teleconference, Mr. Di
Rita explained:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lawrence Di Rita, at 69 (Sept. 24, 2007).
\91\ Id. at 63.
I spent time working with the responsible offices . . .
deciding that it was something that probably required
some public interaction, as distinct from an
announcement. I seem to recall that we discussed the
importance of this, the fact that it was fairly large
news, that what everybody believed to be true was no
longer the case, no longer true, and that it required
more of a public presentation than a simple
announcement, particularly inasmuch as this thing had
been concluded late in the week, or at least they were
prepared to announce it late in a week, and I thought
it was important.\92\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Id.
According to Admiral Olson and General Brown, during the
teleconference, General Brown suggested that Mr. Di Rita make
the announcement since it was such a high-profile matter.\93\
Mr. Di Rita apparently decided that his ``responsibilities''
for managing the announcement did not extend to actually making
the announcement. He told the Committee, ``a public affairs
officer, to me, was not the answer.'' \94\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ General Bryan Brown, Response to Questions from BG Jones (Dec.
9, 2004) (``[W]e initially told Mr. DiRita that OSD PA should make the
announcement. They determined it should be a uniformed member of the
chain of command. The logical choice was LTG Kensinger. I agreed.'').
\94\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lawrence Di Rita, at 67 (Sept. 24, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Admiral Olson described the following discussion:
As I recall, General Brown suggested that the Public
Affairs Office for the Secretary of Defense be the one
to make the announcement as a defense matter. Larry Di
Rita thought it was more appropriate for a uniformed
officer to make the announcement. Then the question was
who is the appropriate uniformed officer. It is not a
SOCOM responsibility, it was an Army responsibility.
Because General Kensinger had an Army chain of command
outside of SOCOM, the discussion just sort of circled
in on General Kensinger as the appropriate officer.\95\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Admiral Eric T. Olson, at 40 (July 27, 2007).
Another teleconference participant also recalled that Mr.
Di Rita recommended that General Kensinger make the public
announcement. Colonel Hans Bush, who was the head of USASOC's
public affairs office at the time, recalled, ``General Brown
acknowledged the recommendation and then said, General
Kensinger, you meet the criteria. Congratulations, you're the
guy.'' \96\ When Committee staff asked General Kensinger if he
considered this a direct order by General Brown to make the
announcement, he responded, ``Not in so many words. . . . You
can be directed to do it, or you can be highly encouraged to
think that is the right decision.'' \97\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).
\97\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 63 (Feb. 29,
2008).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Kensinger explained that because he was unfamiliar
with the details of the investigation, he did not believe he
was the appropriate person to deliver the news. Colonel Bush,
the USASOC public affairs chief, described General Kensinger's
reaction: ``It was a little odd to be presenting someone else's
findings, and I think he felt that way.'' \98\ Because the
friendly fire investigation had been conducted and approved by
CENTCOM, General Kensinger told the Committee he thought ``it
would have been CENTCOM or somebody else would have made it,
above CENTCOM.'' \99\ He stated that he acquiesced to the
assignment only after he was told he would not have to answer
any questions from the media.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).
\99\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 64 (Feb. 29,
2008).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
At the press conference at Fort Bragg on May 29, 2004,
General Kensinger read a prepared statement approved by CENTCOM
and the Secretary of Defense's public affairs office.\100\ The
statement asserted that ``investigation results indicate that
Corporal Tillman probably died as the result of friendly
fire.'' \101\ According to Colonel Bush, ``It was specifically
requested by CENTCOM that we include `probably' in that
sentence.'' \102\ However, this language differed from the
investigative report itself, which stated, ``My findings lead
me to believe that CPL Tillman's death was the result of
fratricide.'' \103\ The report was not made public at that
time.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ E-mail from Bryan Whitman, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs, to Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the
Chief Public Affairs (May 28, 2004).
\101\ U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Press Statement: USASOC
Announces Tillman Investigation Results (May 29, 2004) (online at
news.soc.mil/advisories/Press-Media%20Releases/2004/040529-01.htm).
\102\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Colonel Hans Bush, at 57 (Sept. 19, 2007).
\103\ U.S. Central Command, Report of Fratricide Investigation (May
28, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
After the press conference, Pentagon public affairs
officials congratulated each other for limiting the impact of
the disclosure. Colonel George Rhynedance, an assistant to Mr.
Di Rita in the Secretary of Defense's public affairs office,
wrote to Bryan Whitman, another employee in the same office:
``No one will ever tell you, but nice job on this one. May have
minimized . . . damage by pushing the panic button early.''
\104\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ E-mail from Colonel George Rhynedance, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to Bryan Whitman,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (May
29, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In another e-mail on the day of the announcement, Colonel
Joseph Curtin, an Army public affairs officials, wrote, ``Story
will run hot today and diminish over the weekend.'' He also
noted, ``Senior leaders want to make sure the public affairs
community vigorously respond to any media query that
potentially questions the Silver Star award.'' \105\ In
response, Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson, a CENTCOM public
affairs official, wrote ``the WWII Memorial and attack in Saudi
Arabia have helped dilute the story somewhat.'' \106\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ E-mail from Colonel Joseph Curtin, Office of the Chief Public
Affairs to multiple recipients (May 29, 2004).
\106\ E-mail from Lieutenant Colonel John Robinson to multiple
recipients (May 29, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
III. THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE
Testimony and e-mails obtained by the Committee show that
White House officials were intensely interested in the news of
Pat Tillman's death. On April 23, the White House rushed out a
press statement acknowledging Corporal Tillman's death twelve
hours before the Department of Defense publicly confirmed the
casualty. This early statement was issued notwithstanding a
military rule intended to protect military families from media
attention during the first 24 hours after learning about a
casualty. A week later, on May 1, 2004, President Bush gave a
speech discussing Corporal Tillman's military service. Yet when
the Committee inquired into how and when White House officials
learned Corporal's death was a fratricide, the White House
provided no responsive e-mails, and each of the former
officials interviewed by Committee staff professed to have no
recollection.
A. NEWS BREAKS AT WHITE HOUSE
There was intense interest in the news of Corporal
Tillman's death at the White House as the story broke in the
press on the morning of April 23, 2004. Documents and
interviews with White House officials show that as White House
staff members learned the news from cable television and other
media sources, they quickly shared and discussed it with their
colleagues and friends. According to former White House
Communications Director Dan Bartlett, he discussed Corporal
Tillman's death directly with President Bush. Mr. Bartlett told
Committee staff that he ``had conversations with the President
about this news event.'' \107\ Although Mr. Bartlett claimed he
could not recall what was said, he told Committee staff that he
``likely'' discussed with the President the ``appropriate
response'' for the White House to take.\108\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).
\108\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Barry Jackson, a deputy to President Bush's political
adviser Karl Rove, sent Mr. Rove language for a potential
presidential tribute to Pat Tillman.\109\ Speechwriter Matthew
Scully wrote an e-mail to fellow speechwriter Michael Gerson
highlighting Corporal Tillman's death as a ``big story.'' \110\
Condoleezza Rice, then National Security Advisor, was informed
of Corporal Tillman's death by her executive assistant, Army
Major Jennie Koch Easterly.\111\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ E-mail from Barry Jackson, Deputy to the President's Senior
Advisor, to Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the President (Apr. 23, 2004).
\110\ E-mail from Matthew Scully, Deputy Director of Presidential
Speechwriting, to Michael Gerson, Assistant to the President for
Speechwriting (Apr. 23, 2004).
\111\ E-mail from Jennie M. Koch, Executive Assistant to the
National Security Advisor, to Gregory Schulte, Executive Secretary,
National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Several high-level staff members of President Bush's
reelection campaign contacted White House officials to suggest
public responses to Corporal Tillman's death. Matthew Dowd, the
campaign's chief strategist, sent an e-mail to Mr. Bartlett,
writing, ``You hear about pat tilman? Potus should call his
family or go to Arizona or his hometown.'' \112\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ E-mail from Matthew Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W.
Bush presidential campaign, to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the
President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark McKinnon, the campaign's media advisor, also e-mailed
Mr. Bartlett, saying: ``Realize President really shouldn't do
anything that he hasn't done for any other soldier killed in
the military, but certainly think he could say something about
he exemplifies the ultimate in humility, heroism and
sacrifice.'' \113\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ E-mail from Mark McKinnon, Chief Media Advisor, 2004 George
W. Bush presidential campaign to Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the
President for Communications (Apr. 23, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Commentators and reporters contacted the White House to
offer advice. For example, Wall Street Journal columnist Peggy
Noonan e-mailed the White House's Director of Strategic
Initiatives, Peter Wehner, recommending that he ``find out what
faith Tillman practiced and have the president go by that
church and light a candle or say a prayer.'' \114\ Karl Rove
exchanged e-mails about Pat Tillman with Associated Press
reporter Ron Fournier, under the subject line ``H-E-R-O.'' In
response to Mr. Fournier's e-mail, Mr. Rove asked, ``How does
our country continue to produce men and women like this,'' to
which Mr. Fournier replied, ``The Lord creates men and women
like this all over the world. But only the great and free
countries allow them to flourish. Keep up the fight.'' \115\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ E-mail from Peggy Noonan to Peter Wehner, White House
Director of Strategic Initiatives (Apr. 23, 2004).
\115\ E-mail from Ron Fournier to Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the
President (Apr. 23, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In total, the White House staff sent or received nearly 200
e-mails relating to Corporal Tillman's death on April 23, 2004.
B. STATEMENT ISSUED PREMATURELY
At approximately noon on April 23, 2004, the White House
issued a statement of condolence from the President. Before
releasing this statement, White House officials failed to
confirm with the Defense Department that Corporal Tillman had
actually died. They also failed to determine whether
information about the casualty, which occurred during a special
operations mission, was classified. Moreover, the White House
rushed to release its statement notwithstanding a military
requirement intended to protect military families from media
attention during the first 24 hours after a casualty.
Taylor Gross, the White House spokesman responsible for
media outlets in the South and Southwestern United States, told
Committee staff that he drafted a White House statement on the
morning of April 23 after receiving several calls from Arizona
media outlets.\116\ He sent the draft to Communications
Director Dan Bartlett and Press Secretary Scott McClellan for
approval at 11:40 a.m. The statement read:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Although various e-mails reviewed by the Committee referred
to this as a ``statement'' or a ``comment,'' Mr. Gross explained that
he had technically written a ``response to an inquiry,'' rather than a
``presidential statement'' because it was released only in reply to
particular queries. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Interview of Taylor Gross, at 61 (Sept. 5, 2007). Other White House
officials also told the Committee that they saw a distinction between
Mr. Gross's ``response to questions'' and a more formal, proactive
``presidential statement.'' White House officials were unhappy with
news coverage of Mr. Gross's April 23 comment, possibly because the
press referred to it is as a ``statement'' from the White House. See E-
mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy
DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr.
23, 2004).
Pat Tillman was an inspiration on the football field
and in his private life. As with all who made the
ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror, his family are
in the thoughts and prayers of President and Mrs.
Bush.\117\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ E-mail from Taylor Gross, White House spokesman, to Daniel
Bartlett, Assistant to the President for Communications (Apr. 23,
2004).
Minutes later, both Mr. Bartlett and Mr. McClellan approved
the message on behalf of the President. Mr. Bartlett noted that
the statement might ``set a precedent,'' but wrote ``I'm fine
with it.'' \118\ He later clarified: ``good to go.'' \119\
Speaking to Committee staff, Mr. Bartlett explained that he
made this decision due to the high level of media interest in
the story. According to Mr. Bartlett, the story of Pat Tillman
``made the American people feel good about our country . . .
and our military.'' \120\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for
Communications, to Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr.
23, 2004).
\119\ E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for
Communications, to Taylor Gross, White House spokesman (Apr. 23, 2004).
\120\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Bartlett's response to Matthew Dowd's April 23, 2004,
e-mail, which suggested that the President visit Corporal
Tillman's family, offers additional insight into the White
House's approach to the reports. He wrote:
I agree he is a hero. But there will be a lot of
pressure not to single out one guy just because he was
a football player. We are providing a statement to AZ
press, but we will need to discuss anything
further.\121\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ E-mail from Daniel Bartlett, Assistant to the President for
Communications, to Matthew Dowd, Chief Strategist, 2004 George W. Bush
presidential campaign (Apr. 23, 2004).
When Committee staff asked Mr. Bartlett whether there were
further discussions within the White House about responding to
Corporal Tillman's death, Mr. Bartlett said he thought it was
likely there were discussions, but he did not have any specific
recollection of them.\122\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Although Mr. Gross's statement was approved by President
Bush's top communications advisors, it appears that no one in
the White House confirmed with the military whether Corporal
Tillman had actually died. The White House also did not confirm
with the military that it could talk publicly about Corporal
Tillman, whose regiment regularly participated in sensitive
missions. According to Mr. Gross, ``by and large things are
confirmed by the White House before they're stated,'' whether
in ``a reactive statement or a proactive statement.'' \123\ But
Mr. Gross told Committee staff that he drafted this statement
quickly (``about a two-hour turnaround time''), without
consulting the Defense Department.\124\ Mr. Gross stated:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Taylor Gross, at 67 (Sept. 5, 2007).
\124\ Id. at 42.
I personally did not verify with DOD, but I got my
statement approved via my normal chain of commend. . .
. You know, again, frankly, confirming--confirming that
was--you know, that's above my pay grade. That was for
a superior.\125\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ Id. at 52.
Mr. Gross's superiors did not verify the statement either.
Mr. McClellan told Committee staff that ``the way it usually
was done was, you know, you confirm he was killed.'' \126\ But
Mr. McClellan asserted that confirmation of these facts was not
his job, and that he did not attempt to verify the statement
before approving it for release. He also did not check whether
information relating to Corporal Tillman's death was
classified, explaining, ``It was obvious. It was in the news.''
\127\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).
\127\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Likewise, Mr. Bartlett said, ``I did not take any formal
steps'' to confirm the information.\128\ Nevertheless, he
``personally was under the impression that this was true''
based on the ``totality of information coming from the media.''
\129\ Mr. Bartlett also denied that confirming the accuracy of
a presidential statement was his job. He explained: ``Generally
my conversations with DOD were at a much higher level.'' \130\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\128\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).
\129\ Id.
\130\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
If White House officials had checked with the Department of
Defense, they would have learned that the Department had not
yet publicly announced Corporal Tillman's death. In accordance
with a policy intended to give the families of war casualties a
24-hour private grieving period, the Defense Department did not
announce the casualty until late that evening.\131\ This 24-
hour policy was mandated by an act of Congress, the Military
Family Peace of Mind Act, which President Bush signed into law
in November 2003 as part of the Fiscal Year 2004 National
Defense Authorization Act.\132\ The act sought to ``provide
service members' next-of-kin with a period of privacy before
the public is made aware of service members' death.'' \133\ In
the case of Corporal Tillman, the family was not notified until
approximately 10:00 p.m. on April 22.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ Department of Defense, Instruction Number 1300.18 (2008).
\132\ Pub. L. 108-136.
\133\ U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report to Accompany
H.R. 1588 (Report 108-354), at 695 (Nov. 7, 2003). Representative
Walter B. Jones, the original sponsor of the act, explained that some
military families ``had little time to grieve'' because they were
forced to ``fend off aggressive press inquiries'' in the hours after a
loved one's death. A 24-hour delay on publicity, he said, ``would not
unreasonably impair the public's access to information about military
activities, but could provide an immeasurable amount of relief to those
who have endured the loss.'' Statement of Representative Walter B.
Jones, Congressional Record, E889 (May 7, 2003).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
An hour after the White House released its statement,
deputy press secretary Claire Buchan learned that DOD was not
yet confirming Corporal Tillman's death. She sent an e-mail to
Scott McClellan and Trent Duffy, another deputy press
secretary, with the subject line ``alert--do not use tillman
statement.'' \134\ The e-mail stated, ``dod is not confirming
that he is dead--next of kin still being notified.
unfortunately taylor's statement is on the wire.'' \135\ Later
in the afternoon, Ms. Buchan e-mailed National Security Council
spokesman Sean McCormack and asked him to ``bug your friend at
DOD'' about the Tillman casualty announcement. Mr. McCormack
quickly wrote back that DOD was ``not confirming yet. this will
soon become a problem.'' \136\ Later that night, Scott
McClellan concurred, writing, ``Media affairs commented when
asked for reaction from arizona press. They did not check to
verify if it had been confirmed.'' \137\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press
Secretary, to Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, and
Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).
\135\ Id.
\136\ E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press
Secretary, to Sean McCormack, NSC Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004). Mr.
McCormack told the Committee he had no recollection of the events
described in this e-mail.
\137\ E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant to the President for Communications
(Apr. 23, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Noam Neusner, a speechwriter for President Bush, criticized
the hastily issued comment as it was reported in the press,
noting that it inappropriately equated Corporal Tillman's
football career with his military service. In an e-mail
obtained by the Committee, he wrote:
That statement, as quoted, was ridiculous. Pat Tillman
wasn't a hero on the football field. He played
football. But he died for his country. We shouldn't try
to tie the two things together--he didn't.\138\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ E-mail from Noam Neusner, Special Assistant to the President
for Economic Speech Writing, to Erin Healy, Assistant White House Press
Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
C. DISCUSSION OF CORPORAL TILLMAN IN PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH
On May 1, 2004, President Bush delivered a speech during
the annual White House Correspondents' Dinner. The President
devoted a significant portion of the speech to a discussion of
Corporal Tillman. According to Dan Bartlett, ``We made a
strategic decision to pay tribute to the troops'' during the
2004 speech because the White House ``got singed pretty bad''
for a previous speech in which the President's jokes were
considered inappropriate during wartime.\139\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Documents reviewed by the Committee show that White House
officials had decided to include Corporal Tillman in the
Correspondents' Dinner speech by April 27, 2004. On that day,
White House Research Assistant Lee Bockhorn e-mailed White
House speechwriter, Michael Gerson, a number of press clippings
in response to Mr. Gerson's request for the ``'most moving''
stuff on Tillman, particularly anything he said.'' \140\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ E-mail from Lee Bockhorn, White House Research Assistant, to
Michael Gerson, Assistant to the President for Speechwriting (Apr. 27,
2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In his speech, the President spoke about the sacrifices of
military personnel, singling out Corporal Tillman's service. He
said:
The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last week in
Afghanistan brought home the sorrow that comes with
every loss and reminds us of the character of the men
and women who serve on our behalf. Friends say that
this young man saw the images of September the 11th,
and seeing that evil, he felt called to defend America.
He set aside a career in athletics and many things the
world counts important, wealth and security and the
acclaim of the crowds. He chose, instead, the rigors of
Ranger training and the fellowship of soldiers and the
hard duty in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Corporal Tillman asked for no special attention. He was
modest because he knew there were many like him, making
their own sacrifices. They fill the ranks of the Armed
Forces. Every day, somewhere, they do brave and good
things without notice. Their courage is usually seen
only by their comrades, by those who long to be free,
and by the enemy. They're willing to give up their
lives, and when one is lost, a whole world of hopes and
possibilities is lost with them.\141\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\141\ President George W. Bush, Remarks at White House
Correspondents' Dinner (May 1, 2004).
One sentence in this passage--``Friends say that this young
man saw the images of September the 11th, and seeing that evil,
he felt called to defend America''--was the subject of
extensive discussions during the speechwriting process.
Although the White House did not give Committee staff access to
the earlier drafts of the President's speech, it appears from
e-mails that in at least one of the earlier drafts, this
sentence read, ``Pat Tillman saw the burning towers on
television and felt called to fight the evil behind it.'' \142\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-
Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White
House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
White House e-mails reviewed by the Committee show that
John Currin, the White House Director of Fact-Checking, quickly
discovered that he could not find any substantiation for the
statement that Corporal Tillman had enlisted after he ``saw the
burning towers on television.'' When Mr. Currin asked White
House speechwriter Matthew Scully about the source of this
statement, Mr. Scully responded: ``Should be in news
accounts.'' \143\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ E-mail from Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential
Speechwriting, to John Currin, White House Director of Fact-Checking
(Apr. 28, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to confirm this statement, Mr. Currin
contacted Carol Darby, a public affairs officer at U.S. Army
Special Operations Command, to ask whether she could confirm
why Pat and Kevin Tillman had joined the Army. According to Ms.
Darby, she told him:
No, that I could not, that I had never talked to either
of the brothers and I had never seen anything in print
of any sort that stated why they joined the Army. But I
had seen press reports where Pat's coach had spoke of
something along those lines, but it really didn't give
exactly why Pat joined the Army. And he asked if I
could send him some of those press reports and I did
have those.\144\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Carol Darby, at 39 (Sept. 18, 2007).
After speaking with Ms. Darby and receiving her faxed
articles discussing Corporal Tillman's enlistment, Mr. Currin
urged the speechwriting team to change or remove text claiming
that Corporal Tillman joined the Army as a result of the
attacks of September 11. On April 28, 2004, he wrote to
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
speechwriter Matthew Scully:
My DoD contact, who checked with the Rangers, confirm
that he never gave any media interview or discussed the
reason why he left the NFL to join the Rangers. . . .
[G]iven that he never spoke to the press about his
reasons for joining the Rangers, we simply do not have
support for the statement that he decided to join the
Rangers after seeing the burning towers on
television.\145\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-
Checking, to Matthew Scully, deputy director of Presidential
Speechwriting (Apr. 28, 2004).
Two hours later, Mr. Currin e-mailed Michael Gerson, the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
chief White House speechwriter:
There is no direct support for the statement that Pat
Tillman saw the burning towers on television and felt
called to fight the evil behind it. Tillman and his
brother never discussed their reasons with the press,
nor have their parents. Tillman kept his reasons to
himself. The people at Fort Lewis, the base for
Tillman's unit, could not confirm that September 11 was
the reason why Tillman joined the Army. All that I and
Carol Darby at USASOC (Ft. Lewis) could find is mention
in a news article from March 2003 that says that
``friends say the brothers were deeply affected by the
September 11 terrorist attacks and felt compelled to
enlist.'' We do not know if these friends were
speculating about Tillman's reasons or if they had
direct knowledge of Tillman's reasons. The bottom line
is that Tillman never stated publicly his reasons for
joining the Rangers, and it is speculation that he did
so because of September 11.\146\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-
Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White
House Speechwriters (Apr. 28, 2004).
Mr. Currin thought the issue was important enough that he
sent a third message to the speechwriters on the following day,
April 29. In this e-mail, he wrote that Ms. Darby of USASOC had
offered to call the Tillman family on his behalf, but Mr.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Currin advised against it. He wrote:
As I mentioned yesterday, Pat Tillman and his family
never spoke about the reasons why he chose to leave the
NFL and join the Army, and the statement in the remarks
for the correspondence dinner attributing his
motivation to seeing the burning towers on 9/11 is
speculation. I spoke yesterday with Carol Darby at Ft.
Lewis (the base for the Rangers) to check on Tillman's
correct rank and see if she could verify Tillman's
reasons for joining the Rangers. Carol phoned me just
now to ask if we wanted to go through the CACO
[casualty assistance officer] assigned to the Tillman
family and see if they would want to talk to us about
Corporal Tillman's reasons for joining the Army. I am
not certain if we would want to approach the family in
their time of grief (they will receive Corporal
Tillman's remains today), or if you can work around the
problem of not knowing as fact the reasons that
motivated Tillman to join the Army. Let me know if you
want me to go through the Tillman family CACO to see if
the family will let us know his reasons. My sense,
however, is that because Tillman wanted to keep his
reasons private, and because his family continues to
respect his wish to this day, we should as well, and
work as best we can around the speculation.\147\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ E-mail from John Currin, White House Director of Fact-
Checking, to Michael Gerson, Matthew Scully, and John McConnell, White
House Speechwriters (Apr. 29, 2004).
Yet the final draft, approved and read by the President,
retained the admittedly ``speculative'' statement about
Corporal Tillman's motivation for enlisting. Rather than remove
the passage, the speechwriters attributed it to unknown
``friends.''
D. KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE
The record before the Committee does not explain when and
how White House officials learned that Corporal Tillman's death
was due to fratricide. Although the Committee requested from
the White House all documents related to Corporal Tillman, none
of the documents produced discussed the fratricide. Moreover,
none of the White House officials interviewed by Committee
staff had any recollection of how they learned of the
fratricide or what they did in response.
As discussed in part II, on April 29, 2004, General
McChrystal sent a P4 message to the commanding general at
CENTCOM, and sent information copies to the commanders of SOCOM
and USASOC, urging that they inform the President of the likely
fratricide. The P4 cited ``unconfirmed but suspected reports
that POTUS [the President of the United States] and the
Secretary of the Army might include comments about Corporal
Tillman's heroism and his approved Silver Star medal in
speeeches [sic] currently being prepared'' and stressed that it
was ``essential'' that the P4 recipients were immediately
informed about the fratricide ``to preclude any unknowing
statements by our country's leaders which might cause public
embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death
become public.'' \148\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ ``Personal For'' message from Major General Stanley
McChrystal to General John Abizaid, General Bryan Brown, and Lieutenant
General Philip Kensinger (Apr. 29, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Two days after the P4 memo was sent, President Bush gave
his speech at the White House Correspondents' Dinner. As the P4
advised, the President did not discuss how Corporal Tillman
died. None of the documents provided to the Committee indicate
whether the P4 or the information in the P4 reached the White
House.\149\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Although the acting Defense Department Inspector General,
Thomas Gimble, testified that his office ``think[s] the P4 memo stopped
with the three generals that were on it,'' the IG did not interview
Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, or any White House officials during
its investigation. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Testimony of Thomas Gimble, Acting Defense Department Inspector
General, Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield, 110th
Cong. (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, was by statute the ``principal military advisor to the
President.'' \150\ Although he knew at the end of April that
Corporal Tillman was likely killed by friendly fire, he told
the Committee that he could not remember ``ever having a
discussion with anybody in the White House about the Tillman
case, one way or another.'' \151\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ 10 U.S.C. 151(b).
\151\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The former White House officials interviewed by the
Committee also provided no details about how they, or the
President, learned of the fratricide. Committee staff
interviewed seven White House employees, including the
President's communications director, press secretary, chief
speechwriter, and top NSC communications officials. None could
recall when they learned the death of Corporal Tillman was
under investigation as a possible fratricide, or what they did
in response.
Dan Bartlett, White House communications director in 2004,
told the Committee he did not have a ``specific recollection''
as to when he learned of the friendly fire. Asked whether he
informed the President of the fratricide, he stated, ``I don't
remember a particular conversation, but I can't rule out that I
talked to him about it.'' \152\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Daniel Bartlett (Sept. 12, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Scott McClellan, the White House Press Secretary in 2004,
said he did not remember when he or the President learned about
the fratricide, but stated that he ``maybe'' could have heard
about the fratricide just before the public release on May 29,
2004.\153\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Scott McClellan (Sept. 10, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Gerson, former chief White House speechwriter, did
not recall when he learned about the friendly fire, whether he
knew about the fratricide while preparing the President's
Correspondents' Dinner speech, or whether he ever discussed the
fratricide with the President.\154\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Michael Gerson (Sept. 11, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Taylor Gross, former White House spokesman, told Committee
staff, ``after the 23rd of April, I did not have any official
conversation with anyone that I can recall regarding this
matter on an official or informal basis.'' He said, ``after
that date, my only information that I recall having about Pat
Tillman's death or anything to do with Pat Tillman's death,
friendly fire or otherwise, was reading in the news reports.''
\155\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Taylor Gross, at 102 (Sept. 5, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
President Bush was asked directly by a reporter in August
2007 when he learned that Corporal Tillman was killed by
friendly fire. He said he did not remember. He explained: ``I
can't give you the precise moment. But obviously the minute I
heard that the facts that people believed were true were not
true, that I expect there to be a full investigation and get to
the bottom of it.'' \156\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ White House, President Bush Discusses American
Competitiveness Initiative During Press Conference (Aug. 9, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S RESPONSE
Evidence obtained by the Committee shows that Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat
Tillman's enlistment in the Army Rangers. Evidence also
establishes that after Corporal Tillman was killed, senior
military officials who reported directly to Secretary Rumsfeld,
including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and several
combatant commanders, became aware of the fratricide. Yet when
Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Committee in August
2007, he stated he had no recollection of how or when he
learned of the fratricide and no recollection of what he did in
response.
On June 25, 2002, about a month after Pat Tillman enlisted
in the Army, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote a so-called ``snowflake
memo'' to the Secretary of the Army with the subject line,
``Pat Tillman.'' The memo attached a Chicago Tribune newspaper
account about Mr. Tillman's enlistment and read, ``Here is an
article on a fellow who is apparently joining the Rangers. He
sound[s] like he is world-class. We might want to keep our eye
on him.'' \157\ Documents produced to the Committee show that a
friend living in the Chicago area had initially brought the
Tribune article to Secretary Rumsfeld's attention.\158\ Three
days later, on June 28, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld sent Mr.
Tillman a personal letter applauding him for his decision to
enlist. He wrote, ``I heard that you were leaving the National
Football League to become an Army Ranger. It is a proud and
patriotic thing you are doing.'' \159\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Tom
White, Secretary of the Army (June 25, 2002).
\158\ Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to William
H. Layer (June 26, 2002).
\159\ Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Mr. Pat
Tillman (June 28, 2002).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
When he was asked about the June 25 snowflake memo to
Secretary White, Secretary Rumsfeld told the Committee he did
not intend to ``single out'' Corporal Tillman for progress
reports or other special treatment. He said the purpose of his
memo was to communicate that, ``here is an individual who is
serving his country and is prominent and gave up a good deal to
do that; and that we, as people in the Department, ought to
acknowledge that and be grateful for his service, as I was.''
\160\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Donald Rumsfeld, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 203 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Colonel Steven Bucci, Secretary Rumsfeld's military
assistant at the time, recalled that Mr. Tillman's enlistment
was a major event that caught the attention of Secretary
Rumsfeld. He told the Committee, ``it was all over the
newspapers. It was sort of a big event for everybody.'' \161\
Both Colonel Bucci and Lieutenant General Bantz J. Craddock,
former senior military assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld, told
the Committee this was the only time they could recall
Secretary Rumsfeld writing personal notes praising the
enlistment of an individual soldier.\162\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Dr. Steven Bucci, at 26 (Sept. 20, 2007).
\162\ Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Interview of General Bantz J. Craddock, at 18 (July 27, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Larry Di Rita, who was serving as Special Assistant to the
Secretary in June 2002, had a similar recollection of why
Secretary Rumsfeld took a personal interest in Pat Tillman's
enlistment. Mr. Di Rita told Committee staff that he did not
remember being involved in the drafting of Secretary Rumsfeld's
June 25 snowflake memo or June 28 letter, but he generally
remembered the attention Corporal Tillman's enlistment received
within the Secretary's office. He told the Committee:
This was a noteworthy event in the country. It had to
do with the Department for which he [Secretary
Rumsfeld] had oversight responsibility and control. . .
. [T]his was less than a year after 9/11. So there was
still a great deal of interest in what was happening
with respect to the Armed Forces. . . . [I]t was a very
unusual circumstance, a football player leaving the NFL
to join the Army. I don't recall that it had happened
to anybody else while we were serving. So the nature of
that kind of event is not surprising to me that the
Secretary would have chosen to single it out.\163\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lawrence Di Rita, at 41 (Sept. 24, 2007).
In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld
said he could not recall when he learned about the fratricide
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
or who told him. He told the Committee:
I don't recall when I was told and I don't recall who
told me. But my recollection is that it was at a stage
when there were investigations under way, in which case
I would not have told anybody to go do something with
respect to it. . . . And it was not something that I
would inject myself into the normal course of my role
as secretary of defense.\164\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Donald Rumsfeld, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 35 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
When he was asked how he could not have known that Corporal
Tillman's death was being investigated as a fratricide,
Secretary Rumsfeld responded: ``You're talking about an
institution of something like 3 million people: active duty,
Reserve, Guard, civilians, contractors. . . . It's not possible
for someone to know all the things that are going on.'' \165\
Furthermore, Secretary Rumsfeld told the Committee, ``I know
that I would not engage in a cover-up. I know that no one in
the White House suggested such a thing to me.'' \166\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ Id. at 177.
\166\ Id. at 178.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee received conflicting evidence about when
Secretary Rumsfeld learned about the fratricide. General
Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander, recalled informing Secretary
Rumsfeld ``that there was an investigation that was ongoing and
it looked like it was friendly fire'' between May 18 and May
20, 2004, more than a week prior to the public
announcement.\167\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
But Secretary Rumsfeld informed the Committee that his
military assistant, Colonel Steven Bucci, recalled that
Secretary Rumsfeld did not learn about the fratricide until
after May 20. In a letter to the Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld
wrote:
I am told that I received word of this development
sometime after May 20, 2004, but my recollection
reflects the fact that it occurred well over two years
ago. As a result, I do not recall when I first learned
about the possibility that Corporal Tillman's death
might have resulted from fratricide. I am confident
that I did not discuss this matter with anyone outside
the Department of Defense.\168\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ Letter from Donald Rumsfeld to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, and
Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform (July 26, 2007).
The Committee interviewed Colonel Bucci, who returned to
the Secretary's personal office on Monday, May 24, 2004, after
a six-month temporary assignment to the Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq. Sometime during that week, he said he
received a call from the Army Chief of Staff's executive
assistant or the Secretary of the Army's military assistant.
His colleague told him, ``We're pretty sure that this may have
actually been a fratricide event, and you need to let the
Secretary know.'' \169\ Colonel Bucci's colleague also told him
officials were ``trying to ascertain exactly which caliber
weapon had killed him [Corporal Tillman] and trying to check
that against the weapon that his brother was carrying,'' in
order to eliminate any possibility that Corporal Tillman had
been killed by his brother, Specialist Kevin Tillman.\170\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Dr. Steven Bucci, at 26 (Sept. 20, 2007).
\170\ Id. at 32.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Colonel Bucci stated that he shared this information with
Secretary Rumsfeld within fifteen minutes, at one of the
Secretary's daily ``stand up'' staff meetings. He told the
Committee:
I said, ``Sir, you know, I have bad news. The Army
thinks and they are pretty sure that this was actually
a fratricide.'' And he said, ``Oh, gosh, that's a
shame. Well, they need to settle it and get the word
out as quickly as possible.'' And it was clear to me
from his reaction and the reaction of General Craddock
and the others that that was the first time anyone had
heard anything about it being a fratricide.\171\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\ Id.
When asked to further explain his observation that the
people in the meeting appeared to be hearing the fratricide
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
news for the first time, Colonel Bucci explained:
We tend in the military to not be particularly happy
when there's fratricide of any sort. You know, it's
enough of a tragedy when you lose soldiers to the
enemy. When you lose them because your own guys did
something, you know, made a mistake, it's particularly
tragic. So, yeah, everybody's response to me said this
was the first time they were hearing about that aspect
of it.\172\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ Id. at 34.
When the Committee interviewed Secretary Rumsfeld's senior
military assistant, General Bantz J. Craddock, he did not
recall this conversation. Instead, he recalled that he first
heard about the suspected fratricide ``over the fence at my
quarters one weekend'' from his colleague and neighbor at Fort
Myer, Lieutenant General James Lovelace, who at that time was
Director of the Army Staff.\173\ General Craddock told the
Committee:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\173\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of General Bantz J. Craddock, at 19 (July 27, 2007).
As I said, I recall at sometime--and it would have been
on a weekend. I don't recall when. My neighbor, Jim
Lovelace, indicated it was a possibility, that it was a
concern that it might have been a fratricide and it
was, like I was, ``you're kidding.'' \174\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ Id. at 27.
General Craddock told the Committee that he could not
recall ever talking to Secretary Rumsfeld about Corporal
Tillman.\175\ He stated that he was ``surprised and taken
aback'' to hear the news of the fratricide, but he never raised
the issue with Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, or the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\176\ General Lovelace
told the Committee that he did not recall the ``over the
fence'' conversation with General Craddock. He also told the
Committee that, based on a review of his e-mails, he believed
he learned about Corporal Tillman's fratricide on May 27, 2007,
two days before the public announcement.\177\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ Id. at 17.
\176\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of General Bantz J. Craddock, at 28 (July 27, 2007).
\177\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lieutenant General James Lovelace, at 20 (July 31, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
V. GENERAL MYERS'S RESPONSE
General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in 2004, testified before the Committee on August 1,
2007. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers was the
highest-ranking officer in the military and the ``principal
military adviser to the President, the National Security
Council, and the Secretary of Defense.'' \178\ In that role, he
communicated many times a day with Secretary Rumsfeld,
including attending a daily ``roundtable'' meeting in Secretary
Rumsfeld's office.\179\ Moreover, according to Secretary
Rumsfeld, he and General Myers also ``met with the White House
frequently.'' \180\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\ 10 U.S.C. 151(b); although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff is not in the chain of command between combatant commanders
and the Secretary of Defense, the Goldwater-Nickles Act allows the
Chairman to act as a conduit for communications between the combatant
commanders and the Secretary, 10 U.S.C. 163(a).
\179\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of General Bantz J. Craddock, at 34 (July 27, 2007).
\180\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Donald Rumsfeld, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 34 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
When General Myers testified before the Committee on August
1, 2007, he confirmed that he learned about the friendly fire
suspicions only days after Corporal Tillman died. He testified:
``I knew right at the end of April, that there was a
possibility of fratricide in the Corporal Tillman death, and
that General McChrystal had started an investigation.'' \181\
General Myers did not recall how he learned of the
investigation, but thought he might have heard it from the
operations office within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\182\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
\182\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Myers's early knowledge of the fratricide was
confirmed by General Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM. General
Abizaid testified that he called General Myers after receiving
the P4 message on or after May 6, 2004, but found that General
Myers was already aware of the situation:
I called the chairman, I told the chairman about having
received General McChrystal's message that friendly
fire was involved. . . . And it was my impression from
having talked to the chairman at the time that he knew
about it.\183\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
According to Lieutenant General Sattler, General Abizaid's
top operations officer at CENTCOM, General Abizaid likely
called General Myers with the understanding that the Chairman
would pass the information in the P4 message on to Secretary
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Rumsfeld. General Sattler stated:
I'm sure that General Abizaid's goal would have been to
let the Secretary know immediately as in his chain of
command. And there's obviously two different ways. One
is point to point; the other one is through his
confidant and advisor, the Chairman. So, yes, I would
be very surprised if General Abizaid did not know, one
way or the other, the Secretary was going to be
informed immediately.\184\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\184\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of General John F. Sattler, at 41 (July 24, 2007).
General Myers could not recall whether he informed the
Secretary of Defense or the President about the fratricide.
General Myers acknowledged in his testimony that it would have
been ``logical'' for him to share the news with the Secretary
of Defense, but said ``I just don't recall whether I did it or
not'' and ``I don't have any documentation that says I did.''
\185\ General Myers also testified that he could not recall
``ever having a discussion with anybody in the White House
about the Tillman case, one way or another.'' \186\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 223 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
\186\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after learning of the possibility of a fratricide,
General Myers had a conversation with his top public affairs
official, then-Captain Frank Thorp, about how to discuss the
circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death. He told the
Committee:
[I]n working with my former public affairs adviser, I
said, you know, ``We need to keep this in mind in case
we go before the press. We've just got to calibrate
ourselves. With this investigation ongoing, we want to
be careful how we portray the situation.'' . . . I do
remember talking to him about the potential of
fratricide and just say we've got to be cautious here,
. . . if we make any comments.\187\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\187\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 33 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
When the Committee interviewed now-Admiral Thorp, he had a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
similar recollection of the encounter:
He pulled me aside, as I recall, pulled me in his
office and gave me a heads--I don't remember his exact
words, but I do remember him saying, giving me a heads
up that he has heard it is possible fratricide and
advising me to make sure that I kept him honest and
correct in his public remarks.\188\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, IV, at 26 (Sept. 19, 2007).
General Myers told the Committee he was ``cautious'' when
discussing Corporal Tillman's death to avoid exerting ``command
influence'' over those investigating the fratricide, even
though General Myers, as Joint Chiefs Chairman, was not
technically in the chain of command. He denied engaging in a
cover-up of the friendly fire.\189\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\189\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General Richard Myers, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 197 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Myers told the Committee that he took no steps to
notify the Tillman family or speak in public about the
possibility of friendly fire. He told the Committee that
notifying the family ``wouldn't be our responsibility'' at the
Joint Chiefs because it is done in ``Army channels.'' He said
it would have been ``absolutely irresponsible of me to
interfere with Army procedures, frankly.'' \190\ He further
explained:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ Id. at 219.
I mean, it sounds harsh, and it is harsh, but the
reality is there is a lot of things going on, and
this--Corporal Tillman's death was significant, but it
wasn't the kind of issue that occupied a whole lot of
time. . . . We were working on the battle of Fallujah.
We had a myriad of issues. Abu Ghraib had just broke;
we spent a lot of time in the media with Abu Ghraib.
There were a lot of issues taking our attention. I
think it would have been irresponsible for the chairman
to get involved in what are Army matters.\191\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ Id.
Although General Myers did not notify the Tillman family of
the possible friendly fire, he did notify the National Football
League on April 23 that Corporal Tillman had been killed.\192\
Greg Aiello, Vice President for Public Relations for the NFL,
told Army representatives that General Myers called NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue on April 23, 2004, to notify him of
the casualty.\193\ Mr. Tagliabue confirmed to Committee staff
that he received this call.\194\ At the time General Myers made
this call, Defense Department policy required that the
Department refrain from public comment on the death of a
soldier until 24 hours after family notification.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ Shari Lawrence, Army Human Resources Command, ``EXSUM''
Document (Apr. 23, 2004).
\193\ Id.
\194\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Paul Tagliabue (May 27, 2008).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
VI. GENERAL ABIZAID'S RESPONSE
General John Abizaid, commanding general of CENTCOM, was
the military officer at the top of Corporal Tillman's
operational chain of command and the main addressee on General
McChrystal's P4 memo. General Abizaid testified before the
Committee that he was traveling in Iraq and Afghanistan when
the P4 memo was sent and that CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa,
Florida failed to forward him the message in a timely way. As a
result, General Abizaid testified, he received the P4 message a
week or more after it was sent, probably around May 6,
2004.\195\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ General Abizaid blamed the delay in his receipt of the P4 on
``a problem within my own headquarters.'' According to CENTCOM's
Director of Operations at the time, Lieutenant General John Sattler,
``we had problems with our P4 system'' while deployed outside of the
continental United States that might have caused such a delay. House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview of General John
F. Sattler, at 33 (July 24, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Abizaid told the Committee that immediately after
receiving the P4, he contacted General Myers, the Joint Chiefs
Chairman, to notify him that Corporal Tillman's death was a
suspected friendly fire. He stated, ``[a]s soon as I saw the
message . . . I called the chairman; I told the chairman about
it.'' \196\ General Abizaid testified that when he called
General Myers, ``it was my impression from having talked to the
chairman at the time he knew about it.'' \197\ General Abizaid
also testified that in their conversation, he told General
Myers he thought the ``leadership'' should know about the
suspected fratricide, by which he meant ``the secretary and the
president.'' \198\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
\197\ Id.
\198\ Id. at 233.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
During his visit to Afghanistan in late April, General
Abizaid spoke with Corporal Tillman's platoon leader, 1st
Lieutenant David Uthlaut, who had been injured in the same
firefight in which Corporal Tillman was killed. In his April
30, 2004, press availability in Qatar, General Abizaid made the
following comment:
I'd also like to say that while I was in Afghanistan
yesterday I had the opportunity to talk to 1st
Lieutenant Dave Hutman [sic] of the 1st Ranger
Battalion, of the Ranger battalion--maybe I've got the
wrong Ranger battalion that he was with. He was the
platoon leader of Pat Tillman. I asked him yesterday
how operations were going. I asked him about Pat
Tillman. He said, ``Pat Tillman was a great Ranger and
a great soldier, and what more can I say about him?''
And I'd say that about every one of those young men and
women that are fighting, not only in Afghanistan but in
Iraq. I also probably bear some understanding that--
that lieutenant I was talking to happened to be a
former first captain of corps of cadets at West Point,
and when he was talking to me, he was still nursing a
large number of wounds that he sustained in that
firefight where Pat Tillman lost his life.\199\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ Department of Defense, Gen. Abizaid Central Command
Operations Update Briefing (Apr. 30, 2004) (online at
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2557).
General Abizaid testified that Lieutenant Uthlaut ``gave no
indication that there was a friendly fire issue'' during their
conversation.\200\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General John Abizaid, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 31 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49). Then-Captain Uthlaut told the DOD IG that he
was unaware of the friendly fire for approximately 10 days while
recuperating after the firefight. Department of Defense Office of
Inspector General, Interview of Captain David Uthlaut, at 5 (July 29,
2006).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In a written response to the Committee, General Abizaid
said he was not informed about the friendly fire suspicions
before or during this trip to Afghanistan. He also reiterated
his testimony that he did not know about the friendly fire
before he reviewed General McChrystal's P4 message on about May
6, 2004.\201\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ Letter from General John Abizaid (Retired) to Chairman Henry
Waxman and Ranking Member Tom Davis, House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform (Jan. 15, 2008).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Abizaid told the Committee that when he traveled to
Washington, DC, between May 18 and May 20, 2004, he informed
Secretary Rumsfeld ``that there was an investigation that was
ongoing and it looked like it was friendly fire.'' \202\ Yet
when asked by the Defense Department Inspector General whether
he spoke with the Secretary upon learning of the fratricide,
General Abizaid stated, ``No. I didn't talk to the Secretary of
Defense about it.'' \203\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing
on the Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense
Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 32 (Aug. 1, 2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
\203\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of General John Abizaid, at 9 (Dec. 13, 2006).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. THE RESPONSE OF OTHER SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS
A. GENERAL BRYAN BROWN
General Bryan Brown, the SOCOM commander, told the
Committee he received General McChrystal's April 29, 2004, P4
memo, but failed to inform his superiors or the Tillman family
of the fratricide. According to General Brown:
When I got the P4, I made the assumption and probably
the bad assumption since I was an info addressee and
not the ``to'' that that information would flow through
the normal chain of command. It would have been very
simple for me to pick up the phone and call the
chairman, I didn't. I did respond to the P4 back to
General McChrystal but quite frankly, I just made the
assumption, a bad assumption now--I know that normal P4
traffic moves pretty fast--that that would go to the
chairman immediately. So it's unfortunate it was poorly
handled and unfortunately it's the Tillman family that
had to pay the price for it.\204\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of General Bryan Brown, Hearing on the Tillman Fratricide: What the
Leadership of the Defense Department Knew, 110th Cong., at 218 (Aug. 1,
2007) (Serial No. 110-49).
General Brown told the Defense Department Inspector General
that he knew about the friendly fire suspicions even before
receiving the memo because he received a phone call from
General McChrystal a few days earlier notifying him that the
shooting was a possible friendly fire and that an Army 15-6
investigation was under way. He also said that he believed the
Department of Defense should have notified the Tillman family
of the investigation as soon as it became aware of the
information.\205\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of General Bryan Brown, at 16 (Nov. 17, 2006).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
According to General Brown, notifying the family was not
his responsibility because he was a combatant commander.\206\
Nevertheless, General Brown told the Committee that when he
learned the notification had not taken place, more than a month
after the shooting, he initiated an effort to notify the
Tillman family before the public announcement on May 29,
2004.\207\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ Id.
\207\ Id. at 39.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
B. LIEUTENANT GENERAL PHILIP KENSINGER
Precisely how and when General Kensinger, the commanding
general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC),
learned of the fratricide remains a subject of dispute. When
the Committee interviewed General Kensinger, he stated that he
was unaware of any suspicions of friendly fire when he attended
Corporal Tillman's memorial service in San Jose, California, on
May 3, 2004. But his account is contradicted by the testimony
of several other officers, as well as by General Kensinger's
own prior statements, all of which suggest he learned about the
possibility of friendly fire prior to the May 3 memorial
service. All the witnesses agree, however, that General
Kensinger made no effort to inform the Tillman family of the
fratricide until the end of May 2004.
When the Committee interviewed General Kensinger on
February 29, 2008, he was asked when he first learned that
Corporal Tillman's death may have been caused by friendly
fire.\208\ General Kensinger responded, ``to the best that I
remember, it was after the memorial service when I got the
P4.'' \209\ General Kensinger said he did not learn about
suspicions of friendly fire until Colonel Clarence K.K. Chinn,
the deputy commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, told him
about them after the memorial service. He also stated that he
did not see General McChrystal's P4 memo until after he
returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after the service. He
told the Committee this recollection was based in part on his
feeling that he would have been uncomfortable attending the
memorial service knowing about the friendly fire suspicions. He
stated:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ General Kensinger had been invited to attend the August 1,
2007, Committee hearing, but refused, citing a ``previously scheduled
business matter.'' E-mail from Charles Gittins, Attorney for General
Kensinger, to Majority Staff, House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee (July 22, 2007). A subpoena was issued to compel his
appearance, but U.S. Marshals could not locate General Kensinger prior
to the hearing. Subpoena from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee, to Lieutenant General Philip
Kensinger (July 31, 2007).
\209\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 24 (Feb. 29,
2008).
I mean I just have a hard time going back and trying to
rectify the dates. And that is why I said that it was
after the memorial service. Because I would have had a
different feel--I just know myself. I would have had a
different feeling at the memorial service if I had
known about this before going to the memorial
service.\210\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ Id. at 30.
General Kensinger's statements are contradicted by the
testimony of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, the deputy
commander of USASOC in April 2004. He told the Defense
Department Inspector General that on April 24, the commander of
the 75th Ranger Regiment, Colonel Nixon, called and told him
``I think we have a possible fratricide.'' \211\ General Yellen
told Committee staff he shared this information with General
Kensinger on the same day. He stated: ``I either went by and
went into his office and told him, or brought it up at a daily
update.'' \212\ When asked about this conversation, General
Kensinger told the Committee, ``I don't remember that.'' \213\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 8 (Dec. 1, 2006).
\212\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Brigadier General Howard Yellen (Retired), at 40 (July 25, 2007).
\213\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Retired), at 25 (Feb. 29,
2008).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Yellen also told the Committee that General
Kensinger ``[a]bsolutely'' knew about the suspected fratricide
prior to the memorial service on May 3.\214\ According to
General Yellen, he had a discussion with General Kensinger
prior to the memorial about the need to disclose to the Tillman
family the possibility of fratricide. General Yellen told the
Committee:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Brigadier General Howard Yellen (Retired), at 39 (July 25, 2007).
I remember indicating that not saying anything might
not be to our best--bad news doesn't get better with
time. And I remember General Kensinger saying the
investigation is not yet complete. . . . My
recommendation was just to explain to the family that
we have a suspicion that this may have been friendly
fire. We have a thorough investigation currently
ongoing and we are going to brief you just as soon as
that investigation is complete. We are going to come
out there and we're going to lay all the facts on the
table for you and explain this, as we do for all of our
15-6 collateral investigations. . . . I mean, this was
not unusual in going out and briefing a family. In
fact, General Shinseki, when he was Chief of Staff,
instituted that policy.\215\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ Id. at 62.
According to General Yellen, General Kensinger did not
support sharing the information with the Tillman family before
the investigation was complete. General Yellen summed up their
disagreement in the following way: ``He wanted to have a
complete report. And I, my approach is you don't need the
completed report.'' \216\ Although he did not recall specific
conversations with General Yellen about notifying the family of
the fratricide investigation, General Kensinger told the
Committee he recalled believing ``that until the investigation
was completed you didn't notify the family.'' \217\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\216\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 74 (Dec. 1, 2006).
\217\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Retired), at 59 (Feb. 29,
2008).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Kensinger's assertion to the Committee that he
learned about friendly fire suspicions after the May 3 memorial
is also contradicted by another former member of General
Kensinger's staff, Lieutenant Colonel David Duffy. Colonel
Duffy told the Department of Defense Inspector General that he
personally delivered General McChrystal's P4 message to General
Kensinger on the morning of April 30, 2004, three days before
the memorial service. Colonel Duffy stated:
Once I got it I hand carried it immediately up to GEN
Kensinger, the commander at the time. . . . I mean, I
sat down. He sat in on chair, I sat in the other and I
handed it to him.\218\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of Lieutenant Colonel David Duffy, at 7 (Nov. 30, 2006).
Colonel Duffy recalled that General Kensinger was concerned
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
about the P4 message, and warned him to avoid discussing it:
[H]e read it and, you know, was dismayed by the
contents obviously. And then basically looked me in the
eye and said if it leaked anywhere that, you know, it
was on me. . . . I do know that he said words to the
effect of ``Damn, I wish they hadn't have told me.''
\219\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\219\ Id. at 8.
Colonel Duffy noted that General Kensinger's warning not to
disclose the information in the P4 was not a routine
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
occurrence:
That's unusual. That the only time it ever happened.
The only time. . . . And I had a good relationship with
GEN Kensinger. But it was like, you know, ``Hey if
leaks out, Duffy, you know, you're dead,'' or
something.\220\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ Id. at 16.
Although General Kensinger told Committee staff that he
only received P4s ``very infrequently'' and agreed that they
tended to be urgent messages, he said that he had no
recollection that Colonel Duffy, or anyone else, delivered the
message from General McChrystal.\221\ He had no explanation for
the delay he says he experienced in receiving the P4, stating:
``I can't tell you why I didn't get it in a timely manner. I
don't know.'' \222\ According to his deputy, General Yellen,
P4s were generally delivered promptly at USASOC because
``personnel understood the sensitivity and the expediency of
those messages.'' \223\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger (Retired), at 28 (Feb. 29,
2008).
\222\ Id.
\223\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Brigadier General Howard Yellen, at 47 (July 25, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
General Kensinger's account was also contradicted by a
third officer, Colonel Clarence Chinn, the deputy commander of
the 75th Ranger Regiment in 2004. In an interview with the
Defense Department Inspector General, Colonel Chinn disputed
the idea that he had informed General Kensinger of the ongoing
fratricide investigation. He told investigators that sometime
after the memorial service, General Kensinger informed him that
Corporal Tillman's death was a possible fratricide. Colonel
Chinn stated that he was certain of his recollection:
Oh, I am very clear. I, I am absolutely, one hundred
percent positive he told me. . . . And the reason I am
very aware of that because I was not very happy about
not knowing and going to a memorial service for a
soldier unaware that that is what happened.\224\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\224\ Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Interview
of Colonel Clarence Chinn, at 26 (Nov. 7, 2006).
Finally, General Kensinger's statements to the Committee
are contradicted by his own previous testimony to Army
investigators that he learned the information shortly before
the May 3 memorial service. On two separate occasions, he
testified that he was told about the friendly fire
investigation by Lt. Colonel Chinn, who picked him up at the
airport before the memorial.\225\ When Army investigators then
asked him if there was ``a conscious decision made not to tell
the family of that possibility,'' General Kensinger responded:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\ Brigadier General Mike Jones, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger, Jr. (Nov. 29, 2004); Department of Defense Office of
Inspector General, Interview of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger,
Jr., at 6 (Dec. 8, 2006).
On that particular day, considering what I was told,
the answer is: Yes. You know, the decision was made not
to--first of all, we didn't have enough information to
say that it was. And I think what we wanted to do is
make sure that we told them the right information.
Again, that was a memorial service. I didn't think it
was my responsibility to go up to them and say, ``Hey,
you know, this is a possible friendly fire.'' Again, I
think that would just not be the right thing to do
personally. Again, I didn't have any information. Mine
was all hearsay.\226\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ Brigadier General Mike Jones, Interview of Lieutenant General
Philip Kensinger, Jr., at 3 (Nov. 29, 2004).
Despite the conflicts in testimony relating to when General
Kensinger found out about the ongoing fratricide investigation,
all the witnesses agree that when he did find out, General
Kensinger chose not to tell the Tillman family. Instead, he
waited until the investigation had been completed at the end of
May 2004. This delay was not consistent with Army regulations,
which required the Army to notify the Tillman family that it
was investigating Corporal Tillman's death as a possible
fratricide.\227\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\227\ Army Regulation 600-34 Sec. 3-7 (2003) (``[W]ithin a
reasonable period of time after family members are notified of the
death of a soldier, but not more than 30 days after the date of
notification, the CAO [casualty assistance officer] . . . will ensure
that the PNOK [primary next of kin] and other family members . . .
[a]re informed of the investigations, the names of the agencies
conducting the investigations, and the existence of any reports by such
agencies that have or will be issued as a result of the
investigations''); Army Regulation 600-8-1 Sec. 4-13(b) (1994)
(providing a script for notifying family members in cases of friendly
fire, including, ``His/her death is the result of suspected friendly
fire. An investigation is being conducted.'').
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. THE RESPONSE TO THE CAPTURE AND RESCUE OF PRIVATE JESSICA LYNCH
A. PRIVATE LYNCH'S CAPTURE AND RESCUE
Private First Class Jessica Lynch was a member of the
Army's 507th Maintenance Company, a logistics team assigned to
support a Patriot missile battery during the initial invasion
of Iraq. While the company was heading towards Baghdad as part
of a convoy on March 23, 2003, several vehicles experienced
mechanical problems, and the company fell hours behind. As a
result, the company missed a turn and headed into territory
controlled by Iraqi forces.\228\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ U.S. Army, Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March
2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq (undated) (online at www.army.mil/features/
507thMaintCmpy/AttackOnThe507MaintCmpy.pdf).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraqi forces attacked the company as it traveled through
the city of An Nasiriyah. Private Lynch was severely injured
when the Humvee she was riding in crashed into another convoy
vehicle. Iraqi forces captured Private Lynch and transported
her to a military hospital and later to the Saddam Hussein
General Hospital in An Nasiriyah.\229\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\229\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Jessica Lynch, Hearing on Misleading Information from the
Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 22 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For the next seven days, Iraqi hospital staff treated
Private Lynch's life-threatening wounds, which included
numerous shattered bones. During that time, Marines conducting
operations in the area learned that Private Lynch was being
held at the hospital and that Iraqi forces were using the
hospital as an operations center.\230\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\230\ U.S. Central Command Operational Update Briefing with Major
General Victor Renuart, CENTCOM Director of Operations (Apr. 5, 2003).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Late on the night of April 1, 2003, a U.S. special forces
unit rescued Private Lynch and recovered the remains of nine
U.S. soldiers who had been killed during the earlier battle.
Private Lynch was transported to the Landstuhl Regional Medical
Center in Germany for further treatment.\231\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
B. THE DISSEMINATION OF INACCURATE INFORMATION
On April 1, 2003, immediately after the rescue of Private
Lynch, military officials at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
headquarters in Doha, Qatar, called in members of the media to
announce the success of the mission. CENTCOM's chief spokesman
Jim Wilkinson stated: ``America doesn't leave its heroes
behind. . . . Never has. Never will.'' \232\ He also stated,
``We also have other POWs we are just as worried about. This is
good news today but we need a lot more good news.'' \233\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\ American Troops Rescue Iraq POW Lynch, Associated Press (Apr.
1, 2003).
\233\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The next morning, Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, another
CENTCOM spokesman, gave his daily press briefing. During this
briefing, he showed a four-minute video of the rescue operation
and gave the following narration:
[C]oalition Special Operations forces did stage an
operation last night into the town of An Nasiriya. It
was in the Saddam Hospital in An Nasiriya, a facility
that had been used by the regime as a military post.
We were successful in that operation last night and did
retrieve Pfc. Jessica Lynch, bringing her away from
that location of danger, clearing the building of some
of the military activity that was in there. There was
not a fire-fight inside the building I will tell you,
but there were fire-fights outside of the building
getting in and getting out.
There were no coalition casualties as a result of this
and in the destruction that occurred inside of the
building, particularly in the basement area where the
operations centers had been, we found ammunition,
mortars, maps, a terrain model, and other things that
make it very clear that it was being used as a military
command post.
The nature of the operation was a coalition special
operation that involved Army Rangers, Air Force pilots
and combat controllers, U.S. Marines and Navy Seals. It
was a classical joint operation done by some of our
nation's finest warriors, who are dedicated to never
leaving a comrade behind.\234\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\ U.S. Central Command Operational Update Briefing with
Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, CENTCOM Deputy Director of Operations
(Apr. 2, 2003).
On the same day, April 2, 2003, the Washington Post printed
its first report (``Missing Soldier Rescued; U.S. Forces Remove
POW From Hospital'') on the Lynch rescue. The front page story
was written by Vernon Loeb and Dana Priest, and it provided a
factually accurate account of the rescue. The story's opening
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
paragraph began:
Jessica Lynch, a 19-year-old private first class
missing since the ambush of an Army maintenance company
10 days ago in southern Iraq, has been rescued by
Special Operations forces, defense officials said
yesterday. CIA operatives in Iraq located Lynch in a
hospital near Nasiriyah, where she was being held
because of multiple wounds, officials said, and a
helicopter-borne team of Navy SEALS and Army rangers
rescued her about midnight local time.\235\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\ Missing Soldier Rescued; U.S. Forces Remove POW From
Hospital, Washington Post (Apr. 2, 2003).
The story quoted Mr. Wilkinson, who said of Private Lynch,
``[s]he's safe in coalition hands and happier than where she
was.'' \236\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The April 2 story did not include any details about heroic
actions by Private Lynch. But just one day later the Washington
Post reported sensational new details. The April 3 front page
story (``She Was Fighting to the Death''), written by Susan
Schmidt and Vernon Loeb, began with a vivid battlefield
account:
Pfc. Jessica Lynch, rescued Tuesday from an Iraqi
hospital, fought fiercely and shot several enemy
soldiers after Iraqi forces ambushed the Army's 507th
Ordnance Maintenance Company, firing her weapon until
she ran out of ammunition, U.S. officials said
yesterday. Lynch, a 19-year-old supply clerk, continued
firing at the Iraqis even after she sustained multiple
gunshot wounds and watched several other soldiers in
her unit die around her in the fighting March 23, one
official said.\237\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\ `She Was Fighting to the Death'; Details Emerging of W. Va.
Soldier's Capture and Rescue, Washington Post (Apr. 3, 2003).
The article quoted ``one official'' as saying that at the
time of her capture, Private Lynch ``was fighting to the death.
She did not want to be taken alive.'' \238\ The authors stated
that according to this anonymous official, Private Lynch ``was
also stabbed when Iraqi forces closed in on her position,''
though there was no ``indication'' that Lynch's wounds were
``life-threatening.'' \239\ The article also stated:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\ Id.
\239\ Id.
Several officials cautioned that the precise sequence
of events is still being determined, and that further
information will emerge as Lynch is debriefed. Reports
are thus far based on battlefield intelligence, they
said, which comes from monitored communications from
Iraqi sources in Nasiriyah whose reliability has yet to
be assessed. Pentagon officials said they heard
``rumors' of Lynch's heroics but had no
confirmation.\240\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\ Id.
On the same day, April 3, 2003, the Military Times ran a
similar account with confirmation from Navy Captain Frank
Thorp.\241\ At the time, Captain Thorp was a CENTCOM public
affairs officer stationed at the command's Qatar headquarters.
He subsequently became the top public affairs official for
General Myers and was promoted to Rear Admiral. According to
this report:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\ Remains Found at Iraqi Hospital to be Flown to U.S., Military
Times (Apr. 3, 2003).
Thorp said Lynch ``waged quite a battle prior to her
capture. We do have very strong indications that
Jessica Lynch was not captured very easily,'' he said.
``Reports are that she fired her (M-16 rifle) until she
had no more ammunition.'' \242\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\ Id.
The dramatic story and video of Private Lynch's rescue
dominated the media for the next few days. In the words of one
CENTCOM public affairs official, Lieutenant Colonel John
Robinson, ``It was an awesome story.'' \243\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\ A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation
Reveals Lynch--Still in Hospital After 67 Days--Suffered Bone-crushing
Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington Post (June 17, 2003).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The story of Private Lynch's rescue unfolded during a
difficult time for the White House. An April 3, 2003,
Washington Post story detailed the difficulties the Bush
Administration was having at the time with communications about
the war. The Post reported that the Administration's plan ``did
not allow for strong Iraqi resistance and overestimated the
welcome allied troops would receive.'' \244\ The story also
noted:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\ White House is Revising its War Message; Setbacks Providing
Lessons, Washington Post (Apr. 3, 2003).
After nearly two weeks of discouraging news from Iraq,
the White House viewed yesterday as an excellent
message day. There were new details on the rescue of
prisoner of war Jessica Lynch by U.S. Special
Operations forces.\245\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ Id.
Those new details, however, included an entirely fictional
account of her capture. It is not uncommon for initial
battlefield reports to have factual inaccuracies, since they
are often written in difficult circumstances and under intense
time pressures. Subsequent reports then correct the record. The
opposite was true, though, in Private Lynch's case. The initial
reporting was accurate. It was the subsequent stories that
invented new facts. This unusual situation raised concerns that
the misinformation might be part of a deliberate propaganda
strategy. As New York Times columnist Frank Rich wrote,
``[w]hen American forces were bogged down in the war's early
days, she was the happy harbinger of an imminent military
turnaround: a 19-year-old female Rambo who tried to blast her
way out of the enemy's clutches, taking out any man who got in
her way.'' \246\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\ Pfc. Jessica Lynch Isn't Rambo Anymore, New York Times (Nov.
9, 2003).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In a June 17, 2003, story, the Washington Post disclosed
that Private Lynch did not engage the enemy, was not wounded by
gunshots, and was rescued without significant resistance.
According to the Post, the source of the inaccurate account was
a top-secret battlefield intelligence report that military
officials had quickly leaked to the press without
verifying.\247\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ A Broken Body, a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation
Reveals Lynch--Still in Hospital After 67 Days--Suffered Bone-crushing
Injuries in Crash During Ambush, Washington Post (June 17, 2003). The
military conducted at least two investigations into Private Lynch's
capture and rescue, one by the Army and one by the Defense Department
Inspector General, but neither specifically addressed the dissemination
of false information. Defense Department Office of Inspector General,
Executive Summary: Alleged Premeditated Fabrication and Inappropriate
Conduct of U.S. Military Personnel Involved in the Rescue of Private
First Class Jessica Lynch, U.S. Army (undated); U.S. Army, Attack on
the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March 2003, An Nasiriyah, Iraq
(undated) (online at www.army.mil/features/507thMaintCmpy/
AttackOnThe507MaintCmpy.pdf).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In late 2003, Vernon Loeb, one of the authors of the
erroneous April 3 Post story, stated: ``I don't think we were
spun at all. . . . I don't think the Pentagon ever set out to
make Jessica Lynch a poster child for battlefield heroism.''
\248\ According to an article in the American Journalism
Review, Mr. Loeb and one of his editors at the Post ``say they
have no reason to doubt that their April 3 story accurately
reflected the information contained in those [intelligence]
reports--even if the reports had inaccuracies. `We had multiple
sources because multiple people were reading the same
intelligence reports.' '' \249\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\ Steve Ritea, Jessica Lynch's Story: A Little Too Perfect?
American Journalism Review (Aug./Sept. 2003).
\249\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In May 2004, the Washington Post reported that another U.S.
soldier had been captured and then executed in the same ambush
during which Private Lynch was taken captive. The article noted
that this soldier's mother ``believed the Army had not given
her son credit for actions first attributed to Lynch.'' The
article further explained that the soldier's ``family and
others have said that early reports depicting a blond soldier
bravely fighting off Iraqis may have been mistakenly attributed
to Lynch, possibly because of an erroneous translation of Iraqi
radio transmissions.'' \250\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\250\ Family Learns Iraqis Executed Soldier Captured at Same Time
as Lynch, Washington Post (May 29, 2004).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
C. THE RESPONSE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICIALS
The Committee exchanged e-mails and interviewed now-Admiral
Thorp about his knowledge of the capture and rescue of Private
Lynch. In an April 2007 e-mail to Committee majority staff,
Admiral Thorp described his statements to the Military Times
reporter about Private Lynch. He wrote:
As I recall, this was a short interview and media
desperately wanted me to confirm the story that was
running in the States. . . . I never said that I had
seen any intel or even intimated the same. . . . I may
have said I am familiar with ``the reports'' meaning
the press reports, but as you can see I did not confirm
them. . . . We did have reports of a battle and that a
firefight had occurred. . . . That is what I stated . .
.\251\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\ E-mail from Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication, to Majority Staff, House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee (Apr. 19, 2007) (ellipses in
original).
Five months later, during a transcribed Committee
interview, Admiral Thorp was asked about the same conversation
with the Military Times reporter. At this time, he denied
having any memory of the interaction, stating, ``I do not
recall specifically talking to this reporter about this.''
\252\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of Rear Admiral Frank Thorp, IV, at 69 (Sept. 19, 2007).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
During the interview, Admiral Thorp was asked what his
source was for his statements that Private Lynch ``waged quite
a battle'' and that he had ``strong indications'' that she
``was not captured very easily'' and fired her rifle ``until
she had no more ammunition.'' Admiral Thorp responded that he
could not recall making these statements, but stated that if he
had, he would have gathered the information from ``various
sources.'' \253\ He also said that his statements could have
been ``based on things that I had heard,'' including other
press reports.\254\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ Id. at 73.
\254\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Admiral Thorp explained that in the opening days of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, he regularly confirmed press reports
by citing other press reports. He explained how this process
worked at CENTCOM headquarters in Qatar:
I could give you one anecdote to tell you, to give a
perspective as to what was going on, which was on
numerous occasions I would be standing there watching a
television monitor on CNN reporting from a unit in Iraq
in which a journalist next to me would ask me to
confirm that what we were watching together on TV was
happening, which obviously he had the same knowledge I
did of that live situation on the ground. It would not
be odd for me to then tell another journalist later
that I saw something on CNN. . . . So there were times
where I would say I just saw on CNN a report that boom,
boom, boom. Whether somebody attributed that to me,
that a Navy spokesman said there are reports, that I
have no way of knowing because it was happening so fast
and so furious. But I absolutely felt that in my realm
of responsibility, to share other reports that were
already out, that reporters had made to make sure that
everyone knew.\255\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\255\ Id. at 71.
Admiral Thorp told the Committee that he did not recall
seeing classified battlefield intelligence reports about
Private Lynch, and he said he did not remember if his remarks
were based on such reports.\256\ When asked whether he knew at
the time he spoke to reporters that Private Lynch had not
actually fired any shots, Admiral Thorp replied: ``I would
absolutely never, ever, ever, ever say anything that I knew to
not be true.'' \257\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\ Id. at 75.
\257\ Id. at 76.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Admiral Thorp, the public affairs official who
attended CENTCOM operational briefings was Jim Wilkinson, the
Director of Strategic Communications for CENTCOM commander,
General Tommy Franks.\258\ When the Committee interviewed Mr.
Wilkinson, he said he was not a source for the story and that
he was never familiar with the operational details of Private
Lynch's capture and rescue. He told the Committee: ``I still,
to this day, don't know if those details are right or wrong. I
just don't know. I don't remember seeing any operational
report.'' \259\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ Id. at 73.
\259\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Interview
of James R. Wilkinson, at 58 (Mar. 14, 2008).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Neither Mr. Wilkinson nor Admiral Thorp said they knew the
identity of the ``U.S. officials'' cited in the April 3, 2003,
Washington Post story. Neither could explain why initial news
reports about Private Lynch's capture and rescue were accurate,
and subsequent stories contained significant errors.
IX. OTHER CASES BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION
The Committee's investigation has focused on the
information the Defense Department provided about the two most
famous U.S. soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: Corporal
Tillman and Private Lynch. During the course of the
investigation, however, families and friends of soldiers killed
or injured in the wars contacted the Committee's majority staff
to recount similar experiences in which the Pentagon provided
misleading information about a battlefield casualty.
For example, the family of Specialist Jesse Buryj of
Canton, Ohio, who died in Iraq on May 5, 2004, experienced many
of the same frustrations as the Tillman family. The Army
initially claimed that Specialist Buryj had been killed by the
enemy and posthumously awarded him a Bronze Star for his valor
while guarding a highway checkpoint.\260\ Nine months later,
after several investigations, the family learned his death was
actually a fratricide.\261\ In July 2004, Specialist Buryj's
parents accepted an invitation to meet President Bush at a
campaign rally. They asked him to help them learn the truth
about how their son died. According to the family, the
President agreed to assist.\262\ Specialist Buryj's mother
recalled that after the meeting, her case received more
attention, but the military still did not provide a
satisfactory account of what happened to her son.\263\ A few
months later, a Bush-Cheney campaign official contacted the
family. Rather than offer assistance, the official asked
Specialist Buryj's mother to appear in a campaign commercial
for the President. Mrs. Buryj refused.\264\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\260\ An Army Death, and a Family Left in the Dark, Washington Post
(Jan. 17, 2006).
\261\ Id.
\262\ Id.; House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Majority Staff, Telephone Interview of Peggy Buryj (June 2, 2008).
\263\ NOW, PBS (Nov. 17, 2006) (online at www.pbs.org/now/
transcript/246.html).
\264\ An Army Death, and a Family Left in the Dark, Washington Post
(Jan. 17, 2006).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee's majority staff was also contacted by the
family and friends of Private First Class LaVena Johnson, a
weapons supply manager from Florissant, Missouri, who died,
family members say, in a suspicious non-combat incident near
Balad, Iraq, on July 19, 2005. According to news reports, the
Army ruled the death a suicide, and a medical examiner
concurred with this finding.\265\ But Private Johnson's family
believes Army investigators ignored physical evidence
inconsistent with a finding of suicide. They also believe that
the Army has additional information about the circumstances of
Private Johnson's death that it has not shared with the family.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\ Father Wants Soldier's Death Reinvestigated, Associated Press
(June 4, 2008).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
While the names of these soldiers are not as well-known as
Pat Tillman and Jessica Lynch, their sacrifices were just as
great and their families are just as deserving of the truth.
X. CONCLUSION
The men and women who serve in the military act selflessly
and courageously in defending our country and fighting for
freedom. They are willing to risk serious injury and even death
in fulfilling their responsibilities. And too often their
willingness to sacrifice becomes an actual and irreplaceable
loss for their families and for our country.
Our nation cannot adequately recognize that service, but we
can honor their sacrifice by keeping faith with their trust and
dedication.
That starts by making sure our troops never go to battle
unless it is absolutely necessary. It also means making sure
they have the benefit of the best equipment and intelligence
and the best medical care if they are injured.
Our nation also has an inviolate obligation to share
truthful information with a soldier's family and the American
people should injury or death occur. As Corporal Tillman's
brother, Kevin, told the Committee:
Pat and these other soldiers volunteered to put their
lives on the line for this country. Anything less than
the truth is a betrayal of those values that all
soldiers who have fought for this nation have sought to
uphold.\266\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\ House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Testimony
of Kevin Tillman, Hearing on Misleading Information from the
Battlefield, 110th Cong., at 21 (Apr. 24, 2007) (Serial No. 110-54).
That standard was not met in either Corporal Tillman's or
Private Lynch's cases.
Neither case involved an act of omission. The
misinformation was not caused by overlooking or
misunderstanding relevant facts. Instead, in both cases
affirmative acts created new facts that were significantly
different than what the soldiers in the field knew to be true.
And in both cases the fictional accounts proved to be
compelling public narratives at difficult times in the war.
The fictional version of Private Lynch's circumstances came
when many Americans were first beginning to worry about the
direction of the Iraq war. The heroic efforts of Private Lynch
became, in the words of one CENTCOM officer, ``an awesome
story.''
Specialist Kevin Tillman told the Committee that he
believed the combination of a difficult battle in Fallujah, bad
news about the state of the war, and emerging reports about Abu
Ghraib prison created a motive to fictionalize the details
about his brother's death. Whether he is correct or not, the
public affairs staff of the Army recounted that the death of
Corporal Tillman generated the most media coverage of the Army
``since the end of active combat'' and was ``extremely positive
in all media.''
As the Committee investigated the Tillman and Lynch cases,
it encountered a striking lack of recollection. In Private
Lynch's case, Jim Wilkinson, who was the Director for Strategic
Communications for the CENTCOM Commander and attended CENTCOM
operational briefings, told the Committee he did not know where
the false information originated or who disseminated it.
In Corporal Tillman's case, even after seven Defense
Department investigations, no one has been able to identify the
person who created the false information about enemy fire. At
the top of the chain of command, where the Committee focused
its attention, pertinent questions also remain unanswered. The
White House was intensely interested in the first reports of
Corporal Tillman's death. On April 23, White House officials
sent or received nearly 200 e-mails concerning Corporal
Tillman. In contrast, the White House could not produce a
single e-mail or document relating to any discussion about
Corporal Tillman's death by friendly fire. Not a single written
communication about the personal reactions or the substantive,
political, and public relations implications of the new
information was provided to the Committee.
Despite receiving information from all the top military
leaders in Corporal Tillman chain of command--including
Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, and General Abizaid--the
Committee could not determine if any of the officials had
communicated with President Bush or White House officials about
fratricide in Corporal Tillman's case. The lack of recollection
also prevented the Committee from understanding how information
about Corporal Tillman was handled within the Defense
Department and how the Defense Department and the White House
shared information on this matter.
If the testimony the Committee received is accurate and if
the documents submitted are complete, then the intense interest
that initially characterized the White House's and Defense
Department's reaction to Corporal Tillman's death was followed
by a stunning lack of curiosity about emerging reports of
fratricide and an incomprehensible carelessness and
incompetence in handling this sensitive information.
The pervasive lack of recollection and absence of specific
information makes it impossible for the Committee to assign
responsibility for the misinformation in Corporal Tillman's and
Private Lynch's cases. It is clear, however, that the Defense
Department did not meet its most basic obligations in sharing
accurate information with the families and with the American
public.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. TOM DAVIS
The tragic loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman in Afghanistan
in April 2004 painfully reminds all Americans of the costs of
war. He was a true hero, a role model whose personal sense of
duty drew him from the ranks of elite professional sports to
perilous military service in the barren hills of Afghanistan.
Nothing we say can improve or diminish his shining legacy of
patriotism and self-sacrifice.
What is said about the death of a hero should be said
thoughtfully, carefully, and reverently. Events surrounding the
timeless end of a heroic life should never be shaped or shaded
by either side to fuel the political disputes of the day. This
bipartisan investigation asked whether Pentagon or White House
officials broke that rule by manipulating information to build
public support for an unpopular war. The record before us
contains substantial evidence of inadvertence, misjudgment,
ineptitude, error--and even negligence. But, as the Committee's
report acknowledges, the investigative record is incomplete,
and therefore inconclusive, on the question whether government
officials purposefully delayed or distorted information about
battlefield events. The same rule against political
misinformation argues strongly against the Committee filling
those evidentiary gaps with unsupported inferences and negative
characterizations. However inconvenient or frustrating, the
absence of evidence cannot be used to prove a conclusion the
actual evidence does not sustain.
As much out of disappointment as disagreement, we submit
these Additional Views to supplement and clarify the factual
findings of the Committee Report. This has been a bipartisan
investigation from the outset, and we appreciate the majority
sharing early drafts with us and incorporating our suggestions
into the final report. Nevertheless, we believe it necessary to
state certain matters for the public record separately because
we find the report not always complete and balanced in its
discussion of key questions. What should be a factual summary
gets weighed down by conclusions, inferences and
characterizations not reasonably supported by the investigative
record. The facts deserve an unfettered opportunity to speak
for themselves.
The Committee Report concludes the White House and DoD
displayed ``carelessness and incompetence'' in handling
information about the death and friendly-fire incident. We
agree. Rules and procedures put in place precisely for the
purpose of providing timely and accurate information about
combat deaths were ignored. Those errors, omissions and delays
understandably fueled suspicions senior government officials
knew the actual circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death, but
manipulated the information to avoid bad news. After several
investigations, it now seems clear those officials could have
known friendly fire was suspected. It was a disservice to the
memory of Corporal Tillman, to his family, his unit and this
nation to let the happy myth outrun the unpleasant facts, even
for a day.
But even serial incompetence at the highest levels does not
constitute proof of a conspiracy--intentional distortion of
public statements about both Patrick Tillman and Jessica Lynch.
So the Committee attempts to build a bridge of circumstance--
faded memories and a lack of e-mail traffic--to link the hard
facts of ineptitude to soft speculation that only conscious
manipulation explains otherwise ``incomprehensible'' actions
and a ``stunning lack of curiosity'' about conflicting
battlefield reports.
An objective presentation of the facts makes such
speculation and characterizations unnecessary, even
counterproductive to an accurate historical record. It seems
perfectly comprehensible, even inevitable, that years later
people might not recall the exact moment they obtained specific
information about these events. The Committee concludes
witnesses should have detailed recollection about fleeting
conversations and transactions that stand out from the torrent
of daily activities only in magnified hindsight. We need not
reach conclusions about what government officials should have
known to summarize the factual findings of an extensive
investigation.
It's said the first casualty of war is the truth. We now
know in the fog of war the truth comes under friendly fire as
well. Whether exaggerated accounts of heroism, delayed
acknowledgement of fratricide, or widely published--but utterly
fictional--blogs describing alleged cruelty by U.S. troops,
misinformation from the battlefield corrodes the bond of trust
that defines us as a nation of free men and women.
Corporal Patrick Tillman, like thousands of other brave
Americans, gave his life in service to this nation. His death
was made even more heartbreaking by the fact it was found to
have been caused by fratricide. The U.S. Army's egregious
mishandling of the process meant to ensure complete and timely
notification to families turned this ``friendly fire'' incident
into a prolonged, decidedly unfriendly spectacle of official
malfeasance and miscommunication. As then-Acting Secretary of
the Army Pete Geren conceded, ``We as an Army failed in our
duty to the Tillman family, the duty we owe to all the families
of our fallen soldiers: Give them the truth, the best we know
it, as fast as we can.''
That is our charge as well.
I. THE INVESTIGATION
The Committee's inquiry into the circumstances in which
senior White House and Pentagon officials became aware that
Army Corporal Pat Tillman was a victim of fratricide took more
than fourteen months. In this period, the Committee held two
hearings in which it heard from ten witnesses, including former
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and retired Generals
Richard Myers, John Abizaid, and Bryan Brown. Committee staff
received 50,000 pages of documents from the Pentagon, the White
House, and the Defense Department Inspector General and
reviewed additional documents ``in camera.'' In addition, staff
interviewed 19 witnesses, totaling nearly 29 hours and
producing more than 1,200 pages of transcription.\1\ The
Committee also received supplementary information from three
individuals.\2\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Interview by House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform [hereinafter House Oversight Committee or the Committee] staff
of General John F. Sattler, U.S. Marines, in Washington, D.C. (Jul. 24,
2007) [hereinafter Sattler Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight
Committee staff of Brigadier General Howard W. Yellen, U.S. Army
(Retired), in Washington, D.C. (Jul. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Yellen
Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of General
Bantz Johnson Craddock, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. (Jul. 27, 2007)
[hereinafter Craddock Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight
Committee staff of Admiral Eric T. Olson, U.S. Navy, in Washington,
D.C. (Jul. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Olson Transcript]; Interview by House
Oversight Committee staff of Lieutenant General James Lovelace, U.S.
Army, by telephone (Jul. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Lovelace Transcript];
Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Taylor Gross, former
White House Communications official, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 5, 2007)
[hereinafter Gross Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee
staff of Carol Darby, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army, in Washington,
D.C. (Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Darby Transcript]; Interview by House
Oversight Committee staff of Colonel Hans Bush, U.S. Army, in
Washington, D.C. (Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Bush Transcript];
Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Rear Admiral Frank
Thorp IV, U.S. Navy, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 19, 2007) [hereinafter
Thorp Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of
Colonel Steven P. Bucci, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, in Washington, D.C. (Sep.
20, 2007) [hereinafter Bucci Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight
Committee staff of John Currin, former Director of Fact-Checking,
Office of Presidential Speechwriting, White House, in Washington, D.C.
(Sep. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Currin Transcript]; Interview by House
Oversight Committee staff of Lawrence Di Rita, former director, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, U.S.
Department of Defense, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 24, 2007) [hereinafter
Di Rita Transcript]; Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of
George Rhynedane, IV, former Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, in
Washington, D.C. (Sep. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Rhynedance Transcript];
Interview by House Oversight Committee staff of Hedy Henderson, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, in Washington,
D.C. (Sep. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Henderson Transcript]; Interview of
Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council, by House
Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 20, 2008)
[hereinafter McCormack Transcript] [Note, no contemporaneous transcript
was produced for this interview, however, an unofficial transcript was
created from an audio recording of the interview]; Interview by House
Oversight Committee staff of Lieutenant General Philip Kensinger, Jr.,
U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Kensinger
Transcript]; Interview of James Wilkinson, Strategic Communications,
U.S. Central Command, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Wilkinson Transcript].
\2\ Untranscribed interview of Scott McClellan, White House Press
Secretary, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C.
(Sep. 9, 2007) (Committee staff notes on file) [hereinafter McClellan
Interview]; Untranscribed interview of Michael Gerson, Chief
Speechwriter, White House, by House Oversight Committee Staff, in
Washington, D.C. (Sep. 11, 2007) (Committee staff notes on file)
[hereinafter Gerson Interview]; Untranscribed interview of Dan
Bartlett, Director, White House Communications, by House Oversight
Committee Staff, in Washington, D.C. (Sep. 12, 2007) (Committee staff
notes on file) [hereinafter Bartlett Interview].
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to determine the origins of the Washington
Post story about Jessica Lynch's purported behavior at the time
of her capture, the Committee took testimony from Ms. Lynch and
one of her physicians at a hearing which also examined the
Tillman situation. Staff posed questions to two other persons
in three interviews. In addition, staff evaluated twenty-nine
U.S. Army documents made available to a media outlet pursuant
to a Freedom of Information Act request in an effort to learn
more about the procedural problems which apparently allowed an
Army soldier to report inaccurate details from the battlefield
for The New Republic.
II. SECRETARY RUMSFELD, SENIOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEADERSHIP
A. EXTENT OF SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S INTEREST IN PAT TILLMAN'S ENLISTMENT
AND MILITARY SERVICE
Written material produced by Secretary Rumsfeld between the
time of Corporal Tillman's enlistment and his death provides an
understanding of Secretary Rumsfeld's interest in Corporal
Tillman and his enlistment. Shortly after Corporal Tillman
enlisted, Secretary Rumsfeld distributed a memorandum (known
colloquially as a ``snowflake'') regarding Corporal Tillman to
U.S. Army Secretary, Tom White.\3\ Secretary Rumsfeld also sent
Corporal Tillman a personal note.\4\ After Corporal Tillman's
death, Secretary Rumsfeld signed a condolence letter to
Corporal Tillman's widow.\5\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Defense, to Thomas White, Secretary, U.S. Army (Jun. 25, 2002; 14:39
EDT) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/White Snowflake] (Committee staff notes on
file).
\4\ Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Defense, to Corporal Patrick Tillman (Jun. 28, 2002) [hereinafter
Rumsfeld/Tillman Letter] (Committee staff notes on file).
\5\ Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Defense, to Mrs. Patrick Tillman (May 3, 2004) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/
Condolence Letter] (Committee staff notes on file).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The enlistment of Corporal Tillman and his brother, Kevin
Tillman, in May 2002 was the subject of numerous news reports.
Thereafter, an individual who appears to be a personal
acquaintance of Secretary Rumsfeld sent Secretary Rumsfeld a
note about Corporal Tillman's enlistment, enclosing a related
June 2, 2002 newspaper column.
On June 25, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld forwarded the June 2,
2002 article to Secretary White with a note that stated (in
full):
Here is an article on a fellow who is apparently
joining the Rangers. He sound [sic] like he is world-
class. We might want to keep our eye on him.\6\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Rumsfeld/White Snowflake.
The following day, Secretary Rumsfeld responded to his
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
acquaintance (addressing him by nickname) writing (in full):
Thanks so much for sending along the article from the
Tribune. I had not seen it. You are quite right--this
fellow, Pat Tillman, sounds like a world-class
American.\7\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Defense, to [Acquaintance] [name withheld by Committee staff] (Jan. 26,
2002) (emphasis in the original). Note Secretary Rumsfeld's statement
that ``[he] had not seen [the article regarding Tillman].'' Id.
On June 28, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote to Corporal Tillman,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
saying:
I heard you were leaving the National Football League
to become an Army Ranger. It is a proud and patriotic
thing you are doing.\8\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Rumsfeld/Tillman Letter.
The phraseology and timing of this exchange strongly
implies that Secretary Rumsfeld learned from his acquaintance
and not the Army or Defense Department bureaucracy that a
professional football player, of whom he appears not to have
been previously aware, had enlisted. It also suggests that
Secretary Rumsfeld believed his memorandum to Secretary White
would be the first time the Army's top civilian leader learned
about Corporal Tillman and his service commitment.
Secretary Rumsfeld testified under oath that he did not
intend the comment ``[w]e might want to keep our eye on him''
as a literal instruction.\9\ Rather, it appears that this was
intended as a rhetorical statement. Testimony and other
evidence support this interpretation. For example, the
apparently standard clause ``please respond by'' at the bottom
of Secretary Rumsfeld's memorandum was crossed out, as if to
suggest no reply was expected.\10\ Also, the Committee received
no documents or testimony that indicated that Corporal
Tillman's activities were, in fact, monitored in any way by
Secretary Rumsfeld or other Department of Defense or White
House officials. In fact, the Committee received testimony that
indicated the opposite: Secretary Rumsfeld was not keeping
track of Corporal Tillman.\11\ Finally, there is no indication
that Secretary Rumsfeld ever noted or was concerned by the fact
that no follow-up information was ever conveyed to him, lending
strong credence to the suggestions that Secretary Rumsfeld did
not expect any.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The Tillman Fratricide: What the Leadership of the Defense
Department Knew before the House Oversight Committee, 110th Cong. (Aug.
2, 2007) [hereinafter Tillman Hearing II], at Tr. 107-08 (referring to
Rumsfeld/White Snowflake).
\10\ Rumsfeld/White Snowflake.
\11\ See, e.g., Craddock Transcript at Tr. 47-48 (Q: ``Do you have
any knowledge of the fact that the Secretary--either Secretary of the
Army or Secretary of the Defense kept an eye on [Corporal Tillman]
after his enlistment?'' A: ``Not that I'm aware of. Again, if that
happened, it happened before I got there. Nothing was left to me by my
predecessor, stay on top of this, watch this or be aware of this.);
Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 49-50 (Q: ``When you arrived in your
position as Army Staff Director, did you get the impression at any time
that, in fact, Army leadership was, quote, keeping an eye on Tillman?''
A: ``No.'' Q: ``You didn't get correspondence about him, memos about
him, phone calls about him?'' A: ``No.''); Di Rita Transcript at Tr. 39
(Q: ``Okay. Based on your close working relationship with Secretary
Rumsfeld, what did he mean when he said, We might want to keep our eye
on him?'' A: ``I think he was making a point that this is somebody who
has done something of a very high-profile nature, and that is
impressive, and we ought to recognize that somewhere along the way, we
appreciate this kind of commitment to public service. I would imagine
that is the extent of his intent there.'' Q: ``Were there times later
in Corporal Tillman's service where he turned to you and said, How is
this Tillman guy doing?'' A: `` I don't remember him ever doing that.''
Q: ``Check up on Tillman?'' A: ``Yeah, it would have been unlike him,
but that is not to say it wouldn't have happened. I just don't remember
that.'' Q: ``How common was it for Secretary Rumsfeld to single out a
soldier like this on a snowflake or in a communication with the
Secretary?'' A: ``Let me just step back on that. It was very common of
Secretary Rumsfeld to see something in the paper and comment on it by
saying --by shooting a note to somebody and saying, This is
interesting. Could I get more information? Or did you see this? I find
this something worth following up on. Or something like that. So that
was not uncommon. So he was -- he didn't read the papers cover to cover
every day, but he was generally aware of what was happening in areas
involving the Department of Defense. So as much attention as this would
almost certainly have gotten when Pat Tillman joined, it is not
surprising that he would have seen it and said, Wow, that's
interesting.''); Di Rita Transcript at Tr. 76-78 (A: ``And in this
case, this was primarily an outgoing -- it is a bit of the way Rumsfeld
operated: ``Hey, let's just keep an eye on that fellow; that's
interesting.'' But it wasn't like he was asking for a report back or
anticipating something.'' Q: ``You don't think he was -'' A: ``I would
tend to doubt it. I'm looking at that the way -- the person who
transcribed the Dictaphone kind of drew the same conclusion. I mean,
she just decided not to put a date [by which a response was required]
on there, because it's not the kind of thing where a deadline really
applies.'' Q: ``Am I correct that you said in your testimony that you
don't recall seeing a report come back?'' A: ``I don't recall anything
coming back. From Secretary White?'' Q: ``Correct.'' A: ``Yeah, no, I
don't recall anything.'' Q: ``How about from anyone else?'' A: ``I
don't recall. I don't recall.'').
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, in testimony received by the Committee, no one
(including his closest assistants) recalled Secretary Rumsfeld
referring to Corporal Tillman between his June 28, 2002 letter
to Corporal Tillman and the time of Corporal Tillman's death in
2004.\12\ Secretary Rumsfeld's senior military assistant told
the Committee that, in light of the press of business in
Secretary Rumsfeld's office, he did not ever discuss Corporal
Tillman with Secretary Rumsfeld even upon Corporal Tillman's
death.\13\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See, e.g., Bucci Transcript at Tr. 29; Craddock Transcript at
Tr. 17.
\13\ Craddock Transcript at Tr. 24, 28-29 (Q: ``Wasn't [the news of
Corporal Tillman's death] a hot one on April 23rd, you know, when every
newspaper and television station in America was, you know, talking
about it?'' A: ``[] I can't tell you that it was a hot one and
everything came to a stop and we focused on Pat Tillman. I apologize
for that. It is bad, but that's not the way I recall it. [] But, I've
got to tell you, I don't recall that everything came to a screeching
halt to deal with this.''). Craddock believed he learned of Corporal
Tillman's death ``on the news.'' Craddock Transcript at Tr. 19-21.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 29, 2004, one week after Corporal Tillman's death,
an executive secretary in Secretary Rumsfeld's office drafted a
condolence letter for Corporal Tillman's widow. The executive
secretary apparently used a brief Pentagon statement issued on
the day after Corporal Tillman was killed to prepare this
condolence letter.\14\ Secretary Rumsfeld signed the condolence
letter dated May 3, 2004. There seems to be nothing
extraordinary about the way it was drafted and promulgated; the
Committee received testimony that Secretary Rumsfeld signed
similar communications to families of all those killed in
action.\15\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ E-mail from Monica Generous, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Executive Services, U.S. Department of Defense, to various
(Apr. 29, 2004; 15:34 EDT) (bates no. 1871).
\15\ See Craddock Transcript at Tr. 48-49; Di Rita Transcript at
Tr. 58-59, 85, 89-90.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
B. SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE AS A CAUSE OF CORPORAL
TILLMAN'S DEATH
Secretary Rumsfeld also testified under oath before the
Committee that he never instructed anyone to withhold
information about the finding that Corporal Tillman's death
resulted from fratricide and that he was not aware of (nor was
he a party to) any related ``cover-up.'' \16\ He testified that
he had neither foreknowledge of the Correspondents Dinner
speech in which the President referenced Corporal Tillman nor
any discussions with the White House about the circumstances of
Corporal Tillman's death prior to such details becoming
public.\17\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 55, 72, 152, 100.
\17\ Id. at Tr. 30-31, 64, 98. See also Letter from Donald
Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense, to Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, and Tom
Davis, Ranking Member, House Oversight and Government Reform Committee,
(Jul. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Rumsfeld/Committee Letter].
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Committee that he
did not remember when or how he learned that fratricide was the
suspected cause of Corporal Tillman's death.\18\ From the
testimony and evidence provided to the Committee, it is
possible to identify a period in which these details were
probably conveyed to him.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 30, 157. Secretary Rumsfeld also
told the Committee that he was not disturbed by the timing or method of
his notification. Id. at Tr. 104.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In testimony before this Committee, Secretary Rumsfeld
repeated the statement he had made previously in letters to
Chairman Waxman, Ranking Member Davis, and to the DoD Inspector
General (DoD IG), namely: ``I am told I received word of this
development [i.e., the suspicion of fratricide] after May 20,
2004.'' \19\ According to Secretary Rumsfeld, he was able to
proffer a date because, in responding to questions from the DoD
IG on this matter on December 15, 2006,\20\ an aide consulted
others to determine if they remembered circumstances Secretary
Rumsfeld did not.\21\ One aide, Colonel Steven Bucci,
apparently recalled details of Secretary Rumsfeld's
notification and was able to determine the period in which this
occurred.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Id. at Tr. 15-16.
\20\ Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Defense, to Thomas Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Defense (Dec. 15, 2006).
\21\ Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 32-34, 125-7. See also Bucci
Transcript at Tr. 40-41; Craddock Transcript at Tr. 38-39.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Committee took sworn testimony from Colonel Bucci.
Colonel Bucci testified that, in the course of his normal
duties in Secretary Rumsfeld's office between May 24 and May
28, 2004, he received a phone call from one of the military
assistants in the Army.\22\ From this call, Colonel Bucci
learned that an investigation into Corporal Tillman's death had
been undertaken and that this inquiry had determined that
fratricide was the likely cause of death.\23\ Colonel Bucci
further testified the caller suggested that this information be
conveyed to Secretary Rumsfeld, which Colonel Bucci did ``about
15 minutes'' later at a regularly-scheduled morning
meeting.\24\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Bucci Transcript at Tr. 31 (``[] I got a phone call in the
morning there at the office from one of the military assistants in the
Army. And I can't remember whether it was the Chief of Staff's
executive assistant or Secretary of Army's military assistant who
called me.'').
\23\ Id. at Tr. 31-32.
\24\ Id. (``[] I got a phone call in the morning there at the
office from one of the military assistants in the Army. And I can't
remember whether it was the Chief of Staff's executive assistant or
Secretary of Army's military assistant who called me. And they said,
hey, you need to let the Secretary know. We're pretty sure that this
may have actually been a fratricide event, and you need to let the
Secretary know.'').
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Colonel Bucci testified he believed this was the first
Secretary Rumsfeld learned that friendly fire was being
considered as a cause of Corporal Tillman's death.\25\ Colonel
Bucci testified that Secretary Rumsfeld responded to the news
by saying [something to the effect of] ``Oh, gosh, that's a
shame. Well, they need to settle it and get the word out as
quickly as possible.'' \26\ Colonel Bucci testified that he was
able to determine the date range in which these events
transpired because he returned from six months of duty in Iraq
on May 20, 2004, but did not report to work in Secretary
Rumsfeld's office until May 24, 2004. Assuming this information
is correct, Colonel Bucci received the call from the military
assistant before a daily morning briefing sometime in that
five-day period between May 24 and May 28, 2004.\27\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Id. at Tr. 32.
\26\ Id. at Tr. 31-32. For a description of the timing and
attendance at morning ``stand up[]'' meetings, see Bucci Transcript at
Tr. 11.
\27\ Id. at Tr. 39, 33.
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Additional details add further credence to the timing and
substance of Colonel Bucci's account. According to the DoD IG,
on May 25, 2004, Army Maj. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the
commander of the Joint Task Force to which Corporal Tillman was
assigned, approved the investigative report of Corporal
Tillman's death and conveyed it to U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM).\28\ The director of the Army staff, Lt. Gen. James
J. Lovelace, testified before the Committee that he was
informed of the investigation and its findings (namely, that
``[Corporal] Tillman's death was the result of fratricide'') by
both Lt. Gen. Philip Kensinger and the Army Operations Center
``on or about'' May 27, 2004.\29\ Inasmuch as this is two days
after Gen. McChrystal's approval and in the period CENTCOM was
considering the report, it is logical for Lt. Gen. Lovelace to
have been notified at this time.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick
Tillman, U.S. Army, Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Defense (Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter DoD IG Report]
(unnumbered appendix). On May 28, 2004, Marine Maj. Gen. John Sattler,
the CENTCOM director of operations, approved the AR 15-6 report, in the
absence of Gen. John Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander. See DoD IG Report
(unnumbered appendix). See also Sattler Transcript at Tr. 42-43, 46-51,
54-56.
\29\ Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 20, 21, 35-36, 57. For findings,
see DoD IG Report at 29.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Lt. Gen. Lovelace said that it was also on May 27, 2004,
that he called Lawrence Di Rita, at that time the director of
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs, with this news and took steps to have Gen. Bantz
Craddock (Colonel Bucci's supervisor), and assistants to the
Army Secretary and to the Army Chief and Vice Chief of Staff
receive this information by e-mail.\30\ Thus, it seems possible
that it was Lt. Gen. Lovelace's communications which resulted
in the call Colonel Bucci remembers receiving.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 23-27, 55-56, 58. Lt. Gen. Lovelace
was interviewed telephonically by Committee staff. During the call, Lt.
Gen. Lovelace had in his possession an e-mail showing when and how he
notified the others. This e-mail informed his recollection of the
matter. See Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 22-23. Additionally, with one
exception, Lt. Gen. Lovelace stated he believed the principals to each
aide learned about the fratricide investigation as a result of his e-
mail. Lt. Gen. Lovelace appears to have agreed with the question posed
by Committee staff that ``[Y] ou have no knowledge of when the
Secretary himself might have [learned].'' Id. at Tr. 27. However, this
is confused somewhat by a mischaracterization by Majority interviewers
of ``May 20 [2004]'' as a date certain that ``[Secretary Rumsfeld]
learned that Corporal Tillman's death was a suspected fratricide.'' Id.
Secretary Rumsfeld stipulated that he had been told he was informed
``after May 20, [2004].'' Rumsfeld/Committee Letter (emphasis added).
See also Di Rita Trancript at Tr. 44 for his recollection that he
recalled learning of the fratricide ``shortly before it was publicly
announced, I would imagine, because I remember being involved in some
of the discussions about how it would be announced. But I don't
remember when that was.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Gen. Craddock, Secretary Rumsfeld's senior military aide,
testified he learned about the possibility of fratricide from
Lt. Gen. Lovelace in person. Gen. Craddock recalls seeing Lt.
Gen. Lovelace in the yard separating their homes \31\ and
remarking that ``[Corporal] Tillman may have been killed by
friendly fire.'' \32\ Gen. Craddock said he was ``surprised and
taken aback'' by this information.\33\ Although Lt. Gen.
Lovelace testified he did not recall this conversation, because
he claims to have found out about the friendly fire ``on or
about May 27'' and the backyard exchange had to have occurred
before Lt. Gen. Lovelace had an e-mail sent on this topic on
May 27, the two generals probably encountered each other on or
just before May 26.\34\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Both generals at the time lived in military housing, and their
yards shared a fence. See Craddock Transcript at Tr. 19.
\32\ Id. at Tr. 19.
\33\ Id. at Tr. 27, 29. Gen. Craddock also testified that, after
learning of the fratricide from Lt. Gen. Lovelace, he never raised the
issue with Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen. Myers, or Gen. Peter Pace, the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
\34\ Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 20-21, 23-25, 55-56.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, when Gen. Craddock was asked by Committee
staff: ``[D]id you ever get a report or ever hear that an
investigation was going on into [Corporal Tillman's death],''
Gen. Craddock replied, ``I do recall [that it was] being
investigated'' \35\ and said he ``probably'' learned of this
from the Chairman or Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
or the Department's General Counsel in the course of the
notification being provided to Secretary Rumsfeld.\36\ Gen.
Craddock's encounter with Lt. Gen. Lovelace likely preceded
Gen. Craddock's learning about the investigation, otherwise
Gen. Craddock would not have been ``surprised'' upon hearing of
the possibility of fratricide in the death of Corporal Tillman.
Assuming the recollections of Gen. Craddock and Lt. Gen.
Lovelace are correct, Gen. Craddock likely learned of the
investigation May 27 or May 28.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Craddock Transcript at Tr. 32-33.
\36\ Id. at Tr. 32-34.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The recollections of Gen. Craddock and others are
consistent with Colonel Bucci's description and add further
credence to the timing and substance of Colonel Bucci's
account. However, these specifics do not prove whether Colonel
Bucci's report to Secretary Rumsfeld was, in fact, the first
Secretary Rumsfeld learned of the possibility of fratricide as
the cause of Corporal Tillman's death.
CENTCOM commander, U.S. Army Gen. John P. Abizaid,
testified before the Committee about his interaction with
Secretary Rumsfeld in May 2004. Gen. Abizaid said, ``I was in
Washington from the 18th to the 20th [of May 2004] and I talked
with [Secretary Rumsfeld] during that period, and I believe
during that period I discussed with him the fratricide
investigation.'' \37\ In a December 2006 colloquy with the DoD
IG, however, about ``what if any action you took after
receiving the information that friendly fire was suspected,''
Gen. Abizaid was asked, ``[d]id you have any discussions with
[] the Secretary of Defense,'' to which Gen. Abizaid answered,
``No. I didn't talk to the Secretary of defense about it.''
\38\ The Committee is unable to reconcile these statements.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 76. See also id. at Tr. 26.
\38\ Interview by DOD IG staff of Gen. John P. Abizaid, then-U.S.
CENTCOM Commander (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Abizaid IG Transcript],
at Tr. 7, 9. There is further uncertainty about this matter. According
to Gen. Abizaid, his only knowledge of the possibility of fratricide as
the cause of Corporal Tillman's death derived from an Army
communication known as a P4 (discussed further in text below). See
Letter from Gen. (Ret.) John P. Abizaid, former U.S. CENTCOM Commander,
to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Oversight and Government Refrom
Committee, and Tom Davis, Ranking Member, House Oversight and
Government Reform Committee (Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter Abizaid/
Committee Letter]. However, the IG determined Gen. Abizaid received
this P4 sometime between May 6 and May 20, 2004 (See DoD IG Report
(unnumbered appendix)). Assuming the accuracy of Gen. Abizaid's
recollection that he received the P4 before meeting with Secretary
Rumsfeld, it appears either Gen. Abizaid misremembers the date of his
meeting (and it actually occurred later than he remembers), or the DoD
IG erred in concluding Gen. Abizaid could have received the P4 as late
as May 18, 2004 or thereafter. It is not possible to reconcile both
possibilities.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
No individual who gave testimony to the Committee provided
support to Gen. Abizaid's recollection of talking with
Secretary Rumsfeld between May 18 and May 20, 2004, about the
possibility of Corporal Tillman's death being a fratricide. No
one recalled this exchange nor said that Secretary Rumsfeld
commented upon it. In addition, if Secretary Rumsfeld had been
informed during this period, there is no evidence that he
ordered any action to be taken as a result.
The Committee received testimony and documents that public
affairs officials at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command
(USASOC) were among those individuals informed on May 27, 2004,
that an investigation into Corporal Tillman's death was about
to be approved by CENTCOM. Consequently, these officials,
working with Di Rita, began preparations for notifying Congress
and the media.\39\ Gen. Abizaid's possible notification of
Secretary Rumsfeld would have come just as the friendly fire
investigation was about to formally conclude and preparations
for announcing the findings were about to begin. It is not
clear what instructions Secretary Rumsfeld could have issued at
that time even if he had wanted to do so.\40\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Bush Transcript at Tr. 53-54, 81-84. See also E-mail from Lt.
Col. Hans Bush, U.S. Army, to various (Jun. 2, 2004; 10:17 EDT) (bates
nos. 2250-2905 to 2250-2906). For description of the routine
circumstances of this e-mail, see, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 66-67,
79-81, 90. For Di Rita's description of his involvement, see Di Rita
Transcript at Tr. 63-76.
\40\ See, e.g., Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 33.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Based upon documentary evidence provided to the Committee,
as well as interviews and testimony, the most senior officials
at the Pentagon seem not to have been preoccupied by the news
of Corporal Tillman's death, aware of the breadth of related
media coverage, inquisitive about the ensuing investigation, or
cognizant of the existence or application of Army next-of-kin
regulations.\41\ In addition, to the extent senior officers at
the Pentagon and others were aware of impressions held by the
public relating to the circumstances of Corporal Tillman's
death, it is not at all apparent they understood that such
impressions were being derived from actions (or inaction)
ascribed to the DoD, and hence ostensibly subject to corrective
action by DoD. This situation is further complicated by DoD's
persistent deference to the military's hierarchical environment
and delineated lines of authority in which responsibility for
handling Army battle deaths rested only with certain
individuals and institutions.\42\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Id. at Tr. 47-48 (statement by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Defense). See also Craddock Transcript at Tr. 37-38.
\42\ See, e.g., Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 70-72, 113-114, 147-149.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, as outlined above, it seems Pentagon officials
initiated arrangements to announce the friendly fire findings
as soon as they received word that the investigation was
concluding. The DoD IG concluded that Kevin Tillman, Corporal
Tillman's brother, was informed of the fratricide finding on
May 26, 2004.\43\ The IG concluded that Corporal Tillman's
wife, Marie Tillman, was notified the next day.\44\ The
Committee took testimony from several witnesses who suggested
the timeline for Marie Tillman's notification was spurred by
the fact that media inquires were being made about the friendly
fire results even before Lt. Gen. Philip Kensinger's public
announcement.\45\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See DoD IG Report (unnumbered appendix).
\44\ Id. at 44.
\45\ See, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 58.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
III. THE WHITE HOUSE
A. INITIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF DEATH
The Army Special Operations Command communicated word of
Corporal Tillman's death to the Army Human Resources Command in
Alexandria, Virginia at 4:28 p.m. on April 22, 2004.\46\ As
outlined in the DoD IG's report, because of erroneous details
provided by the Army medical facility which received Corporal
Tillman's body, the form which transmitted the details of death
indicated ``hostile'' fire from ``enemy forces'' as the cause
of death.\47\ There is no evidence that senior Defense or White
House officials were aware of this report.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ E-mail from SFC Darien Swilley, USA SOC, to various (Apr. 22,
2004; 16:28 EDT).
\47\ DOD IG Report at 42-43.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence gathered by the Committee, including e-mails and
interviews conducted by Committee staff demonstrate that White
House staffers learned about Corporal Tillman's death from
television news reports or from individuals who had received
information from these sources.\48\ As a result of news
coverage, a number of White House employees, friends, family
members, and colleagues sent e-mail to advise of the tragedy
and to express their own personal shock and remorse.\49\ That
day and later, some individuals provided unsolicited
suggestions for White House action or sought more information
from their contacts there.\50\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See, e.g., Currin Transcript at Tr. 17; Gross Transcript at
Tr. 8, 39-40. Further, McClellan stated that he learned from Gross.
McClellan Interview.
\49\ See, e.g., E-mail from Ron Fournier, Reporter, Associated
Press, to Karl Rove, Political Advisor, White House (Apr. 23, 2004;
11:45 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-00684); E-mail from Peter H. Wehner,
Director, Strategic Initiatives, White House, to various (White House
official appears to have been blind carbon copied) (Apr. 23, 2004;
11:44 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01040).
\50\ See, e.g., E-mail from Steve Cardona to Michael Gerson, Chief
Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 25, 2004; 16:35 EDT) (bates HOGR004-
00976 to -0977); E-mail from Barry S. Jackson, Deputy Political
Advisor, White House, to Karl Rove, Political Advisor, White House
(Apr. 23, 2004; 17:05 EDT) (bates HOGR004-01120); E-mail from Peggy
Noonan to Peter H. Wehner (Apr. 23, 2004; 12:47 EDT) (bates no.
HOGR004-00560).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The White House produced nearly 200 pages of e-mails
referencing Corporal Tillman in response to the Committee's
subpoena. It is difficult to argue, however, that the large
number of e-mails somehow reflects a particular interest on the
part of White House staffers in the matter of Corporal
Tillman's death. In fact, a large percentage of this computer
traffic consists of messages to and from White House employees
(many very junior) and friends or family in which the parties
mention Corporal Tillman's death and express sympathy. In some
instances, the chains continue at great length and diverge into
a myriad of unrelated private topics. Because the Committee's
subpoena required the entirety of such exchanges be produced,
this had the affect of inflating the volume of material
provided to the Committee and providing a distorted impression
of official White House interest beyond that reported herein.
Taylor Gross, a spokesman in the White House Media Affairs
office, who was responsible for media outlets and issues in the
South and Southwestern U.S., told the Committee that he learned
from a cable television news broadcast at approximately 10:00
am on April 23, 2004 that Corporal Tillman had been killed.\51\
Shortly thereafter, Gross had started to receive a number of
inquiries from Arizona journalists about ``what the President
thinks about Pat Tillman's death.'' \52\ The interest of
Arizona media stemmed from the fact that Corporal Tillman had
played college and professional football in Arizona. At 11:40
am, Gross, on his own initiative, drafted remarks which he
proposed to distribute to reporters in response to such
queries, and then sought approval from his supervisors,
including White House Communications Director Dan Bartlett and
White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, for the comments
he had prepared.\53\ Specifically, Gross proposed replying to
these media inquiries by saying:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Gross Transcript at Tr. 8, 39-40.
\52\ Id. at Tr. 41.
\53\ Gross Transcript at Tr. 49-50.
Pat Tillman was an inspiration on the football field
and in his private life. As with all who made the
ultimate sacrifice in the war on terror, his family are
in the thoughts and prayers of President and Mrs.
Bush.\54\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications
Director, to Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, and
Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (among others) (Apr. 23,
2004; 11:55 EDT) (bates HOGR004-01083) (responding to E-mail from
Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to Daniel Bartlett,
White House Communications Director, and Scott McClellan, White House
Press Secretary, (among others) (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:55 EDT)).
Five minutes later, Bartlett wrote McClellan, ``does this set a
precedent? i'm fine with it.'' \55\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications
Director, to Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23,
2004; 11:45 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01084).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In this period, Bartlett also received an e-mail from
Matthew Dowd, a Bush campaign official who suggested (using an
abbreviation for the President of the United States,) that
Potus should call his family or go to Arizona [. . . .]
True hero.\56\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications
Director, to Matthew Dowd, Bush Campaign Official (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:53
EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01704) (responding to E-mail from Matthew Dowd,
Bush Campaign Official, to Daniel J. Bartlett, White House
Communications Director (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:50 EDT)).
Bartlett responded at 11:53 am and, in doing so, conveyed the
concerns he was apparently contemplating in considering Gross'
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
proposal. ``. . . I agree he is a hero,'' Bartlett wrote,
But there will be a lot of pressure not to single out
one guy just because he was a football player. We are
providing a statement to the AZ press, but we will have
to discuss anything broader.\57\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
McClellan responded to Gross' suggestion similarly:
[I t]hink it is fine to respond if asked, as long as we
always keep in context of president mourns loss of all
those who have sacrificed to make America safer.\58\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to
Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director (Apr. 23, 2004;
11:54 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01091); see also McClellan Interview.
Senior advisors on the Presidential campaign agreed. Mark McKinnon,
Media Advisor, Bush Campaign, wrote to Bartlett: ``[I r]ealize
President really shouldn't do anything that he hasn't done for any
other solider killed in the military, but certainly think he could say
something about he exemplified the ultimate in humility, heroism, and
sacrifice.'' E-mail from Mark McKinnon, Media Advisor, Bush Campaign,
to Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications Director (Apr. 23,
2004; 13:01 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01099).
With agreement apparently at hand, Bartlett e-mailed Gross:
``good to go.'' \59\ With this approval, Gross replied to press
queries from his region with the two-sentence script.\60\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ E-mail from Daniel J. Bartlett, White House Communications
Director, to Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, and
Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (among others) (Apr. 23,
2004; 11:55 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01083) (responding to E-mail from
Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to Daniel Bartlett,
White House Communications Director, and Scott McClellan, White House
Press Secretary (among others) (Apr. 23, 2004; 11:55 EDT)).
\60\ Gross Transcript at Tr. 79.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on staff interviews and e-mails, it seems White House
officials specifically rejected other options when deciding to
proceed in this manner. One alternative was to offer comments
on the matter without waiting to receive press inquiries.
Another possibility was to issue a Presidential ``statement''
remarks intended to be directly attributed to the chief
executive. While these alternatives may seem to differ little
from the chosen course of action, the distinctions were
significant to the White House press office as it wrestled with
the issue. The press officials sought to acknowledge the
tragedy of Corporal Tillman's death, but in a manner which did
not slight others. White House staffers believed their approach
(a relatively junior employee responding only when asked)
properly balanced these competing demands.\61\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Id. at Tr. 60-62, 86-87. See also Bartlett Interview;
McClellan Interview.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, it was not possible to determine how and when the
President learned that Corporal Tillman had been killed.\62\
However, the President was out of Washington on April 23, 2004;
the deputy press secretary traveling with him forwarded
inquiries about Corporal Tillman to colleagues in the White
House.\63\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Gross told the Committee he never talked to the President
about Corporal Tillman on the day the soldier was killed or otherwise.
Gross Transcript at Tr. 113. In responding to an e-mail about Corporal
Tillman's death from a friend, Gross wrote ``[d]on't know if you saw my
quote about this in the AZ Republic web site, but obviously the
President was notified and the White House mourns his loss.'' E-mail
from Taylor Gross, Spokesman, White House Media Affairs, to [name
withheld by Committee staff] (Apr. 23, 2004; 19:07 EDT) (bates no.
HOGR004-00234 to 00236). Gross also told Committee staff that he
actually had no knowledge of the President's notification. Gross
Transcript at Tr. 111-113. It is possible Gross meant to imply
otherwise in order to impress a friend.
\63\ E-mail from Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary,
to Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004;
15:15 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01080). See also McClellan Interview.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In Washington, however, soon after Gross acted upon
Bartlett's instructions, two problems became apparent. First,
once Gross provided his remarks to the Arizona media, some
outlets elsewhere repeated his comments, but inaccurately
described them as a ``statement'' from the President.\64\
Because officials had specifically sought to avoid this
situation, this mischaracterization caused confusion and angst
in the White House. ``[Dan Bartlett] approved a comment from
taylor gross for the Arizona papers,'' one staffer explained
with apparent exasperation, yet ``our wires are asking what the
white house statement was.'' \65\ ``[W]e are not putting out a
statement, we are responding if asked,'' explained
McClellan.\66\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ See, e.g., E-mail from Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press
Secretary, to Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary (Apr.
23, 2004; 15:15 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01080); E-mail from Claire
Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack,
Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:07 EDT) (bates
no. HOGR004-01107); E-mail from Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White
House Communications, to Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary
(Apr. 23, 2004 16:31) (bates no. HOGR004-01110).
\65\ E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary,
to Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (among others) (Apr.
23, 2004; 12:40 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01109) (emphasis in original).
\66\ E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to
Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, Trent Duffy, Deputy
White House Press Secretary, and Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National
Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 13:37 EDT) (Committee staff notes from
in camera review).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Media reports of the White House reaction confused even
those who worked there. A White House speechwriter, employed in
the office charged with authoring Presidential statements, was
perplexed by the coverage.\67\ ``Did we issue a `statement of
sympathy' on Tillman's death?'' he asked a colleague, ``So says
MSNBC.'' \68\ Another befuddled staffer queried McClellan that
afternoon, ``Did we put out a statement as MSNBC said[?]'' \69\
``No-ap reported it that way,'' McClellan responded. He added,
``[w]e should correct msnbc too.'' \70\ Later that evening,
McClellan instructed Gross and the individual in charge of
Media Affairs, ``let's make sure we correct if people r [sic]
saying we put out a statement.'' \71\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Gross Transcript at Tr. 84-86; Currin Transcript at Tr. 8, 14-
15.
\68\ E-mail from Noam Neusner, White House, Speechwriter, to Erin
Healy, White House staff (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:50) (Committee staff notes
from in camera review).
\69\ E-mail from Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House
Communications, to Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr.
23, 2004 16:31) (bates no. HOGR004-01110).
\70\ E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to
Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House Communications (Apr. 23,
2004; 19:10 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01122).
\71\ E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to
Jeanie Mamo, Director, Media Affairs, White House, and Taylor Gross,
Spokesman, White House Media Affairs (Apr. 23, 2004; 19:21 EDT) (bates
no. HOGR004-01124).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The second problem became apparent when the White House
press office learned that the Defense Department had not yet
officially confirmed the fact that Corporal Tillman had been
killed. This meant that the White House was in the awkward
position of commenting upon a wartime death before the Pentagon
had announced it. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act,
which became law in November 2003, contained a provision
prohibiting DoD from releasing the names of casualties until
twenty-four hours after next-of-kin had been notified. The
legislation was meant to prevent the possibility of family
members learning of a death from news accounts. By ensuring
that relatives will not be contacted by the media immediately
upon notification, the provision also ensures that survivors
have time to consider how to respond.
Unfortunately, because the media were running stories about
Corporal Tillman's death even in the absence of official
confirmation, the law's goals were stymied even before the
White House elected to respond to inquiries on the matter.
Significantly, however, White House officials denied knowing of
the legislation.\72\ This may be because in the seven months
between its enactment and Corporal Tillman's death, the White
House had not been queried about a specific wartime death, and
thus, there had been little cause for White House employees to
know of a prohibition on Pentagon actions. There is no evidence
the White House intentionally acted in contravention of this
provision.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ See, e.g., Gross Transcript at Tr. 68-70; McClellan Interview;
Bartlett Interview.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
It seems that White House and DoD officials did not
communicate about the Corporal Tillman case until after Gross
began to reply to inquires.\73\ As a result, Claire Buchan, one
of two White House deputy press secretaries, somehow learned
that the Pentagon had not yet announced Corporal Tillman's
death. At 12:54 pm (fifty-nine minutes after approval had been
given to Gross), Buchan sent an e-mail to McClellan. The e-mail
was captioned ``alert--do not use tillman statement,'' the text
said, in part, ``dod is not confirming that he is dead,'' but
conceded, ``unfortunately, taylor's statement is on the wire.''
\74\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Gross had no knowledge whatsoever of any communications
between DoD and the White House. Gross Transcript at Tr. 45.
\74\ E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary,
to Trent Duffy, Deputy White House Press Secretary, and Scott
McClellan, White House Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2004; 12:54 EDT)
(bates no. HOGR004-01108). This e-mail also reports ``next of kin still
being notified.'' Id. (NB: This was erroneous; by this time Corporal
Tillman's parents and widow had been informed.)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Apparently seeking details of what she thought was an
imminently forthcoming Defense Department release, Buchan then
inquired of Sean McCormack, the National Security Council's
spokesman, ``can you bug your friend at dod[?]'' \75\
Presumably speaking of Pentagon officials, McCormack replied,
``not confirming yet;'' \76\ and he added, ``this will soon
become a problem.'' \77\ Buchan responded
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary,
to Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004;
16:07 EDT) (bates no. HOGR0004-01107) (including E-mail from Claire
Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary, to Sean McCormack,
Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr. 23, 2004; 16:00 EDT)).
\76\ Id. (including E-mail from Sean McCormack, Spokesman, National
Security Council, to Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary
(Apr. 23, 2004; 16:06 EDT)).
\77\ Id.
trust me. it is already. i have everyone and their
brother bugging me for `the statement.' can they give
you any sense of timing? \78\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Id. Buchan continued, ``are you anticipating a bigger problem
than just managing this?'' Id.
In fact, the Pentagon release was not issued until 11:15 pm;
about ten hours later. As required, this was twenty-four hours
after Corporal Tillman's family was informed of his death.\79\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ E-mail from Shari Lawrence, Deputy Public Affairs Officer,
U.S. Army Human Resources Command, to various (Apr. 23, 2004; 15:59
EDT) (bates no. 200-205) (forwarding death notice data sheet of
Corporal Tillman). For instructions on release date and time as well as
death notice data sheet, see id. Note that the release indicates the
statement ``[t]he incident is under investigation.'' Id. This
apparently was standard phraseology used on all announcements of
theater deaths at the time. See, e.g., Bush Transcript at Tr. 23-24;
Henderson Transcript at Tr. 24.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Four hours before the DoD release, in the course of
instructing subordinates to ensure media outlets corrected any
mischaracterization of Gross' remarks, McClellan outlined his
understanding of what had transpired that day:
Media affairs commented when asked for reaction from
Arizona press. They did not check to verify if it had
been confirmed.\80\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ E-mail from Scott McClellan, White House Press Secretary, to
Suzy DeFrancis, Deputy Assistant, White House Communications (Apr. 23,
2004; 19:10 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01122).
In an interview with the Committee, Gross acknowledged that he
did not confirm news accounts of Corporal Tillman's death
before drafting the proposed response. He explained that he
assumed, if confirmation was to be secured, it was the
responsibility of others.\81\ Bartlett, in his interview with
the Committee, said he assumed someone had done so.\82\
Although the Committee did not receive any White House
documents which reflect this, Gross also recalled ``verbal
conversations'' with staffers (although he could not remember
which) about the veracity of the broadcast reports, whether or
not Corporal Tillman's family had been informed, and the
desirability of a response from the Pentagon or White
House.\83\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Gross Transcript at Tr. 52-3, 64-67, 70, 93-96.
\82\ Bartlett Interview. In addition, McClellan said this was
something Gross' office ``could have done.'' McClellan Interview
(Committee staff notes).
\83\ Gross Transcript at Tr. 41-42, 44, 46-47.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
McClellan told the Committee that although Corporal
Tillman's death was certainly newsworthy, it did not
``dominate'' press office duties that day.\84\ Gross recalls no
after-action follow-up on the matter.\85\ Indeed, Gross told
the Committee that ``my knowledge of Pat Tillman's death, and
any information about Pat Tillman's death stopped'' on April
23.\86\ He declared ``I never once, to my recollection, again
took up the subject'' aside from ``maybe a friend or two e-
mailing me or contacting me over the phone. . . .'' \87\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ McClellan Interview.
\85\ Gross Transcript at Tr. 75.
\86\ Id. at Tr. 98.
\87\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Staffers also apparently did not attempt to discern the
basis of the mix-up surrounding Gross' remarks. This may be
because it was a Friday when the White House reacted to news of
Corporal Tillman's death. By the next business day (Monday,
April 26), concern about White House actions appear to have
dissipated and other events had come to preoccupy staffers.
It seems Buchan did not take note of the official Pentagon
release until returning to work after being off for the
weekend. On April 26 at 11:36 am she e-mailed McCormack, ``i
see the army is finally confirming it.'' \88\ Although she had
known since the afternoon of April 23 that the White House
response had preceded the Defense Department's announcement,
she seems not to have monitored the situation later that day in
order to determine how long in advance Gross' remarks had
circulated.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ E-mail from Claire Buchan, Deputy White House Press Secretary,
to Sean I. McCormack, Spokesman, National Security Council (Apr 26,
2004; 11:36 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01105).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
B. CORRESPONDENTS DINNER SPEECH
On May 1, eight days after the announcement that Corporal
Tillman had been killed, the President gave remarks at the
annual White House Correspondents Dinner. In this short speech,
the President spoke of wartime journalists (including those
killed in action) and World War II veterans. He also said:
The loss of Army Corporal Pat Tillman last week in
Afghanistan brought home the sorrow that comes with
every loss, and reminds us of the character of the men
and women who serve on our behalf. Friends say that
this young man saw the images of September the 11th,
and seeing that evil, he felt called to defend America.
He set aside a career in athletics and many things the
world counts important: wealth and security and the
acclaim of the crowds. He chose, instead, the rigors of
Ranger training and the fellowship of soldiers and the
hard duty in Afghanistan and Iraq. Corporal Tillman
asked for no special attention. He was modest because
he knew there were many like him, making their own
sacrifices.\89\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ E-mail from Robert Pratt, White House staff, to various (May
3, 2004; 13:01 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-00613) (forwarding E-mail from
Margaret Suntum, White House staff, to various (May 3, 2004; 12:54
EDT), including Official Remarks by the President at the White House
Correspondents Dinner, May 1, 2004).
In an April 27, 2004 e-mail to Gerson from research
assistant, Lee Bockhorn, Bockhorn conveyed three news clippings
about Corporal Tillman to the speechwriter, with the note,
``[y]ou asked for the `most moving' stuff on Corporal Tillman,
particularly anything he said. . . .'' \90\ Bockhorn noted
``pretty remarkable'' comments by Corporal Tillman on September
12, 2001, about the affect of the previous day's terrorist
attacks on his professional aspirations.\91\ ``At times like
this,'' one clip quoted Corporal Tillman as saying, compared to
other relatives who had served in the military, he believed he
hadn't ``done a damn thing as far as laying myself on the line
like that.'' \92\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ E-mail from Lee Bockhorn, Research Assistant, White House, to
Michael J. Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 27, 2004;
13:49 EDT (bates no. HOGR004-01137).
\91\ Id.
\92\ Id. (citing, Richard Lacayo, One For The Team, Time Mag. (May
3, 2004) (quoting Corporal Pat Tillman)). See also, Currin Transcript
at Tr. 9, 47-48.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
As the speech was being finalized, a draft was provided to
John Currin, the White House speechwriting ``fact-checker'' for
review.\93\ On the morning of April 28, Currin e-mailed Hedy
Henderson, a counterpart at the Defense Department.\94\ He
wrote
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ For description of fact checker responsibilities and process,
see Currin Transcript at Tr. 6-7, 12.
\94\ For Henderson's role, see Currin Transcript at Tr. 15, 23;
Henderson Transcript at Tr. 22-23, 31. For understanding of the routine
nature of contact, see Henderson Transcript at Tr. 29, 46-49.
I hope you can help us confirm some information. We are
putting in the President's remarks at the
correspondent's [sic] dinner a few lines about Pat
Tillman. We need to get confirmed his rank and that he
did tours of duty in both Afghanistan and Iraq.\95\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting
factchecker, to Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Department of Defense (Apr. 29, 2004; 13:50 EDT) (bates no. 14005)
(forwarding E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting
factchecker, to Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Department of Defense (Apr. 28, 204; 11:45 EDT).
Henderson responded by forwarding the April 23, 2004 Defense
Department press release announcing the death and commented
``I'm still checking the Afghanistan/Iraq part.'' \96\
----------------------------------------------------------------------- \96\ Id. (forwarding E-mail from Hedy Henderson, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, to John Currin, White
House speechwriting factchecker (Apr. 28, 2004; 11:59 EDT). Henderson
told Committee staff that she recalled these were the only points
Currin raised with her during this call, not Corporal Tillman's
enlistment motivations. Henderson said she had ``vague'' recollections
that it was ``very possible'' this topic came up. Henderson Transcript
at Tr. 27-28, 34-40, 44-45. Currin had the same recollection. Currin
Transcript at Tr. 75-76.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Between 12:40 pm and 2:03 pm on April 27, 2004, Currin and
Henderson then exchanged five e-mails about the nations in
which Corporal Tillman served and the proper way to refer to
his rank. When Currin was told that Corporal Tillman was a
Specialist, he replied (referencing those who crafted the
speech), ``The writers pulled from a news article that put his
rank as sergeant;'' as if by explanation, Henderson responded
only with the Internet link to an Army Special Operations
Command statement about Corporal Tillman's death (which noted
he ``received a posthumous lateral appointment April 26 from
the rank of specialist to corporal'') and the name and
telephone number of Carol Darby, the Special Operations
Command's civilian public affairs officer at Fort Lewis,
Washington.\97\ Currin apparently then called Darby to discuss
these matters further.\98\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ E-mail from Hedy Henderson, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, to John Currin, White House
speechwriting factchecker (Apr. 28, 2004; 14:03 EDT) (citing U.S. Army
Special Operations Command News Service, Press Release 040423-01: Army
Ranger killed in Afghanistan, Apr. 23, 2004) (forwarding E-mail from
John Currin, White House speechwriting factchecker to Hedy Henderson,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (Apr.
28, 2004; 13:46 EDT). See also Henderson Transcript at Tr. 28, 38, 42-
43. For the routine origins of the release, see Darby Transcript at Tr.
28-31. Henderson also apparently talked with Darby before referring
Currin to her. Id.
\98\ Currin Transcript at Tr. 29-31.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Henderson told the Committee ``probably sometime in late
May'' 2004 she learned ``[f]rom the news'' that Corporal
Tillman was possibly a victim of fratricide.\99\ Before then
she did not know an investigation was underway nor had she
heard any suggestion that speeches with which she was involved
``should avoid going into detail about how Corporal Tillman
died.'' \100\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ Henderson Transcript at Tr. 21.
\100\ Id. at Tr. 21-22, 29.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Darby similarly testified that she had no knowledge of
fratricide or an investigation until weeks after her
communication with Currin; this was consistent with an
affidavit she had executed in February 2005.\101\ Lastly,
Currin told the committee that neither Henderson nor Darby
apprised him that friendly fire was suspected in Corporal
Tillman's death or an inquiry was ongoing, and no speech draft
he saw referenced in any way the circumstances in which the
soldier died.\102\ Indeed, he did not learn of the fratricide
finding until after the Army released the information publicly
on May 29.\103\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ Sworn Statement by Carol Darby, Public Affairs Officer, U.S.
Army (Feb. 22, 2005) (available in DoD IG Report (unnumbered
appendix)).
\102\ Currin Transcript at Tr. 35, 71.
\103\ Id. at Tr. 72.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In describing her contact with the fact-checker, Darby told
the Committee Currin also asked ``if I could tell him why Pat
Tillman joined the Army. . . .'' \104\ She recounted her
response:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\104\ Darby Transcript at Tr. 39.
I told him no, that I could not, that I had never
talked to either of the [Tillman] brothers and I had
never seen anything in print of any sort that stated
why they joined the Army. But I had seen press reports
where Pat's coach had spoke [sic] of something along
those lines, but [the reports] didn't really give
exactly why Pat joined the Army.\105\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Id.
In response to a request from Currin, Darby faxed him copies of
the articles she had at hand.\106\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Currin apparently reviewed this material, and then queried
Matthew Scully, one of Gerson's deputies:
What is your source for the statement that Corporal
Tillman seeing on September 11 the burning towers on
television, felt called to fight that evil. Going back
to press accounts at the time, Corporal Tillman refused
to give his reasons, and kept it to himself.\107\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact
checker, to Matthew Scully, Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28,
2004; 14:09 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01093). Throughout the time the
Tillman brothers were stationed at Fort Lewis, Darby was responsible
for conveying various media requests to them. She told the Committee
she thought they declined interview requests because ``they wanted to
do what they had joined to do without the interruptions of media query
and media involvement;'' in describing to the Committee her encounter
with Currin, Darby denied the suggestion that she knew Tillman refused
to reveal the reason he joined the Army. Rather, she stated she did not
know his motivation. Darby Transcript at Tr. 22, 41-42.
Scully replied (possibly referencing the packet of news clips
that had been provided by Bockhorn) ``[s]hould be in news
accounts.'' \108\ Currin told the Committee he never saw the e-
mail from Bockhorn or its attachments.\109\ This may be why, in
reply to Gerson, Currin (while also noting Corporal Tillman
``ha[d] been posthumously promoted to Corporal'') responded:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact
checker, to Matthew Scully, Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28,
2004; 14:25 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-010904) (forwarding E-mail from
Matthew Scully Deputy Speechwriter, White House, to John Currin, White
House speechwriting fact checker (Apr. 28, 14:11 EDT).
\109\ Currin Transcript at Tr. 51, 53.
My DoD contact, who checked with the Rangers, confirm
[sic] that he never gave any media interview [sic] or
discussed the reasons why he left the NFL to join the
Rangers. [. . .] But given that he never spoke to the
press about his reasons for joining the Rangers, we
simply do not have support for the statement that he
decided to join the Rangers after seeing the burning
towers on television.\110\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact
checker, to Matthew Scully, Deputy Speechwriter, White House (Apr. 28,
2004; 14:25 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-010904).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
About one and a half hours later, Currin wrote again:
There is no direct support for the statement that Pat
Tillman saw the burning towers on television and felt
called to fight the evil behind it. Tillman and his
brother never discussed their reasons with the press,
nor have their parents. Tillman kept his reasons to
himself. The people at Fort Lewis, the base for
Tillman's unit, could not confirm that September 11 was
the reason why Tillman joined the Army. All that I and
Carol Darby at USASOC (Ft. Lewis) could find is mention
in a news article from March 2003 that says that
``friends say the brothers were deeply affected by the
September 11 terrorist attacks and felt compelled to
enlist.'' We do not know if these friends were
speculating about Tillman's reasons or if they had
direct knowledge of Tillman's reasons. The bottom line
is that Tillman never stated publicly his reasons for
joining the Rangers, and it is speculation that he did
so because of September 11.\111\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact
checker, to Matthew Scully, Deputy Speechwriter, White House, Michael
Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House, and others (Apr. 28, 2004;
15:53 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01095).
The next afternoon, it seems that Darby called Currin to
discuss the matter further. The fact-checker summarized this
conversation in an e-mail to Gerson, Scully, and a third
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
speechwriter:
As I mentioned yesterday, Pat Tillman and his family
never spoke about the reasons why he chose to leave the
NFL and join the Army, and the statement in the remarks
for the correspondence dinner attributing his
motivation to seeing the burning towers on 9/11 is
speculation. I spoke yesterday with Carol Darby at Ft.
Lewis (the base for the Rangers) to check on Tillman's
correct rank and see if she could verify Tillman's
reasons for joining the Rangers. Carol phoned me just
now to ask if we wanted to go through the CACO assigned
to the Tillman family and see if they would want to
talk to us about Corporal Tillman's reasons for joining
the Army. I am not certain if we would want to approach
the family in their time of grief (they will receive
Corporal Tillman's remains today), or if you can work
around the problem of not knowing as fact the reasons
that motivated Tillman to join the Army. Let me know if
you want me to go through the Tillman family CACO to
see if the family will let us know his reasons. My
sense, however, is that because Tillman wanted to keep
his reasons private, and because his family continues
to respect his wish to this day, we should as well, and
work as best we can around the speculation.\112\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact
checker, to Matthew Scully, Deputy Speechwriter, White House, Michael
Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House, and others (Apr. 29, 2004,
13:47 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01096) (``CACO'' which is mentioned in
this e-mail is an abbreviation for Casualty Assistant Calls Officer, an
individual assigned by the Army to provide advice and counseling to
next of kin on the military's procedures and protocols in the case of
active duty deaths.). Currin told Committee staff that he routinely
submitted written remarks and sometimes other back-up material to the
White House staff secretary about the items he fact-checked. Thus, it
is possible that at least one other White House official (other than
those known to be the e-mail recipients) were apprised of the substance
of Currin's conversations with Darby. Currin Transcript at Tr. 12-14,
42-44, 64-65, 74-75.
In a subsequent exchange of e-mails, Gerson referred Currin to
a ``new draft'' of the speech which the writer believed
addressed the fact-checker's concerns. Currin responded by
saying, ``I gather you have worked around the issue?'' \113\ to
which Gerson responded: ``I think so.'' \114\ Currin seemed to
concur. When he reviewed the later version, he did not object
to any discussion of Corporal Tillman's enlistment, but rather
to the fact that the soldier's rank was incorrectly noted as
``corporal.'' In the next nine minutes, he sent or received
five e-mails on the subject, to ensure that this detail was
properly revised.\115\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ E-mail from John Currin, White House speechwriting fact
checker, to Michael J. Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White House (Apr.
29, 2004; 14:01 EDT) (bates HOGR004-01086).
\114\ E-mail from Michael J. Gerson, Chief Speechwriter, White
House, to John Currin, White House speechwriting fact checker (Apr. 29,
2004; 14:02 EDT) (Committee staff notes from in camera review).
\115\ See E-mails to/from John Currin, White House speechwriting
fact checker (Committee staff notes from in camera review). See also
Currin Transcript at Tr. 55-56.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Currin agreed when the Committee asked him if his
preoccupation with Corporal Tillman's rank indicated
``satisfaction'' with the way the speech draft addressed
enlistment motivations. However, he also said it was ``perhaps
not 100 percent'' in compliance with his suggestions.\116\ In
addition, when asked if it was accurate to say that in his
``research and fact-checking'' he learned that the Tillman
brothers considered their ``reasons for joining the military as
something they didn't want to talk about in public,'' he
replied ``that is probably fair.'' \117\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Id. at Tr. 35-37, 55, 63, 67-68.
\117\ Currin Transcript at Tr. 57, 70.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Contemporary media accounts of Corporal Tillman's time in
the Army are replete with reports of acquaintances commenting
upon the circumstances of the Ranger's enlistment. In addition
to the two cited by Bockhorn, one 2002 article said, ``[s]ome
close to him suspect that the Sept. 11 attacks had an influence
on his decision.'' \118\ A month earlier, a Kansas newspaper
reported, ``[a]lthough Tillman had been considering joining the
military before Sept. 11, friends say the terrorist attacks
stoked his patriotic embers.'' \119\ Another story explained,
``Several of Tillman's confidants say the Sept 11 terrorist
attacks influenced'' him.\120\ In July 2002, the Des Moines
Register described Corporal Tillman's reason for joining the
military: ``It's a personal decision, he told friends, who
think it has something to do with what happened to this country
last Sept. 11.'' \121\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ Nick Wishart, Tillman Declines to Discuss his Enlistment in
Army, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jul. 14, 2002, D5 (noting ``[Tillman] is
not talking to the media . . . He wants to be left alone to pursue his
most recent goal, leaving the rest of us to speculate on his
motivations.'')
\119\ Mark Emmons, Tillman Takes His Won Path from NFL to Army;
Friends and Family of Arizona's Pat Tillman Aren't Surprised He's
Giving Up NFL Lifestyle to Become an Army Ranger, Wichita Eagle, Jun.
4, 2002, 1D.
\120\ Troy Johnson, NFL No Match for Tillman's New Challenge;
Former Cardinal Defensive Back to Begin Army's Ranger Training,
Charleston Gazette, Jul. 12, 2002, 5B.
\121\ Carlson John, Decision to Serve, Rather than Be Served,
Admirable, Des Moines Register, Jul. 10, 2002, 1B.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The exchange between Currin and Darby on April 27 and April
28 likely spurred Army Maj. Gen. Stanley McChrystal to send his
Personal For (or ``P4'') message to Gen. Abizaid on April 29,
although this connection cannot be precisely established. The
DoD IG testified before the Committee that the P4 ``stopped
with the three generals that were on it.'' \122\ The
Committee's inquiry supports this conclusion. No other
individual, including Secretary Rumsfeld, Gen. Myers, Lt. Gen.
Lovelace and DiRita, testified to having had knowledge of the
P4 or its contents.\123\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Hearing on Misleading Information from the Battlefield before
the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, 110th Cong. (Apr.
24, 2007) [hereinafter Tillman Hearing I] (prepared statement by Thomas
Gimble, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense).
\123\ See Tillman Hearing II at Tr. 28, 63, 93 (statements by Gen.
Richard Myers); Id. at Tr. 16 (statements by Donald Rumsfeld); Id. at
Tr. 75 (statement by Donald Rumsfeld, regarding having never received
any P4 message); Lovelace Transcript at Tr. 28-29; Di Rita Transcript
at Tr. 55.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
C. OTHER ACTIVITIES
The White House intergovernmental affairs office apparently
responded to a request from the San Jose Mayor to assist in
arranging for Corporal Tillman's widow to fly to California
with her late husband's remains.\124\ On the other hand, it is
difficult to determine if the White House contemplated
involvement in Corporal Tillman's memorial service. On May 6,
Brook Holladay, an apparently junior-level employee reported to
another staffer about receiving a telephone call from ``Stu
Hadley'' who was involved with planning a memorial service for
Corporal Tillman at the University of Arizona. Holladay said
Hadley reported ``someone from the White House called and
offered a message for the event to be read;'' Holladay lamented
that Hanley did not ``have the name of the person who called.''
\125\ After an exchange of e-mails, Holladay reported on what
appears to be a second call with Hadley, stating he ``COULD NOT
HAVE BEEN MORE UNDERSTANDING OR NICER about this whole
situation! All's good.'' \126\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ E-mail from Jim Cunneen, President and CEO, San Jose Silicon
Valley Chamber of Commerce, to Ruben Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs
Office, White House (Apr. 30, 2004; 11:37 EDT) (bates nos. HOGR004-
00379-00381) (forwarding E-mail from Jim Cunneen, President and CEO,
San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce, to Ruben Barrales,
Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 29, 2004; 02:00 EDT);
E-mail from Jeananne Fair, White House staff, to Ruben Barrales,
Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House (Apr. 27, 2004; 17:34 EDT)
(bates no., HOGR004-01111); E-mail from Pat Dando, Mayor, City of San
Jose, to Ruben Barrales, Intergovernment Affairs Office, White House
(Apr. 28, 2004; 17:26 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-00135).
\125\ E-mail from Brook Holladay, White House staff, to Brooke
Chambers, White House staff (May 7, 2004; 14:15 EDT) (bates no.
HOGR004-01113-01114) (forwarding E-mail from Brook Holladay, White
House staff, to Brooke Chambers, White House staff (May 6, 2004; 15:08
EDT)).
\126\ Id. (Emphasis in original.)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the situation appeared to be satisfactorily
resolved, the e-mail exchange continued between eleven more
staffers. One volunteered ``this issue probably rises to a
Karl-level,'' presumably a reference to Presidential aide Karl
Rove.\127\ This brought the reply, ``[t]hey are checking with
them.'' \128\ This suggests that either a White House staffer
or the Arizona contact was getting in touch with ``Karl.'' The
Committee found no further evidence that the White House
contemplated or actually sent a message about Corporal Tillman
to the University of Arizona or that Rove was involved. Of
course, even if it was determined that Rove contemplated
proffering some sort of official statement to be read at a
University of Arizona event, this does not indicate that he was
aware of the likelihood that Corporal Tillman had been killed
by friendly fire.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ E-mail from Brooke Manning, White House staff, to David Holt,
White House staff (May 6, 2004; 15:51 EDT) (bates no. HOGR004-01117-
01119) (forwarding E-mail from Brooke Holt, White House staff, to David
Holt, White House staff (May 6, 2004; 15:39 EDT)).
\128\ Id.
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D. KNOWLEDGE OF FRATRICIDE
No White House staffer interviewed by the Committee said
they knew that fratricide was suspected until the Army's
announcement on the subject.\129\ The Committee did not obtain
any information to the contrary. It also found no evidence
which suggested that other White House staffers or the
President had foreknowledge of the friendly fire suspicions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ See Gross Transcript at Tr. 101-2; Currin Transcript at Tr.
72; Bartlett Interview; McClellan Interview; Gerson Interview.
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When the Pentagon released the fratricide findings, White
House press and speechwriting officials considered it a Defense
Department matter about which a comment or explanation from the
Presidential staff was unnecessary.\130\ The media apparently
shared this view. There is no record of any question about
Corporal Tillman being posed in a White House press conference
immediately after the release by the Army of the findings of
the friendly fire investigation; this was confirmed by White
House officials.\131\
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\130\ McClellan Interview.
\131\ See Gross Transcript at Tr. 107-108, 117-118; Bartlett
Interview; McClellan Interview. In addition, Committee staff performed
an article search and a search of White House press gaggles and did not
find any instance of White House officials being quoted or asked,
respectively, about Corporal Tillman immediately after to the
announcement of the finding of friendly fire.
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IV. OTHER CASES
A. JESSICA LYNCH
The April 3, 2003, front page Washington Post article which
attributed special heroism to Private Jessica Lynch was based
on information provided by unnamed ``U.S. officials.'' \132\
The Washington Post article was widely circulated and formed
the basis of additional stories in other publications in the
following days. Many other media outlets apparently sought to
substantiate claims about Private Lynch's actions at the time
she was captured. As then-U.S. Navy Captain Frank Thorp, a
CENTCOM public affairs official, recounted to Committee staff,
``I remember specifically everyone and their brother and sister
trying to chase that story and being unable to.'' \133\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ Susan Schmidt and Vernon Loeb, `She Was Fighting to the
Death,' Details Emerging of W.Va. Soldier's Capture and Rescue, Wash.
Post, Apr. 3. 2003, p. A1.
\133\ Thorp Transcript at Tr. 79.
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Some charge that now-Rear Admiral Thorp or other
administration or Pentagon officials intentionally misinformed
the Washington Post as part of an effort to make Private Lynch
appear to be particularly heroic and thus buttress support for
the Iraq War. It is also possible the flawed Washington Post
article resulted from prosaic circumstances. The story may have
been based upon innocent confusion about details conveyed
amidst the war. Alternatively, some have argued that the
problematic Washington Post article may have been advanced by
proponents of an expanded role for women in the military
namely, by demonstrating that Private Lynch had behaved
valiantly in combat, efforts to allow other females into front-
line units would have presumably been aided. A cursory
examination of some of the articles subsequently written based
upon the initial Washington Post article lends support to this
suggestion.\134\
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\134\ In the week following the Post story, editorials and articles
appeared, relating Lynch's heroics to the prospect of women being given
combat roles. See Joan Lowy, Heroics of female POW raise combat debate,
Scripps Howard News Service, Apr. 3, 2003; Pfc. Jessica Lynch shows
again that women can handle combat; she kept firing at attackers until
ammunition ran out, official says, Detroit News, Apr. 4, 2003, p. 8A;
Women are proving they're just as tough as the men; The arguments for
keeping women out of combat are quickly losing credibility, Portland
(ME) Press Herald, Apr. 5, 2003, 9A; Lynch quells gender debate, Boston
Herald, Apr. 6, 2003, 26; Jessica's Lesson, Rochester Democrat and
Chronicle, Apr. 7, 2003, 8A; Frank Ritter, Lynch settles the question
of women in combat, Tennessean, Apr. 9, 2003, 13A; Martha Ackmann, A
woman's place is on the battlefield, too, Record (Bergen County, NJ),
Apr. 10, 2003, L11.
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The Committee's investigation of the identity and
motivation of the Washington Post's source for the article was
limited to posing a handful of questions to two witnesses: Rear
Admiral Thorp and Jim Wilkinson, a CENTCOM official charged
with strategic communications during the April 2003 time
period. Neither stated any knowledge of the background of the
leak.\135\ The Committee obtained no further information on
this topic.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\135\ Thorp Transcript at Tr. 68-79; Wilkinson Transcript at Tr.
43-76.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Significantly, the Post journalists and their editors,
according to a 2003 account in the American Journalism Review,
reject the suggestion they were intentionally mislead by
Pentagon officals; \136\ they instead trace the difficulties to
flawed data from the battlefield. This possibility seemed
buttressed in 2004 when it was suggested that erroneous
translations of Iraqi radio transmissions about the convoy
ambush may have led some to believe Private Lynch undertook
actions actually performed by another soldier.\137\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ Steve Ritea, Jessica Lynch's Story: A Little Too Perfect?,
American Journalism Review (Aug./Sep. 2003).
\137\ Andrew Kramer, Family Learns Iraqis Executed Soldier Captured
at Same Time as Lynch, Wash. Post, May 29, 2004, A15.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
After Private Lynch's rescue, an Army 15-6 investigation
was conducted to learn more about the actions of her unit on
the day it was attacked.\138\ In the month after the Washington
Post article, another news account reported that ``two Pentagon
officials in interviews cast doubt on the Washington Post's
report. The officials said all evidence suggests that [Private]
Lynch's truck crashed in the chaos of the ambush . . ..'' \139\
The article attributed to these same ``officials'' the view
that Private Lynch ``suffered several bone fractures and was in
no position to put up a fight.'' \140\ Indeed, an Army
spokesman, who described the inquiry as ``extremely complex,''
stipulated it would answer the query ``[w]hen the ambush hit,
did the vehicle wreck or did she fight?'' \141\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ Rowan Scarborough, Army to probe Lynch Capture, Wash. Times,
May 23, 2003, A01.
\139\ Id.
\140\ Id.
\141\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
On June 17, 2003, the Washington Post reported that Private
Lynch did not engage the enemy, was not wounded by gunshots,
and was rescued without significant resistance.\142\ According
to press reports, the 15-6 investigation results, officially
released the following month, said much the same.\143\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ Dana Priest, William Booth and Susan Schmidt, A Broken Body,
a Broken Story, Pieced Together; Investigation Reveals Lynch--Still in
Hospital After 67 Days--Suffered Bone-crushing Injuries in Crash During
Ambush, Wash. Post, June 17, 2003, A01 [hereinafter Jun. 17, 2003 Post
Follow-up].
\143\ Dana Priest, M-16s Jammed During Ambush in Iraq, Wash. Post,
Jul. 10, 2003, A14.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 5, 2003, three days after Private Lynch's rescue,
Air Force Maj. Gen. Victor Renuart, in the course of a CENTCOM
briefing, told assembled reporters he would ``spend a minute or
two talking about the rescue of Private Lynch,'' and declared
``you'll forgive me for referring to notes a little bit more,
but the facts of this are important . . .'' \144\
Significantly, when describing the operation, Gen. Renuart made
no assertions about Private Lynch's response when her unit was
attacked.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ Transcript of CENTCOM Operational Update Briefing by Maj.
Gen. Victor Renuart, Federal News Service, Apr. 5, 2003.
[A]s you know, on or about 23rd of March [Private
Lynch's] 507th maintenance company was ambushed in the
vicinity of An Nasiriyah. A number of members of that
maintenance company were killed, a number captured and
a number were unaccounted for, [Private Lynch] being
one of them.\145\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ Id.
Gen. Renuart explained further that the military's special
forces subsequently ``got an indication'' that an injured
American POW was being ``held in . . . the Saddam Hospital, in
An Nasiriyah.'' \146\ As a result, he said, highly trained
elite Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine units were ordered to
``very rapidly get into the area of the hospital to determine
the location of Private Lynch and then to bring her out, and at
the same time, exploit some areas of the hospital where we had
reports of enemy headquarters, command and control facilities
and the like.'' \147\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ Id.
\147\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In the assault, one group of Marines was charged with
creating a diversionary attack to allow a main rescue group to
approach the hospital unimpeded. Gen. Renuart explained that
this second element ``persuaded a local physician to lead them
to Private Lynch's location.'' \148\ The General also said some
military personnel on the rescue team discovered a ``weapons
cache'' in the hospital and a three-dimensional map of the
town. Gen. Renuart said this ``terrain model'' included red and
blue markers which ``depicted with relative accuracy the
general position of U.S. forces and also enemy forces in the
town.'' \149\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ Id.
\149\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Lynch's rescue was, as later recounted by CENTCOM public
affairs official, Lt. Colonel John Robinson, ``an awesome
story.'' \150\ However, notwithstanding Robinson's declaration
and Gen. Renuart's explanation, some questioned the conduct of
the rescue operation. Six weeks after Private Lynch's rescue,
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) aired a documentary
segment entitled ``War Spin'' on its Correspondent television
program. About the rescue, the documentary concluded: ``her
story is one of the most stunning pieces of news management
ever conceived.'' \151\ The program asserted ``the US military
knew there were no Iraqi forces guarding the hospital, and
quoted a local doctor saying the troops used blank rounds to
`make a show' of the operation.'' \152\ ``War Spin'' also
questioned whether Private Lynch ``had been slapped about on
her hospital bed and interrogated'' before troops came to her
aid.\153\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Jun. 17, 2003 Post Follow-up.
\151\ John Kampfner, Saving Private Lynch Story `Flawed', BBC News
(online), May 15, 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
programmes/correspondent/3028585.stm [last visited Jul. 14, 2008].
\152\ Id.
\153\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
A Pentagon spokesman termed these assessments ``void of all
facts and absolutely ridiculous.'' \154\ However, three Members
of Congress asked the Defense Department Inspector General to
undertake an inquiry to determine the veracity of the BBC's
assertions. Writing about the charges in ``War Spin,'' one
wrote, ``[I]f these allegations prove true the US military put
Private Lynch's life in greater risk in order to produce a
made-for-TV event to boost public support for this war,'' and
noted, ``if true, this is hardly a fitting way to treat Private
Lynch in light of her bravery and courage.'' \155\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ Id.
\155\ Letter from Pete Stark, Member of Congress, to Joseph E.
Schmitz, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense (Jun. 2, 2003)
(on file with Committee staff).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
None of the accusations made by the BBC, however, appears
to be accurate. A DoD IG inquiry was undertaken in response to
the request from the Members. In September 2003, the DoD IG
reported that, under its oversight, the CENTCOM Inspector
General had completed an investigation which included
``extensive evidence not available to the media.'' \156\
Investigators ``concluded that the allegations were not
substantiated'' and ``no further investigation was warranted.''
\157\ The operation to locate and repatriate Private Lynch
``constituted a valid mission to recover a U.S. POW under
combat conditions,'' the IG found.\158\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Letter from Joseph E. Schmitz, Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Defense, to Rahm Emmanuel, Member of Congress (Sep. 2,
2003) (see Attachment: Executive Summary) (on file with Committee
Staff).
\157\ Id.
\158\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the inquiry found ``[t]he level of force used
by [the U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF)] to perform the
mission was consistent with the anticipated resistance and
established doctrine.'' \159\ The video tape collected during
the mission (and shown later to reporters) ``was filmed by a
combat cameraman and a member of USSOF in accordance with
standard procedures'' and the IG determined ``no public affairs
personnel were involved in the planning or filming of the
operation.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, the IG reported:
USSOF conducted a personnel recovery mission, during
wartime, in a nonpermissive environment, to rescue a
U.S. POW from a hostile enemy location. During the
mission USSOF received enemy fire from the hospital
building, the surrounding complex, and nearby areas.
They successfully engaged the enemy forces they
encountered, neutralizing them without sustaining any
casualties of their own.\160\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ Id.
The IG also conveyed an assessment of the possibility mission
participants were ``acting for the camera;'' there was no
evidence of this, investigators reported.\161\ Indeed, ``all
USSOF members,'' the IG stated, ``were offended by such an
accusation.'' \162\ These results were conveyed to the
Committee by the DoD IG at the Committee's first hearing into
this matter.\163\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ Id.
\162\ Id.
\163\ Tillman Hearing I (prepared statement by Thomas Gimble,
Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Defense).
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B. SCOTT THOMAS BEAUCHAMP
While an Army private stationed in Iraq in 2007, Scott
Thomas Beauchamp ``blogged'' for The New Republic under a
pseudonym. His postings recounted acts he had allegedly
witnessed or participated in during his time in theater. These
included U.S. soldiers mocking a disfigured woman, making
playthings of the bones of dead children, and intentionally
running over stray dogs. To some, these episodes illustrated
the morally debasing effects of the Iraqi conflict on U.S.
service personnel. When others disagreed and expressed doubt
about the events reported, Beauchamp responded ``[m]y pieces
were always intended to provide my discrete view of the war;
they were never intended as a reflection of the entire U.S.
Military.'' \164\ He also revealed his actual identity. ``I was
initially reluctant to take the time out of my already insane
schedule fighting an actual war in order to play some role in
an ideological battle that I never wanted to join,'' and ``That
being said, my character, my experiences, and those of my
comrades in arms have been called into question, and I believe
it is important to stand by my writing under my real name.''
\165\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ Scott Thomas Beauchamp, Blog: The Plank, New Republic
(online), Jul. 26, 2007.
\165\ Id.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 2, 2007, however, The New Republic editors
disclosed that their initial inquiry into Beauchamp's veracity
had found a ``significant'' discrepancy in one story: some
witnesses recalled seeing a mutilated woman fitting the
description provided by Beauchamp in Kuwait, not Iraq.\166\
This is important because if Beauchamp and others had
encountered her and behaved inappropriately towards her there,
it could not been because of the rigors of combat. This is
because Beauchamp's unit was in Kuwait before it entered the
fight. But, only five days later, the Army announced the
results of an inquiry into the claims in Beauchamp's blog: not
only was the boorish behavior towards the injured disproved,
but all ``the allegations made by PVT Beauchamp were found to
be false,'' according to Multilateral Division-Baghdad
spokesman Major Steven F. Lamb.\167\ Major Lamb explained that
Beauchamp's ``platoon and company were interviewed and no one
could substantiate his claims.'' \168\ In December 2007, in
light of inconsistencies coming to light, The New Republic's
editor published an explanation of their position declaring,
``[W]e cannot stand by these stories.'' \169\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Editors, A statement on Scott Thomas Beauchamp, New Republic
(online), Aug. 2, 2007.
\167\ Marcus Baram, Pentagon: Baghdad Diarist Writes Fiction, ABC
News, Aug. 7, 2007. See also Howard Kurt, Army Concludes Baghdad
Diarist Accounts Untrue, Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 2007.
\168\ Id.
\169\ Franklin Foer, Fog of War: The story of our Baghdad Diarist,
New Republic (online), Dec. 10, 2007.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The next month, twenty-seven sworn statements from soldiers
were provided to a New York media outlet as a result of a
Freedom of Information Act request.\170\ These sworn statements
buttress the reported conclusions of the Army's investigation:
no interviewee admitted to having any information which
supported any of Beauchamp's alleged observations. In addition,
in one sworn statement by Beauchamp's squad leader indicates
that Beauchamp did not consult with him before making blog
posts in violation of ``operational security'' regulations
governing soldiers on the battlefield.\171\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ The New Republic's Soldier's Tale, RADAR [magazine] (online),
available at http://www.radaronline.com/exclusives/2008/01/scott-
beauchamp-new-republic-documents-foia.php [last visited Jul 14, 2008]
[hereinafter RADAR article].
\171\ Sworn affidavit by E-6/Squad Leader [name withheld by
Committee staff] (Jul. 28, 2007; 18:21) (reported in RADAR article).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not clear how an Army private was able to repeatedly
and intentionally disseminate misinformation from the
battlefield to a major publication, especially when doing so
violated security provisions and slandered his fellow troops.